{"id":"court_ctb_1407_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":1407,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT In re:","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"#### **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\nIn re:\n\nHO WAN KWOK, *et al.*,\n\nChapter 11\n\nCase No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\nDebtors.\n\n(Jointly Administered)\n\n# **UBS AG'S OBJECTION TO MOTION OF CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR ENTRY OF AN ORDER COMPELLING UBS AG TO COMPLY WITH RULE 2004 SUBPOENA**\n\n# **TABLE OF CONTENTS**\n\n# **Page**\n\n| | INTRODUCTION 1 |\n|-----------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | FACTUAL BACKGROUND 5 |\n| I.
II. | UBS Served Valid Objections to the Subpoena 6
The Trustee Misrepresents UBS's Cooperation to Date 9 |\n| | ARGUMENT 10 |\n| I. | Complying with the Subpoena Would Require UBS to
Violate Foreign Law and Place UBS Employees in Legal Jeopardy 10 |\n| | A.
Relevant Provisions of Foreign Law 10 |\n| | i.
Hong Kong 10
ii.
People's Republic of China 11
iii.
Switzerland 12 |\n| II. | The Trustee Should Be Ordered to Seek Discovery Pursuant to UBS's Proposal 12 |\n| | A.
The Trustee Could Seek Discovery by
Filing Applications Under the Hague Convention 13
B.
The Trustee Could Seek Discovery by
Seeking Hong Kong Recognition of the
US Bankruptcy Proceedings and Pursuing Disclosure There 14 |\n| III. | The Comity Balancing Test Requires that the Trustee Proceed Via One of the Proposed
Alternatives 15 |\n| | A.
The Information the Trustee
Seeks Includes a Broad Swath of Irrelevant Documents Available Elsewhere. 16
B.
The Trustee's Requests Are Not \"Specific.\" 17
C.
The Information Sought Did Not \"Originate in the United States.\" 19
D.
The Information is Available Through Other Means. 19
E.
The Balance of Interests Tips in Favor of Respecting Foreign Law. 21
F.
Responding to the Subpoena Would
Impose Substantial Hardship On UBS. 23
G.
UBS Has Acted in Good
Faith. 24 |\n| IV. | The Subpoena as Drafted is Vague and
Overbroad, and Complying is Impracticable 24 |\n| V. | The Subpoena Improperly Seeks Information Relating to a Pending Proceeding 27 |\n\n| | A. | The Pending Proceeding Doctrine Bars the Use of Rule 2004 Discovery Once | |\n|-----|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|\n| | | Parallel Litigation Has Begun 27 | |\n| | B. | The Motion Should Be Denied and the | |\n| | | Subpoena Quashed with Respect to All 2004 | |\n| | | Discovery Targets Who Are Parties to the Pending UK Litigation 28 | |\n| VI. | | If this Court Orders UBS to Comply with the | |\n| | | Subpoena, UBS Must Be Granted Its Reasonable Costs 29 | |\n| | | CONCLUSION 31 | |\n| | | | |\n\n### **TABLE OF AUTHORITIES**\n\n| Cases | Pages(s) |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|\n| Advanced Indus. Products, S.C.S v. Alcoa Glob. Fasteners, Inc.,
No. CV 04-3049-ABC(CTx), 2006 WL 8433934 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2006) 13 | |\n| CE Int'l Res. Holdings, LLC v. S.A. Mins. Ltd. P'ship,
No. 12-CV-08087 CM SN, 2013 WL 2661037 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2013) Passim | |\n| Daimler AG v. Bauman,
571 U.S. 117 (2014) 9 | |\n| de Borja v. Razon,
No. 3:18-cv-01131-YY, 2019 WL 4724317 (D. Or. Aug. 16, 2019) 13 | |\n| In re Aggrenox Antitrust Litig.,
No. 3:14-MD-02516 (SRU), 2017 WL 4679228 (D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2017) 29 | |\n| In re Bennett Funding Grp., Inc.,
203 B.R. 24 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1996) 28-29 | |\n| In re Brown,
No. 18-10617-JLG, 2018 WL 4944816 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2018) 27 | |\n| In re Buccaneer Res., LLC,
No. 14-60041, 2015 WL 8527424 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Dec. 10, 2015) 30 | |\n| In re China Fishery Grp. Ltd.,
No. 16-11895 (JLG), 2017 WL 3084397 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2017) 26 | |\n| In re Coffee Cupboard, Inc.,
128 B.R. 509 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991) 28 | |\n| In re Comair Ltd.,
No. 21-10298(JLG), 2021 WL 5312988 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov 14, 2021) 20 | |\n| In re del Valle Ruiz,
939 F.3d 520 (2d Cir. 2019) 9 | |\n| In re Martelli,
No. BR 16-20316-PRW, 2017 WL 3098105 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. July 20, 2017) 27 | |\n| In re Merrill,
No. 09-54616-C, 2010 WL 985231 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2010) 25 | |\n| In re Sanomedics, Inc.,
No. 16-21659-RAM, 2018 WL 3816772 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. July 25, 2018) 28 | |\n\n| In re Szadkowski,
198 B.R. 140 (Bankr. D. Md. 1996) 27-28 |\n|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| In re Texaco Inc.,
79 B.R. 551 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) 18, 25 |\n| Kansas Heart Hosp., L.L.C. v. Exec. Risk Indem., Inc.,
No. 06-1345-MLB, 2007 WL 1125772 (D. Kan. Apr. 16, 2007) 27 |\n| Koopmann v. Robert Bosch, LLC,
No. 18-CV-4065 (JMF), 2018 WL 9917679 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2018) 29-30 |\n| Laydon v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd.,
183 F. Supp. 3d 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) 19 |\n| Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC,
262 F.R.D. 136 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) 19 |\n| Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC,
463 F. Supp. 2d 310 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) 22 |\n| Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc.,
116 F.R.D. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) 15, 18, 22, 24 |\n| Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa,
482 U.S. 522 (1987) 15-16, 21-22 |\n| Rotstain v. Trustmark Nat'l Bank,
No. 3:09-CV-2384-N-BG, 2015 WL 13031698 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 2015) 21 |\n| Société Internationale Pour Participations lndustrielles Et Commerciales, S. A. v. Rogers,
357 U.S. 197 (1958) 23 |\n| Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais. S.A.,
249 F.R.D. 429 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) 18, 23 |\n| Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew,
276 F.R.D. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 9, 22 |\n| United States v. First Nat. Bank of Chicago,
699 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983) 22 |\n| Rules |\n| Fed. R. Civ. P. 34 25 |\n| Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 4, 29 |\n\n# **Other Authorities**\n\n| Br. United States Amicus Curiae
Opp'n Pet. Writ Cert. Arab Bank, PLC v. Linde, 2014 WL
2191224 (U.S.) 22 | |\n|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|\n| Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 442(1)(c) 16 | |\n| JOHN FELLAS ET AL.,
TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION GUIDE § 25:46 (2022) 13 | |\n| Notice of Presentment of Debtors Application on | |\n| Consent for an Order Pursuant to Rule 7028 of the Federal Rules of | |\n| Bankruptcy Procedure Issuing a Letter of Request for an Order | |\n| Compelling the Examination Under Oath of Louisa Watt in the | |\n| United Kingdom Under the Hague Evidence Convention, | |\n| In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., | |\n| 08 BR 13555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2009) [ECF No. 5015] 14-15 | |\n\nNon-party UBS AG (\"UBS\"), by and through its undersigned counsel, respectfully submits this objection to the Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee for Entry of Order Compelling UBS AG to Comply with Rule 2004 Subpoena [ECF No. 1362] (the \"Motion\"), filed by Luc A. Despins, in his capacity as the chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") on January 23, 2023. The Motion to Compel seeks an order requiring UBS to produce within 14 days documents responsive to the Trustee's Subpoena for Rule 2004 Examination (the \"Subpoena\"). The Motion should be denied.\n\n### **INTRODUCTION**\n\n1. UBS has been and remains willing to cooperate and comply with the Trustee's requests to the extent it can. UBS has made clear to the Trustee that it will provide responsive material he requests through recognized international channels from jurisdictions that prohibit UBS from simply producing materials pursuant to the Subpoena. Contrary to the mischaracterizations in the Motion, UBS has never refused to comply. Although the Trustee claims to have received no responsive information to date, UBS voluntarily performed substantial investigations in response to the extremely broad Subpoena after UBS served its objections. Moreover, UBS has reported to the Trustee that, apart from those 2004 Discovery Targets (as defined in the Subpoena) against which UBS is already litigating in a pending proceeding in the United Kingdom,1 none of the remaining 2004 Discovery Targets have accounts in the United States, the United Kingdom, or the British Virgin Islands – three of the six jurisdictions that the Trustee's counsel has consistently represented to be jurisdictions of primary interest to the Trustee. In the time since the Trustee filed the Motion, UBS has additionally confirmed that if any documents responsive to the Subpoena exist in Switzerland – one of the three remaining jurisdictions the Trustee indicated was of primary interest – they would not be in the possession,\n\n1 *See, infra*, Section III.\n\ncustody or control of UBS, because as of June 14, 2015, all Swiss-booked wealth management and retail and corporate accounts were transferred from UBS to an affiliated entity, UBS Switzerland AG (\"UBS Switzerland\"), as a consequence of a spin-off of the Swiss-booked business into a separately incorporated entity. 2\n\n2. With respect to the remaining jurisdictions the Trustee has claimed to be potentially relevant – Hong Kong, the People's Republic of China (the \"PRC\"), and Switzerland (which is included here in an abundance of caution in the event that the Trustee suggests that the Subpoena reaches any separately incorporated UBS-related entity in Switzerland, which it does not) – and the Subpoena more generally, UBS objects to the Motion, chiefly on three bases:3\n\n3. *First*, complying with the Subpoena would require UBS to violate the laws of Hong Kong, the PRC, and Switzerland. However, UBS can provide disclosure using appropriate international channels through which the Trustee can readily obtain local court orders with which UBS can and would comply, to the extent that responsive material exists. Indeed, in Hong Kong and Switzerland, UBS and its employees would violate the law even by confirming whether any relevant accounts exist. Should UBS or its employees disclose any information without either customer consent or an order from a court in those jurisdictions, they could face severe, and in some cases criminal, consequences. The Trustee should instead pursue the disclosure he seeks in those jurisdictions *either*: (i) with respect to all three jurisdictions, by pursuing disclosure via the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (the \"Hague\n\n2 *See, infra,* ¶ 15.\n\n3 The Trustee is incorrect in his purported understanding that \"UBS's sole basis for refusing to comply with the UBS Subpoena is the purported applicability of foreign privacy laws.\" (Motion ¶ 17). UBS asserted several other objections to the Subpoena (*see* Motion, Ex. B) and made clear during the parties' meet-and-confer discussion that one of its key objectives in negotiating with the Trustee was reaching agreement on a manageable scope of disclosure limited to documents the Trustee actually requires and that UBS might be in a position to provide. (*See* Declaration of Lisa J. Fried, date January 30, 2023 (the \"Fried Declaration\" or \"Fried Decl.\") ¶ 6).\n\nConvention\"), or (ii) with respect to Hong Kong, by seeking recognition of the US bankruptcy proceedings, thereby enabling the Trustee to seek disclosure in those jurisdictions, consistent with local law.\n\n4. As UBS has communicated to the Trustee, UBS would not object to the Trustee proceeding via either of these alternatives, and UBS would work in parallel to search for and prepare for production responsive documents, to the extent they exist, to avoid further delay until appropriate foreign court orders calling for production are issued. The balance of interests favors these alternatives. Employing Hague Convention procedures or recognition in Hong Kong would not prejudice the Trustee or the estates. And these alternatives would also substantially protect UBS, its employees, and its agents from the legal jeopardy they would face if they violated the laws of jurisdictions in which UBS operates; would comport with principles of international comity; and likely would take only a few weeks to a couple of months.\n\n5. *Second,* the Subpoena is overbroad and vague and cannot be enforced as written. The Subpoena applies to a staggering range of materials relating to an indeterminate number of more than 25 individuals and entities, around the world, going back 11 years – despite the fact that this Court has ordered some of the 2004 Discovery Targets themselves to produce documents dating back only nine years. Strict compliance with the Subpoena's terms would require UBS to mount a global investigation of everything from cancelled checks to marginal notes on paper documents potentially relating to UBS's tens of thousands of current and former employees around the world, covering petabytes of electronic data, among other materials. The Subpoena as drafted could generate an enormous volume of documents beyond the proper scope of a Rule 2004 subpoena to investigate the assets of the estates. Moreover, the Trustee's requests are to some extent duplicative of requests already issued to individuals and entities related to the Debtor.\n\n6. UBS, in an effort to narrow the scope of the Subpoena, asked that the Trustee indicate the jurisdictions upon which he was primarily focused. Thereafter, UBS invested substantial time and resources in researching what information it could and could not provide to the Trustee from the six jurisdictions that the Trustee's counsel identified as being of primary interest. UBS should not now be required to perform additional costly and time-consuming searches with respect to an unspecified number of additional jurisdictions around the world.\n\n7. *Third*, the Subpoena violates the Pending Proceeding Doctrine to the extent that a number of the 2004 Discovery Targets are claimants in ongoing litigation against UBS in the United Kingdom. The Pending Proceeding Doctrine is well-established law in this Circuit, and the Trustee has no legal basis to use Rule 2004 to seek discovery on subjects that are at issue in the UK litigation between 2004 Discovery Targets Mr. Kwok, Ace Decade and Dawn State (the \"Claimants\"), on the one hand, and UBS, on the other, where the Trustee intends to litigate on behalf of the Claimants by stepping into Mr. Kwok's shoes.\n\n8. Finally, by refusing to engage in good faith negotiations to reasonably narrow the overbroad scope of the Subpoena, the Trustee has violated his obligation to take \"reasonable steps\" to avoid imposing an undue burden upon a non-party such as UBS pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d). If this Court orders UBS to comply with the Subpoena over UBS's objections, then this Court \"must protect [UBS],\" as an entity \"who is neither a party nor a party's officer from significant expense resulting from compliance.\" *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2)(B)(ii).\n\n9. Accordingly, UBS requests that the Court issue an order denying the Motion and quashing the Subpoena or, in the alternative, (i) ordering the Trustee to seek discovery via the Hague Convention or after obtaining foreign recognition of the instant bankruptcy proceedings; (ii) ordering the Trustee to narrow the scope and breadth of the Subpoena substantially to\n\nadequately specify the discovery sought, avoid imposing an undue burden on UBS, and comply with the proper scope of a Rule 2004 subpoena; (iii) denying the Motion as to those 2004 Discovery Targets that are Claimants in the UK Proceedings; and (iv) to the extent that the Court orders UBS to comply with the Subpoena, authorizing UBS to recover the reasonable costs and attorneys' fees incurred in compliance.\n\n#### **FACTUAL BACKGROUND**\n\n10. The Trustee served the exceedingly broad Subpoena on September 26, 2022, demanding that UBS produce a nearly limitless range of information and documents relating to the 2004 Discovery Targets, *i.e*., Debtor Ho Wan Kwok and 26 other individuals and entities4 purportedly associated with him. (*See* Fried Decl. ¶ 2). The Subpoena seeks dozens of types of documents5 going back 11 years, to January 1, 2012, and the Trustee's counsel, during the parties' meet and confer discussions, has insisted that the Trustee seeks documents held by UBS anywhere on earth. (*See id.* ¶ 4). Nonetheless, in his motion for leave to serve the Subpoena [ECF No. 839], the Trustee indicated that the Subpoena should be directed to \"UBS AG Hong Kong branch\" (*see id.*, Ex. B at 4), suggesting that his primary, albeit not sole, jurisdiction of interest is Hong Kong.\n\n4 These are merely the discovery targets that are specifically identified; the Subpoena defines \"Debtor\" to include not only Mr. Kwok but also his \"employees, agents, counsel, advisors, or anyone acting on his behalf,\" making it impossible to know with certainty who the actual discovery targets are. (Subpoena, at 7).\n\n5 The Subpoena defines \"Documents\" to include \"electronic mail, computer files maintained in electronic form, correspondence, memoranda, tapes, stenographic or handwritten notes, written forms of any kind, charts, blueprints, drawings, sketches, graphs, plans articles, specification, diaries, letters, telegrams, photographs, minutes, contracts, agreements, surveys, computer printouts, data compilations of any kind, telexes, facsimiles, emails, text messages, instant messages, voice messages, invoices, order forms, checks, drafts, statements, credit memos, reports, position reports, summaries, indices, books, ledgers, notebooks, schedules, transparencies, recordings, catalogs, advertisements, promotional materials, film, video tapes, audio tapes, CDs, computer disks, brochures, pamphlets, punch-cards, time-slips, Tweets, social media posts, or any written or recorded materials of any other kind, and all meta-data thereof, however stored (whether in tangible or electronic form), recorded, produced, or reproduced, and also including but not limited to, drafts or copies of any of the foregoing that contain any notes, comments, or marking of any kind not found on the original documents or that are otherwise not identical to the original documents.\" (Subpoena, at 11).\n\n#### **I. UBS Served Valid Objections to the Subpoena**\n\n11. On October 12, 2022, UBS served its objections to the Subpoena (the \"Objection\"). (*See* Motion, Ex. B). Among other objections, UBS objected: (i) to producing documents relating to accounts located outside the US, noting that \"employees of UBS entities in jurisdictions outside of the United States could face criminal penalties\" if they were to produce documents in response to a subpoena; (ii) to producing documents relating to any regulator of UBS; (iii) on the basis that the Subpoena is overly broad and unduly burdensome; (iv) because certain of the materials requested in the Subpoena could be sought from the parties to the proceeding; (v) to the lack of particularity of the Subpoena and its failure to identify a reasonable time period; (vi) to the extent that it improperly seeks documents in the possession, custody or control not of UBS but of UBS's affiliates; and (vii) on the basis of attorney-client and other applicable privileges. The Objection also stated, \"UBS will not produce documents from UBS's offices or those of its affiliates or subsidiaries located outside of the United States that would violate the laws of any other jurisdiction.\" (*Id.* at 2). UBS also reserved the right to supplement or amend the Objection and offered to meet and confer with the Trustee to narrow or eliminate areas of dispute.\n\n12. Counsel for UBS and the Trustee communicated in the weeks that followed to arrange a mutually convenient time for a meet-and-confer discussion, which occurred on November 28, 2022. (*See* Fried Decl. ¶ 4). During that call, and in subsequent discussions, UBS – far from \"refus[ing] to comply with the UBS Subpoena\" (Motion ¶ 12) – has worked in good faith to provide to the Trustee information it could supply without violating the laws of jurisdictions in which UBS operates and to propose procedures that would enable the Trustee to seek the additional information sought in the Subpoena without putting UBS, its employees, and agents in legal jeopardy abroad. Following each of the parties' meet-and-confer calls, UBS and\n\nits counsel have worked diligently – across multiple time zones, and over the Lunar New Year holidays when business activity in Hong Kong and the PRC slows considerably – to obtain information for the Trustee. (*See* Fried Decl. ¶ 5).\n\n13. In light of the vagueness and overbreadth of the Subpoena as drafted, UBS's counsel, during the meet and confer discussions, requested that the Trustee point UBS to the jurisdictions and 2004 Discovery Targets in which the Trustee was primarily interested. (*See* Fried Decl. ¶ 7). The Trustee asserts that \"UBS has sought to put the onus on the Trustee to name specific jurisdictions where UBS should search its documents and information\" (Motion ¶ 8 n.3) but has never responded to UBS's well-founded objection to the impracticability and undue burden of requiring a non-party to search *all* of its systems throughout the world for a seemingly endless list of documents relating to an unlimited number of individuals and entities, over an 11-year period. Lacking any other good-faith guidance from the Trustee regarding what specifically the Bank should be looking for, and where, UBS reasonably asked the Trustee to specify jurisdictions of primary interest.\n\n14. On January 10, 2023, the Trustee's counsel confirmed that the jurisdictions in which the Trustee was primarily interested were the United States, the United Kingdom, the British Virgin Islands, Hong Kong, the PRC, and Switzerland. (*See* Fried Decl. ¶ 9). UBS subsequently determined the scope of the information potentially responsive to the Subpoena it was able to provide to the Trustee relating to those jurisdictions. On the parties' most recent meet-and-confer telephone call on January 20, 2023, UBS's external counsel informed the Trustee's counsel that:\n\n- a. UBS had not identified any responsive accounts in the United States, the United Kingdom or the British Virgin Islands relating to any of the 2004 Discovery Targets that are not also claimants in a pending proceeding between those claimants and UBS in the United Kingdom;\n- b. UBS expected to soon be in a position to update the Trustee with respect to the PRC but would need additional time, in part because of the Lunar\n\nNew Year holiday (celebrated January 22 through February 5, 2023), during which business in the PRC slows in a manner analogous to the US holiday period between Christmas and New Year's Day; and\n\nc. With respect to Switzerland and Hong Kong, assuming that UBS had any responsive materials in those jurisdictions, UBS would not be able to produce any information or documents in response to the Subpoena without violating those jurisdictions' laws, which carry severe, and in certain circumstances criminal, penalties for violation. However, as UBS's external counsel had explained on several of the parties' earlier meet-and-confer calls, the Trustee could instead seek disclosure from those jurisdictions *either* by (i) proceeding under the Hague Evidence Convention or, (ii) seeking judicial recognition in Hong Kong of this U.S. bankruptcy case, which could lead to local court orders with which UBS could comply, eliminating the risk of it violating the law of those jurisdictions. UBS's external counsel – again, not for the first time – also explained that UBS would not object if the Trustee proceeded via either or both of these alternative paths and that, to the extent any potentially responsive materials existed in Switzerland or Hong Kong, UBS was prepared to review and prepare such materials for production in parallel with the Trustee making his applications under the Hague Evidence Convention or for foreign recognition, to avoid any delay once appropriate court orders were issued requiring production in those jurisdictions.\n\n(*See* Fried Decl. ¶ 10.)\n\n15. UBS subsequently confirmed that, as of June 14, 2015, all Swiss-booked wealth management and retail and corporate accounts were transferred from UBS to an affiliated entity, UBS Switzerland AG (\"UBS Switzerland\"), as a consequence of a spin-off of the Swiss-booked business into a separately incorporated entity in response to a request by the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (\"FINMA\"), the Swiss financial market regulator. It necessarily follows that documents responsive to the Subpoena, if any exist in Switzerland, would not be in the possession, custody or control of UBS in Switzerland. (*See* Fried Decl. ¶ 12). 6\n\n6 To the extent that the Trustee asserts that the Subpoena reaches beyond UBS to any separate legal entity affiliated with it, UBS reiterates its objection to the Subpoena to the extent that it can be construed as seeking documents in the possession, custody or control of UBS's affiliates having corporate identities separate and apart from UBS. (*See* Motion, Ex. B at 2). The Trustee has never challenged that objection and could not, as this Court lacks jurisdiction to compel UBS Switzerland or any other affiliate of UBS to comply with the Subpoena, where such affiliates are neither incorporated in nor principally based in the United States and are not alleged to have engaged in\n\n#### **II. The Trustee Misrepresents UBS's Cooperation to Date**\n\n16. It simply is not true that UBS \"informed the Trustee earlier this month that it will not produce *any* documents or information – or even disclose what documents or information exists – responsive to the UBS Subpoena, because of banking privacy laws in foreign jurisdictions\" (Motion ¶ 8). Nor did UBS insist that the Trustee undertake legal process (via Hague Convention discovery or recognition proceedings) \"in *dozens of countries* throughout the world where UBS has branches*.*\" (*Id.* (emphasis in original)). Rather, UBS proposed viable and well-recognized alternative paths for the Trustee to seek the information he requests without requiring UBS to violate other jurisdictions' laws. And, contrary to the Trustee's assertion, those alternatives are anything but \"unworkable.\" (Motion ¶ 12). Federal courts frequently require litigants to resort to Hague Convention procedures. *See, e.g.*, *Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew*, 276 F.R.D. 143, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (directing plaintiffs to request information they sought in China through the Hague Convention), *aff'd sub nom. Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Andrew*, No. 10 Civ. 9471(WHP), 2011 WL 11562419 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2011).\n\n17. During the January 20, 2023 meet-and-confer telephone call, the Trustee's external counsel stated that, rather than pursue any of the alternative paths UBS had outlined (and agreed not to oppose), the Trustee planned to file the Motion to Compel. (*See* Fried Decl. ¶ 11).\n\nany acts sufficient to subject them to specific jurisdiction by this Court. *See generally Daimler AG v. Bauman*, 571 U.S. 117, 139 (2014); *In re del Valle Ruiz*, 939 F.3d 520, 529 (2d Cir. 2019). To be sure, the Trustee can direct a Hague Convention request to UBS Switzerland.\n\n#### **ARGUMENT**\n\n### **I. Complying with the Subpoena Would Require UBS to Violate Foreign Law and Place UBS Employees in Legal Jeopardy**\n\n#### **A. Relevant Provisions of Foreign Law**\n\n18. The Trustee does not dispute that complying with the Subpoena would require UBS to violate foreign law. Instead, he merely asserts, without any support, that \"UBS will be fully protected by a court order directing it to produce documents and information responsive to the UBS Subpoena.\" Motion ¶ 33.7 As detailed below, that is demonstrably false.\n\n#### **i.** *Hong Kong*\n\n19. The Declaration of Eugene Fung, dated January 27, 2023 (the \"Fung Declaration\" or the \"Fung Decl.\"), submitted herewith, describes the provisions of Hong Kong law that UBS's Hong Kong branch (and its employees and agents) would be forced to violate if compelled to comply with the Subpoena. In sum, UBS's Hong Kong branch is under a contractual duty of confidentiality to its customers in respect of information about the customers' affairs gained by virtue of the banking relationship. That duty may be overridden by a Hong Kong court order compelling the Hong Kong branch to disclose documents relating to its customers (but not a foreign court order). *See* Fung Decl. ¶¶ 4, 8(2), 23, 25. Complying with the Subpoena would render UBS and its employees and agents in breach of its duty of confidentiality towards its customers, which could lead to serious financial and reputational harm. *See id.* In addition to exposing UBS and its employees and agents to the possibility of civil liability, a customer advised (as required under Hong Kong law) that a bank intends to breach the bankers' duty of confidentiality by disclosing the customer's account information may be able to obtain an\n\n7 The Trustee has not addressed the potential liability of UBS employees for facilitating compliance with the Subpoena.\n\ninjunction restraining the bank from doing so. Penalties for violation of any such injunction could include fines for the entity itself and, for a director or other officer of the bank, imprisonment. *See id.* ¶¶ 10, 26.\n\n#### **ii.** *PRC*\n\n20. The Declaration of Gary Gao, dated January 29, 2023 (the \"Gao Declaration\" or the \"Gao Decl.\"), submitted herewith. describes the provisions of PRC law that UBS (and its employees and agents) would be forced to violate if compelled to comply with the Subpoena. In sum, PRC laws and regulations impose broad restrictions on banks operating in the PRC, which limit the circumstances in which information and documents relating to accounts at such branches can be disclosed. The laws imposing such restrictions include, but are not limited to, the *Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China*, *Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China*, *Data Security Law of the People's Republic of China*, *Cybersecurity Law of the People's Republic of China*, *Personal Information Protection Law of the People's Republic of China*, and the *Commercial Banking Law of the People's Republic of China*. UBS's PRC Branch and its employees and agents would not be able to comply with the Subpoena without violating PRC laws and regulations, absent (a) approval of PRC authorities, (b) express consent of any account holder at issue and (c) the release of any other restrictions imposed by PRC laws and regulations. *See* Gao Decl. ¶¶ 13, 20-32, 34, 36. UBS's PRC branch and its employees and agents would face severe consequences if it disclosed information or documents relating to accounts held there in violation of PRC laws and regulations, including but not limited to criminal penalties, significant fines, suspension of business, disqualification of senior management of the Bank, and reputational harm. *See id*. And a US court order would not offer UBS any protection from these consequences.\n\n*See id.* ¶¶ 23–25 (\"Banks in China are not legally obligated to comply with the U.S. courts' orders.\")\n\n#### **iii.** *Switzerland*\n\n21. As described, *supra*, ¶ 15, documents responsive to the Subpoena, if any exist in Switzerland, would not be in the possession, custody or control of UBS in Switzerland. However, in an abundance of caution, in the event that the Trustee suggests that the Subpoena reaches any separately incorporated UBS-related entity in Switzerland, which it does not, the Declaration of Felix Dasser, dated January 27, 2023 (the \"Dasser Declaration\" or the \"Dasser Decl.\"), submitted herewith, describes the provisions of Swiss law that a financial institution operating in Switzerland (and its employees and agents) would be forced to violate if compelled to comply with the Subpoena. In sum, production of documents by a financial institution in Switzerland in compliance with the Subpoena would be prohibited by Swiss criminal law, namely Article 47 of the Swiss Banking Act (\"SBA\"), Article 271 of the Swiss Penal Code (\"SPC\") and Article 273 of the SPC and would expose any employees and agents of such an institution involved in the production of the documents to criminal sanctions, including imprisonment. *See* Dasser Decl. § III (Conclusions), (1). *See also id.* ¶¶ 11, 18–21, 36 (noting that violations of Swiss bank secrecy provisions are regularly prosecuted, and the Swiss Federal Statistical Office reports on average about a dozen criminal convictions per year relating to the SBA alone).\n\n#### **II. The Trustee Should Be Ordered to Seek Discovery Pursuant to UBS's Proposal**\n\n22. UBS proposes that the Trustee proceed via one of two alternate methods, depending on the jurisdiction, and would not object if the Trustee pursued either method. In addition, UBS would work in parallel to identify and prepare for production of responsive documents, to the extent that they exist, so as to be in a position to produce those documents to the Trustee as soon as an appropriate order is issued by the appropriate courts in those jurisdictions.\n\n# **A. The Trustee Could Seek Discovery by Filing Applications Under the Hague Convention**\n\n23. In each of Hong Kong, the PRC and Switzerland, the Trustee could pursue discovery by filing applications under the Hague Convention, \"which provides for the efficient transmission of evidence abroad.\" *de Borja v. Razon*, No. 3:18-cv-01131-YY, 2019 WL 4724317, at \\*8 (D. Or. Aug. 16, 2019), *report and recommendation adopted*, 2019 WL 4723070 (D. Or. Sept. 25, 2019), *aff'd*, 835 Fed. Appx. 184 (9th Cir. 2020).8 \"[W]here, as here, discovery is directed to foreign nationals, who are not parties to the litigation, proceeding under the Hague Evidence Convention is often more appropriate.\" *Advanced Indus. Prods., S.C.S v. Alcoa Glob. Fasteners, Inc.*, No. CV 04-3049-ABC(CTx), 2006 WL 8433934, at \\*1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2006) (citation omitted).\n\n24. Litigants routinely seek discovery from Hong Kong, the PRC, and Switzerland via the Hague Convention, and in each of those jurisdictions, such applications are processed swiftly and routinely granted. *See* Fung Decl. ¶¶ 4 (noting that discovery is available in Hong Kong pursuant to the Hague Convention), 27–37 (noting that applications seeking discovery in Hong Kong pursuant to the Hague Convention typically are \"disposed of quickly\"); Gao Decl. ¶ 14 (noting that pursuing discovery in the PRC via the Hague Convention \"would be an effective and legitimate approach\" for the Trustee), 47 (noting that the PRC Ministry of Justice has processed 1,827 requests for judicial assistance including through the Hague Convention), 49 (\"Procedures of obtaining evidence through the Hague Evidence Convention [are] clear and straightforward\" in the PRC); Dasser Decl. ¶¶ 45–46 (noting that Swiss courts can order the production of documents\n\n8 *See also* JOHN FELLAS ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION GUIDE § 25:46 (2022) (\"The major goal of the Hague Evidence Convention is to simplify the service of letters rogatory and, thereafter, the taking of evidence itself.\").\n\nfrom Switzerland, including the disclosure of secret information about bank customers, for use in foreign proceedings through the route of the Hague Convention, and that such applications typically are processed by Swiss authorities in a timely manner, *i.e*., between a few weeks and three months). In sum, seeking discovery via the Hague Convention is simple, fast and efficient and would enable the Trustee to seek the same discovery requested in the Subpoena, without requiring UBS to violate the laws of Hong Kong, the PRC, or Switzerland and subject UBS to monetary fines, reputational damage and imprisonment of one or more of its employees or agents.\n\n# **B. The Trustee Could Seek Discovery by Seeking Hong Kong Recognition of the US Bankruptcy Proceedings and Pursuing Disclosure There**\n\n25. With respect to any disclosure the Trustee seeks from UBS's branch in Hong Kong, the Trustee could, as an alternative to applying via the Hague Convention, seek recognition of the US bankruptcy proceedings and the Trustee's corresponding authority, which could permit the Trustee to pursue disclosure directly in Hong Kong. Litigants routinely seek recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings in Hong Kong, and the Trustee could do so here as well. *See* Fung Decl. ¶ 42 (noting that \"a Hong Kong court can recognise foreign insolvency proceedings and can grant assistance to a foreign insolvency office-holder in the form of an order which must be consistent with justice and public policy of the Hong Kong\"). As with an application under the Hague Convention, this alternative could enable the Trustee to seek the discovery requested in the Subpoena, without requiring UBS to violate foreign law.\n\n26. UBS's proposal is consistent with recent practice in other proceedings involving information and documents subject to foreign laws. *See, e.g.*, Notice of Presentment of Debtors Application on Consent for an Order Pursuant to Rule 7028 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure Issuing a Letter of Request for an Order Compelling the Examination Under Oath of Louisa Watt in the United Kingdom Under the Hague Evidence Convention, *In re: Lehman*\n\n*Brothers Holdings Inc.*, 08 BR 13555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2009) [ECF No. 5015] (noticing an application \"for the issuance of a Letter of Request compelling the examination under oath of [a witness] in the United Kingdom\" under the Hague Convention); *CE Int'l Res. Holdings, LLC v. S.A. Mins. Ltd. P'ship*, No. 12-CV-08087 CM SN, 2013 WL 2661037, at \\*18 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2013) (\"CEIR may seek relief through the Hague Evidence Convention in Singapore.\").\n\n### **III. The Comity Balancing Test Requires that the Trustee Proceed Via One of the Proposed Alternatives**\n\n27. The Trustee maintains that UBS must search for potentially responsive documents \"across six continents.\" (Motion ¶ 8 n.3). Setting aside the overbreadth and burden concerns that statement raises in and of itself, the conflict of law issues raised squarely by the Subpoena require analysis under principles of international comity. The Motion makes short shrift of UBS's goodfaith objection that UBS, its employees and agents stand to suffer a broad range of consequences – including potential criminal prosecution, regulatory sanctions and civil liability.\n\n28. The central question therefore is whether the Court should*,* in its discretion*,* giving due weight to international comity, issue an order that would cause UBS to violate foreign laws. *See Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc.*, 116 F.R.D. 517, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (denying motion to compel where Swiss bank secrecy provisions would be violated). This Court should decline to issue an order requiring UBS to produce documents in violation of foreign laws.\n\n29. Considerations of comity require US courts to \"exercise special vigilance to protect foreign litigants [such as UBS] from the danger that unnecessary, or unduly burdensome, discovery may place them in a disadvantageous position.\" *Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa*, 482 U.S. 522, 546 (1987) (\"*Aérospatiale*\"). This Court \"should therefore take care to demonstrate due respect for any special problem confronted by [UBS] on account of . . . the location of its operations . . . .\" *Id.* The Trustee cannot deny that the Subpoena will require UBS and its employees and agents to violate foreign law due to the locations of UBS's operations but has refused to engage in any good faith efforts to narrow the scope of the Subpoena.\n\n30. The international comity inquiry \"calls for a 'particularized analysis of the respective interests of the foreign nation and the requesting nation.'\" *CE Int'l*, 2013 WL 2661037, at \\*8 (quoting *Aérospatiale*, 482 U.S. at 543–44)*.* The inquiry is case- and factspecific, turning on a careful balancing of factors identified by the Supreme Court in *Aérospatiale*, \"the five-factor test set forth in the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 442(1)(c),\" and other considerations, including the objecting party's good faith. *Id.* The Supreme Court has emphasized that our courts should \"exercise special vigilance\" before overruling foreign litigants' comity-based objections. *See Aérospatiale*, 482 U.S. at 546.\n\n31. The *Aérospatiale* factors weigh decisively in favor of this Court denying the Trustee's Motion.\n\n## **A. The Information the Trustee Seeks Includes a Broad Swath of Irrelevant Documents Available Elsewhere.**\n\nThe first *Aérospatiale* factor requires consideration of \"the importance . . . of the documents or other information requested.\" *CE Int'l*, 2013 WL 2661037, at \\*8. *First*, UBS does not dispute that some of the documents the Trustee seeks in the Subpoena may be relevant and therefore \"important\" to these proceedings. However, if enforced as drafted, the Subpoena also would seek a vast array of wholly irrelevant, and therefore unimportant, documents. *See, infra,* at 26-27.\n\n32. *Second*, the Trustee argues that the information requested in the Subpoena is of \"paramount importance\" on the basis that \"Bravo Luck (at a time it was owned and controlled by the Individual Debtor) held hundreds of millions of dollars in UBS accounts.\" (Motion ¶ 22). But whatever importance such materials may have in the abstract, it is hardly \"crucial\" that the Trustee obtain them from UBS, when he is seeking materials from Bravo Luck itself via a separate subpoena served in this proceeding. *See CE Int'l*, 2013 WL 2661037, at \\*9 (\"Where parties have other means of obtaining the requested documents, courts consider the requested discovery to have a 'reduced degree of importance'\" (citation omitted)).\n\n33. *Third*, the Subpoena seeks information dating back eleven years (from January 1, 2012 to present) concerning the Debtor and the 2004 Discovery Targets. Separately, though, the Trustee requested, and this Court ordered, the Debtor and other 2004 Discovery Targets to produce documents for a significantly shorter date range (from June 1, 2014 to present). *See* Order Granting in Part Motion to Compel Compliance with Rule 2004 Subpoenas dated January 20, 2023 [ECF No. 1353]. The Trustee nowhere explains why he seeks discovery from UBS going back further than that which has been sought from the Debtor himself. Thus, fully two-and-a-half years' worth of the eleven years' worth of documents the Trustee seeks in the Subpoena already has implicitly been held to be of no relevance in this case and, by implication, not \"important.\"\n\n### **B. The Trustee's Broad Requests for Customer Information Are Not \"Specific.\"**\n\n34. The Trustee claims that \"[t]he document requests set forth in the UBS Subpoena are *specific* to the Individual Debtor and *certain persons and entities that are directly related to or associated with him*.\" (Motion ¶ 23 (emphasis added)). Even a cursory review of the Subpoena undermines that statement, as key terms within the Subpoena are vaguely and expansively defined. For example, the Subpoena defines the term \"Debtor\" to include not only Mr. Kwok but also his \"employees, agents, counsel, advisors, or anyone acting on his behalf,\" making it impossible to know with certainty who the actual discovery targets are. (Subpoena, at 7). Similarly, the term \"2004 Discovery Targets\" includes the term \"Debtor's Family,\" which in turn is defined to include not only the Debtor's immediate family, but *any* person with \"any other familial relation to the Debtor.\" (Subpoena, at 8).\n\n35. In addition, the categories of information for which UBS would be obligated to perform searches across its global network of branches is unreasonable and impracticable, given the expansive scope of the term \"Documents\" under the Subpoena and the overbroad language of the specific requests. For example, a request for *\"All Documents* dated between January 1, 2012 and the present related to any funds, securities, property, or assets belonging to, held by, controlled by, on behalf of, *or otherwise related* to *any* of the 2004 Discovery Targets\" is not \"specific\"; such a request by its terms calls for the search, review, and production of documents that would be irrelevant to the Trustee's investigation. (*See* Subpoena, at 13 (emphasis added)); *see Minpeco*, 116 F.R.D. at 528 (\"given the wide scope of plaintiffs' requests and interrogatories, compliance by BPS is very likely to yield much material that plaintiffs will not find useful in this litigation\").\n\n36. The facts here are easily distinguishable from those in *Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais. S.A.* or similar cases*,* where the requested discovery involved only a single customer account that was crucial to the litigation, rendering \"the requested discovery . . . relevant, vital and narrowly tailored . . . .\" 249 F.R.D. 429, 441 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). Here, in contrast, the vague and overbroad language of the Subpoena would require a costly, time consuming and unduly burdensome – and likely impossible – effort to determine, among other issues, how many individuals and entities must be included within the \"2004 Discovery Targets,\" and which accounts may be \"related\" to such persons or entities. *See In re Texaco Inc.*, 79 B.R. 551, 553 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (noting that \"the scope of [a 2004] examination is not limitless\" and limiting a requested 2004 subpoena).\n\n### **C. The Customer Information Did Not \"Originate in the United States.\"**\n\n37. The Motion alleges that \"at least some responsive documents and information are located within the United States.\" (Motion ¶ 24). As an initial matter, UBS already has informed the Trustee that, with respect to all 2004 Discovery Targets that are not Claimants in the UK litigation against UBS, there are no accounts in the US. In any event, the Trustee has insisted throughout the parties' meet-and-confer discussions that he seeks documents that originated and are located in foreign jurisdictions such as Hong Kong. The foreign location of those materials \"weighs in favor of non-enforcement.\" *CE Int'l*, 2013 WL 2661037, at \\*10 (citing *Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC*, 262 F.R.D. 136, 150 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)); *Laydon v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd.*, 183 F. Supp. 3d 409, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (\"Given that the Document Requests relate to documents turned over to UK regulators, and which are in the possession, custody or control of banks that are located in the UK, it is likely that much, if not all, of the requested information originated outside of the United States. Accordingly, this factor favors the [party resisting producing documents].\").\n\n### **D. The Information is Available Through Other Means.**\n\n38. The Trustee acknowledges (as he must) that UBS has in good faith made at least three constructive proposals to facilitate the Trustee's investigation in jurisdictions where UBS, its employees, and agents would be subject to legal jeopardy if UBS is forced to comply with the Subpoena. (Motion ¶¶ 25–26). UBS's proposals have included (i) commencing recognition proceedings; (ii) submitting requests via the Hague Convention; or (iii) obtaining consent from the individuals and entities affiliated with the Debtor that are included within the scope of the Subpoena. The Trustee claims that these options are not \"realistic\" or \"viable,\" and the lack of alternatives \"supports compelling UBS.\" *Id.* At least with respect to two of these alternatives – seeking foreign recognition of the US proceedings and seeking discovery pursuant to the Hague\n\nConvention – the Trustee's conclusory dismissal of these alternatives is unavailing.9 \"[I]f the information sought can be easily obtained elsewhere, there is little or no reason to require a party to violate foreign law.\" *CE Int'l*, 2013 WL 2661037, at \\*10. The alternatives UBS has proposed would enable the Trustee to obtain the requested information through well-established channels for foreign discovery sought from non-parties such as UBS and would not require UBS to violate foreign law.\n\n39. *First*, the Trustee does not explain why seeking recognition of the US bankruptcy proceedings in Hong Kong would not be \"realistic,\" deny that discovery could be obtained through such proceedings, or otherwise identify any specific barrier to the Trustee's seeking the requested information through direct applications to the appropriate Hong Kong court. This factor weighs strongly in favor of UBS. *See id.* at \\*13. Seeking recognition by a Hong Kong court of the instant bankruptcy proceedings to pursue discovery of facts relevant to these proceedings would be entirely analogous with the representative of a foreign debtor seeking recognition of those proceedings under Chapter 15 in order to pursue disclosure of facts in the US to support those foreign proceedings. *See, e.g.*, *In re Comair Ltd.*, No. 21-10298(JLG), 2021 WL 5312988, at \\*13 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov 14, 2021) (finding that the Foreign Representative had established grounds to conduct discovery in the US relating to causes of action that Debtor might hold).\n\n40. *Second*, the Trustee's argument that proceeding under the Hague Convention is not \"realistic\" is undermined by the Supreme Court's holding in *Aérospatiale*. There, the Supreme Court observed that although the Hague Convention procedure may be more time-consuming and\n\n9 The Trustee rejects the notion that he could seek consent from purported UBS accountholders on the basis of those individuals' and entities' refusal to cooperate in these proceedings to date. (*See* Motion ¶ 9). But the Trustee nowhere explains why the remedy for noncompliance by the Debtor and his affiliates should be to require UBS – a non-party – to violate foreign law.\n\nexpensive in certain situations, \"in other instances a litigant's first use of the Hague Convention procedures can be expected to yield *more evidence abroad more promptly* than use of the normal procedures governing pre-trial civil discovery.\" 482 U.S. at 542 n.26 (emphasis added). Here, given the global scope of the Subpoena and the binding nature of the bank secrecy and other laws restricting disclosure in Hong Kong, the PRC, and Switzerland, UBS submits that the Hague Convention could be expected to yield more evidence responsive to the Trustee's requests more promptly than compelling UBS's compliance. *See CE Int'l*, 2013 WL 2661037, at \\*10 (\"the better course is 'to forebear from assuming that the Hague Evidence Convention is not a viable option until the [local] authorities have had a meaningful opportunity to comply' with a request\" (citation omitted)).\n\n41. In sum, UBS has proposed viable alternatives for seeking discovery in the relevant jurisdictions. The Trustee has failed to articulate any specific reasons why one or both alternatives are unavailable or would otherwise compromise the Trustee's investigation.\n\n## **E. The Balance of Interests Tips in Favor of Respecting Foreign Laws.**\n\n42. UBS does not dispute that the United States has an important interest in ensuring that the Trustee is permitted to diligently investigate the Individual Debtor's financial affairs. (*Cf.* Motion ¶ 27). However, UBS's proposal of alternative methods for obtaining the information requested would not compromise the Trustee's investigation or US interests. In contrast, an order compelling UBS and its employees and agents to violate foreign laws would substantially undermine the interests of the foreign jurisdictions at issue. Foreign sovereigns have substantial interests, based on important domestic policies, in the enforcement of their laws as to banking secrecy and customer confidentiality. *See generally* Fung Decl.; Gao Decl.; Dasser Decl.\n\n43. Courts have repeatedly recognized that a foreign jurisdiction's interest in\n\n21\n\ncompliance with its bank secrecy laws is an \"important\" interest of the foreign jurisdiction. *See*, *e.g.*, *Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC*, 463 F. Supp. 2d 310, 315 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting that \"maintaining bank secrecy is *an important interest of the foreign jurisdictions where the discovery sought here resides – indeed the United States has enacted similar bank secrecy protection*\") (emphasis added), *aff'd*, 2007 WL 812918 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2007); *United States v. First Nat. Bank of Chicago*, 699 F.2d 341, 346 (7th Cir. 1983) (\"Although the interest of the United States in collecting taxes is of importance to the financial integrity of the nation, the interest of Greece, served by its bank secrecy law is also important . . . .\"); *see also* Br. United States *Amicus Curiae* Opp'n Pet. Writ Cert. 8-21, at \\*8, *Arab Bank, PLC v. Linde*, No. 12–1485, 2014 WL 2191224 (U.S.) (arguing that lower courts erred in \"failing to accord sufficient weight to the foreign jurisdictions' interests in enforcing their bank secrecy laws\" in the context of discovery).\n\n44. The bank secrecy laws at issue here \"have the legitimate purpose of protecting commercial privacy inside and outside\" Hong Kong, the PRC, and Switzerland. *Minpeco*, 116 F.R.D. at 524. These laws embody a \"sovereign interest expressed by a foreign state,\" that is worthy of \"due respect[.]\" *Aérospatiale*, 482 U.S. at 546. *See also Minpeco*, 116 F.R.D. at 524 (finding that Switzerland has a \"substantial\" interest in its bank secrecy laws where prohibition is codified and violators are subject to criminal penalties); *Rotstain v. Trustmark Nat'l Bank*, No. 3:09-CV-2384-N-BG, 2015 WL 13031698, at \\*4 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 2015) (largely rejecting plaintiffs' request to compel production of material protected by Swiss banking secrecy law); *Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew*, 276 F.R.D. 143, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (\"While the United States certainly has an interest in enforcing its orders and protecting trademark rights, the Chinese interest in protecting its account holders' confidentiality appears more significant in this case.\").\n\n45. In contrast, the United States does not have a strong interest in compelling UBS\n\n22\n\nand its employees and agents to take action that would place them in legal jeopardy elsewhere. This is not a case where \"the substance of the matter concerns issues of national concern,\" like the \"goal of combatting terrorism.\" *CE Int'l*, 2013 WL 2661037, at \\*13 (citing *Strauss*, 249 F.R.D. at 443). Nor is this a \"request . . . initiated by the U.S. government for purposes of an enforcement action or criminal prosecution.\" *Id.* (citation omitted). In such circumstances, \"courts allocate relatively less weight to the United States in this analysis.\" *Id.* at \\*14. Here, although UBS does not dispute that the Trustee is required to investigate assets of the estates, the Trustee has made no showing that that goal outweighs the interests of Hong Kong, the PRC and Switzerland in the enforcement of their customer confidentiality and bank secrecy laws, especially where the Trustee's overbroad requests are likely to lead to the discovery of substantial quantities of irrelevant information, and where the requests are wholly duplicative of outstanding requests issued to persons and entities linked to the Debtor.\n\n### **F. Responding to the Subpoena Would Impose Substantial Hardship On UBS.**\n\n46. \"If compliance with a discovery request would subject the party on whom compliance is sought to liability or sanctions, this factor will weigh against compelling disclosure.\" *Id.* at \\*15. If the Court grants the Motion, the Trustee will have succeeded in placing UBS between a rock and a hard place – if UBS searches for and produces the materials sought in the Subpoena, it will violate foreign bank secrecy laws, exposing it and its employees to civil and criminal liability and regulatory enforcement. \"It is hardly debatable that fear of criminal prosecution constitutes a weighty excuse for nonproduction.\" *Societe Internationale Pour Participations lndustrielles Et Commerciales,* S. *A.* v. *Rogers,* 357 U.S. 197, 211 (1958).\n\n47. In any event, hardship is heightened where the party from whom discovery is sought, here UBS, is not a party to the litigation:\n\n[W[here the party sought to be compelled to produce documents in violation of foreign secrecy laws is merely a neutral source of information, and not itself a target of a criminal investigation or an adverse party in litigation, some courts have found the hardship to weigh more heavily in the balance. Indeed, it has been suggested that the factor which distinguished the early Second Circuit cases adopting a restrictive approach to ordering discovery in the face of foreign nondisclosure laws was the fact that they all involved a nonparty witness.\n\n*Minpeco*, 116 F.R.D. at 526–27 (citations omitted).\n\n#### **G. UBS Has Acted in Good Faith.**\n\n48. As noted above, UBS does not object in principle to complying with the Subpoena as evidenced by its multiple discussions with the Trustee seeking to narrow issues and offer potential avenues to *legally* turn over the requested documents. To that end, UBS has worked in good faith to provide the Trustee with information it could supply without violating the laws of jurisdictions in which it operates and to propose procedures that would enable the Trustee to seek the information sought in the Subpoena without putting UBS, its employees, and agents in legal jeopardy abroad. Unlike bad faith actors, UBS has not \"deliberately courted legal impediments to production.\" *Minpeco*, 116 F.R.D. at 523 (citation omitted). Instead, UBS merely wants to ensure that it abides by applicable law. UBS has never attempted to delay these proceedings. Indeed, once it realized that foreign law prohibited disclosure of documents from Hong Kong, the PRC, and Switzerland, UBS promptly and voluntarily proposed alternative, and workable, paths for the Trustee to seek the information he requests without putting UBS in violation of other jurisdictions' laws, notwithstanding the fact that UBS had already submitted its objections to the Subpoena and it is the Trustee's obligation – not UBS's – to take \"reasonable steps\" to ensure that the Subpoena does not impose an undue burden or expense upon UBS.\n\n#### **IV. The Subpoena as Drafted is Vague and Overbroad, and Complying is Impracticable**\n\n49. Even setting aside UBS's objections based on foreign law, the Subpoena is\n\nimpermissibly vague and overbroad, and complying with the Subpoena as drafted would be impracticable.\n\n50. *First*, the Subpoena is impermissibly vague. For example, the Subpoena defines \"Debtor's Family\" to include the impossibly broad qualifier of \"any other familial relation to the Debtor\". Similarly, the term \"Debtor\" includes the Debtor's \"employees, agents, counsel, advisors, *or anyone acting on his behalf*.\" (emphasis added). These terms make it impossible as a practical matter for UBS to identify a complete list of appropriate search terms or even know the total number of Discovery Targets. *Cf. In re Merrill*, No. 09-54616-C, 2010 WL 985231, at \\*2 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2010) (finding permissible definition of \"[t]he debtor's estate\" which included \"all assets of both spouses (essentially) and encompasses all liabilities of both spouses.\").\n\n51. *Second*, the Subpoena is overbroad. As noted above, the Trustee requests \"[a]ll Documents\" dating back over eleven years to January 1, 2012, which concern, inter alia, any accounts, property, business, transfers, communications related to at least 28 persons or entities. Indeed, much of the discovery sought appears to be irrelevant. *See In re Texaco Inc.*, 79 B.R. at 553–54 (noting that \"Pennzoil's definition of the word 'document' is *obviously too broad and borders on the ridiculous*,\" holding that \"[f]or purposes of the examination, the word 'document' shall mean financial or other reports, contracts, records and minutes,\" and limiting the examination to \"only to those three corporations which are debtors in these Chapter 11 cases\"). As worded, the Subpoena would require UBS to search for many documents – *e.g.*, a cancelled check from 2012 by a family member of the Debtor – which would reveal absolutely nothing about the \"nature and extent of the bankruptcy estate.\" The Subpoena's definition of \"Documents\" unreasonably goes far beyond that in Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a), applicable pursuant to Local Civil Rule 26(c)(2).\n\n52. *Third*, the Subpoena impermissibly seeks discovery that is wholly duplicative of\n\n25\n\ndiscovery sought from others. This Court has already authorized Rule 2004 subpoenas against *the same persons and entities* that are included within the \"2004 Discovery Targets.\"10 The fact that the Trustee is pursuing simultaneous, overlapping discovery from these persons and entities makes it extremely likely that UBS's prior and ongoing efforts to provide information to the Trustee are duplicative of other discovery targets' efforts. It is unduly burdensome to require a nonparty such as UBS to comply with an overbroad subpoena where the Trustee can and is taking steps to obtain disclosure from so many others. *See, e.g.*, *In re China Fishery Grp. Ltd.*, No. 16-11895 (JLG), 2017 WL 3084397, at \\*10 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2017) (\"The Court expects that as the Trustee moves forward with his Rule 2004 discovery, and as applicable, he will first seek to obtain information from the Debtors\").\n\n53. *Fourth,* complying with the Subpoena as drafted would effectively be impossible, for a global financial institution of UBS's size and operations. *See* Declaration of Scott Lipnick, dated January 29, 2023 (the \"Lipnick Declaration\" or \"Lipnick Decl\") ¶ 9 (\"Several categories of documents requested in the Subpoena cannot be scoped in good faith due to a lack of specificity.\"; ¶ 10 (\"The result of the lack of specificity described above is that it is impossible to scope what is actually sought by the Subpoena. It likewise would be extraordinarily time consuming and costly – if even possible – to structure search parameters adequate to search for\n\n10 *See* Order Granting Chapter 11 Trustee's Application for Rule 2004 Examination of Ho Wan Kwok [ECF No. 758] (granting Rule 2004 subpoena against the Debtor); Order Granting Chapter 11 Trustee's Application for Rule 2004 Discovery with respect to Various Entities and Individuals affiliated with Debtor [ECF No. 758] (granting Rule 2004 subpoenas against Ace Decade Holdings Limited, Bravo Luck Limited, Daniel Thomas Podhaskie, Dawn State Limited, Mei Guo, Qiang Guo, Hing Chi Ngok, Eastern Profit Corporation Limited, Golden Spring (New York) Ltd., Greenwich Land LLC, GTV Media Group, Inc., HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited LLC, Lamp Capital LLC, Qu Guo Jiao, Rule of Law Society IV Inc., Saraca Media Group, Inc., Voice of Guo Media, Inc., and Yvette Wang); Order Granting First Supplemental Omnibus Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee for Rule 2004 Examination of Additional Legal and Financial Advisors to the Debtor, Entities and Individuals Affiliated with Debtor, and Relevant Banks [ECF No. 866] (granting Rule 2004 subpoenas against ACA Capital Group Limited, Himalaya International Clearing Ltd., Himalaya International Financial Group Ltd., Himalaya International Payments Ltd., Himalaya International Reserves Ltd., Jesse Brown, and William Je).\n\nmaterials requested in the Subpoena.\"); ¶ 9(c) (\"The Subpoena also does not indicate what custodians, current or former, should have their custodial files searched for potentially relevant information. UBS AG can run archive-wide searches for keywords, but running such searches can elicit a substantial number of false positive results if the keywords are not narrowly tailored\"); ¶ 12 (\"In my more than three years as eDiscovery COunsel, I have never seen a motion to compel production relating to any document request or production demand as broad as the one at issue here. The requesting party's unwillingness to identify custodians, keywords, or jurisdictional limitations is without precedent.\"); *see also Kansas Heart Hosp., L.L.C. v. Exec. Risk Indem., Inc.*, No. 06-1345-MLB, 2007 WL 1125772, at \\*3 (D. Kan. Apr. 16, 2007) (holding, where \"plaintiffs' definition of 'you' include[d] all of defendant and any of the Chubb Corporation's affiliated companies,\" including \"120 offices in some 29 countries worldwide,\" that \"[p]laintiffs have not shown the relevance or need for conducting a worldwide search for documents\").\n\n### **V. The Subpoena Improperly Seeks Information Relating to Several Pending Proceedings**\n\n# **A. The Pending Proceeding Doctrine Bars the Use of Rule 2004 Discovery Once Parallel Litigation Has Begun**\n\n54. The Pending Proceeding Doctrine prevents the Trustee from using the broad power of Rule 2004 to obtain disclosure as an end-run around disclosure limitations that exist in the context of a separate pending proceeding. *See, e.g.*, *In re Brown*, No. 18-10617-JLG, 2018 WL 4944816, at \\*4 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2018) (\"[O]nce an adversary proceeding or contested matter is commenced, discovery should be pursued under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and not Rule 2004.\" (citations omitted)); *In re Martelli*, No. BR 16-20316-PRW, 2017 WL 3098105, at \\*4 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. July 20, 2017); *In re Szadkowski*, 198 B.R. 140, 142 (Bankr. D. Md. 1996) (holding that \"once an adversary proceeding . . . has been commenced, the discovery of matters related to that adversary proceeding . . . must proceed in accordance with the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure\").\n\n## **B. The Motion Should Be Denied and the Subpoena Quashed with Respect to All 2004 Discovery Targets Who Are Claimants in the UK Litigation**\n\n55. Here, where the discovery sought in the Subpoena relates to numerous individuals and entities against whom the Trustee or anticipates actively litigating against UBS, such discovery is improper and the Trustee should instead be made to proceed under the more limited Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As this Court is aware, three 2004 Discovery Targets – the Claimants – have asserted claims against UBS in the United Kingdom in a proceeding in which disclosure has yet to be exchanged. The Trustee has indicated that he intends to step into Mr. Kwok's shoes for purposes of litigating that matter. (*See, e.g.*, Objection Filed by Patrick R. Linsey on behalf of Luc A. Despins Trustee, (RE: 761 Motion To Stay Pending Appeal [ECF No. 796])). Permitting the Trustee to pursue virtually unfettered disclosure about the Claimants from UBS via a Rule 2004 subpoena is improper when he has made clear to the Court his intention to step into Mr. Kwok's shoes for purposes of the UK proceeding. *See, e.g.*, *In re Sanomedics, Inc.*, No. 16- 21659-RAM, 2018 WL 3816772, at \\*2–3 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. July 25, 2018) (holding that the \"textbook cause for application of the pending proceeding rule\" is where the party seeking discovery would be / is seeking the same documents in a parallel proceeding); *In re Coffee Cupboard, Inc*., 128 B.R. 509, 516 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991) (Rule 2004 \"should not be used to obtain information for use in an unrelated case or proceeding pending before another tribunal\").\n\n56. In *In re Bennett Funding Grp., Inc.*, where the complaint in the parallel proceeding implicated a broad range of financial activities of the defendants, and the scope of the Rule 2004 discovery, if permitted, \"could not avoid delving into issues\" that related to the complaint, the court deemed the Rule 2004 discovery demand to be improper. 203 B.R. 24, 30 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1996). In such circumstances, the court acknowledged that the target of the requested Rule 2004 examination and the parties and subject matter of the parallel proceeding were \"not easily separable because of the complex relationship between them,\" and the Court recognized that use of a Rule 2004 examination would \"unavoidably and unintentionally create a back door through which the Trustee could circumvent the limitations\" of the narrower disclosure rules applicable to the parallel proceeding. *Id.* That is precisely what the Trustee is attempting here in seeking disclosure from UBS in connection with the Claimants.\n\n### **VI. If this Court Orders UBS to Comply with the Subpoena, UBS Should Be Granted Its Reasonable Costs**\n\n57. Rule 45(d) provides, in relevant part, that \"[a] party or attorney responsible for issuing and serving a subpoena must take reasonable steps to avoid imposing undue burden or expense on a person subject to the subpoena.\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1). By refusing to engage in any good faith negotiation to narrow the scope of the Subpoena, the Trustee has violated Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d). *See In re Aggrenox Antitrust Litig.*, No. 3:14-MD-02516 (SRU), 2017 WL 4679228, at \\*3 (D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2017) (\"Rule 45 directs district courts to 'impose an appropriate sanction – which may include . . . reasonable attorney's fees – on a party or attorney who fails to comply' with the Rule's mandate to 'take reasonable steps to avoid imposing undue burden or expense on a person subject to the subpoena.'\") (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1)).\n\n58. Separately, pursuant to Rule 45(d)(2)(B)(ii), if this Court orders compliance with the Trustee's overbroad Subpoena, the Court must order the Trustee to bear UBS's reasonable costs and attorneys' fees incurred in complying with the Subpoena. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2)(B)(ii) (providing that a court ordering compliance with a subpoena over an objection \"*must* protect a person who is neither a party nor a party's officer from significant expense resulting from compliance\" (emphasis added)); *see also Koopmann v. Robert Bosch, LLC*, No. 18-CV-4065 (JMF), 2018 WL 9917679, at \\*1 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2018) (\"Courts have deemed . . . Rule\n\n[45(d)(2)(B)(ii)] 'to make cost shifting *mandatory* in all instances in which a non-party incurs significant expense from compliance with a subpoena.'\" (emphasis added)). This applies in the Rule 2004 context as well. *See, e.g.*, *In re Buccaneer Res., LLC*, No. 14-60041, 2015 WL 8527424, at \\*8 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Dec. 10, 2015) (granting certain directors subjected to Rule 2004 examinations \\$744,424.28 pursuant to Rule 45).\n\n### **CONCLUSION**\n\n59. For the foregoing reasons, UBS respectfully requests that the Court issue an\n\norder denying the Motion and quashing the Subpoena or, in the alternative:\n\n- (i) ordering the Trustee to seek discovery via the Hague Convention or after obtaining foreign recognition of the instant bankruptcy proceedings;\n- (ii) ordering the Trustee to narrow the scope and breadth of the Subpoena substantially to adequately specify the discovery sought, avoid imposing undue burden on UBS, and comply with the proper scope of Rule 2004;\n- (iii) denying the Motion as to those 2004 Discovery Targets that are Claimants in the UK litigation against UBS; and\n- (iv) if this Court orders UBS to comply with the Subpoena, granting UBS its reasonable costs and attorneys' fees incurred in compliance.\n\nDated: January 30, 2023\n\n## UBS AG\n\nBy: */s/ Marc J. Gottridge\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_* Marc J. Gottridge (ct12094) Lisa J. Fried (*admission pending*) HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS NEW YORK LLP 450 Lexington Avenue New York, New York 10017 (917) 542-7600 marc.gottridge@hsf.com lisa.fried@hsf.com\n\n*Counsel for Non-Party UBS AG*\n\n# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\nIn re:\n\nHO WAN KWOK, *et al.*,\n\nChapter 11\n\nCase No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\nDebtors.\n\n(Jointly Administered)\n\n# **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nThe undersigned hereby certifies that on January 30, 2023, the foregoing Objection, along with all declarations submitted in support thereof,11 was electronically filed. Notice of this filing was sent by e-mail to all parties to the above-captioned chapter 11 case by operation of the Court's electronic filing (\"CM/ECF\") system or by mail to anybody unable to accept electronic filing as indicated on the Notice of Electronic Filing.12 Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF system.\n\nDated: January 30, 2023 UBS AG\n\nBy: \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_*/s/ Marc J. Gottridge\\_\\_\\_\\_* Marc J. Gottridge (ct12094) Lisa J. Fried (*admission pending*) HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS NEW YORK LLP 450 Lexington Avenue New York, New York 10017 (917) 542-7600 marc.gottridge@hsf.com lisa.fried@hsf.com\n\n*Counsel for Non-Party UBS AG*\n\n11 The declarations include, along with the exhibits thereto, the Declaration of Lisa J. Fried, dated January 30, 2023; the Declaration of Scott Lipnick, dated January 29, 2023; the Declaration of Gary Gao, dated January 29, 2023; the Declaration of Felix Dasser, dated January 27, 2023; and the Declaration of Eugene Fung, dated January 27, 2023.\n\n12 To the extent that the foregoing was filed outside regular business hours, service by mail on recipients unable or not qualified to accept electronic notice was made on the next business day.","body_zh":"美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院\n\n关于：\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，\n\n第11章\n\n案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n\n债务人。\n\n（联合管理）\nUBS AG（瑞银集团）就第11章受托人请求作出命令，强制 UBS AG 遵守 Rule 2004 传票之动议提出的异议\n目录\n页码\n\n引言 1\n\n事实背景 5\nI.\nII. UBS 已就传票送达有效异议 6\n受托人歪曲 UBS 迄今为止的配合情况 9\n论证 10\nI. 遵守传票将要求 UBS 违反外国法律，并使 UBS 员工陷入法律风险 10\nA.\n外国法律的相关规定 10\ni.\n香港 10\nii.\n中华人民共和国 11\niii.\n瑞士 12\nII. 应命令受托人根据 UBS 的建议寻求证据开示 12\nA.\n受托人可通过根据《海牙公约》提交申请寻求证据开示 13\nB.\n受托人可通过寻求香港承认美国破产程序并在当地寻求披露而取得证据开示 14\nIII. 礼让衡量检验要求受托人通过所提替代方案之一推进 15\nA.\n受托人所寻求的信息包括可从其他来源获得的大量无关文件。 16\nB.\n受托人的请求并不“具体”。 17\nC.\n所寻求的信息并非“起源于美国”。 19\nD.\n该信息可通过其他方式获得。 19\nE.\n利益衡量倾向于尊重外国法律。 21\nF.\n回应传票将给 UBS 造成重大困难。 23\nG.\nUBS 一直秉持善意行事。 24\nIV. 按现有措辞，传票含糊且范围过宽，遵守该传票不可行 24\nV. 传票不当地寻求与一项待决程序有关的信息 27\n\nA. 一旦平行诉讼已经开始，待决程序原则即禁止使用 Rule 2004 证据开示 27\nB. 对于作为英国待决诉讼当事人的所有 2004 证据开示对象，应驳回该动议并撤销传票 28\nVI. 如本院命令 UBS 遵守传票，必须向 UBS 判给其合理费用 29\n结论 31\n\n引用文献目录\n\n案例 页码\n\nAdvanced Indus. Products, S.C.S v. Alcoa Glob. Fasteners, Inc.,\nNo. CV 04-3049-ABC(CTx), 2006 WL 8433934 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2006) 13\nCE Int'l Res. Holdings, LLC v. S.A. Mins. Ltd. P'ship,\nNo. 12-CV-08087 CM SN, 2013 WL 2661037 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2013) 多处引用\nDaimler AG v. Bauman,\n571 U.S. 117 (2014) 9\nde Borja v. Razon,\nNo. 3:18-cv-01131-YY, 2019 WL 4724317 (D. Or. Aug. 16, 2019) 13\nIn re Aggrenox Antitrust Litig.,\nNo. 3:14-MD-02516 (SRU), 2017 WL 4679228 (D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2017) 29\nIn re Bennett Funding Grp., Inc.,\n203 B.R. 24 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1996) 28-29\nIn re Brown,\nNo. 18-10617-JLG, 2018 WL 4944816 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2018) 27\nIn re Buccaneer Res., LLC,\nNo. 14-60041, 2015 WL 8527424 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Dec. 10, 2015) 30\nIn re China Fishery Grp. Ltd.,\nNo. 16-11895 (JLG), 2017 WL 3084397 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2017) 26\nIn re Coffee Cupboard, Inc.,\n128 B.R. 509 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991) 28\nIn re Comair Ltd.,\nNo. 21-10298(JLG), 2021 WL 5312988 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov 14, 2021) 20\nIn re del Valle Ruiz,\n939 F.3d 520 (2d Cir. 2019) 9\nIn re Martelli,\nNo. BR 16-20316-PRW, 2017 WL 3098105 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. July 20, 2017) 27\nIn re Merrill,\nNo. 09-54616-C, 2010 WL 985231 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2010) 25\nIn re Sanomedics, Inc.,\nNo. 16-21659-RAM, 2018 WL 3816772 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. July 25, 2018) 28\n\nIn re Szadkowski,\n198 B.R. 140 (Bankr. D. Md. 1996) 27-28\n\nIn re Texaco Inc.,\n79 B.R. 551 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) 18, 25\nKansas Heart Hosp., L.L.C. v. Exec. Risk Indem., Inc.,\nNo. 06-1345-MLB, 2007 WL 1125772 (D. Kan. Apr. 16, 2007) 27\nKoopmann v. Robert Bosch, LLC,\nNo. 18-CV-4065 (JMF), 2018 WL 9917679 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2018) 29-30\nLaydon v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd.,\n183 F. Supp. 3d 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) 19\nLinde v. Arab Bank, PLC,\n262 F.R.D. 136 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) 19\nLinde v. Arab Bank, PLC,\n463 F. Supp. 2d 310 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) 22\nMinpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc.,\n116 F.R.D. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) 15, 18, 22, 24\nSociété Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa,\n482 U.S. 522 (1987) 15-16, 21-22\nRotstain v. Trustmark Nat'l Bank,\nNo. 3:09-CV-2384-N-BG, 2015 WL 13031698 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 2015) 21\nSociété Internationale Pour Participations lndustrielles Et Commerciales, S. A. v. Rogers,\n357 U.S. 197 (1958) 23\nStrauss v. Credit Lyonnais. S.A.,\n249 F.R.D. 429 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) 18, 23\nTiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew,\n276 F.R.D. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 9, 22\nUnited States v. First Nat. Bank of Chicago,\n699 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983) 22\n规则\nFed. R. Civ. P. 34 25\nFed. R. Civ. P. 45 4, 29\n其他权威资料\n\nBr. United States Amicus Curiae\nOpp'n Pet. Writ Cert. Arab Bank, PLC v. Linde, 2014 WL\n2191224 (U.S.) 22\n\nRestatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 442(1)(c) 16\nJOHN FELLAS ET AL.,\nTRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION GUIDE § 25:46 (2022) 13\nNotice of Presentment of Debtors Application on\nConsent for an Order Pursuant to Rule 7028 of the Federal Rules of\nBankruptcy Procedure Issuing a Letter of Request for an Order\nCompelling the Examination Under Oath of Louisa Watt in the\nUnited Kingdom Under the Hague Evidence Convention,\nIn re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.,\n08 BR 13555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2009) [ECF No. 5015] 14-15\n\n非当事人 UBS AG（瑞银集团）通过其下列签署的律师，谨就 Luc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯平斯）以第11章受托人（以下简称“受托人”）身份于 January 23, 2023 提交的《第11章受托人请求作出命令，强制 UBS AG 遵守 Rule 2004 传票之动议》[ECF No. 1362]（以下简称“该动议”）提出本异议。该强制动议请求作出命令，要求 UBS 在14日内提交响应受托人 Rule 2004 审查传票（以下简称“该传票”）的文件。应驳回该动议。\n\n引言\n\n1. UBS 一直并仍愿意在其能够的范围内配合并遵从受托人的请求。UBS 已向受托人明确表示，其将通过获认可的国际渠道，提供受托人所请求的、来自禁止 UBS 仅根据该传票提供材料的司法管辖区的响应性材料。与该动议中的不实描述相反，UBS 从未拒绝遵从。尽管受托人声称迄今未收到任何响应性信息，但 UBS 在送达其异议后，已自愿就范围极其广泛的传票进行了大量调查。此外，UBS 已向受托人报告，除 UBS 已在英国一项待决程序中与之诉讼的 2004 证据开示对象（定义见该传票）外，1其余 2004 证据开示对象均未在美国、英国或英属维尔京群岛开立账户——该三地为受托人律师一直称为受托人主要关注的六个司法管辖区中的三个。自受托人提交该动议以来，UBS 还确认，如瑞士——受托人表示其主要关注的其余三个司法管辖区之一——存在任何响应于该传票的文件，则该等文件不会处于 UBS 的占有、保管或控制之下，因为截至 June 14, 2015，因将瑞士簿记业务分拆至一家单独设立的实体，所有瑞士簿记的财富管理以及零售和公司账户均已从 UBS 转移至其关联实体 UBS Switzerland AG（瑞银瑞士有限公司）。2\n\n1 见下文第 III 节。\n\n2. 就受托人声称可能相关的其余司法管辖区——香港、中华人民共和国（以下简称“中国”）和瑞士（出于谨慎起见，此处包括瑞士，以防受托人主张该传票涵盖任何在瑞士单独设立的 UBS 关联实体；而其并不涵盖）——以及就该传票整体而言，UBS 主要基于以下三项理由对该动议提出异议：3\n\n2 见下文第 15 段。\n\n3. 第一，遵守该传票将要求 UBS 违反香港、中国和瑞士法律。然而，UBS 可通过适当的国际渠道提供披露，受托人可经由该等渠道轻易取得当地法院命令；在存在响应性材料的范围内，UBS 能够且愿意遵从该等命令。事实上，在香港和瑞士，UBS 及其员工即使仅确认是否存在任何相关账户，也将违反法律。如 UBS 或其员工未经客户同意或未经该等司法管辖区法院命令而披露任何信息，其可能面临严重后果，在某些情况下还可能面临刑事后果。受托人应改为在该等司法管辖区通过以下任一方式寻求其所要求的披露：(i) 就全部三个司法管辖区而言，通过《民事或商事案件国外取证海牙公约》（以下简称“海牙公约”）寻求披露；或 (ii) 就香港而言，通过寻求承认美国破产程序，从而使受托人能够在该等司法管辖区依照当地法律寻求披露。\n\n3 受托人所谓理解，即“UBS 拒绝遵从 UBS 传票的唯一理由是外国隐私法据称适用”，系不正确。（动议第 17 段）。UBS 对该传票提出了若干其他异议（见动议附件 B），并在双方协商讨论期间明确表示，其与受托人协商的主要目标之一，是就可管理的披露范围达成一致，该范围仅限于受托人实际需要且 UBS 可能能够提供的文件。（见 Lisa J. Fried（丽莎·J·弗里德）于 January 30, 2023 作出的声明〔以下简称“Fried 声明”或“Fried Decl.”〕第 6 段）。\n\n4. 如 UBS 已向受托人表示，UBS 不反对受托人通过上述任一替代方案推进；同时，UBS 将并行开展工作，搜索并准备提供响应性文件（如存在），以避免在作出要求提供文件的适当外国法院命令前进一步延误。利益衡量支持这些替代方案。采用海牙公约程序或在香港获得承认，不会损害受托人或破产财产。这些替代方案还将大幅保护 UBS、其员工及其代理人，使其免于因违反 UBS 经营所在司法管辖区法律而可能面临的法律风险；将符合国际礼让原则；并且很可能仅需数周至数月时间。\n\n5. 第二，该传票范围过宽且含糊，无法按其书面内容执行。该传票适用于涉及全球范围内超过25名个人和实体（具体人数不定）的惊人广泛材料，追溯期达11年——尽管本院已命令部分 2004 证据开示对象本人仅提交追溯九年的文件。严格遵守该传票条款，将要求 UBS 对全球调查，包括从已注销支票到纸质文件上的边注等一切可能与 UBS 全球数万名现任及前任员工有关的材料，其中涵盖数拍字节的电子数据及其他材料。按现有措辞，该传票可能产生数量巨大的文件，超出为调查破产财产资产而发出的 Rule 2004 传票的适当范围。此外，受托人的请求在一定程度上与已向债务人相关个人和实体发出的请求重复。\n\n6. UBS（瑞银）为缩小传票的范围，要求受托人说明其主要关注的司法管辖区。此后，UBS 投入了大量时间和资源，研究其可向受托人提供及不可提供来自受托人律师确定为主要关注的六个司法管辖区的信息。现不应要求 UBS 就全球数量未明确的其他司法管辖区进行额外的高成本且耗时的搜索。\n\n7. 第三，在 2004 年取证对象中的若干方为在英国针对 UBS 进行的持续诉讼中的索赔人的范围内，该传票违反了在诉程序原则（Pending Proceeding Doctrine）。在诉程序原则是本巡回区确立已久的法律原则，受托人无法律依据使用 Rule 2004 就英国诉讼中存在争议的事项寻求取证；该英国诉讼的一方为 2004 年取证对象郭先生、Ace Decade 和 Dawn State（合称“索赔人”），另一方为 UBS，而受托人拟通过代位郭先生的地位代表索赔人进行诉讼。\n\n8. 最后，受托人拒绝进行善意协商，以合理缩小传票过于宽泛的范围，违反了其根据 Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d) 采取“合理步骤”以避免对 UBS 等非当事人施加不当负担的义务。若本院驳回 UBS 的异议并命令 UBS 遵守传票，则本院“必须保护 [UBS]”，即保护作为“既非当事人亦非当事人高级职员”的实体，免于因遵守而产生的重大费用。见 Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2)(B)(ii)。\n\n9. 因此，UBS 请求法院作出命令，驳回该动议并撤销该传票，或作为替代方案，(i) 命令受托人通过《海牙取证公约》或在获得对本破产程序的外国承认后寻求取证；(ii) 命令受托人大幅缩小传票的范围和广度，以充分明确所寻求的取证内容，避免对 UBS 施加不当负担，并符合 Rule 2004 传票的适当范围；(iii) 对作为英国程序中索赔人的那些 2004 年取证对象驳回该动议；以及 (iv) 在法院命令 UBS 遵守传票的范围内，准许 UBS 追偿因遵守而产生的合理成本和律师费。\n\n事实背景\n\n10. 受托人于 September 26, 2022 向 UBS 送达了范围极其宽泛的传票，要求 UBS 提供与 2004 年取证对象有关、几乎不受限制范围的信息和文件，即债务人 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）及据称与其有关联的另外 26 名个人和实体4。（见 Fried Decl. ¶ 2）。该传票要求提供追溯至 January 1, 2012、长达 11 年的数十类文件5；且受托人的律师在双方会谈协商期间坚持认为，受托人寻求 UBS 在世界任何地点持有的文件。（见同上 ¶ 4）。然而，受托人在其申请获准送达传票的动议 [ECF No. 839] 中表示，该传票应送达“UBS AG Hong Kong branch”（见同上，Ex. B，第 4 页），这表明其主要但并非唯一关注的司法管辖区为香港。\n\n4 这些仅是被具体确定的取证对象；该传票将“Debtor”界定为不仅包括郭先生，还包括其“雇员、代理人、律师、顾问，或任何代表其行事之人”，因此无法确定实际取证对象为何人。（传票，第 7 页）。\n\n5 该传票将“Documents”界定为包括“电子邮件、以电子形式保存的计算机文件、通信函件、备忘录、磁带、速记或手写笔记、各种书面表格、图表、蓝图、绘图、草图、曲线图、计划、文章、规格说明、日记、信件、电报、照片、会议记录、合同、协议、调查资料、计算机打印件、任何种类的数据汇编、电传、传真、电子邮件、短信、即时消息、语音消息、发票、订购表、支票、汇票、对账单、贷项通知单、报告、头寸报告、摘要、索引、账簿、分类账、笔记本、日程表、透明胶片、录音资料、目录、广告、宣传材料、胶片、录像带、录音带、CD、计算机磁盘、小册子、传单、穿孔卡、工时单、推文、社交媒体帖子，或任何其他种类的书面或记录材料，以及其全部元数据，无论以何种方式存储（无论为有形形式还是电子形式）、记录、制作或复制，且还包括但不限于前述任何文件的草稿或副本，如其中载有原始文件中不存在的任何种类的笔记、评论或标记，或在其他方面与原始文件不完全相同。”（传票，第 11 页）。\n\n一、UBS 对传票提出了有效异议\n\n11. 于 October 12, 2022，UBS 对传票送达了其异议（“异议”）。（见动议，Ex. B）。除其他异议外，UBS 提出异议：(i) 反对提供与位于美国境外的账户有关的文件，并指出，如美国境外司法管辖区内的 UBS 实体雇员为回应传票而提供文件，“可能面临刑事处罚”；(ii) 反对提供与 UBS 的任何监管机构有关的文件；(iii) 以传票范围过宽且造成不当负担为由提出异议；(iv) 因传票中请求的某些材料可向程序当事人索取；(v) 反对传票缺乏具体性，且未确定合理期间；(vi) 在其不当寻求并非由 UBS 而是由 UBS 关联方占有、保管或控制的文件的范围内提出异议；以及 (vii) 基于律师—当事人特权及其他适用特权提出异议。异议还称：“UBS 不会提供来自 UBS 位于美国境外的办公室，或其位于美国境外的关联方或子公司的、将违反任何其他司法管辖区法律的文件。”（同上，第 2 页）。UBS 还保留补充或修改异议的权利，并提议与受托人会谈协商，以缩小或消除争议领域。\n\n12. 在随后数周中，UBS 与受托人的律师进行沟通，以安排双方均方便的会谈协商时间；该会谈于 November 28, 2022 进行。（见 Fried Decl. ¶ 4）。在该次通话及后续讨论中，UBS 远非“拒绝遵守 UBS 传票”（动议 ¶ 12），而是一直善意努力向受托人提供其能够在不违反 UBS 营运所在司法管辖区法律的情况下提供的信息，并提出程序，使受托人能够寻求传票中要求的额外信息，而不会使 UBS、其雇员和代理人在国外面临法律风险。在双方每次会谈协商通话后，UBS 及其律师均勤勉工作——跨越多个时区，并在香港和中华人民共和国（PRC）的商业活动大幅放缓的农历新年假期期间——为受托人获取信息。（见 Fried Decl. ¶ 5）。\n\n13. 鉴于按其起草方式传票的模糊性和过宽范围，UBS 的律师在会谈协商期间要求受托人向 UBS 指明其主要关注的司法管辖区及 2004 年取证对象。（见 Fried Decl. ¶ 7）。受托人主张，“UBS 试图将点名应由 UBS 在何处搜索其文件和信息的具体司法管辖区的责任加诸受托人”（动议 ¶ 8 n.3），但受托人从未回应 UBS 所提出的有根据异议，即要求非当事人在其全球全部系统中，就涉及数量无限的个人和实体、历时 11 年、看似无止境的文件清单进行搜索，既不可行又构成不当负担。由于受托人未就银行具体应寻找何物及在何处寻找提供任何其他善意指引，UBS 合理地要求受托人明确其主要关注的司法管辖区。\n\n14. 于 January 10, 2023，受托人的律师确认，受托人主要关注的司法管辖区为美国、英国、英属维尔京群岛、香港、中华人民共和国和瑞士。（见 Fried Decl. ¶ 9）。UBS 随后确定了其能够向受托人提供的、与该等司法管辖区有关且可能回应传票的信息范围。在双方最近一次于 January 20, 2023 进行的会谈协商电话中，UBS 的外聘律师告知受托人的律师：\n\n- a. UBS 未发现与任何 2004 年取证对象有关的、位于美国、英国或英属维尔京群岛的回应性账户，但该等取证对象同时也是该等索赔人与 UBS 之间在英国进行的待决程序中的索赔人者除外；\n\n- b. UBS 预计不久即可就中华人民共和国向受托人提供最新情况，但需要额外时间，部分原因是农历新年假期（于 January 22 through February 5, 2023 庆祝）；在该假期期间，中华人民共和国的商业活动放缓，其方式类似于美国圣诞节至元旦期间的假期；以及\n\nc. 就瑞士和香港而言，假设 UBS 在该等司法管辖区拥有任何回应性材料，UBS 将无法在不违反该等司法管辖区法律的情况下，回应传票提供任何信息或文件；违反该等法律会受到严厉处罚，并在某些情况下受到刑事处罚。然而，正如 UBS 的外聘律师已在双方数次先前的会谈协商通话中解释的那样，受托人可以通过以下任一路径向该等司法管辖区寻求披露：(i) 根据《海牙取证公约》进行，或 (ii) 寻求香港对该美国破产案件的司法承认；这可能导致 UBS 可予遵守的当地法院命令，从而消除其违反该等司法管辖区法律的风险。UBS 的外聘律师——再次且并非首次——还说明，如受托人通过上述任一或两种替代路径进行，UBS 不会提出异议；并且，如瑞士或香港存在任何可能回应性材料，UBS 准备在受托人根据《海牙取证公约》或为获得外国承认提出申请的同时，审查并准备该等材料以供提供，从而避免在发布要求于该等司法管辖区提供材料的适当法院命令后出现任何延误。\n\n（见 Fried Decl. ¶ 10）。\n\n15. UBS 随后确认，截至 June 14, 2015，所有在瑞士记账的财富管理、零售和公司账户，均因应瑞士金融市场监督管理局（Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority，“FINMA”）——瑞士金融市场监管机构——的要求，将瑞士记账业务分拆至一家独立注册成立的实体，而从 UBS 转移至关联实体 UBS Switzerland AG（“UBS Switzerland”）。因此，如瑞士存在回应传票的文件，该等文件不会由 UBS 在瑞士占有、保管或控制。（见 Fried Decl. ¶ 12）。6\n\n6 在受托人主张该传票的范围超出 UBS（瑞银）而及于与其关联的任何独立法律实体的范围内，UBS 重申其对该传票的异议，即该传票可被解释为寻求由具有独立于 UBS 的公司身份的 UBS 关联公司占有、保管或控制的文件。（见动议，附件 B，第 2 页）。受托人从未对该异议提出异议，且也无法提出异议，因为本院无管辖权强制 UBS Switzerland（瑞银瑞士）或 UBS 的任何其他关联公司遵守该传票；该等关联公司既未在美国注册成立，亦未主要设于美国，且未被指称实施了足以使其受本院特定管辖的任何行为。一般参见 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 139 (2014); In re del Valle Ruiz, 939 F.3d 520, 529 (2d Cir. 2019)。当然，受托人可以向瑞银瑞士提出《海牙公约》请求。\n\n论证\n\n一、遵守该传票将要求 UBS 违反外国法律，并使 UBS 员工面临法律风险\n\nA. 外国法律的相关规定\n\n16. 认为 UBS“于本月早些时候告知受托人，其不会提供任何回应 UBS 传票的文件或信息——甚至不会披露存在哪些文件或信息——原因是外国司法辖区的银行保密法”的说法并不属实。（动议第 8 段）。UBS 也未坚持要求受托人在“UBS 设有分支机构的世界数十个国家”采取法律程序（通过《海牙公约》取证或承认程序）。（同上〔原文强调〕）。相反，UBS 提出了可行且广获认可的替代途径，使受托人能够在不要求 UBS 违反其他司法辖区法律的情况下寻求其所请求的信息。而且，与受托人的主张相反，这些替代途径绝非“不可行”。（动议第 12 段）。联邦法院经常要求诉讼当事人采用《海牙公约》程序。参见，例如，Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew, 276 F.R.D. 143, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)（指示原告通过《海牙公约》请求其在中国寻求的信息），经确认，案名为 Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Andrew, No. 10 Civ. 9471(WHP), 2011 WL 11562419 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2011)。\n\n17. 在 2023 年 1 月 20 日的会谈电话中，受托人的外部律师表示，受托人计划提出强制动议，而非采取 UBS 已概述的任何替代途径（且 UBS 同意不对此提出异议）。（见 Fried 声明第 11 段）。\n\n二、应当命令受托人依照 UBS 的提议寻求取证\n\n18. 受托人并不争议，遵守该传票将要求 UBS 违反外国法律。相反，他仅在没有任何依据的情况下主张：“要求 UBS 提供回应 UBS 传票的文件和信息的法院命令将为 UBS 提供充分保护。”动议第 33 段。7 如下文详述，该主张显然错误。\n\ni. 香港\n\n19. 随附提交的 Eugene Fung（冯尤金）于 2023 年 1 月 27 日作出的声明（“Fung 声明”或“Fung Decl.”）说明，如被强制遵守该传票，UBS 的香港分行（及其雇员和代理人）将被迫违反的香港法律规定。概言之，UBS 香港分行对其客户负有合同保密义务，即对因银行业务关系而获悉的客户事务信息保密。香港法院命令可推翻该义务，强制香港分行披露与其客户有关的文件（但外国法院命令不能）。见 Fung Decl. ¶¶ 4, 8(2), 23, 25。遵守该传票将导致 UBS 及其雇员和代理人违反其对客户负有的保密义务，可能造成严重的财务和声誉损害。见同上。除使 UBS 及其雇员和代理人可能承担民事责任外，被告知（根据香港法律的要求）银行拟通过披露客户账户信息违反银行家的保密义务的客户，可能能够获得禁令，禁止该银行如此行事。违反任何此类禁令的处罚可包括对实体本身处以罚款，以及对银行董事或其他高级人员处以监禁。见同上，第 10、26 段。\n\n7 受托人未处理 UBS 员工因促成遵守该传票而可能承担的责任。\n\nii. 中华人民共和国\n\n20. 随附提交的 Gary Gao（高加里）于 2023 年 1 月 29 日作出的声明（“Gao 声明”或“Gao Decl.”）说明，如被强制遵守该传票，UBS（及其雇员和代理人）将被迫违反的中华人民共和国法律规定。概言之，中华人民共和国法律和法规对在中华人民共和国经营的银行施加广泛限制，限制在何种情形下可披露与该等分行账户有关的信息和文件。施加该等限制的法律包括但不限于《中华人民共和国民事诉讼法》《中华人民共和国刑法》《中华人民共和国数据安全法》《中华人民共和国网络安全法》《中华人民共和国个人信息保护法》及《中华人民共和国商业银行法》。除非具备以下条件，否则 UBS 的中华人民共和国分行及其雇员和代理人无法在不违反中华人民共和国法律和法规的情况下遵守该传票：(a) 获得中华人民共和国主管机关批准，(b) 获得所涉任何账户持有人的明确同意，以及 (c) 解除中华人民共和国法律和法规施加的任何其他限制。见 Gao Decl. ¶¶ 13, 20-32, 34, 36。若 UBS 的中华人民共和国分行及其雇员和代理人违反中华人民共和国法律和法规披露与该处分行所持账户有关的信息或文件，其将面临严重后果，包括但不限于刑事处罚、巨额罚款、暂停营业、取消银行高级管理人员任职资格以及声誉损害。见同上。美国法院命令亦不会使 UBS 免受该等后果。\n\n见同上，第 23–25 段（“中国的银行并无法律义务遵守美国法院的命令。”）。\n\niii. 瑞士\n\n21. 如上文第 15 段所述，如瑞士存在任何回应传票的文件，该等文件不会由位于瑞士的 UBS 占有、保管或控制。然而，为审慎起见，如受托人主张该传票及于瑞士任何单独注册成立的 UBS 关联实体——事实并非如此——则随附提交的 Felix Dasser（费利克斯·达瑟）于 2023 年 1 月 27 日作出的声明（“Dasser 声明”或“Dasser Decl.”）说明，如被强制遵守该传票，在瑞士经营的金融机构（及其雇员和代理人）将被迫违反的瑞士法律规定。概言之，瑞士金融机构为遵守该传票而提供文件将受瑞士刑法禁止，即受《瑞士银行法》（“SBA”）第 47 条、《瑞士刑法典》（“SPC”）第 271 条和《瑞士刑法典》第 273 条禁止，并将使参与提供文件的该等机构的任何雇员和代理人面临刑事制裁，包括监禁。见 Dasser Decl. § III（结论），(1)。另见同上，第 11、18–21、36 段（指出，对违反瑞士银行保密规定的行为经常提起刑事追诉，且 Swiss Federal Statistical Office（瑞士联邦统计局）报告，仅就 SBA 而言，平均每年约有十二项相关刑事定罪）。\n\n二、应当命令受托人依照 UBS 的提议寻求取证\n\n22. UBS 提议受托人视司法辖区而定，通过两种替代方法之一推进；如受托人采取任一方法，UBS 均不会提出异议。此外，UBS 将同步开展工作，以识别并准备提供回应性文件（如该等文件存在），从而在相应司法辖区的适格法院发出适当命令后，能够尽快将该等文件提供给受托人。\n\nA. 受托人可通过根据《海牙公约》提出申请寻求取证\n\n23. 在香港、中华人民共和国和瑞士的每一司法辖区，受托人均可通过根据《海牙公约》提出申请寻求取证；该公约“规定了在国外高效调取证据的机制”。de Borja v. Razon, No. 3:18-cv-01131-YY, 2019 WL 4724317, at \\*8 (D. Or. Aug. 16, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 4723070 (D. Or. Sept. 25, 2019), aff'd, 835 Fed. Appx. 184 (9th Cir. 2020)。8 “在如本案般取证对象为外国国民且其并非诉讼当事人的情况下，依《海牙取证公约》进行通常更为适当。”Advanced Indus. Prods., S.C.S v. Alcoa Glob. Fasteners, Inc., No. CV 04-3049-ABC(CTx), 2006 WL 8433934, at \\*1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2006)（引文略）。\n\n24. 诉讼当事人经常通过《海牙公约》从香港、中华人民共和国和瑞士寻求取证，并且在每个该等司法辖区，此类申请均得到迅速处理并通常获准。见 Fung Decl. ¶¶ 4（指出可依据《海牙公约》在香港获得取证），27–37（指出依据《海牙公约》在香港寻求取证的申请通常“会迅速得到处理”）；Gao Decl. ¶ 14（指出受托人通过《海牙公约》在中华人民共和国寻求取证“将是一种有效且合法的途径”），47（指出中华人民共和国司法部已处理 1,827 项司法协助请求，其中包括通过《海牙公约》提出的请求），49（“在中华人民共和国，通过《海牙取证公约》获得证据的程序清晰且直接”）；Dasser Decl. ¶¶ 45–46（指出瑞士法院可通过《海牙公约》途径，命令提供来自瑞士、包括有关银行客户的秘密信息在内的文件，以供外国程序使用，且瑞士主管机关通常会及时处理此类申请，即在数周至三个月之间）。概言之，通过《海牙公约》寻求取证简单、快速且高效，并将使受托人能够寻求传票所要求的同样取证，而无需 UBS 违反香港、中华人民共和国或瑞士的法律，或使 UBS 面临金钱罚款、声誉损害及其一名或多名雇员或代理人被监禁的风险。\n\n8 另见 JOHN FELLAS ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION GUIDE § 25:46 (2022)（“《海牙取证公约》的主要目标是简化调查委托书的送达，以及此后证据本身的调取。”）。\n\nB. 受托人可通过寻求香港承认美国破产程序并在当地寻求披露而取得证据\n\n25. 对于受托人欲从 UBS 香港分行取得的任何披露，受托人可作为通过《海牙公约》提出申请的替代方案，寻求承认美国破产程序及受托人的相应权限；此举可使受托人能够直接在香港寻求披露。诉讼当事人经常在香港寻求承认外国破产程序，受托人在本案中亦可如此。见 Fung Decl. ¶ 42（指出“香港法院可以承认外国破产程序，并可以向外国破产程序管理人提供协助，形式为必须符合香港司法和公共政策的命令”）。与根据《海牙公约》提出申请一样，该替代方案可使受托人在不要求 UBS 违反外国法律的情况下寻求传票所要求的取证。\n\n26. UBS（瑞银）的提议与近期其他涉及受外国法律约束的信息和文件的程序中的做法一致。参见，例如，债务人就同意根据《联邦破产程序规则》第7028条申请裁定、签发请求书，以根据《海牙取证公约》在英国强制对Louisa Watt（路易莎·瓦特）进行宣誓审查的呈递通知，In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.（雷曼兄弟控股公司案），08 BR 13555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2009) [ECF No. 5015]（通知申请“根据《海牙公约》签发请求书，强制在英国对[一名证人]进行宣誓审查”）；CE Int'l Res. Holdings, LLC（CE国际资源控股有限责任公司）诉S.A. Mins. Ltd. P'ship（S.A. Mins有限合伙企业），No. 12-CV-08087 CM SN, 2013 WL 2661037, at \\*18 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2013)（“CEIR可通过《海牙取证公约》在新加坡寻求救济。”）。\n\nIII. 礼让衡量测试要求受托人通过所提议替代方案之一进行\n\n27. 受托人主张，UBS必须在“六大洲”范围内搜索可能具有回应性的文件。（动议第8段注3）。即使暂且不论该陈述本身引发的范围过宽和负担问题，传票直接引发的法律冲突问题仍要求依照国际礼让原则进行分析。该动议对UBS善意提出的异议轻描淡写；该异议指出，UBS、其雇员及代理人将面临广泛后果，包括可能遭受刑事起诉、监管制裁和民事责任。\n\n28. 因此，核心问题是，本院是否应当行使自由裁量权，并适当重视国际礼让，作出将导致UBS违反外国法律的命令。参见Minpeco, S.A.（米恩佩科股份公司）诉Conticommodity Servs., Inc.（康迪商品服务公司），116 F.R.D. 517, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)（在将违反瑞士银行保密规定的情况下驳回强制提交动议）。本院应拒绝作出要求UBS违反外国法律提交文件的命令。\n\n29. 礼让方面的考量要求美国法院“特别警惕地保护外国诉讼当事人[如UBS]，使其免受不必要或过度负担性的证据开示可能使其处于不利地位的风险。”Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale（法国航空航天工业国民公司）诉U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa（美国爱荷华州南区地区法院），482 U.S. 522, 546 (1987)（“Aérospatiale”）。本院“因此应当注意，对[UBS]因……其经营所在地……而面临的任何特殊问题表示应有的尊重。”同上。受托人无法否认，鉴于UBS经营所在地，传票将要求UBS及其雇员和代理人违反外国法律，但其拒绝作出任何善意努力以缩小传票的范围。\n\n30. 国际礼让审查“要求对外国和请求国各自利益进行‘具体化分析’。”CE Int'l，2013 WL 2661037, at \\*8（引自Aérospatiale，482 U.S. at 543–44）。该审查因案件和事实而异，取决于对最高法院在Aérospatiale案中确定的因素、“《美国对外关系法重述（第三版）》§ 442(1)(c)规定的五因素测试”以及其他考量因素（包括提出异议一方的善意）进行审慎衡量。同上。最高法院强调，在推翻外国诉讼当事人基于礼让提出的异议之前，我国法院应当“特别警惕”。参见Aérospatiale，482 U.S. at 546。\n\n31. Aérospatiale因素明确支持本院驳回受托人的动议。\n\nA. 受托人寻求的信息包括大量可从其他渠道获得的无关文件。\n\n第一项Aérospatiale因素要求考量“所请求文件或其他信息的……重要性”。CE Int'l，2013 WL 2661037, at \\*8。首先，UBS并不争议受托人在传票中寻求的某些文件可能与本程序有关，因而对本程序“重要”。然而，如按起草文本予以执行，传票还将寻求大量完全无关、因而不重要的文件。见下文第26-27页。\n\n32. 第二，受托人基于“Bravo Luck（在其由个人债务人拥有和控制期间）在UBS账户中持有数亿美元”的理由，主张传票所请求的信息具有“至关重要性”。（动议第22段）。但是，无论该等材料在抽象意义上可能具有何种重要性，当受托人已经通过在本程序中送达的另一份传票向Bravo Luck本身寻求材料时，他从UBS取得该等材料绝非“关键”。参见CE Int'l，2013 WL 2661037, at \\*9（“当当事人具有其他方式取得所请求文件时，法院认为所请求的证据开示具有‘较低程度的重要性’”）（引文略）。\n\n33. 第三，传票寻求自十一年前起（自January 1, 2012至今）关于债务人及2004证据开示对象的信息。然而，受托人请求且本院命令债务人及其他2004证据开示对象提交文件的日期范围明显较短（自June 1, 2014至今）。参见部分准许强制遵守日期为January 20, 2023的第2004规则传票之动议的命令 [ECF No. 1353]。受托人未在任何地方解释，为何其向UBS寻求的证据开示追溯期间比其向债务人本人寻求的更早。因此，受托人通过传票寻求的十一年文件中整整两年半的文件，已被默示认定与本案无关，并因而不“重要”。\n\nB. 受托人对客户信息提出的宽泛请求并非“具体”。\n\n34. 受托人声称，“UBS传票中列明的文件请求具体针对个人债务人以及与其直接相关联或有关联的某些人员和实体。”（动议第23段（着重号为原文所加））。即使仅粗略审阅传票，也会削弱该陈述，因为传票中的关键术语定义含糊且宽泛。例如，传票将“债务人”一词界定为不仅包括Kwok先生，还包括其“雇员、代理人、律师、顾问或代表其行事的任何人”，使人无法确切知晓实际的证据开示对象是谁。（传票，第7页）。同样，“2004证据开示对象”一词包括“债务人家庭成员”，而后者的定义不仅包括债务人的直系亲属，也包括与债务人具有“任何其他亲属关系”的任何人。（传票，第8页）。\n\n35. 此外，鉴于传票中“文件”一词的宽泛范围及具体请求的过宽表述，要求UBS在其全球分支机构网络内进行搜索的信息类别并不合理且不可行。例如，要求提供“所有日期在January 1, 2012至今之间、与属于、由……持有、控制、代表……持有或以其他方式与任何2004证据开示对象有关的任何资金、证券、财产或资产相关的文件”，并不“具体”；按其措辞，该请求要求搜索、审阅并提交与受托人调查无关的文件。（见传票，第13页（着重号为原文所加））；参见Minpeco，116 F.R.D. at 528（“鉴于原告请求和书面质询的广泛范围，BPS的遵从极有可能产生大量原告不会认为对本诉讼有用的材料”）。\n\n36. 本案事实易于与Strauss（施特劳斯）诉Credit Lyonnais S.A.（里昂信贷银行）案或类似案件中的事实相区分；在该等案件中，所请求的证据开示仅涉及一个对诉讼至关重要的客户账户，因此“所请求的证据开示……具有相关性、至关重要且经过狭义限定……”。249 F.R.D. 429, 441 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)。相比之下，传票含糊且过宽的措辞将要求付出高成本、耗时且过度负担性——并且很可能不可能完成——的努力，以确定包括在“2004证据开示对象”内的个人和实体数量，以及哪些账户可能与该等人员或实体“有关”。参见In re Texaco Inc.（德士古公司案），79 B.R. 551, 553 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987)（指出“[第2004规则]审查的范围并非无限”，并限制所请求的第2004规则传票）。\n\nC. 客户信息并非“源自美国”。\n\n37. 动议称，“至少部分具有回应性的文件和信息位于美国境内。”（动议第24段）。首先，UBS已经告知受托人，对于并非在英国针对UBS诉讼中申索人的所有2004证据开示对象，美国境内不存在账户。无论如何，受托人在双方会谈协商中始终坚持其寻求的是源自并位于香港等外国司法辖区的文件。该等材料的外国所在地“支持不予执行”。CE Int'l，2013 WL 2661037, at \\*10（引自Linde（林德）诉Arab Bank, PLC（阿拉伯银行），262 F.R.D. 136, 150 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)）；Laydon（莱登）诉Mizuho Bank, Ltd.（瑞穗银行），183 F. Supp. 3d 409, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)（“鉴于文件请求涉及移交给英国监管机构的文件，且该等文件由位于英国的银行占有、保管或控制，所请求信息中的大部分（即使不是全部）很可能源自美国境外。因此，该因素有利于[拒绝提交文件的一方]。”）。\n\nD. 该信息可通过其他方式获得。\n\n38. 受托人承认（其必须承认），UBS已善意提出至少三项建设性建议，以便利受托人在如下司法辖区进行调查：若UBS被迫遵从传票，UBS、其雇员及代理人将在该等司法辖区面临法律风险。（动议第25-26段）。UBS的提议包括：(i) 启动承认程序；(ii) 通过《海牙公约》提交请求；或(iii) 获得传票范围内与债务人有关联的个人和实体的同意。受托人声称，这些选择并不“现实”或“可行”，且缺乏替代方案“支持强制UBS遵从”。同上。至少就其中两种替代方案——寻求对美国程序的外国承认及根据《海牙公约》寻求证据开示——而言，受托人对这些替代方案的结论性否定并无说服力。9“[如]所寻求的信息能够轻易从其他渠道获得，则几乎没有或根本没有理由要求一方违反外国法律。”CE Int'l，2013 WL 2661037, at \\*10。UBS提出的替代方案将使受托人能够通过为向UBS等非当事人寻求外国证据开示而确立的渠道取得所请求的信息，并且不会要求UBS违反外国法律。\n\n39. 首先，受托人并未说明，为何在香港寻求承认美国破产程序并不“现实”，未否认可通过该等程序取得证据开示，亦未指出受托人通过直接向适当的香港法院提出申请以取得所请求信息的任何具体障碍。该因素强烈有利于UBS（瑞银集团）。参见同上，第*13页。在香港法院寻求承认本破产程序，以就与本程序相关的事实进行证据开示，完全类似于外国债务人的代表根据Chapter 15寻求承认该等程序，以便在美国对事实进行披露，从而支持该等外国程序。参见，例如，In re Comair Ltd.（科迈尔有限公司）, No. 21-10298(JLG), 2021 WL 5312988, at *13 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov 14, 2021)（认定外国代表已确立在美国就债务人可能享有的诉因进行证据开示的依据）。\n\n40. 其次，受托人关于依照《海牙公约》进行程序并不“现实”的主张，受到最高法院在Aérospatiale案中裁决的削弱。该案中，最高法院指出，尽管《海牙公约》程序在某些情形下可能更耗时且\n\n9 受托人以该等个人和实体迄今拒绝在本程序中合作为由，否定其可向被指称的UBS账户持有人寻求同意这一观点。（参见动议第9段）。但受托人从未说明，为何债务人及其关联方不遵从规定的补救措施，应当是要求作为非当事人的UBS违反外国法律。\n\n费用更高，“在其他情形中，诉讼当事人首次使用《海牙公约》程序，预期可比使用规范审前民事证据开示的通常程序更迅速地在国外取得更多证据。”482 U.S. at 542 n.26（着重号为原文所加）。在本案中，鉴于传票的全球范围，以及限制在香港、中华人民共和国和瑞士披露信息的银行保密及其他法律具有约束力，UBS主张，与强制UBS遵从相比，预期《海牙公约》可更迅速地取得更多回应受托人请求的证据。参见CE Int'l, 2013 WL 2661037, at *10（“更佳的做法是，‘在[当地]主管机关有实质性机会遵从请求之前，不应假定《海牙取证公约》并非可行选择’”（省略引文））。\n\n41. 总之，UBS已就于相关司法管辖区寻求证据开示提出可行的替代方案。受托人未能阐明任何具体理由，说明其中一项或两项替代方案为何不可用，或将以其他方式损害受托人的调查。\n\nE. 利益衡量倾向于尊重外国法律。\n\n42. UBS不争议，美国在确保受托人获准勤勉调查个人债务人的财务事务方面具有重要利益。（参见动议第27段）。然而，UBS关于取得所请求信息的替代方法建议，不会损害受托人的调查或美国利益。相反，强制UBS及其雇员和代理人违反外国法律的命令，将实质性损害所涉外国司法管辖区的利益。外国主权国家基于重要的国内政策，在执行其有关银行保密和客户保密的法律方面具有重大利益。概参Fung声明；Gao声明；Dasser声明。\n\n43. 法院一再承认，外国司法管辖区在遵守其银行保密法方面的利益，是该外国司法管辖区的一项“重要”利益。参见，例如，Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 463 F. Supp. 2d 310, 315 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)（指出，“维持银行保密是本案所请求证据开示所在地外国司法管辖区的一项重要利益——事实上，美国已制定类似的银行保密保护”）（着重号为原文所加），aff'd, 2007 WL 812918 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2007)；United States v. First Nat. Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d 341, 346 (7th Cir. 1983)（“尽管美国征收税款的利益对于国家的财政完整性具有重要意义，但希腊通过其银行保密法所维护的利益同样重要……。”）；另参Br. United States Amicus Curiae Opp'n Pet. Writ Cert. 8-21, at *8, Arab Bank, PLC v. Linde, No. 12–1485, 2014 WL 2191224 (U.S.)（主张下级法院在证据开示背景下“未能对外国司法管辖区执行其银行保密法的利益给予充分权重”而构成错误）。\n\n44. 本案所涉银行保密法“具有保护香港、中华人民共和国和瑞士境内及境外商业隐私的正当目的”。Minpeco, 116 F.R.D. at 524。这些法律体现了“由外国表达的主权利益”，值得得到“适当尊重[。]”Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 546。另参Minpeco, 116 F.R.D. at 524（认定瑞士对其银行保密法具有“重大”利益，因为该禁止规定已被法典化，且违反者将受到刑事处罚）；Rotstain v. Trustmark Nat'l Bank, No. 3:09-CV-2384-N-BG, 2015 WL 13031698, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 2015)（大体驳回原告要求强制提交受瑞士银行保密法保护材料的请求）；Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew, 276 F.R.D. 143, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)（“尽管美国当然在执行其命令及保护商标权方面具有利益，但在本案中，中国保护其账户持有人保密性的利益似乎更为重大。”）。\n\n45. 相反，美国并无强烈利益要求UBS及其雇员和代理人采取会使其在其他地区面临法律风险的行动。本案并非“事项的实质涉及国家关切问题”的案件，例如“打击恐怖主义的目标”。CE Int'l, 2013 WL 2661037, at *13（引述Strauss, 249 F.R.D. at 443）。本案也并非“……由美国政府为执行行动或刑事起诉目的而发起的请求”。同上（省略引文）。在此类情形下，“法院在该分析中给予美国相对较少的权重。”同上，第*14页。在本案中，尽管UBS不争议受托人必须调查破产财产的资产，但受托人并未证明，该目标超过香港、中华人民共和国和瑞士在执行其客户保密和银行保密法律方面的利益，尤其是在受托人范围过宽的请求很可能导致发现大量无关信息，且该等请求完全重复了向与债务人有关联的个人和实体发出的尚未解决的请求的情况下。\n\nF. 回应传票将给UBS造成重大困难。\n\n46. “如遵从证据开示请求将使被要求遵从的一方承担责任或制裁，该因素将不利于强制披露。”同上，第*15页。若本院准许该动议，受托人将成功使UBS陷入进退两难的境地——如UBS检索并提交传票所要求的材料，其将违反外国银行保密法，使其自身及其雇员面临民事和刑事责任以及监管执法。“对于不提交材料而言，害怕遭受刑事起诉构成有力理由，这几乎无可争议。”Societe Internationale Pour Participations lndustrielles Et Commerciales, S. A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 211 (1958)。\n\n47. 无论如何，当被请求提供证据开示的一方——本案中为UBS——并非诉讼当事人时，困难程度更高：\n\n[当被要求强制提交文件的一方仅为中立的信息来源，而非刑事调查的对象或诉讼中的不利当事人，并且提交文件将违反外国保密法时，一些法院认定该困难在利益衡量中应具有更大权重。事实上，有人认为，早期第二巡回法院案件在面对外国不披露法时采取限制性证据开示命令方式的区别性因素，是这些案件均涉及非当事人证人。]\n\nMinpeco, 116 F.R.D. at 526–27（省略引文）。\n\nG. UBS一直秉持善意行事。\n\n48. 如上所述，UBS原则上并不反对遵从传票，这可由其与受托人进行的多次讨论证明；该等讨论旨在缩小争议事项，并提出以合法方式交付所请求文件的潜在途径。为此，UBS已善意努力向受托人提供其可在不违反其经营所在司法管辖区法律的情况下提供的信息，并提出程序，使受托人能够寻求传票所请求的信息，而不会使UBS、其雇员及代理人在国外面临法律风险。与恶意行为者不同，UBS并未“故意招致妨碍提交材料的法律障碍”。Minpeco, 116 F.R.D. at 523（省略引文）。相反，UBS仅希望确保其遵守适用法律。UBS从未试图拖延本程序。事实上，一旦其认识到外国法律禁止披露来自香港、中华人民共和国和瑞士的文件，尽管UBS已就传票提交异议，且采取“合理步骤”确保传票不对UBS施加不当负担或费用的义务属于受托人而非UBS，UBS仍迅速并自愿提出替代且可行的途径，使受托人能够在不使UBS违反其他司法管辖区法律的情况下寻求其所请求的信息。\n\nIV. 按现有起草文本，传票模糊且范围过宽，且遵从并不可行\n\n49. 即使撇开UBS基于外国法律提出的异议，传票仍属不当模糊且范围过宽，并且按其现有起草文本遵从传票将不可行。\n\n50. 首先，传票不当模糊。例如，传票将“债务人的家庭成员”定义为包括不可能地宽泛的限定语“与债务人存在任何其他家庭关系者”。同样，“债务人”一词包括债务人的“雇员、代理人、律师、顾问，或任何代表其行事的人。”（着重号为原文所加）。在实践中，这些术语使UBS不可能确定一份完整的适当检索词清单，甚至无法知悉证据开示对象的总数。参见In re Merrill, No. 09-54616-C, 2010 WL 985231, at *2 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2010)（认定对“债务人的破产财产”的定义可被允许，该定义包括“双方配偶的全部资产（实质上）并涵盖双方配偶的全部负债。”）。\n\n51. 第二，该传票范围过宽。如上所述，受托人要求提供追溯至2012年1月1日、跨度逾十一年的“[一]切文件”，该等文件涉及（其中包括）与至少28名个人或实体有关的任何账户、财产、业务、转让及通信。事实上，所寻求的大部分证据开示似乎并无相关性。参见 In re Texaco Inc.（德士古公司案）, 79 B.R. at 553–54（指出“Pennzoil 对‘文件’一词的定义显然过于宽泛，近乎荒谬”，裁定“[为进行审查之目的，‘文件’一词应指财务或其他报告、合同、记录及会议纪要”，并将审查限于“仅限于本第11章案件中的三家债务人公司”）。按其措辞，该传票将要求 UBS（瑞银集团）检索许多文件——例如债务人的一名家庭成员于2012年开具的一张已注销支票——而这些文件绝不会揭示任何有关“破产财产的性质和范围”的信息。该传票对“文件”的定义不合理地远超根据 Local Civil Rule 26(c)(2) 适用的 Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a) 所规定的范围。\n\n52. 第三，该传票不当地寻求与向他人索取的证据开示完全重复的证据开示。本院已授权对纳入“2004调查对象”的相同个人及实体发出 Rule 2004 传票。10 受托人正同时向该等个人及实体进行重叠的证据开示，使得 UBS 先前及持续向受托人提供信息的努力极有可能与其他证据开示对象的努力重复。在受托人能够且正在采取措施从如此众多其他主体处取得披露的情况下，要求 UBS 这类非当事人遵守一份范围过宽的传票，构成不当负担。参见，例如，In re China Fishery Grp. Ltd.（中国渔业集团有限公司案）, No. 16-11895 (JLG), 2017 WL 3084397, at *10 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2017)（“法院预期，随着受托人推进其 Rule 2004 证据开示，在适用的情况下，他将首先设法从债务人处获取信息。”）。\n\n53. 第四，对于 UBS 这种规模和业务范围的全球性金融机构而言，按该传票现有文本予以遵守实际上不可能。参见 Scott Lipnick（斯科特·利普尼克）于 January 29, 2023 作出的声明（“Lipnick 声明”或“Lipnick Decl”）¶ 9（“由于缺乏具体性，无法善意地界定传票所要求的若干类文件的范围。”）；¶ 10（“上述缺乏具体性的结果是，无法界定传票实际寻求的内容。即使可能，要构建足以检索传票所要求材料的检索参数，也同样将极其耗时且成本高昂。”）；¶ 9(c)（“该传票亦未表明应检索哪些现任或前任保管人的保管文件以查找可能相关的信息。UBS AG 可对全部档案进行关键词检索，但如果关键词未经过狭义限定，进行此类检索可能会产生大量误报结果”）；¶ 12（“在我担任电子证据开示律师逾三年的期间，我从未见过一项与本案所涉文件请求或提交要求同样宽泛的强制提交动议。请求方不愿确定保管人、关键词或司法管辖限制，实属前所未有。”）；另参见 Kansas Heart Hosp., L.L.C.（堪萨斯心脏医院有限责任公司）v. Exec. Risk Indem., Inc.（行政风险赔偿公司）, No. 06-1345-MLB, 2007 WL 1125772, at *3 (D. Kan. Apr. 16, 2007)（裁定，在“原告对‘你方’的定义包括[d]被告及 Chubb Corporation（丘博集团）的任何关联公司”的情形下，包括“遍布全球约29个国家的120个办事处”，原告“未能证明对文件进行全球范围检索的相关性或必要性”）。\n\nV. 该传票不当地寻求与数项未决程序有关的信息\n\nA. 一旦平行诉讼已经开始，未决程序原则即禁止使用 Rule 2004 证据开示\n\n54. 未决程序原则禁止受托人利用 Rule 2004 的广泛权力，规避在另一项独立未决程序中存在的披露限制以获取披露。参见，例如，In re Brown（布朗案）, No. 18-10617-JLG, 2018 WL 4944816, at *4 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2018)（“[一]旦对抗程序或争议事项开始，证据开示应根据 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 进行，而非根据 Rule 2004。”（引文略））；In re Martelli（马尔泰利案）, No. BR 16-20316-PRW, 2017 WL 3098105, at *4 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. July 20, 2017)；In re Szadkowski（沙德科夫斯基案）, 198 B.R. 140, 142 (Bankr. D. Md. 1996)（裁定“一旦对抗程序……已经开始，与该对抗程序有关事项的证据开示……必须按照 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 的证据开示规定进行”）。\n\nB. 对于英国诉讼中的索赔人所涉全部2004调查对象，应驳回该动议并撤销传票\n\n55. 本案中，该传票所寻求的证据开示涉及众多个人和实体，受托人正针对其或预期将积极针对其与 UBS 进行诉讼，因此该等证据开示不当；受托人应改为依照范围更受限制的 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 进行。如本院所知，三名2004调查对象——即索赔人——已在英国的一项程序中对 UBS 提出请求，该程序中的披露尚未交换。受托人已表示，其拟为就该事项进行诉讼而取代 Kwok 先生的地位。（参见，例如，Patrick R. Linsey（帕特里克·R·林赛）代表 Luc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯平斯）受托人提交的异议，（关于：761 Motion To Stay Pending Appeal [ECF No. 796]）。）在受托人已向本院明确其拟为英国程序之目的取代 Kwok 先生地位的情况下，允许其通过 Rule 2004 传票向 UBS 追求几乎不受限制的、关于索赔人的披露，实属不当。参见，例如，In re Sanomedics, Inc.（萨诺医疗公司案）, No. 16-21659-RAM, 2018 WL 3816772, at *2–3 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. July 25, 2018)（裁定，“适用未决程序规则的典型理由”是寻求证据开示的一方将会/正在平行程序中寻求相同文件的情形）；In re Coffee Cupboard, Inc.（咖啡橱柜公司案）, 128 B.R. 509, 516 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991)（Rule 2004“不应被用于获取供另一审裁机构待决的无关案件或程序中使用的信息”）。\n\n56. 在 In re Bennett Funding Grp., Inc.（贝内特融资集团公司案）中，平行程序中的诉状涉及被告广泛的金融活动，而若获准进行的 Rule 2004 证据开示范围“无法避免深入探究”与该诉状有关的问题，因此法院认定该 Rule 2004 证据开示请求不当。203 B.R. 24, 30 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1996)。在此等情形下，法院承认，所请求的 Rule 2004 审查对象、平行程序的当事人及其标的，因其间复杂的关系而“并不易于区分”，并确认使用 Rule 2004 审查将“不可避免且非故意地创造一条后门，受托人可借此规避”适用于平行程序的较狭窄披露规则之限制。Id. 这正是受托人本案试图通过就索赔人事项向 UBS 寻求披露所要实现的结果。\n\nVI. 如本院命令 UBS 遵守该传票，应向 UBS 支付其合理费用\n\n57. Rule 45(d) 的相关规定为：“[签发和送达传票的一方或律师必须采取合理措施，以避免对受传票约束之人施加不当负担或费用。” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1)。受托人拒绝进行任何善意协商以缩小该传票的范围，违反了 Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)。参见 In re Aggrenox Antitrust Litig.（Aggrenox 反垄断诉讼案）, No. 3:14-MD-02516 (SRU), 2017 WL 4679228, at *3 (D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2017)（“Rule 45 指示地区法院，‘应对未遵守’该规则所规定的‘采取合理措施以避免对受传票约束之人施加不当负担或费用’义务的一方或律师，‘施加适当制裁——其中可包括……合理律师费。’”）（引自 Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1)）。\n\n58. 另外，根据 Rule 45(d)(2)(B)(ii)，如本院命令遵守受托人范围过宽的传票，本院必须命令受托人承担 UBS 因遵守该传票而产生的合理费用和律师费。参见 Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2)(B)(ii)（规定法院在对异议置之不理而命令遵守传票时，“必须保护既非当事人亦非当事人高级职员之人免受因遵守而产生的重大费用”（强调系原文所加））；另参见 Koopmann（库普曼）v. Robert Bosch, LLC（罗伯特·博世有限责任公司）, No. 18-CV-4065 (JMF), 2018 WL 9917679, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2018)（“法院已认为……Rule [45(d)(2)(B)(ii)] ‘使得在非当事人因遵守传票而产生重大费用的所有情形下，费用转移均为强制性。’”（强调系原文所加））。这同样适用于 Rule 2004 的情形。参见，例如，In re Buccaneer Res., LLC（海盗资源有限责任公司案）, No. 14-60041, 2015 WL 8527424, at *8 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Dec. 10, 2015)（根据 Rule 45 向接受 Rule 2004 审查的若干董事支付 $744,424.28）。\n\n结论\n\n59. 基于上述理由，UBS 恭请本院作出命令，驳回该动议并撤销该传票；或者，作为备选：\n\n(i) 命令受托人通过 Hague Convention（《海牙公约》）或在获得对本破产程序的外国承认后寻求证据开示；\n\n(ii) 命令受托人大幅缩小该传票的范围和广度，以充分明确所寻求的证据开示，避免对 UBS 施加不当负担，并遵守 Rule 2004 的适当范围；\n\n(iii) 就英国针对 UBS 的诉讼中作为索赔人的该等2004调查对象驳回该动议；以及\n\n(iv) 如本院命令 UBS 遵守该传票，则向 UBS 支付其因遵守而产生的合理费用和律师费。\n\n日期：January 30, 2023\n\nUBS AG（瑞银集团）\n\n签署人：/s/ Marc J. Gottridge（马克·J·戈特里奇）_____ Marc J. Gottridge (ct12094) Lisa J. Fried（丽莎·J·弗里德）(admission pending) HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS NEW YORK LLP（赫伯特·史密夫·富理达纽约律师事务所） 450 Lexington Avenue New York, New York 10017 (917) 542-7600 marc.gottridge@hsf.com lisa.fried@hsf.com\n\n非当事人 UBS AG 的代理律师\n美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院\n\n关于：\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，\n\n第 11 章\n\n案号 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n债务人。\n\n（联合管理）\n送达证明\n\n下列签署人特此证明，于 January 30, 2023，前述异议以及为支持该异议而提交的所有声明11已通过电子方式提交。依照法院电子提交（“CM/ECF”）系统的运作，或依《电子提交通知》所示通过邮件向无法接受电子提交的任何人发送了本次提交的通知，通知对象为上述标题第 11 章案件的所有当事方。12 当事方可通过法院的 CM/ECF 系统查阅本次提交。\n\n日期：January 30, 2023 UBS AG\n\n签署人：____*/s/ Marc J. Gottridge____* Marc J. Gottridge（ct12094）Lisa J. Fried（待准入）HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS NEW YORK LLP 450 Lexington Avenue New York, New York 10017 (917) 542-7600 marc.gottridge@hsf.com lisa.fried@hsf.com\n\n非当事人 UBS AG 的代理律师\n\n11 该等声明连同其所附证据包括：Lisa J. Fried 于 January 30, 2023 作出的声明；Scott Lipnick 于 January 29, 2023 作出的声明；Gary Gao 于 January 29, 2023 作出的声明；Felix Dasser 于 January 27, 2023 作出的声明；以及 Eugene Fung 于 January 27, 2023 作出的声明。\n\n12 如前述文件在正常营业时间以外提交，则对无法或无资格接受电子通知的收件人，通过邮件进行的送达于下一个营业日完成。","key_entities":["Je","Kwok","Guo","Ho Wan Kwok","Himalaya","CIPA","Despins","William Je","GTV","Saraca"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":758,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":796,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":839,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":866,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1353,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1362,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":5015,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":11480,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 21:34:20"}