{"id":"court_ctb_1174_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":1174,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"MOTION","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION | In re:                                | Cha","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"## **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| In re:                                | Chapter 11              |\n|---------------------------------------|-------------------------|\n| HO WAN KWOK<br>et al.,                | Case No: 22-50073 (JAM) |\n| Debtor.                               | Jointly Administered    |\n|                                       |                         |\n| HO WAN KWOK,                          |                         |\n| Movant,                               |                         |\n| v.                                    |                         |\n| LUC A. DESPINS,<br>CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE |                         |\n| Respondent.                           |                         |\n\n#### **REPLY IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER**\n\nThe individual debtor, Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\"), through his undersigned counsel, hereby submits his reply in further support of his Motion for Protective Order (Doc. No. 1063) (the \"Motion\") seeking to preclude the disclosure of the Asylum Application<sup>1</sup> to the Trustee. The Chapter 11 Trustee's Response in Opposition to the Motion (Doc. No. 1105) (the \"Objection\") conspicuously ignores the clear language of the Consent Order and federal regulation. Therefore, the Motion should be granted. In further support of the Motion, the Debtor respectfully states as follows:\n\n#### **I. The Trustee Ignores the Clear Language of the Consent Order**\n\n1. Unsurprisingly, given his predilection for *ad hominem* attacks, the Trustee begins\n\n<sup>1</sup> Capitalized terms herein shall have the same meaning as in the Motion, unless otherwise indicated.\n\nthe Objection by making a thinly-veiled accusation that the Debtor has not been forthright with the Court. (Objection, ¶ 2.) However, it is the Trustee who ignores the clear language of the Consent Order. The Trustee relies upon Paragraph 2 of the Consent Order to argue that the Debtor cannot claim any privilege as to the Asylum Application. However, the Trustee conveniently reads Paragraph 2 in isolation and ignores the Consent Order's language that applies specifically to the Asylum Application.\n\n2. Paragraph 2 of the Consent Order identifies certain privileges that belonged to the Debtor and transferred to the Trustee (defined in the Consent Order as \"Trustee Privileges\"). Paragraph 2 limits Trustee privileges to \"attorney-client privileges[s] or work product protection[s] that could otherwise be asserted by the Debtor . . . concerning [Investigation Topics]\" (as defined in the Consent Order).\n\n3. By contrast, Paragraph 4 of the Consent Order specifically (i) applies to the Debtor's Asylum Application; (ii) extends to all privileges (not just the attorney-client and work product privileges) and (iii) acknowledges that the substance of the Debtor's Asylum Application is not an Investigation Topic. Paragraph 4 provides:\n\nNothing herein shall prevent the Debtor from asserting **any and all privileges concerning legal matters unrelated to the Investigation Topics, such as** unrelated criminal allegations or **the Debtor's asylum application** (other than documents related to the litigation styled as *Guo Wengui v. Clark Hill, PLC*, Case No. 19-cv-03195 (D. D.C.) [(the \"Clark Hill Action\")] that relate to the merits of the legal malpractice action, **as distinguished from the merits of the Debtor's asylum application**, subject to the balancing test incorporated herein, **which does not relate to the substance of the asylum application**).\n\n(Consent Order, ¶ 4.) (emphasis added). Thus, Paragraph 4 of the Consent Order makes clear that the Debtor retains his rights to assert any and all privileges related to the merits of the Asylum Application.\n\n4. Although the completed version of the Asylum Application was not technically protected by the attorney-client privilege once it was submitted to the government for consideration, the Asylum Application is, nonetheless, protected from disclosure by federal law, and specifically, 8 C.F.R. § 208.6(a). Therefore, it is privileged from disclosure. Because only the attorney client and work product privileges transferred to the Trustee under the Consent Order, and only with respect to Investigation Topics (and even then, only when the personal harm to the Debtor from disclosure did not outweigh the Trustee's interest in obtaining the document or information)—and the Debtor retained all other privileges, including privileges that concern the substance of the Asylum Application—the Consent Order precludes disclosure of the Asylum Application to the Trustee. 2\n\n### **II. The Substance of the Asylum Application Is Not at Issue in the Malpractice Action**\n\n5. The substance of the entire Asylum Application is not at issue in the action captioned *Guo Wengui v. Clark Hill, PLC*, Case No. 19-cv-03195 (D. D.C.) (the \"Malpractice Action\"). Rather, the primary issue is whether Clark Hill, PLC (\"Clark Hill\") committed malpractice, breached its fiduciary duties, and/or breached its contract for legal representation by failing to maintain adequate security to protect the Asylum Application from being publicly leaked by a data breach. Moreover, to the extent the Malpractice Action concerns damages, *i.e.,* the emotional distress that the Debtor suffered from disclosure of certain portions of his Asylum Application into the public sphere, the Trustee presumably can obtain that information from the public sphere. Regardless, and more importantly, the Trustee's interest in obtaining the Asylum\n\n<sup>2</sup> In his Objection to the Motion, the Trustee cites and attaches emails in which the Debtor's undersigned counsel stated that the Asylum Application is not privileged. (*E.g.*, Objection, ¶ 34.) However, that statement implicitly referred only to the attorney-client privilege, and was made before the undersigned, who is not an immigration attorney, had spoken with immigration counsel and was not aware of 8 C.F.R. § 208.6(a).\n\nApplication, whatever it may be, certainly does not trump the federal protections that preclude disclosure of asylum applications to third-parties or the substantial personal harm that the Debtor will suffer from additional disclosure of his Asylum Application. *See Consent Order,* ¶ 7 (requiring a balancing test weighing personal harm to the Debtor against the Trustee's interest in obtaining privileged information).\n\n6. Moreover, after the Trustee's counsel acknowledged that the Subpoena, among other subpoenas, \"could be read to include . . . [the Debtor's] asylum application\", he \"[made] clear on the record that [the Trustee was] not seeking to get that type of information and we'll limit that request accordingly.\" (Tr. 8/30/22, at 110: 20-111:2 (Bassett, N.).)\n\n7. Finally, neither Clark Hill's data breach nor Clark Hill's more limited disclosures under seal in the Malpractice Action constitute a waiver of the Debtor's privilege or rights as to the Asylum Application. 8 C.F.R. § 208.6(a) (\"Information contained in or pertaining to any application for . . . asylum . . . shall not be disclosed **without the written consent of the applicant**, except as permitted by this section or at the discretion of the Secretary [of the Department of Homeland Security.\").<sup>3</sup>\n\n#### **III. 8 C.F.R. § 208.6(a) Is Not Limited to the Government**\n\n8. Nothing within the text of 8 C.F.R. § 208.6(a) limits its application so as to only preclude disclosure of an asylum application by government actors. Rather, *only certain exceptions* to the general prohibition against disclosure of an asylum application in 8 C.F.R. § 208.6(a) apply only to government actors. *E.g.*, 8 C.F.R. § 208.6(c) (\"**This section shall not apply to any disclosure to: (1) Any United States Government official or contractor having a need**\n\n<sup>3</sup> 8 C.F.R § 208.6 and § 1208.6 are substantively identical, except that § 208.6 authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security to authorize disclosure of an asylum application and § 1208.6 authorizes the Attorney General to authorize disclosure.\n\n**to examine information in connection with**. . . .\") (emphasis added). Clearly, the Department of Homeland Security demonstrated that it knows how to limit a regulation's application to government actors—and it chose not to do so in 8 C.F.R. § 208.6.\n\n9. Further evidencing the intent of 8 C.F.R. § 208.6, the \"Federal Regulation Protecting the Confidentiality of Asylum Applicants Synopsis\" (the \"Synopsis\"), which is attached hereto as Exhibit A, expressly states that third parties who receive an asylum application are bound by the confidentiality regulations. *See Synopsis, Frequently Asked Question 2*, at p. 3 (\"In general, asylum-related information must not be shared with third parties without the asylum applicant's written consent or the Secretary of Homeland Security's specific authorization.\"); *Frequently Asked Question 7*, at p. 4 (Q: If asylum-related information is properly disclosed to a third party pursuant to the regulation, what is the third party's obligation with respect to confidentiality? A: *As the new custodian of the asylum-related information, the third-party recipient is bound by the confidentiality regulation under 8 CFR 208.6.*\") (emphasis added).\n\n10. The Trustee relies upon a single case for the proposition that 8 C.F.R. § 208.6 applies only to government actors, *Al Otro Lado v. Mayorkas*, No. 3:17-cv-02366-BAS-KSC, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68380, at \\*22 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2021). However, that case, which is not controlling, is not persuasive in light of the foregoing. In *Al Otro Lado*, the parties did not dispute that the regulation applied only to government actors, and the Court accepted their agreement without analysis. Here, the issue is disputed, and the Court should resolve the issue by looking to the clear language of 8 C.F.R. § 208.6 and the *Synopsis* attached hereto.\n\n11. **WHEREFORE,** the Debtor respectfully requests that the Court grant the Motion and enter an order precluding the disclosure of the Asylum Application to the Trustee.\n\n5\n\nDated at Bridgeport, Connecticut on this 29th day of November, 2022.\n\n# **THE DEBTOR, HO WAN KWOK**\n\n*/s/ Aaron A. Romney* Aaron A. Romney (ct28144) John L. Cesaroni (ct29309) 10 Middle Street, 15th Floor Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604 Telephone: (203) 368-4234 Facsimile: (203) 368-5487 Email: [aromney@zeislaw.com](mailto:aromney@zeislaw.com) [jcesaroni@zeislaw.com](mailto:jcesaroni@zeislaw.com)\n\n## **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| In re:                                | Chapter 11              |\n|---------------------------------------|-------------------------|\n| HO WAN KWOK<br>et al.,                | Case No: 22-50073 (JAM) |\n| Debtor.                               | Jointly Administered    |\n|                                       |                         |\n| HO WAN KWOK,                          |                         |\n| Movant,                               |                         |\n| v.                                    |                         |\n| LUC A. DESPINS,<br>CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE |                         |\n| Respondent.                           |                         |\n\n### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI hereby certify that on this 29 th day of November, 2022, copies of foregoing Reply in Further Support of Motion for Protective Order was filed electronically. Notice of this filing will be sent by e-mail to all parties by operation of the Court's electronic filing system or by mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing as indicated on the Notice ofElectronic Filing. Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF System.\n\n### **THE DEBTOR, HO WAN KWOK**\n\n*/s/ Aaron A. Romney* Aaron A. Romney (ct28144) 10 Middle Street, 15th Floor Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604 Telephone: (203) 368-4234 Facsimile: (203) 368-5487 Email: [aromney@zeislaw.com](mailto:aromney@zeislaw.com)","body_zh":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION（美国康涅狄格区联邦破产法院布里奇波特分部）\n\n关于：第11章\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人。合并审理\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），\n动议人，\n诉\nLUC A. DESPINS，\n第11章受托人\n被申请人。\n关于进一步支持保护令动议的答复意见\n\n个人债务人 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵，下称“债务人”）通过其下述署名律师，特此提交本答复意见，以进一步支持其寻求阻止向受托人披露《庇护申请》（Asylum Application）1的《保护令动议》（Doc. No. 1063）（下称“该动议”）。第11章受托人针对该动议提出的《反对答辩书》（Doc. No. 1105）（下称“异议书”）公然无视《同意令》（Consent Order）和联邦法规的明确措辞。因此，该动议应予准许。为进一步支持该动议，债务人谨陈述如下：\nI. 受托人无视《同意令》的明确措辞\n\n1. 不出所料，鉴于其对人身攻击的偏好，受托人在异议书开篇\n\n1 本文中的首字母大写术语应与动议中具有相同含义，除非另有说明。\n\n便含沙射影地指责债务人对法院不够坦诚。（《异议书》，第2段。）然而，真正无视《同意令》明确措辞的是受托人。受托人依据《同意令》第2段主张债务人不能就《庇护申请》主张任何特权。然而，受托人为了自身便利，孤立地解读第2段，而忽略了《同意令》中专门适用于《庇护申请》的措辞。\n\n2. 《同意令》第2段确定了属于债务人并已转移给受托人的某些特权（在《同意令》中定义为“受托人特权”）。第2段将受托人特权限定为“本可由债务人……就[调查主题]（如《同意令》所定义）主张的律师-委托人保密特权或工作成果保护”。\n\n3. 相比之下，《同意令》第4段特别 (i) 适用于债务人的《庇护申请》；(ii) 涵盖所有特权（不仅限于律师-委托人及工作成果特权），并且 (iii) 确认债务人的《庇护申请》实质内容不属于调查主题。第4段规定：\n\n本令中的任何内容均不妨碍债务人就与调查主题无关的法律事项主张任何及所有特权，例如无关的刑事指控或债务人的庇护申请（与名为 Guo Wengui v. Clark Hill, PLC, Case No. 19-cv-03195 (D. D.C.) [(“Clark Hill 案”)] 的诉讼相关的、关乎法律职业疏忽诉讼实体问题的文件除外，该诉讼实体问题区别于债务人庇护申请的实体问题，并受本文所纳入的权衡测试约束，该测试与庇护申请的实质内容无关）。\n\n（《同意令》，第4段。）（强调为后加）。因此，《同意令》第4段明确规定，债务人保留就与《庇护申请》实体问题相关的任何及所有特权提出主张的权利。\n\n4. 尽管填妥版《庇护申请》一旦提交给政府审议，在技术上不再受律师-委托人保密特权保护，但《庇护申请》无论如何均受到联邦法律、特别是 8 C.F.R. § 208.6(a) 的免于披露保护。因此，其属于免于披露的特权范畴。由于根据《同意令》，仅律师-委托人及工作成果特权转移给了受托人，且仅限于与调查主题相关的部分（即便如此，也仅限于披露对债务人造成的个人损害不超过受托人获取该文件或信息的利益之时）——而债务人保留了所有其他特权，包括涉及《庇护申请》实质内容的特权——因此《同意令》阻止向受托人披露《庇护申请》。2\nII. 《庇护申请》的实质内容并非职业疏忽诉讼中的争议焦点\n\n5. 整个《庇护申请》的实质内容并不是名为 Guo Wengui v. Clark Hill, PLC, Case No. 19-cv-03195 (D. D.C.) 的诉讼（下称“职业疏忽诉讼”）中的争议焦点。相反，核心争议焦点在于 Clark Hill, PLC（Clark Hill 律师事务所，下称“Clark Hill”）是否因未能维持足够的安全性以保护《庇护申请》免遭数据泄露而公开，从而构成了执业疏忽、违反信义义务和/或违反法律代理合同。此外，在职业疏忽诉讼涉及损害赔偿的范围内，即债务人因其《庇护申请》的某些部分被披露至公共领域而遭受的精神损害，受托人想必可以从公共领域获取该信息。无论如何，更重要的是，受托人获取《庇护申请》的利益，不论其为何，都绝不能凌驾于阻止向第三方披露庇护申请的联邦保护规定之上，也不能凌驾于进一步披露《庇护申请》将给债务人带来的重大个人损害之上。参见《同意令》，第7段（要求进行权衡测试，权衡债务人所受的个人损害与受托人获取特权信息的利益）。\n\n2 在其对动议的异议书中，受托人引用并附上了电子邮件，在邮件中债务人的下述署名律师曾表示《庇护申请》不享有特权。（例如，《异议书》，第34段。）然而，该表述暗中仅指律师-委托人特权，并且是在下述署名律师（其并非移民律师）与移民律师交谈之前作出的，当时其并不知晓 8 C.F.R. § 208.6(a) 的存在。\n\n6. 此外，在受托人的律师承认包括该传票在内的传票“可被解读为包括……[债务人的]庇护申请”之后，其“在记录中明确表示[受托人]并未试图获取该类信息，我们将相应限制该请求。”（2022年8月30日庭审笔录，第110页第20行至第111页第2行（Bassett, N.））。\n\n7. 最后，无论 Clark Hill 的数据泄露，还是 Clark Hill 在职业疏忽诉讼中根据盖印保密规则作出的较为有限的披露，均不构成债务人对《庇护申请》特权或权利的放弃。8 C.F.R. § 208.6(a)（“未经申请人书面同意，不得披露……庇护……申请中所载或与之相关的任何信息，但本条允许或由[国土安全部]部长酌情决定的除外。”）。3\nIII. 8 C.F.R. § 208.6(a) 并不限于政府\n\n8. 8 C.F.R. § 208.6(a) 的条文中没有任何内容将其适用范围限制为仅阻止政府行为人披露庇护申请。相反，8 C.F.R. § 208.6(a) 中禁止披露庇护申请的一般性规定仅有个别例外情形仅适用于政府行为人。例如，8 C.F.R. § 208.6(c)（“本条不适用于向以下对象的任何披露：(1) 因……需要而必须审查信息的任何美国政府官员或承包商。”）（强调为后加）。显而易见，国土安全部表明了其知道如何将法规的适用限制于政府行为人——而它在 8 C.F.R. § 208.6 中选择不这样做。\n\n3 8 C.F.R § 208.6 和 § 1208.6 在实质上是相同的，唯一的区别在于 § 208.6 授权国土安全部长批准披露庇护申请，而 § 1208.6 授权司法部长批准披露。\n\n9. 作为 8 C.F.R. § 208.6 立法意图的进一步证明，作为附件 A 附于本文件的《保护庇护申请人保密性的联邦法规概要》（下称“《概要》”）明确指出，收到庇护申请的第三方受保密法规的约束。参见《概要》，常见问题2，第3页（“一般而言，未经庇护申请人书面同意或国土安全部长的特别授权，不得与第三方共享与庇护相关的信息。”）；常见问题7，第4页（“问：如果与庇护相关的信息根据法规被适当地披露给第三方，第三方在保密方面的义务是什么？答：作为庇护相关信息的新保管人，第三方接收人受 8 CFR 208.6 保密法规的约束。”）（强调为后加）。\n\n10. 受托人仅依据唯一一份判例来支持 8 C.F.R. § 208.6 仅适用于政府行为人的主张，即 Al Otro Lado v. Mayorkas, No. 3:17-cv-02366-BAS-KSC, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68380, at *22 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2021)。然而，鉴于前述情况，该判例既无约束力，亦不具说服力。在 Al Otro Lado 案中，双方对该法规仅适用于政府行为人并无争议，法院未作分析即采纳了双方的共识。而在本案中，该问题存在争议，法院应通过查阅 8 C.F.R. § 208.6 的明确措辞以及随附的《概要》来解决该问题。\n\n11. 综上所述，债务人谨请求法院准许该动议，并签署命令阻止向受托人披露《庇护申请》。\n2022年11月29日订于康涅狄格州布里奇波特。\n债务人：HO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）\n\n/签名/ Aaron A. Romney Aaron A. Romney (ct28144) John L. Cesaroni (ct29309) 10 Middle Street, 15th Floor Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604 电话：(203) 368-4234 传真：(203) 368-5487 电子邮件：[aromney@zeislaw.com] [jcesaroni@zeislaw.com]\nUNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION（美国康涅狄格区联邦破产法院布里奇波特分部）\n\n关于：第11章\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人。合并审理\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），\n动议人，\n诉\nLUC A. DESPINS，\n第11章受托人\n被申请人。\n送达证书\n\n本人特此证明，于2022年11月29日，前述《关于进一步支持保护令动议的答复意见》的副本已通过电子方式提交。本提交通知将通过法院的电子申报系统运作以电子邮件形式发送给所有各方，或根据《电子申报通知》的指示，以邮寄方式发送给无法接受电子申报的任何人。各方可通过法院的 CM/ECF 系统查阅本次提交的文件。\n债务人：HO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）\n\n/签名/ Aaron A. Romney Aaron A. Romney (ct28144) 10 Middle Street, 15th Floor Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604 电话：(203) 368-4234 传真：(203) 368-5487 电子邮件：[aromney@zeislaw.com]","key_entities":["Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Guo","Despins"],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":1704,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 13:01:17"}