{"id":"court_ctb_1388_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":1388,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"| UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
BRIDGEPORT DIVISION
----------------------------------","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"| UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
BRIDGEPORT DIVISION
-----------------------------------------------------------
x | | | | |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|--|--|\n| In re:
1
HO WAN KWOK,
et al., | :
:
:
:
: | Chapter 11
Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) | | |\n| -----------------------------------------------------------
PACIFIC ALLIANCE ASIA
OPPORTUNITY FUND L.P.,
v. | Debtors.
:
:
x
:
:
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
: | (Jointly Administered)
Adv. Proceeding No. 22-05032 (JAM) | | |\n| HO WAN KWOK,
----------------------------------------------------------- | :
:
Defendant.
:
:
x | | | |\n\n# **OMNIBUS REPLY OF CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE AND GENEVER DEBTORS (I) IN SUPPORT OF THEIR EMERGENCY MOTION, FOR ENTRY OF ORDER (A) COMPELLING INDIVIDUAL DEBTOR TO COMPLY WITH PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION WITH RESPECT TO CLAIMS PROCESS, (B) QUASHING INDIVIDUAL DEBTORS' OBJECTIONS TO CLAIMS, AND (C) BARRING INDIVIDUAL DEBTOR FROM FILING FURTHER OBJECTIONS TO CLAIMS, ABSENT LEAVE OF COURT, AND (II) IN RESPONSE TO OBJECTIONS**\n\nTo the Honorable United States Bankruptcy Judge Julie A. Manning:\n\nLuc Despins, in his capacity as the chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") appointed in the\n\nchapter 11 case of Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Individual Debtor\" or \"Defendant\"), Genever Holdings\n\n1 The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and the Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\nCorporation (\"Genever (BVI)\"), and Genever Holdings LLC (\"Genever (US)\" and, together with the Trustee, and Genever (BVI), the \"Movants\"), respectfully submit this omnibus reply (the \"Reply\") (a) in support of the *Emergency Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee and Genever Debtors for Entry of Order (A) Compelling Individual Debtor to Comply With Preliminary Injunction With Respect to Claims Process, (B) Quashing Individual Debtors' Objections to Claims, and (C) Barring Individual Debtor From Filing Further Objections to Claims, Absent Leave of Court* [Main Case Docket No. 1345] (the \"Motion\")2 and (b) in response to (i) the objection filed by the Individual Debtor in the main chapter 11 case [Main Case Docket No. 1380] (the \"Main Case Objection\") and (ii) the objection filed by Individual Debtor in this adversary proceeding [Adv. Proc. Docket No. 154] (the \"AP Objection,\" and, together with the Main Case Objection, the \"Objections\"). In support of the Reply, the Movants respectfully state as follows.\n\n#### **REPLY**\n\n# **A. Court Should Compel Individual Debtor to Comply With Preliminary Injunction Order**\n\n1. As a threshold matter, neither Objection challenges the accuracy of the statements made by the Individual Debtor (and his followers) detailed in the Motion, including the informal English translations of such statements. 3 Still, the Individual Debtor asserts that he is merely \"voic[ing] his opinion with respect to the legitimacy of a particular claim that he believes is unfounded.\"4 This is a blatant mischaracterization of the statements in question, all of which go well beyond expressing an \"opinion\" about the merits of a claim. Instead, as detailed in the\n\n2 Capitalized terms used but not defined herein have the meanings set forth in the Motion.\n\n3 To remove any doubt as to the accuracy of the translations, Movants are also filing, concurrently with the Reply, a declaration (the \"Barron Declaration\") attaching certified translations of the social media posts and the video quoted in the Motion.\n\n4 AP Obj. ¶ 6.\n\nMotion, the Individual Debtor and his followers are clearly maligning an individual creditor (accusing her of \"gangster behavior,\" \"lying,\" being a \"little bastard,\" etc.) and exposing personal information about her (including a copy of her German ID card), not addressing the merits of her claim. Worse, the Individual Debtor is not limiting his *ad hominem* attacks to one particular creditor, but threatens to expose personal information of \"every person who reports their case\" to the court. These are not merely \"opinions\" about the merits of a claim, but clear threats directed at all creditors who file, have filed, or may file a proof of claim against the Individual Debtor. 5\n\n2. Nor are the Individual Debtor's statements that his followers could \"become billionaire[s]\" by filing proofs of claim innocent musings of an out-of-possession debtor. Whatever the import of this statement viewed in isolation, it must be read and understood in the larger context of the Individual Debtor's well-documented harassment campaign directed at the Trustee and his largest unsecured creditor, as orchestrated through his web of related organizations that \"serve as business vehicles to the [Individual] Debtor\" and whose members are \"personally loyal to the [Individual] Debtor.\" 6 Here, again, the Individual Debtor is using his social media presence and his related organizations to rally his followers to file frivolous claims in an attempt to throw the claims process into disarray. Through this lens, it is obvious\n\n5 The Individual Debtor asserts that Movants' \"concerns about personal information do[] not make sense in the context of the claims process, which requires claimants to include their name and address on the court docket if they file a claim.\" AP Obj. ¶ 8. While it is true that creditors who file their proofs of claim with the Court's claims registry are publicly disclosing their names and contact information, this certainly does not mean that they also assume the risk that other personal information not included in their claims (such as an ID card or passport) will be disclosed by the Individual Debtor or persons in active concert or participation with the Individual Debtor. Nor do they assume the risk that they will become the target of a social media harassment campaign.\n\n6 *Corrected Memorandum of Decision Granting in Part Motion For Preliminary Injunction* [Main Case Docket No. 133] (the \"Preliminary Injunction Decision\") ¶ 7. These organizations include all the entities associated with \"the Whistleblower Movement, NFSC, ROLF, GSeries, and Himalaya.\" *Id.*\n\nthat the Individual Debtor's latest antics are simply a continuation of the very conduct that this\n\nCourt previously found \"embarrass[es], burden[s], delay[s] or otherwise impede[s] the\n\nreorganization proceedings.\" 7\n\n3. If any further proof of the Individual Debtor's intention of flooding the claims\n\nregister with frivolous claims were necessary, it was supplied by an article posted on GNews on\n\nJanuary 25, 2023:8\n\nMr. Guo suggested that all the comrades could register because they had invested in GTV, but GTV was pseudo-classed as a fraudulent case and the SEC investigated it, so the money invested by the comrades had been withheld from the SEC, and the comrades were looking for money from the SEC, but in the bankruptcy case, the comrades could register as creditors of Mr. Guo. accept the registration of other comrades. *If all the comrades go to register, they will make up the majority of the creditors, then the money Mr. Guo earned will be distributed to the comrades, which Mr. Guo is very willing to do. In addition war buddies as the majority can initiate the ownership of lady may ship and the 18th floor, is also the majority will be given to the hands of war buddies, such a way of handling, all happy*. In addition, after the registration of creditors, is to testify in court, some can not get a visa to come to the United States of war, can have a reasonable reason to come to the United States, if you do not want to leave, you can apply for political asylum on the spot. We can legally use the law to solve the problem.9\n\n4. There can also be no serious argument that preserving the integrity of the claims\n\nprocess (which is a key component of any bankruptcy case) is part and parcel of the Court's\n\ndirective that the Individual Debtor not \"interfere in any way with the integrity of [t]his Chapter\n\n7 Preliminary Injunction Decision at 41.\n\n8 As the Court previously found, the Individual Debtor \"founded and controls GNews.\" Memorandum Decision ¶ 3.\n\n9 *See Mr. Guo's wisdom: war veterans can all go to register creditors in bankruptcy* cases, GNews (January 25, 2023, 17:38 p.m.)[, http](http) (last accessed January 25, 2023) (emphasis added). A copy of the English version of the article (as posted on GNews' website) is attached as Exhibit 7 to the Barron Declaration.\n\n11 case.\"10 In this regard, the Court should reject the Individual Debtor's suggestion that the only conduct prohibited by the foregoing injunction is behavior that raises safety concerns because the Court included, as an example of such prohibited conduct, actions that threaten, or encourage others to threaten, the safety of the Trustee, PAX, and related persons. 11 It should go without saying that the word \"including\" is **not** limiting—indeed, this is one of the fundamental rules of construction of the Bankruptcy Code.12 In any event, posting a German ID card of a creditor and exposing other personal information does raise serious safety concerns. For all these reasons, and the reasons set forth in the Motion, Movants submit that there is substantial evidence that the Individual Debtor and others in active concert or participation with the Individual Debtor are violating the Preliminary Injunction Order by interfering with the integrity of the claims process.\n\n5. Finally, the Court should reject the Individual Debtor's argument that Movants are seeking to short-circuit the process of finding the Individual Debtor in contempt.13 The Motion is not requesting that the Court hold the Individual Debtor in contempt, but Movants recognize that the Court has the discretion to do so, if it is satisfied that the statements by the Individual Debtor and his followers are a clear violation of the Preliminary Injunction Order. For these reasons, Movants defer to the Court as to whether the Individual Debtor should be held in contempt based on the facts presented.\n\n10 Preliminary Injunction Order ¶ 2.\n\n11 AP Obj. ¶ 4.\n\n12 11 U.S.C. § 102(3) (\"'includes' and 'including' are not limiting\").\n\n13 AP Obj. ¶ 5\n\n### **B. Individual Debtor's Claims Objections Should Be Quashed Because He Has No Right to Object to Claims**\n\n6. The Individual Debtor continues to press his argument that the surplus analysis in which a debtor out of possession has standing only if there will be a surplus in the estate does not apply in chapter 11.14 In doing so, however, he ignores the multiple cases cited in the Motion that demonstrate the opposite: courts have consistently applied the surplus analysis to standing in a chapter 11 case.15\n\n7. The Individual Debtor relies on *McCorhill*, another case cited in the Motion, but then goes on to selectively quote (and ultimately misunderstand the holding of) that case.16 As explained in the Motion, the out-of-possession chapter 11 debtor in *McCorhill* sought to assert certain claims that would have \"create[d] an equity for the debtor,\" *Kraus-Thomson Org., Ltd. v. McCorhill Publ'g, Inc. (In re McCorhill Publ'g, Inc.)*, 89 B.R. 393, 396, and the court allowed the debtor to bring those claims to \"protect [those] equity interests, if any.\" *Id.* at 396. 17 This is entirely consistent with and, in fact, supports the Trustee's point that the Individual Debtor does **not** have the right to object to claims because there is no surplus here and the Claims Objections, even if successful, would not create a surplus.\n\n8. Ignoring this, the Individual Debtor cites to *McCorhill* in an attempt to support his argument that he has standing to file a plan and, therefore, has standing to file a claim\n\n14 Main Case Obj. ¶¶ 15-25.\n\n15 For example, the Individual Debtor ignores the Trustee's citations to *In re Visiting Nurse Ass'n*, 176 B.R. 748, 750 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995) and *In re Olympia Off. LLC*, 574 B.R. 38, 46 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2017), even though in both of these chapter 11 cases the court recognized that principles of prudential standing limit claim objections in a chapter 11 case. *See* Mot. ¶¶ 24, 25.\n\n16 Main Case Obj. ¶ 21.\n\n17 The court also held that the \"debtor's counsel must look beyond this estate for any compensation unless the debtor's efforts succeed in producing an equity for the debtor.\" *In re McCorhill Publ'g, Inc., 89 B.R.* at 396.\n\nobjection.18 However, the court in *McCorhill* reached the exact opposite conclusion: while an out-of-possession debtor \"continues to be regarded as a party in interest for plan filing purposes[,] *[n]onetheless*, the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1104 terminates the debtor in possession's trustee-like authority under 11 U.S.C. § 1107.\" *In re McCorhill Publ'g, Inc.*, 89 B.R. at 396 (emphasis added). And for those purposes—*i.e.*, purposes of the trustee-like authority under section 1107, including the authority to object to a proof of claim—\"the debtor has a pecuniary interest in the equity of the estate *if* all the creditors can be paid in full.\" *Id.* at 396 (emphasis added).\n\n9. The Individual Debtor also cites to section 1109 of the Bankruptcy Code, which allows \"parties in interest\" to be heard on matters in the bankruptcy case. This, however, ignores a fundamental point: an out-of-possession debtor is not a \"party in interest\" because it has no interest to protect. This is exactly the distinction made by *McCorhill*, which recognized that an out-of-possession debtor is \"regarded as a party in interest *for plan filing purposes*,\" but not for the \"trustee-like authority under [section 1107 of the Bankruptcy Code].\" *Id.* (emphasis added).\n\n10. The reason for this is the structure of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 1106 of the Bankruptcy Code imposes certain obligations on a bankruptcy trustee, including the obligation to \"perform the duties of the trustee\" appointed under section 704(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1). One of those duties is to examine and object to proofs of claim—but only if a purpose would be served in doing so.\n\n11. Under section 1107 of the Bankruptcy Code, as long as a chapter 11 debtor remains in possession, the debtor retains the authority to act as trustee. However, \"the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1104 terminates the debtor in\n\n18 Main Case Obj. ¶ 21.\n\npossession's trustee-like authority under 11 U.S.C. § 1107.\" *McCorhill Publ'g, Inc.*, 89 B.R. at 396. At that point, \"the appointed Chapter 11 trustee then assumes the duties expressed in 11 U.S.C. § 1106, including most of the duties specified in 11 U.S.C. § 704.\" *Id.* The Bankruptcy Code does not contemplate that a chapter 11 trustee would be required to share the powers, and obligations, of section 704 with an out-of-possession debtor. That would be an absurd result that would be inconsistent with the basic structure of the Bankruptcy Code and would also undermine the effective administration of the estate. To the contrary, an out-of-possession chapter 11 debtor can exercise the powers granted to a chapter 11 trustee only where he \"possesses a direct pecuniary interest the estate which *would not implicate the rights of the Chapter 11 trustee*.\" *Id.* (emphasis added).\n\n12. None of the other cases cited in the Main Case Objection help the Individual Debtor. For example, the Individual Debtor cites *Frontier Insurance* for the proposition that a \"party in interest\" should not be construed more narrowly for claims objections. Yet this ignores the very next sentence in the decision, in which the court explained that \"[p]arties in interest for the purpose of claims objections 'include not only the debtor, *but anyone who has a legally protected interest that could be affected by a bankruptcy proceeding*.'\"19 (emphasis added). In other words, anyone—like the Individual Debtor—who has failed to show that the proofs of claim at issue affect their interests has no such standing. *See In re Standard Insulations, Inc*., 138 B.R. 947, 950 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992) (stating under section 502, \"[t]he phrase 'parties in interest' applies to those who have some interest in the assets of the debtor being administered in the case\") (internal quotations omitted); *see also In re Quintero*, 513 B.R. 127, 133 (Bankr.\n\n19 *See* Main Case Obj. ¶ 19 (citing *Frontier Ins. Co. v. Westport Ins. Corp. (In re Black)*, 460 B.R. 407, 413 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2011) (emphasis added).\n\nD.N.M. 2014) (\"Typically, a debtor is not a 'party in interest' within the meaning of § 502(a) because the debtor will not receive a distribution from estate assets, and therefore has no 'pecuniary interest' in the outcome of the claim objection.\").\n\n13. But even if the Individual Debtor were to qualify as a \"party in interest\" under sections 1109 and 502 of the Bankruptcy Code, that would not, on its own, enable the Individual Debtor to prosecute the Claims Objections. Numerous courts have held that, even for a \"party in interest,\" the right to object to claims is not an unbridled right—nor could it be, as an unbridled right would wreak havoc on case administration. *See, e.g.*, *In re Dow Corning Corp.*, 244 B.R. 721, 750 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999) (\"While the [unsecured creditors' committee] is a 'party in interest' under § 502 with the right to object to other creditors' claims, it is well-settled that the right nevertheless has limits.\") (subsequent history omitted); *see generally In re James Wilson Assocs.*, 965 F.2d 160, 169 (7th Cir. 1992) (\"But we do not think that this section was intended to waive other limitations on standing, such as that the claimant be within the class of intended beneficiaries of the statute that he is relying on for his claim, although a literal reading of section 1109(b) would support such an interpretation.\"); *In re Abengoa Bioenergy Biomass of Kansas, LLC*, No. 16-10446, 2018 WL 2138620, at \\*3 (Bankr. D. Kan. May 7, 2018) (\"While the debtor's other creditors may make objections to the allowance of a claim, the demands of orderly and expeditious administration have led to a recognition that the right to object is generally exercised by the trustee. Pursuant to § 502(a) of the Code, however, any party in interest may object to a claim. But under § 704 the trustee, if any purpose would be served thereby, has the duty to, examine proofs of claim and object to improper claims.\") (discussing comments to Bankruptcy Rule 3007) (internal quotations omitted).20 The reason for this limitation is\n\n20 *See also In re Simon*, 179 B.R. 1, 7 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995) (\"if every creditor were entitled to challenge the claim of another creditor filed in a particular case, an orderly administration could degrade to chaos\"); *In re*\n\nstraightforward: \"If every creditor were entitled to challenge the claim of another creditor an orderly administration could degrade to chaos.\" *In re Ampal-Am. Israel Corp.*, 545 B.R. 802, 809 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016) (citing *In re Sinclair's Suncoast Seafood, Inc.*, 140 B.R. 588 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992) (as modified)). 21\n\n14. The foregoing analysis is not affected by the Individual Debtor's assessment that claims based on the issuance of Himalaya Coins are \"at the very core of the Debtor's reorganization.\"22 Even assuming that is the case, it would **not** advance the administration of these chapter 11 cases to allow the Individual Debtor to object to these claims before the Trustee has had the opportunity to analyze these claims, in a holistic fashion, and after he has completed his investigation into the Debtor's financial affairs, **particularly** as it relates to the Debtor's relationship with Himalaya and the issuance of Himalaya Coins. Allowing the Individual Debtors to file *ad hoc* objections to these types of claims does not advance the resolution of these complex issues or the administrations of these cases—and this is especially true when viewed in light of the Individual Debtor's out-of-court antics directed at the very creditors that are asserting claims based on the issuance of Himalaya Coins.23\n\n*Thompson*, 965 F.2d 1136, 1147 (1st Cir. 1992) (\"absent leave of court, the chapter 7 trustee alone may interpose objections to proofs of claim\"); *In re Chi. Invs., LLC*, 470 B.R. 32 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012) (concerns for orderly administration \"echo those raised by the First Circuit in the context of Chapter 7\").\n\n21 The judge-made limitation on claim objections comes up most frequently in the context of one creditor objecting to the claim of another. But creditors, by definition, have a pecuniary interest in the estate and are **even still** limited in their right to bring claim objections. In fact, in the *Dow Corning* case discussed above, the court applied this limitation to an official committee. Certainly, then, an out-of-possession debtor with no such pecuniary interest should have no greater rights under section 1109 than other creditors.\n\n22 Main Case Obj. ¶ 16.\n\n23 It is also of no moment that the Individual Debtor's stated motivation for objecting to claims based on the issuance of Himalaya Coin is to eliminate claims that he views as illegitimate in order to return to his preferred settlement structure. As noted, whether such claims are, in fact, legitimate can only be determined in a holistic fashion.\n\n# **C. Individual Debtor Should Be Barred From Filing Objections to Claims Absent Leave of Court**\n\n15. The Individual Debtor does not dispute that Movants' request for a limited prefiling order (as it relates to the filing of objections to claims) is governed by the multi-factor test laid out by the Second Circuit in *Safir v. U.S. Lines, Inc.*, 792 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1986). The Individual Debtor asserts, however, that the *Safir* factors do not support the requested relief and further asserts, with no sense of irony, that \"the Debtor has not demonstrated any improper conduct through his filings with the Court.\"\n\n16. The Individual Debtor's proclivity for interfering with the Trustee's investigation and the administration of these chapter 11 cases has already been well documented, including in the memorandum decision issued by this Court in connection with the Preliminary Injunction Order. In fact, only yesterday, the Court issued the *Order Granting Motion to Hold Debtor in Contempt of Corporate Governance Order* [Docket No. 1372] (the \"Ace Decade Contempt Order\"). In that order, the Court found that the Individual Debtor acted in bad faith, including by (i) failing to comply with the corporate governance order [Docket No. 717] and (ii) taking one position in court pleadings and during deposition and then abandoning that position. 24 As a result of these findings and the Individual Debtor's bad faith, the Court held the Individual Debtor in civil contempt and ordered him to cure the contempt or be sanctioned to pay the fees and costs the Trustee was forced to incur in pursuing compliance with the Corporate Governance Order.\n\n17. Movants submit that based on the record of these chapter 11 cases, including the Preliminary Injunction Order and the Ace Decade Contempt Order, the *Safir* test has been easily\n\n24 Ace Decade Contempt Order at 13.\n\nsatisfied, and, accordingly, Movants request that the Individual Debtor be required to seek leave of court to file objections to claims is appropriate and necessary.\n\n[*Remainder of page intentionally left blank.*]\n\nWHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the Movants respectfully request that the Court\n\noverrule the Objections and enter the Proposed Order granting the relief requested in the Motion\n\nand such other relief as is just and proper.\n\n# Dated: January 25, 2023 LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE, New Haven, Connecticut GENEVER HOLDINGS LLC, AND GENEVER HOLDINGS CORPORATION\n\nBy: */s/ Patrick R. Linsey*\n\nDouglas S. Skalka (ct00616) Patrick R. Linsey (ct29437) NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 781-2847 dskalka@npmlaw.com plinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n*and*\n\nNicholas A. Bassett (admitted *pro hac vice*) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C., 20036 (202) 551-1902 nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n*and*\n\nAvram E. Luft (admitted *pro hac vice*) G. Alexander Bongartz (admitted *pro hac vice*) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6079 aviluft@paulhastings.com alexbongartz@paulhastings.com\n\n*Counsel for the Chapter 11 Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and Genever Holdings Corporation*\n\n| UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT |\n|--------------------------------|\n| DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT |\n| BRIDGEPORT DIVISION |\n\n| ----------------------------------------------------------- | | x | | |\n|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|--|\n| In re: | 1 | :
:
: | Chapter 11 | |\n| HO WAN KWOK,
et al., | | :
: | Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) | |\n| | Debtors. | :
: | (Jointly Administered) | |\n| -----------------------------------------------------------
PACIFIC ALLIANCE ASIA
OPPORTUNITY FUND L.P.,
v.
HO WAN KWOK, | Plaintiff, | x
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
: | Adv. Proceeding No. 22-05032 (JAM) | |\n| | Defendant. | :
:
: | | |\n| -----------------------------------------------------------
x
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE | | | | |\n\nThe undersigned certifies that on January 25, 2023, the foregoing Reply, and the Second Declaration of Douglass Barron filed contemporaneously therewith (including all exhibits thereto), was sent by e-mail to all parties able to receive electronic notice by operation of the Court's electronic filing system (\"CM/ECF\"). Parties may access these filings by CM/ECF.\n\n*[THE REST OF THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK.]*\n\n1 The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and the Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\nDated: January 25, 2023 New Haven, Connecticut\n\n> By: */s/ Patrick R. Linsey* Patrick R. Linsey (ct29437) NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 821-2000 plinsey@npmlaw.com","body_zh":"美国破产法院\n康涅狄格州地区\n布里奇波特分庭\n\nx\n\n关于：\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），\n等，　：\n：\n：\n：\n：　第11章\n案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n\nPACIFIC ALLIANCE ASIA\nOPPORTUNITY FUND L.P.（太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金有限合伙），\n诉　债务人。\n：\n：\nx\n\n原告，\n：\n：\n：　（联合管理）\n对抗性程序案号：22-05032 (JAM)\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），\n\n被告。\n：\n：\nx\n\n第11章受托人及GENEVER债务人提交的综合答复：（一）支持其紧急动议，请求作出命令：（A）强制个人债务人就债权程序遵守初步禁令；（B）撤销个人债务人对债权提出的异议；及（C）禁止个人债务人在未经法院许可的情况下进一步对债权提出异议；以及（二）回应异议\n\n致尊敬的美国破产法院法官 Julie A. Manning（朱莉·A.·曼宁）：\n\nLuc Despins（吕克·德斯潘）以其在 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（“个人债务人”或“被告”）第11章案件中获任命的第11章受托人（“受托人”）身份，Genever Holdings\n\n1 本第11章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（又名 Guo Wengui、Miles Guo 和 Miles Kwok，以及众多其他别名）（税务识别号码后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（吉尼弗控股有限责任公司）（税务识别号码后四位：8202）及 Genever Holdings Corporation（吉尼弗控股公司）。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 及 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为 Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166，收件人：Luc A. Despins，作为 Ho Wan Kwok 遗产的受托人（仅用于通知和通信）。\n\nCorporation（“Genever (BVI)”），以及 Genever Holdings LLC（“Genever (US)”；与受托人及 Genever (BVI) 合称“动议方”），谨提交本综合答复（“答复”），以（a）支持《第11章受托人及 Genever 债务人请求作出命令的紧急动议：（A）强制个人债务人就债权程序遵守初步禁令；（B）撤销个人债务人对债权提出的异议；及（C）禁止个人债务人在未经法院许可的情况下进一步对债权提出异议》[主案件案卷编号 1345]（“动议”）2，以及（b）回应（i）个人债务人在主第11章案件中提交的异议[主案件案卷编号 1380]（“主案件异议”），及（ii）个人债务人在本对抗性程序中提交的异议[对抗性程序案卷编号 154]（“对抗程序异议”；与主案件异议合称“异议”）。为支持本答复，动议方谨陈述如下。\n\n答复\n\nA. 法院应强制个人债务人遵守初步禁令命令\n\n1. 首先，两项异议均未质疑动议中详述的个人债务人（及其追随者）所作陈述的准确性，包括该等陈述的非正式英文译文。3 尽管如此，个人债务人主张，他仅是在“就其认为毫无根据的某项特定债权的正当性发表其意见”。4 这是对有关陈述的明显歪曲；所有该等陈述均远不止于就一项债权的是非曲直表达“意见”。相反，如动议中详述，\n\n2 本文中使用但未定义的首字母大写术语具有动议中规定的含义。\n\n3 为消除对译文准确性的任何疑虑，动议方亦与本答复同时提交一份声明（“Barron 声明”），并附上动议中引用的社交媒体帖子及视频的认证译文。\n\n4 对抗程序异议第 6 段。\n\n动议中所述，个人债务人及其追随者显然正在诋毁一名个人债权人（指控其有“黑帮行为”、“撒谎”、是“小混蛋”等），并披露其个人信息（包括其德国身份证副本），而非针对其债权的是非曲直。更糟的是，个人债务人并未将其人身攻击限于某一特定债权人，而是威胁要向法院披露“每一位申报其案件之人”的个人信息。这些并非仅是关于债权是非曲直的“意见”，而是针对所有已对、正在对或可能对个人债务人提交债权证明的债权人的明确威胁。5\n\n2. 个人债务人关于其追随者可通过提交债权证明“成为亿万富翁”的陈述，也并非失去占有的债务人的无辜遐想。无论孤立地看该陈述有何含义，其必须在更广泛的背景下加以阅读和理解：个人债务人通过其关联组织网络，对受托人及其最大无担保债权人实施有据可查的骚扰行动；该等组织“充当[个人]债务人的商业工具”，其成员“个人上忠于[个人]债务人”。6 在此，个人债务人再次利用其社交媒体影响力及其关联组织，动员其追随者提交无理债权，企图使债权程序陷入混乱。通过这一视角，显而易见，\n\n5 个人债务人主张，动议方“对个人信息的担忧在债权程序的背景下没有意义，因为债权人如提交债权，必须在法院案卷中载明其姓名和地址。”对抗程序异议第 8 段。虽然向法院债权登记簿提交债权证明的债权人确实公开披露了其姓名及联系信息，但这当然并不意味着他们也承担如下风险：其债权中未包含的其他个人信息（例如身份证或护照）将由个人债务人或与个人债务人积极共同行动或参与之人披露。他们也并未承担成为社交媒体骚扰行动目标的风险。\n\n6 《部分准许初步禁令动议的更正决定备忘录》[主案件案卷编号 133]（“初步禁令决定”）第 7 段。这些组织包括与“the Whistleblower Movement（吹哨人运动）、NFSC、ROLF、GSeries 和 Himalaya（喜马拉雅）”有关联的所有实体。同上。\n\n个人债务人最近的荒唐行径仅是对本法院此前认定“使重整程序尴尬、加重负担、拖延或以其他方式妨碍”的行为的延续。7\n\n3. 如还需要任何进一步证据证明个人债务人意图以无理债权淹没债权登记簿，GNews 于 January 25, 2023 发布的一篇文章已提供了该证据：8\n\n郭先生建议，所有战友都可以登记，因为他们投资了 GTV，但 GTV 被伪定性为欺诈案件，SEC 对其进行了调查，因此战友投资的钱被 SEC 扣留，战友正向 SEC 要钱，但在破产案件中，战友可以登记为郭先生的债权人。接受其他战友的登记。如果所有战友都去登记，他们将构成债权人的多数，那么郭先生赚的钱将分配给战友，郭先生非常愿意这样做。此外，战友作为多数可以发起对女士船和第18层的所有权，多数也将交到战友手中，这样处理，皆大欢喜。此外，债权人登记后，即可在法庭作证，一些无法获得签证来美国的战友，可以有合理理由来到美国；如果不想离开，可以当场申请政治庇护。我们可以合法地运用法律解决问题。9\n\n4. 也不可能存在任何严肃论点认为，维护债权程序的完整性（其为任何破产案件的关键组成部分）并非本法院指示个人债务人不得“以任何方式干扰本第11章案件完整性”的组成部分。10 就此而言，法院应驳回个人债务人的主张，即前述禁令所禁止的唯一行为是引发安全担忧的行为，因为法院以威胁或鼓励他人威胁受托人、PAX 及相关人员安全的行为作为该等被禁止行为的一个示例。11 不言而喻，“包括”一词并不具有限制性——事实上，这是《破产法》的基本解释规则之一。12 无论如何，发布一名债权人的德国身份证并披露其他个人信息确实会引发严重的安全担忧。基于所有上述理由及动议中所述理由，动议方主张，有充分证据表明，个人债务人及其他与个人债务人积极共同行动或参与之人，正通过干扰债权程序的完整性而违反初步禁令命令。\n\n5. 最后，法院应驳回个人债务人的论点，即动议方正试图绕过认定个人债务人藐视法庭的程序。13 动议并未请求法院认定个人债务人藐视法庭，但动议方承认，如法院确信个人债务人及其追随者的陈述明显违反初步禁令命令，法院有酌情权作出该认定。基于上述理由，动议方尊重法院就是否应根据所呈事实认定个人债务人藐视法庭所作的决定。\n\n10 初步禁令命令第 2 段。\n\n11 对抗程序异议第 4 段。\n\n12 11 U.S.C. § 102(3)（“‘includes’和‘including’不具有限制性”）。\n\n13 对抗程序异议第 5 段。\n\nB. 应撤销个人债务人对债权提出的异议，因为其无权对债权提出异议\n\n6. 个人债务人继续坚持其论点，即失去占有的债务人仅在遗产中将有剩余时才具有诉讼资格的剩余分析不适用于第11章案件。14 然而，在此过程中，他无视动议中引用的多个证明相反结论的案件：法院一贯将剩余分析适用于第11章案件中的诉讼资格。15\n\n7. 个人债务人援引 McCorhill——动议中引用的另一案件——但随后选择性地引用（并最终误解该案件的裁判要旨）。16 如动议中所解释，McCorhill 案中失去占有的第11章债务人试图主张某些将会“为债务人创设权益”的请求权，Kraus-Thomson Org., Ltd. v. McCorhill Publ'g, Inc. (In re McCorhill Publ'g, Inc.), 89 B.R. 393, 396，而法院允许该债务人提出该等请求权，以“保护[该等]权益，如有”。同上，第 396 页。17 这完全符合并且事实上支持受托人的观点，即个人债务人无权对债权提出异议，因为本案不存在剩余，即使债权异议成功，也不会产生剩余。\n\n8. 个人债务人无视这一点，援引 McCorhill，试图支持其主张：其有资格提交一项计划，因此有资格提交一项债权\n\n15 例如，个别债务人无视受托人对 In re Visiting Nurse Ass'n, 176 B.R. 748, 750 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995) 和 In re Olympia Off. LLC, 574 B.R. 38, 46 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2017) 的引用，尽管法院在这两起 chapter 11 案件中均确认，审慎性诉讼资格原则限制了 chapter 11 案件中的债权异议。见动议 ¶¶ 24, 25。\n\n16 主案异议 ¶ 21。\n\n17 法院还裁定，“除非债务人的努力成功为债务人产生剩余权益，否则债务人的律师必须从本财产之外寻求任何报酬。”In re McCorhill Publ'g, Inc., 89 B.R. at 396。\n\n异议。18 然而，McCorhill 案的法院得出了恰恰相反的结论：尽管非占有债务人“就提交计划而言，仍被视为利害关系方[,] [n]onetheless，根据 11 U.S.C. § 1104 任命 Chapter 11 受托人，终止了占有债务人根据 11 U.S.C. § 1107 所具有的类似受托人的权限。”In re McCorhill Publ'g, Inc., 89 B.R. at 396（强调部分为原文所加）。就该等目的而言——即根据第 1107 条享有类似受托人的权限的目的，包括对债权申报提出异议的权限——“如果能够全额清偿所有债权人，则债务人对财产中的剩余权益具有金钱利益。”Id. at 396（强调部分为原文所加）。\n\n9. 个别债务人还援引《破产法》第 1109 条，该条允许“利害关系方”就破产案件中的事项陈述意见。然而，这忽略了一个基本要点：非占有债务人并非“利害关系方”，因为其没有需要保护的利益。这正是 McCorhill 所作出的区分；该案确认，非占有债务人“就提交计划而言被视为利害关系方”，但并非就“根据[《破产法》第 1107 条]享有的类似受托人的权限”而言。Id.（强调部分为原文所加）。\n\n10. 其原因在于《破产法》的结构。《破产法》第 1106 条对破产受托人施加若干义务，包括履行根据《破产法》第 704(a) 条任命的“受托人的职责”的义务。11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)。其中一项职责是审查并对债权申报提出异议——但仅限于这样做能够实现某项目的的情形。\n\n11. 根据《破产法》第 1107 条，只要 chapter 11 债务人仍处于占有状态，债务人即保留以受托人身份行事的权限。然而，“根据 11 U.S.C. § 1104 任命 Chapter 11 受托人，终止了占有债务人根据 11 U.S.C. § 1107 所具有的类似受托人的权限。”McCorhill Publ'g, Inc., 89 B.R. at 396。届时，“被任命的 Chapter 11 受托人随即承担 11 U.S.C. § 1106 所规定的职责，包括 11 U.S.C. § 704 规定的大部分职责。”Id.《破产法》并未设想 chapter 11 受托人须与非占有债务人分享第 704 条规定的权力和义务。那将产生荒谬的结果，既与《破产法》的基本结构不一致，也会损害对财产的有效管理。相反，非占有的 chapter 11 债务人仅在其“对财产具有直接的金钱利益，且该利益不会涉及 Chapter 11 受托人的权利”时，方可行使授予 chapter 11 受托人的权力。Id.（强调部分为原文所加）。\n\n18 主案异议 ¶ 21。\n\n12. 主案异议中引用的其他任何案件均无助于个别债务人。例如，个别债务人援引 Frontier Insurance，主张就债权异议而言，不应对“利害关系方”作更狭义的解释。然而，这忽略了该判决中的紧接下一句，法院在该句中解释：“就债权异议而言，‘利害关系方’不仅包括债务人，还包括任何可能受破产程序影响、具有受法律保护利益的人。”19（强调部分为原文所加）。换言之，任何人——例如个别债务人——如未能证明所涉债权申报影响其利益，即不具有该等诉讼资格。见 In re Standard Insulations, Inc., 138 B.R. 947, 950 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992)（根据第 502 条指出，“‘利害关系方’一语适用于对本案中正在管理的债务人资产具有某种利益者”）（略去内部引文）；另见 In re Quintero, 513 B.R. 127, 133 (Bankr.\n\n19 见主案异议 ¶ 19（引自 Frontier Ins. Co. v. Westport Ins. Corp. (In re Black), 460 B.R. 407, 413 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2011)（强调部分为原文所加））。\n\nD.N.M. 2014)（“通常，债务人并非 § 502(a) 所称的‘利害关系方’，因为债务人不会从财产资产中获得分配，因而对债权异议的结果不具有‘金钱利益’。”）。\n\n13. 但即使个别债务人符合《破产法》第 1109 条和第 502 条规定的“利害关系方”资格，这本身也不会使个别债务人能够推进债权异议。众多法院已裁定，即使对于“利害关系方”而言，对债权提出异议的权利也不是不受限制的权利——且不可能是，因为不受限制的权利将会对案件管理造成严重混乱。见，例如，In re Dow Corning Corp., 244 B.R. 721, 750 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999)（“尽管[无担保债权人委员会]是 § 502 所规定的有权对其他债权人的债权提出异议的‘利害关系方’，但已确定无疑的是，该权利仍有限制。”）（略去后续历史）；一般见 In re James Wilson Assocs., 965 F.2d 160, 169 (7th Cir. 1992)（“但我们认为，该条款无意放弃对诉讼资格的其他限制，例如，申请人必须属于其为支持其请求所援引法规的预期受益人类别，尽管对第 1109(b) 条作字面解读会支持这种解释。”）；In re Abengoa Bioenergy Biomass of Kansas, LLC, No. 16-10446, 2018 WL 2138620, at \\*3 (Bankr. D. Kan. May 7, 2018)（“尽管债务人的其他债权人可以对债权的准许提出异议，但有序且迅速管理的要求已导致人们承认，提出异议的权利通常由受托人行使。然而，根据《法典》§ 502(a)，任何利害关系方均可对债权提出异议。但根据 § 704，受托人如认为这样做可实现某项目的，则负有审查债权申报并对不当债权提出异议的职责。”）（讨论《破产程序规则》3007 条评注）（略去内部引文）。20 该限制的原因是\n\n20 另见 In re Simon, 179 B.R. 1, 7 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995)（“若每一债权人均有权质疑在特定案件中提交的另一债权人的债权，则有序管理可能退化为混乱”）；In re\n\n很直接：“若每一债权人均有权质疑另一债权人的债权，有序管理可能退化为混乱。”In re Ampal-Am. Israel Corp., 545 B.R. 802, 809 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016)（引自 In re Sinclair's Suncoast Seafood, Inc., 140 B.R. 588 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992)（经修正））。21\n\n14. 个别债务人认为，基于发行 Himalaya Coins 的债权“处于债务人重组的绝对核心”，该评估并不影响上述分析。22 即使假定情况确实如此，在受托人有机会以整体方式分析这些债权，并在其完成对债务人财务事务的调查之后，尤其是就债务人与 Himalaya 之间的关系及 Himalaya Coins 的发行而言，允许个别债务人对这些债权提出异议，也不会促进这些 chapter 11 案件的管理。允许个别债务人就此类债权临时提出异议，既不会促进这些复杂问题的解决，也不会促进这些案件的管理——鉴于个别债务人在法庭外针对那些基于发行 Himalaya Coins 主张债权的债权人所实施的行径，这一点尤为明显。23\n\nThompson, 965 F.2d 1136, 1147 (1st Cir. 1992)（“除非法院准许，唯有 chapter 7 受托人可以对债权申报提出异议”）；In re Chi. Invs., LLC, 470 B.R. 32 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012)（对有序管理的关切“与第一巡回法院在 Chapter 7 情形下提出的关切相呼应”）。\n\n21 对债权异议的判例法限制最常出现于一名债权人对另一名债权人的债权提出异议的情形。但债权人，按定义而言，对财产具有金钱利益，且其提出债权异议的权利仍受到限制。实际上，在上文所讨论的 Dow Corning 案中，法院将该限制适用于一个正式委员会。因此，不具有该等金钱利益的非占有债务人，根据第 1109 条当然不应享有比其他债权人更大的权利。\n\n22 主案异议 ¶ 16。\n\n23 个别债务人声称其对基于发行 Himalaya Coin 的债权提出异议的动机，是为消除其认为不合法的债权，以恢复其偏好的和解结构，这同样无关紧要。如前所述，该等债权事实上是否合法，只能以整体方式予以确定。\n\nC. 个别债务人应被禁止在未经法院许可的情况下提交债权异议\n\n15. 个别债务人不争议，动议申请人提出的有限预先提交命令请求（就提交债权异议而言）受第二巡回法院在 Safir v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1986) 中确立的多因素检验所规制。然而，个别债务人主张 Safir 因素不支持所请求的救济，并且毫无讽刺意味地进一步主张，“债务人未通过其向法院提交的文件表现出任何不当行为。”\n\n16. 个别债务人干扰受托人调查及这些 chapter 11 案件管理的倾向，已有充分记载，包括本院就初步禁令命令作出的备忘录裁决。事实上，就在昨日，法院发布了准许要求认定债务人藐视公司治理命令的动议的命令 [Docket No. 1372]（“Ace Decade 藐视命令”）。在该命令中，法院认定个别债务人存在恶意行为，包括：(i) 未遵守公司治理命令 [Docket No. 717]；以及 (ii) 在法庭文件及讯问期间采取一种立场，随后又放弃该立场。24 鉴于这些认定及个别债务人的恶意，法院认定个别债务人构成民事藐视，并命令其纠正藐视行为，否则将被制裁，支付受托人为寻求遵守公司治理命令而被迫发生的费用和成本。\n\n17. 动议申请人主张，基于这些 chapter 11 案件的记录，包括初步禁令命令和 Ace Decade 藐视命令，Safir 检验已轻易得到满足，因此，要求个别债务人在提交债权异议前寻求法院许可，乃属适当且必要。\n\n24 Ace Decade 藐视命令第 13 页。\n\n[本页其余部分特意留白。]\n\n因此，基于上述理由，动议申请人谨请法院\n\n驳回异议，并作出拟议命令，准予动议所请求的救济\n\n以及法院认为公正和适当的其他救济。\n\n日期：January 25, 2023 LUC A. DESPINS（卢克·A·德斯平斯），CHAPTER 11 受托人，New Haven, Connecticut，GENEVER HOLDINGS LLC，及 GENEVER HOLDINGS CORPORATION\n\n签署人：/s/ Patrick R. Linsey\n\nDouglas S. Skalka（道格拉斯·S·斯卡尔卡）（ct00616）Patrick R. Linsey（帕特里克·R·林赛）（ct29437）NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C.（诺伊伯特、佩佩与蒙泰斯专业公司）195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 781-2847 dskalka@npmlaw.com plinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n以及\n\nNicholas A. Bassett（尼古拉斯·A·巴塞特）（获准临时出庭）PAUL HASTINGS LLP（保罗·黑斯廷斯有限责任合伙律师事务所）2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C., 20036 (202) 551-1902 nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n以及\n\nAvram E. Luft（阿夫拉姆·E·卢夫特）（获准临时出庭）G. Alexander Bongartz（G·亚历山大·邦加茨）（获准临时出庭）PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6079 aviluft@paulhastings.com alexbongartz@paulhastings.com\n\n第11章受托人、Genever Holdings LLC（Genever控股有限责任公司）及Genever Holdings Corporation（Genever控股公司）的代理律师\n\n美国破产法院\n\n康涅狄格州联邦地区\n\n布里奇波特分院\n\n-----------------------------------------------------------　x\n\n关于：　1　：\n：\n：　第11章\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），\n等，　：\n：　案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人。　：\n：　（合并管理）\n\nPACIFIC ALLIANCE ASIA OPPORTUNITY FUND L.P.（太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金有限合伙企业），\n诉\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），　原告，　x\n\n：　对抗程序案号：22-05032 (JAM)\n被告。　：\n\nx\n送达证明\n\n下列签署人证明，于2023年1月25日，前述答复以及与其同时提交的Douglass Barron（道格拉斯·巴伦）的第二份声明（包括其所有附件），已通过电子邮件发送给因法院电子备案系统（“CM/ECF”）的运行而能够接收电子通知的所有当事人。当事人可通过CM/ECF查阅这些提交文件。\n\n[本页其余部分有意留白。]\n\n1 本第11章案件中的债务人为Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（亦称Guo Wengui（郭文贵）、Miles Guo（郭文贵）及Miles Kwok（郭文贵），并使用众多其他别名）（税务识别号码后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（税务识别号码后四位：8202）及Genever Holdings Corporation。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC及Genever Holdings Corporation的邮寄地址为Paul Hastings LLP，200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166，转交Luc A. Despins（吕克·A·德斯潘），作为Ho Wan Kwok遗产的受托人（仅用于通知和通信）。\n\n日期：2023年1月25日　康涅狄格州纽黑文\n\n签署人：/s/ Patrick R. Linsey\nPatrick R. Linsey（帕特里克·R·林赛）（ct29437）\nNEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C.\n195 Church Street, 13th Floor\nNew Haven, Connecticut 06510\n(203) 821-2000\nplinsey@npmlaw.com","key_entities":["Je","Kwok","Guo","Ho Wan Kwok","Himalaya","Despins","Paul Hastings","Miles Guo","GTV","CIPA","Luc Despins"],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":4262,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 18:33:13"}