{"id":"court_ctb_1228_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":1228,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION :","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n:\n\n:\n\n:\n\nHO WAN KWOK, *et al.* : Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\nIn re : Chapter 11\n\nDebtors. : \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_:\n\n\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\n\n# **INDIVIDUAL DEBTOR'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE APPEAL OF ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER AND, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS**\n\nPursuant to 28 U.S.C. §158(a)(3), Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8004, and 28 U.S.C. § 1651, the individual debtor, Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Individual Debtor\"), by and through his undersigned counsel, Zeisler & Zeisler, P. C. (\"Z&Z\"), respectfully moves (the \"Motion/Petition\") for leave to appeal the Bankruptcy Court's December 9, 2022 Order Granting in Part Motion for Protective Order (Doc. No. 1217, the \"Order\"), which authorized the production of the Individual Debtor's asylum application (the \"Asylum Application\") to the chapter 11 trustee Luc A. Despins (the \"Trustee\") and, in the alternative, petitions for a writ of mandamus vacating the Bankruptcy Court's Order. In further support of his Motion/Petition, the Individual Debtor respectfully states as follows.\n\n#### **I. INTRODUCTION**\n\n1. The Individual Debtor has been a political target of the Chinese Communist Party (the \"CCP\") for many years. In early 2015, after learning that the CCP was going to arrest him on politically motivated charges based on fabricated evidence, the Individual Debtor fled to the United States. Since the Individual Debtor left China, both he and his family have been the subject of relentless threats and harassment by the CCP and its agents.\n\n2. Several years before filing for bankruptcy protection, the Individual Debtor, with the assistance of counsel at Clark Hill PLC (\"Clark Hill\"), prepared and submitted the Asylum Application to the United States Department of Homeland Security. By the Asylum Application, the Individual Debtor sought refuge in the United States and protection from the CCP's persistent threats. The Asylum Application contains confidential, highly sensitive information that is expressly protected from disclosure by 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6(a) and 1208.6(a).<sup>1</sup>\n\n3. By the instant motion, the Individual Debtor seeks leave to obtain appellate review of an order entered by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut (*Manning*, *J.*) (the \"Bankruptcy Court\"), which authorized the production of, *inter alia*, the Asylum Application to the Trustee and his counsel. In the alternative, the Individual Debtor respectfully petitions for a writ of mandamus vacating the Bankruptcy Court's Order.\n\n### **II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND**\n\n4. On February 15, 2022 (the \"Petition Date\"), the Individual Debtor filed his voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, thereby commencing the above-captioned bankruptcy case. On July 7, 2022, the Trustee was appointed. (*See* Doc. No. 514).\n\n5. One of the assets of the Individual Debtor's bankruptcy estate is a pre-petition claim (the \"Malpractice Action\") that the Individual Debtor initiated against Clark Hill. In the Malpractice Action, the Individual Debtor alleges that he was harmed when Clark Hill's computer system was hacked, which allowed unauthorized persons to access the Asylum Application. Specifically, the Individual Debtor asserted, *inter alia*, that as a direct and proximate cause of Clark Hill's multiple breaches of their duties, the details and contents of the Asylum Application\n\n<sup>1</sup> 8 C.F.R. § 208.6(a) and 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a) are identical, except one authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security and the other authorizes the Attorney General to permit the disclosure of information contained in or pertaining to an asylum application. For ease of reference, this Motion/Petition cites to only 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6 except where necessary.\n\nwere disclosed widely on social media platforms and placed in the hands of third-parties hostile to the Individual Debtor. Clark Hill retained Jenner & Block, LLP (\"Jenner & Block\") to represent it in the Malpractice Action.\n\n6. On July 28, 2022, the Trustee filed his Omnibus Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee for Entry of Order under Bankruptcy Rule 2004 and Local Rule 2004-1 Authorizing Discovery with Respect to Various Legal and Financial Advisors to the Debtor (Doc. No. 637, the \"Professionals 2004 Motion\"), seeking, *inter alia*, to conduct the examination of Clark Hill.\n\n7. The Individual Debtor filed a limited objection (Doc. No. 703), *inter alia*, to the Professionals 2004 Motion on August 5, 2022, on the grounds that if the proposed order filed therewith was entered and interpreted literally, it would preclude substantive objections to the subpoenas to be served in accordance with the Professionals 2004 Motion, including objections based upon privilege, in violation of Bankr. L. R. 2004-1.\n\n8. On August 16, 2022, the Bankruptcy Court entered the Order Granting Chapter 11 Trustee's Application for Rule 2004 Discovery with Respect to Various Legal and Financial Advisors to the Debtor (the \"Order Granting the Professionals 2004 Motion\") (Doc. No. 756). The Order Granting the Professionals 2004 Motion, *inter alia*, permitted service of a subpoena upon Clark Hill (the \"Subpoena\"), but directed that compliance was \"[s]ubject to any rights under the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and applicable Local Rules[.]\" Thus, the Bankruptcy Court modified the Trustee' proposed order granting the Professionals 2004 Motion so as to preserve the Individual Debtor's and the recipients of the subpoenas' rights to object to the substance of the subpoenas.\n\n9. On August 18, 2022, the Trustee gave notice that it would serve subpoenas pursuant to the Order granting the Professionals 2004 Motion, including, *inter alia*, the Subpoena on Clark Hill.\n\n10. On September 14, 2022, the Court entered the Consent Order Regarding Control of Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Protection Related to Rule 2004 Subpoenaed Documents and Information (Doc. No. 856, the \"Consent Order\"). The Consent Order defined the scope of the Trustee's and Individual Debtor's respective control of the attorney-client and workproduct privileges and set forth certain procedures for disputes concerning the same. Moreover, the Consent Order specifically provided:\n\nNothing herein shall prevent the Debtor from asserting any and all privileges concerning legal matters unrelated to the Investigation Topics, such as unrelated criminal allegations or the Debtor's asylum application (other than documents related to the litigation styled as *Guo Wengui v. Clark Hill, PLC*, Case No. 19-cv-03195 (D. D.C.) [(the \"Clark Hill Action\")] that relate to the merits of the legal malpractice action, as distinguished from the merits of the Debtor's asylum application, subject to the balancing test incorporated herein, **which does not relate to the substance of the asylum application**).\n\n(Consent Order, ¶¶ 2, 4.) (emphasis added). The Investigation Activities are limited to the Debtors' assets, financial condition, or activities related to the administration of the bankruptcy estate, which, per the Consent Order, \"does not relate to the substance of the asylum application.\" (*Id.*, ¶\n\n2).\n\n11. During the hearings held in the Bankruptcy Court concerning the negotiation of the\n\nConsent Order, the Trustee and his counsel each represented—and separately so—that the Trustee\n\ndid not seek the Debtor's Asylum Application:\n\nThe debtor identifies his concerns about potentially privileged documents related to . . . things that have been made against him as well as his asylum application. *We are not, in our investigation at this time, seeking any documents related to those issues***.** (Tr. 8/30/22, **Exhibit A**, at 104: 6-11 (Bassett, N.) (emphasis added)).\n\n[T]he debtor contends, well as I said before, there's a concern that, you know, it's possible documents the trustee is seeking to have access to could involve potential . . . *unrelated issues like his asylum application, but, again, as I said before, we're not seeking to get those documents through our discovery requests*. (*Id*., at 110: 12-19 (Bassett, N.) (emphasis added)).\n\nThe debtor has identified one request in our subpoena directed to his former law firms and professionals, *Request 17, that asks for information about legal disputes which could be read to include . . . his asylum application, we are willing to make clear on the record that we're not seeking to get that type of information and we'll limit that request accordingly*. (*Id.*, at 110: 20-111:2 (Bassett, N.) (emphasis added)).\n\n[*T]here is no basis that's been provided as to why documents would relate to assets, financial condition, or the administration of the estate, would have anything to do with the debtor's asylum application*. (*Id.*, at 137: 17-20 (Bassett, N.) (emphasis added)).\n\nBut, again, if there is language we could work out to make clear if there's a document that talks about . . . *his asylum application*, things like that, in his objection, I think we could work out language to put in the proposed order to again make clear that *we are not seeking that*. (*Id.*, at 138: 24-139: 5 (Bassett, N.) (emphasis added)).\n\n[A]s we've made clear in our order, you know, *there are carveouts designed to address specifically the concerns that the debtor has raised concerning privileged communications that relate to . . . his asylum application*. (Tr. 9/6/22, **Exhibit B**, 49: 5-10 (Bassett, N.) (emphasis added)).\n\nAnd that is exactly how we tried to craft our revised proposed order is to track those categories in that weigh of the case law and then to also make clear to address the debtor's concerns that he is still able to assert privileges over documents related to . . . his asylum application . . . . (*Id.*, at 76: 13-18 (Bassett, N.)).\n\nSo the balancing—[the court is] doing the balancing. [The court is] doing the balancing in a category-by-category document *with some very specific carveouts regarding . . . the asylum issue carved out, [the court is] doing the balancing*. (*Id.*, at 108: 9-15 (Despins, L.) (emphasis added)).\n\n12. The Bankruptcy Court expressly relied on the Trustee's and his counsel's\n\nrepresentations when it entered the Consent Order, just as the Individual Debtor did when he\n\nagreed to the Consent Order:\n\nThe Bankruptcy Court: Well, I'm trying to figure out how we should proceed. And\n\nright now this was a continued hearing on the trustee's motion to have this court determine that he holds all the privileges of the debtor.\n\nMy understanding of that motion was that even though the trustee wants that order, *he would agree to carveout anything with regard to the asylum issue. . .*\n\n*I mean, he was—he's not asserting and never has asserted that he's going to exercise that right.* (*Id.*, at 67: 20-68:5) (emphasis added)).\n\n13. Thereafter, pursuant to discussions among the Individual Debtor's counsel and Clark Hill's counsel, it was agreed that Clark Hill would produce documents responsive to the Subpoena to the Individual Debtor's counsel for review.\n\n14. Clark Hill's counsel produced documents to the Individual Debtor's counsel, which included the Asylum Application. Thereafter, counsel for the Individual Debtor asserted to the Trustee's counsel that the Asylum Application is prohibited from disclosure and requested to Clark Hill's counsel that it refrain from producing the Asylum Application to allow the Individual Debtor an opportunity to seek a protective order.\n\n15. Consequently, the Individual Debtor filed the Motion for Protective Order (ECF No. 1063) with the Bankruptcy Court. The Trustee objected, claiming that his and his counsel's statements to the Bankruptcy Court during hearings concerning the Consent Order were inapplicable because the Trustee did not know at the time that Clark Hill had attached the Asylum Application to its Motion for Summary Judgment in the Malpractice Action.\n\n16. After hearings held on November 30, 2022, and December 2, 2022, to consider the Individual Debtor's Motion for Protective Order, the Bankruptcy Court issued the Order attached hereto as **Exhibit C**. 2\n\n<sup>2</sup> The Bankruptcy Court's Order references hearings on November 30, 2022 and December 1, 2022. In actuality, the second hearing to consider the Motion for Protective Order was held on December 2, 2022.\n\n17. In the Order, the Bankruptcy Court held that the Trustee and his counsel \"need access to the Motion for Summary Judgment and the Asylum Application to prosecute the Malpractice Action[.]\"<sup>3</sup> (Order, at 2). Consequently, the Bankruptcy Court ordered that Jenner & Block (as Clark Hill's counsel) \"is authorized to produce the Motion for Summary Judgment and the Asylum Application\" to the Trustee and his counsel.<sup>4</sup> (*Id*., at 3).\n\n# **III. THE ASYLUM APPLICATION IS PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE BY 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a)**\n\n18. As asserted by the Individual Debtor in his Motion for Protective Order submitted to the Bankruptcy Court, the Immigration and Nationality Act (\"INA\") \"prohibits the disclosure of information pertaining to any asylum application. . . .\" *Zhong Rong Li v. Gonzales*, 181 F. App'x 124, 128 (2d Cir. 2006); *see also Gafurova v. Whitaker*, 911 F.3d 321, 328 n.3 (6th Cir. 2018) (the INA \"generally prohibit[s] the disclosure to third parties of any information relating to an asylum application without the written consent of the applicant unless permitted by the listed exceptions or at the discretion of the [Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security]\") (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6, 1208.6(a)).\n\n19. Specifically, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a) provides:\n\nInformation contained in or pertaining to any application for refugee admission, asylum, withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3) of the Act, or protection under regulations issued pursuant to the Convention Against Torture's implementing legislation, records pertaining to any credible fear determination conducted pursuant to § 208.30, and records pertaining to any reasonable fear determination conducted pursuant to § 208.31, shall not be disclosed without the written consent of the applicant, except as permitted by\n\n<sup>3</sup> The Individual Debtor does not object to the Trustee receiving Clark Hill's Motion for Summary Judgment and exhibits thereto that do not contain content from his Asylum Application.\n\n<sup>4</sup> Though the Subpoena was directed at Clark Hill, at oral argument concerning the Individual Debtor's Motion for Protective Order, the Trustee orally requested that Jenner & Block be authorized to produce the Asylum Application. The Individual Debtor objected, asserting that the Trustee's request was procedurally improper. Nonetheless, the Bankruptcy Court authorized Jenner & Block to produce the Asylum Application.\n\nthis section or at the discretion of the [Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security].\n\n20. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a), along with the substantially similar 8 C.F.R. § 208.6(a), \"establish a 'right' of asylum seekers 'to keep confidential any information contained in or pertaining to an asylum application that allows a third party to link the identity of the applicant to: (1) the fact that the applicant has applied for asylum; (2) specific facts or allegations pertaining to the individual asylum claim contained in an asylum application; or (3) facts or allegations that are sufficient to give rise to a reasonable inference that the applicant has applied for asylum.'\" *Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. Nielsen*, No. 17-cv-02366-BAS-KSC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210401, at \\*22 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2017) (citation omitted).\n\n21. \"These regulations 'safeguard information that, if disclosed publicly, could subject the claimant to retaliatory measures by government authorities or non-state actors in the event that the claimant is repatriated, or endanger the security of the claimant's family members who may still be residing in the country of origin.'\" *Id*., at\\*22-23, *quoting* U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. Asylum Div., *Fact Sheet: Federal Regulations Protecting the Confidentiality of Asylum Applications* (Oct. 12, 2011).\n\n22. The Trustee argued to the Bankruptcy Court that 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a) is inapplicable to the production of an Asylum Application by non-government actors. However, nothing within the text of 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a) limits its application in that manner. Rather, *only certain exceptions* to the general prohibition against disclosure of an asylum application in 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a) apply only to government actors. *E.g.*, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(c) (\"**This section shall not apply to any disclosure to: (1) Any United States Government official or contractor having a need to examine information in connection with**. . . .\") (emphasis added).\n\n23. Further evidencing the confidentiality of asylum applications, the *Federal Regulation Protecting the Confidentiality of Asylum Applicants Synopsis* (the \"Synopsis\") prepared by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services agency, attached hereto as **Exhibit D**, expressly states that third parties who receive an asylum application are bound by the confidentiality regulations. *See Synopsis, Frequently Asked Question 2*, at p. 3 (\"In general, asylum-related information must not be shared with third parties without the asylum applicant's written consent or the Secretary of Homeland Security's specific authorization.\"); *Frequently Asked Question 7*, at p. 4 (Q: If asylum-related information is properly disclosed to a third party pursuant to the regulation, what is the third party's obligation with respect to confidentiality? A: *As the new custodian of the asylum-related information, the third-party recipient is bound by the confidentiality regulation under 8 CFR 208.6.*\") (emphasis added).\n\n24. Additionally, at least one court in the District of Connecticut has denied a \"motion to compel the production of documents concerning [an individual plaintiff's] asylum application\" to the defendant in that action on the basis that such material is not generally subject to disclosure, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant argued that the content of the plaintiff's asylum application was relevant to the plaintiff's claim for infliction of emotional distress. *See Bakhit v. Safety Marking, Inc.*, No. 3:13CV1049 (JCH), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192934, at \\*9 (D. Conn. Feb. 17, 2015).\n\n25. Thus, it is clear that the Asylum Application is protected from disclosure by 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a), and that no exception is applicable to permit disclosure.<sup>5</sup> *See* 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(c)-(e); *see also Bakhit*, No. 3:13CV1049 (JCH), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192934, at \\*9.\n\n<sup>5</sup> In addition, the Asylum Application does not relate to the Investigation Activities of the Trustee – *i.e.*, investigation of the Debtor's assets, financial condition, and administration of the estate—a fact that the Trustee's counsel repeatedly represented to the Court during the hearings concerning the Consent Order. Moreover, in light of the fact that the Subpoena had already been served when the Trustee's counsel made\n\n# **IV. THE INDIVIDUAL DEBTOR RESPECTFULLY MOVES FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL THE BANKRUPTCY COURT'S ORDER**\n\n# **a. QUESTIONS PRESENTED AND RELIEF SOUGHT**\n\n26. The Individual Debtor respectfully submits the following question in the appeal of\n\nthe Order:<sup>6</sup>\n\n- i. Whether the Bankruptcy Court erred in ordering the production of the Asylum Application to the Trustee and his counsel in violation of 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a).\n- 27. The Individual Debtor respectfully requests that the District Court vacate the Order\n\nand prohibit the production of the Asylum Application to the Trustee and his counsel.\n\n# **b. REASONS THIS APPEAL SHOULD BE GRANTED**\n\n# **1. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION**\n\n28. This Court has jurisdiction over this proposed appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §\n\n158(a)(3) because the Order sought to be appealed from is an interlocutory ordered entered by the Bankruptcy Court in a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157 and the Bankruptcy Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334. Venue was proper in the Bankruptcy Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.\n\nthose representations in open court, the Subpoena cannot reasonably be construed to seek to compel Clark Hill to produce the Individual Debtor's Asylum Application. Simply stated, since the Trustee represented in open court that the Subpoena did not seek to compel the production of the Asylum Application, and the Court entered an order expressly relying on that representation; *see Exhibit B*, at 67:20-68:5; the Trustee is judicially estopped from arguing that the Subpoena compels (or even permits) Clark Hill to produce the Asylum Application. *Intellivision v. Microsoft Corp.*, 484 F. App'x 616, 620 (2d Cir. 2012) (\"[T]he [Supreme] Court has stated that judicial estoppel 'generally prevents a party from prevailing in one phase of a case on an argument and then relying on a contradictory argument to prevail in another phase.'\" (*quoting New Hampshire v. Maine*, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001)).\n\n<sup>6</sup> The Individual Debtor reserves the right to alter, amend, add to, or otherwise change this question when he submits a statement of the issues presented in accordance with the applicable rules.\n\n#### **2. STANDARD FOR GRANTING LEAVE TO APPEAL**\n\n29. A party may seek an interlocutory appeal of orders and decrees of the Bankruptcy Court \"with leave of the [District] [C]ourt\" pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). \"[C]ourts in this Circuit have invariably held that all appeals governed by [28 U.S.C. §] 158(a)(3) should refer to the standards articulated by [28 U.S.C. §] 1292(b) to determine whether leave to appeal should be granted.\" *Golden v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency*, No. 22-MC-01899 (HG), 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143072, at \\*11 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2022) (quotation, citation, and ellipsis omitted).\n\n30. This Court may accept an appeal from an interlocutory order if \"the order (1) involves a controlling question of law (2) as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion, and (3) an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.\" *Osuji v. U.S. Bank, Nat'l Ass'n*, 285 F. Supp. 3d 554, 558 (E.D.N.Y. 2018). \"[A]ppellants bear the burden of showing that exceptional circumstances exist that warrant an interlocutory appeal….\" *Id*. (citation and quotation omitted).\n\n#### **a. THE ORDER INVOLVES A CONTROLLING QUESTION OF LAW**\n\n31. An order involves a controlling question of law where \"reversal of the bankruptcy court's order would (1) terminate the action or (2) materially affect the outcome of the litigation.\" *Osuji*, 285 F. Supp. 3d at 558. \"In addition, the question of law must refer to a 'pure' question of law that the reviewing court could decide quickly and cleanly without having to study the record.\" *2178 Atl. Realty LLC v. 2178 Atl. Ave. Hous. Dev. Fund Corp.*, No. 20-CV-1278 (RRM), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62226, at \\*11 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2021) (citation omitted).\n\n32. The question of law at the core of the Bankruptcy Court's Order, and this appeal, is undeniably \"pure\" and this Court can decide it \"quickly and cleanly without having to study the record.\" Indeed, the core issue here is whether 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6 prohibits the disclosure of the\n\n11\n\nAsylum Application to the Trustee. This Court need not review the record to adjudicate this purely legal question.\n\n33. Additionally, adjudication of this narrow legal question will \"materially affect the outcome of the litigation\" because this is a contested matter in the Bankruptcy Court and the sole issue is the Trustee's right to access the Asylum Application. *See generally Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC*, 140 S.Ct. 582, 586(2020) (\"A bankruptcy case embraces an aggregation of individual controversies.\") (quotations and citations omitted). With each additional entity that maintains a copy of the Asylum Application, the risk that the Asylum Application falls into the hands of individuals who wish to do the Individual Debtor harm (including the CCP and its agents) rises incrementally, as evidenced by the hack of Clark Hill's computer system. *See generally Dunkin' Donuts Franchising LLC v. CDDC Acquisition Co. LLC (In re FPSDA I, LLC)*, 470 B.R. 257, 265 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding that a question of law \"materially affect[s] the outcome of the litigation\" when it would force a debtor to act \"immediately,\" as the Individual Debtor might to protect the safety of himself and his family, \"which could have significant consequences\"). Fundamentally, and despite their presumably best technological and security efforts, the Trustee and his counsel maintaining copies of the Asylum Application increases the potential for unauthorized third parties to obtain copies of the Asylum Application, further infringing on the Individual Debtor's privacy and potential safety.\n\n34. Therefore, the Bankruptcy Court's Order involves a controlling question of law.\n\n# **b. THERE IS A SUBSTANTIAL GROUND FOR DIFFERENCE OF OPINION**\n\n35. There is a substantial ground for difference of opinion \"where (1) there is conflicting authority on the issue, or (2) the issue is particularly difficult and of first impression for the Second Circuit.\" *Osuji*, 285 F. Supp. 3d 554, 558 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).\n\n12\n\n36. The Individual Debtor submits that the law on the protected status of an asylum application under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6 is well-settled and, as such, there is not conflicting authority on the issue.\n\n37. However, the issue of whether a chapter 11 bankruptcy trustee has the ability to obtain a copy of a debtor's asylum application—despite well settled law *protecting an asylum application from disclosure*—is a \"particularly difficult\" issue given a bankruptcy trustee's established duties (including those under 11 U.S.C. § 1106 to investigate the assets and liabilities of the debtor, such as the Malpractice Action) and the highly confidential and protected nature of an asylum application under Federal regulations. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6. The difficulty of this issue is compounded by the fact that it is, as far as the Individual Debtor can determine, an issue of first impression for the Second Circuit.\n\n38. Additionally, there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion as to whether the Trustee, in fact, \"need[s] access to the… Asylum Application to prosecute the Malpractice Action,\" which the Bankruptcy Court found without providing any meaningful analysis. (Order, at 2). In opposing the Individual Debtor's Motion for Protective Order, the Trustee stated in highly conclusory fashion that he \"needs access to the [Individual] [D]ebtor's [A]sylum [A]pplication\" to \"fully assess the merits of the Malpractice Action.\" *Even if* a showing of need was sufficient to overcome the protections provided to the Individual Debtor under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6 (the Individual Debtor submits that a showing of need is *not* sufficient), the conclusory statements by the Bankruptcy Court and the Trustee as to the Trustee's need to access the Asylum Application provide no basis to understand *why* the Trustee needs the Asylum Application. Accordingly, there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion as regards the Bankruptcy Court Order.<sup>7</sup>\n\n<sup>7</sup> See footnote 3.\n\n### **c. AN IMMEDIATE APPEAL MATERIALLY ADVANCES THE ULTIMATE TERMINATION OF THE LITIGATION**\n\n39. This prong, \"assessing whether an appeal would materially advance termination of the litigation, is satisfied where the appeal promises to advance the time for trial or to shorten the time required for trial.\" *Osuji*, 285 F. Supp. 3d at 558 (citation and quotation omitted).\n\n40. The Individual Debtor acknowledges that this appeal technically is a discovery dispute which renders it an interlocutory appeal under binding precedent. However, the *sole* issue underlying this dispute is whether Federal regulation entitles the Individual Debtor to keep his Asylum Application confidential from the Trustee and whether the Bankruptcy Court exceeded its authority by ordering Clark Hill's counsel to produce it. Said differently, unlike almost all other discovery disputes, there is no other/larger dispute between the Trustee and the Debtor that will be impacted by the very narrow subject of this appeal, *i.e.,* the Trustee's right (or lack thereof) to access the Debtor's asylum application. In this extreme and highly uncommon circumstance, the Individually Debtor respectfully submits that allowing an immediate appeal will resolve the entirety of this dispute and provide clarity to other courts concerning the rights to which victims of political persecution are entitled.\n\n41. Therefore, by granting the immediate appeal of the Bankruptcy Court's Order (and subsequently vacating the Order), this Court will resolve the entirety of this underlying dispute between the Individual Debtor and the Trustee and provide necessary guidance to similarly situated parties.\n\n### **d. EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES EXIST THAT WARRANT AN INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL**\n\n42. The Individual Debtor respectfully submits that the production of the Asylum Application to the Trustee represents exceptional circumstances warranting an interlocutory appeal for the following reasons.\n\n43. In issuing the Order, the Bankruptcy Court deviated from the protections afforded to the Individual Debtor under 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6 and 1208.6. Functionally, with an order than runs barely more than two pages, the Individual Debtor's privacy rights in the Asylum Application enshrined by Congress in the INA were effectively eliminated.\n\n44. The chilling effects of such an order are profound, as persons may be dissuaded by seeking much-needed bankruptcy protection to avoid producing \"information that, if disclosed publicly, could subject the claimant to retaliatory measures by government authorities or non-state actors in the event that the claimant is repatriated, or endanger the security of the claimant's family members who may still be residing in the country of origin.\" *Al Otro Lado, Inc.*, No. 17-cv-02366- BAS-KSC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210401, at \\*22-23, *quoting* U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. Asylum Div., *Fact Sheet: Federal Regulations Protecting the Confidentiality of Asylum Applications* (Oct. 12, 2011).\n\n45. One of the purposes of bankruptcy proceedings is \"to relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes.\" *Williams v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co.*, 236 U.S. 549, 554-55, 35 S. Ct. 289, 290 (1915). It is simply unjust to force the Individual Debtor to choose between obtaining such relief and protecting himself and his family from retaliatory measures by government authorities or non-state actors. An immediate appeal should be granted in light of this exceptional circumstance.\n\n46. Unlike in *Mohawk Indus. v. Carpenter*, 558 U.S. 100, 130 S. Ct. 599, 606 (2009), where the Supreme Court held that the improper disclosure of privileged material could be remedied \"by vacating [the] adverse judgment and remanding for a new trial,\" there is no way to avoid the immediately present danger of the Asylum Application falling into the hands of persons and entities who wish the Individual Debtor harm without an immediate appeal. *Id*., at 109. Simply stated, the issue here is not a potential adverse impact that disclosure may have on litigation (which a court could rectify later)—it is an adverse impact that disclosure may have on the Debtor's safety and security (which, unfortunately, no court can rectify or reverse).\n\n47. For these reasons, the Individual Debtor respectfully submits that leave to appeal the Bankruptcy Court's interlocutory Order should be granted.\n\n# **V. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE INDIVIDUAL DEBTOR RESPECTFULLY PETITIONS FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS TO VACATE THE BANKRUPTCY COURT'S ORDER**\n\n48. In the Second Circuit, appellate courts \"will exercise mandamus review of discovery orders relating to claims of privilege where: (i) an issue of importance and of first impression is raised; (ii) the privilege will be lost in the particular case if review must await a final judgment; and (iii) immediate resolution will avoid the development of discovery practices or doctrine undermining the privilege.\" *Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Turner & Newall, PLC*, 964 F.2d 159, 163 (2d Cir. 1992).\n\n49. The Supreme Court \"has recognized that the writ of mandamus has traditionally been used in the federal courts only to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so…. Only exceptional circumstances, amounting to a judicial usurpation of power, will justify the invocation of this extraordinary remedy. *Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc.*, 449 U.S. 33, 35, 101 S. Ct. 188, 190 (1980) (citations and quotations omitted).\n\n50. In *Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.*, the Second Circuit entertained a petition for a writ of mandamus \"because of the unusual nature of the challenged discovery order,\" which effectively permitted opposing counsel to conduct a privilege review, \"and the significant and important issues it raises relating to the attorney-client privilege.\" *Id*., at 166; *see also, e.g., In re Itron, Inc.*, 883 F.3d 553, 568 (5th Cir. 2018) (granting mandamus following improper application of attorney-client privilege); *In re Seagate Tech., LLC*, 497 F.3d 1360, 1375–76 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (granting mandamus after district court held that a party waived the attorney-client privilege and work product), *overruled on other grounds by Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc.,* 579 U.S. 93, 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016).\n\n51. Here, the production of the Asylum Application is \"an issue of great importance\" as it eliminates protections explicitly afforded to the Individual Debtor (and all other similarly situated debtors) under 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6 and 1208.6. *Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.*, 964 F. 2d, at 163. Likewise, as discussed herein, it appears to be an issue of first impression in this Circuit.\n\n52. Further, the protections of 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6 and 1208.6 \"will be lost in the particular case if review must await a final judgment.\" *See Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.*, 964 F. 2d, at 163. Indeed, the very purpose of 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6 and 1208.6 is to prevent the disclosure \"to third parties of any information relating to an asylum application without the written consent of the applicant unless permitted by the listed exceptions,\" which do not apply to the current situation,\n\n\"or at the discretion of the Attorney General\" or the Secretary of Homeland Security, which have not authorized the disclosure. *Gafurova v. Whitaker*, 911 F.3d 321, 328 n.3 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing\n\n17\n\n8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6, 1208.6(a)). If the Trustee and his counsel obtain a copy of the Asylum Application pursuant to the Order, then the Individual Debtor's privacy rights under 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6 and 1208.6 immediately vanish.\n\n53. Finally, the \"immediate resolution\" of the dispute regarding the Asylum Application \"will avoid the development of discovery practices or doctrine undermining the privilege,\" specifically a doctrine that allows a bankruptcy trustee (and a bankruptcy court) to circumvent the provisions of 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6 and 1208.6, which are designed solely to protect asylum applicants – the very narrow class of persons to which the Individual Debtor is indisputably a party. *Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.*, 964 F. 2d, at 163.\n\n54. As in *Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.*, the Bankruptcy Court's Order is \"unusual,\" to say the least, in that it permits the Trustee to obtain documents that are confidential and protected pursuant to Federal regulations and does so without any legal analysis that addresses the regulation. For this reason, and because of \"the significant and important issues\" the Order \"raises relating to\" the confidentiality of asylum applications, this Court should grant this petition for a writ of mandamus. *Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.*, 964 F. 2d, at 166.\n\n#### **VI. CONCLUSION**\n\n55. For the reasons set forth above, this Court should (i) grant the Individual Debtor leave to appeal the Bankruptcy Court's Order or, in the alternative, (ii) grant the Individual Debtor's petition for a writ of mandamus.\n\n# THE DEBTOR, HO WAN KWOK\n\nBy: */s/ Aaron A. Romney* Aaron A. Romney (ct28144) ZEISLER & ZEISLER, P.C. 10 Middle Street, 15th floor Bridgeport, CT 06605 Telephone: (203) 368-4234 Facsimile: (203) 368-0903 Email: [aromney@zeislaw.com](mailto:aromney@zeislaw.com)\n\n#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI hereby certify that on this 13 day of December, 2022, a copy of the foregoing was filed electronically. Notice of this filing will be sent by e-mail to all parties by operation of the Court's electronic filing system or by mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing as indicated on the Notice of Electronic Filing. Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF System.\n\n> By: */s/ Aaron A. Romney* Aaron A. Romney (ct28144)","body_zh":"美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院布里奇波特分院\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等人：案号 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n关于：第 11 章\n\n债务人。：____________________________________________________________：\n\n____________________________________________________________\n个人债务人请求准许就部分准许保护令动议的命令提起上诉的动议，以及作为备选请求的调卷令申请\n\n根据 28 U.S.C. §158(a)(3)、Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8004 和 28 U.S.C. § 1651，个人债务人 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（以下简称“个人债务人”）通过其下列签署的代理律师事务所 Zeisler & Zeisler, P. C.（以下简称“Z&Z”），谨此提出动议（以下简称“本动议/申请”），请求准许其就破产法院于 2022 年 12 月 9 日作出的《部分准许保护令动议的命令》（Doc. No. 1217，以下简称“该命令”）提起上诉；该命令授权向第 11 章受托人 Luc A. Despins（以下简称“受托人”）提供个人债务人的庇护申请（以下简称“庇护申请”）；作为备选请求，个人债务人申请签发调卷令，撤销破产法院的该命令。为进一步支持本动议/申请，个人债务人谨陈述如下。\n\n一、引言\n\n1. 个人债务人多年来一直是中国共产党（以下简称“中共”）的政治打击目标。2015 年初，在得知中共将基于捏造的证据以政治动机的指控逮捕他后，个人债务人逃往美国。自个人债务人离开中国以来，他本人及其家人一直遭受中共及其代理人持续不断的威胁和骚扰。\n\n2. 在申请破产保护数年前，个人债务人在 Clark Hill PLC（以下简称“Clark Hill”）律师的协助下，准备并向 United States Department of Homeland Security（美国国土安全部）提交了庇护申请。个人债务人通过庇护申请寻求在美国避难，并寻求免受中共持续威胁的保护。庇护申请包含保密性极强的高度敏感信息，8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6(a) 和 1208.6(a) 明确保护该等信息不得披露。1\n\n3. 个人债务人通过本动议，请求准许其就 United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut（康涅狄格州联邦破产法院）（Manning, J.）（以下简称“破产法院”）作出的命令取得上诉审查；该命令授权向受托人及其律师提供包括庇护申请在内的文件。作为备选请求，个人债务人谨申请签发调卷令，撤销破产法院的该命令。\n\n二、事实及程序背景\n\n4. 2022 年 2 月 15 日（以下简称“申请日”），个人债务人根据《破产法》第 11 章提交自愿救济申请，从而启动上述破产案件。2022 年 7 月 7 日，受托人获任命。（见 Doc. No. 514）。\n\n5. 个人债务人破产财产的资产之一，是个人债务人在申请破产前针对 Clark Hill 提起的一项请求权（以下简称“失职诉讼”）。在失职诉讼中，个人债务人主张，Clark Hill 的计算机系统遭到黑客攻击，致使未经授权的人员得以访问庇护申请，从而使其受到损害。具体而言，个人债务人主张，除其他事项外，作为 Clark Hill 多次违反其职责的直接且近因，庇护申请的细节和内容在社交媒体平台上被广泛披露，并落入对个人债务人怀有敌意的第三方之手。Clark Hill 聘请 Jenner & Block, LLP（以下简称“Jenner & Block”）在失职诉讼中代理其进行诉讼。\n\n1 8 C.F.R. § 208.6(a) 和 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a) 内容相同，但前者授权 Secretary of Homeland Security（国土安全部长），后者授权 Attorney General（司法部长），允许披露庇护申请中包含或与其相关的信息。为便于引用，本动议/申请仅援引 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6，除非必要。\n\n6. 2022 年 7 月 28 日，受托人提交了《第 11 章受托人根据破产规则 2004 和地方法规则 2004-1 请求作出命令，授权就债务人的各类法律及财务顾问进行取证的综合动议》（Doc. No. 637，以下简称“专业人士 2004 动议”），请求除其他事项外，对 Clark Hill 进行审查。\n\n7. 2022 年 8 月 5 日，个人债务人对专业人士 2004 动议提出有限异议（Doc. No. 703），除其他事项外，理由是：如随该动议提交的拟议命令获作出并按字面解释，则将禁止对依照专业人士 2004 动议送达的传票提出实体异议，包括基于特权提出的异议，违反 Bankr. L. R. 2004-1。\n\n8. 2022 年 8 月 16 日，破产法院作出《准许第 11 章受托人关于就债务人的各类法律及财务顾问进行规则 2004 取证之申请的命令》（以下简称“准许专业人士 2004 动议的命令”）（Doc. No. 756）。该命令除其他事项外，允许向 Clark Hill 送达传票（以下简称“该传票”），但指示履行应“[s]ubject to any rights under the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and applicable Local Rules[.]”。因此，破产法院修改了受托人拟议的、准许专业人士 2004 动议的命令，以保留个人债务人及传票受送达人的权利，使其能够对传票的实体内容提出异议。\n\n9. 2022 年 8 月 18 日，受托人通知其将根据准许专业人士 2004 动议的命令送达传票，其中包括向 Clark Hill 送达该传票。\n\n10. 2022 年 9 月 14 日，法院作出《有关对与规则 2004 传票文件和信息相关的律师—当事人特权及工作成果保护之控制权的同意命令》（Doc. No. 856，以下简称“同意命令”）。同意命令界定了受托人与个人债务人各自对律师—当事人特权及工作成果特权的控制范围，并规定了处理有关该等事项争议的若干程序。此外，同意命令特别规定：\n\n本命令任何内容均不得阻止债务人就与调查事项无关的法律事宜主张任何及所有特权，例如无关的刑事指控或债务人的庇护申请（但 Guo Wengui v. Clark Hill, PLC（郭文贵诉 Clark Hill, PLC），Case No. 19-cv-03195 (D. D.C.) [（以下简称“Clark Hill 诉讼”）] 中与法律失职诉讼实体有关、而非与债务人庇护申请实体有关的诉讼文件除外；该等文件受纳入本命令的利益衡量测试约束，而该测试并不涉及庇护申请的实质内容）。\n\n（同意命令，第 2、4 段。）（强调系后加）。调查活动限于债务人的资产、财务状况或与破产财产管理有关的活动；根据同意命令，该等活动“does not relate to the substance of the asylum application.”（同上，第 2 段）。\n\n11. 在破产法院就协商同意命令举行的听证会上，受托人及其律师均分别陈述，受托人并不寻求债务人的庇护申请：\n\n债务人指出其对可能享有特权的文件的担忧，该等文件涉及……针对其提出的事项以及其庇护申请。我们目前在调查中并不寻求任何与该等事项有关的文件。（Tr. 8/30/22, Exhibit A, at 104: 6-11 (Bassett, N.)（强调系后加））。\n\n[债务人主张，正如我此前所说，存在一种担忧，即受托人寻求获取的文件有可能涉及……诸如其庇护申请等无关事项，但再次强调，正如我此前所说，我们并不寻求通过我们的取证请求获得该等文件。]（同上，at 110: 12-19 (Bassett, N.)（强调系后加））。\n\n债务人已指出我们传票中一项针对其前律师事务所和专业人士的请求，即第 17 项请求，该请求要求提供有关法律争议的信息，而该信息可能被理解为包括……其庇护申请；我们愿意在记录中明确说明，我们并不寻求获得该类信息，并将相应地限制该项请求。（同上，at 110: 20-111:2 (Bassett, N.)（强调系后加））。\n\n尚未提供任何依据说明，为什么与资产、财务状况或破产财产管理有关的文件，会与债务人的庇护申请有任何关系。（同上，at 137: 17-20 (Bassett, N.)（强调系后加））。\n\n但是，再次强调，如果我们可以拟定措辞，以明确说明，如存在涉及……其庇护申请等事项的文件，在其异议中，我认为我们可以拟定措辞纳入拟议命令，再次明确我们并不寻求该等文件。（同上，at 138: 24-139: 5 (Bassett, N.)（强调系后加））。\n\n[A]s we've made clear in our order, you know, there are carveouts designed to address specifically the concerns that the debtor has raised concerning privileged communications that relate to . . . his asylum application.（Tr. 9/6/22, Exhibit B, 49: 5-10 (Bassett, N.)（强调系后加））。\n\n而这正是我们试图拟定修订后拟议命令的方式，即遵循判例法中该等类别的权衡方式，并进一步明确，为解决债务人的担忧，他仍能够就与……其庇护申请有关的文件主张特权……。（同上，at 76: 13-18 (Bassett, N.)）。\n\n因此，衡量——[法院正在]进行衡量。[法院正在]按类别逐一对文件进行衡量，其中就……庇护事项设置了一些非常具体的例外；[法院正在]进行衡量。（同上，at 108: 9-15 (Despins, L.)（强调系后加））。\n\n12. 破产法院在作出同意命令时，明确依赖了受托人及其律师的陈述，正如个人债务人在同意该同意命令时所依赖的一样：\n\n破产法院：嗯，我正试图弄清楚我们应当如何继续。现在，这是就受托人请求本法院认定其持有债务人全部特权的动议举行的续期听证会。\n\n我对该动议的理解是，即使受托人希望获得该命令，他也会同意排除与庇护事项有关的任何内容……\n\n我的意思是，他过去没有主张、现在也没有主张其将行使该项权利。（同上，at 67: 20-68:5）（强调系后加）。\n\n13. 此后，根据个人债务人律师与 Clark Hill 律师之间的讨论，各方同意 Clark Hill 将向个人债务人的律师提供对传票作出回应的文件，以供审查。\n\n14. Clark Hill 的律师向个人债务人的律师提供了文件，其中包括庇护申请。此后，个人债务人的律师向受托人的律师主张，庇护申请被禁止披露，并请求 Clark Hill 的律师暂缓提供庇护申请，以使个人债务人有机会寻求保护令。\n\n15. 因此，Individual Debtor（个人债务人）向 Bankruptcy Court（破产法院）提交了保护令动议（ECF No. 1063）。Trustee（受托人）提出异议，称其本人及其律师在有关 Consent Order（同意令）的听证中向破产法院所作的陈述不适用，因为当时受托人并不知道 Clark Hill（克拉克·希尔）已将 Asylum Application（庇护申请）附于其在 Malpractice Action（失职诉讼）中提出的简易判决动议。\n\n16. 在于 November 30, 2022 和 December 2, 2022 举行的、审议个人债务人保护令动议的听证会后，破产法院作出了随附于本文件并列为附件 C 的命令。2\n\n2 破产法院的命令提及于 November 30, 2022 和 December 1, 2022 举行的听证会。事实上，审议保护令动议的第二次听证会于 December 2, 2022 举行。\n\n17. 在该命令中，破产法院裁定，受托人及其律师“需要获得简易判决动议和庇护申请，以推进失职诉讼[。]”3（命令，第 2 页）。因此，破产法院命令 Jenner & Block（詹纳与布洛克）（作为克拉克·希尔的律师）“获授权向受托人及其律师出示简易判决动议和庇护申请”。4（同上，第 3 页）。\n\nIII. 庇护申请受 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a) 保护，不得披露\n\n18. 如个人债务人在其提交给破产法院的保护令动议中所主张，《移民与国籍法》（Immigration and Nationality Act，“INA”）“禁止披露与任何庇护申请有关的信息……。”Zhong Rong Li（李忠荣） v. Gonzales（冈萨雷斯）, 181 F. App'x 124, 128 (2d Cir. 2006)；另见 Gafurova（加富罗娃） v. Whitaker（惠特克）, 911 F.3d 321, 328 n.3 (6th Cir. 2018)（INA“通常禁止在未经申请人书面同意的情况下，向第三方披露与庇护申请有关的任何信息，除非列明的例外允许，或者由[国土安全部部长]酌情决定”）（引自 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6, 1208.6(a)）。\n\n19. 具体而言，8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a) 规定：\n\n载于或涉及任何难民准入、庇护、根据本法第 241(b)(3) 条暂缓遣返，或依照《禁止酷刑公约》实施立法所颁布法规提供保护之申请的信息；与根据 § 208.30 作出的任何可信恐惧认定有关的记录；以及与根据 § 208.31 作出的任何合理恐惧认定有关的记录，未经申请人书面同意，不得披露，但本条允许或[国土安全部部长]酌情决定的情形除外。\n\n3 个人债务人不反对受托人取得克拉克·希尔的简易判决动议及其不包含其庇护申请内容的附件。\n\n4 尽管 Subpoena（传票）是向克拉克·希尔发出的，但在有关个人债务人保护令动议的口头辩论中，受托人口头请求授权詹纳与布洛克出示庇护申请。个人债务人提出异议，主张受托人的请求在程序上不当。尽管如此，破产法院授权詹纳与布洛克出示庇护申请。\n\n20. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a) 与实质上相同的 8 C.F.R. § 208.6(a)，“确立了庇护寻求者的一项‘权利’，即‘对载于或涉及庇护申请的、能够使第三方将申请人的身份与下列事项关联的任何信息保密：(1) 申请人已申请庇护这一事实；(2) 庇护申请中所载与个人庇护请求有关的具体事实或主张；或 (3) 足以引发申请人已申请庇护之合理推断的事实或主张。’”Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. Nielsen, No. 17-cv-02366-BAS-KSC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210401, at \\*22 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2017)（引文略）。\n\n21. “这些法规‘保护如下信息：如公开披露，在申请人被遣返的情况下，可能使申请人遭受政府当局或非国家行为者的报复性措施，或危及可能仍居住在原籍国的申请人家庭成员的安全。’”同上，第 \\*22-23 页，引自 U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY（美国国土安全部）, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. Asylum Div.（美国公民及移民服务局庇护司）, Fact Sheet: Federal Regulations Protecting the Confidentiality of Asylum Applications（情况说明：保护庇护申请保密性的联邦法规）（Oct. 12, 2011）。\n\n22. 受托人向破产法院主张，8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a) 不适用于非政府主体出示庇护申请。然而，8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a) 的文本中没有任何内容以该种方式限制其适用。相反，8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a) 中针对禁止披露庇护申请这一一般规则的某些例外，仅适用于政府主体。例如，8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(c)（“本条不适用于向下列对象作出的任何披露：(1) 因……需要审查信息的任何美国政府官员或承包商。”）（强调处为原文所加）。\n\n23. 进一步证明庇护申请保密性的，是由 United States Citizenship and Immigration Services（美国公民及移民服务局）编制、随附于本文件并列为附件 D 的 Federal Regulation Protecting the Confidentiality of Asylum Applicants Synopsis（《保护庇护申请人保密性的联邦法规概要》，下称“概要”）。该概要明确指出，收到庇护申请的第三方受保密法规约束。见概要，常见问题 2，第 3 页（“通常，未经庇护申请人书面同意或国土安全部部长特别授权，不得与第三方分享与庇护有关的信息。”）；常见问题 7，第 4 页（问：如依该法规将与庇护有关的信息适当披露给第三方，该第三方对保密负有何种义务？答：作为与庇护有关信息的新保管人，第三方接收人受 8 CFR 208.6 项下保密法规的约束。）（强调处为原文所加）。\n\n24. 此外，District of Connecticut（康涅狄格联邦地区法院）至少有一家法院，以该等材料通常不受披露为由，驳回了要求向该案被告“强制出示有关[一名个人原告]庇护申请文件”的动议，尽管被告主张原告庇护申请的内容与原告提出的精神痛苦损害请求有关。见 Bakhit（巴希特） v. Safety Marking, Inc.（安全标记公司）, No. 3:13CV1049 (JCH), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192934, at \\*9 (D. Conn. Feb. 17, 2015)。\n\n25. 因此，显然，庇护申请受 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a) 保护，不得披露，且不存在允许披露的适用例外。5 见 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(c)-(e)；另见 Bakhit, No. 3:13CV1049 (JCH), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192934, at \\*9。\n\n5 此外，庇护申请与受托人的 Investigation Activities（调查活动）无关——即对债务人资产、财务状况及破产财产管理的调查——这是受托人的律师在有关同意令的听证中反复向法院陈述的事实。此外，鉴于受托人的律师在公开法庭作出该等陈述时传票已送达，传票不能被合理解释为寻求强制克拉克·希尔出示个人债务人的庇护申请。简言之，既然受托人在公开法庭陈述传票并非寻求强制出示庇护申请，且法院作出的命令明确依赖该陈述；见附件 B，第 67:20-68:5 页；受托人即受司法禁反言约束，不得主张传票强制（甚至允许）克拉克·希尔出示庇护申请。Intellivision v. Microsoft Corp.（微软公司）, 484 F. App'x 616, 620 (2d Cir. 2012)（“[最高]法院已指出，司法禁反言‘通常阻止当事人在案件的一个阶段凭借某一论点胜诉后，又在另一阶段依赖相矛盾的论点胜诉。’”（引自 New Hampshire（新罕布什尔州） v. Maine（缅因州）, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001)））。\n\nIV. 个人债务人谨请许可对破产法院的命令提起上诉\n\na. 提出的问题及请求的救济\n\n26. 个人债务人谨就该命令的上诉提出下列问题：6\n\ni. 破产法院命令向受托人及其律师出示庇护申请，是否因违反 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a) 而有误。\n\n6 个人债务人保留在其依照适用规则提交所提问题陈述时，对该问题进行变更、修订、补充或以其他方式修改的权利。\n\n27. 个人债务人谨请 District Court（地区法院）撤销该命令，并禁止向受托人及其律师出示庇护申请。\n\nb. 应准许本上诉的理由\n\n1. 管辖权陈述\n\n28. 本法院根据 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) 对本拟议上诉拥有管辖权，因为请求上诉的命令是破产法院在 28 U.S.C. § 157 规定的核心程序中作出的中间命令，且破产法院根据 28 U.S.C. § 1334 拥有管辖权。根据 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 和 1409，审判地在破产法院是适当的。\n\n2. 准许上诉的标准\n\n29. 一方可根据 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)，在获得“[地区]法院许可”的情况下，对破产法院的命令和判决提起中间上诉。“本巡回区的法院一贯认为，所有受[28 U.S.C. §] 158(a)(3) 管辖的上诉，均应参照[28 U.S.C. §] 1292(b) 所阐述的标准，以确定是否应准许上诉。”Golden v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, No. 22-MC-01899 (HG), 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143072, at \\*11 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2022)（引文、引用及省略号略）。\n\n30. 如“该命令 (1) 涉及一个控制性的法律问题，(2) 对该问题存在重大意见分歧的依据，并且 (3) 对该命令立即上诉可能实质性促进诉讼的最终终结”，本法院可以受理对中间命令的上诉。Osuji v. U.S. Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 285 F. Supp. 3d 554, 558 (E.D.N.Y. 2018)。“[上诉人]负有证明存在足以使中间上诉正当化的特殊情形的责任……。”同上（引文及引用略）。\n\na. 该命令涉及一个控制性的法律问题\n\n31. 如“撤销破产法院的命令将 (1) 终结该诉讼，或 (2) 实质性影响诉讼结果”，则该命令涉及一个控制性的法律问题。Osuji, 285 F. Supp. 3d at 558。“此外，该法律问题必须是‘纯粹’的法律问题，审查法院可以迅速且明确地作出裁决，而无需研究案卷。”2178 Atl. Realty LLC v. 2178 Atl. Ave. Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., No. 20-CV-1278 (RRM), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62226, at \\*11 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2021)（引文略）。\n\n32. 作为破产法院命令及本次上诉核心的法律问题，无疑是“纯粹”的，本法院可以“迅速且明确地作出裁决，而无需研究案卷”。事实上，此处的核心问题是，8 C.F.R. § 1208.6 是否禁止向受托人披露庇护申请。本法院无需审查案卷即可裁判这一纯粹的法律问题。\n\n33. 此外，对这一狭窄法律问题的裁决将“实质性影响诉讼结果”，因为该事项在破产法院中存在争议，而唯一的问题是受托人获得庇护申请的权利。一般参见 Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, 140 S.Ct. 582, 586(2020)（“破产案件涵盖了众多个别争议的集合。”）（引文和援引省略）。随着每一个持有庇护申请副本的实体增加，庇护申请落入希望伤害个人债务人的个人之手的风险（包括 CCP 及其代理人）便相应增加，Clark Hill（克拉克·希尔律师事务所）计算机系统遭黑客攻击即证明了这一点。一般参见 Dunkin' Donuts Franchising LLC v. CDDC Acquisition Co. LLC (In re FPSDA I, LLC), 470 B.R. 257, 265 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)（认定当某一法律问题将迫使债务人“立即”采取行动——如个人债务人为保护其本人及家人的安全可能采取的行动——“这可能造成重大后果”时，该问题“实质性影响诉讼结果”）。从根本上说，尽管受托人及其律师推定已尽最大技术和安全努力，二者持有庇护申请副本仍会增加未经授权的第三方取得庇护申请副本的可能性，从而进一步侵犯个人债务人的隐私及潜在安全。\n\n34. 因此，破产法院的命令涉及一个控制性法律问题。\n\nb. 对该问题存在重大意见分歧的依据\n\n35. 当“(1) 该问题存在相互冲突的权威观点，或者 (2) 该问题对于 Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）而言尤为困难且属首次裁决”时，即存在重大意见分歧的依据。Osuji, 285 F. Supp. 3d 554, 558 (E.D.N.Y. 2018)。\n\n36. 个人债务人主张，根据 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6，有关庇护申请受保护地位的法律已经确定，因此该问题不存在相互冲突的权威观点。\n\n37. 然而，尽管保护庇护申请免于披露的法律已经确定，chapter 11 破产受托人是否有权取得债务人庇护申请副本这一问题，鉴于破产受托人的既定职责（包括根据 11 U.S.C. § 1106 调查债务人的资产和负债的职责，例如 Malpractice Action（过失诉讼））以及联邦法规下庇护申请高度保密和受保护的性质，是一个“尤为困难”的问题。见 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6。该问题的困难性还因如下事实而加剧：就个人债务人所能确定的范围而言，该问题对于第二巡回上诉法院属于首次裁决。\n\n38. 此外，对于受托人是否确实“需要获得……庇护申请以提起过失诉讼”这一问题，也存在重大意见分歧；破产法院在未作出任何实质性分析的情况下作出了这一认定。（命令，第 2 页）。在反对个人债务人的保护令动议时，受托人以高度结论性的方式称，其“需要获得[个人][债务人]的[庇护][申请]”，以“全面评估过失诉讼的是非曲直”。即使证明存在需要足以克服 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6 向个人债务人提供的保护（个人债务人主张，证明存在需要并不足够），破产法院和受托人就受托人需要获得庇护申请所作的结论性陈述，也未提供任何依据以理解受托人为何需要庇护申请。因此，就破产法院命令而言，存在重大意见分歧的依据。7\n\n7 见脚注 3。\n\nc. 立即上诉将实质性推进诉讼的最终终结\n\n39. 这一要件，即“评估上诉是否会实质性推进诉讼终结，在上诉有望推进审判时间或缩短审判所需时间时得到满足。”Osuji, 285 F. Supp. 3d at 558（援引和引文省略）。\n\n40. 个人债务人承认，本次上诉在技术上属于证据开示争议，因此根据具有约束力的先例构成中间上诉。然而，该争议所涉的唯一问题是，联邦法规是否赋予个人债务人对受托人保密其庇护申请的权利，以及破产法院命令 Clark Hill 的律师提交该申请是否超越其权限。换言之，与几乎所有其他证据开示争议不同，受本次上诉极为狭窄的主题——即受托人获得或无权获得债务人庇护申请的权利——影响的受托人与债务人之间不存在其他或更大的争议。在这种极端且极不寻常的情形下，个人债务人谨此主张，允许立即上诉将解决该争议的全部内容，并就政治迫害受害人享有的权利向其他法院提供明确指引。\n\n41. 因此，通过准许对破产法院命令的立即上诉（并随后撤销该命令），本法院将解决个人债务人与受托人之间这一基础争议的全部内容，并向处境相似的当事人提供必要指引。\n\nd. 存在支持中间上诉的特殊情形\n\n42. 个人债务人谨此主张，出于以下理由，向受托人提交庇护申请构成支持中间上诉的特殊情形。\n\n43. 破产法院作出该命令时，背离了 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6 和 1208.6 向个人债务人提供的保护。实际上，一项仅略超过两页的命令，便有效消除了 INA 中由 Congress（国会）规定的个人债务人对庇护申请享有的隐私权。\n\n44. 此类命令的寒蝉效应深远，因为人们可能会因此不再寻求急需的破产保护，以避免提交“如果公开披露，可能使申请人在被遣返回国时遭受政府当局或非国家行为者报复性措施，或者危及仍居住在原籍国的申请人家庭成员安全的信息。”Al Otro Lado, Inc., No. 17-cv-02366- BAS-KSC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210401, at \\*22-23, quoting U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. Asylum Div., Fact Sheet: Federal Regulations Protecting the Confidentiality of Asylum Applications (Oct. 12, 2011)。\n\n45. 破产程序的目的之一是“使诚实债务人摆脱沉重债务的负担，并使其能够重新开始，不再承担因商业不幸而产生的义务和责任。”Williams v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55, 35 S. Ct. 289, 290 (1915)。强迫个人债务人在获得此种救济与保护其本人及家人免受政府当局或非国家行为者报复性措施之间作出选择，显然不公。鉴于这一特殊情形，应准许立即上诉。\n\n46. 与 Mohawk Indus. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 130 S. Ct. 599, 606 (2009) 不同，在该案中，Supreme Court（联邦最高法院）认定，对特权材料的不当披露可以通过“撤销[该]不利判决并发回重审”予以补救；若不允许立即上诉，则无法避免庇护申请立即落入希望伤害个人债务人的个人和实体之手的危险。Id., at 109。简言之，此处的问题不是披露可能对诉讼产生的不利影响（法院以后可以纠正），而是披露可能对债务人安全和保障产生的不利影响（遗憾的是，任何法院均无法纠正或逆转）。\n\n47. 基于上述理由，个人债务人谨此主张，应准许其就破产法院中间命令提出上诉的许可。\n\nV. 作为替代请求，个人债务人谨此申请调卷令，以撤销破产法院的命令\n\n48. 在第二巡回上诉法院，上诉法院“将在以下情形对涉及特权主张的证据开示命令行使调卷令审查权：(i) 提出了重要且属首次裁决的问题；(ii) 如审查必须等待最终判决，特权将在具体案件中丧失；以及 (iii) 立即解决将避免形成削弱该特权的证据开示惯例或原则。”Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Turner & Newall, PLC, 964 F.2d 159, 163 (2d Cir. 1992)。\n\n49. 联邦最高法院“已确认，调卷令历来仅用于联邦法院，以将下级法院限制在依法行使其既定管辖权的范围内，或者在其有义务行使职权时强制其行使该职权……只有构成司法篡夺权力的特殊情形，才足以证明援用这一非常救济手段具有正当性。Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 35, 101 S. Ct. 188, 190 (1980)（援引和引文省略）。\n\n50. 在 Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. 一案中，第二巡回上诉法院审理了调卷令申请，“原因在于受到质疑的证据开示命令具有不同寻常的性质”，该命令实际上允许对方律师进行特权审查，“以及其所提出的有关律师—客户特权的重要且重大问题。”Id., at 166；另见，例如，In re Itron, Inc., 883 F.3d 553, 568 (5th Cir. 2018)（在不当适用律师—客户特权后准许调卷令）；In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1375–76 (Fed. Cir. 2007)（地区法院认定一方放弃律师—客户特权和工作成果特权后准许调卷令），因其他理由被 Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 579 U.S. 93, 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016) 推翻。\n\n51. 在本案中，提交庇护申请是“一项极其重要的问题”，因为其消除了 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6 和 1208.6 明确赋予个人债务人（及所有其他处境相似债务人）的保护。Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 964 F. 2d, at 163。同样，如本文所述，这似乎是本巡回区内首次裁决的问题。\n\n52. 此外，如审查必须等待最终判决，8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6 和 1208.6 提供的保护“将在具体案件中丧失”。见 Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 964 F. 2d, at 163。事实上，8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6 和 1208.6 的根本目的，是防止“在未经申请人书面同意的情况下，向第三方披露与庇护申请有关的任何信息，除非列明的例外允许披露”，而该等例外不适用于当前情形，\n\n“或经 Attorney General（总检察长）或 Secretary of Homeland Security（国土安全部长）酌情决定”，而二者均未授权披露。Gafurova v. Whitaker, 911 F.3d 321, 328 n.3 (6th Cir. 2018)（引用\n8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6, 1208.6(a)）。如受托人及其律师依命令获得庇护申请副本，则个人债务人根据 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6 和 1208.6 享有的隐私权将立即消失。\n\n53. 最后，对有关庇护申请的争议作出“即时解决”将“避免形成削弱该保密特权的证据开示实践或原则”，具体而言，即避免形成一种允许破产受托人（以及破产法院）规避 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6 和 1208.6 规定的原则；该等规定仅旨在保护庇护申请人——个人债务人无可争议地属于该极为狭窄的一类人员。Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.（大通曼哈顿银行，N.A.）, 964 F. 2d, at 163.\n\n54. 如同 Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. 一案，破产法院（Bankruptcy Court）的命令至少可以说是“不同寻常的”，因为该命令允许受托人取得依据联邦法规属于保密并受保护的文件，且未对该法规作出任何法律分析。基于此原因，并且由于该命令就庇护申请保密性“提出”的“重大且重要的问题”，本法院应当准许该项调卷令申请。Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 964 F. 2d, at 166.\nVI. 结论\n\n55. 基于上述理由，本法院应当：(i) 准许个人债务人就破产法院命令提出上诉，或者，作为替代方案，(ii) 准许个人债务人提出的调卷令申请。\n债务人，HO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）\n\n签署人：/s/ Aaron A. Romney\nAaron A. Romney（ct28144）\nZEISLER & ZEISLER, P.C.（ZEISLER & ZEISLER 专业公司）\n10 Middle Street, 15th floor\nBridgeport, CT 06605\n电话：(203) 368-4234\n传真：(203) 368-0903\n电子邮件：[aromney@zeislaw.com]\n\n送达证明\n\n本人特此证明，于 2022 年 12 月 13 日，前述文件副本已以电子方式提交。本次提交的通知将通过法院电子提交系统以电子邮件发送给所有当事人，或按电子提交通知所示，以邮寄方式发送给无法接受电子提交的任何人员。当事人可通过法院的 CM/ECF 系统查阅本次提交。\n\n签署人：/s/ Aaron A. Romney\nAaron A. Romney（ct28144）","key_entities":["Je","CCP","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Despins","Guo","Chinese Communist Party"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":1063,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":5787,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 19:13:03"}