{"id":"court_ctb_1274_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":1274,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"| In re:                                | Chapter 11              | |---------------------------------------|-----------","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"| In re:                                | Chapter 11              |\n|---------------------------------------|-------------------------|\n| HO WAN KWOK, et al.,                  | Case No: 22-50073 (JAM) |\n| Debtors.                              |                         |\n|                                       |                         |\n| HO WAN KWOK,                          |                         |\n| Movant,                               |                         |\n| v.                                    |                         |\n| LUC A. DESPINS,<br>CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE |                         |\n| Respondent.                           |                         |\n\n## **MOTION FOR ORDER REMOVING TRUSTEE**[1](#page-0-0)\n\nTo quote Luc A. Despins (the \"Trustee\"), this Chapter 11 case is at a \"crossroads\" (Adv.\n\nPro. No. 22-05032, Transcript of December 12, 2022 Hearing (\"Dec. 12 Tr.\"), at 898, lines 15-\n\n17)—it can go down a years-long path of expensive litigation[2](#page-0-1) with an uncertain outcome, or the\n\n<span id=\"page-0-0\"></span><sup>1</sup> As detailed in The Debtor's Motion For Relief From Order Appointing Luc A. Despins As Chapter 11 Trustee (ECF Doc. No. 561, the \"Rule 60(b) Motion\"), the Debtor believes that the Trustee is not disinterested and should be removed based on the Trustee's and/or Paul Hastings' relationships with UBS, PAX related entities, the People's Republic of China, and the Chinese Communist Party. However, the Debtor recognizes that in an order entered on August 2, 2022 (ECF Doc. No. 667), the Court held that the foregoing relationships do not provide a basis to remove the Trustee. The Debtor has appealed the Court's order that the grounds cited in the Rule 60(b) Motion are not grounds to remove the Trustee, ECF Doc. No. 715, and the Debtor reserves the right to seek the Trustee's removal based on the grounds cited in the Rule 60(b) Motion if that appeal is successful. Unlike the Rule 60(b) Motion, this motion is focused on the Trustee's conduct since his appointment.\n\n<span id=\"page-0-1\"></span><sup>2</sup> Notwithstanding that the Trustee has testified that the Debtor's case \"is actually pretty straightforward,\" Adv. Pro. No. 22-05032, Transcript of December 7, 2022 Hearing, at 715, effective January 1, 2023, Paul Hastings' hourly rates will be as follows: \\$1,400 - \\$2,075 for partners; \\$1,400 - \\$2,000 for of counsel; \\$800 - \\$1,320 for associates; and \\$275 - \\$600 for paralegals. ECF Doc. No. 1251. The Trustee is not providing reporting to the Court or the parties in interest in this case, but a conservative estimate is that Paul Hastings has incurred between \\$6 million and \\$8 million in fees to date. This estimate does not include the Trustee's Connecticut counsel.\n\ntrue parties in interest in the case can work constructively to maximize recoveries to creditors in an efficient and expeditious way. As described herein, the debtor, Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\"), has worked for months to pursue the latter path.[3](#page-1-0) The Trustee has aggressively pursued the former, and has sought to prevent a fair, efficient, and prompt resolution of the case.\n\nThe Trustee consciously obstructed a potential global settlement of the case that was very near final and that had been negotiated over a period of months with PAX and the Creditors' Committee. [4](#page-1-1) As the Trustee made clear in the November 17 Meeting described and defined herein, the Trustee is following a strategy of trying to entrap the Debtor in a contempt, perjury or some other crime, and then using the threat of criminal sanction, namely incarceration, to leverage a payment to the estate—which would have to come from the Debtor's immediate and/or extended family members—that would be far in excess of what the true parties in interest have indicated would be acceptable and far in excess of any reasonable assessment of what is available to the estate. (\"The Trustee said he [the Debtor] will [pay \\$250 million] when he is about to go to jail.\" Dec. 12 Tr., at 867, lines 22-24.). The Trustee's approach culminated in the November 17 Meeting, during which the Trustee threatened the Debtor with criminal consequences if the Debtor, or more\n\n<span id=\"page-1-0\"></span><sup>3</sup> As described herein, since at least August the Debtor has worked very concretely towards the goal of an expeditious and efficient resolution of this case, notwithstanding the efforts of the Trustee to prevent that from happening. An efficient and fair resolution has been the Debtor's stated goal since the outset of the case. *E.g*., Declaration of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok In Support of the Chapter 11 Case and Certain Motions, ECF Doc. No. 107, ¶ 39, at 18 (\"My ultimate objective is to arrive at a fully consensual Chapter 11 plan that finally resolves all issues with my creditors. I hope to achieve this outcome through reasoned and reasonable dialogue ….\"). Reasoned and reasonable dialogue has been possible with PAX and the Creditors' Committee. Unfortunately, as described herein, it has not been possible with the Trustee.\n\n<span id=\"page-1-1\"></span><sup>4</sup> The Debtor respectfully submits that Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence does not, in the context of this motion and the relief sought herein, prohibit the disclosure of the settlement terms negotiated with PAX and the Creditors' Committee, and proposed to the Trustee. Notwithstanding, the Debtor has elected not to disclose such terms in this motion and anticipates that whether such terms may be disclosed to this Court and others in this proceeding will be resolved at a subsequent hearing or by further motion. If the terms negotiated with PAX and the Committee, and proposed to the Trustee are disclosed to the Court, the Debtor reasonably anticipates that the Court will agree that the Trustee's failure to pursue those terms, and instead advance a strategy of threatening the Debtor, was a massive failure by the Trustee.\n\naccurately the Debtor's immediate and/or extended family members, did not accede to the Trustee's demand of \\$250 million.\n\nThe Trustee has engaged in misconduct and is the major impediment to a fair and efficient resolution of this case. Accordingly, and in order to promote a fair and efficient resolution of this case, the Debtor, by and through his undersigned counsel, Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C., moves pursuant to Bankruptcy Code section 324(a) for an order removing the Trustee as the Chapter 11 trustee in this case. To be clear, the Debtor is not challenging through this Motion that there be *any* Chapter 11 trustee; rather, he asserts that *the* Trustee should be removed so that a reasonable, non-biased, and conflict-free trustee can be appointed to administer the Debtor's estate. In support of his Motion, the Debtor represents as follows:\n\n#### **BACKGROUND**\n\n1. The Court has jurisdiction to consider this motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334. Consideration of this motion is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b). Venue is proper in the Court for this case and this motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409, respectively.\n\n2. On February 15, 2022, the Debtor filed his voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.\n\n3. On June 15, 2022, the Bankruptcy Court issued its Memorandum of Decision And Order Denying Motion To Dismiss Without Prejudice And Granting Joinder To Motion For Appointment Of Chapter 11 Trustee (ECF Doc. No. 465), ordering, among other things, that a chapter 11 trustee be appointed in the bankruptcy case.\n\n4. On July 7, 2022, the United States Trustee filed a notice appointing the Trustee as trustee in this bankruptcy case (ECF Doc. No. 514), and an Application for Order Approving\n\n3\n\nAppointment of Chapter 11 Trustee (ECF Doc. No. 515), seeking the Court's approval of the appointment of the Trustee.\n\n5. On July 8, 2022, the Court entered its Order Granting Appointment Of Chapter 11 Trustee (ECF Doc. No. 523), granting the appointment of the Trustee as chapter 11 trustee in the bankruptcy case.\n\n#### The Trustee's Immediate Bias Against the Debtor\n\n6. Almost immediately after his appointment, and before he could have or had commenced (let alone conducted) an independent investigation into the Debtor's purported assets and affairs, the Trustee demonstrated a bias against the Debtor. *Examples only* of the Trustee's many statements indicating bias against the Debtor include:\n\na. In his Objection of Chapter 11 Trustee to Debtor's Motion for Relief from Order Appointing Luc A. Despins as Chapter 11 Trustee, ECF Doc. No. 575, ¶ 1, at 2, filed on July 20, 2022, twelve days after the order entered granting the Trustee's appointment, before he possibly had any opportunity to conduct any independent investigation, the Trustee stated that \"this Debtor's demonstrated objective through years of litigation with his creditors has been to keep his purported billions of dollars in assets outside of their reach through shell companies and transfers to his family members, while he simultaneously retains all the benefits of those assets and uses them to enable his lavish lifestyle.\"\n\nb. In his Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee for Entry of Order, Pursuant To Bankruptcy Code Sections 363, 541, 1108, And 1505, (A) Confirming That Chapter 11 Trustee Holds All Of The Debtor's Economic And Corporate Governance Rights In Debtor-Controlled Entities, (B) Authorizing Chapter 11 Trustee To Act In Any Foreign Country On Behalf Of Estate, And (C) Granting Related Relief (Doc. No. 598, the \"Corporate Governance Motion\"), filed on July 23, 2022, fifteen days after the order entered granting the Trustee's appointment, the Trustee stated that the \"Debtor has shown a willingness to defy court orders,\" Corporate Governance Motion ¶ 1, at 1, and that the \"Trustee is deeply concerned that the Debtor will continue his efforts to impede the Trustee's exercise of control over assets of the Estate ….\" Corporate Governance Motion ¶ 16, at 6. At the time the Corporate Governance Motion was filed, there was not even any claim that the Debtor had defied any order of this Court. At the time the Corporate Governance Motion was filed, the Debtor could not possibly have impeded the Trustee's exercise of control over assets of the estate, in that the Trustee had only been in place for fifteen days and had only requested information from the Debtor at that point.\n\nc. Perhaps most egregiously, at a hearing on August 1, 2022, the Trustee stated that \"we'll get to [a point] in this case eventually, which is contempt.\" Transcript of August 1, 2022, Hearing, at 122, lines 10-11. This statement was made in the context of a discussion of what the consequence would be if the Debtor did not comply with the proposed Corporate Governance Order (as defined below), but it was a more general prediction by the Trustee, three weeks after his appointment, that the Debtor would commit some contempt of an order of this Court. This was a foreshadowing of the Trustee's strategy to entrap the Debtor in a contempt, perjury or some other crime in order to gain a litigation advantage.\n\nd. In his Trustee's Objection to Debtor's Motion for Stay Pending Appeal of Order, Pursuant to Bankruptcy Code Sections 363, 521, 541, 1108, And 1505, (A) Confirming That Chapter 11 Trustee Holds All Of The Debtor's Economic And Corporate Governance Rights In Debtor-Controlled Entities, (B) Authorizing Chapter 11 Trustee To Act In Any Foreign Country On Behalf Of Estate, And (C) Granting Related Relief, ¶ 55, at 24, the Trustee stated that the Debtor seemed intent on obstructing the administration of the estate at every turn and using this\n\nCourt as a \"shield\" from his creditors. The Debtor's effort to protect attorney-client and other privilege belonging to him is in no sense evidence of an effort by the Debtor to improperly use of this Court as a \"shield\" from his creditors. And, as describe herein, the Debtor has worked to promote, not obstruct, the administration of this estate.\n\ne. The Trustee has stated in Court on at least one occasion that Himalaya International Financial Group Ltd, the entity that loaned HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC the \\$37 million that is now held in escrow and the repair reserve for the Lady May, \"is Kwok.\" The Trustee has provided no evidence whatsoever of this claim, and the Debtor denies it. This is an example of the Trustee's attempt to prejudice the Court against the Debtor without providing any evidence of statements made.\n\n#### The Trustee's Strategy to Entrap the Debtor in a Contempt, Perjury or Other Crime\n\n7. As noted above and described in more detail below, the Trustee believes that the Debtor, or more accurately the Debtor's immediate and/or extended family members, will accede to the Trustee's demand to pay \\$250 million when the Debtor is \"about to go to jail.\" In accordance with that belief, rather than pursue legitimate claims or a fair resolution of this case, the Trustee has pursued a strategy of trying to entrap the Debtor in a contempt, perjury or some other crime.\n\n8. One of the principal examples of this strategy is the Trustee's attempt to have the Court hold the Debtor in contempt (and subject him to \"confinement,\" as noted below) due to his purported non-compliance with the Court's Order, Pursuant To Bankruptcy Code Sections 363, 521, 541, 1108, And 1505, (A) Confirming That Chapter 11 Trustee Holds All Of The Debtor's Economic And Corporate Governance Rights In Debtor-Controlled Entities, (B) Authorizing Chapter 11 Trustee To Act In Any Foreign Country On Behalf Of Estate, And (C) Granting Related Relief (Doc. No. 717, the \"Corporate Governance Order\").\n\n9. On August 10, 2022, the Court entered the Corporate Governance Order.\n\nParagraphs 2, 3 and 6 of the Corporate Governance Order provide, in relevant part:\n\n2. Effective as of entry of the order, dated July 8, 2022, granting the appointment of Luc A. Despins as the Trustee in the Chapter 11 Case [ECF No. 523], the Trustee holds all of the Debtor's economic and governance rights, for the benefit of the Estate, with respect to all Debtor-Controlled Entities, including, without limitation, Genever (BVI). *For the avoidance of doubt, the foregoing rights include the Trustee's asserted authority to replace any existing officer, director, manager, or similar person of the Debtor-Controlled Entities. As part of the foregoing, to the extent necessary, the Trustee is authorized to act, in his capacity as the chapter 11 trustee in this Chapter 11 Case, as any such officer, director, manager, or similar person who has been removed.*\n\n3. In accordance with sections 521(a)(3) and 521(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Debtor is hereby directed to, respectively, (a) cooperate with the Trustee as necessary to enable the Trustee to perform his duties, including, without limitation, the Trustee's investigation into the assets of the Debtor, and (b) surrender to the Trustee all property of the estate and any recorded information, including, without limitation, books, documents, records, and papers relating to property of the estate (including, without limitation, his shares in Genever (BVI) and all related corporate governance documents).\n\n(Emphasis added). Thus, the Corporate Governance Order expressly granted the Trustee the power\n\nto replace any officer, director or similar person, and such person would then be able to take any corporate action deemed necessary by the Trustee.\n\n10. On August 31, 2022, notwithstanding the express authority granted to the Trustee\n\nin the Corporate Governance Order, the Trustee sent counsel for the Debtor a letter requesting that the Debtor (a) execute, and cause any nominee shareholder to execute, a share transfer instrument to transfer all of the Debtor's shares in Ace Decade Limited (including all shares beneficially owned by the Debtor through any nominee shareholder) to the Trustee, and (b) execute and/or cause the director(s) of Ace Decade Limited to execute a resolution approving such transfer of the shares in Ace Decade Limited to the Trustee. The Debtor did not comply with the Trustee's request.\n\n11. On October 4, 2022, again, notwithstanding the express authority granted to the Trustee in the Corporate Governance Order, the Trustee filed his Motion Of Chapter 11 Trustee For Entry Of Order Holding Debtor In Civil Contempt For Failure To Comply With Corporate Governance Rights Order (Doc. No. 913, the \"Contempt Motion\"). By the Contempt Motion, the Trustee seeks to have the Debtor held in contempt, arguing that \"despite the Court's clear directive in the Corporate Governance [Rights] Order, the Debtor refuses to transfer the shares of Ace Decade … to the Trustee or provide the Trustee with any corporate documents regarding Ace Decade or its wholly owned subsidiary Dawn State Limited (\"Dawn State\") ….\" Motion ¶ 1, at 2. As the Court is aware, there was a lengthy hearing on the Contempt Motion the week of November 14, 2022.\n\n#### The Trustee's Destruction of a Potential Global Settlement and the November 17 Meeting\n\n12. Beginning in July 2022, the Debtor, through counsel, engaged in extensive negotiations with PAX and the Creditors' Committee towards a global resolution of this case. The Debtor negotiated with PAX, with the idea that if he reached an agreement with PAX, then he would try to reach an agreement with the Creditors Committee. These negotiations were extremely complex because, in addition to negotiating with PAX and the Committee, the Debtor, through counsel, had to negotiate with the Debtor's immediate and/or extended family members, as all value to be paid to creditors would come from such family members, via, in part, the surrender of rights in various assets asserted by such family members. The Debtor and PAX made significant progress in August, to the point where the Debtor requested that PAX summarize its demands in writing. Negotiations continued through September and culminated in a term sheet at the end of September (the \"September PAX Term Sheet\"). The term sheet contemplated, among other things, a substantial payment to PAX in full satisfaction of its claim, with security for such payment to be further discussed. (Dec. 12 Tr. at 844, lines 4-17).\n\n13. After reaching agreement in principle with PAX as reflected in the September PAX Term Sheet, the Debtor, through counsel, focused on reaching an agreement with the Creditor's Committee. The Debtor negotiated with the Creditors' Committee through October and reached an agreement in principle with the Committee by the end of October. (Dec. 12 Tr. at 844, lines 17- 22).\n\n14. On October 26, 2022, the Debtor's counsel informed the Trustee in writing that the Debtor had reached an agreement in principle on all material terms with both PAX and the Creditors' Committee. The Debtor's counsel had been informing the Trustee of the substantial progress being made with the creditors, and asking him repeatedly to stand down on the many motions he was filing with the Court and on the voluminous discovery he was seeking, which he refused to do. The Debtor's purpose in asking the Trustee to stand down was not to prevent the Trustee from conducting his investigation, but rather to slow down the continuing excessive accrual of administrative expenses in the case.\n\n15. The Debtor's counsel asked the Trustee to articulate what additional concessions he wanted in addition to what had already been negotiated, and agreed to, with PAX and Creditors' Committee. The Trustee sent the Debtor's counsel an eight-page, single spaced term sheet on October 30, 2022, outlining his \"preliminary issues.\" The Trustee's focus was on (1) trying to secure performance of the agreements that had been reached with PAX and the Creditors' Committee and (2) with *potential* claims related to H-Coin surfacing in the future. While the Debtor's counsel disputed that there was any validity to these so-called potential H-Coin claims, the Trustee raised an issue with how any such potential claims would be addressed in the case. (Dec. 12 Tr. at 844, line 21 to 845, line 16).\n\n16. In November, PAX raised its desire to have further security through a line of credit or some other collateral, *e.g*., the posting of cash. The Debtor's counsel and PAX went back and forth, and by November 16th, the Debtor's extended family members had agreed to provide PAX what it was requesting in terms of security. (Dec. 12 Tr. at 845, lines 19-23).\n\n17. On November 16, the Debtor's counsel sent a letter to the Trustee summarizing the terms that had been negotiated with PAX and the Creditors' Committee, and that the Debtor believed should be acceptable to the Trustee with respect to global settlement in the case (the \"November 16 Letter\"). The Debtor's counsel believed that what was proposed in the November 16 Letter was very, very close to reaching a global settlement, and again asked the Trustee to stand down while the parties worked to finalize a settlement. (Dec. 12 Tr. at 846, lines 2-15; Adv. Pro. No. 22-05032, Transcript of December 5, 2022 Hearing (\"Dec. 5 Tr.\"), at 247, lines 8-9).\n\n18. The Trustee called the Debtor's counsel later on November 16th to request a faceto-face meeting with Debtor. The Debtor agreed to meet the following day, November 17 (the \"November 17 Meeting\"). The Debtor's counsel was guardedly optimistic about the meeting they were hopeful that the Trustee's request for a meeting was for the purposes of being conciliatory, building consensus, and expressing whatever remaining concessions the Trustee was asking for. The Debtor's counsel did not believe that the Trustee would use the meeting as an opportunity to intimidate or threaten the Debtor given where settlement discussions stood. (Dec. 12 Tr., at 841, line 18, to 843, line 24 (\"[W]e were, also, very concerned of the possibility that the Trustee who we perceived as having been extraordinarily aggressive in this case was going to use this meeting as an opportunity to intimidate or threaten Mr. Kwok. And so we contemplated that risk, but we dismisse[d] it, and literally, I concluded that there's no way the Trustee is that stupid to have a meeting like that under these circumstances when millions and millions of dollars … have been spent. … We concluded that the Trustee's intentions had to have been in good faith, and so we agreed to the meeting.\")).\n\n19. The November 17 Meeting took place in New York and was attended by the Debtor, the Debtor's translator, the Debtor's attorneys Stephen Kindseth and Aaron Mitchell, the Trustee, and the Trustee's attorney Nicholas Basset. (Dec. 12 Tr., at 848, line 25 to 849, line 1; Adv. Pro. No. 22-05032, Transcript of December 7, 2022 Hearing (\"Dec. 7 Tr.\"), at 672, line 13 to 673, line 2; Dec. 5 Tr., at 230, line 17 to 231, line 20).\n\n20. During the November 17 Meeting, the Trustee spoke and first told the Debtor that he should not speak. The Trustee began by stating that he would be able to recover all of the identified assets: the \\$37 million Lady May escrow, the Sherry-Netherland apartment, the Lady May, and the house in Greenwich owned by the Debtor's wife. (Dec. 12 Tr., at 861, lines 15-20).\n\n21. At one point the Trustee asked the Debtor if he knew who Al Capone was and then told him what happened to Al Capone, that he went to jail for tax evasion. (Dec. 12 Tr., at 862, lines 18-19; Dec. 7 Tr., at 673, lines 6-8 13).\n\n22. The Trustee stated that while friends and supporters were supporting the Debtor financially, the Trustee hoped that such support was being reported as income in the United States. The Trustee also stated that he assumed the Debtor had paid income tax on consulting fees. The Trustee then immediately said that he spoke to the IRS and SEC on a weekly basis, (Dec. 12 Tr., at 862, line 24 to 863, line 11; Dec. 7 Tr., lines 10-12), and that the Debtor that he had better settle because it would soon be \"too late.\" (Dec. 12 Tr., at 863, lines 11-12).\n\n23. The Trustee then demanded that the Debtor pay \\$250 million. (Dec. 12 Tr., at 863, lines 16-18; Dec. 7 Tr., at 691, lines 20-22; Dec. 5 Tr., at 227, line 20 to 228, line 5, and 247, lines 18-19).\n\n11\n\n24. Finally, the Trustee threatened to lock the Debtor out of Sherry-Netherland apartment and stated that the Debtor would pay \\$250 million when he was about to go to jail. (Dec. 12 Tr., at 866, line 24 to 867, line 24).\n\n#### **APPLICABLE LAW**\n\n25. Bankruptcy Code section 324(a) provides, in part: \"The court, after notice and a hearing, may remove a trustee … for cause.\"\n\n26. Courts have held that \"cause,\" which is not defined by the Bankruptcy Code, must be determined on an \"ad hoc\" basis. *E.g., Livore v. Hargrave (In re Livore)*, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1653, [\\*5] (Bankr. D. N.J. May 6, 2010) (\"Cause, which is not defined by the Bankruptcy Code, must be determined by courts on an ad hoc basis.\"); *In re Lundborg*, 110 B.R. 106, 108 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1990) (same).\n\n27. To remove a trustee for cause generally requires a showing of fraud or actual injury to the bankruptcy estate. *Dieffenbach v. Haworth (In re Haworth)*, 356 Fed. Appx. 529, 530 (2nd Cir. 2009); *In re Freeport Italian Bakery, Inc.*, 340 F.2d 50, 54 (2d Cir. 1965); *In re Cee Jay Discount Stores*, 171 B.R. 173, 175-76 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1994); *In re Lundborg*, 110 B.R. at 108.\n\n28. Courts have held that cause may include trustee incompetence, violation of fiduciary duties, misconduct, failure to perform trustee's duties, lack of disinterestedness or holding an interest adverse to the estate. *E.g.*, *Dye v. Brown (In re AFI Holding, Inc.)*, 355 B.R. 139, 148 (9th Cir. BAP 2006) (\"It is well established that 'cause' may include trustee incompetence, violation of the trustee's fiduciary duties, misconduct or failure to perform the trustee's duties, or lack of disinterestedness or holding an interest adverse to the estate.\"), *aff'd*, 530 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2008); *In re Regan*, 2021 Bankr. LEXIS 2855, [\\*] (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2021) (same); *In re Derryberry,* 72 B.R. 874, 879-81 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987) (trustee removed based on, among other reasons, violations of Code of Professional Conduct). *See also* 28 CFR § 58.6(3) (reasons United States Trustee may suspend panel trustee may include failure to comply with local rules of court).\n\n29. In defining a trustee's duties, courts have held that a trustee owes a fiduciary duty to creditors *and* the debtor to act fairly. *See Commodity Futures Trading Com v. Weintraub*, 471 U.S. 343, 355 (1985) (\"[T]he fiduciary duty of the trustee runs to shareholders as well as to creditors.\"); *In re WHET, Inc*., 750 F.2d 149, 149 (1st Cir. 1984) (a trustee \"owes a fiduciary duty to debtor and creditors alike to act fairly and protect their interests.\"); *Wiscovitch-Rentas v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. (In re Fiddler Gonzales & Rodriquez, P.S.C.)*, 415 F.Supp. 272, (D. P.R. 2019) (same); *In re Vebeliunas*, 231 B.R. 181, 190 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) (\"[T]he trustee's professionals cannot be allowed under any circumstances to lack disinterestedness through bias against a debtor given the responsibilities of the trustee in regard to a natural debtor ….\"). *See also* 7 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1106.02[3], at 1106-11 (16th Ed. 2019) (\"In addition to the explicit duties specified in the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee in a reorganization case is a fiduciary who has an obligation to treat all parties in the case fairly. As a fiduciary, the trustee owes the debtor's estate and its creditors a general duty of loyalty, i.e., absence of self-interest.\"); United States Trustee Chapter 11 Trustee Handbook, [http](http)[200405.pdf/download,](http) at 19 (\"In short, a chapter 11 trustee is a fiduciary charged with protecting the interests in the bankruptcy estate of all parties, including all creditors and the debtor. The trustee must protect and preserve estate assets.\").\n\n30. A Chapter 11 trustee also has the duty to consult with creditors with the goal of confirming a plan as expeditiously and efficiently as possible, so that the return to creditors is maximized in a reasonable period of time. 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(5) (\"A trustee shall— **…** as soon\n\n13\n\nas practicable, file a plan under section 1121 of this title, file a report of why the trustee will not file a plan, or recommend conversion of the case to a case under chapter 7, 12, or 13 of this title or dismissal of the case.\"); Senate Report No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 116 (1978) (\"It is anticipated that the trustee will consult with creditors and other parties in interest in the formulation of a plan … .\"); House Report No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 404 (1977) (\"It is anticipated that the trustee will consult with creditors and other parties in interest in the formulation of a plan …. Consultation will be necessary in order to make more likely the obtaining of the requisite number of acceptances of the plan that is eventually formulated.\").\n\n31. Courts have held that in determining whether there is injury sufficient to justify removal of a trustee, courts must consider the best interests of the bankruptcy estate. *In re Freeport Italian Bakery*, 340 F.2d at 55 (\"If the administration of the estate in bankruptcy would suffer more from the discord created by the present trustee than would be suffered from a change of administration, the removal of the trustee is necessarily the better solution.\"); *Morgan v. Goldman (In re Morgan)*, 375 B.R. 838, 848 (8th Cir. BAP 2007) (\"Court must also consider the best interests of the estate when determining whether to remove a trustee.\" (internal quotation marks omitted)); *In re Baker*, 38 B.R. 705, 708 (D. Md. 1983) (same); *In re Mason*, 12 B.R. 318, 318-19 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1981) (trustee relieved of duties where there was a \"bitter feeling of enmity by the debtor against the trustee in bankruptcy.\").\n\n32. Notably, removal may be based on *the appearance of impropriety* as well as actual impropriety. *See Morgan v. Goldman (In re Morgan)*, 375 B.R. 838, 848 (8th Cir. BAP 2007) (some courts \"have found that removal can be based not only [on] actual impropriety, but [on] the appearance of impropriety as well.\" (internal quotation marks omitted)); *In re Vebeliunas*, 231 B.R. at 187-95 (\"To be disinterested is to prevent even the appearance of a conflict irrespective of the integrity of the person or firm under consideration.\" (internal quotation marks omitted)); *In re Micro-Time Management Sys*., 102 B.R. 602, 603-09 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1989) (trustee disqualified based on prior work for creditor).\n\n## **ARGUMENT**\n\n# The Trustee has Engaged in Misconduct\n\n33. The Trustee has caused actual injury to the estate by engaging in blatant misconduct\n\nthat clearly violates the Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct.\n\n34. Connecticut Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4(7) provides that a lawyer shall not\n\n\"[p]resent, participate in presenting, or threaten to present criminal charges solely to obtain an\n\nadvantage in a civil matter.\"[5](#page-14-0)\n\n[T]he rule is designed to promote \"fair competition in the adversary system [by] securing prohibitions against destruction or concealment of evidence, improperly influencing witnesses, obstructive tactics in discovery procedure, and the like.\" …. \"[T]he conduct proscribed by rule 3.4 is incompatible with the principle of fair competition that forms the basis of our adversary system of justice … . The conduct contemplated by rule 3.4(7) is prohibited because it is deemed to be unfairly coercive and, therefore, an abuse of the criminal process … . As an officer and commissioner of the court, an attorney is obliged to refrain from using improper tactics whether acting in a personal or representative capacity.\n\n<span id=\"page-14-0\"></span><sup>5</sup> Rule 1001-1(b) of the Local Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut provides: \"The Local Rules of Civil Procedure of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut shall apply in all cases or proceedings in the Bankruptcy Court to the extent they are relevant and not inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code, the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, or these Local Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.\" Rule 83.2(a)1 of the Local Civil Rules of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut provides: \"Except as provided in Rule 83.2(a)2 of these Local Rules, this Court recognizes the authority of the 'Rules of Professional Conduct,' as approved by the Judges of the Connecticut Superior Court as expressing the standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers practicing in the District of Connecticut.\" In paragraph 6 of his affidavit annexed to the Motion for Admission *Pro Hac Vice* of Luc A. Despins (ECF Doc. No. 540), the Trustee stated, as required by D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 83.1(d)(1)(d): \"I have read and am familiar with the Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure, the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, the Local Rules of the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut, and the Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct, and will abide by and comply with the substantive and procedural requirements of the local rules and the administrative orders of this Court.\" Courts have a responsibility to enforce applicable Rules of Professional Responsibility. *United States v. Hammad*, 858 F.2d 834, 837 (2nd Cir. 1988) (\"The federal courts enforce professional responsibility standards pursuant to their general supervisory authority over members of the bar.\"); *Hull v. Celanese Corp*., 513 F.2d 568, 571 (2nd Cir. 1975) (\"The district court bears the responsibility for the supervision of the members of its bar.\").\n\n*Somers v. Statewide Grievance Comm*., 245 Conn. 277, 288 (1988) (quoting Commentary to Rule 3.4, ¶ 1). In an analogous situation to what occurred here, the Connecticut Statewide Grievance Committee found by clear and convincing evidence that an attorney representing a creditor violated Rule 3.4(7) where the attorney faxed a letter to the attorney for the debtor stating:\n\nSince our meeting I have had four discussions with individuals from the Department of Consumer Protection who tell me, because your client is unregistered, they will have an arrest warrant out for your client within 72 hours of my filing a written complaint for criminal violation of the State's contractor licensing laws. I have not yet filed this complaint. They also tell me because your client took \\$30,000.00 from my client and did not do the work said violation is a Class A felony. I would suggest your client soften his view on this case, and you immediately forward 1) a general release and non disclosure naming my clients, and 2) a trustee check in the amount of \\$37,000.00 to my office to cover my clients' original payment and their attorney fees to date. I would also suggest your client make said payment on or before close of business Monday May 15, 2006, **Time is of the essence.** Failure to take said action as aforesaid will result in my clients taking whatever actions are necessary to protect their rights.\n\nDouglas Fleming vs. Arthur D. Machado, Statewide Grievance Committee Grievance Complaint\n\n## #07-0062, [http](http)\n\n35. At the November 17 Meeting, the Trustee threatened the Debtor with criminal sanction if the Debtor did not immediately accede to the Trustee's demand for payment of \\$250 million. The Trustee stated what had happened to Al Capone to compare the Debtor's fate to that of Al Capone, stated that he spoke to the IRS and the SEC every week, stated that the Debtor needed to settle before it was too late, and bluntly stated to Debtor's counsel that the \\$250 million would be paid to the Trustee when the Debtor was about to go to jail. The Trustee's statements were a blatant and not even remotely veiled threat that there would be criminal consequences if the Debtor did not accede to the Trustee's civil demands. Thus, *at a minimum*, the Trustee's conduct clearly violated Rule 3.4(7) of the Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct. The Trustee's conduct is worse than that of an attorney seeking an advantage for a client because the Trustee is an officer of the Court and his actions carry the imprimatur of the Court, thereby giving greater weight to his threats of criminal action absent the Debtor meeting his demands.\n\n36. The Trustee has caused actual injury to the estate by engaging in blatant misconduct and by breaching his duties to the Debtor in that he has engaged in a strategy of trying to entrap the Debtor in a contempt, perjury or some other crime for the purpose of using the threat of criminal sanction, namely incarceration, in order to leverage a \\$250 million payment from the Debtor's immediate and/or extended family. The Trustee's statement at the November 17 Meeting that such a payment would be forthcoming when the Debtor was about to go to jail is telling as to the Trustee's strategy.\n\n37. A primary example of the Trustee's strategy in this regard with which the Court is familiar is the Contempt Motion. The entire premise of the Corporate Governance Motion and the Corporate Governance Order was that the Debtor has no governance rights with respect to any Debtor-Controlled Entities. The Trustee requested in the Corporate Governance Motion and was granted in the Corporate Governance Order the power to do what the Trustee was demanding of the Debtor. The Trustee's purpose with the Contempt Motion was not to gain control of Ace Decade Limited, which did not require any action from the Debtor, but rather to have the Debtor held in contempt and incarcerated. Transcript of November 18, 2022 Hearing, at 103, lines 10 to 104, line 9 (\"[S]anctions are wide ranging in the discretion of the Court and they include confinement\"). The Contempt Motion was a massive waste of time and money, and was pursued with the improper purpose of entrapping the Debtor in a contempt in order to gain leverage against the Debtor and his immediate and/or extended family members.\n\n#### The Trustee's Removal Would Be in the Best Interests of the Estate\n\n38. The Trustee's conduct in obstructing a global resolution of this case has caused\n\nactual injury to the estate and his removal would be in the best interests of creditors and the estate.\n\n39. Since at least August of this year, the Debtor has actively worked on reaching a fair resolution with his creditors. As described above, the Debtor had reached agreements in principle with both PAX and the Creditors' Committee with respect to a global resolution of the case. Creditors certainly are the best judge of what would be a reasonable and acceptable payout to them.\n\n40. For motives that only the Trustee may be able to explain, the Trustee actively obstructed such a global resolution. Instead, he threatened the Debtor and made outrageous demands. At this point, based on the Trustee's conduct, the Debtor and, more importantly, the Debtor's immediate and extended family members (because they would fund payments to creditors under any consensual plan) will not deal with the Trustee. At this point, the options are removal of the Trustee or years of expensive and uncertain litigation. The discord created by the Trustee in this case is such that, while there may be some cost to replacing the Trustee, the removal of the Trustee is necessarily the better solution. *See In re Freeport Italian Bakery*, 340 F.2d at 55.\n\n41. The Trustee has not complied with his obligation to consult with creditors in formulating a plan. As described above, PAX and the Creditors' Committee spent months negotiating a global resolution of this case. The Trustee chose to completely disregard all of that work and the wishes of the major creditor constituencies in this case.\n\n42. The Trustee has not complied with his duty to administer the Debtor's estate in order to minimize expense and maximize value available to creditors. The Trustee has continued to vigorously litigate even though he knew about settlement negotiations and was asked repeatedly to \"stand down.\" Again, by \"stand down\" the Debtor never meant that the Trustee should not execute his duties, but rather, that all parties should work to limit administrative costs and allow counsel to focus on negotiations. The Trustee refused and consistently filed motions on an expedited basis and took (and continues to take) voluminous amounts of discovery. Massive administrative expenses continue to be run up in this case for no good purpose.\n\n43. The Trustee not complied with his duty to deal fairly with the Debtor. As described above, the Trustee displayed a massive bias against the Debtor essentially from the day he was appointed, he has engaged in a strategy to entrap the Debtor in a contempt, perjury or some other crime, he threatened the Debtor with criminal consequences if the Debtor did not accede to his demands. At the very least, the Trustee's conduct gives the appearance of massive bias against the Debtor.\n\n**WHEREFORE,** the Debtor respectfully requests that the Court grant his Motion, enter an order removing the Trustee, and grant him such other and further relief as justice requires.\n\nDated at Bridgeport, Connecticut on this 30th day of December, 2022.\n\n## **THE DEBTOR, HO WAN KWOK**\n\n*/s/ Eric Henzy*  Eric Henzy (ct12849) Aaron A. Romney (ct28144) James M. Moriarty (ct21876) John L. Cesaroni (ct29309) 10 Middle Street, 15th Floor Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604 Telephone: (203) 368-4234 Facsimile: (203) 368-5487 Email: [ehenzy@zeislaw.com](mailto:ehenzy@zeislaw.com) [aromney@zeislaw.com](mailto:aromney@zeislaw.com) [Jmoriarty@zeislaw.com](mailto:Jmoriarty@zeislaw.com)  [jcesaroni@zeislaw.com](mailto:jcesaroni@zeislaw.com)\n\n| In re:                                | Chapter 11              |\n|---------------------------------------|-------------------------|\n| HO WAN KWOK, et al.,                  | Case No: 22-50073 (JAM) |\n| Debtors.                              |                         |\n|                                       |                         |\n| HO WAN KWOK,                          |                         |\n| Movant,                               |                         |\n| v.                                    |                         |\n| LUC A. DESPINS,<br>CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE |                         |\n| Respondent.                           |                         |\n\n## **PROPOSED ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR ORDER REMOVING TRUSTEE**\n\nUpon the Motion for Order Removing Trustee (the \"Motion\"), filed by the debtor, Ho\n\nWan Kwok, having come before the Court, and there being due and sufficient cause to grant the\n\nrequested relief, it is hereby\n\n**ORDERED**, that the Motion is in all respects **GRANTED**, and it is further\n\n**ORDERED**, that the Chapter 11 Trustee, Luc A. Despins, is hereby removed as the\n\nChapter 11 trustee in this bankruptcy case for cause pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 324(a).\n\n| In re:                                | Chapter 11              |\n|---------------------------------------|-------------------------|\n| HO WAN KWOK, et al.,                  | Case No: 22-50073 (JAM) |\n| Debtors.                              |                         |\n|                                       |                         |\n|                                       |                         |\n| HO WAN KWOK,                          |                         |\n| Movant,                               |                         |\n| v.                                    |                         |\n| LUC A. DESPINS,<br>CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE |                         |\n| Respondent.                           |                         |\n\n### **NOTICE OF CONTESTED MATTER RESPONSE DEADLINE**\n\nHo Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\") has filed a Motion for Order Removing Trustee (the \"Contested Matter\") in the above-captioned case. Notice is hereby given that any response to the Contested Matter must be filed with the Court no later than January 13, 2023. In the absence of a timely filed response, the proposed order in the Contested Matter *may* enter without further notice and hearing, *see*, 11 U.S.C. section 102 (1).\n\n### **THE DEBTOR, HO WAN KWOK**\n\n*/s/ Eric Henzy*  Eric Henzy (ct12849) 10 Middle Street, 15th Floor Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604 Telephone: (203) 368-4234 Facsimile: (203) 368-5487 Email: [ehenzy@zeislaw.com](mailto:ehenzy@zeislaw.com)\n\n| In re:                                | Chapter 11              |\n|---------------------------------------|-------------------------|\n| HO WAN KWOK, et al.,                  | Case No: 22-50073 (JAM) |\n| Debtors.                              |                         |\n|                                       |                         |\n| HO WAN KWOK,                          |                         |\n| Movant,                               |                         |\n| v.                                    |                         |\n| LUC A. DESPINS,<br>CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE |                         |\n| Respondent.                           |                         |\n\n### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI hereby certify that on this 30th day of December, 2022, copies of foregoing Motion for Order Removing Trustee, Proposed Order, and Notice of Contested Matter Procedure were filed electronically. Notice of this filing will be sent by e-mail to all parties by operation of the Court's electronic filing system or by mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing as indicated on the Notice ofElectronic Filing. Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF System.\n\n### **THE DEBTOR, HO WAN KWOK**\n\n*/s/ Eric Henzy*  Eric Henzy (ct12849) 10 Middle Street, 15th Floor Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604 Telephone: (203) 368-4234 Facsimile: (203) 368-5487 Email: [ehenzy@zeislaw.com](mailto:ehenzy@zeislaw.com)","body_zh":"关于：　第11章\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等人，　案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人。\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），\n动议人，\n诉\nLUC A. DESPINS（卢克·A·德斯平斯），\n第11章受托人\n被申请人。\n要求撤换受托人的命令之动议[1]\n\n借用Luc A. Despins（“受托人”）的话说，本第11章案件正处于“十字路口”（对抗程序案号22-05032，2022年12月12日听证会记录（“12月12日记录”），第898页，第15-17行）——它可以走上一条持续数年、费用高昂且结果不确定的诉讼道路[2]，或者本案实际利害关系方可以通过建设性合作，以高效且迅速的方式最大限度提高对债权人的追偿。如本文所述，债务人Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（“债务人”）已努力数月，以寻求后一条道路。[3] 受托人则积极追求前一条道路，并试图阻止本案获得公平、高效和迅速的解决。\n\n1 如《债务人请求免除任命Luc A. Despins为第11章受托人之命令的动议》（ECF文件编号561，即“规则60(b)动议”）所详述，债务人认为，受托人并非无利害关系人，并应基于受托人和/或Paul Hastings（普衡律师事务所）与UBS（瑞银）、PAX相关实体、中华人民共和国及中国共产党的关系而被撤换。然而，债务人承认，在2022年8月2日作出的命令（ECF文件编号667）中，法院认定上述关系并不构成撤换受托人的依据。债务人已对法院关于规则60(b)动议所列理由并非撤换受托人理由的命令提出上诉，ECF文件编号715；如该上诉成功，债务人保留基于规则60(b)动议所列理由请求撤换受托人的权利。与规则60(b)动议不同，本动议聚焦于受托人自其获任以来的行为。\n\n2 尽管受托人曾作证称债务人的案件“实际上相当直接明了”，对抗程序案号22-05032，2022年12月7日听证会记录，第715页，自2023年1月1日起，Paul Hastings的小时费率如下：合伙人$1,400 - $2,075；顾问律师$1,400 - $2,000；律师$800 - $1,320；以及律师助理$275 - $600。ECF文件编号1251。受托人未向法院或本案利害关系方提供报告，但保守估计，Paul Hastings迄今已产生$6 million至$8 million的费用。该估计不包括受托人的康涅狄格州律师。\n\n受托人故意阻挠本案可能达成的一项全球和解；该和解已接近最终完成，并已与PAX及债权人委员会经过数月谈判达成。[4] 正如受托人在本文所述并界定的11月17日会议中明确表示的那样，受托人正在采取一项策略，试图诱使债务人构成藐视法庭、伪证或其他犯罪，然后利用刑事制裁威胁，即监禁，来迫使向破产财产付款——该付款将不得不来自债务人的直系和/或旁系家庭成员——其数额将远远超过实际利害关系方表示可接受的数额，也远远超过对破产财产可得资产作出的任何合理评估。“受托人说他[债务人]在即将入狱时会[支付$250 million]。”12月12日记录，第867页，第22-24行。受托人的做法在11月17日会议上达到顶点，在该会议中，受托人威胁债务人，如债务人，或者更准确地说债务人的直系和/或旁系家庭成员，不接受受托人提出的$250 million要求，便将面临刑事后果。\n\n3 如本文所述，至少自8月以来，尽管受托人努力阻止此事发生，债务人一直为迅速和高效解决本案这一目标作出非常具体的努力。公平、高效的解决一直是债务人自本案开始以来所宣示的目标。例如，Ho Wan Kwok先生支持第11章案件及若干动议的声明，ECF文件编号107，第39段，第18页（“我的最终目标是达成一项完全协商一致的第11章计划，最终解决与我的债权人之间的所有问题。我希望通过审慎且合理的对话实现这一结果……。”）。与PAX及债权人委员会进行审慎且合理的对话一直是可能的。遗憾的是，如本文所述，与受托人进行该等对话并不可能。\n\n4 债务人谨陈，《联邦证据规则》第408条在本动议及本文所请求救济的情形下，并不禁止披露与PAX及债权人委员会谈判达成并向受托人提出的和解条款。尽管如此，债务人选择不在本动议中披露该等条款，并预期该等条款是否可以向本法院及本程序中的其他方披露，将在后续听证会或通过进一步动议予以解决。如与PAX及委员会谈判达成并向受托人提出的条款被披露给法院，债务人合理预期，法院将同意，受托人未追求该等条款、反而推进威胁债务人的策略，构成受托人的重大失职。\n\n受托人实施了不当行为，并且是公平、高效解决本案的主要障碍。因此，为促进公平、高效地解决本案，债务人通过其下列签署律师Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（泽斯勒与泽斯勒律师事务所），依据《破产法典》第324(a)条提出动议，请求作出命令，撤换受托人担任本案第11章受托人。为明确起见，债务人并非通过本动议质疑是否应有第11章受托人；相反，他主张应撤换该受托人，以便任命一名合理、无偏见且不存在利益冲突的受托人管理债务人的破产财产。为支持其动议，债务人陈述如下：\n\n背景\n\n1. 法院依据28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334对审理本动议具有管辖权。依据28 U.S.C. § 157(b)，审理本动议属于核心程序。依据28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409，本案及本动议的审判地分别适当设于本法院。\n\n2. 2022年2月15日，债务人根据《破产法典》第11章提交了自愿救济申请。\n\n3. 2022年6月15日，破产法院发布《驳回无损害再行起诉动议并准许加入请求任命第11章受托人动议的裁决备忘录及命令》（ECF文件编号465），其中命令在该破产案件中任命第11章受托人等事项。\n\n4. 2022年7月7日，美国受托人提交通知，任命受托人为本破产案件的受托人（ECF文件编号514），并提交《批准任命第11章受托人之命令申请》（ECF文件编号515），请求法院批准任命该受托人。\n\n5. 2022年7月8日，法院作出《准许任命第11章受托人的命令》（ECF文件编号523），准许任命受托人为该破产案件的第11章受托人。\n\n受托人对债务人的即时偏见\n\n6. 受托人在获任后几乎立即、且在其能够或已经开始（更不用说完成）对债务人所谓资产和事务进行独立调查之前，即表现出对债务人的偏见。受托人众多表明其对债务人存在偏见的陈述中，仅举例如下：\n\na. 在其于2022年7月20日提交的《第11章受托人对债务人请求免除任命Luc A. Despins为第11章受托人之命令的动议的异议》，ECF文件编号575，第1段，第2页中，即在准许任命受托人的命令作出后十二天，且在他不可能有机会进行任何独立调查之前，受托人称：“该债务人在与其债权人多年的诉讼中所表现出的目标，一直是通过空壳公司及向其家庭成员转移资产，使其所谓数十亿美元资产不受债权人追及，同时他仍保有该等资产的一切利益，并利用其维持奢靡生活方式。”\n\nb. 在其于2022年7月23日提交的《第11章受托人请求作出命令的动议，根据《破产法典》第363、541、1108及1505条，(A) 确认第11章受托人持有债务人控制实体中债务人的所有经济及公司治理权利，(B) 授权第11章受托人代表破产财产在任何外国采取行动，以及(C) 准许相关救济》（文件编号598，即“公司治理动议”）中，即在准许任命受托人的命令作出后十五天，受托人称“债务人已表现出违抗法院命令的意愿”，公司治理动议第1段，第1页，并称“受托人深切担忧债务人将继续努力妨碍受托人对破产财产资产行使控制权……。”公司治理动议第16段，第6页。在提交公司治理动议时，甚至没有任何主张称债务人曾违抗本法院的任何命令。在提交公司治理动议时，债务人不可能妨碍受托人对破产财产资产行使控制权，因为受托人仅到任十五天，且在当时仅向债务人索取过信息。\n\nc. 或许最为恶劣的是，在2022年8月1日的一次听证会上，受托人称：“本案最终会到达[一个阶段]，即藐视法庭。”2022年8月1日听证会记录，第122页，第10-11行。该陈述是在讨论如果债务人不遵守拟议公司治理命令（定义见下文）将产生何种后果的背景下作出的，但这也是受托人在其获任三周后作出的一个更普遍预测，即债务人将构成对本法院某项命令的藐视。该陈述预示了受托人的策略，即诱使债务人构成藐视法庭、伪证或其他犯罪，以取得诉讼优势。\n\nd. 在其《受托人对债务人请求在上诉期间中止执行命令之动议的异议；该命令系根据《破产法典》第363、521、541、1108及1505条，(A) 确认第11章受托人持有债务人控制实体中债务人的所有经济及公司治理权利，(B) 授权第11章受托人代表破产财产在任何外国采取行动，以及(C) 准许相关救济》中，第55段，第24页，受托人称，债务人似乎执意在每一步都阻挠破产财产的管理，并将本法院作为抵御其债权人的“盾牌”。债务人为保护属于其本人的律师—当事人特权及其他特权所作的努力，绝非债务人试图不当利用本法院作为抵御其债权人的“盾牌”的证据。而且，如本文所述，债务人一直努力促进而非阻挠该破产财产的管理。\n\ne. 受托人至少曾一次在法院称，Himalaya International Financial Group Ltd（喜马拉雅国际金融集团有限公司）——向HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC（香港国际基金投资（美国）有限责任公司）出借现由第三方托管并作为Lady May维修准备金的$37 million的实体——“就是Kwok”。受托人未就该主张提供任何证据，债务人亦予以否认。这是受托人试图在未为所作陈述提供任何证据的情况下，使法院对债务人产生偏见的一个例子。\n\n受托人诱使债务人构成藐视法庭、伪证或其他犯罪的策略\n\n7. 如上所述并如下文进一步详述，受托人认为，债务人，或更准确地说，债务人的直系和／或其他家庭成员，将在债务人“即将入狱”时同意受托人要求支付 $250 million。基于该信念，受托人并未寻求推进正当请求或公平解决本案，而是采取了一项策略，试图诱使债务人陷入藐视法庭、伪证或其他犯罪。\n\n8. 该策略的主要例证之一，是受托人试图使本院以债务人据称未遵守本院《关于依据《破产法典》第 363、521、541、1108 及 1505 条作出的命令：（A）确认第 11 章受托人持有债务人在债务人控制实体中的全部经济及公司治理权利；（B）授权第 11 章受托人代表破产财产在任何外国行事；及（C）给予相关救济》（Doc. No. 717，以下简称“公司治理命令”）为由，认定债务人构成藐视法庭（并使其面临如下所述的“拘禁”）。\n\n9. 2022 年 8 月 10 日，本院作出公司治理命令。\n\n公司治理命令第 2、3 及 6 段在相关部分规定如下：\n\n2. 自 2022 年 7 月 8 日作出的命令生效之日起，即批准任命 Luc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯平斯）为本第 11 章案件受托人的命令[ECF No. 523]生效之日起，受托人为破产财产之利益，就所有债务人控制实体持有债务人的全部经济及治理权利，包括但不限于 Genever (BVI)。为免生疑义，上述权利包括受托人所主张的、替换债务人控制实体任何现任高级职员、董事、经理或类似人员的权限。作为上述事项的一部分，在必要范围内，受托人获授权以其在本第 11 章案件中第 11 章受托人的身份，担任任何已被免职的该等高级职员、董事、经理或类似人员。\n\n3. 根据《破产法典》第 521(a)(3) 及 521(a)(4) 条，现命令债务人分别：（a）在必要时与受托人合作，以使受托人能够履行其职责，包括但不限于受托人对债务人资产进行的调查；以及（b）向受托人交出破产财产的全部财产及任何记录信息，包括但不限于与破产财产有关的账簿、文件、记录及文书（包括但不限于其持有的 Genever (BVI) 股份及所有相关公司治理文件）。\n\n（着重号为后加）。因此，公司治理命令明确授予受托人以下权力：\n\n替换任何高级职员、董事或类似人员，而该等人员随后将能够采取受托人认为必要的任何公司行动。\n\n10. 2022 年 8 月 31 日，尽管公司治理命令明确授予受托人该等权限，受托人仍向债务人的律师发送函件，要求债务人：（a）签署并促使任何代名股东签署股份转让文书，将债务人在 Ace Decade Limited（艾斯十年有限公司）持有的全部股份（包括债务人通过任何代名股东实益拥有的全部股份）转让给受托人；以及（b）签署和／或促使 Ace Decade Limited 的董事签署一项决议，批准将 Ace Decade Limited 的该等股份转让给受托人。债务人未遵从受托人的请求。\n\n11. 2022 年 10 月 4 日，受托人再次尽管公司治理命令明确授予其该等权限，提交了《第 11 章受托人关于请求作出命令，因债务人未遵守公司治理权利命令而认定其民事藐视法庭的动议》（Doc. No. 913，以下简称“藐视法庭动议”）。受托人通过该藐视法庭动议，寻求使债务人被认定构成藐视法庭，并主张：“尽管本院在公司治理[权利]命令中作出了明确指示，债务人拒绝将 Ace Decade 的股份……转让给受托人，也拒绝向受托人提供任何有关 Ace Decade 或其全资子公司 Dawn State Limited（曙光州有限公司，以下简称‘Dawn State’）的公司文件……。”动议第 1 段，第 2 页。正如本院所知，于 2022 年 11 月 14 日当周，就藐视法庭动议举行了长时间的听证。\n\n受托人对潜在全球和解的破坏及 11 月 17 日会议\n\n12. 自 2022 年 7 月起，债务人通过律师与 PAX 及债权人委员会，就本案的全球性解决方案进行了广泛谈判。债务人与 PAX 谈判的设想是，如其与 PAX 达成协议，则其将尝试与债权人委员会达成协议。该等谈判极其复杂，因为除与 PAX 及委员会谈判外，债务人还必须通过律师与债务人的直系和／或其他家庭成员谈判，因为将向债权人支付的所有价值均将来自该等家庭成员，部分方式为交出该等家庭成员主张享有权利的各种资产中的权利。债务人与 PAX 在 8 月取得重大进展，以至于债务人要求 PAX 以书面形式概述其要求。谈判持续至 9 月，并于 9 月末形成一份条款清单（以下简称“9 月 PAX 条款清单”）。该条款清单设想，其中包括，向 PAX 支付一笔巨额款项，以完全清偿其债权，而该付款的担保将另行讨论。（Dec. 12 Tr. at 844, lines 4-17）。\n\n13. 在如 9 月 PAX 条款清单所反映、与 PAX 达成原则性协议后，债务人通过律师着力于与债权人委员会达成协议。债务人与债权人委员会在 10 月期间进行谈判，并在 10 月末与该委员会达成原则性协议。（Dec. 12 Tr. at 844, lines 17-22）。\n\n14. 2022 年 10 月 26 日，债务人的律师书面告知受托人，债务人已就与 PAX 及债权人委员会达成协议的全部重大条款达成原则性一致。债务人的律师一直向受托人告知与债权人取得的实质性进展，并一再要求其停止就其向本院提交的众多动议以及其寻求的大量证据开示采取行动，但其拒绝这样做。债务人要求受托人停止采取行动的目的，并非阻止受托人进行调查，而是减缓本案中行政费用持续过度累积的速度。\n\n15. 债务人的律师要求受托人说明，除已与 PAX 及债权人委员会谈判并同意的事项外，其还希望获得何种额外让步。2022 年 10 月 30 日，受托人向债务人的律师发送了一份八页、单倍行距的条款清单，概述其“初步问题”。受托人的重点是：（1）试图确保已与 PAX 及债权人委员会达成的协议得到履行；以及（2）与未来可能出现的、与 H-Coin 有关的潜在请求权相关的问题。尽管债务人的律师对这些所谓潜在 H-Coin 请求权是否具有任何有效性提出异议，受托人提出了本案将如何处理任何该等潜在请求权的问题。（Dec. 12 Tr. at 844, line 21 to 845, line 16）。\n\n16. 11 月，PAX 提出希望通过信用额度或其他担保获得进一步保障，例如提供现金。债务人的律师与 PAX 来回磋商，截至 11 月 16 日，债务人的其他家庭成员已同意就担保事宜向 PAX 提供其所要求的内容。（Dec. 12 Tr. at 845, lines 19-23）。\n\n17. 11 月 16 日，债务人的律师向受托人发送函件，概述了已与 PAX 及债权人委员会谈妥的条款，以及债务人认为就本案全球和解而言应可为受托人接受的条款（以下简称“11 月 16 日函”）。债务人的律师认为，11 月 16 日函中提出的内容距离达成全球和解已非常、非常接近，并再次要求受托人在各方努力最终确定和解期间停止采取行动。（Dec. 12 Tr. at 846, lines 2-15; Adv. Pro. No. 22-05032, Transcript of December 5, 2022 Hearing (\"Dec. 5 Tr.\"), at 247, lines 8-9）。\n\n18. 11 月 16 日晚些时候，受托人致电债务人的律师，请求与债务人举行面对面会议。债务人同意于次日，即 11 月 17 日会面（以下简称“11 月 17 日会议”）。债务人的律师对该会议持审慎乐观态度；他们希望受托人请求会议是为了和解、建立共识，并说明受托人所要求的任何剩余让步。鉴于和解讨论所处的阶段，债务人的律师不认为受托人会利用该会议作为恐吓或威胁债务人的机会。（Dec. 12 Tr., at 841, line 18, to 843, line 24（“[我]们也非常担心，我们认为在本案中一直极具攻击性的受托人可能会利用这次会议作为恐吓或威胁 Kwok（郭）先生的机会。因此，我们考虑过这一风险，但我们排除了它，而且，确实，我得出的结论是，在这种情况下、在已经花费了数百万又数百万美元……之后，受托人不可能愚蠢到举行这样一次会议。……我们得出结论，受托人的意图必定是善意的，因此我们同意了会议。”））。\n\n19. 11 月 17 日会议在纽约举行，出席者包括债务人、债务人的翻译、债务人的律师 Stephen Kindseth（斯蒂芬·金德塞思）和 Aaron Mitchell（亚伦·米切尔）、受托人以及受托人的律师 Nicholas Basset（尼古拉斯·巴塞特）。（Dec. 12 Tr., at 848, line 25 to 849, line 1; Adv. Pro. No. 22-05032, Transcript of December 7, 2022 Hearing (\"Dec. 7 Tr.\"), at 672, line 13 to 673, line 2; Dec. 5 Tr., at 230, line 17 to 231, line 20）。\n\n20. 在 11 月 17 日会议期间，受托人发言，并首先告知债务人不应发言。受托人开场陈述称，其将能够追回所有已识别资产：$37 million Lady May 托管款、Sherry-Netherland 公寓、Lady May，以及债务人妻子所有的位于 Greenwich（格林尼治）的房屋。（Dec. 12 Tr., at 861, lines 15-20）。\n\n21. 在某一时刻，受托人询问债务人是否知道 Al Capone（阿尔·卡彭）是谁，随后告诉债务人 Al Capone 的遭遇，即其因逃税入狱。（Dec. 12 Tr., at 862, lines 18-19; Dec. 7 Tr., at 673, lines 6-8 13）。\n\n22. 受托人表示，尽管朋友和支持者在经济上支持债务人，受托人希望该等支持在美国被申报为收入。受托人还表示，其假定债务人已就咨询费缴纳所得税。受托人随后立即称，其每周均与 IRS（美国国税局）和 SEC（美国证券交易委员会）交谈，（Dec. 12 Tr., at 862, line 24 to 863, line 11; Dec. 7 Tr., lines 10-12），并称债务人最好和解，因为很快就会“太晚”。（Dec. 12 Tr., at 863, lines 11-12）。\n\n23. 受托人随后要求债务人支付 $250 million。（Dec. 12 Tr., at 863, lines 16-18; Dec. 7 Tr., at 691, lines 20-22; Dec. 5 Tr., at 227, line 20 to 228, line 5, and 247, lines 18-19）。\n\n24. 最后，受托人威胁要将债务人拒之于 Sherry-Netherland 公寓之外，并称债务人在即将入狱时将支付 $250 million。（Dec. 12 Tr., at 866, line 24 to 867, line 24）。\n\n适用法律\n\n25. 《破产法典》第 324(a) 条在相关部分规定：“法院在通知并举行听证后，可以因正当理由……免除受托人职务。”\n\n26. 法院认为，“事由”一词未由《破产法典》界定，必须按照“个案”基础予以确定。参见，例如，Livore v. Hargrave（Livore诉Hargrave案）（In re Livore（关于Livore案））, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1653, [*5] (Bankr. D. N.J. May 6, 2010)（“‘事由’一词未由《破产法典》界定，法院必须按照个案基础予以确定。”）；In re Lundborg（关于Lundborg案）, 110 B.R. 106, 108 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1990)（同上）。\n\n27. 以事由免除受托人职务通常要求证明存在欺诈或对破产财产造成实际损害。Dieffenbach v. Haworth（Dieffenbach诉Haworth案）（In re Haworth（关于Haworth案））, 356 Fed. Appx. 529, 530 (2nd Cir. 2009); In re Freeport Italian Bakery, Inc.（关于Freeport Italian Bakery, Inc.案）, 340 F.2d 50, 54 (2d Cir. 1965); In re Cee Jay Discount Stores（关于Cee Jay Discount Stores案）, 171 B.R. 173, 175-76 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1994); In re Lundborg, 110 B.R. at 108.\n\n28. 法院认为，事由可包括受托人无能、违反信义义务、不当行为、未履行受托人职责、缺乏无利害关系性，或持有与破产财产相冲突的利益。参见，例如，Dye v. Brown（Dye诉Brown案）（In re AFI Holding, Inc.（关于AFI Holding, Inc.案））, 355 B.R. 139, 148 (9th Cir. BAP 2006)（“业已确立，‘事由’可包括受托人无能、违反受托人的信义义务、不当行为或未履行受托人职责，或缺乏无利害关系性，或持有与破产财产相冲突的利益。”）, aff'd, 530 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2008); In re Regan（关于Regan案）, 2021 Bankr. LEXIS 2855, [*] (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2021)（同上）；In re Derryberry（关于Derryberry案）, 72 B.R. 874, 879-81 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987)（受托人基于包括违反《职业行为准则》在内的理由被免职）。另见 28 CFR § 58.6(3)（United States Trustee（美国受托人）可暂停专家组受托人的理由可包括未遵守地方法院规则）。\n\n29. 在界定受托人的职责时，法院认为，受托人对债权人和债务人负有公平行事的信义义务。见 Commodity Futures Trading Com v. Weintraub（Commodity Futures Trading Commission（商品期货交易委员会）诉Weintraub案）, 471 U.S. 343, 355 (1985)（“受托人的信义义务不仅对债权人负有，亦对股东负有。”）；In re WHET, Inc.（关于WHET, Inc.案）, 750 F.2d 149, 149 (1st Cir. 1984)（受托人“对债务人和债权人均负有公平行事并保护其利益的信义义务。”）；Wiscovitch-Rentas v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.（Wiscovitch-Rentas诉Liberty Mutual Insurance Company（自由互助保险公司）案）（In re Fiddler Gonzales & Rodriquez, P.S.C.（关于Fiddler Gonzales & Rodriquez, P.S.C.案））, 415 F.Supp. 272, (D. P.R. 2019)（同上）；In re Vebeliunas（关于Vebeliunas案）, 231 B.R. 181, 190 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999)（“鉴于受托人对于自然人债务人的职责，在任何情况下均不得允许受托人的专业人员因对债务人存在偏见而缺乏无利害关系性……。”）。另见 7 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1106.02[3], at 1106-11 (16th Ed. 2019)（“除《破产法典》明确规定的职责外，重整案件中的受托人属于受信人，负有公平对待案件中所有当事人的义务。作为受信人，受托人对债务人的破产财产及其债权人负有一般忠实义务，即不存在自利。”）；United States Trustee Chapter 11 Trustee Handbook（美国受托人第11章受托人手册）, [http][200405.pdf/download,] at 19（“简言之，第11章受托人是一名受信人，负责保护包括所有债权人和债务人在内的所有当事人对破产财产享有的利益。受托人必须保护和保全破产财产资产。”）。\n\n30. 第11章受托人还负有与债权人协商的义务，目标是尽可能迅速和高效地确认一项计划，以便在合理期限内最大化债权人的回收。11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(5)（“受托人应当——……在可行时尽快根据本编第1121条提交一项计划，提交说明受托人为何不会提交计划的报告，或者建议将案件转换为本编第7章、第12章或第13章下的案件，或驳回该案件。”）；Senate Report No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 116 (1978)（“预期受托人将在制定计划时与债权人及其他利害关系方协商……。”）；House Report No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 404 (1977)（“预期受托人将在制定计划时与债权人及其他利害关系方协商……。为更有可能获得最终制定的计划所需数量的接受，协商将是必要的。”）。\n\n31. 法院认为，在确定是否存在足以证明免除受托人职务的损害时，法院必须考虑破产财产的最佳利益。In re Freeport Italian Bakery, 340 F.2d at 55（“如果破产财产的管理因现任受托人造成的不和而遭受的损害，大于因更换管理人所遭受的损害，则免除该受托人职务必然是更好的解决办法。”）；Morgan v. Goldman（Morgan诉Goldman案）（In re Morgan（关于Morgan案））, 375 B.R. 838, 848 (8th Cir. BAP 2007)（“法院在确定是否免除受托人职务时，还必须考虑破产财产的最佳利益。”（省略内部引号））；In re Baker（关于Baker案）, 38 B.R. 705, 708 (D. Md. 1983)（同上）；In re Mason（关于Mason案）, 12 B.R. 318, 318-19 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1981)（因“债务人对破产受托人怀有强烈敌意”，受托人被解除职责）。\n\n32. 值得注意的是，免职可基于不当行为的表象，也可基于实际不当行为。见 Morgan v. Goldman（In re Morgan）, 375 B.R. 838, 848 (8th Cir. BAP 2007)（一些法院“认为，免职不仅可基于实际不当行为，也可基于不当行为的表象。”（省略内部引号））；In re Vebeliunas, 231 B.R. at 187-95（“无利害关系性意味着防止哪怕是利益冲突的表象，而不论被审查的个人或事务所是否正直。”（省略内部引号））；In re Micro-Time Management Sys.（关于Micro-Time Management Sys.案）, 102 B.R. 602, 603-09 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1989)（受托人因先前为债权人工作而被取消资格）。\n\n论证\n\n受托人已实施不当行为\n\n33. 受托人实施了明显违反 Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct（康涅狄格州职业行为规则）的公然不当行为，因而对破产财产造成了实际损害。\n\n34. Connecticut Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4(7) 规定，律师不得“[p]resent, participate in presenting, or threaten to present criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter.”[5]\n\n“该规则旨在通过确保禁止毁灭或隐匿证据、不当影响证人、在证据开示程序中采取阻碍性策略等行为，以促进‘对抗制体系中的公平竞争’……。‘规则3.4所禁止的行为，与构成我国对抗制司法体系基础的公平竞争原则不相容……。规则3.4(7)所设想的行为之所以被禁止，是因为其被视为具有不公平的强制性，因而构成对刑事程序的滥用……。作为法院的官员和专员，律师无论以个人身份还是代表身份行事，均有义务避免使用不当策略。\n\n5 United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut（康涅狄格州联邦破产法院）的 Local Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure（破产程序地方法院规则）Rule 1001-1(b) 规定：“United States District Court for the District of Connecticut（康涅狄格州联邦地区法院）的 Local Rules of Civil Procedure（民事程序地方法院规则）在与《破产法典》、Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure（联邦破产程序规则）或本破产程序地方法院规则相关且不相抵触的范围内，适用于破产法院的所有案件或程序。”United States District Court for the District of Connecticut 的 Local Civil Rules（民事地方法院规则）Rule 83.2(a)1 规定：“除本地方法院规则Rule 83.2(a)2另有规定外，本院承认由 Connecticut Superior Court（康涅狄格州高等法院）法官批准的《职业行为规则》的权威，该规则表述了对在康涅狄格州地区执业律师所期望的职业行为标准。”在随附于 Luc A. Despins（Luc A. Despins）Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice（临时执业许可动议）（ECF Doc. No. 540）的宣誓书第6段中，受托人依 D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 83.1(d)(1)(d) 的要求陈述：“我已阅读并熟悉 Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure（联邦民事和刑事程序规则）、United States District Court for the District of Connecticut 的地方法院规则、Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut（康涅狄格州破产法院）的地方法院规则以及 Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct，并将遵守和履行地方法院规则及本院行政命令的实体和程序要求。”法院负有执行适用的职业责任规则的责任。United States v. Hammad（United States（美国）诉Hammad案）, 858 F.2d 834, 837 (2nd Cir. 1988)（“联邦法院依据其对律师协会成员的一般监督权执行职业责任标准。”）；Hull v. Celanese Corp.（Hull诉Celanese Corp.案）, 513 F.2d 568, 571 (2nd Cir. 1975)（“地区法院负有监督其律师协会成员的责任。”）。\n\nSomers v. Statewide Grievance Comm.（Somers诉Statewide Grievance Committee（全州申诉委员会）案）, 245 Conn. 277, 288 (1988)（援引 Rule 3.4 评论第1段）。在与此处发生的情况类似的情形中，Connecticut Statewide Grievance Committee（康涅狄格州全州申诉委员会）以清楚且令人信服的证据认定，一名代表债权人的律师违反了 Rule 3.4(7)，该律师向债务人的律师传真了一封信，称：\n\n自我们会面以来，我已与 Department of Consumer Protection（消费者保护部）的人员进行了四次交谈；他们告诉我，由于你的客户未登记，只要我就违反本州承包商许可法的刑事违法行为提交书面投诉，他们将在72小时内对你的客户签发逮捕令。我尚未提交该投诉。他们还告诉我，由于你的客户从我的客户处收取了\\$30,000.00却未完成工作，该违法行为构成A级重罪。我建议你的客户在本案中的立场有所软化，并请你立即向我的办公室转交：1）一份列明我的客户的全面解除及不披露文件，以及2）金额为\\$37,000.00的受托人支票，以支付我的客户原始付款及其截至目前的律师费。我还建议你的客户在2006年5月15日星期一营业结束前作出该等付款。时间至关重要。未能如前述采取行动，将导致我的客户采取一切必要行动以保护其权利。\n\nDouglas Fleming vs. Arthur D. Machado, Statewide Grievance Committee Grievance Complaint\n#07-0062, [http]\n\n35. 在11月17日会议上，受托人威胁债务人，若债务人不立即同意受托人提出的支付\\$250 million要求，债务人将受到刑事制裁。受托人提及 Al Capone（阿尔·卡彭）的遭遇，以将债务人的命运与 Al Capone 的命运相比较；称其每周均与 IRS（美国国税局）和 SEC（美国证券交易委员会）交谈；称债务人必须在为时已晚之前和解；并直言告知债务人的律师，当债务人即将入狱时，\\$250 million将支付给受托人。受托人的陈述是一项公然且毫不掩饰的威胁，即若债务人不同意受托人的民事要求，将会产生刑事后果。因此，至少而言，受托人的行为明显违反了 Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct 的 Rule 3.4(7)。受托人的行为比为客户寻求利益的律师更为严重，因为受托人是法院官员，其行为带有法院的认可，从而使其关于若债务人不满足其要求将采取刑事行动的威胁具有更大的分量。\n\n36. 受托人通过公然的不当行为以及违反其对债务人的职责，已对债务人财产造成实际损害；其采取的策略是试图诱使债务人构成藐视法庭、伪证或其他犯罪，以利用刑事制裁即监禁的威胁，向债务人的直系和／或扩展家庭成员施压，以获取 $250 million 的付款。受托人在 11 月 17 日会议上称，当债务人即将入狱时该笔付款将会到位，此言足以说明受托人的策略。\n\n37. 本院所熟悉的受托人在此方面所采取策略的一个主要例子，是藐视法庭动议（Contempt Motion）。公司治理动议（Corporate Governance Motion）和公司治理裁定（Corporate Governance Order）的全部前提是，债务人对任何债务人控制实体（Debtor-Controlled Entities）均不享有治理权。受托人在公司治理动议中请求、并在公司治理裁定中获准行使其要求债务人采取的行为之权力。受托人提出藐视法庭动议的目的并非取得 Ace Decade Limited 的控制权，因为这无需债务人采取任何行动，而是为了使债务人被认定藐视法庭并遭监禁。2022 年 11 月 18 日听证会记录，第 103 页第 10 行至第 104 页第 9 行（“制裁措施由本院酌情决定，其范围广泛，并包括拘禁”）。藐视法庭动议是对时间和金钱的巨大浪费，其提出具有不当目的，即诱使债务人构成藐视法庭，以便对债务人及其直系和／或扩展家庭成员取得筹码。\n\n撤换受托人将最符合债务人财产的利益\n\n38. 受托人阻挠本案整体解决的行为已对债务人财产造成实际损害，而撤换其职务将最符合债权人及债务人财产的利益。\n\n39. 至少自今年 8 月以来，债务人一直积极致力于与其债权人达成公平解决方案。如上所述，债务人已就本案的整体解决方案分别与 PAX 和债权人委员会（Creditors' Committee）达成原则性协议。债权人当然最能判断何种付款对其而言是合理且可接受的。\n\n40. 出于或许只有受托人能够解释的动机，受托人积极阻挠该整体解决方案。相反，其威胁债务人并提出骇人听闻的要求。基于受托人的行为，目前债务人以及更重要的是债务人的直系和扩展家庭成员（因为其将根据任何合意计划为向债权人的付款提供资金）将不再与受托人打交道。目前的选择是撤换受托人，或者进行多年昂贵且结果不确定的诉讼。受托人在本案中造成的不和程度表明，尽管更换受托人可能产生一些成本，撤换受托人必然是更好的解决方案。见 In re Freeport Italian Bakery, 340 F.2d at 55。\n\n41. 受托人未履行其在制定计划时与债权人协商的义务。如上所述，PAX 和债权人委员会花费数月时间协商本案的整体解决方案。受托人选择完全无视所有这些工作，以及本案主要债权人群体的意愿。\n\n42. 受托人未履行其管理债务人财产以尽量减少费用并最大化可供债权人取得的价值的职责。尽管其知悉和解谈判，并被反复要求“暂缓行动”，受托人仍持续积极进行诉讼。再次说明，债务人所称“暂缓行动”绝不意味着受托人不应履行其职责，而是指各方应努力限制管理费用，并允许律师专注于谈判。受托人拒绝如此，并一贯以加急方式提出动议，且进行了（并仍在进行）大量证据开示。本案中为无正当目的而持续产生巨额管理费用。\n\n43. 受托人未履行其公平对待债务人的职责。如上所述，受托人实质上自其获任之日起便对债务人表现出极大的偏见；其采取策略诱使债务人构成藐视法庭、伪证或其他犯罪；其威胁债务人，如债务人不接受其要求，将面临刑事后果。至少，受托人的行为造成其对债务人存在极大偏见的表象。\n\n因此，债务人谨请求本院准许其动议，作出撤换受托人的裁定，并给予其正义所要求的其他及进一步救济。\n\n2022 年 12 月 30 日，于 Connecticut（康涅狄格州）Bridgeport（布里奇波特）。\n\n债务人，HO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）\n\n/s/ Eric Henzy\nEric Henzy（ct12849）\nAaron A. Romney（ct28144）\nJames M. Moriarty（ct21876）\nJohn L. Cesaroni（ct29309）\n10 Middle Street, 15th Floor\nBridgeport, Connecticut 06604\n电话：(203) 368-4234\n传真：(203) 368-5487\n电子邮件：[ehenzy@zeislaw.com]\n[aromney@zeislaw.com]\n[Jmoriarty@zeislaw.com]\n[jcesaroni@zeislaw.com]\n\n关于：第 11 章\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人。\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），\n动议人，\n诉\nLUC A. DESPINS，\n第 11 章受托人\n被申请人。\n准许撤换受托人动议的拟议裁定\n\n债务人 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）提出的撤换受托人裁定动议（以下简称“动议”）已提交本院审理，且存在充分且适当的理由准许所请求的救济，现据此\n\n裁定：该动议在各方面均予准许，并进一步\n\n裁定：第 11 章受托人 Luc A. Despins（吕克·A·德斯平斯）因故依据 11 U.S.C. § 324(a) 被撤去其在本破产案件中的第 11 章受托人职务。\n\n关于：第 11 章\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人。\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），\n动议人，\n诉\nLUC A. DESPINS（吕克·A·德斯平斯），\n第 11 章受托人\n被申请人。\n争议事项答复期限通知\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（以下简称“债务人”）已在上述标题案件中提出撤换受托人裁定动议（以下简称“争议事项”）。现通知，对该争议事项的任何答复必须不迟于 2023 年 1 月 13 日向本院提交。如未及时提交答复，争议事项中的拟议裁定可在不另行通知和举行听证的情况下作出，见 11 U.S.C. section 102 (1)。\n\n债务人，HO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）\n\n/s/ Eric Henzy\nEric Henzy（ct12849）\n10 Middle Street, 15th Floor\nBridgeport, Connecticut 06604\n电话：(203) 368-4234\n传真：(203) 368-5487\n电子邮件：[ehenzy@zeislaw.com]\n\n关于：第 11 章\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人。\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），\n动议人，\n诉\nLUC A. DESPINS（吕克·A·德斯平斯），\n第 11 章受托人\n被申请人。\n送达证明\n\n本人特此证明，于 2022 年 12 月 30 日，前述撤换受托人裁定动议、拟议裁定及争议事项程序通知的副本已通过电子方式提交。根据本院电子提交系统的运行，提交通知将通过电子邮件发送给所有当事人；对于无法接受电子提交者，则将按照电子提交通知中的说明通过邮件发送。当事人可通过本院的 CM/ECF 系统查阅该提交文件。\n\n债务人，HO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）\n\n/s/ Eric Henzy\nEric Henzy（ct12849）\n10 Middle Street, 15th Floor\nBridgeport, Connecticut 06604\n电话：(203) 368-4234\n传真：(203) 368-5487\n电子邮件：[ehenzy@zeislaw.com]","key_entities":["Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Despins","CIPA","Je","Paul Hastings","Himalaya","Chinese Communist Party"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":523,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":7242,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 20:02:45"}