{"id":"court_ctb_1380_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":1380,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION § § § § §","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n**§ § § § §**\n\n**IN RE:**\n\n**HO WAN KWOK et al.**\n\n**Debtors.**\n\n**CHAPTER 11 CASE NO. 22-50073 (JAM)**\n\n# **THE DEBTOR'S OBJECTION TO EMERGENCY MOTION OF CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE AND GENEVER DEBTORS FOR ENTRY OF ORDER (A) COMPELLING INDIVIDUAL DEBTOR TO COMPLY WITH PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION WITH RESPECT TO CLAIMS PROCESS, (B) QUASHING INDIVIDUAL DEBTORS' OBJECTIONS TO CLAIMS, AND (C) BARRING INDIVIDUAL DEBTOR FROM FILING FURTHER OBJECTIONS TO CLAIMS, ABSENT PRIOR LEAVE OF COURT**\n\nHo Wan Kwok, the individual debtor (the \"Debtor\") in the above-captioned bankruptcy case (the \"Bankruptcy Case\"), respectfully submits his objection to the Emergency Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee and Genever Debtors for Entry of Order (A) Compelling Individual Debtor to Comply with Preliminary Injunction with Respect to Claims Process, (B) Quashing Individual Debtors' Objections to Claims, and (C) Barring Individual Debtor from Filing Further Objections to Claims, Absent Prior Leave Of Court (Doc. No. 1345) (the \"Motion to Compel and Quash\"), filed by Luc A. Despins, the Chapter 11 Trustee (the \"Trustee\"), and debtors Genever Holdings LLC (\"Genever (US)\") and Genever Holdings Corporation (\"Genever BVI\" and collectively with the Trustee and Genever (US), \"Movants\") 1 on January 19, 2023. Because the Motion to Compel and Quash concerns both the Bankruptcy Case and the adversary proceeding captioned *Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. v. Kwok*, Adv. Pro. No. 22-05032 (the \"Adversary Proceeding\"), and undersigned counsel only represents the Debtor in the Bankruptcy\n\n<sup>1</sup> After the Trustee took control of Genver (US) and Genver BVI, their bankruptcy cases were transferred to this district and is now jointly administered along with the Debtor's case. *See* Order Granting Motion for Joint Administration of Related Chapter 11 Cases (Doc. No. 970).\n\nCase, this objection is limited to addressing the relief sought by the Motion to Compel and Quash in the Bankruptcy Case, specifically, orders (i) quashing the subject claims objections (Doc. Nos. 1332, 1333, 1334) (collectively, the \"Claims Objections\"), filed by the Debtor; and (ii) barring the Debtor from filing any further objections to claims absent prior leave of the Court. 2 In support of this objection, the Debtor respectfully represents as follows:\n\n#### **I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\n1. There is absolutely no legal or factual justification in this Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Case to quash the Debtor's Claims Objections or prohibit the Debtor from filing future objections to claims. To the contrary, the Debtor's perfectly legitimate effort to challenge claims he disputes, investigate the grounds relied upon by the claimants, and seek the disallowance of invalid claims is, beyond question, in the best interests of the bankruptcy estate, its creditors and other parties in interest.\n\n2. As a Chapter 11 debtor (even out of possession), the Debtor has standing to object to claims in this case. The cases cited by Movants are inapplicable because they involve debtors in Chapter 7. In a Chapter 11 case where the Trustee has been appointed, the Debtor's rights and interests are not completely divested. Rather, the Debtor shares the paramount interest in addressing the allowed claims asserted against him through a plan of reorganization. This is precisely why the Debtor possesses the statutory right to file a plan of reorganization to treat allowed claims.\n\n3. The Debtor's extensive good faith efforts to file and confirm a plan and also to obtain agreement from the then known creditors concerning their treatment is hardly theoretical in this case. As this Court heard from the Debtor's counsel during his prior testimony, the Debtor\n\n<sup>2</sup> Counsel for the Debtor in the Adversary Proceeding will be filing an opposition therein.\n\nand his counsel engaged in months of negotiations which resulted in agreements in principle with the Debtor's largest unsecured creditor, Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. (\"PAX\") and the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the \"Committee\"), subject to an agreement being reached with the Trustee and the plan of reorganization being confirmed, among other performance conditions.\n\n4. However, at a meeting between the Trustee and the Debtor, the Trustee demanded instead that the Debtor pay \\$250 million to settle this case, well more than had been agreed in principle between the Debtor and his then known creditors. The Trustee's purported justification for his position was that the Trustee claimed to believe that there were significant additional claims against the Debtor related to investments in Himalaya Coin (\"H-Coin\"). Thus, the full and fair determination of these H-Coin claims bears directly upon the Debtor's prospect for a successful reorganization. Prohibiting the Debtor from objecting to and investigating what he believes to be illegitimate claims serves only to preclude an expeditious resolution of this Bankruptcy Case. Moreover, the Debtor is in the very best position to challenge these claims where appropriate. Thus, the Motion to Compel and Quash should be denied to the extent that it seeks to quash the Claims Objections and restrict the filing of further objections.\n\n#### **II. BACKGROUND**\n\n5. On February 15, 2022, the Debtor filed his voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.\n\n6. On June 15, 2022, the Bankruptcy Court issued its Memorandum of Decision and Order Denying Motion To Dismiss Without Prejudice And Granting Joinder To Motion For Appointment Of Chapter 11 Trustee (Doc. No. 465), ordering, among other things, that a chapter 11 trustee be appointed in the bankruptcy case.\n\n3\n\n7. On July 7, 2022, the United States Trustee filed a notice appointing the Trustee, as trustee in this bankruptcy case (Doc. No. 514), and an Application for Order Approving Appointment of Chapter 11 Trustee (Doc. No. 515), seeking the Court's approval of the appointment of the Trustee.\n\n8. On July 8, 2022, the Court entered its Order Granting Appointment Of Chapter 11 Trustee (Doc. No. 523), granting the appointment of the Trustee as chapter 11 trustee in the bankruptcy case.\n\n9. On November 17, 2022, at the Trustee's request, a meeting (the \"November 17 Meeting\") was held among the Trustee, the Trustee's counsel, Nicholas Bassett, the Debtor, and the Debtor's counsel, Aaron Mitchell and Stephen Kindseth (\"Attorney Kindseth\"), at the offices of Brown Rudnick LLP in New York City.<sup>3</sup> (Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, December 12, 2022, Adv. Pro. No. 22-05032 (\"Dec. 12 Tr.\"), 841:15-23, 848:21 – 849:5, Direct Examination of Attorney Kindseth.) <sup>4</sup> At that meeting, the Trustee demanded that the Debtor pay \\$250 million to the Debtor's estate. (*Id.*, 864:24 – 865:4.) This demand deviated greatly from the \"nearly imminent\" global settlement of the Bankruptcy Case as it stood the day before, which had been negotiated over the course of several months with the major creditor, PAX, and the Committee. (*Id.*, 866:1-8.) The Trustee's issue with the negotiated settlement stemmed entirely from the *potential* claims related to H-Coin surfacing in the future.<sup>5</sup> (*Id.*, 844:21 – 845:16.) While the Debtor disputes that there is any validity to these so-called potential H-Coin claims, the Trustee raised an issue with how any such potential claims would be\n\n<sup>3</sup> A translator for the Debtor was also present.\n\n<sup>4</sup> A true and correct copy of the relevant excerpts from the Dec. 12 Tr. is attached hereto as **Exhibit A**.\n\n<sup>5</sup> As testified to by Debtor's counsel, the Debtor had resolved the issue of providing sufficient security to secure the payment obligations due PAX. (Dec. 12 Tr., 895:9-24.)\n\naddressed in the case. (*Id.*)\n\n10. On January 6, 2023, Qiu Yu (\"Yu\") filed Claim number 16 (\"Claim 16\") in the amount of \\$14,000.00 and Claim number 17 (\"Claim 17\") in the amount of \\$200,200.00. Claim 16 asserts a non-priority unsecured claim in the amount of \\$14,000.00. The only basis alleged by Yu in support of Claim 16 is \"investment fraud\", and the only documents attached to Claim 16 are what appear to be two wire transfer confirmations, in German – one in the amount of \\$7,000.00 to an entity called Himalaya International Clearing, and the other in the same amount to Deltec Bank and Trust Limited. Claim 17 asserts a non-priority unsecured claim in the amount of \\$200,200.00. The only basis alleged by Yu in support of Claim 17 is \"investment fraud\", and again, the only documents attached to Claim 17 are what appear to be a wire transfer confirmation and bank form, both in German, regarding a transfer to Crane Advisory Group, LLC.\n\n11. On January 11, 2023, Lee Chu (\"Chu\" and together with Yu, \"Claimants\")) filed Claim number 18 (\"Claim 18\" and collectively with Claim 16 and Claim 17, the \"Claims\") in the amount of \\$9,809,860.00. Claim 18 asserts a non-priority unsecured claim in the amount of \\$9,809,860.00. Chu alleges the basis of the claim is that \"Miles Guo fraudulently induced me to wire money to a number of entities.\" In addition, a number of documents are attached to Claim 18; however, none of them establish the fraudulent inducement claimed by Chu.\n\n12. On January 13, 2023, the Court entered the Corrected Order Granting in Part Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Adversary Proceeding, Doc. No. 134) (the \"Preliminary Injunction\"). Relevant here, the Preliminary Injunction provides: \"The Debtor is further preliminarily enjoined from interfering in any way with the integrity of his Chapter 11 case . . . including taking any act to, and/or directing or encouraging others to take any act that, threatens,\n\n5\n\nor encourages others to threaten the safety of Chapter 11 Trustee, PAX's or its affiliates' officers or employees, counsel to the Chapter 11 Trustee or PAX, and any of their respective relatives (including former spouses).\" (Preliminary Injunction, ¶ 2.) The Preliminary Injunction further provides that it binds, *inter alia*, the Debtor's attorneys upon their receipt of actual notice thereof. (*Id.*, ¶ 5.)\n\n13. On January 17, 2023, the Debtor filed the Claims Objections separately objecting to each of the claims because he disputed he owed an debt to Claimants. Claimants also failed to allege, in the first instance, sufficient facts or attach documentation to the Claims to demonstrate that they have a claim against the Debtor.\n\n14. On January 19, 2023, Movants filed the Motion to Compel and Quash, seeking an order (i) compelling the Debtor to comply with the Corrected Order Granting in Part Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Adv. Proc. Docket No. 134) issued by this Court in the Adversary Proceeding; (ii) quashing the Claims Objections; and (iii) barring the Debtor from filing any further objections to claims absent prior leave of the Court.\n\n#### **III.LEGAL ANALYSIS**\n\n#### **A. The Debtor Has Standing to Pursue the Claims Objections**\n\n15. Movants' sole argument in support of quashing the Claims Objections is that the Debtor lacks standing to pursue them because the Trustee has been appointed in the Bankruptcy Case. However, the Trustee cites to and relies upon authority concerning the standing of a debtor to object to claims in a Chapter 7 case. As set forth below, a Chapter 11 case where a trustee has been appointed is different because, unlike in a Chapter 7 case, the Debtor has a more farreaching pecuniary interest in the case, specifically, resolving claims against him through objections to claims to determine whether disputed claims should be allowed and then through\n\nthe treatment of allowed claims in a plan of reorganization.\n\n16. Considering that the Trustee's ostensible reason for demanding \\$250 million at the November 17 Meeting was the existence of these H-Coin claims, the Trustee cannot dispute that their resolution is at the very core of the Debtor's reorganization. Accordingly, the Debtor's right to object to claims he disputes, to investigate those claims through discovery, and to demonstrate to the Court that such claims should be disallowed should not be infringed. Rather than interfering with the administration of the estate, the Claims Objections, and any future objections, if successful, would only benefit the estate by reducing the number and amount of claims – specifically those without merit.\n\n17. Moreover, even in the Chapter 7 context, there are several recognized exceptions to the general rule that the Chapter 7 debtor lacks standing to pursue claims objections that are applicable here, including that there are nondischargeable claims asserted against the Debtor and the objection will not interfere with the administration of the estate. The Trustee could proceed independently with his administration of the estate unaffected by the Claims Objections and simply let the Debtor prosecute them to their appropriate conclusion, by way of settlement or adjudication. Thus, the Debtor has standing to pursue the Claims Objections.\n\n18. Section 502(a)<sup>6</sup> provides in relevant part that \"[a] claim or interest, proof of which is filed under section 501 of this title, is deemed allowed, unless a party in interest . . . objects.\" Section 1109(b) provides that \"[a] party in interest, including the debtor, the trustee, a creditors' committee, an equity security holders' committee, a creditor, an equity security holder, or any indenture trustee, may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue in a case under this chapter.\"\n\n<sup>6</sup> References herein to \"Section(s)\" are to sections of the United States Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 *et seq.*, unless otherwise indicated.\n\n19. \"Section 1109(b) must be construed broadly to permit parties affected by a Chapter 11 proceeding to appear and be heard.\" *In re Texaco, Inc.*, 81 B.R. 820, 828 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); *see also Frontier Ins. Co. v. Westport Ins. Corp. (In re Black)*, 460 B.R. 407, 413 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2011). \"For the purposes of Chapter 11 proceedings, a 'party in interest' includes 'the debtor, the trustee, a creditors' committee, an equity security holders' committee, a creditor, an equity security holder, or any indenture trustee.'\" *Pascazi v. Fiber Consultants, Inc.*, 445 B.R. 124, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c)). \"There is no reason to define 'party in interest' standing more narrowly in the context of an objection to a claim than in the context of a plan objection. Parties in interest for the purpose of claims objections 'include not only the debtor, but anyone who has a legally protected interest that could be affected by a bankruptcy proceeding.'\" *Frontier Ins. Co.,* 460 B.R. at 414 (quoting *Adair v. Sherman*, 230 F.3d 890, 894 n. 3 (7th Cir. 2000)). Thus, in a Chapter 11 case, the Debtor has standing to object to a claim filed in his bankruptcy case even where a trustee has been appointed because the Debtor is a party in interest. *In re Futterman*, 602 B.R. 465, 472 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019). *Cf. In re Greenfield*, 2021 Bankr. LEXIS 1845, at \\*4 (Bankr. D. Idaho July 13, 2021) (rejecting Chapter 7 debtor's argument that she had standing to object to claims under Section 1109(b) because Ҥ 1109(b) allows a debtor standing to raise and be heard on any issue in a case under chapter 11.\").\n\n20. Confoundingly, all the cases cited by the Trustee in opposition to the Debtor's standing are Chapter 7 cases. *See In re 60 E. 80th St. Equities*, 218 F.3d 109, 115 (2d Cir. 2000); *In re Licata*, 659 Fed. App'x 704, 706 (2d Cir. 2016); *Cole v. Rescia*, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175759, at \\*15-16, 2022 WL 4536830 (D. Conn. Sept. 28, 2022); *Pascazi*, 445 B.R. at 127; *Chorches v. Ferraro (In re Ferraro)*, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 583, at \\*7 (Bankr. D. Conn. Mar. 3,\n\n8\n\n2017); *In re I & F Corp.*, 219 B.R. 483, 484 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1998); *Caserta v. Tobin*, 175 B.R. 773, 775 (S.D. Fla. 1994). <sup>7</sup> The gravamen of the cases under Chapter 7 is that a debtor has standing to object to a claim if he has a pecuniary interest such as the reasonable possibility of a surplus. *See Ferraro*, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 583, at \\*7. This is because in a Chapter 7 case, the \"'proceedings absolve the debtor of any liability to creditors and the debtor has no interest in the distribution of the estate's property since the property has passed to the trustee.'\" *Id.* (quoting *Licata v. Coan*, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160333, at \\*15, 2015 WL 9699304, at \\*5 (D. Conn. Sep. 22, 2015)). This makes sense in a Chapter 7 case where \"a trustee is appointed to administer the debtor's case, by collecting the property of the estate, reducing it to cash, and distributing the proceeds to creditors.\" *In re Abbott*, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1550, at \\*9 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2010).\n\n21. However, in a Chapter 11 case, the debtor, whether or not a trustee is appointed, has a more far-reaching pecuniary interest in the case. Chapter 11 debtors, even out of possession, are not simply absolved of liability, and therefore, they seek to resolve through the Chapter 11 bankruptcy case all the valid claims against them. Accordingly, such debtors have statutory authority to object to claims. *See* 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(a) & 1109(b). They also have the right to file and confirm a plan of reorganization. This is made abundantly clear by Section 1121(c), which provides that \"[a]ny party in interest, including the debtor, the trustee, a\n\n<sup>7</sup> Movants also cite Collier on Bankruptcy for the proposition that \"[i]n a chapter 7 case, or a chapter 11 case in which the debtor is not in possession and there is no possibility of a surplus being returned to the debtor, the debtor usually has no pecuniary interest in the outcome of claims objections and thus no standing to object to claims.\" Collier on Bankruptcy § 502.02[2][c]. However, that assertion in the treatise cites only to *Pascazi*, 445 B.R. 124, a Chapter 7 case, which does not support the assertion regarding a Chapter 11 case. In fact, *Pascazi* refers to Chapter 11 only to distinguish it: \"For the purposes of Chapter 11 proceedings, a 'party in interest' includes 'the debtor, the trustee, a creditors' committee, an equity security holders' committee, a creditor, an equity security holder, or any indenture trustee.' 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c). But the term is not defined in Chapter 7.\" *Id.* at 127.\n\ncreditors' committee, an equity security holders' committee, a creditor, an equity security holder, or any indenture trustee, may file a plan if and only if — (1) a trustee has been appointed under this chapter. . . .\" Moreover, it has been recognized that\n\n[t]he Chapter 11 trustee's authority to conduct the debtor's business and to manage the estate, primarily for the creditors, does not mean that the Chapter 11 debtor's interests are totally divested. In addition to having standing to file a reorganization plan, the debtor has a pecuniary interest in the equity of the estate if all the creditors can be paid in full, or if each class of impaired claims accepts the plan in accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (a) (8) (A), so that the debtor may retain an equity interest. In such case, the Chapter 11 debtor possesses a direct pecuniary interest in the estate which would not implicate the rights of the Chapter 11 trustee, whose primary function is to protect the creditors' interests in the estate.\n\n*In re McCorhill Pub., Inc.*, 89 B.R. 393, 396 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988).\n\n22. Here, the Debtor certainly has interests in his bankruptcy estate that are clearly sufficient to establish his standing to file the Claims Objections and further objections to claims. As the Debtor has the ability to file and confirm a plan, and the impediment (or at least the impediment claimed by the Trustee) is that there are supposedly significant additional H-Coin related claims against the Debtor, the Debtor has a direct interest in investigating such claims and having them disallowed to the extent that they are not legitimate claims against him. This would allow the Debtor to demonstrate the feasibility of a plan, and acceptability to existing creditors, in line with the terms previously negotiated with creditors. Otherwise, the Debtor's ability to propose a plan and settle this Bankruptcy Case would be seriously compromised, if not eliminated.\n\n23. If the Trustee's true concern is that there are other significant, legitimate claims against the Debtor –based on H-Coin–, which forms the basis for his demand of \\$250 million, then the administration of the estate could only benefit if the Debtor could demonstrate that there are no other legitimate claims. In that case, the creditors of the Debtor's estate would be limited to those that the Debtor, and indeed the creditors, believe to exist. This would support a potential resolution of this Bankruptcy Case along the lines of the settlement that the Trustee effectively quashed.\n\n24. Moreover, even if the Court believes that the caselaw regarding a debtor's ability to object to claims in a Chapter 7 case applies, Courts have recognized several situations in which a debtor can object to a claim, including (1) there could be a surplus for the debtor; (2) there are nondischargeable claims against the debtor; (3) the trustee has failed or refused to object to the claim; or (4) the objection will not interfere with the administration of the estate. *See In re Stylianou*, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 5524, at \\*78 n.48 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2009); *In re Yerushalmi*, 2019 Bankr. LEXIS 1769, at \\*34 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. June 5, 2019) (citing cases); *McGuirl v. White*, 86 F.3d 1232, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Thus, even assuming, *arguendo*, that the Chapter 7 caselaw applies here, there have been several nondischargeability complaints filed against the Debtor, and while the Debtor denies that the claims are nondischargeable and believes he will prevail in those actions, he recognizes that there is risk inherent in all litigation. Moreover, the Debtor's objections would not interfere with the administration of the Debtor's estate. As set forth above, the disallowance of illegitimate claims only serves to aid in the administration of the estate. Moreover, the Claims Objections are separate contested proceedings that would only affect whether, and to what extent, the Claims should be disallowed.\n\n25. Therefore, since the Debtor clearly has standing to prosecute the Claims Objections, and objections to other claims, the Court should deny the Motion to Compel and Quash to the extent that it seeks to quash the Claims Objections.\n\n# **B. There Is No Basis for a Bar on the Debtor Filing Further Objections to Claims without Leave of the Court**\n\n26. The Trustee has not established that the Debtor should be barred from filing any\n\nfuture objections to claims in the Bankruptcy Case without leave of the Court. The fact that the Debtor filed legitimate Claims Objections certainly does not rise to the level of the extreme circumstances that would support a bar on filing pleadings in this case. Therefore, to the extent that Movants seek a restriction on the Debtor's ability to file legitimate pleadings in this Bankruptcy Case, the Motion to Compel and Quash should be denied.\n\n27. The Second Circuit has established factors to consider before restricting a litigant's access to the Courts:\n\n[I]n determining whether or not to restrict a litigant's future access to the courts, courts should consider the following factors: (1) the litigant's history of litigation and in particular whether it entailed vexatious, harassing or duplicative lawsuits; (2) the litigant's motive in pursuing the litigation, e.g., does the litigant have an objective good faith expectation of prevailing?; (3) whether the litigant is represented by counsel; (4) whether the litigant has caused needless expense to other parties or has posed an unnecessary burden on the courts and their personnel; and (5) whether other sanctions would be adequate to protect the courts and other parties. Ultimately, the question the court must answer is whether a litigant who has a history of vexatious litigation is likely to continue to abuse the judicial process and harass other parties.\n\n*Safir v. United States Lines, Inc.*, 792 F.2d 19, 24 (2d Cir. 1986). \"[A] prefiling order is an extreme remedy to be imposed only under extreme circumstances.\" *Richardson v. Melcher (In re Melcher)*, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 1586, at \\*29 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Apr. 11, 2014).\n\n28. All of the *Safir* factors clearly militate against restricting the Debtor's access to this Court as requested by Movants. First, the Debtor's history of litigation has not entailed vexatious, harassing, or duplicative proceedings. Specifically, as set forth above, and in the Claims Objections themselves, the Claims Objections are legitimate challenges to the allowance of illegitimate claims that provide no evidence that Claimants have any claims against the Debtor. Vexatious proceedings or litigation are made \"for the purpose of harassing, annoying, and vexing an opponent, rather than for the adjudication of rights, being invoked, not for the attainment of justice, but to further or satisfy a malicious motive.\" Vexatious Suit, *Ballentine's Law Dictionary*, 2010 ed. The Claims Objections, and indeed the Debtor's filings in this case, have not been made for the purpose of harassing, annoying, and vexing any opponent, but rather, have been filed in order to adjudicate the rights of the Debtor – i.e., whether the Claimants have any valid claims against the Debtor. Moreover, there has not been any duplication of litigation.\n\n29. Second, the Debtor has a good faith objective for filing the Claims Objections. He seeks to have the Court determine the validity of the Claims, which he believes are illegitimate based on the information set forth in the Claims themselves, in order to attempt to resolve this case by demonstrating that the Trustee's concerns about significant additional claims are unfounded. As a result, he continues to pursue the objective of resolving this case along the lines of the terms that were previously acceptable to creditors. While Movants assert that the purpose of the Claims Objections is \"to harass creditors and intimidate them into not filing proofs of claim\"; Motion to Compel and Quash, p.21; there is absolutely nothing intimidating about the Claims Objections as they merely challenge claims filed without adequate allegations to demonstrate they are claims against the Debtor. If anything, the Claims Objections make Claimants (and other potential claimants) aware of deficiencies in their claims, which they presumably could correct before the claims bar date.\n\n30. Third, the Debtor does have counsel, and counsel submit that the Claims Objections fall squarely within their duty to zealously advocate for their client. Movants do not accuse counsel of any sanctionable conduct.<sup>8</sup>\n\n<sup>8</sup> In the Motion to Compel and Quash, Movants do not appear to argue that the filing of the Claims Objections violated the Preliminary Injunction, and indeed, the Claims Objections do not violate the Preliminary Injunction. However, to the extent that the Motion to Compel and Quash can be read to claim that the filing of the Claims Objections violated the Preliminary Injunction, the Debtor and his counsel reserve all rights to challenge such an assertion.\n\n31. Fourth, the Debtor has not imposed a needless expense on other litigants or an undue burden on the Court. Indeed, the prosecution of the Claims Objections would reduce expenses to the estate (and ultimately proper creditors) by avoiding the use of potential estate funds by the Trustee in litigating objections to the Claims. Moreover, there is no undue burden on the Court as deciding whether claims should be allowed or not is squarely within the ordinary functions of the Bankruptcy Court.\n\n32. Last, lesser, or any, sanctions would be inappropriate because, as set forth herein, the Claims Objections are completely legitimate filings made by the Debtor in furtherance of his rights.\n\n33. Moreover, the cases cited by Movants highlight the type of extreme, prolonged conduct necessary to justify a filing ban. *See Safir*, 792 F.2d at 20-21, 25 (upholding permanent injunction barring further proceedings because of \"meritless, duplicative, and burdensome\" litigation over nearly twenty years); *Seaport Capital Partners v. Speer (In re Speer)*, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 4523, at \\*15, 25 (Bankr. D. Conn. Nov. 22, 2017) (warning that after a further hearing debtor's filing of future documents could be restricted for, *inter alia*, filing sixty-four documents in case in eight months that did not address prior sanctions order); *Coan v. Peia (In re Peia)*, 212 B.R. 217 (D. Conn. 1997) (prohibiting debtor from filing actions against Bankruptcy Judge, but not others, after thirteen bankruptcy filings in nine years that were used to file innumerable adversary proceedings against government officials and others); *In re Armstrong*, 297 B.R. 154 (Bankr. D. Utah 2003) (enjoining debtor from filing new motions or actions related to bankruptcy proceedings where debtor had filed over thirty actions collaterally attacking confirmation order); *Melcher*, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 1586, at \\*5, 25 (directing bankruptcy court to fashion appropriate prefiling order where debtor made \"seemingly endless\" filings and docket had over 1,700 entries in about a year).\n\n34. Such extreme conduct is not present here. In fact, the Debtor has not demonstrated any improper conduct through his filings with the Court, including the Claims Objections, which are legitimate filings to further the Debtor's rights. Therefore, to the extent that the Motion to Compel and Quash seeks the imposition of a filing restriction on the Debtor, it should be denied.\n\n#### **IV.CONCLUSION**\n\n**WHEREFORE**, the Debtor requests that the Court deny the Motion to Compel and Quash to the extent set forth herein, and grant him such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.\n\nDated at Bridgeport, Connecticut this 24 th day of January, 2023.\n\n### **THE DEBTOR, HO WAN KWOK**\n\n*/s/ John L. Cesaroni* Stephen M. Kindseth (ct14640) James M. Moriarty (ct21876) John L. Cesaroni (ct29309) 10 Middle Street, 15th Floor Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604 Telephone: (203) 368-4234 Facsimile: (203) 368-5487 Email: [skindseth@zeislaw.com](mailto:skindseth@zeislaw.com) [jmoriarty@zeislaw.com](mailto:jmoriarty@zeislaw.com) [jcesaroni@zeislaw.com](mailto:jcesaroni@zeislaw.com)\n\n# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n**§ § § § §**\n\n**IN RE:**\n\n**HO WAN KWOK et al.**\n\n**Debtors.**\n\n**CHAPTER 11**\n\n**CASE NO. 22-50073 (JAM)**\n\n# **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI, John L. Cesaroni, hereby certify that on the 24 th day of January, 2023, a copy of the foregoing was sent by e-mail to all appearing parties by operation of the Court's electronic filing system.\n\n> */s/* John L. Cesaroni John L. Cesaroni (ct29309) 10 Middle Street, 15 th Floor Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604 Telephone: (203) 368-4234 Facsimile: (203) 368-5487 Email: [jcesaroni@zeislaw.com](mailto:jcesaroni@zeislaw.com)","body_zh":"美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院 布里奇波特分院\n\n§ § § § §\n\n关于：\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等人\n\n债务人。\n\n第11章 案号 22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人对第11章受托人及 Genever 债务人关于请求作出命令的紧急动议提出的异议，该命令旨在：(A) 强制个人债务人就债权程序遵守初步禁令；(B) 撤销个人债务人对债权提出的异议；以及 (C) 禁止个人债务人在未事先获得法院许可的情况下进一步对债权提出异议\n\n上述标题所列破产案件（以下简称“破产案件”）中的个人债务人 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（以下简称“债务人”）谨就第11章受托人及 Genever 债务人提出的《关于请求作出命令的紧急动议，该命令旨在：(A) 强制个人债务人就债权程序遵守初步禁令；(B) 撤销个人债务人对债权提出的异议；以及 (C) 禁止个人债务人在未事先获得法院许可的情况下进一步对债权提出异议》（文件编号 1345）（以下简称“强制及撤销动议”）提出异议。该动议由第11章受托人 Luc A. Despins（以下简称“受托人”）以及债务人 Genever Holdings LLC（以下简称“Genever (US)”）和 Genever Holdings Corporation（以下简称“Genever BVI”，并与受托人及 Genever (US) 合称“动议方”）1 于 January 19, 2023 提交。由于强制及撤销动议涉及破产案件以及题为 Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.（太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金有限合伙企业）诉 Kwok（郭文贵）的对抗程序，Adv. Pro. No. 22-05032（以下简称“对抗程序”），且下列签署律师仅在破产案件中代理债务人，\n\n1 在受托人接管 Genever (US) 和 Genever BVI 后，其破产案件被移送至本辖区，并现与债务人的案件一并联合管理。见《关于准许相关第11章案件联合管理动议的命令》（文件编号 970）。\n\n故本异议仅限于回应强制及撤销动议在破产案件中所请求的救济，具体而言，即请求作出命令：(i) 撤销债务人提交的相关债权异议（文件编号 1332、1333、1334）（合称“债权异议”）；以及 (ii) 禁止债务人在未事先获得法院许可的情况下进一步提出任何债权异议。2 为支持本异议，债务人谨陈述如下：\n\n一、初步陈述\n\n1. 在本第11章破产案件中，绝无任何法律或事实依据可撤销债务人的债权异议，或禁止债务人日后提出债权异议。恰恰相反，债务人为质疑其有争议的债权、调查债权人所依据的理由以及请求不予认可无效债权所作出的完全正当努力，无疑最符合破产财产、其债权人及其他利害关系方的利益。\n\n2. 作为第11章债务人（即使并非占有中的债务人），债务人有资格对本案债权提出异议。动议方援引的案件不适用，因为其涉及第7章中的债务人。在已指定受托人的第11章案件中，债务人的权利和利益并未被完全剥夺。相反，债务人对通过重整计划处理针对其提出的获准债权具有首要利益。这正是债务人享有法定权利提交重整计划以处理获准债权的原因。\n\n3. 在本案中，债务人为提交并确认一项计划以及就对当时已知债权人的处理取得其同意而作出的广泛善意努力，绝非仅属理论。如本法院在债务人律师先前作证时所听取的陈述，债务人\n\n2 债务人在对抗程序中的律师将在该程序中提交反对意见。\n\n及其律师进行了数月谈判，并与债务人最大的无担保债权人 Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.（“PAX”）及无担保债权人官方委员会（以下简称“委员会”）达成了原则性协议，但须满足与受托人达成协议、重整计划获得确认以及其他履行条件等前提。\n\n4. 然而，在受托人与债务人之间的一次会议上，受托人反而要求债务人支付 $250 million 以和解本案，该金额远高于债务人与其当时已知债权人之间原则上商定的金额。受托人据称为其立场提出的理由是，其称相信存在与对 Himalaya Coin（“H-Coin”）投资有关的针对债务人的重大额外债权。因此，对这些 H-Coin 债权作出充分且公正的裁定，直接关系到债务人成功重整的前景。禁止债务人对其认为不合法的债权提出异议并进行调查，只会妨碍本破产案件的迅速解决。此外，债务人最适宜在适当情况下对这些债权提出质疑。因此，强制及撤销动议就其请求撤销债权异议并限制进一步提出异议的范围而言，应予驳回。\n\n二、背景\n\n5. On February 15, 2022，债务人根据《破产法》第11章提交了自愿救济申请。\n\n6. On June 15, 2022，破产法院作出《关于驳回动议但不妨碍再次提出以及准许加入指定第11章受托人动议的裁决备忘录及命令》（文件编号 465），其中命令在该破产案件中指定一名第11章受托人。\n\n7. On July 7, 2022，美国受托人提交了指定受托人为本破产案件受托人的通知（文件编号 514），以及《关于批准指定第11章受托人的命令申请》（文件编号 515），请求法院批准指定受托人。\n\n8. On July 8, 2022，法院作出《关于准许指定第11章受托人的命令》（文件编号 523），准许指定受托人为该破产案件中的第11章受托人。\n\n9. On November 17, 2022，应受托人请求，受托人、受托人律师、Nicholas Bassett（尼古拉斯·巴塞特）、债务人，以及债务人的律师 Aaron Mitchell（阿伦·米切尔）和 Stephen Kindseth（斯蒂芬·金德塞斯，以下简称“Kindseth 律师”）在位于 New York City（纽约市）的 Brown Rudnick LLP（布朗·拉德尼克律师事务所）办公室举行会议（以下简称“November 17 Meeting”）。3（《初步禁令动议听证会记录》，December 12, 2022，Adv. Pro. No. 22-05032（以下简称“Dec. 12 Tr.”），841:15-23，848:21 – 849:5，Kindseth 律师的直接询问。）4 在该会议上，受托人要求债务人向债务人的破产财产支付 $250 million。（同上，864:24 – 865:4。）该要求与前一日破产案件已“几乎即将达成”的全球和解大相径庭，该和解是与主要债权人 PAX 及委员会历经数月谈判达成的。（同上，866:1-8。）受托人对谈判达成的和解所持异议，完全源于未来可能出现的与 H-Coin 有关的潜在债权。5（同上，844:21 – 845:16。）尽管债务人对这些所谓潜在 H-Coin 债权是否具有任何有效性提出争议，受托人仍就任何该等潜在债权将如何在本案中得到\n\n3 债务人的翻译人员亦在场。\n\n4 Dec. 12 Tr. 相关摘录的真实、准确副本作为附件 A 随附于此。\n\n5 如债务人律师所作证，债务人已解决就其对 PAX 应付款义务提供充分担保的问题。（Dec. 12 Tr.，895:9-24。）\n\n处理提出了问题。（同上。）\n\n10. On January 6, 2023，Qiu Yu（邱宇，以下简称“Yu”）提交了金额为 $14,000.00 的第16号债权（以下简称“第16号债权”）及金额为 $200,200.00 的第17号债权（以下简称“第17号债权”）。第16号债权主张金额为 $14,000.00 的非优先无担保债权。Yu 为支持第16号债权所主张的唯一依据是“投资欺诈”，而附于第16号债权的唯一文件是看似两份以德文出具的电汇确认书——其中一份为向名为 Himalaya International Clearing 的实体支付 $7,000.00，另一份为向 Deltec Bank and Trust Limited 支付同等金额。第17号债权主张金额为 $200,200.00 的非优先无担保债权。Yu 为支持第17号债权所主张的唯一依据是“投资欺诈”，并且，附于第17号债权的唯一文件再次是看似一份电汇确认书及一份银行表格，两者均以德文出具，涉及向 Crane Advisory Group, LLC 的转账。\n\n11. On January 11, 2023，Lee Chu（朱莉，以下简称“Chu”，并与 Yu 合称“债权人”）提交了金额为 $9,809,860.00 的第18号债权（以下简称“第18号债权”，并与第16号债权及第17号债权合称“债权”）。第18号债权主张金额为 $9,809,860.00 的非优先无担保债权。Chu 主张该债权的依据为：“Miles Guo（郭文贵）以欺诈方式诱使我向多个实体电汇款项。”此外，第18号债权附有多份文件；然而，其中没有任何文件证明 Chu 所主张的欺诈诱导。\n\n12. On January 13, 2023，法院作出《关于部分准许初步禁令动议的更正命令》（对抗程序，文件编号 134）（以下简称“初步禁令”）。与此相关的是，初步禁令规定：“特此进一步初步禁止债务人以任何方式干扰其第11章案件的完整性……包括实施任何行为，和/或指示或鼓励他人实施任何行为，该等行为威胁，或鼓励他人威胁第11章受托人、PAX 或其关联方的高级职员或雇员、第11章受托人或 PAX 的律师，以及其各自任何亲属（包括前配偶）的人身安全。”（初步禁令，第 2 段。）初步禁令还规定，一经实际收到该禁令通知，其约束的对象包括债务人的律师。（同上，第 5 段。）\n\n13. On January 17, 2023，债务人分别提交债权异议，对每一项债权提出异议，原因是其否认其对债权人负有任何债务。债权人亦未首先陈述足够事实或将文件附于债权之中，以证明其对债务人享有债权。\n\n14. On January 19, 2023，动议方提交强制及撤销动议，请求作出命令：(i) 强制债务人遵守本法院在对抗程序中作出的《关于部分准许初步禁令动议的更正命令》（Adv. Proc. Docket No. 134）；(ii) 撤销债权异议；以及 (iii) 禁止债务人在未事先获得法院许可的情况下进一步提出任何债权异议。\n\n三、法律分析\n\nA. 债务人有资格提出债权异议\n\n15. 动议方支持撤销债权异议的唯一论点是，由于已在破产案件中指定受托人，债务人缺乏提出该等异议的资格。然而，受托人援引并依赖的是有关债务人在第7章案件中对债权提出异议资格的判例。如以下所述，已指定受托人的第11章案件有所不同，因为与第7章案件不同，债务人在该案件中具有更广泛的金钱利益，具体而言，是通过对债权提出异议以确定有争议的债权是否应获准，并随后通过重整计划中对获准债权的处理，解决针对其提出的债权。\n\n16. 鉴于受托人在11月17日会议上要求支付$250 million的表面理由是存在这些H-Coin（H币）债权申报，受托人不能否认，对这些债权申报的解决处于债务人重组的核心。因此，债务人对其存有争议的债权申报提出异议、通过证据开示调查该等债权申报，以及向法院证明该等债权申报应被不予认可的权利，不应受到侵害。债权异议以及任何未来异议，如获成功，并不会干扰破产财产的管理，反而仅会通过减少债权申报的数量和金额——尤其是那些缺乏依据的债权申报——使破产财产受益。\n\n17. 此外，即使在第7章破产程序中，对于第7章债务人通常不具有提出债权异议的诉讼资格这一一般规则，亦存在若干适用于本案的公认例外，包括针对债务人提出了不可免责债权申报，以及该异议不会干扰破产财产的管理。受托人可以不受债权异议影响，独立继续其对破产财产的管理，并仅让债务人通过和解或裁决，将该等异议进行至适当结论。因此，债务人具有提出债权异议的诉讼资格。\n\n18. 第502(a)条的相关规定为：“根据本法典第501条提交证明的债权申报或权益，视为获准，除非利害关系方……提出异议。”第1109(b)条规定：“利害关系方，包括债务人、受托人、债权人委员会、股权证券持有人委员会、债权人、股权证券持有人或任何契约受托人，可以在本章项下案件中的任何问题上提出主张、出庭并陈述意见。”\n\n6 除非另有说明，本文中对“第……条”的引用均指《美国破产法典》（United States Bankruptcy Code）11 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq.的条款。\n\n19. “第1109(b)条必须作宽泛解释，以允许受第11章程序影响的当事人出庭并陈述意见。”In re Texaco, Inc.（德士古公司）, 81 B.R. 820, 828 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); 另见 Frontier Ins. Co.（前沿保险公司） v. Westport Ins. Corp.（韦斯特波特保险公司） (In re Black), 460 B.R. 407, 413 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2011)。“就第11章程序而言，‘利害关系方’包括‘债务人、受托人、债权人委员会、股权证券持有人委员会、债权人、股权证券持有人或任何契约受托人。’”Pascazi v. Fiber Consultants, Inc.（光纤顾问公司）, 445 B.R. 124, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c))。“在对债权申报提出异议的情形下，没有理由比在对计划提出异议的情形下更狭义地界定‘利害关系方’的诉讼资格。就债权异议而言，利害关系方‘不仅包括债务人，还包括任何其受法律保护的利益可能受到破产程序影响的人。’”Frontier Ins. Co., 460 B.R. at 414 (quoting Adair v. Sherman, 230 F.3d 890, 894 n. 3 (7th Cir. 2000)). 因此，在第11章案件中，即使已任命受托人，债务人作为利害关系方，仍具有对其破产案件中提交的债权申报提出异议的诉讼资格。In re Futterman, 602 B.R. 465, 472 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019). 参见 In re Greenfield, 2021 Bankr. LEXIS 1845, at *4 (Bankr. D. Idaho July 13, 2021)（驳回第7章债务人的主张，即其根据第1109(b)条有资格对债权申报提出异议，因为第1109(b)条允许债务人在第11章项下案件中的任何问题上提出主张并陈述意见）。\n\n20. 令人费解的是，受托人为反对债务人诉讼资格而援引的所有案件均为第7章案件。见 In re 60 E. 80th St. Equities, 218 F.3d 109, 115 (2d Cir. 2000); In re Licata, 659 Fed. App'x 704, 706 (2d Cir. 2016); Cole v. Rescia, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175759, at *15-16, 2022 WL 4536830 (D. Conn. Sept. 28, 2022); Pascazi, 445 B.R. at 127; Chorches v. Ferraro (In re Ferraro), 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 583, at *7 (Bankr. D. Conn. Mar. 3, 2017); In re I & F Corp., 219 B.R. 483, 484 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1998); Caserta v. Tobin, 175 B.R. 773, 775 (S.D. Fla. 1994). 7 第7章案件的核心在于：如债务人具有金钱利益，例如存在剩余财产的合理可能性，则其具有对债权申报提出异议的诉讼资格。见 Ferraro, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 583, at *7。这是因为，在第7章案件中，“程序使债务人免除对债权人的任何责任，而债务人对破产财产的分配不具有任何利益，因为财产已移转给受托人。”Id. (quoting Licata v. Coan, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160333, at *15, 2015 WL 9699304, at *5 (D. Conn. Sep. 22, 2015)). 在第7章案件中，这一做法合乎逻辑，因为“受托人被任命管理债务人的案件，方法是收集破产财产，将其变现，并将所得款项分配给债权人。”In re Abbott, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1550, at *9 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2010).\n\n21. 然而，在第11章案件中，无论是否任命受托人，债务人在案件中均具有更为广泛的金钱利益。第11章债务人，即使不占有财产，也并非仅被免除责任；因此，他们寻求通过第11章破产案件解决针对其提出的所有有效债权申报。因此，该等债务人具有对债权申报提出异议的法定授权。见 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(a) & 1109(b)。他们亦有权提交并确认重组计划。第1121(c)条对此作出了极其明确的规定，该条规定：“任何利害关系方，包括债务人、受托人、债权人委员会、股权证券持有人委员会、债权人、股权证券持有人或任何契约受托人，仅在下列情形下方可提交计划——（1）已根据本章任命受托人……。”此外，已有判例确认：\n\n7 动议方还援引 Collier on Bankruptcy（《科利尔破产法论著》），主张：“在第7章案件中，或者在债务人不占有财产且不存在向债务人返还剩余财产可能性的第11章案件中，债务人通常对债权异议的结果不具有金钱利益，因此不具有对债权申报提出异议的诉讼资格。”Collier on Bankruptcy § 502.02[2][c]. 然而，该论著中的这一主张仅援引 Pascazi, 445 B.R. 124——一个第7章案件——其并不支持关于第11章案件的该项主张。事实上，Pascazi仅为区别第11章而提及该章：“就第11章程序而言，‘利害关系方’包括‘债务人、受托人、债权人委员会、股权证券持有人委员会、债权人、股权证券持有人或任何契约受托人。’11 U.S.C. § 1121(c). 但该术语在第7章中并未定义。”Id. at 127.\n\n第11章受托人经营债务人业务并主要为债权人管理破产财产的权限，并不意味着第11章债务人的利益被完全剥夺。除具有提交重组计划的诉讼资格外，如所有债权人均能获得全额清偿，或者每一类受损债权申报均依照11 U.S.C. § 1129 (a) (8) (A)接受该计划，从而使债务人得以保留股权利益，则债务人对破产财产中的权益具有金钱利益。在此情况下，第11章债务人对破产财产具有直接的金钱利益，而这不会牵涉第11章受托人的权利，因为受托人的主要职能是保护债权人在破产财产中的利益。\n\nIn re McCorhill Pub., Inc., 89 B.R. 393, 396 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988).\n\n22. 在本案中，债务人显然在其破产财产中享有足以确立其提出债权异议及进一步提出债权异议之诉讼资格的利益。鉴于债务人有能力提交并确认一项计划，且障碍（或至少是受托人所称的障碍）在于据称存在针对债务人的大量额外H-Coin相关债权申报，债务人对调查该等债权申报并在其并非针对债务人的合法债权申报的范围内使其不获认可，具有直接利益。这将使债务人能够根据此前与债权人协商的条款，证明计划的可行性以及其对现有债权人的可接受性。否则，债务人提出计划并解决本破产案件的能力将受到严重损害，甚至被完全消除。\n\n23. 如果受托人真正担心的是存在其他针对债务人的重大、合法的债权申报——以H-Coin为基础——而这正构成其要求$250 million的依据，则如债务人能够证明不存在其他合法债权申报，破产财产的管理只会从中受益。在该情况下，债务人破产财产的债权人将限于债务人以及债权人自身均认为存在的那些债权人。这将支持按照受托人实际上阻挠的和解方案来解决本破产案件。\n\n24. 此外，即使法院认为有关债务人在第7章案件中对债权申报提出异议之能力的判例法适用，法院也已确认债务人可以对债权申报提出异议的若干情形，包括：（1）债务人可能获得剩余财产；（2）存在针对债务人的不可免责债权申报；（3）受托人未能或拒绝对债权申报提出异议；或（4）该异议不会干扰破产财产的管理。见 In re Stylianou, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 5524, at *78 n.48 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2009); In re Yerushalmi, 2019 Bankr. LEXIS 1769, at *34 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. June 5, 2019) (citing cases); McGuirl v. White, 86 F.3d 1232, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 因此，即使为论证起见假定第7章判例法适用于本案，仍已有数项关于不可免责性的诉状针对债务人提出；尽管债务人否认该等债权申报不可免责，并相信其将在该等诉讼中胜诉，但其承认所有诉讼均固有风险。此外，债务人的异议不会干扰债务人破产财产的管理。如上所述，对不合法债权申报的不予认可只会有助于破产财产的管理。此外，债权异议是独立的争议程序，仅会影响该等债权申报是否应被不予认可，以及应在何种范围内被不予认可。\n\n25. 因此，鉴于债务人显然具有进行债权异议以及对其他债权申报提出异议的诉讼资格，法院应驳回强制及撤销动议，惟以该动议寻求撤销债权异议的范围为限。\n\nB. 不应禁止债务人在未获法院许可的情况下进一步提出债权异议\n\n26. 受托人未能证明应禁止债务人在未经法院许可的情况下，就本破产案件中的债权申报提出任何未来异议。债务人提出了合法的债权异议这一事实，显然未达到足以支持禁止在本案中提交诉状的极端情形的程度。因此，在动议方寻求限制债务人在本破产案件中提交合法诉状之能力的范围内，强制及撤销动议应予驳回。\n\n27. 第二巡回法院已确立在限制诉讼当事人接触法院之前应考虑的因素：\n\n“[在]确定是否限制诉讼当事人今后诉诸法院时，法院应考虑以下因素：（1）该当事人的诉讼历史，尤其是该历史是否包括无理缠讼、骚扰性或重复性诉讼；（2）该当事人提起诉讼的动机，例如，该当事人是否具有客观、善意的胜诉预期？（3）该当事人是否由律师代理；（4）该当事人是否给其他当事人造成不必要的费用，或者给法院及其工作人员造成不必要的负担；以及（5）其他制裁措施是否足以保护法院及其他当事人。归根结底，法院必须回答的问题是，具有无理缠讼历史的诉讼当事人是否可能继续滥用司法程序并骚扰其他当事人。\n\nSafir v. United States Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 19, 24 (2d Cir. 1986)。“[预先提交限制命令]是一种极端救济，仅应在极端情形下施加。”Richardson v. Melcher (In re Melcher), 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 1586, at \\*29 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Apr. 11, 2014)。\n\n28. 所有 Safir 因素均明确不支持按动议方所请求的方式限制债务人进入本法院。首先，债务人的诉讼历史并未包括无理缠讼、骚扰性或重复性程序。具体而言，如上所述，并且如债权异议本身所载，债权异议是对不正当债权获准的正当质疑，该等债权并未提供任何证据证明债权人对债务人享有任何债权。无理缠讼程序或诉讼是“旨在骚扰、烦扰和纠缠对方，而非裁判权利；其提起并非为实现正义，而是为推进或满足恶意动机。”Vexatious Suit, Ballentine's Law Dictionary, 2010 ed.。债权异议，以及事实上债务人在本案中提交的文件，并非为骚扰、烦扰和纠缠任何对方而提出，而是为了裁判债务人的权利——即债权人是否对债务人享有任何有效债权。此外，不存在任何重复诉讼。\n\n29. 第二，债务人提交债权异议具有善意的客观目的。他寻求由法院确定债权的有效性；根据债权本身所载信息，他认为该等债权不正当，以便通过证明受托人对重大额外债权的担忧毫无根据来尝试解决本案。因此，他继续寻求按照此前债权人可接受的条款解决本案。尽管动议方主张债权异议的目的在于“骚扰债权人并恐吓其不提交债权证明”；Motion to Compel and Quash, p.21；债权异议绝无任何恐吓性，因为其仅质疑在未提出充分陈述以证明其为针对债务人的债权的情况下提交的债权。即便有任何影响，债权异议也是使债权人（及其他潜在债权人）意识到其债权中的缺陷，而他们推定可在债权申报截止日期前予以纠正。\n\n30. 第三，债务人确有律师代理，律师主张，债权异议完全属于其为当事人积极辩护的职责范围。动议方并未指控律师存在任何可受制裁的行为。8\n\n8 在 Motion to Compel and Quash 中，动议方似乎并未主张提交债权异议违反了初步禁令；事实上，债权异议并未违反初步禁令。但是，如 Motion to Compel and Quash 可被理解为主张提交债权异议违反了初步禁令，债务人及其律师保留对该项主张提出质疑的一切权利。\n\n31. 第四，债务人并未给其他诉讼当事人造成不必要的费用，也未给法院造成不当负担。事实上，推进债权异议将通过避免受托人使用潜在的财产资金对债权异议进行诉讼，从而减少财产（并最终减少适格债权人）的费用。此外，法院不存在不当负担，因为决定是否准予债权完全属于破产法院的通常职能范围。\n\n32. 最后，较轻或任何制裁措施均不适当，因为如本文所述，债权异议是债务人为推进其权利而作出的完全正当的提交。\n\n33. 此外，动议方援引的案件凸显了证明提交禁令正当所必需的极端且长期的行为类型。见 Safir, 792 F.2d at 20-21, 25（维持永久禁令，禁止进一步程序，理由是近二十年来“毫无根据、重复且负担沉重”的诉讼）；Seaport Capital Partners v. Speer (In re Speer), 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 4523, at \\*15, 25 (Bankr. D. Conn. Nov. 22, 2017)（警告称，在进一步听证后，债务人今后提交文件的行为可能受到限制，理由包括债务人在八个月内于案件中提交了六十四份未处理先前制裁命令的文件）；Coan v. Peia (In re Peia), 212 B.R. 217 (D. Conn. 1997)（在九年内十三次破产申请被用来对政府官员及其他人提起无数对抗程序后，禁止债务人针对破产法官而非其他人提交诉讼）；In re Armstrong, 297 B.R. 154 (Bankr. D. Utah 2003)（债务人提交三十多项附带攻击确认命令的诉讼后，禁止债务人提交与破产程序有关的新动议或诉讼）；Melcher, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 1586, at \\*5, 25（债务人作出“看似无休止”的提交，且案卷在约一年内有逾 1,700 项记录后，指示破产法院制定适当的预先提交限制命令）。\n\n34. 此处不存在该等极端行为。事实上，债务人未通过其向法院提交的文件表现出任何不当行为，包括作为推进债务人权利的正当提交的债权异议。因此，就 Motion to Compel and Quash 寻求对债务人施加提交限制而言，应予驳回。\n\nIV. 结论\n\n据此，债务人请求法院在本文所述范围内驳回 Motion to Compel and Quash，并给予其本法院认为公正和适当的其他及进一步救济。\n\n日期：2023 年 1 月 24 日，康涅狄格州布里奇波特。\n债务人，HO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）\n\n/s/ John L. Cesaroni（约翰·L·切萨罗尼） Stephen M. Kindseth（斯蒂芬·M·金德塞思）(ct14640) James M. Moriarty（詹姆斯·M·莫里亚蒂）(ct21876) John L. Cesaroni（约翰·L·切萨罗尼）(ct29309) 10 Middle Street, 15th Floor Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604 电话：(203) 368-4234 传真：(203) 368-5487 电子邮件：[skindseth@zeislaw.com] [jmoriarty@zeislaw.com] [jcesaroni@zeislaw.com]\n\nUNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION（美国破产法院康涅狄格地区布里奇波特分院）\n\n§ § § § §\n\n关于：\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等人\n\n债务人。\n\n第 11 章\n\nCASE NO. 22-50073 (JAM)\n送达证明\n\n本人，John L. Cesaroni（约翰·L·切萨罗尼），特此证明，于 2023 年 1 月 24 日，通过法院电子提交系统的运行，已通过电子邮件向所有出庭当事人发送上述文件副本。\n\n/s/ John L. Cesaroni（约翰·L·切萨罗尼） John L. Cesaroni（约翰·L·切萨罗尼）(ct29309) 10 Middle Street, 15th Floor Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604 电话：(203) 368-4234 传真：(203) 368-5487 电子邮件：[jcesaroni@zeislaw.com]","key_entities":["Je","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Himalaya","Guo","Miles Guo","Despins"],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":4982,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 18:42:18"}