{"id":"court_2cir_25-2726_dkt_46","court":"2Cir","case_no":"","doc_number":null,"sub_number":null,"doc_type":"DOC","filed_date":null,"title":"2Cir ECF 25-2726_dkt_46","summary_zh":"政府答辩状——美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok(郭文贵)案,第二巡回上诉法院 25-2726 号(与 Chunk Chyi 的26-077、Tony 的26-361、Carolyn Sun 的26-441 并案)ECF #46,2026年4月24日提交。南区联邦检察官办公室助理检察官 Micah F. Fergenson 提交宣誓书,反对 Ranyue Bai、Chunk Chyi、Tony、Carolyn Sun 四名请愿人提出的'暂缓郭文贵量刑'紧急动议。文件回顾郭文贵2024年7月16日被裁定九项罪名成立(另三项无罪)、量刑已由2026年4月27日改期至2026年6月29日(2026年4月23日 Dkt. 837),并说明地区法院2025年4月针对涉逾6亿美元没收资金的第三方提交及 Chyi 等'近乎每日'来信所设的过滤/警告令背景,主张 Bai 的 mandamus 请愿已被驳回、其余请愿人诉求亦无胜诉可能。","summary_en":"Government Opposition — United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo), 2d Cir. No. 25-2726 (consolidated with Chunk Chyi's No. 26-077, Tony's No. 26-361, and Carolyn Sun's No. 26-441), ECF/DktEntry #46, filed April 24, 2026. AUSA Micah F. Fergenson filed an affirmation opposing the emergency motions by petitioners Ranyue Bai, Chunk Chyi, Tony, and Carolyn Sun to stay Miles Guo's sentencing pending their mandamus petitions. It recounts Guo's July 16, 2024 conviction on nine counts (acquittal on three), the sentencing's rescheduling from April 27 to June 29, 2026 (Dkt. 837, April 23, 2026), and the district court's April 2025 orders restricting nonparty filings — including Chyi's 'near-daily' letters — concerning over $600 million in seized forfeiture proceeds, arguing Bai's mandamus has already been denied and the other petitioners' claims lack merit.","body_en":"UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\nFOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT\n\n- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x\n\nIn Re: Ranyue Bai,\n\nPetitioner.\n\nDocket No. 25-2726\n\n- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x\n\nIn Re: Chunk Chyi,\n\nPetitioner.\n\nDocket No. 26-077\n\n- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x\n\nIn Re: Tony,\n\nPetitioner.\n\nDocket No. 26-361\n\n- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x\n\nIn Re: Carolyn Sun,\n\nPetitioner.\n\nDocket No. 26-441\n\n- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x\n\nAFFIRMATION IN OPPOSITION TO MOTIONS FOR STAY\nPENDING MANDAMUS PETITIONS\n\nSTATE OF NEW YORK\n\n)\nCOUNTY OF NEW YORK\n\n:\nss.:\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK )\n\nMICAH F. FERGENSON, pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section\n1746, hereby affirms under penalty of perjury:\nCase: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 1 of 18\n\n---\n\n2\n\n1.\nI am an Assistant United States Attorney in the Office of Sean Buckley,\nAttorney for the United States, acting under authority conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 515,\nand I represent the United States in this case. I respectfully submit this affirmation\nin opposition to the emergency motions (the “Motions”) filed by petitioners Ranyue\nBai, Chunk Chyi, Tony, and Carolyn Sun (the “Petitioners”), to stay the sentencing\nof criminal defendant Miles Guo, pending adjudication of their mandamus petitions.\nSTATEMENT OF FACTS\nA. The Criminal Case Against Miles Guo\n2.\nOn March 6, 2023, a grand jury returned sealed indictment 23 Cr. 118\n(AT) charging Guo and Kin Ming Je, a/k/a “William Je,” with various fraud and\nmoney laundering counts. (Dkt. 2).1  On March 15, 2023, Guo was arrested and has\nbeen detained since his arrest. The Government filed several superseding\nindictments after Guo’s arrest, adding charges as to Guo and charging co-defendant\nYanping “Yvette” Wang. (See Dkt. 19; Dkt. 215). On April 24, 2024, the\nGovernment filed superseding indictment S3 23 Cr. 118 (AT) (the “Indictment”),\ncharging Guo, Je, and Wang with racketeering conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C.\n§ 1962(d) (Count One); conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud, in violation\nof 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (Count Two); conspiracy to commit money laundering, in\n\n1 “Dkt.” refers to a docket entry on the District Court’s docket for the criminal\ncase. Unless otherwise noted, case quotations omit all internal quotation marks,\ncitations, and previous alterations.\nCase: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 2 of 18\n\n---\n\n3\n\nviolation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (Count Three); conspiracy to commit securities\nfraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count Four); wire fraud, in violation of 18\nU.S.C. § 1343, in connection with the GTV Private Placement (Count Five), Farm\nLoan Program (Count Seven), G|CLUBS (Count Nine), and the Himalaya Exchange\n(Count Eleven); and securities fraud, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and 78ff, in\nconnection with the GTV Private Placement (Count Six), Farm Loan Program\n(Count Eight), and G|CLUBS (Count Ten), and unlawful monetary transactions, in\nviolation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (Count Twelve). (Dkt. 307). Guo proceeded to trial on\nthe S3 Indictment.2\n3.\nGuo’s roughly eight-week trial began on May 22, 2024. The\nGovernment called 34 witnesses, and the defense called nine witnesses. Guo elected\nnot to testify. On July 16, 2024, the jury returned a verdict finding Guo guilty on\nCounts One, Two, Three, Four, Seven, Eight, Nine, Ten, and Eleven of the\nIndictment, and finding him not guilty on Counts Five, Six, and Twelve. (Dkt. 395).\n4.\nGuo’s sentencing was originally scheduled for November 19, 2024.\nGuo has requested, and has been granted, numerous adjournments of his sentencing\nhearing. Guo’s sentencing is scheduled to proceed on June 29, 2026, nearly two\n\n2 Wang pled guilty prior to trial. The third defendant, Je, remains at large.\nCase: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 3 of 18\n\n---\n\n4\n\nyears after his conviction at trial, before the Honorable Analisa Torres, United States\nDistrict Judge.3\nB. Nonparty Submissions in the District Court\n5.\nNumerous nonparties have filed submissions on the docket in Guo’s\ncriminal case.  Many of these submissions relate to the nonparty’s interest in over\n$600 million of proceeds that have been seized by the Government as fraud proceeds\nand funds involved in money laundering, while certain pro se submissions have\nconcerned other matters.  (See, e.g., Dkt. 529-595 (66 nonparty filings docketed on\nApril 3-4, 2025).\n6.\nOver a year ago, on April 3, 2025, the District Court issued an order\nregarding “certain nonparty filings and email correspondence the Court has received\nin connection with” Guo’s criminal case. (Dkt. 528 at 1). The District Court\nexplained that nonparties did not have standing to submit any filing other than “a\nthird-party petition under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)” or “a motion under the Crime Victims’\nRights Act (‘CVRA’), which applies only to persons ‘directly and proximately\nharmed’ by a defendant’s commission of a federal offense.” (Dkt. 528 at 1 (quoting\n18 U.S.C. § 3771(e)(2)(A))). The District Court noted that nonparties had\nimproperly submitted filings, including Chunk Chyi, who had “filed near-daily\n\n3 When Petitioners filed their stay motions, sentencing was scheduled for\nApril 27, 2026. On April 23, 2026, Judge Torres adjourned sentencing to June 29,\n2026. (Dkt. 837).\nCase: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 4 of 18\n\n---\n\n5\n\nletters on the docket for the last two weeks.” (Dkt. 528 at 2). The District Court\nwarned Chyi that further filings “in violation of this Order or applicable Court rules\nmay be construed as frivolous, vexatious, or harassing, and may subject the filer to\na permanent filing injunction.” (Dkt. 528 at 2).\n7.\nOn April 4, 2025, the District Court issued another order related to\nimproper nonparty filings. (Dkt. 596).  The District Court noted that Chyi and\nanother had continued to violate the Court’s order from the day prior, and found that\nChyi was a vexatious nonparty who was abusing “the public’s right of access to the\nCourt in clear violation of Court orders.” (Dkt. 596). Accordingly, the District Court\nordered that any further filings by Chyi “be screened and docketed only if the Court\ndetermines that the filing is made in accordance with applicable court rules, in good\nfaith, and with a proper basis under the law.”  (Dkt. 596). Additionally, in the same\norder, the Court also denied nonparty Carolyn Sun’s motions for the reasons stated\nin the April 3, 2025 order.  (Dkt. 596).\nC. The Mandamus Petitions and the Emergency Motions to Stay\n8.\nThe Petitioners have filed mandamus petitions in this Court and more\nrecently filed emergency motions to stay Guo’s sentencing, i.e., the Motions.  This\nCourt has ordered that the mandamus petitions filed by Petitioners Chunk Chyi,\nTony, and Carolyn Sun, among others, be heard in tandem. (See, e.g., No. 26-77,\nDkt. 29 (ordering that Nos. 26-77, 26-361, 26-441, among others, be heard in\nCase: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 5 of 18\n\n---\n\n6\n\ntandem)). The mandamus petition filed by the remaining Petitioner, Ranyue Bai, has\nalready been denied. The mandamus petitions and the Motions are described in\nfurther detail below.\n9.\nIn Re: Ranyue Bai (25-2726): Petitioner Ranyue Bai filed a mandamus\npetition in this Court on October 28, 2025.  (No. 25-2726, Dkt. 5).  Bai complained\nthat the District Court did not permit him to continue to file pro se submissions on\nthe criminal case’s docket.  As to the undocketed filings, Bai sought to claim that\nthe Government and Guo’s bankruptcy trustee “acted in coordination to commit\nfraud upon the court.” (No. 25-2726, Dkt. 5 at 4; id., Exs. A-B).  Bai asserted that\nhis filings not being docketed on the criminal case’s docket violated his rights under\nthe Crime Victims’ Rights Act (“CVRA”).\n10.\nOn November 26, 2025, this Court denied Bai’s petition “because\nPetitioner has not demonstrated that his right to the writ is clear and indisputable,\nand that granting the writ is appropriate under the circumstances.” (No. 25-2727,\nDkt. 19).  This Court further stated that “[i]n view of the large number of submissions\nreceived by the district court, which we trust the court will address expeditiously,\nPetitioner’s mandamus petition as to docketing his submissions is denied without\nprejudice to renewal if the district court fails to docket the submissions within a\nreasonable time.”  Bai then sought leave to file a supplemental mandamus petition,\nCase: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 6 of 18\n\n---\n\n7\n\nwhich this Court also denied.  (No. 25-2726, Dkt. 30).  The mandate issued on\nJanuary 21, 2026. (No. 25-2726, Dkt. 30).\n11.\nBai nevertheless has continued to submit numerous filings to this Court.\n(No. 25-2727, Dkt. 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43). Among these filings\nis Bai’s emergency motion to stay Guo’s sentencing, filed on April 20, 2026 (No.\n25-2726, Dkt. 43). In his emergency motion, Bai argues that his mandamus\npetition—which has already been denied—will succeed on the merits because his\ndistrict court motions have not yet been filed on the District Court docket. (No. 25-\n2726, Dkt. 43 at 4). Bai asserts that his motion raises his objections to sentencing\nand forfeiture. (No. 25-2726, Dkt. 43 at 4).\n12.\nIn Re: Chunk Chyi (26-77): Petitioner Chunk Chyi filed a mandamus\npetition in this Court on January 13, 2026. (No. 26-77, Dkt. 1). On April 18, 2026,\nChyi filed an emergency motion to stay Guo’s sentencing. (No. 26-77, Dkt. 12).\nChyi contends that a stay is needed for the proper “calculation of loss, restitution,\nand guideline enhancements.” (No. 26-77, Dkt. 12 at 1). Chyi states that he disputes\nor has concerns about the number or identity of victims referenced in Guo’s and the\nGovernment’s sentencing submissions. (No. 26-77, Dkt. 12 at 2-6). Chyi also\ncomplains that his filings are subject to screening prior to docketing on the criminal\ncase’s docket.\nCase: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 7 of 18\n\n---\n\n8\n\n13.\nIn Re: Tony (26-361): Petitioner Tony filed a mandamus petition in\nthis Court on February 17, 2026. (See No. 26-361, Dkt. 7). On April 18, 2026, Tony\nfiled an emergency motion to stay Guo’s sentencing. (No. 26-361, Dkt. 18). Tony\nappears to contend that a stay is required because of his concerns about the record\nin the district court regarding the applicable loss amount calculation under the U.S.\nSentencing Guidelines. (No. 26-361, Dkt. 18 at 2-5).\n14.\nIn Re: Carolyn Sun (26-441): Petitioner Carolyn Sun filed a\nmandamus petition in this Court on February 26, 2026. On April 20, 2026, Sun filed\nan emergency motion to stay Guo’s sentencing. (No. 26-441, Dkt. 23). Sun appears\nto principally complain that filings she has emailed to the pro se intake unit’s email\naddress have not been docketed on Guo’s criminal case’s docket. (No. 26-441, Dkt.\n23). Sun seeks a stay so that her filings can be included in the record, including for\nany “forfeiture-related processes.” (No. 26-441, Dkt. 23 at 9).\nARGUMENT\nTHE MOTIONS TO STAY SHOULD BE DENIED\n15.\nThe Motions should all be denied. As nonparties to the criminal case\nagainst Guo, the Petitioners generally lack standing to stay an individual criminal\ndefendant’s sentencing, and similarly lack standing to contest matters such as the\napplicable Sentencing Guidelines calculation. Under the CVRA, to the extent that\nthe Petitioners are victims of Guo’s crimes, they are entitled to reasonably be heard\nCase: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 8 of 18\n\n---\n\n9\n\nat the sentencing hearing—a right that can be exercised only if the sentencing in fact\nproceeds. They are also entitled to move in the district court to vindicate their rights\nunder the CVRA, but that does not extend to the right to make unlimited court filings\nthat are not related to one of the rights articulated in the CVRA. To the extent the\nPetitioners’ concerns relate to forfeiture, those concerns are not ripe, as no final order\nof forfeiture will issue at Guo’s sentencing, and instead the claims and interests of\nthird parties to any specific property for which the Government will seek a final\norder of forfeiture will be resolved through the ancillary proceeding that follows\nGuo’s sentencing, during which the Petitioners and any other parties asserting an\ninterest in forfeited property will have the opportunity to be heard in the District\nCourt.\nA. Applicable Law\n16.\n“A stay is not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury might\notherwise result.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433 (2009). “It is instead an\nexercise of judicial discretion, and the propriety of its issue is dependent upon the\ncircumstances of the particular case.” Id. “The party requesting a stay bears the\nburden of showing that the circumstances justify an exercise of that discretion.” Id.\nat 433-34.\n17.\nThis Court considers four factors in deciding whether to grant a stay of\nan order pending appeal:\nCase: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 9 of 18\n\n---\n\n10\n\n(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing\nthat he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the\napplicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay;\n(3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the\nother parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the\npublic interest lies.\n\nUnited States v. Grote, 961 F.3d 105, 122-23 (2d Cir. 2020). The first two factors\nare the “most critical.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 434.\n18.\nWith respect to the first factor, “[i]t is not enough that the chance of\nsuccess on the merits be better than negligible.” Id. Here, the Petitioners face a high\nhurdle, because they must show a likelihood of obtaining a writ of mandamus, which\nis a remedy that is warranted “only in exceptional circumstances amounting to a\njudicial usurpation of power or a clear abuse of discretion,” and thus is to be used\n“sparingly.” In re United States, 945 F.3d 616, 622-23 (2d Cir. 2019).\n19.\nAs to the second factor, “simply showing some possibility of\nirreparable injury fails to satisfy” it. Nken, 556 U.S. at 434-35. The third and fourth\n“factors merge when the Government is the opposing party.” Id. at 435. “The degree\nto which a factor must be present varies with the strength of the others; more of one\nfactor excuses less of the other.” S.E.C. v. Daspin, 557 F. App’x 46, 48 (2d Cir.\n2014).\n20.\nThis Court reviews the denial of a stay for abuse of discretion. Grote,\n961 F.3d at 123.\nCase: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 10 of 18\n\n---\n\n11\n\nB. Discussion\n1. The Petitions Are Unlikely to Succeed on the Merits\n21.\nThe Petitioners have failed to show that they are likely to demonstrate\nthe exceptional circumstances that would support mandamus. Their request for an\nemergency stay, as a nonparty to a criminal case, of an individual criminal\ndefendant’s long-scheduled sentencing following conviction at trial, and while that\ndefendant remains detained in pretrial detention, is baseless.\n22.\nAs an initial matter, to the extent the Petitioners seek to contest issues\nrelated to the calculation of the loss amount under the Sentencing Guidelines, or to\nquestion the credibility of trial witnesses, they have no standing to do so as a\nnonparty to the criminal case. For example, the stay motion filed by Tony does not\nmake any CVRA-related claims, but instead challenges the loss methodology being\nused to calculate the Sentencing Guidelines range for Guo. (No. 26-361, Dkt. 18).\nThird parties do not have the right to make such challenges.\n23.\nTo the extent the Petitions are seeking to assert rights as victims under\nthe CVRA, their claims lack merit.  First, the rights under the CVRA apply only if\nthe Petitioners are persons “directly and proximately harmed as a result of” Guo’s\ncriminal conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e). While the Petitioners purport to be asserting\nrights under the CVRA, their Petitions largely involve attacks on the Government’s\nmethodology for identifying victim losses, and none of the Petitions asserts any\nCase: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 11 of 18\n\n---\n\n12\n\nparticular loss as a result of Guo’s crime. Thus, it is unclear whether the Petitioners\nactually claim to have been harmed as a result of Guo’s crimes, or whether they\ninstead seek to challenge and prolong Guo’s prosecution as continued supporters of\nGuo. (See Dkt. 528 (Judge Torres noting that “Chunk Chyi has repeatedly disclaimed\nvictim status”)); No. 26-441, Dkt. 1 at 14 (Carolyn Sun: “Any prior reference to the\nCVRA was procedural in nature only and did not reflect an assertion or concession\nof crime-victim status.”).\n24.\nSecond, and in any event, the only provision of the CVRA that\npetitioners apparently invoke, aside from conclusory assertions, is “[t]he right to be\nreasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving . . .\nsentencing.” 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4). That right, however, can only be exercised if\nthe sentencing proceeding, in fact, occurs and is not stayed or further delayed. And\nby its own terms, § 3771(a)(4) does not authorize a victim to make any filings on the\ndocket, but instead allows crime victims the right to be reasonably heard in court at\ncertain public proceedings. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4).\n25.\nTo the extent that the Petitioners claim a right under the CVRA to file\nsubmissions on a criminal case’s docket as a nonparty regarding any and all issues\nthat have some relation to the criminal case, the Petitioners are mistaken.  The CVRA\nprovides no such right, and Petitioners identify no cases where a court has\nrecognized such a right.  After all, any such right of carte blanche docketing to any\nCase: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 12 of 18\n\n---\n\n13\n\nnonparty, including pro se individuals, would be particularly impractical where, as\nhere, there are thousands of potential victims in a single criminal case. The CVRA\ndoes authorize victims to file motions to vindicate the rights set forth in 18 U.S.C. §\n3771(a). See United States v. Sullivan, 118 F.4th 170, 230 (2d Cir. 2024); 18 U.S.C.\n§ 3771(c). But such filings must be tailored to one of the rights set forth in the\nCVRA, and not a generalized attempt to intervene in Guidelines disputes and other\nsentencing disputes between the Government and the defendant, as the Petitioners\nhere seek to do. Moreover, the CVRA expressly recognizes that “[i]n a case where\nthe court finds that the number of crime victims makes it impracticable to accord all\nof the crime victims the rights described in subsection (a), the court shall fashion a\nreasonable procedure to give effect to this chapter that does not unduly complicate\nor prolong the proceedings.” 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(2). Such reasonable procedures\nhave been followed in the District Court, and the Petitioners offer no reason to\nbelieve that Guo’s actual sentencing proceeding would be any different. Among\nother things, in keeping with common practice in cases involving numerous victims,\nthe Government (and Guo) have received, and transmitted to the Distrct Court,\nvoluminous sets of victim impact statements for the District Court’s consideration\nin advance of, and at, Guo’s sentencing. (Dkt. 832).\n26.\nOne of the Petitioners, Chunk Chyi, is subject to the District Court’s\nApril 5, 2025 order enjoining Chyi from making further filings in the District Court\nCase: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 13 of 18\n\n---\n\n14\n\nunless the District Court “determines that the filing is made in accordance with\napplicable court rules, in good faith, and with a proper basis under the law.” (Dkt.\n596). Chyi argues that this order violates Moates v. Barkley, 147 F.3d 207, 208 (2d\nCir. 1998), which held that a district court “may not impose a filing injunction on a\nlitigant sua sponte without providing the litigant with notice and an opportunity to\nbe heard.” But Chyi overlooks that the District Court did provide notice before\nissuing the injunction. Specifically, Judge Torres first issued an order noting that\nChyi’s numerous filings were “improper” and “could be construed as threatening or\nharassing to the Government and the victims of Defendants’ crimes.” (Dkt. 528).\nAccordingly, Judge Torres warned Chyi that any further such filings “may be\nconstrued as frivolous, vexatious, or harassing, and may subject the filer to a\npermanent filing injunction.” (Id.). It was only after Chyi disregarded that warning\nby making multiple additional frivolous filings that Judge Torres issued the order\nthat Chyi now challenges. Thus, the record reveals that Judge Torres fully complied\nwith Moates and did not enjoin Chyi’s filings until after providing notice and an\nopportunity for Chyi to respond. Certainly, there is no basis to find that the District\nCourt’s reasonable response amounts to the level of “exceptional circumstances\namounting to a judicial usurpation of power or a clear abuse of discretion,” that\nwould be needed to entitle Chyi to mandamus relief. In re United States, 945 F.3d\n616, 622-23 (2d Cir. 2019).\nCase: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 14 of 18\n\n---\n\n15\n\n27.\nThe Petitions also raise complaints about the forfeiture proceedings, but\nthose claims are meritless or unripe. To the extent the Petitioners seek to contest\nissues related to any forfeiture order entered against Guo, they have no standing to\ndo so. And to the extent the Petitioners seek to assert their ownership interest in\nspecific property for which the Government seeks a final order of forfeiture, they\nmay do so in the ancillary proceeding that will take place after Guo’s sentencing. 21\nU.S.C. § 853(n). Similarly, to the extent the Petitioners seek to make a claim for\nremission of forfeited property, pursuant to 28 C.F.R. Part 9, such claims can be\nsubmitted to the Attorney General, but will only be addressed after (i) Guo is\nsentenced, (ii) any third-party claims have been adjudicated in the ancillary, and (iii)\na final order of forfeiture has been entered.  See, e.g., United States v. Romeo, 136\nF.4th 372, 381 (2d Cir. 2025). Thus, a stay would only delay the Petitioners—and\nany other claimants—in asserting any such claims regarding forfeiture.\n2. The Petitioners Will Not Be Irreparably Injured Absent a Stay\n28.\nThe Petitioners also fail to show irreparable injury. The Petitioners are\nnot parties to Guo’s criminal case. The sentence imposed on Guo will not cause the\nPetitioners any injury, irreparable or otherwise. As noted above, to the extent the\nPetitioners seek to exercise rights under the CVRA to be reasonably heard, they may\nseek to do so at Gou’s public sentencing proceeding—but that can only occur if\nGuo’s sentencing actually happens. To the extent the Petitioners seek to claim\nCase: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 15 of 18\n\n---\n\n16\n\nownership in specific property that is being forfeited pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n),\nthose claims will be addressed after Guo’s sentencing in the ancillary proceeding.\nAnd to the extent the Petitioners instead, or alternatively, seek to make a claim for\nremission of forfeited property, such claims will likewise be addressed after Guo’s\nsentencing.\n3. A Stay Is Against the Public Interest\n31.\nA stay of Guo’s sentencing, requested by nonparties who are not\nthemselves being sentenced, would in no way serve the public interest. The\nPetitioners have no legal right or authority to contest Sentencing Guidelines\ndeterminations or to file whatever they choose on the criminal case’s docket, while\ntheir potential interests in forfeited funds can only be realized after Guo’s\nsentencing. A stay would thus prejudice the Petitioners’ potential interests in\nforfeited funds. The same is true for the multitude of victims of Guo’s crimes who\nhave not sought to stay his sentencing, some of whom submitted victim impact\nstatements or other correspondence opposing the many adjournments of Guo’s\nsentencing to date. (E.g., Dkt. 809 at 3-4). The record demonstrates that any delay\nin sentencing based on this handful of last-minute collateral petitions would harm\nthe interests of many victims of Guo’s crimes, who have already waited years for\nthis sentencing to occur. It bears emphasis that Guo was convicted by a jury nearly\ntwo years ago of orchestrating a massive, years-long, multi-faceted, international\nCase: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 16 of 18\n\n---\n\n17\n\nracketeering enterprise. Victims of Guo’s crimes have a “right to proceedings,”\nincluding Guo’s sentencing, “free from unreasonable delay.” 18 U.S.C. §\n3771(a)(7); see also United States v. Bert, 814 F.3d 70, 83 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Certainly,\nthe public is the loser when a criminal trial is not prosecuted expeditiously, as\nsuggested by the aphorism, justice delayed is justice denied.”). This Court should\nnot grant the extraordinary remedy of mandamus, much less the extraordinary\nremedy of staying the sentencing of a criminal defendant convicted at trial of\norchestrating a billion-dollar fraud.\nCONCLUSION\n\n32.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ motions should be denied.\nDated:\nNew York, New York\n\nApril 24, 2026\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\nSEAN BUCKLEY\n\nAttorney for the United States\n\nActing Under Authority Conferred by\n28 U.S.C. § 515\n\nBy:\n  /s/ Micah F. Fergenson\n\nMicah F. Fergenson\n\nAssistant United States Attorney\n\n(212) 637-2190\n\nCase: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 17 of 18\n\n---\n\n18\n\nCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE\n\nPursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(g), the undersigned\ncounsel hereby certifies that this opposition complies with the type-volume\nlimitation of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. As measured by the word\nprocessing system used to prepare this opposition, there are 4,118 words in this\nopposition.\n\nSEAN BUCKLEY\n\nAttorney for the United States\n\nActing Under Authority Conferred by\n28 U.S.C. § 515\n\nBy:\n\n/s/\n\nMICAH F. FERGENSON\n\nAssistant United States Attorney\n\n(212) 637-2190\n\nCase: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 18 of 18","body_zh":"UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT（美国第二巡回上诉法院）\n\n- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x\n\n事由：Ranyue Bai（白然跃），\n\n申请人。\n\n案号：25-2726\n\n- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x\n\n事由：Chunk Chyi，\n\n申请人。\n\n案号：26-077\n\n- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x\n\n事由：Tony，\n\n申请人。\n\n案号：26-361\n\n- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x\n\n事由：Carolyn Sun，\n\n申请人。\n\n案号：26-441\n\n- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x\n\n反对在调卷令/职务执行令申请审理期间暂缓执行动议的证词\n\n纽约州\n\n）\n纽约县\n\n：\n证明记录：\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（纽约南区） ）\n\nMICAH F. FERGENSON（米卡·F·弗根森）依据《美国法典》第 28 编第 1746 条（Title 28, United States Code, Section 1746），在此受伪证罪处罚的前提下确认：\nCase: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 1 of 18\n\n---\n1.\n我是联邦检察官 Sean Buckley（肖恩·巴克利）办公室的助理联邦检察官，依据 28 U.S.C. § 515 授予的权力行事，并在此案中代表美国。我谨提交本证词，反对申请人 Ranyue Bai、Chunk Chyi、Tony 和 Carolyn Sun（以下简称「申请人」）提交的紧急动议（以下简称「动议」），该动议请求在其调卷令/职务执行令申请审理期间，暂缓对刑事被告人 Miles Guo（郭文贵）进行宣判。\n事实陈述\nA. 针对 Miles Guo 的刑事案件\n2.\n2023年3月6日，大陪审团作出未公开起诉书 23 Cr. 118 (AT)，指控郭和 Kin Ming Je（余建明，又名「William Je」）犯有多项欺诈和洗钱罪名。（Dkt. 2）。1 2023年3月15日，郭被捕，并自被捕以来一直被羁押。郭被捕后，政府提交了数份追加起诉书，增加了针对郭的指控，并指控了共同被告人 Yanping “Yvette” Wang（王雁平）。（见 Dkt. 19；Dkt. 215）。2024年4月24日，政府提交了第三次追加起诉书 S3 23 Cr. 118 (AT)（以下简称「起诉书」），指控郭、余和王犯有共谋敲诈勒索罪，违反 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)（罪名项一）；共谋实施电汇欺诈和银行欺诈罪，违反 18 U.S.C. § 1349（罪名项二）；共谋洗钱罪，\n\n1「Dkt.」指地方法院该刑事案件卷宗中的卷宗条目。除非另有说明，判例引用均省略了所有内部引号、引文和先前的修改。\nCase: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 2 of 18\n\n---\n违反 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h)（罪名项三）；共谋实施证券欺诈罪，违反 18 U.S.C. § 371（罪名项四）；与 GTV 私募（罪名项五）、农场贷款项目（罪名项七）、G|CLUBS（罪名项九）以及喜马拉雅交易所（罪名项十一）相关的电汇欺诈罪，违反 18 U.S.C. § 1343；与 GTV 私募（罪名项六）、农场贷款项目（罪名项八）和 G|CLUBS（罪名项十）相关的证券欺诈罪，违反 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) 和 78ff；以及非法货币交易罪，违反 18 U.S.C. § 1957（罪名项十二）。（Dkt. 307）。郭就第三次追加起诉书接受了审判。2\n3.\n对郭为期大约八周的庭审于2024年5月22日开始。政府传唤了34名证人，辩方传唤了9名证人。郭选择不出庭作证。2024年7月16日，陪审团作出裁决，裁定郭在起诉书的罪名项一、二、三、四、七、八、九、十和十一上罪名成立，并在罪名项五、六和十二上罪名不成立。（Dkt. 395）。\n4.\n对郭的宣判原定于2024年11月19日进行。郭多次申请并获准延期举行其量刑听证会。对郭的宣判预定于2026年6月29日在美国地方法院法官 Analisa Torres（阿娜丽莎·托雷斯）主持下进行，距离其在庭审中被定罪已接近两年。3\nB. 地方法院中的非当事人提交材料\n5.\n众多非当事人在郭的刑事案件卷宗中提交了材料。这些提交的材料中，许多与非当事人在超过6亿美元收益中的权益有关，该笔款项已被政府作为欺诈收益和涉及洗钱的资金扣押，而某些本人诉讼提交的材料则涉及其他事项。（见，例如，Dkt. 529-595（于2025年4月3日至4日入卷的66份非当事人文件））。\n6.\n一年多以前，即2025年4月3日，地方法院就法院收到的「与郭的刑事案件相关的某些非当事人提交文件和电子邮件往来」发布了一项命令。（Dkt. 528 第 1 页）。地方法院解释称，非当事人无权提交除「依据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 提出的第三方申请」或「依据《犯罪被害人权利法案》（CVRA, Crime Victims’ Rights Act）提出的动议，该法案仅适用于因被告人实施联邦罪行而『受到直接且近因损害』的人员」之外的任何文件。（Dkt. 528 第 1 页（引用 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e)(2)(A)））。地方法院指出，非当事人不当提交了文件，其中包括 Chunk Chyi，其在「过去两周内在卷宗中提交了几乎每日一封的信件」。（Dkt. 528 第 2 页）。地方法院警告 Chyi，「违反本命令或适用的法院规则」进一步提交文件「可能被视为无理无据的、无理缠诉的或骚扰性的，并可能使提交人受到永久性禁止提交文件的禁令限制」。（Dkt. 528 第 2 页）。\n7.\n2025年4月4日，地方法院发布了另一项与不当非当事人提交文件相关的命令。（Dkt. 596）。地方法院指出，Chyi 和另一人继续违反法院前一天的命令，并认定 Chyi 是一名无理缠诉的非当事人，其「在明显违反法院命令的情况下滥用公众进入法院的权利」。（Dkt. 596）。因此，地方法院命令，Chyi 今后提交的任何文件「均须经过审查，且仅在法院认定该提交符合适用的法院规则、出于善意并在法律上有适当依据的情况下方可入卷」。（Dkt. 596）。此外，在同一命令中，法院还基于2025年4月3日命令中所述的理由，驳回了非当事人 Carolyn Sun 的动议。（Dkt. 596）。\nC. 职务执行令申请及紧急暂缓执行动议\n8.\n申请人已向本法院提交了职务执行令申请，并在最近提交了暂缓对郭宣判的紧急动议，即本案动议。本法院已命令将申请人 Chunk Chyi、Tony 和 Carolyn Sun 等人提交的职务执行令申请合并审理。（见，例如，No. 26-77, Dkt. 29（命令将 Nos. 26-77, 26-361, 26-441 等案合并审理））。其余申请人 Ranyue Bai 提交的职务执行令申请已被驳回。职务执行令申请和动议的进一步详情载于下文。\n9.\n事由：Ranyue Bai（25-2726）：申请人 Ranyue Bai 于2025年10月28日向本法院提交了职务执行令申请。（No. 25-2726, Dkt. 5）。Bai 抱怨地方法院不允许其继续在刑事案件卷宗中提交本人诉讼材料。关于未入卷的提交材料，Bai 试图声称政府与郭的破产受托人「协同行动以对法院实施欺诈」。（No. 25-2726, Dkt. 5 第 4 页；同上，附件 A-B）。Bai 坚称，其提交材料未在刑事案件卷宗中入卷，侵犯了其依据《犯罪被害人权利法案》（CVRA）享有的权利。\n10.\n2025年11月26日，本法院驳回了 Bai 的申请，「因为申请人未能证明其获得令状的权利是清晰且无可争辩的，并且在此情况下签发令状是适当的」。（No. 25-2727, Dkt. 19）。本法院进一步表示，「鉴于地方法院收到的大量提交材料（我们相信法院将迅速处理），申请人关于将其提交材料入卷的职务执行令申请予以驳回，但若地方法院未在合理时间内将提交材料入卷，不影响其重新提出该申请。」随后，Bai 申请许可提交补充职务执行令申请，本法院亦予以驳回。（No. 25-2726, Dkt. 30）。执行令于2026年1月21日发出。（No. 25-2726, Dkt. 30）。\n11.\n尽管如此，Bai 仍继续向本法院提交大量文件。（No. 25-2727, Dkt. 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43）。在这些提交的文件中，包括 Bai 于2026年4月20日提交的暂缓对郭宣判的紧急动议（No. 25-2726, Dkt. 43）。在其紧急动议中，Bai 主张其已被驳回的职务执行令申请在实体理由上将取得成功，因为其向地方法院提交的动议尚未在地方法院卷宗中入卷。（No. 25-2726, Dkt. 43 第 4 页）。Bai 坚称其动议提出了其对量刑和没收的异议。（No. 25-2726, Dkt. 43 第 4 页）。\n12.\n事由：Chunk Chyi（26-77）：申请人 Chunk Chyi 于2026年1月13日向本法院提交了职务执行令申请。（No. 26-77, Dkt. 1）。2026年4月18日，Chyi 提交了暂缓对郭宣判的紧急动议。（No. 26-77, Dkt. 12）。Chyi 主张，为了妥善进行「损失计算、赔偿和量刑指南加重处罚计算」，有必要暂缓执行。（No. 26-77, Dkt. 12 第 1 页）。Chyi 声明，其对郭和政府量刑陈述文件中提及的受害人人数或身份存有争议或疑虑。（No. 26-77, Dkt. 12 第 2-6 页）。Chyi 还抱怨其提交的文件在刑事案件卷宗入卷前须经过审查。\n13.\n事由：Tony（26-361）：申请人 Tony 于2026年2月17日向本法院提交了职务执行令申请。（见 No. 26-361, Dkt. 7）。2026年4月18日，Tony 提交了暂缓对郭宣判的紧急动议。（No. 26-361, Dkt. 18）。Tony 似乎主张，由于其对地方法院关于依据《美国量刑指南》适用的损失金额计算的记录存有疑虑，因而必须暂缓执行。（No. 26-361, Dkt. 18 第 2-5 页）。\n14.\n事由：Carolyn Sun（26-441）：申请人 Carolyn Sun 于2026年2月26日向本法院提交了职务执行令申请。2026年4月20日，Sun 提交了暂缓对郭宣判的紧急动议。（No. 26-441, Dkt. 23）。Sun 似乎主要抱怨其通过电子邮件发送至本人诉讼接收部门电子邮箱的文件未在郭的刑事案件卷宗中入卷。（No. 26-441, Dkt. 23）。Sun 请求暂缓执行，以便将其提交的文件纳入记录，包括用于任何「与没收相关的程序」。（No. 26-441, Dkt. 23 第 9 页）。\n法律论证\n暂缓执行动议应予驳回\n15.\n所有动议均应予以驳回。作为针对郭的刑事案件的非当事人，申请人通常缺乏请求暂缓对单个刑事被告人宣判的诉讼资格，并且同样缺乏对适用的量刑指南计算等事项提出异议的诉讼资格。根据 CVRA，在申请人属于郭犯罪行为受害人的范围内，他们有权获得被合理听取陈述的权利\nCase: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 8 of 18\n\n在量刑听证会上发言——该权利只有在量刑程序实际进行的情况下才能行使。他们也有权向地方法院提出动议，以主张其在 CVRA（《犯罪被害人权利法》）项下的权利，但这并不延伸至提交与 CVRA 中明确列举的权利无关的无限量法院文书的权利。就申请人所关切的问题涉及没收而言，这些关切尚未成熟，因为在 Guo（郭文贵）的量刑听证会上不会签发最终没收命令，相反，第三方对政府将为其寻求最终没收命令的任何特定财产的权利主张和权益，将通过郭量刑之后的附随程序予以解决；在该附随程序中，申请人及任何其他主张对被没收财产享有权益的当事方，将有机会在 District Court（地方法院）获得陈述意见的机会。\n\nA. 适用法律\n\n16.\n“即使不暂停执行可能会导致不可挽回的损害，中止执行也并非法定权利。”Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433 (2009)。“相反，它是司法裁量权的行使，其签发的妥当性取决于个案的具体情况。”同上。 “申请中止执行的一方承担证明相关情况证明有理由行使该裁量权的举证责任。”同上，第 433-34 页。\n\n17.\n本法院在决定是否在上诉期间准予中止命令执行时，考量以下四个因素：\n\n(1) 申请中止执行人是否充分证明其在实体问题上很可能胜诉；(2) 在没有中止执行的情况下，申请人是否会受到不可挽回的损害；(3) 签发中止执行令是否会对诉讼程序中具有权益的其他当事方造成实质性损害；以及 (4) 公共利益所在。\n\nUnited States v. Grote, 961 F.3d 105, 122-23 (2d Cir. 2020)。前两个因素是“最关键的”。Nken, 556 U.S. at 434。\n\n18.\n关于第一个因素，“仅证明在实体问题上的胜诉几率高于可忽略不计的程度是不够的。”同上。在此，申请人面临着极高的门槛，因为他们必须证明有可能获得 mandamus（复审令/调卷令/履行职务令），而这是一种“仅在相当于司法越权或明显滥用裁量权的例外情况下”才予以适用的救济途径，因此应当“审慎”使用。In re United States, 945 F.3d 616, 622-23 (2d Cir. 2019)。\n\n19.\n关于第二个因素，“仅仅证明存在遭受不可挽回损害的某种可能性并不能满足”该要素。Nken, 556 U.S. at 434-35。当“政府为相对方时，第三和第四个因素合并”。同上，第 435 页。“某一因素必须具备的程度因其他因素的强弱而异；某一因素越强，对另一因素的要求就越低。”S.E.C. v. Daspin, 557 F. App’x 46, 48 (2d Cir. 2014)。\n\n20.\n本法院按滥用裁量权标准审查驳回中止执行申请的裁定。Grote, 961 F.3d at 123。\n\nB. 论述\n\n1. 请愿书在实体问题上胜诉的可能性不大\n\n21.\n申请人未能证明其可能展示足以支持签发履行职务令的例外情况。他们作为刑事案件的非当事人，请求对一名在审判中定罪后早已排定判决的个人刑事被告人紧急中止量刑程序，且该被告人目前仍处于审前羁押状态，该请求是毫无根据的。\n\n22.\n首先，就申请人试图对 Sentencing Guidelines（《量刑指南》）项下的损失金额计算相关问题提出异议，或质疑审判证人的可信度而言，他们作为刑事案件的非当事人无权提起此类异议（无诉讼资格）。例如，Tony（托尼）提交的中止执行动议并未提出任何与 CVRA 相关的权利主张，而是对用于计算郭的《量刑指南》量刑范围的损失计算方法提出质疑。(No. 26-361, Dkt. 18)。第三方无权提出此类异议。\n\n23.\n就请愿书试图主张 CVRA 项下的被害人权利而言，其主张缺乏依据。首先，只有当申请人是“因郭的犯罪行为直接且近因受到损害的”人时，CVRA 项下的权利才适用。18 U.S.C. § 3771(e)。虽然申请人声称在主张 CVRA 项下的权利，但其请愿书主要涉及对政府确定被害人损失方法的攻击，且没有任何一份请愿书主张因郭的犯罪而遭受了任何具体损失。因此，尚不清楚申请人是确实声称因郭的犯罪而受损，还是作为郭的持续支持者企图借此挑战并拖延对郭的起诉。(参见 Dkt. 528 (Torres 法官指出“Chunk Chyi 多次否认被害人身份”))；No. 26-441, Dkt. 1 at 14 (Carolyn Sun：“任何先前对 CVRA 的引用仅具有程序性质，并不反映对犯罪被害人身份的主张或承认。”)。\n\n24.\n其次，无论如何，除了结论性的断言之外，申请人显然唯一引用的 CVRA 条款是“在涉及……量刑的地方法院任何公开程序中获得合理陈述意见的权利”。18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4)。然而，该项权利只有在量刑程序实际发生且未被中止或进一步推迟的情况下才能行使。根据其自身条款，第 3771(a)(4) 条并未授权被害人在案卷中提交任何文书，而是允许犯罪被害人在特定的公开程序中享有在法庭上获得合理陈述意见的权利。18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4)。\n\n25.\n就申请人声称根据 CVRA 享有作为非当事人就与刑事案件有某种关联的任何及所有问题向刑事案件卷宗提交文书的权利而言，申请人是错误的。CVRA 没有赋予此类权利，申请人也未能指出有任何法院承认此类权利的判例。毕竟，向任何非当事人（包括自行辩护的当事人）赋予此类不受限制的立案建卷权，在像本案这样单个刑事案件中存在成千上万名潜在被害人的情况下，将是极其不切实际的。CVRA 确实授权被害人提出动议以维护 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a) 中规定的权利。参见 United States v. Sullivan, 118 F.4th 170, 230 (2d Cir. 2024)；18 U.S.C. § 3771(c)。但是，此类提交的文书必须紧扣 CVRA 中规定的某项权利，而不能像本案申请人所试图做的那样，普遍性地试图干预政府与被告人之间的《量刑指南》争议及其他量刑争议。此外，CVRA 明确承认，“如果法院认定犯罪被害人的人数使得向所有犯罪被害人提供 (a) 款所述的权利变得不切实际，法院应制定合理的程序以落实本章规定，且该程序不得使诉讼程序过分复杂化或拖延程序。”18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(2)。地方法院已经遵循了此类合理程序，申请人没有理由认为郭的实际量刑程序会有所不同。除其他事项外，为了遵循涉及众多被害人案件的通行做法，政府（以及郭）已收到并向地方法院转交了大量的被害人影响陈述书，供地方法院在郭的量刑听证会之前及量刑时予以考量。(Dkt. 832)。\n\n26.\n申请人之一 Chunk Chyi 受地方法院 2025年4月5日 命令的约束，该命令禁止 Chyi 在地方法院进一步提交文书，除非地方法院“认定该提交是按照适用的法院规则善意做出的，并且在法律上有正当依据”。(Dkt. 596)。Chyi 主张该命令违反了 Moates v. Barkley, 147 F.3d 207, 208 (2d Cir. 1998) 案，该判例认定地方法院“不得在未向诉讼当事人提供通知和陈述意见的机会的情况下，依职权对当事人施加禁止提交文书的禁令”。但 Chyi 忽略了地方法院在签发禁令之前确实提供了通知。具体而言，Torres 法官首先签发了一项命令，指出 Chyi 提交的大量文书是“不当的”，并且“可能被解释为对政府以及被告人犯罪的被害人构成威胁或骚扰”。(Dkt. 528)。因此，Torres 法官警告 Chyi，任何进一步的此类提交“可能被视为无理缠诉、无理取闹或骚扰，并可能使提交人受到永久性禁止提交文书禁令的约束”。(同上)。正是在 Chyi 无视该警告、多次额外提交无理文书之后，Torres 法官才签发了 Chyi 现在提出异议的命令。因此，记录表明 Torres 法官完全遵守了 Moates 案，直到向 Chyi 提供通知并给予其答复机会之后才禁止其提交文书。当然，没有任何依据认定地方法院的合理应对措施达到了使 Chyi 有权获得履行职务令救济所需的“相当于司法越权或明显滥用裁量权的例外情况”的程度。In re United States, 945 F.3d 616, 622-23 (2d Cir. 2019)。\n\n27.\n请愿书还对没收程序提出了申诉，但这些主张毫无依据或尚未成熟。就申请人试图对针对郭作出的任何没收命令相关问题提出异议而言，他们无权提起此类诉讼（无诉讼资格）。就申请人试图对其要求政府寻求最终没收命令的特定财产主张所有权权益而言，他们可以在郭量刑后进行的附随程序中提出。21 U.S.C. § 853(n)。同样，就申请人试图依据 28 C.F.R. Part 9 申请减免被没收财产而言，此类申请可以提交给 Attorney General（司法部长），但只有在 (i) 对郭进行量刑、(ii) 任何第三方主张已在附随程序中裁决、以及 (iii) 已签发最终没收命令之后才会得到处理。参见例如 United States v. Romeo, 136 F.4th 372, 381 (2d Cir. 2025)。因此，中止执行只会推迟申请人以及任何其他权利主张人就没收提出任何此类主张。\n\n2. 在不中止执行的情况下，申请人不会遭受不可挽回的损害\n\n28.\n申请人也未能证明存在不可挽回的损害。申请人并非郭刑事案件的当事人。对郭作出的判决不会对申请人造成任何损害，无论是不可挽回的还是其他损害。如上所述，就申请人寻求行使 CVRA 项下获得合理陈述意见的权利而言，他们可以寻求在郭的公开量刑程序中行使——但这只有在郭的量刑程序实际发生时才能实现。就申请人寻求主张而言\n\n---\n根据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 主张对正被没收的特定财产拥有所有权，这些权利主张将在郭的量刑宣判后的附属程序中予以审理。并且在申诉人转而或备选地寻求对被没收财产提出减免申请的范围内，此类权利主张同样将在郭的量刑宣判后予以审理。\n\n3. 暂缓执行违背公共利益\n\n31.\n由自身并非受量刑对象的非当事人申请暂缓郭的量刑宣判，绝不符合公共利益。申诉人既无合法权利或职权去质疑《量刑指南》（Sentencing Guidelines）的认定，也无权在刑事案件的卷宗中随意提交其选择的文件，而其在被没收资金中的潜在利益只有在郭被量刑宣判后才能实现。因此，暂缓执行将损害申诉人在被没收资金中的潜在利益。对于众多未曾寻求暂缓其量刑的郭案罪行受害者而言亦是如此，其中一些受害者提交了受害者影响陈述或其他信函，反对迄今为止对郭量刑宣判的多次延期。（例如，Dkt. 809，第 3-4 页）。记录表明，仅凭这少数几份在最后一刻提出的附带申诉而推迟量刑宣判，将损害郭案罪行众多受害者的利益，他们为了这一量刑宣判的进行已经等待了数年。必须强调的是，郭在近两年前已被陪审团裁定犯有策划庞大、耗时数年、多层面的跨国敲诈勒索企业罪。\n\nCase: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 16 of 18\n\n---\n郭案罪行的受害者享有诉讼程序“不受不合理拖延的权利”，包括郭的量刑宣判。18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(7)；另见 United States v. Bert, 814 F.3d 70, 83 (2d Cir. 2016)（“诚然，当刑事审判未能迅速推进起诉时，公众就是受害者，正如格言所言，迟到的正义非正义。”）。本法院不应准予职务履行令这一非常规救济，更不应准予对一名在审判中被裁定策划十亿美元欺诈罪名的刑事被告人暂缓量刑宣判这一非常规救济。\n\n结论\n\n32.\n基于前述理由，申诉人的动议应当予以驳回。\n\n日期：\nNew York, New York（纽约州纽约市）\n\n2026年4月24日\n\n谨此提交，\n\nSEAN BUCKLEY（肖恩·巴克利）\n\n美国政府代理律师\n\n依据 28 U.S.C. § 515 所赋予的职权行事\n\n签名人：\n  /s/ Micah F. Fergenson\n\nMicah F. Fergenson（米卡·F·费尔根森）\n\n美国助理检察官\n\n(212) 637-2190\n\nCase: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 17 of 18\n\n---\n合规证明\n\n根据《联邦上诉程序规则》（Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure）第 32(g) 条，下述签字律师特此证明本异议书符合《联邦上诉程序规则》的字数容量限制。经用于准备本异议书的文字处理系统测量，本异议书共计 4,118 字。\n\nSEAN BUCKLEY（肖恩·巴克利）\n\n美国政府代理律师\n\n依据 28 U.S.C. § 515 所赋予的职权行事\n\n签名人：\n\n/s/\n\nMICAH F. FERGENSON（米卡·F·费尔根森）\n\n美国助理检察官\n\n(212) 637-2190\n\nCase: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 18 of 18","key_entities":[],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":4312,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 09:30:01"}