{"id":"court_2cir_25-3046_dkt_41","court":"2Cir","case_no":"25-3046","doc_number":41,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"FORFEITURE","filed_date":"2026-06-29","title":"Case: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 1 of 37 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT","summary_zh":"紧急动议 —— 美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）案，2Cir 25-3046 ECF #41（2026-06-29立案）。利害关系第三方主张人 Jason Zen 自行提请动议，请求第二巡回上诉法院撤销地方法院作出的刑事判决，并对相关没收、赔偿及受害者分配程序申请紧急行政中止。动议主张地方法院在多项监督请愿未决的情况下强行推进判决，出具未经核实的8.89亿美元没收令（ECF #858），且违反了《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第32条的 mandatory 事实认定要求。","summary_en":"Emergency motion — United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo), 2Cir 25-3046 ECF #41 (filed 2026-06-29). Interested third-party claimant Jason Zen moves pro se to vacate the criminal sentence imposed by the district court and requests an immediate administrative stay of related forfeiture, restitution, and victim-allocation proceedings pending appellate review. The motion alleges the district court rushed sentencing while supervisory petitions were pending, issued an unverified $889 million forfeiture order (ECF No. 858), and committed structural Rule 32 violations.","body_en":"Case: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 1 of 37\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT\nThurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse 40 Foley Square, New York, NY 10007 Telephone: 212-857-8500\nMOTION INFORMATION STATEMENT\nDocket Number(s): Caption [use short title]\nMotion for:\nSet forth below precise, complete statement of relief sought:\nMOVING PARTY: OPPOSING PARTY:\nPlaintiff Defendant\nAppellant/Petitioner Appellee/Respondent\nMOVING ATTORNEY: OPPOSING ATTORNEY:\n[name of attorney, with firm, address, phone number and e-mail]\nCourt- Judge/ Agency appealed from:\nPlease check appropriate boxes: FOR EMERGENCY MOTIONS, MOTIONS FOR STAYS AND\nINJUCTIONS PENDING APPEAL:\nHas movant notified opposing counsel (required by Local Rule 27.1):\nHas this request for relief been made below? Yes No\nYes No (explain):\nHas this relief been previously sought in this court? Yes No\nRequested return date and explanation of emergency:\nThe District Court forced sentencing today (June 29), intentionally racing to\nOpposing counsel’s position on motion:\nmoot this Court’s pending mandamus and stay review. The court issued an\nUnopposed Opposed Don’t Know unverified $889M order (ECF 858), refused to rule on double-counting,\nDoes opposing counsel intend to file a response: denied 50 PSR objections, and suppressed 7 pending recusal motions.\nYes _No Don’t Know Without an immediate administrative stay, these structural Rule 32 and\nprocess failures will permanently lock into final judgment. This will cause\nimmediate, irreversible harm to the statutory CVRA and § 853(n) rights of\nthousands of victims before this Court can act.\nIs the oral argument on motion requested? Yes No (requests for oral argument will not necessarily be granted)\nHas the appeal argument date been set? Yes No If yes, enter date:\nSignature of Moving Attorney:\nDate: Service : Electronic Other [Attach proof of service]\nForm T-1080 (rev. 10-23)\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 2 of 37\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT\nDocket No. 25-3046\nIn re JASON ZEN, Petitioner,\nRelated to S.D.N.Y. Criminal Case No. 1:23-cr-00118-AT\nEMERGENCY MOTION TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT OF\nSENTENCE AND FOR AN IMMEDIATE ADMINISTRATIVE\nSTAY PENDING APPELLATE REVIEW\nPursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and the inherent\nsupervisory powers of this Court, Petitioner Jason Zen, proceeding pro se\nas an interested third-party claimant, respectfully and on an emergency\nbasis moves this Court to VACATE the judgment of sentence imposed by\nthe United States District Court for the Southern District of New York\n(S.D.N.Y.) on June 29, 2026, in United States v. Ho Wan Kwok, No.\n1:23-cr-00118-AT, and for an IMMEDIATE ADMINISTRATIVE STAY of all\nrelated forfeiture, restitution, and victim-allocation proceedings pending\nthe final disposition of the extraordinary volume of active, unresolved\npetitions before this Court.\nINTRODUCTION & SUMMARY OF THE EMERGENCY\nThis motion presents a profound constitutional and procedural crisis\nthat demands immediate appellate correction. On the very day of\nsentencing, June 29, 2026, the District Court executed a calculated \"race\nagainst the appellate clock,\" culminating in the issuance of an\nextraordinary 17-page Preliminary Order of Forfeiture (POF) (ECF No.\n858)(See Exhibit A) immediately followed by the entry of a final criminal\njudgment.\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 3 of 37\nThe District Court's actions constitute a direct, aggressive bypass of the\nSecond Circuit's active supervisory authority. At the exact moment the\nDistrict Court imposed sentence and finalized an staggering\n$889,000,000 personal money judgment (ECF No. 858), it was fully\naware that this Court held active jurisdiction over:\n1. 16 Mandamus Petitions arising directly from this underlying\nmatter;\n2. 10 Emergency Stay Applications;\n3. 9 Administrative Stay Applications; and\n4. Multiple unresolved emergency motions for judicial recusal,\nincluding Petitioner's multi-layered requests to both the Second\nCircuit and the Southern District.\nBy forcing this case across the final threshold of criminal sentencing\nwhile these extensive supervisory actions remained pending, the District\nCourt attempted to render this Court’s review completely academic by\npresenting a fait accompli. To achieve this \"racing,\" the District Court\nsystematically trampled upon the mandatory fact-finding frameworks of\nFederal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 (Rule 32), leaving a massive $889\nmillion deficit completely unverified and stripping thousands of\nstakeholders of their statutory participation rights. To preserve the\nintegrity of the federal judiciary, this Court must immediately vacate the\njudgment below.\nI. THE DISTRICT COURT’S SYSTEMATIC VIOLATIONS OF FED. R. CRIM. P.\n32 AS MANIFESTED IN ECF NO. 858\nFederal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 is a rigid, mandatory framework\ndesigned to guarantee that no criminal sentence is predicated on\nspeculative or unverified factual records. The District Court’s June 29\nOrder (ECF No. 858) contains smoking-gun admissions of structural Rule\n32 violations:\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 4 of 37\nA. The District Court’s Wholesale, Summary Rejection of 50 Material\nObjections and Arbitrary Redefinition of Victim Loss Violates Rule\n32(i)(3)(B)\nDuring the sentencing hearing on June 29, 2026, the District Court’s\nprocedural shortcuts reached a crescendo of constitutional defiance.\nFaced with fifty (50) distinct, material factual objections raised by the\ndefendant to the Presentence Report (PSR)—each capable of shifting\nthe Guidelines calculation—the District Court summarily stated: 'I deny\nMr. Kwok’s objections.' This wholesale dismissal, completely devoid of\nitemized, on-the-record factual findings or explicit statements of\nnon-reliance, represents a textbook violation of the mandatory\ncommands of Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B). Furthermore, the District\nCourt explicitly declared from the bench: ' I do not consider whether a\nperson subjectively considers themselves a victim in order ot consider\ntheirs as loss. So the actual and intended loss both exceed $550 million.\nMr. Guo makes 50 other objections to the PSR. I reject Mr. Guo's\nobjections.'\nhttp\nThis unilateral, paternalistic declaration is legally untenable. By flatly\nrefusing to consider the subjective status and evidence of the actual\ncapital providers—thousands of whom explicitly asserted they suffered\nno loss—the District Court engineered a completely fabricated and\nunverified $550 million loss threshold to drastically inflate the sentence.\nTo sentence a defendant by intentionally blinding the court to the direct\ninput of the purported victims violates the foundational core of both\nRule 32 verification and the CVRA, rendering the final sentence\nstructurally defective.\"\nB. Blatant Violation of Rule 32(i)(3)(B): Explicit Discretionary Refusal to\nRule on Material Controverted Disputes\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 5 of 37\nRule 32(i)(3)(B) dictates that for any disputed portion of the presentence\nreport or other controverted matter, the sentencing court must rule on\nthe dispute prior to sentencing. The District Court explicitly broke this\nrule. In ECF No. 858, Page 6, Footnote 4, the District Court acknowledges\nthat the underlying inflows used to calculate the astronomical personal\nliability are heavily contested due to the \"possible double-counting of\ninflows across various components of the G Enterprise.\" Yet, the\nDistrict Court summarily stated that because this structural objection\nwas not raised in a specific prior submission, \"the Court will not address\nthis objection.\" A district court cannot use forfeiture technicalities to\nescape the mandatory command of Rule 32(i)(3)(B). By leaving a\nmulti-hundred-million-dollar fund duplication dispute completely\nunruled upon, the District Court sentenced the defendant based on a\nstructurally unreliable financial record.\nC. Violation of Rule 32(i)(2): Arbitrary Denial of an Evidentiary Hearing\nFaced with an Untraceable $889 Million Judgement\nRule 32(i)(2) guarantees the right to introduce evidence on contested\nsentencing factors. In ECF No. 858, the District Court finalized a\n$889,000,000 Personal Money Judgment against the defendant. Yet, the\nface of the same order reveals that the Bankruptcy Trustee in parallel\nproceedings has launched over 300 adversary proceedings and drained\nmassive professional fees over 3.5 years without ever locating or\nsecuring these purported personal funds (ECF No. 858, Page 15). The\ntotal absence of physical assets matching this $889 million figure proves\nthat the true routing, ownership, and allocation of these\ninvestor-originated transfers remain highly disputed and opaque. To\nissue an $889,000,000 judgment while simultaneously denying an\nevidentiary hearing on June 25 (Doc. No. 855) is an arbitrary substitution\nof administrative haste for the rigid fact-finding required by Rule\n32(i)(2).\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 6 of 37\nD. Structural Violation of Rule 32(i)(1)(A): Stripping Third-Party Voice\nvia the Sudden Elimination of Restitution\nIn a sudden procedural maneuver at the tail-end of ECF No. 858 (Pages\n16-17), the District Court completely abrogated its duty to enter a\nRestitution Order, declaring it \"impractical\" due to the number of\nvictims and complexity, and instead authorized a unilateral government\n\"remission process.\" Restitution is the exact statutory anchor under the\nCrime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA) that grants third-party stakeholders a\nmandatory right to comment on factual inaccuracies in the sentencing\nrecord at the time of the hearing. By entirely wiping out restitution\nhours before sentencing, the District Court successfully engineered an\nabsolute informational vacuum, preventing Petitioner and other\naffected investors from exposing the flaws of the $889 million model\nduring the sentencing hearing, in direct violation of Rule 32(i)\nverification mandates.\nE. The Forced Appearance of a Medically Incapacitated Defendant\nUnder Extralegal Coercion Eviscerated the Right of Presence and\nAllocution Under Rule 43 and Rule 32\nThe District Court’s rush to judgment on June 29, 2026, culminated in a\nshocking, unprecedented violation of the physical integrity and\nconstitutional rights of the defendant. According to the defendant's\ncontemporaneous statement during the sentencing hearing and the\nreal-time, live-text transcription provided by Inner City Press\n(http), the\ndefendant disclosed from the bench that prior to the hearing, he had\ncollapsed, vomited blood, and had been hospitalized. Rather than\ngranting a mandatory medical continuance, the state engineered a\nhighly coercive, irregular extraction: the defendant was forcibly removed\nfrom the hospital, returned to MDC, and met by an unidentified civilian\nfemale who sheared off his blood-stained clothing, wiped blood from his\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 7 of 37\nface, forced a change of attire, and unilaterally compelled his physical\npresence in the courtroom.This shocking irregular procedure directly\nviolates multiple structural tenets of federal criminal law:\n1. Violation of Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(a)(3) (Right to be Present): Rule 43\nrequires the defendant’s meaningful, competent, and conscious\npresence at sentencing. Mere physical placement of an\nincapacitated, bleeding, and medically un-evaluated defendant in a\ncourtroom does not satisfy the constitutional definition of\n\"presence.\" Forcing a defendant to undergo sentencing immediately\nfollowing physical trauma and extralegal handling directly poisons\nthe competency of the entire proceeding.\n2. Violation of Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii) (The Right of Allocution):\nThe right of allocution requires the court to address the defendant\npersonally and determine if he wishes to make a statement under\nconditions that allow for a free, rational, and uncoerced exercise of\njudgment. A defendant who has just had his clothes cut off by a\nmysterious operative and is actively recovering from physical\ncollapse cannot legally or psychologically exercise a fair right of\nallocution.\n3. Violation of Fifth Amendment Due Process: The introduction of an\nunidentified, non-law-enforcement handler to physically alter a\ndefendant's medical and physical state in order to push him through\na sentencing sprint constitutes a profound breakdown of judicial\nintegrity. It transforms a federal sentencing into an unconstitutional\nexercise of raw administrative force, necessitating that the final\njudgment of sentence be immediately vacated.\nInner City Press's tweet history↓\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 8 of 37\nII. The District Court's Intentional Suppression and Total Silence\nRegarding Pending Emergency Recusal Motions Establishes a Structural\nConstitutional Defect\nThe District Court’s rush to impose sentence and finalize ECF No. 858 on\nJune 29, 2026, involved an even more alarming violation of\nfundamental due process: the deliberate and systematic ignoring of\nactive, pending judicial disqualification motions. On Friday, June 26,\n2026, Petitioner filed an Emergency Motion for Judicial Recusal pursuant\nto 28 U.S.C. § 455 directly with the District Court, with copies properly\nserved upon defense counsel(See Exhibit B).In tandem, to my\nknowledge, about six other similarly situated investors and victims filed\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 9 of 37\nidentical emergency recusal applications and gave due notice to defense\ncounsel, presenting a collective and severe challenge to the District\nCourt’s appearance of impartiality under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Yet,\nthroughout the entire sentencing proceeding on June 29, 2026, the\nDistrict Court—as well as counsel—maintained an absolute, calculated\nsilence regarding these pending motions. Not a single mention was\nmade on the record, and no ruling was issued. A district court cannot\nsimply blindfold itself to a properly submitted disqualification motion in\norder to complete a sentencing sprint. Under long-standing federal\njurisprudence, when a substantial challenge to a judge’s qualifications\nis filed, the court must address and resolve that jurisdictional threshold\nbefore finalizing a criminal judgment. By treating these multi-layered\nrecusal motions as non-existent, the District Court willfully acted without\na verified mandate of impartiality, transforming the entire sentencing\ninto an unconstitutional star-chamber exercise that must be\nimmediately vacated.\nIII.THE DISTRICT COURT’S \"SENTENCING RACING\" MANIFESTS AN\nINTENTIONAL BYPASS OF THE CIRCUIT'S MANDAMUS JURISDICTION\nUnder 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), a judge must disqualify themselves if their\nimpartiality might reasonably be questioned. The frantic timeline of June\n29, 2026, shatters the appearance of judicial impartiality.\nIn ECF No. 858, Page 9, the District Court openly acknowledges that\n6,512 members of the Himalaya Exchange and numerous third-party\npetitioners have filed extensive objections to the undocketed and\nunexamined nature of the records. However, the District Court\nsummarily brushed aside these 6,512 objectors, stating that their\nstatutory rights \"shall be assessed through ancillary proceedings... after\nsentencing.\" (ECF No. 858, Page 9).\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 10 of 37\nThis is a direct insult to the Second Circuit's pending jurisdiction. The\ncore of Petitioner’s 16 active mandamus petitions currently before this\nCourt is precisely that third-party records are being improperly excluded\nand suppressed prior to sentencing, transforming their statutory\nparticipation rights into an unconstitutional afterthought. By rushing out\nECF No. 858 on the morning of June 29 and forcing the case into final\njudgment, the District Court deliberately attempted to execute a\nprocedural \"fait accompli\" to strip this Court of its ability to exercise\nmeaningful, pre-judgment supervisory oversight over those 16 pending\npetitions. Under § 455(a), this calculated effort to outrun the appellate\ncourt is fundamentally disqualifying.\nIV. ALLOWING THE SENTENCING JUDGMENT TO STAND CAUSES\nIRREPARABLE SYSTEMIC HARM TO THIRD-PARTY CLAIMANTS\nIf this Court permits the District Court’s rushed judgment to stand\nuncorrected, Petitioner and thousands of similarly situated third-party\ninvestors will suffer immediate, irreversible injury:\n1. Permanent Lock-In of a Deficient, Unreviewed $889 Million\nModel: Post-sentencing, the unexamined $889,000,000 loss\nframework is legally locked into the criminal judgment. The 16\npending pro se mandamus petitions designed to correct the\nrecord pre-sentencing are instantly threatened with academic\nobsolescence.\n2. Permanent Castration of Statutory Participation Rights: By\nforcing § 853(n) claimants and victims into post-sentencing\nancillary procedures, they are restricted to operating entirely\nwithin the rigged confines of the District Court's unexamined,\ndouble-counted sentencing findings. Assets will be distributed via\nan unverified \"remission process\" without any judicial oversight,\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 11 of 37\npermanently extinguishing third-party property rights before this\nCourt can act.\nCONCLUSION & RELIEF REQUESTED\nThe District Court’s defiance of Rule 32,its explicit refusal to resolve the\ndisputes regarding the records underlying the forfeiture funds, and its\nstrategic race to outrun 16 mandamus petitions require immediate\nappellate correction. Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court:\n1. VACATE the judgment of sentence imposed on June 29, 2026, in\nUnited States v. Ho Wan Kwok, No. 1:23-cr-00118-AT, and remand\nthe case for comprehensive restructuring on a clean, complete,\nand legally reliable record;\n2. ENTER AN IMMEDIATE ADMINISTRATIVE STAY of all related\nforfeiture, restitution, victim-allocation, and ancillary proceedings\npending further order of this Court; and\n3. DIRECT the District Court to conduct a comprehensive, mandatory\nevidentiary hearing prior to any subsequent resentencing,\nensuring full transparency regarding the source, routing, and legal\nownership of the investor-originated transfers at issue.\nDated: June 29, 2026\nRespectfully submitted,\n/s/ Jason Zen\n___________________________\nPetitioner, pro se\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 12 of 37\n\nUSDC SDNY\nDOCUMENT\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ELECTRONICALLY FILED\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA DOC #: ______ ____________\nDATE FILED: __6/29/2026__\n-against-\nMILES GUO, 23 Cr. 118-1 (AT)\nDefendant. ORDER\nANALISA TORRES, District Judge:\nDefendant, Miles Guo, objects to the preliminary order of forfeiture (“POF”) entered by\nthe Court on August 11, 2025. See Objs., ECF No. 799; POF, ECF No. 720; Gov’t Mot., ECF\nNo. 716; Resp., ECF No. 803; see also Reply, ECF No. 804. For the reasons stated below, the\nCourt SUSTAINS IN PART and OVERRULES IN PART Guo’s objections to the POF.\nBACKGROUND\nThe Court presumes familiarity with the factual background of the case and recounts only\na summary of forfeiture-related proceedings and submissions here.\nA. Jury Verdict\nOn July 16, 2024, a jury convicted Guo of nine counts of various financial crimes:\n(1) one count of racketeering conspiracy (Count One of the third superseding indictment);\n(2) one count each of conspiracy to commit wire fraud or bank fraud, money laundering, and\nsecurities fraud (Counts Two, Three, and Four); (3) one count each of wire fraud and securities\nfraud in connection with the Farm Loan Program (Counts Seven and Eight); (4) one count each\nof wire fraud and securities fraud in connection with G|CLUBS (“G Clubs”) (Counts Nine and\nTen); (5) and one count of wire fraud in connection with the Himalaya Exchange (Count\nEleven). The jury acquitted Guo of one count each of wire and securities fraud in connection\nwith the GTV Private Placement and one count of committing an unlawful monetary transaction\n(Counts Five, Six, and Twelve). See Jury Verdict, ECF No. 395; S3 Superseding Indictment,\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 13 of 37\n\nECF No. 307. Each of these activities—the Farm Loan Program, G Clubs, the Himalaya\nExchange, and the GTV Private Placement—were alleged to be components of the “G\nEnterprise,” a series of investment schemes comprising the racketeering conspiracy detailed in\nCount One. See S3 Superseding Indictment ¶¶ 16–19.\nB. Applicable Forfeiture Provisions\nAs a result of Guo’s convictions, he is subject to three distinct provisions of the United\nStates Code which call for forfeiture of certain assets to the Government:\n1) 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a), which requires a defendant to forfeit any property “constituting,\nor derived from, any proceeds which the person obtained . . . from racketeering\nactivity” (Count One);\n2) 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C), which requires a defendant to forfeit all property “which\nconstitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to” fraud or a conspiracy to commit\nfraud (Counts Two, Four, Seven, Eight, Nine, and Ten, and Eleven);1 and\n3) 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1), which requires a defendant to forfeit all property “involved” in\nmoney laundering, or “traceable to such property [involved in money laundering]”\n(Count Three).\nSee id. ¶¶ 58–61.\nC. Prior Submissions\nOn April 8, 2025, the Court appointed Guo’s present counsel and ordered the parties to\nprovide a joint letter stating the date when Guo would provide his position with respect to\nforfeiture. See Apr. 8 Tr. at 10:14–23, ECF No. 684. The Court subsequently granted four\nextensions, at the parties’ and at Guo’s request, for Guo to articulate his position on the forfeiture\nof various assets. See, e.g., ECF Nos. 698, 704, 706, 708. Then, on June 27, 2025, Guo filed a\nletter claiming that he was “unable to take a position with respect to issues regarding potential\n1 The Indictment also cites 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) in this forfeiture allegation, which specifies further rules and\nprocedures related to forfeiture. See S3 Superseding Indictment ¶ 59.\n2\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 14 of 37\n\nforfeiture and remission of money and property seized by the Government.” ECF No. 710 at 1–\n2. The letter stated Guo “[did] not waive any of [his] rights, including his appellate rights, in this\ncase.” Id. at 1. In response, the Government wrote that although “Guo is not consenting to a\npreliminary order of forfeiture, the Court can enter a preliminary order of forfeiture that imposes\na money judgment and forfeits Guo’s personal interest in specific property.” ECF No. 713.\nA month later, by motion dated July 28, 2025, the Government asked the Court to “enter\na preliminary order of forfeiture setting forth . . . [a] money judgment” in the amount of $1.3\nbillion. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(b)(2)(A); Gov’t Mot.2 The Government characterized the $1.3\nbillion as “the proceeds traceable to the commission” of the racketeering and fraud counts\n(Counts One, Two, Four, Seven, Eight, Nine, and Ten, and Eleven) and “the property involved”\nin the money laundering offense (Count Three). See POF at 3. The Government argued that\n$1.3 billion is a “conservative estimate of the . . . funds sent by individual victims to certain arms\nof the G Enterprise,” which included the Farm Loan Program, GTV, G Clubs, and the Himalaya\nExchange. Gov’t Mot. at 3; see Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A) (“If the government seeks a\npersonal money judgment, the court must determine the amount of money that the defendant will\nbe ordered to pay.”).\nThe Government also sought the forfeiture of certain property listed in the POF (the\n“Listed Property”), Gov’t Mot. at 4; POF at 3–11: “cash seized from several bank\naccounts . . . used in furtherance of [Guo’s] crimes and his racketeering enterprise,” which,\n2 Courts may impose money judgments in cases where criminal forfeiture is required. Where a defendant’s assets or\nidentifiable property may not cover the full amount of the proceeds that a forfeiture statute requires the defendant to\nforfeit, money judgments may be used to ensure that the defendant is held liable for the full amount of those\nproceeds. See, e.g., United States v. Kenner, 443 F. Supp. 3d 354, 362 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (“If the defendant lacks the\nassets to satisfy the order, the court can award the government a forfeiture money judgment.”); United States v.\nPeters, 732 F.3d 93, 98–99, 104 (2d Cir. 2013) (affirming entry of a money judgment in a case alleging forfeiture\nunder 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(2)); United States v. Kalish, 626 F.3d 165, 168–69 (2d Cir. 2010) (affirming entry of a\nmoney judgment in a case alleging forfeiture under 28 U.S.C. § 2461).\n3\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 15 of 37\n\naccording to the Government, represent “proceeds of the G Enterprise [(the racketeering\nenterprise defined in Count One)] and property involved in money laundering” (Count Three).\nGov’t Mot. at 4–5. The Government categorized these bank accounts based on the date they\nwere seized by the Government and the names in which the accounts were held; each of the\naccount holders “was named in the [superseding] [i]ndictment as a member of the RICO\nenterprise.” Id. at 4; see S3 Superseding Indictment ¶ 3(a). The Government attached several\nseizure warrant affidavits related to these accounts. See Gov’t Mot. Exs. B–E, ECF Nos. 716-2\nthrough 716-5; see also Proposed POF ¶¶ a–u, bb (listing bank accounts), ECF No. 716-1.\nThe Listed Property included a mansion located at 675 Ramapo Valley Road in Mahwah,\nNew Jersey, “its contents,” including, for example, an “Italian giltwood mirror with rococo crest\nwith cross-hatched panels,” and several other luxury items, such as a Bugatti, Lamborghini, and\nRolls-Royce. See Gov’t Mot. at 5–7; see also Proposed POF ¶ aa (listing “personal property\nseized by the Government from the [Mahwah] property”). The Government argued that the\nMahwah property, the personal property therein, and the luxury items were purchased with funds\ntraceable to G Clubs, the G Enterprise, or money laundering. See Gov’t Mot. at 5–7.\nGuo did not respond to the Government’s motion, and given that he had represented to\nthe Court that he was “unable to take a position with respect to issues regarding” forfeiture, on\nAugust 11, 2025, the Court entered the POF. See POF. Nearly a month later, on September 4,\n2025, Guo requested an opportunity “to address” “deficiencies” in the Government’s motion,\nsuch as “whether certain property is forfeitable,” “the issue of offsets,” and “the accuracy of the\ntotal amount the government seeks.” See ECF No. 724 at 1. By order dated January 8, 2026, the\nCourt directed Guo to file any objections and to specify “whether [Guo] claims a personal\n4\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 16 of 37\n\ninterest in any of” the Listed Property. ECF No. 784.3 Before the Court is Guo’s February 3,\n2026 submission. See Objs.\nLEGAL STANDARD\nWhen the Government seeks forfeiture in the form of a money judgment, the Court “must\ndetermine the amount of money that the defendant will be ordered to pay,” Fed. R. Crim. P.\n32.2(b)(1)(A), using “evidence already in the record,” id. 32.2(b)(1)(B), including the trial\nrecord. See United States v. Mathieu, 853 F. App’x 739, 742 (2d Cir. 2021). The calculation of\na forfeiture amount, however, “is not an exact science.” United States v. Treacy, 639 F.3d 32, 48\n(2d Cir. 2011). As a result, the Court need only make a “reasonable estimate” based on\n“available information” concerning the appropriate amount of forfeiture. Id.; see id. (noting,\nadditionally, that a court may “use general points of reference as a starting point” and “may\nmake reasonable extrapolations from the evidence established by a preponderance of the\nevidence” in evaluating a proposed money judgment); see also United States v. Uddin, 551 F.3d\n176, 180 (2d Cir. 2009).\nThe Court must determine forfeiture—both the proper money judgment amount and\nwhether forfeiture applies to the Listed Property—by a preponderance of the evidence. United\nStates v. Capoccia, 503 F.3d 103, 116 (2d Cir. 2007).\nDISCUSSION\nGuo raises several objections to the POF: (1) the “scope” of his alleged fraud is\noverbroad and includes those who were not victims of his crimes; (2) he “can only be ordered to\n3 The Government argues that Guo has waived any challenges to the POF due largely to his statement in his June 27,\n2025 letter that he was not taking a position as to forfeiture. See, e.g., Resp. at 3–4. The Court’s January 8 order did\nnot address waiver, and, because the Court largely concludes in this order that Guo’s challenges to the POF lack\nmerit and prefers to decide the issues on the merits, the Court expresses no view on whether Guo waived his\nobjections.\n5\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 17 of 37\n\nforfeit assets that he personally obtained”; (3) forfeiture should not cover any alleged proceeds\nfrom the GTV Private Placement because he was acquitted of two fraud counts related to GTV;\nand (4) the money judgment should be offset by certain amounts. See Objs. at 3, 9, 11, 17.\nThe Court finds that the Government has demonstrated by a preponderance of the\nevidence that approximately $889 million is a reasonable estimate of the gross inflows of cash\ninto the Farm Loan Program, G Clubs, and the Himalaya Exchange—all either components of\nthe racketeering conspiracy of which Guo was convicted or enterprises which formed the basis of\nhis fraud convictions—and that $889 million is, therefore, the proper money judgment amount in\nthis case. See Gov’t Mot. at 3; GXZ26, ECF No. 803-1; Trial Tr. at 4330–32;4 Fed. R. Crim. P.\n32(b)(1)(A).\nA. Scope\nThe Court rejects Guo’s argument that the POF should not include property traceable to\n“proceeds” from individuals who claim they “were not victimized” by his fraud. See Objs. at 3–\n4, 5.\nAs an initial matter, Guo assumes that forfeiture distinguishes between “investors who\nwere defrauded, and those who insist they were not.” Objs. at 4. It does not. Forfeiture, in this\ncase, applies to proceeds “from racketeering activity,” proceeds from “fraud,” and property\n“involved in” money laundering. See Resp. at 5 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963(a), 981(a)(1)(C), and\n982(a)(2)). Contrary to Guo’s claims, the scope of his crimes of conviction is not defined by the\n4 In his sentencing submission, Guo argues that exhibit GXZ26 does not account for the possible double-counting of\ninflows across various components of the G Enterprise. See, e.g., ECF No. 822 at 41,53 (claiming that individuals\ncould use Himalaya Exchange funds to purchase a G Club membership); see also ECF No. 826 (correcting\nsentencing submission). Guo does not cite any evidence showing that this occurred, or suggesting that the\nGovernment’s inflow calculation in fact improperly included contributions made from Himalaya Exchange accounts\nto G Clubs. Id. The Court, therefore, makes this determination on the evidence available in the record, which\ndemonstrates that the Government’s calculation is correct. And, in any event, this argument was not raised in Guo’s\nobjections to the forfeiture order. As such, the Court will not address this objection.\n6\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 18 of 37\n\n“expectations and reliance” of individual victims on his statements. Cf. Objs. at 5 (claiming that\n“individual investors’ expectations and reliance are critical to distinguishing between victims of\nfraud and those who were not victimized”).\nIndeed, the Second Circuit has held that “reliance is not an element of criminal fraud”\nand that “the unreasonableness of a fraud victim in relying (or not) on a misrepresentation does\nnot bear on a defendant’s criminal intent.” United States v. Weaver, 860 F.3d 90, 95–96 (2d Cir.\n2017). In other words, even if an alleged “investor” in a fraudulent scheme disclaims that they\nrelied on the false statements which underpinned the fraud, a fraudulent scheme may nonetheless\nexist, and all proceeds obtained from such a scheme would be subject to forfeiture. Relatedly, an\n“investor[’s]” subjective views as to whether they are victims of the scheme have no bearing on\nwhether their contributions to the scheme are “proceeds” that a defendant has obtained from\nfraud. All that matters is “materiality”—that the statements alleged to be fraudulent have the\n“natural tendency to influence the decisionmakers to whom they were addressed.” Weaver, 860\nF.3d at 96. And materiality is evaluated under an objective test, “rather than from the subjective\nperspective of the victim.” United States v. Frenkel, 682 F. App’x 20, 22 (2d Cir. 2017).\nThe Court’s conclusion is confirmed by the statutory definitions of the fraud crimes of\nconviction. Wire fraud criminalizes the knowing participation in any “scheme or artifice to\ndefraud” and the transmittal by wire of certain communications for “the purpose of executing\nsuch scheme or artifice [to defraud].” 18 U.S.C. § 1343; see July 9, 2024 Trial Tr. at 5791:25–\n5794:6, ECF No. 450. As for securities fraud, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)\nrule violated in this case, see S3 Superseding Indictment ¶¶ 47, 51, prohibits using a\n“scheme . . . to defraud,” “mak[ing] an untrue statement of material fact” or omitting a material\nfact in certain circumstances, or “engaging in an act, practice, or course of business which\n7\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 19 of 37\n\noperates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a)–(c)\n(emphasis added). See also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1999) (observing that\nCongress prohibited the “‘scheme to defraud,’ rather than the completed fraud,” in the fraud\nstatutes). In other words, the “scope” of Guo’s fraudulent schemes does not depend on whether\neach individual making contributions to those schemes believed they were defrauded. Their\nbeliefs as to whether their individual “investments” had material value, or as to whether they in\nfact relied on any material misrepresentations, do not affect whether those investments were\nmade in a fraudulent scheme.5\nThe cases cited by Guo, United States v. Miller, 997 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1993), and\nUnited States v. Rainford, 110 F.4th 455 (2d Cir. 2024), are inapposite. In Miller, the Second\nCircuit held that the Government failed to prove that the defendants intended to deprive a victim\nof a property interest on the facts shown at a trial for mail fraud because the property that the\ndefendants had allegedly diverted “to their own benefit” from the victims was not, in fact, “a\nspecific, identifiable property interest” belonging to the victims in the first place. Id. at 1017–\n1021. Miller, in other words, turned ultimately on the scope of the alleged victims’ contractual\nproperty interests, not on their expectations or beliefs, and, therefore, has no bearing here. See\nid. Rainford vacated and remanded a forfeiture order where a district court based its order solely\non “the government’s word.” 110 F.4th at 489. Here, by contrast, there is ample evidence\nsupporting the POF filed in this case.\nGuo further argues that there is “abundant proof that a considerable number of supposed\n‘victims’ reject that classification.” Objs. at 6–7. He claims that “6,512 members of the\n5 Guo does not argue otherwise—he neither discusses, nor even cites, the elements of his fraud convictions in the\nportion of his submission making this argument. See Objs. at 4–9.\n8\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 20 of 37\n\nHimalaya Exchange” (the enterprise for which Guo was convicted of wire fraud in Count\nEleven) “have objected to forfeiture of their accounts” and “express[] frustration at being labeled\nas victims.” Id. at 6. These complaints, as well as those from the “Hamilton petitioners” and\nvarious other third parties, do not affect this order, which addresses solely whether the properties\nidentified by the Government are, in fact, either proceeds of racketeering activity, proceeds of\nfraud, or traceable to funds involved in money laundering, and whether the $1.3 billion money\njudgment is a reasonable estimate of the value of Guo’s forfeiture obligations.6 Third-parties’\nalleged claims to the property identified in the POF shall be assessed through ancillary\nproceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 853(n) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2.\nB. Possession\nGuo argues that he “can only be held liable to forfeit the value of tainted proceeds to the\nextent that he at some point personally obtained them,” and that, for various reasons, there is\ninsufficient evidence that he “obtained” the property listed in the POF. Objs. at 10–11 (emphasis\nin original).\nGuo misunderstands the nature of forfeiture. For proceeds of a defendant’s crime to be\nforfeitable, the property “need not be personally or directly in the possession of the defendant,\nhis assignees, or his co-conspirators.” United States v. Contorinis, 692 F.3d 136, 147 (2d Cir.\n2012) (citation omitted). Instead, the property need only “have, at some point, been under the\ndefendant’s control.” Id. Further, property may be forfeited even when the defendant’s control\nover the property is temporary. See United States v. Tanner, 942 F.3d 60, 68 (2d Cir. 2019).\n6 The Court acknowledges the voluminous petitions filed under 18 U.S.C. § 853(n) seeking to assert a third-party’s\nlegal interest in property forfeited to the United States, and the Court expresses no opinion as to whether any\npetitioner’s claim, properly made and submitted under § 853(n), is meritorious.\n9\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 21 of 37\n\nAt trial, the Government proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Guo was the\n“Boss” in control of all of the entities in the G Enterprise and those entities’ assets. Resp. at 7.7\nFor example, testimony from several witnesses shows that Guo exercised control over assets\ninvolved in the G Enterprise: Karin Maistrello testified that Guo was in control of the Rule of\nLaw organizations’ funds, a scheme involved in the G Enterprise (see Trial Tr. at 424); multiple\nwitnesses testified that Guo had control over G Clubs (see Trial Tr. at 1941 (describing Guo as\nthe “top boss”), 1995:3–15, 1996:2–5 (clarification at sidebar), 1999:4–7, 2975:8–2976:10,\n2980:11–22, 2999:20–3000:6 (testimony concerning G Clubs)); and abundant documentary\nevidence supports the conclusion that Guo exercised control over the funds involved in his\ncrimes (see GXC415; Resp. at 7 n.3 (citing trial exhibits depicting Guo exercising control over\nfunds involved in the G Enterprise)).8\nThe documentary evidence introduced at trial, see, e.g., GXZ26 (showing cash flows\nfrom certain G Enterprise bank accounts into other bank accounts which are listed in the POF),\nalso establishes that the particular accounts that the Government argues are subject to forfeiture\ncontain funds derived from proceeds of the G Enterprise and property involved in money\nlaundering. See Mot. at 4–5. Notably, Guo does not argue that the funds in these accounts hold\n7 Additionally, under each statute serving as the basis for forfeiture in this case, the Court need only find that Guo\nobtained the proceeds “directly or indirectly.” See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963(a)(3), 981(a)(2)(A), 982(a)(2).\n8 Guo’s sole argument regarding the trial record is that one witness “testified that . . . Guo was not the ultimate\nbeneficial owner of G Clubs, nor was he the source of funds for G Clubs or G Fashion.” Objs. at 10–11. That\nwitness, James R. Collins Jr., was an employee at Mercantile Global Holdings, a company which owned a bank that\nmaintained client relationships with G Clubs, G Fashion, and the Himalaya Exchange. See Trial Tr. at 2753:8–\n2756:15. But Collins only testified that Mercantile Bank believed that Guo was not the ultimate beneficial owner of\nG Clubs and that G Clubs had represented as much to him. See Trial Tr. at 2758:23–2762:12. He did not testify as\nto any personal knowledge of the inner workings of G Clubs, or whether Guo, in fact, exercised control over G\nClubs funds. The Court, therefore, accords Collins’ testimony minimal weight. Guo also attempts to incorporate by\nreference arguments made by third parties who have filed ancillary claims to assets subject to forfeiture under 21\nU.S.C. § 853(n). See Objs. at 11. The Court will consider those arguments as part of the ancillary proceedings that\nshall be conducted after sentencing pursuant to §853(n) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2. The Court\nexpresses no opinion as to whether any third party has a superior legal interest in any forfeited property.\n10\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 22 of 37\n\nmoney which is not derived from entities involved in the G Enterprise. See POF ¶¶ a–z, bb;\nObjs. at 9–11 (instead arguing solely that he did not personally obtain or exercise control over\nthese funds).\nGuo relies in substantial part on Honeycutt v. United States, 581 U.S. 443 (2017), to\nsupport his argument that he cannot be ordered to “forfeit assets that he [did not] personally\nobtain[].” Obj. at 9. In that case, the Supreme Court held that 21 U.S.C. § 853, which requires\nforfeiture of any property derived from proceeds of certain drug crimes, does not automatically\nimpose joint and several liability on all convicted parties of a conspiracy. See 581 U.S. at 443.\nIn Honeycutt, the government sought a money judgment against a defendant, arguing that\nhe was liable for the entirety of a conspiracy’s profits, even though the defendant was merely a\nsalaried employee who had assisted his store’s participation in a drug crime, and never benefited\nfrom, let alone exercised control over, the extent of the store’s tainted profits. See id. at 445–47.\nHere, however, the Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that Guo benefitted from and\nexercised control over the funds that the Government maintains are subject to forfeiture. See,\ne.g., Resp. at 7–8 n.3 (citing trial evidence noting, for example, that Guo directed his co-\nconspirators to use “G-Club or another private company” to finance the purchase of an expensive\ncoffee table). Indeed, since Honeycutt, the Second Circuit has reiterated that the Government\nneed not show that a defendant personally retained or directly possessed property for forfeiture to\napply. See, e.g., Rajaratnam v. United States, 736 F. App’x 279, 284 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding\nthat a forfeiture order could be imposed against a defendant for funds over which the defendant\nonly had temporary authority and which had subsequently been disbursed).\nThe Court, therefore, finds that the Government has demonstrated by a preponderance of\nthe evidence that the Listed Property is subject to forfeiture.\n11\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 23 of 37\n\nC. GTV Private Placement and SEC Disgorgement\nGuo argues that funds derived from the GTV Private Placement should not be included in\nthe forfeiture order and that the money judgment against Guo should be reduced by the amount\nof funds the Government alleges were involved in GTV. See Objs. at 17.9 Guo contends that\nbecause he was acquitted of wire and securities fraud in connection with the GTV Private\nPlacement, $411 million in funds derived from the GTV Private Placement that the Government\nseeks to forfeit should be excluded from the order. Id. at 11–12; Resp. at 8.\nThe Court need not resolve this in light of another issue raised by the parties: whether the\nmoney judgment against Guo should be reduced by the amount already recovered by the SEC in\nadministrative proceedings. See SEC Order, ECF No. 799-2. Guo states that GTV has already\ndisgorged in excess of $411 million as part of an administrative proceeding initiated by the SEC.\nSee Objs. at 17–18. The Government concedes this, in part, stating that “[t]he actual funds\nderived from the GTV [P]rivate [P]lacement were recovered by the SEC, which established a fair\nfund for distribution to victims,” and that “[i]f the Court were to deduct the GTV [P]rivate\n[P]lacement funds from the forfeiture amount, approximately $411 million would be deducted.”\nMot. at 4 n.2.\nHowever, the parties’ figures diverge. Guo argues that GTV, along with Saraca Media\nGroup, Inc. and Voice of Guo Media, Inc., has disgorged over $486 million to the SEC and that\nthe full $486 million should be deducted from the money judgment because it relates to conduct\ncharged in this case. See Objs. at 18. The Government, however, contends that only $411\n9 Guo does not claim that a specific bank account, or item of personal property, solely constitutes proceeds from the\nGTV Private Placement, see generally Objs. The Government maintains that all of the relevant funds are proceeds\nof the G Enterprise and property involved in money laundering. See Mot. at 4–5. Guo does not argue that any of\nthe Listed Property should be excluded from forfeiture on this basis, and the Court, therefore, only examines how\nthe disgorgement affects the money judgment.\n12\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 24 of 37\n\nmillion of the $1.3 billion figure derives from the GTV Private Placement and that the remaining\n$889 million derives from proceeds traceable to the Farm Loan Program, G Clubs, or the\nHimalaya Exchange. See GXZ26. The fact that GTV and other entities disgorged $75 million\nmore than $411 million is relevant to the money judgment only if the excess $75 million is\ntraceable to proceeds from the fraudulent schemes involved in this case, namely, the Farm Loan\nProgram, G Clubs, or the Himalaya Exchange.\nThe Court rejects Guo’s arguments that the purported $75 million disgorged in excess of\n$411 million is traceable to his crimes of conviction. First, he claims that $34 million of the total\ndisgorged funds relate to sales of “G-Coins and G-Dollars,” early precursors to the Himalaya\nExchange. See Objs. at 17–18. However, the sale of G-Coin and G-Dollars from April to June\nof 2020 is not covered by the Indictment, which targets the Himalaya Exchange enterprise\ntransactions that took place from 2021 to 2023. See S3 Superseding Indictment ¶ 53.\nMoreover, Guo provides no evidence that the $115 million in disgorged funds\nattributable to Voice of Guo Media, Inc. (“VOG”) “overlaps with the so-called Farm Loan\nProgram.” Objs. at 17–18. The SEC Order reports that VOG pooled funds from “prospective\ninvestors” who wanted to invest less than $100,000 in GTV. See Objs. at 17–18; SEC Order\n¶¶ 15–21, ECF No. 799-2. The Indictment’s description of the Farm Loan Program, however,\ndiffers substantially from the SEC Order’s description of VOG’s fundraising efforts. Compare,\ne.g., S3 Superseding Indictment ¶ 17 (describing “The Himalaya Farm Alliance” as “a collective\nof informal groups (each known as a ‘Farm’) located in various cities around the world” which\nobtained investments “in the form of ‘loans’ to a Farm” and “promising that such loans would be\nconvertible into GTV common stock” via a “Loan Agreement”) with SEC Order ¶¶ 16–18\n(describing how VOG would provide an investor a one-page “Limited Purpose Agency\n13\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 25 of 37\n\nAgreement,” stating that, for minimal consideration, a representative of VOG would act as an\n“agent” for investors and purchase GTV stock on their behalf).\nAlthough Guo is correct that the SEC obtained $75 million more than $411 million from\nGTV and related companies, he has not shown that this surplus coincides with any of the\nproceeds that the Government has demonstrated are related to Guo’s crimes of conviction—that\nis, the Farm Loan Program, G Clubs, and the Himalaya Exchange.\nThe Court concludes, therefore, that only $411 million may be deducted from the\nproposed money judgment, because the record reflects—and the Government does not contest—\nthat $411 million in funds traceable to the GTV Private Placement has already been disgorged by\nentities related to the G Enterprise in separate proceedings prior to the commencement of this\ncriminal case. This deduction does not affect the forfeiture of any of the Listed Property.\nD. Offsets\nGuo argues that the money judgment should be “already offset by the more than\n$1 billion already in the Government’s possession in connection with this case” and by the\n“funds and assets in the Bankruptcy Trustee’s possession that are among the items the\nGovernment deems forfeitable in this case.” Objs. at 18–20. In response, the Government notes\nthat the value of property “forfeited to the United States under a Final Order of Forfeiture” will,\nindeed “be applied towards the satisfaction of the [m]oney [j]udgment” once all third-party\ninterests are adjudicated, and that there is no authority to order an offset for any assets not\n14\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 26 of 37\n\ncovered by the POF. See Resp. at 10 & n.7; POF ¶ 7.10 Accordingly, the Court will not deduct\nthe value of any of the Listed Property from the money judgment at this time.11\nE. Ancillary Matters\nGuo also seeks an order directing the Government to take possession of certain assets (the\n“bankruptcy assets”) from the Chapter 11 Trustee of Guo’s estate in bankruptcy proceedings,\nwhich were commenced on February 15, 2022, in the District of Connecticut. See Seizure Mot.,\nECF No. 724, at 1; see generally In re Kwok, No. 22 Bk. 50073 (D. Conn. Bankr. February 15,\n2022); In re Kwok, 172 F.4th 145 (2d Cir. 2026). Guo argues that the Government’s interest in\nthe forfeited assets is “superior to that of any creditor in the bankruptcy proceeding,” Seizure\nMot. at 5, that ordering the Government to seize the bankruptcy assets will both “make them\navailable to investors in the various entities involved in this case, and for whom restitution will\nbe ordered” and “halt the accumulation of considerable fees and expenses incurred by the\nTrustee” in the bankruptcy proceeding. See id. at 5–7.\nThe Court does not have the power to grant the relief Guo requests.12 Guo merely cites\nFederal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(3) for the proposition that the Court “may include\n. . . conditions reasonably necessary to preserve the property’s value pending any appeal” in a\npreliminary order of forfeiture. See Seizure Reply at 4, ECF No. 754. Rule 32.2(b)(3) limits the\n10 Guo also argues that if the Court finds, in ancillary proceedings, that any property belongs to a third party, the\nvalue of that property should be deducted from the money judgment. Objs. at 18. Not so. Third-party forfeiture\nproceedings are designed to determine if a third party possesses a superior legal interest in the property subject to\nforfeiture. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6); Gov’t Forfeiture Ltr. at 1–2, ECF No. 785. That is a separate question from\nwhether the assets are forfeitable. Property may well have come under Guo’s control due to, for example, fraud,\neven though a third party possessed a superior legal interest in that property. Therefore, if the Court finds that any\nproperty belongs to a third party under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6), it will not deduct the value of that property from the\nmoney judgment.\n11 The Court denies Guo’s request to reduce the money judgment “to the extent the Government has declined to\npursue other potentially forfeitable assets in this case,” and to reduce the money judgment by the amount forfeited\nby Haithem Khaled. See Objs. at 19–21. Guo offers no legal basis for either of these requests.\n12 The Court expresses no opinion on the Government’s argument that Guo lacks standing on this issue.\n15\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 27 of 37\n\nCourt’s authority to conditions required to preserve the property’s value on “appeal,” rather than\nconditions required to preserve value pending related, separate proceedings—like the bankruptcy\nproceeding here.\nFurthermore, several other procedural features of the forfeiture rules indicate that such an\norder would exceed the Court’s power. For example, Rule 32.2(b)(3) “authorizes” the\nGovernment “to seize the specific property subject to forfeiture” upon entry of a preliminary\norder but does not require that the Government do so. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(3). Nor does\nRule 32.2 state when, or how, the Government may seize property listed in a forfeiture order\nonce it is authorized to do so under Rule 32.2(b)(3). Likewise, 21 U.S.C. § 853(e) and (f)\nempower the Court to take certain protective measures concerning assets potentially subject to\nforfeiture, but do not authorize the Court to compel the Government to enact a seizure. See\nResp. at 4.\nMoreover, Guo’s request lacks merit. Guo argues that the Court may impose conditions\n“reasonably necessary to preserve the property’s value pending any appeal,” Seizure Reply at 4,\nbut nothing in Rule 32.2 requires the Court to do so. Although the Court acknowledges that the\nChapter 11 Estate in the bankruptcy proceeding has incurred fees owed to the Trustee and\nvarious other professionals, see Seizure Mot. at 7, such fees are not unusual given the remarkable\ncomplexity of that proceeding. See id. (claiming that 300 adversary proceedings have been filed\nin the bankruptcy proceeding).\nF. Restitution\nThe Government requests that the Court find that imposing a restitution order would be\nimpracticable and authorize a remission process. See Gov’t Ltr. at 4–5, ECF No. 785; ECF\nNo. 784 (January 8, 2026 order). Guo agrees. ECF No. 789 at 3. The Court agrees and finds,\n16\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 28 of 37\n\nbased on the extensive record in this case, that given the “complexity of the case and the number\nof victims involved,” awarding restitution to victims in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3663A\nwould be impractical and would complicate or prolong the sentencing process. See 18 U.S.C.\n§ 3663(c)(3)(A)–(B).\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the Government has demonstrated\nthat forfeiture applies to the Listed Property due to Guo’s convictions for racketeering\nconspiracy, wire and securities fraud, and conspiracy to commit money laundering. The Court\nSUSTAINS Guo’s objections to the extent that the Court shall deduct $411 million from the $1.3\nbillion proposed money judgment, such that the money judgment in the final order of forfeiture\nshall be $889 million.\nThe Court DENIES Guo’s motion at ECF No. 724 seeking an order compelling the\nGovernment to seize assets in the bankruptcy proceedings. The Clerk of Court is respectfully\ndirected to terminate the motion at ECF No. 724.\nFinally, the Court finds that restitution is impracticable in this case and authorizes the\nGovernment to compensate victims through a remission process.\nSO ORDERED.\nDated: June 29, 2026\nNew York, New York\n17\n\nCase: 25-3046,E 0m7/0a1i/l2 0s2c6r, eDektnEnsthryo: 4t1.1, Page 29 of 37\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 30 of 37\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\nUnited States of America,\nv.\nHo Wan Kwok, a/k/a Miles Guo, et al.,\nDefendants.\nCase No. 1:23-cr-00118-AT\nEMERGENCY MOTION FOR RECUSAL OF THE HONORABLE ANALISA TORRES\nPursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (Must Be Resolved Prior to June 29,2026\nSentencing)\npetitioner Jason Zen, appearing pro se as a third-party claimant under 21 U.S.C. §\n853(n) and as an affected person who has repeatedly attempted to participate\nthrough submissions to this Court, respectfully moves for recusal of the presiding\njudge from further proceedings in this matter. This motion is filed on an emergency\nbasis because sentencing is scheduled for June 29, 2026, and the appearance-of-\nimpartiality issue should be resolved before the Court proceeds further on a record\nalready marked by unresolved docketing disputes, privacy breaches, and pending\nappellate supervision.\nThis motion does not ask the Court to concede the merits of every accusation\nraised by Movant or by other participants. It asks only whether, from the\nstandpoint of an objective observer fully informed of the procedural history, the\nCourt's impartiality might reasonably be questioned after months of selective non-\ndocketing of pro se submissions, public exposure of protected personal information\ndespite requests for sealing or redaction, continued inaction after documented\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 31 of 37\nallegations of record contamination and Brady-related concerns, and the decision\nto press ahead with sentencing while related appellate proceedings remain active.\nI. Governing standard\nSection 455(a) requires a federal judge to disqualify herself in any proceeding in\nwhich her impartiality might reasonably be questioned. The test is objective and\nturns not on the judge's subjective intent, but on whether a reasonable observer\naware of the relevant facts would harbor substantial doubt about neutrality.\nThat standard is concerned not only with actual bias but also with the appearance\ncreated by a pattern of procedural choices. Where repeated acts affecting one\nclass of participants, one side of the record, or one set of safety interests\naccumulate into a coherent appearance of partiality, recusal is required to preserve\npublic confidence in the integrity of the proceedings.\nII. Systematic Exclusion of Pro Se Third-Party Submissions\nMovant and other pro se third parties have submitted multiple filings under 21\nU.S.C. § 853(n), the CVRA, and related procedural theories concerning forfeiture,\nvictim identification, loss calculations, and record completeness. These filings were\nsent to the Court and served on the Government and defense counsel, yet most\nwere not placed on the docket. By contrast, attorney-filed submissions addressing\nsimilar issues were routinely docketed and considered. This pattern has produced\n16 pending mandamus petitions in the Second Circuit, all arising from the same\npattern of selective non-docketing, and has created a record in which only one side\nof the record is permitted to mature into an adjudicable form.\nIII. The Court's handling of personal identifying information creates a serious\nappearance of retaliatory or arbitrary treatment\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 32 of 37\nMovant previously asked that personal identity information and investment details\nbe filed under seal because public disclosure could create safety risks, including\nrisks associated with the Chinese Communist Party and with public exposure of a\nmainland Chinese investor's identity and financial data. That request was explicit\nand tied to Rule 49.1-style privacy concerns and the Court's inherent authority to\nprotect sensitive information.\nIn Movant's supplemental mandamus filing, Movant described that the Southern\nDistrict uploaded his Second Circuit mandamus filing to the district-court docket as\nDkt. 770 and, in doing so, publicly disclosed personal identifying information\ndespite an accompanying request for redaction or sealing. The same filing also\ndescribed comparable treatment of other pro se petitioners, including public\nexposure of unredacted information in Dkts. 732 and 765.\nWhether or not each disclosure was intentional in a subjective sense, the\nappearance is deeply troubling. An objective observer could reasonably question\nneutrality when a court that receives explicit privacy requests from unrepresented\npetitioners nonetheless places sensitive identifying information into the public\nrecord, especially where those petitioners have simultaneously been seeking\nappellate review of the court's docketing practices.\nIV. Movant previously raised Brady-related and record-contamination concerns\nthat were never meaningfully addressed on the district-court docket\nMovant's earlier submissions, later reproduced in the renewed mandamus\nappendix, stated that on August 13, 2025 Movant sent prosecutors materials\nidentified as potentially favorable to the defense and requested disclosure under\nBrady and Giglio, then followed up with defense counsel on August 29, 2025 after\nreceiving no acknowledgment. Those materials included concerns about selective\nuse of livestream statements, contacts between Trustee Luc Despins and the U.S.\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 33 of 37\nAttorney's Office, the role of attorney Geyer in presenting large claimant groups,\nand the possibility that centrally organized claims had distorted the victim picture\nplaced before the Court.\nMovant also filed a motion seeking intervention for the limited purpose of formally\nrecording the submission of Brady-related material and asking the Court to require\nconfirmation of disclosure. According to the renewed mandamus record, that\nmotion likewise was not ordinarily docketed and therefore did not receive the sort\nof transparent judicial handling that would reassure an outside observer that\nadverse or inconvenient information had been considered in a neutral manner.\nThe point here is not that this Court was required to adopt Movant's view of the\nevidence. The point is that the combination of non-docketing and silence on\nsubmissions challenging the completeness of the Government's narrative can\ncreate a reasonable appearance that only one side of the procedural record is\npermitted to mature into an adjudicable form.\nV.This Court's decision to press ahead with sentencing despite active Second\nCircuit supervision further undermines the appearance of impartiality\nThe present recusal issue cannot be evaluated in isolation from the parallel\nappellate proceedings already underway in the Second Circuit. This criminal case\nhas generated an extraordinary volume of mandamus petitions, emergency stay\nrequests, and related supervisory filings arising from the District Court's handling of\npro se submissions, privacy issues, third-party participation, and unresolved\nprocedural disputes.\nOne set of related proceedings included No. 25-3046, in which the Second Circuit,\non May 15, 2026, denied prior mandamus relief without prejudice and expressly\npermitted renewal if the District Court failed to docket the relevant submissions\nwithin a reasonable time. The renewed petition has since been filed because the\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 34 of 37\nDistrict Court still did not docket the previously submitted materials even after that\norder and the passage of additional time.\nAt the same time, other petitioners in related proceedings have sought emergency\nrelief from the Court of Appeals on overlapping grounds, including nondocketing,\nprivacy violations, improper handling of victim and third-party submissions,\nrequests for stays, and requests that the presiding judge be removed or recused.\nThe significance of that procedural landscape is not merely quantitative. It means\nthat the conduct of this Court is already the subject of ongoing supervisory\nattention by the Court of Appeals in multiple pending matters.\nDespite that posture, this Court denied adjournment and announced on June 25,\n2026 that sentencing would proceed on June 29, 2026. In the same order, the\nCourt stated that it could make the factual findings necessary for sentencing\nwithout an evidentiary hearing, that Brady and Rule 17(c) disputes did not justify\ndelay, and that resolution of third-party petitions under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) and the\nspecial-master issue was not required before sentencing\nThat sequence matters. When a district court knows that the Court of Appeals is\nalready reviewing, or being asked to review, whether pro se filings were improperly\nexcluded from the record, whether third-party participation has been mishandled,\nwhether emergency stays are needed, and whether reassignment or recusal is\nwarranted, yet nevertheless accelerates the case toward sentencing before those\nsupervisory proceedings can run their course, a reasonable observer may conclude\nthat the court is attempting to move the case past a critical threshold before\neffective appellate review can occur.\nThis is especially so here because some of the emergency filings in the Court of\nAppeals have expressly raised judicial-removal or recusal concerns, and others seek\nto prevent sentencing from going forward before unresolved procedural defects\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 35 of 37\nare addressed. Proceeding to sentencing in the face of that appellate posture does\nnot merely create tension with ordinary case management. It creates the\nappearance that the District Court is disregarding the practical significance of the\nappellate court's ongoing supervisory role.\nAn objective observer could therefore reasonably see the June 25 order not as a\nneutral scheduling determination, but as part of a broader procedural pattern: pro\nse filings are not timely docketed; related participation and record-integrity issues\nremain unresolved; multiple appellate proceedings remain active; some of those\nproceedings explicitly seek recusal or removal; yet sentencing is pressed forward\nanyway before those matters can be meaningfully sorted out.\nUnder § 455(a), that appearance is itself disqualifying. The issue is not whether\nevery pending appellate filing will ultimately succeed. The issue is whether a\nreasonable person, fully informed of the surrounding circumstances, would\nquestion the impartiality of a court that continues toward final sentencing while\nhigher-court supervision over its own procedural conduct remains actively pending.\nOn the present record, the answer is yes.\nVI. Recusal is required to preserve confidence in any further proceedings\nThis motion does not rest on disagreement with a single ruling. It rests on the\ncumulative appearance produced by repeated exclusion of pro se third-party filings\nfrom the ordinary docket, public handling of sensitive identifying information\ndespite sealing requests, the absence of meaningful district-court engagement with\nBrady-related and record-integrity concerns raised by Movant, and the decision to\nproceed toward sentencing while the Second Circuit is still supervising related\ndocketing disputes in No. 25-3046.Even if each event might be defended in\nisolation, the issue under § 455(a) is the appearance seen by a reasonable observer\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 36 of 37\nwho views the record as a whole. On that record, substantial doubt about\nimpartiality is no longer speculative.\nRelief requested\nMovant respectfully requests that the Court:\n1. Recuse ANALISA TORRES from further proceedings in this matter pursuant to\n28 U.S.C. § 455(a);\n2. If the Court declines to recuse, issue a prompt written order stating the\ngrounds for denial before sentencing proceeds, so that the issue is preserved\nfor immediate review;\n3. Direct the Clerk to ensure that all previously submitted pro se filings identified\nin Movant's mandamus materials are preserved and appropriately handled as\npart of the record;\n4. Grant such other and further relief as may be just and proper.\nRespectfully submitted,\nJason Zen\nPetitioner,pro se\n6.27.2026\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 37 of 37\nCertificate of Service\nUnited States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit\nCase No: 25-3046\nSDNY Case: United States v. Kwok, et al., 1:23-CR-118-1 (AT)\nI, Jason Zen, hereby certify as follows:\nOn July 1, 2026, I mailed the true and correct copy of the following\ndocuments:\n1. EMERGENCY MOTION TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT OF SENTENCE\nAND FOR AN IMMEDIATE ADMINISTRATIVE STAY PENDING\nAPPELLATE REVIEW\n2. SDNY Dkt.858\n3. EMERGENCY MOTION FOR RECUSAL OF THE HONORABLE ANALISA\nTORRES Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (Must Be Resolved Prior to\nJune 29,2026 Sentencing)\nTo\nJuliana Murray\nDirect: 212-637-2203\nUnited States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York One\nSaint Andrew's Plaza Room 739 New York, NY 10007\nJustin Horton\nDirect: 212-637-2200\nDOJ-USAO Southern District of New York One St. Andrews Plaza New\nYork, NY 10007\nNathan Rehn\nDirect: 212-637-2354\nUnited States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York 26\nFederal Plaza 37th Floor New York, NY 10278\nRespectfully submitted,\nJason Zen\n_____________________","body_zh":"Case: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 1 of 37\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT（美国第二巡回联邦上诉法院）\nThurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse 40 Foley Square, New York, NY 10007 Telephone: 212-857-8500\n动议信息声明表\n案号： 案由标头 [使用简短案名]\n动议事项：\n下文列出所寻求救济的准确、完整声明：\n动议方： 相对方：\n原告 被告\n上诉人/请愿人 被上诉人/相对人\n动议方律师： 相对方律师：\n[律师姓名，附律所、地址、电话号码及电子邮件]\n被上诉法院-法官/机构：\n请勾选相应方框： 适用于紧急动议、上诉期间中止执行动议及禁令动议：\n动议方是否已通知对方律师（Local Rule 27.1（本地规则第27.1条）所要求）：\n该救济请求是否已在下级法院提出？ 是 否\n是 否（说明）：\n该救济此前是否曾向本法院寻求？ 是 否\n所请求的答复日期及紧急情况说明：\n地区法院于今日（6月29日）强行进行量刑宣判，蓄意争分夺秒以使本法院悬而未决的调卷令及中止执行审查归于无效。该法院发布了一项未经核实的8.89亿美元裁定（ECF 858），拒绝就重复计算作出裁决，驳回了50项量刑前报告异议，并压制了7项悬而未决的申请回避动议。若无立即的行政性中止执行，这些重大的 Rule 32（第32条）及正当程序缺陷将永久锁定于终审判决之中。这将在本法院能够采取行动之前，对数千名受害人法定的 CVRA（《犯罪受害人权利法》）及 § 853(n) 权利造成即时且不可逆转的损害。\n相对方律师对动议的立场：\n不反对 反对 不知情\n相对方律师是否打算提交答辩：\n是 否 不知情\n是否请求就动议进行口头辩论？ 是 否（口头辩论请求不一定会获准）\n上诉辩论日期是否已确定？ 是 否 若是，请输入日期：\n动议方律师签名：\n日期： 送达方式： 电子送达 其他 [附送达证明]\n表格 T-1080 (rev. 10-23)\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 2 of 37\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT（美国第二巡回联邦上诉法院）\nDocket No. 25-3046\nIn re JASON ZEN, Petitioner,\nRelated to S.D.N.Y. Criminal Case No. 1:23-cr-00118-AT\n撤销判决书量刑部分并请求在上诉审查期间立即予以行政性中止执行的紧急动议\n依据 Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure（《联邦上诉程序规则》）及本法院固有的监督权力，请愿人 Jason Zen 以有利害关系的第三方权利主张人身份 pro se（自辩）进行诉讼，恭敬地并以紧急方式提请本法院撤销 United States District Court for the Southern District of New York（S.D.N.Y.，美国纽约南区联邦地区法院）于2026年6月29日在 United States v. Ho Wan Kwok（美国诉郭文贵案）, No. 1:23-cr-00118-AT 中作出的判决书量刑部分，并请求对所有相关的没收、赔偿和受害人分配程序予以立即的行政性中止执行，直至本法院对大量悬而未决的现有请愿作出最终处置。\n引言与紧急情况摘要\n本动议呈现了一场深刻的宪法与程序危机，亟待上诉审予以立即纠正。就在量刑宣判当天，即2026年6月29日，地区法院蓄意展开了一场“与上诉时钟的赛跑”，其顶点便是发布了一份长达17页的特别 Preliminary Order of Forfeiture (POF)（初步没收裁定）（ECF No. 858）（见附件 A），并紧随其后作出了刑事终审判决。\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 3 of 37\n地区法院的作为构成了对第二巡回法院现行监督管辖权的直接、肆意规避。就在地区法院作出量刑判决并敲定高达 889,000,000 美元的巨额个人金钱判决（ECF No. 858）的确切时刻，该法院完全知晓本法院正对以下事项行使积极管辖权：\n1. 直接源自本基础案件的16起调卷令请愿；\n2. 10起紧急中止执行申请；\n3. 9起行政性中止执行申请；以及\n4. 多起尚未裁决的关于法官回避的紧急动议，包括请愿人向第二巡回法院及纽约南区法院提出的多层面请求。\n通过在这些广泛的监督程序仍悬而未决之际，强行推动本案跨过刑事量刑的最后门槛，地区法院试图以既成事实使本法院的审查完全归于徒劳。为了实现这一“抢跑”，地区法院系统性地践踏了 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 (Rule 32)（《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第32条）的强制性事实认定框架，导致高达8.89亿美元的巨大缺口完全未经核实，并剥夺了数千名利益相关方的法定参与权。为维护联邦司法的廉洁与公正，本法院必须立即撤销下级法院的判决。\nI. 地区法院系统性违反 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 之情形在 ECF NO. 858 中的体现\nFederal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 是一项刚性、强制性的框架，旨在确保没有任何刑事量刑是建立在推测性或未经核实的事实记录之上。地区法院的6月29日裁定（ECF No. 858）包含了构成重大 Rule 32 违规行为的铁证般的自认：\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 4 of 37\nA. 地区法院对50项实质性异议的全盘、即席驳回以及对受害人损失的任意重新定义违反了 Rule 32(i)(3)(B)\n在2026年6月29日的量刑听证会期间，地区法院的程序性捷径达到了公然藐视宪法的高潮。面对被告对 Presentence Report (PSR)（量刑前报告）提出的五十（50）项各自独立的实质性事实异议——每一项都足以改变量刑指南的计算——地区法院仅仅简略地宣称：“我驳回郭先生的异议。”这种全盘驳回完全没有任何逐项的、记录在案的事实认定，也没有明确声明不予采信，构成了对 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B) 强制性命令的教科书式违反。此外，地区法院在法庭上明确宣称：“我在考虑是否将某人的损失计入时，并不考虑该人在主观上是否认为自己是受害人。因此，实际损失和意图损失均超过5.5亿美元。郭先生对量刑前报告提出了另外50项异议。我驳回郭先生的异议。”\nhttp\n这一单方面的、家长制式的声明在法律上是站不住脚的。通过断然拒绝考虑实际出资人的主观状态和证据——其中数千人已明确声明他们未遭受任何损失——地区法院炮制出了一个完全虚构且未经核实的5.5亿美元损失门槛，以大幅拔高刑期。通过刻意对所谓受害人的直接意见视而不见来对被告进行量刑宣判，违反了 Rule 32 核实要求与 CVRA 的核心根本，导致最终量刑在结构上存在缺陷。\nB. 公然违反 Rule 32(i)(3)(B)：明确以自由裁量为由拒绝就实质性争议事项作出裁决\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 5 of 37\nRule 32(i)(3)(B) 明确规定，对于量刑前报告中任何有争议的部分或其他争议事项，量刑法院必须在量刑宣判前对该争议作出裁决。地区法院明确违反了这一规则。在 ECF No. 858 第6页脚注4中，地区法院承认，由于“可能在 G Enterprise（G系列企业）各个组成部分之间存在资金流入的重复计算”，用于计算天文数字般个人责任的基础资金流入存在重大争议。然而，地区法院却简要表示，由于这一结构性异议未在先前特定的书面陈述中提出，“本法院将不予审理该异议”。地区法院不能利用没收程序的技术性规定来逃避 Rule 32(i)(3)(B) 的强制性命令。由于对涉及数亿美元的资金重复计算争议完全未予裁决，地区法院基于一份结构上不可靠的财务记录对被告进行了量刑宣判。\nC. 违反 Rule 32(i)(2)：在面对无法追踪的8.89亿美元判决时任意剥夺证据听证会\nRule 32(i)(2) 保障了就有争议的量刑因素引入证据的权利。在 ECF No. 858 中，地区法院敲定了针对被告的 889,000,000 美元个人金钱判决。然而，同一份裁定的字面内容显示，在并行程序中的破产受托人已提起了300多起对抗性诉讼，并在长达3.5年的时间里耗费了巨额专业服务费用，却从未定位或保全过这些所谓的个人资金（ECF No. 858，第15页）。与这笔8.89亿美元数字相对应的实物资产的完全缺失证明，这些源自投资者的资金转移的真实走向、所有权归属和分配仍然高度存疑且不透明。在作出 889,000,000 美元判决的同时，于6月25日（Doc. No. 855）断然拒绝举行证据听证会，是以行政上的仓促草率任意取代 Rule 32(i)(2) 所要求的严格事实认定。\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 6 of 37\nD. 结构性违反 Rule 32(i)(1)(A)：通过突然取消赔偿剥夺第三方的发声权利\n在 ECF No. 858 结尾处（第16-17页）的突然程序运作中，地区法院以受害人人数众多且案情复杂导致“不切实际”为由，彻底放弃了作出 Restitution Order（赔偿裁定）的职责，取而代之的是批准了政府单方面的“免除/退还程序”。根据 Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA)（《犯罪受害人权利法》），赔偿正是赋予第三方利益相关方在听证会时就量刑记录中的事实不准确之处发表意见的法定依托。通过在量刑宣判前数小时完全取消赔偿，地区法院成功制造了彻底的信息真空，阻止了请愿人及其他受影响的投资者在量刑听证会期间揭露该8.89亿美元模型的缺陷，直接违反了 Rule 32(i) 的核实命令。\nE. 在法外胁迫下强迫身体丧失能力的被告出庭剥夺了 Rule 43 与 Rule 32 项下的出庭权和最后陈述权\n地区法院在2026年6月29日的草率判决，最终演变成对被告人身完整性与宪法权利的令人震惊的、前所未有的侵害。根据被告在量刑听证会期间的当庭陈述以及 Inner City Press（内城出版社）（http）提供的实时文字实录，被告在法庭上披露，在听证会前他曾晕厥、吐血并曾被送医救治。当局非但没有批准必须给予的医疗延期，反而策划了一场极具强迫性的、异常的强制带离：被告被强行带出医院，押回 MDC（大都会拘留中心），并由一名身份不明的平民女性剪掉他沾满血迹的衣物，擦去其身上的血迹\n\n案号：25-3046，07/01/2026，案卷分录：41.1，第 7 页（共 37 页）\n脸部，强迫更换服装，并单方面强行将其押解至法庭。这种令人震惊的非常规程序直接违反了联邦刑法的多项基本结构性原则：\n1. 违反《联邦刑事诉讼规则》（Fed. R. Crim. P.）第 43(a)(3) 条（出庭权）：第 43 条要求被告人在判决时实质、适格且清醒地在场。仅仅将一名丧失行为能力、流血且未接受医疗评估的被告人身体置于法庭中，并不符合宪法对“在场”的定义。强迫一名刚遭受身体创伤和法外对待的被告人立即接受判决，直接破坏了整个诉讼程序的合法适格性。\n2. 违反《联邦刑事诉讼规则》（Fed. R. Crim. P.）第 32(i)(4)(A)(ii) 条（最后陈述权）：最后陈述权要求法院亲自向被告人问话，并确定其是否希望在允许自由、理性且不受强迫地行使判断力的条件下发表陈述。一名刚被神秘经办人员剪断衣服且正处于身体虚脱恢复期的被告人，在法律上或心理上都无法行使公正的最后陈述权。\n3. 违反第五修正案正当程序：引入身份不明的非执法人员来强行改变被告人的医疗和身体状态，以便将其强行推进快速判决，构成了对司法廉洁性的深刻破坏。这使联邦量刑程序转变为对纯粹行政权力的违宪行使，必须立即撤销最终判决。\nInner City Press 的推文历史↓\n\n案号：25-3046，07/01/2026，案卷分录：41.1，第 8 页（共 37 页）\nII. 地区法院对悬而未决的紧急回避动议的蓄意压制与彻底沉默构成了结构性宪法缺陷\n地区法院在 2026 年 6 月 29 日急于作出判决并敲定 ECF No. 858 的做法，涉及对基本正当程序更为惊人的侵犯：故意且系统性地忽视正在审理中的司法回避动议。2026 年 6 月 26 日（星期五），请愿人根据 28 U.S.C. § 455 直接向地区法院提交了《紧急司法回避动议》，并将副本妥善送达辩护律师（见附件 B）。据我所知，大约六名处于类似处境的投资者和受害者也同时提交了\n\n案号：25-3046，07/01/2026，案卷分录：41.1，第 9 页（共 37 页）\n完全相同的紧急回避申请，并向辩护律师发出正式通知，依据 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) 对地区法院的公正表象提出了集体且严峻的质疑。然而，在 2026 年 6 月 29 日的整个判决程序中，地区法院以及辩护律师对这些待决动议保持了绝对且蓄意的沉默。记录中没有提及一次，也没有作出任何裁定。地区法院绝不能为了完成一场快速判决而对妥善提交的回避动议视而不见。根据长期确立的联邦判例法，当对法官的资格提出实质性质疑时，法院必须在敲定刑事判决之前解决这一管辖权门槛问题。地区法院将这些多层次的回避动议视作不存在，其行为故意脱离了经核实的公正授权，将整个量刑程序转变成了必须立即撤销的违宪星室法院式操作。\nIII. 地区法院的“竞速判决”表明其蓄意绕过巡回法院的职务执行令管辖权\n根据 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)，如果法官的公正性可能受到合理质疑，则必须自行回避。2026 年 6 月 29 日仓促的时间线粉碎了司法公正的表象。\n在 ECF No. 858 第 9 页中，地区法院公开承认 Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）的 6,512 名成员以及众多第三方请愿人已就案卷未归档和未审查的性质提出了广泛异议。然而，地区法院草率驳回了这 6,512 名异议人，声称他们的法定权利“应在判决后……通过附属程序予以评估”。（ECF No. 858，第 9 页）。\n\n案号：25-3046，07/01/2026，案卷分录：41.1，第 10 页（共 37 页）\n这是对第二巡回法院待决管辖权的直接藐视。请愿人目前呈递给本法院的 16 份有效职务执行令请愿书的核心，恰恰在于第三方案卷在判决前被不当排除和压制，从而使其法定参与权沦为违宪的马后炮。地区法院通过在 6 月 29 日上午仓促发布 ECF No. 858 并强行作出终审判决，蓄意试图造成程序上的“既成事实”，以剥夺本法院对这 16 份待决请愿书行使有意义的判前监督审查权的能力。根据 § 455(a)，这种企图跑赢上诉法院的蓄意行为在根本上构成了取消资格的理由。\nIV. 维持量刑判决将对第三方索赔人造成不可挽回的系统性损害\n如果本法院允许地区法院仓促作出的判决在未经纠正的情况下维持有效，请愿人和数千名处于类似处境的第三方投资者将遭受直接且不可逆转的损害：\n1. 永久锁定存在缺陷、未经审查的 8.89 亿美元模型：判决后，未经审查的 889,000,000 美元损失框架在法律上被固化在刑事判决中。旨在在判决前更正记录的 16 份待决自行代理（pro se）职务执行令请愿书立即面临失去实际意义的风险。\n2. 永久剥夺法定参与权：通过强迫 § 853(n) 索赔人和受害者进入判后附属程序，他们被限制在地区法院未经审查、重复计算的量刑事实认定的被操纵范围内运作。资产将通过未经核实的“减免程序”在没有任何司法监督的情况下进行分配，\n\n案号：25-3046，07/01/2026，案卷分录：41.1，第 11 页（共 37 页）\n在本法院能够采取行动之前永久消灭第三方的财产权利。\n结论及请求的救济\n地区法院对第 32 条的公然对抗、其明确拒绝解决有关没收资金基础记录的争议，以及其为了跑赢 16 份职务执行令请愿书而进行的策略性竞速，都需要上诉法院立即予以纠正。请愿人谨请求本法院：\n1. 撤销在 United States v. Ho Wan Kwok（美国诉郭文贵案），案号：No. 1:23-cr-00118-AT 中于 2026 年 6 月 29 日作出的量刑判决，并将本案发回重审，以便在干净、完整且法律上可靠的记录基础上进行全面重构；\n2. 立即对所有相关的没收、赔偿、受害者分配和附属程序作出行政中止命令，直至本法院另有命令；并\n3. 指示地区法院在随后的任何重新判决之前举行全面、强制性的证据听证会，确保涉及的投资者原始转账的来源、流向和合法所有权完全透明。\n日期：2026 年 6 月 29 日\n谨此提交，\n/s/ Jason Zen\n\n请愿人，自行代理（pro se）\n\n案号：25-3046，07/01/2026，案卷分录：41.1，第 12 页（共 37 页）\n\nUSDC SDNY\n文件\n美国联邦地区法院\n纽约南区（SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK） 电子归档\n美利坚合众国 文件编号：______ ____________\n归档日期：__6/29/2026__\n-诉-\nMILES GUO（郭文贵）， 23 Cr. 118-1 (AT)\n被告。 裁定\nANALISA TORRES（阿娜丽莎·托雷斯），联邦地区法官：\n被告 Miles Guo（郭文贵）对法院于 2025 年 8 月 11 日作出的初步没收命令（“POF”）提出异议。参见异议书，ECF No. 799；初步没收命令，ECF No. 720；政府动议，ECF No. 716；答辩书，ECF No. 803；亦参见回复，ECF No. 804。基于下文所述理由，法院部分支持并部分驳回郭对初步没收命令的异议。\n背景\n法院假定各方熟悉本案的事实背景，在此仅对与没收相关的程序和提交材料进行简要叙述。\nA. 陪审团裁决\n2024 年 7 月 16 日，陪审团裁定郭犯有九项不同金融犯罪罪名：\n(1) 一项诈骗集团阴谋罪（第三份替代起诉书的第一项罪名）；\n(2) 各一项电汇欺诈或银行欺诈阴谋罪、洗钱罪和证券欺诈罪（第二、三、四项罪名）；(3) 各一项与农场贷款项目（Farm Loan Program）相关的电汇欺诈罪和证券欺诈罪（第七、八项罪名）；(4) 各一项与 G|CLUBS（“G Clubs”）相关的电汇欺诈罪和证券欺诈罪（第九、十项罪名）；(5) 以及一项与 Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）相关的电汇欺诈罪（第十一项罪名）。陪审团宣判郭在与 GTV 私募（GTV Private Placement）相关的一项电汇欺诈罪和一项证券欺诈罪，以及一项从事非法货币交易罪（第五、六、十二项罪名）中无罪。参见陪审团裁决，ECF No. 395；第三份替代起诉书（S3 Superseding Indictment），\n\n案号：25-3046，07/01/2026，案卷分录：41.1，第 13 页（共 37 页）\n\nECF No. 307。上述每一项活动——农场贷款项目、G Clubs、Himalaya Exchange 和 GTV 私募——均被指控为“G 企业”（G Enterprise）的组成部分，该企业是由第一项罪名中所述的诈骗集团阴谋所包含的一系列投资计划。参见第三份替代起诉书第 16–19 段。\nB. 适用的没收条款\n由于郭被定罪，他受制于《美国法典》（United States Code）中要求向政府没收某些资产的三项不同条款：\n1) 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)，该条款要求被告人没收“构成或源自该人从诈骗集团活动中直接或间接获得的任何收益”的任何财产（第一项罪名）；\n2) 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C)，该条款要求被告人没收“构成或源自可追溯至”欺诈或欺诈阴谋的收益的所有财产（第二、四、七、八、九、十和十一项罪名）；1 以及\n3) 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1)，该条款要求被告人没收“涉及”洗钱或“可追溯至此类财产［涉及洗钱的财产］”的所有财产（第三项罪名）。\n参见同上，第 58–61 段。\nC. 先前的提交材料\n2025 年 4 月 8 日，法院指定了郭目前的辩护律师，并命令双方提交一份联合信函，说明郭将就没收问题表明其立场的日期。参见 4 月 8 日庭审笔录第 10:14–23 行，ECF No. 684。法院随后根据双方及郭的请求批准了四次延期，以便郭阐明其对各项资产没收的立场。参见，例如，ECF Nos. 698, 704, 706, 708。随后，在 2025 年 6 月 27 日，郭提交了一封信函，声称他“无法就潜在的\n\n1 起诉书在此项没收指控中还引用了 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c)，该条款规定了与没收相关的进一步规则和程序。参见第三份替代起诉书第 59 段。\n案号：25-3046，07/01/2026，案卷分录：41.1，第 14 页（共 37 页）\n\n没收以及发还由政府扣押的资金和财产」。ECF No. 710，第 1–2 页。该信函声明 Guo（郭文贵）在本案中「不放弃任何权利，包括其上诉权」。同上，第 1 页。作为回应，政府致函称，尽管「郭文贵不同意初步没收令，但法院可以作出处以金钱判决并没收郭文贵在特定财产中个人权益的初步没收令」。ECF No. 713。\n\n一个月后，通过日期为 2025 年 7 月 28 日的动议，政府请求法院「作出列明……金钱判决的初步没收令」，金额为 13 亿美元。参见 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(b)(2)(A)；Gov’t Mot.2 政府将这 13 亿美元定性为「可追溯至实施」诈骗集团及欺诈罪名项（罪名项一、二、四、七、八、九、十和十一）的「收益」，以及洗钱犯罪（罪名项三）中「涉及的财产」。参见 POF，第 3 页。政府辩称，13 亿美元是「个别受害者汇往 G Enterprise（G 集团）某些分支机构……资金的保守估计」，这些分支机构包括 Farm Loan Program（农场贷款项目）、GTV、G Clubs 以及 Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）。Gov’t Mot.，第 3 页；参见 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A)（「若政府寻求个人金钱判决，法院必须确定裁定被告支付的金钱数额。」）。\n\n政府还寻求没收 POF 中列出的某些财产（以下简称「列明财产」），Gov’t Mot.，第 4 页；POF，第 3–11 页：即「从若干银行账户中扣押的现金……这些账户曾被用于推进［郭文贵的］犯罪及其诈骗企业」，根据政府的说法，这些代表了「G 集团［（罪名项一所定义的诈骗企业）］的收益以及洗钱所涉及的财产」（罪名项三）。\n\n2 法院可在需要刑事没收的案件中处以金钱判决。当被告的资产或可识别财产可能不足以涵盖没收法规要求被告没收的全部收益金额时，可采用金钱判决以确保被告对该等收益的全额承担责任。参见，例如，United States v. Kenner, 443 F. Supp. 3d 354, 362 (E.D.N.Y. 2020)（「若被告缺乏资产来履行裁定，法院可判给政府一份没收金钱判决。」）；United States v. Peters, 732 F.3d 93, 98–99, 104 (2d Cir. 2013)（在指控依据 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(2) 没收的案件中维持作出的金钱判决）；United States v. Kalish, 626 F.3d 165, 168–69 (2d Cir. 2010)（在指控依据 28 U.S.C. § 2461 没收的案件中维持作出的金钱判决）。\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 15 of 37\n\nGov’t Mot.，第 4–5 页。政府根据被政府扣押的日期以及开户人姓名对这些银行账户进行了分类；每位开户人「在［第三次替代］起诉书中均被指名为 RICO 企业（诈骗企业）的成员」。同上，第 4 页；参见 S3 Superseding Indictment（S3 替代起诉书）¶ 3(a)。政府附上了与这些账户相关的数份扣押令宣誓书。参见 Gov’t Mot. 证物 B–E，ECF Nos. 716-2 至 716-5；亦见 Proposed POF ¶¶ a–u, bb（列出银行账户），ECF No. 716-1。\n\n列明财产包括位于新泽西州马瓦市（Mahwah, New Jersey）华谷路 675 号（675 Ramapo Valley Road）的一座豪宅、「其屋内物品」，例如包含「带有网格纹饰板洛可可式顶冠的意大利贴金木镜」，以及数件其他奢侈品，如布加迪（Bugatti）、兰博基尼（Lamborghini）和劳斯莱斯（Rolls-Royce）。参见 Gov’t Mot.，第 5–7 页；亦见 Proposed POF ¶ aa（列出「政府从［马瓦］物业扣押的个人财产」）。政府辩称，马瓦物业、其中的个人财产以及奢侈品均系使用可追溯至 G Clubs、G 集团或洗钱的资金购买。参见 Gov’t Mot.，第 5–7 页。\n\n郭文贵未对政府的动议作出回应，且鉴于他曾向法院表示自己「无法就有关没收的问题表明立场」，法院于 2025 年 8 月 11 日作出了 POF。参见 POF。将近一个月后，于 2025 年 9 月 4 日，郭文贵请求获得机会「以应对」政府动议中的「缺陷」，例如「某些财产是否属于可没收财产」、「抵销问题」以及「政府所寻求总额的准确性」。参见 ECF No. 724，第 1 页。通过日期为 2026 年 1 月 8 日的裁定，法院指示郭文贵提交任何异议，并指明「［郭文贵］是否对任何」列明财产「主张个人权益」。ECF No. 784.3 现呈递于法院面前的是郭文贵于 2026 年 2 月 3 日提交的文件。参见 Objs。\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 16 of 37\n\n法定标准\n\n当政府寻求以金钱判决形式进行没收时，法院「必须确定裁定被告支付的金钱数额」，Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A)，采用「已有记录中的证据」，同上 32.2(b)(1)(B)，包括庭审记录。参见 United States v. Mathieu, 853 F. App’x 739, 742 (2d Cir. 2021)。然而，没收数额的计算「并非一门精确的科学」。United States v. Treacy, 639 F.3d 32, 48 (2d Cir. 2011)。因此，法院只需基于关于适当没收数额的「可用信息」作出「合理估计」。同上；参见同上（此外指出，法院在评估提议的金钱判决时，可「使用一般参照点作为起点」，并「可从根据优势证据确立的证据中作出合理推断」）；亦见 United States v. Uddin, 551 F.3d 176, 180 (2d Cir. 2009)。\n\n法院必须根据优势证据确定没收事宜——包括适当的金钱判决数额以及没收是否适用于列明财产。United States v. Capoccia, 503 F.3d 103, 116 (2d Cir. 2007)。\n\n讨论\n\n郭文贵对 POF 提出了若干异议：(1) 其被指控欺诈的「范围」过宽，包括了那些并非其犯罪受害者的人；(2) 他「只能被裁定没收其个人获取的资产」；(3) 没收不应涵盖来自 GTV Private Placement（GTV 私募）的任何所谓收益，因为他在与 GTV 相关的两项欺诈罪名上已被宣判无罪；以及 (4) 金钱判决应按特定数额予以抵销。参见 Objs.，第 3、9、11、17 页。\n\n3 政府辩称，郭文贵已放弃对 POF 的任何异议，这主要是由于他在 2025 年 6 月 27 日的信函中声明其不对没收表明立场。参见，例如，Resp.，第 3–4 页。法院 1 月 8 日的裁定并未处理放弃权利的问题，且由于法院在本裁定中大体认定郭文贵对 POF 的异议缺乏事实依据，并倾向于对实质问题作出实体裁决，法院对郭文贵是否放弃了其异议不表态。\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 17 of 37\n\n法院认定，政府已通过优势证据证明，约 8.89 亿美元是对流入 Farm Loan Program、G Clubs 和 Himalaya Exchange 现金总流入额的合理估计——这些要么是郭文贵被定罪的诈骗共谋的组成部分，要么是构成其欺诈定罪基础的企业——因此，8.89 亿美元是本案中适当的金钱判决金额。参见 Gov’t Mot.，第 3 页；GXZ26，ECF No. 803-1；Trial Tr.，第 4330–32 页；4 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(b)(1)(A)。\n\nA. 范围\n\n法院驳回了郭文贵的论点，即 POF 不应包括可追溯至声称自己「并未受其欺诈侵害」之个人的「收益」的财产。参见 Objs.，第 3–4、5 页。\n\n首先，郭文贵预设了没收会区分「被欺诈的投资者与坚称自己未受欺诈的投资者」。Objs.，第 4 页。事实并非如此。在本案中，没收适用于「来自诈骗活动」的收益、「来自欺诈」的收益以及洗钱「所涉及」的财产。参见 Resp.，第 5 页（援引 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963(a), 981(a)(1)(C), 及 982(a)(2)）。与郭文贵的主张相反，其被定罪罪行的范围并非由个别受害者对其陈述的「预期和信赖」来界定。对照 Objs.，第 5 页（声称「个别投资者的预期和信赖对于区分欺诈受害者与未受害者至关重要」）。\n\n4 在其量刑意见书中，郭文贵辩称证物 GXZ26 未考虑 G 集团各组成部分之间资金流入可能存在的重复计算。参见，例如，ECF No. 822，第 41、53 页（声称个人可以使用喜马拉雅交易所的资金购买 G Club 会员资格）；亦见 ECF No. 826（更正量刑意见书）。郭文贵未引用任何证据表明发生过这种情况，也未表明政府的资金流入计算实际上不当地包含了从喜马拉雅交易所账户向 G Clubs 支付的款项。同上。因此，法院根据记录中可用的证据作出此项认定，该证据表明政府的计算是正确的。而且，无论如何，该论点未在郭文贵对没收令的异议中提出。因此，法院将不对该异议进行论述。\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 18 of 37\n\n事实上，Second Circuit（第二巡回法院）已经认定「信赖并非刑事欺诈的构成要件」，且「欺诈受害者在信赖（或不信赖）不实陈述方面的不合理性，与被告的犯罪故意无关」。United States v. Weaver, 860 F.3d 90, 95–96 (2d Cir. 2017)。换言之，即使欺诈方案中的某位所谓「投资者」否认他们信赖了支撑欺诈的虚假陈述，欺诈方案仍可能存在，且从该方案中获得的所有收益都将应予没收。同理，某位「投资者」对于自己是否为该方案受害者的主观观点，与他们对该方案的投入资金是否属于被告从欺诈中获得的「收益」无关。唯一重要的是「重大性」——即被指控为欺诈性的陈述具有「影响陈述所针对的决策者的自然倾向」。Weaver, 860 F.3d at 96。而重大性是根据客观标准进行评估的，「而非从受害者的主观视角」。United States v. Frenkel, 682 F. App’x 20, 22 (2d Cir. 2017)。\n\n法院的结论得到了被定罪欺诈罪行的法定定义的证实。电汇欺诈将明知而参与任何「欺诈方案或欺诈计谋」以及为了「执行该等［欺诈］方案或欺诈计谋的目的」通过电汇传输某些通信的行为定为犯罪。18 U.S.C. § 1343；参见 2024 年 7 月 9 日 Trial Tr.，第 5791:25–5794:6 行，ECF No. 450。至于证券欺诈，在本案中违反的 Securities and Exchange Commission（美国证券交易委员会，以下简称「SEC」）规则，参见 S3 Superseding Indictment ¶¶ 47, 51，禁止使用「方案……进行欺诈」、「作出对重大事实的不实陈述」或在特定情况下遗漏重大事实，或者「从事作为……的行为、做法或业务流程\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 19 of 37\n\n从事或将要从事对任何人的欺诈或欺骗行为”，17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a)–(c)（强调为后加）。另见 Neder v. United States，527 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1999)（指出国会在欺诈法规中禁止的是“‘欺诈预谋’，而非既遂的欺诈”）。换言之，Guo（郭文贵）欺诈预谋的“范围”并不取决于向这些预谋出资的每个个人是否认为自己被骗。他们关于其个人“投资”是否具有实质价值的看法，或关于其是否实际上信赖了任何重大不实陈述的看法，均不影响这些投资是否是在欺诈预谋中所作出的。5\n\n郭文贵引用的先例 United States v. Miller，997 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1993) 以及 United States v. Rainford，110 F.4th 455 (2d Cir. 2024) 均不适用。在 Miller 案中，Second Circuit（第二巡回法院）裁定，在邮政欺诈罪的庭审所出示的事实基础上，政府未能证明被告有意剥夺受害者的财产权益，因为被告据称从受害者处转移“据为己有”的财产，事实上自始至终都不属于受害者的“特定、可识别的财产权益”。出处同上，第 1017–1021 页。换言之，Miller 案最终取决于涉嫌受害者合同财产权益的范围，而非其预期或看法，因此与本案无关。见出处同上。Rainford 案中，地区法院仅凭“政府的一面之词”作出没收命令，该命令被撤销并被发回重审。110 F.4th at 489。相比之下，本案中有充足的证据支持在本案中提交的初步没收裁定书（POF）。\n\n郭文贵进一步辩称，有“充分证据表明相当数量的所谓‘受害者’拒绝接受这种分类”。异议书第 6–7 页。他声称“Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）”（即郭文贵在第十一项罪名中被定罪犯有电信欺诈罪的企业）的“6,512 名成员”“已对没收其账户提出异议”，并“对被贴上受害者标签表示沮丧”。出处同上，第 6 页。这些申诉，以及来自“Hamilton 请求人”和各种其他第三方的申诉，并不影响本裁定，本裁定仅针对政府所指认的财产事实上是否属于诈骗活动收益、欺诈收益，或是可追溯至涉洗钱资金，以及 13 亿美元的赔偿判决金是否系对郭文贵没收义务价值的合理解释。6 第三方对 POF 中所指认财产的主张权利，应根据 18 U.S.C. § 853(n) 和《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 32.2 条通过附随程序进行评估。\n\n5 郭文贵并无相反主张——在其提出该主张的意见书中，他既未讨论，甚至也未引用其欺诈定罪的构成要件。见异议书第 4–9 页。\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 20 of 37\n\nB. 占有\n\n郭文贵辩称，他“仅在他在某个时刻亲自获取了被污染收益的价值的范围内，方可被判处承担没收责任”，并且出于各种原因，没有充分证据证明他“获取”了 POF 中列出的财产。异议书第 10–11 页（强调为原文所加）。\n\n郭文贵误解了没收的性质。被告犯罪收益若要符合可予没收的条件，该财产“不必亲自或直接由被告、其受让人或其共谋者占有”。United States v. Contorinis，692 F.3d 136, 147 (2d Cir. 2012)（引文省略）。相反，该财产只需“在某个时刻曾处于被告的控制之下”。出处同上。此外，即使被告对财产的控制是暂时的，该财产仍可予以没收。见 United States v. Tanner，942 F.3d 60, 68 (2d Cir. 2019)。\n\n6 本院注意到根据 18 U.S.C. § 853(n) 提交的大量请愿书，这些请愿书旨在主张第三方在没收给美国的财产中的合法权益，本院对根据 § 853(n) 正式提出并提交的任何请愿人的主张是否具有实体理由不发表意见。\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 21 of 37\n\n在庭审中，政府以优势证据证明郭文贵是控制 G Enterprise（G系列企业）中所有实体及其资产的“老板”。回应书第 7 页。7 例如，数名证人的证言显示郭文贵对涉及 G 系列企业的资产实施了控制：Karin Maistrello 作证称郭文贵控制了 Rule of Law（法治基金/法治社会）组织的资金，即涉及 G 系列企业的一项预谋（见庭审记录第 424 页）；多位证人作证称郭文贵对 G Clubs 拥有控制权（见庭审记录第 1941 页（称郭文贵为“最高老板”）、1995:3–15、1996:2–5（法官席前澄清）、1999:4–7、2975:8–2976:10、2980:11–22、2999:20–3000:6（关于 G Clubs 的证词））；并且大量书证支持郭文贵对其犯罪所涉资金实施控制的结论（见 GXC415；回应书第 7 页注释 3（引用展示郭文贵对涉及 G 系列企业的资金实施控制的庭审物证））。8\n\n庭审中出示的书证，例如 GXZ26（显示资金从某些 G 系列企业银行账户流向列于 POF 中的其他银行账户），亦证实政府主张应予没收的特定账户中包含来源于 G 系列企业收益的资金以及涉洗钱的财产。见动议第 4–5 页。值得注意的是，郭文贵并未主张这些账户中的资金包含非来源于涉及 G 系列企业实体的款项。见 POF 第 a–z、bb 段；异议书第 9–11 页（相反，仅辩称他并未亲自获取或对这些资金实施控制）。\n\n7 此外，根据作为本案没收依据的各项法规，本院仅需认定郭文贵“直接或间接”获取了收益。见 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963(a)(3), 981(a)(2)(A), 982(a)(2)。\n8 郭文贵关于庭审记录的唯一辩解是一位证人“作证称……郭文贵不是 G Clubs 的最终实益拥有人，也不是 G Clubs 或 G Fashion 的资金来源”。异议书第 10–11 页。该证人 James R. Collins Jr. 是 Mercantile Global Holdings 的员工，该公司的旗下银行与 G Clubs、G Fashion 和 Himalaya Exchange 保持着客户关系。见庭审记录第 2753:8–2756:15。但 Collins 仅作证称 Mercantile Bank 认为郭文贵不是 G Clubs 的最终实益拥有人，且 G Clubs 也是如此向其陈述的。见庭审记录第 2758:23–2762:12。他并未就有关 G Clubs 内部运作的任何个人知情情况作证，也未就郭文贵事实上是否对 G Clubs 资金实施控制作证。因此，本院对 Collins 的证言赋予极低权重。郭文贵还试图援引已根据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 就应予没收资产提出附随主张的第三方所作的主张。见异议书第 11 页。本院将在量刑后根据 § 853(n) 和《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 32.2 条进行的附随程序中审理这些主张。本院对任何第三方在任何被没收财产中是否拥有更优先的合法权益不发表意见。\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 22 of 37\n\n郭文贵在很大程度上依据 Honeycutt v. United States，581 U.S. 443 (2017) 来支持其不应被命令“没收他[未]亲自获取的资产”的主张。异议书第 9 页。在该案中，Supreme Court（最高法院）裁定，要求没收源自某些毒品犯罪收益之任何财产的 21 U.S.C. § 853，并不会自动对共谋中所有被定罪的当事人强加连带责任。见 581 U.S. at 443。\n\n在 Honeycutt 案中，政府寻求针对一名被告作出金钱判决，辩称该被告应对共谋的全部利润承担责任，尽管该被告仅仅是一名协助其所在商店参与毒品犯罪的受薪雇员，并且从未从该商店的被污染利润中获益，更不用说对其全部利润实施控制了。见出处同上，第 445–47 页。然而在本案中，本院以优势证据认定郭文贵从政府主张应予没收的资金中获益并实施了控制。例如见回应书第 7–8 页注释 3（引用庭审证据指出，例如郭文贵指示其同谋使用“G-Club 或另一家私营公司”出资购买一张昂贵的茶几）。事实上，自 Honeycutt 案以来，第二巡回法院重申，政府无需证明被告亲自保留或直接占有财产即可适用没收。例如见 Rajaratnam v. United States，736 F. App’x 279, 284 (2d Cir. 2018)（裁定可对被告就其仅具有临时支配权且随后已被支出的资金作出没收命令）。\n\n因此，本院认定政府已以优势证据证明列明财产应予没收。\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 23 of 37\n\nC. GTV 私募与 SEC 追缴违法所得\n\n郭文贵主张，源自 GTV Private Placement（GTV 私募）的资金不应计入没收命令中，并且针对郭文贵的金钱判决金额应扣减政府声称涉及 GTV 的资金数额。见异议书第 17 页。9 郭文贵主张，因为他已被判定不构成与 GTV 私募相关的电信欺诈和证券欺诈罪，政府寻求没收的源自 GTV 私募的 4.11 亿美元资金应从裁定中剔除。出处同上，第 11–12 页；回应书第 8 页。\n\n鉴于当事人提出的另一个问题，本院无需对此作出决断：针对郭文贵的金钱判决金额是否应扣减 SEC（美国证券交易委员会）在行政程序中已追缴的数额。见 SEC 裁定书，ECF 编号 799-2。郭文贵称，作为 SEC 发起的行政程序的一部分，GTV 已追缴退缴了超过 4.11 亿美元的违法所得。见异议书第 17–18 页。政府在一定程度上承认了这一点，声明“源自 GTV 私募的实际资金已由 SEC 追缴，SEC 设立了用于向受害者分配的公平基金”，并且“如果法院从没收金额中扣除 GTV 私募资金，将扣除约 4.11 亿美元”。动议第 4 页注释 2。\n\n然而，双方的数据存在分歧。郭文贵辩称，GTV 连同 Saraca Media Group, Inc. 及 Voice of Guo Media, Inc.，已向 SEC 追缴退缴了超过 4.86 亿美元的违法所得，并且全部 4.86 亿美元均应从金钱判决中扣除，因为这与本案指控的行为相关。见异议书第 18 页。然而，政府主张只有 4.11 亿\n\n9 郭文贵并未声称某个特定银行账户或个人财产项目完全仅构成来自 GTV 私募的收益，通篇见异议书。政府坚称所有相关资金均系 G 系列企业的收益以及涉及洗钱的财产。见动议第 4–5 页。郭文贵并未据此主张任何列明财产应被排除在没收之外，因此，本院仅审查该追缴违法所得如何影响金钱判决。\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 24 of 37\n\n13 亿美元这一数字中有数百万美元源于 GTV Private Placement（GTV 私募），且其余 8.89 亿美元源于可追溯至 Farm Loan Program（农场贷款项目）、G Clubs 或 Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）的收益。参见 GXZ26。GTV 及其他实体上缴非法所得（disgorged）的金额比 4.11 亿美元多出 7500 万美元这一事实，仅在多出的 7500 万美元可追溯至本案所涉欺诈计划（即农场贷款项目、G Clubs 或喜马拉雅交易所）收益的情况下，才与金钱判决相关。\n\n法院驳回 Guo（郭）关于据称超出 4.11 亿美元而上缴的 7500 万美元可追溯至其定罪罪行的主张。首先，他声称上缴资金总额中的 3400 万美元与“G-Coins and G-Dollars（G币与G美元）”的销售有关，而后者是喜马拉雅交易所的早期前身。参见 Objs. 第 17–18 页。然而，2020 年 4 月至 6 月销售 G-Coin 和 G-Dollars 的行为并不在 Indictment（起诉书）的涵盖范围内，该起诉书针对的是 2021 年至 2023 年发生的喜马拉雅交易所企业交易。参见 S3 Superseding Indictment（S3 替代起诉书）第 53 段。\n\n此外，郭没有提供任何证据证明归属于 Voice of Guo Media, Inc.（“VOG”，郭媒体公司）的 1.15 亿美元上缴资金“与所谓的农场贷款项目重叠”。Objs. 第 17–18 页。SEC Order（美国证券交易委员会命令）报告称，VOG 从希望向 GTV 投资少于 100,000 美元的“潜在投资者”处汇集资金。参见 Objs. 第 17–18 页；SEC Order 第 15–21 段，ECF No. 799-2。然而，起诉书对农场贷款项目的描述与 SEC 命令对 VOG 筹款工作的描述大相径庭。例如，对比 S3 Superseding Indictment 第 17 段（将“The Himalaya Farm Alliance（喜马拉雅农场联盟）”描述为“位于世界各地的非正式团体的集合体（每个团体被称为‘农场’）”，其“以向农场提供‘贷款’的形式”获取投资，并“承诺该等贷款将通过‘Loan Agreement（贷款协议）’转换为 GTV 普通股”）与 SEC Order 第 16–18 段（描述 VOG 如何向投资者提供一份一页纸的“Limited Purpose Agency Agreement（有限目的代理协议）”，其中载明，只要收取极低的对价，VOG 的代表将作为投资者的“代理人”并代表他们购买 GTV 股票）。\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 25 of 37\n\n虽然郭关于 SEC 从 GTV 及其关联公司获取的金额比 4.11 亿美元多出 7500 万美元的主张是正确的，但他未能证明该笔多余款项与政府已证明的、与郭定罪罪行相关的任何收益（即农场贷款项目、G Clubs 和喜马拉雅交易所）相重合。\n\n因此，法院认定，拟议的金钱判决中仅可扣减 4.11 亿美元，因为记录反映且政府不持异议的是，在提起本刑事诉讼之前，在另案程序中，与 G Enterprise（G系列企业）相关的实体已经上缴了可追溯至 GTV 私募的 4.11 亿美元资金。该项扣减不影响对任何 Listed Property（列明财产）的没收。\n\nD. 抵销\n\n郭主张，金钱判决应当“扣除与本案相关的、政府已占有的 10 亿多美元”以及“破产受托人（Bankruptcy Trustee）占有的、且属于政府在本案中认为应予没收的物品当中的资金和资产”。Objs. 第 18–20 页。作为回应，政府指出，一旦所有第三方权益审结完毕，根据“Final Order of Forfeiture（最终没收命令）没收归 United States（美国）”的财产价值确实将“用于清偿金钱判决”，并且没有任何法律依据可以命令对任何未包含在 POF（初步没收命令）中的资产进行抵销。\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 26 of 37\n\n参见 Resp. 第 10 页及注 7；POF 第 7.10 段。据此，法院目前不会从金钱判决中扣除任何列明财产的价值。11\n\nE. 附属事项\n\n郭还寻求一项命令，指示政府从郭破产财产的 Chapter 11（第 11 章）受托人处接管某些资产（即“破产资产”），该破产程序于 2022 年 2 月 15 日在 District of Connecticut（康涅狄格区）启动。参见 Seizure Mot.，ECF No. 724，第 1 页；概见 In re Kwok, No. 22 Bk. 50073 (D. Conn. Bankr. February 15, 2022)；In re Kwok, 172 F.4th 145 (2d Cir. 2026)。郭主张，政府对被没收资产的权益“优于破产程序中任何债权人的权益”，Seizure Mot. 第 5 页，命令政府扣押破产资产将既“使本案所涉各实体中的投资者（将为其下达赔偿命令）能够获得这些资产”，又“阻止受托人在破产程序中所产生的可观费用和开支继续累积”。参见同上，第 5–7 页。\n\n法院无权准许郭所请求的救济。12 郭仅仅引用了 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure（《联邦刑事诉讼规则》）第 32.2(b)(3) 条，用以主张法院“可以在初步没收命令中包含……在上诉期间合理必要用于保全财产价值的条件”。参见 Seizure Reply 第 4 页，ECF No. 754。第 32.2(b)(3) 条将\n\n10 郭还主张，如果法院在附属程序中认定任何财产属于第三方，则该财产的价值应从金钱判决中扣除。Objs. 第 18 页。实则不然。第三方没收程序旨在确定第三方是否对受制于没收的财产拥有更优的法定权益。参见 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)；Gov’t Forfeiture Ltr. 第 1–2 页，ECF No. 785。这与资产是否应予没收是两个不同的问题。即使第三方对某项财产拥有更优的法定权益，该财产也很可能是由于例如欺诈等原因而落入郭的控制之下。因此，如果法院根据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6) 认定任何财产属于第三方，亦不会从金钱判决中扣除该财产的价值。\n\n11 法院驳回郭关于“在政府放弃追缴本案其他潜在应予没收资产的限度内”核减金钱判决、以及按 Haithem Khaled 被没收的金额核减金钱判决的请求。参见 Objs. 第 19–21 页。郭对这两项请求均未提供法律依据。\n\n12 法院对政府关于郭在该问题上缺乏诉讼主体资格（standing）的主张不发表意见。\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 27 of 37\n\n法院的权限限制在“上诉”期间为保全财产价值所必需的条件，而不是在相关的、单独的诉讼程序（如本案的破产程序）审理期间为保全价值所必需的条件。\n\n此外，没收规则的其他几项程序性特征表明，下达此类命令将超出法院的权限。例如，第 32.2(b)(3) 条在下达初步命令后“授权”政府“扣押受制于没收的具体财产”，但并未要求政府必须这样做。Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(3)。第 32.2 条也没有规定政府根据第 32.2(b)(3) 条获得授权后，可以在何时或以何种方式扣押没收命令中列明的财产。同样，21 U.S.C. § 853(e) 和 (f) 款赋权法院对可能受制于没收的资产采取某些保护性措施，但并未授权法院强迫政府实施扣押。参见 Resp. 第 4 页。\n\n况且，郭的请求缺乏实体依据。郭主张法院可以施加“在上诉期间合理必要用于保全财产价值”的条件，Seizure Reply 第 4 页，但第 32.2 条中没有任何规定要求法院必须这样做。尽管法院承认破产程序中的第 11 章破产财产已产生了欠付受托人和各类其他专业人士的费用，参见 Seizure Mot. 第 7 页，但鉴于该程序的极度复杂性，此类费用并不异常。参见同上（声称在破产程序中已提起了 300 起对抗性诉讼）。\n\nF. 赔偿\n\n政府请求法院认定下达赔偿命令并不切合实际（impracticable），并授权启动减免（remission）程序。参见 Gov’t Ltr. 第 4–5 页，ECF No. 785；ECF No. 784（2026 年 1 月 8 日命令）。郭表示同意。ECF No. 789 第 3 页。法院表示同意，并认定，\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 28 of 37\n\n基于本案详尽的案卷记录，鉴于“案件的复杂性和所涉受害者的数量”，根据 18 U.S.C. § 3663A 向受害者判给赔偿将是不切合实际的，且会使量刑程序复杂化或拖延量刑程序。参见 18 U.S.C. § 3663(c)(3)(A)–(B)。\n\n结论\n\n基于前述理由，法院认定，由于郭因共谋敲诈勒索、电信和证券欺诈以及共谋洗钱而被定罪，政府已证明没收适用于列明财产。法院支持（SUSTAINS）郭的异议，支持范围为：法院应从拟议的 13 亿美元金钱判决中扣减 4.11 亿美元，从而使最终没收命令中的金钱判决金额为 8.89 亿美元。\n\n法院驳回（DENIES）郭在 ECF No. 724 中寻求命令强迫政府扣押破产程序中资产的动议。谨指示法院书记官终结 ECF No. 724 处的动议。\n\n最后，法院认定在本案中进行赔偿是不切实际的，并授权政府通过减免程序对受害者进行补偿。\n\n特此裁定。\n\n日期：2026 年 6 月 29 日\n纽约州纽约市\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 29 of 37 电子邮件截图\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 30 of 37\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT（美国联邦地区法院）\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（纽约南区）\nUnited States of America（美利坚合众国），\n诉\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵），又名 Miles Guo，等，\n被告。\n案号：1:23-cr-00118-AT\n请求 HONORABLE ANALISA TORRES（阿娜丽莎·托雷斯法官阁下）回避的紧急动议\n依据 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)（必须在 2026 年 6 月 29 日量刑前解决）\n\n请愿人 Jason Zen（詹森·岑），作为 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 项下的第三方权利主张人以及一再试图通过向本法院提交材料参与诉讼的受影响人员，亲自出庭（pro se），谨此提请动议，请求主持法官回避本案的进一步审理。本动议系以紧急方式提出，盖因量刑定于 2026 年 6 月 29 日进行，且在法院就一份已充斥着未决案卷录入争议、隐私泄露以及悬而未决的上诉监督的案卷记录进一步采取行动之前，应当解决表现出的公正性问题。\n\n本动议并不要求法院承认动议人或其他参与者提出的每一项指控之实体理由。本动议仅提出如下质问：从完全知晓程序历程的客观观察者角度来看，在经历了数月对诉讼当事人自行提交的材料进行选择性不予入档、在提出封存或隐名请求的情况下仍公开披露受保护的个人隐私信息、在出现有据可查的件件之后仍持续不作为之后，法院的公正性是否可能会受到合理的质疑\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 31 of 37\n关于卷宗污染的指控以及与 Brady（布雷迪）相关的关切，以及在相关上诉程序仍在进行期间执意推进量刑的决定。\n\nI. 适用标准\n\nSection 455(a)（第 455 条 (a) 款）要求联邦法官在任何其公正性可能会受到合理质疑的程序中自行回避。该检验标准是客观的，不取决于法官的主观意图，而取决于了解相关事实的理性观察者是否会对中立性产生实质性怀疑。\n\n该标准不仅关注实际偏见，还关注由一系列程序性选择所造成的表象。当针对某一类参与者、卷宗的某一方或某一类安全利益的重复行为累积形成具有一致性的偏颇表象时，为维护公众对程序完整性的信心，法官必须回避。\n\nII. 系统性排除无律师自辩第三方的提交文件\n\nMovant（动议人）和其他 pro se（自身代表/无律师自辩的）第三方已依据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)、CVRA（《犯罪受害者权利法》）以及关于没收、受害者认定、损失计算和卷宗完整性的相关程序理论提交了多份文件。这些文件已发送至法院并送达给 Government（政府方）及辩护律师，然而大多数文件均未被录入 docket（案件卷宗索引/案卷）。相比之下，由律师提交的涉及类似问题的材料却被依例录入案卷并予以审酌。这种模式导致在 Second Circuit（第二巡回法院）产生了 16 起未决的 mandamus（调卷令/职务执行令）申请，均源于同样的歧视性不予录入案卷模式，并造成了仅允许卷宗的一方成熟为可裁决形式的诉讼记录。\n\nIII. 法院对个人身份识别信息的处理造成了严重的报复性或任意性对待之表象\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 32 of 37\n动议人此前曾请求将个人身份信息和投资详情予以封存（under seal）提交，因为公开披露可能会造成安全风险，包括与 Chinese Communist Party（中国共产党）相关的风险，以及公开暴露一名中国大陆投资者的身份和财务数据所带来的风险。该请求是明确的，并且与 Rule 49.1（第 49.1 条规则）式的隐私关切以及法院保护敏感信息的固有权力挂钩。\n\n在动议人的补充调卷令申请文件中，动议人说明了 Southern District（纽约南区联邦地区法院）将其向第二巡回法院提交的调卷令申请文件作为 Dkt. 770 上传至地区法院案卷，且在此过程中，尽管附有涂抹隐去或封存的请求，仍公开披露了个人身份识别信息。该份文件还描述了对其他无律师自辩申诉人的类似对待，包括在 Dkts. 732 和 765 中对未涂抹隐去信息的公开发布。\n\n无论每一次披露在主观意义上是否属于故意，其表象都令人深感不安。当一家收到来自无代理人申诉人的明确隐私请求的法院，仍然将敏感身份识别信息置于公开记录中，特别是在这些申诉人同时一直在就该法院的案卷录入做法寻求上诉审查的情况下，客观观察者完全有理由质疑其中立性。\n\nIV. 动议人此前曾提出与 Brady 相关的及卷宗污染关切，但这些关切在地区法院案卷中从未得到实质性处理\n\n动议人早先提交的、随后在重新提交的调卷令附录中复现的文件指出，2025 年 8 月 13 日，动议人向检察官发送了被认定为可能有利于辩方的材料，并请求根据 Brady 和 Giglio（吉廖）规则进行披露，随后在未收到任何确认的情况下，于 2025 年 8 月 29 日向辩护律师进行了跟进。这些材料包括对直播言论的选择性使用、Trustee Luc Despins（受托人吕克·德斯宾斯）与 U.S. Attorney's Office（美国联邦检察官办公室）之间的接触、\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 33 of 37\nGeyer（盖耶）律师在代表庞大索赔人群体中的角色，以及集中组织的索赔可能扭曲了呈交给法院的受害者全貌的可能性的关切。\n\n动议人还提出了一项动议，请求以正式记录提交与 Brady 相关材料并要求法院确认披露为有限目的获准参加诉讼（intervention）。根据重新提交的调卷令记录，该动议同样未被依常例录入案卷，因此未获得能够让外部观察者确信不利或棘手信息已得到中立审酌的那种透明司法处理。\n\n这里的关键并不在于本法院必须采纳动议人对证据的看法。关键在于，不予录入案卷与对质疑政府叙事完整性的提交文件保持沉默相结合，可能会形成合理的表象，即仅允许程序记录的一方成熟为可裁决的形式。\n\nV. 本法院在第二巡回法院积极监督下仍决定执意推进量刑，进一步损害了公正性的表象\n\n目前的法官回避问题不能脱离第二巡回法院已经在进行的平行上诉程序来孤立评估。由于地区法院对自身代表的提交文件、隐私问题、第三方参与以及未决程序争议的处理，该刑事案件引发了大量的调卷令申请、紧急暂缓执行请求及相关的监督性文件。\n\n其中一组相关诉讼程序包括 No. 25-3046 案，在该案中，第二巡回法院于 2026 年 5 月 15 日在不影响实体权利的情况下驳回了先前的调卷令救济请求，并明确允许在地区法院未能在合理时间内将相关提交文件录入案卷的情况下重新提出申请。由于地区法院\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 34 of 37\n在做出该命令以及经过额外时间之后，仍未将先前提交的材料录入案卷，因此已提交了重新申请。\n\n与此同时，相关程序中的其他申诉人也基于重叠的理由向上诉法院寻求紧急救济，包括未予录入案卷、侵犯隐私、对受害者和第三方提交文件的不当处理、暂缓执行请求，以及要求主审法官被撤换或回避的请求。\n\n该程序格局的意义不仅在于数量层面。它意味着本法院的行为已经在多起未决事项中成为上诉法院持续监督关注的对象。\n\n尽管处于这种态势，本法院仍拒绝休庭/延期，并于 2026 年 6 月 25 日宣布量刑将于 2026 年 6 月 29 日进行。在同一份裁定中，法院声称无需举行证据听证会即可做出量刑必要的事实认定，Brady 和 Rule 17(c)（第 17 条 (c) 款规则）的争议不能成为推迟的理由，且在量刑前无需解决 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 项下的第三方申请和 special-master（特别主事官）问题。\n\n这一时间先后顺序至关重要。当地区法院明知上诉法院已经在审查——或已被请求审查——无律师自辩文件是否被不当排除在卷宗之外、第三方参与是否处理不当、是否需要紧急暂缓执行以及是否应当重新指派法官或回避，却依然在这些监督程序得出结果之前将案件加速推向量刑阶段，理性观察者可能会得出结论：该法院正试图在有效的上诉审查发生之前将案件推过关键节点。\n\n此处尤其如此，因为上诉法院的部分紧急提交文件已明确提出了司法撤换或法官回避的关切，而其他文件则力求防止在未解决的程序缺陷\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 35 of 37\n得到解决之前推进量刑。面对这种上诉态势仍推进量刑，不仅与通常的案件审理管理产生冲突，更造成了地区法院无视上诉法院持续监督角色的实际意义的表象。\n\n因此，客观观察者完全有理由将 6 月 25 日的裁定视为更广泛的程序模式的一部分，而非中立的日程安排决定：无律师自辩文件未被及时录入案卷；相关的参与和卷宗完整性问题仍未解决；多项上诉程序仍在进行中；其中一些程序明确要求法官回避或撤换；然而无论如何，在这些事项得到有效理清之前，量刑仍在被强行推进。\n\n根据 § 455(a)，这种表象本身就构成了回避理由。问题并不在于每一份未决的上诉文件最终是否都会成功。问题在于，一个充分了解周围情况的理性人，是否会质疑一个在上级法院对其自身程序行为的监督仍在积极进行期间，继续推进最终量刑的法院的公正性。\n\n根据现有记录，答案是肯定的。\n\nVI. 为维护对后续任何程序的信心，法官必须回避\n\n本动议并非基于对单一裁决的异议。它基于以下一系列行为所产生的累积表象：一再将无律师自辩第三方的提交文件排除在普通案卷之外；尽管有封存请求仍公开处理敏感身份识别信息；地区法院对动议人提出的与 Brady 相关的及卷宗完整性关切缺乏实质性回应；以及在第二巡回法院仍在 No. 25-3046 案中监督相关案卷录入争议时决定推进量刑。即使每一事件单独来看都可以解释，但在 § 455(a) 下的核心问题是理性观察者\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 36 of 37\n纵观整个卷宗所看到的表象。在这样的卷宗记录下，对公正性的实质性怀疑已不再是凭空推测。\n\n请求的救济\n\n动议人谨此请求法院：\n1. 依据 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)，令 ANALISA TORRES（阿娜丽莎·托雷斯）回避本案的后续程序；\n2. 若法院拒绝回避，在量刑进行前迅速签发一份说明驳回理由的书面裁定，以便该问题得以保留并供立即审查；\n3. 指示 Clerk（法庭书记官）确保动议人调卷令材料中所指明的所有先前提交的无律师自辩文件均作为卷宗的一部分予以保存并妥善处理；\n4. 准予法院认为公正且适当的其他及进一步救济。\n\n谨此提交，\nJason Zen（曾杰森）\n自身代表申诉人\n2026年6月27日\n\nCase: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 37 of 37\n送达证明\nUnited States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit（美国联邦第二巡回上诉法院）\n案号：25-3046\n纽约南区联邦地区法院案号：United States v. Kwok, et al.（美国诉郭等人案），1:23-CR-118-1 (AT)\n\n我，Jason Zen，特此证明如下：\n2026 年 7 月 1 日，我邮寄了下列文件的真实准确副本：\n1. EMERGENCY MOTION TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT OF SENTENCE AND FOR AN IMMEDIATE ADMINISTRATIVE STAY PENDING APPELLATE REVIEW（关于撤销判决书中的量刑判决并在上诉审查期间立即给予行政暂缓执行的紧急动议）\n2. SDNY Dkt. 858\n3. EMERGENCY MOTION FOR RECUSAL OF THE HONORABLE ANALISA TORRES Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (Must Be Resolved Prior to June 29, 2026 Sentencing)（依据 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) 要求法官阿娜丽莎·托雷斯阁下回避的紧急动议［必须在 2026 年 6 月 29 日量刑前予以解决］）\n\n致：\nJuliana Murray（朱莉安娜·默里）\n直线电话：212-637-2203\nUnited States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York One Saint Andrew's Plaza Room 739 New York, NY 10007\n\nJustin Horton（贾斯汀·霍顿）\n直线电话：212-637-2200\nDOJ-USAO Southern District of New York One St. Andrews Plaza New York, NY 10007\n\nNathan Rehn（内森·雷恩）\n直线电话：212-637-2354\nUnited States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York 26 Federal Plaza 37th Floor New York, NY 10278\n\n谨此提交，\nJason Zen","key_entities":["Guo","forfeiture","GTV","G Clubs","Himalaya","Pro Se","pro se","853(n)","Himalaya Exchange","CIPA","Farm Loan","Kwok","Brady","Rule 32.2","Torres","CVRA","Miles Guo","Ho Wan Kwok","Analisa Torres","Geyer","Despins","Luc Despins","Horton","Murray","Saraca","Chinese Communist Party","Crime Victim","RICO","Giglio"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":307,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":395,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":450,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":684,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":710,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":713,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":716,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":720,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":724,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":754,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":770,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":784,"court":"2Cir"},{"doc_number":785,"court":"2Cir"},{"doc_number":789,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":799,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":803,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":804,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":822,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":826,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":858,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":10502,"status":"published","published_at":"2026-06-29 00:00:00","created_at":"2026-06-29","updated_at":"2026-08-23 09:31:58"}