{"id":"court_2cir_25-3046_dkt_41","court":"2Cir","case_no":"25-3046","doc_number":41,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"FORFEITURE","filed_date":"2026-06-29","title":"Case: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 1 of 37 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT","summary_zh":"紧急动议 —— 美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）案，2Cir 25-3046 ECF #41（2026-06-29立案）。利害关系第三方主张人 Jason Zen 自行提请动议，请求第二巡回上诉法院撤销地方法院作出的刑事判决，并对相关没收、赔偿及受害者分配程序申请紧急行政中止。动议主张地方法院在多项监督请愿未决的情况下强行推进判决，出具未经核实的8.89亿美元没收令（ECF #858），且违反了《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第32条的 mandatory 事实认定要求。","summary_en":"Emergency motion — United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo), 2Cir 25-3046 ECF #41 (filed 2026-06-29). Interested third-party claimant Jason Zen moves pro se to vacate the criminal sentence imposed by the district court and requests an immediate administrative stay of related forfeiture, restitution, and victim-allocation proceedings pending appellate review. The motion alleges the district court rushed sentencing while supervisory petitions were pending, issued an unverified $889 million forfeiture order (ECF No. 858), and committed structural Rule 32 violations.","body_en":"Case: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 1 of 37\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT\nThurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse 40 Foley Square, New York, NY 10007 Telephone: 212-857-8500\nMOTION INFORMATION STATEMENT\nDocket Number(s): Caption [use short title]\nMotion for:\nSet forth below precise, complete statement of relief sought:\nMOVING PARTY: OPPOSING PARTY:\nPlaintiff Defendant\nAppellant/Petitioner Appellee/Respondent\nMOVING ATTORNEY: OPPOSING ATTORNEY:\n[name of attorney, with firm, address, phone number and e-mail]\nCourt- Judge/ Agency appealed from:\nPlease check appropriate boxes: FOR EMERGENCY MOTIONS, MOTIONS FOR STAYS AND\nINJUCTIONS PENDING APPEAL:\nHas movant notified opposing counsel (required by Local Rule 27.1):\nHas this request for relief been made below? Yes No\nYes No (explain):\nHas this relief been previously sought in this court? Yes No\nRequested return date and explanation of emergency:\nThe District Court forced sentencing today (June 29), intentionally racing to\nOpposing counsel’s position on motion:\nmoot this Court’s pending mandamus and stay review. The court issued an\nUnopposed Opposed Don’t Know unverified $889M order (ECF 858), refused to rule on double-counting,\nDoes opposing counsel intend to file a response: denied 50 PSR objections, and suppressed 7 pending recusal motions.\nYes _No Don’t Know Without an immediate administrative stay, these structural Rule 32 and\nprocess failures will permanently lock into final judgment. This will cause\nimmediate, irreversible harm to the statutory CVRA and § 853(n) rights of\nthousands of victims before this Court can act.\nIs the oral argument on motion requested? Yes No (requests for oral argument will not necessarily be granted)\nHas the appeal argument date been set? Yes No If yes, enter date:\nSignature of Moving Attorney:\nDate: Service : Electronic Other [Attach proof of service]\nForm T-1080 (rev. 10-23)\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 2 of 37\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT\nDocket No. 25-3046\nIn re JASON ZEN, Petitioner,\nRelated to S.D.N.Y. Criminal Case No. 1:23-cr-00118-AT\nEMERGENCY MOTION TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT OF\nSENTENCE AND FOR AN IMMEDIATE ADMINISTRATIVE\nSTAY PENDING APPELLATE REVIEW\nPursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and the inherent\nsupervisory powers of this Court, Petitioner Jason Zen, proceeding pro se\nas an interested third-party claimant, respectfully and on an emergency\nbasis moves this Court to VACATE the judgment of sentence imposed by\nthe United States District Court for the Southern District of New York\n(S.D.N.Y.) on June 29, 2026, in United States v. Ho Wan Kwok, No.\n1:23-cr-00118-AT, and for an IMMEDIATE ADMINISTRATIVE STAY of all\nrelated forfeiture, restitution, and victim-allocation proceedings pending\nthe final disposition of the extraordinary volume of active, unresolved\npetitions before this Court.\nINTRODUCTION & SUMMARY OF THE EMERGENCY\nThis motion presents a profound constitutional and procedural crisis\nthat demands immediate appellate correction. On the very day of\nsentencing, June 29, 2026, the District Court executed a calculated \"race\nagainst the appellate clock,\" culminating in the issuance of an\nextraordinary 17-page Preliminary Order of Forfeiture (POF) (ECF No.\n858)(See Exhibit A) immediately followed by the entry of a final criminal\njudgment.\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 3 of 37\nThe District Court's actions constitute a direct, aggressive bypass of the\nSecond Circuit's active supervisory authority. At the exact moment the\nDistrict Court imposed sentence and finalized an staggering\n$889,000,000 personal money judgment (ECF No. 858), it was fully\naware that this Court held active jurisdiction over:\n1. 16 Mandamus Petitions arising directly from this underlying\nmatter;\n2. 10 Emergency Stay Applications;\n3. 9 Administrative Stay Applications; and\n4. Multiple unresolved emergency motions for judicial recusal,\nincluding Petitioner's multi-layered requests to both the Second\nCircuit and the Southern District.\nBy forcing this case across the final threshold of criminal sentencing\nwhile these extensive supervisory actions remained pending, the District\nCourt attempted to render this Court’s review completely academic by\npresenting a fait accompli. To achieve this \"racing,\" the District Court\nsystematically trampled upon the mandatory fact-finding frameworks of\nFederal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 (Rule 32), leaving a massive $889\nmillion deficit completely unverified and stripping thousands of\nstakeholders of their statutory participation rights. To preserve the\nintegrity of the federal judiciary, this Court must immediately vacate the\njudgment below.\nI. THE DISTRICT COURT’S SYSTEMATIC VIOLATIONS OF FED. R. CRIM. P.\n32 AS MANIFESTED IN ECF NO. 858\nFederal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 is a rigid, mandatory framework\ndesigned to guarantee that no criminal sentence is predicated on\nspeculative or unverified factual records. The District Court’s June 29\nOrder (ECF No. 858) contains smoking-gun admissions of structural Rule\n32 violations:\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 4 of 37\nA. The District Court’s Wholesale, Summary Rejection of 50 Material\nObjections and Arbitrary Redefinition of Victim Loss Violates Rule\n32(i)(3)(B)\nDuring the sentencing hearing on June 29, 2026, the District Court’s\nprocedural shortcuts reached a crescendo of constitutional defiance.\nFaced with fifty (50) distinct, material factual objections raised by the\ndefendant to the Presentence Report (PSR)—each capable of shifting\nthe Guidelines calculation—the District Court summarily stated: 'I deny\nMr. Kwok’s objections.' This wholesale dismissal, completely devoid of\nitemized, on-the-record factual findings or explicit statements of\nnon-reliance, represents a textbook violation of the mandatory\ncommands of Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B). Furthermore, the District\nCourt explicitly declared from the bench: ' I do not consider whether a\nperson subjectively considers themselves a victim in order ot consider\ntheirs as loss. So the actual and intended loss both exceed $550 million.\nMr. Guo makes 50 other objections to the PSR. I reject Mr. Guo's\nobjections.'\nhttp\nThis unilateral, paternalistic declaration is legally untenable. By flatly\nrefusing to consider the subjective status and evidence of the actual\ncapital providers—thousands of whom explicitly asserted they suffered\nno loss—the District Court engineered a completely fabricated and\nunverified $550 million loss threshold to drastically inflate the sentence.\nTo sentence a defendant by intentionally blinding the court to the direct\ninput of the purported victims violates the foundational core of both\nRule 32 verification and the CVRA, rendering the final sentence\nstructurally defective.\"\nB. Blatant Violation of Rule 32(i)(3)(B): Explicit Discretionary Refusal to\nRule on Material Controverted Disputes\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 5 of 37\nRule 32(i)(3)(B) dictates that for any disputed portion of the presentence\nreport or other controverted matter, the sentencing court must rule on\nthe dispute prior to sentencing. The District Court explicitly broke this\nrule. In ECF No. 858, Page 6, Footnote 4, the District Court acknowledges\nthat the underlying inflows used to calculate the astronomical personal\nliability are heavily contested due to the \"possible double-counting of\ninflows across various components of the G Enterprise.\" Yet, the\nDistrict Court summarily stated that because this structural objection\nwas not raised in a specific prior submission, \"the Court will not address\nthis objection.\" A district court cannot use forfeiture technicalities to\nescape the mandatory command of Rule 32(i)(3)(B). By leaving a\nmulti-hundred-million-dollar fund duplication dispute completely\nunruled upon, the District Court sentenced the defendant based on a\nstructurally unreliable financial record.\nC. Violation of Rule 32(i)(2): Arbitrary Denial of an Evidentiary Hearing\nFaced with an Untraceable $889 Million Judgement\nRule 32(i)(2) guarantees the right to introduce evidence on contested\nsentencing factors. In ECF No. 858, the District Court finalized a\n$889,000,000 Personal Money Judgment against the defendant. Yet, the\nface of the same order reveals that the Bankruptcy Trustee in parallel\nproceedings has launched over 300 adversary proceedings and drained\nmassive professional fees over 3.5 years without ever locating or\nsecuring these purported personal funds (ECF No. 858, Page 15). The\ntotal absence of physical assets matching this $889 million figure proves\nthat the true routing, ownership, and allocation of these\ninvestor-originated transfers remain highly disputed and opaque. To\nissue an $889,000,000 judgment while simultaneously denying an\nevidentiary hearing on June 25 (Doc. No. 855) is an arbitrary substitution\nof administrative haste for the rigid fact-finding required by Rule\n32(i)(2).\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 6 of 37\nD. Structural Violation of Rule 32(i)(1)(A): Stripping Third-Party Voice\nvia the Sudden Elimination of Restitution\nIn a sudden procedural maneuver at the tail-end of ECF No. 858 (Pages\n16-17), the District Court completely abrogated its duty to enter a\nRestitution Order, declaring it \"impractical\" due to the number of\nvictims and complexity, and instead authorized a unilateral government\n\"remission process.\" Restitution is the exact statutory anchor under the\nCrime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA) that grants third-party stakeholders a\nmandatory right to comment on factual inaccuracies in the sentencing\nrecord at the time of the hearing. By entirely wiping out restitution\nhours before sentencing, the District Court successfully engineered an\nabsolute informational vacuum, preventing Petitioner and other\naffected investors from exposing the flaws of the $889 million model\nduring the sentencing hearing, in direct violation of Rule 32(i)\nverification mandates.\nE. The Forced Appearance of a Medically Incapacitated Defendant\nUnder Extralegal Coercion Eviscerated the Right of Presence and\nAllocution Under Rule 43 and Rule 32\nThe District Court’s rush to judgment on June 29, 2026, culminated in a\nshocking, unprecedented violation of the physical integrity and\nconstitutional rights of the defendant. According to the defendant's\ncontemporaneous statement during the sentencing hearing and the\nreal-time, live-text transcription provided by Inner City Press\n(http), the\ndefendant disclosed from the bench that prior to the hearing, he had\ncollapsed, vomited blood, and had been hospitalized. Rather than\ngranting a mandatory medical continuance, the state engineered a\nhighly coercive, irregular extraction: the defendant was forcibly removed\nfrom the hospital, returned to MDC, and met by an unidentified civilian\nfemale who sheared off his blood-stained clothing, wiped blood from his\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 7 of 37\nface, forced a change of attire, and unilaterally compelled his physical\npresence in the courtroom.This shocking irregular procedure directly\nviolates multiple structural tenets of federal criminal law:\n1. Violation of Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(a)(3) (Right to be Present): Rule 43\nrequires the defendant’s meaningful, competent, and conscious\npresence at sentencing. Mere physical placement of an\nincapacitated, bleeding, and medically un-evaluated defendant in a\ncourtroom does not satisfy the constitutional definition of\n\"presence.\" Forcing a defendant to undergo sentencing immediately\nfollowing physical trauma and extralegal handling directly poisons\nthe competency of the entire proceeding.\n2. Violation of Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii) (The Right of Allocution):\nThe right of allocution requires the court to address the defendant\npersonally and determine if he wishes to make a statement under\nconditions that allow for a free, rational, and uncoerced exercise of\njudgment. A defendant who has just had his clothes cut off by a\nmysterious operative and is actively recovering from physical\ncollapse cannot legally or psychologically exercise a fair right of\nallocution.\n3. Violation of Fifth Amendment Due Process: The introduction of an\nunidentified, non-law-enforcement handler to physically alter a\ndefendant's medical and physical state in order to push him through\na sentencing sprint constitutes a profound breakdown of judicial\nintegrity. It transforms a federal sentencing into an unconstitutional\nexercise of raw administrative force, necessitating that the final\njudgment of sentence be immediately vacated.\nInner City Press's tweet history↓\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 8 of 37\nII. The District Court's Intentional Suppression and Total Silence\nRegarding Pending Emergency Recusal Motions Establishes a Structural\nConstitutional Defect\nThe District Court’s rush to impose sentence and finalize ECF No. 858 on\nJune 29, 2026, involved an even more alarming violation of\nfundamental due process: the deliberate and systematic ignoring of\nactive, pending judicial disqualification motions. On Friday, June 26,\n2026, Petitioner filed an Emergency Motion for Judicial Recusal pursuant\nto 28 U.S.C. § 455 directly with the District Court, with copies properly\nserved upon defense counsel(See Exhibit B).In tandem, to my\nknowledge, about six other similarly situated investors and victims filed\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 9 of 37\nidentical emergency recusal applications and gave due notice to defense\ncounsel, presenting a collective and severe challenge to the District\nCourt’s appearance of impartiality under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Yet,\nthroughout the entire sentencing proceeding on June 29, 2026, the\nDistrict Court—as well as counsel—maintained an absolute, calculated\nsilence regarding these pending motions. Not a single mention was\nmade on the record, and no ruling was issued. A district court cannot\nsimply blindfold itself to a properly submitted disqualification motion in\norder to complete a sentencing sprint. Under long-standing federal\njurisprudence, when a substantial challenge to a judge’s qualifications\nis filed, the court must address and resolve that jurisdictional threshold\nbefore finalizing a criminal judgment. By treating these multi-layered\nrecusal motions as non-existent, the District Court willfully acted without\na verified mandate of impartiality, transforming the entire sentencing\ninto an unconstitutional star-chamber exercise that must be\nimmediately vacated.\nIII.THE DISTRICT COURT’S \"SENTENCING RACING\" MANIFESTS AN\nINTENTIONAL BYPASS OF THE CIRCUIT'S MANDAMUS JURISDICTION\nUnder 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), a judge must disqualify themselves if their\nimpartiality might reasonably be questioned. The frantic timeline of June\n29, 2026, shatters the appearance of judicial impartiality.\nIn ECF No. 858, Page 9, the District Court openly acknowledges that\n6,512 members of the Himalaya Exchange and numerous third-party\npetitioners have filed extensive objections to the undocketed and\nunexamined nature of the records. However, the District Court\nsummarily brushed aside these 6,512 objectors, stating that their\nstatutory rights \"shall be assessed through ancillary proceedings... after\nsentencing.\" (ECF No. 858, Page 9).\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 10 of 37\nThis is a direct insult to the Second Circuit's pending jurisdiction. The\ncore of Petitioner’s 16 active mandamus petitions currently before this\nCourt is precisely that third-party records are being improperly excluded\nand suppressed prior to sentencing, transforming their statutory\nparticipation rights into an unconstitutional afterthought. By rushing out\nECF No. 858 on the morning of June 29 and forcing the case into final\njudgment, the District Court deliberately attempted to execute a\nprocedural \"fait accompli\" to strip this Court of its ability to exercise\nmeaningful, pre-judgment supervisory oversight over those 16 pending\npetitions. Under § 455(a), this calculated effort to outrun the appellate\ncourt is fundamentally disqualifying.\nIV. ALLOWING THE SENTENCING JUDGMENT TO STAND CAUSES\nIRREPARABLE SYSTEMIC HARM TO THIRD-PARTY CLAIMANTS\nIf this Court permits the District Court’s rushed judgment to stand\nuncorrected, Petitioner and thousands of similarly situated third-party\ninvestors will suffer immediate, irreversible injury:\n1. Permanent Lock-In of a Deficient, Unreviewed $889 Million\nModel: Post-sentencing, the unexamined $889,000,000 loss\nframework is legally locked into the criminal judgment. The 16\npending pro se mandamus petitions designed to correct the\nrecord pre-sentencing are instantly threatened with academic\nobsolescence.\n2. Permanent Castration of Statutory Participation Rights: By\nforcing § 853(n) claimants and victims into post-sentencing\nancillary procedures, they are restricted to operating entirely\nwithin the rigged confines of the District Court's unexamined,\ndouble-counted sentencing findings. Assets will be distributed via\nan unverified \"remission process\" without any judicial oversight,\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 11 of 37\npermanently extinguishing third-party property rights before this\nCourt can act.\nCONCLUSION & RELIEF REQUESTED\nThe District Court’s defiance of Rule 32,its explicit refusal to resolve the\ndisputes regarding the records underlying the forfeiture funds, and its\nstrategic race to outrun 16 mandamus petitions require immediate\nappellate correction. Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court:\n1. VACATE the judgment of sentence imposed on June 29, 2026, in\nUnited States v. Ho Wan Kwok, No. 1:23-cr-00118-AT, and remand\nthe case for comprehensive restructuring on a clean, complete,\nand legally reliable record;\n2. ENTER AN IMMEDIATE ADMINISTRATIVE STAY of all related\nforfeiture, restitution, victim-allocation, and ancillary proceedings\npending further order of this Court; and\n3. DIRECT the District Court to conduct a comprehensive, mandatory\nevidentiary hearing prior to any subsequent resentencing,\nensuring full transparency regarding the source, routing, and legal\nownership of the investor-originated transfers at issue.\nDated: June 29, 2026\nRespectfully submitted,\n/s/ Jason Zen\n___________________________\nPetitioner, pro se\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 12 of 37\n\nUSDC SDNY\nDOCUMENT\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ELECTRONICALLY FILED\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA DOC #: ______ ____________\nDATE FILED: __6/29/2026__\n-against-\nMILES GUO, 23 Cr. 118-1 (AT)\nDefendant. ORDER\nANALISA TORRES, District Judge:\nDefendant, Miles Guo, objects to the preliminary order of forfeiture (“POF”) entered by\nthe Court on August 11, 2025. See Objs., ECF No. 799; POF, ECF No. 720; Gov’t Mot., ECF\nNo. 716; Resp., ECF No. 803; see also Reply, ECF No. 804. For the reasons stated below, the\nCourt SUSTAINS IN PART and OVERRULES IN PART Guo’s objections to the POF.\nBACKGROUND\nThe Court presumes familiarity with the factual background of the case and recounts only\na summary of forfeiture-related proceedings and submissions here.\nA. Jury Verdict\nOn July 16, 2024, a jury convicted Guo of nine counts of various financial crimes:\n(1) one count of racketeering conspiracy (Count One of the third superseding indictment);\n(2) one count each of conspiracy to commit wire fraud or bank fraud, money laundering, and\nsecurities fraud (Counts Two, Three, and Four); (3) one count each of wire fraud and securities\nfraud in connection with the Farm Loan Program (Counts Seven and Eight); (4) one count each\nof wire fraud and securities fraud in connection with G|CLUBS (“G Clubs”) (Counts Nine and\nTen); (5) and one count of wire fraud in connection with the Himalaya Exchange (Count\nEleven). The jury acquitted Guo of one count each of wire and securities fraud in connection\nwith the GTV Private Placement and one count of committing an unlawful monetary transaction\n(Counts Five, Six, and Twelve). See Jury Verdict, ECF No. 395; S3 Superseding Indictment,\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 13 of 37\n\nECF No. 307. Each of these activities—the Farm Loan Program, G Clubs, the Himalaya\nExchange, and the GTV Private Placement—were alleged to be components of the “G\nEnterprise,” a series of investment schemes comprising the racketeering conspiracy detailed in\nCount One. See S3 Superseding Indictment ¶¶ 16–19.\nB. Applicable Forfeiture Provisions\nAs a result of Guo’s convictions, he is subject to three distinct provisions of the United\nStates Code which call for forfeiture of certain assets to the Government:\n1) 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a), which requires a defendant to forfeit any property “constituting,\nor derived from, any proceeds which the person obtained . . . from racketeering\nactivity” (Count One);\n2) 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C), which requires a defendant to forfeit all property “which\nconstitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to” fraud or a conspiracy to commit\nfraud (Counts Two, Four, Seven, Eight, Nine, and Ten, and Eleven);1 and\n3) 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1), which requires a defendant to forfeit all property “involved” in\nmoney laundering, or “traceable to such property [involved in money laundering]”\n(Count Three).\nSee id. ¶¶ 58–61.\nC. Prior Submissions\nOn April 8, 2025, the Court appointed Guo’s present counsel and ordered the parties to\nprovide a joint letter stating the date when Guo would provide his position with respect to\nforfeiture. See Apr. 8 Tr. at 10:14–23, ECF No. 684. The Court subsequently granted four\nextensions, at the parties’ and at Guo’s request, for Guo to articulate his position on the forfeiture\nof various assets. See, e.g., ECF Nos. 698, 704, 706, 708. Then, on June 27, 2025, Guo filed a\nletter claiming that he was “unable to take a position with respect to issues regarding potential\n1 The Indictment also cites 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) in this forfeiture allegation, which specifies further rules and\nprocedures related to forfeiture. See S3 Superseding Indictment ¶ 59.\n2\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 14 of 37\n\nforfeiture and remission of money and property seized by the Government.” ECF No. 710 at 1–\n2. The letter stated Guo “[did] not waive any of [his] rights, including his appellate rights, in this\ncase.” Id. at 1. In response, the Government wrote that although “Guo is not consenting to a\npreliminary order of forfeiture, the Court can enter a preliminary order of forfeiture that imposes\na money judgment and forfeits Guo’s personal interest in specific property.” ECF No. 713.\nA month later, by motion dated July 28, 2025, the Government asked the Court to “enter\na preliminary order of forfeiture setting forth . . . [a] money judgment” in the amount of $1.3\nbillion. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(b)(2)(A); Gov’t Mot.2 The Government characterized the $1.3\nbillion as “the proceeds traceable to the commission” of the racketeering and fraud counts\n(Counts One, Two, Four, Seven, Eight, Nine, and Ten, and Eleven) and “the property involved”\nin the money laundering offense (Count Three). See POF at 3. The Government argued that\n$1.3 billion is a “conservative estimate of the . . . funds sent by individual victims to certain arms\nof the G Enterprise,” which included the Farm Loan Program, GTV, G Clubs, and the Himalaya\nExchange. Gov’t Mot. at 3; see Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A) (“If the government seeks a\npersonal money judgment, the court must determine the amount of money that the defendant will\nbe ordered to pay.”).\nThe Government also sought the forfeiture of certain property listed in the POF (the\n“Listed Property”), Gov’t Mot. at 4; POF at 3–11: “cash seized from several bank\naccounts . . . used in furtherance of [Guo’s] crimes and his racketeering enterprise,” which,\n2 Courts may impose money judgments in cases where criminal forfeiture is required. Where a defendant’s assets or\nidentifiable property may not cover the full amount of the proceeds that a forfeiture statute requires the defendant to\nforfeit, money judgments may be used to ensure that the defendant is held liable for the full amount of those\nproceeds. See, e.g., United States v. Kenner, 443 F. Supp. 3d 354, 362 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (“If the defendant lacks the\nassets to satisfy the order, the court can award the government a forfeiture money judgment.”); United States v.\nPeters, 732 F.3d 93, 98–99, 104 (2d Cir. 2013) (affirming entry of a money judgment in a case alleging forfeiture\nunder 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(2)); United States v. Kalish, 626 F.3d 165, 168–69 (2d Cir. 2010) (affirming entry of a\nmoney judgment in a case alleging forfeiture under 28 U.S.C. § 2461).\n3\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 15 of 37\n\naccording to the Government, represent “proceeds of the G Enterprise [(the racketeering\nenterprise defined in Count One)] and property involved in money laundering” (Count Three).\nGov’t Mot. at 4–5. The Government categorized these bank accounts based on the date they\nwere seized by the Government and the names in which the accounts were held; each of the\naccount holders “was named in the [superseding] [i]ndictment as a member of the RICO\nenterprise.” Id. at 4; see S3 Superseding Indictment ¶ 3(a). The Government attached several\nseizure warrant affidavits related to these accounts. See Gov’t Mot. Exs. B–E, ECF Nos. 716-2\nthrough 716-5; see also Proposed POF ¶¶ a–u, bb (listing bank accounts), ECF No. 716-1.\nThe Listed Property included a mansion located at 675 Ramapo Valley Road in Mahwah,\nNew Jersey, “its contents,” including, for example, an “Italian giltwood mirror with rococo crest\nwith cross-hatched panels,” and several other luxury items, such as a Bugatti, Lamborghini, and\nRolls-Royce. See Gov’t Mot. at 5–7; see also Proposed POF ¶ aa (listing “personal property\nseized by the Government from the [Mahwah] property”). The Government argued that the\nMahwah property, the personal property therein, and the luxury items were purchased with funds\ntraceable to G Clubs, the G Enterprise, or money laundering. See Gov’t Mot. at 5–7.\nGuo did not respond to the Government’s motion, and given that he had represented to\nthe Court that he was “unable to take a position with respect to issues regarding” forfeiture, on\nAugust 11, 2025, the Court entered the POF. See POF. Nearly a month later, on September 4,\n2025, Guo requested an opportunity “to address” “deficiencies” in the Government’s motion,\nsuch as “whether certain property is forfeitable,” “the issue of offsets,” and “the accuracy of the\ntotal amount the government seeks.” See ECF No. 724 at 1. By order dated January 8, 2026, the\nCourt directed Guo to file any objections and to specify “whether [Guo] claims a personal\n4\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 16 of 37\n\ninterest in any of” the Listed Property. ECF No. 784.3 Before the Court is Guo’s February 3,\n2026 submission. See Objs.\nLEGAL STANDARD\nWhen the Government seeks forfeiture in the form of a money judgment, the Court “must\ndetermine the amount of money that the defendant will be ordered to pay,” Fed. R. Crim. P.\n32.2(b)(1)(A), using “evidence already in the record,” id. 32.2(b)(1)(B), including the trial\nrecord. See United States v. Mathieu, 853 F. App’x 739, 742 (2d Cir. 2021). The calculation of\na forfeiture amount, however, “is not an exact science.” United States v. Treacy, 639 F.3d 32, 48\n(2d Cir. 2011). As a result, the Court need only make a “reasonable estimate” based on\n“available information” concerning the appropriate amount of forfeiture. Id.; see id. (noting,\nadditionally, that a court may “use general points of reference as a starting point” and “may\nmake reasonable extrapolations from the evidence established by a preponderance of the\nevidence” in evaluating a proposed money judgment); see also United States v. Uddin, 551 F.3d\n176, 180 (2d Cir. 2009).\nThe Court must determine forfeiture—both the proper money judgment amount and\nwhether forfeiture applies to the Listed Property—by a preponderance of the evidence. United\nStates v. Capoccia, 503 F.3d 103, 116 (2d Cir. 2007).\nDISCUSSION\nGuo raises several objections to the POF: (1) the “scope” of his alleged fraud is\noverbroad and includes those who were not victims of his crimes; (2) he “can only be ordered to\n3 The Government argues that Guo has waived any challenges to the POF due largely to his statement in his June 27,\n2025 letter that he was not taking a position as to forfeiture. See, e.g., Resp. at 3–4. The Court’s January 8 order did\nnot address waiver, and, because the Court largely concludes in this order that Guo’s challenges to the POF lack\nmerit and prefers to decide the issues on the merits, the Court expresses no view on whether Guo waived his\nobjections.\n5\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 17 of 37\n\nforfeit assets that he personally obtained”; (3) forfeiture should not cover any alleged proceeds\nfrom the GTV Private Placement because he was acquitted of two fraud counts related to GTV;\nand (4) the money judgment should be offset by certain amounts. See Objs. at 3, 9, 11, 17.\nThe Court finds that the Government has demonstrated by a preponderance of the\nevidence that approximately $889 million is a reasonable estimate of the gross inflows of cash\ninto the Farm Loan Program, G Clubs, and the Himalaya Exchange—all either components of\nthe racketeering conspiracy of which Guo was convicted or enterprises which formed the basis of\nhis fraud convictions—and that $889 million is, therefore, the proper money judgment amount in\nthis case. See Gov’t Mot. at 3; GXZ26, ECF No. 803-1; Trial Tr. at 4330–32;4 Fed. R. Crim. P.\n32(b)(1)(A).\nA. Scope\nThe Court rejects Guo’s argument that the POF should not include property traceable to\n“proceeds” from individuals who claim they “were not victimized” by his fraud. See Objs. at 3–\n4, 5.\nAs an initial matter, Guo assumes that forfeiture distinguishes between “investors who\nwere defrauded, and those who insist they were not.” Objs. at 4. It does not. Forfeiture, in this\ncase, applies to proceeds “from racketeering activity,” proceeds from “fraud,” and property\n“involved in” money laundering. See Resp. at 5 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963(a), 981(a)(1)(C), and\n982(a)(2)). Contrary to Guo’s claims, the scope of his crimes of conviction is not defined by the\n4 In his sentencing submission, Guo argues that exhibit GXZ26 does not account for the possible double-counting of\ninflows across various components of the G Enterprise. See, e.g., ECF No. 822 at 41,53 (claiming that individuals\ncould use Himalaya Exchange funds to purchase a G Club membership); see also ECF No. 826 (correcting\nsentencing submission). Guo does not cite any evidence showing that this occurred, or suggesting that the\nGovernment’s inflow calculation in fact improperly included contributions made from Himalaya Exchange accounts\nto G Clubs. Id. The Court, therefore, makes this determination on the evidence available in the record, which\ndemonstrates that the Government’s calculation is correct. And, in any event, this argument was not raised in Guo’s\nobjections to the forfeiture order. As such, the Court will not address this objection.\n6\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 18 of 37\n\n“expectations and reliance” of individual victims on his statements. Cf. Objs. at 5 (claiming that\n“individual investors’ expectations and reliance are critical to distinguishing between victims of\nfraud and those who were not victimized”).\nIndeed, the Second Circuit has held that “reliance is not an element of criminal fraud”\nand that “the unreasonableness of a fraud victim in relying (or not) on a misrepresentation does\nnot bear on a defendant’s criminal intent.” United States v. Weaver, 860 F.3d 90, 95–96 (2d Cir.\n2017). In other words, even if an alleged “investor” in a fraudulent scheme disclaims that they\nrelied on the false statements which underpinned the fraud, a fraudulent scheme may nonetheless\nexist, and all proceeds obtained from such a scheme would be subject to forfeiture. Relatedly, an\n“investor[’s]” subjective views as to whether they are victims of the scheme have no bearing on\nwhether their contributions to the scheme are “proceeds” that a defendant has obtained from\nfraud. All that matters is “materiality”—that the statements alleged to be fraudulent have the\n“natural tendency to influence the decisionmakers to whom they were addressed.” Weaver, 860\nF.3d at 96. And materiality is evaluated under an objective test, “rather than from the subjective\nperspective of the victim.” United States v. Frenkel, 682 F. App’x 20, 22 (2d Cir. 2017).\nThe Court’s conclusion is confirmed by the statutory definitions of the fraud crimes of\nconviction. Wire fraud criminalizes the knowing participation in any “scheme or artifice to\ndefraud” and the transmittal by wire of certain communications for “the purpose of executing\nsuch scheme or artifice [to defraud].” 18 U.S.C. § 1343; see July 9, 2024 Trial Tr. at 5791:25–\n5794:6, ECF No. 450. As for securities fraud, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)\nrule violated in this case, see S3 Superseding Indictment ¶¶ 47, 51, prohibits using a\n“scheme . . . to defraud,” “mak[ing] an untrue statement of material fact” or omitting a material\nfact in certain circumstances, or “engaging in an act, practice, or course of business which\n7\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 19 of 37\n\noperates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a)–(c)\n(emphasis added). See also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1999) (observing that\nCongress prohibited the “‘scheme to defraud,’ rather than the completed fraud,” in the fraud\nstatutes). In other words, the “scope” of Guo’s fraudulent schemes does not depend on whether\neach individual making contributions to those schemes believed they were defrauded. Their\nbeliefs as to whether their individual “investments” had material value, or as to whether they in\nfact relied on any material misrepresentations, do not affect whether those investments were\nmade in a fraudulent scheme.5\nThe cases cited by Guo, United States v. Miller, 997 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1993), and\nUnited States v. Rainford, 110 F.4th 455 (2d Cir. 2024), are inapposite. In Miller, the Second\nCircuit held that the Government failed to prove that the defendants intended to deprive a victim\nof a property interest on the facts shown at a trial for mail fraud because the property that the\ndefendants had allegedly diverted “to their own benefit” from the victims was not, in fact, “a\nspecific, identifiable property interest” belonging to the victims in the first place. Id. at 1017–\n1021. Miller, in other words, turned ultimately on the scope of the alleged victims’ contractual\nproperty interests, not on their expectations or beliefs, and, therefore, has no bearing here. See\nid. Rainford vacated and remanded a forfeiture order where a district court based its order solely\non “the government’s word.” 110 F.4th at 489. Here, by contrast, there is ample evidence\nsupporting the POF filed in this case.\nGuo further argues that there is “abundant proof that a considerable number of supposed\n‘victims’ reject that classification.” Objs. at 6–7. He claims that “6,512 members of the\n5 Guo does not argue otherwise—he neither discusses, nor even cites, the elements of his fraud convictions in the\nportion of his submission making this argument. See Objs. at 4–9.\n8\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 20 of 37\n\nHimalaya Exchange” (the enterprise for which Guo was convicted of wire fraud in Count\nEleven) “have objected to forfeiture of their accounts” and “express[] frustration at being labeled\nas victims.” Id. at 6. These complaints, as well as those from the “Hamilton petitioners” and\nvarious other third parties, do not affect this order, which addresses solely whether the properties\nidentified by the Government are, in fact, either proceeds of racketeering activity, proceeds of\nfraud, or traceable to funds involved in money laundering, and whether the $1.3 billion money\njudgment is a reasonable estimate of the value of Guo’s forfeiture obligations.6 Third-parties’\nalleged claims to the property identified in the POF shall be assessed through ancillary\nproceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 853(n) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2.\nB. Possession\nGuo argues that he “can only be held liable to forfeit the value of tainted proceeds to the\nextent that he at some point personally obtained them,” and that, for various reasons, there is\ninsufficient evidence that he “obtained” the property listed in the POF. Objs. at 10–11 (emphasis\nin original).\nGuo misunderstands the nature of forfeiture. For proceeds of a defendant’s crime to be\nforfeitable, the property “need not be personally or directly in the possession of the defendant,\nhis assignees, or his co-conspirators.” United States v. Contorinis, 692 F.3d 136, 147 (2d Cir.\n2012) (citation omitted). Instead, the property need only “have, at some point, been under the\ndefendant’s control.” Id. Further, property may be forfeited even when the defendant’s control\nover the property is temporary. See United States v. Tanner, 942 F.3d 60, 68 (2d Cir. 2019).\n6 The Court acknowledges the voluminous petitions filed under 18 U.S.C. § 853(n) seeking to assert a third-party’s\nlegal interest in property forfeited to the United States, and the Court expresses no opinion as to whether any\npetitioner’s claim, properly made and submitted under § 853(n), is meritorious.\n9\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 21 of 37\n\nAt trial, the Government proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Guo was the\n“Boss” in control of all of the entities in the G Enterprise and those entities’ assets. Resp. at 7.7\nFor example, testimony from several witnesses shows that Guo exercised control over assets\ninvolved in the G Enterprise: Karin Maistrello testified that Guo was in control of the Rule of\nLaw organizations’ funds, a scheme involved in the G Enterprise (see Trial Tr. at 424); multiple\nwitnesses testified that Guo had control over G Clubs (see Trial Tr. at 1941 (describing Guo as\nthe “top boss”), 1995:3–15, 1996:2–5 (clarification at sidebar), 1999:4–7, 2975:8–2976:10,\n2980:11–22, 2999:20–3000:6 (testimony concerning G Clubs)); and abundant documentary\nevidence supports the conclusion that Guo exercised control over the funds involved in his\ncrimes (see GXC415; Resp. at 7 n.3 (citing trial exhibits depicting Guo exercising control over\nfunds involved in the G Enterprise)).8\nThe documentary evidence introduced at trial, see, e.g., GXZ26 (showing cash flows\nfrom certain G Enterprise bank accounts into other bank accounts which are listed in the POF),\nalso establishes that the particular accounts that the Government argues are subject to forfeiture\ncontain funds derived from proceeds of the G Enterprise and property involved in money\nlaundering. See Mot. at 4–5. Notably, Guo does not argue that the funds in these accounts hold\n7 Additionally, under each statute serving as the basis for forfeiture in this case, the Court need only find that Guo\nobtained the proceeds “directly or indirectly.” See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963(a)(3), 981(a)(2)(A), 982(a)(2).\n8 Guo’s sole argument regarding the trial record is that one witness “testified that . . . Guo was not the ultimate\nbeneficial owner of G Clubs, nor was he the source of funds for G Clubs or G Fashion.” Objs. at 10–11. That\nwitness, James R. Collins Jr., was an employee at Mercantile Global Holdings, a company which owned a bank that\nmaintained client relationships with G Clubs, G Fashion, and the Himalaya Exchange. See Trial Tr. at 2753:8–\n2756:15. But Collins only testified that Mercantile Bank believed that Guo was not the ultimate beneficial owner of\nG Clubs and that G Clubs had represented as much to him. See Trial Tr. at 2758:23–2762:12. He did not testify as\nto any personal knowledge of the inner workings of G Clubs, or whether Guo, in fact, exercised control over G\nClubs funds. The Court, therefore, accords Collins’ testimony minimal weight. Guo also attempts to incorporate by\nreference arguments made by third parties who have filed ancillary claims to assets subject to forfeiture under 21\nU.S.C. § 853(n). See Objs. at 11. The Court will consider those arguments as part of the ancillary proceedings that\nshall be conducted after sentencing pursuant to §853(n) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2. The Court\nexpresses no opinion as to whether any third party has a superior legal interest in any forfeited property.\n10\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 22 of 37\n\nmoney which is not derived from entities involved in the G Enterprise. See POF ¶¶ a–z, bb;\nObjs. at 9–11 (instead arguing solely that he did not personally obtain or exercise control over\nthese funds).\nGuo relies in substantial part on Honeycutt v. United States, 581 U.S. 443 (2017), to\nsupport his argument that he cannot be ordered to “forfeit assets that he [did not] personally\nobtain[].” Obj. at 9. In that case, the Supreme Court held that 21 U.S.C. § 853, which requires\nforfeiture of any property derived from proceeds of certain drug crimes, does not automatically\nimpose joint and several liability on all convicted parties of a conspiracy. See 581 U.S. at 443.\nIn Honeycutt, the government sought a money judgment against a defendant, arguing that\nhe was liable for the entirety of a conspiracy’s profits, even though the defendant was merely a\nsalaried employee who had assisted his store’s participation in a drug crime, and never benefited\nfrom, let alone exercised control over, the extent of the store’s tainted profits. See id. at 445–47.\nHere, however, the Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that Guo benefitted from and\nexercised control over the funds that the Government maintains are subject to forfeiture. See,\ne.g., Resp. at 7–8 n.3 (citing trial evidence noting, for example, that Guo directed his co-\nconspirators to use “G-Club or another private company” to finance the purchase of an expensive\ncoffee table). Indeed, since Honeycutt, the Second Circuit has reiterated that the Government\nneed not show that a defendant personally retained or directly possessed property for forfeiture to\napply. See, e.g., Rajaratnam v. United States, 736 F. App’x 279, 284 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding\nthat a forfeiture order could be imposed against a defendant for funds over which the defendant\nonly had temporary authority and which had subsequently been disbursed).\nThe Court, therefore, finds that the Government has demonstrated by a preponderance of\nthe evidence that the Listed Property is subject to forfeiture.\n11\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 23 of 37\n\nC. GTV Private Placement and SEC Disgorgement\nGuo argues that funds derived from the GTV Private Placement should not be included in\nthe forfeiture order and that the money judgment against Guo should be reduced by the amount\nof funds the Government alleges were involved in GTV. See Objs. at 17.9 Guo contends that\nbecause he was acquitted of wire and securities fraud in connection with the GTV Private\nPlacement, $411 million in funds derived from the GTV Private Placement that the Government\nseeks to forfeit should be excluded from the order. Id. at 11–12; Resp. at 8.\nThe Court need not resolve this in light of another issue raised by the parties: whether the\nmoney judgment against Guo should be reduced by the amount already recovered by the SEC in\nadministrative proceedings. See SEC Order, ECF No. 799-2. Guo states that GTV has already\ndisgorged in excess of $411 million as part of an administrative proceeding initiated by the SEC.\nSee Objs. at 17–18. The Government concedes this, in part, stating that “[t]he actual funds\nderived from the GTV [P]rivate [P]lacement were recovered by the SEC, which established a fair\nfund for distribution to victims,” and that “[i]f the Court were to deduct the GTV [P]rivate\n[P]lacement funds from the forfeiture amount, approximately $411 million would be deducted.”\nMot. at 4 n.2.\nHowever, the parties’ figures diverge. Guo argues that GTV, along with Saraca Media\nGroup, Inc. and Voice of Guo Media, Inc., has disgorged over $486 million to the SEC and that\nthe full $486 million should be deducted from the money judgment because it relates to conduct\ncharged in this case. See Objs. at 18. The Government, however, contends that only $411\n9 Guo does not claim that a specific bank account, or item of personal property, solely constitutes proceeds from the\nGTV Private Placement, see generally Objs. The Government maintains that all of the relevant funds are proceeds\nof the G Enterprise and property involved in money laundering. See Mot. at 4–5. Guo does not argue that any of\nthe Listed Property should be excluded from forfeiture on this basis, and the Court, therefore, only examines how\nthe disgorgement affects the money judgment.\n12\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 24 of 37\n\nmillion of the $1.3 billion figure derives from the GTV Private Placement and that the remaining\n$889 million derives from proceeds traceable to the Farm Loan Program, G Clubs, or the\nHimalaya Exchange. See GXZ26. The fact that GTV and other entities disgorged $75 million\nmore than $411 million is relevant to the money judgment only if the excess $75 million is\ntraceable to proceeds from the fraudulent schemes involved in this case, namely, the Farm Loan\nProgram, G Clubs, or the Himalaya Exchange.\nThe Court rejects Guo’s arguments that the purported $75 million disgorged in excess of\n$411 million is traceable to his crimes of conviction. First, he claims that $34 million of the total\ndisgorged funds relate to sales of “G-Coins and G-Dollars,” early precursors to the Himalaya\nExchange. See Objs. at 17–18. However, the sale of G-Coin and G-Dollars from April to June\nof 2020 is not covered by the Indictment, which targets the Himalaya Exchange enterprise\ntransactions that took place from 2021 to 2023. See S3 Superseding Indictment ¶ 53.\nMoreover, Guo provides no evidence that the $115 million in disgorged funds\nattributable to Voice of Guo Media, Inc. (“VOG”) “overlaps with the so-called Farm Loan\nProgram.” Objs. at 17–18. The SEC Order reports that VOG pooled funds from “prospective\ninvestors” who wanted to invest less than $100,000 in GTV. See Objs. at 17–18; SEC Order\n¶¶ 15–21, ECF No. 799-2. The Indictment’s description of the Farm Loan Program, however,\ndiffers substantially from the SEC Order’s description of VOG’s fundraising efforts. Compare,\ne.g., S3 Superseding Indictment ¶ 17 (describing “The Himalaya Farm Alliance” as “a collective\nof informal groups (each known as a ‘Farm’) located in various cities around the world” which\nobtained investments “in the form of ‘loans’ to a Farm” and “promising that such loans would be\nconvertible into GTV common stock” via a “Loan Agreement”) with SEC Order ¶¶ 16–18\n(describing how VOG would provide an investor a one-page “Limited Purpose Agency\n13\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 25 of 37\n\nAgreement,” stating that, for minimal consideration, a representative of VOG would act as an\n“agent” for investors and purchase GTV stock on their behalf).\nAlthough Guo is correct that the SEC obtained $75 million more than $411 million from\nGTV and related companies, he has not shown that this surplus coincides with any of the\nproceeds that the Government has demonstrated are related to Guo’s crimes of conviction—that\nis, the Farm Loan Program, G Clubs, and the Himalaya Exchange.\nThe Court concludes, therefore, that only $411 million may be deducted from the\nproposed money judgment, because the record reflects—and the Government does not contest—\nthat $411 million in funds traceable to the GTV Private Placement has already been disgorged by\nentities related to the G Enterprise in separate proceedings prior to the commencement of this\ncriminal case. This deduction does not affect the forfeiture of any of the Listed Property.\nD. Offsets\nGuo argues that the money judgment should be “already offset by the more than\n$1 billion already in the Government’s possession in connection with this case” and by the\n“funds and assets in the Bankruptcy Trustee’s possession that are among the items the\nGovernment deems forfeitable in this case.” Objs. at 18–20. In response, the Government notes\nthat the value of property “forfeited to the United States under a Final Order of Forfeiture” will,\nindeed “be applied towards the satisfaction of the [m]oney [j]udgment” once all third-party\ninterests are adjudicated, and that there is no authority to order an offset for any assets not\n14\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 26 of 37\n\ncovered by the POF. See Resp. at 10 & n.7; POF ¶ 7.10 Accordingly, the Court will not deduct\nthe value of any of the Listed Property from the money judgment at this time.11\nE. Ancillary Matters\nGuo also seeks an order directing the Government to take possession of certain assets (the\n“bankruptcy assets”) from the Chapter 11 Trustee of Guo’s estate in bankruptcy proceedings,\nwhich were commenced on February 15, 2022, in the District of Connecticut. See Seizure Mot.,\nECF No. 724, at 1; see generally In re Kwok, No. 22 Bk. 50073 (D. Conn. Bankr. February 15,\n2022); In re Kwok, 172 F.4th 145 (2d Cir. 2026). Guo argues that the Government’s interest in\nthe forfeited assets is “superior to that of any creditor in the bankruptcy proceeding,” Seizure\nMot. at 5, that ordering the Government to seize the bankruptcy assets will both “make them\navailable to investors in the various entities involved in this case, and for whom restitution will\nbe ordered” and “halt the accumulation of considerable fees and expenses incurred by the\nTrustee” in the bankruptcy proceeding. See id. at 5–7.\nThe Court does not have the power to grant the relief Guo requests.12 Guo merely cites\nFederal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(3) for the proposition that the Court “may include\n. . . conditions reasonably necessary to preserve the property’s value pending any appeal” in a\npreliminary order of forfeiture. See Seizure Reply at 4, ECF No. 754. Rule 32.2(b)(3) limits the\n10 Guo also argues that if the Court finds, in ancillary proceedings, that any property belongs to a third party, the\nvalue of that property should be deducted from the money judgment. Objs. at 18. Not so. Third-party forfeiture\nproceedings are designed to determine if a third party possesses a superior legal interest in the property subject to\nforfeiture. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6); Gov’t Forfeiture Ltr. at 1–2, ECF No. 785. That is a separate question from\nwhether the assets are forfeitable. Property may well have come under Guo’s control due to, for example, fraud,\neven though a third party possessed a superior legal interest in that property. Therefore, if the Court finds that any\nproperty belongs to a third party under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6), it will not deduct the value of that property from the\nmoney judgment.\n11 The Court denies Guo’s request to reduce the money judgment “to the extent the Government has declined to\npursue other potentially forfeitable assets in this case,” and to reduce the money judgment by the amount forfeited\nby Haithem Khaled. See Objs. at 19–21. Guo offers no legal basis for either of these requests.\n12 The Court expresses no opinion on the Government’s argument that Guo lacks standing on this issue.\n15\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 27 of 37\n\nCourt’s authority to conditions required to preserve the property’s value on “appeal,” rather than\nconditions required to preserve value pending related, separate proceedings—like the bankruptcy\nproceeding here.\nFurthermore, several other procedural features of the forfeiture rules indicate that such an\norder would exceed the Court’s power. For example, Rule 32.2(b)(3) “authorizes” the\nGovernment “to seize the specific property subject to forfeiture” upon entry of a preliminary\norder but does not require that the Government do so. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(3). Nor does\nRule 32.2 state when, or how, the Government may seize property listed in a forfeiture order\nonce it is authorized to do so under Rule 32.2(b)(3). Likewise, 21 U.S.C. § 853(e) and (f)\nempower the Court to take certain protective measures concerning assets potentially subject to\nforfeiture, but do not authorize the Court to compel the Government to enact a seizure. See\nResp. at 4.\nMoreover, Guo’s request lacks merit. Guo argues that the Court may impose conditions\n“reasonably necessary to preserve the property’s value pending any appeal,” Seizure Reply at 4,\nbut nothing in Rule 32.2 requires the Court to do so. Although the Court acknowledges that the\nChapter 11 Estate in the bankruptcy proceeding has incurred fees owed to the Trustee and\nvarious other professionals, see Seizure Mot. at 7, such fees are not unusual given the remarkable\ncomplexity of that proceeding. See id. (claiming that 300 adversary proceedings have been filed\nin the bankruptcy proceeding).\nF. Restitution\nThe Government requests that the Court find that imposing a restitution order would be\nimpracticable and authorize a remission process. See Gov’t Ltr. at 4–5, ECF No. 785; ECF\nNo. 784 (January 8, 2026 order). Guo agrees. ECF No. 789 at 3. The Court agrees and finds,\n16\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 28 of 37\n\nbased on the extensive record in this case, that given the “complexity of the case and the number\nof victims involved,” awarding restitution to victims in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3663A\nwould be impractical and would complicate or prolong the sentencing process. See 18 U.S.C.\n§ 3663(c)(3)(A)–(B).\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the Government has demonstrated\nthat forfeiture applies to the Listed Property due to Guo’s convictions for racketeering\nconspiracy, wire and securities fraud, and conspiracy to commit money laundering. The Court\nSUSTAINS Guo’s objections to the extent that the Court shall deduct $411 million from the $1.3\nbillion proposed money judgment, such that the money judgment in the final order of forfeiture\nshall be $889 million.\nThe Court DENIES Guo’s motion at ECF No. 724 seeking an order compelling the\nGovernment to seize assets in the bankruptcy proceedings. The Clerk of Court is respectfully\ndirected to terminate the motion at ECF No. 724.\nFinally, the Court finds that restitution is impracticable in this case and authorizes the\nGovernment to compensate victims through a remission process.\nSO ORDERED.\nDated: June 29, 2026\nNew York, New York\n17\n\nCase: 25-3046,E 0m7/0a1i/l2 0s2c6r, eDektnEnsthryo: 4t1.1, Page 29 of 37\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 30 of 37\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\nUnited States of America,\nv.\nHo Wan Kwok, a/k/a Miles Guo, et al.,\nDefendants.\nCase No. 1:23-cr-00118-AT\nEMERGENCY MOTION FOR RECUSAL OF THE HONORABLE ANALISA TORRES\nPursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (Must Be Resolved Prior to June 29,2026\nSentencing)\npetitioner Jason Zen, appearing pro se as a third-party claimant under 21 U.S.C. §\n853(n) and as an affected person who has repeatedly attempted to participate\nthrough submissions to this Court, respectfully moves for recusal of the presiding\njudge from further proceedings in this matter. This motion is filed on an emergency\nbasis because sentencing is scheduled for June 29, 2026, and the appearance-of-\nimpartiality issue should be resolved before the Court proceeds further on a record\nalready marked by unresolved docketing disputes, privacy breaches, and pending\nappellate supervision.\nThis motion does not ask the Court to concede the merits of every accusation\nraised by Movant or by other participants. It asks only whether, from the\nstandpoint of an objective observer fully informed of the procedural history, the\nCourt's impartiality might reasonably be questioned after months of selective non-\ndocketing of pro se submissions, public exposure of protected personal information\ndespite requests for sealing or redaction, continued inaction after documented\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 31 of 37\nallegations of record contamination and Brady-related concerns, and the decision\nto press ahead with sentencing while related appellate proceedings remain active.\nI. Governing standard\nSection 455(a) requires a federal judge to disqualify herself in any proceeding in\nwhich her impartiality might reasonably be questioned. The test is objective and\nturns not on the judge's subjective intent, but on whether a reasonable observer\naware of the relevant facts would harbor substantial doubt about neutrality.\nThat standard is concerned not only with actual bias but also with the appearance\ncreated by a pattern of procedural choices. Where repeated acts affecting one\nclass of participants, one side of the record, or one set of safety interests\naccumulate into a coherent appearance of partiality, recusal is required to preserve\npublic confidence in the integrity of the proceedings.\nII. Systematic Exclusion of Pro Se Third-Party Submissions\nMovant and other pro se third parties have submitted multiple filings under 21\nU.S.C. § 853(n), the CVRA, and related procedural theories concerning forfeiture,\nvictim identification, loss calculations, and record completeness. These filings were\nsent to the Court and served on the Government and defense counsel, yet most\nwere not placed on the docket. By contrast, attorney-filed submissions addressing\nsimilar issues were routinely docketed and considered. This pattern has produced\n16 pending mandamus petitions in the Second Circuit, all arising from the same\npattern of selective non-docketing, and has created a record in which only one side\nof the record is permitted to mature into an adjudicable form.\nIII. The Court's handling of personal identifying information creates a serious\nappearance of retaliatory or arbitrary treatment\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 32 of 37\nMovant previously asked that personal identity information and investment details\nbe filed under seal because public disclosure could create safety risks, including\nrisks associated with the Chinese Communist Party and with public exposure of a\nmainland Chinese investor's identity and financial data. That request was explicit\nand tied to Rule 49.1-style privacy concerns and the Court's inherent authority to\nprotect sensitive information.\nIn Movant's supplemental mandamus filing, Movant described that the Southern\nDistrict uploaded his Second Circuit mandamus filing to the district-court docket as\nDkt. 770 and, in doing so, publicly disclosed personal identifying information\ndespite an accompanying request for redaction or sealing. The same filing also\ndescribed comparable treatment of other pro se petitioners, including public\nexposure of unredacted information in Dkts. 732 and 765.\nWhether or not each disclosure was intentional in a subjective sense, the\nappearance is deeply troubling. An objective observer could reasonably question\nneutrality when a court that receives explicit privacy requests from unrepresented\npetitioners nonetheless places sensitive identifying information into the public\nrecord, especially where those petitioners have simultaneously been seeking\nappellate review of the court's docketing practices.\nIV. Movant previously raised Brady-related and record-contamination concerns\nthat were never meaningfully addressed on the district-court docket\nMovant's earlier submissions, later reproduced in the renewed mandamus\nappendix, stated that on August 13, 2025 Movant sent prosecutors materials\nidentified as potentially favorable to the defense and requested disclosure under\nBrady and Giglio, then followed up with defense counsel on August 29, 2025 after\nreceiving no acknowledgment. Those materials included concerns about selective\nuse of livestream statements, contacts between Trustee Luc Despins and the U.S.\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 33 of 37\nAttorney's Office, the role of attorney Geyer in presenting large claimant groups,\nand the possibility that centrally organized claims had distorted the victim picture\nplaced before the Court.\nMovant also filed a motion seeking intervention for the limited purpose of formally\nrecording the submission of Brady-related material and asking the Court to require\nconfirmation of disclosure. According to the renewed mandamus record, that\nmotion likewise was not ordinarily docketed and therefore did not receive the sort\nof transparent judicial handling that would reassure an outside observer that\nadverse or inconvenient information had been considered in a neutral manner.\nThe point here is not that this Court was required to adopt Movant's view of the\nevidence. The point is that the combination of non-docketing and silence on\nsubmissions challenging the completeness of the Government's narrative can\ncreate a reasonable appearance that only one side of the procedural record is\npermitted to mature into an adjudicable form.\nV.This Court's decision to press ahead with sentencing despite active Second\nCircuit supervision further undermines the appearance of impartiality\nThe present recusal issue cannot be evaluated in isolation from the parallel\nappellate proceedings already underway in the Second Circuit. This criminal case\nhas generated an extraordinary volume of mandamus petitions, emergency stay\nrequests, and related supervisory filings arising from the District Court's handling of\npro se submissions, privacy issues, third-party participation, and unresolved\nprocedural disputes.\nOne set of related proceedings included No. 25-3046, in which the Second Circuit,\non May 15, 2026, denied prior mandamus relief without prejudice and expressly\npermitted renewal if the District Court failed to docket the relevant submissions\nwithin a reasonable time. The renewed petition has since been filed because the\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 34 of 37\nDistrict Court still did not docket the previously submitted materials even after that\norder and the passage of additional time.\nAt the same time, other petitioners in related proceedings have sought emergency\nrelief from the Court of Appeals on overlapping grounds, including nondocketing,\nprivacy violations, improper handling of victim and third-party submissions,\nrequests for stays, and requests that the presiding judge be removed or recused.\nThe significance of that procedural landscape is not merely quantitative. It means\nthat the conduct of this Court is already the subject of ongoing supervisory\nattention by the Court of Appeals in multiple pending matters.\nDespite that posture, this Court denied adjournment and announced on June 25,\n2026 that sentencing would proceed on June 29, 2026. In the same order, the\nCourt stated that it could make the factual findings necessary for sentencing\nwithout an evidentiary hearing, that Brady and Rule 17(c) disputes did not justify\ndelay, and that resolution of third-party petitions under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) and the\nspecial-master issue was not required before sentencing\nThat sequence matters. When a district court knows that the Court of Appeals is\nalready reviewing, or being asked to review, whether pro se filings were improperly\nexcluded from the record, whether third-party participation has been mishandled,\nwhether emergency stays are needed, and whether reassignment or recusal is\nwarranted, yet nevertheless accelerates the case toward sentencing before those\nsupervisory proceedings can run their course, a reasonable observer may conclude\nthat the court is attempting to move the case past a critical threshold before\neffective appellate review can occur.\nThis is especially so here because some of the emergency filings in the Court of\nAppeals have expressly raised judicial-removal or recusal concerns, and others seek\nto prevent sentencing from going forward before unresolved procedural defects\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 35 of 37\nare addressed. Proceeding to sentencing in the face of that appellate posture does\nnot merely create tension with ordinary case management. It creates the\nappearance that the District Court is disregarding the practical significance of the\nappellate court's ongoing supervisory role.\nAn objective observer could therefore reasonably see the June 25 order not as a\nneutral scheduling determination, but as part of a broader procedural pattern: pro\nse filings are not timely docketed; related participation and record-integrity issues\nremain unresolved; multiple appellate proceedings remain active; some of those\nproceedings explicitly seek recusal or removal; yet sentencing is pressed forward\nanyway before those matters can be meaningfully sorted out.\nUnder § 455(a), that appearance is itself disqualifying. The issue is not whether\nevery pending appellate filing will ultimately succeed. The issue is whether a\nreasonable person, fully informed of the surrounding circumstances, would\nquestion the impartiality of a court that continues toward final sentencing while\nhigher-court supervision over its own procedural conduct remains actively pending.\nOn the present record, the answer is yes.\nVI. Recusal is required to preserve confidence in any further proceedings\nThis motion does not rest on disagreement with a single ruling. It rests on the\ncumulative appearance produced by repeated exclusion of pro se third-party filings\nfrom the ordinary docket, public handling of sensitive identifying information\ndespite sealing requests, the absence of meaningful district-court engagement with\nBrady-related and record-integrity concerns raised by Movant, and the decision to\nproceed toward sentencing while the Second Circuit is still supervising related\ndocketing disputes in No. 25-3046.Even if each event might be defended in\nisolation, the issue under § 455(a) is the appearance seen by a reasonable observer\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 36 of 37\nwho views the record as a whole. On that record, substantial doubt about\nimpartiality is no longer speculative.\nRelief requested\nMovant respectfully requests that the Court:\n1. Recuse ANALISA TORRES from further proceedings in this matter pursuant to\n28 U.S.C. § 455(a);\n2. If the Court declines to recuse, issue a prompt written order stating the\ngrounds for denial before sentencing proceeds, so that the issue is preserved\nfor immediate review;\n3. Direct the Clerk to ensure that all previously submitted pro se filings identified\nin Movant's mandamus materials are preserved and appropriately handled as\npart of the record;\n4. Grant such other and further relief as may be just and proper.\nRespectfully submitted,\nJason Zen\nPetitioner,pro se\n6.27.2026\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 37 of 37\nCertificate of Service\nUnited States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit\nCase No: 25-3046\nSDNY Case: United States v. Kwok, et al., 1:23-CR-118-1 (AT)\nI, Jason Zen, hereby certify as follows:\nOn July 1, 2026, I mailed the true and correct copy of the following\ndocuments:\n1. EMERGENCY MOTION TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT OF SENTENCE\nAND FOR AN IMMEDIATE ADMINISTRATIVE STAY PENDING\nAPPELLATE REVIEW\n2. SDNY Dkt.858\n3. EMERGENCY MOTION FOR RECUSAL OF THE HONORABLE ANALISA\nTORRES Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (Must Be Resolved Prior to\nJune 29,2026 Sentencing)\nTo\nJuliana Murray\nDirect: 212-637-2203\nUnited States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York One\nSaint Andrew's Plaza Room 739 New York, NY 10007\nJustin Horton\nDirect: 212-637-2200\nDOJ-USAO Southern District of New York One St. Andrews Plaza New\nYork, NY 10007\nNathan Rehn\nDirect: 212-637-2354\nUnited States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York 26\nFederal Plaza 37th Floor New York, NY 10278\nRespectfully submitted,\nJason Zen\n_____________________","body_zh":null,"key_entities":["Guo","forfeiture","GTV","G Clubs","Himalaya","Pro Se","pro se","853(n)","Himalaya Exchange","CIPA","Farm Loan","Kwok","Brady","Rule 32.2","Torres","CVRA","Miles Guo","Ho Wan Kwok","Analisa Torres","Geyer","Despins","Luc Despins","Horton","Murray","Saraca","Chinese Communist Party","Crime Victim","RICO","Giglio"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":307,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":395,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":450,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":684,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":710,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":713,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":716,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":720,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":724,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":754,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":770,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":784,"court":"2Cir"},{"doc_number":785,"court":"2Cir"},{"doc_number":789,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":799,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":803,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":804,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":822,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":826,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":858,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":10502,"status":"published","published_at":"2026-06-29 00:00:00","created_at":"2026-06-29","updated_at":"2026-08-17 09:56:37"}