{"id":"court_ctb_1026_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":1026,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION : Debtor. : \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"## **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n : Debtor. : \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_:\n\n\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_ :\n\n:\n\nIn re : Chapter 11\n\nHO WAN KWOK, : Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n## **DEBTOR'S OBJECTION TO MOTION OF CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR ENTRY OF ORDER HOLDING DEBTOR IN CIVIL CONTEMPT FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RIGHTS ORDER**\n\nThe debtor, Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\"), by and through his undersigned counsel, Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C., hereby objects to the Motion Of Chapter 11 Trustee For Entry Of Order Holding Debtor In Civil Contempt For Failure To Comply With Corporate Governance Rights Order (Doc. No. 913, the \"Motion\"). The Corporate Governance Order (as defined below) does not clearly and unambiguously require the Debtor to (a) execute, or cause any nominee shareholder to execute, a share transfer instrument to transfer all of the Debtor's shares in Ace Decade Holdings Limited (\"Ace Decade\") to the Trustee (as defined below), and (b) execute and/or cause the director(s) of Ace Decade to execute a resolution approving such transfer of the shares in Ace Decade to the Trustee. And even assuming the Corporate Governance Order does require such action by the Debtor (it does not), the Debtor is unable to comply. The Trustee cannot meet his burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that there is no fair ground of doubt as to whether the Debtor has violated the Corporate Governance Order, and this Court should not impose the \"severe sanction\" of contempt. In support of his objection, the Debtor respectfully states as follows:\n\n1. On February 15, 2022 (the \"Petition Date\"), the Debtor filed his voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, thereby commencing the above-captioned\n\n1\n\nbankruptcy case.\n\n2. On June 15, 2022, this Court issued a Memorandum of Decision, *inter alia*, granting PAX's Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, Partial Joinder to the UST's Motion for the Appointment of a Chapter 11 Trustee (Doc. No. 183), to the extent that it sought the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee (Doc. No. 465.)\n\n3. On July 7, 2022, the UST filed a notice appointing Luc A. Despins (the \"Trustee\") as Chapter 11 trustee (Doc. No. 514), and an Application for Order Approving Appointment of Chapter 11 Trustee (Doc. No. 515) seeking the Court's approval of the appointment of the Trustee. On July 8, 2022, the Court entered its Order Granting Appointment Of Chapter 11 Trustee (Doc. No. 523), granting the appointment of the Trustee as Chapter 11 trustee in this case.\n\n4. On July 23, 2022, the Trustee filed his Motion Of Chapter 11 Trustee For Entry Of Order, Pursuant To Bankruptcy Code Sections 363, 541, 1108, And 1505, (A) Confirming That Chapter 11 Trustee Holds All Of The Debtor's Economic And Corporate Governance Rights In Debtor-Controlled Entities, (B) Authorizing Chapter 11 Trustee To Act In Any Foreign Country On Behalf Of Estate, And (C) Granting Related Relief (Doc. No. 598, the \"Corporate Governance Motion\"). At paragraph 12 of the Corporate Governance Motion, the Trustee stated:\n\nSection 541 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that property of the estate includes \"all property, wherever located and by whomever held, to which the debtor has legal or equitable interest.\" 11 U.S.C. § 541. In addition, section 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that \"[u]nless the court, on request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, orders otherwise, the trustee may operate the debtor's business.\" Id. § 1108. The related case law confirms that a chapter 11 trustee \"possesses both the economic and governance rights to participate in the management of [the debtor-owned entity] that the Debtor himself enjoyed prior to his bankruptcy filing.\" *In re Modanlo*, 412 B.R. 715, 728 (Bankr. D. Md. 2006) (confirming chapter 11 trustee's authority to, among other things, amend formation papers of debtor's wholly-owned Delaware LLC, designate himself as the LLC manager, and place LLC into voluntary chapter 11). *See also In re Albright*, 291 B.R. 538 (Bankr. D. Col. 2003) (\"Because the Trustee became the sole member of [debtorowned entity] upon the Debtor's bankruptcy filing, the Trustee now controls, directly or indirectly, all governance of that entity, including decisions regarding liquidation of the entity's assets.\").\n\nAt paragraphs 20 and 21 of the Corporate Governance Motion, the Trustee further stated:\n\n[T]he Debtor should not be left to exercise any corporate governance rights with respect to the Debtor-Controlled Entities for one more day. … To enable the Trustee to exercise the foregoing authority without interference from the Debtor, the Court should confirm that the Debtor may not to interfere with, hinder, or delay the Trustee's exercise of the Debtor's economic and governance rights with respect to the Debtor-Controlled Entities.\n\n5. On August 10, 2022, the Court entered its Order, Pursuant To Bankruptcy Code\n\nSections 363, 521, 541, 1108, And 1505, (A) Confirming That Chapter 11 Trustee Holds All Of\n\nThe Debtor's Economic And Corporate Governance Rights In Debtor-Controlled Entities, (B)\n\nAuthorizing Chapter 11 Trustee To Act In Any Foreign Country On Behalf Of Estate, And (C)\n\nGranting Related Relief (Doc. No. 717, the \"Corporate Governance Order\"). Paragraphs 2, 3 and\n\n6 of the Corporate Governance Order provide in relevant part:\n\n2. Effective as of entry of the order, dated July 8, 2022, granting the appointment of Luc A. Despins as the Trustee in the Chapter 11 Case [ECF No. 523], the Trustee holds all of the Debtor's economic and governance rights, for the benefit of the Estate, with respect to all Debtor-Controlled Entities, including, without limitation, Genever (BVI). For the avoidance of doubt, the foregoing rights include the Trustee's asserted authority to replace any existing officer, director, manager, or similar person of the Debtor-Controlled Entities. As part of the foregoing, to the extent necessary, the Trustee is authorized to act, in his capacity as the chapter 11 trustee in this Chapter 11 Case, as any such officer, director, manager, or similar person who has been removed.\n\n3. In accordance with sections 521(a)(3) and 521(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Debtor is hereby directed to, respectively, (a) cooperate with the Trustee as necessary to enable the Trustee to perform his duties, including, without limitation, the Trustee's investigation into the assets of the Debtor, and (b) surrender to the Trustee all property of the estate and any recorded information, including, without limitation, books, documents, records, and papers relating to property of the estate (including, without limitation, his shares in Genever (BVI) and all related corporate governance documents).\n\n6. The Debtor shall not interfere with, hinder, or delay the Trustee's exercise of the authority under this Order ….\n\nParagraph 3(a) of the Corporate Governance Order went on to expressly direct the Debtor to execute a share transfer instrument and director's resolutions for Genever BVI in the forms attached as Exhibit A to the Corporate Governance Order. The Debtor did not dispute that he was the legal owner of the shares, and sole director, of Genever BVI on the Petition Date and at the time of the Trustee's appointment, and he promptly executed the share transfer and director's resolutions for Genever BVI following the entry of the Corporate Governance Order.\n\n6. On August 31, 2022, the Trustee sent counsel for the Debtor a letter requesting that the Debtor (a) execute, and cause any nominee shareholder to execute, a share transfer instrument to transfer all of the Debtor's shares in Ace Decade (including all shares beneficially owned by the Debtor through any nominee shareholder) to the Trustee, and (b) execute and/or cause the director(s) of Ace Decade to execute a resolution approving such transfer of the shares in Ace Decade to the Trustee. The Trustee's August 31, 2022, letter provides that the share transfer instrument and related director's resolution shall be in the same form as the corresponding documents related to the shares of Genever (BVI), which were attached as Exhibit A to the Corporate Governance Order. For the reasons stated herein, Debtor has not complied with the Trustee's request.\n\n7. By the Motion, the Trustee seeks to have the Debtor held in contempt, arguing that \"despite the Court's clear directive in the Corporate Governance [Rights] Order, the Debtor refuses to transfer the shares of Ace Decade … to the Trustee or provide the Trustee with any corporate documents regarding Ace Decade or its wholly owned subsidiary Dawn State Limited (\"Dawn State\"), even though the Debtor has attested on multiple occasions—at the creditors' committee meeting in this chapter 11 case as well as in various court filings—that he owns Ace Decade and that Ace Decade wholly owns Dawn State.\" Motion ¶ 1, at 2.\n\n8. A \"bankruptcy court's contempt power, like that of a district court, is 'narrowly circumscribed.'\" *PHH Mortg. Corp v. Sensenich (In re Gravel)*, 6 F.4th 503, 511 (2nd Cir. 2021). *See also Perez v. Danbury Hosp*., 347 F.3d 419, 423 (2nd Cir. 2003) (\"[O]ur review of a contempt order is more exacting than under the ordinary abuse-of-discretion standard because a district court's contempt power is narrowly circumscribed.\"). This is because \"[t]he judicial contempt power is a potent weapon.\" *Int'l Longshoreman's Ass'n v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n*, 389 U.S. 64, 76 (1967). *See also Taggart v. Lorenzen*, 139 S.Ct. 1795, 1802 (2019) (\"[C]ivil contempt is a severe remedy ….\"); *In re Attorney General of U.S.*, 596 F.2d 58, 65 (2nd Cir. 1979) (\"[T]he court must not lightly invoke its contempt power.\"); *United States v. Wendy*, 575 F.2d 1025, 1030 (2nd Cir. 1978) (recognizing that the \"exercise of the contempt power is awesome in its implications.\"); *Vineyard Vines, LLC v. MacBeth Collection, LLC*, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205502, [\\*38] (D. Conn. Dec. 5, 2018) (\"The standard is strict, and 'the power of a district court to impose contempt liability is carefully limited.'\" (quoting *CBS Broad, Inc. v. FilmOn.com, Inc.*, 814 F.3d 91, 98 (2nd Cir. 2016))). Accordingly, \"civil contempt 'should not be resorted to where there is a *fair ground of doubt* as to the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct.'\" *Taggart*, 389 S.Ct. 1801 (quoting *California Artificial Stone Paving Co. v. Molitor*, 113 U.S. 609, 618 (1885)) (emphasis in original). *See also PHH Mortg. Corp.*, 6 F.4th at 512 (\"Under Taggart, a bankruptcy court may hold a creditor in contempt for violating the court's injunction only 'if there is *no fair ground of doubt* as to whether the order barred the creditor's conduct. The 'fair ground of doubt' standard has long been used in this Circuit to determine when a party may be held in contempt in the district court.\"); *King v. Allied Vision, Ltd.*, 65 F.3d 1051, 1058 (2nd Cir. 1995) (\"[C]ourts should not resort [to a contempt order] 'where there is a fair ground of doubt as to the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct.'\" (quoting *California Artificial Stone Paving Co.*, 113 U.S. at 618)).\n\n9. \"A contempt order is warranted only where the moving party establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged contemnor violated the district court's edict. More specifically, a movant must establish that (1) the order the contemnor failed to comply with is clear and unambiguous, (2) the proof of noncompliance is clear and convincing, and (3) the contemnor has not diligently attempted to comply in a reasonable manner.\" *King*, 65 F.3d at 1058 (citation omitted). *See also Vineyard Vines, LLC*, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205502, [\\*39] (\"'[T]he moving party …bears the burden of establishing [these] three factors[.]\" (quoting *Latino Officers Ass'n City of New York, Inc. v. City of New York*, 558 F.3d 159, 164 (2nd Cir. 2009))).\n\n10. When the judicial contempt power \"is founded upon a decree too vague to be understood, it can be a deadly one.\" *Int'l Longshoreman's Ass'n*, 389 U.S. at 76. Accordingly, civil contempt usually is not appropriate unless \"those who must obey [orders] will know what the court intends to require and what it means to forbid.\" *Id*. *See also Taggart*, 139 S.Ct. at 1802 (\"[P]rinciples of 'basic fairness require[e] that those enjoined receive explicit notice' of 'what conduct is outlawed' before being held in contempt.\" (*quoting Schmidt v. Lessard*, 414 U.S. 473, 476 (1974))); *PHH Mortg. Corp.*, 6 F.4th at 512 (\"'[B]asic fairness requires that those enjoined receive explicit notice of what conduct is outlawed.'\" (quoting *Taggart*, 139 S.Ct. at 1802)). \"A clear and unambiguous order is one that leaves no uncertainty in the minds of those to whom it is addressed, who must be able to ascertain from the four corners of the order precisely what acts are forbidden.\" *King*, 65 F.3d at 1058 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). *See also Gucci Am. v. Bank of China*, 768 F.3d 122, 143 (2nd Cir. 2014) (\"[U]nless the parties can 'ascertain from the four corners of the order precisely what acts are forbidden,' the order cannot form the basis for contempt.\" (quoting King, 65 F.3d at 1058)); *Liberty Propane L.P. v. Feheley*, 522 Fed. Appx. 38, 39 (2nd Cir. 2013) (vacating contempt order for failure to produce specific documents where underlying orders regarding production did not expressly require production of those specific documents); *Red Ball Interior Demolition Corp. v. Palmadessa*, 947 F. Supp. 116, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding contempt inappropriate where order operated by reference to motion, and thus did not expressly set forth its requirements within the four corners of the order). \"Furthermore, 'the longstanding, salutary rule in contempt cases is that ambiguities and omissions in orders redound to the benefit of the person charged with contempt.'\" *[Drywall Tapers, Local 1974 v. Local 530,](http)  Operative Plasterers Int'l Ass'n*[, 889 F.2d 389, 395](http) (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting *Ford v. [Kammerer](http)*, [450 F.2d 279, 280 \\(3d](http) Cir. 1971)).\n\n11. \"A long recognized defense to a civil contempt citation is the cited individual's inability to comply with the court's order.\" *United States v. Wendy*, 575 F.2d at 1030 (finding technical ability to comply did not support contempt where there was no practical ability to comply). *See also Perez,* 347 F.3d at 425 (finding no evidence that defendants had not attempted to comply in a reasonable manner where defendants were not directly responsible for the improper conduct of others); *Experience Hendrix, LLC v. Hendrix*, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4876, [\\*22] (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2021) (holding party defending against contempt may assert noncompliance because of inability or impossibility).\n\n12. The Corporate Governance Order does not clearly and unambiguously require the Debtor to do what the Trustee is demanding. To the extent that the relief sought by the Trustee is based on his belief that the Debtor was the equitable owner of Ace Decade on the Petition Date and at the time of the Trustee's appointment (the Trustee has not claimed and there is no evidence that the Debtor was ever the nominee or legal shareholder or a director of Ace Decade), the Trustee's argument that the Corporate Governance Order somehow requires the Debtor to cause the person who is now the nominee shareholder of Ace Decade to execute a share transfer\n\nagreement and cause the person who is now the director of Ace Decade to execute a resolution approving such transfer makes no sense in the context of the Corporate Governance Order and is inconsistent with the Corporate Governance Order and the position taken by the Trustee in the Corporate Governance Motion. As noted above, the Trustee took the position in the Corporate Governance Motion that upon his appointment he became the holder of all of the Debtor's governance and economic rights in any Debtor-Controlled Entities, that the Debtor should not be left to exercise any corporate governance rights with respect to the Debtor-Controlled Entities \"for one more day,\" and that the Court should confirm that the Debtor may not to interfere with, hinder, or delay the Trustee's exercise of the Debtor's economic and governance rights with respect to the Debtor-Controlled Entities. Corporate Governance Motion, ¶¶ 12, 20 and 21. As also noted above, the Corporate Governance Order expressly states that \"the Trustee holds all of the Debtor's economic and governance rights\" and that \"the Debtor shall not interfere with, hinder, or delay the Trustee's exercise of the authority under this Order.\" The entire premise of the Corporate Governance Motion and the Corporate Governance Order is that the Debtor has no governance rights with respect to any Debtor-Controlled Entities. Even assuming that the Debtor was the equitable owner of Ace Decade as of the date of the Trustee's appointment (he was not), as of the appointment of the Trustee he was no longer the equitable owner of Ace Decade, and the Corporate Governance Order expressly confirms that. How could the Debtor instruct the nominee shareholder of Ace Decade to transfer shares or the director of Ace Decade to execute a resolution approving such transfer when he has no governance rights with respect to Ace Decade? The Trustee asked for and received confirmation from this Court that he is the sole holder of all governance rights with respect to any entity that the Debtor owned prior to the Trustee's appointment. To the extent that the Trustee is now the equitable owner of Ace Decade (the Debtor believes that he is not), it is up to the Trustee to instruct or cause any nominee shareholder or director of Ace Decade to take action. Finding that the Debtor has the authority to instruct any nominee shareholder or director of Ace Decade would imply that the Debtor has continuing governance rights with respect to Ace Decade and would be directly inconsistent with the paragraph 2 of the Corporate Governance Order. At the very least, the Corporate Governance Order is ambiguous on this issue and accordingly cannot be the basis for contempt.\n\n13. This situation is distinguishable from that of Genever (BVI). There, the Debtor did not dispute that he was the legal owner and director of Genever (BVI) (he disputes that he is the equitable owner of Genever (BVI)). In the Corporate Governance Order, the Court *expressly and precisely* ordered the Debtor to perform what was essentially a ministerial act in executing the share transfer, there was no exercise of corporate authority by the Debtor of the type requested here in connection with Ace Decade.\n\n14. In addition to the foregoing basic internal inconsistency that would be caused by the Trustee's interpretation of the Corporate Governance Order, the four corners of the Corporate Governance Order do not expressly and precisely require the Debtor to draft share transfer documents and cause any nominee shareholder to execute a share transfer or cause any director to execute a resolution approving such transfer. The Trustee knew how to ask for express, precise relief, as he did with respect to Genever (BVI), he did not do so with respect to Ace Decade. The very broad relief provided for in paragraph 3 of the Corporate Governance Order, which does nothing more than refer to and restate Bankruptcy Code section 521(a)(3) and (4), cannot be the basis for a contempt finding with respect to the action requested by the Trustee. *See King*, 65 F.3d at 1058 (party \"must be able to ascertain from the four corners of the order precisely what acts are forbidden.\").\n\n15. To the extent that the Court interprets the Corporate Governance Order to require the Debtor to cause any nominee shareholder to execute a share transfer and cause any director to execute a resolution approving such transfer, the Debtor is unable to comply. At any hearing on the Motion, the Debtor will testify that he has never been the nominee shareholder or director of Ace Decade and that at the very least he was not the equitable owner of Ace Decade on the Petition Date or on the date of the Trustee's appointment. Thus, he can neither execute a share transfer or a director resolution nor instruct any nominee shareholder or director to execute such transfer or resolution.\n\n16. The Trustee states in the Motion that the Debtor has attested in various court filings that he owns Ace Decade, but the only court filing he refers to that addresses ownership of Ace Decade is the Bill of Particulars filed in the UK action against UBS.[1](#page-9-0) The Bill of Particulars alleges that Ace Decade was acquired by the Debtor in November 2014, more than seven years prior to the Petition Date. It does not say anything about who the equitable owner, nominee shareholder or director was on the Petition Date or the date of the Trustee's appointment.\n\n17. The Debtor did not list Ace Decade on his schedules. (Doc. No. 78). This is consistent with the testimony that the Debtor will give at any hearing on the Motion that he has never been the nominee shareholder or a director of Ace Decade and that at least as of the Petition Date and the time of the Trustee's appointment he was not the equitable owner of Ace Decade.\n\n18. The Debtor will testify at any hearing on the Motion that he did not intend to testify at the April 6, 2022 341 meeting that he was the owner of Ace Decade, and that to the extent that his testimony came across that way it was based on confusion and/or difficulties in the\n\n<span id=\"page-9-0\"></span><sup>1</sup> The Trustee attaches July 7, 2020, and February 9, 2022, orders entered by Justice Ostrager in the PAX New York Supreme Court litigation, but neither of those orders addresses or mentions Ace Decade.\n\ninterpretation. At any hearing on the Motion, the Debtor will put on testimony from an interpreter as to the many material deficiencies in the \"official\" translation of the 341 meeting. As an example, while the \"official\" translation of the April 6, 2022 341 meeting has the Debtor answer \"no\" in response to the US Trustee's question \"Are there any other owners of Ace Decade?\", just prior to that question, according to the \"official\" translation, the Debtor purportedly answered the US Trustee's question \"Are you the only legal owner of Ace Decade?\" by stating that he was \"a legal representing owner.\" The Debtor's interpreter will testify, however, that the proper interpretation of the Debtor's response to the US Trustee's question \"Are you the only legal owner of Ace Decade?\" was \"I am legally representing the owner.\" This is consistent with the Debtor's position that he was never the equitable owner of Ace Decade, but that he only represented such owner at the time of the UBS transaction.\n\n19. In addition to misinterpretations during that 341 meeting, there were numerous other problems with the interpretation during the April 6, 2022 341 meeting which created confusion. The following is an example of the difficulty that started early in that 341 meeting:\n\n> 8 MS. CLAIBORN: I think the better route 9 for today -- 10 THE OFFICIAL INTERPRETER: Yeah. 11 MS. CLAIBORN: -- and for purposes of a 12 clear translation and a clear record -- 13 THE OFFICIAL INTERPRETER: Okay. 14 MS. CLAIBORN: -- is for you, Jeff, to 15 interpret -- 16 THE OFFICIAL INTERPRETER: Uh-huh. 17 MS. CLAIBORN: -- my questions and to 18 interpret Mr. Kwok's answers. 19 THE OFFICIAL INTERPRETER: Okay. 20 MS. CLAIBORN: And if Mr. Kwok thinks, 21 based on your interpretation, that you have not 22 translated properly, then he can testify again and 23 you can try again. 24 But I would like to restrict the 25 interaction that happens between translators and\n\n1 between Mr. Kwok's personal translator so that we 2 have an official record where the person asking the 3 question is me, it's being officially translated, 4 and Mr. Kwok is giving the answers, and that also is 5 being officially translated. 6 MR. BALDIGA: But, Holley, the problem 7 with that is the witness doesn't know whether Jeff's 8 English report is in fact accurate. You can't leave 9 it up to the witness. That's why we have a check 10 interpreter. If he spoke English, then we wouldn't 11 need any interpreters. He can't do that. 12 MS. CLAIBORN: I think as a practical 13 matter, Mr. Kwok speaks enough English to know 14 whether or not he's answered his question. 15 MR. BALDIGA: No, he doesn't. I object. 16 MS. CLAIBORN: Well, I -- I think that 17 that has been what I have seen from my own personal 18 experience. 19 That said, we're going to try and do the 20 best we can -- 21 MR. BALDIGA: I agree. 22 MS. CLAIBORN: -- and we'll see where we 23 go. 24 MR. BALDIGA: Okay. 25 MS. CLAIBORN: Okay?\n\nTranscript of April 6, 2022 341 Meeting, at 19-20. The official interpreter became upset\n\non several occasions during the 341 meeting, which led to several stoppages and\n\noff-the-record discussions regarding how to proceed. For example, following an objection\n\nby Debtor's counsel, the following colloquy took place:\n\n8THE PRIVATE INTERPRETER: The counsel 9 raised objection. The interpreter did not interpret 10 the objection.\n\n11 MS. CLAIBORN: I can happily repeat the 12 question, but we are not going to get anywhere today 13 in a meaningful fashion if people are interrupting 14 on basic questions. 15 MR. BALDIGA: No, I didn't interrupt, but 16 --\n\n17 MS. CLAIBORN: So let me try again. 18 MR. BALDIGA: Okay. But hold on. If I 19 object or if I say anything else, that has to be 20 interpreted. 21 MS. CLAIBORN: You're not waiting for 22 space to interpret. So, Mr. Jeff, can you interpret 23 that exchange that just happened? 24 THE OFFICIAL INTERPRETER: Okay. I don't 25 know. It's just too much interruption. 1 MS. CLAIBORN: Right. 2 THE OFFICIAL INTERPRETER: Holley, I can't 3 do -- keep doing this. I just too distracted and I 4 don't know. It just a simple -- ask the witness 5 just a simple repeat and then -- 6 MS. CLAIBORN: Let me try -- 7 THE OFFICIAL INTERPRETER: -- it gets all 8 these people involved. 9 MS. CLAIBORN: Correct. Let me -- 10 THE OFFICIAL INTERPRETER: We're not going 11 anywhere. 12 MS. CLAIBORN: Let me try the question 13 again. 14 BY MS. CLAIBORN: 15 Q Mr. Kwok, what do you mean by the term, 16 family office? 17 MR. BALDIGA: Objection. You may answer. 18 MS. CLAIBORN: Mr. Baldiga, that term is 19 all over the papers. Can you repeat -- translate? 20 THE OFFICIAL INTERPRETER: No, I'm not 21 going anywhere. Holley, I just excuse myself. I'm 22 sorry. It's -- it's not going -- 23 MS. CLAIBORN: I'm going to put it on 24 pause, please. 25 THE OFFICIAL INTERPRETER: -- this is too 1 much. 2 (Off the record) 3 MS. CLAIBORN: We're back on the record 4 after a short break. 5 Mr. Kwok, you remain under oath. During 6 the break, I spoke with Attorney Baldiga and we have 7 agreed that all objections as to form of the 8 question are reserved.\n\nIt is not clear what the US Trustee meant by \"all objections to form being reserved,\" but this was\n\nin the context of the US Trustee trying to limit the number of interruptions based on concerns\n\nabout the interpretation. As noted, at any hearing on the Motion, the Debtor will testify that he by no means intended to testify that he was the legal or equitable owner of Ace Decade prior to the appointment of the Trustee.\n\n20. Based on the testimony that the Debtor will give at any hearing on the Motion that he was never the nominee shareholder or a director of Ace Decade and that at least as of the Petition Date and the time of the Trustee's appointment he was not the equitable of Ace Decade, the Debtor is not able to execute a share transfer document or resolution approving a transfer, cause a nominee shareholder to execute such a transfer document, or cause a director to execute a resolution approving a transfer. As the Debtor is not able to do what the Trustee is demanding, he may not be held in contempt.\n\n**WHEREFORE,** the Debtor respectfully requests that the Court deny the Motion and grant him such other and further relief as justice requires.\n\nDated at Bridgeport, Connecticut on this 25th day of October, 2022.\n\n## **THE DEBTOR, HO WAN KWOK**\n\n*/s/ Eric Henzy*  Eric Henzy (ct12849) Stephen M. Kindseth (ct14640) Aaron A. Romney (ct28144) James M. Moriarty John L. Cesaroni (ct29309) 10 Middle Street, 15th Floor Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604 Telephone: (203) 368-4234 Facsimile: (203) 368-5487 Email: [ehenzy@zeislaw.com](mailto:ehenzy@zeislaw.com) [skindseth@zeislaw.com](mailto:skindseth@zeislaw.com) [aromney@zeislaw.com](mailto:aromney@zeislaw.com) [Jmoriarty@zeislaw.com](mailto:Jmoriarty@zeislaw.com) [jcesaroni@zeislaw.com](mailto:jcesaroni@zeislaw.com)\n\n## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI hereby certify that on this 25th day of October, 2022, a copy of foregoing was filed electronically. Notice of this filing will be sent by e-mail to all parties by operation of the Court's electronic filing system or by mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing as indicated on the Notice of Electronic Filing. Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF System.\n\n> */s/ Eric Henzy* Eric Henzy (ct12849)","body_zh":"美国康涅狄格州联邦地区破产法院布里奇波特分院\n\n：债务人。：________________________________________________________________________：\n\n________________________________________________________________________：\n\n：\n\n关于：第11章\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）：案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人就第11章受托人要求作出裁定、认定债务人因未遵守公司治理权利裁定而构成民事藐视法庭的动议提出的异议\n\n债务人Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（以下简称“债务人”），经由其下列签署的律师Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.律师事务所），现就第11章受托人要求作出裁定、认定债务人因未遵守公司治理权利裁定而构成民事藐视法庭的动议（Doc. No. 913，以下简称“该动议”）提出异议。公司治理裁定（定义如下）并未清楚且明确地要求债务人：(a) 签署或促使任何代名股东签署股份转让文书，将债务人在Ace Decade Holdings Limited（十年控股有限公司）（以下简称“Ace Decade”）的全部股份转让给受托人（定义如下）；及(b) 签署和/或促使Ace Decade的董事签署一项决议，批准将Ace Decade的该等股份转让给受托人。即使假定公司治理裁定确实要求债务人采取该等行动（实际上并未要求），债务人亦无法遵守。受托人无法履行其举证责任，以清楚且令人信服的证据证明，对于债务人是否违反公司治理裁定不存在任何合理怀疑的基础，本院不应施加藐视法庭这一“严厉制裁”。为支持其异议，债务人谨陈述如下：\n\n1. 2022年2月15日（以下简称“申请日”），债务人根据《破产法》第11章提交了自愿救济申请，由此启动上述破产案件。\n\n2. 2022年6月15日，本院发布了裁决备忘录，除其他事项外，批准了PAX的驳回动议，或作为替代方案，批准其部分加入UST关于任命第11章受托人的动议（Doc. No. 183），但仅限于该动议请求任命第11章受托人的部分（Doc. No. 465）。\n\n3. 2022年7月7日，UST提交了一份通知，任命Luc A. Despins（以下简称“受托人”）为第11章受托人（Doc. No. 514），并提交了请求批准任命第11章受托人的裁定申请（Doc. No. 515），请求本院批准任命该受托人。2022年7月8日，本院作出批准任命第11章受托人的裁定（Doc. No. 523），批准在本案中任命该受托人为第11章受托人。\n\n4. 2022年7月23日，受托人提交了第11章受托人根据《破产法》第363、541、1108及1505条要求作出裁定的动议，内容为：(A) 确认第11章受托人持有债务人控制实体中债务人的全部经济及公司治理权利；(B) 授权第11章受托人代表破产财产在任何外国行事；以及(C) 给予相关救济（Doc. No. 598，以下简称“公司治理动议”）。在公司治理动议第12段中，受托人陈述：\n\n《破产法》第541条规定，破产财产包括“债务人具有法定或衡平权益的一切财产，无论位于何处，亦无论由何人持有。”11 U.S.C. § 541。此外，《破产法》第1108条规定：“除非法院应利害关系方请求，并在通知及听证后另行裁定，受托人可以经营债务人的业务。”同上，第1108条。相关判例法确认，第11章受托人“同时拥有参与[债务人所有实体]管理的经济权利及治理权利，而债务人在提交破产申请前本亦享有该等权利。”In re Modanlo, 412 B.R. 715, 728 (Bankr. D. Md. 2006)（确认第11章受托人有权，除其他事项外，修改债务人全资拥有的特拉华州有限责任公司的设立文件，指定其本人担任该有限责任公司的经理，并使该有限责任公司自愿进入第11章程序）。另见In re Albright, 291 B.R. 538 (Bankr. D. Col. 2003)（“由于受托人在债务人提交破产申请时成为[债务人所有实体]的唯一成员，受托人现直接或间接控制该实体的全部治理事项，包括有关该实体资产清算的决定。”）。\n\n在公司治理动议第20及21段中，受托人进一步陈述：\n\n[T]债务人不应再被允许行使与债务人控制实体有关的任何公司治理权利，哪怕多一天。……为使受托人能够在不受债务人干扰的情况下行使上述权限，法院应确认，债务人不得干扰、阻碍或延迟受托人行使债务人就债务人控制实体所享有的经济及治理权利。\n\n5. 2022年8月10日，本院作出根据《破产法》第363、521、541、1108及1505条的裁定，内容为：(A) 确认第11章受托人持有债务人控制实体中债务人的全部经济及公司治理权利；(B) 授权第11章受托人代表破产财产在任何外国行事；以及(C) 给予相关救济（Doc. No. 717，以下简称“公司治理裁定”）。公司治理裁定第2、3及6段的相关内容规定：\n\n2. 自2022年7月8日作出的、批准任命Luc A. Despins为第11章案件受托人的裁定[ECF No. 523]录入之日起，受托人为破产财产之利益，持有债务人就所有债务人控制实体享有的全部经济及治理权利，包括但不限于Genever (BVI)（Genever（英属维尔京群岛））。为免生疑义，上述权利包括受托人所主张的权限，即撤换债务人控制实体的任何现任高级职员、董事、经理或类似人员。作为上述事项的一部分，在必要范围内，受托人获授权以其作为本第11章案件第11章受托人的身份，担任任何已被撤换的该等高级职员、董事、经理或类似人员。\n\n3. 根据《破产法》第521(a)(3)及521(a)(4)条，特此指示债务人分别：(a) 在必要范围内与受托人合作，以使受托人能够履行其职责，包括但不限于受托人对债务人资产所进行的调查；以及(b) 向受托人交出全部破产财产及任何记录信息，包括但不限于与破产财产有关的账簿、文件、记录及文书（包括但不限于其在Genever (BVI)中的股份及所有相关公司治理文件）。\n\n6. 债务人不得干扰、阻碍或延迟受托人行使本裁定项下的权限……。\n\n公司治理裁定第3(a)段进一步明确指示债务人按照作为公司治理裁定附件A所附的格式，签署Genever BVI的股份转让文书及董事决议。债务人并不争议，其于申请日及任命受托人时系Genever BVI股份的法定所有人及唯一董事；在公司治理裁定录入后，其即迅速签署了Genever BVI的股份转让文书及董事决议。\n\n6. 2022年8月31日，受托人致函债务人的律师，要求债务人：(a) 签署并促使任何代名股东签署股份转让文书，将债务人在Ace Decade的全部股份（包括债务人通过任何代名股东实益拥有的全部股份）转让给受托人；及(b) 签署和/或促使Ace Decade的董事签署一项决议，批准将Ace Decade的该等股份转让给受托人。受托人2022年8月31日的函件规定，股份转让文书及相关董事决议应采用与Genever (BVI)股份有关的相应文件相同的格式，该等文件作为附件A附于公司治理裁定。基于本文件所述理由，债务人未遵从受托人的请求。\n\n7. 受托人通过该动议寻求认定债务人构成藐视法庭，其主张：“尽管本院在公司治理[权利]裁定中作出了明确指示，债务人仍拒绝将Ace Decade的股份……转让给受托人，或向受托人提供有关Ace Decade或其全资子公司Dawn State Limited（曙光州有限公司）（以下简称“Dawn State”）的任何公司文件，尽管债务人曾多次——在本第11章案件的债权人委员会会议上以及在各类法院提交文件中——证明其拥有Ace Decade，且Ace Decade全资拥有Dawn State。”动议第1段，第2页。\n\n8. “破产法院的藐视法庭权力，与地区法院的该等权力相同，均‘受到严格限制。’”PHH Mortg. Corp v. Sensenich (In re Gravel), 6 F.4th 503, 511 (2nd Cir. 2021)。另见Perez v. Danbury Hosp., 347 F.3d 419, 423 (2nd Cir. 2003)（“[O]我们对藐视法庭裁定的审查，比通常的裁量权滥用标准更为严格，因为地区法院的藐视法庭权力受到严格限制。”）。这是因为“司法藐视法庭权力是一种强有力的武器。”Int'l Longshoreman's Ass'n v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n, 389 U.S. 64, 76 (1967)。另见Taggart v. Lorenzen, 139 S.Ct. 1795, 1802 (2019)（“[C]民事藐视法庭是一项严厉的救济……。”）；In re Attorney General of U.S., 596 F.2d 58, 65 (2nd Cir. 1979)（“[T]法院不得轻率行使其藐视法庭权力。”）；United States v. Wendy, 575 F.2d 1025, 1030 (2nd Cir. 1978)（承认“行使藐视法庭权力的影响极其重大。”）；Vineyard Vines, LLC v. MacBeth Collection, LLC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205502, [*38] (D. Conn. Dec. 5, 2018)（“该标准严格，且‘地区法院施加藐视法庭责任的权力受到谨慎限制。’”（引自CBS Broad, Inc. v. FilmOn.com, Inc., 814 F.3d 91, 98 (2nd Cir. 2016)））。因此，“如对于被告行为的不当性存在合理怀疑的基础，‘不应诉诸民事藐视法庭。’”Taggart, 389 S.Ct. 1801（引自California Artificial Stone Paving Co. v. Molitor, 113 U.S. 609, 618 (1885)）（原文强调）。另见PHH Mortg. Corp., 6 F.4th at 512（“根据Taggart，破产法院仅在‘对于该命令是否禁止债权人的行为不存在合理怀疑的基础’时，方可认定债权人因违反法院禁令而构成藐视法庭。‘合理怀疑的基础’标准长期以来一直用于本巡回区，以确定一方何时可在地区法院被认定构成藐视法庭。”）；King v. Allied Vision, Ltd., 65 F.3d 1051, 1058 (2nd Cir. 1995)（“[C]如对于被告行为的不当性存在合理怀疑的基础，法院不应诉诸[藐视法庭裁定]。”（引自California Artificial Stone Paving Co., 113 U.S. at 618））。\n\n9. “仅在动议方以清楚且令人信服的证据证明，被指控藐视法庭者违反了地区法院的命令时，方可作出藐视法庭裁定。更具体地说，动议方必须证明：(1) 被指控藐视法庭者未能遵守的命令清楚且明确；(2) 不遵守的证据清楚且令人信服；以及(3) 被指控藐视法庭者未以合理方式勤勉尝试遵守。”King, 65 F.3d at 1058（引文略）。另见Vineyard Vines, LLC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205502, [*39]（“‘[T]动议方……负有证明[该]三项要素的举证责任[。]’”（引自Latino Officers Ass'n City of New York, Inc. v. City of New York, 558 F.3d 159, 164 (2nd Cir. 2009)））。\n\n10. 当司法藐视法庭权力“建立在一项含糊不清、无法理解的裁令之上时，它可能是致命的。”Int'l Longshoreman's Ass'n（国际码头工人协会）, 389 U.S. at 76。因此，除非“必须遵守［命令］的人知道法院意图要求什么以及意图禁止什么”，否则民事藐视法庭通常并不适当。Id. 另见 Taggart（塔格特）, 139 S.Ct. at 1802（“［］‘基本公平原则要求，被禁止者在被认定藐视法庭之前，应当得到关于“何种行为被禁止”的明确通知。’”（引自 Schmidt v. Lessard（施密特诉莱萨德案）, 414 U.S. 473, 476 (1974)））；PHH Mortg. Corp.（PHH抵押贷款公司）, 6 F.4th at 512（“‘基本公平要求被禁止者得到关于何种行为被禁止的明确通知。’”（引自 Taggart, 139 S.Ct. at 1802））。“一项清楚明确的命令，是指不会使其所针对之人产生任何不确定性；该等人员必须能够仅从命令本身准确确定哪些行为被禁止。”King（金）, 65 F.3d at 1058（内部引证和引号略）。另见 Gucci Am.（美国古驰公司）v. Bank of China（中国银行）, 768 F.3d 122, 143 (2nd Cir. 2014)（“［］除非当事人能够‘仅从命令本身准确确定哪些行为被禁止’，否则该命令不能构成藐视法庭的依据。”（引自 King, 65 F.3d at 1058））；Liberty Propane L.P.（自由丙烷有限合伙企业）v. Feheley（费希利）, 522 Fed. Appx. 38, 39 (2nd Cir. 2013)（在有关提交文件的基础命令未明确要求提交该等特定文件的情况下，因未提交特定文件而撤销藐视法庭命令）；Red Ball Interior Demolition Corp.（红球室内拆除公司）v. Palmadessa（帕尔马德萨）, 947 F. Supp. 116, 121 (S.D.N.Y.〔纽约南区〕 1996)（认定藐视法庭并不适当，因为该命令通过援引动议而生效，因而未在命令本身中明确载明其要求）。“此外，‘藐视法庭案件中长期确立且有益的规则是，命令中的歧义和遗漏应有利于被控藐视法庭之人。’”[Drywall Tapers, Local 1974（干墙抹灰工会第1974地方分会）v. Local 530,] Operative Plasterers Int'l Ass'n（操作性泥瓦匠国际协会）[, 889 F.2d 389, 395] (2d Cir. 1989)（引自 Ford v. [Kammerer], [450 F.2d 279, 280 \\(3d] Cir. 1971)）。\n\n11. “对民事藐视法庭指控的一项长期公认的抗辩理由，是被指控人无能力遵守法院命令。”United States（美国）v. Wendy（温迪）, 575 F.2d at 1030（认定在不存在实际遵守能力的情况下，技术上具备遵守能力不足以支持藐视法庭认定）。另见 Perez（佩雷斯）, 347 F.3d at 425（在被告不直接对他人的不当行为负责的情况下，认定没有证据表明被告未以合理方式尝试遵守）；Experience Hendrix, LLC（亨德里克斯体验有限责任公司）v. Hendrix（亨德里克斯）, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4876, [\\*22] (S.D.N.Y.〔纽约南区〕 Jan. 11, 2021)（裁定针对藐视法庭进行抗辩的一方可主张因无能力或不可能而未遵守）。\n\n12. 公司治理命令并未清楚明确地要求债务人实施受托人所要求的行为。就受托人所寻求的救济是基于其认为债务人在申请日及受托人获任命时是 Ace Decade（Ace Decade公司）的衡平所有人而言（受托人并未主张，且没有证据表明债务人曾经是 Ace Decade 的名义股东、法定股东或董事），受托人主张公司治理命令以某种方式要求债务人促使现为 Ace Decade 名义股东之人签署股份转让协议，并促使现为 Ace Decade 董事之人签署批准该等转让的决议，这在公司治理命令的语境下毫无意义，并且与公司治理命令及受托人在公司治理动议中所采取的立场不一致。如上所述，受托人在公司治理动议中采取的立场是，在其获任命后，其成为债务人在任何债务人控制实体中的全部治理及经济权利的持有人；不得让债务人“再多一天”行使有关债务人控制实体的任何公司治理权利；且法院应确认债务人不得干扰、阻碍或拖延受托人行使债务人有关债务人控制实体的经济及治理权利。Corporate Governance Motion, ¶¶ 12, 20 and 21。如上所述，公司治理命令亦明确载明，“受托人持有债务人的全部经济及治理权利”，且“债务人不得干扰、阻碍或拖延受托人行使本命令项下的权限。”公司治理动议及公司治理命令的整个前提是，债务人对任何债务人控制实体均不享有治理权利。即使假定债务人在受托人获任命之日是 Ace Decade 的衡平所有人（其并非如此），自受托人获任命时起，其亦不再是 Ace Decade 的衡平所有人，而公司治理命令明确确认了这一点。当债务人对 Ace Decade 不享有任何治理权利时，他如何能够指示 Ace Decade 的名义股东转让股份，或指示 Ace Decade 的董事签署批准该等转让的决议？受托人请求并从本法院获得确认，即其是债务人在受托人获任命前所拥有的任何实体全部治理权利的唯一持有人。就受托人现为 Ace Decade 的衡平所有人而言（债务人认为其并非如此），应由受托人指示或促使 Ace Decade 的任何名义股东或董事采取行动。认定债务人有权指示 Ace Decade 的任何名义股东或董事，将意味着债务人对 Ace Decade 持续享有治理权利，并将直接与公司治理命令第2段不一致。至少，公司治理命令在此问题上存在歧义，因此不能构成藐视法庭的依据。\n\n13. 本案情形与 Genever (BVI)（Genever〔英属维尔京群岛〕）的情形不同。在该案中，债务人并不争议其是 Genever (BVI) 的法定所有人及董事（其争议自己是 Genever (BVI) 的衡平所有人）。在公司治理命令中，法院明确且准确地命令债务人完成在签署股份转让文件时实质上属于事务性行为的事项；债务人并未如本案就 Ace Decade 所要求的那样行使公司权力。\n\n14. 除受托人对公司治理命令的解释将导致上述基本内在不一致之外，公司治理命令本身并未明确且准确地要求债务人起草股份转让文件，并促使任何名义股东签署股份转让文件，或促使任何董事签署批准该等转让的决议。受托人知道如何请求明确、准确的救济，正如其就 Genever (BVI) 所作的那样；其就 Ace Decade 则未如此请求。公司治理命令第3段所规定的极为宽泛的救济，其无非是援引并重述《破产法典》第521(a)(3)及(4)条，不能构成就受托人所要求的行为作出藐视法庭认定的依据。见 King, 65 F.3d at 1058（当事人“必须能够仅从命令本身准确确定哪些行为被禁止。”）。\n\n15. 就法院将公司治理命令解释为要求债务人促使任何名义股东签署股份转让文件并促使任何董事签署批准该等转让的决议而言，债务人无能力遵守。在就该动议举行的任何听证会上，债务人将作证称，其从未担任 Ace Decade 的名义股东或董事，并且至少在申请日及受托人获任命之日，其并非 Ace Decade 的衡平所有人。因此，其既不能签署股份转让文件或董事决议，也不能指示任何名义股东或董事签署该等转让文件或决议。\n\n16. 受托人在动议中称，债务人在各种法院文件中证明其拥有 Ace Decade，但其所援引的唯一一份涉及 Ace Decade 所有权的法院文件，是在针对 UBS（瑞银集团）的英国诉讼中提交的《诉讼详情书》。[1]《诉讼详情书》称，Ace Decade 于 November 2014 被债务人收购，较申请日早七年多。该文件未载明在申请日或受托人获任命之日，谁是衡平所有人、名义股东或董事。\n\n1 受托人附上了 Ostrager（奥斯特拉格）法官在 PAX New York Supreme Court litigation（PAX纽约州最高法院诉讼）中作出的 July 7, 2020, 和 February 9, 2022, 命令，但该等命令均未涉及或提及 Ace Decade。\n\n17. 债务人未在其申报表中列出 Ace Decade。(Doc. No. 78). 这与债务人将在就该动议举行的任何听证会上作出的证词一致，即其从未担任 Ace Decade 的名义股东或董事，并且至少在申请日及受托人获任命时，其并非 Ace Decade 的衡平所有人。\n\n18. 债务人将在就该动议举行的任何听证会上作证称，其并非意图在 April 6, 2022 341会议上作证称自己是 Ace Decade 的所有人；如其证词被理解为如此，则是基于口译中的混乱和／或困难。在就该动议举行的任何听证会上，债务人将由一名口译员作证，说明341会议“官方”译文中存在的诸多重大缺陷。例如，尽管 April 6, 2022 341会议的“官方”译文记载，债务人对美国受托人提出的“Are there any other owners of Ace Decade?”问题回答“no”，但在该问题之前，根据“官方”译文，债务人据称对美国受托人提出的“Are you the only legal owner of Ace Decade?”问题回答称其是“a legal representing owner。”然而，债务人的口译员将作证称，对债务人就美国受托人提出的“Are you the only legal owner of Ace Decade?”问题所作回答的正确口译应为：“I am legally representing the owner.” 这与债务人的立场一致，即其从未是 Ace Decade 的衡平所有人，而仅在 UBS 交易时代表该所有人。\n\n19. 除该次341会议中的误译外，April 6, 2022 341会议中的口译还存在许多其他问题，从而造成混乱。以下是该次341会议早期即出现的困难示例：\n\n8 CLAIBORN女士：我认为今天更好的方式\n9 是——\n10 官方口译员：是。\n11 CLAIBORN女士：——并且为了\n12 获得清晰的翻译和清晰的记录——\n13 官方口译员：好的。\n14 CLAIBORN女士：——是由你，Jeff（杰夫），来\n15 口译——\n16 官方口译员：嗯哼。\n17 CLAIBORN女士：——我的问题，并且\n18 口译 Kwok先生的回答。\n19 官方口译员：好的。\n20 CLAIBORN女士：如果 Kwok先生认为，\n21 根据你的口译，你没有\n22 正确翻译，那么他可以再次作证，并且\n23 你可以再试一次。\n24 但是，我希望限制\n25 译员之间发生的互动以及\n\n在 Kwok 先生（郭文贵）的私人译员之间，以便我们有一份正式记录，其中提问人是我，问题得到正式翻译，而 Kwok 先生作出回答，该回答也得到正式翻译。BALDIGA 先生（巴尔迪加）：但是，Holley（霍利），问题在于，证人并不知道 Jeff（杰夫）的英文报告实际上是否准确。你不能把这件事交给证人决定。这就是我们配备校核译员的原因。如果他会说英语，我们根本不需要任何译员。他做不到这一点。CLAIBORN 女士（克莱伯恩）：我认为，从实际情况来看，Kwok 先生会说足够的英语，能够知道自己是否回答了问题。BALDIGA 先生：不，他不会。我提出异议。CLAIBORN 女士：嗯，我——我认为，这是我从个人经验中所看到的情况。话虽如此，我们将尽力而为——BALDIGA 先生：我同意。CLAIBORN 女士：——然后看看进展如何。BALDIGA 先生：好的。CLAIBORN 女士：好的？\n\n2022 年 4 月 6 日第 341 次会议笔录，第 19-20 页。正式译员在第 341 次会议期间数次感到不安，导致多次中止以及就如何继续进行的非记录讨论。例如，在债务人代理律师提出异议后，发生了如下对话：\n\n私人译员：律师提出了异议。译员没有翻译该异议。CLAIBORN 女士：我很乐意重复该问题，但如果有人在基本问题上不断打断，我们今天将无法取得任何有实质意义的进展。BALDIGA 先生：不，我没有打断，但是——CLAIBORN 女士：那我再试一次。BALDIGA 先生：好的。但请等一下。如果我提出异议或说任何其他话，那必须得到翻译。CLAIBORN 女士：你没有留出翻译的时间。因此，Jeff 先生，你能翻译刚才发生的那段对话吗？正式译员：好的。我不知道。打断实在太多了。CLAIBORN 女士：对。正式译员：Holley，我无法——继续这样做。我太分心了，我不知道。这只是一个简单的——问证人一个简单的重复问题，然后——CLAIBORN 女士：让我试试——正式译员：——却把所有这些人都牵扯进来。CLAIBORN 女士：没错。让我——正式译员：我们毫无进展。CLAIBORN 女士：让我再问一次这个问题。由 CLAIBORN 女士提问：问：Kwok 先生，您所说的“家族办公室”一词是什么意思？BALDIGA 先生：异议。您可以回答。CLAIBORN 女士：Baldiga 先生，该术语在文件中随处可见。你能重复——翻译吗？正式译员：不，我不会再继续了。Holley，我请辞。对不起。这——这无法继续——CLAIBORN 女士：请暂停记录。正式译员：——这实在太多了。（未记录）CLAIBORN 女士：短暂休息后，我们恢复记录。Kwok 先生，您仍在宣誓之下。休息期间，我与 Baldiga 律师交谈，我们同意保留对问题形式的一切异议。\n\n不清楚 US Trustee（美国受托人）所说的“保留对问题形式的一切异议”是什么意思，但这是在美国受托人因担忧翻译问题而试图限制中断次数的背景下作出的。如上所述，在就该动议举行的任何听证会上，债务人将作证称，他绝无意证言称自己在受托人获任命之前是 Ace Decade（艾斯·迪凯德）的法定或衡平法所有人。\n\n20. 根据债务人在就该动议举行的任何听证会上将作出的证言，即其从未担任 Ace Decade 的名义股东或董事，且至少截至申请日及受托人获任命时，其并非 Ace Decade 的衡平法所有人，债务人无法签署股份转让文件或批准转让的决议，无法促使名义股东签署该等转让文件，亦无法促使董事签署批准转让的决议。由于债务人无法完成受托人所要求之事，不得认定其藐视法庭。\n\n因此，债务人谨请求法院驳回该动议，并授予其正义所要求的其他及进一步救济。\n\n于 October 25, 2022 在 Connecticut（康涅狄格州）Bridgeport（布里奇波特）签署。\n债务人，HO WAN KWOK\n\n/s/ Eric Henzy（埃里克·亨齐）\nEric Henzy（埃里克·亨齐）（ct12849）\nStephen M. Kindseth（斯蒂芬·M. 金德塞思）（ct14640）\nAaron A. Romney（亚伦·A. 罗姆尼）（ct28144）\nJames M. Moriarty（詹姆斯·M. 莫里亚蒂）\nJohn L. Cesaroni（约翰·L. 切萨罗尼）（ct29309）\n10 Middle Street, 15th Floor\nBridgeport, Connecticut 06604\n电话：(203) 368-4234\n传真：(203) 368-5487\n电子邮件：[ehenzy@zeislaw.com]\n[skindseth@zeislaw.com]\n[aromney@zeislaw.com]\n[Jmoriarty@zeislaw.com]\n[jcesaroni@zeislaw.com]\n\n送达证明\n\n本人特此证明，于 October 25, 2022，上述文件副本已以电子方式提交。依照法院电子提交系统的运作，本次提交通知将通过电子邮件发送给所有当事人；对于如电子提交通知所示无法接受电子提交的任何人员，则将通过邮件送达。当事人可通过法院的 CM/ECF System（CM/ECF 系统）查阅本次提交。\n\n/s/ Eric Henzy（埃里克·亨齐） Eric Henzy（埃里克·亨齐）（ct12849）","key_entities":["Je","Kwok","Guo","Ho Wan Kwok","Despins","CIPA"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":523,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":4817,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 18:33:57"}