{"id":"court_ctb_1249_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":1249,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"TRANSCRIPT","filed_date":"2022-12-19","title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION In Re \\* Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) \\* HO WAN KW","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION In Re \\* Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) \\* HO WAN KWOK, \\* Bridgeport, Connecticut \\* September 12, 2022 Debtor. \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION FOR ODER BEFORE THE HONORABLE JULIE A. MANNING UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE APPEARANCES: For the Debtor: AARON ROMNEY, ESQ. Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. 10 Middle Street, 15th Floor Bridgeport, CT 06604 For the Creditor, Pacific PETER FRIEDMAN, ESQ. Alliance Asia Opportunity O'Melveny & Myers LLP Fund L.P.: Times Square Tower 7 Times Square New York, NY 10036 ANNECCA SMITH, ESQ. Robinson & Cole 28 Trumbull Street Hartford, CT 06103 For the Chapter 11 Trustee: NICHOLAS A. BASSETT, ESQ. Paul Hastings LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166 Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording, transcript produced by transcription service. **Fiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc. 4 Research Drive, Suite 402 Shelton, Connecticut 06484 (203)929-9992**\n\nAPPEARANCES Cont'd: For the Chapter 11 PATRICK R. LINSEY, ESQ. Trustee: Neubert Pepe & Monteith, PC 195 Church Street New Haven, CT 06510 Chapter 11 Trustee: LUC A. DESPINS, ESQ. Paul Hastings LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166 For the Creditors Committee: IRVE GOLDMAN, ESQ. Pullman & Comley 850 Main Street Bridgeport, CT 06601 For the U.S. Trustee: HOLLEY L. CLAIBORN, ESQ. Office of the United States Trustee The Giaimo Federal Building 150 Court Street, Room 302 New Haven, CT 06510 For the Creditor, JAY MARSHALL WOLMAN, ESQ. Logan Cheng: Randazza Legal Group, PLLC 100 Pearl Street, 14th Floor Hartford, CT 06103\n\n (Proceedings commenced at 2:16 p.m.) THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Case Number 22-50073, Ho Wan Kwok. THE COURT: Okay. Good afternoon. If we could have appearances for the record, starting with the Chapter 11 Trustee, please? MR. DESPINS: Good morning, Your Honor. Luc Despins, Chapter 11 Trustee. THE COURT: Good afternoon. MR. BASSETT: Good after -- sorry. Good afternoon, Your Honor. Nick Bassett from Paul Hastings on behalf of the Chapter 11 Trustee. THE COURT: Good afternoon. MR. LINSEY: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Patrick Linsey, local counsel of the trustee. THE COURT: Good afternoon. MR. FRIEDMAN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. It's Peter Friedman of O'Melveny and Myers on behalf of PAX. THE COURT: Good afternoon. MR. ROMNEY: Good afternoon -- is someone else speaking? MS. SMITH: This is Annecca smith of Robinson and Cole, also Connecticut counsel on behalf of PAX. THE COURT: Good afternoon. Mr. Romney? MR. ROMNEY: Good afternoon, Aaron Romney, Zeisler\n\n|    | 4                                                         |\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1  | and Zeisler in behalf of the debtor.                      |\n| 2  | THE COURT:<br>Good afternoon.<br>Mr. Goldman.             |\n| 3  | MR. GOLDMAN:<br>Good afternoon, Your Honor.<br>Irve       |\n| 4  | Goldman, Pullman and Comley for the Creditor's Committee. |\n| 5  | THE COURT:<br>Attorney Claiborn.                          |\n| 6  | MS. CLAIBORN:<br>Good afternoon, Your Honor.<br>Holley    |\n| 7  | Claiborn for the U.S. Trustee.                            |\n| 8  | THE COURT:<br>Good afternoon.<br>And, Mr. Wolman.         |\n| 9  | MR. WOLMAN:<br>Good afternoon, Your Honor.<br>Jay         |\n| 10 | Wolman of Randazza Legal Group for creditor, Logan Cheng. |\n| 11 | THE COURT:<br>Good afternoon.                             |\n| 12 | I think we've taken everyone's appearances at this        |\n| 13 | point then, so we'll proceed.                             |\n| 14 | MR. BALDIGA:<br>Your Honor, William Baldiga, Brown        |\n| 15 | Rudnick.                                                  |\n| 16 | THE COURT:<br>Oh, I'm sorry.<br>I didn't see you          |\n| 17 | anywhere.                                                 |\n| 18 | MR. BALDIGA:<br>Not a problem.                            |\n| 19 | THE COURT:<br>Do you -- I don't see Mr. Baldiga.          |\n| 20 | THE COURTROOM DEPUTY:<br>He must be on his phone.         |\n| 21 | THE COURT:<br>Okay.                                       |\n| 22 | THE COURTROOM DEPUTY:<br>He's on the phone.               |\n| 23 | THE COURT:<br>Oh, okay.<br>You're participating by        |\n| 24 | phone, Mr. Baldiga.                                       |\n| 25 | MR. BALDIGA:<br>Yes.                                      |\n|    |                                                           |\n\n THE COURT: Okay. Sorry. That's why I didn't see you. In any event, good afternoon.\n\n So today, our hearing today is the continued hearing on the motion for an order providing that control of the privilege is passed to the trustee upon appointment and related relief. We've had two hearings on the trustee's motion, August 30 and September 6th.\n\n When we were here last, the Chapter 11 trustee and the debtor's counsel had submitted revised proposed orders with regard to the motion that the trustee had filed, providing that control of the privileges had passed to him. We had some discussions about those proposed orders during our last hearing. Those proposed orders were filed shortly before the hearing on September 6th, which is what I asked for, but I did not have an opportunity to fully review them before our continued hearing on September 6th.\n\n I know the parties then submitted orders on September 7th, which essentially showed -- well, I should say the trustee submitted a supplemental exhibit showing the differences between the trustee's proposed order and the debtor's proposed order, and that was at ECF 835, and then the debtor proposed a summary of disputed issues in a list form at ECF Number 836.\n\n Have the parties had any further discussions regarding the trustee's motion for order providing that\n\n control of privileges passed to the trustee upon appointment? MR. DESPINS: Yes, Your Honor. Luc Despins, Chapter 11 Trustee. I also wanted to make sure Your Honor had a chance to look at something we filed Friday afternoon, which is Docket Number 846, which is -- which added two provisions that we believe should address the debtor's issues, but -- and there's been a lot of back and forth since then as late as this morning, and what I think would make sense at this point would be for Mr. Bassett to take the Court through what these two provisions that were added on Friday, what they do, what they're supposed to address, and then see -- take the Court through what issues we believe have been resolved, and because I believe some have been resolved, not all unfortunately, but some have been resolved, to save the Court some time. So I would -- with Your Honor's permission, I would turn it over to Mr. Bassett to take Your Honor through this. THE COURT: That's fine. Thank you. Mr. Bassett. MR. BASSETT: Yeah. THE COURT: I'm now looking at 846. Do you want me to be looking at 846? MR. BASSETT: Yes, Your Honor. And again, for the\n\n record, Nick Bassett from Paul Hastings on behalf of the trustee. I think Your Honor -- THE COURT: Why don't we pull up -- why don't we pull up 846 so everyone's looking at the same document at the same time? Okay? MR. BASSETT: Sure. And then, Your Honor -- oh, I apologize. THE COURT: Go right ahead. MR. BASSETT: I was just going to say that I would suggest going to Page 13 of 19 of the PDF, which would be Exhibit B to what we filed, because that contains the redline that I think will be easiest for us to use. THE COURT: 13 of 19? MR. BASSETT: That's correct, Your Honor. It should say Exhibit B on it. THE COURT: I see. MR. BASSETT: And then if you go to the next page, it will be the first page of the redline. THE COURT: I see. Thank you. So then we'll turn to Page 14 of 19 right now. Okay. MR. BASSETT: Perfect. THE COURT: Go right ahead. MR. BASSETT: So, Your Honor -- thank you, Your Honor. And before I dive in and walk Your Honor through\n\n the changes, just a bit of further context. So after the hearing that we had last week, we sat down internally and sort of thought over what we had heard from the debtor at that hearing, and also the comments and the discussion that occurred with the Court. So over a couple of days after the hearing last week, we endeavored to put together this revised proposed order that in our mind was specifically designed to address what we understood to be really the key concerns that the debtor had referenced, and this was our attempt to really kind of bridge the gap and specifically to address some of the concerns that had been raised regarding the sort of balancing test that we've been discussing and some of the specific issues regarding waiver and otherwise that had come up in the discussions with the Court. Now the last point on process I'll just raise is that we had sent this revised proposed order, or actually a version slightly different from it, but that contained most of these changes, on Thursday evening. We were hoping to discuss that on Friday. We didn't have the opportunity to discuss it with the debtor's counsel on Friday, so we went ahead and submitted our revised proposed order, which is what we're looking at here at Docket 846. But the Court on Friday -- because we wanted to\n\n make sure that Your Honor had some time with it had you been able to take a look at it between then and now, that said, we also had continued to have a discussion with counsel for the debtor. Attorney Romney and I had a call yesterday, and then we received a markup containing additional comments from them this morning, which I think he -- I will let him explain it to you, but I think it goes to further evolve some of our issues. But before going to that, I think it would be helpful for me to just walk you through, Your Honor, the key changes that we've made. I think we could go ahead and scroll down. There are no material changes until we get to Paragraph 7. Paragraph 2, there's just a definitional clarification that is not material on -- when we get to Paragraph 7, which is on Page 17 of 19 of the PDF, this is our first major change that we included, again, to address some of the issues that were raised. Now specifically what this would do is -- although the earlier paragraphs of the order remain the same in terms of defining the scope of the trustee privileges that have passed to the trustee and that those paragraphs make clear, that privileges related to assets of the estate to the debtor's financial condition and liabilities, and to post\n\n petition -- the post-petition administration of the estate, of the sort of default rule if you will, is that those privileges would pass to the debtor, or to the trustee, rather, and I think that, you know, gives us the clarification that we are seeking and will really help inform the path forward as to what may or may not be withheld by the debtor in discovery. But what Paragraph 7 does, is it addresses specifically the concern that the debtor had raised that,\n\n you know, he believes, although the documents outside some criminal issues, have not really been identified, he believes that there could be documents that would contain information that's privileged that if disclosed, could result in harm to the debtor.\n\n So what we've tried to do here is build in a provision that would allow the debtor, in a situation where he believes going forward, has a good faith belief that there is information in a document or testimony that sort of now applies to both documents and information, I think that's agreed by the parties.\n\n But to the extent the debtor thinks there is information that if disclosed to the trustee -- information that's privileged, could result in personal harm to the debtor, then there is a process by which we would submit that issue to the Court for resolution.\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n Specifically, the debtor would first log the document, would identify on that log the personal harm that is the subject of the claim of privilege, and then after that, either party could seek relief from the Court, but importantly we've built in an expedited process for that to happen, just so we're not, you know, taking a ton of time to resolve these issues as they arise.\n\n And importantly, at the end of this paragraph, Your Honor, after we describe the process for review that we would envision on an expedited basis, which could include in-camera review of documents by the Court, we have language clarifying or adding some important clarity around the sort of definition of personal harm, or what we mean by that.\n\n And what this language at the end makes clear, is that the debtor cannot take a position that he would be personally harmed by revealing documents that could result in the recovery of estate assets. You know, this goes back to what we talked about at the last hearing, where we're concerned that the debtor could take the position that if we're seeking documents from a relative or an affiliate that relates to their assets, which we think could be property of the estate, or assets that are purportedly theirs that we think should be property of the estate, you know, the debtor could not claim in response to that, that he would be harmed because he would take the position that those assets are not\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n property of the estate. So that's sort of generally what that clarification at the end of this paragraph is designed to address. The one other thing I would say on Paragraph 7, Your Honor, is that, you know, we did hear the Court loud and clear. I think Your Honor had made a couple of comments at the last hearing that it would be nice to resolve this privilege issue up front once and for all so we don't have a series of disputes that continue to pop up later in the case. We agree with that. We think -- you know, we drafted this paragraph to sort of strike a balance between that concern and also the concerns that the debtor had addressed of not being able to anticipate every potential document that could relate to -- or that could cause personal harm that disclosed to this -- gets kind of a narrow ability for those types of issues to be resolved on a case-by-case basis in the future, but without opening up the door for any and all privilege issues to have to be decided on a case-by-case basis. So that's Paragraph 7. I can answer questions about that before getting to Paragraph 8 if Your Honor would like but -- THE COURT: Well, my question is, is -- Mr. Romney, are you agreeing to the language in Paragraph 7?\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n MR. ROMNEY: Your Honor, we agreed with the language of Paragraph 7, as well as the other changes that Mr. Bassett is getting into, significantly bridged the gap. We had returned a redline of this document to the trustee's counsel this morning. I had hoped to get it last night but it didn't happen, and as Attorney Bassett was saying, we were speaking as recently as -- actually about an hour ago. We do have a -- there are still some differences. I believe personally, and I'm sharing my view here, that I believe that if given a little bit more time we would be able to bridge those gaps because they are getting to be many, but not all, but in many respect, semantical in nature. My understanding is that the trustee's counsel would prefer to just submit this, have the debtor's counsel submit its redline to that document, and then the Court will rule in whatever way the rules fit. The judge -- the Court can fit. So to answer your question, no, we are not in complete agreement, but we are substantially closer to an agreement than we have ever been with respect to this issue. And as I said, I do believe at this point, given how far we've come, that we could get there with a little more time, but I also do want to make clear that the trustee's position is that it would like to submit this\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n issue to the Court. THE COURT: I didn't hear the last thing you said. You said, I want to make clear that the trustee's position, and then I couldn't understand what you said. MR. ROMNEY: Is that it's time to submit this to the Court and not attempt to take a little bit more time to get a completely consensual order. THE COURT: Okay. MR. DESPINS: Your Honor -- Your Honor, this is Luc Despins. Two seconds on that. I mean, of course, you know, if we could take -- the point is, we sent them that markup on Thursday afternoon. That's a -- to me, that's a long time between now and then. And, you know, if they need another half hour to resolve the issues, okay, but I -- my fear is that now we're talking about another week and it just -- you know, a bunch of us don't -- you know, we don't think that's appropriate. By the way, Your Honor, I received an email from Mr. Goldman saying that he was -- he was dropped from the call and he's not able to dial back in, so whoever controls the Zoom should let Mr. Goldman back in because he's not able to join for some reason. THE COURT: Thank you. Thank you. We'll see if we can get him back in.\n\n THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: He's not in the waiting room. THE COURT: He's not in the waiting room. Yeah, he's not able to connect for some reason. I don't know why. (Pause) THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Despins, for that update. Mr. Romney, I'd like to have Mr. Bassett go through the rest of the changes, and then we're going to talk about -- you know, you say that you're substantially there. I want you to make sure that you're telling me ultimately what your issues still are. And I mean, I -- you're absolute entitled to have your issues, but as I said last week at the hearings, I need to understand what you're Case 22-50073 Doc 1249 Filed 12/19/22 Entered 12/19/22 13:50:05 Page 15 of 52\n\n objecting to. Okay? So just, would you keep that in mind, please, when\n\nMr. Bassett is going --\n\n MR. ROMNEY: Understood, Your Honor. THE COURT: -- through the rest of the changes? Okay. All right. So now we just went through paragraph -- and I'm not saying I don't have questions by the way, but I want to hear from the parties first. So we've now gone through Paragraph 7. So should we go to Paragraph 8, Mr. Bassett? MR. BASSETT: Yes, Your Honor. I'm happy to walk\n\n through Paragraph 8. I think this one will be a shorter discussion. As I'm sure Your Honor recalls from the hearings that we've had, one of the issues that the debtor has raised on a number of occasions is a concern about a quote/unquote, waiver of a privilege occurring. And I think what we've always maintained is that the relief we are seeking is about control of the privilege, and that would mean, obviously that the trustee going forward, to the extent privilege pass -- privilege passes to it, would have the control to, you know, do what it wants with that privilege going forward. But what we have done in this Paragraph 8 to address specifically the concern that has been addressed -- that has been raised about waiver, is to say that for purposes of this order at this time, when we talk about passage of control of privileges to the trustee, all that means right now is that the trustee will be able to review, access, and otherwise use all of the documents and information subject to the claimed privileges. So what that means is, we could use that for all purposes of our investigation. To the extent that the trustee determines based on information he has received that he believes there are claims worth pursuing, for example, to recover state assets, we could use all of the information,\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n including the privileged information that we've received for that purpose, but we would not be entitled to further waive the privilege over those documents by, for example, filing them on the public docket so that the rest of the world can see the privileged information. We would not, you know, share privileged documents with third parties.\n\n So the trustee would have access, but would not be able to effect a waiver by providing the privileged information to third parties.\n\n And we've also built in this paragraph, a mechanism for being able to file under seal, and then to the extent that down the road, the trustee does feel that it is appropriate for him to waive a privilege over a particular document, he would be able to come to the Court and request that relief, and we have envisioned that that would happen under the same expedited type of process that we've outlined in the prior paragraph.\n\n Lastly, Your Honor, Paragraph 9, that is basically adopting language that the debtor had proposed in its last order to the Court.\n\n The debtor had a -- had this language in its order where it wanted to clarify that nothing in this order was designed to impact the issues that are involved in the Court's other order related to the corporate governance motion, and in particular, the UBS litigation.\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n So this paragraph just incorporates that and makes explicit that nothing herein is intended to effect the privileges at issue in that litigation, which again are subject to the other order.\n\n So those were the changes, Your Honor. I won't speak for Attorney Romney, but I do think that this new version of the order does resolve a lot of the other issues that we had identified and that we had submitted to the Court in our issues list at Docket 835, as I mentioned before as an example.\n\n You know, the issue is to whether this applies to both documents and information that's been resolved. It applies to both documents and information, there's issues with some of the wording in Paragraph 2 that I think are now resolved in light of the new Paragraphs 7 and 8 that we've added.\n\n So I do think the issues are substantially more narrow, but based on the markup that we've received this morning, as Mr. Despins said, you know, I think our view is that there are still issues that remain and we want to have a decision on those issues at this stage. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Mr. Romney? MR. ROMNEY: Thank you, Your Honor.\n\nTHE COURT: With regard to --\n\nMR. ROMNEY: Aaron Romney --\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n THE COURT: -- with regard to paragraphs -- MR. ROMNEY: -- Zeisler and Zeisler for the debtor. THE COURT: Hold -- hold on a second. Hold on a second, Mr. Romney. With regard to Paragraph 7 of this marked up document, on Page 17 of 19 of ECF 846, what -- MR. ROMNEY: Yes. THE COURT: -- objections does the debtor have with regard to the language in Paragraph 7? MR. ROMNEY: With regard to Paragraph 7, specifically we felt that the word personal home is ambiguous, and I'm going in no particular order here other than the order with which they show up on the redline that I am looking at that the Court does not yet have. But looking at the case law, we believe that the language, the balancing test would be just home to the debtor rather than personal home. With regard to the submission and the timing of a privilege log, as well as the information that should be on any privilege log, we believe there should just be a reference to Local Rule 26(e), rather than anything that at least arguably not applies that, such as requiring the log contemporaneously with the production deadline. We don't believe that's consistent with applicable case law.\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 1249 Filed 12/19/22 Entered 12/19/22 13:50:05 Page 20 of 52\n\n And probably the most significant issue in Paragraph 7 is the trustee's language that would require all privilege issues submitted through this process to be considered on an expedited basis and to be briefed within four days. It's -- it was debtor's position that the federal and local rules exist for a reason, and that's because people deserve a reasonable amount of time to respond to issues that are brought before them. Sometimes counsel have other cases. Sometimes counsel have families. Sometimes counsel need to sleep. And four days, just because as distinguished from a particular situation that requires adjudication in, you know, an expedited basis, we don't believe that that is reasonable or fair.\n\n As Attorney Bassett and I were discussing as recently as earlier this afternoon, there is probably a middle ground on this issue. And by probably, I believe there is, meaning there is a number between 4 and the 14 that I think the debtor could live with, but we've -- you know, the clock ran out on us and here we are. Four days is just cutting it a bit close.\n\n The events of the last two days are a perfect illustration for that. The trustee pointed out, they got us a proposed order on Thursday night, and I personally couldn't look at that proposed order until Saturday morning, and that's because I had two deadlines on Friday evening in\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n### Case 22-50073 Doc 1249 Filed 12/19/22 Entered 12/19/22 13:50:05 Page 21 of 52\n\n another case, and that happens sometimes and it's not being dilatory or not giving it the attention it deserves. It's just that human beings can only do one thing at once, particularly when we're talking about complex issues that have significant implications on the party's rights, and we believe that four days just because it falls under this order and no showing of cause, is simply not fair or consistent with applicable law. THE COURT: Okay. So you're saying to me that if you had another day, you think you could work this provision out? MR. ROMNEY: This particular provision, I am reasonably -- I am at least reasonably confident that this provision, these are -- this is one provision of a few, but this is probably the most significant one. I believe we could work out a reasonable time line sometime between the 4 and the 14 that the default order is. And yes, I do. MR. BASSETT: Your Honor. It's Nick Bassett from Paul Hastings. On that particular point, Attorney Romney is correct. We did have a discussion about whether there might be a middle ground between regular notice and the expedited notice that we proposed in this language that we're looking at. I think what we said was four days. You know, Attorney Romney said, you know, under the rules you would typically\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1249 Filed 12/19/22 Entered 12/19/22 13:50:05 Page 22 of 52\n\n have 14. Can we go somewhere in the middle and say maybe, you know, eight days to respond, and then, you know, three days for a reply? Something to that effect. I think that would be fine.\n\n But just to be clear, I mean, the reason for making this expedited is that there are a lot of parties from whom the trustee is seeking discovery where these issues could potentially arise.\n\n As the Court, knows, we've served subpoenas on a number of law firms who used to represent or continue to represent the debtor, and we're going to, I imagine, get privilege logs and information from those firms at varying times.\n\n And you know, it could be that as those issues arise, we need to avail ourselves of this procedure. If it happens a number of times, we just can't be in a position where our investigation is unduly delayed because we have to do through regular notice every time, even though these issues by that point will be very, very familiar to the Court, given how much we've already spent -- how much time we've already spent talking about it. So that's really the logic for it.\n\n But as I said, you know, it sounds like we can -- we can bridge the gap on the timing issue by going to something in the middle.\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n THE COURT: Thank you. All right. With regard to Paragraph 7, Mr. Romney, so it sounds to me as though -- I want to make sure the record is accurate. Number 1, the last -- during the last hearing that we had on this issue on September 6th, your colleague stated that this was an advisory opinion and it could be deemed to be that. I'm not going to enter an order if your client is going to take the position that this is an advisory opinion. So you need to clarify for the record whether or not at the entry of this order you're going to appeal it as an advisory opinion, because if you are, then I'm not going to enter this order. I'm going to have to write a written decision and I think you've already abandoned that argument and waived that argument anyway. When I went back and looked at your affidavit in -- that you had submitted, it was actually a declaration that you had submitted after -- to just talk about the meet\n\n and confer, you state in your declaration that you swore to that you wanted the process to be dealt with in an omnibus fashion, and that you didn't want it to be on a piece meal fashion.\n\n And so I want to make sure that you're not changing that position because I -- I'm not going to proceed if you're going to assert contrary positions with regard to\n\n this motion. So what's your position with regard to the entry of an order on the trustee's motion regarding the privileges? MR. ROMNEY: So the -- and I want to make sure I choose my words very carefully here so that I'm precise. I unquestionably signed a declaration that stated my view that this -- that the resolution of these issues would be substantially more efficient if the parties were aware of which line of authority or even subline of authority. The standard to the Court was imposing that I felt that the -- there would be a lot less disputes down the line related to individual documents if we knew the standard the Court was going to apply. I believed that to be the case. I still believe that to be the case, and that's why I signed that declaration and that's why we've been working with trustee's counsel to get to, you know -- to get to a place that whether the Court adjudicates or the parties ultimately consent to that makes everybody's lives, including the Court's, more efficient down the line. Now fast forward to last week. I believe you're referring to Attorney Henzy made the comment about that this could be construed as an advisory opinion. I believe in the\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n first hearing concerning this matter, I actually raised the issue that it could be -- but I didn't know, and that arguably it wasn't advisory opinion, and that's why -- that's why I'm on this side of the bench and the Court is on the other side, because I honestly don't know the answer to that as to whether somebody could determine that this is advisory opinion.\n\n But I think really to what the Court's question was, I mean, we have -- I stated, hopefully clearly at the last hearing, we are consenting -- we have -- we would have consented to the entry of a proposed order that we had submitted as of the last hearing.\n\n I intend, if I am permitted by the Court following the conclusion of this hearing, unless the determine is made that was -- the determination is made that we're going to try and take a little bit more time to work this out.\n\n But barring that, I would like the Court's permission to submit yet another order that the debtor would consent to entry, and I believe if the debtor's consent to entry, it would have waived its right to appeal.\n\n And while I have not specifically discussed the question with our client as to how -- have you waived any appellate rights, have you not waived any appellate rights. The only thing I can say as I sit here right now is that the differences between the proposed orders, the one\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n that I would propose to submit and the one that has been submitted, I would imagine that the only issues we were reserving our rights to appeal, even in theory, are to the extent that there are differences between the two orders, and I do have authority to submit -- to consent to the proposed order that I already submitted. So in that respect -- THE COURT: But the proposed order that you've already you've just said is changed again. MR. ROMNEY: Correct, and by it will have changed, I mean it will be closer to some -- there will be less differences between it and the trustee's proposed order. So I guess what I'm saying, perhaps not articulately, is I would imagine that the only thing a party could appeal having consented to entry of an order, would be the few -- issues that were materially different than to what they had consented. And in that respect, I wouldn't -- I just don't -- I believe that the debtor is going to consent to an order on this issue. And if the issues is that the Court enters an order that's not -- is materially different than what the debtor was prepared to consent to, then any hypothetical appeal would have to relate to issues to which the debtor was not consenting. Does that make sense, Your Honor? THE COURT: Possibly. But here's the problem.\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n You have, as does Mr. Despins and Mr. Bassett, an ongoing obligation to act in good faith with regard to discovery disputes. You had your meet and confer. You filed a declaration in which you said that you thought it should be -- proceed -- these issues of privilege should proceed in an omnibus fashion. After you filed that declaration, the trustee filed his motion to proceed with these issues in an omnibus fashion. If someone files an appeal saying that this -- an entry of any order on this motion is an advisory opinion, I'm not sure that's good faith. In fact, I think it's close to not being good faith, because otherwise you shouldn't have engaged in all of these discussions, including filing orders with the Court. Now I think you should -- you party -- the two of you should continue to work on a consensual order, and I'm going to give you some time to do that until tomorrow afternoon. It sounds -- but I am not going to put this court or anyone else in the position of having to deal with appeals on issues that relate to the administration of this estate, that with regard to the production of documents in which you've already stated in an order that you submitted\n\n-- you had authority to consent to, that at least the post\n\nto this Court, a proposed order that you just said that your\n\n petition information would be made available to the Chapter 11 Trustee.\n\n And you've also stated that you believe there's a balancing test that had to come into play. And so when you talk about the three buckets of the types of law out there, with regard to the attorney/client privilege in an individual case, and specifically -- and there are no cases that have been found by anyone in an individual Chapter 11 case with regard to the privilege passing to the trustee, but there are cases, and you're consenting to that, that they're on a post-petition basis from the time that your client voluntarily subjected himself to the jurisdiction of this Court, and to the date that the trustee became the trustee, the Chapter 11 Trustee, that all that information, the privileges pass -- the control of that passes to the trustee.\n\n Now the trustee had carved out what you asked him to carve out. The trustee has asked -- specifically carved out of this order what you've specifically asked him to carve out. And so why I asked you what you still object to, you and Mr. Bassett, I'm going to give you some time to finalize that.\n\n But I will say one thing I don't understand about Paragraph 7, and I don't know if this is your language, Mr. Romney, or Mr. Bassett's language, or both, but paragraph --\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n the fourth line says, \"The trustee then 1, the debtor or his counsel as applicable.\" The debtor can't act in this court on his own. He has his -- he acts through you. And I'm not having filings made by the debtor on his own while he has counsel. So I want that to be very clear. The debtor has no right in this court to file some separate kind of document that isn't signed by you as his counsel and submitted under Rule 11 standards. MR. ROMNEY: Understood, Your Honor. I don't believe the intent of this line -- and I -- THE COURT: Well, then let's take -- MR. ROMNEY: -- understand the -- THE COURT: -- out the debtor and say the debtor's counsel. MR. BASSETT: Well, Your Honor. Your Honor, this is Nick Bassett from Paul Hastings. But I do think that may have been our language, but I think the intent behind it was to address the fact that we have served subpoenas on the debtor through his counsel in this case. THE COURT: Then his counsel will have to interpose the objections, not the debtor. MR. BASSETT: Understood, Your Honor. But we've also served subpoenas on a number of other law firms that\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 1249 Filed 12/19/22 Entered 12/19/22 13:50:05 Page 30 of 52\n\n either currently or formerly represented him, so I think Attorney Bassett is -- THE COURT: Then they'll have to interpose their own objections. They're not going to -- MR. BASSETT: Right. What -- THE COURT: -- Mr. Kwok isn't going to be interposing any objections for any of his professionals. MR. BASSETT: Understood, Your Honor. So we can -- we're on the same page. We can clarify that. That's not -- that's not what we had intended by this language, but I understand the Court's concern. THE COURT: Yeah. I'm not going to spend any time on that. Then the debtor's counsel shall by the applicable production deadline, log all such documents in accordance with the requirements of the District Court Local Rule 26(e). Okay? That's going to happen. Then with regard to the deadlines, the dates, it sounds like, Mr. Bassett, you might be able to work with Mr. Romney to change those dates and give Mr. Romney a little more time between the 4 days and the 14 days and Rule 26, correct? MR. BASSETT: Yes, that's correct, Your Honor. And the only other thing I wanted to mention is, I didn't -- I think Mr. Romney, when you had asked him to articulate his issues with Paragraph 7, he had mentioned the expedited\n\nprocess as one of three.\n\n I just didn't want my silence on the other two to be misunderstood. We do have an issue which we will continue to discuss with Attorney Romney regarding his proposal that the word personal be removed. We do think that is an important word. We're happy to discuss it with him, but we don't consent to simply removing it. And I think he had also mentioned that with respect to the privilege log requirement, he wanted to strike the language saying by the applicable production deadline, and then he also wanted to strike the language that follows the reference to the local district court rule concerning the identification of information necessary to support the claim for personal harm. We also take issue with those changes and we do think it's important to get privilege logs at the time of production, given the context of this case. We also think given the way this carve out or this sort of safety valve provision is drafted, that it's absolute necessary for us to understand what the particular personal harm being claimed is. So again, I just wanted to clarify that we do have issues with those two other aspects of Paragraph 7 that Attorney Romney addressed. THE COURT: Well, with regard to the personal harm\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n issue and the term personal, Mr. Romney, I haven't found any cases that talk about the balancing test in an individual case. They all talk about harm to the debtor. The debtor in this case is a person. So the harm that would be suffered would be personal harm. So I'm not persuaded by your argument that the term personal shouldn't be in there. The debtor is a person. The only case law that talks about harm to the debtor talks about it in the context of a corporate case. So I don't understand what your issue is with the term personal. 12 MR. ROMNEY: Your Honor, I -- in the case -- in the context of the cases that discuss the balancing test in the individual debtor situation, the language just says harm to the debtor. Now I agree with you, when you're talking about a person, harm to the debtor is harm to debtor, not somebody else or some business that the debtor no longer, you know, owns or controls, or never owned or controlled, but it's -- again, my comment there was to track the language in cases that the -- that the parties have both cited, frankly, talking about balancing the harm to the debtor. And I think that the connotation of personal there is that it has a connotation of physical injury as distinguished from economic injury. That maybe --\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n THE COURT: I did completely disagree with you. MR. ROMNEY: -- that's not correct. THE COURT: The term personal is never defined as physical injury. Where do you -- where is a case that says that? MR. ROMNEY: Well, I suppose where it most comes from is that the practice group in many firms called personal injury is almost exclusively physical injury to an individual. THE COURT: If that -- if that -- this doesn't say personal injury, Mr. Romney. It says personal harm. That's what it says. So I don't think your -- MR. ROMNEY: And -- THE COURT: -- argument on that issue is persuasive. With regard to the other issues, you and Mr. Bassett should continue to try to work those out. I agree with you, Mr. Romney, and I think Mr. Bassett has already stated that he agrees that he will increase the period of time for the motion and the privilege log, but the -- where is the case law that says the privilege log doesn't need to be produced at the time that you're objecting to the production of documents? MR. ROMNEY: My understanding is -- not my understanding. My very clear recollection is that there is\n\n a long line of cases from the District of Connecticut talking about that a privilege log must be produced within a quote/unquote, reasonable period of time from the production date under the circumstances. THE COURT: Okay. Well, then I'll set a -- MR. ROMNEY: I don't have those cases -- THE COURT: -- reasonable period of time if you both can't agree to one, but I'm telling you right now a -- if someone is going to assert a privilege with regard to all this information that you've already consented the entry of an order with regard to these categories of information, the administration of the estate, the assets of the estate, and the claims to and against or by the estate, you've already consented to the entry of that order, then I will set the reasonable time if you and Mr. Bassett don't come up with one. But it's going to be short because we are not going to bog down this case with motion practice and discovery disputes. It's not going to happen. Your client came to this Court voluntarily. He has exposed himself to the jurisdiction of this Court, and under the balancing test that you both cited, as you've just stated, he has exposed all of his assets and liabilities, including claims brought against him and claims that he has brought to the administration of the estate in this court.\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n So I would suggest that you and Mr. Bassett come up with a date by which that privilege log needs to be filed after the date for compliance of the subpoena, but I am telling you right now, it's not going to be a long period of time. It's not going to be the 30 days that you have to object to the materials in this subpoena. That's not going to happen. It's not going to be an additional 30 days for a privilege log. Not going to happen. So, Mr. Bassett, have you served these subpoenas -- MR. ROMNEY: Your Honor, may I be -- THE COURT: -- yet? Have you served these subpoenas yet? MR. BASSETT: Your Honor, generally speaking, the answer is yes, we have. I have colleagues who have a comprehensive list and would know better than I do. There may be a few of the subpoenas that for whatever reason we're still addressing service issues. But because there was a number of them, we were serving them as quickly as we can. Some had to be served in different ways, but generally speaking, yes, we've certainly served the subpoena on the debtor himself. THE COURT: Okay. So the 30-day period for production of documents has -- the clock has begun.\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n MR. BASSETT: It has begun and I think is about to expire in some cases. Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Romney, I think I cut you off. You wanted to say something. I'm sorry, I was asking a question to Mr. Bassett, but go ahead. MR. ROMNEY: Yeah. Thank you, Your Honor. The reason -- and I -- why I think that the reasonable standard applies to privilege log is because in any given case, depending on the volume of electronically stored information that any particular recipient of a subpoena is holding, in some cases, it may be minor. In some it may be voluminous and there's going to require search terms, and someone's going to have to go through these documents to see what would implicate the balancing test and what should simply just be turned over. And in many cases, if not most, it may be most or all the documents in possession of counsel. I just don't know, and the reason for the reasonableness standard, I believe, is if somebody is clearly acting in good faith and they're producing on a rolling basis, and they're logging what they -- what they have flagged within those productions, I think it's just an acceptance of the reality of the volume of information in certain cases. But as long as people are being reasonable and being transparent and working as diligently as they can,\n\n that it makes more sense to be reasonable than it does to impose an artificial time line that may make sense in some or all cases, but might not in a particular situation. And that's why I believe that the great weight of the authority has said that it is a reasonableness case with specific time. It's not an effort to sandbag anyone.\n\n But the debtor has no -- delaying does not help this debtor to the extent it helps anybody else. The issues in this case are going to be decided. They're either going to be decided by the parties working something out, or the Court is going to rule and somebody is going to be happy in any given situation and someone's not going to be.\n\n But this is not a situation where -- certainly, I can't ascertain any reason why anybody would benefit from only -- from delaying just for the sake of delaying. Either the trustee is going to get information or not, and assets are going to be determined to belong to somebody and not somebody else, but it's -- there's just no incentive that I see to delay, and I believe that the debtor -- while anyone can say what they want about anybody, but certainly to my firm, and perceiving -- before my firm was involved for the debtor, I believe that people are working diligently to try and provide information and dealing with a tremendous amount of requests for it from a number of different directions, and I believe that -- well, I know that as long as Zeisler\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 1249 Filed 12/19/22 Entered 12/19/22 13:50:05 Page 38 of 52\n\n and Zeisler and myself are working with the debtor, as well as the other professionals who I've worked with on the debtor's behalf, we are going to do a job, we are going to be reasonable, and we are going to be diligent.\n\n And I don't believe that anything has been done that should lead to a presumption that anything but that will happen, and for that reason I think the customary reasonable language does belong in this order.\n\n THE COURT: Okay. I understand what you said, but you also said that things will move along. So then it won't be arbitrary for me to set a date for that compliance with the privilege log. And then you will add a provision that if for some reason you can't meet that privilege log date, you'll file a motion seeking an extension of that time. That's what you'll do, because we are going to set a date for that.\n\n These Rule 2004 motions have been out there for more than 30 days. The trustee has -- was appointed 60 days ago. It was more than 60 days ago. It was clear that the trustee was going to need to do investigation into this estate and its assets. It's also clear that everyone that was involved in the case before the appointment of the Chapter 11 trustee knew that that would have to occur. This is -- so if we want to talk about\n\nreasonableness, the reasonableness of these issues and the\n\n time to comply with the cooperation with the trustee and to provide the trustee with the information the trustee needs to administer the estate, has at least been pending for 60 days. Actually, 64 days. And if you go back to the time when the trustee -- United States Trustee's office filed the motion for the appointment of an examiner, that was in February of this year. So the reasonableness period of time has been running since, the best case scenario for your client, July 8th, and the worst case scenario since February -- I don't know. I can look at the docket, but I would say 28th or the very beginning of March. So for anyone to make an argument that there somehow -- it's unreasonable, and they haven't been given a reasonable time to comply with these requests is not persuasive. So the reasonableness standard has already been in place, and you will -- you and Mr. Bassett will talk about a date, and it will be subject to extension if some party can Case 22-50073 Doc 1249 Filed 12/19/22 Entered 12/19/22 13:50:05 Page 39 of 52\n\n come in and show why they need the extension. But there is going to be a date in the order.\n\n MR. ROMNEY: Understood, Your Honor, but, if I may? With respect to particular document requests, I don't think that it would be reasonable to assume that the\n\n| 1  | recipients of subpoenas would be searching for responsive     |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2  | documents and identifying which ones are privileged and       |\n| 3  | which ones are not, and which ones belong on a privilege log  |\n| 4  | before they've been served with subpoenas.                    |\n| 5  | THE COURT:<br>I understand that.                              |\n| 6  | MR. BASSETT:<br>Your Honor.                                   |\n| 7  | THE COURT:<br>But I just -- that's why I asked Mr.            |\n| 8  | Bassett, did he serve the subpoenas.<br>And what I also said  |\n| 9  | was, the 30-day period is what's applicable to the            |\n| 10 | subpoenas.                                                    |\n| 11 | So when someone gets the subpoena, they're on                 |\n| 12 | notice that they're being subpoenaed, and they have 30 days   |\n| 13 | to comply with the subpoena.                                  |\n| 14 | And what the order is going to say is that after              |\n| 15 | the period of time to comply with the service of the          |\n| 16 | subpoena passes, they will have whatever amount of days you   |\n| 17 | both agree to.<br>Ten, 14, days to produce a privilege log on |\n| 18 | what they claim is privileged, and they would have had to     |\n| 19 | have file a motion to quash or a protective order before      |\n| 20 | then, timely, in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil   |\n| 21 | Procedure.<br>And if they don't do that, then they will have  |\n| 22 | waived their right to do all those things.<br>Okay?           |\n| 23 | But the privilege log, when they -- they have an              |\n| 24 | obligation when they're reviewing the documents, to comply    |\n| 25 | with a subpoena to put those documents aside that they claim  |\n|    |                                                               |\n\n are privileged, or at least partially privileged, and then create that log. And so that's how this is going to proceed. MR. ROMNEY: Understood, Your Honor. And my only point, and I thank you for the clarity, I think that's a very reasonable approach. My only point was sometimes when you're dealing with large volumes of documents, it takes some more time to get through everything, depending on the number of bodies one (indiscernible) to it and the number of documents involved, but you're certainly correct. The time to -- THE COURT: The Federal Rules of -- the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure address all your concerns, Mr. Romney. MR. BASSETT: And, Your Honor. Your Honor, I apologize, but I do have to just provide one quick response to something that Mr. Romney keeps emphasizing. When he talks about the burden involved of reviewing many responsive documents and logging a large number of documents, I just want to put this in a bit of context. You know, we had a meet and confer with the debtor on discovery last week, and what we are being told so far, which we frankly find very hard to believe and we are still exploring, is that they don't believe that the debtor has\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n very many responsive documents at all, because he does not communicate in writing. So I just -- this idea that there is some voluminous production out there that needs to be reviewed and therefore it's not reasonable to produce a privilege log in a short period of time, that's just not consistent with what we've been told and I don't want the Court to be under a misimpression as to what we expect to find out when we get a production from the debtor. THE COURT: Understood. MR. ROMNEY: If I may? Aaron Romney, Zeisler and Zeisler. My understanding is that when requests are made for communications between the debtor and insert third party, that that includes his agents and with respect to the communications between the debtor's agents and the third parties, that's really what we're getting into, where we're thinking there's going to be large volumes. The statement that I made to Mr. Bassett, and now we're yet again getting into the substance of a meet and confer, that I'd rather avoid those conversations in court because the point of meeting and conferring is to try and work these things out. But the statement that I made with regard to the debtor as an individual speaking with others and my concern\n\n with the volumes of documents would be -- third persons acting on behalf of the debtor or a third party if there's an allegation that there is someone acting on behalf of the debtor.\n\n To the extent that the trustee is solely seeking communication regarding the debtor personally and not his agents, I agree. That should not be a voluminous or burdensome task.\n\n THE COURT: Well, I understand your point, but obviously you don't represent the debtor's agents, and whomever represents the debtor's agents will have to address those issues.\n\n MR. ROMNEY: Understood, Your Honor, but it is information that at least in theory pertains to the debtor. And I say at least in theory because we're here talking about a concept and not particular documents.\n\n THE COURT: Which is what you asked the trustee to do when you filed your declaration and at your first meet and confer, which was to deal with these issues on an omnibus basis, and that's what we're doing. And now we're doing it on a limited omnibus basis.\n\n We're doing it in connection with the post- petition assets, administration of the estate, and claims asserted by and against the debtor, and the Rule 2004 Examinations, all of which have been granted. No appeal\n\n from any of those orders were taken. Mr. Bassett has told me that some, if not all, of the subpoenas have served -- been served, and therefore, any party's rights with regard to these issues are governed by applicable Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and will be by this order. So with regard to Paragraph 7, the change that I expect that -- you both to make is to change the wording that -- it should just say the debtor's counsel shall, by the applicable production deadline, log all such documents. Then you're going to talk about dates. You're going to talk about this expedited basis provision being extended for a period of time, and then you're going to talk about a date by which the privilege log will be produced. With regard to Paragraph 8, what -- are there any other objections, Mr. Romney, you have with regard to Paragraph 7? MR. ROMNEY: Not in addition -- not beyond that which I've identified on the Court -- on this record. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. With regard to Paragraph 8, what objections does the debtor have with regard to Paragraph 8? MR. ROMNEY: The objection with respect to Paragraph 8, I don't -- they're minor and really fine point that I don't think are -- will be objectionable. One of them is that where the language refers to\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1249 Filed 12/19/22 Entered 12/19/22 13:50:05 Page 45 of 52\n\n the trustee not being entitled to waive any trustee privilege, for example, by disclosing privileged documents or information on any public docket. We have a qualification in there that this should apply to, in open court as well, meaning -- spoken word in court as distinguished from written word on the docket. I don't expect that to be controversial, but I wouldn't put words -- or try to put words in anybody's mouth, but we just hadn't gotten around to discussing that point yet. THE COURT: Mr. Bassett, that seems reasonable to me. Does that seem reasonable to you? MR. BASSETT: It does, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. So that takes care of -- MR. BASSETT: There is no issue with it. THE COURT: -- that issue. What else, Mr. Romney? MR. ROMNEY: There's a reference to -- immediately after the language that I just read, there's a reference to the docket in this case. Same concept, any public docket, meaning if it's in an adversary proceeding, if it's in litigation, this -- the rule would apply until the Court orders otherwise. THE COURT: Mr. Bassett? MR. BASSETT: No issue with that either, Your Honor.\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Mr. Romney, what else, on Paragraph 8? MR. ROMNEY: The only other issue with 8 is to the extent the last sentence refers to the timing issue in the prior paragraph that we've just discussed we would -- we would incorporate whatever changes into this paragraph, although to the extent that it's just referring to the expedited dates of -- and that is defined by agreement in Paragraph 7, there would not -- there would likely not be any reason to further change Paragraph 8 as a result of that issue. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. The two of you are going to talk about that expedited basis provision. So as you said, if you agree, if you both agree, then they'll -- let's assume you both agree, then the debtor has no objections to anything in Paragraph 8 because we've just resolved them. MR. ROMNEY: Correct, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Great. Thank you. Now what about Paragraph 9? I think that's your language, Mr. Romney, isn't it? MR. ROMNEY: That is -- I believe it is, and whether there were any minor changes to it or not, there's no objection to Paragraph 9. THE COURT: Okay. Great. So then as far -- you\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1249 Filed 12/19/22 Entered 12/19/22 13:50:05 Page 47 of 52\n\n have a few things to address in Paragraph 7, and if you agree on the expedited basis timing in Paragraph 7, then they'll have no objection to Paragraph 8. So 8 and 9 are no longer at issue. So it's only Paragraph 7. And then obviously, there may be something else that Mr. Romney wants to add, Mr. Bassett. I obviously don't have the redline version of the document he sent to you today, but I'm going to ask you both to work together on that and it should be, Mr. Romney -- I mean, this sounds like there's a very good chance that this will be a consented to order. Do you agree with that? MR. ROMNEY: I do agree with that, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. So tomorrow, we have hearings during the day, and our last hearing is at, I believe 3:00 p.m. Well, hold on just a second and I will confirm that for you. It is. It's at 3:00 p.m. tomorrow, and I anticipate, although I could be wrong, of course, that that will not take a great deal of time. So I could hear this -- I could continue this matter until 3:30 tomorrow afternoon via Zoom if -- does anyone have any issue with that? MR. ROMNEY: Your Honor, that should be fine. I personally have somewhere I need to be for a childcare issue. I need to leave the office at 4:30 tomorrow. THE COURT: Okay.\n\n MR. ROMNEY: I don't have these very often, but I do tomorrow. I imagine one of my colleagues, if we went beyond 4:30, one of my colleagues could step in, but I do have to leave at 4:30, hard stop, tomorrow.\n\n THE COURT: Well, I'm trying -- I understand that, and I appreciate that. I'm trying to give you as much time to work with Attorney Bassett as possible.\n\n The other thing we could do is we could schedule it earlier at say, 1:30. But you decide. I mean, I don't -- you can -- you and Mr. Bassett can talk offline, and you can let the clerk's office know what time you would prefer. I have different pockets of time in between hearings, and then -- why I was saying 3:30, because I think everything will be done for the day. But you could -- you could, you know -- we could start as early as noon, 1:00, or 1:30, but I didn't want you to feel time pressure -- as much time pressure. So that's why I went to 3:30.\n\n But you and Mr. Bassett talk, and then you'll let the courtroom staff know. And whatever time you all want to do it, whether it's at noon, 1:00, 1:30, or 3:30, we can -- or, you know, I -- whatever you -- whatever you decide. Okay? But I -- it sounds to me like we are going to have a consensual order, so I would like that to occur tomorrow. Okay? MR. ROMNEY: Understood, Your Honor.\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n MR. BASSETT: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Is there anything else we need to address this afternoon? MR. DESPINS: Yes, Your Honor. Luc Despins, trustee. You'll recall at the last hearing, we provided the Court with reference to the complaint filed in the UK to show that the debtor owned Ace Decade. And since then, we've discovered another reference even better than that, which is the debtor's own statement under oath at the 341 hearing, and we just filed this before the hearing. We've shown you extracts of that 341 hearing that lasted hours, so we didn't want to burden the Court with everything. But you'll see in there, the question is, Do you have a question in Ace Decade? And essentially he says, yes, I own it. Are there any other owners? No. So the point is, I'm not asking you to rule on that today. What I would like to see the Court order, because we already have an order in place on this, that's the corporate governance order, that direct the debtors to respond to this issue within, you know, three or four days because now the evidence on this issue that he owns it is as fresh as during this case, in the 341 hearing in April of 2022.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 1249 Filed 12/19/22 Entered 12/19/22 13:50:05 Page 50 of 52\n\n THE COURT: I apologize, but I don't remember -- I do remember, obviously, the governance order, but what do you mean that they need to respond? Have they been -- MR. DESPINS: Yeah, they need to respond because -- yeah, we sent them a letter. By now, it's been ten days, 15 days, but said, hey, you own this entity as Ace Decade, and we want you to turn over to us all the books and records and the stock, the same way you have to do in Javer (ph) -- THE COURT: I see. MR. DESPINS: -- based on the corporate governance order. And Mr. Henzy said, I'm very busy, I have other clients and all that, and we said, still rightly so, you've just hit me with this, Mr. Despins, so let me review the complaint and all that, and I -- my point is, I wanted Your Honor to see that there's much more recent testimony from the debtor saying, I own it. I'm the sole owner of this entity. And of course I'm not asking you now to say, yes, you're right, but rather you should set a deadline for the debtor's counsel to respond to my letter of, you know, before the Labor Day weekend, the Thursday before the Labor Day weekend that says, provide us with the documents. And so we're asking the Court to set a response deadline at this point, given this new -- I think. I don't know how they would contest that, that that 341 testimony\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.\n\n that he owns this entity; he's the sole owner. THE COURT: Okay. I have a recollection now of what you're talking about so I will take a look at what was filed on the docket today, and consider your request for the deadline for the debtor to respond to the issues regarding that entity. MR. DESPINS: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you. All right. Is there anything further we need to address this afternoon? All right. So, Mr. Romney and Mr. Bassett, when you -- when you're talking, I would appreciate it if possible, for you to send an email to the courtroom deputy box tonight so that the courtroom deputy knows by early tomorrow morning at the latest, what time this hear -- when I say early, by, you know, 8:30, 9:00 tomorrow morning, what time this hearing is going to be continued to tomorrow, and then we will go from there. Okay? We have hearings starting at 10:00 in other cases. As I told you, I have some time. Noon, 1:00, 1:30, 3:30. You decide, but if you would please -- even if you don't send that email to the courtroom deputy until tomorrow morning, I would ask that it be sent at least between 8:30 and 9:00 a.m., please, so that the courtroom deputy can schedule things appropriately. At the moment, the docket will indicate that the\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1249 Filed 12/19/22 Entered 12/19/22 13:50:05 Page 52 of 52\n\n hearing was held today, and it's continued to tomorrow at a time to be determined. Okay? MR. ROMNEY: Understood, Your Honor. Thank you. MR. BASSETT: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. All right. I think that that takes care of everything in the Kwok case today, so we will see the parties tomorrow, and court is adjourned for today. MR. ROMNEY: Thank you. THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Court is adjourned. (Proceedings concluded at 3:29 p.m.) I, CHRISTINE FIORE, court-approved transcriber and certified electronic reporter and transcriber, certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the official electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above- entitled matter. 20 December 18, 2022 21 Christine Fiore, CERT Transcriber","body_zh":"康涅狄格州联邦破产法院\n\n布里奇波特分院\n\n关于\n\n*\n\n案号 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n*\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）\n\n*\n\n康涅狄格州布里奇波特\n\n*\n\n2022年9月12日\n\n债务人。\n\n*\n\n*\n\n*\n\n*\n\n*\n\n*\n\n*\n\n*\n\n*\n\n*\n\n*\n\n*\n\n*\n\n*\n\n*\n\n*\n\n*\n\n*\n\n关于命令动议的庭审记录\n\n在尊敬的 JULIE A. MANNING（朱莉·A·曼宁）美国联邦破产法官面前\n\n出庭人员：\n\n代理债务人：AARON ROMNEY, ESQ.（亚伦·罗姆尼律师）\n\nZeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（泽斯勒与泽斯勒专业公司）\n\n康涅狄格州布里奇波特市米德尔街10号15层\n\nBridgeport, CT 06604\n\n代理债权人 Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.（太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金有限合伙企业）：PETER FRIEDMAN, ESQ.（彼得·弗里德曼律师）\n\nO'Melveny & Myers LLP（奥美律师事务所）\n\n时代广场塔楼\n\n时代广场7号\n\nNew York, NY 10036\n\nANNECCA SMITH, ESQ.（安妮卡·史密斯律师）\n\nRobinson & Cole（罗宾逊与科尔律师事务所）\n\n康涅狄格州哈特福德市特朗布尔街28号\n\nHartford, CT 06103\n\n代理第11章受托人：NICHOLAS A. BASSETT, ESQ.（尼古拉斯·A·巴塞特律师）\n\nPaul Hastings LLP（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所）\n\n纽约市公园大道200号\n\nNew York, NY 10166\n\n代理债权人委员会：IRVE GOLDMAN, ESQ.（欧文·戈德曼律师）\n\nPullman & Comley（普尔曼与康利律师事务所）\n\n康涅狄格州布里奇波特市主街850号\n\nBridgeport, CT 06601\n\n代理美国受托人：HOLLEY L. CLAIBORN, ESQ.（霍莉·L·克莱伯恩律师）\n\nOffice of the United States Trustee（美国受托人办公室）\n\nGiaimo 联邦大楼\n\n康涅狄格州纽黑文市法院街150号302室\n\nNew Haven, CT 06510\n\n代理债权人 Logan Cheng（郑洛根）：JAY MARSHALL WOLMAN, ESQ.（杰伊·马歇尔·沃尔曼律师）\n\nRandazza Legal Group, PLLC（兰达扎法律集团专业有限责任公司）\n\n康涅狄格州哈特福德市珍珠街100号14层\n\nHartford, CT 06103\n\n庭审通过电子录音记录，笔录由转录服务机构制作。\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷记录及转录服务公司）\n\n康涅狄格州谢尔顿市研究大道4号402套间\n\nShelton, Connecticut 06484\n\n(203)929-9992\n\n出庭人员续：\n\n代理第11章受托人：PATRICK R. LINSEY, ESQ.（帕特里克·R·林西律师）\n\nNeubert Pepe & Monteith, PC（诺伊伯特、佩佩与蒙蒂思专业公司）\n\n康涅狄格州纽黑文市教堂街195号\n\nNew Haven, CT 06510\n\n第11章受托人：LUC A. DESPINS, ESQ.（吕克·A·德斯平律师）\n\nPaul Hastings LLP（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所）\n\n纽约市公园大道200号\n\nNew York, NY 10166\n\n代理债权人委员会：IRVE GOLDMAN, ESQ.（欧文·戈德曼律师）\n\nPullman & Comley（普尔曼与康利律师事务所）\n\n康涅狄格州布里奇波特市主街850号\n\nBridgeport, CT 06601\n\n代理美国受托人：HOLLEY L. CLAIBORN, ESQ.（霍莉·L·克莱伯恩律师）\n\nOffice of the United States Trustee（美国受托人办公室）\n\nGiaimo 联邦大楼\n\n康涅狄格州纽黑文市法院街150号302室\n\nNew Haven, CT 06510\n\n代理债权人 Logan Cheng（郑洛根）：JAY MARSHALL WOLMAN, ESQ.（杰伊·马歇尔·沃尔曼律师）\n\nRandazza Legal Group, PLLC（兰达扎法律集团专业有限责任公司）\n\n康涅狄格州哈特福德市珍珠街100号14层\n\nHartford, CT 06103\n\n（庭审于下午2:16开始。）\n\n法庭书记员：案号 22-50073，郭文贵。\n\n法庭：好的。下午好。请为记录说明各方出庭情况，先请第11章受托人？\n\n德斯平律师：早上好，法官阁下。吕克·德斯平，第11章受托人。\n\n法庭：下午好。\n\n巴塞特律师：午后——抱歉。下午好，法官阁下。我是代表第11章受托人的保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所尼克·巴塞特。\n\n法庭：下午好。\n\n林西律师：下午好，法官阁下。帕特里克·林西，受托人的本地代理律师。\n\n法庭：下午好。\n\n弗里德曼律师：下午好，法官阁下。我是代表 PAX 的奥美律师事务所彼得·弗里德曼。\n\n法庭：下午好。\n\n罗姆尼律师：下午好——还有其他人在发言吗？\n\n史密斯律师：我是罗宾逊与科尔律师事务所的安妮卡·史密斯，也是代表 PAX 的康涅狄格州代理律师。\n\n法庭：下午好。罗姆尼先生？\n\n罗姆尼律师：下午好，我是代表债务人的泽斯勒与泽斯勒律师事务所亚伦·罗姆尼。\n\n法庭：下午好。戈德曼先生。\n\n戈德曼律师：下午好，法官阁下。我是代表债权人委员会的普尔曼与康利律师事务所欧文·戈德曼。\n\n法庭：克莱伯恩律师。\n\n克莱伯恩律师：下午好，法官阁下。我是代表美国受托人的霍莉·克莱伯恩。\n\n法庭：下午好。还有，沃尔曼先生。\n\n沃尔曼律师：下午好，法官阁下。我是代表债权人郑洛根的兰达扎法律集团杰伊·沃尔曼。\n\n法庭：下午好。\n\n我想我们至此已记录了所有人的出庭情况，因此我们继续进行。\n\nBALDIGA 律师：法官阁下，我是 Brown Rudnick（布朗·拉德尼克律师事务所）的 William Baldiga（威廉·鲍尔迪加）。\n\n法庭：哦，很抱歉。我没有看到您。\n\n鲍尔迪加律师：没关系。\n\n法庭：您——我看不到鲍尔迪加先生。\n\n法庭书记员：他应该在用电话接入。\n\n法庭：好的。\n\n法庭书记员：他在电话上。\n\n法庭：哦，好的。您是通过电话参与的，鲍尔迪加先生。\n\n鲍尔迪加律师：是的。\n\n法庭：好的。抱歉。这就是我没有看到您的原因。无论如何，下午好。\n\n那么，今天的庭审是就请求裁定确认特权控制权在受托人获任命后移交给受托人及相关救济的动议所进行的续行庭审。我们已于8月30日和9月6日就受托人的动议举行了两次庭审。\n\n我们上次开庭时，第11章受托人和债务人的代理律师已就受托人所提交的动议提交了经修订的拟议裁定，规定特权控制权已移交给受托人。我们在上次庭审期间就这些拟议裁定进行了一些讨论。这些拟议裁定是在9月6日庭审前不久提交的，这正是我所要求的，但在我们9月6日续行庭审之前，我没有机会全面审阅它们。\n\n我知道各方随后于9月7日提交了命令，实质上显示了——嗯，我应该说，受托人提交了一份补充证据，显示受托人拟议裁定与债务人拟议裁定之间的差异，该文件载于 ECF 835；随后，债务人在 ECF Number 836 提交了一份以列表形式列出的争议问题摘要。\n\n各方是否就受托人提出的、请求裁定确认特权控制权在受托人获任命后移交给受托人的动议进行了进一步讨论？\n\n德斯平律师：是的，法官阁下。吕克·德斯平，第11章受托人。我还想确认法官阁下是否有机会查看我们于周五下午提交的某份文件，即案卷编号 846，其中——其中增加了两项条款，我们认为这些条款应当能够解决债务人的问题，但是——此后直至今天上午，我们进行了大量来回沟通；我认为此时合理的做法是由巴塞特先生向法庭说明周五增加的这两项条款，它们的作用是什么、旨在解决什么问题，然后——向法庭说明我们认为哪些问题已获解决，因为我相信有些问题已经解决，遗憾的是并非全部，但有些已经解决，以节省法庭的一些时间。因此——经法官阁下许可，我将交由巴塞特先生向法官阁下说明此事。\n\n法庭：可以。谢谢。巴塞特先生。\n\n巴塞特律师：好的。\n\n法庭：我现在正在看 846。您希望我看 846 吗？\n\n巴塞特律师：是的，法官阁下。此外，为记录在案，我是代表受托人的保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所尼克·巴塞特。我认为法官阁下——\n\n法庭：我们为什么不调出——我们为什么不调出 846，以便所有人同时查看同一份文件？可以吗？\n\n巴塞特律师：当然可以。然后，法官阁下——哦，抱歉。\n\n法庭：请继续。\n\n巴塞特律师：我只是想说，我建议查看 PDF 的第 13 页，共 19 页，即我们提交文件的附件 B，因为该附件包含红线版本，我认为这将最便于我们使用。\n\n法庭：19 页中的第 13 页？\n\n巴塞特律师：是的，法官阁下。上面应当写有附件 B。\n\n法庭：我看到了。\n\n巴塞特律师：然后，如果您翻到下一页，那将是红线版本的第一页。\n\n法庭：我明白了。谢谢。那么我们现在翻到 19 页中的第 14 页。好的。\n\n巴塞特律师：很好。\n\n法庭：请继续。\n\n巴塞特律师：那么，法官阁下——谢谢，法官阁下。在我深入说明并向法官阁下介绍这些修改之前，再提供一点背景情况。因此，在我们上周举行庭审之后，我们在内部坐下来，仔细考虑了我们在该次庭审中听到债务人所说的内容，以及与法庭进行的意见和讨论。因此，在上周庭审后的几天里，我们努力拟定了这份经修订的拟议裁定；在我们看来，该裁定经过专门设计，以解决我们所理解的债务人所提及的真正关键关切。这是我们真正试图弥合分歧的做法，具体处理了就我们一直讨论的利益衡量测试以及在与法庭讨论中提出的有关放弃及其他事项的一些具体问题所提出的若干关切。现在，我最后要说明的一点程序事项是，我们于周四晚上发送了这份经修订的拟议裁定，或者实际上是与之略有不同但包含大部分这些修改的一个版本。我们原本希望在周五讨论该版本。我们没有机会在周五与债务人的代理律师讨论它，因此我们继续提交了经修订的拟议裁定，也就是我们正在查看的案卷编号 846 中的文件。但是，法庭在周五——因为我们希望确保法官阁下有时间审阅该文件，如果法官阁下能够在当时至现在期间查看它，话虽如此，我们也一直继续与债务人的代理律师讨论。罗姆尼律师和我昨天通了电话，然后我们今天上午收到了他们包含进一步意见的修订稿；我认为他——我将让他向法庭解释，但我认为这涉及进一步演变我们的若干问题。不过，在讨论该事项之前，我认为由我向法官阁下说明我们所作的主要修改会有所帮助。我认为我们可以继续向下滚动。在第 7 段之前没有实质性修改。第 2 段中仅有一项并非实质性的定义澄清——当我们看到第 7 段时，即 PDF 的 19 页中的第 17 页，这是我们加入的第一项重大修改，同样是为了处理所提出的一些问题。具体而言，该修改将产生如下作用：尽管裁定前面的各段关于已移交给受托人的特权范围维持不变，而且这些段落明确规定，与破产财产资产、债务人的财务状况和债务，以及申请提交后——破产财产申请提交后管理有关的特权，作为默认规则而言，这些特权将移交给债务人，或者更确切地说，移交给受托人；我认为，这为我们所寻求的事项提供了澄清，并将真正有助于指引今后的路径，以确定债务人在证据开示中可以或不可以扣留什么。\n\n但是，第 7 段具体处理了债务人提出的关切，即您知道，他认为，尽管除某些刑事问题之外的文件实际上尚未被确定，他认为可能存在包含受特权保护的信息的文件，如予披露，可能对债务人造成损害。\n\n因此，我们在此试图做的是设定一项条款，使债务人在一种情况下能够——在今后其善意地认为某份文件或证词中存在信息时——我认为现在双方均同意其适用于文件和信息——但如果债务人认为存在某些信息，如向受托人披露受特权保护的信息，可能会对债务人造成个人损害，则设有一项程序，我们将通过该程序把该问题提交法庭解决。\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷记录及转录服务公司）\n\n具体而言，债务人首先将该文件列入清单，在该清单中确认作为特权主张标的的个人损害，然后，任何一方均可向法庭寻求救济；但重要的是，我们已设定一项加速程序，以便进行该项处理，从而使我们不会在这些问题出现时花费大量时间解决它们。\n\n重要的是，法官阁下，在本段末尾，在我们说明设想以加速方式进行审查的程序之后，该程序可能包括法庭对文件进行不公开审查，我们加入了一些措辞，以澄清或增加有关个人损害定义，即我们所指含义的重要明确性。\n\n而本段末尾的这一措辞所明确的是，债务人不能主张，披露可能导致追回破产财产的文件会对其本人造成损害。您知道，这又回到我们在上次听证会上讨论的问题，即我们担心债务人可能主张：如果我们向与其资产有关的亲属或关联方索取文件，而我们认为该等资产可能属于破产财产，或者该等资产表面上属于他们、但我们认为应当属于破产财产，那么债务人不能以其会因此受到损害作为回应，因为其会主张该等资产并非破产财产。因此，本段末尾的该项澄清大致旨在处理这一问题。关于第7段，我还想说的一点是，法官大人，我们确实清楚地听到了法院的意见。我认为法官大人在上次听证会上曾作出几项评论，认为最好从一开始就一劳永逸地解决这一特权问题，以免在案件后续过程中不断出现一系列争议。我们同意这一点。我们认为——您知道，我们起草本段，是为了在该项顾虑与债务人提出的顾虑之间取得平衡，即债务人无法预见每一份可能与——或者可能导致个人损害的文件有关的潜在文件；本段对此类问题赋予一种较为有限的、可在未来逐案解决的机制，但不会打开大门，致使任何及所有特权问题都必须逐案裁决。因此，这就是第7段。如果法官大人愿意，我可以在进入第8段之前回答有关该段的问题，但是——\n\n法院：那么，我的问题是——Romney先生（艾伦·罗姆尼），您是否同意第7段中的措辞？\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（Fiore记录与转录服务公司）\n\nROMNEY先生：法官大人，我们认为第7段的措辞，以及Bassett先生（巴塞特先生）正在说明的其他修改，已在很大程度上弥合了分歧。今天上午，我们已向受托人的律师交还了该文件的修订痕迹版本。我原本希望昨晚收到它，但没有发生；正如Bassett律师所说，我们直到——实际上大约一小时前还在交谈。我们确实仍有一些分歧。我个人认为——我在此说明的是我的看法——如果再给我们一点时间，我们将能够弥合这些分歧，因为它们在许多方面——并非所有方面，但在许多方面——属于措辞上的问题。据我了解，受托人的律师宁愿直接提交该文件，让债务人的律师就该文件提交其修订痕迹版本，然后由法院按照其认为适当的规则作出裁决。为回答您的问题，不，我们尚未完全达成一致，但就这一问题而言，我们已比以往任何时候都更接近达成协议。正如我所说，鉴于我们已取得的进展，我确实相信，只要再给一点时间，我们能够达成协议；但我也确实想明确，受托人的立场是其希望将这一问题提交法院。\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（Fiore记录与转录服务公司）\n\n法院：我没有听清您最后说的内容。您说，“我想明确受托人的立场”，之后我就无法理解您说了什么。\n\nROMNEY先生：受托人的立场是，现在应当将此事提交法院，而不应再试图多花一点时间来获得一份完全协商一致的命令。\n\n法院：好的。\n\nDESPINS先生：法官大人——法官大人，我是Luc Despins（卢克·德斯平斯）。就此说两秒钟。我的意思是，当然，您知道，如果我们可以再花——关键是，我们在周四下午向他们发送了那份修改稿。在我看来，从那时到现在已经是很长一段时间了。而且，您知道，如果他们还需要半小时来解决问题，也可以，但我——我担心的是，现在我们谈论的是再过一周，而这——您知道，我们中的许多人不——您知道，我们认为那并不合适。顺便说一下，法官大人，我收到Goldman先生（戈德曼先生）的一封电子邮件，他说自己——自己被从通话中移除了，而且无法重新拨入，因此，无论是谁控制Zoom，都应让Goldman先生重新进入，因为他因某种原因无法加入。\n\n法院：谢谢。谢谢。我们看看能否让他重新进入。\n\n法庭书记员：他不在等候室。\n\n法院：他不在等候室。是的，他因某种原因无法连接。我不知道为什么。（暂停）\n\n法院：好的。Despins先生，谢谢您提供这一更新。Romney先生，我希望Bassett先生先说明其余修改，然后我们将讨论——您知道，您说你们已实质上达成一致。我希望您确保最终向我说明，您仍存在哪些问题。我的意思是，我——您当然有权提出您的问题，但正如我上周在听证会上所说，我需要了解您反对的是什么。好吗？因此，当Bassett先生继续说明时，请您记住这一点，好吗？\n\nROMNEY先生：明白，法官大人。\n\n法院：——说明其余修改？好的。好。那么，我们刚刚审议了第——顺便说一下，我并不是说我没有问题，但我想先听取各方意见。因此，我们现在已经审议了第7段。那么，我们是否应当转到第8段，Bassett先生？\n\nBASSETT先生：是的，法官大人。我很乐意说明第8段。我认为这将是一次较短的讨论。正如法官大人肯定记得我们举行过的听证会，债务人多次提出的问题之一，是担心发生所谓特权的放弃。我认为我们始终坚持的是，我们寻求的救济涉及对特权的控制；这显然意味着，受托人今后在特权转移给其的范围内，将有权控制——您知道，今后可按其意愿处理该等特权。但我们在第8段中为专门处理所提出的——所引发的关于特权放弃的顾虑所做的是：规定，就目前本命令而言，当我们谈及将特权的控制权转移给受托人时，目前其全部含义只是，受托人将能够审阅、查阅并以其他方式使用受主张特权约束的所有文件和信息。这意味着，我们可以将其用于我们调查的所有目的。例如，若受托人根据其所收到的信息认定其认为存在值得追究的请求权，以追回州资产，我们可以为该目的使用所有信息，\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（Fiore记录与转录服务公司）\n\n包括我们收到的特权信息，但我们无权通过例如将其提交至公开案卷、使全世界其他人都能看到特权信息的方式，进一步放弃该等文件所涉特权。我们不会——您知道——与第三方共享特权文件。\n\n因此，受托人将拥有查阅权，但不能通过向第三方提供特权信息而导致特权放弃。\n\n我们还在本段中设置了密封提交的机制；而且，如果在今后某个时候，受托人确实认为其适宜放弃某一特定文件所涉特权，其可以向法院提出申请，请求该项救济。我们设想，这将按照我们在前一段中概述的同类快速程序进行。\n\n最后，法官大人，第9段基本上采纳了债务人在其上次向法院提交的命令中提出的措辞。\n\n债务人在其命令中有——有这一措辞，其希望澄清，本命令中的任何内容均无意影响法院另一项与公司治理动议有关的命令所涉问题，尤其是UBS litigation（UBS诉讼）。\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（Fiore记录与转录服务公司）\n\n因此，本段仅纳入该项内容，并明确规定，本命令任何内容均无意影响该诉讼中所涉的特权，而该等特权再次受另一项命令的约束。\n\n法官大人，这些就是修改内容。我不会代Romney律师发言，但我确实认为，这一新版命令解决了我们先前识别并在Docket 835中向法院提交的问题清单中列明的许多其他问题，正如我先前举例所述。\n\n您知道，关于这是否同时适用于文件和信息的问题已经解决。它同时适用于文件和信息；鉴于我们新增的第7段和第8段，我认为第2段中某些措辞所涉的问题现已解决。\n\n因此，我确实认为问题已大为缩小，但根据我们今天上午收到的修改稿，正如Despins先生所说，您知道，我认为我们的观点是，仍有一些问题尚待解决，我们希望现阶段就这些问题获得裁决。\n\n法院：好的。谢谢。Romney先生？\n\nROMNEY先生：谢谢，法官大人。\n\n法院：关于——\n\nROMNEY先生：Aaron Romney（艾伦·罗姆尼）——\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（Fiore记录与转录服务公司）\n\n法院：——关于各段——\n\nROMNEY先生：——代表债务人的Zeisler and Zeisler（泽斯勒和泽斯勒律师事务所）。\n\n法院：等——等一下。等一下，Romney先生。关于这份修订文件的第7段，即ECF 846第17页（共19页），债务人对第7段中的措辞有何——\n\nROMNEY先生：是。\n\n法院：——异议？\n\nROMNEY先生：关于第7段，具体而言，我们认为“personal home”一词含义不明确；我现在并非按任何特定顺序说明，只是按照我正在查看、而法院尚未收到的修订痕迹版本中所出现的顺序说明。但是，审视判例法后，我们认为，在平衡测试的措辞中，应当只是“对债务人造成损害”，而非“对债务人的个人住所造成损害”。关于特权清单的提交及时间，以及任何特权清单应当载明的信息，我们认为应当仅援引Local Rule 26(e)，而不应加入任何至少可能不符合该规则的内容，例如要求与提交期限同时提交特权清单。我们认为这与适用判例法不一致。\n\n而第7段中最重要的问题可能是，受托人的措辞要求通过该程序提交的所有特权问题均按快速程序审理，并在四天内提交书面意见。债务人的立场是，联邦规则和地方法规之所以存在，是有其理由的，那就是人们应获得合理的时间来回应提交至其面前的问题。有时律师有其他案件。有时律师有家庭。有时律师需要睡觉。仅仅因为某一事项不同于需要以快速程序裁决的特定情形，就要求在四天内完成，我们认为这既不合理也不公平。\n\n正如Bassett律师和我直到今天下午早些时候还在讨论的，这一问题上很可能存在一个中间方案。说“很可能”，我的意思是我相信确有如此，即在4天和14天之间存在一个债务人能够接受的期限，但我们——您知道，时间已经用尽，我们现在就在这里。四天确实有些过于仓促。\n\n过去两天发生的事情正是对此的完美说明。受托人指出，他们在星期四晚上向我们提供了一份拟议命令，而我本人直到星期六上午才得以审阅该拟议命令，这是因为我在星期五晚上在\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷速记与转录服务公司）\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1249 Filed 12/19/22 Entered 12/19/22 13:50:05 Page 21 of 52\n\n另一个案件中有两个截止期限；这种情况有时会发生，这并非是在拖延，也并非没有给予其应有的关注。只是人类一次只能做一件事，尤其是在我们讨论对当事人权利具有重大影响的复杂问题时；我们认为，仅因其属于本命令范围，且未证明存在理由，就规定四天期限，根本不公平，也不符合适用法律。法院：好的。因此，您的意思是，如果您再有一天时间，您认为您能够就此项规定达成一致？罗姆尼先生（Romney）：就这项具体规定，我相当——我至少相当有信心，这项规定，这些是——这只是若干项规定中的一项，但可能是其中最重要的一项。我相信，我们可以在4天与默认命令规定的14天之间，就一个合理的时间表达成一致。是的，我认为可以。巴塞特先生（Bassett）：法官阁下。我是保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所（Paul Hastings）的尼克·巴塞特（Nick Bassett）。就该具体问题而言，罗姆尼律师是正确的。我们确实讨论过，在我们正在审阅的这段措辞中，常规通知与我们提议的加急通知之间是否可能存在一个折中方案。我认为我们说的是四天。您知道，罗姆尼律师说，您知道，按照规则，通常您会\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1249 Filed 12/19/22 Entered 12/19/22 13:50:05 Page 22 of 52\n\n有14天。我们能否取一个中间期限，比如说，八天作出回应，然后，您知道，三天提交答复？大致如此。我认为那样可以。\n\n但为明确起见，我是说，作出这一加急安排的原因是，受托人正向许多当事人寻求证据开示，而这些问题可能会出现。\n\n如法院所知，我们已向若干曾经代理或仍在代理债务人的律师事务所送达传票；我预计，我们将在不同时间从这些事务所获得特权日志和信息。\n\n而且，您知道，随着这些问题出现，我们可能需要采用这一程序。如果这种情况发生多次，我们不能因为每次都必须采用常规通知程序而使我们的调查受到不当延误，尽管届时鉴于我们已经花费——已经花费了如此多时间讨论这些问题，法院将对这些问题极为熟悉。这就是其真正的逻辑。\n\n但如我所说，您知道，听起来我们可以——可以通过采取一个中间期限来弥合时间问题上的分歧。\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷速记与转录服务公司）\n\n法院：谢谢。好的。关于第7段，罗姆尼先生，听起来——我想确保记录准确。第一，在我们于9月6日就该问题举行的上一次听证会上，您的同事表示，这是一项咨询意见，并且可以被视为如此。如果您的当事人将采取立场称这是一项咨询意见，我不会作出命令。因此，您需要为记录澄清，在作出本命令时，您是否会以其为咨询意见为由提出上诉；因为如果您会，我就不会作出本命令。我将必须作出书面裁决，而且我认为无论如何您已经放弃并弃权了该论点。当我回头查看您提交的宣誓书时——实际上是您在之后提交的一份声明——仅为讨论会面协商，您在经宣誓的声明中称，您希望以综合方式处理该程序，而不希望以零碎方式处理。\n\n因此，我想确保您没有改变该立场，因为如果您要就\n\n本动议提出相反立场，我——我不会继续进行。那么，关于就受托人有关特权的动议作出命令，您的立场是什么？罗姆尼先生：那么——我想确保我在此非常谨慎地选择措辞，以做到准确无误。我毫无疑问签署了一份声明，其中表明我的观点是，如果当事人知道法院所适用的是哪一条判例权威路线，甚至哪一条判例权威分支路线，对这些问题的解决将会大为高效。我认为，如果我们知道法院将适用的标准，那么日后与个别文件有关的争议将会少得多。我当时如此认为，现在仍然如此认为；这就是我签署该声明的原因，也是我们一直与受托人的律师合作，以便达成——您知道——达成这样一种状态：无论由法院裁决，还是最终由当事人同意，都会使所有人，包括法院，今后的工作更加高效。现在快进到上周。我相信您指的是亨齐律师（Attorney Henzy）曾评论称，这可能被解释为一项咨询意见。我认为，在就此事举行的\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷速记与转录服务公司）\n\n第一次听证会上，我实际上提出过这可能是——但我并不清楚，并且可以说这不是咨询意见；这就是——这就是为什么我坐在审判席这一边，而法院坐在另一边，因为我确实不知道对于是否有人可能认定这是咨询意见这一问题的答案。\n\n但我认为，真正针对法院的问题是，我是说，我们已经——我希望在上次听证会上已清楚说明，我们同意——我们本会同意作出截至上次听证会时我们已提交的拟议命令。\n\n若在本次听证会结束后法院允许，我打算如此，除非作出决定——作出的决定是，我们将再花一点时间努力解决此事。\n\n但除此之外，我希望获得法院许可，再提交一份债务人将同意作出的命令；我相信，如果债务人同意作出该命令，其将放弃上诉权。\n\n尽管我并未就以下问题与我们的当事人进行具体讨论：您是否放弃了任何上诉权，您是否未放弃任何上诉权。我此刻坐在这里所能说的唯一一点是，拟议命令之间的差异，即我将提议提交的那一份\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷速记与转录服务公司）\n\n与已经提交的那一份之间的差异，我设想，即使在理论上，我们保留上诉权的唯一问题，也是在两份命令存在差异的范围内；而且我有权提交——同意我已经提交的拟议命令。因此，就此而言——法院：但您刚才所说的您已经提交的拟议命令又发生了变化。罗姆尼先生：正确；而且所谓其将发生变化，我的意思是，其将更接近于某种——其与受托人拟议命令之间的差异将会更少。因此，我想说的或许表达得不够清楚的是，我设想，当事人在同意作出一项命令后，唯一可以上诉的事项，将是少数几个——与其同意内容存在实质差异的问题。就此而言，我不会——我只是不会——我相信债务人将同意就该问题作出一项命令。如果问题是法院作出的命令与债务人准备同意的内容不一致——存在实质差异，那么任何假设性的上诉都必须涉及债务人未同意的问题。这有道理吗，法官阁下？法院：或许。但问题在于。\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷速记与转录服务公司）\n\n您与德斯平斯先生（Mr. Despins）和巴塞特先生一样，就证据开示争议负有持续善意行事的义务。你们进行了会面协商。您提交了一份声明，其中称您认为应当——应当以综合方式处理这些特权问题。在您提交该声明后，受托人提交了其动议，要求以综合方式处理这些问题。如果有人提出上诉，称——就该动议作出的任何命令都是咨询意见，我不确定那是否属于善意。事实上，我认为这几乎不能称为善意，因为否则您就不应参与所有这些讨论，包括向法院提交命令。现在，我认为你们当事人——你们二位应当继续努力达成一项协商一致的命令；我将给予你们时间，截至明天下午。听起来——但是，我不会让本院或任何其他人陷入必须处理有关本破产财产管理问题上诉的境地；关于文件的提交，您已在提交给本院的一项命令中说明——您称自己有权同意该命令——至少破产申请提交后的信息将提供给第11章受托人。\n\n您还表示，您认为必须适用一项利益衡量检验。因此，当您谈到关于个人案件中律师—当事人保密特权的现有法律类型的三个类别时，具体而言——并且没有任何人找到有关特权转移给受托人的个人第11章案件判例——但存在一些判例，而且您同意，对于从您的当事人自愿接受本院管辖之时起至受托人成为受托人，即第11章受托人之日止的破产申请提交后期间，所有该等信息的特权均转移——其控制权转移给受托人。\n\n现在，受托人已将您要求其排除的内容排除在外。受托人已——明确将您明确要求其排除的内容排除在本命令之外。因此，关于我为何问您和巴塞特先生仍反对什么，我将给予你们一些时间来最终确定。\n\n但我要说，有一件关于第7段的事情我不理解；我不知道这是您的措辞，罗姆尼先生，还是巴塞特先生的措辞，还是两者的措辞，但该段——\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷速记与转录服务公司）\n\n第四行写道：“受托人随后1，债务人或其律师，视情况而定。”债务人不能自行在本院采取行动。他有他的——他通过你采取行动。而且，在债务人有律师代理期间，我不允许债务人自行提交文件。因此，我希望这一点非常明确。债务人无权在本院提交某种单独的文件，除非该文件由作为其律师的你签署，并依照第11条规则的标准提交。罗姆尼先生：明白，法官阁下。我认为这一行的意图并非——而且我——法庭：那么，我们就把——罗姆尼先生：——理解为——法庭：——把“债务人”删去，写成“债务人的律师”。巴塞特先生：好的，法官阁下。法官阁下，我是来自 Paul Hastings（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所）的尼克·巴塞特（Nick Bassett）。不过，我认为这可能是我们所用的措辞，但我认为其背后的意图是处理这样一个事实：我们已在本案中通过债务人的律师向债务人送达传票。法庭：那么应由其律师提出异议，而不是债务人。巴塞特先生：明白，法官阁下。但我们也向若干其他律师事务所送达了传票，这些律师事务所\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 1249 提交日期 12/19/22 登记日期 12/19/22 13:50:05 第 30 页，共 52 页\n\n目前或曾经代理过他，因此我认为巴塞特律师——法庭：那么他们必须自行提出异议。他们不会——巴塞特先生：对。什么——法庭：——郭文贵先生不会代表其任何专业人士提出任何异议。巴塞特先生：明白，法官阁下。因此我们可以——我们理解一致。我们可以澄清这一点。这并非——这并非我们使用该措辞所意图表达的内容，但我理解法庭的关切。法庭：是的。我不会在这上面花任何时间。然后，债务人的律师应在适用的交付期限届满前，按照地区法院地方法规则 26(e) 的要求，对所有此类文件编制特权日志。可以吗？这将会执行。然后，关于期限和日期，听起来，巴塞特先生，你或许可以与罗姆尼先生协商修改这些日期，并在4天、14天以及第26条规则之间给罗姆尼先生多一些时间，对吗？巴塞特先生：是的，法官阁下，确实如此。我唯一还想提到的是，我没有——我认为，当您要求罗姆尼先生阐明他对第7段的异议时，他提到了加速\n\n程序，作为三项内容之一。\n\n我只是不希望我对另外两项保持沉默被误解。对于罗姆尼律师提出删除“个人”一词的建议，我们确有异议，并将继续与罗姆尼律师讨论。我们认为这是一个重要的词。我们乐意与他讨论，但我们不同意直接将其删除。我认为他还提到，就特权日志要求而言，他希望删除“在适用的交付期限届满前”的措辞，并且还希望删除地区法院地方法规则所涉措辞之后、关于识别支持个人损害主张所必要信息的措辞。我们也反对这些修改，并且鉴于本案的背景，我们确实认为在交付文件时取得特权日志十分重要。鉴于这一除外规定或此类安全阀条款的起草方式，我们也认为，了解所主张的具体个人损害为何是绝对必要的。因此，我只是想澄清，对于罗姆尼律师所谈及的第7段另外两个方面，我们确有异议。法庭：那么，关于个人损害\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷速记和转录服务公司）\n\n问题以及“个人”一词，罗姆尼先生，我没有找到任何讨论个人案件中利益衡量测试的判例。它们都谈及对债务人的损害。本案中的债务人是一个人。因此，将遭受的损害将是个人损害。因此，你关于不应在其中使用“个人”一词的论点并未说服我。债务人是一个人。唯一谈及对债务人损害的判例法，是在公司案件的背景下讨论该问题。因此，我不明白你对“个人”一词有何异议。12 罗姆尼先生：法官阁下，我——在——在讨论个人债务人情形下利益衡量测试的判例背景中，措辞仅仅是“对债务人的损害”。我同意您的看法，当谈论一个人时，对债务人的损害就是对债务人的损害，而不是对其他人或债务人不再——您知道——拥有或控制，或者从未拥有或控制的某项企业的损害，但——再次说，我的意见是要遵循双方坦率地说都已援引的判例中的措辞，即谈论对债务人损害进行衡量。我认为，“个人”一词的含义是，它有身体伤害的含义，而有别于经济损失。那也许——\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷速记和转录服务公司）\n\n法庭：我完全不同意你的意见。罗姆尼先生：——这并不正确。法庭：“个人”一词从未被界定为身体伤害。你在哪里——哪一个判例是这样说的？罗姆尼先生：嗯，我想其最主要的来源是，许多律师事务所中称为“人身伤害”的业务组，几乎专门处理对个人的身体伤害。法庭：即便如此——即便如此——这里写的也不是“人身伤害”，罗姆尼先生。它写的是“个人损害”。这就是它所写的。因此，我不认为你的——罗姆尼先生：而且——法庭：——关于该问题的论点具有说服力。关于其他问题，你和巴塞特先生应继续努力解决。我同意你的意见，罗姆尼先生，而且我认为巴塞特先生已经表示，他同意延长提出动议和提交特权日志的期间，但是——有什么判例法认为，在你对交付文件提出异议时，无须同时提交特权日志？罗姆尼先生：我的理解是——不是我的理解。我的非常明确的记忆是，\n\n康涅狄格地区法院有一系列长期判例谈到，特权日志必须在根据具体情形自交付之日起算的、用引号括起来的“合理期限”内提交。法庭：好的。那么我将设定一个——罗姆尼先生：我没有带那些判例——法庭：——如果你们双方无法就一个期限达成一致，则我将设定合理期限，但我现在告诉你，如果有人要就所有这些信息主张特权，而你们已经同意就这些类别的信息，即遗产管理、遗产资产，以及针对遗产、由遗产提出或针对遗产的请求权，准予一项命令，你们已经同意准予该命令，那么，如果你和巴塞特先生拿不出一个期限，我将设定该合理期限。但该期限将会很短，因为我们不会让动议程序和证据开示争议拖慢本案。这不会发生。你的当事人自愿来到本院。他已使自己受本院管辖，而根据你们双方援引的利益衡量测试，正如你刚才所述，他已使其全部资产和负债，包括针对他的请求权以及他提出的请求权，受本院遗产管理的约束。\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷速记和转录服务公司）\n\n因此，我建议你和巴塞特先生确定一个日期，即传票遵从日期后必须提交该特权日志的日期，但我现在告诉你，这不会是一个很长的期限。不会是你们可以对本传票所涉材料提出异议的30天。这不会发生。也不会再额外给予30天提交特权日志。不会发生。那么，巴塞特先生，你们是否已经送达这些传票——罗姆尼先生：法官阁下，我可以——法庭：——了吗？你们是否已经送达这些传票？巴塞特先生：法官阁下，总体而言，答案是肯定的，我们已经送达了。我有同事掌握一份完整清单，比我更清楚情况。可能仍有少数传票因某些原因而仍在处理送达问题。但由于传票数量较多，我们正尽快送达。有些必须以不同方式送达，但总体而言，是的，我们当然已向债务人本人送达传票。法庭：好的。那么，交付文件的30日期限已经——计时已经开始。\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷速记和转录服务公司）\n\n巴塞特先生：已经开始，我认为在某些情况下即将届满。是的，法官阁下。法庭：好的。罗姆尼先生，我想我打断你了。你想说些什么。抱歉，我当时正在问巴塞特先生一个问题，但请继续。罗姆尼先生：好的。谢谢，法官阁下。理由是——而且我——我认为合理性标准应适用于特权日志，是因为在任何特定案件中，取决于任何特定传票接收人持有的电子存储信息数量，在有些案件中，数量可能很少。在有些案件中，数量可能很大，并且将需要检索词，还必须有人审阅这些文件，以确定哪些会涉及利益衡量测试，哪些应当直接交出。而在许多案件中，即使不是大多数案件，也可能是律师持有的大部分或全部文件。我只是无法知道，而我认为合理性标准的理由在于，如果有人显然是在善意行事，并且滚动交付，同时对其——对其在这些交付中标记出的内容编制日志，我认为这只是承认了某些案件中信息量的现实。但只要人们保持合理、透明，并尽其所能勤勉行事，\n\n那么采用合理标准比施加一个人为的时间表更为合理；该时间表可能适用于某些或全部案件，但在特定情形下可能并不适用。这就是我认为绝大多数权威意见认为，这是一个具有具体时间要求的合理性问题的原因。这并不是试图让任何人措手不及。\n\n但债务人没有——拖延对本债务人没有帮助，除非它帮助了其他人。本案中的问题将会得到裁决。它们要么由当事人达成某种解决办法，要么由法庭作出裁决，在任何特定情形中，有人会满意，而有人不会满意。\n\n但这并不是一种——当然，我无法确定有任何理由使任何人会仅仅——仅仅为了拖延而从拖延中受益。受托人要么会获得信息，要么不会；资产将被认定属于某人而不属于其他人，但——我看不出有任何拖延的动机，而且我相信债务人——任何人都可以随意评论任何人，但至少就我的律师事务所而言，并且就我的律师事务所开始代理债务人之前的认识而言，我相信人们正勤勉努力地提供信息，并应对来自许多不同方向的大量信息请求，而且我相信——嗯，我知道，只要 Zeisler and Zeisler（蔡斯勒与蔡斯勒律师事务所）\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（菲奥雷速记和转录服务公司）\n案件 22-50073 文件 1249 提交日期 12/19/22 登记日期 12/19/22 13:50:05 第 38 页，共 52 页\n\n和我本人正在与债务人合作，以及我曾代表债务人与之合作的其他专业人士，我们都会做好工作，保持合理，并且勤勉行事。\n\n而且我不认为已经发生任何事情，应当导致推定除了上述情形以外的任何其他情形会发生；基于这一原因，我认为惯常的“合理”措辞确实应当列入本命令。\n\n法庭：好的。我理解你所说的，但你也说事情会推进。因此，我为遵守特权清单要求设定一个日期并非武断。然后你们将增加一项规定：如果因某种原因无法满足该特权清单日期要求，你们将提交动议，请求延长该期限。你们将这样做，因为我们将为此设定一个日期。\n\n这些 Rule 2004 动议已提出超过 30 天。信托管理人——此前被任命是在 60 天前。那是在超过 60 天前。显然，信托管理人将需要对该破产财产及其资产进行调查。也显然，在 Chapter 11 信托管理人被任命之前参与本案的每个人都知道这必须发生。因此，如果我们要讨论合理性，这些问题的合理性，以及配合信托管理人并向信托管理人提供其管理破产财产所需信息的履行期限，至少已待决 60 天。实际上是 64 天。如果回溯至信托管理人——United States Trustee's office（美国受托人办公室）提交任命审查员动议之时，那是在今年 2 月。因此，对你方当事人而言，合理期限在最有利的情形下自 7 月 8 日起已开始计算，而在最不利的情形下则自 2 月起——我不知道。我可以查阅案卷，但我会说是 28 日或 3 月初。因此，任何人主张存在某种不合理情形，且他们未被给予合理时间遵守这些请求，均不具说服力。因此，合理性标准已经适用，而你和 Bassett 先生将讨论一个日期；如果任何一方能够出庭说明其为何需要延期，该日期可以延期。但命令中将会有一个日期。案号 22-50073，文件 1249，提交日期 12/19/22，登记日期 12/19/22 13:50:05，第 39 页，共 52 页。\n\nROMNEY 先生：明白，法官阁下，但是，如果我可以说一句？就具体文件请求而言，我认为，假定传票接收人在收到传票之前就会搜寻回应性文件，并识别哪些文件享有特权、哪些不享有特权，以及哪些文件应列入特权清单，是不合理的。\n\n法庭：我理解。\n\nBASSETT 先生：法官阁下。\n\n法庭：但是我只是——这就是我为何询问 Bassett 先生，他是否已经送达传票。而且我还说过，30 日期限适用于传票。因此，当某人收到传票时，他们即被告知其已被传唤，并有 30 天时间遵守传票。命令将规定，在遵守传票送达要求的期限届满后，他们将有你们双方同意的天数——10 天、14 天——就其主张享有特权的文件提供一份特权清单，而且他们本应在此之前及时地、依照 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure（《联邦民事诉讼规则》）提交撤销传票动议或保护令申请。如果他们不这样做，他们将放弃采取所有这些措施的权利。明白吗？\n\n但是，关于特权清单，当他们审查文件以遵守传票时，他们有义务将其主张享有特权、或者至少部分享有特权的文件搁置一边，然后编制该清单。因此，这就是本案将如何进行。\n\nROMNEY 先生：明白，法官阁下。我唯一想说的是，并且感谢您的澄清，我认为这是一种非常合理的处理方式。我唯一想说的是，有时在处理大量文件时，视投入的人手数量——听不清——以及所涉文件数量而定，审阅所有文件需要更多时间；但您当然是正确的。时间——\n\n法庭：Federal Rules of Civil Procedure（《联邦民事诉讼规则》）解决了你所有的关切，Romney 先生。\n\nBASSETT 先生：而且，法官阁下。法官阁下，我很抱歉，但我必须就 Romney 先生不断强调的一点作出一个简短回应。当他谈到审查许多回应性文件以及登记大量文件所涉及的负担时，我只想稍微说明一下背景。您知道，上周我们就取证事宜与债务人进行了会谈，而到目前为止我们被告知的情况——坦率地说，我们很难相信，且仍在调查——是，他们认为债务人根本没有很多回应性文件，因为他不以书面方式沟通。因此，我只是想说，认为存在某种需要审查的大量文件产出，因而在短时间内提供特权清单不合理，这与我们被告知的情况并不一致；我不希望法庭对于在我们获得债务人提供的文件时预期会发现什么产生误解。\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（Fiore 速记与转录服务公司）\n\n法庭：明白。\n\nROMNEY 先生：如果我可以说一句？Aaron Romney（阿伦·罗姆尼），Zeisler and Zeisler（泽斯勒与泽斯勒律师事务所）。我的理解是，当请求提供债务人与某第三方之间的通信时，这包括其代理人；就债务人的代理人与第三方之间的通信而言，这才是我们正在讨论的内容，我们认为届时将会有大量文件。我要对 Bassett 先生所作的陈述——而现在我们又一次开始讨论会谈的实质内容——我宁愿避免在法庭上进行这些讨论，因为会谈的目的在于尝试解决这些问题。但是，我所作的陈述是关于债务人作为个人与他人沟通，而我对文件数量的关切将涉及代表债务人行事的第三人，或者，如果主张有人代表债务人行事，则涉及该第三方。\n\n就信托管理人仅寻求有关债务人本人而非其代理人的通信而言，我同意。这不应是一项大量或繁重的任务。\n\n法庭：嗯，我理解你的观点，但显然你并不代表债务人的代理人，而代表债务人代理人的任何人都必须处理这些问题。\n\nROMNEY 先生：明白，法官阁下，但这至少在理论上是与债务人有关的信息。我说至少在理论上，是因为我们在此讨论的是一个概念，而非具体文件。\n\n法庭：这正是你在提交声明以及在你们第一次会谈时要求信托管理人所做的，即以综合方式处理这些问题，而这正是我们正在做的。现在，我们是在有限的综合基础上这样做。\n\n我们正在就申请后资产、破产财产管理、债务人提出及针对债务人提出的请求权，以及均已获准的 Rule 2004 Examinations（Rule 2004 审查）进行处理。没有人对任何这些命令提出上诉。Bassett 先生告诉我，部分传票——即使不是全部传票——已经送达，因此，任何一方就这些问题所享有的权利均受适用的 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure（《联邦民事诉讼规则》）管辖，并将受本命令管辖。因此，就第 7 段而言，我预期你们双方作出的修改是改变措辞——其应仅表述为，债务人的律师应在适用的提交期限前，将所有该等文件登记在清单中。然后你们将讨论日期。你们将讨论这一加急处理规定延长一段时间，然后你们将讨论特权清单最迟应于何日提交。就第 8 段而言，Romney 先生，就第 7 段，你是否还有其他异议？\n\nROMNEY 先生：除我已在法庭——在本记录中指出的内容之外，没有其他异议。\n\n法庭：好的。谢谢。就第 8 段而言，债务人对第 8 段有何异议？\n\nROMNEY 先生：关于第 8 段的异议，我不——这些是细微且非常具体的问题，我认为不会——不会引起异议。其中之一是，文本提到例如信托管理人无权通过在任何公开案卷上披露享有特权的文件或信息而放弃任何信托管理人特权。我们在其中加入了一项限定，即这也应适用于公开法庭，意思是——法庭中的口头言辞，有别于案卷中的书面言辞。我预计这不会有争议，但我不会替任何人说话——或试图替任何人说话，只是我们尚未来得及讨论这一点。\n\n法庭：Bassett 先生，这对我而言似乎合理。对你而言是否也合理？\n\nBASSETT 先生：是的，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：好的。那么这就处理了——\n\nBASSETT 先生：对此没有问题。\n\n法庭：——该问题。还有什么，Romney 先生？\n\nROMNEY 先生：在我刚才读到的文本之后，紧接着提及本案案卷。同一概念，任何公开案卷，意即如果是在对抗程序中，如果是在诉讼中，该——规则将适用，直至法庭另有命令。\n\n法庭：Bassett 先生？\n\nBASSETT 先生：对此也没有问题，法官阁下。\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（Fiore 速记与转录服务公司）\n\n法庭：好的。谢谢。Romney 先生，第 8 段还有什么？\n\nROMNEY 先生：第 8 段唯一的其他问题是，就最后一句提及我们刚刚讨论的前一段中的时间问题而言，我们将——我们将把任何修改纳入本段，尽管如果其仅指——而该事项在第 7 段中通过协议界定——加急日期，则该问题很可能不会需要进一步修改第 8 段。\n\n法庭：好的。谢谢。你们两人将讨论该加急处理规定。因此，正如你所说，如果你们达成一致，如果你们双方都达成一致，那么——假定你们双方都达成一致——债务人对第 8 段的任何内容均无异议，因为我们刚刚已经解决了这些问题。\n\nROMNEY 先生：正确，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：好的。很好。谢谢。那么第 9 段呢？我认为那是你的措辞，Romney 先生，不是吗？\n\nROMNEY 先生：那是——我相信是的，而且无论是否对其作出了任何细微修改，对第 9 段均无异议。\n\n法庭：好的。很好。那么，就你——\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（Fiore 速记与转录服务公司）\n\n案号 22-50073，文件 1249，提交日期 12/19/22，登记日期 12/19/22 13:50:05，第 47 页，共 52 页\n\n第7段有几项问题需要处理，如果你们同意第7段中加速处理基础上的时间安排，那么他们将不反对第8段。因此，第8段和第9段已不再存在争议。所以只剩第7段。当然，Bassett先生（巴塞特），Romney先生（罗姆尼）可能还希望补充一些内容。我显然没有他今天发送给你们的文件的修订痕迹版本，但我会要求你们二人就此共同处理；Romney先生——我是说，听起来这很有可能成为一项经同意的裁定。你同意吗？ROMNEY先生：我同意，法官阁下。法庭：好的。谢谢。那么，明天我们白天有听证会，我想我们最后一场听证会是在下午3:00。请稍等片刻，我将为你确认。确实如此。明天是下午3:00，而且我预计，当然我也可能判断有误，那不会花费太多时间。因此，如果——有人对此有任何异议吗？我可以通过 Zoom 在明天下午3:30继续审理本事项。ROMNEY先生：法官阁下，应该没有问题。我个人因儿童照护事项有事需要处理。我明天必须在下午4:30离开办公室。法庭：好的。\n\nROMNEY先生：我不常有这种情况，但明天确实如此。我想，如果超过下午4:30，我的一位同事可以代为出席，但我明天下午4:30必须离开，不能延后。\n\n法庭：嗯，我正在努力——我理解这一点，也感谢你说明这一点。我正努力尽可能给你更多时间与Bassett律师合作。\n\n我们还可以做的另一件事是，把时间安排得更早一些，比如下午1:30。但由你们决定。我的意思是，我不——你们可以——你和Bassett先生可以私下商谈，然后告知书记官办公室你们希望的时间。我在各场听证会之间有不同的空档时间，然后——我之所以说下午3:30，是因为我认为当天所有事情都会结束。但你们可以——你们可以，你知道——我们最早可在中午、下午1:00或1:30开始，但我不想让你们感到时间压力——不那么大的时间压力。因此，我才定在下午3:30。\n\n但你和Bassett先生商量，然后告知法庭工作人员。无论你们想在中午、下午1:00、1:30还是3:30进行，我们都可以——或者，你知道，我——无论你们——无论你们决定什么。好吗？但我——在我看来，我们将会有一项经同意的裁定，因此我希望这在明天完成。好吗？ROMNEY先生：明白，法官阁下。\n\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（Fiore记录与转录服务公司）\n\nBASSETT先生：谢谢，法官阁下。法庭：好的。今天下午我们还有其他需要处理的事项吗？DESPINS先生：有，法官阁下。Luc Despins（吕克·德斯潘），受托人。您会记得，在上次听证会上，我们向法庭提及了在英国提交的诉状，以证明债务人拥有Ace Decade（艾斯十年）。此后，我们发现了另一项比那更有力的依据，即债务人在341听证会上的宣誓陈述，我们刚刚在本次听证会之前提交了该材料。我们向您展示了那场持续数小时的341听证会的摘录，因此我们不想以全部材料增加法庭负担。但您会看到，其中的问题是：您是否在Ace Decade中拥有权益？而他基本上说，是的，我拥有它。还有其他所有人吗？没有。因此，关键在于，我并不请求您今天就此作出裁定。我希望法庭作出命令，因为我们对此已经有一项现行命令，即公司治理裁定，指示债务人在——你知道的——三或四天内就该问题作出答复，因为现在关于他拥有该实体的问题的证据，就在本案期间、2022年4月的341听证会上，仍如当时一样新近。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 1249 提交于 12/19/22 录入于 12/19/22 13:50:05 第 50 页，共 52 页\n\n法庭：抱歉，但我不记得——我当然记得公司治理裁定，但你所说他们需要作出答复是什么意思？他们是否已经——\n\nDESPINS先生：是的，他们需要作出答复，因为——是的，我们给他们发了一封信。到现在已经十天、十五天了，但信中说，嘿，你拥有这个名为Ace Decade的实体，我们要求你向我们移交全部账簿、记录和股票，就像你必须在Javer（音）中所做的那样——\n\n法庭：我明白了。\n\nDESPINS先生：——依据公司治理裁定。Henzy先生（亨齐）说，我很忙，我有其他客户等等；我们说，这当然也有道理，你刚刚把这个问题抛给我，Despins先生，所以让我审阅诉状及其他材料，而我——我的重点是，我希望法官阁下看到，债务人有更近的证词称，我拥有它。我是该实体的唯一所有人。当然，我现在并不是请求您说，是的，你是对的，而是您应为债务人的律师设定一个期限，以回复我在劳动节周末之前、即劳动节周末前的星期四所发的信，信中说，向我们提供文件。因此，鉴于这一新的——我认为，我不知道他们会如何对该341证词提出异议——他拥有该实体；他是唯一所有人，我们请求法庭此时设定答复期限。\n\nFiore记录与转录服务公司\n\n法庭：好的。我现在记起你所说的事情了，因此我会查看今天提交至案卷的材料，并考虑你提出的关于债务人就该实体相关问题作出答复的期限请求。DESPINS先生：谢谢，法官阁下。法庭：谢谢。好的。今天下午我们还有其他需要处理的事项吗？好的。那么，Romney先生和Bassett先生，当你们——当你们商谈时，如有可能，我希望你们今晚向法庭书记官邮箱发送一封电子邮件，以便法庭书记官最迟在明天清晨知道本听证——当我说清晨时，即明天早上8:30、9:00之前——本听证会明天将续期至何时，然后我们将据此推进。好吗？我们从10:00开始审理其他案件的听证会。正如我告诉你们的，我有一些时间。中午、下午1:00、1:30、3:30。由你们决定，但请你们——即使你们要到明天早上才向法庭书记官发送该电子邮件，我也请求最迟在上午8:30至9:00之间发送，以便法庭书记官能够适当安排事项。目前，案卷将显示该听证会已于今天举行，并续期至明天，具体时间待定。好吗？ROMNEY先生：明白，法官阁下。谢谢。BASSETT先生：谢谢，法官阁下。法庭：好的。谢谢。好的。我认为这已处理完今天Kwok（郭文贵）案中的所有事项，因此我们明天将见到各方当事人，今日法庭休庭。ROMNEY先生：谢谢。法庭书记官：法庭休庭。（程序于下午3:29结束。）本人，CHRISTINE FIORE（克里斯汀·菲奥雷），经法庭批准的转录员及认证电子记录员和转录员，证明前述内容系根据上述案件程序的官方电子录音制作的正确笔录。20 2022年12月18日 21 Christine Fiore，CERT转录员","key_entities":["Je","Despins","Paul Hastings","Kwok","Luc Despins","CIPA","Ho Wan Kwok","Guo"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":835,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":846,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":11824,"status":"published","published_at":"2022-12-19 00:00:00","created_at":"2022-12-19","updated_at":"2026-08-23 21:09:18"}