{"id":"court_ctb_1105_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":1105,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION | -------------------------------------------","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| -----------------------------------------------------------<br>x |             |                         |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|-------------------------|\n| In re:                                                           | :<br>:      | Chapter 11              |\n| HO WAN KWOK, et al.,                                             | :<br>:<br>: | Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |\n| Debtors.1                                                        | :<br>:      | Jointly Administered    |\n| -----------------------------------------------------------<br>x |             |                         |\n\n# **CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO THE DEBTOR'S MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER PRECLUDING THE DISCLOSURE OF THE DEBTOR'S ASYLUM APPLICATION**\n\nLuc A. Despins, in his capacity as the chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") appointed in the chapter 11 case of Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\"), respectfully submits this objection (the \"Objection\") to the Debtor's *Motion For Protective Order* [Docket No. 1063] (the \"Motion for Protective Order\"). In support of this Objection, the Trustee submits the *Declaration of Avram E. Luft in Support of Opposition to Protective Order* (the \"Luft Declaration\"),<sup>2</sup> and respectfully states as follows:\n\n## **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\n1. Although the Court would not know it from reading the Debtor's Motion for\n\nProtective Order, what the Debtor seeks to do is prevent the Trustee from reviewing a critical document—the asylum application—that it is attached to and incorporated into the summary judgment motion filed by Clark Hill against the Debtor in the Malpractice Action and that forms\n\n<sup>1</sup> The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595) (the \"Debtor\") and Genever Holdings Corporation (the \"Genever BVI Debtor\"). The mailing address for the Trustee and the Genever BVI Debtor is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\n<sup>2</sup> The Luft Declaration is being filed contemporaneously herewith.\n\nthe backbone of the Debtor's claims in the Malpractice Action.<sup>3</sup> The Malpractice Action is now an asset of the estate that the Trustee owns and controls. Absent the production of the asylum application, and the information in it that is referenced in the pleadings, depositions and expert reports in the Malpractice Action, the Trustee will be flying blind in a litigation he controls, unable to read the pleadings and evidence at issue. The Malpractice Action is a potentially valuable asset of the estate that could mature into a recovery for the Debtor's creditors, but only if the Trustee has the ability to assess and litigate the matter.\n\n2. The Debtor's Motion for Protective Order ignores this fundamental issue and is instead highly misleading, to the point where serious questions need to be asked regarding the Debtor's candor with this Court. First, nowhere in the Motion for Protective Order does the Debtor disclose that the asylum application he seeks to withhold from production is at the very core of the Malpractice Action, a litigation that counsel for the Debtor has admitted is an asset of the estate. The Debtor also omits that the asylum application was not independently requested by the Trustee, but rather is directly responsive to the Trustee's requests for the pleadings and related documents in the Malpractice Action to enable the Trustee to manage such action.\n\n3. Second, the Motion for Protective Order fails to disclose that seemingly the one point of agreement between the Debtor and Clark Hill in the Malpractice Action is that the information in the asylum application is already public. While the Trustee has been prevented for almost three months from even being able to review the relevant pleadings in the Malpractice Action based on bogus objections by the Debtor's counsels, as it has been represented to the Trustee by counsel for Clark Hill, and as set forth in the complaint, the Debtor sued based on his theory that he was harmed due to the content of his asylum application being hacked and\n\n<sup>3</sup> Capitalized terms within the Preliminary Statement take the meaning given to them *infra*.\n\nreleased to the public, while Clark Hill has argued in response that the disclosed information was already public knowledge prior to the hack. Given this, it seems that what the Debtor wants is not to prevent his asylum application from being disclosed, but rather to prevent the Trustee from being able to exercise control over an estate asset – a violation of the automatic stay.\n\n4. Third, the Motion for Protective Order, despite being predicated on the alleged need to prevent production of the asylum application so as to be in compliance with the Privileges Consent Order, fails to disclose that counsel for the Debtor already admitted to counsel for Clark Hill that the Debtor's asylum application is *not privileged*—making the Debtor's arguments to the Court based on the Privileges Consent Order irrelevant at best, and in reality misleading and disingenuous.\n\n5. Fourth, similarly, the Motion for Protective Order's reliance on comments made by counsel for the Trustee to this Court during hearings concerning the negotiation of the Privileges Consent Order – discussions inherently about *privileged* information – are nothing more than a smoke screen to obscure the Debtor's omissions. At no point when the Privileges Consent Order was being negotiated did counsel for the Debtor, who had access to the pleadings and papers relevant to the Malpractice Action, tell counsel for the Trustee that the Debtor's asylum application was attached to Clark Hill's summary judgment briefing and formed the basis for its defense to the Debtor's claims. The comments made by counsel for the Trustee simply indicated that the Trustee had no interest (and still has no interest) in specifically investigating the asylum application process or reviewing the substance of the application independent of its relevance to the Malpractice Action.\n\n6. Fifth, the Motion for Protective Order omits that the federal regulation the Debtor cites only applies to disclosures made by government officials, not private parties, and that far\n\n3\n\nfrom prohibiting disclosure of the asylum application to the Trustee, it explicitly states that the Debtor may consent for the government (or anyone else) to disclose the asylum application. Nothing prohibits the Debtor from disclosing the asylum application to the Trustee. His refusal not to do so is yet another example of his lack of cooperation with the Trustee and continued attempts to obstruct the Trustee's work under the Bankruptcy Code.\n\n7. There is no basis for the Debtor's motion: the asylum application is not privileged; by the Debtor's own admission, its contents have already been disclosed to the public; and withholding of the asylum application will prevent the Trustee from effectively exercising control over the Malpractice Action, an asset of the estate that must now be utilized to provide a recovery for the Debtor's creditors.\n\n8. The Trustee needs to be able to fully assess the merits of the Malpractice Action, which is an estate asset. To do so, the Trustee needs access to the Debtor's asylum application. Importantly, receiving the Debtor's asylum application to evaluate and exercise control over the Malpractice Action is quite different from requesting access to the Malpractice Action to explore the merits of the Debtor's asylum application—something the Trustee has no interest in doing. The Motion for Protective Order should be denied.\n\n#### **BACKGROUND**\n\n#### **A. The Debtor's Malpractice Action against Clark Hill**\n\n9. On September 19, 2019, the Debtor filed a complaint against his former counsel Clark Hill PLC (\"Clark Hill\") alleging malpractice and seeking damages arising from a breach of Clark Hill's computer server resulting in the public dissemination of the Debtor's asylum application information on the internet (the \"Malpractice Action\"). The Malpractice Action was removed to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (the \"District Court\") on\n\n4\n\nOctober 24, 2019.<sup>4</sup>\n\n10. The Debtor retained Ari Casper from The Casper Firm, LLC (\"Casper\") to represent him in the Malpractice Action, and Clark Hill retained Jenner & Block LLP (\"Jenner & Block\") as defense counsel.\n\n11. The Debtor alleged that, \"[a]s a direct and proximate cause of [Clark Hill's] multiple breaches of their duties and legal obligations, the details and contents of [the Debtor's] asylum application and other materials have been disclosed widely on social media platforms and placed in the hands of third-parties hostile to [the Debtor].\"<sup>5</sup>\n\n12. Up until the Debtor filed for bankruptcy, the parties to the Malpractice Action actively litigated the case: discovery proceeded and depositions were taken, which was then followed by service of expert reports from the parties and expert discovery. <sup>6</sup>\n\n13. On February 15, 2022, Clark Hill moved for summary judgment and to exclude the Debtor's experts.<sup>7</sup>\n\n#### **B. The Debtor's Bankruptcy Case and Appointment of the Trustee**\n\n14. On February 15, 2022, the Debtor filed for bankruptcy in this Court, immediately triggering the automatic stay under section 362 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (the \"Bankruptcy Code\").\n\n<sup>4</sup> *Wengui v. Clark Hill PLC*, 1:19-cv-03195-JEB (D.D.C.).\n\n<sup>5</sup> Luft Decl., **Exhibit A**, Complaint in Malpractice Action at ¶ 57.\n\n<sup>6</sup> In furtherance of the litigation, on May 26, 2020, the District Court entered the Stipulated Protective Order. *See*  Stipulated Protective Order, *Wengui v. Clark Hill PLC*, 1:19-cv-03195-JEB (D.D.C.) [Docket No. 23] (the \"Malpractice Action Protective Order\").\n\n<sup>7</sup> Because they referenced discovery designated as confidential, the pleadings were filed under seal. No public versions of these pleadings were ever filed, because counsel for the Debtor requested that he not be required to do so, given that he did not believe the Debtor would pay him for the work, given his bankruptcy filing.\n\n15. On June 15, 2022, this Court issued the Trustee Order (*see* ECF No. 465), and, on July 7, 2022, the Office of the United States Trustee filed a Notice of Appointment of Chapter 11 Trustee appointing Luc Despins as Chapter 11 Trustee. (*See* ECF No. 514).\n\n16. The Debtor in his bankruptcy schedules listed litigation claims, with unknown value, as property of his estate. (*See* ECF No. 78 at 6). In his Statement of Financial Affairs, the Debtor listed the Malpractice Action as an active litigation in which he was a plaintiff. (*See* ECF No. 77 at 22).\n\n17. Upon his appointment, the Trustee stepped into the Debtor's shoes with respect to the Malpractice Action, and has a duty to litigate the Malpractice Action to its fullest potential, for the benefit of the Debtor's creditors and estate.\n\n#### **C. The Trustee's Rule 2004 Discovery**\n\n18. On July 28, 2022, the Trustee filed a motion for Rule 2004 discovery as to various legal and financial advisors to the Debtor, including Clark Hill (the \"Professionals 2004 Motion\") (*See* ECF No. 637). On August 16, 2022, the Court granted the Trustee's Professionals 2004 Motion. (*See* ECF No. 756).\n\n19. Pursuant to the Court's order, on August 19, 2022, Clark Hill was served with a Rule 2004 Subpoena and document requests attached thereto (the \"Subpoena\").<sup>8</sup> The Subpoena sought information necessary for the Trustee to both evaluate and exercise control over the Malpractice Action, which is property of the estate. *See* Subpoena, Request for Production 17.\n\n20. On September 14, 2022, this Court entered the *Consent Order Regarding Control of Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Protection Related to Rule 2004*\n\n<sup>8</sup> The Subpoena is attached to the Luft Declaration as **Exhibit B**.\n\n*Subpoenaed Documents and Information* (the \"Privileges Consent Order\"). (*See* ECF No.\n\n856).\n\n# 21. Among other things, the Privileges Consent Order holds that\n\nThe Trustee has exclusive control of any attorney-client privilege or work product protection that could otherwise be asserted by the Debtor or his counsel under any applicable law (including, without limitation, any interests of the Debtor in any common interest or joint defense privilege alleged to be held with other parties) . . . concerning (i) assets *(including actual or potential causes of action) that (A) are or were held by the Debtor*, (B) are or were held by others that the Trustee is investigating pursuant to the Rule 2004 Subpoenas for purposes of determining whether they hold or may have information about assets in which the Debtor holds or may have held an interest, or (C) otherwise relate to, or could be brought into, the Debtor's estate,[] (ii) the Debtor's financial condition (including, without limitation, liabilities of the estate), or (iii) activities related to the administration of the estate . . . during the period between the petition date and the issuance of the order appointing the Trustee on July 8, 2022 (topics (i) through (iii), collectively, the \"Investigation Topics\").\n\n(*See* Privileges Consent Order at ¶ 2 (emphasis added)).\n\n22. The Privileges Consent Order also provides that\n\nNothing herein shall prevent the Debtor from asserting any and all privileges concerning legal matters unrelated to the Investigation Topics, such as unrelated criminal allegations or the Debtor's asylum application (*other than documents related to the [Malpractice Action] that relate to the merits of the legal malpractice action*, as distinguished from the merits of the Debtor's asylum application, subject to the balancing test incorporated herein, which does not relate to the substance of the asylum application). The Trustee and the Debtor reserve all rights with respect to any privileges claimed over such other matters.\n\n(*See* Privileges Consent Order at ¶ 4 (emphasis added)).\n\n23. When counsel for the Trustee was negotiating the Privileges Consent Order with counsel for the Debtor, counsel for the Trustee did not have access to all the pleadings in the matter, including, notably, the motion for summary judgment. Thus, while the Trustee knew he had to carve out an exclusion of the transfer of the privilege to allow him access to information regarding the merits of that litigation, he was not aware that the asylum application itself was\n\nincorporated into the pleadings in the Malpractice Action. Counsel for the Debtor, while negotiating the Privileges Consent Order, never told counsel for the Trustee otherwise.\n\n24. Comments that counsel for the Trustee made during the hearings concerning the negotiation of the Privileges Consent Order merely reflect that lack of knowledge. At the time those statements were made, counsel for the Trustee did not know the full importance of the Debtor's asylum application to Clark Hill's defenses in the Malpractice Action.\n\n### **D. Trustee's Repeated Attempts to Gain Access to Pleadings, Expert Reports and Evidence in Malpractice Action**\n\n25. Since late August, the Trustee has repeatedly attempted to obtain access to relevant documents in the Malpractice Action on a consensual basis.<sup>9</sup>\n\n26. Following receipt of this Court's Privileges Consent Order, on September 19, 2022, counsel for Clark Hill wrote Casper to make him aware (a) of the Privileges Consent Order, (b) that the Trustee had requested copies of the pleadings filed under seal, (c) that while the Trustee did not believe it was necessary, he was willing to sign the Malpractice Action Protective Order, and (d) when that occurred, he would seek confirmation that Casper had no objection to providing the Trustee with the requested documents.<sup>10</sup>\n\n27. Consistent with this message, on September 20, 2022, counsel for the Trustee wrote counsel for Clark Hill and Casper jointly to inform them that he had executed the undertaking for the Malpractice Action Protective Order on behalf of the Trustee, and asking for confirmation that neither counsel had an objection to the Trustee being given access to the\n\n<sup>9</sup> *See* Parties' Joint Status Report, *Wengui v. Clark Hill PLC*, 1:19-cv-03195-JEB (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 2022) (emphasis added) [Docket No. 95] (\"Once the Trustee has received and reviewed this discovery and can review the relevant pleadings and documents in this case currently covered by the Protective Order, the Trustee has informed counsel that he will be in an informed position to give guidance and instruction on how he wants to proceed with this case.\")\n\n<sup>10</sup> Luft Decl., **Exhibit C**, email from John Storino, counsel for Clark Hill, to Ari Casper (Sept. 19, 2022, 12:58 EST).\n\npleadings filed under seal, along with the underlying expert reports and deposition transcripts.<sup>11</sup> Counsel for Clark Hill responded that \"[t]he defense is fine providing the pleadings, expert reports and/or deposition transcripts that have been marked confidential or attorneys eyes only under the protective order to the Trustee's counsel.\"<sup>12</sup> In contrast, Casper responded that \"we are not authorized by Mr. Guo to agree to the disclosure of pleadings, reports, and/or transcripts marked confidential or attorney's eyes only and/or which have been filed under seal.\"<sup>13</sup>\n\n28. On September 21, 2022, following a telephone call during which Casper clarified that his objection was not at the behest of the Debtor, but that he wished for confirmation that the Debtor agreed the Malpractice Action was an asset of the estate that was now controlled by the Trustee, counsel for the Trustee sent an email to both Casper and bankruptcy counsel for the Debtor attaching the signed undertaking for the Malpractice Action Protective Order and asking for confirmation from the Debtor's bankruptcy counsel that \"the Clark Hill litigation is property of the estate, and is under the exclusive control of the Trustee.\"<sup>14</sup> Counsel for the Debtor immediately confirmed to Casper that \"*Mr. Kwok[']s claims in the litigation against Clark Hill are property of the bankruptcy estate*.\"<sup>15</sup> Despite this confirmation, Casper still refused to withdraw his objection.\n\n<sup>11</sup> Luft Decl., **Exhibit D**, email from Avram Luft, counsel for the Trustee, to Ari Casper, and John Storino, counsel for Clark Hill (Sept. 20, 2022, 2:54 EST).\n\n<sup>12</sup> Luft Decl., **Exhibit E**, email from John Storino, counsel for Clark Hill, to Ari Casper, and Avram Luft, counsel for the Trustee (Sept. 20, 2022, 3:58 EST).\n\n<sup>13</sup> Luft Decl., **Exhibit F**, email from Ari Casper to Avram Luft, counsel for the Trustee, and John Storino, counsel for Clark Hill (Sept. 20, 2022, 4:14 EST).\n\n<sup>14</sup> Luft Decl., **Exhibit G**, email from Avram Luft, counsel to the Trustee, to Ari Casper (Sept. 21, 2022, 3:59 EST).\n\n<sup>15</sup> Luft Decl., **Exhibit H**, email from Aaron A. Romney, counsel to the Debtor, to Ari Casper, and Avram Luft, counsel to the Trustee (Sept. 21, 2022, 4:43 EST) (emphasis added).\n\n29. On or around October 11, 2022, Clark Hill sent documents to counsel for the Debtor to review for personal harm.<sup>16</sup> On October 14, counsel for the Debtor emailed counsel for Clark Hill saying, \"[p]lease withhold the following: Mr. Kwok's asylum application . . . .\"<sup>17</sup>\n\n30. On October 19, 2022, counsel for the Trustee wrote Casper again requesting that Casper cease its control over the Malpractice Action and withdraw its objection to Clark Hill's production of documents concerning the Malpractice Action to the Trustee. <sup>18</sup> On October 19, 2022, counsel for Casper \"expressly withdr[e]w the Casper Firm's prior opposition to the production of filings requested by Luc Despins, Trustee, by [Clark Hill].\" 19\n\n31. On October 27, 2022, counsel for Clark Hill asked counsel for the Debtor, among other things, \"[w]hat is the basis for withholding [the Debtor's] asylum application. It was submitted to the immigration office several years ago as part of his seeking asylum. We don't see how it can be privileged.\"<sup>20</sup> That same day, counsel for the Debtor responded: \"[t]he asylum application *isn't technically privileged* but it is a highly confidential document that has absolutely nothing to do with the debtor's estate.\"<sup>21</sup> Therefore, the Debtor sought to withhold the documents not based on any assertion of privilege.\n\n32. Later that day, counsel for Clark Hill responded to counsel for the Debtor saying, in part,\n\n<sup>16</sup> Luft Decl., **Exhibit I at I-12**, email from John Storino, counsel for Clark Hill, to Aaron Romney, John Cesaroni, Eric Henzy, Stephen Kindseth, and Sadra Wenthen (Oct. 11, 2022, 9:45 EST).\n\n<sup>17</sup> Luft Decl., **Exhibit I at I-11 – I-12**, email from John Cesaroni, counsel to the Debtor, to John Storino, Aaron Romney, John Cesaroni, Eric Henzy, Stephen Kindseth, among others (Oct. 14, 2022, 2:58 EST).\n\n<sup>18</sup> Luft Decl., **Exhibit J**, letter from Avram Luft, counsel to the Trustee, to Ari Casper (Oct. 19, 2022).\n\n<sup>19</sup> Luft Decl., **Exhibit K**, email from Gary Leibowitz, counsel to Casper, to John Storino, counsel for Clark Hill, and Avram Luft and Luc Despins, counsel for the Trustee (8:37 PM EST).\n\n<sup>20</sup> Luft Decl., **Exhibit I at I-7 – I-8**, email from John Storino, counsel to Clark Hill, to Aaron Romney, John Cesaroni, Eric Henzy, and Stephen Kindseth, among others (Oct. 27, 2022, 8:11 EST).\n\n<sup>21</sup> Luft Decl., **Exhibit I at I-7**, email from Aaron Romney to John Storino, John Cesaroni, Stephen Kindseth, and Eric Henzy, among others (Oct. 27, 2022, 10:35 EST) (emphasis added).\n\nContrary to your assertion that the asylum application \"has absolutely nothing to do with the debtor's estate,\" the core allegation of the debtor's complaint against Clark Hill [in the Malpractice Action] is that the content of the asylum application was leaked and therefore damaged the debtor; one of Clark Hill's primary defenses is that the supposedly leaked information was voluntar[il]y put on the internet or otherwise publicly disclosed by the debtor. Thus the asylum application and the information from the asylum application that was supposedly leaked is fundamental to the [Malpractice Action], . . . .<sup>22</sup>\n\n33. On October 31, 2022, Counsel for the Trustee, counsel for the Debtor, and\n\ncounsel for Clark Hill met and conferred. Counsel for Clark Hill reiterated the importance of the\n\nDebtor's asylum application to the Malpractice Action, indicating that the Debtor's asylum\n\napplication is discussed in detail within, and attached as an exhibit to, Clark Hill's summary\n\njudgement brief in the Malpractice Action, and that one of its main arguments in defense of the\n\nMalpractice Action is that the Debtor has not been harmed by the purportedly negligent\n\ndisclosure of certain information in his asylum application to the public because such\n\ninformation was already in the public domain prior to the disclosure in question.\n\n34. On November 2, 2022, counsel for the Trustee emailed counsel for the Debtor\n\nsaying,\n\nI am following up regarding your pending objection to Clark Hill producing to us the asylum application, that is both an exhibit to their motion for summary judgment and directly at issue in the litigation. After we all confirmed that it was not a privileged document, you asked to be able to speak to your client regarding your pending objection now that you understood that it is an exhibit and directly at issue in the litigation. Can you please confirm that your client is no longer objecting to the production of the document so that Clark Hill can proceed with its production to the Trustee. If he is maintaining his objection[,] I ask that you please let us and Jenner know the basis of your legal objection immediately so that we can take appropriate steps to address the issue promptly.<sup>23</sup>\n\n<sup>22</sup> Luft Decl., **Exhibit I at I-5 – I-7**, email from Vincent Lazar to Aaron Romney, John Cesaroni, Eric Henzy, Stephen Kindseth, Avi Luft, Jonathon Kosciewicz, Douglass Barron, Ezra Sutton, and Nicholas Bassett, among others (Oct. 27, 2022, 7:13 EST).\n\n<sup>23</sup> Luft Decl., **Exhibit I at I-1**, email from Avi Luft to Aaron Romney, among others (Nov. 2, 2022, 2:07 EST).\n\n35. That same day, counsel for the Debtor, for the first time, claimed that\n\n\"[d]issemination of the [Individual] Debtor's Asylum application appears to violate Section 208.6 of Title 8 of the Federal Regulations.\"<sup>24</sup> Later that night, counsel for the Debtor filed this Motion for Protective Order.\n\n#### **Argument**\n\n### **A. The Debtor's Asylum Application is not Privileged**\n\n36. \"In the absence of a claim of privilege, a party usually does not have standing to object to a subpoena directed to a non-party witness.\" *Est. of Ungar v. Palestinian Auth.*, 400 F. Supp. 2d 541, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), *aff'd*, 332 F. App'x 643 (2d Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). Here, the Debtor's asylum application is not privileged, and the Debtor lacks standing to pursue the Motion for Protective Order.\n\n37. The Debtor purports to rely, in part, on paragraph 4 of the Privileges Consent Order to support his argument that he retains the ability to assert privilege over his asylum application. (*See* Motion for Protective Order at ¶ 6). As noted above, paragraph 4 of the Privileges Consent Order states, in relevant part,\n\nNothing herein shall prevent the Debtor from asserting any and all privileges concerning legal matters unrelated to the Investigation Topics, such as unrelated criminal allegations or the Debtor's asylum application (*other than documents related to the [Malpractice Action] that relate to the merits of the legal malpractice action*, as distinguished from the merits of the Debtor's asylum application, subject to the balancing test incorporated herein, which does not relate to the substance of the asylum application). The Trustee and the Debtor reserve all rights with respect to any privileges claimed over such other matters.\n\n(*See* Privileges Consent Order at ¶ 4 (emphasis added)).\n\n<sup>24</sup> Luft Decl., **Exhibit I at I-1**, email from Aaron Romney to Avi Luft, among others (Nov. 2, 2022, 6:14 EST).\n\n38. The Debtor's argument is fundamentally flawed because paragraph 4 of the Privileges Consent Order, by its terms, only applies to documents that are privileged in the first place. That the Debtor's asylum application is not privileged is not in dispute – it was filed with the government years ago – and counsel for the Debtor has admitted it is not privileged.<sup>25</sup>\n\n39. Moreover, even if the Debtor's asylum application was privileged (it is not), paragraph 4 of the Privileges Consent Order carves out documents related to the merits of the Malpractice Action, and distinguishes documents related to the merits of the Malpractice Action from documents concerning the merits of the Debtor's asylum application. This carve out was included in paragraph 4 of the Privileges Consent Order to ensure that the Debtor could not assert privilege over documents relating to the Trustee's ability to evaluate the Malpractice Action, an asset controlled by the Trustee.\n\n40. There is no denying that the Debtor's asylum application relates to the merits of the Malpractice Action. The Debtor's core allegation in the Malpractice Action is that his asylum application was made public in a hack of Clark Hill's systems. One of Clark Hill's main defenses to the Malpractice Action is that the contents of the Debtor's asylum application were already public prior to any hack. The asylum application is directly at issue in the litigation, exemplified by the representation by counsel for Clark Hill to both the Trustee and Debtor that the asylum application is directly put at issue within its motion for summary judgement and is attached as an exhibit to that motion.\n\n41. It is disingenuous for the Debtor to suggest that comments made by counsel for the Trustee during hearings concerning the Privileges Consent Order waived any right to obtain\n\n<sup>25</sup> Luft Decl., **Exhibit I at I-7**, email from Aaron Romney to John Storino, John Cesaroni, Stephen Kindseth, and Eric Henzy, among others (Oct. 27, 2022, 10:35 EST).\n\ndocuments related to the Malpractice Action. Those comments need to be understood in their context, as standing for the proposition that the Trustee was not seeking documents to independently evaluate the merits of the Debtor's application for asylum, while ensuring access to all documents related to the merits of the Malpractice Action. Nowhere in the Trustee's comments was it suggested that if the Debtor's asylum application was centrally relevant to the merits of the Malpractice Action, then the Trustee would not seek that document. Such a statement, in fact, would be contrary to the Privileges Consent Order, which permits the Trustee to obtain documents pertaining to the merits of the Malpractice Action.\n\n# **B. The Debtor's Asylum Application is Related to the Administration of the Debtor's Estate Because it is Central to the Malpractice Action Which is a Potential Asset of the Estate**\n\n42. Contrary to the Debtor's contention, the Debtor's Asylum Application is relevant to the Administration of the Debtor's Estate and well within the scope of Rule 2004. The scope of an examination authorized under Rule 2004 is exceedingly broad and may relate to the \"acts, conduct, or property or to the liabilities and financial condition of the Debtor, or to any matter which may affect the administration of the Debtor's estate.\" Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004(b).\n\n43. Upon his appointment, the Trustee was automatically substituted as the Plaintiff in the Malpractice Action, which became an estate asset. *See* Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2012 (\"[i]f a trustee is appointed in a chapter 11 case or the debtor is removed as debtor in possession in a chapter 12 case, the trustee is substituted automatically for the debtor in possession as a party in any pending action, proceeding, or matter\"). Counsel for the Debtor has confirmed as much.<sup>26</sup>\n\n<sup>26</sup> Luft Decl., **Exhibit H**, email from Aaron A. Romney, counsel to the Debtor, to Ari Casper, and Avram Luft, counsel to the Trustee (Sept. 21, 2022, 4:43 EST).\n\n44. The Malpractice Action also falls within the Investigation Topics defined by the Privileges Consent Order. Specifically, the Privileges Consent Order provides that \"[t]he trustee has exclusive control of any attorney-client privilege or work product protection that could otherwise be asserted by the Debtor or his counsel under any applicable law . . . concerning (1) assets (*including actual or potential causes of action) that (A) are or were held by the Debtor*, . . . .\" (*See* Privileges Consent Order at ¶ 2 (emphasis added)).\n\n45. As discussed above, the Debtor's asylum application is central to the Debtor's claim in the Malpractice Action and therefore well within the scope of Rule 2004. The fact that the asylum application is an exhibit to Clark Hill's pending motion for summary judgment alone necessitates its disclosure to the Trustee. The Trustee cannot possibly evaluate and make decisions regarding the Malpractice Action—which he now owns—unless he is able to fully evaluate the merits of the claims and defenses at issue, including especially the merits of a pending motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the application must be produced.\n\n# **C. The Immigration and Nationality Act Does Not Prohibit the Disclosure of the Debtor's Asylum Application**\n\n46. The federal regulation<sup>27</sup> that the Debtor cites for the proposition that his asylum application is protected from disclosure concerns disclosure by *government officials*, not private parties. *See Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. Mayorkas*, No. 317CV02366BASKSC, 2021 WL 1312531, at \\*4 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2021) (\"In support of their argument that additional conditions should now be imposed on the court-ordered disclosure, defendants rely heavily on federal regulations limiting the disclosure of asylum information *by the government*. [citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6 and 1208.6]. Yet, as defendants admit, plaintiffs and their counsel are not subject to these\n\n<sup>27</sup> 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6.\n\nregulations.\" (emphasis in original)); *see also id.* (\"Further, the plain text of the regulations does not constrain the treatment of asylum information by private actors.\"). The federal regulation cited by the Debtor does not prohibit Clark Hill, or any other private actor, from disclosing the Debtor's asylum application.\n\n47. Moreover, even if the plain text of the federal regulation cited by the Debtor does apply to private actors (it does not), the applicant can consent to disclosure through written consent. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a). Here, the Debtor simply refuses to provide such consent. The Debtor provides no support for the proposition that he may not consent to the production of the asylum application.\n\n48. Moreover, the Trustee is not a true third party in this case, and, therefore, any disclosure of the asylum application to the Trustee would not implicate the regulation. The Trustee is not a third party but rather is the successor in interest to the Debtor and needs the application to carry out his responsibilities under the Bankruptcy Code. The Debtor is free to designate the application confidential or highly confidential as appropriate under the Protective Order to guard against any possible concern espoused by the regulation the Debtor relies upon. But the Debtor is not entitled to refuse to provide the application to the Trustee.\n\n49. Finally, the regulation at issue is inapplicable because the Debtor chose to place his asylum application at the heart of the Malpractice Action. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6 (c)(2)(ii) (\"This section shall not apply to any disclosure to: . . . [a]ny Federal, State, or local court in the United States considering any legal action: . . . [a[rising from the proceedings of which the asylum application, credible fear determination, or reasonable fear determination is a part.\"). Here, the Debtor brought the Malpractice Action on the theory that the contents of his asylum application were made public to his detriment. The contents of the asylum application are\n\n16\n\ntherefore a central issue in the litigation. Ironically, what is not in dispute by either the Debtor or Clark Hill is that the contents of the asylum application that the Debtor now seeks to prevent the Trustee from seeing is no longer confidential. As such, any law designed to maintain confidentiality of private materials is not applicable to these facts.\n\n**WHEREFORE**, for the foregoing reasons, the Trustee respectfully requests that the Court deny the Debtor's Protective Order, or for any other relief the Court deems just and proper.\n\n[*Remainder of page intentionally left blank*]\n\nDated: November 16, 2022 LUC A. DESPINS, New Haven, Connecticut CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE\n\nBy: */s/ Patrick R. Linsey*\n\nPatrick R. Linsey (ct29437) NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 781-2847 plinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n*and*\n\nNicholas A. Bassett *(pro hac vice* pending) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C., 20036 (202) 551-1902 nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n*and*\n\nAvram E. Luft *(pro hac vice* pending) Douglass Barron (*pro hac vice* pending) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6079 aviluft@paulhastings.com\n\n*Counsel for the Chapter 11 Trustee*","body_zh":"美国康涅狄格联邦破产法院布里奇波特分院\n\nx\n\n关于：　：\n：　第11章\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）等，　：\n：\n：　案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人。1　：\n：　合并管理\n\nx\n\n第11章受托人反对债务人关于禁止披露债务人庇护申请的保护令动议的答复\n\nLuc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯平斯）以其作为在 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（以下简称“债务人”）第11章案件中被指定的第11章受托人（以下简称“受托人”）的身份，谨此提交本反对意见（以下简称“本反对意见”），以反对债务人的保护令动议 [Docket No. 1063]（以下简称“保护令动议”）。为支持本反对意见，受托人提交 Avram E. Luft（阿夫拉姆·E·卢夫特）关于支持反对保护令的声明（以下简称“卢夫特声明”），2 并谨此陈述如下：\n\n初步陈述\n\n1. 尽管法院从阅读债务人的保护令动议中不会得知这一点，债务人试图做的是阻止受托人审阅一份关键文件——庇护申请——该文件附于并纳入 Clark Hill（克拉克·希尔律师事务所）在针对债务人的失职诉讼中提出的简易判决动议，且构成债务人在失职诉讼中主张的\n\n1 本第11章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（又名 Guo Wengui、Miles Guo 和 Miles Kwok，以及众多其他化名）（税务识别号码后四位：9595）（以下简称“债务人”）及 Genever Holdings Corporation（Genever Holdings Corporation）（以下简称“Genever BVI 债务人”）。受托人和 Genever BVI 债务人的邮寄地址为：Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166，收件人：Luc A. Despins，作为 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）遗产的受托人（仅用于通知和通信目的）。\n\n2 卢夫特声明与本文件同时提交。\n\n核心。3 失职诉讼现为受托人拥有并控制的遗产资产。如不提供庇护申请以及该申请中在失职诉讼的诉状、证词和专家报告中被提及的信息，受托人在其控制的诉讼中将如同盲目飞行，无法阅读所涉诉状和证据。失职诉讼是遗产中一项可能具有价值的资产，可能为债务人的债权人带来回收，但前提是受托人有能力评估并诉讼处理该事项。\n\n2. 债务人的保护令动议忽视了这一根本问题，反而具有高度误导性，以至于需要就债务人对本法院是否坦诚提出严重疑问。首先，债务人在保护令动议中未在任何地方披露，其试图拒绝提供的庇护申请正是失职诉讼的核心，而债务人的律师已承认该诉讼为遗产资产。债务人还遗漏了，庇护申请并非由受托人独立请求，而是直接回应受托人为使其能够管理该诉讼而提出的、要求提供失职诉讼诉状及相关文件的请求。\n\n3. 其次，保护令动议未披露，债务人与 Clark Hill 在失职诉讼中看似唯一达成一致的一点是：庇护申请中的信息已属公开。尽管受托人因债务人律师提出的虚假异议，近三个月来甚至无法审阅失职诉讼的相关诉状，但正如 Clark Hill 的律师向受托人陈述且起诉状所载，债务人依据其如下理论提起诉讼：其因庇护申请内容遭黑客入侵并\n\n3 初步陈述中的首字母大写术语具有下文赋予其的含义。\n\n向公众披露而受到损害；而 Clark Hill 则辩称，在黑客入侵之前，被披露的信息已为公众所知。鉴于此，债务人似乎想要的并非阻止披露其庇护申请，而是阻止受托人能够对一项遗产资产行使控制权——此举违反自动中止。\n\n4. 第三，保护令动议虽以据称需要防止提供庇护申请以遵守特权同意令为依据，却未披露债务人的律师已向 Clark Hill 的律师承认，债务人的庇护申请并非特权信息——这使债务人基于特权同意令向法院提出的论点，充其量毫无相关性，实际上则具有误导性且并非出于善意。\n\n5. 第四，同样地，保护令动议依赖受托人律师在有关协商特权同意令的听证中向本法院作出的评论——该等讨论本质上涉及特权信息——不过是用以掩盖债务人遗漏事项的烟幕。在协商特权同意令期间，债务人的律师从未告知受托人的律师：债务人的庇护申请附于 Clark Hill 的简易判决陈述中，并构成其针对债务人主张进行抗辩的基础；该律师能够获取与失职诉讼相关的诉状和文件。受托人律师所作评论仅表明，受托人无意（现在仍无意）专门调查庇护申请程序，或在其与失职诉讼的相关性之外审阅申请的实质内容。\n\n6. 第五，保护令动议遗漏了债务人援引的联邦法规仅适用于政府官员作出的披露，而不适用于私人当事人；该法规绝非禁止向受托人披露庇护申请，而是明确规定债务人可以同意政府（或任何其他人）披露庇护申请。没有任何规定禁止债务人向受托人披露庇护申请。他拒绝如此做，是其缺乏与受托人合作以及持续试图阻碍受托人依《破产法》开展工作的又一例证。\n\n7. 债务人的动议毫无依据：庇护申请并非特权信息；根据债务人自己的承认，其内容已向公众披露；且扣留庇护申请将妨碍受托人有效行使对失职诉讼的控制权，该诉讼是一项现必须用于为债务人债权人实现回收的遗产资产。\n\n8. 受托人需要能够全面评估作为遗产资产的失职诉讼的是非曲直。为此，受托人需要获取债务人的庇护申请。重要的是，为评估并行使对失职诉讼的控制权而接收债务人的庇护申请，与为探究债务人庇护申请的是非曲直而请求获取失职诉讼，截然不同——后者是受托人毫无兴趣从事之事。应驳回保护令动议。\n\n背景\n\nA. 债务人针对 Clark Hill 的失职诉讼\n\n9. 2019年9月19日，债务人对其前律师 Clark Hill PLC（克拉克·希尔律师事务所）提起诉状，主张失职，并寻求因 Clark Hill 计算机服务器遭到入侵，致使债务人庇护申请信息在互联网向公众传播而产生的损害赔偿（以下简称“失职诉讼”）。失职诉讼于2019年10月24日被移送至 United States District Court for the District of Columbia（美国哥伦比亚特区联邦地区法院）（以下简称“地区法院”）。4\n\n10. 债务人聘请 The Casper Firm, LLC（卡斯珀律师事务所）的 Ari Casper（阿里·卡斯珀）（以下简称“Casper”）在失职诉讼中代理其，而 Clark Hill 聘请 Jenner & Block LLP（詹纳与布洛克律师事务所）（以下简称“Jenner & Block”）担任辩护律师。\n\n11. 债务人主张：“作为 [Clark Hill] 多次违反其职责和法定义务的直接及近因，其庇护申请及其他材料的细节和内容已在社交媒体平台上被广泛披露，并落入对 [债务人] 怀有敌意的第三方手中。”5\n\n12. 在债务人申请破产之前，失职诉讼的当事人积极进行诉讼：证据开示持续进行，并已录取证词，随后各方送达专家报告并开展专家证据开示。6\n\n13. 2022年2月15日，Clark Hill 提出简易判决动议，并请求排除债务人的专家。7\n\nB. 债务人的破产案件及受托人的指定\n\n14. 2022年2月15日，债务人在本法院申请破产，随即触发《美国破产法》（以下简称“破产法”）第362条规定的自动中止。\n\n4 Wengui v. Clark Hill PLC, 1:19-cv-03195-JEB (D.D.C.).\n\n5 Luft Decl., Exhibit A, Complaint in Malpractice Action at ¶ 57.\n\n6 为推进该诉讼，地区法院于2020年5月26日作出约定保护令。见 Stipulated Protective Order, Wengui v. Clark Hill PLC, 1:19-cv-03195-JEB (D.D.C.) [Docket No. 23]（以下简称“失职诉讼保护令”）。\n\n7 因其援引被指定为保密的证据开示材料，该等诉状以密封方式提交。该等诉状从未提交任何公开版本，因为债务人的律师请求不要求其如此做，鉴于债务人已申请破产，该律师认为债务人不会为该工作向其支付报酬。\n\n15. 2022年6月15日，本法院作出受托人命令（见 ECF No. 465）；2022年7月7日，Office of the United States Trustee（美国受托人办公室）提交第11章受托人指定通知，指定 Luc Despins（卢克·德斯平斯）为第11章受托人。（见 ECF No. 514）。\n\n16. 债务人在其破产财产清单中将价值未知的诉讼请求列为其遗产财产。（见 ECF No. 78 at 6）。债务人在其财务状况说明书中将失职诉讼列为其作为原告参与的正在进行的诉讼。（见 ECF No. 77 at 22）。\n\n17. 受托人获指定后，就失职诉讼而言取代债务人的地位，并负有为债务人债权人及遗产之利益，最大限度地进行失职诉讼的职责。\n\nC. 受托人的《规则2004》证据开示\n\n18. 2022年7月28日，受托人就债务人的多名法律及财务顾问，包括 Clark Hill，提出《规则2004》证据开示动议（以下简称“专业人士2004动议”）（见 ECF No. 637）。2022年8月16日，法院准许受托人的专业人士2004动议。（见 ECF No. 756）。\n\n19. 根据法院命令，2022年8月19日，向 Clark Hill 送达《规则2004》传票及附随的文件请求（以下简称“传票”）。8 该传票寻求受托人为评估及行使对失职诉讼的控制权所必需的信息，该诉讼为遗产财产。见 Subpoena, Request for Production 17。\n\n20. 2022年9月14日，本法院作出关于与《规则2004》传票所要求文件和信息相关的律师—当事人特权及工作成果保护控制权的同意令（以下简称“特权同意令”）。（见 ECF No. 856）。\n\n21. 除其他事项外，特权同意令规定：\n\n受托人对债务人或其律师依任何适用法律本可主张的任何律师—当事人特权或工作成果保护享有专属控制权（包括但不限于债务人在被主张与其他当事人共同持有的任何共同利益特权或共同抗辩特权中享有的任何权益）……该等特权或保护涉及：(i) 资产（包括实际或潜在的诉因），该等资产：(A) 现由或曾由债务人持有，(B) 现由或曾由他人持有，而受托人正根据《规则》第2004条传票进行调查，以确定该等他人是否持有或可能持有关于债务人现持有或可能曾持有权益的资产的信息，或 (C) 以其他方式与债务人的破产财产有关，或可能被纳入债务人的破产财产，[]；(ii) 债务人的财务状况（包括但不限于破产财产的负债）；或 (iii) 与破产财产管理有关的活动……发生于申请日与2022年7月8日作出指定受托人命令之间的期间（第(i)至(iii)项合称“调查事项”）。\n\n（参见《特权同意令》第2段（强调部分为后加））。\n\n22. 《特权同意令》还规定：\n\n本文件任何内容均不妨碍债务人就与调查事项无关的法律事项主张任何及全部特权，例如无关的刑事指控或债务人的庇护申请（但与[法律过失诉讼]有关且涉及法律过失诉讼实体问题的文件除外，而非涉及债务人庇护申请实体问题的文件；该等文件须接受本文件所纳入的利益衡量测试，该测试不涉及庇护申请的实质内容）。受托人和债务人就任何就该等其他事项主张的特权保留一切权利。\n\n（参见《特权同意令》第4段（强调部分为后加））。\n\n23. 当受托人的律师与债务人的律师就《特权同意令》进行谈判时，受托人的律师无法查阅该事项中的全部诉状，尤其无法查阅简易判决动议。因此，尽管受托人知道他必须对特权移转作出例外规定，以便允许其获取有关该诉讼实体问题的信息，但他并不知道庇护申请本身被纳入法律过失诉讼的诉状之中。债务人的律师在就《特权同意令》进行谈判时，从未向受托人的律师告知相反情况。\n\n24. 受托人的律师在有关《特权同意令》谈判的听证会上所作的评论，仅反映了该等不知情。在作出这些陈述时，受托人的律师并不知道债务人的庇护申请对于Clark Hill（克拉克·希尔）在法律过失诉讼中抗辩的重要性。\nD. 受托人为获取法律过失诉讼中的诉状、专家报告及证据所作的反复尝试\n\n25. 自8月底以来，受托人已多次尝试在双方同意的基础上获取法律过失诉讼中的相关文件。9\n\n26. 在收到本院的《特权同意令》后，于2022年9月19日，Clark Hill的律师致函Casper（卡斯珀），使其知悉：(a)《特权同意令》；(b)受托人已请求取得密封提交的诉状副本；(c)尽管受托人认为并无必要，他愿意签署法律过失诉讼保护令；以及 (d)在此发生后，他将寻求确认Casper不反对向受托人提供所请求的文件。10\n\n27. 与该信息一致，2022年9月20日，受托人的律师共同致函Clark Hill和Casper的律师，告知他们其已代表受托人签署法律过失诉讼保护令的承诺书，并请求确认两方律师均不反对受托人获准查阅密封提交的诉状，以及所依据的专家报告和证言笔录。11 Clark Hill的律师答复称：“辩方同意向受托人的律师提供根据保护令被标记为保密或仅限律师阅览的诉状、专家报告和/或证言笔录。”12 相比之下，Casper答复称：“我们未获Guo（郭）先生授权，同意披露被标记为保密或仅限律师阅览和/或已密封提交的诉状、报告和/或笔录。”13\n\n28. 2022年9月21日，在一次电话通话后，Casper澄清其异议并非受债务人指使，而是希望确认债务人同意法律过失诉讼是现由受托人控制的破产财产资产；受托人的律师随后向Casper和债务人的破产律师发送电子邮件，附上已签署的法律过失诉讼保护令承诺书，并请求债务人的破产律师确认“针对Clark Hill的诉讼是破产财产，且由受托人专属控制。”14 债务人的律师立即向Casper确认，“Kwok（郭文贵）先生针对Clark Hill的诉讼请求属于破产财产。”15 尽管有此确认，Casper仍拒绝撤回其异议。\n\n9 参见当事人联合状态报告，Wengui v. Clark Hill PLC, 1:19-cv-03195-JEB (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 2022)（强调部分为后加）[Docket No. 95]（“一旦受托人收到并审阅该等证据开示材料，并能审阅本案中目前受保护令涵盖的相关诉状和文件，受托人已告知律师，他将能够在知情的基础上就其希望如何推进本案提供指导和指示。”）\n\n10 Luft声明，附件C，Clark Hill律师John Storino（约翰·斯托里诺）致Ari Casper（阿里·卡斯珀）的电子邮件（Sept. 19, 2022, 12:58 EST）。\n\n11 Luft声明，附件D，受托人律师Avram Luft（阿夫拉姆·卢夫特）致Ari Casper及Clark Hill律师John Storino的电子邮件（Sept. 20, 2022, 2:54 EST）。\n\n12 Luft声明，附件E，Clark Hill律师John Storino致Ari Casper及受托人律师Avram Luft的电子邮件（Sept. 20, 2022, 3:58 EST）。\n\n13 Luft声明，附件F，Ari Casper致受托人律师Avram Luft及Clark Hill律师John Storino的电子邮件（Sept. 20, 2022, 4:14 EST）。\n\n14 Luft声明，附件G，受托人律师Avram Luft致Ari Casper的电子邮件（Sept. 21, 2022, 3:59 EST）。\n\n15 Luft声明，附件H，债务人律师Aaron A. Romney（亚伦·A·罗姆尼）致Ari Casper及受托人律师Avram Luft的电子邮件（Sept. 21, 2022, 4:43 EST）（强调部分为后加）。\n\n29. 于2022年10月11日或前后，Clark Hill向债务人的律师发送文件，供其审查是否会造成个人损害。16 10月14日，债务人的律师向Clark Hill的律师发送电子邮件称：“请暂缓提供以下文件：Kwok先生的庇护申请……。”17\n\n30. 2022年10月19日，受托人的律师再次致函Casper，请求Casper停止其对法律过失诉讼的控制，并撤回其对Clark Hill向受托人提交有关法律过失诉讼文件的异议。18 2022年10月19日，Casper的律师“明确撤回Casper Firm（卡斯珀律师事务所）先前反对[Clark Hill]向受托人Luc Despins（吕克·德斯潘）提交所请求备案文件的立场。”19\n\n31. 2022年10月27日，Clark Hill的律师向债务人的律师询问，其中包括：“暂缓提供[债务人]庇护申请的依据是什么？该申请数年前作为其寻求庇护的一部分提交给移民办公室。我们不明白它何以能够享有特权。”20 同日，债务人的律师答复：“庇护申请在技术上并不享有特权，但它是一份高度保密的文件，与债务人的破产财产绝对无关。”21 因此，债务人请求暂缓提供该等文件，并非基于任何特权主张。\n\n32. 当日稍后，Clark Hill的律师答复债务人的律师，部分内容如下：\n\n与您所称庇护申请“与债务人的破产财产绝对无关”相反，债务人针对Clark Hill的起诉书[在法律过失诉讼中]的核心主张是，庇护申请的内容被泄露，因而对债务人造成损害；Clark Hill的主要抗辩之一是，据称泄露的信息系由债务人自愿发布于互联网或以其他方式公开披露。因此，庇护申请以及据称被泄露的庇护申请信息，对于[法律过失诉讼]具有根本性意义，……。22\n\n33. 2022年10月31日，受托人的律师、债务人的律师和Clark Hill的律师举行会议并进行协商。Clark Hill的律师重申了债务人的庇护申请对法律过失诉讼的重要性，指出债务人的庇护申请在Clark Hill于法律过失诉讼中提交的简易判决意见书中被详细讨论并作为证物附上，并且其为法律过失诉讼进行抗辩的主要论点之一是，债务人并未因其庇护申请中的某些信息被据称因过失而向公众披露而遭受损害，因为该等信息在所涉披露之前已经处于公共领域。\n\n34. 2022年11月2日，受托人的律师向债务人的律师发送电子邮件称：\n\n我就您尚未解决的异议作进一步跟进；该异议涉及Clark Hill向我们提交庇护申请，该申请既是其简易判决动议的证物，也是诉讼中直接争议的事项。在我们均确认该文件并非享有特权的文件后，鉴于您现已了解其为证物并且是诉讼中直接争议的事项，您要求能够就您尚未解决的异议与您的客户交谈。请您确认，您的客户已不再反对提交该文件，以便Clark Hill可以继续向受托人提交。如果他仍坚持其异议[,]，我请求您立即告知我们和Jenner（詹纳）您提出法律异议的依据，以便我们能够采取适当措施迅速处理该问题。23\n\n22 Luft声明，附件I，第I-5页至第I-7页，Vincent Lazar（文森特·拉扎尔）致Aaron Romney、John Cesaroni（约翰·切萨罗尼）、Eric Henzy（埃里克·亨齐）、Stephen Kindseth（斯蒂芬·金塞思）、Avi Luft（阿维·卢夫特）、Jonathon Kosciewicz（乔纳森·科谢维奇）、Douglass Barron（道格拉斯·巴伦）、Ezra Sutton（埃兹拉·萨顿）和Nicholas Bassett（尼古拉斯·巴塞特）等人的电子邮件（Oct. 27, 2022, 7:13 EST）。\n\n23 Luft声明，附件I，第I-1页，Avi Luft致Aaron Romney等人的电子邮件（Nov. 2, 2022, 2:07 EST）。\n\n35. 同日，债务人的律师首次主张，\n\n“[个人]债务人的庇护申请的[d]传播似乎违反《联邦法规》第8编第208.6条。”24 当晚稍后，债务人的律师提交了本保护令动议。\n\n论证\n\nA. 债务人的庇护申请不受特权保护\n\n36. “在未主张特权的情况下，当事人通常无权对向非当事人证人发出的传票提出异议。”Est. of Ungar v. Palestinian Auth., 400 F. Supp. 2d 541, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d, 332 F. App’x 643 (2d Cir. 2009)（引文省略）。本案中，债务人的庇护申请不受特权保护，债务人无权提出保护令动议。\n\n37. 债务人声称，部分依赖《特权同意命令》第4段，以支持其仍有能力就其庇护申请主张特权的论点。（见保护令动议第¶ 6段）。如上所述，《特权同意命令》第4段的相关内容规定：\n\n本命令中的任何内容均不得阻止债务人就与调查事项无关的法律事务主张任何及一切特权，例如无关的刑事指控或债务人的庇护申请（但与[失职诉讼]有关、且涉及法律失职诉讼实体理由的文件除外；该等文件有别于涉及债务人庇护申请实体理由的文件，并受纳入本命令的利益衡量测试约束，该测试与庇护申请的实质内容无关）。受托人与债务人均保留就该等其他事项所主张的任何特权的一切权利。\n\n（见《特权同意命令》第¶ 4段（着重号为原文所加））。\n\n24 Luft Decl., Exhibit I at I-1, Aaron Romney致Avi Luft等人的电子邮件（Nov. 2, 2022, 6:14 EST）。\n\n38. 债务人的论点从根本上存在缺陷，因为《特权同意命令》第4段依其条款仅适用于原本即受特权保护的文件。债务人的庇护申请不受特权保护并无争议——该申请多年前已向政府提交——且债务人的律师已承认其不受特权保护。25\n\n39. 此外，即使债务人的庇护申请受特权保护（其并不受保护），《特权同意命令》第4段仍排除了与失职诉讼实体理由有关的文件，并将与失职诉讼实体理由有关的文件与涉及债务人庇护申请实体理由的文件区分开来。该排除条款被纳入《特权同意命令》第4段，是为了确保债务人不能就与受托人评估失职诉讼能力有关的文件主张特权；失职诉讼是一项由受托人控制的资产。\n\n40. 无可否认，债务人的庇护申请与失职诉讼的实体理由有关。债务人在失职诉讼中的核心指控是，其庇护申请在Clark Hill（克拉克·希尔）系统遭黑客入侵时被公开。Clark Hill对失职诉讼的主要抗辩之一是，债务人庇护申请的内容在任何黑客入侵之前已属公开。庇护申请是该诉讼中直接争议的事项，Clark Hill的律师向受托人与债务人均表示，该庇护申请在其简易判决动议中被直接置于争议之中，并作为该动议的附件附上，这一点即为证明。\n\n41. 债务人称，受托人的律师在有关《特权同意命令》的听证会上所作评论放弃了取得\n\n25 Luft Decl., Exhibit I at I-7, Aaron Romney致John Storino、John Cesaroni、Stephen Kindseth和Eric Henzy等人的电子邮件（Oct. 27, 2022, 10:35 EST）。\n\n与失职诉讼有关文件的任何权利，此种说法并不诚实。这些评论必须结合其背景理解，即受托人并非寻求文件以独立评估债务人庇护申请的实体理由，同时确保获得与失职诉讼实体理由有关的所有文件。受托人的评论中从未表示，如果债务人的庇护申请与失职诉讼的实体理由具有核心关联，受托人便不会寻求该文件。事实上，此类表述将违反《特权同意命令》，该命令允许受托人取得与失职诉讼实体理由有关的文件。\n\nB. 债务人的庇护申请与债务人财产的管理有关，因为其对于作为财产潜在资产的失职诉讼具有核心意义\n\n42. 与债务人的主张相反，债务人的庇护申请与债务人财产的管理相关，且完全属于规则2004的范围。根据规则2004获准进行的审查范围极其广泛，可以涉及“债务人的行为、操守或财产，或者债务人的负债及财务状况，或者可能影响债务人财产管理的任何事项。”Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004(b)。\n\n43. 受托人获任命后，即自动替代为失职诉讼中的原告，该诉讼因此成为一项财产资产。见Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2012（“[如]在第11章案件中任命受托人，或者在第12章案件中将债务人免除其占有中债务人身份，受托人即在任何未决诉讼、程序或事项中自动替代占有中债务人成为当事人”）。债务人的律师已确认这一点。26\n\n26 Luft Decl., Exhibit H, 债务人律师Aaron A. Romney致Ari Casper及受托人律师Avram Luft的电子邮件（Sept. 21, 2022, 4:43 EST）。\n\n44. 失职诉讼也属于《特权同意命令》所界定的调查事项范围。具体而言，《特权同意命令》规定：“[受]托人对根据任何适用法律原本可由债务人或其律师主张的任何律师—客户特权或工作成果保护享有专属控制权……该等特权或保护涉及（1）由债务人持有或曾经持有的资产（包括实际或潜在的诉因）……”（见《特权同意命令》第¶ 2段（着重号为原文所加））。\n\n45. 如上所述，债务人的庇护申请对于债务人在失职诉讼中的主张具有核心意义，因此完全属于规则2004的范围。仅该庇护申请作为Clark Hill尚未裁决的简易判决动议附件这一事实，即足以要求向受托人披露该申请。除非受托人能够全面评估争议中主张及抗辩的实体理由，特别是尚未裁决的简易判决动议的实体理由，否则其不可能评估并就失职诉讼——其现已拥有的诉讼——作出决定。因此，必须提交该申请。\n\nC. 《移民和国籍法》并不禁止披露债务人的庇护申请\n\n46. 债务人援引以主张其庇护申请受保护、不得披露的联邦法规27，涉及的是政府官员而非私人当事人的披露。见Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. Mayorkas, No. 317CV02366BASKSC, 2021 WL 1312531, at \\*4 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2021)（“为支持其主张，即现在应对法院命令的披露施加额外条件，被告严重依赖限制政府披露庇护信息的联邦法规。[引用8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6 and 1208.6]。然而，如被告承认，原告及其律师不受这些\n\n27 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6.\n\n法规的约束。”（着重号为原文所加））；另见id.（“此外，该等法规的明确文本并未限制私人行为者对庇护信息的处理。”）。债务人援引的联邦法规并不禁止Clark Hill或任何其他私人行为者披露债务人的庇护申请。\n\n47. 此外，即使债务人援引的联邦法规的明确文本适用于私人行为者（其并不适用），申请人仍可通过书面同意允许披露。见8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a)。本案中，债务人仅仅拒绝提供该等同意。债务人未提供任何依据支持其不能同意提交庇护申请的主张。\n\n48. 此外，受托人在本案中并非真正的第三方，因此，向受托人披露庇护申请并不会触及该法规。受托人并非第三方，而是债务人的利益继受人，并且需要该申请以履行其在《破产法》下的职责。债务人可根据保护令适当地将该申请指定为保密或高度保密，以防范债务人所依赖法规所表达的任何可能关切。但是，债务人无权拒绝向受托人提供该申请。\n\n49. 最后，该法规不适用，因为债务人选择将其庇护申请置于失职诉讼的核心。见8 C.F.R. § 1208.6 (c)(2)(ii)（“本节不适用于向下列对象作出的任何披露：……[美]国任何正在审理任何法律诉讼的联邦、州或地方法院：……[该诉讼]源于庇护申请、可信恐惧认定或合理恐惧认定构成其中一部分的程序。”）。本案中，债务人以其庇护申请内容被公开并使其受损为理论提起失职诉讼。因此，庇护申请的内容是该诉讼中的核心争议。具有讽刺意味的是，债务人或Clark Hill均无争议的是，债务人现试图阻止受托人查看的庇护申请内容已不再保密。因此，任何旨在维持私人材料保密性的法律均不适用于这些事实。\n\n因此，基于上述理由，受托人谨请求法院驳回债务人的保护令，或给予法院认为公正且适当的任何其他救济。\n\n[本页余下部分故意留白]\n\n日期：November 16, 2022    LUC A. DESPINS（卢克·A·德斯平斯），New Haven, Connecticut    第11章受托人\n\n签署人：/s/ Patrick R. Linsey\n\nPatrick R. Linsey（帕特里克·R·林赛）（ct29437）    NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 781-2847 plinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n以及\n\nNicholas A. Bassett（尼古拉斯·A·巴塞特）（pro hac vice待决）    PAUL HASTINGS LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C., 20036 (202) 551-1902 nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n以及\n\nAvram E. Luft（阿夫拉姆·E·卢夫特）（pro hac vice待决） Douglass Barron（道格拉斯·巴伦）（pro hac vice待决）    PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6079 aviluft@paulhastings.com\n\n第11章受托人律师","key_entities":["Je","Kwok","Despins","Ho Wan Kwok","Guo","Luc Despins","Paul Hastings","Miles Guo"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":77,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":78,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":465,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":514,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":637,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":756,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":856,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":5603,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 19:02:13"}