{"id":"court_ctb_1409_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":1409,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION In re:","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"## UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION\n\nIn re:\n\nChapter 11\n\nHO WAN KWOK, et al.,\n\nCase No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\nDebtors\n\n(Jointly Administered)\n\n# DECLARATION OF EUGENE FUNG\n\nI, Eugene Fung, declare as follows:\n\n### Introduction A.\n\n1. I am a barrister in Hong Kong practising at Temple Chambers, 16/F One Pacific Place, 88 Queensway, Hong Kong. I obtained my Bachelor of Arts degree and my Masters of Law degree from the University of Cambridge in England in 1994 and 1995 respectively. I was called to the Bar in England and Wales (Lincoln's Inn) and in Hong Kong both in 1997. I have been in private practice in Hong Kong for almost 25 years (since 1998) and was appointed Senior Counsel2 in 2012. My areas of practice focus on the fields of commercial law, trusts and probate, tax, property litigation, professional negligence, and company and insolvency law. Since 2014, I have spent at least five weeks every year sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge or a Recorder of the High Court in the Court of First Instance in Hong Kong. Further information about my background and educational and professional qualifications can be found in my Curriculum Vitae which is appended to this declaration.\n\n<sup>1</sup> The legal profession in Hong Kong consists primarily of solicitors and barristers. Barristers are legal practitioners expert in advocacy and specialising in litigation.\n\n<sup>2</sup> In Hong Kong, a person is appointed as a Senior Counsel who (a) has, in the opinion of the Chief Justice, sufficient ability and standing and sufficient knowledge of the law to be accorded that status, (b) has the requisite experience and (c) is practising at the Hong Kong Bar. The title of Senior Counsel is equivalent to that of King's Counsel or Queen's Counsel in the United Kingdom and in some Commonwealth countries. There are around 1,600 barristers currently practising in the Hong Kong Bar, of whom only around 100 are appointed as Senior Counsel.\n\n- 2. I have been asked by counsel for UBS AG (\"UBS\" or the \"Bank\") to provide this Declaration (1) regarding the nature, scope and application of bankers' duty of confidentiality under Hong Kong law and the effect of such a duty on the ability of UBS's Hong Kong Branch (the \"Hong Kong branch\") to comply with the subpoena that the Trustee in the abovecaptioned case served on UBS in the United States of America, pursuant to bankruptcy Rule 2004 (the \"Subpoena\"); and (2) to describe for the Court alternatives that could enable the Trustee to pursue the disclosure he seeks without requiring the Hong Kong branch to violate Hong Kong law.\n- 3. In preparation for providing this Declaration, I have developed familiarity with the events culminating in the Trustee's filing of the instant motion to compel UBS to produce certain information and documents to the extent that material exists and is in the possession, custody or control of the Hong Kong branch (the \"Motion to Compel\"). In particular, I have reviewed the Subpoena. It is my understanding that, in the Subpoena, the Trustee has requested that UBS produce, among other materials, information and documents in the possession of the Hong Kong branch relating to various entities and individuals, to the extent such information and documents exist. I also have reviewed the Motion to Compel.\n\n### Executive Summary B.\n\n4. entity to UBS's head office or any of UBS's branches elsewhere in the world. It is under a contractual duty of confidentiality to its customers in respect of information about the customers' affairs gained by virtue of the banking relationship. This duty may be overridden by a Hong Kong court order (but not a foreign court order) compelling the Hong Kong branch to disclose documents relating to its customers. Complying with the Subpoena will have the effect of rendering UBS being in breach of its duty of confidentiality towards its customer. Further, serious financial and reputational harm may be caused to the Hong Kong branch if the duty of confidentiality is violated. There are, however, two alternatives that the Trustee can pursue to achieve the objective of obtaining information on the Bank's customer without requiring the Hong Kong branch to violate Hong Kong law and without indirectly committing an infringement of the sovereignty of another country, namely (1) making a request to the Hong Kong court under the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, and (2) making a request to the Hong Kong court for assistance under the common law principle of modified universalism. These issues will be further elaborated and expanded upon in Sections C to F below.\n\n## C. Bankers' Duty of Confidentiality under Hong Kong Law\n\n#### C1. Background\n\n- 5. of confidentiality is largely derived from English law. In order to understand why English judicial authorities have been and are still referred to by the Hong Kong courts as a source of law, the following explanations may be helpful.\n\t- (1) Before 1 July 1997, English common law and rules of equity were in force in Hong Kong.\n\t- (2) On 1 July 1997, Hong Kong became a Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China.\n\t\t- (a) Article 8 of the Basic Law (the constitutional document for Hong Kong) provides that \"[the] laws previously in Hong Kong, that is, the common law, rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation and customary law shall be maintained, except for any that contravene this Law, and subject to any amendment by the legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region\".\n\t\t- (b) in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be this Law, the laws previously in force in Hong Kong as provided for in Article 8 of this Law, and the laws enacted by the legislature of the Region.\"\n\t- (3) Section 7(1) of the Hong Kong Reunification Ordinance provides that \"[the] laws previously in force in Hong Kong, that is the common law, rules of equity, Ordinances, subsidiary legislation and customary law, which have been adopted as the laws of the HKSAR [Hong Kong Special Administrative Region], shall continue to apply\".\n\t- (4) Article 84 of the Basic Law permits the Hong Kong courts to refer to precedents of other common law jurisdictions. It provides \"[the] courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall adjudicate cases in accordance with the laws applicable in the\n\nRegion as prescribed by Article 18 of this Law and may refer to precedents of other common law jurisdictions\".\n\n- C2. Scope of duty and its application\n- 6. Junder English and Hong Kong law, a duty of confidence is implied into the contract between certain people, including that between banker and customer. In Parry-Jones v Law Society [1969] 1 Ch 1, Lord Justice Diplock at p 9 said:\n\n\"[a contractual duty of confidence] exists not only between solicitor and client, but, for example, between banker and customer, doctor and patient and accountant and client. Such a dutv of confidence is subject to, and overridden by, the duty of any party to that contract to comply with the law of the land.\"\n\n- 7. The leading authority on the duty of confidence owed by a bank to its customer is the English case of Tournier v National Provisional and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 KB 461. In this case, the defendant bank disclosed the state of the plaintiff customer's account to the customer's employers (i.e. a third party). As a result of this disclosure, the customer's contract was not renewed by the employers upon its expiration. The English Court of Appeal held that the bank was guilty of a breach of a duty of confidentiality and awarded damages against it.\n\t- (1) which the bank was bound to treat as confidential, was not restricted to the facts that it learned from the state of the customer's account. Furthermore, the bank's duty remained intact even after the account had been closed or ceased to be active. The bank's duty to maintain confidentiality encompassed \"information obtained from other sources than the customer's actual account, if the occasion upon which the information was obtained arose out of the banking relations of the bank and its customers\" (p 485).\n\t- (2) Because the duty of confidentiality covers information about the customer's affairs gained by virtue of the banking relationship and is not limited to information from or about the account itself, the duty would be infringed if the bank discloses information to third parties whether it has in its possession certain documents of the customers or where such documents may be located.\n- (3) Lord Justice Bankes said that a bank owes a duty towards its customers not to disclose his affairs and that the duty is a legal one arising out of contract (pp 471-472). The duty of confidentiality is not an absolute duty but a qualified one, and \"the qualifications can be classified under four heads: (a) Where disclosure is under compulsion by law; (b) where there is a duty to the public to disclose; (c) where the interests of the bank require disclosure; and (d) where the disclosure is made by the express or implied consent of the customer\" (p 473).\n- 8. J The principles laid down in the English case of Tournier have been fully adopted and followed in Hong Kong.\n\t- (1) In FDC Co Ltd v The Chase Manhattan Bank NA [1990] 1 HKLR 277, a bank with headquarters in New York and a branch in Hong Kong found itself caught between, on the one hand, an order of a United States court compelling it to disclose information about accounts maintained with the Hong Kong branch and, on the other, an injunction obtained by the account holders from the Hong Kong court preventing such disclosure. The bank applied in Hong Kong to discharge the injunction but the Court of Appeal (the second highest court in Hong Kong) refused to do so by following the principles in Tournier (pp 282F-283F & 290D-H).\n\t- (2) In particular, Sir Alan Huggins said that the first qualification to the bank's duty of confidentiality (disclosure under compulsion of law) must necessarily be confined to the law within the jurisdiction (i.e. Hong Kong law), and would not include foreign law or a court order of a foreign court (p 283F-H). His Lordship further said (p 283H-1):\n\n\"The [account holders] contracted with the Bank in Hong Kong and it was intended by both sides that the accounts would be kept in Hong Kong. I adopt the view of the English Court of Appeal in R v Grossman (1981) 73 Cr. App. R. 302 and conclude that the Hong Kong Branch of the Bank should for present purposes be considered as a different entity separate from the head office in New York. Anyone opening an account in Hong Kong would anticipate that in the ordinary course of business the records containing the details of that account would be kept entirely within the office or branch at which the account was opened.\"\n\n- (3) It is right to note that the same conclusion was reached in England in relation to the ambit of the disclosure under compulsion of law qualification. In X AG v A Bank [1983] 2 All ER 464,3 a subpoena was issued in the US District Court for the Southern District of New York against an American bank requiring it to produce documents relating to accounts maintained at its London branch by X, a Swiss corporation with no business in the US, and Y, a subsidiary of X which was also incorporated in Switzerland, but had a major office in New York. The subpoena was returnable before a federal grand jury investigating alleged tax evasion. The bank declared its intention to comply with the subpoena. X and Y obtained an injunction in the English High Court restraining the bank from doing so on the ground that it would be in breach of the duty of confidence. An order was then made by the New York District Court requiring the bank to comply with the subpoena. The bank applied to set aside the injunction and Leggatt J refused to do so. The Judge observed that to apply foreign law in relation to banking business conducted in the City of London would be to \"allow a fairly large cuckoo in the domestic nest\" (p 478d-e).\n- (4) As can be seen from the above-quoted passage of Sir Alan Huggins's judgment in FDC, as a matter of English and Hong Kong law, a Hong Kong branch of an international bank is to be treated as a separate legal entity different from the bank's head office, or any of the bank's branch offices elsewhere in the world.\n- (5) The principles in the Tournier case have been affirmed by the Court of Final Appeal (the highest court in Hong Kong) in Nam Tai Electronics Inc v PricewaterhouseCoopers (2008) 11 HKCFAR 62 at para 35.\n- C3. Consequences of breaching the duty of confidentiality\n- 9. Given that the bank owes a duty of confidentiality under the contract with the customer, a breach of such a duty would entitle the customer to claim against the bank for compensatory damages. Under Hong Kong law, the aim of compensatory damages for breach of contract is to put the plaintiff into as good a position as if the contract had been performed. If a loss has been caused to the customer as a result of the breach of the bank's duty of confidentiality, the bank would be ordered pay damages to the customer\n\n<sup>3</sup> This case was also referred to by the Court of Appeal in FDC Co Ltd v The Chase Manhattan Bank NA.\n\nfor compensation. This was what happened in the Tournier case where the account holder successfully obtained damages from the English court (see 87 above).\n\n- 10. Further, from the Hong Kong and English authorities referred to in §7 above, a customer may be able to obtain an injunction to restrain a bank from breaching its duty of confidentiality and from disclosing information to third parties. An injunction is a court order and a breach of an injunction by the party restrained would constitute contempt of court. A body corporate guilty of contempt of court can be fined and a writ of sequestration would be applied against the property of the corporation under Order 45, rule (5)(i) of the Rules of the High Court. A director or other officer of the body corporate may be included in the application such that his/her property may be sequestrated and that he/she may be committed to prison for contempt.\n- 11. The terms of an injunction may be wide enough to require the bank to return to its local branch any documents already removed from the jurisdiction in connection with any foreign subpoena: see the order recited in A v B Bank [1993] QB 311 at 313H-314A.\n- 12. The bankers' duty of confidentiality is enshrined in the Code of Banking Practice (\"Code\") (§8.1) jointly issued by the Hong Kong Association of Banks and the DTC Association (i.e. the industry associations, and endorsed by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (\"HKMA\") (Hong Kong's central banking institution). The HKMA expects all institutions to comply with the Code and will monitor compliance as part of its regular supervision (§3.1). It is self-evident that a bank which has breached its duty of confidentiality towards its customers will suffer reputational harm and may trigger investigations by the HKMA. Significantly, UBS is a private bank and its customers would naturally expect UBS (including the Hong Kong branch) to keep their affairs confidential. If UBS is known to the private banking market in Hong Kong to disclose customers' confidential information to third parties without a Hong Kong court order, this will seriously diminish its reputation as a private bank and will suffer financial harm in the form of loss of future revenue.\n- 13. In paragraph 8 of Section IV (Documents to be Produced) in the Request for Production of Documents appended to the Subpoena, the Trustee requests all documents dated between 1 January 2012 and the present relating to any communications with any regulator from any country, including the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission (\"SFC\") and the HKMA relating to any of the 2004 Discovery Targets.\n- 14. Because of the extreme width of this request, there is every possibility that a disclosure of some of the requested documents will lead to an infringement of two statutory secrecy provisions in Hong Kong.\n- 15. The Hong Kong branch carries on the business of taking deposits from its customers and is an \"authorised institution\" under the Banking Ordinance (Chapter 155 of the Laws of Hong Kong) (\"BO\"). All authorised institutions under the BO in Hong Kong are supervised by the HKMA. Further, the Hong Kong branch conducts securities and futures businesses and is therefore required to be registered with the SFC and regulated under the Securities and Futures Ordinance (Chapter 571 of the Laws of Hong Kong) (\"SFO\"). Accordingly, the Hong Kong branch is subject to two regulatory regimes in Hong Kong. In so far as the Hong Kong branch's business of taking deposits is concerned the BO and any statutory secrecy obligations set out under the BO would be relevant. Similarly, in so far as the Hong Kong branch's regulated activities (e.g. the provision of investment banking or asset management services) are concerned, the SFO and any statutory secrecy obligations set out under the SFO would be relevant.\n- 16. Section 378(1) of the SFO provides:\n\n\"Subject to subsection (13A), except in the performance of a function under, or for the purpose of carrying into effect or doing anything required or authorized under, any of the relevant provisions, a specified person -\n\n- (a) shall preserve and aid in preserving secrecy with regard to any matter coming to his knowledge by virtue of his appointment under any of the relevant provisions, or in the performance of any function under or in carrying into effect any of the relevant provisions, or in the course of assisting any other person in the performance of any function under or in carrying into effect any of the relevant provisions;\n- (b) shall not communicate any such matter to any other person; and\n- (c) shall not suffer or permit any other person to have access to any record or document which is in his possession by virtue of the appointment, or the performance of any such\n\nfunction under or the carrying into effect of any such provisions, or the assistance to the other person in the performance of any such function under or in carrying into effect any such provisions. \"\n\n- 17. A \"specified person\" for the purpose of section 378 is defined in section 378(15) to mean (a) the SFC; (b) any person who is or was a member, an employee, or a consultant, agent or adviser, of the SFC; or (c) any person who is or was (i) a person appointed under any of the relevant provisions of the SFO, (ii) a person forming any function under or carrying into effect any of the relevant provisions of the SFO; or (iii) a person assisting any other person in the performance of any function under or in carrying into effect any of the relevant provisions of the SFO.\n- 18. Accordingly, the author of the relevant communications between the SFC and UBS could well constitute a \"specific person\" and accordingly be subject to the statutory secrecy obligations imposed under section 378 of the SFO.\n- 19. Further, section 120(1) of the BO provides:\n\n\"Except as may be necessary for the exercise of any function under this Ordinance or for carrying into effect the provisions of this Ordinance, every person to whom this subsection applies-\n\n- (a) shall preserve and aid in preserving secrecy with regard to all matters relating to the affairs of any person that mav come to his knowledge in the exercise of any function under this Ordinance:\n- (b) shall not communicate any such matter to any person other than the person to whom such matter relates; and\n- (c) shall not suffer or permit any person to have access to any records in the possession, custody or control of any person to whom this subsection applies. \"\n- 20. Section 120(2) of the BO provides:\n\n\"Subsection (1) shall apply to any person who is or has been-\n\na public officer; (a)\n\n- (b) a person authorized by the Monetary Authority;\n- (c)\n- (d) the Manager of an authorized institution;\n- (da) a person appointed under section 53G(5);\n- (e)\n- (f) subsection applies by virtue of paragraph (b), (c), (d), or (e).\n\nwho exercises or has exercised any function under this Ordinance. \"\n\n- 21. As pointed out above, HKMA functions likes a central bank in Hong Kong. Its principal function is to \"promote the general stability and effective working of the banking system\" (section 7(1) of the BO). It is also \"responsible for supervising compliance with the provisions of the [Banking] Ordinance\" (section 7(2) of the BO). Therefore, insofar as there exists any documents between the HKMA and UBS which fall within the description of the request, the author(s) of such documents could well be subject to the statutory secrecy obligations imposed under section 120 of the BO.\n- Analysis E.\n- 22. Bravo Luck Limited (\"Bravo Luck\") has maintained a banking relationship with the Hong Kong branch. As a matter of Hong Kong law (as summarised in Section C2 above), there is a contract between Bravo Luck and the Hong Kong branch and a duty of confidentiality has been implied into such a contract. The duty of confidentiality requires the Hong Kong branch not to disclose to third parties information relating to Bravo Luck which the Hong Kong branch has acquired through the keeping of Bravo Luck's account(s) with the bank.\n- 23. The Hong Kong branch's duty of confidentiality to Bravo Luck is subject to the four qualifications mentioned in Section C2 above. However, on the basis of the materials currently made available to me. I am unable to see how the duty of confidentiality can be qualified. In particular, there is no\n\n10\n\nlaw in Hong Kong or any Hong Kong court order compelling the Hong Kong branch to disclose any information relating to Bravo Luck. Under Hong Kong law, as mentioned in Section C2 above, the first qualification to the duty of confidentiality does not extend to a court order made by a foreign court.\n\n- 24. If the Hong Kong branch breaches its duty of confidentiality by disclosing to third parties information relating to Bravo Luck, Bravo Luck will have a right to commence proceedings against the Hong Kong branch for damages.\n- 25. Further, Bravo Luck may apply for an injunction to restrain the Hong Kong branch from disclosing any information to any third parties (including the Trustee). If this were to happen, there is little doubt that a Hong Kong court would grant such an injunction following the reasoning of the Court of Appeal's decision in FDC Co Ltd v The Chase Manhattan Bank NA (see Section C2 above). As Sir Alan Huggins VP observed in that case, in granting an injunction to restrain the bank from disclosing information pursuant to a foreign court order, the Hong Kong court would not be \" offending in any way the principles of comity which apply between the two countries\" (p 284J). His Lordship observed (pp 284J - 285A):\n\n\"All persons opening accounts with banks in Hong Kong, whether local or foreign banks, are entitled to look to the Hong Kong courts to enforce any obligation of secrecy which, by the law of Hong Kong, is implied by virtue of the relationship of customer and banker. The obligation is implied for the very reason that it is fundamental to that relationship. \"\n\n- 26. As mentioned in Section C3 above, there are serious consequences for failing to comply with an injunction. If the Hong Kong branch discloses any information of Bravo Luck notwithstanding an injunction to restrain it to do so, the Bank may be held to be in contempt of court and its directors or other officials may be committed to prison.\n- F. Alternative Options Available to the Trustee to Obtain the Information Sought in the Subpoena\n- F1. The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters\n- 27. The Hague Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (the \"Convention\") establishes\n\ntwo methods of cooperation between states parties for the taking of evidence abroad in civil or commercial matters. One of the methods is through the use of letters of request. China and United States are both contracting parties to the Convention. The Chief Secretary of Hong Kong has been designated as the \"competent authority\" for the purpose of Article 17 of the Convention.4 The Registrar of the High Court of Hong Kong has been designated \"other authority\" for the purpose of Article 24 of the Convention.5\n\n- 28. In dealing with a receipt for evidence from a foreign court, the Hong Kong courts will use the following framework to assess whether the request ought to be granted.\n\t- (1) First, the court should decide whether it has jurisdiction to make the requested relief under sections 75 and 76 of the Evidence Ordinance (Chapter 8 of the Laws of Hong Kong).\n\t- (2) Secondly, if the court concludes it has jurisdiction, it must decide whether, as a matter of discretion, it ought to make, limit or refuse the requested relief sought.\n\nSee Angela Chen v Vivien Chen (unreported, HCMP 1478/2011, 7 December 2011) §22(v).\n\n29. Section 75 of the Evidence Ordinance provides:\n\n\"Where an application is made to the Court of First Instance for an order for evidence to be obtained in Hong Kong and the court is satisfied-\n\n- (a) that the application is made in pursuance of a request issued by or on behalf of a court or tribunal (the requesting court) exercising jurisdiction in a country or territory outside Hong Kong; and\n- (b) that the evidence to which the application relates is to be obtained for the purposes of civil proceedings which either have been instituted before the requesting court or whose institution before that court is contemplated,\n\n<sup>4</sup> http\n\n<sup>5</sup> http\n\nthe Court of First Instance shall have the powers conferred on it by this Part.\"\n\n- 30. In other words, in order for section 75 to be complied with, there must be an application to the Hong Kong court for evidence to be obtained; the applicant must satisfy the court that the evidence to which the application relates is sought pursuant to a request by or on behalf of a foreign court of tribunal, and the court must be satisfied that the evidence to which the application relates is sought for the purpose of civil proceedings which either have been instituted or where institution is contemplated.\n- 31. There is a specific provision in section 76(2)(b) of the Evidence Ordinance to include order for the production of documents. Production will be ordered only of specific documents named in the order as likely to be in the possession, custody or power of the witness, and witnesses will not be ordered to state what relevant documents they have, nor to produce all documents relevant to particular issues (section 76(4) of the Evidence Ordinance).\n- 32. The overarching principle in response to a request from a foreign court for evidence is that the Hong Kong courts will ordinarily give effect to a request so far as it is proper and practicable, and to the extent that is permissible under Hong Kong law. The principle reflects judicial and international comity. In Re Trioielli [1995] 2 HKC 785, Barnett J at p 796 G-H said \" [t]his court in the interests of international comity should strive to give effect to a letter of request if at all possible\". See also Angela Chen v Vivien Chen (above) §22(iv).\n- 33. As far as discretion is concerned, Hong Kong courts would ordinarily exercise its discretion to make the order asked for unless they are satisfied that the application would be regarded as falling within the description of frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process of the court. It is essentially a matter for the requesting court whether the evidence requested will be relevant and admissible, and the Hong Kong courts will give due weight to the decision made by the foreign court regarding the relevancy of the requested evidence. See Angela Chen v Vivien Chen (above) §§22(vi), 22(viii), 23 & 24.\n- 34. The procedure governing the application, which is ex parte by affidavit, is set out in Rules of High Court Order 70, rule 2, which states:\n\n\"(1) Subject to rule 3 an application for an order under the Ordinance must be made ex parte and must be supported by affidavit.\n\n(2) There shall be exhibited to the affidavit the request in pursuance of which the application is made, and if the request is not in the English language, a translation thereof in that language.\"\n\n- 35. Accordingly, the affidavit in support must exhibit a copy of the letter of request. Because the application is made ex parte to a Master of the High Court, it will be dealt with on paper. There is no need for any hearing to be fixed and the matter will be disposed of quickly. According to paragraph 14 of Practice Direction 36, judgment for paper applications will be handed down within three months after the close of the parties' submissions. Because of the simple nature of the application, I anticipate that the Master is likely to produce a determination within a month after the receipt of the application.\n- 36. On the basis that the above principles are observed and all the relevant requirements are complied with, it seems to me that the Trustee will not be in difficulty to (1) satisfy the requirements in sections 75 and 76 of the Evidence Ordinance to demonstrate that a Hong Kong court has jurisdiction to deal with a request for documents, and (2) persuade a Hong Kong court to exercise its discretion to grant the application for disclosure of documents, provided that the requests do not infringe any statutory secrecy obligations as mentioned in Section D above.\n- 37. It is right for me to point out that if and when the Trustee obtains an ex parte order for disclosure of the requested documents, it would mean that there is effectively a Hong Kong court order requiring the relevant documents to be disclosed. This will constitute the first qualification to the bankers' duty of confidentiality (namely disclosure under compulsion by law) (see section C2 above). It follows that UBS's duty of confidentiality in respect of such documents will be overridden and that UBS will no longer be violating Hong Kong law when it discloses the requested documents pursuant to a Hong Kong order. In fact, the Hong Kong branch would be in contempt of the Hong Court if it did not comply with such an order, once made and served on the Hong Kong branch.\n\n<sup>6</sup> Practice Directions are issued by the Hong judiciary to give guidance on the conduct of court proceedings in Hong Kong.\n\n- F2. Seeking recognition and assistance orders from the Hong Kong courts\n- 38. J There is a general principle of private international law at common law that bankruptcy (whether personal or corporate) should be unitary and universal. In Re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 852, Lord Hoffmann at §6 said:\n\n\"Despite the absence of statutory provision, some degree of international co-operation in corporate insolvency had been achieved by judicial practice. This was based upon what English judges have for many years regarded as a general principle of private international law, namely that bankruptcy (whether personal or corporate) should be unitary and universal. There should be a unitary bankruptcy proceeding in the court of the bankrupt's domicile which receives worldwide recognition and it should apply universally to all the bankrupt's assets. \"\n\n39. Further, at common law, the courts have power to recognise and grant assistance to foreign insolvency proceedings. In Rubin v Eurofinance SA [2013] 1 AC 236, Lord Collins said:\n\n> \"29 Fourth, at common law the court has power to recognise and grant assistance to foreign insolvency proceedings. The common law principle is that assistance may be given to foreign office-holders in insolvencies with an international element. The underlying principle has been stated in different ways: \"recognition ... carries with it the active assistance of the court\": In re African Farms Ltd [1906] TS 373, 377; \"This court . . . will do its utmost to co-operate with the US Bankruptcy Court and avoid any action which might disturb the orderly administration of [the company] in Texas under ch 11'': Banque Indosuez SA v Ferromet Resources Inc [1993] BCLC 112, 117.\n\n> 30 In Credit Suisse Fides Trust v Cuoghi [1998] QB 818, 827, Millett I J said:\n\n\"In other areas of law, such as cross-border insolvency, commercial necessity has encouraged national courts to provide assistance to each other without waiting for such co-operation to be sanctioned by international\n\nconvention . . . It is becoming widely accepted that comity between the courts of different countries requires mutual respect for the territorial integrity of each other's jurisdiction, but that this should not inhibit a court in one jurisdiction from rendering whatever assistance it properly can to a court in another in respect of assets located or persons resident within the territory of the former.\"\n\n31 The common law assistance cases have been concerned with such matters as the vesting of English assets in a foreign officeholder, or the staying of local proceedings, or orders for examination in support of the foreign proceedings, or orders for the remittal of assets to a foreign liquidation, and have involved cases in which the foreign court was a court of competent jurisdiction in the sense that the bankrupt was domiciled in the foreign country or, if a company, was incorporated there.\"\n\n- 40. The above-quoted passages from Re HIH and Rubin were approved by Harris J in Re Global Brand Group Holding Ltd (in liq) [2022] 3 HKLRD 316 at §§§23, 25 and 28.\n- 41. In particular, Harris J fully endorsed the views of Lord Sumption in Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers [2015] AC 1675 and held that under the principle of modified universalism, Hong Kong courts have the power to assist officers of a foreign court of insolvency jurisdiction by ordering the production of information necessary for the performance of the officers' functions. Harris J at §45 said:\n\n\"It is permissible to grant foreign insolvency office-holders the power to gather information from third parties. Continuing from his explanation quoted in [25] above Lord Sumption explains in Singularis:\n\n[T]here is a power at common law to assist a foreign court of insolvency jurisdiction by ordering the production of information in oral or documentary form which is necessary for the administration of a foreign winding up. In recognising the existence of such a power, the Board would not wish to encourage the promiscuous creation of other common law powers to compel the production of information. The limits of this power are implicit in the reasons for recognising its existence. In the first place, it is available only to assist the officers of a foreign court of insolvency jurisdiction or equivalent public officers. It would not, for example, be available to assist a voluntary winding up, which is essentially a private arrangement and although subject to the directions of the court is not conducted by or on behalf of an officer of the court. Secondly, it is a power of assistance. It exists for the purpose of enabling those courts to surmount the problems posed for a world-wide winding up of the company's affairs by the territorial limits of each court's powers. It is not therefore available to enable them to do something which they could not do even under the law by which they were appointed. Thirdly, it is available only when it is necessary for the performance of the office-holder's functions. Fourth, the power is subject to the limitation in In re African Farms Ltd and in HIH and Rubin, that such an order must be consistent with the substantive law and public policy of the assisting court ... It follows that it is not available for purposes which are properly the subject of other schemes for the compulsory provision of information. \"\n\n- 42. Although there is no relevant legislation in Hong Kong, it is clear from the above that, as a matter of common law, a Hong Kong court can recognise foreign insolvency proceedings and can grant assistance to a foreign insolvency office-holder in the form of an order which must be consistent with justice and public policy of the Hong Kong.\n- 43. Procedurally, the Hong Kong court has developed a standard practice on applications for recognition and assistance:\n\t- (1) The insolvency office-holder must first obtain, from the court which appointed him or her, a letter of request addressed to the Hong Kong court. The letter of request would typically set out the terms of the order to be sought in Hong Kong. The application for the letter of request is effectively an occasion for the appointing court from outside Hong Kong to be satisfied, from the perspective of the law of the appointing court and the facts of the case, that recognition and assistance should be sought and the terms of the proposed order are appropriate.\n- (2) Having obtained a letter of request, the insolvency office-holder can then apply to the Court of First Instance by originating summons with affidavit / affirmation evidence, on an \"ex parte on paper\" basis, for a standard-form order.\n- (3) If in addition to the standard-form order, the insolvency officeholder applies for substantive orders affecting a specific party (for example, orders for production of documents), that party should be identified as a respondent and served with the application.\n\nSee Re Pacific Andes Enterprises (BVI) Ltd (unreported, HCMP 3560/2016, 27 January 2017); Re Takematsu [2019] 5 HKC 505.\n\n44. It is acknowledged that the Hong Kong cases referred to above are all concerned with foreign corporate bankruptcy, as opposed to foreign personal bankruptcy. However, as Lord Hoffmann said in the HIH case quoted above, it is a general principle of private international law that bankruptcy (whether personal or corporate) should be unitary and universal. Importantly, such a principle has been approved by the Hong Kong court in Re Global Brand. Harris J in Re Global Brand said at §26 \"modified universalism is the foundation of the common law power to recognise and assist a foreign insolvency process and that the power may be developed if the development is consistent with modified universalism and is consistent with the applicable domestic legal framework'. In my view, there is no reason why the Hong Kong court will not as a matter of principle recognise and/or assist the Trustee (being the Chapter 11 trustee appointed by the US Bankruptcy Court in the Chapter 11 case of the Individual Debtor) by ordering disclosure of documents in the custody or possession of a party in Hong Kong.\n\nI declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.\n\nHong Kong 27 January 2023\n\nEurophy\n\nEugene Fung SC\n\n### Exhibits:\n\n- 1. Eugene Fung's Curriculum Vitae\n- 2. Basic Law of Hong Kong, Articles 8, 18, 84\n- 3. Hong Kong Reunification Ordinance, section 7\n- 4. Parry-Jones v Law Society [1969] 1 Ch 1\n- 5. 461\n- 6. FDC Co Ltd v The Chase Manhattan Bank NA [1990] 1 HKLR 277\n- 7. X AG v A Bank [1983] 2 All ER 464\n- 8. Nam Tai Electronics Inc v PricewaterhouseCoopers (2008) 11 HKCFAR 62\n- A v B Bank [1993] QB 311 9.\n- 10. Code of Banking Practice in Hong Kong\n- 11. Banking Ordinance (Chapter 155 of the Laws of Hong Kong), sections 7, 120\n- 12. Securities and Futures Ordinance (Chapter 571 of the Laws of Hong Kong), section 378\n- 13. Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters\n- 14. Evidence Ordinance (Chapter 8 of the Laws of Hong Kong), sections 75, 76\n- 15. Angela Chen v Vivien Chen (unreported, HCMP 1478/2011, 7 December 2011)\n- 16. Re Trioielli [1995] 2 HKC 785\n- 17. Rules of High Court, Order 45, rule (5) & Order 70, rule 2\n- 18. Practice Direction 36, paragraph 14\n- 19. Re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 852\n- 20. Rubin v Eurofinance SA [2013] 1 AC 236\n- 21. Re Global Brand Group Holding Ltd (in liq) [2022] 3 HKLRD 316\n- 22. Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers [2015] AC 1675\n- 23. Re Pacific Andes Enterprises (BVI) Ltd (unreported, HCMP 3560/2016, 27 January 2017)\n- 24. Re Takematsu [2019] 5 HKC 505","body_zh":"美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院布里奇波特分庭\n\n关于：\n\n第11章\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，\n\n案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n\n债务人\n\n（联合管理）\nEUGENE FUNG（冯敬恩）的声明\n\n本人Eugene Fung（冯敬恩）声明如下：\n\nA. 导言\n\n1. 本人系在香港天一大律师事务所（Temple Chambers）执业的大律师，地址为香港金钟道88号太古广场一座16楼。本人于1994年及1995年分别获得英国剑桥大学（University of Cambridge）文学学士学位及法学硕士学位。本人于1997年分别获准在英格兰及威尔士（林肯律师学院）（Lincoln's Inn）及香港执业为大律师。本人在香港从事私人执业近25年（自1998年起），并于2012年获委任为资深大律师2。本人执业领域主要集中于商法、信托及遗嘱认证、税务、物业诉讼、专业疏忽以及公司和破产清算法。自2014年起，本人每年均至少有五周以香港原讼法庭（Court of First Instance）高等法院暂委法官或高等法院特委法官的身份审理案件。关于本人的背景、教育及专业资格的进一步资料，载于随附于本声明的个人简历中。\n\n1 香港法律界主要由事务律师和大律师构成。大律师是擅长法庭辩护并专门从事诉讼的法律执业者。\n\n2 在香港，如某人(a)在终审法院首席法官看来具备足够能力、声望及法律知识而应获授该资格，(b)具备所需经验，且(c)在香港大律师公会执业，即获委任为资深大律师。资深大律师的称号等同于英国及部分英联邦国家的御用大律师或王后御用大律师称号。目前约有1,600名大律师在香港大律师公会执业，其中仅约100名获委任为资深大律师。\n\n2. UBS AG（瑞银集团）（“UBS”或“银行”）的律师要求本人提供本声明，(1)说明香港法下银行保密义务的性质、范围及适用，以及该义务对UBS香港分行（“香港分行”）遵从本案受托人依据《破产程序规则》第2004条在美利坚合众国向UBS送达的传票（“传票”）的能力所产生的影响；及(2)向法院说明可使受托人在无需香港分行违反香港法的情况下寻求其所要求披露的替代方案。\n\n3. 为准备本声明，本人已了解导致受托人在本案中提出即时动议、要求强制UBS就香港分行所持有、保管或控制且确实存在的材料，交付某些信息和文件（“强制交付动议”）的相关事件。具体而言，本人已审阅传票。本人理解，受托人在传票中要求UBS交付的材料包括但不限于：香港分行持有的、与各种实体及个人有关的信息和文件，但以前述信息和文件确实存在为限。本人亦已审阅强制交付动议。\n\nB. 摘要\n\n4. 香港分行是与UBS总行或UBS在世界其他地区的任何分行相互独立的实体。对于因银行关系而获知的客户事务信息，其依合同对客户负有保密义务。香港法院命令（但非外国法院命令）可推翻该义务，并强制香港分行披露与其客户有关的文件。遵从传票将导致UBS违反其对客户所负的保密义务。此外，如违反保密义务，香港分行可能遭受严重的财务及声誉损害。然而，受托人可采用两种替代方案，以实现在无需香港分行违反香港法且不间接侵犯另一国家主权的情况下获取银行客户信息的目的，即：(1)根据《关于从国外调取民事或商事证据的海牙公约》向香港法院提出请求；以及(2)根据修正普遍主义的普通法原则，请求香港法院提供协助。下文C至F节将对这些问题作进一步阐述和展开。\n\nC. 香港法下银行保密义务\n\nC1. 背景\n\n5. 香港法中有关银行保密义务的法律主要源自英国法。为理解英国司法判例为何过去曾且目前仍被香港法院援引作为法律渊源，以下说明或有帮助。\n\n(1) 在1997年7月1日之前，英国普通法及衡平法规则在香港有效。\n\n(2) 1997年7月1日，香港成为中华人民共和国的特别行政区。\n\n(a) 《基本法》（香港的宪制性文件）第8条规定：“香港原有法律，即普通法、衡平法、条例、附属立法和习惯法，除同本法相抵触者外，予以保留，并可由香港特别行政区立法机关修改。”\n\n(b) 香港特别行政区实行的法律为本法、依照本法第8条规定原在香港实行的法律和香港特别行政区立法机关制定的法律。”\n\n(3) 《香港回归条例》第7(1)条规定：“原在香港实行的法律，即已被采纳为香港特别行政区（HKSAR）法律的普通法、衡平法、条例、附属立法和习惯法，继续适用”。\n\n(4) 《基本法》第84条允许香港法院援引其他普通法司法管辖区的判例。该条规定：“香港特别行政区法院依照本法第18条所列适用于香港特别行政区的法律审理案件，其他普通法适用地区的司法判例可作参考”。\n\nC2. 义务的范围及其适用\n\n6. 根据英国法及香港法，某些人之间的合同中默示包含保密义务，包括银行与客户之间的合同。在Parry-Jones v Law Society [1969] 1 Ch 1一案中，Diplock勋爵上诉法官在第9页称：\n\n“[合同上的保密义务]不仅存在于事务律师与客户之间，例如亦存在于银行与客户、医生与病人以及会计师与客户之间。此类保密义务受合同任何一方遵守本国法律的义务所规限，并可被该义务推翻。”\n\n7. 关于银行对其客户负有保密义务的主要判例，是英国案件Tournier v National Provisional and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 KB 461。在该案中，被告银行向客户的雇主（即第三方）披露了原告客户账户的状况。由于该披露，客户与雇主的合同期满后未获续签。英国上诉法院裁定银行违反保密义务，并判令其赔偿损失。\n\n(1) 银行有义务保密的信息，并不限于其从客户账户状况中得知的事实。此外，即使账户已经关闭或不再活跃，银行的义务仍然存在。银行的保密义务涵盖“并非来自客户实际账户的信息，只要取得该信息的场合是因银行与其客户之间的银行关系而产生”（第485页）。\n\n(2) 由于保密义务涵盖因银行关系而获知的客户事务信息，且不限于来自账户本身或关于账户的信息，如银行向第三方披露其是否持有客户的某些文件，或该等文件可能位于何处，即会违反该义务。\n\n(3) Bankes上诉法官表示，银行对其客户负有不披露其事务的义务，且该义务是由合同产生的法律义务（第471-472页）。保密义务并非绝对义务，而是附条件义务，“这些条件可归纳为四类：(a)法律强制披露；(b)为公共利益而负有披露义务；(c)银行利益要求披露；及(d)经客户明示或默示同意而披露”（第473页）。\n\n8. 英国案件Tournier所确立的原则已在香港获得全面采纳和遵循。\n\n(1) 在FDC Co Ltd v The Chase Manhattan Bank NA [1990] 1 HKLR 277一案中，一家总行设于纽约、在香港设有分行的银行，陷于两难境地：一方面，美国法院命令其披露在香港分行维持的账户信息；另一方面，账户持有人从香港法院取得禁令，禁止作出该等披露。该银行在香港申请解除禁令，但上诉法院（香港第二高级别法院）遵循Tournier所确立的原则，拒绝解除禁令（第282F-283F及290D-H页）。\n\n(2) 具体而言，Alan Huggins爵士表示，银行保密义务的第一项例外（法律强制披露）必然仅限于该司法管辖区内的法律（即香港法），并不包括外国法或外国法院命令（第283F-H页）。阁下进一步表示（第283H-1页）：\n\n“[账户持有人]与银行在香港订立合同，双方均意图将账户保留在香港。本人采纳英国上诉法院在R v Grossman (1981) 73 Cr. App. R. 302一案中的观点，并得出结论：就目前目的而言，银行的香港分行应被视为不同于纽约总行的独立实体。任何在香港开立账户的人都会预期，在通常业务过程中，载有该账户详情的记录将完全保存在开立该账户的办事处或分行内。”\n\n（3）应当指出，就受法律强制披露这一例外的范围而言，英格兰亦得出了相同结论。在 X AG v A Bank [1983] 2 All ER 464 中，3 美国纽约南区联邦地区法院（US District Court for the Southern District of New York）向一家美国银行发出传票，要求其提交与以下账户有关的文件：X（一家在美国没有业务的瑞士公司）在其伦敦分行维持的账户，以及 Y（X 的子公司，亦在瑞士注册成立，但在纽约设有主要办事处）在其伦敦分行维持的账户。该传票要求在调查涉嫌逃税的联邦大陪审团面前提交。该银行声明其拟遵从该传票。X 和 Y 以此将违反保密义务为由，取得英格兰高等法院（English High Court）的一项禁令，禁止该银行如此行事。其后，纽约联邦地区法院（New York District Court）作出命令，要求该银行遵从传票。该银行申请撤销该禁令，Leggatt 法官拒绝如此做。该法官指出，将外国法律适用于在伦敦金融城进行的银行业务，等同于“让一只相当大的杜鹃进入国内鸟巢”（第 478 页 d-e 段）。\n\n（4）正如 Sir Alan Huggins 爵士在 FDC 一案判决中上述引文所示，依英格兰及香港法律，国际银行的香港分行应被视为独立的法律实体，不同于该银行的总行或该银行位于世界其他地方的任何分行。\n\n（5）香港终审法院（Court of Final Appeal）（香港最高法院）在 Nam Tai Electronics Inc v PricewaterhouseCoopers (2008) 11 HKCFAR 62 第 35 段确认了 Tournier 一案中的原则。\n\nC3. 违反保密义务的后果\n\n9. 鉴于银行根据其与客户的合同负有保密义务，违反该义务将使客户有权向银行请求补偿性损害赔偿。根据香港法律，违约补偿性损害赔偿的目的，是使原告处于如同合同已获履行时一样良好的地位。倘若客户因银行违反其保密义务而遭受损失，银行将被命令向客户支付损害赔偿金\n\n3 上诉法院（Court of Appeal）在 FDC Co Ltd v The Chase Manhattan Bank NA 一案中亦提及本案。\n\n作为赔偿。这正是 Tournier 一案中发生的情况，该账户持有人成功从英格兰法院获得损害赔偿（见上文第 87 段）。\n\n10. 此外，根据上文 §7 所述的香港及英格兰判例，客户可能能够取得禁令，以制止银行违反其保密义务及向第三方披露信息。禁令是一项法院命令，受禁令约束的一方违反禁令即构成藐视法庭。犯藐视法庭罪的法人团体可被处以罚款，并将根据《高等法院规则》（Rules of the High Court）第 45 号命令第 (5)(i) 条，对该法团的财产适用扣押令状。该法团的董事或其他高级人员可被列入该申请，以致其财产可被扣押，且其可因藐视法庭而被监禁。\n\n11. 禁令的条款可能范围广泛，足以要求银行将其就任何外国传票而已移出管辖区的任何文件返还其本地分行：见 A v B Bank [1993] QB 311 第 313H-314A 页所载命令。\n\n12. 银行家的保密义务载于由香港银行公会（Hong Kong Association of Banks）及 DTC Association（DTC 协会）（即行业协会）联合发布，并获香港金融管理局（Hong Kong Monetary Authority，“HKMA”）（香港的中央银行机构）认可的《银行营运守则》（Code of Banking Practice，“守则”）（§8.1）。HKMA 期望所有机构遵守该守则，并将作为其日常监管的一部分监测遵守情况（§3.1）。显而易见，违反其对客户保密义务的银行将遭受声誉损害，并可能引发 HKMA 的调查。值得注意的是，UBS（瑞银）是一家私人银行，其客户自然会期望 UBS（包括香港分行）对其事务保密。倘若 UBS 在香港私人银行市场中被知悉在未获香港法院命令的情况下向第三方披露客户的机密信息，这将严重削弱其作为私人银行的声誉，并将以未来收入损失的形式遭受财务损害。\n\n13. 在附于传票的文件提交请求（Request for Production of Documents）第 IV 节（须提交的文件）第 8 段中，受托人请求提供所有日期介于 1 January 2012 与现在之间、与任何国家的任何监管机构（包括香港证券及期货事务监察委员会（Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission，“SFC”）及 HKMA）就任何 2004 Discovery Targets 所进行的任何通信有关的文件。\n\n14. 由于该请求范围极其宽泛，所请求文件中的部分文件一经披露，极有可能导致违反香港两项法定保密条文。\n\n15. 香港分行从事吸收客户存款的业务，并且是《银行业条例》（Banking Ordinance，香港法例第 155 章，“BO”）下的“认可机构”。香港所有 BO 下的认可机构均受 HKMA 监管。此外，香港分行从事证券及期货业务，因此须向 SFC 注册，并受《证券及期货条例》（Securities and Futures Ordinance，香港法例第 571 章，“SFO”）规管。因此，香港分行在香港受两项监管制度规管。就香港分行吸收存款的业务而言，BO 及 BO 所载的任何法定保密义务将具相关性。同样，就香港分行的受规管活动（例如提供投资银行或资产管理服务）而言，SFO 及 SFO 所载的任何法定保密义务将具相关性。\n\n16. SFO 第 378(1) 条规定：\n\n“在不抵触第 (13A) 款的情况下，除为执行任何有关条文下的职能，或为实施或进行任何有关条文规定或授权实施或进行的任何事情外，指明人士——\n\n(a) 须对其凭借根据任何有关条文作出的委任而得知的，或在执行任何有关条文下的任何职能、实施任何有关条文，或协助任何其他人士执行任何有关条文下的任何职能或实施任何有关条文的过程中得知的任何事项，保守秘密并协助保守秘密；\n\n(b) 不得向任何其他人士传达任何该等事项；及\n\n(c) 不得容受或准许任何其他人士查阅其凭借该项委任、执行任何该等职能、实施任何该等条文，或协助其他人士执行任何该等职能或实施任何该等条文而管有的任何纪录或文件。”\n\n17. 就第 378 条而言，“指明人士”在第 378(15) 条中被定义为：(a) SFC；(b) 现时或曾经是 SFC 成员、雇员、顾问、代理人或咨询人的任何人士；或 (c) 现时或曾经是：(i) 根据 SFO 任何有关条文获委任的人士，(ii) 执行 SFO 任何有关条文下的任何职能或实施 SFO 任何有关条文的人士，或 (iii) 协助任何其他人士执行 SFO 任何有关条文下的任何职能或实施 SFO 任何有关条文的人士。\n\n18. 因此，SFC 与 UBS 之间有关通信的作者很可能构成“特定人士”，并因此受 SFO 第 378 条施加的法定保密义务约束。\n\n19. 此外，BO 第 120(1) 条规定：\n\n“除为行使本条例下的任何职能或为实施本条例的条文所必需者外，适用本款的每名人士——\n\n(a) 须对其在行使本条例下的任何职能时可能得知的、与任何人士事务有关的一切事项保守秘密并协助保守秘密；\n\n(b) 不得向该等事项所关乎的人以外的任何人士传达任何该等事项；及\n\n(c) 不得容受或准许任何人士查阅适用本款的任何人士所管有、保管或控制的任何纪录。”\n\n20. BO 第 120(2) 条规定：\n\n“第 (1) 款适用于现时或曾经是下列人士的任何人士——\n\n(a) 公职人员；\n\n(b) 获金融管理专员授权的人士；\n\n(c)\n\n(d) 认可机构的经理；\n\n(da) 根据第 53G(5) 条获委任的人士；\n\n(e)\n\n(f) 凭借第 (b)、(c)、(d) 或 (e) 段而适用本款的人士，\n\n而其行使或曾行使本条例下任何职能者。”\n\n21. 如上所述，HKMA 在香港履行类似中央银行的职能。其主要职能是“促进银行体系的整体稳定及有效运作”（BO 第 7(1) 条）。其亦“负责监管对《银行业条例》条文的遵守情况”（BO 第 7(2) 条）。因此，凡 HKMA 与 UBS 之间存在任何属于该请求描述范围内的文件，该等文件的作者很可能受 BO 第 120 条施加的法定保密义务约束。\n\nE. 分析\n\n22. Bravo Luck Limited（Bravo Luck 有限公司，“Bravo Luck”）一直与香港分行保持银行业务关系。作为香港法律事项（如上文 C2 节所概述），Bravo Luck 与香港分行之间存在合同，并且保密义务被默示纳入该合同。该保密义务要求香港分行不得向第三方披露香港分行通过为 Bravo Luck 在该银行维持账户而获得的、与 Bravo Luck 有关的信息。\n\n23. 香港分行对 Bravo Luck 所负的保密义务受上文 C2 节所述四项例外所规限。然而，根据目前向我提供的材料，我无法看出该保密义务如何能够受到例外限制。特别是，香港并无任何法律或香港法院命令强制香港分行披露任何与 Bravo Luck 有关的信息。根据香港法律，如上文 C2 节所述，保密义务的第一项例外并不延伸至外国法院作出的法院命令。\n\n24. 如香港分行违反其保密义务，向第三方披露与Bravo Luck（百乐运）有关的信息，百乐运将有权对香港分行提起损害赔偿诉讼。\n\n25. 此外，百乐运可申请禁制令，以禁止香港分行向任何第三方（包括Trustee（受托人））披露任何信息。若发生此种情况，香港法院毫无疑问会依据Court of Appeal（上诉法院）在FDC Co Ltd（FDC有限公司）v The Chase Manhattan Bank NA（大通曼哈顿银行全国协会）一案中的推理授予该禁制令（见上文C2节）。正如Sir Alan Huggins VP（艾伦·哈金斯爵士副庭长）在该案中所述，在授予禁制令以禁止该银行根据外国法院命令披露信息时，香港法院不会“以任何方式违背两国之间适用的礼让原则”（第284J页）。阁下指出（第284J—285A页）：\n\n“所有在香港银行开立账户的人士，无论是本地银行还是外国银行，均有权依赖香港法院强制履行根据香港法律因客户与银行家之间关系而默示存在的任何保密义务。该义务之所以被默示，正是因为其对该关系具有根本性。”\n\n26. 如上文C3节所述，不遵守禁制令会产生严重后果。若香港分行尽管受到禁止其如此行事的禁制令，仍披露百乐运的任何信息，该银行可能被裁定藐视法庭，其董事或其他高级人员可能被监禁。\n\nF. 受托人为取得传票所要求的信息而可采用的替代选择\n\nF1. 《关于从国外调取民事或商事证据的海牙公约》\n\n27. 1970年3月18日《关于从国外调取民事或商事证据的海牙公约》（下称“《公约》”）确立了缔约国之间在民事或商事事项中从国外调取证据的两种合作方式。其中一种方式是使用请求书。China（中国）和United States（美国）均为《公约》缔约方。Hong Kong（香港）Chief Secretary（政务司司长）已被指定为《公约》第17条所称的“主管机关”。4 Hong Kong High Court（香港高等法院）的Registrar（司法常务官）已被指定为《公约》第24条所称的“其他机关”。5\n\n28. 在处理外国法院提出的取证请求时，香港法院将采用以下框架评估是否应当批准该请求。\n\n(1) 首先，法院应当裁定其是否有权根据Evidence Ordinance（《证据条例》，香港法例第8章）第75及76条作出所请求的救济。\n\n(2) 其次，如法院认定其具有管辖权，则必须裁定其作为酌处权事项，是否应当作出、限制或拒绝所请求的救济。\n\n见Angela Chen（安吉拉·陈）v Vivien Chen（薇薇安·陈）（未报道，HCMP 1478/2011，7 December 2011）§22(v)。\n\n29. 《证据条例》第75条规定：\n\n“如有人向Court of First Instance（原讼法庭）申请命令，以在香港取得证据，而法院信纳—\n\n(a) 该申请是依照由在香港以外国家或地区行使管辖权的法院或审裁处（请求法院）发出或代表其发出的请求而提出；及\n\n(b) 该申请所涉证据是为已在请求法院提起或拟在该法院提起的民事法律程序而取得，\n\n则原讼法庭具有本部赋予其的权力。”\n\n4 http\n\n5 http\n\n30. 换言之，为符合第75条，必须向香港法院提出取得证据的申请；申请人必须使法院信纳，该申请所涉证据是根据外国法院或审裁处发出或代表其发出的请求而寻求取得；并且法院必须信纳，该申请所涉证据是为已经提起或拟提起的民事法律程序而寻求取得。\n\n31. 《证据条例》第76(2)(b)条有一项明确规定，将交出文件的命令包括在内。仅会命令交出命令中具体指明、且可能由证人占有、保管或控制的文件；不会命令证人说明其持有何等相关文件，也不会命令其交出与特定争议事项有关的所有文件（《证据条例》第76(4)条）。\n\n32. 对外国法院提出的取证请求所适用的总括原则是，香港法院通常会在适当及切实可行的范围内，并在香港法律允许的限度内，使该请求生效。该原则体现司法礼让及国际礼让。在Re Trioielli（特里奥伊利案）[1995] 2 HKC 785中，Barnett J（巴尼特法官）于第796 G-H页表示：“为国际礼让之利益，本院应尽可能努力使请求书生效。”另见Angela Chen v Vivien Chen（上引）§22(iv)。\n\n33. 就酌处权而言，香港法院通常会行使其酌处权作出所请求的命令，除非其信纳该申请属于轻率、无理缠扰或滥用法院程序的情形。所请求的证据是否相关及可采纳，本质上属于请求法院的事项；香港法院将适当重视外国法院就所请求证据的相关性作出的决定。见Angela Chen v Vivien Chen（上引）§§22(vi), 22(viii), 23 & 24。\n\n34. 规管该项以宣誓书提出的单方面申请的程序载于Rules of High Court（《高等法院规则》）Order 70, rule 2，其规定：\n\n“(1) 在符合rule 3的规定下，根据本条例申请命令必须以单方面方式提出，并必须由宣誓书支持。\n\n(2) 该宣誓书须附上据以提出申请的请求书；如该请求书并非英文，须附上其英文译本。”\n\n35. 因此，支持申请的宣誓书必须附上请求书副本。由于该申请是向High Court（高等法院）的Master（聆案官）单方面提出，因此将以书面方式处理。无需排期聆讯，事项将会迅速处理。根据Practice Direction 36（第36号实务指示）第14段，书面申请的判决将在各方提交陈词结束后三个月内宣告。鉴于该申请性质简单，我预计聆案官很可能在收到申请后一个月内作出裁定。\n\n36. 在遵守上述原则并符合所有相关要求的基础上，我认为，受托人不会难以：(1) 符合《证据条例》第75及76条的要求，以证明香港法院具有处理文件请求的管辖权；及(2) 说服香港法院行使其酌处权，批准披露文件的申请，前提是该等请求不违反上文D节所述的任何法定保密义务。\n\n37. 我应当指出，如受托人在何时取得披露所请求文件的单方面命令，这实际上意味着存在一项要求披露相关文件的香港法院命令。这将构成对银行保密义务的第一项例外，即根据法律强制披露（见上文C2节）。因此，UBS（瑞银）就该等文件所负的保密义务将被排除，且瑞银根据香港命令披露所请求文件时将不再违反香港法律。事实上，一旦该命令作出并送达香港分行，如香港分行不遵守该命令，便会构成藐视香港法院。\n\n6 实务指示由香港司法机构发布，以就香港法院程序的进行提供指引。\n\nF2. 向香港法院寻求承认及协助命令\n\n38. 普通法中的一项一般国际私法原则是，破产（无论个人或公司）应当具有单一性及普遍性。在Re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd（HIH意外及综合保险有限公司案）[2008] 1 WLR 852中，Lord Hoffmann（霍夫曼勋爵）于§6表示：\n\n“尽管没有法定规定，公司无力偿债领域仍已通过司法实践实现了一定程度的国际合作。这是基于英国法官多年来视为国际私法一般原则的原则，即破产（无论个人或公司）应当具有单一性及普遍性。应当在破产人住所地法院进行单一的破产程序，并获得全球承认，且应普遍适用于破产人的全部资产。”\n\n39. 此外，普通法下，法院有权承认及向外国无力偿债程序提供协助。在Rubin v Eurofinance SA [2013] 1 AC 236中，Lord Collins（柯林斯勋爵）表示：\n\n“29. 第四，普通法下，法院有权承认及向外国无力偿债程序提供协助。普通法原则是，可以向具有国际因素的无力偿债程序中的外国破产管理人提供协助。该基本原则有不同表述方式：‘承认……带有法院积极协助之意’：In re African Farms Ltd（African Farms有限公司案）[1906] TS 373, 377；‘本院……将尽其所能与美国破产法院合作，并避免采取任何可能扰乱[该公司]在Texas（得克萨斯州）依ch 11有序管理的行动’：Banque Indosuez SA（法国外贸银行）v Ferromet Resources Inc（费罗梅特资源公司）[1993] BCLC 112, 117。\n\n30. 在Credit Suisse Fides Trust（瑞士信贷信托）v Cuoghi（夸吉）[1998] QB 818, 827中，Millett LJ（米列特上诉法官）表示：\n\n‘在其他法律领域，例如跨境无力偿债，商业上的必要性已促使各国法院在不等待此类合作获国际公约认可的情况下相互提供协助……人们日益普遍接受，不同国家法院之间的礼让要求相互尊重彼此管辖权的属地完整性，但这不应妨碍一个管辖区的法院，就位于前者领土内的资产或居住于前者领土内的人士，向另一管辖区的法院提供其能够适当提供的任何协助。’\n\n31. 普通法协助案件涉及的事项包括：将英国资产归属外国破产管理人、暂缓本地程序、为支持外国程序而作出讯问命令，或命令将资产汇交外国清算程序；并且涉及外国法院具有适格管辖权的案件，即破产人住所位于该外国，或如属公司，则该公司在该外国注册成立。”\n\n40. Harris J（哈里斯法官）在 Re Global Brand Group Holding Ltd（环球品牌集团控股有限公司）（in liq）[2022] 3 HKLRD 316 第23、25及28段中认可了上文引述的 Re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd（HIH意外及一般保险有限公司）及 Rubin v Eurofinance SA（Eurofinance SA公司）中的段落。\n\n41. 特别是，Harris J 完全赞同 Lord Sumption（萨姆普申勋爵）在 Singularis Holdings Ltd（Singularis Holdings Ltd公司）v PricewaterhouseCoopers（普华永道）[2015] AC 1675 中的观点，并裁定，根据修正普遍主义原则，香港法院有权通过命令提供破产程序管理人履行职能所必需的信息，协助境外破产管辖法院的人员。Harris J 在第45段称：\n\n“可以授予境外破产程序管理人向第三方收集信息的权力。继其在上文[25]所引述的解释之后，Lord Sumption 在 Singularis 中说明：\n\n普通法赋予一项权力，可通过命令提供为管理境外清盘所必需的口头或书面信息，以协助境外破产管辖法院。在承认该项权力存在时，审裁处并不希望鼓励不加节制地创设其他普通法权力以强制提供信息。该项权力的限度已内含于承认其存在的理由之中。首先，该项权力仅可用于协助境外破产管辖法院的人员或同等的公职人员。例如，该项权力不可用于协助自愿清盘；自愿清盘本质上属于私人安排，尽管受法院指示所规限，但并非由法院人员或代表法院人员进行。其次，这是一项协助权力。其目的在于使该等法院能够克服每一法院权力的地域限制对公司事务的全球性清盘所造成的问题。因此，不能用以使其作出即使根据其获委任所依据的法律也不能作出的事情。第三，该项权力仅在破产程序管理人履行职能所必需时方可行使。第四，该项权力受 In re African Farms Ltd 以及 HIH 和 Rubin 中所述限制，即该等命令必须符合提供协助法院的实体法和公共政策……因此，该项权力不可用于本应属于其他强制提供信息机制范围的目的。”\n\n42. 虽然香港并无相关立法，但从上文可清楚看出，作为普通法事项，香港法院可以承认境外破产程序，并可以通过作出必须符合香港公正及公共政策的命令，向境外破产程序管理人提供协助。\n\n43. 在程序上，香港法院已就承认及协助申请形成一项标准做法：\n\n(1) 破产程序管理人必须首先从委任其的法院取得致香港法院的请求书。该请求书通常会列明拟在香港申请的命令条款。申请请求书，实际上是让香港以外的委任法院能够从委任法院的法律及案件事实角度，确信应寻求承认及协助，以及拟议命令的条款适当的机会。\n\n(2) 取得请求书后，破产程序管理人可随即以传讯令状及宣誓书／确认书证据，按“单方面书面”方式向 Court of First Instance（原讼法庭）申请标准格式命令。\n\n(3) 如破产程序管理人除申请标准格式命令外，还申请影响某一特定一方的实体命令（例如交出文件的命令），则应将该方列为答辩人，并向其送达申请。\n\n见 Re Pacific Andes Enterprises (BVI) Ltd（Pacific Andes Enterprises（BVI）Ltd公司）（unreported, HCMP 3560/2016, 27 January 2017）；Re Takematsu [2019] 5 HKC 505。\n\n44. 兹承认，上述香港案件均涉及境外公司破产，而非境外个人破产。然而，正如 Lord Hoffmann（霍夫曼勋爵）在上文引述的 HIH 案中所述，破产（无论个人或公司）应具统一性和普遍性，乃国际私法的一项一般原则。重要的是，该原则已获香港法院在 Re Global Brand 中认可。Harris J 在 Re Global Brand 第26段称：“修正普遍主义是普通法承认及协助境外破产程序权力的基础，如其发展符合修正普遍主义并符合适用的本地法律框架，该项权力可予发展。”我认为，香港法院原则上没有理由不会通过命令披露由香港一方保管或占有的文件，承认及／或协助 Trustee（受托人）（即由 US Bankruptcy Court（美国破产法院）在 Individual Debtor（个人债务人）的 Chapter 11 案件中委任的 Chapter 11 受托人）。\n\n本人根据美利坚合众国法律，以伪证罪处罚为担保声明，上述内容真实且正确。\n\nHong Kong（香港）27 January 2023\n\nEurophy\n\nEugene Fung SC（冯兆辉资深大律师）\n\n附件：\n\n1. Eugene Fung's Curriculum Vitae（Eugene Fung的履历）\n\n2. Basic Law of Hong Kong, Articles 8, 18, 84（《香港基本法》第8、18、84条）\n\n3. Hong Kong Reunification Ordinance, section 7（《香港回归条例》第7条）\n\n4. Parry-Jones v Law Society [1969] 1 Ch 1\n\n5. 461\n\n6. FDC Co Ltd v The Chase Manhattan Bank NA [1990] 1 HKLR 277\n\n7. X AG v A Bank [1983] 2 All ER 464\n\n8. Nam Tai Electronics Inc v PricewaterhouseCoopers [2008] 11 HKCFAR 62\n\n9. A v B Bank [1993] QB 311\n\n10. Code of Banking Practice in Hong Kong（《香港银行业守则》）\n\n11. Banking Ordinance (Chapter 155 of the Laws of Hong Kong), sections 7, 120（《银行业条例》（香港法例第155章）第7、120条）\n\n12. Securities and Futures Ordinance (Chapter 571 of the Laws of Hong Kong), section 378（《证券及期货条例》（香港法例第571章）第378条）\n\n13. Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters（《关于从国外调取民事或商事证据的海牙公约》）\n\n14. Evidence Ordinance (Chapter 8 of the Laws of Hong Kong), sections 75, 76（《证据条例》（香港法例第8章）第75、76条）\n\n15. Angela Chen（陈安琪）v Vivien Chen（陈薇薇）（unreported, HCMP 1478/2011, 7 December 2011）\n\n16. Re Trioielli [1995] 2 HKC 785\n\n17. Rules of High Court, Order 45, rule (5) & Order 70, rule 2（《高等法院规则》第45号命令第(5)条及第70号命令第2条）\n\n18. Practice Direction 36, paragraph 14（第36号实务指示第14段）\n\n19. Re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 852\n\n20. Rubin v Eurofinance SA [2013] 1 AC 236\n\n21. Re Global Brand Group Holding Ltd (in liq) [2022] 3 HKLRD 316\n\n22. Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers [2015] AC 1675\n\n23. Re Pacific Andes Enterprises (BVI) Ltd (unreported, HCMP 3560/2016, 27 January 2017)\n\n24. Re Takematsu [2019] 5 HKC 505","key_entities":["Je","CIPA","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok"],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":6903,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 19:28:46"}