{"id":"court_ctb_1231_1","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":1231,"sub_number":1,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2022-12-13","title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION :","summary_zh":"准予上诉动议及调卷令申请 —— Ho Wan Kwok 破产案（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo），CTB 22-50073 ECF #1231-1（2022年12月13日立案）。债务人郭文贵申请上诉许可或请求签发调卷令，以撤销破产法院要求其向第 11 章受托人披露其机密庇护申请材料的部分批准保护令（ECF No. 1217）。","summary_en":"Motion for Leave to Appeal / Mandamus Petition — In re Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo / Guo Wengui), CTB 22-50073 ECF #1231-1 (filed Dec 13, 2022). Debtor Ho Wan Kwok requested leave to appeal, or alternatively a writ of mandamus vacating, the bankruptcy court's order (ECF No. 1217) requiring disclosure of his confidential asylum application to the Chapter 11 trustee.","body_en":"#### **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n:\n\n:\n\n:\n\nIn re : Chapter 11\n\nHO WAN KWOK, *et al.* : Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\nDebtors. : \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_:\n\n\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\n\n#### **INDIVIDUAL DEBTOR'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE APPEAL OF ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER AND, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS**\n\nPursuant to 28 U.S.C. §158(a)(3), Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8004, and 28 U.S.C. § 1651, the individual debtor, Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Individual Debtor\"), by and through his undersigned counsel, Zeisler & Zeisler, P. C. (\"Z&Z\"), respectfully moves (the \"Motion/Petition\") for leave to appeal the Bankruptcy Court's December 9, 2022 Order Granting in Part Motion for Protective Order (Doc. No. 1217, the \"Order\"), which authorized the production of the Individual Debtor's asylum application (the \"Asylum Application\") to the chapter 11 trustee Luc A. Despins (the \"Trustee\") and, in the alternative, petitions for a writ of mandamus vacating the Bankruptcy Court's Order. In further support of his Motion/Petition, the Individual Debtor respectfully states as follows.\n\n#### **I. INTRODUCTION**\n\n1. The Individual Debtor has been a political target of the Chinese Communist Party (the \"CCP\") for many years. In early 2015, after learning that the CCP was going to arrest him on politically motivated charges based on fabricated evidence, the Individual Debtor fled to the United States. Since the Individual Debtor left China, both he and his family have been the subject of relentless threats and harassment by the CCP and its agents.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 1231-1 Filed 12/13/22 Entered 12/13/22 13:39:29 Page 2 of 50\n\n2. Several years before filing for bankruptcy protection, the Individual Debtor, with the assistance of counsel at Clark Hill PLC (\"Clark Hill\"), prepared and submitted the Asylum Application to the United States Department of Homeland Security. By the Asylum Application, the Individual Debtor sought refuge in the United States and protection from the CCP's persistent threats. The Asylum Application contains confidential, highly sensitive information that is expressly protected from disclosure by 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6(a) and 1208.6(a).<sup>1</sup>\n\n3. By the instant motion, the Individual Debtor seeks leave to obtain appellate review of an order entered by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut (*Manning*, *J.*) (the \"Bankruptcy Court\"), which authorized the production of, *inter alia*, the Asylum Application to the Trustee and his counsel. In the alternative, the Individual Debtor respectfully petitions for a writ of mandamus vacating the Bankruptcy Court's Order.\n\n#### **II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND**\n\n4. On February 15, 2022 (the \"Petition Date\"), the Individual Debtor filed his voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, thereby commencing the above-captioned bankruptcy case. On July 7, 2022, the Trustee was appointed. (*See* Doc. No. 514).\n\n5. One of the assets of the Individual Debtor's bankruptcy estate is a pre-petition claim (the \"Malpractice Action\") that the Individual Debtor initiated against Clark Hill. In the Malpractice Action, the Individual Debtor alleges that he was harmed when Clark Hill's computer system was hacked, which allowed unauthorized persons to access the Asylum Application. Specifically, the Individual Debtor asserted, *inter alia*, that as a direct and proximate cause of Clark Hill's multiple breaches of their duties, the details and contents of the Asylum Application\n\n<sup>1</sup> 8 C.F.R. § 208.6(a) and 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a) are identical, except one authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security and the other authorizes the Attorney General to permit the disclosure of information contained in or pertaining to an asylum application. For ease of reference, this Motion/Petition cites to only 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6 except where necessary.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 1231-1 Filed 12/13/22 Entered 12/13/22 13:39:29 Page 3 of 50\n\nwere disclosed widely on social media platforms and placed in the hands of third-parties hostile to the Individual Debtor. Clark Hill retained Jenner & Block, LLP (\"Jenner & Block\") to represent it in the Malpractice Action.\n\n6. On July 28, 2022, the Trustee filed his Omnibus Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee for Entry of Order under Bankruptcy Rule 2004 and Local Rule 2004-1 Authorizing Discovery with Respect to Various Legal and Financial Advisors to the Debtor (Doc. No. 637, the \"Professionals 2004 Motion\"), seeking, *inter alia*, to conduct the examination of Clark Hill.\n\n7. The Individual Debtor filed a limited objection (Doc. No. 703), *inter alia*, to the Professionals 2004 Motion on August 5, 2022, on the grounds that if the proposed order filed therewith was entered and interpreted literally, it would preclude substantive objections to the subpoenas to be served in accordance with the Professionals 2004 Motion, including objections based upon privilege, in violation of Bankr. L. R. 2004-1.\n\n8. On August 16, 2022, the Bankruptcy Court entered the Order Granting Chapter 11 Trustee's Application for Rule 2004 Discovery with Respect to Various Legal and Financial Advisors to the Debtor (the \"Order Granting the Professionals 2004 Motion\") (Doc. No. 756). The Order Granting the Professionals 2004 Motion, *inter alia*, permitted service of a subpoena upon Clark Hill (the \"Subpoena\"), but directed that compliance was \"[s]ubject to any rights under the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and applicable Local Rules[.]\" Thus, the Bankruptcy Court modified the Trustee' proposed order granting the Professionals 2004 Motion so as to preserve the Individual Debtor's and the recipients of the subpoenas' rights to object to the substance of the subpoenas.\n\n9. On August 18, 2022, the Trustee gave notice that it would serve subpoenas pursuant to the Order granting the Professionals 2004 Motion, including, *inter alia*, the Subpoena on Clark Hill.\n\n10. On September 14, 2022, the Court entered the Consent Order Regarding Control of Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Protection Related to Rule 2004 Subpoenaed Documents and Information (Doc. No. 856, the \"Consent Order\"). The Consent Order defined the scope of the Trustee's and Individual Debtor's respective control of the attorney-client and workproduct privileges and set forth certain procedures for disputes concerning the same. Moreover, the Consent Order specifically provided:\n\nNothing herein shall prevent the Debtor from asserting any and all privileges concerning legal matters unrelated to the Investigation Topics, such as unrelated criminal allegations or the Debtor's asylum application (other than documents related to the litigation styled as *Guo Wengui v. Clark Hill, PLC*, Case No. 19-cv-03195 (D. D.C.) [(the \"Clark Hill Action\")] that relate to the merits of the legal malpractice action, as distinguished from the merits of the Debtor's asylum application, subject to the balancing test incorporated herein, **which does not relate to the substance of the asylum application**).\n\n(Consent Order, ¶¶ 2, 4.) (emphasis added). The Investigation Activities are limited to the Debtors' assets, financial condition, or activities related to the administration of the bankruptcy estate, which, per the Consent Order, \"does not relate to the substance of the asylum application.\" (*Id.*, ¶\n\n2).\n\n11. During the hearings held in the Bankruptcy Court concerning the negotiation of the\n\nConsent Order, the Trustee and his counsel each represented—and separately so—that the Trustee\n\ndid not seek the Debtor's Asylum Application:\n\nThe debtor identifies his concerns about potentially privileged documents related to . . . things that have been made against him as well as his asylum application. *We are not, in our investigation at this time, seeking any documents related to those issues***.** (Tr. 8/30/22, **Exhibit A**, at 104: 6-11 (Bassett, N.) (emphasis added)).\n\n[T]he debtor contends, well as I said before, there's a concern that, you know, it's possible documents the trustee is seeking to have access to could involve potential . . . *unrelated issues like his asylum application, but, again, as I said before, we're not seeking to get those documents through our discovery requests*. (*Id*., at 110: 12-19 (Bassett, N.) (emphasis added)).\n\nThe debtor has identified one request in our subpoena directed to his former law firms and professionals, *Request 17, that asks for information about legal disputes which could be read to include . . . his asylum application, we are willing to make clear on the record that we're not seeking to get that type of information and we'll limit that request accordingly*. (*Id.*, at 110: 20-111:2 (Bassett, N.) (emphasis added)).\n\n[*T]here is no basis that's been provided as to why documents would relate to assets, financial condition, or the administration of the estate, would have anything to do with the debtor's asylum application*. (*Id.*, at 137: 17-20 (Bassett, N.) (emphasis added)).\n\nBut, again, if there is language we could work out to make clear if there's a document that talks about . . . *his asylum application*, things like that, in his objection, I think we could work out language to put in the proposed order to again make clear that *we are not seeking that*. (*Id.*, at 138: 24-139: 5 (Bassett, N.) (emphasis added)).\n\n[A]s we've made clear in our order, you know, *there are carveouts designed to address specifically the concerns that the debtor has raised concerning privileged communications that relate to . . . his asylum application*. (Tr. 9/6/22, **Exhibit B**, 49: 5-10 (Bassett, N.) (emphasis added)).\n\nAnd that is exactly how we tried to craft our revised proposed order is to track those categories in that weigh of the case law and then to also make clear to address the debtor's concerns that he is still able to assert privileges over documents related to . . . his asylum application . . . . (*Id.*, at 76: 13-18 (Bassett, N.)).\n\nSo the balancing—[the court is] doing the balancing. [The court is] doing the balancing in a category-by-category document *with some very specific carveouts regarding . . . the asylum issue carved out, [the court is] doing the balancing*. (*Id.*, at 108: 9-15 (Despins, L.) (emphasis added)).\n\n12. The Bankruptcy Court expressly relied on the Trustee's and his counsel's\n\nrepresentations when it entered the Consent Order, just as the Individual Debtor did when he\n\nagreed to the Consent Order:\n\nThe Bankruptcy Court: Well, I'm trying to figure out how we should proceed. And\n\nright now this was a continued hearing on the trustee's motion to have this court determine that he holds all the privileges of the debtor.\n\nMy understanding of that motion was that even though the trustee wants that order, *he would agree to carveout anything with regard to the asylum issue. . .*\n\n*I mean, he was—he's not asserting and never has asserted that he's going to exercise that right.* (*Id.*, at 67: 20-68:5) (emphasis added)).\n\n13. Thereafter, pursuant to discussions among the Individual Debtor's counsel and Clark Hill's counsel, it was agreed that Clark Hill would produce documents responsive to the Subpoena to the Individual Debtor's counsel for review.\n\n14. Clark Hill's counsel produced documents to the Individual Debtor's counsel, which included the Asylum Application. Thereafter, counsel for the Individual Debtor asserted to the Trustee's counsel that the Asylum Application is prohibited from disclosure and requested to Clark Hill's counsel that it refrain from producing the Asylum Application to allow the Individual Debtor an opportunity to seek a protective order.\n\n15. Consequently, the Individual Debtor filed the Motion for Protective Order (ECF No. 1063) with the Bankruptcy Court. The Trustee objected, claiming that his and his counsel's statements to the Bankruptcy Court during hearings concerning the Consent Order were inapplicable because the Trustee did not know at the time that Clark Hill had attached the Asylum Application to its Motion for Summary Judgment in the Malpractice Action.\n\n16. After hearings held on November 30, 2022, and December 2, 2022, to consider the Individual Debtor's Motion for Protective Order, the Bankruptcy Court issued the Order attached hereto as **Exhibit C**. 2\n\n<sup>2</sup> The Bankruptcy Court's Order references hearings on November 30, 2022 and December 1, 2022. In actuality, the second hearing to consider the Motion for Protective Order was held on December 2, 2022.\n\n17. In the Order, the Bankruptcy Court held that the Trustee and his counsel \"need access to the Motion for Summary Judgment and the Asylum Application to prosecute the Malpractice Action[.]\"<sup>3</sup> (Order, at 2). Consequently, the Bankruptcy Court ordered that Jenner & Block (as Clark Hill's counsel) \"is authorized to produce the Motion for Summary Judgment and the Asylum Application\" to the Trustee and his counsel.<sup>4</sup> (*Id*., at 3).\n\n# **III. THE ASYLUM APPLICATION IS PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE BY 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a)**\n\n18. As asserted by the Individual Debtor in his Motion for Protective Order submitted to the Bankruptcy Court, the Immigration and Nationality Act (\"INA\") \"prohibits the disclosure of information pertaining to any asylum application. . . .\" *Zhong Rong Li v. Gonzales*, 181 F. App'x 124, 128 (2d Cir. 2006); *see also Gafurova v. Whitaker*, 911 F.3d 321, 328 n.3 (6th Cir. 2018) (the INA \"generally prohibit[s] the disclosure to third parties of any information relating to an asylum application without the written consent of the applicant unless permitted by the listed exceptions or at the discretion of the [Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security]\") (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6, 1208.6(a)).\n\n19. Specifically, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a) provides:\n\nInformation contained in or pertaining to any application for refugee admission, asylum, withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3) of the Act, or protection under regulations issued pursuant to the Convention Against Torture's implementing legislation, records pertaining to any credible fear determination conducted pursuant to § 208.30, and records pertaining to any reasonable fear determination conducted pursuant to § 208.31, shall not be disclosed without the written consent of the applicant, except as permitted by\n\n<sup>3</sup> The Individual Debtor does not object to the Trustee receiving Clark Hill's Motion for Summary Judgment and exhibits thereto that do not contain content from his Asylum Application.\n\n<sup>4</sup> Though the Subpoena was directed at Clark Hill, at oral argument concerning the Individual Debtor's Motion for Protective Order, the Trustee orally requested that Jenner & Block be authorized to produce the Asylum Application. The Individual Debtor objected, asserting that the Trustee's request was procedurally improper. Nonetheless, the Bankruptcy Court authorized Jenner & Block to produce the Asylum Application.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 1231-1 Filed 12/13/22 Entered 12/13/22 13:39:29 Page 8 of 50\n\nthis section or at the discretion of the [Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security].\n\n20. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a), along with the substantially similar 8 C.F.R. § 208.6(a), \"establish a 'right' of asylum seekers 'to keep confidential any information contained in or pertaining to an asylum application that allows a third party to link the identity of the applicant to: (1) the fact that the applicant has applied for asylum; (2) specific facts or allegations pertaining to the individual asylum claim contained in an asylum application; or (3) facts or allegations that are sufficient to give rise to a reasonable inference that the applicant has applied for asylum.'\" *Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. Nielsen*, No. 17-cv-02366-BAS-KSC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210401, at \\*22 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2017) (citation omitted).\n\n21. \"These regulations 'safeguard information that, if disclosed publicly, could subject the claimant to retaliatory measures by government authorities or non-state actors in the event that the claimant is repatriated, or endanger the security of the claimant's family members who may still be residing in the country of origin.'\" *Id*., at\\*22-23, *quoting* U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. Asylum Div., *Fact Sheet: Federal Regulations Protecting the Confidentiality of Asylum Applications* (Oct. 12, 2011).\n\n22. The Trustee argued to the Bankruptcy Court that 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a) is inapplicable to the production of an Asylum Application by non-government actors. However, nothing within the text of 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a) limits its application in that manner. Rather, *only certain exceptions* to the general prohibition against disclosure of an asylum application in 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a) apply only to government actors. *E.g.*, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(c) (\"**This section shall not apply to any disclosure to: (1) Any United States Government official or contractor having a need to examine information in connection with**. . . .\") (emphasis added).\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 1231-1 Filed 12/13/22 Entered 12/13/22 13:39:29 Page 9 of 50\n\n23. Further evidencing the confidentiality of asylum applications, the *Federal Regulation Protecting the Confidentiality of Asylum Applicants Synopsis* (the \"Synopsis\") prepared by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services agency, attached hereto as **Exhibit D**, expressly states that third parties who receive an asylum application are bound by the confidentiality regulations. *See Synopsis, Frequently Asked Question 2*, at p. 3 (\"In general, asylum-related information must not be shared with third parties without the asylum applicant's written consent or the Secretary of Homeland Security's specific authorization.\"); *Frequently Asked Question 7*, at p. 4 (Q: If asylum-related information is properly disclosed to a third party pursuant to the regulation, what is the third party's obligation with respect to confidentiality? A: *As the new custodian of the asylum-related information, the third-party recipient is bound by the confidentiality regulation under 8 CFR 208.6.*\") (emphasis added).\n\n24. Additionally, at least one court in the District of Connecticut has denied a \"motion to compel the production of documents concerning [an individual plaintiff's] asylum application\" to the defendant in that action on the basis that such material is not generally subject to disclosure, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant argued that the content of the plaintiff's asylum application was relevant to the plaintiff's claim for infliction of emotional distress. *See Bakhit v. Safety Marking, Inc.*, No. 3:13CV1049 (JCH), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192934, at \\*9 (D. Conn. Feb. 17, 2015).\n\n25. Thus, it is clear that the Asylum Application is protected from disclosure by 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a), and that no exception is applicable to permit disclosure.<sup>5</sup> *See* 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(c)-(e); *see also Bakhit*, No. 3:13CV1049 (JCH), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192934, at \\*9.\n\n<sup>5</sup> In addition, the Asylum Application does not relate to the Investigation Activities of the Trustee – *i.e.*, investigation of the Debtor's assets, financial condition, and administration of the estate—a fact that the Trustee's counsel repeatedly represented to the Court during the hearings concerning the Consent Order. Moreover, in light of the fact that the Subpoena had already been served when the Trustee's counsel made\n\n# **IV. THE INDIVIDUAL DEBTOR RESPECTFULLY MOVES FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL THE BANKRUPTCY COURT'S ORDER**\n\n# **a. QUESTIONS PRESENTED AND RELIEF SOUGHT**\n\n26. The Individual Debtor respectfully submits the following question in the appeal of\n\nthe Order:<sup>6</sup>\n\n- i. Whether the Bankruptcy Court erred in ordering the production of the Asylum Application to the Trustee and his counsel in violation of 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a).\n- 27. The Individual Debtor respectfully requests that the District Court vacate the Order\n\nand prohibit the production of the Asylum Application to the Trustee and his counsel.\n\n# **b. REASONS THIS APPEAL SHOULD BE GRANTED**\n\n# **1. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION**\n\n28. This Court has jurisdiction over this proposed appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §\n\n158(a)(3) because the Order sought to be appealed from is an interlocutory ordered entered by the Bankruptcy Court in a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157 and the Bankruptcy Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334. Venue was proper in the Bankruptcy Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.\n\nthose representations in open court, the Subpoena cannot reasonably be construed to seek to compel Clark Hill to produce the Individual Debtor's Asylum Application. Simply stated, since the Trustee represented in open court that the Subpoena did not seek to compel the production of the Asylum Application, and the Court entered an order expressly relying on that representation; *see Exhibit B*, at 67:20-68:5; the Trustee is judicially estopped from arguing that the Subpoena compels (or even permits) Clark Hill to produce the Asylum Application. *Intellivision v. Microsoft Corp.*, 484 F. App'x 616, 620 (2d Cir. 2012) (\"[T]he [Supreme] Court has stated that judicial estoppel 'generally prevents a party from prevailing in one phase of a case on an argument and then relying on a contradictory argument to prevail in another phase.'\" (*quoting New Hampshire v. Maine*, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001)).\n\n<sup>6</sup> The Individual Debtor reserves the right to alter, amend, add to, or otherwise change this question when he submits a statement of the issues presented in accordance with the applicable rules.\n\n#### **2. STANDARD FOR GRANTING LEAVE TO APPEAL**\n\n29. A party may seek an interlocutory appeal of orders and decrees of the Bankruptcy Court \"with leave of the [District] [C]ourt\" pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). \"[C]ourts in this Circuit have invariably held that all appeals governed by [28 U.S.C. §] 158(a)(3) should refer to the standards articulated by [28 U.S.C. §] 1292(b) to determine whether leave to appeal should be granted.\" *Golden v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency*, No. 22-MC-01899 (HG), 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143072, at \\*11 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2022) (quotation, citation, and ellipsis omitted).\n\n30. This Court may accept an appeal from an interlocutory order if \"the order (1) involves a controlling question of law (2) as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion, and (3) an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.\" *Osuji v. U.S. Bank, Nat'l Ass'n*, 285 F. Supp. 3d 554, 558 (E.D.N.Y. 2018). \"[A]ppellants bear the burden of showing that exceptional circumstances exist that warrant an interlocutory appeal….\" *Id*. (citation and quotation omitted).\n\n#### **a. THE ORDER INVOLVES A CONTROLLING QUESTION OF LAW**\n\n31. An order involves a controlling question of law where \"reversal of the bankruptcy court's order would (1) terminate the action or (2) materially affect the outcome of the litigation.\" *Osuji*, 285 F. Supp. 3d at 558. \"In addition, the question of law must refer to a 'pure' question of law that the reviewing court could decide quickly and cleanly without having to study the record.\" *2178 Atl. Realty LLC v. 2178 Atl. Ave. Hous. Dev. Fund Corp.*, No. 20-CV-1278 (RRM), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62226, at \\*11 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2021) (citation omitted).\n\n32. The question of law at the core of the Bankruptcy Court's Order, and this appeal, is undeniably \"pure\" and this Court can decide it \"quickly and cleanly without having to study the record.\" Indeed, the core issue here is whether 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6 prohibits the disclosure of the\n\n11\n\nAsylum Application to the Trustee. This Court need not review the record to adjudicate this purely legal question.\n\n33. Additionally, adjudication of this narrow legal question will \"materially affect the outcome of the litigation\" because this is a contested matter in the Bankruptcy Court and the sole issue is the Trustee's right to access the Asylum Application. *See generally Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC*, 140 S.Ct. 582, 586(2020) (\"A bankruptcy case embraces an aggregation of individual controversies.\") (quotations and citations omitted). With each additional entity that maintains a copy of the Asylum Application, the risk that the Asylum Application falls into the hands of individuals who wish to do the Individual Debtor harm (including the CCP and its agents) rises incrementally, as evidenced by the hack of Clark Hill's computer system. *See generally Dunkin' Donuts Franchising LLC v. CDDC Acquisition Co. LLC (In re FPSDA I, LLC)*, 470 B.R. 257, 265 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding that a question of law \"materially affect[s] the outcome of the litigation\" when it would force a debtor to act \"immediately,\" as the Individual Debtor might to protect the safety of himself and his family, \"which could have significant consequences\"). Fundamentally, and despite their presumably best technological and security efforts, the Trustee and his counsel maintaining copies of the Asylum Application increases the potential for unauthorized third parties to obtain copies of the Asylum Application, further infringing on the Individual Debtor's privacy and potential safety.\n\n34. Therefore, the Bankruptcy Court's Order involves a controlling question of law.\n\n#### **b. THERE IS A SUBSTANTIAL GROUND FOR DIFFERENCE OF OPINION**\n\n35. There is a substantial ground for difference of opinion \"where (1) there is conflicting authority on the issue, or (2) the issue is particularly difficult and of first impression for the Second Circuit.\" *Osuji*, 285 F. Supp. 3d 554, 558 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).\n\n12\n\n36. The Individual Debtor submits that the law on the protected status of an asylum application under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6 is well-settled and, as such, there is not conflicting authority on the issue.\n\n37. However, the issue of whether a chapter 11 bankruptcy trustee has the ability to obtain a copy of a debtor's asylum application—despite well settled law *protecting an asylum application from disclosure*—is a \"particularly difficult\" issue given a bankruptcy trustee's established duties (including those under 11 U.S.C. § 1106 to investigate the assets and liabilities of the debtor, such as the Malpractice Action) and the highly confidential and protected nature of an asylum application under Federal regulations. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6. The difficulty of this issue is compounded by the fact that it is, as far as the Individual Debtor can determine, an issue of first impression for the Second Circuit.\n\n38. Additionally, there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion as to whether the Trustee, in fact, \"need[s] access to the… Asylum Application to prosecute the Malpractice Action,\" which the Bankruptcy Court found without providing any meaningful analysis. (Order, at 2). In opposing the Individual Debtor's Motion for Protective Order, the Trustee stated in highly conclusory fashion that he \"needs access to the [Individual] [D]ebtor's [A]sylum [A]pplication\" to \"fully assess the merits of the Malpractice Action.\" *Even if* a showing of need was sufficient to overcome the protections provided to the Individual Debtor under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6 (the Individual Debtor submits that a showing of need is *not* sufficient), the conclusory statements by the Bankruptcy Court and the Trustee as to the Trustee's need to access the Asylum Application provide no basis to understand *why* the Trustee needs the Asylum Application. Accordingly, there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion as regards the Bankruptcy Court Order.<sup>7</sup>\n\n<sup>7</sup> See footnote 3.\n\n#### **c. AN IMMEDIATE APPEAL MATERIALLY ADVANCES THE ULTIMATE TERMINATION OF THE LITIGATION**\n\n39. This prong, \"assessing whether an appeal would materially advance termination of the litigation, is satisfied where the appeal promises to advance the time for trial or to shorten the time required for trial.\" *Osuji*, 285 F. Supp. 3d at 558 (citation and quotation omitted).\n\n40. The Individual Debtor acknowledges that this appeal technically is a discovery dispute which renders it an interlocutory appeal under binding precedent. However, the *sole* issue underlying this dispute is whether Federal regulation entitles the Individual Debtor to keep his Asylum Application confidential from the Trustee and whether the Bankruptcy Court exceeded its authority by ordering Clark Hill's counsel to produce it. Said differently, unlike almost all other discovery disputes, there is no other/larger dispute between the Trustee and the Debtor that will be impacted by the very narrow subject of this appeal, *i.e.,* the Trustee's right (or lack thereof) to access the Debtor's asylum application. In this extreme and highly uncommon circumstance, the Individually Debtor respectfully submits that allowing an immediate appeal will resolve the entirety of this dispute and provide clarity to other courts concerning the rights to which victims of political persecution are entitled.\n\n41. Therefore, by granting the immediate appeal of the Bankruptcy Court's Order (and subsequently vacating the Order), this Court will resolve the entirety of this underlying dispute between the Individual Debtor and the Trustee and provide necessary guidance to similarly situated parties.\n\n#### **d. EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES EXIST THAT WARRANT AN INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL**\n\n42. The Individual Debtor respectfully submits that the production of the Asylum Application to the Trustee represents exceptional circumstances warranting an interlocutory appeal for the following reasons.\n\n43. In issuing the Order, the Bankruptcy Court deviated from the protections afforded to the Individual Debtor under 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6 and 1208.6. Functionally, with an order than runs barely more than two pages, the Individual Debtor's privacy rights in the Asylum Application enshrined by Congress in the INA were effectively eliminated.\n\n44. The chilling effects of such an order are profound, as persons may be dissuaded by seeking much-needed bankruptcy protection to avoid producing \"information that, if disclosed publicly, could subject the claimant to retaliatory measures by government authorities or non-state actors in the event that the claimant is repatriated, or endanger the security of the claimant's family members who may still be residing in the country of origin.\" *Al Otro Lado, Inc.*, No. 17-cv-02366- BAS-KSC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210401, at \\*22-23, *quoting* U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. Asylum Div., *Fact Sheet: Federal Regulations Protecting the Confidentiality of Asylum Applications* (Oct. 12, 2011).\n\n45. One of the purposes of bankruptcy proceedings is \"to relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes.\" *Williams v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co.*, 236 U.S. 549, 554-55, 35 S. Ct. 289, 290 (1915). It is simply unjust to force the Individual Debtor to choose between obtaining such relief and protecting himself and his family from retaliatory measures by government authorities or non-state actors. An immediate appeal should be granted in light of this exceptional circumstance.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 1231-1 Filed 12/13/22 Entered 12/13/22 13:39:29 Page 16 of 50\n\n46. Unlike in *Mohawk Indus. v. Carpenter*, 558 U.S. 100, 130 S. Ct. 599, 606 (2009), where the Supreme Court held that the improper disclosure of privileged material could be remedied \"by vacating [the] adverse judgment and remanding for a new trial,\" there is no way to avoid the immediately present danger of the Asylum Application falling into the hands of persons and entities who wish the Individual Debtor harm without an immediate appeal. *Id*., at 109. Simply stated, the issue here is not a potential adverse impact that disclosure may have on litigation (which a court could rectify later)—it is an adverse impact that disclosure may have on the Debtor's safety and security (which, unfortunately, no court can rectify or reverse).\n\n47. For these reasons, the Individual Debtor respectfully submits that leave to appeal the Bankruptcy Court's interlocutory Order should be granted.\n\n#### **V. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE INDIVIDUAL DEBTOR RESPECTFULLY PETITIONS FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS TO VACATE THE BANKRUPTCY COURT'S ORDER**\n\n48. In the Second Circuit, appellate courts \"will exercise mandamus review of discovery orders relating to claims of privilege where: (i) an issue of importance and of first impression is raised; (ii) the privilege will be lost in the particular case if review must await a final judgment; and (iii) immediate resolution will avoid the development of discovery practices or doctrine undermining the privilege.\" *Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Turner & Newall, PLC*, 964 F.2d 159, 163 (2d Cir. 1992).\n\n49. The Supreme Court \"has recognized that the writ of mandamus has traditionally been used in the federal courts only to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so…. Only exceptional circumstances, amounting to a judicial usurpation of power, will justify the invocation of this\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 1231-1 Filed 12/13/22 Entered 12/13/22 13:39:29 Page 17 of 50\n\nextraordinary remedy. *Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc.*, 449 U.S. 33, 35, 101 S. Ct. 188, 190 (1980) (citations and quotations omitted).\n\n50. In *Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.*, the Second Circuit entertained a petition for a writ of mandamus \"because of the unusual nature of the challenged discovery order,\" which effectively permitted opposing counsel to conduct a privilege review, \"and the significant and important issues it raises relating to the attorney-client privilege.\" *Id*., at 166; *see also, e.g., In re Itron, Inc.*, 883 F.3d 553, 568 (5th Cir. 2018) (granting mandamus following improper application of attorney-client privilege); *In re Seagate Tech., LLC*, 497 F.3d 1360, 1375–76 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (granting mandamus after district court held that a party waived the attorney-client privilege and work product), *overruled on other grounds by Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc.,* 579 U.S. 93, 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016).\n\n51. Here, the production of the Asylum Application is \"an issue of great importance\" as it eliminates protections explicitly afforded to the Individual Debtor (and all other similarly situated debtors) under 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6 and 1208.6. *Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.*, 964 F. 2d, at 163. Likewise, as discussed herein, it appears to be an issue of first impression in this Circuit.\n\n52. Further, the protections of 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6 and 1208.6 \"will be lost in the particular case if review must await a final judgment.\" *See Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.*, 964 F. 2d, at 163. Indeed, the very purpose of 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6 and 1208.6 is to prevent the disclosure \"to third parties of any information relating to an asylum application without the written consent of the applicant unless permitted by the listed exceptions,\" which do not apply to the current situation,\n\n\"or at the discretion of the Attorney General\" or the Secretary of Homeland Security, which have not authorized the disclosure. *Gafurova v. Whitaker*, 911 F.3d 321, 328 n.3 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing\n\n17\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 1231-1 Filed 12/13/22 Entered 12/13/22 13:39:29 Page 18 of 50\n\n8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6, 1208.6(a)). If the Trustee and his counsel obtain a copy of the Asylum Application pursuant to the Order, then the Individual Debtor's privacy rights under 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6 and 1208.6 immediately vanish.\n\n53. Finally, the \"immediate resolution\" of the dispute regarding the Asylum Application \"will avoid the development of discovery practices or doctrine undermining the privilege,\" specifically a doctrine that allows a bankruptcy trustee (and a bankruptcy court) to circumvent the provisions of 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6 and 1208.6, which are designed solely to protect asylum applicants – the very narrow class of persons to which the Individual Debtor is indisputably a party. *Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.*, 964 F. 2d, at 163.\n\n54. As in *Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.*, the Bankruptcy Court's Order is \"unusual,\" to say the least, in that it permits the Trustee to obtain documents that are confidential and protected pursuant to Federal regulations and does so without any legal analysis that addresses the regulation. For this reason, and because of \"the significant and important issues\" the Order \"raises relating to\" the confidentiality of asylum applications, this Court should grant this petition for a writ of mandamus. *Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.*, 964 F. 2d, at 166.\n\n#### **VI. CONCLUSION**\n\n55. For the reasons set forth above, this Court should (i) grant the Individual Debtor leave to appeal the Bankruptcy Court's Order or, in the alternative, (ii) grant the Individual Debtor's petition for a writ of mandamus.\n\n#### THE DEBTOR, HO WAN KWOK\n\nBy: */s/ Aaron A. Romney* Aaron A. Romney (ct28144) ZEISLER & ZEISLER, P.C. 10 Middle Street, 15th floor Bridgeport, CT 06605 Telephone: (203) 368-4234 Facsimile: (203) 368-0903 Email: [aromney@zeislaw.com](mailto:aromney@zeislaw.com)\n\n#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI hereby certify that on this 13 day of December, 2022, a copy of the foregoing was filed electronically. Notice of this filing will be sent by e-mail to all parties by operation of the Court's electronic filing system or by mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing as indicated on the Notice of Electronic Filing. Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF System.\n\n> By: */s/ Aaron A. Romney* Aaron A. Romney (ct28144)\n\n# **EXHIBIT A**\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1231-1 Filed 12/13/22 Entered 12/13/22 13:39:29 Page 22 of\n\nUNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION In Re \\* Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) \\* HO WAN KWOK, \\* Bridgeport, Connecticut \\* August 30, 2022 Debtor. \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* 50\n\nTRANSCRIPT OF ORDER SCHEDULING STATUS CONFERENCE; MOTION FOR ORDER ESTABLISHING REPAIR RESERVE FOR LADY MAY; MOTION TO EXPEDITE HEARING; MOTION TO STAY PENDING APPEAL ESTABLISHING REPAIR RESERVE FOR THE LADY MAY; MOTION TO STAY SECS.523/727 ADVERSARY PROCEEDINGS; MOTION FOR ORDER PROVIDING THAT CONTROL OF PRIVILEGES PASSED TO TRUSTEE UPON APPOINT AND FOR RELATED RELIEF BEFORE THE HONORABLE JULIE A. MANNING UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE\n\nAPPEARANCES:\n\n| For the Debtor,      | STEPHEN M. KINDSETH. ESQ.    |\n|----------------------|------------------------------|\n| HK International and | AARON ROMNEY, ESQ.           |\n| Mei Guo:             | ERIC HENZY, ESQ.             |\n|                      | Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.      |\n|                      | 10 Middle Street, 15th Floor |\n|                      | Bridgeport, CT<br>06604      |\n|                      |                              |\n\nFor the Creditor, Pacific LAURA ARONSSON, ESQ. Alliance Asia Opportunity STUART M. SARNOFF, ESQ. Fund L.P.: O'Melveny & Myers LLP Times Square Tower 7 Times Square\n\n> PATRICK BIRNEY, ESQ. Robinson & Cole 28 Trumbull Street Hartford, CT 06103\n\nNew York, NY 10036\n\nProceedings recorded by electronic sound recording, transcript produced by transcription service.\n\n> **Fiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc. 4 Research Drive, Suite 402 Shelton, Connecticut 06484 (203)929-9992**\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1231-1 Filed 12/13/22 Entered 12/13/22 13:39:29 Page 23 of 50\n\n> APPEARANCES: (Cont'd) For the Creditors Committee: IRVE GOLDMAN, ESQ. Pullman & Comley 850 Main Street Bridgeport, CT 06601 For the U.S. Trustee: HOLLEY CLAIBORN, ESQ. Office of the United States Trustee The Giaimo Federal Building 150 Court Street, Room 302 New Haven, CT 06510 Chapter 11 Trustee: LUC A. DESPINS, ESQ. Paul Hastings LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166 Counsel for the NICHOLAS BASSETT, ESQ. Chapter 11 Trustee: Paul Hastings LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166 PATRICK R. LINSEY, ESQ. Neubert, Pepe & Monteith, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, CT 06510 For Verdolino & Lowey: WILLIAM BALDIGA, ESQ. Brown Rudnick Seven Times Square New York, NY 10036\n\n2\n\n|    | Case 22-50073<br>Doc 1231-1<br>Filed 12/13/22<br>Entered 12/13/22 13:39:29<br>Page 24 of<br>50 |\n|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n|    | Ho Wan Kwok - August 30, 2022<br>104                                                           |\n| 1  | are limiting that.                                                                             |\n| 2  | If you look at the request for release section of                                              |\n| 3  | our motion, which we cited again in our reply, we're looking                                   |\n| 4  | specifically for assets of the estate, his financial                                           |\n| 5  | condition and matters relating to administration.                                              |\n| 6  | The debtor identifies his concerns about                                                       |\n| 7  | potentially privileged documents related to criminal issues                                    |\n| 8  | such as allegations of rape and false imprisonment and other                                   |\n| 9  | things that have been made against him as well as his asylum                                   |\n| 10 | application.<br>We are not, in our investigation at this time,                                 |\n| 11 | seeking any documents related to those issues.                                                 |\n| 12 | Again, we're focused on assets and an                                                          |\n| 13 | investigation that hopefully be used to augment this estate.                                   |\n| 14 | Second, Your Honor, we're not asking for a waiver                                              |\n| 15 | or any control over privileges that belong to other parties.                                   |\n| 16 | And, in fact, I don't know how one could even read our                                         |\n| 17 | motion to be requesting that relief.                                                           |\n| 18 | We are, to be clear, seeking a determination that                                              |\n| 19 | the trustee has succeeded to any privileges that the debtor                                    |\n| 20 | holds with other parties in terms of a common interest or a                                    |\n| 21 | joint defense privilege.<br>And we cite case law for that in                                   |\n| 22 | our motion.<br>And I don't think that's contested, frankly.                                    |\n| 23 | But what we're not seeking, what the debtor seems                                              |\n| 24 | to suggest we are seeking, but we're not, is an order from                                     |\n| 25 | the Court that the trustee now controls any privilege that                                     |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1231-1 Filed 12/13/22 Entered 12/13/22 13:39:29 Page 25 of\n\n|    | 50                                                             |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n|    | Ho Wan Kwok - August 30, 2022<br>107                           |\n| 1  | that very specifically seek documents related to assets of     |\n| 2  | the estate, other transactional matters involving the debtor   |\n| 3  | prior to the bankruptcy, and other things that simply do not   |\n| 4  | implicate the types of concerns regarding criminal             |\n| 5  | liability, et cetera, that this debtor is worried about.       |\n| 6  | So there's nothing in the approach that the Foster             |\n| 7  | case was concerned about that we're trying to ask the Court    |\n| 8  | to do here.                                                    |\n| 9  | And frankly, if you look at other cases, there are             |\n| 10 | plenty of other cases that have issued the type of order       |\n| 11 | that we're asking this court to issue, including one of the    |\n| 12 | cases we cite is the In re Tarkington case from the Eastern    |\n| 13 | District of North Carolina in 2010.                            |\n| 14 | There, there was an investigation into potential               |\n| 15 | estate assets.<br>The trustee wanted to depose an attorney who |\n| 16 | represented the debtor prior to the bankruptcy, and what the   |\n| 17 | Court ended up doing was, all right, I'm going to let the      |\n| 18 | deposition go forward, here is what I consider to be within    |\n| 19 | the scope of the privilege.                                    |\n| 20 | All of the privilege related to assets of the                  |\n| 21 | estate, et cetera, has passed to the trustee.<br>Anything that |\n| 22 | could go under criminal liability or those things could        |\n| 23 | still be covered by a privilege.                               |\n| 24 | So you can go take the deposition, and counsel to              |\n| 25 | the debtor can interpose objections consistent with that,      |\n|    |                                                                |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1231-1 Filed 12/13/22 Entered 12/13/22 13:39:29 Page 26 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok - August 30, 2022 110 These are cases where the issue was the trustee was trying to investigate assets of the estate that would potentially relate in, you know, augmenting the estate, of the value of those assets. And what the courts held in those cases is that this is a situation where the debtor would benefit from that. These are -- when the debtor's estate is augmented by additional -- the location of causes of action or the identification of other assets he benefits. He's not harmed by that. So, you know, the debtor contends, well, as I said before, there's a concern that, you know, it's possible documents that the trustee is seeking to have access to could involve potential criminal liability, whether it's the rape allegations that he mentioned, false imprisonment, or completely unrelated issues like his asylum application, but, again, as I said before, we're not seeking to get those documents through our discovery requests. The debtor has identified one request in our subpoena directed to the debtor's former law firms and professionals, Request 17, that asks for information about legal disputes which could be read to include criminal actions against him, to the extent there are any, or his asylum application, we're willing to make clear on the\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1231-1 Filed 12/13/22 Entered 12/13/22 13:39:29 Page 27 of\n\n|    | 50                                                           |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------|\n|    | Ho Wan Kwok - August 30, 2022<br>111                         |\n| 1  | record that we're not seeking to get that type of            |\n| 2  | information and we'll limit that request accordingly.        |\n| 3  | I mean, the only plausible scenario where the                |\n| 4  | debtor could say that he has a document that is responsive   |\n| 5  | to our subpoena, but also could result in harm to him, is    |\n| 6  | that there's some document that relates to his assets,       |\n| 7  | relates to the topics that we're seeking to explore, and     |\n| 8  | also somehow implicates his criminal liability.              |\n| 9  | But the debtor has not even offered one hint of              |\n| 10 | what that could be.<br>He's come forward with nothing to     |\n| 11 | suggest other than, as he said in his opposition,            |\n| 12 | allegations of false imprisonment and the like.              |\n| 13 | There is no reason to believe that he's given of             |\n| 14 | that we have that I could even imagine as to why the         |\n| 15 | documents we're seeking related to, for example, his         |\n| 16 | interest in the New York condominium, the Lady May, to all   |\n| 17 | the other private jets and things like that that he's talked |\n| 18 | about, there's no conceivable scenario where those documents |\n| 19 | would relate to these types of issues.                       |\n| 20 | So this idea that the balancing test would weigh             |\n| 21 | in favor of not passing control over of these privileges to  |\n| 22 | the estate is just -- I think there's no weight to that.     |\n| 23 | The debtor also raises, Your Honor, the non                  |\n| 24 | dischargeability actions that have been filed against him.   |\n| 25 | And he says that while there's a concern there I could be    |\n|    |                                                              |\n\n|    | Case 22-50073<br>Doc 1231-1<br>Filed 12/13/22<br>Entered 12/13/22 13:39:29<br>Page 28 of<br>50 |\n|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n|    | Ho Wan Kwok - August 30, 2022<br>113                                                           |\n| 1  | all.<br>So there's just no legitimate concern at all that                                      |\n| 2  | somehow we're going to get information related to these                                        |\n| 3  | actions.                                                                                       |\n| 4  | And by the way, we're not going to share the                                                   |\n| 5  | documents we get with the plaintiffs to those actions, so                                      |\n| 6  | this idea of a concern on the 523 actions, again, I think is                                   |\n| 7  | just -- it's really nonexistent.                                                               |\n| 8  | A couple -- a couple more points, Your Honor,                                                  |\n| 9  | before I wrap up.<br>At least on my opening remarks.                                           |\n| 10 | The debtor in his objection, although he initially                                             |\n| 11 | says the Court shouldn't issue any ruling here, he says,                                       |\n| 12 | well, if the Court does, it could issue certain guidance.                                      |\n| 13 | And the way I think the debtor frames that                                                     |\n| 14 | guidance is to say that the Court could direct the                                             |\n| 15 | recipients -- and this is in paragraph 33 of the objection -                                   |\n| 16 | - the Court could direct the recipients of the subpoenas to                                    |\n| 17 | withhold documents on the basis of privilege, quote, \"Only                                     |\n| 18 | documents that they believe potentially implicate harm to                                      |\n| 19 | the debtor such as criminal allegations, facts relating to                                     |\n| 20 | non-dischargeability, or facts that have nothing to do with                                    |\n| 21 | the debtor's estate, such as his pending asylum application.                                   |\n| 22 | Now, some of that actually sounds consistent with                                              |\n| 23 | the remarks I've given today, but I think it also highlights                                   |\n| 24 | sort of what we're also worried about and the mischief that                                    |\n| 25 | could result if an order specific to that language is                                          |\n\n|    | Case 22-50073<br>Doc 1231-1<br>Filed 12/13/22<br>Entered 12/13/22 13:39:29<br>Page 29 of<br>50 |\n|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n|    | Ho Wan Kwok - August 30, 2022<br>137                                                           |\n| 1  | questions.<br>Thank you.                                                                       |\n| 2  | MR. ROMNEY:<br>Thank you, Your Honor.                                                          |\n| 3  | MR. BASSETT:<br>Your Honor, just briefly in                                                    |\n| 4  | response.<br>I think I might stay here this time if that's                                     |\n| 5  | okay.                                                                                          |\n| 6  | THE COURT:<br>That's fine.                                                                     |\n| 7  | MR. BASSETT:<br>So Mr. Romney, in addressing our                                               |\n| 8  | proposed changes to the language, I think his position was                                     |\n| 9  | that, well, we're still not providing for the application of                                   |\n| 10 | a balancing test because if what we're saying is that                                          |\n| 11 | privileges related to the debtor's assets, financial                                           |\n| 12 | condition, or the administration of his estate, pass to the                                    |\n| 13 | trustee, it doesn't account for the possibility that there's                                   |\n| 14 | some other personal, individual interest, criminality or                                       |\n| 15 | otherwise that the debtor might have.                                                          |\n| 16 | And I think the fallacy in that logic is that                                                  |\n| 17 | there is no basis that's been provided as to why documents                                     |\n| 18 | would relate to assets, financial condition, or the                                            |\n| 19 | administration of the estate, would have anything to do with                                   |\n| 20 | the debtor's asylum application, with criminal allegations                                     |\n| 21 | that are made against -- that have been made against him for                                   |\n| 22 | rape or false imprisonment.                                                                    |\n| 23 | I mean, if the debtor's concern is that there                                                  |\n| 24 | could be hypothetically a document where the debtor was                                        |\n| 25 | having a conversation with his counsel about both false                                        |\n|    |                                                                                                |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1231-1 Filed 12/13/22 Entered 12/13/22 13:39:29 Page 30 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok - August 30, 2022 139 unrelated criminal liability or, you know, the particular things, again, that he's mentioned, his asylum application, things like that, in his objection, I think we could work out language to put in the proposed order to again make clear that we're not seeking that. I think there are other tweaks we would need, including to reserve our right to the extent of any withheld documents that we think might be relevant to the trustee's investigation on a crime-fraud exception to the attorney- client privilege, for example, but I do think there is a way to work out some language that could address some of the debtor's concerns. But, again, it cannot be a situation where the debtor gets to decide when he's harmed by the disclosure of a document because that is an open invitation for him to just withhold documents that he doesn't want us to see. Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you. MR. ROMNEY: Your Honor, if I may? THE COURT: Yes. MR. ROMNEY: Very, very briefly. I've already said creating a privilege log is not deciding. But I do want to make one perhaps significant clarification, which is, these order -- the proposed order\n\nHo Wan Kwok - August 30, 2022 150 MR. BASSETT: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Is there anything else that we can address today in the case? (No response) THE COURT: Okay. This was the last matter on today's calendar, so we will see you next Tuesday at 1:00 p.m., and court is adjourned. (Proceedings concluded at 4:29 p.m.) I, CHRISTINE FIORE, court-approved transcriber and certified electronic reporter and transcriber, certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the official electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above- entitled matter. 16 September 10, 2022 17 Christine Fiore, CERT Transcriber Case 22-50073 Doc 1231-1 Filed 12/13/22 Entered 12/13/22 13:39:29 Page 31 of\n\n# **EXHIBIT B**\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1231-1 Filed 12/13/22 Entered 12/13/22 13:39:29 Page 33 of\n\n#### 50\n\n| UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT<br>DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT<br>BRIDGEPORT DIVISION                                                                                                                                  |                                                                                                                              |  |  |  |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|--|--|\n| In Re                                                                                                                                                                                                             | *<br>Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)                                                                                                 |  |  |  |\n| HO WAN KWOK,                                                                                                                                                                                                      | *<br>*<br>Bridgeport, Connecticut                                                                                            |  |  |  |\n| Debtor.                                                                                                                                                                                                           | *<br>September 6, 2022<br>*<br>*                                                                                             |  |  |  |\n| * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *                                                                                                                                                                                   |                                                                                                                              |  |  |  |\n| TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION FOR ORDER PROVIDING<br>THAT CONTROL OF PRIVILEGES PASSED TO<br>TRUSTEE UPON APPOINTMENT AND FOR<br>RELATED RELIEF<br>BEFORE THE HONORABLE JULIE A. MANNING<br>UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE |                                                                                                                              |  |  |  |\n| APPEARANCES:                                                                                                                                                                                                      |                                                                                                                              |  |  |  |\n| For the Debtor,<br>HK International and<br>Mei Guo:                                                                                                                                                               | ERIC HENZY, ESQ.<br>AARON ROMNEY, ESQ.<br>Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.<br>10 Middle Street, 15th Floor<br>Bridgeport, CT<br>06604 |  |  |  |\n| For the Creditor, Pacific<br>Alliance Asia Opportunity<br>Fund L.P.:                                                                                                                                              | PETER FRIEDMAN, ESQ.<br>O'Melveny & Myers LLP<br>Times Square Tower<br>7 Times Square<br>New York, NY<br>10036               |  |  |  |\n|                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | ANNECCA SMITH, ESQ.<br>Robinson & Cole<br>28 Trumbull Street<br>Hartford, CT<br>06103                                        |  |  |  |\n| Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording, transcript<br>produced by transcription service.                                                                                                              |                                                                                                                              |  |  |  |\n| Fiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.<br>4 Research Drive, Suite 402<br>Shelton, Connecticut 06484 (203)929-9992                                                                                        |                                                                                                                              |  |  |  |\n\nAPPEARANCES: (Cont'd) For the Creditors Committee: IRVE GOLDMAN, ESQ. Pullman & Comley 850 Main Street Bridgeport, CT 06601 For the U.S. Trustee: HOLLEY CLAIBORN, ESQ. Office of the United States Trustee The Giaimo Federal Building 150 Court Street, Room 302 New Haven, CT 06510 For the Chapter 11 NICHOLAS BASSETT, ESQ. Trustee: Paul Hastings LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166 PATRICK R. LINSEY, ESQ. Neubert, Pepe & Monteith, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, CT 06510 Chapter 11 Trustee: LUC A. DESPINS, ESQ. Paul Hastings LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166\n\n2\n\n|    | Case 22-50073<br>Doc 1231-1<br>Filed 12/13/22<br>Entered 12/13/22 13:39:29<br>Page 35 of<br>50 |\n|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n|    | Ho Wan Kwok - September 6, 2022<br>49                                                          |\n| 1  | this order because this order is designed to prevent the                                       |\n| 2  | debtor from doing that.                                                                        |\n| 3  | Another bucket I think that could exist that could                                             |\n| 4  | generate future disputes as to privileged communications is                                    |\n| 5  | that, as we've made clear in our order, you know, there are                                    |\n| 6  | carve outs designed to address specifically the concerns                                       |\n| 7  | that the debtor has raised concerning privileged                                               |\n| 8  | communications that relate to criminal allegations that have                                   |\n| 9  | been made against him or that relate to his asylum                                             |\n| 10 | application.<br>And I'm happy to and I'm prepared to walk                                      |\n| 11 | through our changes in more detail.                                                            |\n| 12 | But, again, if the debtor were to assert a                                                     |\n| 13 | privilege over those documents on a privilege log, then we                                     |\n| 14 | could be back before the Court disputing those privileges                                      |\n| 15 | because the point of the order is to reserve all rights with                                   |\n| 16 | respect to those privileges.                                                                   |\n| 17 | It could be that the debtor asserts a privilege                                                |\n| 18 | over criminal allegations. Then, you know, we would argue                                      |\n| 19 | that there's a crime fraud exception and we would otherwise                                    |\n| 20 | argue that the document is just not privileged.<br>So that                                     |\n| 21 | could be back before the Court.                                                                |\n| 22 | But to answer the Court's question, if this order                                              |\n| 23 | is entered, it does resolve what we are asking the Court to                                    |\n| 24 | do today.                                                                                      |\n| 25 | And, again, Your Honor, what we filed was a copy                                               |\n|    |                                                                                                |\n\nHo Wan Kwok - September 6, 2022 68 out anything with regard to the asylum issue, anything with regard to these alleged tort issues and, obviously, with regard to the Fifth Amendment. I mean, he was -- he's not asserting and never has asserted that he's going to exercise that right. MR. ROMNEY: Yeah. Well, there is a discrepancy, as I read the orders on the -- what I would describe as tort issue. THE COURT: Well, I -- I mean -- MR. ROMNEY: Yeah. THE COURT: -- I'm talking about the allegations of rape and things like that. I don't know what those are about, but that's what's been put forth, right, in this -- in the record of this case. Before the trustee was even appointed there were people that said that they -- these causes of action were out there. Those creditors filed motions in this case. They said a lot of things, obviously, none of which have been substantiated in this court at this point and maybe never will be. Okay? So that's what I'm talking about when I'm talking -- I'm talking about some of the alleged very difficult to discuss torts, not, you know, if there was some other -- like maybe you claimed the -- I don't even know. As you know, I didn't read the UBS complaint. Is Case 22-50073 Doc 1231-1 Filed 12/13/22 Entered 12/13/22 13:39:29 Page 36 of\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1231-1 Filed 12/13/22 Entered 12/13/22 13:39:29 Page 37 of\n\n|    | 50<br>Ho Wan Kwok - September 6, 2022<br>76                  |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1  | Second Circuit authority on this question -- but I do think, |\n| 2  | as we tried to marshal in our papers and talk about at last  |\n| 3  | week's hearing, there are many bankruptcy cases out there    |\n| 4  | that have tried to address the issue of the individual       |\n| 5  | privileges passing to a trustee in the wake of Weintraub.    |\n| 6  | And I think the overwhelming majority of those               |\n| 7  | cases and the clear trend of the case law is to say that the |\n| 8  | trustee passes when the privilege relates to efforts by the  |\n| 9  | trustee to identify estate assets, to investigate the        |\n| 10 | debtor's financial condition, and certainly with respect to  |\n| 11 | any post-petition matters affecting the administration of    |\n| 12 | his estate prior to the appointment of a trustee.            |\n| 13 | And that is exactly how we tried to craft our                |\n| 14 | revised proposed order is to track those categories in that  |\n| 15 | weight of the case law and then to also make clear to        |\n| 16 | address the debtor's concerns that he is still able to       |\n| 17 | assert privileges over documents related to criminal         |\n| 18 | allegations or to his asylum application but are not related |\n| 19 | to those four -- to those three categories that I just       |\n| 20 | mentioned.                                                   |\n| 21 | So to address the particular comment that Attorney           |\n| 22 | Romney made, I think he said, you know, there may be a       |\n| 23 | document that talks about estate assets, but it also, you    |\n| 24 | know, is a privileged communication related to criminal      |\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\nallegations against the debtor, you know, that have been\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1231-1 Filed 12/13/22 Entered 12/13/22 13:39:29 Page 38 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok - September 6, 2022 108 communications with Brown Rudnick when he was a debtor-in- possession, there's no debate in the case law that we have access to that. It's narrow. It's a demonstration of the case. And he was acting as a fiduciary, not in his own capacity. And he was getting -- you know, shame on Brown Rudnick if they were giving him advice on his personal situation. They were giving advice to him as a debtor-in-possession. And that's fundamental, Your Honor.\n\n So the balancing -- you're doing the balancing. You're doing it on a category-by-category document with some very specific carve outs regarding the -- what do we call the crime, I want to be precise about this, although it's unfortunate, but the rape and confinement allegations carved out, the asylum issue carved out, you're doing the balancing.\n\n And courts, that's the way they've done it, by categories of documents. Where courts have been reversed, the only circuit court that reversed, and in that case, it's the same as here, where both sides agreed there should be a balancing test, is that the Court did not look at any documents or any category of documents.\n\n And here the Court has right in front of it the very narrow categories that we're raising. And on that basis you have the power to do this.\n\nTHE COURT: Okay. Anything further from anyone\n\n|    | Case 22-50073<br>Doc 1231-1<br>Filed 12/13/22<br>50        | Entered 12/13/22 13:39:29                      | Page 39 of |  |\n|----|------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|------------|--|\n|    | Ho Wan Kwok - September 6, 2022                            |                                                | 110        |  |\n| 1  | hearing today on the Kwok matter.                          |                                                |            |  |\n| 2  | MR. BASSETT:                                               | Thank you, Your Honor.                         |            |  |\n| 3  | THE COURT:                                                 | Thank you.                                     |            |  |\n| 4  | (Proceedings concluded at 3:31 p.m.)                       |                                                |            |  |\n| 5  |                                                            | I, CHRISTINE FIORE, Certified Electronic Court |            |  |\n| 6  | Reporter and Transcriber, certify that the foregoing is a  |                                                |            |  |\n| 7  | correct transcript from the official electronic sound      |                                                |            |  |\n| 8  | recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter. |                                                |            |  |\n| 9  |                                                            |                                                |            |  |\n| 10 |                                                            |                                                |            |  |\n| 11 |                                                            | September 14, 2022                             |            |  |\n| 12 | Christine Fiore, CERT                                      |                                                |            |  |\n| 13 |                                                            |                                                |            |  |\n| 14 |                                                            |                                                |            |  |\n| 15 |                                                            |                                                |            |  |\n| 16 |                                                            |                                                |            |  |\n| 17 |                                                            |                                                |            |  |\n| 18 |                                                            |                                                |            |  |\n| 19 |                                                            |                                                |            |  |\n| 20 |                                                            |                                                |            |  |\n| 21 |                                                            |                                                |            |  |\n| 22 |                                                            |                                                |            |  |\n| 23 |                                                            |                                                |            |  |\n| 24 |                                                            |                                                |            |  |\n|    |                                                            |                                                |            |  |\n|    |                                                            |                                                |            |  |\n\n#### **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\nHO WAN KWOK, *et al.*,\n\n)\n\n)\n\n)\n\n1\n\nIn re: ) Chapter 11 ) Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) ) (Jointly Administered)\n\nDebtors. ) Re: ECF No. 1063\n\n#### **ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER**\n\n On November 2, 2022, Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Individual Debtor\") filed a Motion for Protective Order, ECF No. 1063, (the \"Motion\"), seeking to prevent the production of Clark Hill PLC's motion for summary judgment (the \"Motion for Summary Judgment\") and the Individual Debtor's asylum application attached to the Motion for Summary Judgment (the \"Asylum Application\") in the case of *Guo Wengui v. Clark Hill PLC*, 1:19-cv-03195-JEB (D.D.C.) (hereinafter the \"Malpractice Action\"). On November 16, 2022, Luc A. Despins, in his capacity as Chapter 11 Trustee (the \"Trustee\" and, together with the Individual Debtor, the \"Parties\") for the estate of the Individual Debtor (the \"Estate\"), filed an objection to the Motion, ECF No. 1105, (the \"Objection\"). On November 29, 2022, the Individual Debtor filed a reply in support of the Motion, ECF No. 1174, (the \"Reply\").\n\n<sup>1</sup> The Debtors in these Chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202), and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and the Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 1231-1 Filed 12/13/22 Entered 12/13/22 13:39:29 Page 41 of Case 22-50073 Doc 1217 Filed 12/09/22 Entered 12/09/22 14:50:13 Page 2 of 3 50\n\nA hearing on the Motion was held on November 30, 2022. The Court gave the Parties time to attempt to settle the issues raised in the Motion and continued the hearing to December 1, 2022. During the continued hearing, the Parties reported that they were not able to reach a settlement of the Motion.\n\nThe Court finds that, in accordance with the provisions of a consent order regarding attorney client and work-product privileges, ECF No. 856, (the \"Privileges Consent Order\"), the Motion for Summary Judgment and the Asylum Application are \"documents related to the [Malpractice Action] that relate to the merits of the legal malpractice action.\" (ECF No. 856 ¶ 4.) The Court further finds that the Trustee and his counsel need access to the Motion for Summary Judgment and the Asylum Application to prosecute the Malpractice Action, which is an asset of the Estate, and that production of these documents to the Trustee and his counsel will not result in personal harm to the Individual Debtor in accordance with the terms of the Privileges Consent Order. (ECF No. 856 ¶ 7.) Therefore, upon review of the relevant pleadings, the arguments of counsel advanced during the hearing, and for the reasons stated on the record, it is hereby\n\n**ORDERED**: The Motion is GRANTED in part. The Motion for Summary Judgment and the Asylum Application shall be produced only to the Trustee and his counsel. As it relates to these bankruptcy cases, only the Individual Debtor and his counsel and the Trustee and his counsel shall have access to the Motion for Summary Judgment and the Asylum Application at this time. The Motion for Summary Judgment and the Asylum Application are not to be discussed, shown, or produced in any way to other interested parties in these bankruptcy cases; and it is further\n\n2\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 1231-1 Filed 12/13/22 Entered 12/13/22 13:39:29 Page 42 of Case 22-50073 Doc 1217 Filed 12/09/22 Entered 12/09/22 14:50:13 Page 3 of 3 50\n\n**ORDERED**: Jenner & Block LLP is authorized to produce the Motion for Summary\n\nJudgment and the Asylum Application only to the Trustee and his counsel pursuant to this Order and in accordance with the protective order in the Malpractice Action, as applicable.\n\nDated at Bridgeport, Connecticut this 9th day of December, 2022.\n\n# **EXHIBIT D**\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1231-1 Filed 12/13/22 Entered 12/13/22 13:39:29 Page 44 of\n\n50\n\nPrepared by the USCIS Asylum Division Date: October 18, 20 12\n\n# Fact Sheet: Federal Regulation Protecting the Confidentiality of Asylum Applicants\n\n## Synopsis\n\nThe federal regulation at 8 CFR 208.6 generally prohibit the disclosure to third parties of infonnation contained in or pertaining to asylum applications, credible fear detenninations, and reasonable fear detenninations-including infonnation contained in RAPS or APSS 1 -except under certain limited circumstances. This regulation safeguards infonnation that, if disclosed publicly, could subject the claimant to retaliatory measures by government authorities or nonstate actors in the event that the claimant is repatriated, or endanger the security of the claimant's family members who may still be residing in the country of origin. Moreover, public disclosure might, albeit in rare circumstances<sup>2</sup> , give rise to a plausible protection claim where one would not otherwise exist by bringing an otherwise ineligible claimant to the attention of the government authority or non-state actor against which the claimant has made allegations of mistreatment.\n\nAccording to established guidance, confidentiality is breached when infonnation contained in or pertaining to an asylum application (including infonnation contained in RAPS or APSS) is disclosed to a third party in violation of the regulation, and the unauthorized disclosure is of a nature that allows the third party to link the identity of the applicant to: ( 1) the fact that the applicant has applied for asylum; (2) specific facts or allegations pertaining to the individual asylum claim contained in an asylum application; or (3) facts or allegations that are sufficient to give rise to a reasonable inference that the applicant has applied for asylum. The same principles generally govern the disclosure of infonnation related to credible fear and reasonable fear detenninations, as well as to applications for withholding or deferral of removal under Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture, which are included in the asylum application.\n\nIn the absence of the asylum applicant's written consent or the Secretary of Homeland Security's3 specific authorization, disclosure may be made only to United States government officials or contractors and United States federal or state courts on a need to know basis related to certain administrative, law enforcement, and civil actions. In some instances, interagency arrangements have been established to facilitate the proper disclosure of asylum-related infonnation to United States agencies pursuant to the regulation. The release of infonnation relating to an asylum application, credible fear detennination, or reasonable fear detennination to an official of another government or to any entity for purposes not specifically authorized by the\n\n<sup>&#</sup>x27;RAPS is the system for maintenance of records concerning aliens who affirmatively seek asylum by applying for the benefit with USCIS. APSS is the system for maintenance of records concerning aliens referred to a USCIS asylum officer for a credible fear or reasonable fear screening determination after having expressed a fear of return to the intended country of removal because of persecution or torture during the expedited removal process under INA sec. 23S(b) or administrative removal processes under INA sec. 238(b) or INA sec. 24l(a)(5). 2 Public disclosure alone will rarely be sufficient to establish *sur place* protection claims under U.S. asylum laws.\n\nThe applicant would have to establish, in light of this disclosure, that he or she has a well-founded fear of r,ersecution on account of one ofthe protected grounds.\n\nBy operation of section 1512(d) of the Homeland Security Act of2002, Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, 2310, the Attorney General's authority under 8 C.F.R. § 208.6(a) to authorize disclosure of confidential asylum information held by the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)-and now held by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)-was transferred to the Secretary of DHS.\n\nPrepared by the USCIS Asylum Division Date: October 18,2012\n\nregulation without the written consent of the claimant requires the express permission of the Secretary of Homeland Security.\n\n# Code of Federal Regulations, Title 8\n\nSec. 208.6 *Disclosure to third parties.*\n\n(a) Information contained in or pertaining to any asylum application, records pertaining to any credible fear determination conducted pursuant to § 208.30, and records pertaining to any reasonable fear determination conducted pursuant to § 208.31, shall not be disclosed without the written consent of the applicant, except as permitted by this section or at the discretion of the Attorney General [now the Secretary ofDHS].\n\n(b) The confidentiality of other records kept by the [Immigration and Naturalization] Service [now DHS] and the Executive Office for Immigration Review that indicate that a specific alien has applied for asylum, received a credible fear or reasonable fear interview, or received a credible fear or reasonable fear review shall also be protected from disclosure. The Service [now DHS] will coordinate with the Department of State to ensure that the confidentiality of those records is maintained if they are transmitted to Department of State offices in other countries.\n\n(c) This section shall not apply to any disclosure to:\n\n(1) Any United States Government official or contractor having a need to examine information in connection with:\n\n(i) The adjudication of asylum applications;\n\n(ii) The consideration of a request for a credible fear or reasonable fear interview, or a credible fear or reasonable fear review;\n\n(iii) The defense of any legal action arising from the adjudication of, or failure to adjudicate, the asylum application, or from a credible fear determination or reasonable fear determination under § 208.30 or § 208.31;\n\n(iv) The defense of any legal action of which the asylum application, credible fear determination, or reasonable fear determination is a part; or\n\n(v) Any United States Government investigation concerning any criminal or civil matter; or\n\n(2) Any Federal, State, or local court in the United States considering any legal action:\n\n(i) Arising from the adjudication of, or failure to adjudicate, the asylum application, or from a credible fear or reasonable fear determination under § 208.30 or § 208.31; or\n\n(ii) Arising from the proceedings of which the asylum application, credible fear determination, or reasonable fear determination is a part.\n\n#### Frequently Asked Questions\n\n#### 1. Q: Why does the regulation protect asylum-related information from disclosure?\n\nA: Public disclosure of asylum-related information may subject the claimant to retaliatory measures by government authorities or non-state actors in the event that the claimant is repatriated, or endanger the security of the claimant's family members who may still be residing in the country of origin. Moreover, public disclosure might, albeit in some limited circumstances, give rise to a plausible protection claim where one would not otherwise exist by bringing an otherwise ineligible claimant to the attention of the government authority or non-state actor against which the claimant has made allegations of mistreatment. Because refugee applicants face similar negative consequences when their information is disclosed to\n\nPrepared by the USCIS Asylum Division Date: October 18, 2012\n\na third party, as a matter of policy, USCIS extends the same protections outlined in 8 CFR 208.6 to refugees.\n\n# 2. Q: Under what specific circumstances can asylum-related information be disclosed to third parties?\n\nA: In general, asylum-related information must not be shared with third parties without the asylum applicant's written consent or the Secretary of Homeland Security's specific authorization. However, this general prohibition does not apply to the following limited circumstances as established by the regulation at 8 CFR 208.6:\n\n(I) Any United States Government official or contractor having a need to examine information in connection with:\n\n(i) The adjudication of asylum applications;\n\n(ii) The consideration of a request for a credible fear or reasonable fear interview, or a credible fear or reasonable fear review;\n\n(iii) The defense of any legal action arising from the adjudication of, or failure to adjudicate, the asylum application, or from a credible fear determination or reasonable fear determination under § 208.30 or § 208.31;\n\n(iv) The defense of any legal action of which the asylum application, credible fear determination, or reasonable fear determination is a part; or\n\n(v) Any United States Government investigation concerning any criminal or civil matter; or\n\n(2) Any Federal, State, or local court in the United States considering any legal action:\n\n(i) Arising from the adjudication of, or failure to adjudicate, the asylum application, or from a credible fear or reasonable fear determination under § 208.30 or § 208.31; or\n\n(ii) Arising from the proceedings of which the asylum application, credible fear determination, or reasonable fear determination is a part.\"\n\n# 3. Q: To what extent may asylum-related information be disclosed to personnel within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), such as Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) or Customs and Border Protection (CBP) personnel?\n\nA: Asylum-related information may be disclosed to ICE and CBP personnel, as they are not considered \"third parties\" for the purposes of 8 CFR 208.6. Protected asylum-related information may also be disclosed to offices within the direct policy and legal chains of command of DHS, such as DHS Office of General Counsel, the Office of the Undersecretary for Border and Transportation Security (BTS), the Office of the Deputy Secretary, and the Office of the Secretary.\n\n# 4. Q: If none of the regulatory exceptions applies, what information about an asylum applicant, if any, may be shared with third parties without breaching confidentiality?\n\nA: According to established guidance, confidentiality is breached when information contained in or pertaining to an asylum application is disclosed to a third party in violation of the regulation, and the unauthorized disclosure is of a nature that allows the third party to link the identity ofthe applicant to: (1) the fact that the applicant has applied for asylum; (2)\n\nPrepared by the USCIS Asylum Division Date: October 18, 2012\n\nspecific facts or allegations pertaining to the individual asylum claim contained in an asylum application; or (3) facts or allegations that are sufficient to give rise to a reasonable inference that the applicant has applied for asylum. The same principles govern the disclosure of information related to credible fear and reasonable fear determinations. They also generally apply to applications for withholding or deferral of removal under Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture, which are included in the asylum application.\n\n# 5. Q: Under the regulation's exceptions, can asylum-related information be disclosed to state law enforcement agencies or other state agencies?\n\nA: No. The confidentiality regulation does not allow disclosure of asylum-related information to state agencies, including state law enforcement agencies, except with the asylum applicant's written consent or the Secretary of Homeland Security's specific authorization. The regulation at 208.6(c)(2) do, however, allow for disclosure to state or local courts under certain circumstances.\n\n# 6. Q: Under the regulation, how can a United States Government official or contractor, who is seeking asylum-related information and to whom asylum-related information may be disclosed, obtain that information from the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)?\n\nA: Unless there is a pre-existing interagency arrangement or protocol, government officials or contractors should request asylum-related information about specific aliens directly from the appropriate USCIS Asylum Office Director with jurisdiction over the alien's application. Requests for asylum-related information concerning groups of aliens that match certain identified criteria must be made to the Chief of the Asylum Division of USCIS by the appropriate official in the requesting agency.\n\n# 7. Q: If asylum-related information is properly disclosed to a third party pursuant to the regulation, what is the third party's obligation with respect to confidentiality?\n\nA: As the new custodian of the asylum-related information, the third-party recipient is bound by the confidentiality regulation under 8 CFR 208.6. The recipient must not disclose the asylum-related information to other parties, except as authorized by the regulation.\n\n# 8. Q: What are the obligations of U.S. government officials or contractors who work with or are responsible for maintaining asylum-related information in U.S. government systems?\n\nA: U.S. government officials or contractors who encounter asylum-related information in their work are bound by the confidentiality regulation under 8 CFR 208.6. These personnel must not disclose the asylum-related information to third parties, except as authorized by the regulation. When making an authorized disclosure of asylum-related information to a third party, these personnel should alert the third party to the confidentiality requirements of 8 CFR208.6.\n\nPrepared by the USCIS Asylum Division Date: October 18, 2012\n\n# 9. Q: Are non-USCIS custodians of asylum-related information required to obtain authorization from USCIS before disclosing the asylum-related information to another party pursuant to the regulation?\n\nA: No. However, the transmitter of information should take reasonable steps to ensure that the new recipient of information is aware of the confidentiality rules described in this document to prevent unauthorized disclosure by the new recipient. The transmitter may want to provide the new recipient with a copy of this document for that purpose.\n\n# 10. Q: Is there an interagency arrangement between members of the Intelligence Community and agencies with counterterrorism functions and USCIS concerning the disclosure of asylum-related information?\n\nA: On October 8, 2001, the Attorney General used his discretionary authority under 8 CFR 208.6 to provide the FBI access to asylum applications filed with USC IS for the purpose of gathering foreign counterintelligence or international terrorism information unrelated to pending criminal or civil litigation. This arrangement was superseded in an April 18, 2007, memorandum whereby Secretary of Homeland Security Chertoff exercised his authority under 8 CFR 208.6 to allow disclosure of asylum-related information to any element of the U.S. Intelligence Community or any other federal or state agency having a counterterrorism function, provided that the need to examine the information or the request is made in connection with its authorized intelligence or counterterrorism function or functions and that the information received will be used for the authorized purpose for which it was requested. On August 25, 2011, Secretary Napolitano signed an addendum to the 2007 Memorandum. The addendum expands sharing of asylum-related information to include sharing with any local government agency having a counterterrorism function.\n\nIn general, requests for disclosure of asylum-related information shall be made to the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis Support Branch (IASB) using the DHS Support Request Form. Requests for asylum information must include a detailed justification directly linking the request to an authorized intelligence or counterterrorism function, as IASB is required to validate requests with the offices of Privacy, Intelligence Oversight, and the General Counsel. The request for asylum information must be approved by an individual with supervisory command from the requesting office.\n\nIf the request for disclosure, or pre-emptive disclosure if no request is made, occurs in accordance with the terms and conditions of any applicable standing information-sharing arrangements between DHS and the recipient, disclosure may be made without using the DHS Support Request Form.\n\n# I I. Q: Can members of the Intelligence Community and agencies with counterterrorism functions that receive asylum-related information further disseminate it?\n\nA: Under certain limited circumstances, an element of the Intelligence Community or other federal, state or local governmental agency having a counterterrorism function that received asylum or refugee-related information may further disseminate that information, but such\n\nPrepared by the USCIS Asylum Division Date: October 18, 2012\n\nfurther disclosure must be authorized by the Secretary, Deputy Secretary or the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis acting in coordination with the Director, USCIS, the Assistant Secretary, ICE or any other DHS official to whom disclosure authority under section 208.6(a) bas been delegated.\n\n# 12. Q: Are there any other interagency arrangements?\n\nA: Yes. In 2002, the Attorney General authorized the Asylum Division to disclose to the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) biographical information on individuals granted asylum to enable ORR to meet congressional reporting requirements and generate statistical reports used to allocate funding for asylee social benefits. In 2001 the Attorney General authorized the Asylum Division to disclose to HHS certain biographical information on asylees to enable ORR and the Center for Disease Control (CDC) to provide emergency relief to qualified asylees.\n\n# 13. Q: Can asylum-related information be shared with foreign governments or international organizations (such as INTERPOL)?\n\nA: Asylum-related information cannot be shared with foreign governments or international organizations without the written consent of the asylum applicant, except at the discretion of the Secretary of Homeland Security. Secretary Napolitano bas exercised her discretion to permit regular sharing of asylum-related information with Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand. Secretary Ridge initially allowed the sharing of asylum-related information with Canada in 2003. The arrangement with Canada is in the form of a *Statement of Mutual Understanding on Information Sharing* (SMU) and an Asylum Annex to the SMU, which together permit Canada's Department of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) and USCIS to exchange asylum-related records on both a case-by-case and systematic basis.\n\nSince the signing of the Asylum Annex to the Statement of Mutual Understanding on Information Sharing between the U.S. and Canada in 2003, USCIS and CIC have engaged in a regular exchange of information on asylum claims on a case-by-case basis. More recently, the USC IS Asylum Division bas worked with US-VISIT on sharing information relating to refugee claimants as defined in the agreement under the Five Country Conference (FCC) High Value Data Sharing Protocol (Protocol). Beginning in 2010, the Asylum Division commenced information sharing under the FCC Protocol with Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom. The Asylum Division commenced information sharing under the FCC Protocol with New Zealand in 2011.\n\n#### 14. Q: Why are there special information-sharing agreements with Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand?\n\nA: Sharing information on asylum seekers was included as an initiative in the agreement signed by former Attorney General Ashcroft and former Canadian Minister of Citizenship and lmmigration Caplan on December 2, 2001. It was also one of the thirty initiatives included in the Ridge-Manley Smart Border Action Plan. In furtherance of this initiative, the\n\nPrepared by the USClS Asylum Division Date: October 18, 2012\n\nUnited States and Canadian governments entered into a formal arrangement in 2003 that permits USCIS and CIC to systematically share information on individuals seeking asylum in the U.S. or Canada. The subsequent information-sharing agreements with Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand through the Five Country Conference (FCC) High Value Data Sharing Protocol (Protocol) further strengthen USCIS's capacity to acquire information relevant to asylum adjudications. By gaining access to this key information, USCIS and the immigration authorities in Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand will enhance their abilities to prevent abuse of the asylum process in their respective countries and to make accurate asylum eligibility determinations, thereby strengthening the integrity of each country's asylum system.\n\n# 15. Q: What is the status of the implementation of the information-sharing arrangement with Canada?\n\nA: USCIS and CIC have been sharing information on asylum seekers on a case-by-case basis since 2003. As of2010, the USCIS Asylum Division has also worked with US-VISIT to share asylum-related information with Canada under the Five Country Conference (FCC) High Value Data Sharing Protocol (Protocol). The 2011 Beyond the Border agreement between the United States and Canada includes an action plan for enhanced information sharing between the two countries. USCIS and CIC and their technical specialists are working together to develop a fully automated systematic sharing of information to cover all asylum claimants who are subject to biometric collection requirements by 2014.\n\n# 16. Q: May protected asylum-related information be shared with congressional offices?\n\nA: If the Chairman of a congressional committee with competent jurisdiction submits a written request for protected asylum-related information, the requested information will generally be provided without regard to the regulation. Written requests for asylum-related information by individual Members of Congress or their respective staff members will be considered on a case-by-case basis.\n\n# 17. Q: What information can be shared with the press when the applicant bas gone public with the asylum claim?\n\nA: Because the regulation currently requires the applicant's written consent, we generally do not recognize implicit waivers of confidentiality, even when the asylum-related information is a matter of public record.\n\n# 18. Q: Does 8 CFR 208.6 apply to refugee information?\n\nA: As a matter of policy, USCIS extends the same protections outlined in 8 CFR 208.6 to refugees.\n\nIf you have any questions regarding these policies, please contact the Asylum Division's Operations Branch Chief at 202.272.1651.","body_zh":"美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院布里奇波特分庭\n\n关于：第11章\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等：案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n债务人。：\n\n＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿\n\n个人债务人申请准许就部分准许保护令动议的裁定提出上诉之动议，以及备位的调卷令申请\n\n根据 28 U.S.C. §158(a)(3)、Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8004 及 28 U.S.C. § 1651，个人债务人 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（以下简称“个人债务人”）通过其下列签署的代理律师 Zeisler & Zeisler, P. C.（以下简称“Z&Z”），谨此提出本动议/申请（以下简称“动议/申请”），请求准许就破产法院于 December 9, 2022 作出的部分准许保护令动议的裁定（Doc. No. 1217，以下简称“该裁定”）提出上诉；该裁定授权向第11章受托人 Luc A. Despins（以下简称“受托人”）提交个人债务人的庇护申请（以下简称“庇护申请”）；或者，作为备位请求，申请签发调卷令，以撤销破产法院的该裁定。为进一步支持其动议/申请，个人债务人谨陈述如下。\n\nI. 引言\n\n1. 个人债务人多年来一直是中国共产党（以下简称“中共”）的政治打击目标。2015 年初，在获悉中共将基于捏造的证据以具有政治动机的罪名逮捕他后，个人债务人逃往美国。自个人债务人离开中国以来，他本人及其家人一直遭受中共及其代理人持续不断的威胁和骚扰。\n\n案件 22-50073 文档 1231-1 于 12/13/22 提交，于 12/13/22 13:39:29 录入，第 2 页，共 50 页\n\n2. 在申请破产保护数年前，个人债务人在 Clark Hill PLC（克拉克·希尔律师事务所）的律师协助下，准备并向 United States Department of Homeland Security（美国国土安全部）提交了庇护申请。个人债务人通过该庇护申请寻求在美国避难，并寻求免受中共持续威胁的保护。庇护申请包含保密且高度敏感的信息，8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6(a) 和 1208.6(a) 明确禁止披露该等信息。1\n\n3. 个人债务人通过本动议，请求准许就 United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut（康涅狄格州联邦破产法院）（Manning, J.）（以下简称“破产法院”）作出的裁定取得上诉审查；该裁定授权向受托人及其律师提交包括庇护申请在内的文件。或者，个人债务人谨此申请签发调卷令，以撤销破产法院的该裁定。\n\nII. 事实及程序背景\n\n4. 于 February 15, 2022（以下简称“申请日”），个人债务人根据《破产法》第11章提交了自愿救济申请，从而启动了上述标题所示的破产案件。于 July 7, 2022，受托人获任命。（见 Doc. No. 514）。\n\n5. 个人债务人破产财产的一项资产，是个人债务人在申请破产前对 Clark Hill 提起的一项请求权（以下简称“法律过失诉讼”）。在该法律过失诉讼中，个人债务人主张，Clark Hill 的计算机系统遭到黑客攻击，致使未经授权者得以访问庇护申请，从而使其受到损害。具体而言，个人债务人主张，除其他事项外，作为 Clark Hill 多次违反其职责的直接及近因，庇护申请的细节和内容\n\n1 8 C.F.R. § 208.6(a) 和 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a) 内容相同，区别仅在于前者授权 Secretary of Homeland Security（国土安全部长），后者授权 Attorney General（总检察长），允许披露庇护申请中所载或与之有关的信息。为便于引用，本动议/申请除非必要，仅引用 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6。\n\n案件 22-50073 文档 1231-1 于 12/13/22 提交，于 12/13/22 13:39:29 录入，第 3 页，共 50 页\n\n被广泛披露于社交媒体平台，并落入对个人债务人怀有敌意的第三方手中。Clark Hill 聘请 Jenner & Block, LLP（詹纳与布洛克律师事务所）在该法律过失诉讼中代理其行事。\n\n6. 于 July 28, 2022，受托人提交了《第11章受托人申请根据 Bankruptcy Rule 2004 和 Local Rule 2004-1 作出裁定，授权就债务人的各法律及财务顾问进行证据开示的综合动议》（Doc. No. 637，以下简称“专业人士 2004 动议”），请求除其他事项外，对 Clark Hill 进行审查。\n\n7. 于 August 5, 2022，个人债务人就专业人士 2004 动议提交了有限异议（Doc. No. 703），除其他事项外，理由是，如随附提交的拟议裁定获得作出并按字面解释，将排除对依专业人士 2004 动议送达的传票提出实体异议，包括基于特权提出的异议，违反 Bankr. L. R. 2004-1。\n\n8. 于 August 16, 2022，破产法院作出《准许第11章受托人关于就债务人的各法律及财务顾问进行 Rule 2004 证据开示之申请的裁定》（以下简称“准许专业人士 2004 动议的裁定”）（Doc. No. 756）。准许专业人士 2004 动议的裁定除其他事项外，准许向 Clark Hill 送达传票（以下简称“该传票”），但指示履行义务“[s]ubject to any rights under the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and applicable Local Rules[.]”因此，破产法院修改了受托人拟议的准许专业人士 2004 动议的裁定，以保留个人债务人及传票接收人对传票实质内容提出异议的权利。\n\n9. 于 August 18, 2022，受托人通知其将依照准许专业人士 2004 动议的裁定送达传票，其中包括向 Clark Hill 送达该传票。\n\n10. 于 September 14, 2022，法院作出《有关对与 Rule 2004 传票文件和信息相关的律师—当事人特权及工作成果保护的控制权之同意裁定》（Doc. No. 856，以下简称“同意裁定”）。同意裁定界定了受托人和个人债务人各自对律师—当事人特权及工作成果特权的控制范围，并规定了处理相关争议的若干程序。此外，同意裁定明确规定：\n\n本裁定的任何内容均不得阻止债务人就与调查事项无关的法律事项主张任何及所有特权，例如无关的刑事指控或债务人的庇护申请（除涉及名为 Guo Wengui（郭文贵） v. Clark Hill, PLC（克拉克·希尔律师事务所）, Case No. 19-cv-03195 (D. D.C.) [（以下简称“Clark Hill 诉讼”）] 的诉讼、且与法律过失诉讼的是非曲直有关而非与债务人庇护申请的是非曲直有关的文件外，但须遵守本文所载的利益衡量测试；该测试不涉及庇护申请的实质内容）。\n\n（同意裁定，第 ¶¶ 2, 4 段。）（强调为后加）。调查活动仅限于债务人的资产、财务状况或与破产财产管理有关的活动；根据同意裁定，该等活动“does not relate to the substance of the asylum application.”（同上，第 ¶ 2 段）。\n\n11. 在破产法院就同意裁定的协商举行的听证中，受托人及其律师均作出陈述——且各自分别作出该等陈述——即受托人并不寻求债务人的庇护申请：\n\n债务人表明其担忧的是，可能享有特权的文件涉及……针对其提出的事项以及其庇护申请。我们目前在调查中并不寻求与该等事项有关的任何文件。（Tr. 8/30/22, Exhibit A, at 104: 6-11 (Bassett, N.)（强调为后加））。\n\n[T]he debtor contends, well as I said before, there's a concern that, you know, it's possible documents the trustee is seeking to have access to could involve potential……与其庇护申请等无关的问题，但再次如我先前所述，我们并不寻求通过我们的证据开示请求取得该等文件。（Id., at 110: 12-19 (Bassett, N.)（强调为后加））。\n\n债务人已指出，我们向其先前的律师事务所和专业人士发出的传票中有一项请求，即 Request 17，该请求要求提供有关法律争议的信息，而这可能被理解为包括……其庇护申请；我们愿意在记录中明确说明，我们并不寻求取得该类信息，并将相应限制该项请求。（Id., at 110: 20-111:2 (Bassett, N.)（强调为后加））。\n\n[T]here is no basis that's been provided as to why documents would relate to assets, financial condition, or the administration of the estate, would have anything to do with the debtor's asylum application。（Id., at 137: 17-20 (Bassett, N.)（强调为后加））。\n\n但是，再次说明，如果我们能够拟定措辞，以明确如有文件谈及……其庇护申请等事项，在其异议中，我认为我们可以拟定措辞纳入拟议裁定，再次明确我们并不寻求该等文件。（Id., at 138: 24-139: 5 (Bassett, N.)（强调为后加））。\n\n[A]s we've made clear in our order, you know, there are carveouts designed to address specifically the concerns that the debtor has raised concerning privileged communications that relate to……其庇护申请。（Tr. 9/6/22, Exhibit B, 49: 5-10 (Bassett, N.)（强调为后加））。\n\n这正是我们拟定经修订的拟议裁定的方式，即遵循判例法中这些类别的权衡方式，并进一步明确，为回应债务人的担忧，他仍能够就与……其庇护申请有关的文件主张特权……。（Id., at 76: 13-18 (Bassett, N.)）。\n\n所以，权衡——[法院]正在进行权衡。[法院]正按类别逐份文件进行权衡，并对……庇护问题作出一些非常具体的排除；[法院]正在进行权衡。（Id., at 108: 9-15 (Despins, L.)（强调为后加））。\n\n12. 破产法院在作出同意裁定时明确依赖于受托人及其律师的陈述，正如个人债务人在同意同意裁定时所依赖的一样：\n\n破产法院：嗯，我正在试图弄清我们应当如何继续进行。现在，这是就受托人要求本法院认定其持有债务人所有特权的动议所举行的续期听证。\n\n我对该动议的理解是，即使受托人希望获得该裁定，他也会同意排除与庇护问题有关的任何事项。……\n\n我的意思是，他过去没有、现在也没有主张他将行使该项权利。（Id., at 67: 20-68:5）（强调为后加））。\n\n13. 此后，根据个人债务人的律师与 Clark Hill 的律师之间的讨论，双方同意 Clark Hill 将向个人债务人的律师提供对该传票作出响应的文件供审阅。\n\n14. Clark Hill 的律师向个人债务人的律师提供了文件，其中包括庇护申请。此后，个人债务人的律师向受托人的律师主张，庇护申请依法不得披露，并请求 Clark Hill 的律师暂不向外提供庇护申请，以使个人债务人有机会寻求保护令。\n\n15. 因此，Individual Debtor（个别债务人）向 Bankruptcy Court（破产法院）提交了保护令动议（Motion for Protective Order）（ECF No. 1063）。Trustee（受托人）提出异议，主张其本人及其律师在有关同意令（Consent Order）的听证期间向破产法院所作的陈述不适用，因为受托人当时并不知道 Clark Hill（克拉克·希尔）已将庇护申请（Asylum Application）附于其在过失执业诉讼（Malpractice Action）中提出的简易判决动议（Motion for Summary Judgment）之后。\n\n16. 在分别于 November 30, 2022 和 December 2, 2022 举行的、审议个别债务人保护令动议的听证会后，破产法院作出了随附于此作为附件 C 的命令。2\n\n2 破产法院的命令提及于 November 30, 2022 和 December 1, 2022 举行的听证会。实际上，审议保护令动议的第二次听证会于 December 2, 2022 举行。\n\n17. 在该命令中，破产法院认定，受托人及其律师“需要获得简易判决动议和庇护申请，以推进过失执业诉讼[。]”3（命令，第 2 页）。因此，破产法院命令 Jenner & Block（詹纳与布洛克）（作为 Clark Hill 的律师）“获授权向受托人及其律师提供简易判决动议和庇护申请”。4（同上，第 3 页）。\nIII. 庇护申请受 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a) 保护，不得披露\n\n18. 如个别债务人在其向破产法院提交的保护令动议中所主张，Immigration and Nationality Act（《移民和国籍法》）（“INA”）“禁止披露与任何庇护申请有关的信息。. . . .”Zhong Rong Li v. Gonzales, 181 F. App'x 124, 128 (2d Cir. 2006)；另见 Gafurova v. Whitaker, 911 F.3d 321, 328 n.3 (6th Cir. 2018)（INA“通常禁止在未经申请人书面同意的情况下，向第三方披露与庇护申请有关的任何信息，除非该等披露属于所列例外情形所允许的范围，或由 [Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security（国土安全部部长）] 酌情决定”）（援引 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6, 1208.6(a)）。\n\n19. 具体而言，8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a) 规定：\n\n任何难民入境、庇护、根据本法第 241(b)(3) 条暂停遣返，或根据为实施《禁止酷刑公约》立法而颁布的法规获得保护的申请中所载或与之有关的信息；根据 § 208.30 进行的任何可信恐惧认定的记录；以及根据 § 208.31 进行的任何合理恐惧认定的记录，未经申请人书面同意不得披露，但本节允许的情形或 [Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security] 酌情决定的情形除外。\n\n20. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a) 与实质上相似的 8 C.F.R. § 208.6(a)“确立了庇护申请人‘对任何包含于庇护申请中或与庇护申请有关的信息保密的“权利”，该等信息使第三方能够将申请人的身份与下列事项联系起来：(1) 申请人已申请庇护这一事实；(2) 庇护申请中所载与个别庇护请求有关的具体事实或主张；或 (3) 足以使人合理推断申请人已申请庇护的事实或主张。’”Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. Nielsen, No. 17-cv-02366-BAS-KSC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210401, at \\*22 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2017)（引文略）。\n\n21. “这些法规‘保障如下信息：如被公开披露，可能导致申请人在被遣返回国时受到政府当局或非国家行为人的报复性措施，或者危及仍可能居住在原籍国的申请人家庭成员的安全。’”同上，at \\*22-23，引用 U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. Asylum Div., Fact Sheet: Federal Regulations Protecting the Confidentiality of Asylum Applications (Oct. 12, 2011)。\n\n22. 受托人向破产法院主张，8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a) 不适用于非政府行为人提供庇护申请。然而，8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a) 的文本中没有任何内容以该种方式限制其适用。相反，8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a) 中针对一般性禁止披露庇护申请规定的仅某些例外情形，仅适用于政府行为人。例如，8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(c)（“本节不适用于向下列主体进行的任何披露：(1) 因下列事项而需要审查信息的任何 United States Government（美国政府）官员或承包商。. . . .”）（着重号为原文所加）。\n案件 22-50073 文书 1231-1 提交日期 12/13/22 登记日期 12/13/22 13:39:29 第 8 页，共 50 页\n\n23. 进一步证明庇护申请具有保密性的是，United States Citizenship and Immigration Services（美国公民及移民服务局）编制的《保护庇护申请人保密性的联邦法规概要》（Federal Regulation Protecting the Confidentiality of Asylum Applicants Synopsis）（“概要”）明确指出，收到庇护申请的第三方受保密法规约束，该概要作为附件 D 随附于此。见概要，常见问题 2，第 3 页（“一般而言，未经庇护申请人书面同意或 Secretary of Homeland Security（国土安全部部长）的具体授权，不得与第三方共享与庇护有关的信息。”）；常见问题 7，第 4 页（问：如根据该法规适当地向第三方披露与庇护有关的信息，第三方在保密方面负有什么义务？答：作为与庇护有关信息的新保管人，第三方接收人受 8 CFR 208.6 规定的保密法规约束。）（着重号为原文所加）。\n\n24. 此外，District of Connecticut（康涅狄格联邦地区法院）至少有一家法院，以此类材料通常不受披露为由，驳回了一项要求向该案被告提供“有关[一名个别原告]庇护申请的文件”的强制提供动议，尽管被告主张原告庇护申请的内容与原告提出的精神损害侵权请求相关。见 Bakhit v. Safety Marking, Inc., No. 3:13CV1049 (JCH), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192934, at \\*9 (D. Conn. Feb. 17, 2015)。\n\n25. 因此，显然，庇护申请受 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a) 保护，不得披露，且不存在允许披露的适用例外情形。5 见 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(c)-(e)；另见 Bakhit, No. 3:13CV1049 (JCH), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192934, at \\*9。\n\n5 此外，庇护申请与受托人的调查活动无关——即调查债务人的资产、财务状况及破产财产的管理——这一事实是受托人的律师在有关同意令的听证期间反复向法院陈述的。而且，鉴于传票（Subpoena）已在受托人律师作出\n\nIV. 个别债务人谨请求准许就破产法院的命令提起上诉\na. 提出的问题及所请求的救济\n\n26. 个别债务人谨就该命令的上诉提出以下问题：6\n\n- i. 破产法院命令向受托人及其律师提供庇护申请，是否违反 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a)，从而构成错误。\n- 27. 个别债务人谨请求 District Court（联邦地区法院）撤销该命令，并禁止向受托人及其律师提供庇护申请。\nb. 应准许本次上诉的理由\n1. 管辖权陈述\n\n28. 本法院根据 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) 对本拟议上诉具有管辖权，因为请求上诉的命令是破产法院在依据 28 U.S.C. § 157 的核心程序中作出的中间裁定，且破产法院根据 28 U.S.C. § 1334 具有管辖权。根据 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 和 1409，破产法院是适格审理地点。\n\n该等公开法庭陈述时已经送达，不能合理地将传票解释为寻求强制 Clark Hill 提供个别债务人的庇护申请。简而言之，由于受托人在公开法庭上陈述传票并不寻求强制提供庇护申请，且法院明确依赖该陈述作出命令；见附件 B，第 67:20-68:5；受托人被司法禁止反言，不得主张传票强制（甚至允许）Clark Hill 提供庇护申请。Intellivision v. Microsoft Corp., 484 F. App'x 616, 620 (2d Cir. 2012)（“[Supreme] Court（最高法院）已指出，司法禁止反言‘通常阻止一方当事人在案件的一个阶段凭借某项主张胜诉后，又依赖相矛盾的主张在另一阶段胜诉。’”（引用 New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001)））。\n\n6 个别债务人在根据适用规则提交所提出问题的陈述时，保留修改、修订、增加或以其他方式变更该问题的权利。\n2. 准许上诉的标准\n\n29. 根据 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)，当事人可以“经 [District] [C]ourt 许可”就破产法院的命令和裁定寻求中间上诉。“本巡回区的法院一贯认为，所有受 [28 U.S.C. §] 158(a)(3) 规管的上诉，均应参照 [28 U.S.C. §] 1292(b) 所阐述的标准，以确定是否应准许上诉。”Golden v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, No. 22-MC-01899 (HG), 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143072, at \\*11 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2022)（引号、引文及省略号略）。\n\n30. 如“该命令 (1) 涉及一个决定性的法律问题，(2) 对该问题存在实质性的意见分歧依据，并且 (3) 对该命令立即上诉可能实质性推进诉讼的最终终结”，本法院可以受理对中间裁定的上诉。Osuji v. U.S. Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 285 F. Supp. 3d 554, 558 (E.D.N.Y. 2018)。“[上诉人]负有证明存在足以支持中间上诉的特殊情形的责任……。”同上（引文和引号略）。\na. 该命令涉及一个决定性的法律问题\n\n31. 如“撤销破产法院的命令将 (1) 终结诉讼，或 (2) 实质性影响诉讼结果”，则该命令涉及一个决定性的法律问题。Osuji, 285 F. Supp. 3d at 558。“此外，该法律问题必须是‘纯粹的’法律问题，复审法院无需审阅案卷即可迅速、明确地作出裁决。”2178 Atl. Realty LLC v. 2178 Atl. Ave. Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., No. 20-CV-1278 (RRM), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62226, at \\*11 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2021)（引文略）。\n\n32. 破产法院命令及本次上诉核心的法律问题无疑是“纯粹的”，本法院可以“无需审阅案卷即可迅速、明确地”作出裁决。事实上，本案的核心问题是 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6 是否禁止向受托人披露庇护申请。本法院无需审阅案卷即可裁决这一纯粹的法律问题。\n\n33. 此外，对这一狭义法律问题作出裁断将“实质性影响诉讼结果”，因为这在破产法院中属于争议事项，唯一的问题是受托人查阅庇护申请的权利。参见一般性论述，Ritzen Group, Inc.（里岑集团公司）诉 Jackson Masonry, LLC（杰克逊砌筑有限责任公司），140 S.Ct. 582, 586(2020)（“破产案件包含一系列个别争议。”）（引文和援引略）。随着每一额外实体持有一份庇护申请副本，庇护申请落入希望伤害个人债务人的个人之手的风险（包括中国共产党及其代理人）便逐步上升，Clark Hill（克拉克·希尔）的计算机系统遭黑客入侵即为明证。参见一般性论述，Dunkin' Donuts Franchising LLC（邓肯甜甜圈特许经营有限责任公司）诉 CDDC Acquisition Co. LLC（CDDC 收购公司有限责任公司）（In re FPSDA I, LLC），470 B.R. 257, 265 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)（认定当一项法律问题将迫使债务人“立即”采取行动时，例如个人债务人为保护其本人及家人的安全可能采取的行动，而该行动“可能产生重大后果”，该问题即“实质性影响诉讼结果”）。从根本上说，尽管受托人及其律师推定已尽最大技术和安全努力，其持有庇护申请副本仍会增加未经授权的第三方取得庇护申请副本的可能性，从而进一步侵犯个人债务人的隐私及潜在安全。\n\n34. 因此，破产法院的命令涉及一个控制性法律问题。\n\nb. 对意见分歧存在实质性依据\n\n35. 当“（1）就该问题存在相互冲突的权威，或（2）该问题对于第二巡回上诉法院而言尤其困难且属首次审理”时，即存在对意见分歧的实质性依据。Osuji，285 F. Supp. 3d 554, 558 (E.D.N.Y. 2018)。\n\n36. 个人债务人主张，根据 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6，关于庇护申请受保护地位的法律已确立，因此就该问题不存在相互冲突的权威。\n\n37. 然而，尽管保护庇护申请免于披露的法律已确立，第 11 章破产受托人是否有能力取得债务人庇护申请副本这一问题，鉴于破产受托人既定的职责（包括根据 11 U.S.C. § 1106 调查债务人的资产和负债，例如医疗过失诉讼的职责），以及联邦法规下庇护申请高度保密且受保护的性质，属于一个“尤其困难”的问题。参见 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6。该问题的困难性还因以下事实而加重：就个人债务人所能确定，该问题对于第二巡回上诉法院而言属首次审理。\n\n38. 此外，对于受托人是否事实上“需要查阅……庇护申请以提起医疗过失诉讼”这一问题，亦存在对意见分歧的实质性依据；破产法院作出该认定时未提供任何有意义的分析。（命令，第 2 页）。在反对个人债务人的保护令动议时，受托人以高度结论性的方式称，他“需要查阅[个人][债务人]的[庇护][申请]”，以“全面评估医疗过失诉讼的是非曲直”。即使证明需要足以克服根据 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6 向个人债务人提供的保护（个人债务人主张，证明需要并不足够），破产法院及受托人关于受托人需要查阅庇护申请的结论性陈述，均未提供任何依据以理解受托人为何需要庇护申请。因此，就破产法院命令而言，存在对意见分歧的实质性依据。7\n\n7 参见脚注 3。\n\nc. 即时上诉实质性促进诉讼的最终终结\n\n39. 这一要件，即“评估上诉是否会实质性促进诉讼终结，在上诉有望推进开庭审理时间或缩短审理所需时间时即得到满足。”Osuji，285 F. Supp. 3d 第 558 页（援引和引文略）。\n\n40. 个人债务人承认，本次上诉在技术上属于证据开示争议，因而根据具有约束力的先例构成中间上诉。然而，该争议所依据的唯一问题是，联邦法规是否赋予个人债务人对受托人保密其庇护申请的权利，以及破产法院命令 Clark Hill 的律师提交该申请是否超越其权限。换言之，与几乎所有其他证据开示争议不同，受托人与债务人之间不存在会受到本次上诉极为狭义的标的，即受托人查阅债务人庇护申请的权利（或无此权利），影响的其他或更大争议。在此极端且高度罕见的情况下，个人债务人谨此主张，准许即时上诉将解决该争议的全部内容，并为其他法院就政治迫害受害人有权享有的权利提供明确指引。\n\n41. 因此，通过准许对破产法院命令的即时上诉（并随后撤销该命令），本院将解决个人债务人与受托人之间这一基础争议的全部内容，并为处境相似的当事人提供必要指引。\n\nd. 存在有必要进行中间上诉的特殊情形\n\n42. 个人债务人谨此主张，向受托人提交庇护申请构成有必要进行中间上诉的特殊情形，理由如下。\n\n43. 破产法院在发布该命令时，背离了 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6 和 1208.6 向个人债务人提供的保护。从实际效果看，凭借一项仅略超过两页的命令，国会在 INA 中赋予个人债务人对庇护申请的隐私权实际上被消除。\n\n44. 此类命令的寒蝉效应极为深远，因为人们可能因寻求亟需的破产保护而被劝阻，以避免提交“如果公开披露，可能导致申请人在被遣返回国时受到政府当局或非国家行为者报复性措施，或危及仍可能居住在原籍国的申请人家庭成员安全的信息。”Al Otro Lado, Inc.（阿尔奥特罗拉多公司），No. 17-cv-02366- BAS-KSC，2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210401，第 \\*22-23 页，引自 U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY（美国国土安全部）, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. Asylum Div.（美国公民及移民服务局庇护司）, Fact Sheet: Federal Regulations Protecting the Confidentiality of Asylum Applications（情况说明：保护庇护申请保密性的联邦法规）(Oct. 12, 2011)。\n\n45. 破产程序的目的之一是“使诚实的债务人摆脱压迫性债务的重负，并使其得以摆脱因商业失败而产生的义务和责任，重新开始。”Williams（威廉斯）诉 United States Fid. & Guar. Co.（美国忠实与保证公司），236 U.S. 549, 554-55, 35 S. Ct. 289, 290 (1915)。强迫个人债务人在获得此种救济与保护其本人及家人免受政府当局或非国家行为者报复性措施之间作出选择，显然不公。鉴于该特殊情形，应准许即时上诉。\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 1231-1 提交于 12/13/22 录入于 12/13/22 13:39:29 第 16 页，共 50 页\n\n46. 与 Mohawk Indus.（莫霍克工业公司）诉 Carpenter（卡彭特），558 U.S. 100, 130 S. Ct. 599, 606 (2009) 不同，在该案中，最高法院认定对享有特权材料的不当披露可“通过撤销[该]不利判决并发回重审”予以补救；如无即时上诉，则无法避免庇护申请立即落入希望伤害个人债务人的个人和实体之手的危险。Id., 第 109 页。简言之，此处的问题并非披露可能对诉讼产生的潜在不利影响（法院之后可以纠正），而是披露可能对债务人的安全和保障产生的不利影响（遗憾的是，任何法院均无法纠正或逆转）。\n\n47. 基于上述理由，个人债务人谨此主张，应准许其对破产法院中间命令的上诉许可。\n\nV. 作为备选，个人债务人谨此申请调卷令，以撤销破产法院的命令\n\n48. 在第二巡回上诉法院，上诉法院“将在下列情形下对涉及特权主张的证据开示命令行使调卷令审查权：（i）提出重要且属首次审理的问题；（ii）如审查必须等到最终判决，特权将在该具体案件中丧失；以及（iii）即时解决将避免形成损害该特权的证据开示实践或理论。”Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.（大通曼哈顿银行，全国协会）诉 Turner & Newall, PLC（特纳与纽奥尔公众有限公司），964 F.2d 159, 163 (2d Cir. 1992)。\n\n49. 最高法院“已承认，调卷令传统上仅被联邦法院用于将下级法院限制在其法定管辖权的合法行使范围内，或在其有义务行使权力时强制其行使该权力……只有构成司法篡夺权力的特殊情形，才足以证明援用这一非常救济的正当性。”Allied Chem. Corp.（联合化学公司）诉 Daiflon, Inc.（戴夫隆公司），449 U.S. 33, 35, 101 S. Ct. 188, 190 (1980)（援引和引文略）。\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 1231-1 提交于 12/13/22 录入于 12/13/22 13:39:29 第 17 页，共 50 页\n\n50. 在 Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. 一案中，第二巡回上诉法院审理了一项调卷令申请，“原因在于受到质疑的证据开示命令性质不同寻常”，该命令实际上允许对方律师进行特权审查，“以及该命令提出了与律师—当事人特权相关的重要且重大问题。”Id., 第 166 页；另参见，例如，In re Itron, Inc.（艾创公司案），883 F.3d 553, 568 (5th Cir. 2018)（在不当适用律师—当事人特权后签发调卷令）；In re Seagate Tech., LLC（希捷科技有限责任公司案），497 F.3d 1360, 1375–76 (Fed. Cir. 2007)（地区法院认定一方放弃律师—当事人特权和工作成果保护后签发调卷令），在其他理由上被 Halo Elecs., Inc.（光环电子公司）诉 Pulse Elecs., Inc.（脉冲电子公司），579 U.S. 93, 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016) 推翻。\n\n51. 在本案中，提交庇护申请是“一项极其重要的问题”，因为其消除了根据 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6 和 1208.6 明确赋予个人债务人（及所有其他处境相似的债务人）的保护。Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.，964 F. 2d，第 163 页。同样，如本文所述，该问题似乎是本巡回区内首次审理的问题。\n\n52. 此外，如审查必须等到最终判决，根据 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6 和 1208.6 提供的保护“将在该具体案件中丧失”。参见 Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.，964 F. 2d，第 163 页。事实上，8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6 和 1208.6 的根本目的，是防止“未经申请人书面同意，向第三方披露与庇护申请有关的任何信息，除非该披露受到所列例外情形的允许”，而该等例外情形不适用于当前情况，\n\n“或由司法部长”或国土安全部长酌情允许，而二者均未授权披露。Gafurova（加富罗娃）诉 Whitaker（惠特克），911 F.3d 321, 328 n.3 (6th Cir. 2018)（援引\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 1231-1 提交于 12/13/22 录入于 12/13/22 13:39:29 第 18 页，共 50 页\n\n8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6, 1208.6(a)）。如果受托人及其律师依该命令取得庇护申请副本，则个人债务人根据 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6 和 1208.6 享有的隐私权将立即消失。\n\n53. 最后，对有关庇护申请的争议作出“即时解决”“将避免形成削弱该特权的证据开示惯例或法理”，具体而言，避免形成一种允许破产受托人（及破产法院）规避 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6 和 1208.6 规定的法理；该等规定专为保护庇护申请人而设——个人债务人无可争议地属于这一极为狭窄的人群。Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.（大通曼哈顿银行）, 964 F. 2d, at 163.\n\n54. 如同 Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. 一案，破产法院的命令至少可以说是“不同寻常的”，因为该命令允许受托人取得依据联邦法规属保密并受保护的文件，却未对该法规作出任何法律分析。因此，并鉴于该命令就庇护申请保密性“引发的重大且重要问题”，本院应准予该强制令申请。Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 964 F. 2d, at 166.\n\nVI. 结论\n\n55. 基于上述理由，本院应当：(i) 准许个人债务人就破产法院命令提出上诉，或作为替代方案，(ii) 准许个人债务人提出的强制令申请。\n\n债务人，HO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）\n\n签字：/s/ Aaron A. Romney\nAaron A. Romney（阿伦·A·罗姆尼）(ct28144)\nZEISLER & ZEISLER, P.C.（泽斯勒与泽斯勒律师事务所，专业公司）\n10 Middle Street, 15th floor\nBridgeport, CT 06605\n电话：(203) 368-4234\n传真：(203) 368-0903\n电子邮件：[aromney@zeislaw.com]\n\n送达证明\n\n本人特此证明，于 2022 年 12 月 13 日，前述文件副本已通过电子方式提交。本次提交的通知将通过法院电子提交系统以电子邮件发送给所有当事人，或按照电子提交通知所示，通过邮寄方式发送给无法接受电子提交的任何人士。当事人可通过法院的 CM/ECF 系统查阅本次提交文件。\n\n签字：/s/ Aaron A. Romney\nAaron A. Romney（阿伦·A·罗姆尼）(ct28144)\n\n附件 A\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1231-1 Filed 12/13/22 Entered 12/13/22 13:39:29 Page 22 of\n\n美国破产法院\n康涅狄格地区\n布里奇波特分院\n\n关于\n案号：22-50073 (JAM)\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）\n康涅狄格州布里奇波特\n2022 年 8 月 30 日\n债务人。\n50\n\n关于安排状态会议的命令、关于为 LADY MAY（“拉迪·梅”号）设立维修准备金的命令动议、加快举行听证会的动议、关于在上诉期间为 LADY MAY 设立维修准备金的暂缓执行动议、关于暂缓执行第 523/727 条对抗程序的动议、以及关于规定特权控制权于任命时转移给受托人并请求相关救济的命令动议的庭审记录\n\n于尊敬的 JULIE A. MANNING（朱莉·A·曼宁）美国破产法院法官面前\n\n出庭人员：\n\n代表债务人：\nSTEPHEN M. KINDSETH（斯蒂芬·M·金德塞思）律师\n\nHK International（香港国际）及\nMei Guo（美国）：\nAARON ROMNEY（阿伦·罗姆尼）律师\nERIC HENZY（埃里克·亨齐）律师\nZeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（泽斯勒与泽斯勒律师事务所，专业公司）\n10 Middle Street, 15th Floor\nBridgeport, CT\n\n代表债权人 Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.（太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金有限合伙企业）：\nLAURA ARONSSON（劳拉·阿伦松）律师\nSTUART M. SARNOFF（斯图尔特·M·萨诺夫）律师\nO'Melveny & Myers LLP（欧迈律师事务所）\nTimes Square Tower\n7 Times Square\nNew York, NY 10036\n\nPATRICK BIRNEY（帕特里克·伯尼）律师\nRobinson & Cole（罗宾逊与科尔律师事务所）\n28 Trumbull Street\nHartford, CT 06103\n\n庭审程序以电子录音记录，庭审记录由速记服务机构制作。\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥尔记录与速记服务公司）\n4 Research Drive, Suite 402\nShelton, Connecticut 06484\n(203)929-9992\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1231-1 Filed 12/13/22 Entered 12/13/22 13:39:29 Page 23 of 50\n\n出庭人员：（续）\n代表债权人委员会：\nIRVE GOLDMAN（欧文·戈德曼）律师\nPullman & Comley（普尔曼与康利律师事务所）\n850 Main Street\nBridgeport, CT 06601\n\n代表美国受托人：\nHOLLEY CLAIBORN（霍莉·克莱伯恩）律师\nOffice of the United States Trustee（美国受托人办公室）\nThe Giaimo Federal Building\n150 Court Street, Room 302\nNew Haven, CT 06510\n\n第 11 章受托人：\nLUC A. DESPINS（吕克·A·德斯平）律师\nPaul Hastings LLP（普衡律师事务所）\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, NY 10166\n\n第 11 章受托人的律师：\nNICHOLAS BASSETT（尼古拉斯·巴塞特）律师\nPaul Hastings LLP（普衡律师事务所）\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, NY 10166\n\nPATRICK R. LINSEY（帕特里克·R·林齐）律师\nNeubert, Pepe & Monteith, P.C.（纽伯特、佩佩与蒙泰斯律师事务所，专业公司）\n195 Church Street, 13th Floor\nNew Haven, CT 06510\n\n代表 Verdolino & Lowey（韦尔多利诺与洛伊）：\nWILLIAM BALDIGA（威廉·鲍迪加）律师\nBrown Rudnick（布朗·拉德尼克律师事务所）\nSeven Times Square\nNew York, NY 10036\n\nCase 22-50073\nDoc 1231-1\nFiled 12/13/22\nEntered 12/13/22 13:39:29\nPage 24 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2022 年 8 月 30 日\n\n1　正在限制该等范围。\n2　如果您查看我们动议中的请求移交部分，\n3　我们在答复中再次援引了该部分，我们所寻求的\n4　具体是破产财产、其财务\n5　状况以及与管理有关的事项。\n6　债务人指出了其对于\n7　可能享有特权的、与刑事事项有关的文件的担忧，\n8　例如针对他的强奸和非法拘禁指控，以及其他\n9　针对他的事项，还有其庇护\n10　申请。目前在我们的调查中，\n11　我们并未寻求任何与这些事项有关的文件。\n12　再次强调，我们关注的是资产以及一项\n13　希望可用于充实本破产财产的调查。\n14　其次，法官阁下，我们并未要求放弃\n15　或取得属于其他当事人的任何特权的控制权。\n16　事实上，我不知道如何能将我们的\n17　动议解读为请求该项救济。\n18　为明确起见，我们寻求裁定，\n19　受托人已承继债务人与其他当事人之间所持有的任何特权，\n20　包括共同利益或\n21　共同辩护特权。\n22　我们在动议中援引了相关判例法。坦率地说，\n23　我不认为这一点存在争议。\n24　但我们并未寻求的——债务人似乎\n25　暗示我们正在寻求、但实际上并未寻求的——是法院作出一项命令，规定\n25　受托人现在控制任何特权，\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1231-1 Filed 12/13/22 Entered 12/13/22 13:39:29 Page 25 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2022 年 8 月 30 日\n\n1　该等特意寻求与\n2　破产财产资产有关的文件、涉及债务人在\n3　破产前的其他交易事项，以及其他根本不会\n4　牵涉债务人所担心的各类有关刑事\n5　责任等问题的事项。\n6　因此，我们请求法院在此作出的事项，\n7　并不包含 Foster（福斯特）一案所担心的处理方式。\n8　\n9　坦率地说，如果您查看其他案件，\n10　有大量其他案件已作出我们请求本院作出的\n11　此类命令，包括我们援引的其中一案，即\n12　2010 年北卡罗来纳州东区的 In re Tarkington（塔金顿案）。\n13　\n14　在该案中，曾对潜在\n15　破产财产资产进行调查。受托人希望对一名在\n16　破产前代理债务人的律师进行宣誓取证，而\n17　法院最终所做的是：好，我将允许\n18　宣誓取证继续进行；以下是我认为属于\n19　特权范围内的事项。\n20　所有与\n21　破产财产资产等有关的特权均已转移给受托人。任何可能\n22　涉及刑事责任或该等事项的内容\n23　仍可受到特权保护。\n24　因此，你们可以进行宣誓取证，而债务人的律师可以\n25　按照该项规定提出异议，\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1231-1 Filed 12/13/22 Entered 12/13/22 13:39:29 Page 26 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2022 年 8 月 30 日\n\n110　这些案件中，争议在于受托人试图调查破产财产的资产，而该等资产可能与充实破产财产及该等资产的价值有关。这些案件中的法院裁定，此种情形会使债务人受益。当债务人的破产财产因额外发现诉因或识别出其他资产而得到充实时，他将从中受益，不会因此受到损害。因此，如我此前所说，债务人主张存在一种担忧，即受托人寻求取得的文件可能涉及潜在刑事责任，无论是其提及的强奸指控、非法拘禁，还是与之完全无关的事项，例如其庇护申请，但再次强调，如我之前所说，我们并未通过证据开示请求寻求取得该等文件。债务人指出，我们向债务人的前律师事务所和专业人士发出的传票中有一项请求，即第 17 项请求，要求提供有关法律争议的信息；该请求可被理解为包括针对他的刑事诉讼（如有）或其庇护申请。我们愿意明确记入记录，即我们并不寻求取得该类信息，并将相应限制该项请求。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1231-1 Filed 12/13/22 Entered 12/13/22 13:39:29 Page 27 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2022 年 8 月 30 日\n\n1　我的意思是，债务人能够主张其拥有一份既\n2　响应我们传票、又可能\n3　对其造成损害的文件的唯一合理情形，是\n4　存在某份与其资产有关、\n5　与我们寻求探究的议题有关，\n6　并且同时以某种方式牵涉其刑事责任的文件。\n7　\n8　但债务人甚至没有提出任何\n9　可能存在此种文件的迹象。他没有提出任何内容\n10　表明这一点，除非是如其在反对意见中所说的，\n11　非法拘禁指控及类似事项。\n12　\n13　他没有给出任何理由，我们也没有任何理由能够想象，\n14　为何我们所寻求的文件，例如关于其\n15　在纽约公寓中的权益、“拉迪·梅”号，以及他谈到的\n16　所有其他私人飞机和类似事项，\n17　会与这些类别的问题有关。\n18　在任何可以想见的情形下，这些文件\n19　都不会与这类问题有关。\n20　因此，认为利益衡量检验将支持\n21　不将这些特权的控制权移交给\n22　破产财产的观点，我认为毫无分量。\n23　法官阁下，债务人还提出了\n24　已对其提起的不可免责之诉。\n25　其称，尽管对此存在担忧，我可能会\n\nCase 22-50073\nDoc 1231-1\nFiled 12/13/22\nEntered 12/13/22 13:39:29\nPage 28 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2022 年 8 月 30 日\n\n1　全部。因此，完全不存在任何正当担忧，即\n2　我们会以某种方式获得与这些\n3　诉讼有关的信息。\n4　顺带一提，我们不会将所取得的\n5　文件与这些诉讼的原告分享，因此，\n6　对第 523 条诉讼存在担忧的观点，我再次认为，\n7　确实根本不存在。\n8　法官阁下，在我结束之前，\n9　至少在我的开场陈述方面，还有\n10　几点。\n11　债务人在其异议中，虽然起初\n12　称法院不应在此作出任何裁定，但其称，\n13　如果法院作出裁定，则可提供某些指引。\n14　我认为债务人提出该等\n15　指引的方式是称，法院可指示\n16　收件人——这是异议第 33 段所述——\n17　法院可指示传票的收件人基于特权\n18　暂不提供文件，即：“仅限于他们认为可能\n19　对债务人造成损害的文件，例如刑事指控、\n20　与不可免责有关的事实，或与\n21　债务人的破产财产毫无关系的事实，例如其尚在审理的庇护申请。”\n22　现在，其中一部分实际听起来与\n23　我今天所作的陈述一致，但我认为它也突显了\n24　我们所担心的情形，以及如果作出针对该等措辞的具体命令\n25　可能导致的不当后果。\n\nCase 22-50073\nDoc 1231-1\nFiled 12/13/22\nEntered 12/13/22 13:39:29\nPage 29 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2022 年 8 月 30 日\n\n问题。谢谢。\n\nROMNEY先生（罗姆尼）：谢谢，法官阁下。\n\nBASSETT先生（巴塞特）：法官阁下，简要回应一下。我想这次我可能留在这里，如果可以的话。\n\n法庭：可以。\n\nBASSETT先生：因此，Romney先生在谈及我们对措辞的拟议修改时，我认为他的立场是：我们仍未规定适用利益衡量测试，因为如果我们所说的是，与债务人的资产、财务状况或其财产管理有关的特权转由受托人控制，那么这没有顾及债务人可能具有其他个人、个体利益，涉及犯罪或其他方面的可能性。\n\n我认为该逻辑的谬误在于，没有提出任何依据说明，与资产、财务状况或财产管理有关的文件，为何会与债务人的庇护申请，或针对其提出的强奸或非法拘禁刑事指控有任何关系。\n\n我的意思是，如果债务人担心，假设存在一份文件，其中债务人正与其律师讨论虚假监禁或无关的刑事责任，或者，如他在其异议中提到的具体事项、其庇护申请之类的事项，我认为我们可以拟定措辞写入拟议命令，再次明确我们并不寻求该等文件。我认为还需要作出其他调整，包括保留我们的权利，即对于任何被扣留、而我们认为可能与受托人调查有关的文件，例如就律师—委托人特权中的犯罪—欺诈例外保留我们的权利；但我确实认为，可以拟定某些措辞来解决债务人的部分关切。不过，再次强调，不能出现由债务人决定何时因披露某份文件而受到损害的情形，因为这等于公开邀请他扣留不希望我们看到的文件。谢谢，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：谢谢。\n\nROMNEY先生：法官阁下，如果可以？\n\n法庭：可以。\n\nROMNEY先生：非常、非常简要。我已经说过，制作特权清单并不是作出决定。但我确实想作出一项或许重要的澄清，即，这些命令——拟议命令……\n\nBASSETT先生：谢谢，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：本案今天还有其他可以处理的事项吗？\n\n（无人回应）\n\n法庭：好的。这是今天日程上的最后一项事项，因此我们下周二下午1:00见，现休庭。\n\n（庭审于下午4:29结束。）\n\n本人，CHRISTINE FIORE（克里斯汀·菲奥雷），经法院批准的速记员及认证电子法庭记录员和速记员，兹证明上述内容为上述案件庭审程序官方电子录音的正确文字记录。\n\nSeptember 10, 2022\n\nChristine Fiore（克里斯汀·菲奥雷），CERT速记员\n\n附件B\n\n美国破产法院（UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT）\n康涅狄格州联邦地区（DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT）\n布里奇波特分庭（BRIDGEPORT DIVISION）\n\n关于　*\n案号 22-50073 (JAM)\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），　*\n*\nBridgeport, Connecticut\n债务人。　*\nSeptember 6, 2022\n\n关于作出命令的动议听证会记录，该命令规定特权控制权于受托人获任命时移交受托人，并给予相关救济\n\n在尊敬的JULIE A. MANNING（朱莉·A·曼宁）美国破产法官面前\n\n出庭人员：\n\n代表债务人、\nHK International（香港国际）及\nMei Guo（美购）：　ERIC HENZY（埃里克·亨齐），ESQ.\nAARON ROMNEY（亚伦·罗姆尼），ESQ.\nZeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（泽斯勒与泽斯勒律师事务所）\n10 Middle Street, 15th Floor\nBridgeport, CT\n\n代表债权人Pacific\nAlliance Asia Opportunity\nFund L.P.（太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金有限合伙）：　PETER FRIEDMAN（彼得·弗里德曼），ESQ.\nO'Melveny & Myers LLP（奥美律师事务所）\nTimes Square Tower\n7 Times Square\nNew York, NY\n\nANNECCA SMITH（安妮卡·史密斯），ESQ.\nRobinson & Cole（罗宾逊与科尔律师事务所）\n28 Trumbull Street\nHartford, CT\n\n庭审由电子录音记录，文字记录由速记服务机构制作。\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷记录与速记服务公司）\n4 Research Drive, Suite 402\nShelton, Connecticut 06484 (203)929-9992\n\n出庭人员：（续）代表债权人委员会：IRVE GOLDMAN（欧文·戈德曼），ESQ. Pullman & Comley（普尔曼与科姆利律师事务所）850 Main Street Bridgeport, CT 06601 代表美国受托人：HOLLEY CLAIBORN（霍莉·克莱伯恩），ESQ. Office of the United States Trustee（美国受托人办公室）The Giaimo Federal Building 150 Court Street, Room 302 New Haven, CT 06510 代表第11章受托人：NICHOLAS BASSETT（尼古拉斯·巴塞特），ESQ. Paul Hastings LLP（普衡律师事务所）200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166 PATRICK R. LINSEY（帕特里克·R·林西），ESQ. Neubert, Pepe & Monteith, P.C.（诺伊贝特、佩佩与蒙蒂斯律师事务所）195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, CT 06510 第11章受托人：LUC A. DESPINS（卢克·A·德斯平），ESQ. Paul Hastings LLP（普衡律师事务所）200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166\n\n本命令，因为本命令旨在防止债务人如此行事。\n\n我认为，另一类可能存在、且可能引发日后有关享有特权通信争议的事项是，正如我们在命令中已明确说明的，有一些例外规定，旨在专门处理债务人就与针对其提出的刑事指控有关，或与其庇护申请有关的享有特权通信所提出的关切。我很乐意并准备更详细地说明我们的修改。\n\n但同样地，如果债务人在特权清单上对该等文件主张特权，那么我们可能会再次回到法庭，就该等特权发生争议，因为该命令的要点是保留与该等特权有关的一切权利。\n\n债务人可能会就刑事指控主张特权。届时，我们会主张存在犯罪—欺诈例外，并会另外主张该文件根本不享有特权。因此，该事项可能会再次提交法庭。\n\n但为回答法庭的问题，如果本命令获作出，它确实解决了我们今天请求法庭采取的措施。\n\n再次，法官阁下，我们提交的是一份副本……\n\n……未排除任何与庇护问题有关的事项、任何与这些所称侵权问题有关的事项，以及，显然，与第五修正案有关的事项。我的意思是，他过去没有、现在也没有主张将行使该项权利。\n\nROMNEY先生：是的。不过，依我对命令的理解，就我所称的侵权问题而言，存在不一致之处。\n\n法庭：嗯，我——我的意思是——\n\nROMNEY先生：是的。\n\n法庭：——我指的是强奸指控之类的事情。我不知道那些是怎么回事，但这就是在本案记录中提出的内容，对吗？甚至在受托人获任命之前，就有人称存在这些诉讼请求。那些债权人在本案中提交了动议。他们说了很多事情，显然，其中没有任何一项目前已在本法庭得到证实，也许永远不会。好吗？所以，当我谈到——我谈的是一些据称非常难以讨论的侵权行为，而不是，比如说，如果存在其他情况——例如，也许你主张了——我甚至不知道。如你所知，我没有读UBS起诉书。是否……\n\n……关于这一问题的第二巡回法院权威判例——但我确实认为，正如我们试图在书面材料中汇集并在上周听证会上讨论的，有许多破产案件试图在Weintraub案之后处理个人特权移交受托人的问题。\n\n我认为，这些案件中的绝大多数以及判例法的明确趋势认为，当特权涉及受托人为识别财产资产所作的努力、调查债务人的财务状况，以及当然涉及在受托人获任命前影响其财产管理的任何破产申请后事项时，特权移交受托人。\n\n这正是我们试图制定经修订拟议命令的方式，即遵循该大量判例法中的这些类别，同时也明确，为解决债务人的关切，他仍可就与刑事指控或其庇护申请有关、但与我刚才提到的那四项——那三项类别无关的文件主张特权。\n\n因此，就Romney律师所作的具体评论而言，我认为他说的是，可能存在一份谈及财产资产、但同时也是与针对债务人的刑事指控有关的享有特权通信的文件……\n\n……在其作为占有债务人期间与Brown Rudnick（布朗·拉德尼克律师事务所）的通信，毫无争议的是，我们有权获取该等通信。这是狭窄的。这是本案的一个例证。他是以负有信义义务者的身份行事，而非以其个人身份行事。而他获得的是——如果Brown Rudnick在就其个人情况向他提供意见，那应由Brown Rudnick感到羞愧。他们向其提供的意见，是作为占有债务人的意见。这一点是根本性的，法官阁下。\n\n因此，衡量——您正在进行衡量。您正按照类别逐项文件进行衡量，并对——我们该如何称呼该犯罪，我想对此作出准确表述，尽管这令人遗憾——但对强奸和非法拘禁指控作出具体例外规定，对庇护问题作出例外规定；您正在进行衡量。\n\n法庭一直是按文件类别这样做的。法庭被推翻的情形，唯一推翻的巡回法院案件，以及在该案中与本案相同、双方均同意应有利益衡量测试的情形，是法庭没有审查任何文件或任何类别的文件。\n\n而在本案中，法庭面前正是我们提出的非常狭窄的类别。基于此，您有权作出此项裁定。\n\n法庭：好的。今天在Kwok事项的本次听证会上，任何人还有进一步陈述吗？\n\nBASSETT先生：谢谢，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：谢谢。\n\n（庭审于下午3:31结束。）\n\n本人，CHRISTINE FIORE（克里斯汀·菲奥雷），认证电子法庭记录员及速记员，兹证明上述内容为上述案件庭审程序官方电子录音的正确文字记录。\n\nSeptember 14, 2022\n\nChristine Fiore（克里斯汀·菲奥雷），CERT\n\n美国破产法院（UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT）康涅狄格州联邦地区（DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT）\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，\n\n)\n\n)\n\n)\n关于： ) 第11章 ) 案号 22-50073 (JAM) ) （合并管理）\n\n债务人。 ) 关于：ECF No. 1063\n\n部分准许保护令动议的命令\n\n2022年11月2日，Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（“个人债务人”）提交了保护令动议，ECF No. 1063（“该动议”），请求阻止在 Guo Wengui（郭文贵）诉 Clark Hill PLC（克拉克·希尔律师事务所）案，1:19-cv-03195-JEB (D.D.C.)（以下简称“律师失职诉讼”）中披露 Clark Hill PLC 的简易判决动议（“简易判决动议”）以及附于该简易判决动议的个人债务人庇护申请（“庇护申请”）。2022年11月16日，Luc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯平斯）以个人债务人财产（“财产”）的 Chapter 11 受托人（“受托人”，并与个人债务人合称“各方”）身份，对该动议提出异议，ECF No. 1105（“异议”）。2022年11月29日，个人债务人提交了支持该动议的答复，ECF No. 1174（“答复”）。\n\n1 本 Chapter 11 案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（亦称 Guo Wengui（郭文贵）、Miles Guo（郭文贵）和 Miles Kwok（郭文贵），以及众多其他化名）（税务识别号码后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（杰纳维尔控股有限责任公司）（税务识别号码后四位：8202）以及 Genever Holdings Corporation（杰纳维尔控股公司）。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 和 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为 Paul Hastings LLP（普衡律师事务所），200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166，c/o Luc A. Despins，作为 Ho Wan Kwok 财产的受托人（仅用于通知和通信目的）。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1231-1 Filed 12/13/22 Entered 12/13/22 13:39:29 Page 41 of Case 22-50073 Doc 1217 Filed 12/09/22 Entered 12/09/22 14:50:13 Page 2 of 3 50\n\n本院于2022年11月30日就该动议举行了听证会。本院给予各方时间，尝试就该动议提出的问题达成和解，并将听证会续延至2022年12月1日。在续延后的听证会期间，各方报告称其未能就该动议达成和解。\n\n本院认定，根据有关律师—委托人特权及工作成果特权的同意命令，ECF No. 856（“特权同意命令”）的规定，简易判决动议及庇护申请均属“与[律师失职诉讼]有关、并涉及该律师失职诉讼实体问题的文件”。（ECF No. 856 ¶ 4。）本院进一步认定，受托人及其律师需要查阅简易判决动议及庇护申请，以推进作为财产资产的律师失职诉讼；并且，根据特权同意命令的条款，向受托人及其律师披露这些文件不会对个人债务人造成个人损害。（ECF No. 856 ¶ 7。）因此，经审阅相关诉状、听证会期间律师提出的论点，并基于记录中陈述的理由，现\n\n命令如下：该动议部分准许。简易判决动议及庇护申请仅应向受托人及其律师披露。就本破产案件而言，目前仅个人债务人及其律师，以及受托人及其律师，可以查阅简易判决动议及庇护申请。不得以任何方式向本破产案件中的其他利害关系方讨论、展示或披露简易判决动议及庇护申请；并进一步\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1231-1 Filed 12/13/22 Entered 12/13/22 13:39:29 Page 42 of Case 22-50073 Doc 1217 Filed 12/09/22 Entered 12/09/22 14:50:13 Page 3 of 3 50\n\n命令如下：Jenner & Block LLP（詹纳与布洛克律师事务所）获准仅根据本命令，并在适用情况下依照律师失职诉讼中的保护令，向受托人及其律师披露简易判决动议及庇护申请。\n\n2022年12月9日于康涅狄格州布里奇波特签署。\n附件 D\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1231-1 Filed 12/13/22 Entered 12/13/22 13:39:29 Page 44 of\n\n由 USCIS Asylum Division（美国公民及移民服务局庇护司）编制 日期：October 18, 2012\n情况说明书：保护庇护申请人保密性的联邦法规\n概要\n\n8 CFR 208.6 中的联邦法规通常禁止向第三方披露载于或涉及庇护申请、可信恐惧认定及合理恐惧认定的信息——包括载于 RAPS 或 APSS 1 中的信息——但某些有限情形除外。该法规保护如下信息：如被公开披露，可能在申请人被遣返时使其遭受政府当局或非国家行为者的报复性措施，或者危及仍可能居住在原籍国的申请人家庭成员的安全。此外，公开披露还可能在罕见情形下2，通过使原本不符合资格的申请人引起其曾指称实施虐待的政府当局或非国家行为者的注意，从而产生原本不会存在的表面成立的保护申请理由。\n\n根据既定指导意见，如庇护申请中载有或涉及的信息（包括载于 RAPS 或 APSS 中的信息）被违反该法规地向第三方披露，且该未经授权的披露性质使第三方能够将申请人的身份与下列事项联系起来，即构成对保密性的违反：(1) 申请人已申请庇护这一事实；(2) 庇护申请中载有的、与个人庇护申请有关的具体事实或指称；或 (3) 足以产生申请人已申请庇护之合理推断的事实或指称。相同原则通常适用于披露与可信恐惧和合理恐惧认定有关的信息，以及适用于根据《禁止酷刑公约》第3条提出的禁止递解或暂缓递解申请，该等申请均包括在庇护申请中。\n\n在没有庇护申请人书面同意或国土安全部长3 特别授权的情况下，仅可基于与某些行政、执法及民事诉讼有关的知悉必要原则，向美国政府官员或承包商以及美国联邦或州法院披露信息。在某些情形下，已建立机构间安排，以便利依据该法规向美国机构适当披露与庇护有关的信息。未经申请人书面同意，向另一政府的官员或向任何实体，为非该法规明确授权的目的披露与庇护申请、可信恐惧认定或合理恐惧认定有关的信息，须经国土安全部长明确许可。\n\n1 RAPS 是用于保存通过向 USCIS 申请该项福利而主动寻求庇护的外国人记录的系统。APSS 是用于保存下列外国人记录的系统：该等外国人在根据 INA sec. 23S(b) 的快速递解程序或根据 INA sec. 238(b) 或 INA sec. 24l(a)(5) 的行政递解程序中，因担心在返回拟被递解至的国家时遭受迫害或酷刑而表达了恐惧，随后被移送至 USCIS 庇护官员处接受可信恐惧或合理恐惧筛查认定。\n\n2 仅凭公开披露，极少足以根据美国庇护法确立境外产生的保护申请理由。申请人必须证明，鉴于该披露，其因某一受保护理由而具有遭受迫害的充分根据的恐惧。\n\n3 根据 Homeland Security Act of 2002（2002年《国土安全法》）第1512(d)条，Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, 2310，Attorney General（司法部长）根据 8 C.F.R. § 208.6(a) 授权披露由原 Immigration and Naturalization Service（移民归化局，INS）持有——现由 Department of Homeland Security（国土安全部，DHS）持有——的保密庇护信息的权限，已移交给 DHS 部长。\n\n由 USCIS Asylum Division（美国公民及移民服务局庇护司）编制 日期：October 18, 2012\n\n法规规定，未经申请人书面同意，须经国土安全部长明确许可。\n\n《联邦法规汇编》第8编\n\n第 208.6 节 向第三方披露。\n\n(a) 载于或涉及任何庇护申请的信息、与根据 § 208.30 作出的任何可信恐惧认定有关的记录，以及与根据 § 208.31 作出的任何合理恐惧认定有关的记录，未经申请人书面同意不得披露，但本节允许的情形或 Attorney General（现为 DHS 部长）酌情决定的情形除外。\n\n(b) [Immigration and Naturalization] Service（现为 DHS）和 Executive Office for Immigration Review（移民审查执行办公室）保存的其他记录，如表明某一特定外国人已申请庇护、已接受可信恐惧或合理恐惧面谈，或已接受可信恐惧或合理恐惧复核，其保密性亦应受到保护，免于披露。该局[现为 DHS]将与 Department of State（国务院）协调，以确保如该等记录被传送至其他国家的国务院办事处，其保密性得到维持。\n\n(c) 本节不适用于向下列对象作出的任何披露：\n\n(1) 因下列事项而有必要查阅信息的任何美国政府官员或承包商：\n\n(i) 对庇护申请的裁决；\n\n(ii) 审议可信恐惧或合理恐惧面谈请求，或可信恐惧或合理恐惧复核请求；\n\n(iii) 对因庇护申请的裁决或未裁决，或因根据 § 208.30 或 § 208.31 作出的可信恐惧认定或合理恐惧认定而产生的任何法律诉讼进行抗辩；\n\n(iv) 对庇护申请、可信恐惧认定或合理恐惧认定构成其一部分的任何法律诉讼进行抗辩；或\n\n(v) 与任何刑事或民事事项有关的任何美国政府调查；或\n\n(2) 审理下列任何法律诉讼的美国任何联邦、州或地方法院：\n\n(i) 因庇护申请的裁决或未裁决，或因根据 § 208.30 或 § 208.31 作出的可信恐惧或合理恐惧认定而产生；或\n\n(ii) 因庇护申请、可信恐惧认定或合理恐惧认定构成其一部分的程序而产生。\n\n常见问题\n\n1. 问：为何该法规保护与庇护有关的信息免于披露？\n\n答：公开披露与庇护有关的信息，可能在申请人被遣返时使其遭受政府当局或非国家行为者的报复性措施，或者危及仍可能居住在原籍国的申请人家庭成员的安全。此外，公开披露还可能在某些有限情形下，通过使原本不符合资格的申请人引起其曾指称实施虐待的政府当局或非国家行为者的注意，从而产生原本不会存在的表面成立的保护申请理由。由于难民申请人的信息被向第三方披露时亦面临类似的不利后果，作为政策事项，USCIS 将 8 CFR 208.6 所述的相同保护延伸适用于难民。\n\n2. 问：在何种具体情形下可以向第三方披露与庇护有关的信息？\n\n答：一般而言，未经庇护申请人书面同意或国土安全部长特别授权，不得与第三方分享与庇护有关的信息。但是，该一般禁止规定不适用于 8 CFR 208.6 所规定的下列有限情形：\n\n(1) 任何因下列事项而有必要查阅信息的美国政府官员或承包商：\n\n(i) 对庇护申请的裁决；\n\n(ii) 对可信恐惧或合理恐惧面谈请求，或可信恐惧或合理恐惧复审的审议；\n\n(iii) 对因庇护申请的裁决或未予裁决，或因根据 § 208.30 或 § 208.31 作出的可信恐惧认定或合理恐惧认定而引起的任何法律诉讼进行抗辩；\n\n(iv) 对庇护申请、可信恐惧认定或合理恐惧认定构成其一部分的任何法律诉讼进行抗辩；或\n\n(v) 美国政府就任何刑事或民事事项进行的任何调查；或\n\n(2) 审理下列任何法律诉讼的任何美国联邦、州或地方法院：\n\n(i) 因庇护申请的裁决或未予裁决，或因根据 § 208.30 或 § 208.31 作出的可信恐惧或合理恐惧认定而引起；或\n\n(ii) 因庇护申请、可信恐惧认定或合理恐惧认定构成其一部分的程序而引起。”\n3. 问：与庇护相关的信息在何种范围内可以向国土安全部（Department of Homeland Security，DHS）内部人员披露，例如移民和海关执法局（Immigration and Customs Enforcement，ICE）或海关和边境保护局（Customs and Border Protection，CBP）人员？\n\n答：与庇护相关的信息可以向 ICE 和 CBP 人员披露，因为就 8 CFR 208.6 而言，他们不被视为“第三方”。受保护的庇护相关信息也可以向 DHS 直接政策和法律指挥链内的办公室披露，例如 DHS Office of General Counsel（国土安全部总法律顾问办公室）、Office of the Undersecretary for Border and Transportation Security（边境和运输安全次长办公室，BTS）、Office of the Deputy Secretary（副部长办公室）和 Office of the Secretary（部长办公室）。\n\n4. 问：如不适用任何监管例外，关于庇护申请人的哪些信息（如有）可以在不违反保密义务的情况下与第三方共享？\n\n答：根据既定指导意见，如违反该法规向第三方披露包含在庇护申请中或与庇护申请有关的信息，即构成违反保密义务；且未经授权的披露具有使第三方能够将申请人的身份与下列事项联系起来的性质：(1) 申请人已申请庇护这一事实；(2)\n\n由 USCIS Asylum Division（美国公民及移民服务局庇护司）编制 日期：October 18, 2012\n\n庇护申请中所载与个人庇护申请主张有关的具体事实或指控；或 (3) 足以引起申请人已申请庇护这一合理推断的事实或指控。同样的原则适用于与可信恐惧和合理恐惧认定有关的信息披露。该等原则通常也适用于根据《禁止酷刑公约》第 3 条提出的禁止递解或暂缓递解申请，该等申请包含在庇护申请中。\n\n5. 问：根据该法规的例外规定，与庇护相关的信息能否向州执法机构或其他州机构披露？\n\n答：不能。除非取得庇护申请人的书面同意或国土安全部长的特别授权，保密法规不允许向州机构（包括州执法机构）披露与庇护相关的信息。但是，208.6(c)(2) 的法规规定，在某些情况下可以向州或地方法院披露。\n\n6. 问：根据该法规，寻求获得庇护相关信息且可以向其披露该等信息的美国政府官员或承包商，如何从 United States Citizenship and Immigration Services（美国公民及移民服务局，USCIS）取得该等信息？\n\n答：除非已存在机构间安排或协议，政府官员或承包商应直接向对该外国人申请具有管辖权的适当 USCIS Asylum Office Director（USCIS 庇护办公室主任）请求获取关于特定外国人的庇护相关信息。涉及符合特定已确定标准的外国人群体的庇护相关信息请求，必须由请求机构中的适当官员向 USCIS Asylum Division（USCIS 庇护司）司长提出。\n\n7. 问：如根据该法规适当地向第三方披露庇护相关信息，第三方就保密义务承担何种责任？\n\n答：作为庇护相关信息的新保管人，第三方接收方受 8 CFR 208.6 规定的保密法规约束。除法规授权外，接收方不得向其他方披露庇护相关信息。\n\n8. 问：在美国政府系统中处理或负责维护庇护相关信息的美国政府官员或承包商承担何种义务？\n\n答：在工作中接触庇护相关信息的美国政府官员或承包商，受 8 CFR 208.6 规定的保密法规约束。除法规授权外，该等人员不得向第三方披露庇护相关信息。在向第三方作出经授权的庇护相关信息披露时，该等人员应提醒第三方注意 8 CFR 208.6 的保密要求。\n\n由 USCIS Asylum Division（美国公民及移民服务局庇护司）编制 日期：October 18, 2012\n\n9. 问：庇护相关信息的非 USCIS 保管人，是否必须在根据该法规向另一方披露庇护相关信息之前获得 USCIS 的授权？\n\n答：不必。但是，信息传递方应采取合理措施，确保信息的新接收方知悉本文件所述保密规则，以防止新接收方未经授权披露。为此目的，传递方可考虑向新接收方提供本文件副本。\n\n10. 问：Intelligence Community（情报共同体）成员、具有反恐职能的机构与 USCIS 之间，是否就庇护相关信息的披露存在机构间安排？\n\n答：On October 8, 2001，Attorney General（司法部长）依据 8 CFR 208.6 行使其自由裁量权，允许 FBI（联邦调查局）查阅向 USCIS 提交的庇护申请，以收集与未决刑事或民事诉讼无关的外国反情报或国际恐怖主义信息。该安排后被一份 April 18, 2007 的备忘录所取代，该备忘录中 Secretary of Homeland Security Chertoff（国土安全部长切尔托夫）根据 8 CFR 208.6 行使其权限，允许向 U.S. Intelligence Community（美国情报共同体）的任何组成部分，或具有反恐职能的任何其他联邦或州机构披露庇护相关信息，条件是查阅该信息的需要或提出该请求，是与其获授权的情报或反恐职能有关，且所收到的信息将被用于其被请求提供的获授权目的。On August 25, 2011，Secretary Napolitano（国土安全部长纳波利塔诺）签署了 2007 Memorandum（2007 年备忘录）的补充文件。该补充文件扩大了庇护相关信息的共享范围，将其包括为与任何具有反恐职能的地方政府机构共享。\n\n一般而言，披露庇护相关信息的请求应使用 DHS Support Request Form（DHS 支持请求表）向 DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis Support Branch（国土安全部情报与分析支持处，IASB）提出。庇护信息请求必须包含详细理由，直接将该请求与获授权的情报或反恐职能相联系，因为 IASB 必须与 Privacy（隐私）、Intelligence Oversight（情报监督）和 General Counsel（总法律顾问）办公室核实请求。庇护信息请求必须经请求办公室中具有监督指挥权的个人批准。\n\n如披露请求，或在未提出请求时的预先披露，符合 DHS 与接收方之间任何适用的现行信息共享安排的条款和条件，则可不使用 DHS Support Request Form（DHS 支持请求表）进行披露。\n\n11. 问：接收庇护相关信息的情报共同体成员和具有反恐职能的机构，能否进一步传播该等信息？\n\n答：在某些有限情形下，收到庇护或难民相关信息的情报共同体组成部分，或具有反恐职能的其他联邦、州或地方政府机构，可以进一步传播该等信息，但该等\n\n由 USCIS Asylum Division（美国公民及移民服务局庇护司）编制 日期：October 18, 2012\n\n进一步披露必须经部长、副部长或与 USCIS 局长、ICE 助理部长或任何根据第 208.6(a) 条被授予披露权限的其他 DHS 官员协调行事的情报与分析次长授权。\n\n12. 问：是否存在任何其他机构间安排？\n\n答：是。In 2002，Attorney General（司法部长）授权 Asylum Division（庇护司）向 Department of Health and Human Services（卫生与公众服务部，HHS）下属 Office of Refugee Resettlement（难民安置办公室，ORR）披露获准庇护人员的生物资料，以使 ORR 能够满足国会报告要求，并生成用于分配庇护人员社会福利资金的统计报告。In 2001，Attorney General（司法部长）授权庇护司向 HHS 披露有关获得庇护者的某些生物资料，以使 ORR 和 Center for Disease Control（疾病控制中心，CDC）能够向符合资格的获得庇护者提供紧急救济。\n\n13. 问：庇护相关信息能否与外国政府或国际组织（例如 INTERPOL）共享？\n\n答：除非经庇护申请人书面同意，否则不得与外国政府或国际组织共享庇护相关信息，但国土安全部长可依其自由裁量决定。Secretary Napolitano（国土安全部长纳波利塔诺）已行使其自由裁量权，允许与 Canada（加拿大）、Australia（澳大利亚）、the United Kingdom（英国）和 New Zealand（新西兰）定期共享庇护相关信息。Secretary Ridge（国土安全部长里奇）最初于 2003 年允许与加拿大共享庇护相关信息。与加拿大的安排采取 Statement of Mutual Understanding on Information Sharing（信息共享相互谅解声明，SMU）及其 Asylum Annex（庇护附件）的形式，两者共同允许 Canada's Department of Citizenship and Immigration Canada（加拿大公民与移民部，CIC）和 USCIS 逐案及系统性地交换庇护相关记录。\n\n自 2003 年签署美国与加拿大之间 Statement of Mutual Understanding on Information Sharing（信息共享相互谅解声明）的庇护附件以来，USCIS 和 CIC 一直逐案定期交换庇护申请信息。最近，USCIS Asylum Division（USCIS 庇护司）已与 US-VISIT（美国访客与移民身份指示技术计划）合作，根据 Five Country Conference（五国会议，FCC）High Value Data Sharing Protocol（高价值数据共享协议，Protocol）中协议所定义的难民申请人共享相关信息。自 2010 年起，庇护司开始根据 FCC Protocol（FCC 协议）与加拿大、澳大利亚和英国进行信息共享。庇护司于 2011 年开始根据 FCC Protocol（FCC 协议）与新西兰进行信息共享。\n\n14. 问：为何与加拿大、澳大利亚、英国和新西兰订有特别信息共享协议？\n\n答：在 former Attorney General Ashcroft（前司法部长阿什克罗夫特）和 former Canadian Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Caplan（前加拿大公民与移民部长卡普兰）于 December 2, 2001 签署的协议中，庇护寻求者信息共享被列为一项倡议。它也是 Ridge-Manley Smart Border Action Plan（里奇—曼利智能边境行动计划）所列三十项倡议之一。为推进该项倡议，\n\n美国和加拿大政府于 2003 年达成一项正式安排，允许 USCIS（美国公民及移民服务局）和 CIC（加拿大公民及移民部）系统性地共享有关在美国或加拿大寻求庇护者的信息。随后通过五国会议（FCC）高价值数据共享协议（Protocol）与加拿大、澳大利亚、英国和新西兰达成的信息共享协议，进一步增强了 USCIS 获取与庇护裁决相关信息的能力。通过获得这些关键信息，USCIS 以及加拿大、澳大利亚、英国和新西兰的移民主管机关将提高其防止各自国家庇护程序遭受滥用以及作出准确庇护资格认定的能力，从而强化各国庇护制度的完整性。\n\n15. 问：与加拿大的信息共享安排实施情况如何？\n\n答：自 2003 年以来，USCIS 和 CIC 一直在逐案共享寻求庇护者的信息。截至 2010 年，USCIS 庇护司也与 US-VISIT 合作，根据五国会议（FCC）高价值数据共享协议（Protocol）与加拿大共享与庇护有关的信息。美国和加拿大于 2011 年达成的“超越边界”协议包括一项行动计划，以加强两国之间的信息共享。USCIS、CIC 及其技术专家正共同努力，开发全面自动化、系统性的信息共享机制，以在 2014 年前涵盖所有受生物特征信息采集要求约束的庇护申请人。\n\n16. 问：受保护的庇护相关信息可以与国会办公室共享吗？\n\n答：如具有管辖权的国会委员会主席就受保护的庇护相关信息提交书面请求，所请求的信息通常将不受该法规限制而予以提供。国会议员个人或其各自工作人员就庇护相关信息提出的书面请求，将逐案予以考虑。\n\n17. 问：当申请人已将庇护申请公之于众时，可以与新闻媒体共享哪些信息？\n\n答：由于该法规目前要求获得申请人的书面同意，即使庇护相关信息已属公共记录事项，我们通常也不承认默示放弃保密权。\n\n18. 问：8 CFR 208.6 是否适用于难民信息？\n\n答：作为一项政策，USCIS 将 8 CFR 208.6 所列的同等保护扩展适用于难民。\n\n如您对这些政策有任何疑问，请致电 202.272.1651 联系庇护司业务处处长。","key_entities":["Je","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Guo","Despins","CCP","Paul Hastings","Miles Guo","Chinese Communist Party"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":856,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1063,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1105,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1174,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1217,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":14379,"status":"published","published_at":"2022-12-13 00:00:00","created_at":"2022-12-13","updated_at":"2026-08-23 21:44:53"}