{"id":"court_ctb_1235_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":1235,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION :","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n:\n\n\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_ :\n\n:\n\n Debtors. : \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_:\n\nIn re : Chapter 11\n\nHO WAN KWOK, *et al.* : Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n## **INDIVIDUAL DEBTOR'S MOTION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL OF ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER**\n\nPursuant to Fed. R. Bank. P. 8007(a), the individual debtor, Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Individual Debtor\"), by and through his undersigned counsel, Zeisler & Zeisler, P. C. (\"Z&Z\"), respectfully moves for a stay (the \"Motion to Stay\") pending appeal of this Court's December 9, 2022 Order Granting in Part Motion for Protective Order (Doc. No. 1217, the \"Order\"). The Individual Debtor filed a notice of appeal of the Order on December 12, 2022. The Individual Debtor appeals from the Order and seeks a stay pending appeal to prevent chapter 11 trustee Luc A. Despins (the \"Trustee\") and the Trustee's counsel from obtaining a copy of the Individual Debtor's asylum application (the \"Asylum Application\") until the Individual Debtor can obtain appellate review of the Order. In support of his Motion to Stay, the Individual Debtor respectfully states as follows. [1](#page-0-0)\n\n## **I. INTRODUCTION**\n\n1. For the reasons set forth herein, the Individual Debtor has a substantial possibility of success on his appeal. The relief granted in the Order is extraordinary. The Order Compels the\n\n<span id=\"page-0-0\"></span><sup>1</sup> Pursuant to Fed. R. Bank. P. 8004, on December 13, 2022, the Individual Debtor also filed a motion for leave to appeal (the \"Motion for Leave\") prepared in accordance with Fed. R. Bank. P. 8004(b). In the Motion for Leave, the Individual Debtor petitions, in the alternative, for a writ of mandamus. *See Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Turner & Newall, PLC, 964 F.2d 159, 163 (2d Cir. 1992) (\"We have in the past treated appeals dismissed for lack of jurisdiction as petitions for a writ of mandamus\").*\n\nproduction of the Asylum Application, which is expressly prohibited by 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6 and 1208.6(a), and the Order articulates no substantive basis for why the express terms of those regulations do not apply. Simply stated: this Court does not have authority to compel the production of the Asylum Application in violation of 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6 and 1208.6(a).\n\n2. In addition to the substantial possibility of success on appeal, the issuance of a stay is warranted by the other factors that the Second Circuit balances when considering whether to grant a stay pending appeal. As demonstrated herein, (a) absent a stay, the Individual Debtor will be irreparably harmed if the Asylum Application is produced to the Trustee and his counsel, and the balance of hardships tips in his favor, (b) the Trustee will not suffer substantial injury if a stay is issued, and (c) the public interest supports a stay.\n\n#### **II. BACKGROUND**\n\n3. On February 15, 2022 (the \"Petition Date\"), the Individual Debtor filed his voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, thereby commencing the above-captioned bankruptcy case. On July 7, 2022, the Trustee was appointed. (*See* Doc. No. 514).\n\n4. One of the assets of the Individual Debtor's bankruptcy estate is a pre-petition action (the \"Malpractice Action\") that the Individual Debtor initiated against Clark Hill PLC (\"Clark Hill\"). In the Malpractice Action, the Individual Debtor alleges that he was harmed when Clark Hill's computer system was hacked, which allowed unauthorized persons to access the Asylum Application. Specifically, the Individual Debtor asserted, *inter alia*, that as a direct and proximate cause of Clark Hill's multiple breaches of their duties, the details and contents of the Asylum Application were disclosed widely on social media platforms and placed in the hands of third-parties hostile to the Individual Debtor. Clark Hill retained Jenner & Block, LLP (\"Jenner & Block\") to represent it in the Malpractice Action.\n\n5. On July 28, 2022, the Trustee filed his Omnibus Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee for Entry of Order under Bankruptcy Rule 2004 and Local Rule 2004-1 Authorizing Discovery with Respect to Various Legal and Financial Advisors to the Debtor (Doc. No. 637, the \"Professionals 2004 Motion\"), seeking to conduct the examination of Clark Hill.\n\n6. The Individual Debtor filed a limited objection (Doc. No. 703) to the Professionals 2004 Motion on August 5, 2022, on the grounds that if the proposed order filed therewith were entered and interpreted literally, it would preclude objections, including based upon privilege, in violation of Bankr. L. R. 2004-1.\n\n7. On August 16, 2022, the Bankruptcy Court entered the Order Granting Chapter 11 Trustee's Application for Rule 2004 Discovery with Respect to Various Legal and Financial Advisors to the Debtor (the \"Order Granting the Professionals 2004 Motion\") (Doc. No. 756). The Order Granting the Professionals 2004 Motion, *inter alia*, permitted service of a subpoena upon Clark Hill (the \"Subpoena\"), but directed that compliance was \"[s]ubject to any rights under the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and applicable Local Rules[.]\" Thus, the Bankruptcy Court modified the Trustee' proposed order granting the Professionals 2004 Motion so as to preserve the Individual Debtor's and the recipients of the subpoenas' rights to object to the substance of the subpoenas.\n\n8. On August 18, 2022, the Trustee gave notice that it would serve the Subpoena upon Clark Hill.\n\n9. On September 14, 2022, this Court entered the Consent Order Regarding Control of Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Protection Related to Rule 2004 Subpoenaed Documents and Information (Doc. No. 856, the \"Consent Order\"). The Consent Order defined the scope of the Trustee's and Individual Debtor's respective control of the attorney-client and work-\n\nproduct privileges and set forth certain procedures for disputes concerning the same. Moreover,\n\nthe Consent Order specifically provided:\n\nNothing herein shall prevent the Debtor from asserting any and all privileges concerning legal matters unrelated to the Investigation Topics, such as unrelated criminal allegations or the Debtor's asylum application (other than documents related to the litigation styled as *Guo Wengui v. Clark Hill, PLC*, Case No. 19-cv-03195 (D. D.C.) [(the \"Clark Hill Action\")] that relate to the merits of the legal malpractice action, as distinguished from the merits of the Debtor's asylum application, subject to the balancing test incorporated herein, **which does not relate to the substance of the asylum application**).\n\n(Consent Order, ¶ 4.) (emphasis added). The Investigation Activities are limited to the Debtors' assets, financial condition, or activities related to the administration of the bankruptcy estate, which, per the Consent Order, \"does not relate to the substance of the asylum application.\" (*Id.*, ¶¶ 2, 4.)\n\n10. During the hearings held in the Bankruptcy Court concerning the negotiation of the Consent Order, the Trustee and his counsel each represented—and separately so—that the Trustee was not seeking the Debtor's Asylum Application. (See ¶¶ 11-12 of Motion for Leave, Doc No. 1228).\n\n11. Thereafter, pursuant to discussions among the Individual Debtor's counsel and Clark Hill's counsel, it was agreed that Clark Hill would produce documents responsive to the Subpoena to the Individual Debtor's counsel for review.\n\n12. Clark Hill's counsel produced documents, which included the Asylum Application, to the Individual Debtor's counsel to review for personal harm as defined by the Consent Order. Thereafter, counsel for the Individual Debtor asserted to the Trustee's counsel that the Asylum Application is prohibited from disclosure and requested to Clark Hill's counsel that it refrain from producing the Asylum Application to allow the Individual Debtor an opportunity to seek a protective order.\n\n13. Consequently, the Individual Debtor filed the Motion for Protective Order (ECF No. 1063) with the Bankruptcy Court. The Trustee objected, claiming that his and his counsel's statements to the Bankruptcy Court during hearings concerning the Consent Order were inapplicable because the Trustee did not appreciate at the time that Clark Hill had attached the Asylum Application to its Motion for Summary Judgment, which was filed under seal in the Malpractice Action.\n\n14. After hearings held on November 30, 2022, and December 2, 2022, to consider the Individual Debtor's Motion for Protective Order, this Court issued the Order attached hereto as **Exhibit A**. [2](#page-4-0)\n\n15. In the three-page Order that did not reference either 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6 or 1208.6(a), this Court held that the Trustee and his counsel \"need access to the Motion for Summary Judgment and the Asylum Application to prosecute the Malpractice Action[.]\" (Order, at 2). Consequently, this Court ordered that Jenner & Block (as Clark Hill's counsel) \"is authorized to produce the Motion for Summary Judgment and the Asylum Application\" to the Trustee and his counsel. (*Id*., at 3).[3](#page-4-1)\n\n16. On December 12, 2022, the Individual Debtor filed a Notice of Appeal and on December 13, 2022, he filed his Motion for Leave to File Appeal of Order Granting in Part Motion for Protective Order and, In the Alternative, Petition for Writ of Mandamus.[4](#page-4-2)\n\n<span id=\"page-4-0\"></span><sup>2</sup> This Court's Order references a hearing on November 30, 2022, and December 1, 2022. In actuality, the second hearing to consider the Motion for Protective Order was held on December 2, 2022.\n\n<span id=\"page-4-1\"></span><sup>3</sup> Though the Subpoena was directed at *Clark Hill*, at oral argument concerning the Individual Debtor's Motion for Protective Order*, the Trustee orally requested that Jenner & Block be authorized to produce the Asylum Application*. The Individual Debtor objected, asserting that the Trustee's request was procedurally improper. Nonetheless, this Court without any analysis in the Order, authorized Jenner & Block to produce the Asylum Application.\n\n<span id=\"page-4-2\"></span><sup>4</sup> The Individual Debtor does not object to the Trustee receiving Clark Hill's Motion for Summary Judgment and exhibits thereto that do not contain content from his Asylum Application.\n\n#### **III. ARGUMENT**\n\n17. Fed. R. Bank. P. 8007(a)(1)(A) provides that \"[o]rdinarily a party must move first in the bankruptcy court for … a stay of a judgment, order, or decree of the bankruptcy court pending appeal ….\"\n\n18. The Second Circuit has articulated the following four-prong test in determining whether to issue a stay of an order pending appeal: (a) whether there is a probability or possibility of success, or substantial probability or possibility of success, or serious legal questions going to the merits; (b) irreparable injury, balance of hardships tipping in favor of, or some injury to the movant if a stay is denied; (c) substantial injury to the party opposing a stay if one is issued; and (d) the public interest. *Mohammed v. Reno*, 309 F.3d 95, 100-01 (2nd Cir. 2002); *see also United States v. Grote,* 961 F.3d 105, 122-23 (2nd Cir. 2020) (standard is (1) whether a movant will suffer irreparable injury absent a stay, (2) whether a party will suffer substantial injury if a stay is issued, (3) whether the movant has demonstrated a substantial possibility, although less than a likelihood, of success on appeal, and (4) the public interest that may be affected); *Hirschfeld v. Bd. Of Elections of N.Y.*, 984 F.2d 35, 39 (2nd Cir. 1993) (same).\n\n19. The \"degree to which a factor must be present varies with the strength of the other factors, meaning more of one excuses less of the other.\" *McCue v. City of New York (In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig.)*, 503 F.3d 167, 170 (2nd Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); *see also Mohammed*, 309 F.3d at 100-01 (\"[W]e see considerable merit in the approach expressed by the District of Columbia Circuit: 'The necessary 'level' or 'degree' of possibility of success will vary according to the court's assessment of the other [stay] factors.' Applying that test, that Circuit has granted a stay pending appeal where the likelihood of success is not high but the balance of hardships favors the applicant, and has stated that a stay may be granted where the probability of success is 'high' and 'some injury' has been shown. As the Sixth Circuit has explained, 'The probability of success that must be demonstrated is inversely proportional to the amount of injury plaintiff[ ] will suffer absent the stay. Simply stated, more of one excuses less of the other.'\" (citations omitted)); *In re Taub*, 470 B.R. 273, 278 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2012) (\"The requisite showing of substantial possibility of success is inversely proportional to the amount of injury [the movant] will suffer absent the stay.\").\n\n## **a. The Individual Debtor has a Substantial Possibility of Success on Appeal or, at the Very Least, there are Serious Legal Questions Going to the Merits**\n\n20. The Individual Debtor has demonstrated a substantial possibility of success on his appeal of the Order. Pursuant to the Order, this Court has authorized Jenner & Block to produce the Asylum Application to the Trustee in violation of 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6 and 1208.6(a). This Court's entry of the Order thus constitutes a clear error of law.\n\n21. The Immigration and Nationality Act (\"INA\") \"prohibits the disclosure of information pertaining to any asylum application. . . .\" *Zhong Rong Li v. Gonzales*, 181 F. App'x 124, 128 (2d Cir. 2006); *see also Gafurova v. Whitaker*, 911 F.3d 321, 328 n.3 (6th Cir. 2018) (the INA \"generally prohibit[s] the disclosure to third parties of any information relating to an asylum application without the written consent of the applicant unless permitted by the listed exceptions or at the discretion of the [Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security]\") (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6, 1208.6(a)).\n\n22. Specifically, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a) provides:[5](#page-6-0)\n\nInformation contained in or pertaining to any application for refugee admission, asylum, withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3) of the Act, or protection under regulations issued pursuant to the\n\n<span id=\"page-6-0\"></span><sup>5</sup> 8 C.F.R. § 208.6(a) is identical, except it authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security, rather than the Attorney General, to permit the disclosure of information contained in or pertaining to an asylum application. For ease of reference, this Motion/Petition cites to only 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6 except where necessary.\n\nConvention Against Torture's implementing legislation, records pertaining to any credible fear determination conducted pursuant to § 208.30, and records pertaining to any reasonable fear determination conducted pursuant to § 208.31, shall not be disclosed without the written consent of the applicant, except as permitted by this section or at the discretion of the [Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security].\n\n23. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a), along with the substantially similar 8 C.F.R. § 208.6(a), \"establish a 'right' of asylum seekers 'to keep confidential any information contained in or pertaining to an asylum application that allows a third party to link the identity of the applicant to: (1) the fact that the applicant has applied for asylum; (2) specific facts or allegations pertaining to the individual asylum claim contained in an asylum application; or (3) facts or allegations that are sufficient to give rise to a reasonable inference that the applicant has applied for asylum.'\" *Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. Nielsen*, No. 17-cv-02366-BAS-KSC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210401, at \\*22 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2017) (citation omitted).\n\n24. \"These regulations 'safeguard information that, if disclosed publicly, could subject the claimant to retaliatory measures by government authorities or non-state actors in the event that the claimant is repatriated, or endanger the security of the claimant's family members who may still be residing in the country of origin.'\" *Id*., at\\*22-23, *quoting* U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. Asylum Div., *Fact Sheet: Federal Regulations Protecting the Confidentiality of Asylum Applications* (Oct. 12, 2011).\n\n25. Importantly, nothing within the text of 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a) limits its application so as to only preclude disclosure of an asylum application by government actors. Rather, *only certain exceptions* to the general prohibition against disclosure of an asylum application in 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a) apply only to government actors. *E.g.*, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(c) (\"**This section**\n\n# **shall not apply to any disclosure to: (1) Any United States Government official or contractor having a need to examine information in connection with**. . . .\") (emphasis added).\n\n26. Further evidencing the confidentiality of asylum applications, the *Federal Regulation Protecting the Confidentiality of Asylum Applicants Synopsis* (the \"Synopsis\") prepared by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services agency, attached hereto as **Exhibit B**, expressly states that third parties who receive an asylum application are bound by the confidentiality regulations. *See Synopsis, Frequently Asked Question 2*, at p. 3 (\"In general, asylum-related information must not be shared with third parties without the asylum applicant's written consent or the Secretary of Homeland Security's specific authorization.\"); *Frequently Asked Question 7*, at p. 4 (Q: If asylum-related information is properly disclosed to a third party pursuant to the regulation, what is the third party's obligation with respect to confidentiality? A: *As the new custodian of the asylum-related information, the third-party recipient is bound by the confidentiality regulation under 8 CFR 208.6.*\") (emphasis added).\n\n27. Additionally, at least one court in the District of Connecticut has denied a \"motion to compel the production of documents concerning [an individual plaintiff's] asylum application\" to the defendant in that action on the basis that such material is not generally subject to disclosure, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant argued that the content of the plaintiff's asylum application was relevant to the plaintiff's claim for infliction of emotional distress. *See Bakhit v. Safety Marking, Inc.*, No. 3:13CV1049 (JCH), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192934, at \\*9 (D. Conn. Feb. 17, 2015).\n\n28. Thus, it is clear that the Asylum Application is protected from disclosure by 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a), and that no exception is applicable to permit disclosure.[6](#page-9-0) *See* 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(c)-(e).\n\n29. Further, there is nothing in the Bankruptcy Code that enables this Court to overrule the express provisions of 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a). Indeed, although Bankruptcy Code section 521(a)(3) provides that a debtor shall \"cooperate with the trustee as necessary to enable the trustee to perform the trustee's duties under this title,\" a \"[d]ebtor's duty to cooperate with the Trustee does not specifically require a debtor to waive privilege.\" *Coyle v. Coyle (In re Coyle)*, 538 B.R. 753, 763-64 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2015). Similarly, the Individual Debtor's duty to cooperate with the Trustee does not require the Individual Debtor to consent to (much less authorize this Court to authorize over the Individual Debtor's objection) the production of the confidential Asylum Application to the Trustee.\n\n30. Finally, the Order provides for extreme relief in that it eviscerates the protections afforded to the Individual Debtor by 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a) while providing no authority for its holding. In the Order, this Court merely concluded that \"the Trustee and his counsel need access to the Motion for Summary Judgment and the Asylum Application to prosecute the Malpractice\n\n<span id=\"page-9-0\"></span><sup>6</sup> In addition, the Asylum Application does not relate to the Investigation Activities of the Trustee – *i.e.*, investigation of the Debtor's assets, financial condition, and administration of the estate—a fact that the Trustee's counsel repeatedly represented to the Court during the hearings concerning the Consent Order. Moreover, in light of the fact that the Subpoena had already been served when the Trustee's counsel made those representations in open court, the Subpoena cannot reasonably be construed to seek to compel Clark Hill to produce the Individual Debtor's Asylum Application. Simply stated, since the Trustee represented in open court that the Subpoena did not seek to compel the production of the Asylum Application, and the Court entered an order expressly relying on that representation; *see Exhibit B*, at 67:20-68:5; the Trustee is judicially estopped from arguing that the Subpoena compels (or even permits) Clark Hill to produce the Asylum Application. *Intellivision v. Microsoft Corp.*, 484 F. App'x 616, 620 (2d Cir. 2012) (\"[T]he [Supreme] Court has stated that judicial estoppel 'generally prevents a party from prevailing in one phase of a case on an argument and then relying on a contradictory argument to prevail in another phase.'\" (*quoting New Hampshire v. Maine*, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001)).\n\nAction\" and the \"production of these documents to the Trustee and his counsel will not result in personal harm to the Individual Debtor.\" (Order, at 2). Without meaningful analysis, the extreme relief granted by the Order is unwarranted and unsupported.\n\n# **b. The Individual Debtor Will Likely Suffer Irreparable Injury Absent a Stay and the Balance of Hardships Tip in Favor of the Individual Debtor**\n\n31. Absent a stay, the Individual Debtor will likely suffer irreparable injury, or at the very least, the balance of hardships tips in his favor.\n\n32. The purpose of 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a) is to \"'safeguard information that, if disclosed publicly, could subject the claimant to retaliatory measures by government authorities or non-state actors in the event that the claimant is repatriated, or endanger the security of the claimant's family members who may still be residing in the country of origin.'\" *Al Otro Lado, Inc.*, No. 17-cv-02366- BAS-KSC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210401, at \\*22-23, *quoting* U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. Asylum Div., *Fact Sheet: Federal Regulations Protecting the Confidentiality of Asylum Applications* (Oct. 12, 2011).\n\n33. Authorizing the production of the Asylum Application in violation of 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a) harms the Individual Debtor because, with each additional entity that maintains a copy of the Asylum Application, the risk that the Asylum Application falls into the hands of individuals who wish to do the Individual Debtor harm (including the CCP and its agents) rises incrementally, as evidenced by the hack of Clark Hill's computer system. Despite their presumably best technological and security efforts, the Trustee and his counsel maintaining copies of the Asylum Application increases the potential for hackers to obtain copies of the Asylum Application—just as Clark Hill's maintenance of the Asylum Application did—further infringing on the Individual Debtor's privacy and potential safety.\n\n34. In similar circumstances involving privileged documents – protected from disclosure not by Federal regulations but by doctrines such as the attorney-client privilege – courts have held that forced disclosure of material may bring about irreparable harm. *See*, *e.g.*, *In re Search Warrant Issued June 13, 2019)*, 942 F.3d at 175 (\"In ruling that the law firm had not established a likelihood of irreparable harm, the district court erred as a matter of law by affording insignificant weight to the … principles protecting attorney-client relationships. Crucially, the court failed to recognize that an adverse party's review of privileged materials seriously harms the privilege holder.\" (internal citation omitted)); *United States v. Philip Morris, Inc.*, 314 F.3d 612, 621-22 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (\"Although [the party] 'has not asserted any specific irreparable injury that would occur' if it produced the [document], the general injury caused by the breach of the attorney-client privilege and the harm resulting from the disclosure of the privileged documents to an adverse party is clear enough.\") *In re Perrigo Co*., 128 F.3d 430, 437 (6th Cir. 1997) (\"We find, as have several courts, that forced disclosure of privileged material may bring about irreparable harm.\"); *Kelly v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Ford Motor Co.)*, 110 F.3d 954, 963 (9th Cir. 1997) (\"[O]nce putatively protected material is disclosed, the very 'right sought to be protected' has been destroyed.\" (quoting *Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp*., 738 F.2d 587, 591 (3rd Cir. 1984))); *Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States District Court*, 881 F.2d 1486, 1491 (9th Cir. 1989) (\"In view of the irreparable harm a party will suffer if erroneously required to disclose privileged materials or communications, courts have recognized the propriety of using mandamus for the review of orders compelling discovery in the face of assertions of absolute privilege.\").\n\n35. Here, this Court is authorizing the production of confidential and sensitive information relating to the Individual Debtor's Asylum Application over his objection and in violation of Federal regulations. The Individual Debtor is therefore being deprived of his rights\n\nunder 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a) and, once Jenner & Block produces the Debtor's Asylum Application to the Trustee, the Individual Debtor's rights under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a) will be destroyed. A stay is necessary to prevent such harm, particularly considering the clearly erroneous nature of the relief granted in the Order.\n\n#### **c. The Trustee Will Not Suffer Substantial Injury if this Court Stays the Order**\n\n36. Even assuming the Trustee and his counsel need the Asylum Application to evaluate the ultimate merits of the Malpractice Action (and the Individual Debtor submits that they do not), the Trustee's investigation of the Malpractice Action will likely take longer than it will for the Individual Debtor to obtain appellate review of the Order—which would eliminate any hypothetical injury to the Trustee from a stay that might otherwise justify declining to stay the Order. *See In re Search Warrant Issued June 13, 2019*, 942 F.3d at 181-82 (delay in investigation did not outweigh potential disclosure of privilege materials); *United States v. Philip Morris, Inc*., 314 F.3d 612, 622 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (\"A mere assertion of delay does not constitute substantial harm.\").\n\n37. Moreover, the Malpractice Action itself is currently stayed until *at least* December 30, 2022. *See Wengui v. Clark Hill Plc, et al.*, Case No. 12-cv-3195 (D.D.C.), at Doc. No. 98 (the parties' \"Joint Status Report\" stating that they \"request that the Court continue its stay until December 30, 2022\"), 12/1/22 Minute Order (\"The Court ADOPTS the parties' 98 Status Report and ORDERS that they shall file a further JSR by December 30, 2022. So ORDERED by Judge James E. Boasberg on 12/1/2022\"). Insofar as the Malpractice Action itself was already stayed pending an adjudication of the Individual Debtor's Motion for Protective Order, a stay to seek appellate review of the Order (and thus a likely further stay of the Malpractice Action) will not harm the Trustee.\n\n#### **d. The Public Interest Supports a Stay**\n\n38. The public interest militates in favor of a stay. In issuing the Order, this Court deviated from (and seemingly failed to consider) the protections afforded to the Individual Debtor under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6. Indeed, the Individual Debtor's privacy rights in the Asylum Application enshrined by Congress in the INA were effectively eliminated.\n\n39. The chilling effects of such an order are profound, as persons may be dissuaded in seeking much-needed bankruptcy protection to avoid producing \"information that, if disclosed publicly, could subject the claimant to retaliatory measures by government authorities or non-state actors in the event that the claimant is repatriated, or endanger the security of the claimant's family members who may still be residing in the country of origin.\" *Al Otro Lado, Inc.*, No. 17-cv-02366- BAS-KSC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210401, at \\*22-23, *quoting* U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. Asylum Div., *Fact Sheet: Federal Regulations Protecting the Confidentiality of Asylum Applications* (Oct. 12, 2011).\n\n40. One of the purposes of bankruptcy proceedings is \"to relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes.\" *Williams v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co.*, 236 U.S. 549, 554-55, 35 S. Ct. 289, 290 (1915). It is simply unjust to force an individual bankruptcy debtor to choose between obtaining such relief and protecting himself and his family from retaliatory measures by government authorities or non-state actors.\n\n41. Accordingly, the Individual Debtor respectfully submits that it is in the public's interest for this Court to stay the Order (and thereby allow the Individual Debtor to obtain meaningful appellate review of the Order), which would eliminate the chilling effects that might\n\nbefall would-be or actual debtors with contemplated, pending, or completed asylum applications at least until an appropriate appellate review has been completed.\n\n# **IV. CONCLUSION**\n\n42. For the reasons set forth above, this Court should (a) issue a stay of the Order pending the Individual Debtor's appeal of the Order and (b) grant the Individual Debtor such other and further relief as justice requires.\n\n# THE DEBTOR, HO WAN KWOK\n\n By: */s/ Aaron A. Romney*  Aaron A. Romney (ct28144) ZEISLER & ZEISLER, P.C. 10 Middle Street, 15th floor Bridgeport, CT 06605 Telephone: (203) 368-4234 Facsimile: (203) 368-0903 Email: [aromney@zeislaw.com](mailto:aromney@zeislaw.com)\n\n### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI hereby certify that on this 13th day of December, 2022, a copy of foregoing was filed electronically. Notice of this filing will be sent by e-mail to all parties by operation of the Court's electronic filing system or by mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing as indicated on the Notice of Electronic Filing. Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF System.\n\n By: */s/ Aaron A. Romney*  Aaron A. Romney (ct28144)","body_zh":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION（美国康涅狄格联邦破产法院布里奇波特分庭）\n\n：\n\n＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿ ：\n\n债务人。 ： ＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿：\n\n关于 ： 第11章\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等 ： 案号 22-50073 (JAM)\n个别债务人关于在对部分准许保护令动议的命令提起上诉期间中止执行的动议\n\n根据 Fed. R. Bank. P. 8007(a)，个别债务人 Ho Wan Kwok（以下简称“个别债务人”）通过其下方署名的代理律师 Zeisler & Zeisler, P. C.（以下简称“Z&Z”），谨此请求在对本院于 December 9, 2022 作出的部分准许保护令动议的命令（Doc. No. 1217，以下简称“该命令”）提起上诉期间中止执行（以下简称“中止执行动议”）。个别债务人于 December 12, 2022 就该命令提交了上诉通知。个别债务人就该命令提起上诉，并请求在上诉期间中止执行，以防止第11章受托人 Luc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯平斯，以下简称“受托人”）及受托人的律师，在个别债务人能够就该命令获得上诉审查之前取得个别债务人庇护申请（以下简称“庇护申请”）的副本。为支持其中止执行动议，个别债务人谨陈如下。[1]\n\n一、引言\n\n1. 基于本文所述理由，个别债务人的上诉具有实质性的胜诉可能性。该命令所授予的救济具有非同寻常性。该命令强制提交庇护申请，而 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6 and 1208.6(a) 明确禁止该等提交；该命令亦未阐明任何实质性依据说明为何该等法规的明确条款不适用。简言之：本院无权违反 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6 and 1208.6(a) 强制提交庇护申请。\n\n1 根据 Fed. R. Bank. P. 8004，个别债务人亦于 December 13, 2022 提交了依照 Fed. R. Bank. P. 8004(b) 编制的上诉许可动议（以下简称“许可动议”）。个别债务人在许可动议中备位请求签发调卷令。参见 Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.（大通曼哈顿银行，全国协会） v. Turner & Newall, PLC（特纳和纽奥尔公众有限公司）, 964 F.2d 159, 163 (2d Cir. 1992)（“我们过去曾将因缺乏管辖权而被驳回的上诉视为调卷令申请”）。\n\n2. 除上诉具有实质性的胜诉可能性外，第二巡回法院在考虑是否准许上诉期间中止执行时所权衡的其他因素亦支持签发中止执行令。如本文所示，(a) 如不予中止执行，若庇护申请被提交给受托人及其律师，个别债务人将遭受不可弥补的损害，且利益衡量偏向其一方；(b) 如签发中止执行令，受托人不会遭受实质性损害；以及 (c) 公共利益支持中止执行。\n\n二、背景\n\n3. 于 February 15, 2022（以下简称“申请日”），个别债务人根据《破产法》第11章提交了自愿救济申请，从而启动了上述标题的破产案件。于 July 7, 2022，受托人获任命。（见 Doc. No. 514）。\n\n4. 个别债务人破产财产的一项资产是个别债务人针对 Clark Hill PLC（克拉克·希尔律师事务所，以下简称“Clark Hill”）提起的一宗申请前诉讼（以下简称“执业过失诉讼”）。在该执业过失诉讼中，个别债务人主张，Clark Hill 的计算机系统遭黑客入侵，致使未经授权之人得以访问庇护申请，因而使其受到损害。具体而言，个别债务人主张，除其他事项外，作为 Clark Hill 多次违反其职责的直接和近因结果，庇护申请的细节和内容被广泛披露于社交媒体平台，并落入对个别债务人抱有敌意的第三方之手。Clark Hill 聘请 Jenner & Block, LLP（詹纳与布洛克律师事务所，以下简称“Jenner & Block”）在该执业过失诉讼中代理其行事。\n\n5. 于 July 28, 2022，受托人提交了《第11章受托人根据破产规则 2004 及地方法规则 2004-1 请求作出命令，授权就债务人的各法律及财务顾问进行证据开示的综合动议》（Doc. No. 637，以下简称“专业人士 2004 动议”），请求对 Clark Hill 进行审查。\n\n6. 个别债务人于 August 5, 2022 对专业人士 2004 动议提出有限异议（Doc. No. 703），理由是，如随附提交的拟议命令获作出并按字面解释，其将排除包括基于特权在内的异议，违反 Bankr. L. R. 2004-1。\n\n7. 于 August 16, 2022，破产法院作出《准许第11章受托人根据规则 2004 就债务人的各法律及财务顾问进行证据开示申请的命令》（以下简称“准许专业人士 2004 动议的命令”）（Doc. No. 756）。除其他事项外，准许专业人士 2004 动议的命令允许向 Clark Hill 送达传票（以下简称“传票”），但指示其遵守须“[s]ubject to any rights under the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and applicable Local Rules[.]”。因此，破产法院修改了受托人拟议的准许专业人士 2004 动议的命令，以保留个别债务人及传票收件人就传票实质内容提出异议的权利。\n\n8. 于 August 18, 2022，受托人通知其将向 Clark Hill 送达传票。\n\n9. 于 September 14, 2022，本院作出《关于与根据规则 2004 传唤的文件及信息有关的律师—当事人特权及工作成果保护控制权的同意裁定》（Doc. No. 856，以下简称“同意裁定”）。该同意裁定界定了受托人与个别债务人各自对律师—当事人特权及工作成果特权的控制范围，并规定了处理有关该等事项争议的若干程序。此外，同意裁定具体规定：\n\n本裁定中的任何内容均不妨碍债务人就与调查事项无关的法律事项主张任何及一切特权，例如无关的刑事指控或债务人的庇护申请（但与名为 Guo Wengui（郭文贵） v. Clark Hill, PLC, Case No. 19-cv-03195 (D. D.C.)［以下简称“Clark Hill 诉讼”］的诉讼有关、且涉及法律执业过失诉讼实体问题而非债务人庇护申请实体问题的文件除外；该等文件须受纳入本裁定的利益衡量测试约束，而该测试并不涉及庇护申请的实质内容）。\n\n（同意裁定，第 4 段。）（着重号为原文所加）。调查活动仅限于债务人的资产、财务状况或与破产财产管理有关的活动；根据同意裁定，该等活动“并不涉及庇护申请的实质内容”。（同上，第 2、4 段。）\n\n10. 在破产法院就同意裁定的协商举行的听证中，受托人及其律师均曾作出陈述——且各自分别作出该等陈述——即受托人并不寻求取得债务人的庇护申请。（见许可动议第 11-12 段，Doc No. 1228）。\n\n11. 此后，根据个别债务人的律师与 Clark Hill 的律师之间的讨论，各方同意 Clark Hill 将向个别债务人的律师提交对传票作出回应的文件以供审查。\n\n12. Clark Hill 的律师向个别债务人的律师提交文件，其中包括庇护申请，以供其审查是否存在同意裁定所界定的人身损害。此后，个别债务人的律师向受托人的律师主张，禁止披露庇护申请，并请求 Clark Hill 的律师不要提交庇护申请，以使个别债务人有机会寻求保护令。\n\n13. 因此，个别债务人向破产法院提交了保护令动议（ECF No. 1063）。受托人提出异议，主张其本人及其律师在就同意裁定举行的听证期间向破产法院作出的陈述不适用，因为受托人当时并未意识到 Clark Hill 已将庇护申请作为其简易判决动议的附件，而该动议是在执业过失诉讼中密封提交的。\n\n14. 在于 November 30, 2022 及 December 2, 2022 举行的听证中审议个别债务人的保护令动议后，本院作出随附于此作为附件 A 的该命令。[2]\n\n15. 在未提及 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6 或 1208.6(a) 的三页命令中，本院认定受托人及其律师“需要查阅简易判决动议及庇护申请，以推进执业过失诉讼[。]”（命令，第 2 页）。因此，本院命令 Jenner & Block（作为 Clark Hill 的律师）“获授权向受托人及其律师提交简易判决动议及庇护申请”。（同上，第 3 页）。[3]\n\n16. 于 December 12, 2022，个别债务人提交了上诉通知；于 December 13, 2022，其提交了《关于部分准许保护令动议的命令之上诉许可动议，以及备位的调卷令申请》。[4]\n\n2 本院的命令提及于 November 30, 2022 及 December 1, 2022 举行的听证。事实上，审议保护令动议的第二次听证于 December 2, 2022 举行。\n\n3 尽管传票是向 Clark Hill 发出的，但在就个别债务人的保护令动议进行口头辩论时，受托人口头请求授权 Jenner & Block 提交庇护申请。个别债务人提出异议，主张受托人的请求在程序上不当。然而，本院在命令中未作任何分析，仍授权 Jenner & Block 提交庇护申请。\n\n4 个别债务人不反对受托人取得 Clark Hill 的简易判决动议及其所附不包含其庇护申请内容的证据材料。\n\n三、论证\n\n17. Fed. R. Bank. P. 8007(a)(1)(A) 规定：“[o]rdinarily a party must move first in the bankruptcy court for … a stay of a judgment, order, or decree of the bankruptcy court pending appeal …。”\n\n18. 第二巡回法院就决定是否在对命令提起上诉期间中止执行，阐明了以下四项测试标准：(a) 是否存在胜诉的概率或可能性，或实质性的胜诉概率或可能性，或涉及实体问题的重大法律问题；(b) 如驳回中止执行，是否会对动议方造成不可弥补的损害、利益衡量是否偏向动议方，或动议方是否会遭受某种损害；(c) 如签发中止执行令，反对中止执行的一方是否会遭受实质性损害；以及 (d) 公共利益。Mohammed v. Reno, 309 F.3d 95, 100-01 (2nd Cir. 2002)；另见 United States v. Grote, 961 F.3d 105, 122-23 (2nd Cir. 2020)（标准为：(1) 如不予中止执行，动议方是否将遭受不可弥补的损害；(2) 如签发中止执行令，一方是否将遭受实质性损害；(3) 动议方是否已证明其在上诉中具有实质性的、尽管低于胜诉可能性的成功可能性；以及 (4) 可能受影响的公共利益）；Hirschfeld v. Bd. Of Elections of N.Y., 984 F.2d 35, 39 (2nd Cir. 1993)（同上）。\n\n19. “某一因素必须具备的程度，随其他因素的强弱而变化；这意味着其中一项越多，对另一项的要求就越少。”McCue v. City of New York (In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig.), 503 F.3d 167, 170 (2nd Cir. 2007)（引文及内部引号省略）；另见 Mohammed, 309 F.3d at 100-01（“[W]e see considerable merit in the approach expressed by the District of Columbia Circuit: ‘成功可能性所必需的“水平”或“程度”，将随法院对其他［中止执行］因素的评估而变化。’适用该项检验时，该巡回法院曾在成功可能性不高但困难衡量有利于申请人的情况下，准许上诉待决期间中止执行；并曾指出，在成功概率‘高’且已证明存在‘某种损害’的情况下，可以准许中止执行。如第六巡回法院所解释：‘必须证明的成功概率与原告[ ]在未获中止执行的情况下将遭受的损害数额成反比。简言之，其中一项越多，对另一项的要求就越少。’”（引文省略））；In re Taub, 470 B.R. 273, 278 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2012)（“所需证明的实质性成功可能性与［动议方］在未获中止执行的情况下将遭受的损害数额成反比。”）。\n\na. 个人债务人在上诉中具有实质性成功可能性，或者至少存在涉及实体问题的重大法律争议\n\n20. 个人债务人已证明，其就该裁定提起的上诉具有实质性成功可能性。根据该裁定，本院授权 Jenner & Block（詹纳与布洛克律师事务所）违反 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6 和 1208.6(a)，向受托人提交庇护申请。因此，本院作出该裁定构成明显的法律错误。\n\n21. 《移民与国籍法》（Immigration and Nationality Act，“INA”）“禁止披露与任何庇护申请有关的信息。. . . .”Zhong Rong Li v. Gonzales, 181 F. App'x 124, 128 (2d Cir. 2006)；另见 Gafurova v. Whitaker, 911 F.3d 321, 328 n.3 (6th Cir. 2018)（INA“通常禁止在未经申请人书面同意的情况下，向第三方披露与庇护申请有关的任何信息，除非该等披露为所列例外情形所允许，或由［国土安全部部长］酌情决定”）（引述 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6, 1208.6(a)）。\n\n22. 具体而言，8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a) 规定如下：[5]\n\n任何难民准入申请、庇护申请、依据该法第 241(b)(3) 条提出的不予遣返申请，或依据《禁止酷刑公约》实施立法所颁布法规提出的保护申请中所载或与之有关的信息；依据 § 208.30 作出的任何可信恐惧认定的记录；以及依据 § 208.31 作出的任何合理恐惧认定的记录，未经申请人书面同意，不得披露，但本节允许或［国土安全部部长］酌情决定的情形除外。\n\n5 8 C.F.R. § 208.6(a) 的内容相同，但其授权国土安全部部长而非司法部长，准许披露庇护申请中所载或与之有关的信息。为便于引用，本动议/申请仅援引 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6，必要时除外。\n\n23. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a) 与内容实质相同的 8 C.F.R. § 208.6(a) 一并“确立了庇护申请人‘对任何载于庇护申请中或与之有关的信息予以保密的“权利”；该等信息使第三方能够将申请人的身份与以下事项联系起来：（1）申请人已提出庇护申请这一事实；（2）庇护申请中所载、与个人庇护请求有关的具体事实或指称；或者（3）足以产生合理推论、表明申请人已提出庇护申请的事实或指称。’”Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. Nielsen, No. 17-cv-02366-BAS-KSC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210401, at \\*22 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2017)（引文省略）。\n\n24. “这些法规‘保护如下信息：如果该等信息被公开披露，则在申请人被遣返的情况下，可能使申请人遭受政府当局或非国家行为者的报复措施，或者危及仍可能居住在原籍国的申请人家庭成员的安全。’”同上，at \\*22-23，引自 U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. Asylum Div., Fact Sheet: Federal Regulations Protecting the Confidentiality of Asylum Applications (Oct. 12, 2011)。\n\n25. 重要的是，8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a) 的文本中没有任何内容将其适用范围限制为仅禁止政府行为者披露庇护申请。相反，8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a) 中针对披露庇护申请的一般禁止规定所列的某些例外，仅适用于政府行为者。例如，8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(c)（“本节不适用于向下列主体作出的任何披露：(1) 因与. . . .有关而有必要审查信息的任何美国政府官员或承包商。”）（强调部分为原文所加）。\n\n26. 进一步证明庇护申请的保密性的是，美国公民及移民服务局（United States Citizenship and Immigration Services）编制并作为附件 B 附于本文件的《保护庇护申请人保密性的联邦法规概要》（Federal Regulation Protecting the Confidentiality of Asylum Applicants Synopsis，“概要”）明确规定，接收庇护申请的第三方受保密法规约束。见《概要》，常见问题 2，第 3 页（“通常，未经庇护申请人书面同意或国土安全部部长特别授权，不得与第三方分享与庇护有关的信息。”）；常见问题 7，第 4 页（问：如根据该法规适当向第三方披露与庇护有关的信息，该第三方就保密而言负有何种义务？答：作为与庇护有关信息的新保管人，第三方接收人受 8 CFR 208.6 项下保密法规的约束。）（强调部分为原文所加）。\n\n27. 此外，至少有一家 Connecticut District（康涅狄格地区）法院，以该等材料通常不应披露为由，驳回了要求被告提交“有关［某一原告个人］庇护申请的文件”的“强制提交动议”；尽管该案被告主张，原告庇护申请的内容与原告提出的精神损害赔偿请求相关。见 Bakhit v. Safety Marking, Inc., No. 3:13CV1049 (JCH), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192934, at \\*9 (D. Conn. Feb. 17, 2015)。\n\n28. 因此，显然，庇护申请受 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a) 保护而不得披露，且不存在允许披露的适用例外。[6] 见 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(c)-(e)。\n\n29. 此外，《破产法典》（Bankruptcy Code）中没有任何规定使本院能够推翻 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a) 的明文规定。事实上，尽管《破产法典》第 521(a)(3) 条规定，债务人应“在必要范围内与受托人合作，以使受托人能够履行其在本法典项下的职责”，但“［d］ebtor 与受托人合作的义务并未具体要求债务人放弃特权。”Coyle v. Coyle (In re Coyle), 538 B.R. 753, 763-64 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2015)。同样，个人债务人与受托人合作的义务，并不要求个人债务人同意向受托人提交保密的庇护申请（更不用说授权本院在个人债务人反对的情况下作出该项授权）。\n\n30. 最后，该裁定提供了极端救济，因为其取消了 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a) 赋予个人债务人的保护，同时未为其裁判依据提供任何授权。在该裁定中，本院仅认定，“受托人及其律师需要查阅简易判决动议和庇护申请，以推进失职\n\n6 此外，庇护申请与受托人的调查活动无关——即对债务人的资产、财务状况及破产财产管理进行调查——受托人的律师在有关同意裁定的听证期间多次向本院作出该项陈述。并且，鉴于受托人律师在公开法庭作出该等陈述时，传票已经送达，因此不能合理地将该传票解释为试图强制 Clark Hill（克拉克·希尔）提交个人债务人的庇护申请。简言之，既然受托人在公开法庭陈述该传票并未寻求强制提交庇护申请，且本院明确依赖该项陈述作出了裁定；见附件 B，at 67:20-68:5；受托人即受司法禁止反言原则约束，不得主张该传票强制要求（甚至允许）Clark Hill 提交庇护申请。Intellivision v. Microsoft Corp., 484 F. App'x 616, 620 (2d Cir. 2012)（“［最高］法院已指出，司法禁止反言‘通常防止一方当事人在案件的一个阶段依赖某项论点胜诉后，又在另一阶段依赖与之矛盾的论点胜诉。’”（引述 New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001)））。\n\n诉讼”，且“向受托人及其律师提交这些文件不会对个人债务人造成个人损害。”（裁定，at 2）。在没有实质性分析的情况下，该裁定所准许的极端救济既无正当理由，也缺乏支持。\n\nb. 如不予中止执行，个人债务人很可能遭受不可弥补的损害，且困难衡量有利于个人债务人\n\n31. 如不予中止执行，个人债务人很可能遭受不可弥补的损害，或者至少，困难衡量有利于其一方。\n\n32. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a) 的目的在于“‘保护如下信息：如果该等信息被公开披露，则在申请人被遣返的情况下，可能使申请人遭受政府当局或非国家行为者的报复措施，或者危及仍可能居住在原籍国的申请人家庭成员的安全。’”Al Otro Lado, Inc., No. 17-cv-02366-BAS-KSC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210401, at \\*22-23，引自 U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. Asylum Div., Fact Sheet: Federal Regulations Protecting the Confidentiality of Asylum Applications (Oct. 12, 2011)。\n\n33. 授权违反 8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a) 提交庇护申请，会损害个人债务人，因为随着持有庇护申请副本的实体增加，庇护申请落入希望伤害个人债务人之人士手中的风险（包括 CCP（中国共产党）及其代理人）将逐步上升，Clark Hill 计算机系统遭黑客攻击即为明证。尽管受托人及其律师推定会尽其最大技术和安全努力，但其持有庇护申请副本会增加黑客取得庇护申请副本的可能性——正如 Clark Hill 持有庇护申请时所发生的那样——从而进一步侵犯个人债务人的隐私及其潜在安全。\n\n34. 在涉及享有特权保护的文件的类似情形中——该等文件并非受联邦法规保护而免于披露，而是受律师—委托人特权等原则保护——法院认为，强制披露材料可能造成不可弥补的损害。参见，例如，In re Search Warrant Issued June 13, 2019（关于2019年6月13日签发的搜查令案）, 942 F.3d at 175（“地区法院裁定该律师事务所未能证明存在不可弥补损害的可能性，在法律上犯了错误，原因是其对保护律师—委托人关系的……原则给予了微不足道的权重。关键在于，法院未能认识到，对方当事人审阅享有特权保护的材料会严重损害特权持有人。”（省略内部引文））；United States v. Philip Morris, Inc.（美国诉Philip Morris, Inc.）, 314 F.3d 612, 621-22 (D.C. Cir. 2003)（“尽管[该当事人]‘并未主张如其提交该[文件]将发生的任何具体不可弥补损害’，但违反律师—委托人特权所造成的一般损害，以及向对方当事人披露享有特权保护的文件所导致的损害，已足够明确。”）In re Perrigo Co.（Perrigo Co.案）, 128 F.3d 430, 437 (6th Cir. 1997)（“我们与若干法院一样认定，强制披露享有特权保护的材料可能造成不可弥补的损害。”）；Kelly v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Ford Motor Co.)（Kelly诉Ford Motor Co.案〔In re Ford Motor Co.〕）, 110 F.3d 954, 963 (9th Cir. 1997)（“[一]旦推定受保护的材料被披露，所寻求保护的‘权利本身’即已被摧毁。”（引自Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp.（Bogosian诉Gulf Oil Corp.案）, 738 F.2d 587, 591 (3rd Cir. 1984)））；Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States District Court（Admiral Ins. Co.诉United States District Court案）, 881 F.2d 1486, 1491 (9th Cir. 1989)（“鉴于一方当事人如被错误地要求披露享有特权保护的材料或通信将遭受不可弥补的损害，法院已承认，在主张绝对特权的情况下，使用强制令对责令证据开示的命令进行审查是适当的。”）。\n\n35. 在本案中，本院在个人债务人提出异议且违反联邦法规的情况下，授权提交与个人债务人的庇护申请有关的保密及敏感信息。因此，个人债务人正被剥夺其根据8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a)享有的权利；一旦Jenner & Block（詹纳与布洛克律师事务所）向受托人提交债务人的庇护申请，个人债务人根据8 C.F.R. § 1208.6(a)享有的权利将被摧毁。为防止该等损害，有必要中止执行，尤其考虑到该裁定所给予救济明显错误的性质。\n\nc. 如本院中止该裁定，受托人不会遭受重大损害\n\n36. 即使假定受托人及其律师需要庇护申请以评估失职诉讼的最终实体理由（个人债务人主张他们并不需要），受托人对失职诉讼的调查很可能所需时间长于个人债务人就该裁定获得上诉审查所需时间——这将消除因中止执行而可能给受托人造成、原本可能足以支持拒绝中止该裁定的任何假设性损害。参见In re Search Warrant Issued June 13, 2019, 942 F.3d at 181-82（调查延迟并未超过披露特权材料的潜在后果）；United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 314 F.3d 612, 622 (D.C. Cir. 2003)（“仅仅主张延迟并不构成重大损害。”）。\n\n37. 此外，失职诉讼本身目前已被中止，至少持续至December 30, 2022。参见Wengui v. Clark Hill Plc, et al.（Wengui诉Clark Hill Plc等案）, Case No. 12-cv-3195 (D.D.C.), at Doc. No. 98（当事人的“联合状态报告”声明其“请求法院将中止期限延续至December 30, 2022”），12/1/22 Minute Order（“法院采纳当事人的98号状态报告，并命令其应于December 30, 2022前提交进一步的JSR。特此命令。由James E. Boasberg法官于12/1/2022作出。”）。鉴于失职诉讼本身已在等待裁定个人债务人的保护令动议期间被中止，为寻求对该裁定进行上诉审查而中止执行（从而很可能进一步中止失职诉讼）不会损害受托人。\n\nd. 公共利益支持中止执行\n\n38. 公共利益支持中止执行。在作出该裁定时，本院背离了（且似乎未考虑）8 C.F.R. § 1208.6向个人债务人提供的保护。事实上，国会在INA中确立的个人债务人对庇护申请享有的隐私权实际上已被消除。\n\n39. 该等裁定的寒蝉效应极其深远，因为人们可能不愿寻求急需的破产保护，以避免提交“如被公开披露，可能使申请人在被遣返时遭受政府当局或非国家行为者报复性措施，或危及仍可能居住在原籍国的申请人家庭成员安全的信息。”Al Otro Lado, Inc.（Al Otro Lado, Inc.案）, No. 17-cv-02366- BAS-KSC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210401, at \\*22-23, quoting U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. Asylum Div., Fact Sheet: Federal Regulations Protecting the Confidentiality of Asylum Applications (Oct. 12, 2011).\n\n40. 破产程序的目的之一是“使诚实的债务人摆脱沉重债务的负担，并使其免于因商业不幸而产生的义务和责任，得以重新开始。”Williams v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co.（Williams诉United States Fid. & Guar. Co.案）, 236 U.S. 549, 554-55, 35 S. Ct. 289, 290 (1915)。强迫个人破产债务人在获得该等救济与保护其本人及家人免受政府当局或非国家行为者报复性措施之间作出选择，显属不公。\n\n41. 因此，个人债务人谨陈，为公共利益计，本院应中止该裁定（从而使个人债务人能够获得对该裁定具有实质意义的上诉审查）；这将至少在完成适当的上诉审查之前，消除可能降临于拟申请、正在申请或已完成庇护申请的潜在或实际债务人身上的寒蝉效应。\n\nIV. 结论\n\n42. 基于上述理由，本院应当：(a) 在个人债务人对该裁定提起上诉期间中止执行该裁定；以及(b) 给予个人债务人司法公正所要求的其他及进一步救济。\n\n债务人，HO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）\n\n签署人：/s/ Aaron A. Romney\nAaron A. Romney (ct28144)\nZEISLER & ZEISLER, P.C.\n10 Middle Street, 15th floor\nBridgeport, CT 06605\n电话：(203) 368-4234\n传真：(203) 368-0903\n电子邮件：[aromney@zeislaw.com]\n\n送达证明\n\n本人特此证明，于2022年12月13日，前述文件副本已以电子方式提交。根据法院电子提交系统的运行，本次提交的通知将通过电子邮件发送给所有当事人；对于无法接受电子提交的任何人，则按电子提交通知中所示通过邮件发送。当事人可通过法院的CM/ECF系统查阅本次提交。\n\n签署人：/s/ Aaron A. Romney\nAaron A. Romney (ct28144)","key_entities":["Je","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Guo","Despins","CCP"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":1063,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":4724,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 18:39:38"}