{"id":"court_ctb_1312_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":1312,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2023-01-11","title":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )","summary_zh":"地区法院裁决备忘录 —— Ho Wan Kwok 破产案（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo），CTB 22-50073 ECF #1312（2023-01-11立案）。美国联邦地区法院法官 Kari A. Dooley 裁定驳回债务人郭文贵提出的上诉许可申请及调卷令请求，维持破产法院关于允许在 Clark Hill 法律执业过失诉讼中向破产受托人有限披露其庇护申请材料的保护令。","summary_en":"Memorandum of Decision — In re Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo), CTB 22-50073 ECF #1312 (filed 2023-01-11). U.S. District Judge Kari A. Dooley denies debtor Ho Wan Kwok's motion for leave to appeal and petition for writ of mandamus, upholding the bankruptcy court's protective order permitting limited disclosure of Kwok's asylum application to the Chapter 11 Trustee in connection with the Clark Hill malpractice action.","body_en":"#### **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\n) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )\n\nIN RE: HO WAN KWOK, *et al.*, *Debtors*\n\nHO WAN KWOK, *Debtor-Appellant*,\n\nv.\n\nLUC A. DESPINS, *Trustee-Appellee*. BANKR. NO. 22-50073 (JAM) *Chapter 11*\n\nCIVIL NO. 3:22-cv-1581 (KAD)\n\nJANUARY 11, 2023\n\n#### **MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: INDIVIDUAL DEBTOR'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL AND IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS (ECF No. 8)**\n\nKari A. Dooley, United States District Judge:\n\nHo Wan Kwok, the individual debtor to the underlying bankruptcy proceeding, moves for leave to appeal the Bankruptcy Court's order granting *in part* his motion for protective order; *see In re Ho Wan Kwok*, No. 22-50073 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn Dec. 9, 2022), ECF No. 1217; and in the alternative, petitions for a writ of mandamus to vacate the order. (ECF No. 8) Appellant seeks to prevent the disclosure of his asylum application to Luc A. Despins, Appellee and Chapter 11 Trustee to the bankruptcy estate. Appellee opposes the motion for leave to appeal and the petition for writ of mandamus. (ECF No. 14) For the reasons set forth below, the motion for leave to appeal and in the alternative, petition for writ of mandamus is DENIED.\n\n#### **Facts and Procedural History**\n\n Appellant, a Chinese national and purported political target of the Chinese Communist Party, fled China in 2015. With the assistance of counsel at the Clark Hill PLC law firm (\"Clark Hill\"), Appellant prepared and submitted an asylum application to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. In 2019, Appellant filed a legal malpractice action against Clark Hill after a\n\nbreach of the firm's computer server resulted in the public dissemination of his asylum application (\"the malpractice action\"). Specifically, Appellant alleged that \"[a]s a direct and proximate cause of [Clark Hill's] multiple breaches of their duties and legal obligations, the details and contents of [Appellant's] asylum application and other materials have been disclosed widely on social media platforms and placed in the hands of third-parties hostile to [Appellant].\" Luft Decl., Ex. A ¶ 57, Appellee Br. at 31–32. On February 15, 2022, Clark Hill moved for summary judgment, citing to and attaching Appellant's asylum application as an exhibit. The asylum application was filed under seal because it was discovery material designated as confidential.\n\n That same day, February 15, 2022, Appellant filed for bankruptcy in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut, automatically staying the malpractice action. On July 7, 2022, Appellee was appointed trustee of the bankruptcy estate. The malpractice action, as an active litigation in which Appellant is the plaintiff, is an asset of Appellant's bankruptcy estate. On July 28, 2022, Appellee filed a motion for Rule 2004 discovery from various legal and financial advisors, including Clark Hill, which the Bankruptcy Court granted on August 16, 2022. Appellee thereafter served Clark Hill with a Rule 2004 subpoena, requesting information which would allow the trustee to evaluate the malpractice action and to make decisions regarding its prosecution. The subpoena did not specifically seek the asylum application.\n\nOn September 14, 2022, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order on consent regarding the control and use of attorney-client privilege and work product protection regarding materials obtained from the Rule 2004 subpoenas (\"privileges order\"). The privileges order provides that Appellee has exclusive control of any attorney-client privilege or work product protection that could otherwise be asserted by Appellant or his counsel, including over assets such as \"actual or potential causes of action that [] are or were held by [Appellant].\" *In re Ho Wan Kwok*, No. 22-\n\n50073 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn Sept. 14, 2022), ECF No. 856 ¶ 2. The privileges order further provides that nothing \"shall prevent [Appellant] from asserting any and all privileges concerning legal matters unrelated to the Investigation Topics, such as unrelated criminal allegations or [Appellant's] asylum application (*other than documents related to the [Malpractice Action] that relate to the merits of the legal malpractice action*, as distinguished from the merits of [Appellant's] asylum application, subject to the balancing test incorporated herein, which does not relate to the substance of the asylum application).\" *Id.* ¶ 4 (emphasis added).\n\n On November 2, 2022, Appellant filed a motion for protective order with the Bankruptcy Court seeking to prevent Clark Hill from producing the motion for summary judgment and the attached asylum application. After a hearing on November 30 and December 2, 2022, the Bankruptcy Court granted *in part* the motion for protective order, permitting the production of Clark Hill's motion for summary judgment and the asylum application \"only to [Appellee] and his counsel.\" The Bankruptcy Court further ordered that the materials \"are not to be discussed, shown, or produced in any way to other interested parties in these bankruptcy cases,\" and that the materials remain subject to the protective order issued in the malpractice action. On December 13, 2022, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal in this court as well as the instant motion for permission to appeal or in the alternative for a writ of mandamus. (ECF No. 1, 8)\n\n#### **Standard of Review**\n\n Districts courts have jurisdiction to hear appeals from \"final judgments, orders, and decrees . . . [and] with leave of the court, from other interlocutory orders and decrees . . . of bankruptcy judges.\" 28 U.S.C. § 158(a).<sup>1</sup> \"The decision as to whether to grant leave to appeal an interlocutory order of a bankruptcy court is committed to the discretion of the district court.\" *Osuji v. U.S. Bank,*\n\n<sup>1</sup> The parties agree that this case presents an appeal of an interlocutory order. *See* Appellant Br. at 10; Appellee Br. at 10.\n\n*N.A.*, 285 F. Supp. 3d 554, 557 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (citing *In re Kassover*, 343 F.3d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 2003). The standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), which governs interlocutory appeals from district courts to courts of appeals, similarly governs such interlocutory appeals from bankruptcy courts to district courts. *In re Quigley Co.*, 323 B.R. 70, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (\"[C]ourts in this Circuit have invariably held[ ] all appeals governed by Section 158(a)(3) . . . should refer to the standards articulated by Section 1292(b) to determine whether leave to appeal shall be granted.\" (citation omitted)). Section 1292(b) provides:\n\nWhen a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order.\n\n28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Accordingly, Appellant must establish that \"the order (1) involves a controlling question of law (2) as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion, and (3) an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.\" *Osuji*, 285 F. Supp. 3d at 558; *see also In re Salvatore*, No. 3:18-cv-1429 (SRU), 2019 WL 1284815, at \\*1 (D. Conn. Mar. 20, 2019).\n\n The first inquiry is satisfied \"if the reversal of the bankruptcy court's order would (1) terminate the action or (2) materially affect the outcome of the litigation.\" *In re Salvatore*, 2019 WL 1284815, at \\*2 (quoting *Buckskin Realty Inc., v. Greenberg,* 552 B.R. 40, 44 (E.D.N.Y. 2016)). \"The question of law must be a pure question that does not require resort to the case docket for study.\" *Id.* at \\*2. The second inquiry is satisfied where there is either conflicting authority on the issue or the issue is particularly difficult and of first impression in the Second Circuit. *Osuji*, 285 F. Supp. 3d at 558. Alternatively, there must be \"a genuine doubt as to whether the bankruptcy court applied the correct legal standard. . . . [M]erely claiming that the bankruptcy court's decision\n\nwas incorrect is insufficient to establish substantial ground for difference of opinion.\" *In re Salvatore,* 2109 WL 1284815 at \\*2. The third inquiry is satisfied \"when the appeal promises to advance the time for trial or to shorten the time required for trial.\" *Id.* Further, district courts have \"unfettered discretion to deny certification of an order for interlocutory appeal even when a party has demonstrated that the criteria of [section] 1292(b) are met.\" *Buckskin Realty Inc.*, 552 B.R. at 44.\n\n The writ of mandamus \"has traditionally been used in the federal courts only to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so. . . . Only exceptional circumstances, amounting to a judicial usurpation of power, will justify the invocation of this extraordinary remedy.\" *Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc.*, 449 U.S. 33, 35 (1980) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). A mandamus petition is granted \"only where the petitioner's right to relief is clear and indisputable,\" and not \"used simply to correct error.\" *Hong Mai Sa v. Doe*, 406 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).\n\nThe Second Circuit exercises mandamus review of discovery orders relating to claims of privilege where: \"(i) an issue of importance and of first impression is raised; (ii) the privilege will be lost in the particular case if review must await a final judgment; and (iii) immediate resolution will avoid the development of discovery practices or doctrine undermining the privilege.\" *Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., v. Turner & Newall, PLC*, 964 F.2d 159, 163 (2d Cir. 1992). The Second Circuit has \"rarely used the extraordinary writ of mandamus to overturn a discovery order involving a claim of privilege.\" *Id.*\n\n#### **Discussion**\n\n Appellant argues that the production of his asylum application to the Appellee and his counsel violates 8 C.F.R. § 208.6, which generally prohibits the disclosure of asylum applications to third parties. Appellee argues that § 208.6 has no applicability in this situation nor bearing on the propriety of the Bankruptcy Court's order. Although Appellant's appeal presents an issue that involves a pure question of law, thus satisfying the first inquiry under §1292(b), he has neither demonstrated that this issue is one in which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion, nor that an interlocutory appeal from the Bankruptcy Court's order would materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. Finally, Appellant has not demonstrated that he is entitled to the extraordinary remedy of a writ of mandamus.\n\n Section 208.6(a) of title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations provides that: \"[i]nformation contained in or pertaining to any application for . . . asylum . . . shall not be disclosed without written consent of the applicant, except as permitted by this section or at the discretion of the Secretary [of Homeland Security].\" This regulation essentially prohibits the United States government from disclosing the content and perhaps even the existence of an asylum application without the applicant's consent. It does not, as Appellant contends, prohibit anyone other than the United States and its agencies, such as the Executive Officer of Immigration Review (\"EOIR\") and the Department of Justice (\"DOJ\"), from disclosing asylum applications and related information. *See Lin v. U.S. Dept. of Justice*, 459 F.3d 255, 258 n.1 (2d Cir. 2006) (\"Chapter I of title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations applies to the [Immigration and Naturalization Service] and [Department of Homeland Security], and Chapter V applies to the EOIR and DOJ.\"); *Egiazaryan v. Zalmayev*, No. 11-cv-2670 (PKC) (GWG), 2012 WL 137574, at \\*2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2012) (\"By regulation, the United States and its agencies and departments may not disclose an asylum application or its contents to third persons\") (citing *Lin*, 459 F.3d at 262–65); *Rodriguez v.*\n\n*Robbins*, No. 07-3239 (TJH) (RNBx) 2012 WL 12953870, at \\*2 (C.D. Cal. May 3, 2012) (\"[S]tatutory provisions, generally forbidding disclosure of information, do not bar judicial discovery absent an explicit prohibition against such disclosure. . . .\" and asylum provisions such as 8 C.F.R. § 208.6 do \"not contain such an express limitation\"); *Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. Mayorkas*, No. 3:17-cv-2366 (BAS) (KSC), 2021 WL 1312531, at \\*4 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2021) (\"[T]he plain text of [8 C.F.R. § 208.6] does not constrain the treatment of asylum information by private actors.\").\n\n Moreover, the regulation specifically carves out disclosure in or related to judicial proceedings. Section 208.6(c) provides that \"[t]his section shall not apply to any disclosure to . . . [a]ny Federal, State, or local court in the United States considering any legal action . . . *[a]rising from the proceedings of which the asylum application . . . is a part*.\" 8 C.F.R. § 208.6(c)(2)(ii) (emphasis added). \"Congress intended subsection (ii) to encompass any legal action arising from proceedings in which the asylum application merely constitutes some 'part,' regardless of how active or meaningful the role it played. . . . Some[one], or entity, need not actually litigate the merits of the application before a tribunal for it to be 'part' of a 'proceeding.'\" *Rodriguez*, 2012 WL 12953870, at \\*3. Here, Appellant placed his asylum application directly at issue in the malpractice action when he alleged that his counsel at Clark Hill breached their duties and obligations by allowing the asylum application to be publicly disseminated to his detriment. Those allegations, and any damages allegedly flowing therefrom, necessarily require an evaluation of the contents of the asylum application. It is therefore unremarkable that the asylum application is attached as an exhibit to Clark Hill's motion for summary judgment.\n\nFor each of these reasons, the Court concludes that there is no substantial ground for difference of opinion as to whether 8 C.F.R. § 208.6 precludes production of Appellant's asylum application.<sup>2</sup> It does not.\n\n Nor can Appellant show that he can meet the very high burden that the Second Circuit requires for writs of mandamus for discovery orders relating to claims of privilege. *See Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.*, 964 F.2d at 163–64 (writ of mandamus warranted where the documents \"may be clearly privileged,\" the protection afforded by the privilege is limited to \"the inadmissibility of confidential communications at trial,\" and \"the attorney-client privilege will have been undermined\" while waiting for a final judgment). First, Appellant does not actually advance any argument that § 208.6 creates a privilege nor would any such argument, for the reasons discussed above, have merit. His reliance on *Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.* is therefore misplaced as the case is inapposite. Appellant has likewise not shown any compelling reason to warrant a writ of mandamus insofar as he fails to demonstrate that the Bankruptcy Court committed any legal error or that it clearly abused its discretion. Appellant's concern regarding the sensitive nature of the asylum application is mitigated by the Bankruptcy Court's order limiting disclosure to the trustee and his counsel. Thus, this Court cannot find that the Bankruptcy Court has engaged in the \"[un]lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction\" or \"failed to exercise its authority when it [was] its duty to do so.\" *Hong Mai Sa*, 406 F.3d at 159 (quoting *Richardson Greenshields Secs., Inc. v. Lau*, 825 F.2d 647, 652 (2d Cir. 1987).<sup>3</sup>\n\n<sup>2</sup> It is also clear to the Court that an interlocutory appeal from the protective order does not materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. In fact, it may serve to delay both the bankruptcy proceedings in the District of Connecticut and the malpractice action in the District of Columbia by hindering the trustee's ability to fully perform his obligations in consultation with his counsel.\n\n<sup>3</sup> The Court further observes that Appellant may not \"place a matter in issue and then successfully thwart discovery because it is unduly intrusive, sensitive, or privileged from disclosure.\" *Egiazaryan*, 2012 WL 137574, at \\*2. There is no claim that the malpractice action is not an asset of the bankruptcy estate. Appellee, as trustee of that estate, cannot assess the viability of the malpractice action as an asset to be pursued or abandoned without access to the asylum application and Clark Hill's motion for summary judgment.\n\n#### **Conclusion**\n\n For the reasons set forth above, Appellant's motion for leave to appeal (ECF No. 8) is DENIED. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case.\n\n**SO ORDERED** at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 11th day of January 2023.\n\n */s/ Kari A. Dooley*  KARI A. DOOLEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE","body_zh":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT（美国康涅狄格区联邦地区法院）\n\n) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )\n\n有关：HO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等人，债务人\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），债务人-上诉人，\n\n诉\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，受托人-被上诉人。破产案号 22-50073 (JAM) 第 11 章\n\n民事案号 3:22-cv-1581 (KAD)\n\n2023年1月11日\n关于个人债务人准予上诉动议及备选调卷令申请的裁定备忘录（ECF No. 8）\n\nKari A. Dooley，美国联邦地区法官：\n\n基础破产程序的个人债务人 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）动议申请准予对破产法院部分支持其保护令动议的裁定提起上诉；参见 In re Ho Wan Kwok, No. 22-50073 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn Dec. 9, 2022), ECF No. 1217；并备选申请发出调卷令以撤销该裁定。（ECF No. 8）上诉人试图阻止将其庇护申请披露给破产财产的第 11 章受托人兼被上诉人 Luc A. Despins。被上诉人反对准予上诉动议及调卷令申请。（ECF No. 14）基于下文阐述的理由，准予上诉动议及备选调卷令申请被驳回（DENIED）。\n\n事实与审判经过\n\n上诉人系中国公民，自称为中国共产党的政治目标，于 2015 年逃离中国。在 Clark Hill PLC 律师事务所（“Clark Hill”）律师的协助下，上诉人向 U.S. Department of Homeland Security（美国国土安全部）准备并提交了庇护申请。2019 年，在上诉人律师事务所的计算机服务器遭到入侵导致其庇护申请被公开发播后，上诉人对 Clark Hill 提起了法律执业过失诉讼（“过失诉讼”）。具体而言，上诉人指控称：“作为[Clark Hill]多次违反其职责和法律义务的直接且近因结果，[上诉人]庇护申请及其他材料的细节和内容已被广泛披露在社交媒体平台上，并落入对[上诉人]抱有敌意的第三方手中。”Luft 声明，附件 A 第 57 段，被上诉人简要陈述第 31–32 页。2022 年 2 月 15 日，Clark Hill 提出简易判决动议，引用并附上了上诉人的庇护申请作为证物。该庇护申请因被指定为保密开示材料而作封存提交。\n\n就在同日，即 2022 年 2 月 15 日，上诉人向 U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut（美国康涅狄格区破产法院）申请破产，过失诉讼自动中止。2022 年 7 月 7 日，被上诉人被指定为破产财产的受托人。过失诉讼作为上诉人作为原告的未决诉讼，系上诉人破产财产的一项资产。2022 年 7 月 28 日，被上诉人提出了针对包括 Clark Hill 在内的各法律与财务顾问进行破产规则第 2004 条证据开示的动议，破产法院于 2022 年 8 月 16 日准许了该动议。被上诉人随后向 Clark Hill 送达了第 2004 条传票，要求提供使受托人能够评估该过失诉讼并就其推进作出决定的信息。该传票未特别索取庇护申请。\n\n2022 年 9 月 14 日，破产法院就通过第 2004 条传票获取的材料中律师-委托人保密特权及工作成果保护的控制和使用签署了一项合意裁定（“特权裁定”）。该特权裁定规定，被上诉人对本可由上诉人或其律师主张的任何律师-委托人保密特权或工作成果保护享有排他性控制权，包括对诸如“[上诉人]目前或曾经持有的实际或潜在诉由”等资产的控制。In re Ho Wan Kwok, No. 22-50073 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn Sept. 14, 2022), ECF No. 856 第 2 段。该特权裁定进一步规定，任何内容“均不得阻止[上诉人]就与调查主题无关的法律事务主张任何及所有特权，例如无关的刑事指控或[上诉人]的庇护申请（与[过失诉讼]相关且涉及该法律过失诉讼实体是非而非涉及[上诉人]庇护申请实体是非的文件除外，但须遵守本裁定所包含的利益衡量标准，且该标准不涉及庇护申请的实质内容）”。同上，第 4 段（强调为后加）。\n\n2022 年 11 月 2 日，上诉人向破产法院提出保护令动议，试图阻止 Clark Hill 提供简易判决动议及所附的庇护申请。在 2022 年 11 月 30 日和 12 月 2 日举行听证后，破产法院部分准许了该保护令动议，允许“仅向[被上诉人]及其律师”提供 Clark Hill 的简易判决动议和庇护申请。破产法院进一步下令，这些材料“不得以任何方式向这些破产案件中的其他利害关系方讨论、展示或提供”，并且这些材料仍受过失诉讼中所发出保护令的约束。2022 年 12 月 13 日，上诉人向本法院提交了上诉通知书，以及本案请求准予上诉或备选申请调卷令的动议。（ECF No. 1, 8）\n\n审查标准\n\n地区法院管辖对破产法官作出的“终局判决书、裁定和法令……[以及]经法院许可，对其他中间裁定和法令……”提起的上诉。28 U.S.C. § 158(a)。1“是否准予对破产法院的中间裁定提起上诉的决定权属于地区法院的自由裁量范围。”Osuji v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 285 F. Supp. 3d 554, 557 (E.D.N.Y. 2018)（引用 In re Kassover, 343 F.3d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 2003)）。规范从地区法院向上一级上诉法院提起中间上诉的 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) 所规定的标准，同样规范从破产法院向地区法院提起的此类中间上诉。In re Quigley Co., 323 B.R. 70, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)（“[本巡回区]各法院一贯认为，受第 158(a)(3) 条管辖的所有上诉……均应参照第 1292(b) 条阐述的标准来确定是否准予上诉。”（引文省略））。第 1292(b) 条规定：\n\n当地区法官在民事诉讼中作出一项依本条其他规定不可上诉的裁定时，若认为该裁定涉及一项具有重大意见分歧理由的支配性法律问题，且从该裁定立即提起上诉可实质性推动诉讼的最终终结，则应在该裁定中以书面形式予以载明。\n\n1 双方均认同本案系对中间裁定提起的上诉。参见上诉人简要陈述第 10 页；被上诉人简要陈述第 10 页。\n\n28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)。因此，上诉人必须证明“该裁定 (1) 涉及一项支配性法律问题，(2) 对此存在重大的意见分歧理由，且 (3) 从该裁定立即提起上诉可实质性推动诉讼的最终终结。”Osuji, 285 F. Supp. 3d at 558；另见 In re Salvatore, No. 3:18-cv-1429 (SRU), 2019 WL 1284815, at *1 (D. Conn. Mar. 20, 2019)。\n\n如果“撤销破产法院的裁定将 (1) 终结该诉讼或 (2) 实质性影响诉讼结果”，则满足第一项审查要件。In re Salvatore, 2019 WL 1284815, at *2（引用 Buckskin Realty Inc., v. Greenberg, 552 B.R. 40, 44 (E.D.N.Y. 2016)）。“该法律问题必须是无需借助案件诉讼记录即可研究的纯粹法律问题。”同上，第 *2 页。在对该问题存在冲突性先例，或该问题在 Second Circuit（第二巡回区）特别困难且属于首次先例问题时，第二项审查要件即获满足。Osuji, 285 F. Supp. 3d at 558。或者，必须存在“关于破产法院是否适用了正确法律标准的真正存疑。……仅声称破产法院的决定是错误的，不足以确立重大的意见分歧理由。”In re Salvatore, 2019 WL 1284815 at *2。当“上诉有望提前庭审时间或缩短庭审所需时间”时，第三项审查要件即获满足。同上。此外，地区法院享有“即使当事人证明符合第 1292(b) 条的标准，仍可拒绝签发中间上诉许可证明的绝对自由裁量权。”Buckskin Realty Inc., 552 B.R. at 44。\n\n调卷令“在联邦法院传统上仅用于限制下级法院合法行使其法定的管辖权，或在其负有职责时强制其行使职权。……只有构成司法越权的例外情况，方可适用这种非常救济。”Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 35 (1980)（内部引文和引号省略）。调卷令申请“仅在申请人的救济权利明确且无可争议时”才予准许，而“不能仅仅用于纠正错误。”Hong Mai Sa v. Doe, 406 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 2005)（内部引文和引号省略）。\n\n第二巡回区在满足以下条件时对涉及特权主张的开示裁定进行调卷令审查：“(i) 提出了具有重要性且属首次先例的问题；(ii) 若必须等待终局判决方能审查，该特权将在特定案件中丧失；以及 (iii) 立即解决将避免形成破坏该特权的开示惯例或理论。”Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., v. Turner & Newall, PLC, 964 F.2d 159, 163 (2d Cir. 1992)。第二巡回区“极少使用非常调卷令来撤销涉及特权主张的开示裁定。”同上。\n\n讨论\n\n上诉人主张，向被上诉人及其律师提供其庇护申请违反了 8 C.F.R. § 208.6，该规定通常禁止向第三方披露庇护申请。被上诉人辩称，§ 208.6 在此情况下不适用，且对破产法院裁定的正当性没有影响。尽管上诉人的上诉提出了一个涉及纯粹法律问题的事项，从而满足了 § 1292(b) 下的第一项审查要件，但他既未证明该问题存在重大的意见分歧理由，也未证明针对破产法院裁定的中间上诉会实质性推动诉讼的最终终结。最后，上诉人未能证明其有权获得调卷令这一非常救济。\n\n《联邦法规汇编》（Code of Federal Regulations）第 8 篇第 208.6(a) 条规定：“未经申请人书面同意，不得披露……庇护……申请中所包含的或与之相关的任何信息，但本条允许或由[国土安全部]部长（Secretary [of Homeland Security]）酌情决定的除外。”该法规从根本上禁止美国政府在未经申请人同意的情况下披露庇护申请的内容，甚至可能禁止披露庇护申请的存在。然而，正如上诉人所主张的那样，该法规并未禁止除美国及其机构（例如移民审查执行办公室（Executive Officer of Immigration Review，“EOIR”）和司法部（Department of Justice，“DOJ”））以外的任何人披露庇护申请及相关信息。参见 Lin v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 459 F.3d 255, 258 n.1 (2d Cir. 2006)（“《联邦法规汇编》第 8 篇第 I 章适用于[移民归化局]（[Immigration and Naturalization Service]）和[国土安全部]（[Department of Homeland Security]），第 V 章适用于 EOIR 和 DOJ。”）；Egiazaryan v. Zalmayev, No. 11-cv-2670 (PKC) (GWG), 2012 WL 137574, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2012)（“根据法规，美国及其下属机构和部门不得向第三方披露庇护申请或其内容”）（援引 Lin, 459 F.3d at 262–65）；Rodriguez v. Robbins, No. 07-3239 (TJH) (RNBx) 2012 WL 12953870, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 3, 2012)（“一般禁止信息披露的法定条款，在没有明确禁止此类披露的情况下，并不阻碍司法证据开示……”且诸如 8 C.F.R. § 208.6 等庇护条款“不包含此类明文限制”）；Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. Mayorkas, No. 3:17-cv-2366 (BAS) (KSC), 2021 WL 1312531, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2021)（“[8 C.F.R. § 208.6] 的字面文义并未限制私法主体对庇护信息的处理。”）。\n\n此外，该法规明确排除了在司法程序中或与司法程序相关的披露。第 208.6(c) 条规定：“本条不适用于向……审理因……庇护申请……构成其一部分的程序所引起的……任何法律诉讼的美国任何联邦、州或地方法院进行的任何披露。”8 C.F.R. § 208.6(c)(2)(ii)（强调后加）。“国会意在使第 (ii) 项涵盖由庇护申请仅构成其中某个‘部分’的程序所引起的任何法律诉讼，无论其在其中发挥的作用多么积极或有意义。……某人或实体无需在法庭审理前就申请的实体问题实际进行诉讼，该申请即可成为‘程序’的‘一部分’。”Rodriguez, 2012 WL 12953870, at *3。在本案中，上诉人在执业过错诉讼中直接将他的庇护申请作为争议焦点，当时他声称其在 Clark Hill（克拉克希尔律师事务所）的律师违反了其职责和义务，导致该庇护申请被公开发布，从而对其造成了损害。这些指控以及据称由此产生的任何损害赔偿，必然需要对庇护申请的内容进行评估。因此，将庇护申请作为 Clark Hill 的即决判决动议的附件，是不足为奇的。\n\n基于上述各项理由，本法院认定，关于 8 C.F.R. § 208.6 是否阻止出示上诉人的庇护申请这一问题，不存在产生意见分歧的实质性理由。2 该规定并未阻止出示。\n\n上诉人也未能证明其能够达到第二巡回法院对涉及特权主张的证据开示命令申请职务执行令所要求的极高举证责任。参见 Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 964 F.2d at 163–64（在文件“可能明确享有特权”，特权所提供的保护仅限于“机密通信在审判中的不可采纳性”，且在等待终审判决期间“律师-委托人保密特权将受到损害”的情况下，方可发出职务执行令）。首先，上诉人并未实际提出 § 208.6 确立了一项特权的任何主张，基于上述理由，任何此类主张也均不具有法律依据。因此，他对 Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. 案的援引是不恰当的，因为该判例并不适用。同样，就上诉人未能证明破产法院犯有任何法律错误或明显滥用其自由裁量权而言，他并未表明有任何令人信服的理由支持签发职务执行令。破产法院限制仅向破产受托人及其律师披露的命令，减轻了上诉人对庇护申请敏感性质的担忧。因此，本法院不能认定破产法院存在“对其法定管辖权的[非]法行使”或“在负有行使职责时未行使其权力”。Hong Mai Sa, 406 F.3d at 159（援引 Richardson Greenshields Secs., Inc. v. Lau, 825 F.2d 647, 652 (2d Cir. 1987)）。3\n\n2 本法院同样清楚地看到，针对保护令的中间上诉并不能实质性地推进诉讼的最终终结。事实上，通过阻碍受托人在与律师协商下充分履行其义务的能力，该上诉可能会同时拖延康涅狄格区（District of Connecticut）的破产程序和哥伦比亚特区（District of Columbia）的执业过错诉讼。\n\n3 本法院进一步指出，上诉人不得“将某一事项作为争议焦点，随后又以该事项具有不当侵入性、敏感性或享有免于披露的特权为由，成功阻挠证据开示。”Egiazaryan, 2012 WL 137574, at *2。没有人主张执业过错诉讼不是破产财产的资产。被上诉人作为该破产财产的受托人，若无法查阅庇护申请以及 Clark Hill 的即决判决动议，便无法评估该执业过错诉讼作为一项可追求或可放弃之资产的可行性。\n\n结论\n\n基于上述理由，上诉人的上诉许可动议（ECF No. 8）被驳回（DENIED）。法院书记官奉命将本案结案。\n\n特此裁定。2023 年 1 月 11 日于康涅狄格州布里奇波特。\n\n/s/ Kari A. Dooley\nKARI A. DOOLEY\n美国联邦地区法院法官","key_entities":["Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Despins","Je","Chinese Communist Party"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":1,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":8,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":14,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":15,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":856,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1217,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":2723,"status":"published","published_at":"2023-01-11 00:00:00","created_at":"2023-01-11","updated_at":"2026-08-23 13:21:18"}