{"id":"court_2cir_25-2726_dkt_46","court":"2Cir","case_no":"","doc_number":null,"sub_number":null,"doc_type":"DOC","filed_date":null,"title":"2Cir ECF 25-2726_dkt_46","summary_zh":"政府答辩状——美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok(郭文贵)案,第二巡回上诉法院 25-2726 号(与 Chunk Chyi 的26-077、Tony 的26-361、Carolyn Sun 的26-441 并案)ECF #46,2026年4月24日提交。南区联邦检察官办公室助理检察官 Micah F. Fergenson 提交宣誓书,反对 Ranyue Bai、Chunk Chyi、Tony、Carolyn Sun 四名请愿人提出的'暂缓郭文贵量刑'紧急动议。文件回顾郭文贵2024年7月16日被裁定九项罪名成立(另三项无罪)、量刑已由2026年4月27日改期至2026年6月29日(2026年4月23日 Dkt. 837),并说明地区法院2025年4月针对涉逾6亿美元没收资金的第三方提交及 Chyi 等'近乎每日'来信所设的过滤/警告令背景,主张 Bai 的 mandamus 请愿已被驳回、其余请愿人诉求亦无胜诉可能。","summary_en":"Government Opposition — United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo), 2d Cir. No. 25-2726 (consolidated with Chunk Chyi's No. 26-077, Tony's No. 26-361, and Carolyn Sun's No. 26-441), ECF/DktEntry #46, filed April 24, 2026. AUSA Micah F. Fergenson filed an affirmation opposing the emergency motions by petitioners Ranyue Bai, Chunk Chyi, Tony, and Carolyn Sun to stay Miles Guo's sentencing pending their mandamus petitions. It recounts Guo's July 16, 2024 conviction on nine counts (acquittal on three), the sentencing's rescheduling from April 27 to June 29, 2026 (Dkt. 837, April 23, 2026), and the district court's April 2025 orders restricting nonparty filings — including Chyi's 'near-daily' letters — concerning over $600 million in seized forfeiture proceeds, arguing Bai's mandamus has already been denied and the other petitioners' claims lack merit.","body_en":"UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\nFOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT\n\n- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x\n\nIn Re: Ranyue Bai,\n\nPetitioner.\n\nDocket No. 25-2726\n\n- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x\n\nIn Re: Chunk Chyi,\n\nPetitioner.\n\nDocket No. 26-077\n\n- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x\n\nIn Re: Tony,\n\nPetitioner.\n\nDocket No. 26-361\n\n- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x\n\nIn Re: Carolyn Sun,\n\nPetitioner.\n\nDocket No. 26-441\n\n- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x\n\nAFFIRMATION IN OPPOSITION TO MOTIONS FOR STAY\nPENDING MANDAMUS PETITIONS\n\nSTATE OF NEW YORK\n\n)\nCOUNTY OF NEW YORK\n\n:\nss.:\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK )\n\nMICAH F. FERGENSON, pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section\n1746, hereby affirms under penalty of perjury:\nCase: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 1 of 18\n\n---\n\n2\n\n1.\nI am an Assistant United States Attorney in the Office of Sean Buckley,\nAttorney for the United States, acting under authority conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 515,\nand I represent the United States in this case. I respectfully submit this affirmation\nin opposition to the emergency motions (the “Motions”) filed by petitioners Ranyue\nBai, Chunk Chyi, Tony, and Carolyn Sun (the “Petitioners”), to stay the sentencing\nof criminal defendant Miles Guo, pending adjudication of their mandamus petitions.\nSTATEMENT OF FACTS\nA. The Criminal Case Against Miles Guo\n2.\nOn March 6, 2023, a grand jury returned sealed indictment 23 Cr. 118\n(AT) charging Guo and Kin Ming Je, a/k/a “William Je,” with various fraud and\nmoney laundering counts. (Dkt. 2).1  On March 15, 2023, Guo was arrested and has\nbeen detained since his arrest. The Government filed several superseding\nindictments after Guo’s arrest, adding charges as to Guo and charging co-defendant\nYanping “Yvette” Wang. (See Dkt. 19; Dkt. 215). On April 24, 2024, the\nGovernment filed superseding indictment S3 23 Cr. 118 (AT) (the “Indictment”),\ncharging Guo, Je, and Wang with racketeering conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C.\n§ 1962(d) (Count One); conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud, in violation\nof 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (Count Two); conspiracy to commit money laundering, in\n\n1 “Dkt.” refers to a docket entry on the District Court’s docket for the criminal\ncase. Unless otherwise noted, case quotations omit all internal quotation marks,\ncitations, and previous alterations.\nCase: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 2 of 18\n\n---\n\n3\n\nviolation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (Count Three); conspiracy to commit securities\nfraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count Four); wire fraud, in violation of 18\nU.S.C. § 1343, in connection with the GTV Private Placement (Count Five), Farm\nLoan Program (Count Seven), G|CLUBS (Count Nine), and the Himalaya Exchange\n(Count Eleven); and securities fraud, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and 78ff, in\nconnection with the GTV Private Placement (Count Six), Farm Loan Program\n(Count Eight), and G|CLUBS (Count Ten), and unlawful monetary transactions, in\nviolation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (Count Twelve). (Dkt. 307). Guo proceeded to trial on\nthe S3 Indictment.2\n3.\nGuo’s roughly eight-week trial began on May 22, 2024. The\nGovernment called 34 witnesses, and the defense called nine witnesses. Guo elected\nnot to testify. On July 16, 2024, the jury returned a verdict finding Guo guilty on\nCounts One, Two, Three, Four, Seven, Eight, Nine, Ten, and Eleven of the\nIndictment, and finding him not guilty on Counts Five, Six, and Twelve. (Dkt. 395).\n4.\nGuo’s sentencing was originally scheduled for November 19, 2024.\nGuo has requested, and has been granted, numerous adjournments of his sentencing\nhearing. Guo’s sentencing is scheduled to proceed on June 29, 2026, nearly two\n\n2 Wang pled guilty prior to trial. The third defendant, Je, remains at large.\nCase: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 3 of 18\n\n---\n\n4\n\nyears after his conviction at trial, before the Honorable Analisa Torres, United States\nDistrict Judge.3\nB. Nonparty Submissions in the District Court\n5.\nNumerous nonparties have filed submissions on the docket in Guo’s\ncriminal case.  Many of these submissions relate to the nonparty’s interest in over\n$600 million of proceeds that have been seized by the Government as fraud proceeds\nand funds involved in money laundering, while certain pro se submissions have\nconcerned other matters.  (See, e.g., Dkt. 529-595 (66 nonparty filings docketed on\nApril 3-4, 2025).\n6.\nOver a year ago, on April 3, 2025, the District Court issued an order\nregarding “certain nonparty filings and email correspondence the Court has received\nin connection with” Guo’s criminal case. (Dkt. 528 at 1). The District Court\nexplained that nonparties did not have standing to submit any filing other than “a\nthird-party petition under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)” or “a motion under the Crime Victims’\nRights Act (‘CVRA’), which applies only to persons ‘directly and proximately\nharmed’ by a defendant’s commission of a federal offense.” (Dkt. 528 at 1 (quoting\n18 U.S.C. § 3771(e)(2)(A))). The District Court noted that nonparties had\nimproperly submitted filings, including Chunk Chyi, who had “filed near-daily\n\n3 When Petitioners filed their stay motions, sentencing was scheduled for\nApril 27, 2026. On April 23, 2026, Judge Torres adjourned sentencing to June 29,\n2026. (Dkt. 837).\nCase: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 4 of 18\n\n---\n\n5\n\nletters on the docket for the last two weeks.” (Dkt. 528 at 2). The District Court\nwarned Chyi that further filings “in violation of this Order or applicable Court rules\nmay be construed as frivolous, vexatious, or harassing, and may subject the filer to\na permanent filing injunction.” (Dkt. 528 at 2).\n7.\nOn April 4, 2025, the District Court issued another order related to\nimproper nonparty filings. (Dkt. 596).  The District Court noted that Chyi and\nanother had continued to violate the Court’s order from the day prior, and found that\nChyi was a vexatious nonparty who was abusing “the public’s right of access to the\nCourt in clear violation of Court orders.” (Dkt. 596). Accordingly, the District Court\nordered that any further filings by Chyi “be screened and docketed only if the Court\ndetermines that the filing is made in accordance with applicable court rules, in good\nfaith, and with a proper basis under the law.”  (Dkt. 596). Additionally, in the same\norder, the Court also denied nonparty Carolyn Sun’s motions for the reasons stated\nin the April 3, 2025 order.  (Dkt. 596).\nC. The Mandamus Petitions and the Emergency Motions to Stay\n8.\nThe Petitioners have filed mandamus petitions in this Court and more\nrecently filed emergency motions to stay Guo’s sentencing, i.e., the Motions.  This\nCourt has ordered that the mandamus petitions filed by Petitioners Chunk Chyi,\nTony, and Carolyn Sun, among others, be heard in tandem. (See, e.g., No. 26-77,\nDkt. 29 (ordering that Nos. 26-77, 26-361, 26-441, among others, be heard in\nCase: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 5 of 18\n\n---\n\n6\n\ntandem)). The mandamus petition filed by the remaining Petitioner, Ranyue Bai, has\nalready been denied. The mandamus petitions and the Motions are described in\nfurther detail below.\n9.\nIn Re: Ranyue Bai (25-2726): Petitioner Ranyue Bai filed a mandamus\npetition in this Court on October 28, 2025.  (No. 25-2726, Dkt. 5).  Bai complained\nthat the District Court did not permit him to continue to file pro se submissions on\nthe criminal case’s docket.  As to the undocketed filings, Bai sought to claim that\nthe Government and Guo’s bankruptcy trustee “acted in coordination to commit\nfraud upon the court.” (No. 25-2726, Dkt. 5 at 4; id., Exs. A-B).  Bai asserted that\nhis filings not being docketed on the criminal case’s docket violated his rights under\nthe Crime Victims’ Rights Act (“CVRA”).\n10.\nOn November 26, 2025, this Court denied Bai’s petition “because\nPetitioner has not demonstrated that his right to the writ is clear and indisputable,\nand that granting the writ is appropriate under the circumstances.” (No. 25-2727,\nDkt. 19).  This Court further stated that “[i]n view of the large number of submissions\nreceived by the district court, which we trust the court will address expeditiously,\nPetitioner’s mandamus petition as to docketing his submissions is denied without\nprejudice to renewal if the district court fails to docket the submissions within a\nreasonable time.”  Bai then sought leave to file a supplemental mandamus petition,\nCase: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 6 of 18\n\n---\n\n7\n\nwhich this Court also denied.  (No. 25-2726, Dkt. 30).  The mandate issued on\nJanuary 21, 2026. (No. 25-2726, Dkt. 30).\n11.\nBai nevertheless has continued to submit numerous filings to this Court.\n(No. 25-2727, Dkt. 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43). Among these filings\nis Bai’s emergency motion to stay Guo’s sentencing, filed on April 20, 2026 (No.\n25-2726, Dkt. 43). In his emergency motion, Bai argues that his mandamus\npetition—which has already been denied—will succeed on the merits because his\ndistrict court motions have not yet been filed on the District Court docket. (No. 25-\n2726, Dkt. 43 at 4). Bai asserts that his motion raises his objections to sentencing\nand forfeiture. (No. 25-2726, Dkt. 43 at 4).\n12.\nIn Re: Chunk Chyi (26-77): Petitioner Chunk Chyi filed a mandamus\npetition in this Court on January 13, 2026. (No. 26-77, Dkt. 1). On April 18, 2026,\nChyi filed an emergency motion to stay Guo’s sentencing. (No. 26-77, Dkt. 12).\nChyi contends that a stay is needed for the proper “calculation of loss, restitution,\nand guideline enhancements.” (No. 26-77, Dkt. 12 at 1). Chyi states that he disputes\nor has concerns about the number or identity of victims referenced in Guo’s and the\nGovernment’s sentencing submissions. (No. 26-77, Dkt. 12 at 2-6). Chyi also\ncomplains that his filings are subject to screening prior to docketing on the criminal\ncase’s docket.\nCase: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 7 of 18\n\n---\n\n8\n\n13.\nIn Re: Tony (26-361): Petitioner Tony filed a mandamus petition in\nthis Court on February 17, 2026. (See No. 26-361, Dkt. 7). On April 18, 2026, Tony\nfiled an emergency motion to stay Guo’s sentencing. (No. 26-361, Dkt. 18). Tony\nappears to contend that a stay is required because of his concerns about the record\nin the district court regarding the applicable loss amount calculation under the U.S.\nSentencing Guidelines. (No. 26-361, Dkt. 18 at 2-5).\n14.\nIn Re: Carolyn Sun (26-441): Petitioner Carolyn Sun filed a\nmandamus petition in this Court on February 26, 2026. On April 20, 2026, Sun filed\nan emergency motion to stay Guo’s sentencing. (No. 26-441, Dkt. 23). Sun appears\nto principally complain that filings she has emailed to the pro se intake unit’s email\naddress have not been docketed on Guo’s criminal case’s docket. (No. 26-441, Dkt.\n23). Sun seeks a stay so that her filings can be included in the record, including for\nany “forfeiture-related processes.” (No. 26-441, Dkt. 23 at 9).\nARGUMENT\nTHE MOTIONS TO STAY SHOULD BE DENIED\n15.\nThe Motions should all be denied. As nonparties to the criminal case\nagainst Guo, the Petitioners generally lack standing to stay an individual criminal\ndefendant’s sentencing, and similarly lack standing to contest matters such as the\napplicable Sentencing Guidelines calculation. Under the CVRA, to the extent that\nthe Petitioners are victims of Guo’s crimes, they are entitled to reasonably be heard\nCase: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 8 of 18\n\n---\n\n9\n\nat the sentencing hearing—a right that can be exercised only if the sentencing in fact\nproceeds. They are also entitled to move in the district court to vindicate their rights\nunder the CVRA, but that does not extend to the right to make unlimited court filings\nthat are not related to one of the rights articulated in the CVRA. To the extent the\nPetitioners’ concerns relate to forfeiture, those concerns are not ripe, as no final order\nof forfeiture will issue at Guo’s sentencing, and instead the claims and interests of\nthird parties to any specific property for which the Government will seek a final\norder of forfeiture will be resolved through the ancillary proceeding that follows\nGuo’s sentencing, during which the Petitioners and any other parties asserting an\ninterest in forfeited property will have the opportunity to be heard in the District\nCourt.\nA. Applicable Law\n16.\n“A stay is not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury might\notherwise result.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433 (2009). “It is instead an\nexercise of judicial discretion, and the propriety of its issue is dependent upon the\ncircumstances of the particular case.” Id. “The party requesting a stay bears the\nburden of showing that the circumstances justify an exercise of that discretion.” Id.\nat 433-34.\n17.\nThis Court considers four factors in deciding whether to grant a stay of\nan order pending appeal:\nCase: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 9 of 18\n\n---\n\n10\n\n(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing\nthat he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the\napplicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay;\n(3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the\nother parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the\npublic interest lies.\n\nUnited States v. Grote, 961 F.3d 105, 122-23 (2d Cir. 2020). The first two factors\nare the “most critical.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 434.\n18.\nWith respect to the first factor, “[i]t is not enough that the chance of\nsuccess on the merits be better than negligible.” Id. Here, the Petitioners face a high\nhurdle, because they must show a likelihood of obtaining a writ of mandamus, which\nis a remedy that is warranted “only in exceptional circumstances amounting to a\njudicial usurpation of power or a clear abuse of discretion,” and thus is to be used\n“sparingly.” In re United States, 945 F.3d 616, 622-23 (2d Cir. 2019).\n19.\nAs to the second factor, “simply showing some possibility of\nirreparable injury fails to satisfy” it. Nken, 556 U.S. at 434-35. The third and fourth\n“factors merge when the Government is the opposing party.” Id. at 435. “The degree\nto which a factor must be present varies with the strength of the others; more of one\nfactor excuses less of the other.” S.E.C. v. Daspin, 557 F. App’x 46, 48 (2d Cir.\n2014).\n20.\nThis Court reviews the denial of a stay for abuse of discretion. Grote,\n961 F.3d at 123.\nCase: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 10 of 18\n\n---\n\n11\n\nB. Discussion\n1. The Petitions Are Unlikely to Succeed on the Merits\n21.\nThe Petitioners have failed to show that they are likely to demonstrate\nthe exceptional circumstances that would support mandamus. Their request for an\nemergency stay, as a nonparty to a criminal case, of an individual criminal\ndefendant’s long-scheduled sentencing following conviction at trial, and while that\ndefendant remains detained in pretrial detention, is baseless.\n22.\nAs an initial matter, to the extent the Petitioners seek to contest issues\nrelated to the calculation of the loss amount under the Sentencing Guidelines, or to\nquestion the credibility of trial witnesses, they have no standing to do so as a\nnonparty to the criminal case. For example, the stay motion filed by Tony does not\nmake any CVRA-related claims, but instead challenges the loss methodology being\nused to calculate the Sentencing Guidelines range for Guo. (No. 26-361, Dkt. 18).\nThird parties do not have the right to make such challenges.\n23.\nTo the extent the Petitions are seeking to assert rights as victims under\nthe CVRA, their claims lack merit.  First, the rights under the CVRA apply only if\nthe Petitioners are persons “directly and proximately harmed as a result of” Guo’s\ncriminal conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e). While the Petitioners purport to be asserting\nrights under the CVRA, their Petitions largely involve attacks on the Government’s\nmethodology for identifying victim losses, and none of the Petitions asserts any\nCase: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 11 of 18\n\n---\n\n12\n\nparticular loss as a result of Guo’s crime. Thus, it is unclear whether the Petitioners\nactually claim to have been harmed as a result of Guo’s crimes, or whether they\ninstead seek to challenge and prolong Guo’s prosecution as continued supporters of\nGuo. (See Dkt. 528 (Judge Torres noting that “Chunk Chyi has repeatedly disclaimed\nvictim status”)); No. 26-441, Dkt. 1 at 14 (Carolyn Sun: “Any prior reference to the\nCVRA was procedural in nature only and did not reflect an assertion or concession\nof crime-victim status.”).\n24.\nSecond, and in any event, the only provision of the CVRA that\npetitioners apparently invoke, aside from conclusory assertions, is “[t]he right to be\nreasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving . . .\nsentencing.” 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4). That right, however, can only be exercised if\nthe sentencing proceeding, in fact, occurs and is not stayed or further delayed. And\nby its own terms, § 3771(a)(4) does not authorize a victim to make any filings on the\ndocket, but instead allows crime victims the right to be reasonably heard in court at\ncertain public proceedings. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4).\n25.\nTo the extent that the Petitioners claim a right under the CVRA to file\nsubmissions on a criminal case’s docket as a nonparty regarding any and all issues\nthat have some relation to the criminal case, the Petitioners are mistaken.  The CVRA\nprovides no such right, and Petitioners identify no cases where a court has\nrecognized such a right.  After all, any such right of carte blanche docketing to any\nCase: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 12 of 18\n\n---\n\n13\n\nnonparty, including pro se individuals, would be particularly impractical where, as\nhere, there are thousands of potential victims in a single criminal case. The CVRA\ndoes authorize victims to file motions to vindicate the rights set forth in 18 U.S.C. §\n3771(a). See United States v. Sullivan, 118 F.4th 170, 230 (2d Cir. 2024); 18 U.S.C.\n§ 3771(c). But such filings must be tailored to one of the rights set forth in the\nCVRA, and not a generalized attempt to intervene in Guidelines disputes and other\nsentencing disputes between the Government and the defendant, as the Petitioners\nhere seek to do. Moreover, the CVRA expressly recognizes that “[i]n a case where\nthe court finds that the number of crime victims makes it impracticable to accord all\nof the crime victims the rights described in subsection (a), the court shall fashion a\nreasonable procedure to give effect to this chapter that does not unduly complicate\nor prolong the proceedings.” 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(2). Such reasonable procedures\nhave been followed in the District Court, and the Petitioners offer no reason to\nbelieve that Guo’s actual sentencing proceeding would be any different. Among\nother things, in keeping with common practice in cases involving numerous victims,\nthe Government (and Guo) have received, and transmitted to the Distrct Court,\nvoluminous sets of victim impact statements for the District Court’s consideration\nin advance of, and at, Guo’s sentencing. (Dkt. 832).\n26.\nOne of the Petitioners, Chunk Chyi, is subject to the District Court’s\nApril 5, 2025 order enjoining Chyi from making further filings in the District Court\nCase: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 13 of 18\n\n---\n\n14\n\nunless the District Court “determines that the filing is made in accordance with\napplicable court rules, in good faith, and with a proper basis under the law.” (Dkt.\n596). Chyi argues that this order violates Moates v. Barkley, 147 F.3d 207, 208 (2d\nCir. 1998), which held that a district court “may not impose a filing injunction on a\nlitigant sua sponte without providing the litigant with notice and an opportunity to\nbe heard.” But Chyi overlooks that the District Court did provide notice before\nissuing the injunction. Specifically, Judge Torres first issued an order noting that\nChyi’s numerous filings were “improper” and “could be construed as threatening or\nharassing to the Government and the victims of Defendants’ crimes.” (Dkt. 528).\nAccordingly, Judge Torres warned Chyi that any further such filings “may be\nconstrued as frivolous, vexatious, or harassing, and may subject the filer to a\npermanent filing injunction.” (Id.). It was only after Chyi disregarded that warning\nby making multiple additional frivolous filings that Judge Torres issued the order\nthat Chyi now challenges. Thus, the record reveals that Judge Torres fully complied\nwith Moates and did not enjoin Chyi’s filings until after providing notice and an\nopportunity for Chyi to respond. Certainly, there is no basis to find that the District\nCourt’s reasonable response amounts to the level of “exceptional circumstances\namounting to a judicial usurpation of power or a clear abuse of discretion,” that\nwould be needed to entitle Chyi to mandamus relief. In re United States, 945 F.3d\n616, 622-23 (2d Cir. 2019).\nCase: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 14 of 18\n\n---\n\n15\n\n27.\nThe Petitions also raise complaints about the forfeiture proceedings, but\nthose claims are meritless or unripe. To the extent the Petitioners seek to contest\nissues related to any forfeiture order entered against Guo, they have no standing to\ndo so. And to the extent the Petitioners seek to assert their ownership interest in\nspecific property for which the Government seeks a final order of forfeiture, they\nmay do so in the ancillary proceeding that will take place after Guo’s sentencing. 21\nU.S.C. § 853(n). Similarly, to the extent the Petitioners seek to make a claim for\nremission of forfeited property, pursuant to 28 C.F.R. Part 9, such claims can be\nsubmitted to the Attorney General, but will only be addressed after (i) Guo is\nsentenced, (ii) any third-party claims have been adjudicated in the ancillary, and (iii)\na final order of forfeiture has been entered.  See, e.g., United States v. Romeo, 136\nF.4th 372, 381 (2d Cir. 2025). Thus, a stay would only delay the Petitioners—and\nany other claimants—in asserting any such claims regarding forfeiture.\n2. The Petitioners Will Not Be Irreparably Injured Absent a Stay\n28.\nThe Petitioners also fail to show irreparable injury. The Petitioners are\nnot parties to Guo’s criminal case. The sentence imposed on Guo will not cause the\nPetitioners any injury, irreparable or otherwise. As noted above, to the extent the\nPetitioners seek to exercise rights under the CVRA to be reasonably heard, they may\nseek to do so at Gou’s public sentencing proceeding—but that can only occur if\nGuo’s sentencing actually happens. To the extent the Petitioners seek to claim\nCase: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 15 of 18\n\n---\n\n16\n\nownership in specific property that is being forfeited pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n),\nthose claims will be addressed after Guo’s sentencing in the ancillary proceeding.\nAnd to the extent the Petitioners instead, or alternatively, seek to make a claim for\nremission of forfeited property, such claims will likewise be addressed after Guo’s\nsentencing.\n3. A Stay Is Against the Public Interest\n31.\nA stay of Guo’s sentencing, requested by nonparties who are not\nthemselves being sentenced, would in no way serve the public interest. The\nPetitioners have no legal right or authority to contest Sentencing Guidelines\ndeterminations or to file whatever they choose on the criminal case’s docket, while\ntheir potential interests in forfeited funds can only be realized after Guo’s\nsentencing. A stay would thus prejudice the Petitioners’ potential interests in\nforfeited funds. The same is true for the multitude of victims of Guo’s crimes who\nhave not sought to stay his sentencing, some of whom submitted victim impact\nstatements or other correspondence opposing the many adjournments of Guo’s\nsentencing to date. (E.g., Dkt. 809 at 3-4). The record demonstrates that any delay\nin sentencing based on this handful of last-minute collateral petitions would harm\nthe interests of many victims of Guo’s crimes, who have already waited years for\nthis sentencing to occur. It bears emphasis that Guo was convicted by a jury nearly\ntwo years ago of orchestrating a massive, years-long, multi-faceted, international\nCase: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 16 of 18\n\n---\n\n17\n\nracketeering enterprise. Victims of Guo’s crimes have a “right to proceedings,”\nincluding Guo’s sentencing, “free from unreasonable delay.” 18 U.S.C. §\n3771(a)(7); see also United States v. Bert, 814 F.3d 70, 83 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Certainly,\nthe public is the loser when a criminal trial is not prosecuted expeditiously, as\nsuggested by the aphorism, justice delayed is justice denied.”). This Court should\nnot grant the extraordinary remedy of mandamus, much less the extraordinary\nremedy of staying the sentencing of a criminal defendant convicted at trial of\norchestrating a billion-dollar fraud.\nCONCLUSION\n\n32.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ motions should be denied.\nDated:\nNew York, New York\n\nApril 24, 2026\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\nSEAN BUCKLEY\n\nAttorney for the United States\n\nActing Under Authority Conferred by\n28 U.S.C. § 515\n\nBy:\n  /s/ Micah F. Fergenson\n\nMicah F. Fergenson\n\nAssistant United States Attorney\n\n(212) 637-2190\n\nCase: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 17 of 18\n\n---\n\n18\n\nCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE\n\nPursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(g), the undersigned\ncounsel hereby certifies that this opposition complies with the type-volume\nlimitation of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. As measured by the word\nprocessing system used to prepare this opposition, there are 4,118 words in this\nopposition.\n\nSEAN BUCKLEY\n\nAttorney for the United States\n\nActing Under Authority Conferred by\n28 U.S.C. § 515\n\nBy:\n\n/s/\n\nMICAH F. FERGENSON\n\nAssistant United States Attorney\n\n(212) 637-2190\n\nCase: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 18 of 18","body_zh":null,"key_entities":[],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":4312,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-07-07 13:44:16"}