{"id":"court_ctb_1372_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":1372,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT )","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\n)\n\n)\n\n)\n\nIn re: ) Chapter 11 ) Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) HO WAN KWOK, *et al.*, ) (Jointly Administered)\n\nDebtors. ) Re: ECF Nos. 717 and 913\n\n# **ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO HOLD DEBTOR IN CONTEMPT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ORDER**\n\n### **I. INTRODUCTION**\n\nBefore the Court is the motion of Luc A. Despins, in his capacity as the Chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") for the estate (the \"Estate\") of Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\"), to hold the Debtor in civil contempt. (ECF No. 913, the \"Contempt Motion.\") The Contempt Motion asserts that the Debtor has not complied with the Court's order regarding the transfer of economic and corporate governance rights from the Debtor to the Trustee. (ECF No. 717, the \"Corporate Governance Order.\") For the reasons stated below, the Court finds the Debtor in civil contempt and will sanction him reasonable attorneys' fees and costs in the event he fails to purge himself of contempt.\n\n### **II. BACKGROUND**\n\nOn February 15, 2022, the Debtor filed his voluntary Chapter 11 petition, commencing this case. (ECF No. 1.) His individual case is jointly administered with two affiliated corporate cases. (ECF Nos. 970 and 1141.) On June 15, 2022, after developments the Court has discussed in a prior opinion, the Court ordered the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee. *In re Kwok*, 640 B.R. 514 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022). (ECF No. 465.) On July 8, 2022, the Court appointed Mr. Despins as the Chapter 11 Trustee. (ECF No. 523.)\n\nOn July 23, 2022, the Trustee filed a motion to confirm that he held the Debtor's economic and corporate governance rights. (ECF No. 598, the \"Corporate Governance Motion.\") On July 29, 2022, the Debtor filed an objection to the Corporate Governance Motion, which he supplemented with a further objection on August 4, 2022. (ECF Nos. 643 and 678.) Also on August 4, 2022, the Trustee filed a reply in support of the Corporate Governance Motion. (ECF No. 679.) That same date, a hearing was held on the Corporate Governance Motion. The Court granted the Corporate Governance Motion during the hearing and entered the Corporate Governance Order on August 10, 2022. (ECF No. 717.)\n\nOn October 4, 2022, the Trustee filed the Contempt Motion asserting that the Debtor had failed to comply with the Corporate Governance Order and requesting that he be held in civil contempt of court. (ECF No. 913.) On October 25, 2022, the Debtor filed his objection to the Contempt Motion. (ECF No. 1026, the \"Objection.\") On November 14, 2022, the Trustee filed his reply. (ECF No. 1092, the \"Reply.\") The instant matter is fully briefed.\n\nAn evidentiary hearing (the \"Hearing\") on the Contempt Motion was held on November 16, 17, and 18, 2022. On November 17, 2022, the Court entered an order partially resolving the Contempt Motion (ECF No. 1110, the \"Partial Resolution Order\"), which Order the Debtor insisted the Court enter prior to continuing with the evidentiary hearing. During the Hearing, no testimony was heard but evidence, including excerpts from deposition testimony, was admitted.\n\n### **III. JURISDICTION**\n\nThe United States District Court for the District of Connecticut has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). This Court has authority to hear and determine this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) and the Order of Reference of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut dated September 21, 1984. The instant proceedings are\n\nstatutorily core proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (E). This Court explicitly retained jurisdiction over all matters all matters arising from or related to the implementation, interpretation, and enforcement of the Corporate Governance Order. There is no constitutional issue precluding the exercise of jurisdiction in the instant case. *Cf*. *Stern v. Marshall*, 564 U.S. 462, 487–99 (2011).\n\nVenue in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.\n\n## **IV. FINDINGS OF FACT**\n\nThe Court has already made the findings of fact contained in paragraphs 1 and 2 below, as set forth in the Partial Resolution Order:\n\n1. The Debtor exclusively beneficially owned and controlled Ace Decade Holdings Limited (\"Ace Decade\") on the February 15, 2022 petition date (the \"Petition Date\") and maintained such exclusive beneficial ownership and control up to and including immediately prior to the date of the Trustee's appointment, and (ii) Dawn State Limited (\"Dawn State\" and, together with Ace Decade, the \"Ace Decade Entities\") is Ace Decade's wholly-owned subsidiary and is exclusively owned and controlled by Ace Decade. For the avoidance of doubt, Yanping \"Yvette\" Wang (hereinafter, Ms. Wang) is not and has never been a beneficial owner of the shares in Ace Decade or Dawn State. (Trustee 6–7, 10, 15.)<sup>1</sup>\n\n2. But for the Trustee's appointment and his rights under the Bankruptcy Code and the Corporate Governance Order, the Debtor would still exclusively beneficially own and control Ace Decade. (Trustee 6–7, 10, 15.)\n\n<sup>1</sup> Exhibits submitted during the Hearing by the Trustee will be styled Trustee [No.] and exhibits submitted by the Individual Debtor will be styled Kwok [Letter].\n\nFrom the evidence on the record and introduced during the Hearing, the Court makes the following additional findings of fact:\n\n3. Ms. Yvette Wang is the nominee owner of Ace Decade for the benefit of the Debtor. (Trustee 27.)\n\n4. The Debtor has control over Ms. Wang. The Debtor has employed Yvette Wang for several years, and has directed her to take actions on his behalf, including directing her to act on his behalf to purchase properties such as the Sherry-Netherland apartment. (Trustee 29 and 30.)\n\n5. The Debtor did not sufficiently establish that the letter (the \"Letter,\" Kwok B) and the purportedly attached share transfer instrument and share transfer resolution were delivered to Ms. Wang directing her to transfer the corporate and economic rights of Ace Decade to the Trustee. The Debtor represented he does not believe he has any ability to take the actions he directs Ms. Wang to take in the Letter. (Trustee 27, at 87:3–13.) The Debtor represents he sent the Letter to Ms. Wang via personal delivery (Kwok B), and asserts this personal delivery was completed through his personal bodyguards. However, the Debtor does not remember which bodyguard he directed to deliver the Letter, and \"can never remember the names\" of his security guards. (Trustee 27, at 88:3–13.) Beyond the Debtor's deposition testimony and the description \"via personal delivery\" on the Letter, there is no evidence to support the Letter was actually delivered. The Letter does not contain an address. (Kwok B.) There is no receipt nor sworn affidavit regarding service or delivery of the Letter from the unidentified bodyguard. (*Id.)*\n\n6. Even if the Letter was delivered, the language in it signals to its reader that the Debtor does not fully support executing the share transfer instrument. Instead, the Letter states \"The Trustee believes that I control Ace Decade and that I utilize that perceived control to direct you to execute the Share Transfer Instrument and Share Transfer Resolution.\" [emphasis added].\n\nThe Letter further states, \". . . in compliance with the Trustee's demands and to the extent that I may have any authority over Ace Decade, I hereby direct you to execute the attached Share Transfer Instrument and Share Transfer Resolution.\" (Kwok B.)\n\n7. The Debtor represents he has had no communications of any kind with Yvette Wang about the contempt motion. (Trustee 27, at 84:5–85:5.)\n\n8. The Trustee has been unable to service Yvette Wang with a subpoena. (Trustee 32– 33).\n\n### **V. DISCUSSION**\n\n### **a. Legal Standard**\n\nThis Court has the power to hold parties in contempt of court under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9020. *Taggart v. Lorenzen ex rel. Brown*, 139 S. Ct. 1795, 1801 (2019); *PHH Mortg. Corp. v. Sensenich ex rel. Gravel (In re Gravel)*, 6 F.4th 503, 512 (2d Cir. 2021); *Mar. Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chauteaugay Corp.)*, 920 F.2d 183, 187 (2d. Cir. 1990). Contempt may be sought to \"'coerce the defendant into compliance'\" with a court order or to \"'compensate the complainant for losses'\" resulting from noncompliance with a court order. *Taggart*, 139 S. Ct. at 1801 (citing *United States v. United Mine Workers*, 330 U.S. 258, 303–04 (1947)). A finding of civil contempt requires \"(1) the order the contemnor failed to comply with is clear and unambiguous, (2) the proof of noncompliance is clear and convincing, and (3) the contemnor has not diligently attempted to comply in a reasonable manner.\" *King v. Allied Vision, Ltd.*, 65 F.3d 1051, 1058 (2d Cir. 1995); *see Gravel*, 6 F.4th at 512 (adding that the contemnor must have notice of the order). \"A long recognized defense to a civil contempt citation is the cited individual's inability to comply with the court's order.\" *United States v. Wendy*, 575 F.2d 1025, 1030 (2d Cir. 1978).\n\nContempt \"'should not be resorted to where there is [a] *fair ground of doubt* as to the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct.'\" *Taggart*, 139 S. Ct. at 1801 (citing *Cal. Artificial Stone Paving Co. v. Molitor*, 113 U.S. 609 (1885)). This standard is generally objective – a \"party's subjective belief that she was complying with an order ordinarily will not insulate her from civil contempt if that belief was objectively unreasonable.\" *Taggart*, 139 S. Ct. at 1802 (citing *McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co.*, 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1949) (\"The absence of wilfulness [sic] does not relieve from civil contempt.\")). Nevertheless, a party's bad faith may justify \"placing 'the burden of any uncertainty in the decree . . . on [the] shoulders' of the party who violated the court order,\" and \"a party's good faith, even where it does not bar civil contempt, may help to determine an appropriate sanction.\" *Taggart*, 139 S. Ct. at 1802 (citing *McComb*, 336 U.S. at 192–93 and *Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A.*, 481 U.S. 787, 801 (1987)).\n\n## **b. Conclusions of Law**\n\n### **1. The Debtor Had Notice of the Corporate Governance Order**\n\nThe Court concludes that the Individual Debtor had notice of the Corporate Governance Order. *See Gravel*, 6 F.4th at 512. As outlined above, he litigated its entry. Furthermore, he did not contest notice in his Objection or during the Hearing.\n\n# **2. The Corporate Governance Order Clearly and Unambiguously Directs the Debtor to Cooperate with the Trustee**\n\nThe Court concludes that the Corporate Governance Order is clear and unambiguous, s*ee King*, 65 F.3d at 1058, and that there is no fair ground of doubt as to its meaning, *see Taggart*, 139 S. Ct. at 1801. Under the Corporate Governance Order, the Debtor is required to cooperate with the Trustee regarding the Trustee's control of the Ace Decade Entities and also required to\n\nsurrender the Ace Decade Entities, ownership interests in the Ace Decade Entities, and corporate governance documents relating to the Ace Decade Entities.\n\nThe Trustee argues that paragraph 2 of the Corporate Governance order needs to be read in concert with paragraph 3 and the underlying provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. In this context, the Trustee argues that the Debtor was clearly and unambiguously directed to cooperate with the Trustee and turn over assets of the Estate and related records to the Trustee. The Debtor argues that the Trustee obtained control over the Ace Decade Entities via operation of law under paragraph 2 of the Corporate Governance Order and, therefore, the Debtor need not do anything to comply with the Corporate Governance Order. The Debtor further argues that the Trustee can assert control over the Ace Decade Entities and the present dispute is manufactured and unnecessary.\n\nThe Court agrees with the Debtor that there is no fair ground of doubt that paragraph 2 of the Corporate Governance Order allows the Trustee to act of his own accord to assert control over corporate entities, including the Ace Decade Entities. Paragraph 2 provides in pertinent part:\n\nFor the avoidance of doubt, the foregoing rights include the Trustee's asserted authority to replace any existing officer, director, manager, or similar person of the Debtor-Controlled Entities. As part of the foregoing, to the extent necessary, the Trustee is authorized to act, in his capacity as the chapter 11 trustee in this Chapter 11 Case, as any such officer, director, manager, or similar person who has been removed.\n\nParagraph 2 does allow the Trustee to issue new shares or membership interests and appoint new directors in the Debtor's corporate entities. However, paragraph 2 does not require the Trustee to do so. Even if the Trustee did issue new shares or membership interests or appoint new directors in the Ace Decade Entities, without the corporate documents and access to any\n\ncorporate accounts, it is unclear how the Trustee would operate the Ace Decade Entities. The Trustee's desire for an orderly and complete transition is reasonable.\n\nMoreover, recourse to self-help may be in contravention of applicable non-bankruptcy law or existing governance documents and could create legal problems for the Trustee. The Debtor raised this exact issue during the August 4th hearing on the Corporate Governance Motion and noted that paragraph 2 would \"give [the Trustee] authority that may not be provided for under applicable non-bankruptcy law and the governing documents of particular entities.\" (ECF No. 746, at 63:15–18.) The Trustee assured the Court that his intent was to act where he had authority under applicable non-bankruptcy law and the governing documents. (*Id.* at 64:14–15.) The Trustee stated\n\nThe reason we asked for blanket authority is because we will not exercise that right unless we believe through due diligence we have the power to do it. And if we're doubtful, we'll come back to the Court. But we cannot be in a position where there's a satellite litigation open whether – what state law provides, what foreign law provides, because that's a – that's going to be another case basically.\n\n(*Id.* at 64:19–65:1.) The Debtor then insisted that his intent was not to enter into litigation about corporate governance, but that he was concerned about the Trustee acting contrary to applicable non-bankruptcy law and the governing documents of particular entities. (*Id.* at 65:2–8.) In response to the Debtor's concern, the Court inserted the word \"asserted\" into paragraph 2 of the Corporate Governance Order to address this issue. (*Id.* at 65:11–21.) At that point, the Debtor did not press his objection to paragraph 2. (*Id.* at 65:23–24.) The Court finds the Trustee's desire to avoid \"satellite litigation\" about corporate governance is reasonable. However, despite paragraph 2 of the Corporate Governance Order and the Debtor's stated intent not to engage in satellite litigation, the Trustee has had to engage in litigation against the Debtor and the Ace Decade Entities in the High Court of England and Wales, Chancery Division, regarding\n\nrecognition of these bankruptcy cases in the United Kingdom. *See* Despins v Kwok (Re Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006) [2023] EWHC 74 (Ch) (20 January 2023). Ace Decade argued against the Trustee's application seeking recognition under the Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006 (the \"CBIR\") of the Debtor's Chapter 11 case in that court.\n\nThe Court also disagrees with the Debtor that the Trustee's rights in paragraph 2 end the analysis. Simply because the Trustee has recourse to self-help under paragraph 2 of Corporate Governance Order, does not mean that the Trustee has no other recourse under its terms.\n\nWith respect to paragraph 3 of the Corporate Governance Order, the Court concludes that it clearly and unambiguously directs the Debtor to cooperate with the Trustee. There is no fair ground of doubt that paragraph 3 requires the Debtor's cooperation with the Trustee in locating the Debtor's nominee, Ms. Wang, and in effectuating turnover of her ownership interest in Ace Decade.\n\nParagraph 3 clearly and unambiguously states, in pertinent part:\n\nIn accordance with [section] 521(a)(3) . . . of the Bankruptcy Code, the Debtor is hereby directed to . . . (a) cooperate with the Trustee as necessary to enable the Trustee to perform his duties, including, without limitation, the Trustee's investigation into the assets of the Debtor . . ..\"\n\nSection 521 of the Bankruptcy Code is entitled \"Debtor's duties.\" Section 521(a)(3)'s language is almost identical to the language of the Corporate Governance Order: \"The debtor shall . . . if a trustee is serving in the case . . . cooperate with the trustee as necessary to enable the trustee to perform the trustee's duties under this title.\" The duty to cooperate under section 521(a)(3) is interpreted broadly. *In re Cambridge Analytica LLC*, 596 B.R. 1, 8 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019) (\"Section 521(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code similarly requires a debtor to 'cooperate with the trustee as necessary to enable the trustee to perform the trustee's duties.' ''Cooperate' is a broad term, indeed, and must be construed that whenever the trustee calls upon the debtor for assistance in the performance of his duties, the debtor is required to respond, at least if the request is not unreasonable.' 'Indeed, '[i]t is well settled that a trustee should not be required to drag information from a reluctant and uncooperative debtor. Because of the extraordinary relief offered under the Bankruptcy Code delay and avoidance tactics are inconsistent with, and offensive to, its purpose and spirit.'\") (internal citations omitted); *see Beach v. Morris (In re Beach)*, 281 B.R. 917, 921 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2002) (\"In addition to imposing affirmative duties on the Debtors, these provisions impress the policy that a debtor who voluntarily submits him or herself to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to obtain the benefit of a discharge of debts, must fulfill certain duties to insure that estate assets are administered in accordance with applicable law.\"); *see also* 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 521.15[5] (16th ed. 2022) (\"The debtor's cooperation may involve informing the trustee of and assisting in locating property of the estate in the possession of third parties, executing documents necessary to convey property and assisting in the collection of accounts receivable.\"). Given the close resemblance of the text of the Bankruptcy Code and the explicit cite to section 521 in the Corporate Governance Order, it is clear and unambiguous that paragraph 3 should be read similarly broadly.\n\nAs set forth above and in the uncontested Partial Resolution Order, the Debtor has been found to have exclusively beneficially owned and controlled Ace Decade and, through it, Dawn State, as of the petition date and as of the appointment of the Trustee. Pursuant to paragraph 2 of the Corporate Governance Order, the Trustee \"holds all of the Debtor's economic and governance rights, for the benefit of the Estate, with respect to all Debtor-Controlled Entities.\" Therefore, the Trustee holds the Debtor's economic and governance rights with respect to the Ace Decade Entities in furtherance of his duties to the Estate. The Debtor no longer contests this fact. The Debtor is required by the clear terms of paragraph 3 to cooperate with the Trustee as\n\nnecessary to realize this assertion of control and possession over the Ace Decade Entities for the benefit of the Estate, whether that furthers the Trustee's investigation of assets or some other duty to the Estate. *See Star Direct Telecom, Inc. v. Glob. Crossing Bandwidth, Inc.*, 272 F.R.D. 350, 356 (W.D.N.Y. 2011) (\"First, Global Crossing offers no authority, nor is this Court aware of any, to support its argument that the clause \"including, without limitation\" should be read as a limiting clause.\"); *Shugrue v. Cont'l Airlines*, 977 F. Supp. 280, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (\"Even assuming there is some ambiguity as to what was actually attached to the first page of Schedule C, the language on that first page—'[a]ll of Eastern[ ]'s computer programs and software, including without limitation'—makes it clear that the attached list was not an exclusive list.\").\n\nThe Court further holds that there is no fair ground of doubt under paragraph 3 of the Corporate Governance Order that the Debtor is required to surrender to the Trustee the Ace Decade Entities, including the ownership interests in the Ace Decade Entities and corporate governance documents relating to the Ace Decade Entities. Paragraph 3 clearly and unambiguously states, in pertinent part and in language closely mirroring § 521(a)(4):\n\nIn accordance with [section] . . . 521(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Debtor is hereby directed to . . . (b) surrender to the Trustee all property of the estate and any recorded information, including, without limitation, books, documents, records, and papers relating to property of the estate (including, without limitation, his shares in Genever (BVI) and all related corporate governance documents).\n\nSection 521(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, and the Corporate Governance Order based on its language, reaches all equitable interests a debtor may have, such as beneficial ownership in corporate entities. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). The Debtor is required under section 521(a)(4) and the Corporate Governance Order to promptly surrender assets and documents relating to assets upon request. *See Beach*, 281 B.R. at 921; 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 521.16.\n\nBecause the Debtor exclusively beneficially owned and controlled the Ace Decade Entities as of the petition date and as of the appointment of the Trustee, under paragraph 2 of the Corporate Governance Order, the Trustee controls the Ace Decade Entities for the benefit of the Estate. As noted above, the Debtor does not contest this fact. The Debtor is required by the clear terms of paragraph 3 to surrender the Ace Decade Entities to the Trustee, which includes all recorded information relating the Ace Decade Entities, such as shares and corporate governance documents. *See Star Direct*, 272 F.R.D. at 356; *Shugrue*, 977 F. Supp. at 285.\n\nThe Debtor argued in the alternative that the Corporate Governance Order was unclear and ambiguous because paragraphs 2 and 3 of the corporate governance order were in conflict with each other, trapping the Debtor in a \"Catch-22.\" The Debtor argues that paragraph 2 strips him of the economic and corporate governance rights required to comply with paragraph 3.\n\nThe Court holds, however, that paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Corporate Governance Order are not in conflict. While the Trustee came into *de jure* control of the Estate and the Debtor's economic and corporate governance rights by operation of law, the Bankruptcy Code – and the clear and unambiguous Corporate Governance Order – require turnover of *de facto* possession and control pursuant to the Trustee's rights under the Corporate Governance Order. Courts routinely provide remedies that bring parties' *de facto* rights in line with their *de jure* rights. There is nothing in this case to create a fair ground of doubt as to what conduct the Corporate Governance Order is requiring.\n\nThe Court further finds the Debtor's argument regarding a conflict between paragraphs 2 and 3 would render 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(a)(3)–(4) useless and cannot be correct as a matter of law. The Debtor is directed by the Bankruptcy Code and the Corporate Governance Order to cooperate with the Trustee and surrender assets of the Estate and related records, even if by\n\noperation of law control has already passed to the Trustee. Complying would not have frustrated the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and the Corporate Governance Order, but rather would have furthered them.\n\nAlthough the Court finds the Corporate Governance Order clearly required the Debtor to cooperate with the Trustee, if a reviewing court were to find the Corporate Governance Order is unclear, the burden of that uncertainty is not upon the Trustee, but upon the Debtor, on account of the Debtor's bad faith. *See Taggart*, 139 S. Ct. at 1802. As detailed above, the Court is not persuaded by the Debtor's interpretation of the Order, and, since the burden has been shifted by the Debtor's bad faith, it is sufficient for the Court to find this element in the Trustee's favor.\n\nThe Court finds the Debtor has acted in bad faith for several reasons. Until the hearing, the Debtor's primary argument in his Objection and in his deposition testimony was that he did not own Ace Decade, beneficially or otherwise, as of the petition date and as of the Trustee's appointment. However, during the Hearing he abandoned this argument, sought the entry of the Partial Resolution Order prior to continuing the Hearing, and agreed not to appeal the Partial Resolution Order. Nevertheless, the Partial Resolution Order is not a consent order. The Debtor would not consent to findings in the Partial Resolution Order, which is in tension with his abandonment of his Objection file prior to the Hearing and his agreement not to appeal the order.\n\nFurthermore, the Debtor's only alleged attempt to comply with the Corporate Governance Order came on November 10, 2022, several months after it entered, one month after the Contempt Motion was filed, and less than one week before the Hearing was scheduled to begin. In addition, the Debtor's alleged attempt to comply with the Corporate Governance Order obscured the location of his nominee – Ms. Wang – from the Trustee, who has been unable to serve her with a subpoena. During the Hearing, the Debtor highlighted the Trustee's lack of\n\ncommunication with Ms. Wang despite only informing him she was the nominee owner of Ace Decade shortly before the Hearing. Finally, the Debtor has not sufficiently shown that the Letter was sent to Ms. Wang. The Letter contains no address for Ms. Wang and the Debtor could not remember which of his bodyguards purportedly personally delivered the Letter to Ms. Wang.\n\n### **3. The Debtor Has Not Complied with Corporate Governance Order**\n\nThe Court concludes, by clear and convincing evidence, that the Debtor has not complied with the Corporate Governance Order. *See King*, 65 F.3d at 1058. The Debtor has not surrendered the Ace Decade Entities, ownership interests in them, or their corporate governance documents to the Trustee. If he had, the Motion would be moot. The Debtor's only purported compliance was the Letter allegedly sent to Ms. Wang, which he failed to sufficiently establish was sent. The Debtor has not cooperated with the Trustee's attempt to locate Ms. Wang and effectuate a surrender. The Debtor only belatedly disclosed that Ms. Wang was the nominee owner of Ace Decade Entities. The Letter, which was produced to the Trustee and during the Hearing, lacks an address for Ms. Wang. The Debtor did not produce the bodyguard who purportedly knew how to find Ms. Wang or otherwise tell the Trustee how to locate Ms. Wang.\n\n### **4. The Debtor Has Not Diligently Attempted to Comply**\n\nThe Court further concludes that the Debtor has not diligently attempted to comply with the Corporate Governance Order in a reasonable manner. *See id.* As noted immediately above, the only alleged attempt to either cooperate or effectuate a turnover was the Letter. No evidence was introduced to establish that the Letter was sent to Ms. Wang. Nevertheless, assuming the Letter was sent, it was dilatory – not diligent – coming a month after the Contempt Motion was filed and several months after the Corporate Governance Order was entered. Furthermore, again assuming the Letter was sent, it was not sent in a reasonable manner. There is no address on the\n\nLetter. There is no post-mark. There is no acknowledgment of receipt. The Debtor does not even know which of his bodyguards allegedly personally delivered the Letter.\n\n### **5. The Debtor Could Have Complied**\n\nFinally, the Court concludes that it is not impossible for the Debtor to comply with the Corporate Governance Order. *See Wendy*, 575 F.2d at 1030. The Debtor abandoned his argument that he did not beneficially own or control Ace Decade and, through it, Dawn State, as of the petition date and the appointment of the Trustee. Therefore, it was not impossible for the Debtor to cooperate or to surrender the Ace Decade Entities to the Trustee for the reasons stated above.\n\nThe Trustee introduced into evidence email exchanges showing that Ms. Wang, the nominee owner of Ace Decade, acted under the direction of the Debtor in other transactions, including the New York litigation involving Ace Decade and also matters involving the Sherry Netherland Apartment. (Trustee 29 and 30.) On the basis of this evidence, the Court determines that the Debtor could cause her to turnover her ownership interest over to the Trustee. As of yet, he has not.\n\n### **VI. CONCLUSION & ORDER**\n\nFor the reasons stated above, the Court finds the Debtor in civil contempt of court. It is hereby\n\n**ORDERED:** The Debtor has until at or before 5:00 p.m. (17:00) on March 6, 2023, to purge himself of contempt; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** If the Debtor does not purge himself of contempt at or before 5:00 p.m. (17:00) on March 6, 2023, he will be sanctioned reasonable attorneys' fees and costs that the Trustee has had to incur in pursuing compliance with the Corporate Governance Order as it\n\nrelates to the Ace Decade Entities, which reasonable fees will be determined by the Court, and will be paid to the Estate; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** The Court may, upon notice, issue further sanctions to secure compliance with the Corporate Governance Order, should the Debtor persist in contempt.\n\nDated at Bridgeport, Connecticut this 24th day of January, 2023.","body_zh":"美国康涅狄格联邦破产法院\n\n)\n\n)\n\n)\n\n关于：）第11章）案号 22-50073 (JAM)\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等人，） （合并管理）\n\n债务人。 ）关于 ECF 编号 717 和 913\n准许要求认定债务人藐视公司治理命令之动议的命令\n一、引言\n\n本院面前的是 Luc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯平斯）以 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（以下简称“债务人”）财产（以下简称“财产”）第11章受托人（以下简称“受托人”）身份提出的动议，请求认定债务人民事藐视法庭。（ECF 编号 913，以下简称“藐视动议”。）藐视动议主张，债务人未遵守本院关于将经济权利和公司治理权利由债务人移转给受托人的命令。（ECF 编号 717，以下简称“公司治理命令”。）基于下述理由，本院认定债务人民事藐视法庭；如其未消除藐视状态，本院将对其处以合理的律师费和费用制裁。\n\n二、背景\n\n2022年2月15日，债务人提交了自愿第11章破产申请，启动本案。（ECF 编号 1。）其个人案件与两个关联公司案件合并管理。（ECF 编号 970 和 1141。）2022年6月15日，在本院已于先前意见中讨论的事态发展之后，本院命令指定一名第11章受托人。In re Kwok, 640 B.R. 514 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022)。（ECF 编号 465。）2022年7月8日，本院指定 Despins 先生担任第11章受托人。（ECF 编号 523。）\n\n2022年7月23日，受托人提出动议，请求确认其持有债务人的经济权利和公司治理权利。（ECF 编号 598，以下简称“公司治理动议”。）2022年7月29日，债务人就公司治理动议提出异议，并于2022年8月4日以进一步异议予以补充。（ECF 编号 643 和 678。）同于2022年8月4日，受托人提交了支持公司治理动议的答复。（ECF 编号 679。）同日，就公司治理动议举行了听证。本院在听证期间准许公司治理动议，并于2022年8月10日作出公司治理命令。（ECF 编号 717。）\n\n2022年10月4日，受托人提交藐视动议，主张债务人未遵守公司治理命令，并请求认定其民事藐视法庭。（ECF 编号 913。）2022年10月25日，债务人就藐视动议提交异议。（ECF 编号 1026，以下简称“异议”。）2022年11月14日，受托人提交答复。（ECF 编号 1092，以下简称“答复”。）本事项的书面陈述已齐备。\n\n2022年11月16日、17日和18日，就藐视动议举行了证据听证会（以下简称“听证会”）。2022年11月17日，本院作出部分解决藐视动议的命令（ECF 编号 1110，以下简称“部分解决命令”）；债务人坚持要求本院在继续进行证据听证会之前作出该命令。在听证会期间，未听取任何证人证言，但接纳了包括证言笔录摘录在内的证据。\n\n三、管辖权\n\n美国康涅狄格联邦地区法院对本事项享有管辖权，依据为 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b)。本院有权依据 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) 以及美国康涅狄格联邦地区法院于1984年9月21日作出的移送命令审理并裁决本事项。本程序属于\n\n法定核心程序。28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (E)。本院明确保留对因公司治理命令的实施、解释和执行而产生或与之相关的一切事项的一切管辖权。本案不存在妨碍行使管辖权的宪法问题。参见 Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 487–99 (2011)。\n\n依据 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 和 1409，本地区的审判地适格。\n\n四、事实认定\n\n如部分解决命令所载，本院已作出下文第1和第2段所载的事实认定：\n\n1. 在2022年2月15日的申请日（以下简称“申请日”），债务人对 Ace Decade Holdings Limited（艾斯十年控股有限公司，以下简称“Ace Decade”）享有排他性受益所有权并实施控制，且直至并包括紧接受托人获指定之日前，始终维持该等排他性受益所有权和控制；以及 (ii) Dawn State Limited（道恩州有限公司，以下简称“Dawn State”，并与 Ace Decade 合称“艾斯十年实体”）是 Ace Decade 的全资子公司，并由 Ace Decade 排他性拥有和控制。为免生疑，Yanping “Yvette” Wang（王燕平，以下简称“王女士”）不是且从未是 Ace Decade 或 Dawn State 股份的受益所有人。（受托人 6–7、10、15。）1\n\n2. 若非受托人的获指定以及其根据《破产法》和公司治理命令享有的权利，债务人仍将对 Ace Decade 享有排他性受益所有权并实施控制。（受托人 6–7、10、15。）\n\n1 受托人在听证会期间提交的证物将标注为“Trustee [编号]”，个人债务人提交的证物将标注为“Kwok [字母]”。\n\n根据案卷中的证据及在听证会期间提交的证据，本院作出以下补充事实认定：\n\n3. 王女士是为债务人利益而持有 Ace Decade 的名义所有人。（受托人 27。）\n\n4. 债务人控制王女士。债务人雇用王燕平已数年，并曾指示其代表债务人采取行动，包括指示其代表债务人购买诸如 Sherry-Netherland 公寓之类的房产。（受托人 29 和 30。）\n\n5. 债务人未能充分证明，该信函（以下简称“该信函”，Kwok B）及据称附随的股份转让文书和股份转让决议已送达王女士，以指示其将 Ace Decade 的公司权利和经济权利转让给受托人。债务人表示，其认为自己并无能力采取其在该信函中指示王女士采取的行动。（受托人 27，第 87:3–13 页。）债务人表示，其通过亲自送达的方式向王女士寄送该信函（Kwok B），并主张该亲自送达系通过其私人保镖完成。然而，债务人不记得其指示哪一名保镖递送该信函，并且“永远无法记住”其安保人员的姓名。（受托人 27，第 88:3–13 页。）除债务人的笔录证言及该信函上“通过亲自送达”的描述外，没有证据支持该信函实际已送达。该信函未载明地址。（Kwok B。）没有该身份不明保镖就该信函的送达或递送作出的收据或宣誓书。（同上。）\n\n6. 即使该信函已送达，其中的措辞亦向读者表明，债务人并不完全支持签署股份转让文书。相反，该信函称：“受托人认为我控制 Ace Decade，并且我利用该种被认为的控制权指示您签署股份转让文书和股份转让决议。”［强调系后加。］\n\n该信函还称：“. . . 为遵守受托人的要求，并在我可能对 Ace Decade 享有任何权限的范围内，我特此指示您签署所附的股份转让文书和股份转让决议。”（Kwok B。）\n\n7. 债务人表示，其未曾就藐视动议与王燕平进行任何形式的沟通。（受托人 27，第 84:5–85:5 页。）\n\n8. 受托人一直未能向王燕平送达传票。（受托人 32–33。）\n\n五、讨论\na. 法律标准\n\n本院有权根据 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) 和 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9020 认定当事人藐视法庭。Taggart v. Lorenzen ex rel. Brown, 139 S. Ct. 1795, 1801 (2019); PHH Mortg. Corp. v. Sensenich ex rel. Gravel (In re Gravel), 6 F.4th 503, 512 (2d Cir. 2021); Mar. Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chauteaugay Corp.), 920 F.2d 183, 187 (2d. Cir. 1990)。提出藐视程序，可以是为了“强制被告遵守”法院命令，或为了“赔偿申诉人因未遵守法院命令而遭受的损失”。Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1801（援引 United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 303–04 (1947)）。认定民事藐视法庭须具备：“(1) 被认定藐视者未遵守的命令清晰明确，(2) 对不遵守行为的证明清楚且令人信服，以及 (3) 被认定藐视者未以合理方式勤勉尝试遵守。”King v. Allied Vision, Ltd., 65 F.3d 1051, 1058 (2d Cir. 1995); 参见 Gravel, 6 F.4th at 512（补充指出，被认定藐视者必须知悉该命令）。“对民事藐视法庭裁定的一项长期获承认的抗辩，是被指称者无能力遵守法院命令。”United States v. Wendy, 575 F.2d 1025, 1030 (2d Cir. 1978)。\n\n如对于被告行为的违法性存在“合理疑义”，则“不应诉诸”藐视程序。Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1801（援引 Cal. Artificial Stone Paving Co. v. Molitor, 113 U.S. 609 (1885)）。该标准通常为客观标准——“一方当事人主观相信其正在遵守命令，通常不能使其免于民事藐视法庭，若该相信在客观上不合理。”Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1802（援引 McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1949)（“缺乏故意并不免除民事藐视法庭责任。”））。然而，一方当事人的恶意可能使得“将判决中的任何不确定性负担置于违反法院命令的一方当事人的肩上”具有正当性；并且“一方当事人的善意，即使并不排除民事藐视法庭，也可能有助于确定适当的制裁。”Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1802（援引 McComb, 336 U.S. at 192–93 和 Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 801 (1987)）。\n\nb. 法律结论\n1. 债务人知悉公司治理命令\n\n本院认定，个人债务人知悉公司治理命令。参见 Gravel, 6 F.4th at 512。如上所述，其曾就该命令的作出进行诉讼。此外，其在异议中或在听证会期间均未对知悉该命令提出争议。\n\n2. 公司治理命令清晰明确地指示债务人与受托人合作\n\n本院认定，公司治理命令清晰明确，参见 King, 65 F.3d at 1058，且对其含义不存在合理疑义，参见 Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1801。根据公司治理命令，债务人须就受托人对艾斯十年实体的控制与受托人合作，并且还须\n\n交出艾斯十年实体、艾斯十年实体中的所有权权益以及与艾斯十年实体有关的公司治理文件。\n\n受托人主张，公司治理命令第2段应与第3段及《破产法》的基础性规定一并解读。在此背景下，受托人主张，债务人被清晰明确地指示与受托人合作，并向受托人交出财产资产及相关记录。债务人主张，受托人依据公司治理命令第2段因法律施行而取得对艾斯十年实体的控制权，因此债务人无需采取任何行动以遵守公司治理命令。债务人进一步主张，受托人可以对艾斯十年实体主张控制权，目前的争议系人为制造且无必要。\n\n本院同意债务人的意见，即对于公司治理命令第2段允许受托人自行采取行动以主张对包括艾斯十年实体在内的公司实体的控制权，不存在合理疑义。第2段相关部分规定如下：\n\n为免生疑，上述权利包括受托人所主张的替换债务人控制实体任何现任高级职员、董事、经理或类似人员的权限。作为上述事项的一部分，在必要范围内，受托人获授权以其在本第11章案件中第11章受托人的身份，担任任何已被免职的该等高级职员、董事、经理或类似人员。\n\n第2段确实允许受托人发行新的股份或成员权益，并任命债务人公司实体的新董事。然而，第2段并不要求受托人这样做。即使受托人确实在 Ace Decade Entities（Ace Decade 实体）中发行新的股份或成员权益，或任命新的董事，如果没有公司文件和对任何公司账户的访问权限，也不清楚受托人将如何运营 Ace Decade 实体。受托人希望实现有序且完整的过渡是合理的。\n\n此外，采取自助措施可能违反适用的非破产法或现有治理文件，并可能给受托人造成法律问题。债务人在就公司治理动议举行的 August 4th 听证会上提出了这一确切问题，并指出第2段将“赋予[受托人]适用的非破产法和特定实体的治理文件可能未规定的权限。”（ECF No. 746, at 63:15–18.）受托人向法院保证，其意图是在其根据适用的非破产法和治理文件享有权限的情况下采取行动。（Id. at 64:14–15.）受托人陈述：\n\n我们请求概括性授权的原因是，除非我们通过尽职调查认为我们有权这样做，否则我们不会行使该权利。如果我们存有疑问，我们会再回到法院。但我们不能处于这样一种境地，即围绕——州法规定什么、外国法规定什么——而产生附带诉讼，因为那样基本上会变成另一个案件。\n\n（Id. at 64:19–65:1.）随后，债务人坚持认为，其意图并非就公司治理提起诉讼，但其担心受托人会违反适用的非破产法和特定实体的治理文件行事。（Id. at 65:2–8.）为回应债务人的担忧，法院在公司治理命令第2段中加入了“asserted”一词，以处理该问题。（Id. at 65:11–21.）在该时点，债务人没有坚持其对第2段的异议。（Id. at 65:23–24.）法院认定，受托人希望避免关于公司治理的“附带诉讼”是合理的。然而，尽管有公司治理命令第2段以及债务人所称其不参与附带诉讼的意图，受托人仍不得不在 High Court of England and Wales, Chancery Division（英格兰和威尔士高等法院衡平法庭）就英国对这些破产案件的承认问题，针对债务人和 Ace Decade 实体进行诉讼。\n\n参见 Despins v Kwok (Re Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006) [2023] EWHC 74 (Ch) (20 January 2023)。Ace Decade 反对受托人在该法院根据 Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006（“CBIR”）申请承认债务人的第11章案件。\n\n法院也不同意债务人的观点，即受托人在公司治理命令第2段中的权利终结了分析。仅仅因为受托人可根据公司治理命令第2段采取自助措施，并不意味着受托人根据该命令条款没有其他救济途径。\n\n关于公司治理命令第3段，法院认定，该段明确且毫不含糊地指示债务人与受托人合作。对于第3段要求债务人与受托人合作，以查找债务人的被提名人 Ms. Wang（王女士），并促成其在 Ace Decade 中的所有权权益的移交，不存在任何合理的疑义。\n\n第3段在相关部分明确且毫不含糊地规定：\n\n根据 Bankruptcy Code 的 [section] 521(a)(3) . . .，特此指示债务人 . . . (a) 在必要时与受托人合作，使受托人能够履行其职责，包括但不限于受托人对债务人资产的调查 . . ..\"\n\nBankruptcy Code 的第521条标题为“债务人的义务”。section 521(a)(3) 的措辞与公司治理命令的措辞几乎相同：“债务人应当 . . . 如果受托人在该案件中任职 . . . 在必要时与受托人合作，使受托人能够履行受托人在本法典下的职责。”section 521(a)(3) 规定的合作义务被作广义解释。In re Cambridge Analytica LLC, 596 B.R. 1, 8 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019)（“Bankruptcy Code 的 Section 521(a)(3) 同样要求债务人‘在必要时与受托人合作，使受托人能够履行受托人的职责。’‘合作’确实是一个宽泛的术语，必须被解释为：每当受托人要求债务人协助履行其职责时，债务人均须作出回应，至少在该请求并非不合理的情况下如此。‘事实上，‘已被充分确立的是，不应要求受托人从不情愿且不合作的债务人处拖拽信息。鉴于 Bankruptcy Code 提供的非常救济，拖延和规避策略与其宗旨和精神不一致，且有悖于其宗旨和精神。’”）（内部引文略）；参见 Beach v. Morris (In re Beach), 281 B.R. 917, 921 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2002)（“除对债务人施加积极义务外，这些规定还体现了一项政策：自愿接受破产法院管辖以获得债务免除利益的债务人，必须履行某些义务，以确保破产财产资产依适用法律得到管理。”）；另参见 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 521.15[5] (16th ed. 2022)（“债务人的合作可能包括向受托人告知由第三方持有的破产财产，并协助查找该等财产，签署转让财产所必需的文件，以及协助收回应收账款。”）。鉴于 Bankruptcy Code 的文本与公司治理命令中对 section 521 的明确引用高度相似，第3段显然且毫不含糊地应作同样宽泛的解读。\n\n如上所述，并如无争议的部分解决命令所载，截至申请日及受托人获任命之日，债务人被认定为对 Ace Decade 享有排他性的实益所有权并实施控制，并通过其对 Dawn State（黎明州）实施控制。根据公司治理命令第2段，受托人“就所有债务人控制实体持有债务人的全部经济和治理权利，以使破产财产受益。”因此，受托人为履行其对破产财产的职责，持有债务人就 Ace Decade 实体享有的经济和治理权利。债务人不再对这一事实提出争议。根据第3段的明确条款，债务人必须在必要时与受托人合作，以实现对 Ace Decade 实体的该项控制和占有主张，使破产财产受益，无论这是否有助于受托人对资产的调查或其对破产财产承担的其他职责。参见 Star Direct Telecom, Inc. v. Glob. Crossing Bandwidth, Inc., 272 F.R.D. 350, 356 (W.D.N.Y. 2011)（“第一，Global Crossing 未提供任何依据，本法院亦不知悉有任何依据支持其主张，即‘including, without limitation’一语应被理解为限制性条款。”）；Shugrue v. Cont'l Airlines, 977 F. Supp. 280, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)（“即使假定对于实际附在附表C第一页上的内容存在某种歧义，该第一页上的措辞——‘[a]ll of Eastern[ ]'s computer programs and software, including without limitation’——也清楚表明，所附清单并非排他性清单。”）。\n\n法院进一步认定，根据公司治理命令第3段，对于债务人须向受托人交出 Ace Decade 实体，包括 Ace Decade 实体中的所有权权益以及与 Ace Decade 实体有关的公司治理文件，不存在任何合理的疑义。第3段在相关部分明确且毫不含糊地以与 § 521(a)(4) 高度对应的措辞规定：\n\n根据 Bankruptcy Code 的 [section] . . . 521(a)(4)，特此指示债务人 . . . (b) 向受托人交出全部破产财产以及任何已记录信息，包括但不限于与破产财产有关的账簿、文件、记录和文书（包括但不限于其在 Genever (BVI)（Genever（英属维尔京群岛））中的股份及所有相关公司治理文件）。\n\nBankruptcy Code 的 section 521(a)(4) 以及基于其措辞作出的公司治理命令，涵盖债务人可能享有的所有衡平权益，例如对公司实体的实益所有权。11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)。债务人根据 section 521(a)(4) 和公司治理命令，须在被要求时及时交出资产及与资产有关的文件。参见 Beach, 281 B.R. at 921; 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 521.16。\n\n由于截至申请日及受托人获任命之日，债务人对 Ace Decade 实体享有排他性的实益所有权并实施控制，根据公司治理命令第2段，受托人为破产财产的利益控制 Ace Decade 实体。如上所述，债务人不对这一事实提出争议。根据第3段的明确条款，债务人必须向受托人交出 Ace Decade 实体，其中包括与 Ace Decade 实体有关的所有已记录信息，例如股份和公司治理文件。参见 Star Direct, 272 F.R.D. at 356; Shugrue, 977 F. Supp. at 285。\n\n债务人备位主张，公司治理命令不清楚且含糊不清，因为公司治理命令第2段和第3段相互冲突，使债务人陷入“Catch-22”困境。债务人主张，第2段剥夺了其遵守第3段所需的经济和公司治理权利。\n\n然而，法院认定，公司治理命令第2段和第3段并不冲突。尽管受托人依法取得了对破产财产以及债务人的经济和公司治理权利的法定控制权，但 Bankruptcy Code——以及明确且毫不含糊的公司治理命令——要求根据受托人在公司治理命令下的权利，移交事实上的占有和控制。法院通常提供救济，使当事人的事实权利与其法定权利相一致。本案不存在任何情形，会使人对公司治理命令所要求的行为产生合理疑义。\n\n法院进一步认定，债务人关于第2段和第3段存在冲突的论点，将使 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(a)(3)–(4) 失去效用，并且作为法律问题不可能正确。Bankruptcy Code 和公司治理命令指示债务人与受托人合作，并交出破产财产资产及相关记录，即使控制权已依法移转给受托人。遵守该等要求不会妨碍 Bankruptcy Code 和公司治理命令的规定，反而会促进其实现。\n\n尽管本院认定《公司治理命令》明确要求债务人与受托人合作，但即使复审法院认定《公司治理命令》含义不明，该等不确定性的负担亦不应由受托人承担，而应因债务人的恶意而由债务人承担。参见 Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1802。如上文详述，本院不接受债务人对该命令的解释；且由于债务人的恶意已导致举证负担转移，本院认定该要件对受托人有利即属充分。\n\n本院基于数项理由认定债务人存在恶意。直至听证会举行时，债务人在其异议及其证言中的主要主张是，在申请日及受托人获任命时，其并不以受益所有权或其他方式拥有 Ace Decade（艾斯十年）。然而，在听证会期间，其放弃了该主张，在听证会继续进行之前请求作出《部分解决命令》，并同意不对《部分解决命令》提起上诉。尽管如此，《部分解决命令》并非同意命令。债务人不同意在《部分解决命令》中作出认定，这与其在听证会前放弃其已提交的异议以及同意不对该命令提起上诉相矛盾。\n\n此外，债务人唯一声称为遵守《公司治理命令》所作的尝试发生于 November 10, 2022，即该命令作出数月后、藐视法庭动议提交一个月后，以及听证会原定开始前不足一周。此外，债务人声称为遵守《公司治理命令》所作的尝试向受托人隐瞒了其名义持有人——王女士——的所在地，受托人一直无法向其送达传票。在听证会期间，尽管债务人在听证会前不久才告知受托人王女士是 Ace Decade 的名义所有人，债务人仍强调受托人与王女士之间缺乏沟通。最后，债务人未能充分证明该信函已寄送给王女士。该信函未载明王女士的地址，且债务人无法记起其哪一名保镖据称亲自将该信函送交王女士。\n\n3. 债务人未遵守《公司治理命令》\n\n本院根据明确且令人信服的证据认定，债务人未遵守《公司治理命令》。参见 King, 65 F.3d at 1058。债务人未向受托人交付 Ace Decade 实体、其在该等实体中的所有权权益或其公司治理文件。若其已交付，则该动议将失去争议。债务人唯一声称的遵守行为是据称寄送给王女士的信函，而其未能充分证明该信函已寄送。债务人未配合受托人为寻找王女士并完成交付所作的尝试。债务人仅在较晚时才披露王女士是 Ace Decade 实体的名义所有人。向受托人提交并在听证会期间出示的该信函未载明王女士的地址。债务人未提供据称知道如何找到王女士的保镖，也未以其他方式告知受托人如何找到王女士。\n\n4. 债务人未勤勉地尝试遵守\n\n本院进一步认定，债务人未以合理方式勤勉地尝试遵守《公司治理命令》。参见同上。如紧接上文所述，唯一声称为合作或完成交付所作的尝试是该信函。未提交任何证据证明该信函已寄送给王女士。尽管如此，即使假定该信函已寄送，其亦属拖延而非勤勉——该信函在藐视法庭动议提交一个月后及《公司治理命令》作出数月后才寄出。此外，再次假定该信函已寄送，其并非以合理方式寄送。信函上没有地址。没有邮戳。没有收讫确认。债务人甚至不知道其哪一名保镖据称亲自送交了该信函。\n\n5. 债务人本可遵守\n\n最后，本院认定，债务人遵守《公司治理命令》并非不可能。参见 Wendy, 575 F.2d at 1030。债务人已放弃其关于在申请日及受托人获任命时其并不受益拥有或控制 Ace Decade，并通过该实体拥有或控制 Dawn State（黎明州）的主张。因此，基于上述理由，债务人与受托人合作或向受托人交付 Ace Decade 实体并非不可能。\n\n受托人提交了电子邮件往来作为证据，显示 Ace Decade 的名义所有人王女士在其他交易中依照债务人的指示行事，包括涉及 Ace Decade 的纽约诉讼，以及涉及 Sherry Netherland Apartment（雪莉·内瑟兰公寓）的事项。（Trustee 29 and 30.）基于该证据，本院认定债务人能够促使其将其所有权权益交付给受托人。截至目前，其尚未如此行事。\n\nVI. 结论及命令\n\n基于上述理由，本院认定债务人民事藐视法庭。现特此\n\n命令：债务人须于 March 6, 2023 下午 5:00 p.m. (17:00) 或之前消除其藐视法庭状态；并进一步\n\n命令：如债务人未于 March 6, 2023 下午 5:00 p.m. (17:00) 或之前消除其藐视法庭状态，其将被制裁支付受托人为促使其遵守与 Ace Decade 实体有关的《公司治理命令》而不得不产生的合理律师费及费用，该等合理费用将由本院确定，并支付给破产财产；并进一步\n\n命令：如债务人持续藐视法庭，本院可在通知后作出进一步制裁，以确保遵守《公司治理命令》。\n\n2023 年 1 月 24 日于 Connecticut（康涅狄格州）Bridgeport（布里奇波特）签署。","key_entities":["Je","Guo","Kwok","Despins","Ho Wan Kwok"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":1,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":465,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":523,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":598,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":679,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":717,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":746,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":913,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1026,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1092,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1110,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":4858,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 18:36:10"}