{"id":"court_ctb_1400_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":1400,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION | In re:                                | Cha","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"## **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| In re:                                | Chapter 11              |\n|---------------------------------------|-------------------------|\n| HO WAN KWOK, et al.,                  | Case No: 22-50073 (JAM) |\n| Debtors.                              |                         |\n|                                       |                         |\n| HO WAN KWOK,                          |                         |\n| Movant,                               |                         |\n| v.                                    |                         |\n| LUC A. DESPINS,<br>CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE |                         |\n| Respondent.                           |                         |\n\n## **THE DEBTOR'S LIMITED OBJECTION TO CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF ORDER SEALING EXHIBIT A TO OBJECTION TO DEBTOR'S MOTION FOR ORDER REMOVING TRUSTEE AND RELATED RELIEF**\n\nHo Wan Kwok, the debtor (the \"Debtor\") in the above-captioned bankruptcy case (the \"Bankruptcy Case\"), by and through his undersigned attorneys, Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C., hereby submits his limited objection to Chapter 11 Trustee's Motion for Entry of Order Sealing **Exhibit A** to Objection to Debtor's Motion for Order Removing Trustee and Related Relief (Doc. No. 1328) (the \"Motion to Seal\"), filed by Luc. A. Despins, the Chapter 11 Trustee (the \"Trustee\") on January 13, 2023. In support of this objection, the Debtor respectfully represents as follows:\n\n## **I. Preliminary Statement**\n\n1. The Debtor does not oppose, generally, the Trustee's request to seal **Exhibit A** to the Trustee's Objection (Doc. No. 1326) (the \"Removal Objection\") filed in response to the Debtor's Motion for Order Removing the Trustee (Doc. No. 1274) (the \"Motion to Remove\").\n\nHowever, the Debtor objects to the Motion to Seal to the extent it seeks to deprive the Debtor, and, because the Debtor's counsel also represents HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC (\"HKI\") and Mei Guo (\"Ms. Guo\"), deprive HKI and Ms. Guo of their fundamental right to select their own counsel, communicate with their counsel and meaningfully participate in their defense of the Trustee's claims and allegations against them by precluding them from accessing an ostensibly confidential declaration (the \"Declaration\") and the identity of the declarant (the \"Anonymous Declarant,\" referred to collectively along with the \"Declaration\" as the \"Disputed Materials\"). The Trustee further seeks to violate the Debtor's, HKI's and Ms. Guo's rights by restricting access to the Confidential Materials solely to Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. (\"Z&Z\") and Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC (\"CSG\") and restricting those firms from sharing or discussing the Disputed Materials with anyone outside of their respective firms, including the Debtor, HKI and Ms. Guo. 1\n\n2. Critically, the Motion to Seal seeks to preclude the Debtor, HKI and Ms. Guo from accessing the advice and assistance of their counsel—and depriving their counsel of the advice and assistance of their clients—under a thinly veiled guise of a motion to seal information from the public. The relief sought through the Motion to Seal is all the more outrageous because the Trustee filed it in connection with the Removal Motion, a contested matter to which HKI and Ms. Guo are not even parties, and yet the Motion to Seal expressly seeks permission to provide the Disputed Materials to CGS under the misguided assumption that doing so will allow the Trustee to introduce the Declaration into evidence in the Trustee's Adversary Proceeding against\n\n<sup>1</sup> The undersigned counsel recognizes that HKI and Ms. Guo are not parties to this contested matter, and, therefore, files this limited objection on behalf of the Debtor only. However, because the Motion to Seal overtly seeks relief against HKI and Ms. Guo—and because the Debtor's counsel also represents HKI and Ms. Guo—this limited objection addresses the portions of the Motion to Seal that purport to deprive HKI and Ms. Guo (in addition to the Debtor) of their fundamental rights.\n\nHKI and Ms. Guo, Adv. Proc. No. 5:22-ap-5003, which has absolutely nothing to do with the Removal Proceeding. 2\n\n3. Moreover, the Trustee fails to articulate any basis, whatsoever, for (i) why the Disputed Materials are confidential; (ii) how the Declaration could conceivably be admissible until or unless the Debtor's, HKI's and Ms. Guo's counsel are afforded an opportunity to crossexamine the Anonymous Declarant; or (iii) how the Declaration could possibly be relevant to the Removal Motion or any other proceeding related to the Debtor's bankruptcy case, including the HK Adversary Proceeding.\n\n4. The Motion to Seal cites no authority for the relief sought by the Trustee because there is none. Simply stated, the Motion to Seal is merely the latest effort on the part of the Trustee to deprive the Debtor, HKI and Ms. Guo of their most basic rights as litigants, including due process. For these reasons, as more fully set forth below, the Debtor respectfully requests that the Court deny the Motion to Seal to the extent that it seeks to deprive the Debtor, HKI, Ms. Guo and certain of their chosen counsel from accessing the Disputed Material.\n\n### **II. Background**\n\n5. The Debtor presumes the Court's familiarity with the procedural posture of the Debtor's bankruptcy case and related proceedings.\n\n6. On October 6, 2022, this Court entered a stipulated protective order (Doc. No. 923) (the \"Protective Order\").\n\n7. The Protective Order prescribes two categories of discovery materials which are subject to the Protective Order: \"Confidential Material\" and \"Highly Confidential Material.\"\n\n<sup>2</sup> The Motion to seal incorrectly identifies CSG as the Debtor's counsel. CSG does not represent, and never has represented, the Debtor. Insofar as i) the Motion to Seal ostensibly concerns the Removal Motion and ii) HKI and Ms. Guo are not parties to the Removal Motion, it is unclear on what cognizable basis the Motion to Seal even mentions HKI, Ms. Guo or their lead counsel, CSG.\n\nProtective Order, at ¶¶ 5(a) and (b). Highly Confidential Material includes documents and information that \"is of such a nature that a risk of personal safety…would be created\" if disclosed. *Id.*, at ¶5(b). Confidential Material may be shared with parties (once certain prerequisites are satisfied) while Highly Confidential Material may be shared only with attorneys and certain enumerated persons, such as experts and court professionals. Parties, including the Debtor, may not access Highly Confidential material. Protective Order, at ¶¶ 9 and 10.\n\n8. Pursuant to the Protective Order, if a party seeks to file Designated Materials (as defined in the Protective Order) under seal, \"the Producing Party shall bear the burden of defending such sealing.\" *Id.,* at ¶ 13. Moreover, no provision of the Protective Order purports to allow a Producing Party to decide which of a Receiving Party's counsel may, or may not, receive Designated Materials.\n\n9. On September 23, 2022, the Trustee filed a prejudgment remedy application against HKI and Ms. Guo (the \"PJR Application\"). (Doc. No. 37). On October 17, 2022, the Trustee filed a motion for preliminary injunction against HKI and Ms. Guo (the \"Injunction Application\"). (Doc. No. 50). On or about November 29, 2022, the Trustee, Ms. Guo and HKI exchanged exhibits that they each intended or reserved the right to seek to introduce at the hearing on the PJR and Injunction Applications (the \"Proposed Exhibits\"). Upon information and belief, the Disputed Materials were not included in the Trustee's Proposed Exhibits.<sup>3</sup>\n\n10. On December 30, 2022, the Debtor filed the Motion to Remove.\n\n11. On January 13, 2023, the Trustee filed the Removal Objection on the public docket, other than the Disputed Materials, which the Trustee purports to seek to file under seal pursuant to Local Rule 5(e). In reality, the Trustee seeks restrictions that extend far beyond\n\n<sup>3</sup> The Debtor states that the Declaration was not included in the Trustee's Proposed Exhibits \"upon information and belief\" because the Debtor and his counsel (and HKI and Ms. Guo and their counsel) have not seen and cannot access the Declaration that was filed under seal.\n\nthose permitted by Local Rule 5(e), the restrictions mandated by the Protective Order, and basic principles of due process and fundamental fairness. The Trustee seeks this extraordinary relief based on nothing more than his unilaterally declared \"credible concerns about risks to the declarant's safety….\" (Motion to Seal, at ¶13). This assertion, if accepted by the Court, would effectively open the door to allow the Trustee to restrict the Debtor's, HKI's and Ms. Guo's access to all witnesses and introduce hearsay statements against them in Court while depriving the Debtor, HKI and Ms. Guo of their right to cross-examination and to present evidence to disprove those witnesses' allegations. Simply stated, the Trustee has offered nothing to suggest that the Anonymous Declarant has any particular or legitimate reason to fear for his or her safety or that the Debtor has ever physically harmed anyone for speaking out against his views.<sup>4</sup>\n\n12. Notably, the Trustee provides no authority for the relief that he seeks, articulates no basis or explanation for why he or the Anonymous Declarant purports to have \"credible concerns\" for the Anonymous Declarant's safety and fails to describe the general nature of the Anonymous Declarant's ostensible testimony. Moreover, the Trustee has not provided any explanation regarding, *inter alia*, how the Trustee came into contact with the Anonymous Declarant, who drafted the Declaration, the extent that the Trustee and/or his counsel participated in drafting the Anonymous Declaration or any other information concerning the Disputed Materials.\n\n<sup>4</sup> The only basis on which the Trustee even attempts to argue that the Anonymous Declarant has reason to fear for his or her safety is that the Debtor has allegedly caused internet posts identifying individuals who have interests adverse to his own, and he allegedly encouraged protests near certain persons' residences and places of businesses. Motion to Seal, at ¶ 13. The Trustee does not allege that the Debtor or anyone allegedly acting in connection with his views has engaged in or threatened physical violence. Moreover, the Trustee's rationale for precluding the Debtor from accessing the Disputed Materials applies to anyone who has ever spoken negatively of the Debtor.\n\n#### **III. Argument**\n\n13. It is well established that every litigant has \"the right… to participate in the process whereby justice is done -- to understand and become involved in the preceeding [*sic*], not to be compelled passively to await its outcome.\" *Doe v. District of Columbia*, 679 F.2d 1115, 1119-20 (D.C. Cir. 1983). \"[E]very litigant has a powerful interest in being able to retain and consult freely with an attorney.\" *Id.* at 1119. Moreover, \"[i]nsofar as the fair administration of justice requires that all parties to a controversy be fully and equally informed of their entitlements, the public has a similarly important interest in preserving the ability of each disputant to confer with his [or her] lawyer.\" *Id.* at 1119.\n\n14. When evidence is offered against a party, that party needs to have the opportunity \"to offer a credible defense\" to that evidence including, for example, additional facts to contextualize the evidence or evidence to discredit the statements of a declarant. *See Canadian Am. Oil Co. v. NLRB*, 82 F.3d 469, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1996). This can only be accomplished if the party can consult with their counsel concerning the identity of witnesses and the subject matter of the evidence they intend to present. *See id.* (stating that there is \"much room for an erroneous decision\" where an attorney is precluded from disclosing the identity of the other parties' witnesses testifying against their client). This is particularly true where the documents sought to be protected from a party \"lie at the very heart of\" the claims or counterclaims. *Prometheus Solutions v. Coker*, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201158, \\*18 (D.N.M. Apr. 1, 2015).\n\n15. Ultimately, a party \"should not be put in a position where they are essentially kept in the dark about important facts of the case.\" *Id.*, at \\*7 (quoting *DeFazio v. Hollister, Inc.*, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98147, \\*8 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2007)). While it is indisputably true that certain types of information may be restricted to the eyes of counsel, it is a \"drastic remedy\" that cannot\n\nbe used to deprive an individual party \"from reviewing the documents that lie at the heart of the case [in such a manner that] would severely restrict [a party's] right to participate in their own defense\" or interfere with counsel's ability to depose a witness. *Id.* at \\*8, \\*12. 5 At minimum, \"[a] party seeking relief under [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 26(c) must demonstrate the alleged harm 'with a particular and specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements.\" *Id*. at \\*6 (quoting *Nemir v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp.,* 381 F.3d 540, 550 (6th Cir. 2004) and *Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard*, 452 U.S. 89, 102 n.16 (1981)). \"That showing requires specific demonstrations of fact, supported where possible by concrete examples, rather than broad, conclusory allegations of potential harm.\" *Coker*, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201158, at \\*6.\n\n16. In *Doe v. District of Columbia*, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the District Court's \"protective order sharply curtailing the ability of appellants' counsel to discuss with their clients information obtained during discovery constituted . . . an abuse of discretion.\" *Doe,* 697 F.2d at 1118. In that case, the plaintiffs were a group of prison inmates who \"presented evidence of their exposure to the danger of violent and sexual abuse—a situation allegedly caused or exacerbated by understaffing, deficient security equipment and procedures, inadequate systems for classifying and segregating prisoners, and a poorly designated and deteriorating physical plant.\" *Id.* at 1117. On that basis, the District Count entered an order precluding the defendants' counsel from identifying to the defendants the identity of the plaintiffs' witnesses or the substance of their testimony. *Id.* at 1118-19.\n\n17. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia agreed with the District Court that the plaintiffs had more than adequately detailed \"the danger of retaliation to which they would be exposed if persons inside the prison learned of allegations they made,\" and that\n\n<sup>5</sup> Attorneys'-eyes-only designations are frequently used to protect trade secrets or other highly proprietary information, as distinguished from fact-based evidence that only the parties, as distinguished from counsel or expert witnesses, can understand. *Id.* at \\*8 n.3, \\*11-12.\n\nthose allegations \"were more than sufficient to show that 'substantial and serious harm' might well have resulted from dissemination of the information in question.\" *Id.* at 1121. The Court of Appeals further found that the District Court properly limited its order to specific \"designated areas of inquiry.\" *Id.* Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court abused its discretion because the District Court's protective order unfairly \"inhibited consultation between [defendants] and their attorneys.\" *Id.*\n\n18. *Doe* establishes that the case presently before the Court is not even a close call. Unlike in *Doe,* the Trustee does not allege that the Anonymous Declarant is living in a prison or under the control of the Debtor, HKI or Ms. Guo. Indeed, the Trustee does not allege that the Debtor, HKI or Ms. Guo have *any* ability to control or even contact the Anonymous Declarant. Likewise, the Trustee does not allege that the Debtor, HKI or Ms. Guo have any inclination to harm the Anonymous Declarant or anyone else, and he has not articulated any basis on which the Trustee or the Anonymous Declarant could reasonably fear for the Anonymous Declarant's safety. To the contrary, the only evidence presented in the Debtor's Bankruptcy case concerning violence (as distinguished from speech and peaceful demonstrations) is that the *Debtor* and *Ms. Guo* have been subject to unspeakable acts of violence at the hands of the Chinese Communist Party, and that they have responded to these acts with words. Simply stated: the Debtor fights with his pen—not a sword.\n\n19. For these reasons, among others, there is no legal or constitutional basis to grant the relief sought by the Trustee on this record.\n\n20. Although the above analysis should end the Court's inquiry, the Debtor respectfully requests that the Court take notice of the context in which the Motion to Seal was filed and deny the surreptitious relief that the Motion to Seal seeks. The Trustee has filed the\n\nMotion to Seal as part of his response to the Removal Motion. The basis of the Removal Motion is the Trustee's egregious misconduct, *i.e.*, his attempt to leverage (to put it mildly) the threat of criminal charges against the Debtor to double the amount of a nine-figure global resolution proposal made by the Debtor's family. The Trustee has not articulated how the Disputed Materials could possibly relate, one way or another, to the issue of whether the Trustee's conduct justifies or requires his removal as the trustee of the Debtor's Chapter 11 Estate.\n\n21. By contrast, it is clear that the Trustee filed the Motion to Seal to covertly seek permission to introduce the Disputed Materials at evidentiary hearings, including the hearing on the PJR and Injunction Applications—and he did so in a context where HKI and Ms. Guo are not parties, technically have no interest in the outcome, and had no opportunity to depose the Anonymous Declarant. The Trustee has no legitimate basis to even mention HKI or Ms. Guo in the context of the Removal Motion, much less to use a motion to seal an exhibit that ostensibly concerns the Removal Motion to seek to deprive HKI and Ms. Guo of their right to consult with their counsel and review evidence that the Trustee seeks to introduce against them. Indeed, if the Motion to Seal is granted as proposed by the Trustee, the Debtor, HKI and Ms. Guo may not even be able to confirm that the Anonymous Declarant exists or is the individual who wrote the Declaration. The Court should not tolerate such gamesmanship, particularly from someone who claims the status of a government official.\n\n22. \"In almost every setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.\" *Goldberg v. Kelly*, 37 U.S. 254, 269, 90 S. Ct. 1011 (1970). It is axiomatic that \"[a] party can be prejudiced by the lack of opportunity to 'put the weight of [the witness'] testimony and [] credibility to a test,\" and, in the absence of such evidence, the fact-finder \"'cannot fairly appraise'\" the witness.\n\n*Availa v. Target Corp.*, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193505, \\*4 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2022) (quoting *Du Beau v. Smither and Mayton, Inc.*, 203 F.2d 395, 396 (D.C. Cir. 1953)). Beyond credibility, \"cross-examination can be used to … 'seek the truth,' or to 'delve into the witness' story to test the witness' perceptions and memory.'\" *Id.* (quoting *Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy*, 459 U.S. 248, 259, 103 S. Ct. 608 (1983); citing *Davis v. Alaska*, 415 U.S. 308, 317, 94 S. Ct. 1105 (1974)). Indeed, it is unfair to the opposing party for a court to consider an affidavit or declaration in the context of an evidentiary hearing where that party is not afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. *See e.g., Rafter v. Bank of Am.*, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76082, \\*16 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2011) (refusing to consider an affidavit submitted after an evidentiary hearing had concluded).\n\n23. This principle is underscored in *A.W. v. Bd. Of Educ. of the Wallkill Cent. Sch. Dist.*, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 46346 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2015). In that case, the plaintiffs filed a civil complaint under the Individuals with Disabilities and Education Improvement Act of 2004, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A), \"seeking a review of the final administrative decision of the New York State Review Officer… which denied them tuition reimbursement…\" for their infant, A.W. *Id*. at \\*2-3. In such actions, \"a court shall receive the administrative record,\" and \"'hear additional evidence at the request of a party,' and decide the matter on the preponderance of evidence.\" *Id.* at \\*5-6 (quoting 20 U.S.C. §1415(i)(2)(C)(i)-(iii)).\n\n24. In *A.W.*, the plaintiffs offered as additional evidence five affidavits and a psychological evaluation of A.W. performed by a psychologist. The District Court precluded the plaintiffs from introducing all five affidavits because \"the motion [to supplement the record with the affidavits] [wa]s nothing more than a procedural gambit to shade additional [plaintiffs'] witnesses from the scrutiny of cross examination.'\" *Id*. at \\*9. The court agreed with the\n\ndefendant that the witnesses \"could have been subjected to cross examination…\" and \"to allow affidavits… fully circumvents [the opposing party's] due process rights\" particularly where the plaintiffs \"did not take the opportunity to specifically identify these five employees nor the substance of each of their sworn testimony.\" *Id.* at \\*9-10. Further, the district court allowed the psychological evaluation into evidence, but \"compel[led] [the psychologist] to submit to a deposition\" so the defendant could \"challenge the underlying determinations within the [r]eport.\" *Id.* at \\*12.\n\n25. Here, like the plaintiffs in *A.W.*, the Trustee is using the Motion to Seal as a procedural gambit to deny the Debtor, HKI, and Ms. Guo the opportunity to scrutinize the Anonymous Declarant. The natural consequence of the Trustee's strategy is that this Court, as the fact-finder, will be shielded from evidence that may discredit, contextualize, or contradict the testimony contained in the Declaration, without which the Court cannot fairly evaluate the witness's testimony. <sup>6</sup> This Court should not countenance the Trustee's desired result (*i.e.*, this Court's acceptance of an unchallenged sworn statement to bolster the Trustee's own claims and arguments, as well as the inevitable onslaught of similar evidence in future proceedings of this Court) or his method for achieving that end.\n\nFor the Foregoing reasons, the Debtor respectfully requests that the Court deny the Motion to Seal to the extent that it seeks to preclude the Debtor, HKI and Ms. Guo from viewing or discussing the Disputed Materials with their chosen counsel and grant such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.\n\n<sup>6</sup> The Debtor, HKI, Ms. Guo and their counsel also cannot evaluate the veracity of the Anonymous Declarant's statements if the Debtor, HKI and Ms. Guo do not know the Anonymous Declarant's identity and cannot read the substance of the Declaration.\n\nDated at Bridgeport, Connecticut this 27 th day of January, 2023.\n\n# **THE DEBTOR, HO WAN KWOK**\n\n*/s/Aaron A. Romney* Stephen M. Kindseth (ct14640) Aaron A. Romney (ct28144) Daniel A. Byrd (ct31151) Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. 10 Middle Street, 15th Floor Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604 Telephone: (203) 368-4234 Facsimile: (203) 368-5487 Email: [skindseth@zeislaw.com](mailto:skindseth@zeislaw.com) [aromney@zeislaw.com](mailto:aromney@zeislaw.com) [dbyrd@zeislaw.com](mailto:dbyrd@zeislaw.com) *His Attorneys*\n\n#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI hereby certify that on this 27th day of January, 2023, a copy of foregoing was filed electronically. Notice of this filing will be sent by e-mail to all parties by operation of the Court's electronic filing system or by mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing as indicated on the Notice ofElectronic Filing. Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF System.\n\n> */s/ Aaron A. Romney* Aaron A. Romney (ct28144)","body_zh":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION（美国康涅狄格区联邦破产法院布里奇波特分院）\n\n关于：第11章\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人。\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），\n动议人，\n诉\nLUC A. DESPINS（卢克·A·德斯平斯），\n第11章托管人\n被申请人。\n债务人对第11章托管人关于就针对债务人要求撤换托管人的动议及相关救济的异议之证据A作出封存命令的动议之有限异议\n\n上述标题所示破产案件（以下简称“破产案件”）中的债务人Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（以下简称“债务人”），通过其署名律师Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（蔡斯勒律师事务所），特此对第11章托管人Luc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯平斯）（以下简称“托管人”）于2023年1月13日提交的《第11章托管人关于就针对债务人要求撤换托管人的动议及相关救济的异议之证据A作出封存命令的动议》（文件编号：1328）（以下简称“封存动议”）提出有限异议。为支持本异议，债务人谨陈述如下：\nI. 前言\n\n1. 一般而言，债务人并不反对托管人就其针对债务人的《要求撤换托管人的命令之动议》（文件编号：1274）（以下简称“撤换动议”）所提交的《托管人异议》（文件编号：1326）（以下简称“撤换异议”）中的证据A提出的封存请求。\n\n然而，债务人对封存动议提出异议，其程度在于该动议试图剥夺债务人的基本权利，并且由于债务人的律师同时代表HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC（香港国际基金投资（美国）有限公司，以下简称“HKI”）以及Mei Guo（郭美，以下简称“郭女士”），剥夺HKI和郭女士选择自身律师、与自身律师沟通并切实参与就托管人针对他们提出的主张和指控进行抗辩的基本权利，其手段是阻止他们接触一份表面上保密的声明书（以下简称“声明书”）以及声明人的身份（以下简称“匿名声明人”，与“声明书”统称为“争议材料”）。托管人进一步企图通过将接触机密材料的权限仅限制在Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（蔡斯勒律师事务所，以下简称“Z&Z”）和Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC（基耶萨·沙希尼安与贾恩托马西律师事务所，以下简称“CSG”），并限制上述律师事务所与各自律所以外的任何人（包括债务人、HKI和郭女士）分享或讨论争议材料，从而侵犯债务人、HKI和郭女士的权利。1\n\n2. 至关重要的是，封存动议企图以向公众封存信息的微弱掩饰，剥夺债务人、HKI和郭女士获得其律师咨询与协助的权利——并剥夺其律师获得其客户意见与协助的权利。通过封存动议所寻求的救济尤为荒谬，因为托管人是在与撤换动议相关的背景下提交该动议的，而HKI和郭女士甚至根本不是该争议事项的当事人，然而封存动议却明目张胆地寻求许可向CSG提供争议材料，其基于的错误假定是：这样做将允许托管人在托管人针对\n\n1 署名律师知悉HKI和郭女士不是该争议事项的当事人，因此仅代表债务人提交此有限异议。然而，由于封存动议公然寻求针对HKI和郭女士的救济——且由于债务人的律师亦代表HKI和郭女士——因此本有限异议涉及封存动议中意图剥夺HKI和郭女士（除债务人外）基本权利的部分。\n\nHKI和郭女士的附随诉讼（Adv. Proc. No. 5:22-ap-5003）中将声明书作为证据引入，而该诉讼与撤换程序完全无关。2\n\n3. 此外，托管人完全未能阐明任何依据以说明：(i) 为何争议材料具有保密性；(ii) 在债务人、HKI和郭女士的律师获得对匿名声明人进行交叉质询的机会之前或除非获得该机会，该声明书在何种可能的情况下具有可采性；或 (iii) 该声明书在何种可能的情况下与撤换动议或与债务人破产案件相关的任何其他程序（包括香港附随诉讼）具有相关性。\n\n4. 封存动议未援引任何支持托管人所寻求救济的法律依据，因为根本不存在此类依据。简而言之，封存动议仅是托管人剥夺债务人、HKI和郭女士作为诉讼当事人最基本权利（包括正当程序权利）的最新伎俩。基于上述理由，并如下文所详述，债务人谨请求法院在封存动议试图剥夺债务人、HKI、郭女士及其所选定的某些律师接触争议材料的范围内，驳回该封存动议。\nII. 背景\n\n5. 债务人推定法院知悉债务人破产案件及相关程序的诉讼程序状况。\n\n6. 2022年10月6日，本法院作出了一项约定的保护令（文件编号：923）（以下简称“保护令”）。\n\n7. 保护令规定了受保护令约束的两类证据开示材料：“机密材料”与“高度机密材料”。\n\n2 封存动议错误地将CSG认定为债务人的律师。CSG不代表且从未代表过债务人。鉴于 i) 封存动议表面上涉及撤换动议，且 ii) HKI和郭女士不是撤换动议的当事人，封存动议提及HKI、郭女士或其首席律师CSG究竟基于何种可认知的依据，尚不得而知。\n\n保护令，第5(a)段和第5(b)段。高度机密材料包括如果披露“其性质将造成人身安全风险……”的文件和信息。同上，第5(b)段。机密材料可以与当事人分享（一旦满足某些先决条件），而高度机密材料仅可与律师和某些列举的人员（如专家和法院专业人员）分享。当事人（包括债务人）不得接触高度机密材料。保护令，第9段和第10段。\n\n8. 根据保护令，若当事人寻求对指定材料（定义见保护令）进行封存提交，“提供方当事人应承担为该封存进行辩护的举证责任”。同上，第13段。此外，保护令中没有任何条款旨在允许提供方当事人决定接收方当事人的哪些律师可以或不可以接收指定材料。\n\n9. 2022年9月23日，托管人提交了一份针对HKI和郭女士的判决前救济申请（以下简称“PJR申请”）。（文件编号：37）。2022年10月17日，托管人提交了一份针对HKI和郭女士的初步禁令动议（以下简称“禁令申请”）。（文件编号：50）。2022年11月29日左右，托管人、郭女士和HKI相互交换了各自拟在或保留权利在PJR申请和禁令申请听证会上寻求引入的证据（以下简称“拟定证据”）。据信息和诚信所信，争议材料并未包含在托管人的拟定证据中。3\n\n10. 2022年12月30日，债务人提交了撤换动议。\n\n11. 2023年1月13日，托管人在公开案卷上提交了撤换异议，但不包括争议材料，托管人意图根据《本地规则》第5(e)条申请对争议材料进行封存。事实上，托管人所寻求的限制远远超出了\n\n3 债务人称声明书未包含在托管人的拟定证据中是“据信息和诚信所信”，因为债务人及其律师（以及HKI和郭女士及其律师）尚未看到且无法接触被封存提交的声明书。\n\n《本地规则》第5(e)条所允许的范围、保护令所强制要求的限制，以及正当程序与基本公正的基本原则。托管人寻求这种非常规救济所凭借的仅仅是他单方面声称的“对声明人安全风险的可信担忧……”。（封存动议，第13段）。这一主张如果被法院采纳，实际上将打开方便之门，允许托管人限制债务人、HKI和郭女士接触所有证人，并在法庭上引入针对他们的传闻陈述，同时剥夺债务人、HKI和郭女士进行交叉质询以及提出证据以反驳这些证人指控的权利。简而言之，托管人没有提供任何证据表明匿名声明人有任何特定或正当的理由担心其人身安全，或者债务人曾因任何人公开发表反对其观点的言论而对其进行过人身伤害。4\n\n12. 值得注意的是，托管人没有为其所寻求的救济提供任何法律依据，没有阐明任何理由或解释来说明为何他或匿名声明人声称对匿名声明人的安全存有“可信担忧”，且未能描述匿名声明人表面证言的大致性质。此外，托管人未提供任何解释，除其他事项外，涉及托管人如何与匿名声明人取得联系、谁起草了声明书、托管人和/或其律师在多大程度上参与了匿名声明书的起草，或任何关于争议材料的其他信息。\n\n4 托管人甚至试图主张匿名声明人有理由担心其人身安全的唯一依据是：据称债务人指使发布了指明与自身利益相冲突的个人的网络帖子，且据称其煽动了在某些人的住所和营业场所附近的抗议活动。封存动议，第13段。托管人并未指控债务人或任何据称与其观点一致的人士曾从事或威胁要进行人身暴力。此外，托管人阻止债务人接触争议材料的理由，适用于任何曾经负面评价过债务人的人。\nIII. 辩论\n\n13. 众所周知，每位诉讼当事人都有“参与实现正义过程的权利——了解并参与诉讼程序[原文如此]，而不是被迫被动地等待其结果”。Doe v. District of Columbia, 679 F.2d 1115, 1119-20 (D.C. Cir. 1983)（哥伦比亚特区联邦巡回上诉法院1983年）。“每位诉讼当事人都有能够聘请律师并与律师自由协商的重大利益”。同上，第1119页。此外，“既然正义的公正实施要求争议各方充分和平等地获知其应享有的权利，那么公众在维护每位争议当事人与其律师商议的能力方面具有同样重要的利益”。同上，第1119页。\n\n14. 当有不利于一方当事人的证据被提出时，该当事人需要有机会对该证据“提出可信的抗辩”，包括例如提供额外的事实来使证据置于具体背景中，或提供证据来削弱声明人陈述的可信度。参见Canadian Am. Oil Co. v. NLRB, 82 F.3d 469, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1996)（哥伦比亚特区联邦巡回上诉法院1996年）。只有在当事人能够就证人的身份以及他们拟提出的证据之主题与律师进行协商时，这才可能实现。参见同上（指出在律师被阻止向其客户披露指控该客户的其他当事人证人的身份时，存在“极大的错误裁判空间”）。当被寻求对某一方当事人予以保护不予披露的文件“处于诉讼请求或反请求的核心”时，情况尤其如此。Prometheus Solutions v. Coker, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201158, \\*18 (D.N.M. Apr. 1, 2015)（新墨西哥区联邦地方法院2015年4月1日）。\n\n15. 归根结底，当事人「不应处于基本上对案件重要事实一无所知的境地。」同上，第 *7 页（引自 DeFazio v. Hollister, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98147, *8 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2007)）。虽然不可否认某些类型的信息确可仅限律师查阅，但这是一项「严厉的补救措施」，不能用来剥夺个人当事人「查阅构成案件核心的文件 [以此种方式]，这将严重限制 [当事人] 参与自身辩护的权利」，或干扰律师录取证人证言（depose）的能力。同上，第 *8、*12 页。5 至少，「依据 [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 26(c) 寻求救济的一方当事人，必须通过『具体的、特定的事实证明，而不是刻板且结论性的陈述』来证明所主张的损害。」同上，第 *6 页（引自 Nemir v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 381 F.3d 540, 550 (6th Cir. 2004) 及 Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 102 n.16 (1981)）。「该项举证要求对事实进行具体证明，并在可能的情况下提供具体实例作为支持，而非对潜在损害进行宽泛的、结论性的指控。」Coker, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201158, at *6。\n\n16. 在 Doe v. District of Columbia 一案中，哥伦比亚特区巡回上诉法院（Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit）裁定，地区法院「大幅削弱上诉人律师与其当事人讨论在证据开示期间所获信息能力的保护令构成……滥用裁量权。」Doe, 697 F.2d at 1118。在该案中，原告是一群监狱囚犯，他们「提交了证据证明他们面临暴力与性侵犯的危险——据称这种情况是由人员配置不足、安全设备与程序缺陷、囚犯分类和隔离制度不充分，以及设计不当且日益老化的物理设施所导致或加剧的。」同上，第 1117 页。在此基础上，地区法院作出了一项命令，禁止被告律师向被告披露原告证人的身份或其证词实质内容。同上，第 1118-19 页。\n\n17. 哥伦比亚特区巡回上诉法院同意地区法院的意见，即原告已经极其充分地详细说明了「如果监狱内部人员获悉他们所作的指控，他们将面临的报复危险」，并且\n\n5 「仅限律师查阅（Attorneys'-eyes-only）」的指定通常用于保护商业秘密或其他高度专有的信息，以区别于仅有当事人本人（不同于律师或专家证人）才能理解的基于事实的证据。同上，第 *8 页脚注 3、第 *11-12 页。\n\n这些指控「足以表明，传播涉案信息很可能会导致『实质性且严重的损害』。」同上，第 1121 页。上诉法院进一步认定，地区法院适当地将其命令限制在特定的「指定调查领域」。同上。尽管如此，上诉法院裁定地区法院滥用了自由裁量权，因为地区法院的保护令不公平地「阻碍了 [被告] 与其律师之间的磋商」。同上。\n\n18. Doe 案确立了目前提请本法院审理的案件甚至都算不上边缘性案件（not even a close call）。与 Doe 案不同，破产受托人（Trustee）并未指控匿名声明人（Anonymous Declarant）身处监狱或处于债务人（Debtor）、HKI 或 Guo 女士（Ms. Guo）的控制之下。事实上，受托人并没有指控债务人、HKI 或郭女士有任何能力控制甚至联系匿名声明人。同样，受托人也没有指控债务人、HKI 或郭女士有任何伤害匿名声明人或任何其他人的倾向，并且他也没有阐述受托人或匿名声明人可合理担忧该匿名声明人安全的任何依据。相反，在债务人的破产案件中，关于暴力（区别于言论与和平示威）提交的唯一证据是，债务人和郭女士曾遭受中国共产党（Chinese Communist Party）手中难以言表的暴力行径，而他们对此类行径以言语进行了回应。简而言之：债务人是用笔战斗——而不是用剑。\n\n19. 基于上述原因及其他理由，在本案记录下，不存在准予受托人所寻求救济的法律或宪法依据。\n\n20. 尽管上述分析本应结束法院的审查，但债务人谨请求法院注意封存动议（Motion to Seal）提出的背景，并驳回该封存动议所谋求的秘密救济。受托人提出该\n\n封存动议，是作为其对罢免动议（Removal Motion）回应的一部分。罢免动议的依据是受托人极其恶劣的不当行为，即他企图（往轻了说）利用对债务人提起刑事指控的威胁，使债务人家属提出的九位数全局和解提案金额翻倍。受托人根本没有阐明争议材料（Disputed Materials）究竟能以何种方式与受托人的行为是否证明应当或必须罢免其作为债务人第11章破产财产（Chapter 11 Estate）受托人的资格这一问题产生关联。\n\n21. 相比之下，显而易见的是，受托人提交封存动议，是为了暗中寻求许可，以便在证据听证会（包括判决前补救措施（PJR）和禁令申请的听证会）上引入争议材料——而且他是在 HKI 和郭女士并非当事人、在技术上对结果不享有利益且没有机会对匿名声明人进行录取证人证言的背景下这样做的。受托人在罢免动议的背景下甚至没有任何正当理由提及 HKI 或郭女士，更不用说利用一份表面上涉及罢免动议的证物封存动议，来企图剥夺 HKI 和郭女士与其律师磋商并查阅受托人试图针对她们引入的证据的权利。事实上，如果按照受托人的提议批准封存动议，债务人、HKI 和郭女士甚至可能无法确认匿名声明人是否存在，或者是否就是撰写该声明的人。法院不应容忍这种程序操弄手段（gamesmanship），特别是来自自称具有政府官员身份的人。\n\n22. 「在几乎所有关键决定取决于事实问题的场合，正当程序都要求给予对质和交叉质询（cross-examine）不利证人的机会。」Goldberg v. Kelly, 37 U.S. 254, 269, 90 S. Ct. 1011 (1970)。显而易见的是，「当事人可能会因缺乏机会『对 [证人的] 证词分量和 [] 可信度进行检验』而受到损害」，并且在缺乏此类证据的情况下，事实认定者「『无法公正地评估』」证人。\n\nAvaila v. Target Corp., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193505, *4 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2022)（引自 Du Beau v. Smither and Mayton, Inc., 203 F.2d 395, 396 (D.C. Cir. 1953)）。除了可信度之外，「交叉质询还可以用来……『探求真相』，或者『深入探究证人的陈述以检验证人的感知和记忆。』」同上（引自 Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 259, 103 S. Ct. 608 (1983)；引述 Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 317, 94 S. Ct. 1105 (1974)）。事实上，在证据听证会的背景下，如果法院考虑了一份宣誓书或声明书，而相对方当事人未被给予交叉质询该声明人的机会，这对该相对方当事人是不公平的。参见如 Rafter v. Bank of Am., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76082, *16 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2011)（拒绝考虑在证据听证会结束后提交的宣誓书）。\n\n23. 这一原则在 A.W. v. Bd. Of Educ. of the Wallkill Cent. Sch. Dist., 2015 U.S. LEXIS 46346 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2015) 一案中得到了强调。在该案中，原告根据《2004年残疾人个人教育改进法》（Individuals with Disabilities and Education Improvement Act of 2004），20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) 提起民事诉状，「请求对纽约州复审官（New York State Review Officer）的最终行政决定进行司法审查……该决定拒绝了对其幼童 A.W. 的学费报销……」同上，第 *2-3 页。在此类诉讼中，「法院应接收行政记录」，并「『应一方当事人的请求听取补充证据』，并根据优势证据做出裁决。」同上，第 *5-6 页（引自 20 U.S.C. §1415(i)(2)(C)(i)-(iii)）。\n\n24. 在 A.W. 案中，原告提出五份宣誓书以及一名心理学家对 A.W. 进行的心理评估作为补充证据。地区法院禁止原告引入所有五份宣誓书，因为「[用宣誓书补充记录的] 动议只不过是一种程序策略，旨在掩护更多的 [原告] 证人免受交叉质询的审查。」同上，第 *9 页。法院赞同\n\n被告的意见，即证人「本可以接受交叉质询……」而且「允许提交宣誓书……完全规避了 [相对方当事人的] 正当程序权利」，特别是鉴于原告「没有利用机会具体确定这五名雇员的身份，也没有明确他们各自宣誓证词的实质内容。」同上，第 *9-10 页。此外，地区法院允许将心理评估作为证据采纳，但「强制要求 [该心理学家] 接受录取证人证言」，以便被告能够「对该 [报] 告中的潜在认定提出质疑。」同上，第 *12 页。\n\n25. 在本案中，与 A.W. 案的原告一样，受托人正在将封存动议作为一种程序策略，以剥夺债务人、HKI 和郭女士对匿名声明人进行审查的机会。受托人这一策略的必然结果是，本法院作为事实认定者，将被隔绝于可能败坏、语境化或反驳该声明中所含证词的证据之外，而没有这些证据，法院就无法公正地评估该证人的证词。6 本法院不应纵容受托人所期望的结果（即本法院接受一份未经质证的宣誓陈述以支持受托人自身的主张和论点，以及随之而来的在本法院未来的诉讼程序中不可避免的大量类似证据），也不应纵容他为达到该目的所采用的方法。\n\n基于前述理由，债务人谨请求法院在封存动议旨在阻止债务人、HKI 和郭女士与其选定的律师查阅或讨论争议材料的范围内驳回该动议，并准予法院认为公正且适当的此种其他及进一步的救济。\n\n6 如果债务人、HKI 和郭女士不知道匿名声明人的身份且无法阅读声明的实质内容，则债务人、HKI、郭女士及其律师也无法评估匿名声明人陈述的真实性。\n\n日期：2023年1月27日，于康涅狄格州布里奇波特。\n债务人：HO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）\n\n/签名/ Aaron A. Romney\nStephen M. Kindseth (ct14640)\nAaron A. Romney (ct28144)\nDaniel A. Byrd (ct31151)\nZeisler & Zeisler, P.C.\n10 Middle Street, 15th Floor\nBridgeport, Connecticut 06604\n电话：(203) 368-4234\n传真：(203) 368-5487\n电子邮件：[skindseth@zeislaw.com] [aromney@zeislaw.com] [dbyrd@zeislaw.com]\n其代理律师\n\n送达证明\n\n本人特此证明，于2023年1月27日，上述文书的一份副本已通过电子方式归档。本归档通知将通过法院电子归档系统的运作以电子邮件形式发送给所有当事人，或按照电子归档通知上的指示通过邮寄方式发送给任何无法接受电子归档的人员。各方当事人可通过法院的 CM/ECF 系统查阅本次归档内容。\n\n/签名/ Aaron A. Romney\nAaron A. Romney (ct28144)","key_entities":["Guo","Je","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","CIPA","Despins","Chinese Communist Party"],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":3767,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 13:49:53"}