{"id":"court_ctb_1082_8","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":1082,"sub_number":8,"doc_type":"TRANSCRIPT","filed_date":"2022-11-11","title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION | In Re | *
Case","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"#### 158\n\nUNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION\n\n| In Re | *
Case No. 22-50073(JAM)
* |\n|---------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| HO WAN KWOK, | *
Bridgeport, Connecticut
*
August 1, 2022 |\n| Debtor. | *
* |\n| * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * | |\n| | TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION HEARING
BEFORE THE HONORABLE JULIE A. MANNING
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE |\n| APPEARANCES: | |\n| For the Debtor: | AARON ROMNEY, ESQ.
ERIC A. HENZY, ESQ. |\n\nFor the Creditor, Pacific PETER FRIEDMAN, ESQ. Alliance Asia Opportunity STUART M. SARNOFF, ESQ.\n\n Fund L.P.: O'Melveny & Myers LLP Times Square Tower 7 Times Square New York, NY 10036\n\nSTEPHEN M. KINDSETH, ESQ. Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.\n\nBridgeport, CT 06604\n\nWILLIAM BALDIGA, ESQ. Brown Rudnick, LLP Seven Times Square New York, NY 10036\n\n10 Middle Street, 15th Floor\n\nPATRICK BIRNEY, ESQ. Robinson & Cole 28 Trumbull Street Hartford, CT 06103\n\nProceedings recorded by electronic sound recording, transcript produced by transcription service.\n\n> **Fiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc. 4 Research Drive, Suite 402 Shelton, Connecticut 06484 (203)929-9992**\n\nAPPEARANCES Cont'd: 158\n\nFor the Creditors Committee: IRVE GOLDMAN, ESQ. Pullman & Comley 850 Main Street Bridgeport, CT 06601 For the Creditors, Rui Ma, KRISTEN MAYHEW, ESQ. Weican Meng and Zheng Wu: McElroy Deutsch 225 Liberty Street 36th Floor New York, NY 10281 For the U.S. Trustee: HOLLEY L. CLAIBORN, ESQ. Office of the United States Trustee The Giaimo Federal Building 150 Court Street, Room 302 New Haven, CT 06510 For HK International and STEPHEN M. KINDSETH. ESQ. Mei Guo: Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. 10 Middle Street, 15th Floor Bridgeport, CT 06604 Chapter 11 Trustee: LUC A. DESPINS, ESQ. Paul Hastings LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166 Proposed Counsel for the DOUGLAS SKALKA, ESQ. Chapter 11 Trustee: Neubert, Pepe & Monteith 195 Church Street\n\nNew Haven, CT 06510\n\n| | 158 |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | 3 |\n| 1 | ((Proceedings commenced at 12:15 p.m.) |\n| 2 | THE COURTROOM DEPUTY:
Case No. 22-50073, Ho Wan |\n| 3 | Kwok. |\n| 4 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Good afternoon.
If we could |\n| 5 | have appearances for the record, starting with the Chapter |\n| 6 | 11 Trustee, please. |\n| 7 | MR. DESPINS:
Good afternoon, Your Honor.
Luc |\n| 8 | Despins, Chapter 11 Trustee. |\n| 9 | THE COURT:
Good afternoon. |\n| 10 | MR. SKALKA:
Good afternoon, Your Honor.
Douglas |\n| 11 | Skalka as proposed local counsel for the Chapter 11 Trustee. |\n| 12 | THE COURT:
Good afternoon. |\n| 13 | MS. CLAIBORN:
Good afternoon.
Holley Claiborn |\n| 14 | for the U.S. Trustee. |\n| 15 | THE COURT:
Good afternoon. |\n| 16 | MR. GOLDMAN:
Good afternoon, Your Honor.
Irve |\n| 17 | Goldman, Pullman & Comley, representing the creditors |\n| 18 | committee. |\n| 19 | THE COURT:
Good afternoon. |\n| 20 | MR. GOLDMAN:
If I can ask where I might get a |\n| 21 | mask from the Court? |\n| 22 | THE COURT:
There's some right on the table here, |\n| 23 | Attorney Goldman, right in front of Attorney Henzy. |\n| 24 | MR. GOLDMAN:
Oh, okay.
Thank you. |\n| 25 | THE COURT:
Sure. |\n| | |\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 1082-8 Filed 11/11/22 Entered 11/11/22 13:18:26 Page 3 of\n\n MR. FRIEDMAN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Peter Friedman from O'Melveny & Myers, on behalf of Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund, L.P. THE COURT: Good afternoon. MR. FRIEDMAN: Thank you. THE COURT: And with your is your co-counsel and local counsel? MR. SARNOFF: Stuart Sarnoff also of O'Melveny & Myers. MR. BIRNEY: And Patrick Birney, Robinson & Cole. Good afternoon. THE COURT: Good afternoon. Attorney Henzy? MR. HENZY: Eric Henzy for Ho Wan Kwok. THE COURT: Good afternoon. MR. ROMNEY: Aaron Romney also on behalf of debtor, Ho Wan Kwok. THE COURT: Good afternoon. MR. KINDSETH: Stephen Kindseth on behalf of Ho Wan Kwok. THE COURT: And what about your other clients, Mr. Kindseth? MR. KINDSETH: I don't know if it would be necessary for us to appear on behalf of HK International, but also on behalf of HK International, Stephen Kindseth, Case 22-50073 Doc 1082-8 Filed 11/11/22 Entered 11/11/22 13:18:26 Page 4 of\n\n| 1 | Zeisler & Zeisler. |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | THE COURT:
And Mei Guo? |\n| 3 | MR. KINDSETH:
And Mei Guo. |\n| 4 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Thank you. |\n| 5 | MS. MAYHEW:
Good afternoon, Your Honor.
Kristen |\n| 6 | Mayhew, McElroy Deutsch Mulvaney & Carpenter, on behalf of |\n| 7 | Creditors Rui Ma, Zheng Wu and Weican Meng. |\n| 8 | THE COURT:
Good afternoon. |\n| 9 | Mr. Baldiga, I saw you back there, but please go |\n| 10 | ahead and announce -- |\n| 11 | MR. BALDIGA:
Yes, Your Honor.
William Baldiga, |\n| 12 | Brown Rudnick.
Thank you. |\n| 13 | THE COURT:
Good afternoon. |\n| 14 | Does anyone else wish to make an appearance on the |\n| 15 | record today? |\n| 16 | (No audible response.) |\n| 17 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Mr. Baldiga, we're going to |\n| 18 | take up your application, your motion to withdraw as |\n| 19 | attorney, first, if you'd like to come forward, please.
You |\n| 20 | can come up to the lectern if that's easier, whatever is |\n| 21 | easier for you. |\n| 22 | MR. BALDIGA:
I'll do that.
Thank you. |\n| 23 | THE COURT:
Good afternoon. |\n| 24 | MR. BALDIGA:
Good afternoon.
Well, Your Honor, |\n| 25 | our motion was filed on July 13.
We supplemented it with a |\n\n further submission at docket 623 last week. THE COURT: I did see that. Thank you. MR. BALDIGA: Okay. And I think there were possibly at least two concerns with the court or among other parties. One is a matter of law, whether we are entitled to withdraw, especially now that there has been the appearance of two other firms for Mr. Kwok as debtor out of possession. And then second, we anticipated, I think appropriately and had conversations with Ms. Claiborn and Mr. Despins, as to our continuing responsibilities as to our retainer and as former counsel to the debtor. We just wanted there to be no mystery or no question about the fact that we understand the rules. We've complied with the rules throughout and would continue to. And if -- if there were any concerns, I wanted to be proactive in addressing those, including with the court today. We have no benefit from holding the retainer. And so we -- other than security for our fee obviously -- and so we're happy to have whatever arrangements -- I think the current arrangements are fine with Ms. Claiborn and her office and with the trustee and his office -- THE COURT: For your firm to retain the -- or to\n\nkeep the retainer subject to an order granting your fees, is\n\n that the current -- is that -- MR. BALDIGA: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Yeah. Sure. Okay. Go ahead. That's fine. MR. BALDIGA: And, I mean, it's with a very wellregarded bank. It's not the firm's funds. THE COURT: Right. MR. BALDIGA: It's we keep retainers in a segregated account. We're a firm in -- fortunately in good standing financially and otherwise so I don't think they're at risk in any way. As to replacement counsel, I unfortunately was on vacation at the last hearing, but I've read the -- THE COURT: Well, hopefully it was a good vacation. MR. BALDIGA: -- transcript and I understand the dialog. THE COURT: Hopefully, it wasn't unfortunate that you were on vacation. Hopefully -- MR. BALDIGA: I wasn't going to say that, but I appreciate that comment. I think that's right. I'm not going to take a position as to the Zeisler retention. THE COURT: Understood. MR. BALDIGA: That's a matter for other parties to address. But Mr. Mitchell has appeared. The Zeisler firm\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1082-8 Filed 11/11/22 Entered 11/11/22 13:18:26 Page 7 of\n\n has appeared. I think our motion to withdraw should be allowed as a matter of law whether or not actually there is replacement counsel. But with the replacement counsel, I think it should be, hopefully, routinely addressed. I'm happy to answer any questions from any party or the court, but otherwise I would just rest on those papers. THE COURT: Thank you. I want to hear from everyone else as -- I haven't seen anyone object to your motion and I don't know of any objection. So if anyone has an objection I'd like them to raise it now. MR. DESPINS: Your Honor, it's not an objection, but we had subject to, so if we could be heard at the appropriate time? THE COURT: Well, subject to -- I'm going to make Brown Rudnick -- they're going to have to file a fee application. They know that. That's already -- that's not a problem. Is the issue -- when you say -- are you concerned about Brown Rudnick holding onto the funds? I thought there was no problem with that. MR. DESPINS: No, Your Honor. The issue is that we want them to confirm that they will make themselves\n\n available. And may I approach, Your Honor? THE COURT: Yes. Yes. Yes, please. MR. DESPINS: Okay. THE COURT: I'm sorry. I understand what your point is now that I forgot to mention. You had said in your papers that you would like them to be available and to assist you if necessary. MR. DESPINS: Subject to whatever protective order Your Honor would enter. THE COURT: Right. MR. DESPINS: We filed a 2004 -- THE COURT: Yes. MR. DESPINS: -- last week. They're one of the targets. THE COURT: Right. MR. DESPINS: So we don't need to debate the merits of that. Just that -- THE COURT: Right. MR. DESPINS: -- I want to make sure that they're not sailing into the sunset. That's all. THE COURT: Okay. And have you and Mr. Baldiga had any -- I don't know that you've had an opportunity, but have you had any conversations about what you've just said on the record?\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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158 |\n|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | 10 |\n| 1 | MR. DESPINS:
Not about that point. |\n| 2 | MR. BALDIGA:
I'd be happy to address it, Your |\n| 3 | Honor. |\n| 4 | Well, we have obligations, obviously, to the Court |\n| 5 | under the rules and under law.
Former counsel is in an |\n| 6 | awkward position when it comes to matters as to privilege. |\n| 7 | We don't want to be whipsawed in that I don't want to make a |\n| 8 | commitment to do something that could violate a privilege |\n| 9 | here. |\n| 10 | And so, for example, of course, I've already had |\n| 11 | conversations with Mr. Despins.
Will continue to be |\n| 12 | available.
I'm not hard to find. |\n| 13 | I certainly don't want to make a commitment that |\n| 14 | would put our firm at risk for a claim by a former client |\n| 15 | that we've somehow invaded a privilege or put them in a |\n| 16 | position where they couldn't defend a privilege. |\n| 17 | This is really I don't think an issue for Brown |\n| 18 | Rudnick as much as it is for the trustee and counsel, |\n| 19 | replacement counsel, to the debtor to navigate.
These, in |\n| 20 | my experience, have been challenging issues to navigate in |\n| 21 | the few other cases I've been in where there's a debtor out |\n| 22 | of -- out of possession. |\n| 23 | So I'm pleased to continue to be available to Paul |\n| 24 | Hastings as they -- as they wish, but I will not commit to |\n| 25 | do something that will put our firm at risk. |\n\n THE COURT: Understood. I have a question for you though too. MR. BALDIGA: Certainly. THE COURT: And I'll hear from Mr. Despins if he wants to respond to what you've said. What I would ask is -- and I -- I would assume this would not be a problem from your perspective, that the firm will, you know, accept service. There won't be any issue of service if -- Mr. Despins going to serve probably a subpoena, right, on your records. He's going to want to see your records. And you're going to -- you're going to either -- you or other counsel object on privilege grounds and then we'll have to see how it all works out at the end of the day, whether there can be some form of protective order that's agreed to or that the Court has to enter. I just don't want to have an issue that you wouldn't accept service or something along -- because, to me, that's rudimentary. You have every right, your firm has every right to file whatever documents they think are appropriate with regard to any discovery requests that are made upon you and anything like that. That's not what I'm talking about. I'm just talking about I don't want us all to spend time on issues of service or something that I would\n\n consider, you know, fundamental. There is every -- you have every right to raise any issue you feel is appropriate under applicable law and rules with regard to your attorney/client privilege and any other privilege that you may assert, but I just want -- that would be the commitment that the Court would -- I don't want to spend any time on that and I don't think you do either. MR. BALDIGA: So two commitments, Your Honor. One, as is customary and appropriate, the trustee as one of his first orders of business -- I think as he said in his papers, sent a simple letter, a document hold letter -- THE COURT: Right. MR. BALDIGA: -- which is customary in investigations more generally. And we have -- and I told the trustee this, we have implemented our hold internally, so we've been responsible in that regards. So nothing will be lost. That's step number one and frankly basics. Step number two, there will not need to be service or constables or any type of thing. If there's a 2004 order entered, we'll comply with it. We don't need a subpoena or other formal process as long as the debtor is not challenging whether this trustee has gone through the\n\nappropriate steps.\n\nThat's really up for the debtor to say --\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n| 1 | THE COURT:
I understand. |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | MR. BALDIGA:
-- that something is lacking, but it |\n| 3 | won't be Brown Rudnick standing in the way. |\n| 4 | THE COURT:
That's my question and my request and |\n| 5 | I appreciate that.
Thank you. |\n| 6 | MR. BALDIGA:
Okay. |\n| 7 | THE COURT:
Now, Mr. Despins, do you have anything |\n| 8 | else you want to add to what Mr. Baldiga just stated? |\n| 9 | MR. DESPINS:
No, Your Honor.
You covered my |\n| 10 | point.
Thank you. |\n| 11 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Thank you.
All right. |\n| 12 | So, Mr. Baldiga, as you said in your remarks, we |\n| 13 | haven't had that many cases where -- in recent past, where |\n| 14 | the debtor has been removed from possession and so the |\n| 15 | issues about whether -- you know, I don't even understand |\n| 16 | the two counsel yet. I'm going to talk to Mr. Henzy about |\n| 17 | that. |\n| 18 | But I agree with you that your motion should be |\n| 19 | granted.
And it is going to be granted on the grounds that |\n| 20 | other parties, other lawyers, have filed an appearance on |\n| 21 | behalf of the debtor, and the debtor is out of possession. |\n| 22 | So that's fine. |\n| 23 | What I need to know from you, and I don't know if |\n| 24 | you've had any conversations with Attorney Claiborn about |\n| 25 | this, or anybody else, and I'm not saying you should have -- |\n| | |\n\n how much time do you need to file a fee application? MR. BALDIGA: On that point, Your Honor, I have not had discussions, but I've had quite a bit of thought about it. At the -- at the last couple of hearings, one of the Court's comments, which I thought was very well taken by everyone, is that what you would hate to do is put people through a lot of work needlessly. I think the same goes -- there will be a time and a place for a fee application. Given the criteria for the allowance of fees, especially as counsel for the estate, is so what did your work come to? I think it would be very difficult for the Court or any party to assess today. For example, in your memorandum of decision appointing a trustee, you cited to two of the things that we brought about. One was we filed a plan. Whether that is stillborn or ends up being the basis for a plan that's confirmed in this case, time will tell. I don't think it's possible to assess that today and maybe not for some time. Second, the boat. We don't know where the boat -- the whole issue with the boat is going. Not just procedurally, but does that become part of the estate or not? Is it voluntary or by court decision? Is it part of the deal or not?\n\n| | 15 |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | We take some pride in what we've done, substantial |\n| 2 | pride in what we've done.
The case, for us, is not ending |\n| 3 | in the way that we had intended, but I think the Court, and |\n| 4 | especially the trustee, the Office of the United States |\n| 5 | Trustee, the replacement counsel, the committee, will all be |\n| 6 | able to assess the value of what we've done with the benefit |\n| 7 | of some hindsight once the dust has settled here. |\n| 8 | So I -- and it's a lot of work to put together a |\n| 9 | fee application. |\n| 10 | The other problem with doing a fee application |\n| 11 | today is it's very hard to go further than what I just did |\n| 12 | without concerns of privilege and confidentiality.
Those |\n| 13 | will be lessened over time as discovery plays out. |\n| 14 | So I would ask that given the recognition, that I |\n| 15 | confirm again, that the money doesn't go anywhere without a |\n| 16 | fee application that we just table that for this -- at this |\n| 17 | point.
And at some point any party can say to the Court or |\n| 18 | to me, hey, I think we need to get this going.
But I just |\n| 19 | don't think it's today.
And I think as the case proceeds it |\n| 20 | will become more obvious when that will be. |\n| 21 | THE COURT:
Okay.
I would like to hear from |\n| 22 | others about that point.
Okay? |\n| 23 | MR. BALDIGA:
Of course. |\n| 24 | THE COURT:
But I understand your point.
Thank |\n| 25 | you. |\n| | |\n\n All right. Does anybody -- MR. BALDIGA: Anything else from me right now, Your Honor? THE COURT: Say that again? MR. BALDIGA: Anything else right now from -- THE COURT: I don't have any questions right now. I understand what your position is. And I'm curious to hear what other parties think about that. MR. BALDIGA: I'll stand back for a moment. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. I'd like to know what the other parties think about Mr. Baldiga's suggestion that while the motion to withdraw the appearance would be granted at this time that there wouldn't be a need to file a fee application at this time? MS. CLAIBORN: Your Honor, Holley Claiborn for the U.S. Trustee. I think Attorney Baldiga makes some fair and valid points about the process and about where we are in this case. And perhaps the easiest way to do it is to put it on a tickler say four to six months out and we can revisit the issue, where we are in the case and whether or not it's an appropriate time to file a fee application. Because as Attorney Baldiga noted there would be a difficulty at this point in assessing the value to the Case 22-50073 Doc 1082-8 Filed 11/11/22 Entered 11/11/22 13:18:26 Page 16 of\n\n| | 158 |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | 17 |\n| 1 | estate of the services that were provided because we don't |\n| 2 | know all the facts and we aren't anywhere near the finish |\n| 3 | line. |\n| 4 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Thank you. |\n| 5 | Anyone else wish to be heard? |\n| 6 | MR. DESPINS:
Your Honor, the trustee agrees with |\n| 7 | Mr. Baldiga's proposal. |\n| 8 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Thank you. |\n| 9 | Mr. Friedman? |\n| 10 | MR. FRIEDMAN:
It's Peter Friedman from O'Melveny |\n| 11 | & Myers.
PAX agrees that this is a sensible way to proceed. |\n| 12 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Thank you. |\n| 13 | MR. GOLDMAN:
Your Honor, for the committee, Irve |\n| 14 | Goldman.
We have no problem with the proposal suggested by |\n| 15 | the U.S. Trustee. |\n| 16 | THE COURT:
And Mr. Baldiga? |\n| 17 | MR. GOLDMAN:
Correct. |\n| 18 | THE COURT:
Yes.
Thank you. |\n| 19 | Anyone else wish to be heard? |\n| 20 | (No audible response) |\n| 21 | THE COURT:
Okay.
So, Mr. Baldiga, the motion to |\n| 22 | withdraw as attorney filed on behalf of Brown Rudnick, and |\n| 23 | obviously all the individuals from Brown Rudnick who filed |\n| 24 | notices of appearance, in the case is granted. |\n| 25 | And there will not be a need to file a fee |\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 1082-8 Filed 11/11/22 Entered 11/11/22 13:18:26 Page 17 of\n\n| 1 | application at this time. |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | So the order, probably just do some firm of a |\n| 3 | virtual order that says the motion to withdraw is granted |\n| 4 | for the reasons stated on the record, and that further order |\n| 5 | of the Court will enter with regard to the filing of a fee |\n| 6 | application by Brown Rudnick. |\n| 7 | Does that make sense to you? |\n| 8 | MR. BALDIGA:
It does, Your Honor.
Thank you. |\n| 9 | THE COURT:
Okay.
All right.
Well, I'm sorry to |\n| 10 | see you go.
But it is an unusual case.
And I understand |\n| 11 | the position that you and your firm have taken on the |\n| 12 | parties, all of the parties who have been intimately |\n| 13 | involved in the case, and newly involved in the case, agree |\n| 14 | with your position and so I have no reason to think it |\n| 15 | should move in any other direction at this point. |\n| 16 | MR. BALDIGA:
Thank you, Your Honor. |\n| 17 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Thank you. |\n| 18 | MR. BALDIGA:
May I take my leave? |\n| 19 | THE COURT:
Yes, you may. |\n| 20 | MR. BALDIGA:
Okay. |\n| 21 | THE COURT:
Okay. |\n| 22 | MR. BALDIGA:
Very good.
Thank you, Your Honor. |\n| 23 | THE COURT:
All right.
Thank you very much. |\n| 24 | All right.
So the motion to withdraw as attorney |\n| 25 | is granted and an order will enter, but it will most likely |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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Okay?
So that's ECF 543. |\n| 2 | All right.
Just if everyone could give me one |\n| 3 | moment and then we'll turn to the rest of the matters. |\n| 4 | (Pause) |\n| 5 | THE COURT:
Now, with regard the rest of the |\n| 6 | matters on the calendar, I'm sure people have an idea of how |\n| 7 | they think they should proceed, as far as the order, in |\n| 8 | which they should go.
I have an idea of how I think they |\n| 9 | should proceed. |\n| 10 | Mr. Despins, what is your position as to what we |\n| 11 | should address next today? |\n| 12 | MR. DESPINS:
Thank you, Your Honor. |\n| 13 | Very briefly, as an initial matter I want to say |\n| 14 | that at the end of the hearing we have a lot of -- not a lot |\n| 15 | -- but we have a number of housekeeping matters that we will |\n| 16 | want to cover. |\n| 17 | THE COURT:
Well, do you want to cover them now? |\n| 18 | Are we talking about motions that have been pending by the |\n| 19 | debtor since the beginning of the case, or are you -- |\n| 20 | MR. DESPINS:
No.
But, for example, the bar date |\n| 21 | order.
There's a -- I don't want to cover it now because |\n| 22 | it's actually more involved than initially thought. |\n| 23 | THE COURT:
Okay. |\n| 24 | MR. DESPINS:
So the bar date order is one of |\n| 25 | them.
Also we would want the Court to -- so I'm not going |\n\n to cover all of them -- but to schedule status conferences on a regular basis in the case. THE COURT: That's fine. MR. DESPINS: So things like that. THE COURT: I will say one thing that's not relevant to you actually -- or it might be -- Mr. Baldiga, as counsel, and his firm, filed several motions some time ago that never were resolved because of the change of the circumstance of the case when the debtor decided to withdraw the motion for funding. There are still outstanding motions out there that we're -- we can talk about later -- but the committee also has outstanding applications to employ professionals. There's a lot of things that maybe we do just address at a status conference or later today, but we're going to resolve those one way or another. I would want to know whether or not you, as the trustee, are going to, you know, step into the shoes of any of those pending motions that were -- for example, they were -- the debtor was -- we had an evidentiary hearing about a financial advisor. You know, I was about to rule when all of that changed, everything changed, the motion to withdraw the funding came. You know, it was withdrawn. And then I think that the reality is that that is a motion at least if Brown\n\n| | 21 |\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | Rudnick stayed in the case they were no longer going to |\n| 2 | pursue.
I have no idea if you're going to do that.
But in |\n| 3 | any event we can talk about it later. |\n| 4 | With regard to where we are today -- |\n| 5 | MR. DESPINS:
Yes. |\n| 6 | THE COURT:
-- I mean, the most important things |\n| 7 | -- everything's important, but -- including the bar date |\n| 8 | order -- and I did look at -- I have to say I haven't |\n| 9 | scoured, but I looked at the proposed order that you |\n| 10 | submitted with redlining and things like that and I have a |\n| 11 | couple of thoughts on that but nothing substantial.
Okay? |\n| 12 | With regard to whether or not -- so the things |\n| 13 | that have to be decided today are -- everything has to -- |\n| 14 | has to be handled -- but as we had our last hearing, I know |\n| 15 | there's a lot of discovery that's been served on you because |\n| 16 | you filed motions to quash.
So I understand that. |\n| 17 | Mr. Henzy's pursuing this -- his motion for relief |\n| 18 | from judgment order.
That's been objected to by several |\n| 19 | parties.
I have some concerns about the motion and the |\n| 20 | process that we'll all need to talk about. |\n| 21 | And then you -- and then it's the Paul Hastings' |\n| 22 | retention and the -- and the local counsel retention. |\n| 23 | MR. DESPINS:
Correct.
And then there was also -- |\n| 24 | but I'm not sure you're going to take that up -- you had |\n| 25 | asked the Zeisler firm and the U.S. Trustee to brief some |\n| | |\n\n issue. THE COURT: Yes. MR. DESPINS: We didn't get involved in that -- THE COURT: No. MR. DESPINS: -- so I don't know where that stands. THE COURT: That has -- that's where we're going to turn next I believe. MR. DESPINS: Okay. THE COURT: Okay. But let's do the housekeeping, for what we call housekeeping, although it has substantive impact at the end then. MR. DESPINS: Yes. THE COURT: Let's hope. MR. DESPINS: There's a lot -- there's a lot to cover in a sense that -- THE COURT: Yes. MR. DESPINS: -- for example, the bar date, we did mark it up because you asked us to do that. THE COURT: Right. MR. DESPINS: And that's going to sound bizarre, but I don't think we should proceed with that for reasons related to the *Genever* case. There's a whole thing -- THE COURT: Oh, okay. MR. DESPINS: -- that I want to explain to Your\n\n Honor. THE COURT: Okay. MR. DESPINS: -- so we'll do that at the end of the hearing -- THE COURT: Okay. That's fine. MR. DESPINS: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Thank you. All right. So, Attorney Claiborn and Attorney Henzy, the last hearing I did ask you both -- and I know you did brief the issue on whether or not 327(a) applies to Zeisler & Zeisler and whether or not there's an actual conflict of interest because of the representation of three parties in this case at the same time. Before we get to that though, I don't understand the other lawyer, Attorney Henzy, who has filed an appearance and what his role is going to be and why there's a need for another attorney? MR. HENZY: I'm going to take my mask off just when I speak, Your Honor. THE COURT: Go right ahead. MR. HENZY: I apologize for that. I just -- So Attorney Mitchell appeared -- as I understand it, Your Honor, there was this window, I'll call it, between Brown Rudnick exiting and one -- I don't think it makes any difference to Mr. Baldiga's presentation, but the debtor had\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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I'm told -- I was not part of it, but made an |\n| 2 | affirmative decision to terminate -- |\n| 3 | THE COURT:
That's what we were told by someone |\n| 4 | from Brown Rudnick last week.
And I don't remember who it |\n| 5 | was, so I apologize. |\n| 6 | MR. HENZY:
And, of course, subject to any |\n| 7 | bankruptcy code, bankruptcy rules issue, under the Rules of |\n| 8 | Professional Conduct, if a client terminates a lawyer, the |\n| 9 | lawyer is ethically prohibited from representing a client |\n| 10 | any further. |\n| 11 | So there was this window where Brown Rudnick was |\n| 12 | no longer representing -- again, putting the bankruptcy |\n| 13 | code, bankruptcy rules and the need to withdraw aside -- but |\n| 14 | I could understand them taking the position they were no |\n| 15 | longer representing the debtor and my firm was not -- was |\n| 16 | not at that point retained by the debtor and Mr. Mitchell |\n| 17 | appeared really solely for the purpose -- I think at the |\n| 18 | time of that -- the July 8 hearing that Your Honor held on |\n| 19 | the U.S. Trustee's motion to appoint Mr. Despins as trustee, |\n| 20 | to put something on the record that the debtor in fact was |\n| 21 | objecting to Mr. Despins' appointment as trustee. |\n| 22 | And my recollection is that it was done by filing |\n| 23 | a kind of a letter as opposed to a formal pleading that you |\n| 24 | typically would see. |\n| 25 | But I believe that the debtor does not have any |\n\n| | 158 |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | 25 |\n| 1 | intention of having Attorney Mitchell be in court |\n| 2 | representing him.
That's why he's retained -- he's retained |\n| 3 | us. |\n| 4 | THE COURT:
Well, then, will Mr. Mitchell be |\n| 5 | withdrawing his appearance? |\n| 6 | MR. HENZY:
I'd certainly discuss that with the |\n| 7 | debtor and with Mr. Mitchell, yes. |\n| 8 | THE COURT:
Because Mr. Mitchell said in the |\n| 9 | letter that he understood all the rules in the bankruptcy |\n| 10 | court, but yet he filed this letter. |\n| 11 | So I -- I don't think that there should be two |\n| 12 | lawyers for the debtor in this court.
I don't see the need |\n| 13 | for it. |\n| 14 | And I don't -- and Mr. Mitchell, who says he |\n| 15 | understood, does not understand how it works here |\n| 16 | apparently.
So I would think that it would be wise for Mr. |\n| 17 | Mitchell to withdraw his appearance. |\n| 18 | MR. HENZY:
Understood, Your Honor. |\n| 19 | THE COURT:
Okay. |\n| 20 | MR. HENZY:
And we'll get that cleaned up. |\n| 21 | THE COURT:
Okay.
All right.
Now, turning to the |\n| 22 | 327(a) issue, and Attorney Claiborn as well, and, you know, |\n| 23 | Attorney Henzy, I went back when you said, you know, it was |\n| 24 | black letter law. |\n| 25 | And of course it's not really black letter law. |\n\n It says it in a line in *Collier's* that -- and it doesn't cite to any cases. And then the cases that cite to the proposition that says that a debtor out of possession, 327(a), doesn't apply, cite to the *Collier's* cite. So it's very interesting actually because you would think there would have been more out there than there really is. And the cases that cite for the proposition that say you are out of possession and, therefore, the chapter -- I'm sorry -- therefore, the 327(a) does not apply all rely on a sentence in *Collier's* which is fairly interesting to me. But in any event there's other things in *Collier's* that are interesting as well with regard to the status of this case. Attorney Claiborn, your motion talks about whether the debtor's acting on behalf of the estate or on his individual -- in an individual way as to why -- whether 327(a) should apply. So where do things stand from the U.S. Trustee's standpoint at this point? MS. CLAIBORN: Your Honor, I don't think we're any further than we were when we filed our brief except to say that the debtor's brief filed by the Zeisler firm did acknowledge the fact that there have been conflict waivers\n\n# executed amongst the parties. THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Attorney Claiborn, you're a little low. THE COURT: She can't -- yeah. You have to speak up a little bit. She can't you. I'm sorry. MS. CLAIBORN: I am actually speaking loudly, but I'll try again. I wanted to point the court to the fact that in the Zeisler brief at ECF 620 there is a representation that conflict waivers have been executed by and between the debtor, HK International and Ms. Guo. We have not seen those conflict waivers and we're not privy to any discussions that may have happened by and among the debtor, HK, and Ms. Guo and Zeisler's office. So as we are at the moment not any further along in the analysis than we were when we filed our brief back on July 27th, so in our viewpoint it very much depends on what the debtor is aiming towards and what the debtor is doing as to whether or not the Zeisler firm must comply with Section 327(a). And as part of that it has a lot to do with their role with respect to the three different parties, the debtor, HK and Ms. Guo. THE COURT: Okay. So you're -- you don't know whether 327(a) applies? Or you're saying it's not -- it's not discernible because you don't know what role they're Case 22-50073 Doc 1082-8 Filed 11/11/22 Entered 11/11/22 13:18:26 Page 27 of\n\n| | 28 |\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | playing? |\n| 2 | MS. CLAIBORN:
Correct. |\n| 3 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Does anyone else wish to be |\n| 4 | heard on the conflict issue? |\n| 5 | The 327(a) issue, I have to say, again, Collier |\n| 6 | says in one line that it doesn't apply to a debtor not in |\n| 7 | possession.
That's all it says.
But that issue, you know, |\n| 8 | could be continually raised depending upon what happens in |\n| 9 | the case just because -- if I find 327(a) doesn't apply at |\n| 10 | this time, it doesn't mean I couldn't find 327(a) doesn't |\n| 11 | apply at some other time. |\n| 12 | But that's aside from the fact that the Zeisler |\n| 13 | firm represents now Mr. Kwok, HK International and Ms. Guo, |\n| 14 | and says that because the trustee now is automatically |\n| 15 | substituted as a party in the adversary proceeding that HK |\n| 16 | brought against Mr. Kwok that there's no conflict. |\n| 17 | Do you agree with that? |\n| 18 | MS. CLAIBORN:
I don't think it's as pure as that, |\n| 19 | Your Honor. |\n| 20 | THE COURT:
Well, that's their argument though. |\n| 21 | MS. CLAIBORN:
Correct. |\n| 22 | THE COURT:
Okay.
And so what do you think? |\n| 23 | MS. CLAIBORN:
Your Honor, the U.S. Trustee -- the |\n| 24 | brief that we filed sets out the opinions that have been |\n| 25 | issued in various different jurisdictions, and obviously not |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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158 |\n|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | 29 |\n| 1 | this one, as to the applicability of 327 and I think there |\n| 2 | is support for the idea that depending on what counsel is |\n| 3 | doing and what their role really is in the case, that they |\n| 4 | are subject to 327. |\n| 5 | To the extent that the debtor is pursuing the |\n| 6 | debtor's Rule 60(b) motion here today with the mind set and |\n| 7 | the goal that that trustee appointment is invalid because |\n| 8 | Trustee Despins does not satisfy the disinterested status |\n| 9 | that is required, that position is being taken and advocated |\n| 10 | for the apparent benefit of the estate. |\n| 11 | And so to the extent that that is the debtor's |\n| 12 | objective and that is the debtor's goal, there is an |\n| 13 | interpretation that can be made that 327(a) does in fact |\n| 14 | imply to Zeisler. |\n| 15 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Attorney Henzy? |\n| 16 | MR. HENZY:
On the two points, Your Honor, I -- I |\n| 17 | did not recollect that all of the cases that I cited on the |\n| 18 | 327(a) issue that I -- I know for sure several of them did |\n| 19 | cite the Collier's, but I'm not sure all of them did. |\n| 20 | I could not find any case that said to the |\n| 21 | contrary, that a debtor out of possession is required to |\n| 22 | retain -- |\n| 23 | THE COURT:
I think you're right.
I couldn't |\n| 24 | either.
I looked.
I agree with you.
I don't -- and I |\n| 25 | think the references in those cases to Collier is it. |\n\n There's other cases -- there's other issues about whether you can be compensated under 330. That's a different issue. MR. HENZY: Yeah. Yeah. Which I think the Supreme Court -- THE COURT: But I agree. The 327(a), there's nothing that says that a debtor in -- a debtor out of possession's counsel must abide by 327(a). I wasn't able to find anything. And then the only thing is whether or not you had to disclose your compensation. And you disclosed your compensation. But I don't understand what an evergreen retainer means from your perspective. I think I know what it means, but I assume that means when you're done with your hundred thousand you get another -- it's evergreen, it's always blooming, it never loses it's -- MR. HENZY: It always -- it's always blooming. THE COURT: It's always blooming. MR. HENZY: It's always blooming, yes. THE COURT: So you -- so you go -- you use the hundred thousand -- I'm just saying -- and then you get another hundred thousand. MR. HENZY: Or whatever has been used that particular billing period. Yeah.\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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158 |\n|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | 31 |\n| 1 | THE COURT:
Okay.
And so -- |\n| 2 | MR. HENZY:
So let's say in a month we billed |\n| 3 | \\$10,000, we would bill the client -- we would send the |\n| 4 | client an invoice for \\$10,000.
We would take the \\$10,000 |\n| 5 | from the retainer and the client would be obligated to |\n| 6 | replenish the retainer. |\n| 7 | THE COURT:
Okay. |\n| 8 | MR. HENZY:
That's the idea. |\n| 9 | THE COURT:
And the -- and how would -- how would |\n| 10 | the Court know when your retainer is -- has -- is about to |\n| 11 | lose its bloom and needs to be replenished? |\n| 12 | MR. HENZY:
I don't know that the Court would know |\n| 13 | that.
I don't know that the Court under the rules needs to |\n| 14 | know that.
I suppose they're not -- I'm just saying in |\n| 15 | theory, say take a hypothetical, if the -- if a -- in a |\n| 16 | situation like that, the retainer stopped blooming, the way |\n| 17 | the Court might find out about it is that counsel might be |\n| 18 | filing a motion to withdraw on the basis that the client -- |\n| 19 | THE COURT:
Okay. |\n| 20 | MR. HENZY:
-- is not satisfying its obligations. |\n| 21 | THE COURT:
That's possible.
But, again, the |\n| 22 | debtor's son has provided you with the hundred thousand |\n| 23 | dollars, correct? |\n| 24 | MR. HENZY:
Yeah.
That's correct. |\n| 25 | THE COURT:
Okay.
And so the debtor's son -- you |\n| | |\n\n represent the debtor, the debtor's daughter, the entity that asserts -- MR. HENZY: Says that it owns the boat. THE COURT: -- that they're the registered owner of the boat, and now -- now you're getting money from the debtor's son? MR. HENZY: Yes. THE COURT: Okay. And you don't think any of that's a conflict? MR. HENZY: I do not believe that any of it is a non-waivable conflict other -- THE COURT: Well, there's other things you have to meet under Rule 1.7. It's not just that you got an informed consent waiver in writing. It's four things. That you reasonably believe that you'll be able to provide competent and diligent representation. I'm not suggesting you don't. You may believe that. Somebody might not agree with you, but you may reasonably believe that. The representation is not prohibited by law. Well, I'm not sure about that if the bankruptcy code sections apply, as Attorney Claiborn asserts they might. MR. HENZY: Which I would like to come back to that. THE COURT: Yeah. We'll come back to that. The representation does not involve the assertion\n\n| | 158 |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | 33 |\n| 1 | of a claim by one client against another client represented |\n| 2 | by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding |\n| 3 | before a tribunal. |\n| 4 | So we're not just talking about the adversary |\n| 5 | proceeding here, right?
We're talking about the case as a |\n| 6 | whole, the Chapter 11 case, where the entity -- Mr. Friedman |\n| 7 | reminded me last hearing, because I couldn't remember the |\n| 8 | entity who was loaning the money to the estate, was also an |\n| 9 | entity I believe controlled by the son, and now who's paying |\n| 10 | you, I guess not through an entity but by himself. |\n| 11 | That's what your disclosure says, correct? |\n| 12 | MR. HENZY:
Yes. |\n| 13 | THE COURT:
That the money came directly from the |\n| 14 | son, not from any other entity? |\n| 15 | MR. HENZY:
Yes. |\n| 16 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Okay.
And so you have four |\n| 17 | things you have to meet under Rule 1.7, not just -- not just |\n| 18 | the waiver of the conflict. |\n| 19 | And there's plenty of cases out there -- and I |\n| 20 | don't -- I'm not saying we're going to go through them |\n| 21 | today, okay -- but there's plenty of cases out there, |\n| 22 | bankruptcy judges saying you can assert all those things, |\n| 23 | but that doesn't mean that the conflict is truly waivable. |\n| 24 | Just because you got them to sign a letter that says they |\n\nwaive the conflict doesn't mean it's actually waivable.\n\n That's the issue that you have -- or one of the issues that I think you have.\n\n And given what has occurred outside of this court before the filing of this case, there's a lot of information that could become fact in this case to the contrary, that there's -- they're all one in the same. And some people could argue that your representation of all of them just supports that they're all one in the same, because Mr. Despins said last time we were here that -- and he may be filling more of this in later -- that with regard to the New York bankruptcy case that the direction came from Mr. Kwok, not from the corporate entity.\n\n13 And, you know, I mean, Mr. Friedman's papers, as you know, Mr. Henzy, I'm sure you've read them, go through extensively all the findings that have been made outside of this court.\n\n So Mr. Friedman says, you know, you may need to think about that, Judge, because maybe this is all just a continuation of what was going on back in New York, that through this weave and this web of issues that we just continue to do the same thing, just in another court.\n\n And what I'm having difficulty with is I don't see how you can represent all three of those entities and now get paid by the son and say that you don't have a concurrent conflict of interest under Rule 1.7, which is different from\n\n the 327(a) issue. Okay? I'm not -- I'm saying even if I agree with you that 327a doesn't apply, and I think you might be right -- although I hear Attorney Claiborn's argument. I think the argument with that though is that it has to be raised when the issue has obviously come up. I don't -- I don't think she's -- her office is able to at this point show that this issue that you're really -- that it's -- you're really representing the estate, because I'm not sure I agree with that at this point either. It's complex, obviously, as you know, and this has been going on for a long time. So I just don't see how it's not a conflict of interest. There is -- there are claims in the estate that are going to -- how are you going to provide advice to Mr. Kwok individually, and HK and Ms. Guo, individually without being -- without having their interests overlap and/or conflict, which they can and very well may do? MR. HENZY: So I guess a couple of preliminary points, Your Honor. THE COURT: Yeah. MR. HENZY: Absolutely court has the authority to enforce the rules of professional conduct when it involves proceedings in their court. Absolutely, no -- I don't question that in any way, shape or form.\n\n However, the principal -- in the first instance, it's up to the lawyer to be aware of and to -- their own conflicts and to make sure that they're in compliance with the rules of professional conduct. And, again, if something is in front fo the Court and the Court says that that's a conflict, the Court certainly has the authority and maybe the obligation to do something.\n\n Courts are, the Second Circuit says, to be somewhat deferential to a client's choice of counsel because there's a generally recognized right of people to retain counsel and to retain counsel of their choosing. And I think the 1.7(a) rules don't recognize that or address that or deal with that.\n\n On 1.7(a)(1), right now, there is no adversity. We represent HK International and I think -- and Mei Guo. And there may be other issues that we end up representing them on in the case, but principally, and I don't want to say almost exclusively, it's been on the Lady May.\n\n Now, I understand we filed appearances in the case -- and in theory could an issue come up other than with respect to the Lady May where they're adverse to each other -- but all we've done so far for those two -- those two -- the person and the entity is with respect to the Lady May.\n\n I think it is generally recognized, Your Honor, that where there is no existing concurrent conflict -- and\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n that's what Rule 1.7 says, is a concurrent conflict of interest exists that the fact that there may be a conflict sometime in the future does not disqualify counsel and you potentially have to deal with that. And it certainly is our practice, and I think most firms' practice, to -- in any joint representation -- to advise clients if there -- if you end up with adverse -- end up adverse to each other, we're going to have to deal with that and that may have consequences to you. We may have to resign for one, both, all three, it's -- but you don't know that until you get to that concurrent conflict and you have\n\nto deal with it.\n\n Really, same theme on 1.7(a)(2), there is no -- THE COURT: I'm not talking about (a) though. I'm talking about (b).\n\n MR. HENZY: I'm going to -- I'm going to get to (b) because (b) follows (a). It's --\n\n THE COURT: Yeah. But it says notwithstanding. MR. HENZY: But you don't get to (b) -- if there's no concurrent conflict of interest, you don't get to (b). THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. MR. HENZY: (b) is notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under subsection (a). A lawyer may represent a client, yes, but you don't get to (b) unless you fail (a).\n\n THE COURT: How can you fail -- how do you get by (a)(1) then? You represent HK and Mr. Kwok. The boat -- the trustee wants the boat to be property of the estate. MR. HENZY: Yeah. THE COURT: HK's got a different interest in that boat than Mr. Kwok does according to you. So how is it right now that there is -- they're not directly adverse to each other? MR. HENZY: Well, Mr. Kwok is no longer a party to that adversary proceeding -- THE COURT: That's not what I'm saying. MR. HENZY: -- and has no -- THE COURT: I don't care if he's not a party to the adversary proceeding. He still has an adverse interest with regard to the boat because he -- because they're still going to have to be -- if Mr. Despins is successful, right, in saying that the boat is property of the estate, then that is an -- then it's an adverse interest to your client and to HK because then HK doesn't have the boat and the debtor does. How are they not -- how are they not -- how is it not adverse? MR. HENZY: Certainly it would be adverse to HK if the Court said -- THE COURT: Right. And you represent HK and the\n\n debtor. MR. HENZY: Yeah. But I'm not sure I agree with you. Mr. Kwok's position is that HK owns the boat so they're not adverse. He does not believe that he owns the boat. He does not believe that it's property of the bankruptcy estate. I'll say that unequivocally on the record. So I don't see how they can be adverse if they take the same position. I think he's -- he would -- I know he would contemplate not being involved in that fight. That's a fight between presumably the trustee and HK International. But I don't -- Mr. Kwok -- again, I'll say this on the record, he will not be -- I suppose he might be involved if someone wants to call him as a witness or something like that, but he will not be taking positions. That will be a fight between the trustee and HK International, so there's no adversity, Your Honor. THE COURT: I don't agree with you, but go ahead. MR. HENZY: Okay. When you get to (b), as you said, we do believe that we can provide competent, diligent representation to each client. I'm not concerned that we're going to be pulling punches on behalf of HK International or having what's going on with the boat impact our representation of Mr. Kwok at all. On (b)(2), the 327 issue, again, we can talk more\n\n about. I've made the point in the papers -- I don't want to belabor it, Mr. Kwok is no longer a party to the adversary proceeding. I believe Mr. Despins said that at the last hearing. He was automatically substituted as the party in that -- in that adversary proceeding. And I cited the rule and cases that say that, that upon appointment of a trustee, he is automatically substituted for the debtor in that action. And all three clients have given consent. We did advise them, if they wanted to, to consult with other counsel and they've confirmed their consent in writing. So even assuming that there is a concurrent conflict under 1.7(a) -- and, Your Honor, to your point, it may be that at some point in this case a concurrent conflict does arise. I don't think one exists today -- there may be at some point a concurrent conflict arises. And if it does, then in compliance with the rules of professional responsibility, we will have a professional responsibility to address that. And, again, typically when you have a joint representation you advise clients if a concurrent conflict arises we may need to withdraw or otherwise address it. But if and when a conflict -- concurrent conflict\n\n arises, we'll -- we will have to address it. And the clients have been informed of that. And, again, they have -- they have given their consent. THE COURT: Well, we -- I don't know how they gave their consent. So, I mean, you could have just said I consent. I don't know what they said. I know what you're saying they said, but just by saying I consent doesn't mean that's a -- that is a waiveable conflict -- MR. HENZY: Well, the only -- THE COURT: -- because you have to know what they're consenting to. MR. HENZY: The only non-waiveable conflict under this rule is if we represent two parties in the same litigation. And because Mr. Kwok is no longer a party to the adversary proceeding, I believe that we do not represent two parties to the same litigation. So they can consent -- THE COURT: But it's not just to the litigation that -- you keep focusing on the issue of the adversary -- it's the case. It's the case. It's still Mr. Kwok is in the case. It's his case whether he's not -- out of possession or not. It doesn't just go away because he's out of possession. It's still an issue in the case. You know, it's too convenient to say Mr. Despins steps into the shoes of Mr. Kwok in that adversary but not in any of the 523 adversaries. And I understand the\n\n argument. I'm not -- I understand the argument. But it doesn't -- you just don't have a conflict and then it doesn't -- it just doesn't -- it goes away. It doesn't exist anymore. That's not how it works. The conflict as I think we talked about it the last time, you know, you take the client as you find him. You know, you may argue you don't have a conflict at the moment, but the parties have a conflict with each other. There's some issues here. MR. HENZY: I don't -- I don't see where the parties right now are directly adverse to each other. THE COURT: Well, you may not see it, but that doesn't mean it doesn't exist. MR. HENZY: But if -- THE COURT: The problem is in this case, and in the case before this case, that there were -- there were many, many findings made with regard to this -- these number of family -- closely -- and they're all insiders by the way so let's just -- we didn't raise that either. They're all insiders. MR. HENZY: None of it before you, Your Honor. THE COURT: No. No. No. I'm talking -- MR. HENZY: None of it before you. THE COURT: No. No. No. I'm talking about in this case right now. Ms. Guo is an insider of Mr. Kwok.\n\n| | 158 |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | 43 |\n| 1 | MR. HENZY:
Yes. |\n| 2 | THE COURT:
The son who paid you a hundred |\n| 3 | thousand dollars is an insider of Mr. Kwok.
HK |\n| 4 | International may or may not be an insider of Mr. Kwok, but |\n| 5 | it's close. |\n| 6 | MR. HENZY:
Okay. |\n| 7 | THE COURT:
Okay?
So how is that not a conflict? |\n| 8 | MR. HENZY:
Because they are not adverse -- they |\n| 9 | are not directly adverse to each other.
Your Honor, if a -- |\n| 10 | THE COURT:
If Mr. Despins sues Ms. Guo right now |\n\n--\n\nMR. HENZY: Yeah.\n\n THE COURT: -- and says she got paid whatever she got -- I'm making -- I'm giving a hypothetical. She got paid by Mr. Kwok a hundred thousand dollars 90 days before the filing, then how are they not adverse?\n\n MR. HENZY: I think that Mr. Despins and Ms. Guo would be adverse.\n\n THE COURT: No. Because the money's got to come back from Mr. Kwok and Mr. -- you've got -- you keep -- MR. HENZY: If Ms. -- if Ms. Guo is sued for -- THE COURT: What's the -- you're not going to -- are you going to raise a defense on her part? What's her defense?\n\nMR. HENZY: Hold on. Assume -- I apologize, Your\n\n Honor. THE COURT: No. That's okay. It's okay. MR. HENZY: No. No, that was not okay. I apologize. THE COURT: That's okay. MR. HENZY: If Mr. Despins sues Ms. Guo for a preference, which I think is what you were positing, or for whatever, for whatever -- THE COURT: For whatever. MR. HENZY: -- then the money would come back I think from Ms. Guo, not from Mr. -- THE COURT: But what's her defense? She's going to have a defense. She's not going to just turn it over. If she can, she can turn it over today then. MR. HENZY: I don't know -- THE COURT: How are you going to represent her? MR. HENZY: I don't know what claim Mr. Despins is bringing against her, so I don't -- THE COURT: I understand that. MR. HENZY: -- I don't know what her defense would be. It's possible. I suppose he would bring a claim, I don't know what it would be, that would create some direct adversity, in which case we would have to deal with that. But that doesn't exist today. THE COURT: Okay.\n\n MR. HENZY: It may exist, Your Honor, sometime in the future, but it doesn't exist today. And for the 1.7(a) analysis, it's a concurrent conflict of interest exists. Today, is there a conflict? If a conflict -- and the rules specifically contemplate -- I think it's in the comments to 1.7 where it addresses joint representation -- that a conflict -- a conflict may arise in the future. And if it does, counsel has an ethical responsibility to address it. But today, Ms. Guo hasn't been sued by Mr. Despins for anything. She may get sued by him for something and that, whatever that suit is, may or may not raise -- put Ms. Guo and Mr. Kwok in a directly adverse position. But I -- but I don't know. I can't know that today. THE COURT: Well, (a) doesn't talk about the fact that there has to be a lawsuit by the way. MR. HENZY: Oh, no. It's any -- it's any adverse -- THE COURT: So it doesn't talk about it. MR. HENZY: No. It's any -- I was just -- I was addressing your -- THE COURT: (b) talks about it, not (a). MR. HENZY: I was addressing Your Honor's comment about what if -- THE COURT: I understand. So I'm saying there\n\n| | 158 |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | 46 |\n| 1 | doesn't have to be a lawsuit in (a).
It's if you have the |\n| 2 | representation of one client will be directly adverse to |\n| 3 | another. |\n| 4 | MR. HENZY:
And I -- |\n| 5 | THE COURT:
There doesn't have to be a lawsuit to |\n| 6 | have that issue. |\n| 7 | MR. HENZY:
And today I don't see how Ms. Guo and |\n| 8 | Mr. Kwok are directly adverse -- |\n| 9 | THE COURT:
Okay. |\n| 10 | MR. HENZY:
-- on anything.
I don't see how HK |\n| 11 | International and Mr. Kwok are directly adverse on anything. |\n| 12 | Again, Mr. Despins is going to bring whatever |\n| 13 | claims he brings and we're going to go -- we're going to go |\n| 14 | from there ormake whatever claims he makes. |\n| 15 | THE COURT:
Okay. |\n| 16 | MR. DESPINS:
Your Honor, if I could be heard for |\n| 17 | two minutes on this? |\n| 18 | THE COURT:
Yes.
Yes, please. |\n| 19 | MR. DESPINS:
Not on 327.
I don't have a view on |\n| 20 | that. |\n| 21 | But on the issue of waivable conflict or not, 521, |\n| 22 | debtor's duties, 521(a)(3), if there's a trustee appointed, |\n| 23 | the debtor's duty is to cooperate with the trustee as |\n| 24 | necessary to enable the trustee to perform the trustee's |\n| 25 | duties.
(a)(4), if there's a trustee serving, they must |\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 1082-8 Filed 11/11/22 Entered 11/11/22 13:18:26 Page 46 of\n\n| 1 | surrender all properties, et cetera. |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | Of course their view is, oh, you know, he's a |\n| 3 | billionaire, but he has no assets so, therefore, we're on |\n| 4 | the same side of the V.
But that duty that a -- statutory |\n| 5 | duty that the debtor has exists today.
And you know that |\n| 6 | there are criminal provisions in 18 U.S.C. that tie into |\n| 7 | these obligations to do these things. |\n| 8 | So I'm -- so I'm not so sure this is a waivable |\n| 9 | conflict despite the fact that there's consent because the |\n| 10 | debtor has a statutory duty to do certain things that are in |\n| 11 | direct conflict with the other party that they're |\n| 12 | representing. |\n| 13 | Thank you, Your Honor. |\n| 14 | THE COURT:
Thank you. |\n| 15 | MR. DESPINS:
And also, by the way, I want to |\n| 16 | mention that chart that they said the son paid, they also |\n| 17 | checked the box that the debtor would -- might pay in the |\n| 18 | future.
I want to be very clear under 549 we reserve all |\n| 19 | rights.
If the debtor is paying Zeisler, I don't want them |\n| 20 | to think that because they checked that box that somehow |\n| 21 | we're looking the other way.
I don't see how the debtor is |\n| 22 | paying -- would be paying them during the case. |\n| 23 | Thank you, Your Honor. |\n| 24 | THE COURT:
Thank you. |\n| 25 | MR. HENZY:
I'm pretty sure that Mr. Despins is |\n| | |\n\n not looking the other way on anything, Your Honor. THE COURT: But it's a good point about the debtor making future payments for fees. I think that would be tremendously problematic. MR. HENZY: Your Honor, the debtor is not going to make any payments at the very least out of any -- Mr. Despins references to 549 and any property that's property of the bankruptcy estate. And we wouldn't -- we wouldn't take any such payments, certainly not knowingly anyway. So I'll say again, Your Honor, the debtor -- so the debtor has duties under 521, but I'm not seeing how that -- and Mr. Despins already has made in the corporate governance motion some proposals, but I'm still not seeing that today that there's any directly adverse -- that anyone's directly adverse. Again, it may be that something happens in the future where there is adversity. The only conflict -- expressly under the rules, the only conflict that is not waivable is the (b)(3). So we may think that a client should not -- THE COURT: I'm not sure that's true by the way. I mean, that's not -- case law doesn't really support that completely. I understand that's your argument. But when do -- where -- what authority are you relying on that says the only thing that's not waivable is (b)(3)? MR. HENZY: I think that that's the plain language Fiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n of the rule. That is the -- unless it's prohibited by law, which is back to the 327(a) issue. THE COURT: Which is (2). Yeah. MR. HENZY: Okay. But I'm not aware of any prohibition in any law -- THE COURT: Well, actually there's a lot -- believe it or not, I've seen some case law that the -- even when the informed consent is in writing, the bankruptcy court has found that it's not a waivable conflict no matter what, you know, was written in that consent. Okay? There's cases, and there's recent cases about it, throughout the country that talk about, you know, the -- that it's -- you know, you can waive -- you can say whatever you want and waive it, but just because you said it doesn't mean it's enforceable and it's waivable. MR. HENZY: Yeah. I -- THE COURT: And at this point, you know, I'm not sure that it is. But go ahead. MR. HENZY: I don't understand I guess that point. THE COURT: Well -- MR. HENZY: If there's no prohibition by law and it's not claims made against each other -- THE COURT: Because it impacts the estate as a whole. This isn't just about the one adversary proceeding in which HK International sued Mr. Kwok. It's what Mr.\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 1082-8 Filed 11/11/22 Entered 11/11/22 13:18:26 Page 49 of\n\n Despins is saying and more. The debtor still has -- he may be a debtor out of possession, but he still has obligations under the bankruptcy code.\n\n He voluntarily came to this court and subjected himself to the jurisdiction of this court. And with that, you know, he gets all the benefits, but he also has the burdens. And he has to cooperate and turn over to the trustee all of his -- all property of the estate, whatever equitable or legal interest he has in a -- in a -- any piece of -- any property, whatever it is, whether it's real, personal, whatever. And when there are --\n\n We still haven't gotten to the issue of what HK is doing with regard to the certification on the boat. That seems to have gone by the wayside for a while. But there's \\$37 million in an escrow account that Mr. Despins is going to argue one way or another either that money or the boat's the estate. And that money --\n\n Now Mr. Friedman's going to have to remind me again, was that Golden Spring who funded that 37 million or was it somebody else?\n\n MR. HENZY: But, Your Honor, a couple of points. THE COURT: No. But wait a minute. Let me just finish my thought process first and I'll get back to you. But the point is Mr. Kwok is going to argue that something different -- how could Mr. Kwok -- is he -- he's\n\n| | 158 |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | 51 |\n| 1 | going to say, oh, yeah, go ahead HK, give the boat over to |\n| 2 | the estate or don't?
Go ahead, Mr. -- escrow agent.
Give |\n| 3 | the 37
-- who's going to fight that fight? |\n| 4 | MR. HENZY:
Not Mr. Kwok. |\n| 5 | THE COURT:
Well, who's going to fight the fight? |\n| 6 | HK International.
And you represent HK International and |\n| 7 | Mr. Kwok. |\n| 8 | MR. HENZY:
And Mr. Kwok's not fighting that fight |\n| 9 | at all. |\n| 10 | THE COURT:
He's not going to fight the fight. |\n| 11 | MR. HENZY:
No. |\n| 12 | THE COURT:
So then I could find today -- I could |\n| 13 | make a ruling that the boat is property of the estate and |\n| 14 | Mr. Kwok's not going to fight that fight? |\n| 15 | MR. HENZY:
Mr. Kwok is out of that fight. |\n| 16 | THE COURT:
He's not going to fight it? |\n| 17 | MR. HENZY:
He is -- |\n\n THE COURT: So you're going to represent HK International in that fight?\n\n MR. HENZY: He is out of that fight. That fight is now Mr. Despins' fight with HK International. It's not Mr. Kwok's fight.\n\n THE COURT: All right. What about the \\$37 million in escrow?\n\nMR. HENZY: Same answer, that's not Mr. Kwok's\n\n| | 158 |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | 52 |\n| 1 | fight.
That is HK International's fight.
And Mr. -- I'm |\n| 2 | not sure that's even a fight. |\n| 3 | THE COURT:
So how can you represent HK |\n| 4 | International in a fight against the estate in which the |\n| 5 | estate is your client's estate? |\n| 6 | MR. HENZY:
But the estate is not my client.
The |\n| 7 | Supreme Court says that in the Baker Botts decision and the |\n| 8 | -- |\n| 9 | THE COURT:
Yes.
But the estate is the |\n| 10 | responsibility of your client. |\n| 11 | MR. HENZY:
No. |\n| 12 | THE COURT:
Yeah.
Yes, it is under 521. |\n| 13 | MR. HENZY:
No.
I think that's wrong. |\n| 14 | THE COURT:
Yes.
He's got to turn it over.
He's |\n| 15 | got to cooperate and turn it over. |\n| 16 | MR. HENZY:
He has responsibilities -- |\n| 17 | THE COURT:
So is he going to cooperate right now |\n| 18 | and say that, yeah, you know what, HK International really |\n| 19 | doesn't own the boat.
I do according to the New York State |\n| 20 | Court.
So why don't you just move it over here now? |\n| 21 | Is that how he's going to cooperate? |\n| 22 | And then how does that make sense for him to say |\n| 23 | that and then have HK say, no, I'm the -- I'm the record |\n| 24 | owner of the boat? |\n| 25 | MR. HENZY:
So he -- he has his obligations under |\n\n 521, but that doesn't mean -- 521 doesn't mean that he has to say -- get on the witness stand and say something is true that he doesn't believe is true. So if Mr. Despins is pursuing that action or that action is being pursued and Mr. Kwok is put on the witness stand and Mr. Despins says, isn't it true that you own the boat? And Mr. Kwok says, no. That's not -- he's not violating his obligations under 521 of the bankruptcy code. He's giving truthful testimony. So I'm not -- THE COURT: Well, whether it's true or not isn't for Mr. Kwok to decide. That's the point. Otherwise why are we here? MR. HENZY: Oh. I agree with you. But he's obligated to give truthful testimony. THE COURT: He's obligated to give testimony. MR. HENZY: To give truthful -- THE COURT: He makes the determination of whether or not it's truthful. MR. HENZY: Well, but -- but no one would say, well, Mr. Kwok you believe that you don't own the boat? That's right, I believe I don't own the boat. Well, you can't give that answer. You have to testify that you do own the boat because 521 says you have to testify -- THE COURT: Nobody would suggest -- nobody's suggesting that.\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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158 |\n|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | 54 |\n| 1 | MR. HENZY:
Then I'm missing -- I'm missing the |\n| 2 | point. |\n| 3 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Maybe I'm not articulating it |\n| 4 | well.
I don't understand how this can continue, but we'll |\n| 5 | talk about it. |\n| 6 | Does anyone else wish to be heard on whether or |\n| 7 | not the Zeisler firm can represent these three entities at |\n| 8 | the same time and not have it be deemed to be a conflict of |\n| 9 | interest? |\n| 10 | MR. HENZY:
One point, Your Honor.
If you're |\n| 11 | going to rule that we have a conflict of interest, or you're |\n| 12 | not going to rule, then I don't believe anything else should |\n| 13 | go forward today.
You can't -- because the debtor is then |\n| 14 | -- |\n| 15 | THE COURT:
I agree with you and that's why I |\n| 16 | asked to hear what everybody else -- |\n| 17 | MR. HENZY:
Okay.
Because then the debtor is not |\n| 18 | -- |\n| 19 | THE COURT:
That's why we're talking about this |\n| 20 | right now. |\n| 21 | MR. HENZY:
The debtor is not represented.
And to |\n| 22 | the extent you haven't ruled -- |\n| 23 | THE COURT:
Well, he is represented.
He's got |\n| 24 | another lawyer.
He's got Mr. -- whatever -- |\n| 25 | MR. HENZY:
No one's here in court today |\n| | |\n\n| 1 | representing the debtor. |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | THE COURT:
I understand that.
But that -- you |\n| 3 | know, this is not news that the issue was raised about the |\n| 4 | conflict of interest.
So just hold on. |\n| 5 | MR. HENZY:
Okay. |\n| 6 | THE COURT:
I hear you.
I hear you. |\n| 7 | MR. HENZY:
Okay. |\n| 8 | THE COURT:
Does anyone else wish to be heard on |\n| 9 | this conflict of interest issue? |\n| 10 | MR. DESPINS:
I would just say, Your Honor, that |\n| 11 | I'm not sure.
We need a genie to decide that issue today. |\n| 12 | I think the issue is still live, will continue to be live, |\n| 13 | you know, later. |\n| 14 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Thank you. |\n| 15 | Attorney Claiborn? |\n| 16 | MS. CLAIBORN:
Your Honor, I agree the issue does |\n| 17 | not die today if the Court decides not to rule on it today. |\n| 18 | The only other issue that I would throw into the |\n| 19 | mix is that looking into the future and cognizant of the |\n| 20 | past, the debtor's position on things has changed over time. |\n| 21 | And to the extent that the debtor uses this particular |\n| 22 | conflict, albeit resolved at the moment as a future sword, |\n| 23 | then we have a problem in this case. |\n| 24 | THE COURT:
What do you mean? |\n| 25 | MS. CLAIBORN:
To the extent that he takes the |\n| | |\n\n position in the future that his guidance and his advice from his now current counsel, Zeisler, was conflicted and that he should not be bound by any of the outcomes of that, that's going to cause a problem in this case in the future. The debtor does have a history of parting ways with counsel. THE COURT: Okay. I think I understand your point. I might -- I might not be understanding it fully at the moment, but that's fine. Anyone else wish to be heard? (No audible response) THE COURT: Okay. So, Mr. Henzy, with regard to the concurrent representation of these three parties, Mr. Kwok, who has continuing and remaining and continuous obligations under the bankruptcy code, even if he is a debtor out of possession, and HK International, and Mei Guo, the debtor's daughter, I agree with you that at the moment there is -- you appear to be complying with all of the provisions of Rule 1.7. But I do agree that things can change very quickly and parties, including you, and/or the Court, and/or others, need to bring this to the Court's attention if there are issues that are happening in this case. I think your client, as I said to you the other day, you take your client as you found them. And as your client has some issues with regard to\n\n litigation that has occurred outside of this court, that at some point's going to come back to this court somehow. Mr. Despins is going to have to do what Mr. Despins has to do and so do all the other creditors. I have no idea what any of the other creditors are going to do. They have their rights too. And they -- they can seek whatever relief they think is appropriate with regard to your clients, all three of them. So I -- given the positions that have been taken, and that the U.S. Trustee believes that 327(a) may apply and that you may have a conflict, I think the issue is continuing before this court and there won't -- you know, could be a problem as early as tomorrow. Who knows? And we'll have to deal with that. With regard to your motion for relief from judgment order under -- MR. HENZY: Your Honor, can I -- can I just ask a question? THE COURT: Yes. MR. HENZY: I'd like to think anyway that I take my obligations under the rules of professional responsibility pretty seriously. THE COURT: No one's questioning that. MR. HENZY: Okay. I'll accept that. But -- THE COURT: But you have to understand that the\n\n issues that have been raised in this case are every day -- every week it changes, right? We're going down one path, then we go down another path, now we're down an other path. Now you're filing a motion to try to remove the trustee after, you know, you said -- after your client came in and wanted the boat to be part of the \\$8 million, have the boat be part of the estate, move forward, try to -- who Mr. Baldiga said on many occasions wants to have -- and it says it in the papers, so it's an admission of your party, of your client, whether or not you represent your client or Mr. Baldiga represented your client, that they wanted this case to be a place where everyone could come together and resolve all the issues and have a fair and equal distribution to creditors. And that's not what's happening. Okay? That's not what's happening. There wouldn't have been an appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee if that was what was happening. So I'm not trying to challenge your personal seriousness about the Rule 1.7. As I keep saying to you, you don't represent yourself. You represent your clients. And your clients already have some negative rulings against them that the Court has heard about time and time again. And your client has come in and said he wanted to do all these things and then immediately changes course and\n\n pulls the plug on everything and leaves everybody in a completely different -- on a completely different path than he came in here and said that he was going to pursue. That's what I'm talking about. Okay? MR. HENZY: The point I was going to make, Your Honor, is I think I take my obligations pretty seriously. And if I ever believe that I have a concurrent conflict, I'm going to address it, with the clients if necessary, with the Court. So I would -- I would always do that. A second point is, Mr. -- Ms. Claiborn's point that she doesn't want to see the debtor using a purported conflict of my firm as a sword, I make the same point back at people. To have this sort of weird maybe three -- so if 327 applies, if the debtor is asserting his rights, and if I'm arguing too vigorously about some issue, then 327(a) applies. But if the debtor just sits and doesn't -- quietly and doesn't push back on anything, then 327 doesn't apply. I would hope that parties aren't going to use that in the future when the debtor potentially is objecting to something to stand up and say now he's under 327, he's got to go. A third point, Your Honor, the -- what happened outside of this court in pre-bankruptcy litigation I'm not sure what that has to do with whether or not my firm has a\n\n conflict under Rule 1.7 or 327(a) is implicated. I don't -- I don't think that it does.\n\n This is a tough case. I don't think anybody would disagree with that. This is a -- this is a tough, tough case. But the toughness of the issues isn't the driver on I have a conflict or I don't have a conflict. I either have a conflict or I don't have a conflict.\n\n And what I -- what I don't want to do, Your Honor, is go away from today with you having -- because I -- when you -- I think anyway, okay -- I never would intend to put words in Your Honor's mouth, that's why I'm going to say what I thought I heard -- what I thought I heard was you agree with me that today you believe I don't have an issue under Rule 1.7. But then you said -- I think anyway -- again, I want to be very careful -- but maybe you do.\n\n And if the Court is going to determine that today I have a concurrent conflict of interest and I should not be representing the debtor, I need to know that, because then if that's the case, from the time the Court says that every word that comes out of my mouth I am violating my obligations under the rules of professional responsibility. So either the Court finds I have a concurrent conflict of interest today or it doesn't.\n\n And recognizing that if something comes up in the future that creates that conflict, we're going to have to\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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158 |\n|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | 61 |\n| 1 | deal with it.
But I -- I kind of need to know that today. |\n| 2 | THE COURT:
I think I said you didn't have a |\n| 3 | concurrent conflict of interest today, but you might in the |\n| 4 | future. |\n| 5 | MR. HENZY:
Agreed. |\n| 6 | THE COURT:
And that parties needed to bring that |\n| 7 | to the Court's attention. |\n| 8 | MR. HENZY:
Understood, Your Honor. |\n| 9 | THE COURT:
Okay? |\n| 10 | MR. HENZY:
Thank you. |\n| 11 | THE COURT:
All right.
With regard to Rule 9024 |\n| 12 | motion, as I mentioned to you last time, I didn't understand |\n| 13 | why you weren't moving under section 324, the removal of the |\n| 14 | trustee. |\n| 15 | And the case law that I've looked at says that a |\n| 16 | rule -- and Collier, again, says that Rule 60 is not the |\n| 17 | appropriate way to challenge the appointment of a trustee |\n| 18 | under -- that the United States -- because the Court's not |\n| 19 | involved in the appointment.
Remember.
Right?
The Court's |\n| 20 | not involved in the appointment.
The U.S. Trustee's |\n| 21 | involved in the appointment. |\n| 22 | And the U.S. Trustee is only simply asking that |\n| 23 | the appointment be approved and the Court approved it.
No |\n| 24 | one was able to put forth any evidence as to why it |\n| 25 | shouldn't be approved. |\n\n And so -- then it's -- then that appointment stands. And the way that you have to proceed is a motion of 324. And if that motion is denied, it's not a final appealable order. Which obviously you want the Rule 60 to be an appealable order. So we're not -- we're not proceeding down the Rule 60 road, because according to sources that I've looked at, it's not appropriate. Mr. Despins was appointed as the Chapter 11 Trustee. And the only way he can be removed is under 324. So if you want to file a motion under 324 and meet those requirements, you're entitled to do so. MR. HENZY: I think or under 1105, Your Honor. But the -- THE COURT: Under what? MR. HENZY: I think also 1105 provides for the termination of trustee's appointment. THE COURT: But it refers back to 324. MR. HENZY: 1105 doesn't, but that's neither here nor there. THE COURT: The rules do. MR. HENZY: I understand. Just to be clear, is Your Honor denying our -- THE COURT: Yes.\n\n MR. HENZY: -- 60(b) motion? THE COURT: I'm denying your 60(b) motion. MR. HENZY: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: And all discovery that was related to the 60(b) motion is denied because the motion -- because it's moot. MR. HENZY: Can I have one moment, Your Honor? THE COURT: Yes. (Pause) MR. HENZY: So, Your Honor, the motion -- the motion to quash is granted? THE COURT: It doesn't need to be granted. It's moot. The Rule 60(b) motion is denied. MR. HENZY: Very well. Understood. THE COURT: Any discovery with it, associated with it, is moot. MR. HENZY: Understood, Your Honor. Understood. MR. DESPINS: Your Honor -- THE COURT: Yes. MR. DESPINS: -- may I be heard on this? THE COURT: Yes. MR. DESPINS: I know your reaction might be, you just won, why don't you sit down. But, Your Honor, I know in this case what's going to happen. Everything is going to get appealed. And I wonder whether the Court would Case 22-50073 Doc 1082-8 Filed 11/11/22 Entered 11/11/22 13:18:26 Page 63 of\n\n entertain alternative findings on this, which is that you've already ruled it's not procedurally proper. But in any event, the concept of disinterestedness under 101.54 or 59, I forget which subsection -- MR. HENZY: 14. MR. DESPINS: 14. Sorry. 101.14 deals with the estate, not the debtor. And there's nothing that's been alleged in anything they've produced that would somehow affect the disinterestedness of the trustee vis-a-vis the estate as an alternative finding. Just because what I -- you know what I'm -- I don't want to go back and forth, back and forth -- THE COURT: Well, I haven't -- I haven't written an order -- MR. DESPINS: Okay. THE COURT: -- denying the Rule 60 motion yet, which would have to happen before there could even be an appeal. Number one. MR. DESPINS: Thank you, Your Honor. Thank you. THE COURT: And number two, if there was an appeal, they'd have to be a bond posted. MR. HENZY: And I don't know whether there will be an appeal or not. But, Your Honor, I think those alternative findings should not be made. And I actually disagree with Mr. Despins that a\n\n trustee does not have to be disinterested vis-a-vis a debtor. And there is case law that says a trustee has to be disinterested vis-a-vis a debtor. But, again, I don't think you need to make alternative findings. You've denied the motion. I understand the basis for the denial. And I think that should be it. THE COURT: Well, there's still going to be a written order. There has to be a written order. MR. HENZY: I mean, if you're going to go beyond denying on the I'll call it the 324 ground, which I understand, then I am aware Collier says a 324 or 1105 motion is preferable to a 60(b). But there -- I would -- if you're going to make alternative findings, I would at least like an opportunity to argue because -- THE COURT: You put that argument in your papers. Your argument is in the papers. You stated why you think the trustee should be removed and why the relief from the order should enter. And your papers say all that. You say -- you talk about all that in your papers. MR. HENZY: I think you can -- I would argue you can -- you can deny -- again, that sounds funny because you can do what you obviously decide to do. But denial based on that you need to bring a\n\n THE COURT: I didn't say -- I didn't say just\n\nthat. That's not appropriate.\n\nmotion under 324, I think you --\n\n I said you have to bring a -- and I said to you at the last hearing that the standards under Rule 60 and the standards under 324 are completely different.\n\n And so I didn't just say it's denied because you didn't bring it under 324. That's not what I said.\n\nMR. HENZY: Okay.\n\n THE COURT: Okay? I said that the motion is denied because you didn't bring it under 324 because that's the appropriate section to bring it under. Number one.\n\n And number two, I don't-- I don't have any -- there's no -- you didn't bring forth anything to me under a Rule 60 motion that met the standard under a Rule 60 motion, which is that under your 60(b) motion, you would have to find -- I would have had to have found that there was inadvertent mistakes, surprise or excusable neglect. That's doesn't apply.\n\n Newly discovered evidence that with reasonable diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial. That doesn't apply. Fraud, which doesn't apply. You brought forth no evidence of that. That the judgment is void. That doesn't apply. The judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged. That doesn't apply.\n\n Or any other reason that justifies relief. There is no other reason that you've set forth that justifies relief under Rule 60. So if you want to file a motion and try to meet the requirements of 324, you're welcome to do so. But you already argued all of those issues in your Rule 60(b) motion and I'm denying it. There are no grounds for relief that you have presented to the Court under Rule 60 and bankruptcy Rule 9024, to grant relief under those rules. MR. HENZY: Understood, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. All right. So now we can move on to the application to employ Paul Hastings. MR. DESPINS: Thank you, Your Honor. There were two -- one statement and one objection. And the first, the objection, is filed by the debtor. And we cited a Fifth Circuit decision -- although we don't need a Fifth Circuit decision, but the technical decision that says a debtor out of possession cannot -- does not have standing to object to the retention of counsel. So I believe that's hornbook law. Actually, you had hinted at that at the last hearing without talking about the retention of counsel specifically.\n\n But that case applies to the retention of counsel because it's a case administration matter and the debtor out of possession does not have standing unless there's a surplus. And in this case, they're saying there's no surplus because they have no assets.\n\n Now, I think it's still important again, for appellate purposes, to just assume standing for two minutes and address the debtor's objection. And I go back to the definition of disinterestedness. It's keyed off to the word estate. And it's true that it talks about creditors, equity holders, and the debtor, but the test is vis-a-vis the estate. And none of what's been alleged here has anything to do with the estate.\n\n The issue of Mr. Wynn, you know, has nothing to do with the estate. And I want to be clear about this. My firm was retained after Mr. Wynn was sued by the DOJ, did not advise Mr. Wynn in any way regarding what to do or not to do vis-a-vis Mr. Kwok. There's none of that. Mr. Wynn is not a creditor. The Wynn litigation will not affect the estate up or down in any way and that's very important.\n\n And it's the same thing with the Chinese offices. I mean, that the fact that we have offices in China first of all was well known from the beginning.\n\n But it all falls on the basic point I made before -- and I want to explain this concept where I used insanity\n\n -- in their papers. They say that's outrageous that he says it was insane. I've always been very precise that what is insane is the lack of a link that they're establishing between what's happening between the debtor, his immigration status and the Chinese Communist Party, and this estate. Your Honor is not dealing with an immigration matter. Your Honor is not -- we are not dealing with that. We have no position on that. It's not our issue and we're not going to be involved in these issues. And that's where everything falls apart because there's no link between all of this and the -- and the estate and the job we have to do, which is to get the maximum assets possible and to the holders of allowed claims in this case. The other point is the UBS matter. That's another distraction. First, they've known about UBS from the beginning. That was in the first declaration we said that we represent UBS affiliates. I think I said predominantly or primarily regarding financing matters. We didn't say exclusively. But what does it matter whether we represent them regarding traffic tickets or financing matters or bankruptcy matters? I've said clearly that I've never represented them. I'm not representing them. I am able to be\n\n litigation adverse, meaning as trustee against them. And, in fact, the litigation against them is pending in England. And as Your Honor knows, you know, in England to be appearing in court and to argue a case you have to be a barrister. Paul Hastings are not barristers in the U.K. So practially the people will use -- if you look for example -- at their objection, attached to the complaint that filed against UBS, if you go to the end, there are three signatures there. These are three barristers. We don't have barristers. And those are the people I would think that would continue to handle this matter given they've been handling it for two years, with some success by the way. Well, procedural success I should say. So the issue of UBS is a non-issue because in any event I'm the one as trustee who will handle this. I will supervise the work of U.K. barristers -- who are not Paul Hastings people because we don't have barristers -- and that, again, resolves that issue. And I believe the rest is all the same as the 60(b). PAX also filed a response. I think it would probably make sense to deal with the debtor's issues first, and then we'll come back to PAX after that. Thank you. THE COURT: That's fine. Thank you. Mr. Henzy? MR. HENZY: Thank you, Your Honor.\n\n So if I could address the standing issue first. With standing, first point, 1109(b) says the debtor has a right to raise, appear and be heard on any issue in a Chapter 11 case. That's very, very clear. I recognize that 1109, courts hold that a debtor still has to have -- you may be able to raise, appear and be heard, but that doesn't necessarily mean listening to me talk is the equivalent of an objection that the Court needs to rule on. So you can maybe painfully have to listen to me, but then say, thank you, Mr. Henzy, but I don't -- you don't have standing to object. And you've raised, appeared and been heard, but I don't have to rule on anything. So I understand that there's -- there's really just two levels to the analysis. There's 1109(b) and then there's do you have standing. The traditional standing analysis is you have to -- you either have to be classically aggrieved -- and I don't think that's what's at issue here, because we're dealing with a statute -- or you have to have statutory standing. So you have to have a statute that Congress has passed where the argument is that Congress intended to give a party a right to be heard in connection with that. And that is all very well laid out in many Supreme Court\n\n| 1 | decisions, Your Honor. |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | The standard that the Supreme Court has laid out |\n| 3 | in those decisions -- so the principal decisions being |\n| 4 | Association of Data Processing Service vs. Camp, that's at |\n| 5 | 397 U.S. 150, and then Clarke vs. Security Industry |\n| 6 | Association, that's at 479 U.S. 388, where they lay out that |\n| 7 | it is a party within the zone of interest to be protected by |\n| 8 | the statute in question. |\n| 9 | The standard that the Supreme Court has laid out |\n| 10 | is a -- it's a pretty low bar.
It's a quote from the Clarke |\n| 11 | decision. |\n| 12 | The Court to say there's no standing would have to |\n| 13 | find that the zone of interest denies a right to participate |\n| 14 | of the parties because the parties' interests are so |\n| 15 | marginally related to or inconsistent with the purpose |\n| 16 | implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed |\n| 17 | that Congress intended to permit participation. |\n| 18 | The Clarke court further says the test is not |\n| 19 | meant to be especially demanding.
In particular, there be |\n| 20 | no indication of congressional purpose to benefit the would |\n| 21 | be plaintiff. |\n| 22 | And back to Collier's, the -- discussing those |\n| 23 | cases, Collier's at Volume 7, 1109.04, subparagraph (4)(b), |\n| 24 | says given the nature of Section 1109(b) because courts have |\n| 25 | said that in thinking about that zone of interest analysis |\n| | |\n\n under the Supreme Court case law you plug that in together with 1109(b). And so *Collier's* says given the nature of section 1109(b) and the purposes that it was designed to serve the zone of interest has to be liberally construed in favor of participation in Chapter 11 cases. There are cases, Your Honor, that say that a debtor has a right to object to the retention of counsel. Among other cases, Judge Krechevsky, *in In re Pappas*, at 216 B.R. 87, it's a 1997 decision, ruled that -- he actually ruled that Rule 2002 refers to a debtor as a party in interest and the debtor had standing to object under 327. And then Judge Brozman in a case, the *Vebeliunas*\n\n *-- it's V-E-B-E-L-I-U-N-A-S --* it's 231 B.R. -- give me one second, Your Honor -- 181.\n\n And actually, Your Honor, there Judge Brozman disqualified trustee's counsel on the basis that trustee's counsel, before the 341 had occurred, before ever examining the debtor, had made public statements that indicated an extreme bias against the debtor. He called the debtor a liar and other inappropriate things. And Judge Brozman found that the debtor there both had standing to and, in fact, disqualified counsel on that basis.\n\n Also I point, Your Honor, to a Second Circuit decision, *Savage & Associates, P.C. vs. K&L Gates*, 640 F.3d 53, where the Second Circuit made clear that a debtor has\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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158 |\n|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | 74 |\n| 1 | standing to -- I'm sorry -- that a party may have standing |\n| 2 | not just based -- not based on a financial interest alone, |\n| 3 | but also based on having a legal interest. |\n| 4 | And, again, both Judge Krechevsky and Judge |\n| 5 | Brozman found that a debtor did have a legal interest in |\n| 6 | objecting to a 327(a) application where counsel was not |\n| 7 | disinterested. |\n| 8 | On the financial interest, look, I have no idea |\n| 9 | where this case is going to come out, Your Honor.
And I |\n| 10 | understand that at filing the debtor had some very small |\n| 11 | amount of money in his possession. |\n| 12 | But speaking of the U.K. litigation, the amount |\n| 13 | demanded there is \\$500 million.
And I don't know anything |\n| 14 | really about the status other than I think I may have heard |\n| 15 | a comment that maybe sounds like something similar to what |\n| 16 | Mr. Despins has heard that that litigation apparently has |\n| 17 | gone reasonably well. |\n| 18 | So it may well be that this estate is not solvent. |\n| 19 | And it may be that there's a \\$500 million recovery against |\n| 20 | UBS in the U.K.
And that would be terrific for everyone, |\n| 21 | including the debtor. |\n| 22 | So I believe that the debtor does have standing |\n| 23 | here to -- to object to Paul Hastings' retention. |\n| 24 | In terms of the conflicts and -- I did, you know, |\n| 25 | file a witness and exhibit list with exhibits.
I'm prepared |\n\n to put on evidence. Although with respect to much of the evidence I would put on, I'm not sure that there's any disputed issue. And I don't want to belabor or take up a lot of time that we don't need to take up. I don't think it's disputed that Paul Hastings does work for various UBS entities. The initial declaration that Mr. Despins filed states that and names the entities. Actually the Paul Hastings financial restructuring web page says that they have done -- I don't know if they do today -- but that they have done work for UBS entities. I don't think it's disputed that the defendant in the U.K. action is UBS AG. That the -- in the debtor's schedules, and I don't know why -- in the statement of financial affairs I don't know why this was done, but it was disclosed there was an action against UBS AG, and then, in parens, it says London branch. And in the initial declaration filed by Mr. Despins the UBS AG that he is talking about in the declaration is defined to be that UBS AG, in parens, London Branch. But if you look at the complaint, which I actually attached to our objection -- again, I could -- I'm happy to put it into evidence, Your Honor, but it's attached to our objection and I don't think there's any dispute that it is -- it is the complaint -- it's clear that the defendant\n\n there is UBS AG -- I'm going to say the big UBS AG -- the one that's headquartered in Switzerland and presumably is the parent of a whole bunch of other UBS entities. Again, the damages there asserted is \\$500 million. So this is not an insignificant claim. And that's in, again, in the complaint that I attached to the -- to the objection that we filed. Mr. Despins says he's never represented any UBS entity -- this is in his -- in his initial declaration -- and that he in his capacity as trustee is able to be adverse to UBS AG and to be named plaintiff. A couple of points. In the declaration, because of the way he's defined UBS AG, again, to be just UBS AG, in parens, London Branch, close parens, I don't think his declaration as filed actually covers the actual defendant in that lawsuit because his declaration -- he does say in the declaration that he can be adverse to any -- he's never represented any UBS -- what the declaration says is he's never represented any UBS entity. That's easy to understand. In my capacity as trustee, I'm able to be adverse to UBS AG and to be named plaintiff as Chapter 11 Trustee in any lawsuit against UBS AG. But, again, his definition of UBS AG is UBS AG, London Branch, and that's not -- the principal defendant in that action is UBS -- big UBS AG I'll\n\n call it. And so his declaration just -- it just does not -- other than that he's never represented any UBS entity, it does not address the actual defendant in that lawsuit. The actual -- THE COURT: Why does it need to address the actual defendant if he said he didn't represent any UBS entity ever? MR. HENZY: Well, Your Honor, because it's not clear from all of that whether Paul Hastings has represented -- if we were talking about my denied 60(b) motion, that would be important. But we're not. We're talking about Paul Hastings. And so the issue is whether -- not whether Mr. Despins has ever represented any UBS entity. It's whether any UBS entity is a former or current client of Paul Hastings. And I don't think that his declaration addresses that. THE COURT: Okay. MR. HENZY: Mr. Bassett -- in the actual application to retain Paul Hastings, it's Mr. Despins' application, but there's a declaration by his partner, Mr. Bassett, that's attached. And Mr. Bassett's declaration does not address that representation at all. What it does is it points to Mr. Despins' declaration, his first declaration and just\n\n says when it comes to connections, I'm just relying on his declaration. Which I actually under Rule -- under the rule, I'm not really sure that you can do that. I'm not sure counsel -- in a retention application, I'm not sure that the firm affidavit or declaration that's attached to the application can point to something else and say I'm not -- I'm not disclosing any conflicts. I'm pointing you to somebody -- a different declaration that somebody else has filed and go look at that. But I guess in some sense I'm not -- I'm not swearing to anything here other than what Mr. Despins said over there is true. So Mr. Bassett doesn't himself in his declaration address the UBS issue at all. So I think the bottom line of all of that is that I'm sure the UBS issue has been addressed by the existing declarations. And I'm also not sure how you get around -- or maybe you can get around Paul Hastings representing the trustee here, but I don't think that what is on file now does that. It doesn't carve out Paul Hastings from representing UBS. It just -- it just doesn't. They're being retained as general bankruptcy counsel to the trustee and I think that that's a significant conflict for them. Fiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n That UBS is a client of Paul Hastings I think is admitted. And UBS is a defendant in a major asset of this bankruptcy estate. And I'm a -- I'm a little -- I could keep -- I don't know if we're going to address the PAX/PAG issue separately. Or I can keep going on the issues that I've raised. Because I guess I think the issues that Attorney Friedman has raised are actually different than the ones I would raise with respect to PAX and PAG. So should I keep going, Your Honor? THE COURT: Well, I don't know. Maybe we should hear from Mr. Despins first on this issue and then keep going. I mean, otherwise we're going to be here all day. Right? I mean, what -- you know, the issue is, Mr. Despins, Mr. Henzy's saying your firm has a conflict because they represent UBS. It's not clear that they represent UBS. And they're -- UBS is a defendant in the adversary -- in the case in London. So, you know, he's saying that Mr. Barnett I believe -- MR. DESPINS: Bassett. THE COURT: Bassett, I'm sorry, his affidavit isn't -- doesn't answer that question. MR. DESPINS: May I, Your Honor? Case 22-50073 Doc 1082-8 Filed 11/11/22 Entered 11/11/22 13:18:26 Page 79 of\n\n| | 80 |\n|----|------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | THE COURT:
Yes, please. |\n| 2 | MR. DESPINS:
So the application to retain Paul |\n| 3 | Hastings, which I signed, incorporates by reference my |\n| 4 | declaration, and the declaration addresses both the trustee |\n| 5 | appointment and Paul Hastings.
It says that expressly, that |\n| 6 | the disclosures in that declaration cover both the trustee |\n| 7 | and Paul Hastings. |\n| 8 | That declaration says that we don't represent |\n| 9 | London, sorry, UBS AG currently.
We've represented them in |\n| 10 | the past, but we represent other UBS entities. |\n| 11 | And I don't think -- I'll check this -- but I |\n| 12 | don't think that the fact that it said, open paren, London |\n| 13 | Branch verses non-London Branch changes the analysis.
I |\n| 14 | think that from my point of view it's the same thing. |\n| 15 | Luc Despines as Trustee can be trustee and handle |\n| 16 | as trustee litigation against any UBS entity, London Branch |\n| 17 | of not, and practically -- that's why Mr. Henzy has not -- |\n| 18 | he makes all of these great points, but doesn't die into |\n| 19 | reality. |\n| 20 | The reality here is that there is counsel involved |\n| 21 | in the case.
They're barristers.
These are the people that |\n| 22 | have been handling this case for two years.
And I'm -- I |\n| 23 | think they will continue to do that.
It would be not a good |\n| 24 | idea to replace them with new counsel.
In any event, even |\n| 25 | if I wanted to do that, Paul Hastings are not barristers in |\n\n| | 81 |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | London, therefore, cannot handle that litigation. |\n| 2 | So Paul Hastings, it's a false issue.
Paul |\n| 3 | Hastings cannot handle that litigation.
So that's really |\n| 4 | the crux of the issue, Your Honor, is that it's a non-issue |\n| 5 | for that reason. |\n| 6 | And, you know -- you know, I'm sure Your Honor |\n| 7 | knows the difference between solicitors and barristers.
But |\n| 8 | we are solicitors in London, we're not barristers, cannot |\n| 9 | file a complaint or handle a trial.
I'd love to be able to |\n| 10 | do that, but we're not equipped to do that.
So that, to me, |\n| 11 | deals with that issue completely. |\n| 12 | THE COURT:
Okay. |\n| 13 | MR. DESPINS:
Thank you. |\n| 14 | THE COURT:
Thank you. |\n| 15 | Go ahead, Mr. Henzy. |\n| 16 | MR. HENZY:
So just -- so just to be clear, Your |\n| 17 | Honor, the only place where the UBS issue is addressed is in |\n| 18 | the U.S. Trustee's application for order approving |\n| 19 | appointment of Chapter 11 Trustee, which attached to that |\n| 20 | was Mr. Despins' declaration of disinterestedness. |\n| 21 | And paragraph 7(c) of that declaration provides |\n| 22 | while Paul Hastings previously represented UBS AG, in |\n| 23 | parens, London Branch, defined -- it's in quotes -- \"UBS |\n| 24 | AG.\"
So in -- in his declaration, UBS AG means UBS AG, |\n| 25 | London Branch.
That's not my definition.
I'm not -- I |\n\n don't think I'm parsing things, words, or anything like that. That's how he has defined UBS AG. And what the declaration says is then I have never represented any UBS entity, including UBS AG. I, in my capacity as trustee, am able to be adverse to UBS AG -- again, substitute for that UBS AG, London Branch -- and to be named the plaintiff as Chapter 11 Trustee in a lawsuit against UBS AG -- again, substitute UBS AG, London Branch. What the declaration says about Paul Hastings is Paul Hastings does not currently represent UBS AG. But, again, that-- the way he's defined it UBS AG means UBS AG, London Branch. It doesn't mean big UBS AG. That may -- I don't know. It may or may not be true that Paul Hastings doesn't represent big UBS AG, but that's not what this says. Paul Hastings does currently represent certain UBS entities, namely UBS Securities, LLC, UBS Securities, Limited, Seoul Branch, UBS Investment Bank, that are affiliates of UBS AG, which again I think means UBS AG, London Branch, in unrelated matters. And so I don't think Mr. Despins' declaration addresses Paul Hastings' representation of big -- what I'm calling big UBS AG, which is the defendant in the U.K. action, at all. It just doesn't. And Mr. Bassett's declaration does no more than refer to Mr. Despins's declaration.\n\n| | 83 |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | Mr. Despins' declaration may be adequate with |\n| 2 | respect to his being disinterested with respect to this |\n| 3 | issue.
And he says that he is able to be adverse to UBS AG, |\n| 4 | and meaning London Branch, and to be the named plaintiff |\n| 5 | against UBS AG, London Branch, but it doesn't say anything |\n| 6 | about Paul Hastings. |\n| 7 | So right now I don't think there's been any |\n| 8 | disclosure, Your Honor. |\n| 9 | And, again, I don't know if it's -- I've never |\n| 10 | seen in an application to retain a professional that the |\n| 11 | declaration with the affidavit attached to the affidavit |\n| 12 | simply makes reference to somebody else's declaration.
But |\n| 13 | that -- maybe there's something out there that says that's |\n| 14 | okay. |\n| 15 | So the application is for Paul Hastings to be |\n| 16 | general bankruptcy counsel.
There's no -- there's no carve |\n| 17 | out. |\n| 18 | MR. DESPINS:
Your Honor, I'm happy to put a carve |\n| 19 | out.
Paul Hastings will not handle the U.K. litigation. |\n| 20 | That's the end -- that's the end of it.
I mean, we can -- |\n| 21 | because we can't.
We're not barristers, Your Honor. |\n| 22 | THE COURT:
Anything further on that point, Mr. |\n| 23 | Henzy? |\n| 24 | MR. HENZY:
I don't have anything further on that |\n| 25 | point, Your Honor. |\n\n THE COURT: Okay. So what's your next point? MR. HENZY: With respect to PAX/PAG that was the subject of -- I understand there was disclosure right at the time of the July 8 hearing, and then there was a supplemental disclosure. There has been no disclosure with respect to the common officers, common directors, common control between the PAG, the so-called PAG entities, that Paul Hastings until very recently represented and apparently terminated that relationship. There's no disclosure of the circumstances of the termination of the relationship. And I -- Mr. Friedman can certainly correct this, but based on the statement that he made at the July 21 hearing, my sense was that PAG may not have understood that it was a former client of Paul Hastings. And, again, Mr. Bassett's declaration does not address PAX or PAG at all. It just refers to Mr. Despins' -- actually his initial declaration. So I don't think that the disclosure here has been adequate. And as the Court is obviously very, very aware, the -- PAX is a major creditor in this -- in this bankruptcy case. THE COURT: Mr. Despins? MR. DESPINS: Your Honor, the first supplemental declaration, again, says it's filed in support of the\n\n| 158
1
trustee appointment and the Paul Hastings retention. | 85 |\n|--------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|\n| | |\n| | That's |\n| 2
paragraph one.
So that issue is addressed. | |\n| 3
My declaration covers both. | So I don't understand |\n| 4
why going back to Bassett -- Bassett is irrelevant for the | |\n| 5
purpose of conflict.
There's only one conflict disclosure. | |\n| 6
They're my declarations.
Number one, number two, number | |\n| 7
three. | |\n| 8
So Bassett, the fact that he's incorporated by | |\n| 9
reference is of no meaning because the application to employ | |\n| 10
Paul Hastings says we -- Paul Hastings is relying on the | |\n| 11
declarations of Luc Despins.
Plural. | |\n| 12
Now, on the issue of PAX, he's saying we don't | |\n| 13
know if they're the same officers and all that, paragraph 4 | |\n| 14
of the declaration says, and in any event assuming without | |\n| 15
conceding the point that PAG entities and PAX would be | |\n| 16
treated as one for conflict purposes, meaning assuming that | |\n| 17
they have the same directors and officers, which we didn't | |\n| 18
get into, I'm still able to be adverse to them because | |\n| 19
they're a former client. | |\n| 20
So that's the end of the inquiry, meaning I'm | |\n| 21
assuming the worst here, that they are all the same, which | |\n| 22
I'm not sure is the case. | |\n| 23
But assuming it is the case, we are able to be | |\n| 24
adverse because they're former clients on a -- on a related | |\n| 25
matter. | |\n| Fiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc. | |\n\n There was -- the last transaction is a transaction that closed in May -- I forget the exact date -- May 15th, 17th, something like that. And it's a corporate transaction, and there was a closing, and that was the closing transaction. That was in May of 2022. So I'm not sure I see the point there. THE COURT: Mr. Henzy? MR. HENZY: I mean, again, Your Honor, the only declaration that was actually attached to the application to retain Paul Hastings was Mr. Bassett's. But, I mean, it's always the case, Your Honor, where you have a transactional client there's going to be periods of time where there's no transaction that's pending, and it sounds like PAG, these PAG entities, were transactional clients of Paul Hastings. And I don't -- I don't doubt that in I guess it was May that whatever transaction they were working on closed, but, I mean, at least it appears that there was a relationship. And Paul Hastings certainly can take the position that, well, right now we're not representing any of the PAG entities on any matter and, therefore, they're a former client. Now, that -- and that's always a sort of discussion thing. If you have a client and you're doing\n\n| Case 22-50073
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158 |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 87 |\n| work for that client on a regular basis, but at a point in |\n| time you don't have any matter you're actively working on, |\n| is the client a former client or is the client a current |\n| client? |\n| I think I understand the technical argument is a |\n| former client, but I think often times clients don't |\n| understand the technical argument and might not always agree |\n| with that. |\n| I still think that there is a disclosure issue |\n| though.
What were the -- what were the circumstances of |\n| PAG, the PAG entities, becoming former clients? |\n| I mean, did Paul Hastings inform them we are not |\n| going to represent you anymore?
I think that is -- I think |\n| that's relevant. |\n| How many -- how long did the relationship exist? |\n| How many transactional matters did Paul Hastings represent |\n| the PAG entities on?
I think that is all relevant |\n| disclosure, Your Honor. |\n| THE COURT:
Anything further? |\n| MR. HENZY:
No, Your Honor. |\n| THE COURT:
Anything further on the application to |\n| employ Paul Hastings as a whole? |\n| MR. HENZY:
Yes, Your Honor. |\n| THE COURT:
What?
What's next? |\n| MR. HENZY:
Okay.
Next is I'll call it the |\n| |\n\n broadly Paul Hastings' connections with China. I don't think, Your Honor, that it's disputed that Paul Hastings has a presence in China. It has offices in Beijing, in Shanghai, and it also has an office in Hong Kong. I don't know if it's -- would be disputed today that Paul Hastings does do work for Chinese state owned entities and it also does work for businesses. They're doing business in China. I don't expect anyone to agree with me today that China exercises significant review, control, over businesses in China. I will admit that I'm not going to be able to prove that today. I'm not sure how I would have prove it. I did cite a statement by the Director of the FBI, Christopher Wray, in the objection. I did not subpoena Mr. Wray to court here today to say in court today what he has said publicly in terms of China's -- the degree of control China exercises over -- over businesses in China, including their license to do business in China. I also believe, Your Honor -- I don't know if this would be disputed or not -- there's a pretty good public record of this, that to put it mildly, Mr. Kwok got on the wrong side of the government of China. He had to leave the country. He is seeking asylum here. The Peoples -- the Chinese government and/or the Hong Kong government seized billions of dollars of assets of\n\nfamily members, and others and potentially very significant\n\ndollars that I don't think he would dispute were in entities\n\nthat he did control, like the Pangu Plaza, which my\n\n understanding is that that was actually PAX's -- connected with PAX's loan and kind of was the part anyway of the reason that a lot that unraveled. Mr. Kwok may have claims against the government of Hong Kong or the Peoples Republic of China based on the seizure of those assets. I am not obviously an expert in that world, but my understanding is that there at least in form is a procedure that a person can go through if their assets have been seized. I don't know of Mr. Despins has done any analysis\n\n of that at all in terms of is there a claim to be made by the estate based on the seizure of assets. So there's -- that's a specific concern.\n\n The general concern is that the Chinese government I think it has demonstrated that it is -- it is going after Mr. Kwok.\n\n Again, we cite Department of Justice documents in the objection, Your Honor, that make it clear that the government of China has attempted in various ways to remove Mr. Kwok from this country. And so there's a couple of concerns with that.\n\nOne is that the Chinese government will seek to\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n exercise influence over Paul Hastings. Paul Hastings cannot do business in China if -- unless China allows it to do business there. And, again, according to the FBI director, the government of China does exercise control over businesses that are doing business there. Very recent and up front is -- and Mr. Despins\n\n made reference to this, the United States Department of Justice has sued Mr. Stephen Wynn for failing to register under the Foreign Agent Registration Act. And the allegation is that Mr. Wynn acted as an agent for the Chinese government in seeking to have Mr. Kwok removed from -- from this country.\n\n On July 15, Paul Hastings appeared on behalf of Mr. Wynn in that District of Columbia action and they are seeking to dismiss that action.\n\n Mr. Despins -- after we put this in the objection, he filed a second supplemental disclosure, and among other things, in paragraph 3 of that disclosure, he said I did not disclose Paul Hastings' representation of Mr. Wynn in the prior declaration because he first learned about it by -- via the objection.\n\n Well, obviously the firm knew about its representation of Mr. Wynn and I think it's the firm has an obligation to make their adequate disclosure.\n\nIn the paragraph 4 of the declaration, Mr. Despins\n\n also says that he believes the Wynn representation has no bearing on the retention of Paul Hastings as counsel, and essentially it's just -- it's completely unconnected, irrelevant. I think it's connected in a number of ways. Or the Chinese government's actions are certainly connected in a number of ways. One, if Mr. Kwok is removed from this country that obviously has significant impact on this bankruptcy case if he's not here. Mr. Despins states in the -- in his declaration that the debtor will not be a witness in the action that's pending in -- in the District of Columbia. I don't know how Mr. Despins could know that to be true. I don't know how anyone, unless they talk to someone at the DOJ, could know whether or not the DOJ is going to decide, or maybe Mr. Wynn is going to decide, that Mr. Kwok should be called as a witness. Mr. Despins also states the debtor's estate will not be increased or decreased based on the action that's pending in the District of Columbia. I don't know if Mr. Despins has concluded that the debtor has no claim against Mr. Wynn. And if you -- if you read the complaint filed in the District of Columbia action, it essentially alleges a pretty broad, you know, pattern of behavior put it.\n\n| | 92 |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | Someone might -- you know, someone might say it |\n| 2 | looks like a conspiracy amongst a group of people to have |\n| 3 | Mr. Kwok removed from the country.
So he may well have a |\n| 4 | claim or there may well be a claim against Mr. Wynn on |\n| 5 | account of Mr. Wynn's conduct related to Mr. Kwok. |\n| 6 | So that is it, Your Honor. |\n| 7 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Thank you. |\n| 8 | Mr. Despins, did you want to respond to that last |\n| 9 | point? |\n| 10 | MR. DESPINS:
Yes, Your Honor. |\n| 11 | First, you know, the -- Mr. Henzy talks about |\n| 12 | claims the debtors may have.
The schedules don't mention |\n| 13 | any of this.
Claims against the Chinese government is not |\n| 14 | in the schedules. |\n| 15 | And here, again, the point about exercising |\n| 16 | pressure is, you know, there's always a failure to connect |\n| 17 | to the conduct by the trustee of this case.
How is that |\n| 18 | going to be influenced by any pressure that the -- that |\n| 19 | could be put on.
It's really not there. |\n| 20 | He's not going to be a witness because it has -- |\n| 21 | as my partner told me -- it could have been lobbying to sell |\n| 22 | Chinese technology or Chinese tea or something or anything |\n| 23 | like that. |\n| 24 | It's you need to register if you are acting as a |\n| 25 | foreign agent.
The subject matter of the discussion is not |\n| | |\n\n part of the case. The fact is you did make representation or not -- don't know -- regarding -- on behalf of a foreign entity. And if that's the case, you need to register. That's the end of it. So that's why he's not going to be a witness.\n\n As to the Kwok claims against Mr. Wynn, you know, I hesitate to say this because -- but have at it. I mean, meaning Paul Hastings is not going to represent Mr. Wynn in defending him against claims asserted by Mr. Kwok because clearly they're trying to create a scenario of some kind where somehow Mr. Kwok, you know, has a legitimate concern.\n\n I'm telling you right now if Mr. Kwok decides to sue Mr. Wynn for whatever, Paul Hastings will not defend Mr. Wynn in that litigation. So there's no animosity or issue there. So I think that answers those questions. Thank you.\n\n MR. HENZY: I'll be brief. I probably was not clear. I think the concern is does the trustee and Paul Hastings representing the trustee have an obligation to investigate what claims might exist against Mr. Wynn or other people who were involved in this behavior where they were seeking to assist the Chinese government in having Mr. Kwok deported.\n\n I mean, in terms of a claim against either the government of Hong Kong or the government of China, the debtor did not schedule that. But presumably Mr. Despins\n\n and Paul Hastings representing Mr. Despins would want to investigate that. Again, this Pangu Plaza was worth hundreds of millions of dollars, and it was -- and it was seized. And I think whatever assets that either indirectly or directly may have been owned by a debtor go away that that's something that needs to be looked at an investigated. THE COURT: Anything further? MR. DESPINS: Just one last point on this, Your Honor. If the debtor gets into a car accident tomorrow and has a claim against the other driver, am I supposed to pursue that or is that -- that's another, you know -- so the claims against Mr. Wynn have nothing to do with -- it's not a -- it's a post-petition claim by the debtor. I'm not sure that's for the trustee to prosecute. MR. HENZY: This is -- all the conduct here occurred pre-petition, Your Honor. All of the conduct. The lawsuit was filed by the DOJ post-petition, but all the conduct that occurred occurred pre-petition. And the same thing with the seizure of assets. So it's -- to the extent that there are assets, they're pre-petition. I think those would be property of the bankruptcy estate I believe. THE COURT: Anything further, Mr. Henzy, on your objection to Paul Hastings being retained as counsel to the\n\n| 158 |\n|-----|\n|-----|\n\n| 1 | Chapter 11 trustee?
Mr. Henzy? |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | MR. HENZY:
I'm sorry, Your Honor. |\n| 3 | THE COURT:
I said is there anything further that |\n| 4 | you want to state with regard to your objection of -- for |\n| 5 | Paul Hastings being retained as counsel to the trustee? |\n| 6 | MR. HENZY:
No, Your Honor.
No, Your Honor. |\n| 7 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Thank you. |\n| 8 | Anyone else? |\n| 9 | Mr. Friedman, didn't you file an objection or a |\n| 10 | limited objection with regard to the retention of Paul |\n| 11 | Hastings? |\n| 12 | MR. FRIEDMAN:
Good afternoon, Your Honor.
It's |\n| 13 | Peter Friedman from O'Melveny & Myers. |\n| 14 | THE COURT:
Good afternoon. |\n| 15 | MR. FRIEDMAN:
So we noted our concern that if |\n| 16 | there's going to be a circus around this that that is a |\n| 17 | problem.
Obviously, there are other routes that could have |\n| 18 | been gone in terms of a trustee. |\n| 19 | But I don't -- we don't think, having looked at |\n| 20 | the issues, there's a statutory reason other than it not |\n| 21 | being potentially in the best interest of the estate to have |\n| 22 | Paul Hastings retained. Our objections were mostly fee |\n| 23 | oriented and cost-structurally oriented. |\n| 24 | The colloquy back and forth though did sort of |\n| 25 | remind me of an issue you talked about, which is, you know, |\n| | |\n\n you take the debtor as you find them. And it is a little weird to hear the debtor now talking about all these potentially valuable assets he has that weren't in the schedules and when it was convenient for him to say I have \\$3,850 or, no, the assets were never mine. They were always my families'. But now he claims he maybe does have lawsuits against the Chinese government. There is sort of this very weird miasma around -- it's almost like an -- the case is almost like an etch a sketch from the debtor's perspective.\n\n What he said in the past literally doesn't matter to what he feels today. I think that's sort of a troubling portion of this case, that it simply just doesn't matter what he said in the past in other context. Something else that comes up new that sort he thinks he can ride on the back -- like a blank slate, if it advantages him today and that is sort of a troubling pattern that we've seen over the years.\n\n Look, on fees, Your Honor, we were in a situation where the U.S. Trustee picked somebody who had a lower fee structure, much lower fee structure, which we do think is appropriate for the case overall, particularly if you wind up with either a non-consensual plan or low recoveries. We are concerned about eating into creditor recoveries, you know, if substantial costs are run up by the\n\ntrustee and his counsel.\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n The trustee sort of, you know, has a response. One of the points of the response is, well, on the other hand, we're not acting like a true contingency counsel fee firm because the upside isn't so great.\n\n And to be fair, Your Honor, if the upside turns out to be even better, right, maybe our proposals on the upside aren't as generous as they could be. If the trustee recovers \\$150 million, I think we, you know, we might be open to substantial fee enhancements.\n\n We just -- our real concern is, you know, if there is a low end or if some money gets exhausted after running after Mr. Kwok for many years. And Mr. Despins may well not.\n\n But, you know, and you end up with 60 or 70 million dollars of recovery, but you also wind up with 10 or 15 million dollars in legal fees, that would be a real loss from the PAX perspective and I think the perspective of other creditors, particularly where there was an option at the outset of the case for lower costs. So that's our concern.\n\n And so, you know, I think the Court has it in her power either to evaluate costs now, evaluate costs in the context of what value is given to the estate as things come up. Obviously, you know, people may prefer for it to be dealt with now. We would. But, you know, that's where we\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n| 1 | stand. |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | This is -- you know, I think you've heard from me |\n| 3 | over the course of years.
This isn't like a -- over the |\n| 4 | last six months.
This isn't like I'm going to pound the |\n| 5 | table because there are immediate factual issues that have |\n| 6 | to be addressed. |\n| 7 | But there are real concerns from PAX about how |\n| 8 | much money is PAX going to wind up with at the end of the |\n| 9 | day versus how much is going to be paid to professionals. |\n| 10 | So I think, and said, we've -- we've put forward. |\n| 11 | Beyond that, you know, our specific concerns and |\n| 12 | specific proposal, I think we're amenable to making the |\n| 13 | upside better from our perspective if that's enticing and |\n| 14 | appealing to the trustee and his law firm. |\n| 15 | But whether it's dealt with now or whether it has |\n| 16 | to be dealt with in the future when asset -- when cash comes |\n| 17 | in, we think it's really important to address. |\n| 18 | Thanks, Your Honor. |\n| 19 | THE COURT:
Thank you. |\n| 20 | Anyone else wish to be heard? |\n| 21 | Oh, I'm sorry, Mr. Despins.
Would you like to |\n| 22 | respond first? |\n| 23 | MR. DESPINS:
No.
Maybe others want to be heard. |\n| 24 | MR. GOLDMAN:
Just briefly, Your Honor.
Irve |\n| 25 | Goldman for the creditors committee, Your Honor. |\n\n On the -- this newly raised potential claim that the debtor says he may have against Steve Wynn, as Mr. Friedman pointed out, that's a claim that should have been but was not listed on the schedules. As Mr. Henzy said it's based on pre-petition conduct so it would have had to have been listed on the schedules as an asset of the estate. 8 There is well settled case law that when a debtor doesn't list a claim on its schedules and then tries to bring an action post confirmation, for example, it's going to be judicially estopped from pursuing that claim. And that's the situation here. It should be judicially estopped from making the argument that he has a claim that the trustee needs to investigate against Mr. Wynn. As to the Paul Hastings application, we did file a statement indicating that we had certain understandings concerning how the Paul Hastings firm would represent the trustee in this case, which were formed based on discussions with Mr. Despins. And that is that they would, whenever possible, economize by using local counsel, whose rates are much lower\n\n than the Paul Hastings firm, and that also they would not be seeking litigation funding for the causes of action that we believe exist and which results in a savings in the sense of it would have been an expensive proposition to obtain\n\nof 158\n\n litigation funding. So I think it's important that these understandings at least be confirmed on the record here today. Another one of those understandings was that the trustee himself, in the capacity as trustee, would not be seeking percentage compensation under Section 326 for assets that may be recovered and distributed in this case, but that he would be just looking for his hourly rate as counsel for Paul Hastings for -- in lieu of any percentage compensation that he might claim under section 326 at the end of the day. So I would just appreciate if he can confirm those understandings on the record. As we said in our papers, we have no objection to the retention. THE COURT: Okay. And just why do you think that he should not be receiving a statutory percentage of any recovery? MR. GOLDMAN: Well, because if he's going to be compensated as a lawyer for Paul Hastings at these rates -- THE COURT: Oh, if he's going to be as -- working as a lawyer? MR. GOLDMAN: Yeah. THE COURT: Okay. All right. MR. GOLDMAN: Yeah. THE COURT: I didn't understand. I got it now.\n\nof 158\n\n| | 101 |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | Okay. |\n| 2 | MR. GOLDMAN:
Yeah. |\n| 3 | THE COURT:
Sorry. |\n| 4 | MR. GOLDMAN:
And that he -- |\n| 5 | THE COURT:
I got you. |\n| 6 | MR. GOLDMAN:
Okay. |\n| 7 | THE COURT:
I didn't understand it.
I just didn't |\n| 8 | hear you properly I guess. |\n| 9 | MR. GOLDMAN:
Okay.
Thank you. |\n| 10 | THE COURT:
I'm sorry. |\n| 11 | MR. GOLDMAN:
Thank you. |\n| 12 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Thank you. |\n| 13 | Attorney Claiborn? |\n| 14 | MS. CLAIBORN:
Your Honor, the U.S. Trustee has no |\n| 15 | objection to the employment of Paul Hastings based upon the |\n| 16 | documentation filed thus far in the case. |\n| 17 | I just would note, as we observed this previously |\n| 18 | in this case, that the continuing obligation to disclose |\n| 19 | exists today, tomorrow, into the future. |\n| 20 | And then with respect to the issue of the |\n| 21 | compensation, the U.S. Trustee's position is that attorneys |\n| 22 | carry their firm's fees and their own hourly rates with them |\n| 23 | from their home market. |\n| 24 | And that this is a complex case.
It's got a lot |\n| 25 | of moving parts and it requires experienced counsel and that |\n\nof 158\n\n necessarily sometimes translates into higher fees. The work that's got to get done in this case does need to get done in a cost effective manner. I think everyone has made that clear to Trustee Despins and he's aware of it and I'm sure that he's going to do his best to make sure that the skills match the services and that we are doing them in a cost effective manner. And that when we get to a place of fee application that is the appropriate place and the time to debate the cost effectiveness of the services rendered and the benefit to the estate. THE COURT: Thank you. Trustee Despins, is there -- would you like to respond? MR. DESPINS: Thank you, Your Honor. I'll pick up where counsel for the committee, you know, left off, which is I've made that commitment to try to be as nimble as possible. First of all, it's our job to do that, but -- and that means practically relying on local counsel, on Mr. Skalka and Mr. Linsey, as much as we can. 22 And also leverage what PAX has done in the state court, because there's three years, maybe four years, of learning there and there's no point in us reinventing that wheel. Us as lawyers. We can just borrow from that and we\n\n intend to do that. And that combined together should lower the cost. But I don't want to mislead you. This is going to be an expensive process. And I want to touch on the point that I've agreed there will be no litigation funding. That is correct. But I did get a quote just to give Your Honor a sense. A litigation funder -- let's assume we wanted \\$5 million to pursue claims -- they -- the fee they will charge will be two to four times the amount. So you have to repay the 5 million. Then it would be a 10 to 20 million dollar fee. Just to put that in perspective. We're not asking for any of this. We're not asking for 30 percent, 40 percent. We're asking for our rates. I understand that our rates are high compared to local rates. I understand that, Your Honor. But here I could end up with a zero recovery. I know we all know and we believe what should happen. And I believe that too. But from that to reality is going to take a lot of time and a lot of effort. And we are bearing the risk of that because the debtor has unlimited resources and they will fight us on everything. It will be appealed to the Second Circuit. And if they can, to the Supreme Court. I've no doubt about\n\n that. And that's what we're facing in terms of getting paid. And, therefore, we believe in light of that it would be really inappropriate to say, oh, we're going to discount your rates if you don't collect more than X dollars. Because, for example, let's assume tomorrow I wave a magic wand in my dreams and I get the Sherry-Netherland and the yacht here, how much do they sell for? I don't know. What if they sell -- and this is not my goal -- I want them to sell for 70 million for the apartment and 40 million for the yacht. But let's assume they sell for 20 each. Well, under Mr. Friedman's proposal I'm taking a hit because even though I've obtained a good result in bringing these two assets in, I didn't get the value that people thought would be obtained from the assets. I've become an insurer of the value of the assets. That's really wrong. So I understand PAX's frustration. They've spent millions of dollars chasing this debtor in a kind of a catch me if you can caper. And they almost, almost got it. Almost got it, but they didn't. And now they have -- they have this fear -- and I share the fear -- which is is this the beginning of another\n\n catch me if you can? And my job is to make sure that the movie is shorter this time or more successful. But I -- but the point is that that should not translate into we're going to -- we're frustrated and we're going to hurt you on your fees. I just -- I don't want to sound arrogant about this, Judge, but if I came back to the office and said it's a contingent case and I took a discount on my hours, they would say what did you do? They would just say they would have to have my head examined. So I don't want to be arrogant about this, Judge, but -- and I wish -- I feel Mr. Friedman and his client's pain on this, but there's nothing I can do on the hourly rates. And I would urge Your Honor to look at this as a contingency fee transaction. And in that context, it's a very reasonable rate. Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Henzy? MR. HENZY: So the -- on the Wynn claim, this action was just filed by the Department of Justice on May 17. So approximately three months after the petition was filed and after the schedules were filed. So a lot of -- THE COURT: But you said it was all pre-petition conduct. MR. HENZY: I'm basing that on -- I'm reading the\n\n| | 106 |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | complaint, Your Honor. I'm saying the complaint was filed -- |\n| 2 | THE COURT:
Well, your client would know or not |\n| 3 | know whether it was pre-petition conduct.
That's -- |\n| 4 | MR. HENZY:
No, Your Honor. |\n| 5 | THE COURT:
Yes, he would. |\n| 6 | MR. HENZY:
That's not -- the facts of what |\n| 7 | happened here became public on May 17.
They all occurred |\n| 8 | years ago.
They became public on May 17, 2022 when the |\n| 9 | government filed it's complaint against Mr. Wynn. So I'm |\n| 10 | just -- I'm pointing out that many of the facts which |\n| 11 | occurred years ago became public for the first time when |\n| 12 | this complaint was filed.
That's all. |\n| 13 | So three months after the case was filed and after |\n| 14 | the schedules were filed. |\n| 15 | A second point -- |\n| 16 | THE COURT:
Well, the trustee didn't get appointed |\n| 17 | until July 8th.
So your client could have amended his |\n| 18 | schedules before that. |\n| 19 | MR. HENZY:
I suppose he could have, Your Honor. |\n| 20 | I'm not sure -- |\n| 21 | THE COURT:
Well, he has a duty to do that. |\n| 22 | MR. HENZY:
I'm not sure in this case -- |\n| 23 | THE COURT:
It's not just a supposition. |\n| 24 | MR. HENZY:
Yeah, given all that was going on I |\n| 25 | don't know -- |\n\nof 158\n\n THE COURT: What was going on? Your client wasn't doing anything. They weren't fighting anything. They decided that the case should be dismissed. MR. HENZY: Yeah. THE COURT: Right. So he then just decided what he thought should happen and he doesn't have any other obligations under the code? MR. HENZY: No, I don't think that's fair, Your Honor. THE COURT: Well, I don't think it's fair to say that he could have maybe amended his schedules. MR. HENZY: Maybe. THE COURT: He had an obligation to amend his schedules. MR. HENZY: Your Honor, I'm pointing out the facts here became public well after the case was filed and also -- THE COURT: It wasn't well after the case was filed, by the way. The schedules weren't filed until March. MR. HENZY: Mr. Despins I don't think is judicially estopped by what's in the debtor's schedules. So whether there's a claim against Mr. Wynn or not I don't know, but I do know that Mr. Despins is not estopped. MR. DESPINS: Your Honor, two seconds on that. THE COURT: Yes. MR. DESPINS: Just to show you -- you know, Mr.\n\n| | of 158 |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | 108 |\n| 1 | Henzy's very creative.
We'll give him that.
So we could |\n| 2 | have a claim.
Let's look at his motion to remove me as |\n| 3 | trustee. |\n| 4 | THE COURT:
Why don't we do that. |\n| 5 | MR. DESPINS:
It says -- |\n| 6 | THE COURT:
Hold on a second. Let's look at it all |\n| 7 | together because it's a lot easier for me when we're all |\n| 8 | looking at it together. |\n| 9 | So his motion to remove you -- |\n| 10 | MR. DESPINS:
Is 561. |\n| 11 | THE COURT:
561.
Let's look at that. |\n| 12 | MR. DESPINS:
Paragraph 21. |\n| 13 | THE COURT:
Just give the courtroom deputy a |\n| 14 | second and we'll pull it up. |\n| 15 | (Pause.) |\n| 16 | THE COURT:
What page? |\n| 17 | MR. DESPINS:
Paragraph 21, page 7, Your Honor. |\n| 18 | THE COURT:
Thank you.
Can we make that bigger, |\n| 19 | please?
Thank you. |\n| 20 | Okay. |\n| 21 | MR. DESPINS:
So the point there, Your Honor, as |\n| 22 | you'll see, it talks about a former DOJ official pleaded |\n| 23 | guilty to facilitating the transfer of millions of dollars |\n| 24 | from foreign bank accounts to the United States to fund a |\n| 25 | lobbying campaign to pressure a high ranking U.S. official |\n\n to unlawfully remove the debtor from the United States. Whoa, that's pretty bad. And is that claim in the schedules anywhere? That's 2018. Is that in the schedule? It's not in the schedules. Why? Because, again, I give credit to Mr. Henzy to come up with these theories, but the debtor had a beautiful claim apparently here against this person but is not pursuing that claim. So the claims against Wynn are all of the same ilk, meaning obviously, if the debtor thought they had a claim against Wynn, they would have asserted this one for sure against the DOJ -- ex DOJ official. So it's just to show you that this all pretends to try to bounce Paul Hastings from the case, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you. All right. Anyone else wish to be heard? All right. The application -- go ahead, Mr. Friedman. I'm sorry. MR. FRIEDMAN: Your Honor, the only thing I would say is just in response to Attorney Claiborn's position is obviously they also thought that the first counsel they hired was sophisticated and capable and just came in with a different set of rates. That's all I have to say, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.\n\n| of 158 |\n|--------|\n| |\n\n| | 110 |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | Now Mr. Despins, I just have to look back at -- |\n| 2 | with your application did you file a proposed order?
I |\n| 3 | think you did. I'm not sure it was filed with it or |\n| 4 | subsequent. |\n| 5 | MR. DESPINS:
It should have been.
Let me -- |\n| 6 | THE COURT:
I've looked at -- I may even have it |\n| 7 | right here.
As you can imagine -- |\n| 8 | MR. DESPINS:
Let me find it. |\n| 9 | (Pause.) |\n| 10 | THE COURT:
I'll look.
Don't worry. I can take a |\n| 11 | look.
It will just take me a second. |\n| 12 | (Pause.) |\n| 13 | MR. DESPINS:
It's document 539. |\n| 14 | THE COURT:
Yeah, it's there.
It is there.
It's |\n| 15 | Exhibit -- it's -- proposed order is five pages. |\n| 16 | MR. DESPINS:
Yes.
531 -- 539-1. |\n| 17 | THE COURT:
Yes, I'm looking at it right now. |\n| 18 | Thank you. |\n| 19 | (Pause.) |\n| 20 | When do -- Mr. Despins, do hourly rate increases |\n| 21 | go into effect in your firm?
Does it happen at the |\n| 22 | beginning of the year or -- is it normally when that |\n| 23 | happens? |\n| 24 | MR. DESPINS:
Typically, yes, Your Honor, but we |\n| 25 | have a fiscal year that starts in February, February 1st. So |\n| | |\n\n typically it would be at that time. THE COURT: Okay. Because I think -- and one of the things that I tend to do in cases where people are concerned about hourly rates is to make sure that I'm aware of whatever rate increases there are before they would be binding on anyone in this case. So, for example, in your proposed order you say that you would give no less than ten business day's notice about any increases in rates. And you'll file such notice with the court. I think that's fine, because it may be that depending upon where we are, that maybe the rate will not be increased in the case, okay? It's possible. MR. DESPINS: Understood. THE COURT: Okay. And then I just want to look at one other thing and then I'll -- (Pause.) I know that -- as everybody has acknowledged today, that this is a difficult case. There are many issues and I understand everyone's concerns. I think people have a right to -- raise the concerns that they've raised and I have listened to them. I have looked at the documents that have been filed in the connection with the application to employ Paul Hastings. I know that Paul Hastings and Trustee Despins have a continuing duty, as does everyone in the case, to address\n\nof 158\n\n issues that may impact conflicts or disinterestedness. I at this point find that Paul Hastings is disinterested. That the arguments that have been set forth by the debtor through counsel are not persuasive and that the application to employ Paul Hastings will be granted. The proposed order, Mr. Despins, if there's any minor change to it, it will be minor, but I note, as I note for all counsel, or at least try to remember to. I don't know if I do it as well as I think I do or should, but Section 330 of the bankruptcy code allows the court after a hearing on reimbursement of compensation and expenses to award and amount less than that sought and, therefore, while these rates and issues are before the court are -- you've set forth what you're going to charge, that those are your rates, that the court could make a different finding in the future.\n\n But I'm not suggesting that that's what's going to happen. I'm just suggesting the code -- I like to make sure that counsel knows that the code says that. The code says, and I think it's 330(b), that compensation can be awarded in an amount of less than that sought.\n\n And I do understand your point with regard to this case and how to view it, but at this point the application is granted. The proposed order with some minor change may - - I think the only change it will be -- a reference to rule\n\nof 158\n\n -- I mean, excuse me, Section 330 and that, you know, the court may not enforce an increase in rates if one is filed with the court. It may not be enforced against the estate or it may, depending upon the circumstances of what happens. Again, I think this case has a lot of issues and, you know, I think we just have to see what happens. I think the flexibility is there in the code to give the court as the oversight body the ability to make a determination on the fees and expenses. MR. DESPINS: Understood, Your Honor. Our only point is that we didn't want that discretion, which is normal, meaning if it costs us \\$500,000 to obtain a bond, you should disallow that. Okay? THE COURT: Right? MR. DESPINS: But I want to be clear is that that's not going to be a back door way to bring local rates, or anything like that -- THE COURT: No, I'm not doing that. I agree with that. MR. DESPINS: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: That is not happening. The only thing that would happen is if an application is filed and the court finds that there's some reason why the services rendered should not be reimbursed. MR. DESPINS: Absolutely. Understood, Your Honor.\n\nof 158\n\n THE COURT: And not an increase in rates. I'm not sure that an increase in rates will be -- we'll have to see where we stand at that point. MR. DESPINS: Understood. THE COURT: Mr. Friedman. MR. FRIEDMAN: I just want to make clear, and I don't think we need to add this to the order because I think it's always part of the procedure that, for example, if we want to object to compensability for sideshows about whether a disclosure was appropriate, or if there's an appeal to the Supreme Court that somebody brings, we always have the right in connection with each application, whether interim or final, to assert that a specific time entry was not for value to the estate. THE COURT: Absolutely. Everybody has that right. That is correct. MR. FRIEDMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. Thank you very much. THE COURT: Okay. And the court could make that determination as well, upon review of the fee application. So the application to employ Paul Hastings is granted and the order will enter with minor changes, Trustee Despins, okay? MR. DESPINS: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Now we can move onto the application\n\n| | 115 |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | to employ Neubert, Pepe and Monteith. |\n| 2 | MR. SKALKA:
Good afternoon, Your Honor. |\n| 3 | THE COURT:
Good afternoon. |\n| 4 | MR. SKALKA:
Douglas Skalka on behalf of Neubert, |\n| 5 | Pepe and Monteith's application. |\n| 6 | Your Honor, as you I think are aware, the trustee |\n| 7 | filed an application to retain my firm as his local counsel. |\n| 8 | The application was dated July 19th. It's docket no. 569. |\n| 9 | We received no objections or responses to the application. |\n| 10 | We did get a request from the U.S. Trustee's |\n| 11 | Office to submit a supplemental declaration, which we did on |\n| 12 | July 26th. |\n| 13 | As part of that supplemental application we |\n| 14 | indicated that we no objection to amending our order to add |\n| 15 | a paragraph indicating that we would need seek compensation |\n| 16 | for trustee related services.
So that's not in the order |\n| 17 | that's on file, Your Honor. |\n| 18 | THE COURT:
Okay. |\n| 19 | MR. SKALKA:
I can submit a revised order to that |\n| 20 | effect and certainly would be willing to do that later today |\n| 21 | or tomorrow. |\n| 22 | THE COURT:
And does anyone else wish to be heard |\n| 23 | in connection with the trustee's application to employ |\n| 24 | Neubert, Pepe and Monteith? |\n| 25 | MS. CLAIBORN:
Your Honor, just briefly.
Holley |\n\n| | 116 |\n|----|-------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | Claiborn for the U.S. Trustee. |\n| 2 | The paragraph to which Attorney Skalka's referring |\n| 3 | is also found in the application to employ Paul Hastings in |\n| 4 | that proposed order for Paul Hastings at paragraph 5. |\n| 5 | And it limits the compensation that might be |\n| 6 | awarded to the firm and excludes compensation for trustee |\n| 7 | services. |\n| 8 | THE COURT:
Thank you. |\n| 9 | So you're saying Attorney Skalka just needs to |\n| 10 | have that language in the proposed order. |\n| 11 | MS. CLAIBORN:
Correct. |\n| 12 | THE COURT:
Okay.
That's fine. |\n| 13 | MS. CLAIBORN: And with that the U.S. Trustee has |\n| 14 | no objection. |\n| 15 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Thank you. |\n| 16 | MR. SKALKA:
And it's completely acceptable to |\n| 17 | Your Honor -- to my firm, Your Honor. |\n| 18 | THE COURT:
Does anyone else wish to be heard on |\n| 19 | the application to employ Neubert, Pepe, Monteith? |\n| 20 | Okay.
Hearing nothing from anyone else and having |\n| 21 | reviewed the application and the desire of all parties to |\n| 22 | attempt to make this case as efficient as possible, |\n| 23 | including fees and expenses, I understand the trustee's |\n| 24 | reason for seeking to employ Neubert, Pepe and Monteith. |\n| 25 | I think that Neubert, Pepe and Monteith has |\n\nof 158\n\n demonstrated that they are disinterested and that no one else has any objection to the application. Neubert, Pepe and Monteith has stated that they will submit a new proposed order with the qualifications set forth on the record by the United States Trustee's Office and that were in the order approving the application to employ Paul Hastings. So for all those reasons the application to employ Neubert, Pepe and Monteith is granted and the proposed order -- Attorney Skalka, how much time do you need to submit that proposed order? MR. SKALKA: I think I'll have it by tomorrow, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Well, I'll give you -- so it's easier for the clerk's office I'll say till August 3rd. How's that? That's Wednesday. MR. SKALKA: That's fine. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. MR. SKALKA: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: If everyone could just give me one moment, please. (Pause.) Okay. So that application is granted. Then just so we're clear on what's on the calendar today, then -- I already said that the motion to quash is moot due to the denial of the Rule 60 motion.\n\nof 158\n\n So then we just have left on the calendar the motion for order confirming that the Chapter 11 trustee holds all the debtor's economic and corporate governance rights and debtor controlled entities and authorizing the trustee to act in a foreign country. So Mr. Despins, would you like to be heard on that? MR. DESPINS: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Please. Go right ahead. MR. DESPINS: And also remember that we have housekeeping matters. THE COURT: Yes. MR. DESPINS: Okay. So the corporate governance motion is basically to confirm that we step into the shoes of the debtor. And I'm glad we filed the motion because the debtor's response made clear that it's unclear to the extent they will cooperate with us. So basically they raised issues regarding BVI -- sorry. Genever BVI. Remember, that's the parent holding company in BVI that holds the interest in the Chapter 11 debtor that's in front of Judge Garrity. And to address their concern about what would happen there we actually provided yesterday, last night fairly late, we filed an amended proposed order that says okay, this is what we need from the debtor.\n\nof 158\n\n We look at this, to be kind of colloquial about it, the debtor has a car. We want the keys to the car. Or the debtor has stock. We want the debtor to endorse the stock essentially to give it to us. So the way to do that under BVI law is that he needs to sign certain documents, which we have attached drafts thereof, which our BVI counsel has drafted, and basically the order says Mr. Kwok will within I guess two business days sign these documents, assigning his rights to those share to the trustee. And there's a lot of text, but that's really what it is. In addition to that, because of an issue that was unresolved with the UK lawyers that I mentioned that represent Mr. Kwok in the litigation against UBS, basically, I reached out to them a long time ago, I think two days or three days after being appointed, and they called Mr. Henzy -- actually it would have been later because Mr. Henzy was not appointed til Friday the 14th or something like that. In any event, they reached out to Mr. Henzy saying this guy, meaning the trustee, is calling us. Should we talk to him. Mr. Henzy, to his credit, wrote a very nice email to them saying the trustee owns all the rights in the litigation. Mr. Kwok doesn't control any of this. Talk to\n\nof 158\n\n| 1 | him. |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | So we got on the phone with them and they said |\n| 3 | well, that may be the U.S. view of the law, but that's not |\n| 4 | the U.K. view.
You may have to file a motion to be |\n| 5 | recognized as a foreign -- and I said, no. I need to do that |\n| 6 | if I want to start a foreign insolvency proceeding against |\n| 7 | someone. But if I just want to be substituted as a plaintiff |\n| 8 | I don't need to do that. |\n| 9 | Not to make the story too long, Your Honor, they |\n| 10 | said well, actually, what we need is a letter from Mr. Kwok, |\n| 11 | because they're afraid of getting sued for -- they haven't |\n| 12 | used those terms getting sued but it's clear from the body |\n| 13 | language that they don't want to do anything with a letter |\n| 14 | from Mr. Kwok. |\n| 15 | So that's the same analogy here. I need the keys |\n| 16 | to the car and the keys to the car, Mr. Kwok has it.
He |\n| 17 | just needs to send a letter to them. It's basically -- |\n| 18 | parrots what Mr. Henzy has written to them already but it |\n| 19 | would be under the debtor's signature that says this |\n| 20 | litigation is owned by the Chapter 11 Trustee now.
He has |\n| 21 | all the rights.
You should tell him everything, privileged |\n| 22 | or not.
You should communicate everything with him. |\n| 23 | So that's really what we're doing with this |\n| 24 | motion. The criticism we've received is by the debtors that |\n| 25 | -- first of all there's a standing issue and the debtor be |\n\nof 158\n\n heard on these issues. They raised the rights of others like Bravo Luck, although we gave notice to Bravo Luck. We served Bravo Luck's counsel. So that's not an issue. But the debtor's standing on this is questionable. But putting aside the standing yes, we're seeking broad relief, Your Honor. Why, because cost. We don't want to come back to the court saying hey, could you authorize this for Australia, please? Could you authorize this for Canada? I'm making those up. And come back to court all the time. So, yes, we're asking for something that's broad. The idea is that the trustee will use his discretion to do this in a way that makes sense and if not, you're going to get me basically. You're going to tell me that I shouldn't have done these things. But I think that it is standard, and we cited cases to that effect, to have the trustee's authority to act from a corporate governance point of view recognized. For example, we need to see Judge Garrity in the Genever case. I don't want to be in a situation where Bravo Luck, which is the son's alleged company, shows up to say he's not authorized to speak. He didn't get the shares from BVI, et cetera. We can't deal with that. And that's what this accomplishes. Basically, it makes it very clear that we hold all these rights and that's why we would ask Your Honor to enter the order.\n\nof 158\n\n But I'm happy to answer any questions, Your Honor, or respond to any remaining criticism by the debtor. THE COURT: I just have a question about this -- again, the order was filed yesterday. So I looked at it I would say not as intently as I might otherwise. But that's fine. I've looked at it. I would assume, but I shouldn't assume, but I won't assume. What -- if this order enters and Mr. Kwok doesn't sign these documents, then what's the next step? MR. DESPINS: You're getting to a point that we'll get to in this case eventually, which is contempt. THE COURT: So we need to have another hearing. MR. DESPINS: Well, there'll be a motion to hold them in contempt. THE COURT: Right. MR. DESPINS: Yes. THE COURT: Okay. So that's -- I mean, that's my read of it but, again, as I'm saying to you, I read it not as thoroughly as I might have otherwise because I just had a little bit of time this morning to look at it, but that's fine. I understand the terms and conditions of it in general and I understand that you are asking the court to enter an order under specific sections of the bankruptcy code, including the sections that --\n\n| | Case 22-50073
Doc 1082-8
Filed 11/11/22
Entered 11/11/22 13:18:26
Page 123
of 158 |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | 123 |\n| 1 | MR. DESPINS:
521. |\n| 2 | THE COURT:
The debtor's duties under the code, |\n| 3 | whether the debtor's in possession or not.
And that you |\n| 4 | need this for different -- not only in the United States but |\n| 5 | for different matters that are pending and were pending at |\n| 6 | the time that Mr. Kwok filed his Chapter 11 case here in |\n| 7 | Connecticut. |\n| 8 | So I have no further questions. I just was asking |\n| 9 | about that issue. |\n| 10 | MR. DESPINS:
Thank you, Your Honor. |\n| 11 | THE COURT:
Thank you.
Mr. Henzy? |\n| 12 | MR. HENZY:
So, Your Honor -- |\n| 13 | THE COURT:
So you wish to be heard on this? |\n| 14 | MR. HENZY:
I do, Your Honor. |\n\nTHE COURT: Okay. Go ahead.\n\n MR. HENZY: On the two what I'm going to call new pieces of relief that are now being sought, they were not in the motion.\n\nTHE COURT: You mean the letters?\n\n MR. HENZY: So the letter that he's asking you to order Mr. Kwok to sign that would be sent to the Harcus Parker law firm in the U.K., that was not addressed in the motion in any way, shape or form.\n\n So I don't know how Mr. Despins gets that relief today. That's new.\n\nof 158\n\n With respect to the substance there, Mr. Despins is right. I tried to get out front on that because the Harcus Parker people were trying to contact me and my position was I don't want to talk to you because Mr. Kwok is no longer party in that action. You need to talk to Mr. Despins. And I copied him on the email that I sent him and I have not been part of any communication between them and him since I sent that email. I don't know what the law is in the U.K. I don't know what requirements there are for a court over there. I don't know what privilege issues they live under. I do know -- I mean, I don't represent these people but Mr. Kwok is being asked to sign a letter that may impact other people's rights. I don't know -- the Harcus Parker firm I believe represents other people in that action as well. So I'm in a position where Mr. Despins is adding relief to what was in the motion and I don't know what -- and the relief -- with respect to this anyway would direct Mr. Kwok to do something and I have no idea whether -- what Mr. Kwok is being directed to do is appropriate in the facts and circumstances. THE COURT: Well, let me ask you a question. MR. HENZY: Sure.\n\nof 158\n\n THE COURT: You are objecting to Mr. Kwok even signing the share transfer instrument of the Genever Holdings Corporation? MR. HENZY: Well, let me get to that. THE COURT: That's my question. Are you objecting to that. MR. HENZY: So that was not part of the relief sought either. THE COURT: Let me just ask the question. You now have come in and you articulated very clearly that Mr. Kwok is no longer a debtor in possession. MR. HENZY: That's right. THE COURT: Okay. So he still has obligations under the bankruptcy code and Mr. Despins has asked him to provide information to him, including turning over the shares of Genever Holdings Corporation, correct? Didn't you say you got a letter -- Mr. Despins sent you a letter or sent Mr. Kwok a letter saying he wanted all the information? MR. HENZY: I don't -- MR. DESPINS: Your Honor, we sent a letter to Mr. Baldiga before he was terminated. We sent a letter to Mr. Mitchell? And then we copied -- when they were appointed we copied saying we need all this. And it asked for all the corporate governance documents regarding BVI.\n\n THE COURT: Right. So wait a minute. So my question to you is why would Mr. Kwok not sign over the shares of a company that he owns to this trustee? MR. HENZY: I didn't know if you were done, Your Honor. THE COURT: I am, actually. So go right ahead. MR. HENZY: Okay. So the background is that there's this apartment in New York at the Sherry Netherland Hotel. That's owned by an entity that is in a Chapter 11 before Judge Garrity. THE COURT: I understand. MR. HENZY: Okay. And my understanding, okay, because I haven't spent a bunch of time looking at everything that's gone in that case is that the ownership of then the BVI parent is -- has been disputed. And actually, Judge Garrity -- there was a settlement -- an order, a settlement type of order I guess I'll call it, by Judge Garrity where he -- it basically provides for the sale of the apartment and it's to be overseen by Melanie Cyganowski. And as I understand it the debtor in the Chapter 11 case really signed away almost most of its -- or maybe all of its ability to control that sale. So everybody agreed the apartment's going to get sold and we're going to put it in Melanie Cyganowski's hands\n\n to do that. So that -- the apartment's not going anywhere. It's going to get sold. And I assume the money is going to be in a DIP account in that case and nothing bad is going to happen. But again, the ownership of the parent is in dispute. The allegation is that a trust owns the parent and Mr. Kwok holds the shares as trustee. Your Honor, I want to be clear, that's the allegation that has been made, again, in the Chapter 11 case in front of Judge Garrity. I haven't spent any time on it. My concern is that Mr. Kwok with -- this is -- I saw these documents for the first time -- actually I think I saw them this morning when I woke up because they were filed at 10:09 last night and, frankly, I turned my phone off probably not long before that. So Mr. Kwok -- Mr. Despins has asked you to enter an order directing Mr. Kwok to sign these documents. I have no idea, Your Honor, whether these documents are the appropriate documents. I have no idea how this impacts what's going on in Judge Garrity's case. How it impacts anything. I have no idea. I'm not a BVI lawyer. I don't know if these are the correct documents. I don't know what BVI law says. I've never seen the trust agreement that allegedly exists that\n\nof 158\n\n| 1 | would control anybody's rights here. |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | So if Mr. Despins wants to get an order from the |\n| 3 | court directing Mr. Kwok to sign specific documents and here |\n| 4 | -- these specific documents, my argument is that he should |\n| 5 | have to file a motion and that -- I should have some time to |\n| 6 | review the motion and to review these documents and try to |\n| 7 | get an understanding about whether or not these documents |\n| 8 | are appropriate documents. |\n| 9 | Again, these documents were not attached to the |\n| 10 | motion that was filed with the court, Your Honor.
This is |\n| 11 | new relief that is being sought. |\n| 12 | All that was sought -- what was sought with |\n| 13 | respect to the corporate governance was just this |\n| 14 | confirmation that the trustee has all of the economic and |\n| 15 | governance rights of the debtor.
It wasn't -- there was |\n| 16 | nothing in the motion that said please give me an order that |\n| 17 | directs the order to sign specific documents. |\n| 18 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Mr. Despins? |\n| 19 | MR. DESPINS:
Yes, Your Honor. |\n| 20 | The history there, as you relate is, is that we've |\n| 21 | been asking for documents since July 14th.
They have not |\n| 22 | produced one single document, and the document on corporate |\n| 23 | governance of this entity. |\n| 24 | So when we filed this motion they said oh, we're |\n| 25 | not sure this works under BVI law, I said fine.
We'll make |\n| | |\n\n| | of 158 |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | 129 |\n| 1 | it work.
That's why the order actually provides what it |\n| 2 | provides. |\n| 3 | And it's true that it's on short notice, but 1021 |\n| 4 | says that -- I'm sorry.
Which section says after notice and |\n| 5 | a hearing -- |\n| 6 | THE COURT:
1021 |\n| 7 | MR. DESPINS:
1021.
It is whatever notice is |\n| 8 | appropriate under the particular circumstances. |\n| 9 | So if Your Honor wanted to -- and I think you have |\n| 10 | -- Tuesday are bad days for you, right?
You have a full |\n| 11 | calendar or -- I don't know -- or Wednesday morning, so he |\n| 12 | can respond but I want before we close on this to provide an |\n| 13 | exhibit to, Your Honor, if I may approach. |\n| 14 | THE COURT:
Is it something in the record already? |\n| 15 | MR. DESPINS:
No.
It's something in the record of |\n| 16 | the New York court where Mr. Kwok -- |\n| 17 | THE COURT:
Judge Garrity's case? |\n| 18 | MR. DESPINS:
No.
It's in the New York Ostrager |\n| 19 | case.
Where Mr. Kwok swore that he's the only owner of the |\n| 20 | shares.
So may -- |\n| 21 | THE COURT:
Yes, you could approach the courtroom |\n| 22 | deputy, please.
Thank you. |\n| 23 | MR. HENZY:
Your Honor, I'm not -- I'm going to |\n| 24 | object to the admission here.
This is an affidavit by -- |\n| 25 | MR. DESPINS:
It's more than that.
It's a |\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 1082-8 Filed 11/11/22 Entered 11/11/22 13:18:26 Page 129\n\nof 158\n\n compilation of documents, but in the first affidavit you'll see it's highlighted. And it says Mr. -- this is an affidavit by and entity that is related to Mr. Kwok. And it says Mr. Kwok is a sole shareholder of BVI. But let's assume that doesn't exist. Let's continue flipping the pages. Then we get to Defendant Kwok's responses and objections to plaintiff Pacific Alliance set of interrogatories. Then you go to a page, page 6, responses to interrogatories. Subject to general, dah, dah, dah, I respond that I am the legal owner of the issued shares of Genever Holdings Corporation. And then if you go to the end of that document it's signed by Kwok Ho Wan, December 4th, 2020. THE COURT: And actually, he says it again on page 9 in response to interrogatory number 5. MR. DESPINS: So yes, there's this issue of -- okay, I'm not trying to be cute here. There is an issue of a trust agreement that would render the son the beneficial owner of the apartment. But that does not -- that does not affect the fact that Kwok is the sole shareholder of the BVI holding entity. And, in fact, the fact that he has -- him, not his son, has continued to exercise control over the debtor entity. For example, when the debtor in front of Judge Garrity enters\n\n into an agreement, it's signed by Mr. Kwok on behalf of the debtor entity. So the only thing we're asking is to have the same rights at BVI and at the debtor entity level so that we can be recognized by Judge Garrity in that case. So -- and I've said this before. We're not trying to stop the sale. But there are things I will address during the housekeeping issues that are fundamental issues that we need to address in that case that makes this a time sensitive issue. MR. HENZY: I'm not clear. Are we having a trial, Your Honor, on the issues -- the ownership issues on this that have been in front of Judge Garrity and that I think the order he entered contemplates that are going to get resolved in litigation someplace else, that's not -- none of this is before the court. None of this was in the motion that was filed by Mr. Despins. He asked for a broad confirmation of whatever governance and economic rights he has. And this is -- none of this is in that motion. MR. FRIEDMAN: Your Honor? THE COURT: Yes. MR. FRIEDMAN: It's Peter Friedman. I just want to be heard for two seconds on this. THE COURT: Yes. MR. FRIEDMAN: I just think, again, there's a lot\n\nof 158\n\n of etch-a-sketch and just to go back to one of the issues we talked about a moment ago, if you look at -- I think it's docket no. 107, I think it's paragraph 16, just to be clear and I think you should take into this account the etch-a- sketch nature of everything that happens from that side. Mr. Kwok actually says under oath in that declaration that he knew in May, 2021 about Steve Wynn, right? And now you hear he didn't know until May, 2022. I just think you need to be really careful with everything you hear connected to Mr. Kwok. And that goes to who owns the Genever shares. The one thing I wanted to add is that one of the thing we won in addition to the contempt order, in addition to the judgment, was a turnover the shares from Justice Ostrager who said that Mr. Kwok was actually required to turn over the shares of Genever BVI to PAX. So this is just another -- as we see it as this is another attempt to frustrate legitimate creditor access to the shares of valuable entities. And we think it should stop and we think that the shares should be ordered to be turned -- that the shares have already been ordered to be turned over and that should be effectuated by the relief sought today. And it's just -- it's just a continued pattern of really trying to thwart every effort of creditors to recover\n\n| | of 158 |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | 133 |\n| 1 | assets.
And that's just so important from PAX's perspective |\n| 2 | that that not be delayed any further.
Thank you, Your |\n| 3 | Honor. |\n| 4 | THE COURT:
Thank you.
Mr. Henzy? |\n| 5 | MR. HENZY:
I never said that Mr. Kwok didn't know |\n| 6 | about Mr. Wynn prior to the case being filed.
What I said |\n| 7 | was that a lot of the facts came out after the case was |\n| 8 | filed, when the DOJ filed it's complaint. |\n| 9 | And so I think that to keep going back to that, |\n| 10 | it's twisting I think what I said.
I said when I stood up, |\n| 11 | Your Honor, that it may be that signing these documents, |\n| 12 | that there's no objection. |\n| 13 | What there's an objection to is that the -- |\n| 14 | there's nothing in the motion that asks for this relief. |\n| 15 | The first -- |\n| 16 | THE COURT:
Well, it asks for it generally. I |\n| 17 | understand your point.
There were -- |\n| 18 | MR. HENZY:
The -- |\n| 19 | THE COURT:
I understand your point.
There |\n| 20 | weren't two letters attached to the motion for Mr. Kwok to |\n| 21 | sign. I understand that. |\n| 22 | MR. HENZY:
That would be egregious, Your Honor. |\n| 23 | To say that the relief sought in that motion translates to - |\n| 24 | - and you have to sign these specific documents -- |\n| 25 | THE COURT:
Well, I don't know if it's egregious |\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 1082-8 Filed 11/11/22 Entered 11/11/22 13:18:26 Page 133\n\nof 158\n\n though. I don't know if I agree with you completely, okay, insofar as there's been a trustee in place since July 8th. It's August 1st. The debtor has obligations. The debtor stated in prior documents in different cases that he owns certain things. There's a share certificate that has been produced. There's -- this isn't anything new. It may be new to you, but it's not new. And looking at what Mr. Friedman just pointed out to me again the declaration of Mr. Kwok that was entered on March 20, 2022, where he references the article -- and article about Steve Wynn facing Justice Department action. You know, there comes a point where the arguments start to not be credible. And the problem is Mr. Kwok thought his case was going to get dismissed. I don't know why he thought that, but he thought that. After -- you know, when there was a potential -- two other things happening. Appointment of Chapter 11 trustee or conversion to Chapter 7. He has obligations. He doesn't -- he hasn't met those obligations. With regard to your argument -- MR. HENZY: In what way? In what way? THE COURT: Hold on a second. MR. HENZY: In what way, Your Honor, has he not met -- since the --\n\nof 158\n\n THE COURT: He hasn't turned over to Mr. Despins what Mr. Despins' asked him to turn over. MR. HENZY: Mr. Despins sent a letter -- THE COURT: Hold on. Wait a minute. Wait a minute. Now you're not answering my question. MR. HENZY: Well, what's your -- I don't -- THE COURT: He hasn't turned over to Mr. Despins what Mr. Despins rightfully under the Bankruptcy Code told him to turn over. MR. HENZY: Okay. I don't have the letter in front of me and I -- and what I don't want -- THE COURT: Well, your client should have provided it to you. MR. HENZY: What I don't -- no, I've seen the letter, Your Honor. And what I don't want is for Mr. Friedman to jump up and say -- and twist my words and say I said something I didn't say, okay? But I don't have the letter in front of me. I don't -- THE COURT: Well, no, but -- MR. HENZY: I don't have the letter in front of me, Your Honor. THE COURT: Yeah. MR. HENZY: I think what Mr. Despins asked for in the letter, and Mr. Despins has the letter out and he's\n\n| of 158 |\n|--------|\n|--------|\n\n| 136 |\n|--------------------------------------------------------------|\n| going to tell you if I'm wrong, is it was a very broad -- we |\n| want to see a whole bunch of information about specific |\n| entities, okay? |\n| So I don't remember right now, was there a |\n| demanding that letter that these documents, okay, but -- |\n| which I don't know if these documents even exist. |\n| I don't remember there being a demand in that |\n| letter that said anything other than we want you to turn |\n| over a whole bunch of stuff to us, which I will tell you, |\n| Your Honor, the debtor -- we are working on that.
We are |\n| trying to collect those documents to send them to Mr. |\n| Despins.
We are doing that, okay? |\n| I have no doubt that Mr. Despins and maybe Your |\n| Honor thinks that that should go faster and fine.
But we |\n| are working on that. |\n| But I don't remember in that letter a document |\n| that said -- okay. Mr. Kindseth is telling me, and I think |\n| he has a better knowledge of that letter than I do, that |\n| there was no such request, okay? |\n| So I'm not -- |\n| THE COURT:
No specific letter or with regard to |\n| Genever? I mean, that's a different -- you're parsing things |\n| differently. |\n| MR. HENZY:
I'm not parsing things.
There was a |\n| letter that Mr. Despins sent that appropriately -- okay, |\n| |\n\n there's no push back -- said you've got to send me this stuff, okay? That hasn't happened yet. I admit that. The debtor -- we're working on that. THE COURT: Okay. MR. HENZY: Should it go more quickly? Maybe it should. THE COURT: But let me just say why your argument is failing, okay? Mr. Kwok submitted an affidavit in this court on May -- March 20, ECF 107, paragraph -- I'll tell you what page. Page 16 or 108. Cooperative shares in the Sherry Netherland apartment are held by Genever Holdings, LLC. The membership interests in Genever U.S. are in turn held by Genever Holdings Corporation, Genever BVI. I hold all of the equity of Genever BVI. That's Mr. Kwok. MR. HENZY: But you have to keep going. I think -- I would suggest -- THE COURT: No, I don't. MR. HENZY: However -- THE COURT: No, I really don't. Not when it matters with regard to Genever BVI and that's what the trustee's asking about. MR. HENZY: However, pursuant to a declaration of trustee agreement dated February 17, 2015 I hold such equity in trust for Bravo Luck Limited. My son owns the equity of Case 22-50073 Doc 1082-8 Filed 11/11/22 Entered 11/11/22 13:18:26 Page 137 of 158\n\n the apartment owner. THE COURT: Well, guess what? You don't get to Bravo Luck, Limited till you get to Genever BVI. You can't -- all you have to do is look at the chain. You don't get to Bravo Luck Limited until you get to Genever BVI because he holds all the equity but then he holds it in a trust. I mean, it's going to be very difficult. We can do a chart. We can make a nice little chart. We can draw the lines from entity to entity. But this -- MR. HENZY: What this -- I apologize, Your Honor. THE COURT: This is what he said. And he said it also bears noting that any interest I have in Genever BVI has been ordered by Justice Ostrager to be turned over to PAX, provided that such a turnover does not interfere with pending litigation in the British Virgin Islands or Genever U.S. bankruptcy. Okay? So Mr. Kwok said this on March 20. It's August 1st. For him to be -- I'm not saying I'm not going to give you an opportunity to respond, because I am going to give you one, okay? It's not going to be long. of 158\n\n And the point is this -- to make an argument that you don't -- not that you, not about you. That counsel for Mr. Kwok doesn't know whether this will have an impact and other parties, worried about other third parties, that's all\n\nof 158\n\n| | 139 |\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | irrelevant because Mr. Kwok already swore to this court that |\n| 2 | he holds all the equity of Genever BVI. |\n| 3 | MR. HENZY:
I think that you and I are reading |\n| 4 | this differently, Your Honor.
I'm sorry. |\n| 5 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Then we're reading it |\n| 6 | differently.
But then guess what?
Then you'll have -- I'm |\n| 7 | going to rule that he has to do this ultimately.
This is |\n| 8 | what he said.
This is what he said.
My son owns -- the |\n| 9 | apartment owner. |\n| 10 | However, pursuant to a declaration of trust, I |\n| 11 | hold such equity in trust for Bravo Limited. |\n| 12 | MR. DESPINS:
He still holds it. |\n| 13 | MR. HENZY:
He holds it in -- |\n| 14 | THE COURT:
He's still -- |\n| 15 | MR. HENZY:
He holds it in trust for Bravo |\n| 16 | Limited. |\n| 17 | THE COURT:
Okay. |\n| 18 | MR. HENZY:
Look, I -- |\n| 19 | THE COURT:
And how did Bravo Limited pay for that |\n| 20 | apartment?
Are we just going to go through all the -- this |\n| 21 | is what -- we're going to follow the money, right?
Is that |\n| 22 | what we're going to do?
Isn't that what we're doing? |\n| 23 | MR. HENZY:
I have no idea. |\n| 24 | THE COURT:
That's what we're doing.
That's why |\n| 25 | there was a Chapter 11 trustee appointed.
That's what we're |\n\n doing. What's happened here is -- MR. HENZY: There's a bunch of things here that seem to me like they're not connected, Your Honor. THE COURT: Well, how can they not be connected? He said they're connected. He wrote it in his own declaration. This is what he -- he is saying. So -- MR. HENZY: He says he holds it in trust for someone else. And look, again, I haven't had -- I have not had time to analyze this because this was -- THE COURT: Okay. Let's look at the certificate. Let's look at the certificate that was in the New York State action, which is dated some time in -- February 13, 2015. He holds the -- it says \"I certify that I am the registered holder of 1,000 share of U.S. dollar, one penny par value, each being fully paid in the above company subject to the memorandum and article association of the company.\" So that's February 13, 2015. This trust was dated four days later. So then he took his equity. So then maybe it's a fraudulent transfer. MR. HENZY: It might be. It might, Judge. THE COURT: It might be. MR. HENZY: Okay. But we're not -- I don't think we can resolve that on essentially 14 hours notice. THE COURT: I just told you I'm going to give you\n\n time to respond. MR. HENZY: Okay. THE COURT: I'm going to give you time to respond. MR. HENZY: To circle all the way back here, I said, Your Honor, it may be completely appropriate, the debtor may have no objection to signing these documents, but I don't know because this was filed at 10:09 last night. And it wasn't in the motion that had previously been filed. THE COURT: Okay. Well, I'm going to give you an opportunity to ask your client if he's going to sign the documents, okay? MR. HENZY: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. MR. HENZY: Can I have enough time to do the diligence? Because I have -- I would like to find out -- for me to advise my client I think I need to do some diligence and understand this, okay? So I'm hoping I'm going to get more than 24 or 36 hours. I heard Mr. Despins say Wednesday morning. Nothing is happening here, Your Honor. The apartment -- THE COURT: That's the point. Nothing is happening here. MR. HENZY: No, no, no, no. On the apartment -- and everybody -- THE COURT: And we've got to get some stuff to\n\n move forward. MR. HENZY: I don't know what I said that was funny. I'm generally not viewed as being a funny guy, but the apartment is going to get sold under a process that's being supervised by Melanie Cyganowski. The apartment, the money, it's all going to be property of that bankruptcy estate in the Southern District under Judge Garrity's supervision. It's not going anywhere. I don't know -- is the idea that Mr. Kwok is going to somehow abscond with the apartment, he's going to take the Sherry Netherland apartment and go away with it or he's going to take the money from the apartment and go away with it. That's not going to happen. So I think it's fair given the complexity here. And you and I do read this paragraph differently. I think that -- I don't know, Your Honor, what the structure is here. I do know that property that's held in trust for another is not property of a bankruptcy estate, depending on -- THE COURT: I'm not so sure about that. MR. HENZY: Depending on facts and circumstances. THE COURT: I'm not so sure about that. MR. HENZY: So maybe sometimes it is. I think often times it is not. So I don't know what all of the facts are here because as I said, this was not part of a\n\n motion that had been filed. This was in an order that was filed at 10:09 last night. THE COURT: I understand. MR. DESPINS: And, Your Honor, I'll provide Mr. Henzy more documents. Actually, there's one which is -- MR. HENZY: Don't hand -- I don't want you to hand me documents. We're in court. MR. DESPINS: Okay. MR. HENZY: You can get me documents. MR. DESPINS: Okay. But the point, Your Honor, is that Mr. Kwok is exercising control over that entity. So ti's not his son. So, for example, when the Genever U.S. wanted to file for bankruptcy the authorization is signed by Mr. Kwok. It's not signed by the son or Bravo Luck. It's signed by Mr. Kwok. So I guess, Your Honor, we're talking about scheduling since -- THE COURT: Yes, we are. We're talking about scheduling. I'm going to give Mr. Henzy some time to look at this and file a response. I'm looking at -- hold on one second, okay? I just need to look at the calendar. (Pause.) All right. With regard to the motion filed by the of 158\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1082-8 Filed 11/11/22 Entered 11/11/22 13:18:26 Page 143\n\nof 158\n\n trustee, the motion for order confirming that the Chapter 11 trustee holds all the debtor's economic and corporate governance rights, ECF 598, and the order -- revised proposed order with regard to that motion that appears at ECF 645, for the reasons stated on the record that matter will -- this matter will be continued to Thursday, August 4th at 1:00 p.m. Now with regard to the -- so that I think takes care of all of our matters, other than the housekeeping matters, Trustee Despins, which includes the proof of claim bar date order. MR. HENZY: Can I have one point or question, Your Honor? THE COURT: Yes. MR. HENZY: Okay. On the letter to the Harcus Parker firm, I'm not talking to Harcus Parker without Mr. Despins being on the phone because I think I'm going to get -- probably I'm going to get accused of saying something I shouldn't have said or my words are going to get twisted. THE COURT: Well, you and Mr. Despins work that out. I'm not ordering that you be on the phone. MR. HENZY: I don't know what their availability is. I don't know -- you know, so I don't know if that can happen by August 4 at 1 o'clock. That's all. I certainly will make myself available and use\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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of 158 |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | 145 |\n| 1 | best efforts, but we're talking about talking to lawyers in |\n| 2 | London and I don't know what -- how much time that's going |\n| 3 | to take. |\n| 4 | THE COURT:
I don't think anybody's talking about |\n| 5 | talking to lawyers in London other than you. |\n| 6 | MR. HENZY:
We have to. |\n| 7 | THE COURT:
Then that's your issue. You can figure |\n| 8 | it out. We're having a hearing on Thursday at 1:00 p.m. |\n| 9 | MR. HENZY:
Okay.
So I don't know how I figure it |\n| 10 | out if I -- |\n| 11 | THE COURT:
Well, you'll try.
You can figure it |\n| 12 | out.
You'll try to. |\n| 13 | MR. DESPINS:
Your Honor, Thursday at 1:00 is that |\n| 14 | in person or a Zoom? |\n| 15 | THE COURT:
Well, what do you -- do you have a |\n| 16 | conflict with Thursday?
Is that what you're telling me? |\n| 17 | MR. DESPINS:
Yes, I'm out of the country. |\n| 18 | THE COURT:
Oh, you're out of the country.
Well, |\n| 19 | that's -- |\n| 20 | MR. DESPINS:
But I can do Zoom. |\n| 21 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Well, then we can -- I guess -- |\n| 22 | when are you going to be back?
Are you out for a long time? |\n| 23 | MR. DESPINS:
Yes. |\n| 24 | THE COURT:
Okay.
All right.
So then we'll do it |\n| 25 | by Zoom then. |\n\nof 158\n\n| | 146 |\n|----|------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | MR. DESPINS:
Thank you, Your Honor. |\n| 2 | THE COURT:
We'll do it by Zoom. |\n| 3 | MR. DESPINS:
So now I would go into the |\n| 4 | housekeeping matters, but -- |\n| 5 | THE COURT:
Last point and I'll be quiet, Your |\n| 6 | Honor.
I promise. I just want to be clear. |\n| 7 | There's other relief sought in that motion that |\n| 8 | the debtor objected to.
So I don't want the court to think |\n| 9 | that -- and I'm fine if that goes to -- |\n| 10 | THE COURT:
I don't know -- we're going to talk |\n| 11 | all about that on Thursday. |\n| 12 | MR. HENZY:
So everything is getting carried to -- |\n| 13 | THE COURT:
I will tell you, I -- my initial |\n| 14 | review, subject to further argument on Thursday, is I don't |\n| 15 | know what the basis for the objection of the debtor would be |\n| 16 | to any other relief set forth in that motion. |\n| 17 | MR. HENZY:
Okay.
Understood, Your Honor. |\n| 18 | THE COURT:
Okay. |\n| 19 | MR. DESPINS:
So, Your Honor, we've been at it for |\n| 20 | three hours and 45 minutes.
I don't know if you want to |\n| 21 | take a break before we go into the -- because there's a good |\n| 22 | 20 -- |\n| 23 | THE COURT:
Well, I'll ask the courtroom staff. |\n| 24 | Would you like to take a break?
I'm sure they would, |\n| 25 | actually.
Would you like to take a few minute break?
Okay. |\n\nof 158\n\n Thank you. So it's 3:40. What, do you want to come back at 3:50 or you want longer than that? MR. DESPINS: No, that's fine, Your Honor. THE COURT: Does that work for you -- all of us? I mean, it works for me. So court will be in recess until 3:50. (Recess from 3:37 p.m. until 3:50 p.m.) THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: We're still on case no. 22- 50073, Ho Wan Kwok. THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Despins. Before the recess we were going to talk about a few -- MR. DESPINS: Housekeeping. THE COURT: -- housekeeping matters, so go right ahead. MR. DESPINS: The first one, Your Honor, was the request to have the status conference every ten days or so. And the trustee would have an obligation to file an agenda 24 hours before. I may be that sometimes we'll say no need for the status conference, but I think it's really important, especially in the first few months of the case, to stay in touch with the court and so, therefore, we would ask that we could just -- THE COURT: That's fine. That's absolutely fine.\n\n| | of 158 |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | 148 |\n| 1 | Do you have proposed dates in mind or -- |\n| 2 | MR. DESPINS:
Not yet.
I'll discuss this with Mr. |\n| 3 | Skalka and we'll come back to Your Honor but I just want to |\n| 4 | -- |\n| 5 | THE COURT:
Certainly. |\n| 6 | MR. DESPINS:
Okay. |\n| 7 | The next item -- this is more complicated.
And I |\n| 8 | know last time we talked about the bar date and I said we |\n| 9 | would mark it up and we did. |\n| 10 | But I started looking deeper into this and |\n| 11 | realized that there's a fundamental problem here and it is |\n| 12 | as follows. |\n| 13 | You've go the Genever U.S. case that was filed |\n| 14 | before this case -- |\n| 15 | THE COURT:
Yes. |\n| 16 | MR. DESPINS:
-- and what's at state there is who |\n| 17 | owns the Sherry Netherland.
And there was a bar date set in |\n| 18 | that case, but notice was not given -- first of all, there |\n| 19 | was no publication notice and there was no notice given to |\n| 20 | potential creditors of Mr. Kwok.
It was given to a few |\n| 21 | people and Mr. Friedman and his colleagues, of course, were |\n| 22 | around the hoop because they were already involved. |\n| 23 | And God bless them from their point of view.
They |\n| 24 | did file a claim of PAX against Genever there but my |\n| 25 | position vis-a-vis that entity is I'm an equity holder |\n\n because I'm -- I own the shares. Well, I own the shares not personally, but this estate owns the share. And that doesn't work because the bar date has passed in that case. My Goldman's clients were never on notice of this because he didn't exist then because there was no case here. So there is a need -- a pretty important need to coordinate these two cases, not only because of that issue, because there are many ways of fixing that issue. One would be expand the bar date in that case, reopen it to allow Mr. Goldman's clients to file claims. I'm not saying that's a preferred course, but that's one. Another one would be for us to file a piercing the veil or alter ego claim in that case, et cetera, et cetera. But the point is there's a need for coordination because right now that case is going on its merry way. The sale is not an issue. That's not a problem. It's going on its merry way where at the end of the day assuming the best thing, which is the Sherry Netherland is owned by Mr. Kwok, that money would be shared with those creditors around the hoop there only and that's PAX and the Sherry Netherland, the hotel itself and very few other people. Well, that's -- a fiduciary to the creditors in this case to me that can't work. So -- and there's a second thing that's\n\nof 158\n\n fundamental. We should not have two courts, two separate courts, deciding the issue of the Sherry Netherland -- the ownership of the Sherry Netherland and the issue of who owns the yacht. And you might say well, the yacht is different than the hotel, yes. But at the end of the day, one is the daughter, one is the son. It's all the same issues. Yes, there'll be different timing issues, but at the end of the day the arguments will all be the same. To have two separate courts decide that issue would be a huge waste of judicial resources and professional fees. So you might say well, that's a lot to process and to digest and I've been struggling with this. And I've talked to the committee and to PAX about this and they're proceeding it too. But I think what needs to happen is there should be - - because I would appear in front of Judge Garrity and tell him the same things. But I think you and him need to either -- I don't know how you feel about that, have a conversation about this or have a joint status conference, which is very unusual, but it's been done. But that issue needs to be tackled in one way or another in the next month or so because it is unfair to the people who have claims against Mr. Kwok to have missed out on the bar date in that case because they have no greater or worse\n\n| of 158 | |\n|--------|--|\n|--------|--|\n\n right than PAX had. PAX claim against Genever is a piercing the veil, an alter ego claim.\n\n And, again, I'm not criticizing them. They're doing their job. They're not a fiduciary for anyone and for some reason the debtor -- well, the debtor was controlled by Mr. Kwok so obviously not interested in publicizing -- having publication notice et cetera, et cetera, and that's why I told you the bar date, even though we marked it up an all that.\n\n I think until that issue is resolved we should park it because what I don't want to do is do two publication notice and we need to resolve this issue one way or another and my job is to propose a path forward which I'm not ready to do without talking again to the committee and to PAX and to debtor's counsel in the Genever case.\n\n And I want to be clear, this does not affect the sale. I'm not trying to say oh, we're not going to sell the -- that's not the case.\n\n But there's a nee for coordination and I wanted to put that in front of Your Honor. I don't expect you to have a response on the spot because there's a lot of moving pieces to this but I think that -- and I know you have a full docket, so I'm not trying to put another case on your plate. I understand that.\n\n Judge Garrity is also very busy so that's why I think there needs to be either a call between the two of you or a\n\nof 158\n\n joint status conference but I think that makes sense to happen once we have a path forward to recommend. THE COURT: Well, so what I think you're saying is you think that both of the cases should be in front of the same judge. So isn't there a way to do that by filing a motion? MR. DESPINS: Yeah, there is. But I -- THE COURT: Because I don't know that a judge should have a conversation with another judge about -- I mean, I -- THE COURT: Well, especially do you want to -- one of the reasons I would be not inclined to do that is I don't want to open up any allegations that there was something improper or -- MR. DESPINS: Yeah. THE COURT: I mean, what -- you know, but if you think that's appropriate, then you can file -- anyone can file a motion. MR. DESPINS: Well, but to be clear, that motion would have to be filed in front of Judge Garrity, because he's the first to file. THE COURT: I understand. And so this case may go there is what you're saying. MR. DESPINS: What I'm saying is that, first of all, I would never file that motion without talking to you first because you might say what did you just do? And so I'm socializing the issue with you. You should think about it and\n\n| | 153 |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | we will come back to the court probably at our next status |\n| 2 | conference on this. |\n| 3 | But I want to make sure that is something that you're |\n| 4 | thinking about because it needs to be resolved in one way or |\n| 5 | another.
So that's really the issue regarding the bar date in |\n| 6 | Genever. |\n| 7 | The next thing I wanted to mention very briefly the |\n| 8 | Lady May inspection.
Mr. Kindseth last time described the fact |\n| 9 | that they were very -- well, I won't say very minor, but fairly |\n| 10 | discreet issues that need to be resolved. |\n| 11 | It turns out that that's not the case.
As Your Honor |\n| 12 | will remember even though I'm not a party to the stipulation, |\n| 13 | they allowed me visiting rights or inspection right and it |\n| 14 | turns out that there are more issues. |\n| 15 | But the parties are talking and we're hopeful that |\n| 16 | that will be resolved.
But I wanted to make sure that you knew |\n| 17 | that that dialogue was ongoing.
We had a call I think last |\n| 18 | week about this with the Zeisler firm and with PAX's counsel. |\n| 19 | Your Honor, you will recall that we hired Paul |\n| 20 | Derektor as an expert to assist us with that, \\$2,500.
And it's |\n| 21 | a request for Your Honor, and I know the rules and the U.S. |\n| 22 | Trustee will probably scream about this, but would it be okay |\n| 23 | if we just expensed it. |\n| 24 | What I mean by that is not file a motion to retain |\n| 25 | him as an expert?
We can do that but it's going to cost more |\n| | |\n\nof 158\n\n than the \\$2,500 and my point is -- expensive meaning right now there are no assets. So I mean we're paying for it. Eventually we hope that there'll be money to be paid but we would put that as a line item expense rather than filing a motion to retain Mr. Derektor in the case as an expert. But I don't feel strongly. It's just from a cost savings point of view I think it would make sense. THE COURT: Well, I think you should talk to the parties about that too. I mean, if people don't have an objection, then it's likely to be fine. MR. DESPINS: Okay. We'll table that. You're absolutely right, Your Honor. Lady May we talked about. Just housekeeping, the debtors are still -- their monthly operating reports from May and June still haven't been filed. The debtor still is under obligation to file that so I want to remind everyone of that and that's all I have from a housekeeping point of view, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. MR. DESPINS: Thank you. THE COURT: Let me just take one look for a second and see if there's anything else that I think I had any questions about. (Pause.) So with regard to the bar date motion and the\n\n| of 158 | |\n|--------|--|\n| | |\n\n proposed order then, we're just going to continue those to a future status conference? Is that what you're thinking? MR. DESPINS: That's correct, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. So to a date to be determined essentially. MR. DESPINS: Yes, Your Honor. (Pause.) THE COURT: Mr. Kindseth? MR. KINDSETH: Yes, Your Honor. In the interest of just basically updating Your Honor and the other parties with respect to the Lady May, Your Honor, for HK International, no one is more interested in expediting the satisfaction of the requirements set forth in the stipulation with respect to the Lady May more than my client. We've been working very diligently to satisfy those obligations. Your Honor made reference to the certification. My client is unable to file the certification until the other elements are satisfied, one of which is this court's establishment of the repair reserve. The repair reserve requires my client to provide proposals with respect to the repairs that need to be done for the Lady May to be returned in good working order. There's been some delay with respect to finding and getting proposals from entities just because they're very busy right now.\n\nof 158\n\n As we've received proposals we've circulated them with the trustee, creditors committee counsel and PAX counsel. With respect to the actual repairs that need to be performed, unbeknownst to me at the time before Your Honor last there was an additional repair that needs to be performed. Apparently when the fuel pump failed, which I did disclose to the court, it caused the gears, some gears to basically get stripped. And so there are tiny shards of metal that you can see from the gears -- and, again, this was produced to everybody -- that were circulated in the oil system within the engine. So the oil needs to be cleaned out. The shards need to be reduced. We's just talking about little pieces but obviously it needs to be repaired and we received a quote for that. And so we're in communications with the trustee and counsel for the creditors committee and counsel for PAX to try to come up with an agreed up number for the repair reserve which would then enable us, once this court orders the repair reserve, to file the certification. Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you. Does anyone else wish to be heard? MR. HENZY: Not on the Lady Mae, Your Honor, but am I to file a replay before Thursday at 1 o'clock on the -- THE COURT: Yes. Yes.\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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of 158 |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | 157 |\n| 1 | MR. HENZY:
And I didn't write it down -- |\n| 2 | THE COURT:
I didn't give you a time frame, but I can |\n| 3 | give you till Thursday morning at 9 o'clock, if you'd like. |\n| 4 | But I can't give you any longer than that. I've got to be able |\n| 5 | to read it before the hearing or there's no point in the |\n| 6 | hearing. |\n| 7 | MR. HENZY:
I'll get it -- thank you, Your Honor.
I |\n| 8 | expect I'll get it filed before then but thank you. |\n| 9 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Anyone else wish to be heard? |\n| 10 | (No audible response.) |\n| 11 | THE COURT:
Okay. I think that takes care of all the |\n| 12 | matters today then in this case and we will reconvene on |\n| 13 | Thursday, via Zoom at 1:00 p.m.
And the debtor has until 9:00 |\n| 14 | a.m. on Thursday morning to file the response to the corporate |\n| 15 | governance motion, okay? |\n| 16 | That takes care of all the matters on the calendar so |\n| 17 | court is adjourned. |\n| 18 | (Proceedings adjourned at 4:05 p.m.) |\n| 19 | |\n| 20 | |\n| 21 | |\n| 22 | |\n| 23 | |\n| 24 | |\n| | |\n| | |\n\n| | of 158 |\n|--|--------|\n| | |\n\n| 1 | |\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | I, CHRISTINE FIORE, court-approved transcriber and |\n| 3 | certified electronic reporter and transcriber, certify that the |\n| 4 | foregoing is a correct transcript from the official electronic |\n| 5 | sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled |\n| 6 | matter. |\n| 7 | |\n| 8 | |\n| 9 | August 9, 2022 |\n| 10 | Christine Fiore, CERT |\n| 11 | Transcriber |\n| 12 | |\n| 13 | |\n| 14 | |\n| 15 | |\n| 16 | |\n| 17 | |\n| 18 | |\n| 19 | |\n| 20 | |\n| 21 | |\n| 22 | |\n| 23 | |\n| 24 | |\n| | |\n| | |","body_zh":"美国破产法院 康涅狄格地区 布里奇波特分部\n\n关于 *\n案号 22-50073(JAM)\n*\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）， *\n康涅狄格州布里奇波特\n*\n2022年8月1日\n债务人。 *\n*\n* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *\n动议听证会庭审记录\n于尊敬的 JULIE A. MANNING（朱莉·A·曼宁）法官面前\n美国破产法院法官\n出庭人员：\n代表债务人： AARON ROMNEY, ESQ.（阿伦·罗姆尼律师）\nERIC A. HENZY, ESQ.（埃里克·A·亨齐律师）\n\n代表债权人 Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.（太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金有限合伙企业）：PETER FRIEDMAN, ESQ.（彼得·弗里德曼律师）\nSTUART M. SARNOFF, ESQ.（斯图尔特·M·萨诺夫律师）\n\nO'Melveny & Myers LLP（欧麦伦律师事务所）\nTimes Square Tower\n7 Times Square\nNew York, NY 10036\n\nSTEPHEN M. KINDSETH, ESQ.（斯蒂芬·M·金德塞斯律师）\nZeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（泽斯勒与泽斯勒专业公司）\n\nBridgeport, CT 06604\n\nWILLIAM BALDIGA, ESQ.（威廉·巴尔迪加律师）\nBrown Rudnick, LLP（布朗·拉德尼克律师事务所）\nSeven Times Square\nNew York, NY 10036\n\n10 Middle Street, 15th Floor\n\nPATRICK BIRNEY, ESQ.（帕特里克·伯尼律师）\nRobinson & Cole（罗宾逊与科尔律师事务所）\n28 Trumbull Street\nHartford, CT 06103\n\n程序由电子录音记录，记录文本由速记服务机构制作。\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷庭审记录与转录服务公司）\n4 Research Drive, Suite 402\nShelton, Connecticut 06484\n(203)929-9992\n\n出庭人员（续）：158\n\n代表债权人委员会：IRVE GOLDMAN, ESQ.（欧文·戈德曼律师）\nPullman & Comley（普尔曼与科姆利律师事务所）\n850 Main Street\nBridgeport, CT 06601\n\n代表债权人 Rui Ma（马睿）、Weican Meng（孟维灿）及 Zheng Wu（吴铮）：KRISTEN MAYHEW, ESQ.（克里斯滕·梅休律师）\nMcElroy Deutsch（麦克尔罗伊·多伊奇律师事务所）\n225 Liberty Street\n36th Floor\nNew York, NY 10281\n\n代表美国受托人：HOLLEY L. CLAIBORN, ESQ.（霍利·L·克莱伯恩律师）\nOffice of the United States Trustee（美国受托人办公室）\nThe Giaimo Federal Building\n150 Court Street, Room 302\nNew Haven, CT 06510\n\n代表 HK International（香港国际公司）及 Mei Guo（郭美）：STEPHEN M. KINDSETH, ESQ.（斯蒂芬·M·金德塞斯律师）\nZeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（泽斯勒与泽斯勒专业公司）\n10 Middle Street, 15th Floor\nBridgeport, CT 06604\n\n第11章受托人：LUC A. DESPINS, ESQ.（吕克·A·德斯平斯律师）\nPaul Hastings LLP（普衡律师事务所）\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, NY 10166\n\n拟任第11章受托人的律师：DOUGLAS SKALKA, ESQ.（道格拉斯·斯卡尔卡律师）\nNeubert, Pepe & Monteith（诺伊伯特、佩佩与蒙蒂斯律师事务所）\n195 Church Street\n\nNew Haven, CT 06510\n\n1 （程序于下午12:15开始。）\n\n2 法庭书记员：\n案号 22-50073，Ho Wan\n\n3 Kwok（郭文贵）。\n\n4 法官：\n好的。下午好。请各位为记录目的说明出庭身份，先请第\n\n5 11章受托人。\n\n7 DESPINS 律师：\n下午好，法官阁下。吕克\n\n8 ·德斯平斯，第11章受托人。\n\n9 法官：\n下午好。\n\n10 SKALKA 律师：\n下午好，法官阁下。道格拉斯\n\n11 ·斯卡尔卡，作为第11章受托人的拟任本地律师。\n\n12 法官：\n下午好。\n\n13 CLAIBORN 律师：\n下午好。霍利·克莱伯恩\n\n14 代表美国受托人。\n\n15 法官：\n下午好。\n\n16 GOLDMAN 律师：\n下午好，法官阁下。欧文\n\n17 ·戈德曼，普尔曼与科姆利律师事务所，代表债权人\n\n18 委员会。\n\n19 法官：\n下午好。\n\n20 GOLDMAN 律师：\n我可以请问在哪里能从法庭\n\n21 取得口罩吗？\n\n22 法官：\n桌上这里就有一些，戈德曼律师，就在亨齐律师前面。\n\n24 GOLDMAN 律师：\n哦，好的。谢谢。\n\n25 法官：\n不客气。\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷庭审记录与转录服务公司）\n案号 22-50073，文件 1082-8，于 11/11/22 提交，于 11/11/22 13:18:26 登记，第 3 页，共\n\nFRIEDMAN 律师：下午好，法官阁下。彼得·弗里德曼，来自欧麦伦律师事务所，代表 Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund, L.P.（太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金有限合伙企业）。\n\n法官：下午好。\n\nFRIEDMAN 律师：谢谢。\n\n法官：与您一同出庭的是您的共同代理律师和本地律师吗？\n\nSARNOFF 律师：斯图尔特·萨诺夫，也来自欧麦伦律师事务所。\n\nBIRNEY 律师：以及帕特里克·伯尼，罗宾逊与科尔律师事务所。下午好。\n\n法官：下午好。亨齐律师？\n\nHENZY 律师：埃里克·亨齐，代表 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）。\n\n法官：下午好。\n\nROMNEY 律师：阿伦·罗姆尼，同样代表债务人 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）。\n\n法官：下午好。\n\nKINDSETH 律师：斯蒂芬·金德塞斯，代表 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）。\n\n法官：那么您的其他当事人呢，金德塞斯先生？\n\nKINDSETH 律师：我不知道我们是否有必要代表 HK International（香港国际公司）出庭，但我也代表 HK International（香港国际公司），斯蒂芬·金德塞斯。\n\n案号 22-50073，文件 1082-8，于 11/11/22 提交，于 11/11/22 13:18:26 登记，第 4 页，共\n\n1 Zeisler & Zeisler（泽斯勒与泽斯勒律师事务所）。\n\n2 法官：\n还有 Mei Guo（郭美）呢？\n\n3 KINDSETH 律师：\n以及 Mei Guo（郭美）。\n\n4 法官：\n好的。谢谢。\n\n5 MAYHEW 律师：\n下午好，法官阁下。克里斯滕\n\n6 ·梅休，麦克尔罗伊·多伊奇·穆尔瓦尼与卡彭特律师事务所，代表\n\n7 债权人 Rui Ma（马睿）、Zheng Wu（吴铮）及 Weican Meng（孟维灿）。\n\n8 法官：\n下午好。\n\n9 巴尔迪加先生，我看见您在后面，但请继续说明\n\n10 出庭身份——\n\n11 BALDIGA 律师：\n是，法官阁下。威廉·巴尔迪加，\n\n12 布朗·拉德尼克律师事务所。谢谢。\n\n13 法官：\n下午好。\n\n14 今天还有其他人希望为记录目的说明\n\n15 出庭身份吗？\n\n16 （没有可听见的回应。）\n\n17 法官：\n好的。巴尔迪加先生，我们将首先处理\n\n18 您的申请，即您要求辞任\n\n19 律师的动议；如您愿意，请到前面来。您\n\n20 可以到讲台前，如果那样更方便，无论\n\n21 怎样对您更方便即可。\n\n22 BALDIGA 律师：\n我就这样做。谢谢。\n\n23 法官：\n下午好。\n\n24 BALDIGA 律师：\n下午好。法官阁下，\n\n25 我们的动议于7月13日提交。我们上周在案卷第623号中补充提交了\n\n进一步材料。\n\n法官：我看到了。谢谢。\n\nBALDIGA 律师：好的。我认为法庭或其他当事人之间可能至少存在两项关切。一项是法律问题，即我们是否有权辞任，特别是现在已有另外两家律师事务所作为非占有财产债务人 Kwok 先生的代理律师出庭。其次，我认为我们适当地预期到，并且已就我们作为债务人的原代理律师，对于我们的预付律师费及持续责任问题，与 Claiborn 女士和 Despins 先生进行了交谈。我们只是希望不存在任何疑问或问题，即我们理解相关规则。我们始终遵守这些规则，并将继续遵守。并且，如果——如果存在任何关切，我希望积极主动地处理这些问题，包括今天与法庭一同处理。我们持有该预付律师费并无任何益处。因此，我们——显然，除作为我们律师费的担保外——因此，我们乐于作出任何安排——我认为目前与 Claiborn 女士及其办公室以及受托人及其办公室之间的安排都没有问题——\n\n法官：贵所保留——或者持有该预付律师费，但以准许贵所律师费的命令为条件，这就是目前的——是这样吗——\n\nBALDIGA 律师：是的，法官阁下。\n\n法官：是的。当然。好的。请继续。这没有问题。\n\nBALDIGA 律师：而且，我是说，款项存放在一家信誉极佳的银行。那不是律所的资金。\n\n法官：对。\n\nBALDIGA 律师：我们将预付律师费存放在一个独立账户中。幸运的是，本律所在财务及其他方面均处于良好状态，因此我认为这些款项不存在任何风险。\n\n关于替代律师，不幸的是，我在上次听证会期间正在休假，但我已阅读了——\n\n法官：嗯，希望那是一次愉快的休假。\n\nBALDIGA 律师：——庭审记录，并且我理解相关对话。\n\n法官：希望您休假并不是一件不幸的事。希望——\n\nBALDIGA 律师：我本来不打算这样说，但我感谢您这番话。我认为这是对的。我不会就 Zeisler 律师事务所的聘任采取立场。\n\n法官：明白。\n\nBALDIGA 律师：那是其他当事人需要处理的问题。但是 Mitchell 先生已经出庭。Zeisler 律师事务所\n\n案号 22-50073，文件 1082-8，于 11/11/22 提交，于 11/11/22 13:18:26 登记，第 7 页，共\n\n已经出庭。我认为，无论实际上是否已有替代律师，我们的辞任动议依法均应获准。但既然已有替代律师，我认为这应当能够得到例行处理。我乐于回答任何当事人或法庭的问题，但除此以外，我仅依据这些书面材料陈述。\n\n法官：谢谢。我想听取其他所有人的意见，因为——我没有看到任何人反对你们的动议，我也不知道有任何反对意见。因此，如果有人反对，我希望其现在提出。\n\nDESPINS 律师：法官阁下，这不是反对意见，但我们有一项保留，因此能否请允许我们在适当时候陈述？\n\n法官：嗯，保留——我将要求布朗·拉德尼克律师事务所——他们必须提交律师费申请。他们知道这一点。这已经——这不是问题。问题是——当您说——您是否担心布朗·拉德尼克持有这些资金？我原以为这没有问题。\n\nDESPINS 律师：不，法官阁下。问题是我们希望他们确认他们将配合提供协助。我可以走近吗，法官阁下？\n\n法官：可以。可以。可以，请。\n\nDESPINS 律师：好的。\n\n法官：抱歉，我现在明白您的意思了，我忘了提及。您在书面材料中说过，您希望他们能够配合提供协助，并在必要时协助您。\n\nDESPINS 律师：以法官阁下将作出的任何保护令为前提。\n\n法官：对。\n\nDESPINS 律师：我们提交了一份 2004——\n\n法官：是。\n\nDESPINS 律师：——申请，在上周。他们是目标之一。\n\n法官：对。\n\nDESPINS 律师：所以我们无需辩论其实体问题。只是——\n\n法官：对。\n\nDESPINS 律师：——我想确保他们不会一走了之。仅此而已。\n\n法官：好的。那么，您和巴尔迪加先生是否有过任何——我不知道你们是否有机会，但你们是否就您刚才在庭上所说的内容进行过任何交谈？\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 1082-8\n于 11/11/22 提交\n于 11/11/22 13:18:26 登记\n\n1 DESPINS 律师：\n没有就该问题谈过。\n\n2 BALDIGA 律师：\n我乐于对此作出回应，法官\n\n3 阁下。\n\n4 嗯，显然，我们根据规则和法律，对法庭负有义务。\n\n5 原代理律师在涉及特权事项时处于一个\n\n6 尴尬的位置。\n\n7 我们不希望受到两面夹击，因为我不希望作出一项\n\n8 可能侵犯此处某项特权的承诺。\n\n10 因此，举例而言，当然，我已经与\n\n11 Despins 先生交谈过。将继续\n\n12 配合提供协助。我不难找到。\n\n13 我当然不希望作出一项承诺，\n\n14 使本所面临前客户提出索赔的风险，称\n\n15 我们以某种方式侵犯了特权，或使其处于\n\n16 无法维护某项特权的境地。\n\n17 我认为，这实际上并非布朗·拉德尼克律师事务所的问题，\n\n18 而是受托人及债务人的替代律师\n\n19 需要协调处理的问题。根据我的经验，在我参与过的其他少数案件中，\n\n20 当存在非占有财产债务人时，\n\n21 这些问题均难以\n\n22 协调处理。\n\n23 因此，我很乐意继续按普衡律师事务所\n\n24 所希望的方式向其提供协助，但我不会承诺\n\n25 做任何会使本所面临风险的事情。\n\n法官：明白。不过，我也有一个问题要问您。\n\nBALDIGA 律师：当然。\n\n法官：如果 Despins 先生希望回应您刚才所说的内容，我也会听取他的意见。我想问的是——而且我——我假定从您的角度看这不会有问题，即贵所将会，您知道，接受送达。如果——Despins 先生可能会向贵所的记录送达传票，对吧，那么不会存在任何送达问题。他将希望查看贵所的记录。而你们将会——你们或其他律师将会基于特权理由提出异议，然后我们将在最终时刻看看这一切如何解决，是否能够就某种形式的保护令达成协议，或者是否需要法庭作出该保护令。我只是不希望出现贵所不会接受送达或诸如此类的问题——因为，对我而言，那是基本事项。贵所完全有权，贵所完全有权就向贵所提出的任何证据开示请求以及诸如此类的任何事项，提交其认为适当的任何文件。我说的不是这个。我只是说，我不希望我们都在送达问题或某些我会\n\n考虑，您知道，这是根本性的。您完全有权依据适用法律和规则，就您认为适当的任何问题提出主张，包括您的律师—委托人特权以及您可能主张的任何其他特权，但我只是想——这将是法院所作出的承诺——我不想在此问题上花费任何时间，我认为您也不想。BALDIGA先生：那么，有两项承诺，法官阁下。第一，如同惯且适当的做法，受托人将其首要事务之一——我想正如他在其文件中所说——发送了一封简单的信函，即文件保全函。法院：对。BALDIGA先生：——这在更广泛的调查中属于惯常做法。并且我们——我已向受托人说明此事——我们已在内部实施保全措施，因此我们在这方面已尽到责任。因此，不会有任何资料遗失。这是第一步，坦率地说，也是最基本的。第二步，不需要送达人员、法警或任何此类安排。如果作出2004命令，我们将予以遵从。只要债务人不质疑该受托人是否已经采取了适当步骤，我们不需要传票或其他正式程序。\n\n这确实应由债务人说明——\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷记录与转录服务公司）\n\n法院：我明白。\n\nBALDIGA先生：——存在某些不足之处，但不会是Brown Rudnick（布朗·拉德尼克律师事务所）在从中阻挠。\n\n法院：这就是我的问题和请求，我对此表示感谢。谢谢。\n\nBALDIGA先生：好的。\n\n法院：那么，Despins先生，您是否还有任何内容要补充到Baldiga先生刚才所述内容中？\n\nDESPINS先生：没有，法官阁下。您已经涵盖了我的要点。谢谢。\n\n法院：好的。谢谢。那么，Baldiga先生，正如您在陈述中所说，近期我们没有太多案件——其中债务人被剥夺占有权，因此有关是否——您知道，我甚至尚不明白那两名律师的情况。我将与Henzy先生谈谈此事。\n\n但我同意您的动议应获准许。并且将基于以下理由予以准许：其他当事人、其他律师已代表债务人提交出庭代理通知，且债务人已不再占有。因此，这没有问题。\n\n我需要知道的是，我不知道您是否曾就此与Claiborn律师或其他任何人进行过交谈，我并不是说您应该进行过交谈——您需要多长时间提交费用申请？\n\nBALDIGA先生：关于这一点，法官阁下，我尚未进行讨论，但我已对此作了相当多的思考。在最近几次听证会上，法院的一项意见——我认为每个人都认为该意见十分中肯——是您最不愿意做的，就是让人们无谓地投入大量工作。我认为同样的道理也适用——会有适当的时间和场合提交费用申请。鉴于准许费用的标准，特别是作为遗产财产的律师，问题在于您的工作最终产生了什么价值？我认为，法院或任何当事人今日都将很难作出评估。例如，在您指定受托人的裁定备忘录中，您提到了我们促成的两件事情。其中一件是我们提交了一项计划。该计划是否胎死腹中，还是最终成为本案获确认计划的基础，时间将会说明。我认为今日无法对此作出评估，也许在相当一段时间内都无法作出评估。第二件是游艇。我们不知道游艇问题将如何发展。不仅在程序上如此，而且它是否会成为遗产财产的一部分？是自愿的，还是由法院决定的？它是否构成协议的一部分？\n\n我们对所做的工作感到一些自豪，对所做的工作感到极大的自豪。本案对我们而言并未按我们原先设想的方式结束，但我认为，待此处尘埃落定后，法院，尤其是受托人、Office of the United States Trustee（美国受托人办公室）、替任律师及委员会，都将能够借助事后观察来评估我们所做工作的价值。\n\n因此，我——而且整理费用申请需要大量工作。\n\n今日提交费用申请的另一个问题是，若要超出我刚才所说的范围，将很难不引发特权和保密性方面的担忧。随着证据开示的进行，这些担忧将随时间而减轻。\n\n因此，我请求，鉴于我再次确认，没有费用申请，资金不会流向任何地方，我们现阶段暂缓处理此事。并且在某个时候，任何一方都可以对法院或对我说，嘿，我认为我们需要启动此事。但我只是认为不是今天。我认为随着案件推进，届时何时到来将变得更加明显。\n\n法院：好的。我希望就该问题听取其他人的意见，可以吗？\n\nBALDIGA先生：当然。\n\n法院：但我理解您的观点。谢谢。\n\n好的。还有人——\n\nBALDIGA先生：法官阁下，目前您还需要我说明其他事项吗？\n\n法院：请再说一遍？\n\nBALDIGA先生：目前还有其他事项需要我——\n\n法院：我目前没有任何问题。我理解您的立场是什么。我想听听其他当事人对此有何看法。\n\nBALDIGA先生：我暂时退到一旁。\n\n法院：好的。谢谢。我想知道其他当事人如何看待Baldiga先生的建议，即目前将准许撤回代理出庭通知的动议，但目前无需提交费用申请？\n\nCLAIBORN女士：法官阁下，Holley Claiborn，代表U.S. Trustee（美国受托人）。我认为Baldiga律师就程序以及本案目前所处阶段提出了一些公平且有效的观点。或许最简单的做法是将此事列入提醒事项，例如在四至六个月后，我们可以重新审议该问题、本案届时所处阶段，以及届时是否为提交费用申请的适当时间。因为正如Baldiga律师所指出的，在目前阶段评估所提供服务对遗产财产的价值将存在困难，因为我们不了解全部事实，也远未到达终点。\n\n法院：好的。谢谢。还有其他人希望发言吗？\n\nDESPINS先生：法官阁下，受托人同意Baldiga先生的提议。\n\n法院：好的。谢谢。Friedman先生？\n\nFRIEDMAN先生：我是来自O'Melveny & Myers（奥麦文律师事务所）的Peter Friedman。PAX（帕克斯）同意这是合理的推进方式。\n\n法院：好的。谢谢。\n\nGOLDMAN先生：法官阁下，我是代表委员会的Irve Goldman。我们对美国受托人提出的建议没有异议。\n\n法院：还有Baldiga先生？\n\nGOLDMAN先生：正确。\n\n法院：是的。谢谢。还有其他人希望发言吗？\n\n（无可听见的回应）\n\n法院：好的。那么，Baldiga先生，Brown Rudnick代表提交的律师退出代理动议，以及显然Brown Rudnick所有已提交出庭代理通知的个人提出的退出代理动议，在本案中获准。并且目前无需提交费用申请。\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷记录与转录服务公司）\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1082-8 Filed 11/11/22 Entered 11/11/22 13:18:26 Page 17 of\n\n因此，该命令大概只需作出某种电子命令，说明基于记录中陈述的理由，准许退出代理动议，并且法院将就Brown Rudnick提交费用申请作出进一步命令。\n\n这对您而言是否合理？\n\nBALDIGA先生：合理，法官阁下。谢谢。\n\n法院：好的。那么，我很遗憾看到您离开。但这是一个不同寻常的案件。我理解您和贵所在各方当事人方面所采取的立场，所有与本案密切相关的当事人以及新近参与本案的当事人都同意您的立场，因此我没有理由认为目前应朝任何其他方向推进。\n\nBALDIGA先生：谢谢，法官阁下。\n\n法院：好的。谢谢。\n\nBALDIGA先生：我可以告退吗？\n\n法院：是，您可以。\n\nBALDIGA先生：好的。\n\n法院：好的。\n\nBALDIGA先生：很好。谢谢，法官阁下。\n\n法院：好的。非常感谢。\n\n好的。因此，律师退出代理动议获准，将作出命令，但最有可能只是电子命令。\n\nCase 22-50073\nDoc 1082-8\nFiled 11/11/22\nEntered 11/11/22 13:18:26\n\n好的？因此，这是ECF 543。\n\n好的。请各位给我片刻时间，随后我们将处理其余事项。\n\n（暂停）\n\n法院：现在，关于日程表上的其余事项，我相信各方对于他们认为应如何推进，以及应按何种顺序推进，已有想法。我也有我认为应如何推进的想法。\n\nDespins先生，您对于我们今天接下来应处理什么事项，有何立场？\n\nDESPINS先生：谢谢，法官阁下。\n\n非常简要地说，作为初步事项，我想说，在听证会结束时，我们有许多——不是许多——但有若干程序性事项需要处理。\n\n法院：那么，您现在想处理这些事项吗？我们谈的是债务人自本案开始以来一直待决的动议，还是您——\n\nDESPINS先生：不是。但例如，债权申报截止日期命令。有一项——我不想现在处理，因为它实际上比最初设想的更为复杂。\n\n法院：好的。\n\nDESPINS先生：因此，债权申报截止日期命令是其中之一。此外，我们希望法院——所以我不会——\n\n……以涵盖所有事项——但要在本案中定期安排状态会议。法院：可以。DESPINS先生：诸如此类的事项。法院：我要说一件实际上与你无关的事——或者也可能有关——Baldiga先生（巴尔迪加先生）作为律师，连同其所在律师事务所，先前提出了数项动议，但由于债务人决定撤回融资动议后本案情势发生变化，这些动议从未得到裁决。目前仍有尚未裁决的动议——我们可以稍后讨论——但委员会也有尚未裁决的聘用专业人士申请。有许多事项也许我们可在状态会议上或在今天晚些时候处理，但我们将以某种方式解决这些事项。我想知道，作为受托人，你是否将会承接任何此类待决动议，例如，债务人曾就一名财务顾问举行证据听证会。我当时正准备作出裁决，随后一切都改变了，撤回融资的动议提出了。该动议后来被撤回。我认为，现实情况是，如果Brown Rudnick（布朗·拉德尼克律师事务所）继续留在本案中，他们至少不会再继续推进该动议。我不知道你是否会这样做。但无论如何，我们可以稍后讨论。\n\n关于我们今天所处的阶段——\n\nDESPINS先生：是。\n\n法院：——我的意思是，最重要的事项——所有事项都重要，但是——包括申报债权截止日期命令。我确实看过——我必须说我没有细查——但我看过你们提交的附有修订标记等内容的拟议命令，我对此有一些想法，但没有任何实质性问题。好吗？\n\n至于是否——因此，今天必须决定的事项是——所有事项都必须——必须处理——但如同我们上次听证会时所说，我知道你们已收到大量证据开示请求，因为你们提出了撤销传票动议。因此，我理解这一点。\n\nHenzy先生（亨齐先生）正在推进其请求免除判决书效力的动议。数方已对此提出异议。我对该动议及我们都需要讨论的程序有一些关切。\n\n然后是你们——还有Paul Hastings（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所）的聘用，以及——以及当地律师的聘用。\n\nDESPINS先生：正确。还有——但我不确定你是否会处理这个问题——你曾要求Zeisler律师事务所（泽斯勒律师事务所）和U.S. Trustee（美国受托人）就某项问题提交书面意见。\n\n法院：是。\n\nDESPINS先生：我们没有参与该事项——\n\n法院：没有。\n\nDESPINS先生：——所以我不知道该事项目前处于何种状态。\n\n法院：我认为接下来我们将转而处理该事项。\n\nDESPINS先生：好的。\n\n法院：好的。但让我们先处理我们所称的程序性事项，尽管这些事项最终也具有实质性影响。\n\nDESPINS先生：是。\n\n法院：但愿如此。\n\nDESPINS先生：从某种意义上说，有很多事项需要处理——\n\n法院：是。\n\nDESPINS先生：——例如，申报债权截止日期，我们确实对其作了修订，因为您要求我们这样做。\n\n法院：对。\n\nDESPINS先生：这听起来可能很奇怪，但我认为，基于与Genever案有关的理由，我们不应继续处理该事项。有一整套情况——\n\n法院：哦，好的。\n\nDESPINS先生：——我想向法官阁下说明。\n\n法院：好的。\n\nDESPINS先生：——所以我们将在听证会结束时处理该事项——\n\n法院：好的。可以。\n\nDESPINS先生：谢谢您，法官阁下。\n\n法院：好的。谢谢。好的。那么，Claiborn律师（克莱伯恩律师）和Henzy律师，在上次听证会上，我确实要求你们两位——我知道你们确实就11 U.S.C. § 327(a)是否适用于Zeisler & Zeisler（泽斯勒与泽斯勒律师事务所），以及由于该所在本案中同时代理三方是否存在实际利益冲突这一问题提交了书面意见。不过，在讨论该问题之前，我不理解另一位已提交出庭代理声明的律师、Henzy律师，他将扮演什么角色，以及为何还需要另一位律师？\n\nHENZY先生：法官阁下，我只在发言时摘下口罩。\n\n法院：请便。\n\nHENZY先生：对此我表示歉意。我只是——Mitchell律师（米切尔律师）出庭代理——据我理解，法官阁下，在Brown Rudnick退出与——我认为这对Baldiga先生的陈述没有任何影响——但债务人曾——\n\n案号 22-50073\nDoc 1082-8\nFiled 11/11/22\nEntered 11/11/22 13:18:26\n\n——据告知——我并未参与其中，但其作出了明确决定，终止——\n\n法院：这是我们上周从Brown Rudnick的某人那里得知的。我不记得是谁，所以对此表示歉意。\n\nHENZY先生：当然，在不涉及任何《破产法典》或破产规则问题的前提下，根据《职业行为规则》，如果客户终止委托律师，该律师在职业伦理上不得再继续代理该客户。\n\n因此，在Brown Rudnick不再代理——再次说明，先不考虑《破产法典》、破产规则以及退出代理的必要性——但我可以理解他们采取这样的立场，即他们不再代理债务人，而我的律师事务所当时尚未——尚未受债务人聘用；Mitchell先生出庭，实际上仅是为了——我认为是在法官阁下就美国受托人要求任命Despins先生为受托人的动议举行的7月8日听证会时——在记录中表明债务人事实上反对任命Despins先生为受托人。\n\n我记得，此事是通过提交一种信函，而非通常会看到的正式书状来完成的。\n\n但我相信债务人无意让Mitchell律师在法庭上代理他。这就是他聘用了——他聘用我们事务所的原因。\n\n法院：那么，Mitchell先生是否会撤回其出庭代理声明？\n\nHENZY先生：我当然会与债务人及Mitchell先生讨论此事，是的。\n\n法院：因为Mitchell先生在信中表示，他了解破产法院的所有规则，但他却提交了这封信。\n\n所以我——我认为债务人在本院不应有两名律师。我看不出有此必要。\n\n而且我不——显然，自称了解的Mitchell先生并不了解这里的运作方式。因此，我认为Mitchell先生撤回其出庭代理声明将是明智之举。\n\nHENZY先生：明白，法官阁下。\n\n法院：好的。\n\nHENZY先生：我们会把这件事处理妥当。\n\n法院：好的。好的。现在转向11 U.S.C. § 327(a)的问题，以及Claiborn律师，你知道，Henzy律师，当你说这是明确的法律规则时，我回头查了一下。\n\n当然，这实际上并非明确的法律规则。Collier's（《科利尔破产法论著》）中有一句话这样说——而且没有引用任何判例。随后，援引“非占有中的债务人不适用327(a)”这一命题的判例，又引用Collier's。因此，这实际上很有意思，因为你会认为相关材料应当比实际存在的更多。那些援引“你并未占有财产，因此第——抱歉——因此327(a)不适用”这一命题的判例，都依赖于Collier's中的一句话，这对我而言颇有意思。但无论如何，Collier's中还有其他内容也与本案的状态有关。Claiborn律师，你们的动议谈到债务人是代表破产财产行事，还是以个人身份行事，这关系到327(a)为何——是否应当适用。那么，从美国受托人的立场来看，目前情况如何？\n\nCLAIBORN女士：法官阁下，我认为除债务人由Zeisler律师事务所提交的书面意见承认各方之间已签署利益冲突豁免文件这一点外，我们并未比提交书面意见时取得更多进展。\n\n法庭书记员：Claiborn律师，您的声音有点小。\n\n法院：她听不见——是的。您必须稍微大声一点。她听不见您。抱歉。\n\nCLAIBORN女士：实际上我说话已经很大声了，但我再试一次。我想请法院注意，Zeisler书面意见的ECF 620中陈述，债务人、HK International（HK国际）和Guo女士（郭女士）之间已签署利益冲突豁免文件。我们尚未见到这些利益冲突豁免文件，也不了解债务人、HK、Guo女士及Zeisler律师事务所之间可能进行的任何讨论。因此，截至目前，我们在分析上并未比7月27日提交书面意见时更进一步，所以依我们看来，Zeisler律师事务所是否必须遵守Section 327(a)，极大程度取决于债务人的目标是什么以及债务人正在做什么。作为其中一部分，这也与其针对三个不同当事人——债务人、HK和Guo女士——所扮演的角色密切相关。\n\n法院：好的。所以你们——不知道327(a)是否适用？还是你们说，由于不知道他们扮演什么角色，因此无法确定？\n\nCLAIBORN女士：正确。\n\n法院：好的。还有其他人希望就利益冲突问题发表意见吗？\n\n关于327(a)问题，我必须再次说明，Collier's仅用一句话说它不适用于非占有中的债务人。仅此而已。但该问题，视本案中发生的情况而定，可能会持续被提出，因为——即使我认定327(a)目前不适用，也并不意味着我不能在其他时候认定327(a)不适用。\n\n但这还不止于此，Zeisler律师事务所目前代理Kwok先生（郭文贵先生）、HK International和Guo女士，并称由于受托人现已自动替代HK在针对Kwok先生的对抗程序中成为当事人，因此不存在利益冲突。你同意这一点吗？\n\nCLAIBORN女士：我认为事情并非如此简单，法官阁下。\n\n法院：但这就是他们的论点。\n\nCLAIBORN女士：正确。\n\n法院：好的。那么你怎么看？\n\nCLAIBORN女士：法官阁下，美国受托人——我们提交的书面意见列明了不同司法辖区就327的适用性作出的意见，显然不包括本辖区；我认为，有观点支持这样一种看法：根据律师正在做什么以及他们在本案中实际扮演的角色，他们受327约束。\n\n在债务人今天推进其根据Rule 60(b)提出的动议，并以受托人的任命无效为思路和目标，因为Despins受托人不符合所要求的无利害关系人身份的范围内，该立场显然是为破产财产的利益而提出并加以主张的。\n\n因此，在该事项为债务人的目标和宗旨的范围内，可以作出一种解释，即327(a)事实上适用于Zeisler律师事务所。\n\n法院：好的。Henzy律师？\n\nHENZY先生：关于这两点，法官阁下，我——我不记得我就327(a)问题引用的所有判例——我确定其中数个确实引用了Collier's，但我不确定是否全部如此。\n\n我无法找到任何相反的判例，即要求非占有中的债务人聘用——\n\n法院：我认为你是对的。我也找不到。我查过。我同意你的看法。我不——而且我认为，那些判例中对Collier's的引用就是全部内容。\n\n另有其他案件——另有关于您是否可以依据330获得报酬的问题。那是另一个问题。MR. HENZY（亨齐先生）：是。是。我认为最高法院——法庭：但我同意。关于327(a)，没有任何规定称非占有债务人的律师必须遵守327(a)。我没有找到任何相关规定。然后唯一的问题是，您是否必须披露您的报酬。您披露了您的报酬。但我不明白，从您的角度看，常青预付金是什么意思。我想我知道它是什么意思，但我假定这意味着，当您的十万美元用完后，您会再获得——它是常青的，它总是在盛开，它永远不会失去它的——MR. HENZY：它总是——它总是在盛开。法庭：它总是在盛开。MR. HENZY：它总是在盛开，是的。法庭：所以您——所以您——您用掉那十万美元——我只是说——然后您又得到十万美元。MR. HENZY：或者该特定计费期间已使用的任何金额。是。\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 1082-8\n提交于 11/11/22\n录入于 11/11/22 13:18:26\n\n法庭：好的。那么——\n\nMR. HENZY：那么，假设在一个月内我们计费了$10,000，我们会向客户计费——我们会向客户发送一张$10,000的发票。我们会从预付金中提取该$10,000，客户将有义务补足预付金。\n\n法庭：好的。\n\nMR. HENZY：这就是其设想。\n\n法庭：那么——那么法院如何——法院如何知道您的预付金——已经——即将不再盛开并且需要补足？\n\nMR. HENZY：我不知道法院是否会知道这一点。我不知道根据规则，法院是否需要知道这一点。我想他们并不——我只是说，在理论上，假设举个例子，如果——如果在那种情形下，预付金停止盛开，法院可能得知此事的方式是，律师可能会以客户——\n\n法庭：好的。\n\nMR. HENZY：——未履行其义务为由提出退出代理的动议。\n\n法庭：这是可能的。但是，再说一次，债务人的儿子向您提供了那十万美元，对吗？\n\nMR. HENZY：是。这是正确的。\n\n法庭：好的。因此，债务人的儿子——您代理债务人、债务人的女儿、主张——\n\nMR. HENZY：称其拥有该游艇的实体。\n\n法庭：——其是该游艇登记所有人的实体，而现在——现在您正从债务人的儿子那里收取款项？\n\nMR. HENZY：是。\n\n法庭：好的。您不认为其中任何一点构成利益冲突吗？\n\nMR. HENZY：我不认为其中任何一点构成不可豁免的利益冲突，其他——\n\n法庭：嗯，根据规则1.7，您还必须满足其他事项。这不仅仅是您获得了一份书面的知情同意豁免。共有四项。您有合理理由相信您能够提供称职且勤勉的代理。我并不是说您做不到。您可能相信这一点。其他人可能不同意您，但您可能有合理理由相信这一点。该代理不受法律禁止。嗯，如果破产法典的条款如Claiborn律师（克莱伯恩律师）所主张的那样适用，我对此并不确定。\n\nMR. HENZY：我想回到那个问题。\n\n法庭：是。我们会回到那个问题。该代理不涉及律师在同一诉讼或法庭前的其他程序中代表的一名客户向另一名由该律师代理的客户提出请求。\n\n因此，我们不只是在谈论这里的对抗程序，对吗？我们谈论的是整个案件，即第11章案件，其中，那个实体——Friedman先生（弗里德曼先生）在上次听证时提醒我，因为我记不起向债务人财产出借资金的实体，也是一个我相信由儿子控制的实体，而现在支付您报酬的人，我想并非通过某个实体，而是由他本人支付。\n\n您的披露文件是这样说的，对吗？\n\nMR. HENZY：是。\n\n法庭：该款项直接来自儿子，而非任何其他实体？\n\nMR. HENZY：是。\n\n法庭：好的。好的。因此，根据规则1.7，您有四项必须满足的事项，而不只是——不只是对利益冲突的豁免。\n\n而且有很多判例——我并不是说我们今天要逐一审查它们，好吗——但有很多判例，破产法官说，您可以主张所有这些事项，但这并不意味着该利益冲突确实可以豁免。仅因为您让他们签署了一封写明其豁免利益冲突的信，并不意味着它实际上可被豁免。\n\n这就是您所面临的问题——或者说，我认为您面临的问题之一。\n\n鉴于在本案提交之前于本法院外发生的情况，有许多信息可能成为本案中与此相反的事实，即，他们全然是一体。有人可能会主张，您对他们所有人的代理恰恰支持了他们全然是一体，因为Despins先生（德斯平斯先生）在我们上次开庭时说——而他之后可能会进一步说明此事——就纽约破产案件而言，指示来自Kwok先生（郭文贵先生），而非来自公司实体。\n\n而且，您知道，我的意思是，Friedman先生的文件，如您所知，Henzy先生，我相信您已阅读，其中详尽说明了在本法院外作出的所有认定。\n\n所以Friedman先生说，您知道，法官，您可能需要考虑这一点，因为这或许只是纽约当时发生之事的延续，即通过这一层层交织的问题网络，我们只是继续做同样的事，只不过是在另一家法院。\n\n而我感到困难的是，我看不出您如何能够代理那三个实体，现在又由儿子向您支付报酬，并称您在规则1.7下不存在同时利益冲突；这与327(a)问题不同。好吗？我并不是——我是说，即使我同意您的观点，即327a不适用，而且我认为您可能是对的——尽管我听到了Claiborn律师的论点。不过，我认为关于该论点的问题是，当该问题显然已经出现时就必须提出。我不——我不认为她——她的办公室目前能够表明，您实际上——即，您实际上是在代理债务人财产，因为我目前也不确定我是否同意这一点。显然，正如您所知，这很复杂，而且已经持续很长时间了。因此，我就是看不出这为何不构成利益冲突。债务人财产中存在一些请求权将会——您将如何向Kwok先生个人，以及向HK International（香港国际）和Mei Guo（郭梅）个人提供建议，而不会——而不会使他们的利益重叠和／或冲突，而这种情况可以且很可能会发生？\n\nMR. HENZY：那么，我想先提出几点，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：是。\n\nMR. HENZY：当然，法院有权在涉及其法院内的程序时执行职业行为规则。当然，毫无——我绝不以任何方式、形式或形态对此提出质疑。\n\n然而，首要的是，首先应由律师自己知悉并处理其自身的利益冲突，并确保其遵守职业行为规则。再说一次，如果某件事提交到法院面前，而法院说那构成利益冲突，法院当然有权、也许也有义务采取行动。\n\n第二巡回上诉法院表示，法院应在一定程度上尊重客户选择律师的决定，因为人们享有一项普遍认可的权利，即聘请律师并聘请其自行选择的律师。我认为1.7(a)规则并不承认、处理或涉及这一点。\n\n就1.7(a)(1)而言，目前不存在利益相对。我们代理HK International，我认为——以及Mei Guo。我们可能最终会在案件中就其他问题代理他们，但主要地，而且我不想说几乎完全地，代理事项一直是Lady May号游艇。\n\n现在，我明白我们已在本案中提交出庭代理声明——理论上，除了关于Lady May号游艇的问题外，是否可能出现他们彼此利益相对的问题——但迄今为止，我们为那两个——那两方——该个人和该实体所做的一切，均是关于Lady May号游艇。\n\n法官阁下，我认为，普遍认可的是，在不存在现有的同时利益冲突的情况下——\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷庭审记录和转录服务公司）\n\n——而规则1.7所说的是存在同时利益冲突——未来某个时候可能发生利益冲突这一事实，并不使律师丧失代理资格，而您可能必须在届时处理该问题。这当然也是我们的做法，我认为也是大多数律师事务所的做法，即——在任何共同代理中——告知客户，如果——如果最终出现彼此利益相对的情况，我们将必须处理该问题，而这可能会对您产生后果。我们可能必须辞任代理一方、双方或三方，但是——在您实际面临该同时利益冲突并必须处理它之前，您并不知道这一点。\n\n实际上，就1.7(a)(2)而言，也是同一主题，不存在——\n\n法庭：不过我谈的不是(a)。我谈的是(b)。\n\nMR. HENZY：我会——我会谈到(b)，因为(b)在(a)之后。它是——\n\n法庭：是，但它写的是“尽管如此”。\n\nMR. HENZY：但如果不存在同时利益冲突，您就不会进入(b)。\n\n法庭：好的。请继续。\n\nMR. HENZY：(b)是，尽管存在(a)款项下的同时利益冲突，律师可以代理客户，是的，但除非您在(a)项下不符合要求，否则您不会进入(b)。\n\n法庭：那么您如何未能——您如何通过(a)(1)？您代理HK和Kwok先生。该游艇——受托人希望该游艇成为债务人财产的财产。\n\nMR. HENZY：是。\n\n法庭：根据您的说法，HK对该游艇具有与Kwok先生不同的利益。那么，目前他们怎么会——怎么会不是直接彼此利益相对？\n\nMR. HENZY：嗯，Kwok先生已经不再是该对抗程序的一方——\n\n法庭：我说的不是这个。\n\nMR. HENZY：——而且没有——\n\n法庭：我不在乎他是否是该对抗程序的一方。就该游艇而言，他仍然具有相对利益，因为他——因为他们仍将不得不——如果Despins先生成功地，对吧，成功主张该游艇是债务人财产的财产，那么这就是一项——那么这对您的客户和HK就是相对利益，因为届时HK不拥有该游艇，而债务人拥有。它们怎么会不是——它们怎么会不是——这怎么会不构成利益相对？\n\nMR. HENZY：当然，如果法院裁定——这对HK将构成利益相对——\n\n法庭：对。而您代理HK以及\n\n债务人。HENZY先生（亨齐）：是的。但我不确定我同意您的看法。Kwok先生（郭文贵）的立场是，HK International（香港国际）拥有该船，因此双方不存在利益对立。他不认为自己拥有该船。他不认为该船属于破产财团财产。我明确地在庭审记录中如此说明。因此，如果他们采取相同立场，我看不出他们如何会存在利益对立。我认为他——他会——我知道他会考虑不参与该争议。该争议推定是在受托人与HK International之间。但我不——Kwok先生——我再次在庭审记录中说明，他不会——我想，如果有人希望传唤他作为证人或诸如此类，他或许会参与，但他不会采取任何立场。那将是受托人与HK International之间的争议，因此不存在利益对立，法官阁下。法庭：我不同意您的看法，但请继续。HENZY先生：好的。如您所言，关于(b)，我们确实认为能够为每位客户提供胜任且勤勉的代理。我并不担心我们会代表HK International有所保留，或者该船相关事宜会以任何方式影响我们对Kwok先生的代理。关于(b)(2)、327问题，我们同样可以进一步讨论。我已在书面文件中提出这一点——我不想赘述，Kwok先生已不再是该对抗程序的当事人。我相信Despins先生（德斯平斯）在上次听证会上说过这一点。他在该——该对抗程序中被自动替代为当事人。我引用的规则和案例表明，受托人获任命后，他自动替代债务人成为该诉讼中的当事人。三位客户均已表示同意。我们确实告知他们，如其愿意，可咨询其他律师，并且他们已书面确认其同意。因此，即使假定根据1.7(a)存在同时利益冲突——法官阁下，就您所言，在本案的某一时点可能确实会产生同时利益冲突。我认为目前不存在——但在某一时点可能会产生同时利益冲突。如确有发生，则为遵守职业责任规则，我们将负有职业责任予以处理。再者，通常在共同代理时，您会告知客户，如产生同时利益冲突，我们可能需要退出代理或以其他方式处理。但如果以及当利益冲突——同时利益冲突产生时，我们将——我们必须予以处理。客户已被告知此事。再者，他们已经——他们已经表示同意。法庭：嗯，我们——我不知道他们是如何表示同意的。我的意思是，他们可能只是说“我同意”。我不知道他们说了什么。我知道您说他们说了什么，但仅仅说“我同意”并不意味着这——这是可豁免的利益冲突——HENZY先生：嗯，唯一——法庭：——因为您必须知道他们同意的是什么。HENZY先生：该规则下唯一不可豁免的利益冲突，是我们在同一诉讼中代理两方当事人的情形。由于Kwok先生已不再是该对抗程序的当事人，我认为我们并未在同一诉讼中代理两方当事人。因此，他们可以同意——法庭：但这不仅仅是该诉讼——您不断聚焦于对抗程序的问题——而是本案，是本案。Kwok先生仍在本案中。这是他的案件，无论他是否——不再占有财产。他不再占有财产，并不意味着它就此消失。这仍是本案中的一个问题。您知道，说Despins先生在该对抗程序中取代Kwok先生的地位，但并未在任何523对抗程序中取代他的地位，这太方便了。我理解这一论点。我不是——我理解这一论点。但它并不是——您不能仅仅存在利益冲突，然后它就——它就消失了，不再存在。这不是其运作方式。如同我认为我们上次谈及的利益冲突，您知道，您必须接受客户的现状。您或许会主张您目前不存在利益冲突，但当事人之间存在利益冲突。这里存在一些问题。HENZY先生：我不——我看不出当事人目前在哪里彼此直接利益对立。法庭：嗯，您或许看不出来，但这并不表示它不存在。HENZY先生：但是如果——法庭：本案的问题在于，以及本案之前那个案件中，曾就这——这些家庭成员——密切关系作出许多、许多认定——而且顺便说一下，他们都是内部人，所以我们就——我们也没有提出这一点。他们都是内部人。HENZY先生：没有任何事项在您面前，法官阁下。法庭：不，不，不，我说的是——HENZY先生：没有任何事项在您面前。法庭：不，不，不，我说的是目前本案中的情况。Guo女士（郭女士）是Kwok先生的内部人。\n\nHENZY先生：\n是。\n\n法庭：\n向您支付十万美元的儿子是Kwok先生的内部人。HK International可能是，也可能不是Kwok先生的内部人，但情况很接近。\n\nHENZY先生：\n好的。\n\n法庭：\n好的？那么，这怎么会不是利益冲突？\n\nHENZY先生：\n因为他们并不利益对立——他们彼此并不直接利益对立。法官阁下，如果——\n\n法庭：\n如果Despins先生现在起诉Guo女士——\n\nHENZY先生：是的。\n\n法庭：——并称她收到了她收到的任何款项——我是在——我是在举一个假设。她在申请破产前90日从Kwok先生处获得十万美元付款，那么他们怎么会不利益对立？\n\nHENZY先生：我认为Despins先生和Guo女士将会利益对立。\n\n法庭：不，因为该款项必须从Kwok先生处返还，而Kwok先生——您——您一直——HENZY先生：如果Guo女士——如果Guo女士因——法庭：怎么——您不会——您会代表她提出抗辩吗？她的抗辩是什么？\n\nHENZY先生：请稍等。假定——我很抱歉，法官阁下。法庭：不，没关系，没关系。HENZY先生：不，不，那样不合适。我很抱歉。法庭：没关系。HENZY先生：如果Despins先生因偏颇清偿起诉Guo女士，我认为这正是您所假设的，或者无论因何事，无论因何事——法庭：无论因何事。HENZY先生：——那么我认为款项将由Guo女士返还，而不是由——法庭：但她的抗辩是什么？她会有抗辩。她不会就这样交出来。如果她能够，她今天就能交出来。HENZY先生：我不知道——法庭：您将如何代理她？HENZY先生：我不知道Despins先生对她提出何种请求，因此我不——法庭：我明白。HENZY先生：——我不知道她的抗辩会是什么。这是有可能的。我想他会提出某项请求，我不知道会是什么，该请求将产生某种直接利益对立，在此情形下我们将不得不处理该问题。但目前并不存在。法庭：好的。\n\nHENZY先生：法官阁下，这可能在将来某个时候存在，但目前并不存在。对于1.7(a)分析而言，存在的是同时利益冲突。今天，是否存在利益冲突？如果发生利益冲突——规则明确预见——我认为是在1.7的注释中，其中涉及共同代理——某项利益冲突——某项利益冲突可能在将来产生。如发生此种情况，律师负有伦理责任予以处理。但今天，Guo女士尚未被Despins先生因任何事项起诉。她可能会被他因某件事起诉，而该诉讼，无论其为何种诉讼，可能会，也可能不会——使Guo女士和Kwok先生处于直接利益对立的地位。但我——但我不知道。我今天无法知道这一点。法庭：嗯，顺便说一下，(a)并未说必须存在诉讼。HENZY先生：哦，不，是任何——是任何不利——法庭：所以它没有这样说。HENZY先生：不，是任何——我只是——我是在回应您的——法庭：(b)谈到这一点，而不是(a)。HENZY先生：我是在回应法官阁下关于假如——的评论。法庭：我明白。因此，我的意思是，在(a)中不必存在诉讼。\n\n法庭：\n如果您对一名客户的代理将直接不利于另一名客户。\n\nHENZY先生：\n而我——\n\n法庭：\n不必存在诉讼才会有该问题。\n\nHENZY先生：\n而今天我看不出Guo女士和Kwok先生如何直接利益对立——\n\n法庭：\n好的。\n\nHENZY先生：\n——就任何事项而言。我看不出HK International和Kwok先生就任何事项如何直接利益对立。再者，Despins先生将提出其提出的任何请求，而我们将——我们将从那里开始，或者处理他提出的任何请求。\n\n法庭：\n好的。\n\nDESPINS先生：\n法官阁下，我能否就此发言两分钟？\n\n法庭：\n可以。请讲。\n\nDESPINS先生：\n不是关于327。我对此没有看法。\n\n但关于利益冲突是否可豁免的问题，521，债务人的义务，521(a)(3)，如果任命了受托人，债务人负有在必要范围内与受托人合作的义务，以使受托人能够履行受托人的职责。(a)(4)，如果有受托人在任，他们必须交出所有财产，等等。\n\n当然，他们的观点是，哦，您知道，他是亿万富翁，但他没有资产，因此，我们站在V的同一边。但债务人所负有的该项——法定义务目前即已存在。您也知道，18 U.S.C.中存在与履行这些义务相关联的刑事规定。\n\n因此，我——因此，尽管存在同意，我并不十分确定这属于可豁免的利益冲突，因为债务人负有从事某些行为的法定义务，而这些行为与其所代理的另一方直接冲突。\n\n谢谢您，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：\n谢谢。\n\nDESPINS先生：\n此外，顺便说一下，我想提到他们称儿子支付的那张表，他们还勾选了债务人将——可能在未来付款的方框。我要根据549明确说明，我们保留一切权利。如果债务人正在向Zeisler（蔡斯勒）付款，我不希望他们认为，因为他们勾选了该方框，我们就以某种方式对此视而不见。我看不出债务人如何会——如何会在案件进行期间向他们付款。\n\n谢谢您，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：\n谢谢。\n\nHENZY先生：我相当确定Despins先生不会对任何事情视而不见，法官阁下。法庭：但关于债务人为费用作出未来付款，这是一个好观点。我认为那将极其成问题。HENZY先生：法官阁下，债务人不会作出任何付款，至少不会从任何——Despins先生提到549以及属于破产财团财产的任何财产中作出付款。我们不会——我们不会接受任何此类付款，当然无论如何不会明知而接受。因此，我再次说明，法官阁下，债务人——债务人确实根据521负有义务，但我看不出这如何——Despins先生已经在公司治理动议中提出了一些建议，但我仍看不出目前存在任何直接利益对立——任何人彼此直接利益对立。再者，将来可能发生某些事情，从而存在利益对立。唯一的利益冲突——根据规则明确规定，唯一不可豁免的利益冲突是(b)(3)。因此，我们可能认为某一客户不应当——法庭：顺便说一下，我不确定这是否正确。我的意思是，判例法并不完全支持这一点。我理解这是您的论点。但您何时——在哪里——您所依赖的哪项权威依据表明，唯一不可豁免的是(b)(3)？HENZY先生：我认为这就是Fiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷速记与转录服务公司）的明文规定。\n\n该规则的。也就是说——除非法律禁止，这又回到了 327(a) 问题。法庭：即第（2）项。是的。Henzy先生（亨齐）：好的。但我不知道有任何法律禁止——法庭：嗯，实际上有很多——信不信由你，我看过一些判例法，其中指出——即使知情同意是书面的，破产法院也认定，无论该同意书中写了什么，这都不是可放弃的利益冲突。明白吗？全国各地都有相关案例，也有近期案例讨论此事，即——你可以放弃——你可以说任何你想说的话并放弃它，但仅仅因为你这么说，并不意味着它具有可执行性，也不意味着该冲突可以放弃。Henzy先生：是。我——法庭：而在目前这个阶段，我不确定它是否可以。但请继续。Henzy先生：我想我不理解这一点。法庭：嗯——Henzy先生：如果法律没有禁止，而且不是彼此相互提出的债权主张——法庭：因为这影响整个破产财产。这不只是 HK International（香港国际公司）在其中起诉 Kwok先生（郭文贵）的那一项对抗程序。这还涉及 Despins先生（德斯平斯）所说的事项，以及更多事项。债务人仍然——他可能是非占有财产的债务人，但他在破产法下仍负有义务。\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（Fiore记录与速记服务公司）\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1082-8 Filed 11/11/22 Entered 11/11/22 13:18:26 Page 49 of\n\n他自愿来到本法庭，并使自己受本法庭管辖。随之而来的是，他享有全部利益，但也承担负担。他必须合作，并向受托人移交其拥有的破产财产中的全部财产——无论其对任何一项财产具有何种衡平法或法律权益，不论该财产为何，不论是动产、不动产，或其他任何财产。而当存在——\n\n我们尚未讨论 HK International 就该船舶证书所采取行动的问题。该问题似乎暂时被搁置了。但有 $37 million 存放在一个托管账户中，Despins先生将以某种方式主张，该笔款项或该船属于破产财产。而那笔钱——\n\n现在，Friedman先生（弗里德曼）得再提醒我一次：为那 37 million 提供资金的是 Golden Spring（金泉），还是其他人？\n\nHenzy先生：但是，法官阁下，有几点——法庭：不，等一下。先让我把思路说完，然后我会回到你的问题。但关键在于，Kwok先生将会主张不同的立场——Kwok先生怎么可能——他是否会说：“哦，是的，HK International，请把船交给破产财产，还是不交？请继续，托管代理人先生。把 $37 million——谁来打这场争议？”Henzy先生：不是 Kwok先生。法庭：那么，谁来打这场争议？HK International。你同时代理 HK International 和 Kwok先生。Henzy先生：Kwok先生根本不参与这场争议。法庭：他不会参与这场争议。Henzy先生：不会。法庭：那么，我今天可以认定——我可以作出裁定，认定该船属于破产财产，而 Kwok先生不会就此争议？Henzy先生：Kwok先生不参与那场争议。法庭：他不会参与吗？Henzy先生：他——\n\n法庭：那么，你将代理 HK International 参与那场争议？\n\nHenzy先生：他不参与那场争议。现在这场争议是 Despins先生与 HK International 之间的争议。不是 Kwok先生的争议。\n\n法庭：好的。那么托管中的 $37 million 呢？\n\nHenzy先生：同样的回答，那不是 Kwok先生的争议。那是 HK International 的争议。而且，我——我甚至不确定那是否构成争议。法庭：那么，你怎么能在针对破产财产的争议中代理 HK International，而该破产财产正是你客户的破产财产？Henzy先生：但破产财产不是我的客户。最高法院在 Baker Botts 判决（贝克·博茨判决）中就是这么说的，而且——法庭：是的。但破产财产是你客户的责任。Henzy先生：不是。法庭：是的。根据 521，确实如此。Henzy先生：不。我认为这是错误的。法庭：是的。他必须移交。他必须合作并移交。Henzy先生：他有责任——法庭：那么，他现在是否会合作并说，没错，你知道吗，HK International 实际上并不拥有该船。根据 New York State Court（纽约州法院）的裁判，是我拥有该船。那么，你们为什么不现在就把它移交过来？这就是他合作的方式吗？然后，他怎么能一边这么说，一边让 HK 说，不，我是——我是该船的登记所有人？\n\nHenzy先生：因此，他在 521 下负有义务，但这并不意味着——521 并不意味着他必须说——必须走上证人席并说一件他不相信是真实的事情。所以，如果 Despins先生在推进该诉讼，或者该诉讼正在进行，而 Kwok先生被传唤到证人席，Despins先生问：“你拥有该船，这是真的吗？”Kwok先生回答：“不。”这并不意味着——他没有违反破产法 521 下的义务。他是在作如实证言。所以我并不——法庭：证言是否真实并不由 Kwok先生决定。这正是关键。否则我们为什么在这里？Henzy先生：哦。我同意您的看法。但他有义务作如实证言。法庭：他有义务作证。Henzy先生：作如实——法庭：由他决定该证言是否真实。Henzy先生：嗯，但是——但是，没有人会说：“Kwok先生，你相信你不拥有该船吗？”“是的，我相信我不拥有该船。”“那么你不能给出这个答案。你必须作证说你拥有该船，因为 521 规定你必须作证——”法庭：没有人会提出这种说法——没有人正在提出这种说法。\n\nCase 22-50073\nDoc 1082-8\nFiled 11/11/22\nEntered 11/11/22 13:18:26\n\nHenzy先生：那么我遗漏了——我遗漏了重点。法庭：好的。也许是我没有表达清楚。我不明白这种情况如何能够继续下去，但我们会讨论。还有其他人希望就 Zeisler律师事务所（蔡斯勒律师事务所）是否能够同时代理这三个实体，并且不被视为存在利益冲突一事发表意见吗？Henzy先生：法官阁下，有一点。如果您将裁定我们存在利益冲突，或者您不作出裁定，那么我认为今天其他任何事项都不应继续进行。您不能——因为债务人届时——法庭：我同意你的看法，这就是为什么我要求听取其他所有人的意见——Henzy先生：好的。因为债务人届时没有——法庭：这就是我们现在讨论此事的原因。Henzy先生：债务人没有代理人。而且，就您尚未作出裁定而言——法庭：嗯，他有代理人。他还有另一位律师。他有——不管是谁——Henzy先生：今天法庭上没有人代理债务人。\n\n法庭：我明白。但这——你知道，利益冲突问题被提出并不是什么新鲜事。所以请稍等。Henzy先生：好的。法庭：我听到了。我听到了。Henzy先生：好的。法庭：还有其他人希望就这一利益冲突问题发表意见吗？Despins先生：我只想说，法官阁下，我不确定我们今天是否需要一个精灵来决定该问题。我认为该问题仍然存在，今后仍将继续存在。法庭：好的。谢谢。Claiborn律师（克莱伯恩）？Claiborn女士：法官阁下，我同意，如果法庭决定今天不就该问题作出裁定，该问题并不会在今天消失。我想补充的唯一一点是，着眼未来并考虑过去，债务人对相关事项的立场一直在变化。而且，如果债务人把这一特定的利益冲突——尽管目前已得到解决——在未来用作一把剑，那么本案就会出现问题。法庭：你是什么意思？Claiborn女士：如果他在未来采取这样的立场，即他现任代理人 Zeisler 所给予的指导和意见存在利益冲突，且他不应受由此产生的任何结果约束，那么本案将来就会出现问题。债务人确有与律师分道扬镳的历史。法庭：好的。我想我明白你的意思。我目前可能——可能没有完全理解，但没关系。还有其他人希望发表意见吗？（无可听见的回应）法庭：好的。那么，Henzy先生，关于对这三方的同时代理，即 Kwok先生——即使他是非占有财产的债务人，他在破产法下仍负有持续、未履行且连续的义务——以及 HK International 和债务人的女儿 Mei Guo（郭美），我同意你的看法，目前看来你遵守了 Rule 1.7 的所有规定。但我确实同意，情况可能迅速变化，各方，包括你和/或法庭和/或其他人，如本案出现问题，都需要提请法庭注意。我认为你的客户，正如我前几天对你说的，你接手客户时必须接受其原有状况。由于你的客户在本法庭之外发生的诉讼方面存在一些问题，这些问题将在某个时候以某种方式回到本法庭。Despins先生必须做他必须做的事情，其他所有债权人也是如此。我完全不知道其他债权人会做什么。他们也享有权利。他们可以就你的客户——这三方——寻求他们认为适当的任何救济。因此——鉴于已经采取的立场，以及 U.S. Trustee（美国受托人）认为 327(a) 可能适用且你可能存在利益冲突，我认为该问题仍在本法庭审理之中，而且不会——你知道，可能早到明天就会出现问题。谁知道呢？我们将不得不处理这一问题。关于你所提出的解除判决命令的动议——Henzy先生：法官阁下，我能——我能问一个问题吗？法庭：可以。Henzy先生：无论如何，我想认为我相当认真地对待我在职业责任规则下的义务。法庭：没有人质疑这一点。Henzy先生：好的。我接受这一点。但是——法庭：但是你必须理解，本案中提出的问题每天——每周都在变化，对吗？我们走上一条路，然后又走上另一条路，现在又走上了另一条路。现在，你在提出一项动议，试图撤换受托人，此前——你知道，在你的客户来到这里并希望该船成为 $8 million 的一部分、希望该船成为破产财产的一部分、继续推进，并试图——正如 Baldiga先生（巴尔迪加）多次所说希望做到的——而且文件中写明了，因此这构成你方当事人、你客户的承认，无论是你代理你的客户，还是 Baldiga先生代理你的客户，他们都希望本案成为一个所有人能够聚在一起、解决所有问题并向债权人作出公平、平等分配的场所。但现在并非如此。明白吗？现在并非如此。如果确实如此，就不会任命 Chapter 11 trustee（第11章受托人）。因此，我并非试图质疑你对 Rule 1.7 的个人认真态度。正如我不断对你说的，你并不代理你自己。你代理你的客户。而你的客户已经收到若干对其不利的裁定，法庭一次又一次地听到相关情况。你的客户来到这里并说他想做所有这些事情，然后立即改变方向，并且\n\n他会终止一切，并让所有人走上一条与他来到这里时所说要走的道路完全不同的——完全不同的道路。这就是我所说的。好吗？HENZY 先生：法官阁下，我想提出的要点是，我认为我非常认真地履行我的义务。如果我曾认为自己存在同时利益冲突，我会处理此事，必要时与客户处理，或与法院处理。所以我会——我总会这样做。第二点是，Claiborn 女士所说的她不愿看到债务人将我律所所谓的利益冲突当作武器，我也要向他人提出同样的观点。出现这种奇怪的、也许三种——因此，如果 327 适用，如果债务人在主张其权利，而我就某个问题辩论得过于激烈，那么 327(a) 就适用。但如果债务人只是坐在那里，不——安静地坐着，且不对任何事情提出反驳，那么 327 就不适用。我希望今后各方不会在债务人可能对某事提出异议时，利用这一点站起来说，他现在受 327 约束，他必须离开。第三点，法官阁下，在本法院之外、破产前诉讼中发生的事情，我不确定这与我的律所是否存在\n\n依据规则 1.7 的利益冲突，或是否触发 327(a)，有什么关系。我不——我不认为有关系。\n\n这是一个棘手的案件。我认为不会有人对此有异议。这是一个——这是一个棘手、棘手的案件。但问题的棘手程度并不决定我是否存在利益冲突。我要么存在利益冲突，要么不存在利益冲突。\n\n法官阁下，我——我不希望今天结束后，您会认为——因为我——当您——无论如何，我认为，好吗——我绝不会打算把话塞进法官阁下嘴里，这就是为什么我要说我以为我听到的内容——我以为我听到的是，您同意我的看法，即您今天认为我在规则 1.7 下不存在问题。但随后您说——我认为，无论如何——再次强调，我想非常谨慎——但也许您认为存在。\n\n如果法院将认定我今天存在同时利益冲突，并且我不应代理债务人，我需要知道这一点，因为如果是这样，自法院作出该认定之时起，我说出的每一个字都会违反职业责任规则下的义务。因此，法院要么认定我今天存在同时利益冲突，要么不作此认定。\n\n并且承认，如果将来出现造成该冲突的情况，我们将不得不\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n案件 22-50073\n文档 1082-8\n提交 11/11/22\n录入 11/11/22 13:18:26\n\n1 处理该问题。\n但我——我今天需要知道这一点。\n2 法 院：\n我想我说过你今天不存在\n3 同时利益冲突，但你将来可能存在。\n4\n5 HENZY 先生：\n同意。\n6 法 院：\n并且各方需要将此事\n7 提请法院注意。\n8 HENZY 先生：\n明白，法官阁下。\n9 法 院：\n好吗？\n10 HENZY 先生：\n谢谢。\n11 法 院：\n好。关于规则 9024\n12 动议，正如我上次向你提到的，我不明白\n13 你为什么不依据第 324 条提出动议，即要求免除\n14 受托人职务。\n15 而我查阅的判例法称，\n16 规则——Collier 再次指出，规则 60 并非\n17 对受托人的任命提出异议的适当方式，\n18 因为美国——因为法院并未\n19 参与该任命。记住。对吗？法院\n20 未参与该任命。美国受托人\n21 参与该任命。\n22 而美国受托人仅仅请求\n23 批准该任命，法院批准了该任命。没有\n24 任何人能够提出任何证据说明为什么该任命\n25 不应获得批准。\n\n因此——该任命就——该任命随即有效。你必须采取的程序是依据 324 提出动议。如果该动议被驳回，那不是可终局上诉的命令。而显然，你希望规则 60 是一项可上诉的命令。因此，我们不——我们不沿着规则 60 的路径进行，因为根据我查阅的资料，这并不适当。Despins 先生被任命为 Chapter 11 Trustee（第 11 章受托人）。免除其职务的唯一方式是依据 324。因此，如果你想依据 324 提出动议并满足这些要求，你有权这样做。HENZY 先生：我认为，法官阁下，也可依据 1105。但——法 院：依据什么？HENZY 先生：我认为 1105 也规定终止受托人的任命。法 院：但它援引 324。HENZY 先生：1105 并未援引，但这无关紧要。法 院：规则援引了。HENZY 先生：我明白。为明确起见，法官阁下是否驳回我们的——法 院：是。\n\nHENZY 先生：——60(b) 动议？法 院：我驳回你们的 60(b) 动议。HENZY 先生：谢谢，法官阁下。法 院：与 60(b) 动议有关的所有证据开示均被驳回，因为该动议——因为该动议已无实际意义。HENZY 先生：法官阁下，我能否有片刻时间？法 院：可以。（暂停）HENZY 先生：那么，法官阁下，撤销传票动议——获得准许？法 院：无需准许。它已无实际意义。规则 60(b) 动议被驳回。HENZY 先生：很好。明白。法 院：与其相关的任何证据开示均已无实际意义。HENZY 先生：明白，法官阁下。明白。DESPINS 先生：法官阁下——法 院：是。DESPINS 先生：——我能否就此陈述意见？法 院：可以。DESPINS 先生：我知道您的反应可能是，你刚刚胜诉，为什么不坐下。但法官阁下，我知道本案将会发生什么。一切都会被上诉。我想知道法院是否会\n\n案件 22-50073 文档 1082-8 提交 11/11/22 录入 11/11/22 13:18:26 第 63 页，共\n\n考虑就此作出备选认定，即您已经裁定其在程序上不适当。但无论如何，根据 101.54 或 59 条款中的无利害关系概念——我忘了是哪一款——HENZY 先生：14。DESPINS 先生：14。抱歉。101.14 涉及破产财产，而非债务人。他们所提交的任何材料中，没有任何指称会以某种方式影响受托人相对于破产财产的无利害关系状态，作为备选认定。因为我——您知道我——我不想来回争论——法 院：嗯，我还没有——我还没有起草命令——DESPINS 先生：好的。法 院：——驳回规则 60 动议的命令，而在此之前甚至不可能提出上诉。第一。DESPINS 先生：谢谢，法官阁下。谢谢。法 院：第二，如果有上诉，他们必须提交保证金。HENZY 先生：我不知道是否会有上诉。但是，法官阁下，我认为不应作出那些备选认定。实际上，我不同意 Despins 先生关于受托人不必相对于债务人保持\n\n无利害关系的说法。判例法表明，受托人必须相对于债务人保持无利害关系。但是，再次强调，我认为您没有必要作出备选认定。您已驳回该动议。我明白驳回的依据。我认为应当到此为止。法 院：嗯，仍然会有书面命令。必须有书面命令。HENZY 先生：我的意思是，如果您要超出我姑且称之为 324 理由的驳回范围——我理解该理由——那么我知道 Collier 认为 324 或 1105 动议优于 60(b) 动议。但是——我会——如果您要作出备选认定，我至少希望有机会进行辩论，因为——法 院：你在书面文件中提出了该论点。你的论点在书面文件中。你说明了为什么你认为应当免除受托人职务，以及为什么应当给予免除该命令的救济。你的书面文件中写明了所有这些。你说——你在书面文件中谈到了所有这些。HENZY 先生：我认为您可以——我会主张您可以——您可以驳回——再次，这听起来很奇怪，因为您显然可以作出您决定作出的决定。但基于你需要提出一项\n\n法 院：我并没有说——我并没有只说\n\n这一点。那不适当。\n\n依据 324 的动议而驳回，我认为你——\n\n我说你必须提出一项——并且我在上次听证会上对你说过，规则 60 下的标准与 324 下的标准完全不同。\n\n因此，我并非只是说，因为你没有依据 324 提出动议，所以该动议被驳回。这不是我所说的。\n\nHENZY 先生：好的。\n\n法 院：好吗？我说，该动议被驳回，因为你没有依据 324 提出该动议，而那是应当据以提出该动议的适当条款。第一。\n\n第二，我不——我没有任何——没有——你在规则 60 动议下没有向我提出任何符合规则 60 动议标准的内容，即在你们的 60(b) 动议下，你必须认定——我本应认定存在无意的错误、意外或可原谅的疏忽。这不适用。\n\n经合理勤勉仍无法及时发现以提出重新审判动议的新发现证据。这不适用。欺诈，也不适用。你没有提出任何此类证据。判决书无效。这不适用。判决书已获履行、解除或清偿。这不适用。\n\n或者任何其他足以证明救济正当的理由。你并未提出任何其他足以证明根据规则 60 获得救济正当的理由。因此，如果你想提出一项动议，并尝试满足 324 的要求，欢迎你这样做。但你已经在规则 60(b) 动议中辩论过所有这些问题，我予以驳回。你向法院提出的内容中，不存在依据规则 60 和破产规则 9024、根据这些规则给予救济的任何理由。HENZY 先生：明白，法官阁下。法 院：好。谢谢。好。那么现在我们可以转向聘用 Paul Hastings（宝盛律师事务所）的申请。DESPINS 先生：谢谢，法官阁下。有两项——一项陈述和一项异议。第一项，即异议，由债务人提出。我们援引了一项 Fifth Circuit（第五巡回上诉法院）的判决——尽管我们不需要第五巡回上诉法院的判决，但该技术性判决指出，占有外债务人不能——没有资格对聘任律师提出异议。因此，我认为这是基本法律。实际上，您在上次听证会上曾暗示这一点，尽管没有具体谈及聘任律师。\n\n但该案适用于聘任律师，因为这是一项案件管理事项，且占有外债务人没有资格提出异议，除非存在剩余财产。而在本案中，他们声称不存在剩余财产，因为他们没有资产。\n\n现在，我认为，为了上诉目的，仍然重要的是，暂且假定存在资格两分钟，并回应债务人的异议。我回到无利害关系的定义。它以“破产财产”一词为关键。的确，该定义提到债权人、股权持有人和债务人，但检验标准是相对于破产财产。本案中被指称的一切均与破产财产无关。\n\nWynn 先生的问题，您知道，与破产财产无关。我想就此说清楚。我律所在 Wynn 先生被 DOJ（美国司法部）起诉后受聘，并未以任何方式就相对于 Kwok 先生应做什么或不应做什么向 Wynn 先生提供建议。没有这种情况。Wynn 先生不是债权人。Wynn 诉讼不会以任何方式，无论上行或下行，影响破产财产，这一点非常重要。\n\n中国办公室的情况也是如此。我的意思是，首先，我们在中国设有办公室这一事实从一开始就是众所周知的。\n\n但这一切都归结于我此前提出的基本观点——我想解释一下我使用“insanity（荒谬）”这一概念的地方。\n\n——在其书面文件中。他们说，他称其为荒谬绝伦，这令人愤慨。我始终非常明确地说，荒谬绝伦的是他们试图在债务人、其移民身份以及中国共产党之间建立联系，而这些与本破产财产之间缺乏联系。法官阁下并非在处理移民事项。法官阁下并非——我们并非在处理该事项。我们对此不持立场。这不是我们的问题，我们不会参与这些问题。正是在此处，整件事都站不住脚，因为所有这些与本破产财产以及我们必须履行的工作之间没有联系；我们的工作是尽可能取得最多资产，并将其分配给本案获准债权的持有人。另一点是 UBS（瑞银集团）事项。那也是另一种干扰。首先，他们从一开始就知道 UBS。我们在第一份声明中就表示，我们代理 UBS 的关联实体。我认为我说过，主要或首要涉及融资事项。我们并未说仅限于此。但是，我们代理其处理交通罚单、融资事项还是破产事项，又有什么关系？我已明确表示，我从未代理过他们。我并未代理他们。我能够以\n\n诉讼中的对立方身份，即作为受托人向其主张权利。事实上，针对他们的诉讼正在英格兰审理。如法官阁下所知，在英格兰，若要出庭并进行案件辩论，必须是出庭律师。Paul Hastings（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所）并非英国的出庭律师。因此，实际上，人们会使用——例如，若您查看他们的异议，其中附有针对 UBS 提交的起诉状，若您翻到最后，会看到三个签名。这是三名出庭律师。我们没有出庭律师。我认为，鉴于他们已经办理该事项两年，并且顺便说一句取得了一些成功，他们将会继续处理此事。嗯，我应当说是程序上的成功。因此，UBS 问题并非问题，因为无论如何，作为受托人，将由我处理此事。我将监督英国出庭律师的工作——他们并非 Paul Hastings 的人员，因为我们没有出庭律师——这再次解决了该问题。我相信其余内容均与 Rule 60(b) 相同。PAX（PAX）也提交了答复。我认为，先处理债务人的问题或许更合理，之后我们再回到 PAX 问题。谢谢。法庭：可以。谢谢。Henzy 先生（亨齐）？\n\n亨齐先生：谢谢，法官阁下。\n\n那么，如可允许，我先谈当事人资格问题。关于当事人资格，第一点，1109(b) 规定，债务人有权在 Chapter 11 案件中的任何问题上提出、出庭并陈述意见。这一点非常、非常明确。我承认，法院认为，根据 1109，债务人仍必须具备——您或许能够提出、出庭并被听取，但这并不必然意味着听我讲话就等同于法院必须裁决的一项异议。因此，您或许不得不痛苦地听我讲话，但随后可以说，谢谢你，亨齐先生，但我不——你并无资格提出异议。你已提出、出庭并被听取，但我无需就任何事项作出裁决。因此，我理解——这里实际上只有两个层面的分析：1109(b)，以及您是否具备当事人资格。传统的当事人资格分析是，您必须——您要么必须属于通常意义上的受不利影响者——而我认为这不是本案争议所在，因为我们正在处理一项法令——要么必须具有法定当事人资格。因此，必须存在国会通过的一项法令，据此主张国会意图赋予一方就该事项被听取的权利。这一点在许多最高法院\n\n判决中都得到了充分阐明，法官阁下。\n\n最高法院在这些判决中阐明的标准——主要判决包括 Association of Data Processing Service v. Camp（数据处理服务协会诉坎普案），载于 397 U.S. 150，以及 Clarke v. Security Industry Association（克拉克诉证券业协会案），载于 479 U.S. 388——是该方是否处于相关法令旨在保护的利益范围之内。\n\n最高法院阐明的标准是——这是一个相当低的门槛。这是引自 Clarke 判决的一段话。法院若要认定不存在当事人资格，就必须认定，利益范围否定了当事人参与的权利，因为当事人的利益与法令隐含目的之间的关联极其边缘化，或与该目的不一致，以致不能合理地认为国会意图允许其参与。Clarke 法院进一步指出，该测试并非意在设置特别苛刻的要求。尤其是，无须表明国会有使拟议原告受益的目的。回到 Collier's（科利尔破产法释义），其讨论这些案件时，在第 7 卷第 1109.04 节第 (4)(b) 段中指出，鉴于第 1109(b) 条的性质，因为法院已经说过，在依据最高法院判例法进行该利益范围分析时，\n\n应将其与 1109(b) 一并适用。因此，Collier's 指出，鉴于第 1109(b) 条的性质以及其旨在实现的目的，利益范围应作有利于 Chapter 11 案件参与的宽泛解释。法官阁下，有些案件认为，债务人有权对聘任律师提出异议。其中，Krechevsky 法官（克雷切夫斯基）在 In re Pappas（帕帕斯案），载于 216 B.R. 87，一项 1997 年判决中裁定——他实际上裁定，Rule 2002 将债务人称为利益相关方，且债务人有资格依据 327 对此提出异议。随后，Brozman 法官（布罗兹曼）在 Vebeliunas（韦贝利乌纳斯案）中——拼写为 V-E-B-E-L-I-U-N-A-S——载于 231 B.R.——请稍等，法官阁下——181。\n\n事实上，法官阁下，在该案中，Brozman 法官以受托人的律师在 341 会议举行之前、在从未询问债务人之前，就已公开发表表明其对债务人抱有极端偏见的言论为由，取消了受托人律师的资格。他称债务人为骗子以及其他不当称谓。Brozman 法官认定，该案债务人既有资格提出异议，并且事实上据此取消了该律师的资格。\n\n此外，法官阁下，我还援引 Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）的一项判决，Savage & Associates, P.C. v. K&L Gates（萨维奇及合伙律师事务所诉凯易律师事务所案），640 F.3d 53，其中第二巡回上诉法院明确指出，债务人具有\n\nCase 22-50073\nDoc 1082-8\nFiled 11/11/22\nEntered 11/11/22 13:18:26\n\n当事人资格——抱歉——一方可能不仅基于财务利益而具有当事人资格，也可基于其享有法律利益而具有当事人资格。再次，Krechevsky 法官和 Brozman 法官均认定，在律师并非无利害关系人的情况下，债务人对于反对一项 327(a) 申请具有法律利益。\n\n就财务利益而言，听着，我不知道本案最终将如何收场，法官阁下。我理解，在提交申请时，债务人持有的资金数额很小。\n\n但说到英国诉讼，该案请求的金额为 \\$500 million。我对其状态确实一无所知，只是我想，我可能听到过一项意见，其听起来或许与 Despins 先生（德斯平斯）所听到的情况相似，即该诉讼显然进展得相当顺利。\n\n因此，本破产财产很可能并非无力偿债。并且，英国针对 UBS 的追偿可能达到 \\$500 million。那对所有人——包括债务人——都会非常有利。\n\n因此，我认为，债务人在此有资格反对聘任 Paul Hastings。\n\n关于利益冲突，以及——我确实，您知道，提交了一份附有证据材料的证人及证据清单。我已准备好提出证据。\n\n不过，就我将提出的大部分证据而言，我不确定是否存在任何争议问题。我不想赘述或占用我们不需要占用的大量时间。我认为，Paul Hastings 为多家 UBS 实体提供服务这一点并无争议。Despins 先生提交的初始声明说明了这一点，并列明了这些实体。实际上，Paul Hastings 的金融重组网页称，他们已经——我不知道他们今天是否仍然如此——但他们曾为 UBS 实体提供服务。我认为，英国诉讼的被告是 UBS AG（瑞银集团股份公司）这一点并无争议。债务人的财产清单中——我不知道为什么——在财务状况说明书中披露了针对 UBS AG 的一项诉讼，随后括号中写的是 London Branch（伦敦分行）。而在 Despins 先生提交的初始声明中，他在声明中所称的 UBS AG 被界定为该 UBS AG，即括号中的 London Branch。但若您查看起诉状——事实上我将其附在我们的异议之后——再次，我可以——我很乐意将其作为证据提交，法官阁下，但它附在我们的异议之后，而且我认为其为该起诉状这一点并无争议——显然，该案的被告\n\n是 UBS AG——我将称其为大型 UBS AG——即总部位于瑞士、且推定为众多其他 UBS 实体母公司的那家。再次，该案主张的损害赔偿为 \\$500 million。因此，这并非一项微不足道的请求。这又一次载于我附在所提交异议之后的起诉状中。Despins 先生称，他从未代理任何 UBS 实体——这载于他的初始声明中——并且其以受托人身份能够与 UBS AG 对立，并作为原告具名。这里有几点。由于他在声明中将 UBS AG 界定为仅 UBS AG，即括号中的 London Branch，我认为他已提交的声明实际上并未涵盖该诉讼中的实际被告，因为他的声明——他确实在声明中称，他能够与任何——他从未代理过任何 UBS——该声明所称的是，他从未代理过任何 UBS 实体。这很容易理解。以我作为受托人的身份，我能够与 UBS AG 对立，并在针对 UBS AG 的任何诉讼中作为 Chapter 11 受托人具名为原告。但是，再次，他对 UBS AG 的定义是 UBS AG, London Branch，而那并非——该诉讼的主要被告是 UBS——我将其称为大型 UBS AG。因此，除他从未代理过任何 UBS 实体之外，他的声明只是——它只是没有涉及该诉讼中的实际被告。实际——法庭：如果他说从未代理过任何 UBS 实体，为何还需要涉及实际被告？亨齐先生：嗯，法官阁下，因为从所有这些内容中并不清楚 Paul Hastings 是否曾代理——如果我们谈论的是我被驳回的 60(b) 动议，那会很重要。但我们并非如此。我们谈论的是 Paul Hastings。因此，问题是——并非 Despins 先生是否曾代理任何 UBS 实体。而是任何 UBS 实体是否为 Paul Hastings 的前客户或现客户。我认为他的声明并未涉及这一点。法庭：好的。亨齐先生：Bassett 先生（巴塞特）——在实际申请聘任 Paul Hastings 的文件中，这是 Despins 先生的申请，但附有其合伙人 Bassett 先生的一份声明。Bassett 先生的声明完全没有涉及该代理关系。其所做的是援引 Despins 先生的声明，即他的第一份声明，并且只是\n\n称，就关联关系而言，我只是依赖他的声明。实际上，根据该规则——根据这项规则，我并不确定你是否可以这样做。我不确定律师——在聘任申请中，我不确定随申请附具的律所宣誓书或声明是否可以指向其他文件并称，我并未——我并未披露任何利益冲突。我指向某人——由其他人提交的另一份声明，并说去看看那份声明。但我想，从某种意义上说，我并未——我并未就此作出任何宣誓，只是就德斯平斯先生（Mr. Despins）在那边所说属实作出宣誓。因此，巴西特先生（Mr. Bassett）本人在其声明中根本没有涉及 UBS 问题。因此，我认为，归根结底，我确信现有声明已处理 UBS 问题。我也不确定你如何规避——或者或许你可以规避 Paul Hastings（普衡律师事务所）在此代表受托人一事，但我认为目前已提交的文件并未做到这一点。其并未将普衡律师事务所排除在代表 UBS 之外。事实并非如此。他们被聘任为受托人的一般破产法律顾问，我认为这对他们而言构成重大利益冲突。Fiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷庭审记录与转录服务公司）\n\n我认为，UBS 是普衡律师事务所的客户这一点已获承认。而 UBS 是本破产财产一项主要资产中的被告。我——我有点——我可以继续——我不知道我们是否会另行处理 PAX/PAG 问题。或者我可以继续讨论我提出的问题。因为我想，我认为弗里德曼律师（Attorney Friedman）提出的问题，实际上不同于我就 PAX 和 PAG 将提出的问题。因此，法官阁下，我是否应继续？法庭：嗯，我不知道。也许我们应先就这个问题听取德斯平斯先生的意见，然后再继续。我的意思是，否则我们将整天都在这里。对吧？我的意思是，那个——你知道，问题是，德斯平斯先生，亨齐先生（Mr. Henzy）称贵所存在利益冲突，因为贵所代表 UBS。贵所是否代表 UBS 尚不明确。而且——UBS 是对抗程序中——伦敦案件中的被告。所以，你知道，他称巴尼特先生（Mr. Barnett），我相信——德斯平斯先生：巴西特。法庭：巴西特，抱歉，他的宣誓书并未——并未回答该问题。德斯平斯先生：法官阁下，我可以发言吗？Case 22-50073 Doc 1082-8 Filed 11/11/22 Entered 11/11/22 13:18:26 Page 79 of\n\n法庭：可以，请讲。\n\n德斯平斯先生：因此，聘任普衡律师事务所的申请由我签署，其中通过引用纳入我的声明，该声明同时涉及受托人的任命和普衡律师事务所。该声明明确如此表述，即该声明中的披露同时涵盖受托人和普衡律师事务所。该声明称，我们目前不代表 UBS AG 伦敦分行。我们过去曾代表其，但我们代表其他 UBS 实体。而且我不认为——我会核实这一点——但我不认为其中称，左括号，伦敦分行与非伦敦分行，改变了分析。我认为，从我的观点来看，这是一回事。作为受托人的 Luc Despins（吕克·德斯平斯）可以担任受托人，并以受托人身份处理针对任何 UBS 实体的诉讼，无论是否为伦敦分行；而且实际上——这就是为什么亨齐先生没有——他提出了所有这些很好的观点，但没有深入现实。此处的现实是，该案已有律师参与。他们是出庭律师。这些人已处理此案两年。我——我认为他们将继续如此做。用新的律师替换他们并非好主意。无论如何，即使我想这样做，普衡律师事务所在伦敦也不是出庭律师，因此无法处理该诉讼。因此，普衡律师事务所一事是个虚假问题。普衡律师事务所无法处理该诉讼。因此，法官阁下，这确实是问题的关键，即由于该原因，这不是一个问题。而且，你知道——你知道，我确信法官阁下了解事务律师和出庭律师之间的区别。但我们在伦敦是事务律师，我们不是出庭律师，不能提交起诉状或处理审判。我很希望能够这样做，但我们并不具备这样做的条件。因此，对我而言，这完全解决了该问题。法庭：好的。德斯平斯先生：谢谢。法庭：谢谢。请继续，亨齐先生。亨齐先生：因此——因此，为明确起见，法官阁下，唯一涉及 UBS 问题之处，是美国受托人（U.S. Trustee）的批准任命 Chapter 11 受托人的命令申请，其中附有德斯平斯先生的无利害关系声明。该声明第 7(c) 段规定，普衡律师事务所此前曾代表 UBS AG，即括号内的伦敦分行，并将其定义为——其使用引号——“UBS AG”。因此，在——在他的声明中，UBS AG 的含义是 UBS AG 伦敦分行。这不是我的定义。我并不——我不认为我是在牵强解释任何事情、措辞或诸如此类的内容。这就是他对 UBS AG 所作的定义。该声明随后称，我从未代表任何 UBS 实体，包括 UBS AG。我以受托人身份能够与 UBS AG 相对——再次，将该 UBS AG 替换为 UBS AG 伦敦分行——并能够作为 Chapter 11 受托人，在针对 UBS AG 的诉讼中被列为原告——再次，将 UBS AG 替换为 UBS AG 伦敦分行。该声明就普衡律师事务所所称的是，普衡律师事务所目前不代表 UBS AG。但同样地——按照他的定义，UBS AG 是指 UBS AG 伦敦分行。它并非指大型 UBS AG。那可能——我不知道。普衡律师事务所是否不代表大型 UBS AG，可能属实，也可能不属实，但这并非该声明所述。普衡律师事务所目前确实在无关事项中代表若干 UBS 实体，即 UBS Securities, LLC、UBS Securities, Limited、首尔分行和 UBS Investment Bank；这些实体是 UBS AG 的关联方，而我再次认为 UBS AG 是指 UBS AG 伦敦分行。因此，我不认为德斯平斯先生的声明完全涉及普衡律师事务所对大型——即我所称的大型 UBS AG——的代理；该实体是英国诉讼中的被告。其根本没有涉及。而巴西特先生的声明也仅仅是提及德斯平斯先生的声明。\n\n德斯平斯先生的声明就其本人在该问题上是否无利害关系而言或许足够。他称其能够与 UBS AG 相对，即伦敦分行，并能够在针对 UBS AG 伦敦分行的诉讼中被列为原告，但其中对普衡律师事务所只字未提。因此，目前我认为尚未作出任何披露，法官阁下。而且，再次强调，我不知道这是否——我从未见过在聘任专业人士的申请中，附于宣誓书的声明仅仅援引他人的声明。但这——或许存在某些规定称这可以。因此，该申请是聘任普衡律师事务所担任一般破产法律顾问。没有——没有任何排除事项。德斯平斯先生：法官阁下，我乐意加入排除事项。普衡律师事务所不会处理英国诉讼。事情到此为止——到此为止。我的意思是，我们可以——因为我们不能。我们不是出庭律师，法官阁下。法庭：亨齐先生，关于该点还有其他内容吗？亨齐先生：法官阁下，关于该点我没有其他内容。\n\n法庭：好的。那么你的下一个观点是什么？亨齐先生：关于 PAX/PAG，我理解，在 7 月 8 日听证会当时已作出披露，随后又作了补充披露。对于 PAG，即所谓 PAG 实体，及 PAX 之间的共同高级管理人员、共同董事、共同控制关系，并未作出任何披露；普衡律师事务所直至最近才代表 PAG，并且显然终止了该关系。对于终止该关系的情形也未作出披露。而且我——弗里德曼律师当然可以纠正这一点，但根据他在 7 月 21 日听证会上所作的陈述，我的感觉是，PAG 可能并不理解其曾是普衡律师事务所的客户。再次，巴西特先生的声明根本没有涉及 PAX 或 PAG。其仅提及德斯平斯先生的——实际上是其最初声明。因此，我认为此处的披露并不充分。而且，正如法庭显然非常、非常清楚的，PAX 是本——本破产案的一名主要债权人。法庭：德斯平斯先生？德斯平斯先生：法官阁下，第一份补充声明再次称，其是为支持\n\n受托人的任命和聘任普衡律师事务所而提交。85\n\n这是第一段。因此，该问题已得到处理。\n\n我的声明同时涵盖两者。因此，我不理解\n\n为何又回到巴西特——就利益冲突而言，巴西特\n\n无关紧要。只有一项利益冲突披露。\n\n那就是我的声明。\n\n第一份、第二份和第三份。\n\n因此，巴西特，其通过引用被纳入一事\n\n毫无意义，因为聘用\n\n普衡律师事务所的申请称，我们——普衡律师事务所依赖\n\nLuc Despins 的多份声明。\n\n现在，关于 PAX 问题，他称我们不知道\n\n他们是否有相同的高级管理人员及诸如此类，第 4\n\n段声明称，无论如何，在不承认该点的前提下，假定 PAG\n\n实体和 PAX 为利益冲突目的将被视为一体，即假定\n\n他们拥有相同的董事和高级管理人员，我们并未\n\n讨论这一点，我仍能够与其相对，因为\n\n他们是前客户。\n\n因此，调查至此结束，即我在此处作最不利假定，\n\n即他们全都相同；我并不确定\n\n情况是否如此。\n\n但假定情况确实如此，\n\n我们能够与其相对，因为他们在一项——一项相关事项中是前客户。Fiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n最后一项交易是一项在 5 月完成的交易——我忘了确切日期——5 月 15 日、17 日，诸如此类。而且它是一项公司交易，且已有交割，那就是交割交易。那是在 2022 年 5 月。因此，我不确定我理解该点。法庭：亨齐先生？亨齐先生：我的意思是，再次，法官阁下，实际附于聘任普衡律师事务所申请的唯一声明是巴西特先生的声明。但是，我的意思是，法官阁下，对于交易型客户而言，总会有一段时间没有待决交易，而听起来 PAG、这些 PAG 实体，是普衡律师事务所的交易型客户。而且我并不——我并不怀疑，我想是在 5 月，他们正在处理的任何交易已完成，但我的意思是，至少看起来曾存在一种关系。普衡律师事务所当然可以采取立场，认为，目前我们并未在任何事项中代表任何 PAG 实体，因此，他们是前客户。现在，那——而且这始终是一种讨论问题。如果你有一名客户并且你在进行\n\nCase 22-50073\nDoc 1082-8\nFiled 11/11/22\nEntered 11/11/22 13:18:26\n\n如果您定期为该客户开展工作，但在某一时点您并未积极处理任何事项，该客户是前客户还是现客户？\n\n我认为我理解，从技术角度而言其为前客户，但我认为客户往往并不理解这种技术性论点，也未必总会同意。\n\n不过，我仍认为存在披露问题。\n\nPAG（PAG集团）、PAG实体成为前客户的情形是什么？\n\n我的意思是，Paul Hastings（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所）是否告知其不再代理他们？\n\n我认为这——我认为这具有相关性。\n\n该关系持续了多长时间？\n\nPaul Hastings曾就多少项交易事项代理PAG实体？\n\n我认为以上均属于应披露的相关事项，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：还有其他事项吗？\n\n亨齐律师：没有，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：就聘用Paul Hastings整体而言，还有其他事项吗？\n\n亨齐律师：有，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：什么？接下来是什么？\n\n亨齐律师：好的。接下来，我将其称为Paul Hastings与中国之间更为广泛的联系。我认为，法官阁下，Paul Hastings在中国设有业务据点这一点并无争议。其在北京、上海设有办公室，也在香港设有办公室。我不知道，今日是否会有人对Paul Hastings确实为中国国有实体提供服务，以及也为在中国经营业务的企业提供服务提出异议。我不认为今日会有人同意我的观点，即中国对在中国经营的企业行使重大审查和控制。我承认，我今日无法证明这一点。我不确定自己应如何证明。我在异议中援引了FBI（联邦调查局）局长Christopher Wray（克里斯托弗·雷）的一项陈述。我没有传唤雷先生今日到庭，就中国对在中国经营企业——包括其在中国经营的许可——所行使的控制程度，在法庭上陈述他公开说过的话。我还认为，法官阁下——我不知道这是否会有争议——公开记录已相当充分地表明，轻描淡写地说，Kwok先生（郭文贵）得罪了中国政府。他不得不离开该国。他正在此地寻求庇护。中华人民共和国政府和／或香港政府没收了其家属及其他人的数十亿美元资产，以及可能数额极为巨大的、我认为他不会否认属于其所控制实体的资金，例如盘古广场，据我了解，该项目实际上与PAX的贷款有关联，并且在某种程度上也是后来大量事项瓦解的原因之一。Kwok先生可能基于对该等资产的没收，对香港政府或中华人民共和国政府提出请求权。我显然并非该领域专家，但据我了解，至少在形式上，资产被没收的人可以遵循某种程序。我不知道Despins先生（德斯平斯）是否就此进行过任何分析，即破产财产是否可以基于资产被没收而提出请求权。因此，这是一项具体关切。\n\n一般性关切是，我认为中国政府已经表明其正在针对Kwok先生。\n\n法官阁下，我们在异议中再次援引了司法部的文件，这些文件清楚表明，中国政府曾试图以各种方式将Kwok先生从本国移走。因此，这引发了若干关切。\n\n其中之一是，中国政府将寻求对Paul Hastings施加影响。除非中国允许其在当地经营，否则Paul Hastings无法在中国开展业务。而且，再次根据FBI局长所述，中国政府确实对在当地经营的企业行使控制。最近且最直接的是——Despins先生提到了这一点——美国司法部已起诉Stephen Wynn先生（史蒂芬·永利），指控其未根据《外国代理人登记法》进行登记。指控称，Wynn先生作为中国政府的代理人行事，试图将Kwok先生从本国移走。\n\n2022年7月15日，Paul Hastings在该哥伦比亚特区诉讼中代表Wynn先生出庭，并正寻求驳回该诉讼。\n\n在我们将此事载入异议之后，Despins先生提交了第二份补充披露，其中，在该披露的第3段，他表示，他未在先前声明中披露Paul Hastings对Wynn先生的代理，因为他是经由该异议才首次得知此事。\n\n显然，该律所知道其对Wynn先生的代理，我认为该律所有义务作出充分披露。\n\n在该声明第4段中，Despins先生还称，他认为代理Wynn先生一事与聘用Paul Hastings担任律师无关，实质上完全没有关联，也不相关。我认为其在若干方面有关联。或者说，中国政府的行为在若干方面当然有关联。第一，如果Kwok先生被从本国移走，那么如果他不在此地，这显然会对本破产案件产生重大影响。Despins先生在其声明中称，债务人不会成为哥伦比亚特区待决诉讼中的证人。我不知道Despins先生如何能够知道此事属实。我不知道任何人，除非其与司法部的某人交谈过，如何能够知道司法部是否会决定，或者Wynn先生是否会决定，应当传唤Kwok先生作为证人。Despins先生还称，债务人的破产财产不会因哥伦比亚特区待决诉讼而增加或减少。我不知道Despins先生是否已得出结论，认为债务人对Wynn先生没有请求权。如果您阅读哥伦比亚特区诉讼中提交的起诉状，其实质上指称了一种相当广泛的行为模式。有人可能会说，这看起来像是一群人之间的共谋，意图将Kwok先生驱逐出境。因此，他很可能对Wynn先生享有请求权，或者很可能存在基于Wynn先生与Kwok先生有关的行为而针对Wynn先生的请求权。\n\n以上就是这些，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：好的。谢谢。Despins先生，您想就最后一点作出回应吗？\n\n德斯平斯律师：是的，法官阁下。\n\n首先，亨齐先生谈到债务人可能拥有的请求权。财产清单中没有提到任何此类事项。针对中国政府的请求权不在财产清单中。\n\n而且，再次说到施加压力的问题，始终未能将其与本案受托人的行为联系起来。可能施加的任何压力将如何影响该行为？这根本不存在。\n\n他不会成为证人，因为——正如我的合伙人告诉我的——这可能是为了销售中国技术、中国茶叶，或诸如此类的任何事项而进行的游说。\n\n如果您作为外国代理人行事，就需要登记。讨论事项的主题并非本案的一部分。事实是，您确实曾经代理，或者没有代理——我们不知道——外国实体。如果是这种情形，您就需要登记。仅此而已。因此，他不会成为证人。\n\n至于Kwok先生对Wynn先生的请求权，我不太愿意这么说，但是尽管去做。我的意思是，Paul Hastings不会代理Wynn先生，就Kwok先生提出的请求权为其进行抗辩，因为显然他们正试图构建某种情形，借此表明Kwok先生不知何故具有正当关切。\n\n我现在告诉您，如果Kwok先生决定以任何理由起诉Wynn先生，Paul Hastings不会在该诉讼中为Wynn先生抗辩。因此，不存在敌对关系或问题。因此，我认为这回答了那些问题。谢谢。\n\n亨齐律师：我会简短说明。我可能没有讲清楚。我认为关切在于，受托人以及代理受托人的Paul Hastings，是否有义务调查可能针对Wynn先生或其他参与该等行为、试图协助中国政府将Kwok先生驱逐出境之人的请求权。\n\n我的意思是，就针对香港政府或中国政府的请求权而言，债务人没有将其列入清单。但可以推定，代理Despins先生的Despins先生和Paul Hastings会希望对此进行调查。再次，盘古广场价值数亿美元，而且它被没收了。我认为，任何可能由债务人直接或间接拥有的资产消失，都属于需要审查和调查的事项。\n\n法庭：还有其他事项吗？\n\n德斯平斯律师：法官阁下，关于这一点最后补充一点。如果债务人明天发生车祸，并对另一名驾驶人享有请求权，我是否也应当追诉该请求权，还是说——那又是另一个问题。针对Wynn先生的请求权与此无关——这不是——这是债务人在申请破产后产生的请求权。我不确定这是否应由受托人提起追诉。\n\n亨齐律师：法官阁下，此处的所有行为均发生于申请破产前。所有行为。该诉讼由司法部在申请破产后提起，但所有已发生的行为均发生于申请破产前。资产被没收也是如此。因此，在存在资产的范围内，该等资产属于申请破产前的资产。我认为，我相信这些将构成破产财产。\n\n法庭：亨齐先生，您就反对聘用Paul Hastings担任Chapter 11受托人律师一事，还有其他要说的吗？亨齐先生？\n\n亨齐律师：抱歉，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：我的问题是，关于您反对聘用Paul Hastings担任受托人律师一事，您还有其他要陈述的吗？\n\n亨齐律师：没有，法官阁下。没有，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：好的。谢谢。还有其他人吗？Friedman先生，您是否就聘用Paul Hastings提交了异议或有限异议？\n\n弗里德曼律师：下午好，法官阁下。我是来自O'Melveny & Myers（欧麦律师事务所）的Peter Friedman（彼得·弗里德曼）。\n\n法庭：下午好。\n\n弗里德曼律师：因此，我们指出，我们担心如果此事会变成一场闹剧，那将是一个问题。显然，就受托人而言，还可以采取其他路径。\n\n但是，我们在审阅相关问题后并不认为，除可能不符合破产财产最佳利益之外，存在法定理由不应聘用Paul Hastings。我们的异议主要涉及费用和成本结构。\n\n不过，刚才的来回讨论确实让我想起了您谈到的一个问题，即，您只能接受您所遇到的债务人的样子。现在听债务人谈论他拥有的所有这些潜在有价值资产，确实有些奇怪；这些资产此前并未列入财产清单，而在他方便时，他会说自己有$3,850，或者说，不，这些资产从来不属于我，它们一直属于我的家人。但现在他声称他或许确实可以对中国政府提起诉讼。这周围笼罩着一种非常奇怪的迷雾——从债务人的视角看，这个案件几乎就像一块魔术画板。\n\n他过去所说的话，从字面上讲，与他今天的感受毫无关系。我认为，这或许是本案中令人担忧的一部分，即他过去在其他情境中所说的话根本无关紧要。出现了某些新的事情，他认为只要这在今天对他有利，他就可以像在一张白纸上一样借势而为；这就是我们多年来所看到的一种令人担忧的模式。\n\n法官阁下，关于费用问题，我们当时的情况是，美国受托人（U.S. Trustee）选定了一位收费结构较低的人，其收费结构低得多；我们确实认为，这总体上适合本案，尤其是如果最终形成的是一项非协商一致的计划，或者回收金额较低。我们担心，如果受托人及其律师产生大量费用，就会侵蚀债权人的回收款。\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷记录与转录服务公司）\n\n受托人对此大致上作出了回应。回应中的一点是：另一方面，我们并不像一家真正按风险代理收费的律师事务所那样行事，因为上行空间并不那么大。\n\n而且，公平地说，法官阁下，如果上行结果变得更好，对吧，也许我们关于上行部分的提议并没有我们本可以提出的那么慷慨。如果受托人追回 $150 million，我认为，我们可能会愿意大幅提高费用。\n\n我们只是——我们真正担心的是，如果处于低端，或者在追查 Kwok 先生多年之后，有些资金被耗尽。而 Despins 先生很可能不会。\n\n但是，如果最终追回 60 或 70 million dollars，同时又最终产生 10 或 15 million dollars 的律师费，那么从 PAX 的角度，以及我认为从其他债权人的角度来看，这将是真正的损失，尤其是本案开始时本有一种成本较低的选择。因此，这就是我们所担心的问题。\n\n所以，我认为本院有权现在评估成本，或者随着事态发展，在评估为破产财产带来何种价值的背景下评估成本。显然，人们可能更希望现在处理此事。我们会如此希望。但是，这就是我们的立场。\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷记录与转录服务公司）\n\n这就是——您知道，我认为这些年来您一直听我这样说。这并非像是——过去六个月的事。这并非是因为有必须立即处理的事实问题，我就要拍桌子。但是，PAX 确实担心，到头来 PAX 将获得多少钱，相对于将支付给专业人士多少钱。因此，我认为，如前所述，我们已经提出了。除此之外，除了我们的具体关切和具体提议之外，我认为，如果这对受托人及其律师事务所有吸引力和吸引性，我们愿意从我们的角度改进上行部分。但无论现在处理，还是将来在资产——在现金流入时处理，我们认为处理此事确实非常重要。谢谢，法官阁下。\n\n本院：谢谢。还有其他人希望陈述意见吗？哦，抱歉，Despins 先生。您想先回应吗？\n\nDESPINS 先生：不。也许其他人想陈述意见。\n\nGOLDMAN 先生：简要地说，法官阁下。Irve Goldman（欧文·戈德曼）代表债权人委员会，法官阁下。\n\n关于债务人称其可能对 Steve Wynn（史蒂夫·永利）提出的这一项新近提出的潜在请求权，正如 Friedman 先生指出的那样，这是一项本应但未在财产清单中列明的请求权。正如 Henzy 先生所说，它基于破产申请前的行为，因此本应作为破产财产的一项资产列入财产清单。有充分确立的判例法认为，当债务人未在其财产清单中列明一项请求权，随后又试图在确认后提起诉讼，例如，该债务人将因司法禁止反言而不得追究该请求权。这正是这里的情形。应当因司法禁止反言而禁止其主张，其拥有一项受托人需要调查的针对 Wynn 先生的请求权。关于 Paul Hastings（保尔·黑斯廷斯律师事务所）的申请，我们确实提交了一份声明，表示我们对于 Paul Hastings 律师事务所将在本案中如何代理受托人存在某些共识；这些共识是基于与 Despins 先生的讨论而形成的。即，该所将在可能情况下通过使用当地律师以节省费用，当地律师的费率远低于 Paul Hastings 律师事务所；并且，该所也不会为我们认为存在的诉讼请求寻求诉讼融资，这带来了节省，因为取得诉讼融资本会是一项昂贵的安排。因此，我认为，至少应当在今天的记录中确认这些共识。另一个共识是，受托人本人以受托人身份，不会就本案中可能追回和分配的资产依据第 326 条寻求按比例计算的报酬，而只会寻求其作为 Paul Hastings 律师的小时费率，以代替其最终可能根据第 326 条主张的任何比例报酬。因此，如果他能够在记录中确认这些共识，我将不胜感激。如我们在书面文件中所述，我们不反对聘用该所。\n\n本院：好的。您为什么认为他不应获得任何回收款的法定比例报酬？\n\nGOLDMAN 先生：嗯，因为如果他将以 Paul Hastings 律师的身份，按这些费率获得报酬——\n\n本院：哦，如果他将作为——以律师身份工作？\n\nGOLDMAN 先生：是的。\n\n本院：好的。好的。\n\nGOLDMAN 先生：是的。\n\n本院：我没有理解。现在明白了。\n\n本院：好的。\n\nGOLDMAN 先生：是的。\n\n本院：抱歉。\n\nGOLDMAN 先生：而且他——\n\n本院：我明白您的意思。\n\nGOLDMAN 先生：好的。\n\n本院：我没有理解。我想我只是没有正确听清您所说的话。\n\nGOLDMAN 先生：好的。谢谢。\n\n本院：抱歉。\n\nGOLDMAN 先生：谢谢。\n\n本院：好的。谢谢。Claiborn 律师？\n\nCLAIBORN 女士：法官阁下，美国受托人不反对基于迄今在本案中提交的文件聘用 Paul Hastings。\n\n我只想指出，正如我们此前在本案中所观察到的那样，持续披露义务在今天、明天以及未来均持续存在。\n\n然后，关于报酬问题，美国受托人的立场是，律师从其本地市场携带其所在律所的收费标准及其自身的小时费率。\n\n而且这是一起复杂案件。它有许多动态因素，需要经验丰富的律师，这必然有时会转化为较高的费用。本案必须完成的工作，确实需要以具有成本效益的方式完成。我认为每个人都已向 Despins 受托人明确说明了这一点，他也知悉此事；我确信他会尽最大努力确保技能与服务相匹配，并确保我们以具有成本效益的方式开展工作。当我们进入费用申请阶段时，那才是就所提供服务的成本效益及其对破产财产的益处进行辩论的适当地点和时机。\n\n本院：谢谢。Despins 受托人，您是否——您想回应吗？\n\nDESPINS 先生：谢谢，法官阁下。我将从委员会律师刚才谈到的地方继续说，也就是，我已作出承诺，尽量保持灵活。首先，这是我们的职责，但是——这在实际操作中意味着，尽可能多地依赖当地律师，Skalka 先生和 Linsey 先生。\n\n并且利用 PAX 在州法院所做的工作，因为其中有三年，也许四年的经验积累，我们没有必要重新发明轮子。我们作为律师，可以借用那些成果，而且我们打算这样做。这些结合在一起应当降低成本。但我不想误导您。这将是一个昂贵的过程。我想谈谈我已同意不会有诉讼融资这一点。这是正确的。但我确实获得了一份报价，以便让法官阁下有所了解。一家诉讼融资机构——假设我们想要 $5 million 来追究请求权——其将收取的费用会是该金额的两到四倍。因此，您必须偿还这 5 million，然后还要支付 10 至 20 million dollar 的费用。只是为了让您对此有所认识。我们并未要求任何此类费用。我们没有要求 30 percent、40 percent。我们要求的是我们的费率。我理解，相较于当地费率，我们的费率很高。我理解这一点，法官阁下。但在这里，我最终可能得到零回收。我们都知道，我们都相信，应该发生什么。我也相信如此。但从那一步到现实，将需要大量时间和努力。而我们正在承担这一风险，因为债务人拥有无限资源，他们会在每件事上与我们抗争。案件将上诉至 Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）。如果他们能够，还会上诉至 Supreme Court（最高法院）。对此我毫不怀疑。这就是我们在获得报酬方面所面临的情况。因此，我们认为，鉴于此，如果说，哦，如果你们收取不到超过 X dollars 的金额，我们就折减你们的费率，那将极不适当。因为，例如，假设明天我在梦中挥动魔杖，把 Sherry-Netherland（雪莉-荷兰公寓）和游艇带到这里，它们能卖多少钱？我不知道。如果它们卖出——而这不是我的目标——我希望公寓卖到 70 million，游艇卖到 40 million。但假设它们各卖 20 million。那么，按照 Friedman 先生的提议，我就会遭受损失，因为尽管我在收回这两项资产方面取得了良好结果，我却没有取得人们认为这些资产会产生的价值。我就成了这些资产价值的保险人。这确实是错误的。因此，我理解 PAX 的挫败感。他们花费数百万 dollars 追查这名债务人，像是在进行一场“有本事来抓我”的闹剧。他们几乎，几乎成功了。几乎成功了，但他们没有。现在他们有——他们有这种担心——我也有同样的担心——即，这是否是另一场“有本事来抓我”的开始？而我的职责是确保这部电影这次更短，或者更成功。但是，我——但重点是，这不应转化为我们感到挫败，因此我们要在你们的费用上惩罚你们。我只是——法官阁下，我不想对此显得傲慢，但如果我回到办公室说这是一宗风险代理案件，而且我在我的工作时间上给予了折扣，他们会问我做了什么。他们只会说，他们必须让我检查头部。因此，法官阁下，我不想对此显得傲慢，但是——而且我希望——我感同身受 Friedman 先生及其客户在此事上的痛苦，但在小时费率方面，我无能为力。我恳请法官阁下将此视为一项风险代理费交易。在此背景下，这是一项非常合理的费率。谢谢，法官阁下。\n\n本院：谢谢。Henzy 先生？\n\nHENZY 先生：因此，关于 Wynn 请求权，司法部（Department of Justice）刚于 May 17 提起本案。因此，约在提交破产申请和提交财产清单后三个月。所以很多——\n\n本院：但您说那都是破产申请前的行为。\n\nHENZY 先生：我是基于——我正在阅读——\n\n诉状，法官阁下。我是说，该诉状已被提交——\n\n法院：那么，你的当事人会知道或不知道该行为是否属于申请前行为。那——\n\n亨齐律师：不，法官阁下。\n\n法院：是的，他会知道。\n\n亨齐律师：并不是——此处发生事件的事实于5月17日才被公开。它们全都发生于多年前。2022年5月17日，政府针对Wynn（永利）先生提交诉状时，这些事实才被公开。因此，我只是指出，许多发生于多年前的事实是在该诉状提交时首次被公开的。仅此而已。\n\n因此，是在案件提交及清单提交三个月之后。\n\n第二点——\n\n法院：不过，受托人直到7月8日才被任命。因此，你的当事人本可以在此之前修改其清单。\n\n亨齐律师：我想他可以，法官阁下。我不确定——\n\n法院：不过，他有义务这样做。\n\n亨齐律师：我不确定在本案中——\n\n法院：这不只是一个推测。\n\n亨齐律师：是的，鉴于当时发生的一切，我不知道——\n\n（共158页）\n\n法院：当时发生了什么？你的当事人什么也没做。他们没有就任何事项进行抗争。他们决定该案应当被驳回。\n\n亨齐律师：是的。\n\n法院：对。那么，他随后便决定他认为应当如何处理，而且他在《法典》项下没有其他义务吗？\n\n亨齐律师：不，我认为这不公平，法官阁下。\n\n法院：嗯，我认为说他也许可以修改其清单并不公平。\n\n亨齐律师：也许。\n\n法院：他有义务修改其清单。\n\n亨齐律师：法官阁下，我指出的是，这里的事实是在案件提交很久之后才被公开，而且——\n\n法院：顺便说一句，那并不是在案件提交很久之后。清单直到3月才提交。\n\n亨齐律师：我认为Despins（德斯平斯）先生不会因债务人清单中的内容而受司法禁止反言约束。因此，是否存在针对Wynn先生的请求权，我不知道；但我确实知道，Despins先生不受禁止反言约束。\n\nDespins先生：法官阁下，就此占用两秒钟。\n\n法院：可以。\n\nDespins先生：只是向您说明——您知道，Henzy（亨齐）律师非常有创意。我们承认这一点。因此，我们可能有一项请求权。让我们看看他要求解除我受托人职务的动议。\n\n法院：那我们就这么做。\n\nDespins先生：其中写道——\n\n法院：请稍等。让我们一起看，因为大家一起看时，对我来说容易得多。\n\n那么，他要求解除你职务的动议——\n\nDespins先生：是561号。\n\n法院：561号。让我们看看。\n\nDespins先生：第21段。\n\n法院：请给法庭书记员一点时间，我们会把它调出来。\n\n（暂停。）\n\n法院：哪一页？\n\nDespins先生：第21段，第7页，法官阁下。\n\n法院：谢谢。请把它放大一些，好吗？谢谢。\n\n好的。\n\nDespins先生：因此，法官阁下，正如您将看到的，其中提到一名前DOJ（美国司法部）官员认罪，承认协助将数百万美元从外国银行账户转移至美国，以资助一场游说活动，向一名美国高级官员施压，要求其非法将债务人从美国驱逐。哇，这相当糟糕。该项请求权在清单中的任何地方出现了吗？那是2018年的事。这在清单中吗？不在清单中。为什么？因为，再次说明，我赞赏Henzy律师提出这些理论，但债务人显然对该人拥有一项很好的请求权，却没有追究该项请求权。因此，针对Wynn的请求权全都属同一类，这意味着，显然，如果债务人认为其对Wynn拥有请求权，那么其肯定也会针对这名前DOJ官员提出这一项请求权。因此，这只是向您表明，这一切都只是借口，企图将Paul Hastings（普衡律师事务所）排除在本案之外，法官阁下。\n\n法院：谢谢。好的。还有其他人希望陈述意见吗？好的。该申请——请继续，Friedman（弗里德曼）律师。抱歉。\n\nFriedman律师：法官阁下，我唯一想说的是，就Claiborn（克莱伯恩）律师的立场作出回应，显然，他们也认为他们最初聘请的律师具备专业能力并且胜任，只是该律师采取了不同的收费标准。以上就是我要说的，法官阁下。\n\n法院：好的。谢谢。\n\n（共158页）\n\n现在，Despins先生，我只需要回看一下——你是否随该申请提交了一份拟议裁定？我想你提交了。我不确定它是随该申请提交，还是随后提交的。\n\nDespins先生：应当提交了。让我——\n\n法院：我已经看过——我甚至可能就在这里有一份。你可以想象——\n\nDespins先生：让我找一下。\n\n（暂停。）\n\n法院：我来看看。别担心。我可以看一下。只需一点时间。\n\n（暂停。）\n\nDespins先生：是第539号文件。\n\n法院：是的，在这里。确实在这里。它是附件——它是——拟议裁定共五页。\n\nDespins先生：是的。531——539-1。\n\n法院：是的，我现在正在看。谢谢。\n\n（暂停。）\n\nDespins先生，你所在律所何时上调小时费率？是在年初，还是——通常何时上调？\n\nDespins先生：通常是的，法官阁下，但我们的财年始于2月，即2月1日。因此，通常会在那个时候上调。\n\n法院：好的。因为我认为——而且在有人对小时费率感到担忧的案件中，我倾向于确保，在任何费率上调对本案任何人具有约束力之前，我了解所有此类费率上调。例如，你在拟议裁定中称，对于任何费率上调，你将提前不少于十个工作日发出通知。你将向法院提交该通知。我认为这没有问题，因为根据我们届时所处的情况，该费率或许不会在本案中上调，好吗？这是可能的。\n\nDespins先生：明白。\n\n法院：好的。然后我还想看另一件事，然后我将——\n\n（暂停。）\n\n我知道——正如今天每个人都承认的，这是一个复杂案件。有许多问题，我理解每个人的担忧。我认为，人们有权提出他们已经提出的担忧，我也听取了这些意见。我已审阅与聘用Paul Hastings申请有关而提交的文件。我知道Paul Hastings和Despins受托人，以及本案中的每一个人，均负有持续义务，以处理可能影响利益冲突或无利害关系人资格的问题。目前，我认定Paul Hastings是无利害关系人。债务人通过其律师提出的论点并无说服力，聘用Paul Hastings的申请将获准。\n\nDespins先生，拟议裁定如有任何细微修改，也将只是细微修改；但我注意到，如同我对所有律师所注意到的，或者至少我努力记得这样做。我不知道我是否做得如我认为自己所做的或应当做的那样好，但《破产法典》第330条允许法院在就报酬和费用偿还举行听证后，裁定低于所请求数额的金额。因此，尽管这些费率和问题现正提交法院审理——你们已说明将收取何种费用，即这些是你们的费率——法院将来可能作出不同认定。\n\n但我并不是说那将会发生。我只是说《法典》——我希望确保律师知道《法典》有此规定。《法典》规定，我认为是第330(b)条，可以裁定低于所请求数额的报酬。\n\n（共158页）\n\n我确实理解你关于本案及应如何看待本案的观点，但目前该申请获准。拟议裁定经一些细微修改后可能——我认为唯一的修改将是——提及该规则——我是说，抱歉，第330条，以及，您知道，如果向法院提交费率上调，法院可能不予执行该上调。其可能不对破产财产执行，或者可能执行，取决于所发生情况。再次说明，我认为本案有很多问题，而且，您知道，我认为我们只能看看会发生什么。《法典》赋予法院作为监督机构灵活性，以便对费用和开支作出决定。\n\nDespins先生：明白，法官阁下。我们唯一的观点是，我们不希望该项通常存在的裁量权——也就是说，如果我们为取得一项保证金花费$500,000，您应当不予准许该笔费用。好吗？\n\n法院：对吗？\n\nDespins先生：但我想明确的是，这不会成为以迂回方式引入当地费率或诸如此类事项的方法——\n\n法院：不，我不会这样做。我同意这一点。\n\nDespins先生：谢谢，法官阁下。\n\n法院：不会发生这种情况。唯一可能发生的情况是，如果提交了一份申请，而法院认定存在某种理由，导致已提供的服务不应获得偿还。\n\nDespins先生：当然。明白，法官阁下。\n\n（共158页）\n\n法院：而不是费率上调。我不确定费率上调是否会——我们必须届时看看情况如何。\n\nDespins先生：明白。\n\n法院：Friedman律师。\n\nFriedman律师：我只是想明确说明，而且我认为无需将此加入裁定，因为我认为这始终是程序的一部分。例如，如果我们想对有关某项披露是否适当的枝节事项的可补偿性提出异议，或者有人向最高法院提起上诉，我们始终有权在每一项申请中——无论是中期申请还是最终申请——主张某一特定工时记录未给破产财产带来价值。\n\n法院：当然。每个人都有该项权利。这是正确的。\n\nFriedman律师：谢谢，法官阁下。非常感谢。\n\n法院：好的。法院在审查费用申请后，也可以作出该项决定。因此，聘用Paul Hastings的申请获准，Despins受托人，该裁定将经细微修改后作出，好吗？\n\nDespins先生：谢谢，法官阁下。\n\n法院：现在我们可以转入聘用Neubert, Pepe and Monteith（纽伯特、佩佩和蒙蒂斯律师事务所）的申请。\n\nSkalka（斯卡尔卡）律师：下午好，法官阁下。\n\n法院：下午好。\n\nSkalka律师：Douglas Skalka（道格拉斯·斯卡尔卡）代表Neubert, Pepe and Monteith提出申请。\n\n法官阁下，正如我认为您所知，受托人已提交申请，聘用本所担任其当地律师。该申请日期为7月19日，案卷编号为569。我们未收到对该申请的任何异议或答复。\n\n我们确实收到U.S. Trustee's Office（美国受托人办公室）的请求，要求提交一份补充声明，我们已于7月26日提交。\n\n作为该补充申请的一部分，我们表示不反对修改我们的裁定，以增加一段说明我们不会就受托人相关服务请求报酬。因此，该内容不在现已归档的裁定中，法官阁下。\n\n法院：好的。\n\nSkalka律师：我可以为此提交一份修订后的裁定，当然愿意在今天晚些时候或明天这样做。\n\n法院：还有其他人希望就受托人聘用Neubert, Pepe and Monteith的申请陈述意见吗？\n\nClaiborn律师：法官阁下，简要说一下。Holley\n\n1 代表美国受托人的克莱伯恩律师。\n\n2 斯卡尔卡律师所指的段落，也载于聘用 Paul Hastings（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所）的申请中，\n\n3 即拟议的 Paul Hastings 裁定第5段。\n\n4 该段限制了可能授予该律所的报酬，\n\n5 并排除了受托人服务的报酬。\n\n6 法院：\n谢谢。\n\n7 因此，您的意思是斯卡尔卡律师只需\n\n8 在拟议裁定中加入该等措辞。\n\n9 克莱伯恩女士：\n正确。\n\n10 法院：\n好的。这没有问题。\n\n11 克莱伯恩女士：据此，美国受托人没有异议。\n\n12 法院：\n好的。谢谢。\n\n13 斯卡尔卡先生：\n这完全可以为本所接受，法官阁下。\n\n14 法院：\n还有其他人希望就\n\n15 聘用 Neubert, Pepe, Monteith（纽伯特、佩佩、蒙泰斯律师事务所）的申请陈述意见吗？\n\n16 好的。在没有听到其他任何人发言，并审阅了该申请以及各方希望\n\n17 尽可能提高本案效率，\n\n18 包括费用和开支方面效率的意愿后，我理解受托人\n\n19 寻求聘用 Neubert, Pepe and Monteith 的理由。\n\n20 我认为，Neubert, Pepe and Monteith 已证明其不存在利害关系，且没有其他任何人对该申请提出异议。Neubert, Pepe and Monteith 已表示，其将提交一份新的拟议裁定，其中纳入美国受托人办公室在庭审记录中提出的限定条件，以及批准聘用 Paul Hastings 的申请的裁定中所载的限定条件。因此，基于所有上述理由，聘用 Neubert, Pepe and Monteith 的申请获准。至于该拟议裁定——斯卡尔卡律师，您需要多长时间提交该拟议裁定？\n\n21 斯卡尔卡先生：\n我想我明天就能提交，法官阁下。\n\n22 法院：\n好的。那么，为方便书记官办公室，我就给您到8月3日。如何？那是星期三。\n\n23 斯卡尔卡先生：\n可以。\n\n24 法院：\n好的。谢谢。\n\n25 斯卡尔卡先生：\n谢谢您，法官阁下。\n\n26 法院：\n请大家稍等片刻。\n\n27 （暂停。）\n\n28 法院：\n好的。因此，该申请获准。那么，为了明确今天日程上有哪些事项——我已经说过，由于 Rule 60 动议被驳回，撤销动议已无实际意义。\n\n29 因此，日程上剩下的仅是以下动议：请求裁定确认第11章受托人持有债务人的全部经济权利和公司治理权利，以及债务人控制实体的全部经济权利和公司治理权利，并授权受托人在外国行事。德斯潘斯先生，您希望就此陈述意见吗？\n\n30 德斯潘斯先生：\n是的，法官阁下。\n\n31 法院：\n请讲。请直接开始。\n\n32 德斯潘斯先生：\n并且请记得，我们还有一些程序性事项。\n\n33 法院：\n是的。\n\n34 德斯潘斯先生：\n好的。因此，公司治理动议基本上是要确认，我们取代债务人的法律地位。我很高兴我们提交了该动议，因为债务人的答复清楚表明，他们将在何种程度上与我们合作尚不明确。因此，基本上，他们提出了有关 BVI——抱歉，Genever BVI（英属维尔京群岛的 Genever）的问题。请记得，那是在英属维尔京群岛的母控股公司，持有目前在加里蒂法官面前的第11章债务人的权益。为回应他们对于那里将会发生什么的担忧，我们实际上昨天深夜提交了一份经修订的拟议裁定，说明，好的，这就是我们需要债务人做的事。\n\n35 打个通俗的比方，债务人有一辆车。我们要这辆车的钥匙。或者债务人持有股票。我们希望债务人背书该股票，实质上将其交给我们。根据 BVI 法律，实现这一点的方式是，他需要签署某些文件；我们已附上这些文件的草案，由我们的 BVI 律师起草。基本上，该裁定规定，郭先生将在我想是两个工作日内签署这些文件，将其对该等股份的权利转让给受托人。文本很多，但实质上就是如此。此外，由于我之前提到的、代表郭先生处理其针对 UBS（瑞银）的诉讼的英国律师所涉一个尚未解决的问题，基本上，我很早以前就联系了他们，我想是在我获任后两三天；他们随后给亨齐先生打了电话——实际上应该更晚，因为亨齐先生直到14日星期五左右才获任。无论如何，他们联系亨齐先生，说这个人，也就是受托人，正在给我们打电话。我们应当和他谈吗？亨齐先生值得称赞的是，给他们写了一封非常好的电子邮件，说受托人拥有该诉讼中的全部权利。郭先生不控制其中任何事项。和他谈。\n\n36 因此，我们与他们通了电话，他们说，嗯，这可能是美国法律的观点，但不是英国法律的观点。您可能需要提出一项动议，以被承认为外国——我说，不。如果我想对某人启动外国破产程序，我需要这样做。但如果我只是想被替换为原告，我不需要这样做。\n\n37 法官阁下，长话短说，他们说，实际上，我们需要郭先生的一封信，因为他们担心被起诉——他们没有使用“被起诉”这样的措辞，但从他们的肢体语言可以清楚看出，他们不愿意在没有郭先生来信的情况下做任何事。\n\n38 因此，这里的类比是一样的。我需要这辆车的钥匙，而钥匙在郭先生手中。他只需给他们寄一封信。它基本上——重复了亨齐先生已经写给他们的内容，但会在债务人的签字之下，说明该诉讼现由第11章受托人拥有。他拥有全部权利。无论是否享有保密特权，你们都应当向他告知一切。你们应当就一切事项与他沟通。\n\n39 所以，这就是我们通过这项动议所做的事情。债务人对我们提出的批评是——首先，存在主体资格问题，以及债务人就这些问题陈述意见的问题。他们提出了其他人的权利，例如 Bravo Luck（布拉沃·拉克），尽管我们已向 Bravo Luck 发出通知。我们已向 Bravo Luck 的律师送达。因此，那不是问题。但是，债务人在此问题上的主体资格值得质疑。不过，即使撇开主体资格不谈，是的，我们正在寻求广泛的救济，法官阁下。为什么？因为成本。我们不想一次又一次回到法院，说，嘿，您能否批准我们为澳大利亚这样做？您能否批准我们为加拿大这样做？我只是随便举例。并且不断回到法院。因此，是的，我们要求的是广泛的事项。其理念是，受托人将酌情以合乎情理的方式行使该等权力；如非如此，您基本上会找我。您会告诉我，我本不应当做这些事。但我认为，正如我们引用的判例所示，由公司治理角度确认受托人的行事权限是标准做法。例如，我们需要在 Genever 案中向加里蒂法官陈述意见。我不希望出现这样的情况：Bravo Luck，即据称为其儿子的公司，出庭称他无权发言。他没有从 BVI 获得股份，等等。我们无法处理那种情况。而这项裁定正能解决这一点。基本上，它非常明确地规定，我们持有所有这些权利，这就是为什么我们请求法官阁下作出该裁定。\n\n40 不过，法官阁下，我很乐意回答任何问题，或者回应债务人尚余的任何批评。\n\n41 法院：\n我对此有一个问题——同样，该裁定是昨天提交的。因此，我看了它，但我想说，没有像我原本可能会那样仔细。不过没关系。我已经看过了。我本会假定——但我不应假定，所以我不会假定——如果该裁定作出，而郭先生不签署这些文件，那么下一步是什么？\n\n42 德斯潘斯先生：\n您谈到了我们最终将在本案中走到的一点，也就是藐视法庭。\n\n43 法院：\n所以我们需要举行另一次听证会。\n\n44 德斯潘斯先生：\n嗯，将会有一项请求认定他们藐视法庭的动议。\n\n45 法院：\n对。\n\n46 德斯潘斯先生：\n是。\n\n47 法院：\n好的。所以，这——我是说，这是我对其的理解，但正如我再次对您说的，我没有像原本可能会那样彻底地阅读它，因为我今天早上只有一点时间看它，不过没关系。我总体上理解其条款和条件，也理解您请求法院根据《破产法》的具体条款作出裁定，包括以下条款——\n\n48 案号 22-50073\n文件 1082-8\n提交日期 11/11/22\n录入日期 11/11/22 13:18:26\n\n49 德斯潘斯先生：\n521。\n\n50 法院：\n《法典》规定的债务人义务，无论债务人是否为占有中的债务人。并且，您不仅在美国，而且为了处理在郭先生于康涅狄格州提交其第11章案件时正在进行和曾经进行的不同事项，需要该裁定。\n\n51 所以，我没有进一步的问题。我刚才只是在询问那个问题。\n\n52 德斯潘斯先生：\n谢谢您，法官阁下。\n\n53 法院：\n谢谢。亨齐先生？\n\n54 亨齐先生：\n那么，法官阁下——\n\n55 法院：\n所以，您希望就此陈述意见？\n\n56 亨齐先生：\n是的，法官阁下。\n\n57 法院：\n好的。请讲。\n\n58 亨齐先生：\n关于我将称为现正寻求的两项新增救济，它们并不在该动议中。\n\n59 法院：\n您是指那些信函？\n\n60 亨齐先生：\n因此，他请求您命令郭先生签署、并将寄送给英国 Harcus Parker（哈卡斯·帕克律师事务所）的那封信，在该动议中完全没有以任何方式涉及。\n\n61 所以，我不知道德斯潘斯先生今天如何能获得该救济。那是新的。\n\n62 就其实体内容而言，德斯潘斯先生是对的。我试图先行处理此事，因为 Harcus Parker 的人试图联系我，而我的立场是，我不想和你们谈，因为郭先生不再是该诉讼的当事人。你们需要与德斯潘斯先生谈。我将我发送给他的电子邮件抄送给了他，而自我发送该电子邮件后，我没有参与他们与他之间的任何沟通。我不知道英国的法律是什么。我不知道那里的法院有什么要求。我不知道他们适用什么保密特权问题。我确实知道——我的意思是，我并不代表这些人，但郭先生被要求签署一封可能影响其他人权利的信。我不知道——我相信 Harcus Parker 律师事务所也代表该诉讼中的其他人。因此，我目前的处境是，德斯潘斯先生正在向动议中原有的内容增加救济，我不知道什么——而且，无论如何，就该救济而言，它会指示郭先生做某事，而我完全不知道——在事实和情形下，郭先生被指示做的事情是否适当。\n\n63 法院：\n那么，让我问您一个问题。您反对郭先生甚至签署 Genever Holdings Corporation（Genever 控股公司）的股份转让文书吗？\n\n64 亨齐先生：\n嗯，让我说到那一点。\n\n65 法院：\n那是我的问题。您是否反对那一点？\n\n66 亨齐先生：\n因此，那也不是所请求救济的一部分。\n\n67 法院：\n让我只问这个问题。您现在已经出庭，并且非常明确地阐明，郭先生不再是占有中的债务人。\n\n68 亨齐先生：\n没错。\n\n69 法院：\n好的。因此，他仍然负有《破产法》规定的义务，而德斯潘斯先生已要求他向其提供信息，包括交出 Genever Holdings Corporation 的股份，对吗？您不是说您收到了一封信——德斯潘斯先生向您或向郭先生寄了一封信，说他想要全部信息吗？\n\n70 亨齐先生：\n我不——\n\n71 德斯潘斯先生：\n法官阁下，我们在巴尔迪加先生被解除职务之前向他寄了一封信。我们向米切尔先生寄了一封信？之后，在他们获任时，我们抄送了该信，说明我们需要所有这些资料。该信要求提供与 BVI 有关的全部公司治理文件。\n\n法庭：对。那么请等一下。我想问您的是，为什么 Kwok先生（郭文贵）不将其拥有的一家公司的股份转让给这名受托人？亨齐先生（Mr. Henzy）：法官阁下，我不知道您是否已经说完了。法庭：实际上我已经说完了。您请继续。亨齐先生：好的。背景是，纽约 Sherry Netherland Hotel（雪莉荷兰酒店）有一套公寓。该公寓归一家目前正在 Garrity法官（Judge Garrity）审理的 Chapter 11 程序中的实体所有。法庭：我明白。亨齐先生：好的。我的理解是——因为我没有花很多时间查看该案中已经发生的一切——该英属维尔京群岛（BVI）母公司的所有权一直存在争议。实际上，Garrity法官曾作出一项和解——我想可以称为一项和解性质的命令——该命令基本规定出售该公寓，并由 Melanie Cyganowski（梅拉妮·西加诺夫斯基）监督执行。据我所知，Chapter 11 案件中的债务人确实放弃了其几乎大部分——或者可能全部——控制该出售的权力。因此，各方均同意该公寓将被出售，并将此事交由 Melanie Cyganowski 处理。因此，该公寓不会消失。它将被出售。我假定该笔款项将存入该案中的 DIP 账户，不会发生任何不利情况。但同样，母公司的所有权存在争议。所主张的是，一项信托拥有该母公司，而 Kwok先生作为受托人持有股份。法官阁下，我想明确的是，这是在 Garrity法官审理的 Chapter 11 案件中再次提出的主张。我没有对此投入任何时间。我的担忧是，Kwok先生——这些文件我是第一次看到——实际上，我想我今天早晨醒来时才看到它们，因为它们是在昨晚 10:09 提交的，而且坦率地说，我可能在那之前不久就关掉了手机。因此，Despins先生（Mr. Despins）请求您作出命令，指示 Kwok先生签署这些文件。法官阁下，我完全不知道这些文件是否是适当的文件。我完全不知道这会如何影响 Garrity法官案件中正在发生的事情，或者如何影响任何事情。我完全不知道。我不是 BVI 律师。我不知道这些是否为正确文件。我不知道 BVI 法律如何规定。我从未见过据称存在的、将控制任何人在此权利的信托协议。\n\n因此，如果 Despins先生希望取得法院命令，指示 Kwok先生签署特定文件，即这些特定文件，我的主张是，他应当提交一项动议，而我应当有一些时间审阅该动议、审阅这些文件，并努力了解这些文件是否为适当文件。\n\n再次说明，法官阁下，这些文件并未附在向法院提交的动议中。这是正在寻求的新救济。\n\n就公司治理而言，所寻求的仅是确认受托人拥有债务人的全部经济权利和治理权利。动议中并没有请求作出命令，指示其签署特定文件。\n\n法庭：好的。Despins先生？Despins先生：是，法官阁下。\n\nDespins先生：正如您所述，其经过是，我们自 7月14日以来一直在索要文件。他们没有提交过一份文件，也没有提交该实体关于公司治理的文件。\n\n因此，当我们提交这项动议时，他们说，哦，我们不确定这在 BVI 法律下是否有效。我说，好，我们会使其有效。这就是该命令实际作出如此规定的原因。\n\n而且确实是在短期通知下提出的，但 1021 规定——抱歉。哪一条规定在通知和听证之后——\n\n法庭：\n\nDespins先生：1021。它规定的是，在特定情形下适当的任何通知。\n\n因此，如果法官阁下想要——而且我想您——星期二对您来说日程不佳，对吗？您有排满的日程，或者——我不知道——或者星期三上午，那么他可以作出回应；但在我们结束此事之前，我想向法官阁下提交一份证物，如果我可以上前的话。\n\n法庭：它是否已在案卷中？\n\nDespins先生：没有。它是在纽约法院的案卷中，其中 Kwok先生——\n\n法庭：Garrity法官的案件？\n\nDespins先生：不是。是在 Ostrager法官（Justice Ostrager）的纽约案件中。Kwok先生在那里宣誓称其是股份的唯一所有人。因此我是否可以——\n\n法庭：可以，请您到法庭书记员处上前。谢谢。\n\n亨齐先生：法官阁下，我将反对在此接纳该证据。这是一份由——作出的宣誓书。\n\nDespins先生：不止如此。这是一份文件汇编，但在第一份宣誓书中，您会看到其中有突出标示。它说——这是一份由与 Kwok先生有关联的实体作出的宣誓书。它称 Kwok先生是 BVI 的唯一股东。但假设该文件不存在。我们继续翻页。接着我们看到被告 Kwok 对原告 Pacific Alliance（太平洋联盟）提出的一组书面质询的答复和异议。然后您翻到第 6 页，即对书面质询的答复。在不影响一般性——诸如此类——的前提下，我答复称，我是 Genever Holdings Corporation（吉尼弗控股公司）已发行股份的法定所有人。然后，如果您翻到该文件末尾，其由 Kwok Ho Wan 于 December 4th, 2020 签署。法庭：实际上，他在第 9 页对第 5 项书面质询的答复中再次如此表示。Despins先生：所以，是的，存在这样一个问题——好的，我并不是想耍小聪明。存在一项信托协议的问题，该协议会使其儿子成为该公寓的受益所有人。但这并不——这并不影响 Kwok 是 BVI 控股实体唯一股东这一事实。事实上，Kwok先生——不是其儿子——一直持续对债务人实体行使控制权这一事实也可证明这一点。例如，当 Garrity法官审理的债务人实体签订协议时，该协议由 Kwok先生代表债务人实体签署。因此，我们所请求的唯一事项是在 BVI 层面和债务人实体层面拥有同样的权利，以便我们能够在该案中获得 Garrity法官的认可。因此——我此前已经说过——我们并非试图阻止出售。但在处理日常管理事项时，我将提出一些我们需要在该案中解决的根本性问题，这使得此事具有时间紧迫性。\n\n亨齐先生：我不清楚。法官阁下，我们是否正在就此中的问题——所有权问题——进行审判？这些问题一直在 Garrity法官面前，我认为他作出的命令设想这些问题将通过其他地方的诉讼得到解决；这并非——这些事情均不在法院面前。这些事情都不在 Despins先生提交的动议中。他请求广泛确认其所拥有的任何治理权利和经济权利。而这些事情均不在该动议中。\n\nFriedman先生（Mr. Friedman）：法官阁下？\n\n法庭：是。\n\nFriedman先生：我是 Peter Friedman（彼得·弗里德曼）。我只是想就此陈述两秒钟。\n\n法庭：可以。\n\nFriedman先生：我认为，再次说明，其中存在大量的“Etch A Sketch”式反复变更；回到我们刚才谈到的其中一个问题，如果您查看——我想是案卷编号 107，我想是第 16 段——为明确起见，我认为您应当将该方所发生一切的这种“Etch A Sketch”性质考虑在内。Kwok先生实际上在该声明中宣誓称，他在 May, 2021 就知道 Steve Wynn（史蒂夫·永利）的事情，对吗？而现在您听到的是，他直到 May, 2022 才知道。我只是认为，您需要对与 Kwok先生有关联的一切陈述都非常谨慎。这涉及谁拥有 Genever 股份。我想补充的一点是，除了藐视法庭命令、除了判决书之外，我们取得的一项救济是 Ostrager法官命令交付股份；他裁定 Kwok先生实际上必须将 Genever BVI 的股份交付给 PAX。因此，我们认为，这只是又一次试图挫败合法债权人取得有价值实体股份的企图。我们认为这应当停止，并且应当命令交付这些股份——这些股份已经被命令交付，而今天所请求的救济应当使该命令得以落实。这只是——这只是持续试图阻挠债权人为追回资产所作的一切努力的模式。就 PAX 而言，至关重要的是，不应再进一步延迟此事。谢谢，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：谢谢。亨齐先生？\n\n亨齐先生：我从未说过 Kwok先生在案件提起之前不知道 Wynn先生的事情。我所说的是，在案件提起之后，当 DOJ（美国司法部）提交其起诉书时，许多事实才被披露出来。因此，我认为不断回到这一点，是在歪曲我所说的话。我在发言时说过，法官阁下，签署这些文件或许不存在异议。\n\n存在异议的是——动议中没有任何内容请求这项救济。首先——\n\n法庭：嗯，它是概括性地请求了该救济。我理解您的观点。没有——\n\n亨齐先生：这——\n\n法庭：我理解您的观点。动议中没有附上两封供 Kwok先生签署的信函。我理解这一点。\n\n亨齐先生：那将是令人震惊的，法官阁下。称该动议中所请求的救济等同于——您必须签署这些特定文件——\n\n法庭：嗯，我不知道这是否令人震惊。我不知道我是否完全同意您的意见，好吗？鉴于自 July 8th 起已有一名受托人在任。现在是 August 1st。债务人负有义务。债务人在不同案件的先前文件中表示其拥有某些事项。已有一份股权证书被提交。这里——这并非任何新事项。这对您来说可能是新的，但它并非新的。再看 Friedman先生刚才再次向我指出的 Kwok先生的声明，该声明于 March 20, 2022 提交，其中他提及该篇文章——一篇关于 Steve Wynn 面临司法部行动的文章。您知道，到了某个时候，这些论点开始不再可信。问题在于，Kwok先生认为他的案件会被驳回。我不知道他为什么这样认为，但他就是这样认为。在——您知道——当时有两件其他可能发生的事情：任命 Chapter 11 受托人，或者转换为 Chapter 7。他负有义务。他没有——他尚未履行这些义务。关于您的论点——\n\n亨齐先生：在哪方面？在哪方面？\n\n法庭：等一下。\n\n亨齐先生：法官阁下，自从——以来，他在哪方面没有履行——\n\n法庭：他尚未向 Despins 先生交付 Despins 先生要求其交付的材料。HENZY 先生：Despins 先生发了一封信——法庭：等一下。等一下。等一下。你现在没有回答我的问题。HENZY 先生：嗯，您的——我不——法庭：他尚未向 Despins 先生交付 Despins 先生依据《破产法典》正当地要求其交付的材料。HENZY 先生：好的。我手头没有那封信，而且我——而且我不希望——法庭：那么，你的当事人本应将其提供给你。HENZY 先生：我不——不，我看过那封信，法官阁下。而且我不希望 Friedman 先生跳起来说——歪曲我的话，说我说了我没有说过的话，好吗？但我手头没有那封信。我不——法庭：嗯，不是，但是——HENZY 先生：我手头没有那封信，法官阁下。法庭：是。HENZY 先生：我认为 Despins 先生在信中要求的内容，而且 Despins 先生已经把信拿出来了，他会告诉您如果我说错了，是一项非常宽泛的——我们想要看到关于特定实体的大量信息，好吗？\n\n所以我现在不记得，是否有一项要求说那封信要求提供这些文件，好吗，但——我甚至不知道这些文件是否存在。\n\n我不记得那封信中有任何要求说了除“我们希望你向我们交付大量材料”之外的任何内容；我可以告诉您，法官阁下，债务人——我们正在处理此事。\n\n我们正在努力收集这些文件，以便将其发送给 Despins 先生。我们正在这样做，好吗？\n\n我毫不怀疑 Despins 先生，也许还有法官阁下，认为这应当更快一些，没问题。\n\n但我们正在处理此事。\n\n但我不记得那封信中有一份文件说——好的。Kindseth 先生告诉我，而且我认为他对那封信的了解比我更充分，并没有这样的请求，好吗？\n\n所以我并不是——\n\n法庭：没有关于 Genever 的具体信函或要求？我的意思是，那是不同的——你在以不同方式拆解事情。\n\nHENZY 先生：我没有拆解事情。有一封 Despins 先生发出的信，恰当地——好的，没有任何反对意见——说你必须把这些材料发送给我，好吗？这尚未发生。我承认这一点。债务人——我们正在处理此事。\n\n法庭：好的。\n\nHENZY 先生：它是否应当更快？也许应当。\n\n法庭：但让我说一下为什么你的论点不能成立，好吗？Kwok 先生于 3 月 20 日向本庭提交了一份宣誓书，ECF 107，第——我会告诉你页码。第 16 页，共 108 页。Sherry Netherland 公寓的合作公寓股份由 Genever Holdings, LLC（Genever Holdings, LLC）持有。Genever U.S.（Genever U.S.）的成员权益继而由 Genever Holdings Corporation, Genever BVI（Genever Holdings Corporation, Genever BVI）持有。我持有 Genever BVI 的全部股权。这是 Kwok 先生所说的。\n\nHENZY 先生：但您必须继续往下看。我认为——我建议——\n\n法庭：不，我不必。\n\nHENZY 先生：不过——\n\n法庭：不，我确实不必。在涉及 Genever BVI 时不必，而这正是受托人所询问的。\n\nHENZY 先生：不过，根据日期为 February 17, 2015 的受托人声明协议，我为 Bravo Luck Limited（Bravo Luck Limited）以信托方式持有该等股权。我儿子拥有该公寓所有者的股权。\n\n法庭：那么，你知道吗？在到达 Genever BVI 之前，你到不了 Bravo Luck Limited。你不能——你只要看看这条链条即可。在到达 Genever BVI 之前，你到不了 Bravo Luck Limited，因为他持有全部股权，但随后他以信托方式持有该股权。我的意思是，这将会非常困难。我们可以制作一张图。我们可以制作一张漂亮的小图。我们可以画出从一个实体到另一个实体的连线。但这——\n\nHENZY 先生：这——我道歉，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：这就是他所说的。而且他还说，还应注意的是，我在 Genever BVI 中拥有的任何权益已被 Ostrager 法官命令移交给 PAX（PAX），前提是该移交不会干扰英属维尔京群岛或 Genever U.S. 破产案中正在进行的诉讼。好吗？所以 Kwok 先生在 3 月 20 日说了这些。现在是 8 月 1 日。至于他——我并不是说我不会给你回应的机会，因为我会给你一个，明白吗？时间不会很长。\n\n关键在于——提出一种论点，说你不知道——不是你，不是关于你。Kwok 先生的律师不知道这是否会产生影响，以及其他当事人担心其他第三方，这一切都无关紧要，因为 Kwok 先生已经向本庭宣誓，他持有 Genever BVI 的全部股权。\n\nHENZY 先生：我认为您和我对这段话的理解不同，法官阁下。对不起。\n\n法庭：好的。那么我们理解不同。但你知道吗？那么你将会——我最终将裁定他必须这样做。这就是他所说的。这就是他所说的。我儿子拥有——该公寓所有者。\n\n不过，根据一份信托声明，我为 Bravo Limited（Bravo Limited）以信托方式持有该等股权。\n\nDESPINS 先生：他仍然持有它。\n\nHENZY 先生：他以——方式持有它。\n\n法庭：他仍然——\n\nHENZY 先生：他为 Bravo Limited 以信托方式持有它。\n\n法庭：好的。\n\nHENZY 先生：您看，我——\n\n法庭：而 Bravo Limited 是如何支付那套公寓的？我们是否要逐一审查所有——这就是——我们要追踪资金流向，对吗？这就是我们要做的吗？这不正是我们正在做的吗？\n\nHENZY 先生：我完全不知道。\n\n法庭：这正是我们正在做的。这就是为什么指定了 Chapter 11 受托人。这正是我们正在做的。这里发生的情况是——\n\nHENZY 先生：这里有一大堆事情，在我看来它们并无关联，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：那么它们怎么会没有关联？他说它们有关联。他在自己的声明中写了这一点。这就是他——他所说的。所以——\n\nHENZY 先生：他说他为其他人以信托方式持有它。而且您看，再次说明，我没有——我尚未有时间分析此事，因为这是——\n\n法庭：好的。让我们看看证明书。让我们看看纽约州诉讼中的那份证明书，其日期在——February 13, 2015 的某个时候。他持有——其中写道：“我证明，我是上述公司中 1,000 股每股面值 one penny U.S. dollar、每股均已缴足、但须遵守公司章程大纲及组织章程细则的股份的登记持有人。”因此，那是 February 13, 2015。这份信托的日期是在四天后。因此，他随后转移了他的股权。那么这可能是一项欺诈性转让。\n\nHENZY 先生：可能是。可能是，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：可能是。\n\nHENZY 先生：好的。但我们并不是——我认为我们无法在实质上仅提前 14 小时通知的情况下解决这个问题。\n\n法庭：我刚才告诉你，我会给你时间回应。\n\nHENZY 先生：好的。\n\n法庭：我会给你时间回应。\n\nHENZY 先生：回到这里最开始的部分，我说过，法官阁下，这可能完全适当，债务人可能不反对签署这些文件，但我不知道，因为这是昨晚 10:09 提交的。而且它并不在此前已提交的动议中。\n\n法庭：好的。那么，我会给你一个机会询问你的当事人，他是否会签署这些文件，好吗？\n\nHENZY 先生：谢谢您，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：好的。\n\nHENZY 先生：我能有足够的时间进行尽职调查吗？因为我——我希望查明——为了向我的当事人提供建议，我认为我需要进行一些尽职调查并理解此事，好吗？所以我希望我能得到超过 24 或 36 小时的时间。我听见 Despins 先生说星期三上午。这里并没有发生任何事情，法官阁下。那套公寓——\n\n法庭：这正是重点。这里并没有发生任何事情。\n\nHENZY 先生：不，不，不，不。关于那套公寓——以及每个人——\n\n法庭：而且我们必须取得一些材料以便推进。\n\nHENZY 先生：我不知道我说了什么让人觉得好笑。我通常不被认为是一个有趣的人，但那套公寓将按照由 Melanie Cyganowski（Melanie Cyganowski）监督的程序出售。那套公寓、那笔钱，都将成为纽约南区（Southern District of New York）内、由 Garrity 法官监督的该破产财产的一部分。它不会去任何地方。我不知道——难道认为 Kwok 先生会以某种方式带着那套公寓逃跑，他会带着 Sherry Netherland 公寓离开，或者他会带着公寓售款离开吗。那不会发生。所以鉴于这里的复杂性，我认为这样是公平的。而且您和我确实对这一段有不同理解。我认为——我不知道，法官阁下，这里的结构是什么。我确实知道，为他人以信托方式持有的财产并非破产财产，取决于——\n\n法庭：我对此并不那么确定。\n\nHENZY 先生：取决于事实和情况。\n\n法庭：我对此并不那么确定。\n\nHENZY 先生：所以也许有时是。我认为很多时候不是。因此，我不知道这里所有的事实是什么，因为正如我所说，这并不是已提交动议的一部分。这是在昨晚 10:09 提交的一项命令中。\n\n法庭：我明白。\n\nDESPINS 先生：而且，法官阁下，我会向 Henzy 先生提供更多文件。实际上，有一份是——\n\nHENZY 先生：不要递——我不希望你递给我文件。我们在法庭上。\n\nDESPINS 先生：好的。\n\nHENZY 先生：你可以把文件送给我。\n\nDESPINS 先生：好的。但重点是，法官阁下，Kwok 先生正在对该实体行使控制权。因此，不是他的儿子。例如，当 Genever U.S. 想要申请破产时，授权书是由 Kwok 先生签署的。不是由儿子或 Bravo Luck 签署的。是由 Kwok 先生签署的。所以我想，法官阁下，我们是在讨论日程安排，因为——\n\n法庭：是的，我们是在讨论日程安排。我会给 Henzy 先生一些时间审阅此事并提交答复。我在看——请等一下，好吗？我只需要看看日历。（暂停。）好的。关于受托人提交的动议，即确认 Chapter 11 受托人持有债务人的全部经济权利和公司治理权利的动议，ECF 598，以及有关该动议的经修订拟议命令，即 ECF 645 中所载的命令，基于记录中所述理由，该事项——本事项将续期至 Thursday, August 4th at 1:00 p.m.。现在，关于——因此，我认为这处理了我们所有事项，除了事务性事项外，Despins 受托人，其中包括债权证明申报截止日期命令。\n\nHENZY 先生：法官阁下，我可以提出一点或一个问题吗？\n\n法庭：可以。\n\nHENZY 先生：好的。关于给 Harcus Parker firm（Harcus Parker 律师事务所）的信，如果 Despins 先生不在电话上，我不会与 Harcus Parker 交谈，因为我认为我会被——很可能我会被指控说了不该说的话，或者我的话会被歪曲。\n\n法庭：那么你和 Despins 先生自行解决此事。我不会命令你必须在电话上。\n\nHENZY 先生：我不知道他们何时有空。我不知道——您知道，所以我不知道这能否在 August 4 at 1 o'clock 之前发生。仅此而已。我当然会让自己有空，并使用\n\nCase 22-50073\nDoc 1082-8\nFiled 11/11/22\nEntered 11/11/22 13:18:26\n\n尽最大努力，但我们说的是与伦敦的律师沟通，我不知道那——需要花多少时间。\n\n法院：\n我认为，除了你之外，没有人在说要与伦敦的律师沟通。\n\n亨齐先生：\n我们必须这么做。\n\n法院：\n那就是你自己的问题。你可以想办法解决。我们将在星期四下午1:00举行听证会。\n\n亨齐先生：\n好的。所以如果我——我不知道该如何解决。\n\n法院：\n嗯，你会努力的。你能解决。你会尽力解决。\n\n德斯平斯先生：\n法官阁下，星期四下午1:00是现场进行，还是通过 Zoom？\n\n法院：\n那么，你——你与星期四有冲突吗？你是在告诉我这个吗？\n\n德斯平斯先生：\n是的，我在国外。\n\n法院：\n哦，你在国外。那——\n\n德斯平斯先生：\n但我可以通过 Zoom 参加。\n\n法院：\n好的。那么我们可以——我想——你什么时候回来？你要在外面待很久吗？\n\n德斯平斯先生：\n是的。\n\n法院：\n好的。好吧。那么我们就通过 Zoom 进行。\n\n德斯平斯先生：\n谢谢您，法官阁下。\n\n法院：\n我们将通过 Zoom 进行。\n\n德斯平斯先生：\n那么现在我本来要谈一下事务性事项，但是——\n\n法院：\n最后一点，然后我就不说话了，法官阁下。我保证。我只是想弄清楚。\n\n该动议中还请求了其他救济，而债务人对此提出了异议。因此，我不希望法院认为——如果该事项转至——我也没有问题。\n\n法院：\n我不知道——我们将在星期四全面讨论此事。\n\n亨齐先生：\n所以所有事项都延至——\n\n法院：\n我要告诉你，我——在初步审阅后，仍以星期四进一步辩论为准，我不知道债务人对该动议中列明的任何其他救济提出异议的依据是什么。\n\n亨齐先生：\n好的。明白，法官阁下。\n\n法院：\n好的。\n\n德斯平斯先生：\n那么，法官阁下，我们已经进行了三小时四十五分钟。我不知道您是否想在我们进入——之前休息一下，因为还有足足20——\n\n法院：\n那么，我会问一下法庭工作人员。你们想休息一下吗？实际上，我相信他们会想。你们想休息几分钟吗？好的。\n\n谢谢。那么现在是3:40。怎么说，你们想在3:50回来，还是想多休息一会儿？\n\n德斯平斯先生：\n不，那样可以，法官阁下。\n\n法院：\n这对你们——对我们大家都合适吗？我的意思是，对我合适。那么法庭休庭至3:50。\n\n（于下午3:37休庭，至下午3:50继续开庭。）\n\n法庭书记员：\n我们仍在审理案号 22-50073，Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）案。\n\n法院：\n好的。德斯平斯先生。在休庭前，我们本来要谈几个——\n\n德斯平斯先生：\n事务性事项。\n\n法院：\n——事务性事项，那么请继续。\n\n德斯平斯先生：\n第一项，法官阁下，是要求大约每十天举行一次案件状态会议。受托人将有义务在会议前24小时提交议程。有时我们可能会说不需要举行案件状态会议，但我认为，特别是在本案最初几个月，与法院保持联系确实非常重要，因此，我们请求能够——\n\n法院：\n可以。完全可以。\n\n你心中已有拟定日期了吗，还是——\n\n德斯平斯先生：\n还没有。我会与斯卡尔卡先生（Mr. Skalka）讨论，然后再向法官阁下回复，但我只是想——\n\n法院：\n当然。\n\n德斯平斯先生：\n好的。\n\n下一项——这一项更为复杂。我知道上次我们讨论了申报债权截止日期，我说我们会对其作出标注，我们也确实这样做了。\n\n但我开始更深入地研究这个问题，并意识到这里存在一个根本性问题，具体如下。\n\n在本案之前，已经提交了 Genever U.S.（Genever 美国案）——\n\n法院：\n是的。\n\n德斯平斯先生：\n——而该案争议的是谁拥有 Sherry Netherland（雪莉荷兰人酒店）。该案设定了申报债权截止日期，但没有发出通知——首先，没有公告通知，也没有向郭先生的潜在债权人发出通知。通知发给了少数几人，而弗里德曼先生（Mr. Friedman）及其同事当然早已在那个圈子里，因为他们已经参与其中。\n\n从他们的角度来看，愿上帝保佑他们。他们确实在该案中代表 PAX（PAX）向 Genever 提交了债权申报，但我相对于该实体的立场是，我是股权持有人，因为我——我拥有股份。嗯，我不是以个人身份拥有股份，而是本破产财团拥有该股份。而这行不通，因为该案的申报债权截止日期已经过去。我的戈德曼先生（Mr. Goldman）客户从未收到关于此事的通知，因为当时他还不存在，因为这里尚未有案件。\n\n因此，需要——非常重要地需要——协调这两个案件，不仅是因为该问题，因为有很多办法可以解决该问题。一种办法是在该案中延长申报债权截止日期，重新开放该案，以允许戈德曼先生的客户提交债权申报。我并不是说这是优选方案，但这是其中一种。另一种办法是由我们在该案中提出揭开公司面纱或另我人格请求，等等，等等。\n\n但关键在于需要协调，因为目前该案正自行照常推进。出售不是问题。这不是问题。该案正自行照常推进，最终假定最有利的结果，即 Sherry Netherland 由郭先生所有，该笔资金将只与那个圈子里的债权人分享，也就是 PAX 和 Sherry Netherland，即酒店本身，以及极少数其他人。\n\n那么，作为本案债权人的受托人，对我而言，这行不通。因此——还有第二个根本性问题。\n\n我们不应让两个法院、两个独立的法院来裁决 Sherry Netherland——即 Sherry Netherland 的所有权问题，以及谁拥有游艇的问题。您可能会说，嗯，游艇与酒店不同，是的。但归根结底，一个是女儿，一个是儿子。这些都是同样的问题。是的，会有不同的时间安排问题，但归根结底，论点都将是一样的。让两个独立法院裁决该问题，将是对司法资源和专业费用的巨大浪费。\n\n因此，您可能会说，嗯，这有很多内容需要处理和消化，而我一直在为此苦恼。我已就此与委员会和 PAX 进行沟通，他们也正在推进此事。但我认为需要发生的是，应当——因为我会在加里蒂法官（Judge Garrity）面前陈述同样的事情。但我认为您和他需要要么——我不知道您对此有何看法——就此进行一次沟通，或者举行联合案件状态会议，这非常不寻常，但此前曾经进行过。\n\n但无论以何种方式，该问题都需要在下一个月左右得到处理，因为让对郭先生拥有债权的人错过该案的申报债权截止日期是不公平的，因为他们并不比 PAX 拥有更大的或更小的权利。PAX 对 Genever 的债权是一项揭开公司面纱、另我人格债权。\n\n而且，我再说一遍，我不是在批评他们。他们是在履行自己的职责。他们不是任何人的受托人，并且出于某种原因，债务人——嗯，债务人由郭先生控制，所以显然没有兴趣进行公告通知等的宣传，这也是我向您说明申报债权截止日期的原因，尽管我们已对其作出标注及诸如此类。\n\n我认为，在该问题得到解决之前，我们应当暂缓处理，因为我不想做的是进行两次公告通知，而且我们需要以某种方式解决该问题；我的职责是提出前进路径，但在再次与委员会、PAX 以及 Genever 案中债务人的律师沟通之前，我还没有准备好这样做。\n\n我想明确，这不影响出售。我并不是试图说，哦，我们不会出售——情况不是这样。\n\n但确实需要协调，我想把这一点提交给法官阁下面前。我并不期待您当场作出回应，因为这里有许多变动因素，但我认为——而且我知道您的案卷排期很满，所以我并不是试图再给您增加一个案件。我理解这一点。\n\n加里蒂法官也非常忙，因此我认为，你们二位之间应当进行一次电话沟通，或者举行一次联合案件状态会议；但我认为，一旦我们有了可供建议的前进路径，这样做是合理的。\n\n法院：\n那么，我认为你的意思是，你认为这两个案件都应由同一位法官审理。那么，是否可以通过提交一项动议来实现这一点？\n\n德斯平斯先生：\n是的，可以。但我——\n\n法院：\n因为我不知道一位法官是否应当与另一位法官就——我的意思是，我——\n\n法院：\n嗯，特别是，是否希望——我不倾向于这样做的原因之一是，我不想引起任何关于存在不当行为或——的指控。\n\n德斯平斯先生：\n是的。\n\n法院：\n我的意思是，什么——你知道，但如果你认为这适当，那么你可以提交——任何人都可以提交一项动议。\n\n德斯平斯先生：\n嗯，但需要明确的是，该动议必须提交至加里蒂法官面前，因为他的案件先提交。\n\n法院：\n我明白。那么，你的意思是，本案可能会转到那里。\n\n德斯平斯先生：\n我的意思是，首先，如果不先与您沟通，我绝不会提交该动议，因为您可能会说，你刚才做了什么？因此，我是在向您介绍这个问题。您应当考虑一下，我们可能会在下一次案件状态会议时就此向法院回复。\n\n但我想确保这是您正在考虑的事情，因为它需要以某种方式得到解决。因此，这确实是有关 Genever 申报债权截止日期的问题。\n\n我想非常简要提及的下一件事是 Lady May（Lady May号）检查。金德塞斯先生（Mr. Kindseth）上次描述了这样一个事实，即存在非常——嗯，我不会说是非常轻微，但相当有限的问题需要解决。\n\n事实证明，情况并非如此。法官阁下会记得，尽管我不是该协议的一方，他们允许我享有探视权或检查权，而事实证明存在更多问题。\n\n但各方正在沟通，我们希望该问题能够解决。但我想确保您知道该对话正在进行。我们上周我想就此与 Zeisler 律师事务所（Zeisler firm）及 PAX 的律师举行了一次电话会议。\n\n法官阁下，您会记得，我们聘请了保罗·德雷克托（Paul Derektor）作为专家协助我们处理该事项，\\$2,500。而这是向法官阁下提出的请求，我知道相关规则，而且美国受托人可能会对此大为反对，但如果我们直接将其作为费用处理，是否可以？\n\n我的意思是，不提交动议聘请他担任专家？我们可以这样做，但这将花费更多。\n\n超过 $2,500，我的意思是——昂贵，是指目前没有资产。所以，我的意思是，我们正在为此支付费用。我们最终希望将来会有资金可以支付，但我们会将其列为一项费用，而不是提交动议以聘请 Derektor 先生（德雷克托先生）作为本案专家。但我对此并无强烈意见。只是从节约成本的角度来看，我认为这样做是合理的。法庭：嗯，我认为你也应当就此与各方沟通。我的意思是，如果没有人提出异议，那就很可能没有问题。DESPINS 先生：好的。我们暂缓处理该事项。您完全正确，法官大人。我们谈过 Lady May（“Lady May”号船）。只是一些事务性事项，债务人仍然——其5月和6月的月度经营报告尚未提交。债务人仍负有提交该报告的义务，因此我想提醒各位这一点。从事务性事项的角度而言，法官大人，我要说的就这些。法庭：好的。DESPINS 先生：谢谢。法庭：让我先看一下，看看是否还有我认为需要询问的事项。（停顿。）那么，关于截止申报日期动议和拟议命令，我们只是将其延期至未来的状态会议吗？这是你的考虑吗？DESPINS 先生：是的，法官大人。法庭：好的。因此，实质上是延期至一个待定日期。DESPINS 先生：是的，法官大人。（停顿。）法庭：Kindseth 先生（金塞思先生）？KINDSETH 先生：是，法官大人。为了基本上向法官大人及其他各方通报有关 Lady May 的最新情况，法官大人，对于 HK International（HK国际），没有人比我的当事人更希望加快满足有关 Lady May 的协议中规定的要求。我们一直非常努力地履行这些义务。法官大人提到了证明书。在其他要素得到满足之前，我的当事人无法提交证明书，其中一项是本庭设立维修准备金。维修准备金要求我的当事人就为使 Lady May 恢复良好工作状态而需要进行的维修提供方案。仅仅因为相关实体目前非常繁忙，在寻找并取得其方案方面出现了一些延误。\n\n关于第 158 页\n\n因此，关于拟议命令，我们只是将其延期至未来的状态会议吗？这是你的考虑吗？DESPINS 先生：是的，法官大人。法庭：好的。因此，实质上是延期至一个待定日期。DESPINS 先生：是的，法官大人。（停顿。）法庭：Kindseth 先生（金塞思先生）？KINDSETH 先生：是，法官大人。为了基本上向法官大人及其他各方通报有关 Lady May 的最新情况，法官大人，对于 HK International（HK国际），没有人比我的当事人更希望加快满足有关 Lady May 的协议中规定的要求。我们一直非常努力地履行这些义务。法官大人提到了证明书。在其他要素得到满足之前，我的当事人无法提交证明书，其中一项是本庭设立维修准备金。维修准备金要求我的当事人就为使 Lady May 恢复良好工作状态而需要进行的维修提供方案。仅仅因为相关实体目前非常繁忙，在寻找并取得其方案方面出现了一些延误。\n\n关于第 158 页\n\n随着我们收到方案，我们已将其传阅给受托人、债权人委员会律师和 PAX（PAX）律师。关于实际需要进行的维修，在上次出庭于法官大人面前之前，我当时并不知情的是，还需要进行一项额外维修。显然，在我已向法庭披露的燃油泵发生故障时，导致齿轮——一些齿轮——基本上被磨损。因此，来自齿轮、可以看见的微小金属碎片——而且，再次说明，这已经提供给所有人——在发动机内的机油系统中循环。因此，需要清理机油。需要清除这些碎片。我们谈的只是小碎片，但显然需要修理，而且我们已收到对此的报价。因此，我们正与受托人、债权人委员会律师及 PAX 律师沟通，尝试就维修准备金达成一致金额；一旦本庭命令设立维修准备金，这将使我们能够提交证明书。谢谢，法官大人。法庭：谢谢。还有其他人希望陈述吗？HENZY 先生（亨齐先生）：不是关于 Lady Mae，法官大人，但我是否应在星期四下午1点之前就——提交答复？法庭：是。是。\n\n案件 22-50073\n文件 1082-8\n提交 11/11/22\n录入 11/11/22 13:18:26\n\n1 HENZY 先生：我没有把它记下来——\n2 法庭：我没有给你一个时限，但如果你愿意，我可以\n3 给你到星期四上午9点。\n4 但我不能给你更长时间。我必须能够\n5 在听证会前阅读它，否则听证会就没有意义。\n7 HENZY 先生：我会提交——谢谢，法官大人。我\n8 预计会在那之前提交，但谢谢。\n9 法庭：好的。还有其他人希望陈述吗？\n10 （无可听见的答复。）\n11 法庭：好的。我认为这样就处理完了本案今天的所有\n12 事项，我们将于\n13 星期四下午1:00通过 Zoom 再次开庭。债务人须在星期四\n14 上午9:00前提交对公司治理动议的答复，\n15 好吗？\n16 这样就处理完了日程表上的所有事项，因此\n17 休庭。\n18 （程序于下午4:05结束。）\n\n2 本人，CHRISTINE FIORE（克里斯廷·菲奥雷），经法庭批准的速记员及\n3 经认证电子记录员和速记员，证明\n4 上述内容是以上述标题案件程序的正式电子\n5 录音所制作的正确誊本。\n\n9 August 9, 2022\n10 Christine Fiore, CERT\n11 速记员","key_entities":["Despins","Kwok","Paul Hastings","Je","Guo","CIPA","Ho Wan Kwok","Luc Despins","Chinese Communist Party"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":107,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":539,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":543,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":598,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":620,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":645,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":38529,"status":"published","published_at":"2022-11-11 00:00:00","created_at":"2022-11-11","updated_at":"2026-08-23 22:47:33"}