{"id":"court_ctb_1409_16","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":1409,"sub_number":16,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"Re Troielli and the Prosecutor's Office at the Ordinary Court of **[1995] 2 HKC** Milan, Italy (Barnett J)","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"Re Troielli and the Prosecutor's Office at the Ordinary Court of **[1995] 2 HKC** Milan, Italy (Barnett J)\n\n**785**\n\n#### **A RE TROIELLI & ANOR AND THE PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE AT THE ORDINARY COURT OF MILAN, ITALY**\n\nHIGH COURT – MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 620 OF 1994 BARNETT J 26–28 JUNE, 14 JULY 1995\n\n**B**\n\n**Evidence – Letter of request – Jurisdiction – Whether foreign requesting party a court or tribunal – Meaning of 'court' – Magistrate in Italy performing role as investigator and prosecutor not a court or tribunal under Hong Kong law – Evidence Ordinance (Cap 8) s 75**\n\n**C**\n\n### **Words and Phrases – 'Court' – Evidence Ordinance (Cap 8) s 75**\n\n**D** Under a letter of request by the 'Prosecutor's Office at the Ordinary Court of Milan', an ex parte order was made by a master requiring that the duly authorised officer of A Ltd be examined in relation to specific matters. By a summons, A Ltd, joined by T (the applicants), applied to set aside the order on the grounds that the master lacked jurisdiction, that there was material misdirection or non-disclosure when the ex parte application was heard and that the order provided for general discovery.\n\n**E** In relation to the jurisdiction point, the applicant submitted that in order to assume jurisdiction, the court must be satisfied that the request must be by or on behalf of a court or tribunal, that the evidence sought must be for the purposes of criminal proceedings which had been instituted or whose institution was likely before the requesting court if the evidence was obtained and that the criminal proceedings were not of a political character. Moreover, there was a residual discretion under s 76(1) of the Evidence Ordinance (Cap 8) (the Ordinance) to\n\n**F** refuse an order in appropriate circumstances.\n\n#### **Held, setting aside the order:**\n\n**G** (1) Jurisdiction to give effect to a letter of request from a court or tribunal in another country was conferred on the High Court by Pt VIII of the Ordinance. The fact that a requesting party considered that it fell within the definition of court or tribunal could not confer jurisdiction on a Hong Kong court if the requesting party was not a court within s 75 of the Ordinance according to Hong Kong Law. *Re State of Norway's Application* [1987] 1 QB 433 and *Re Binoy & Court of the Special Judge Delhi, India* [1995] 1 HKC 305 considered (at 787D, 793G).\n\n- **H I** (2) Part VIII of the Ordinance plainly contemplated the situation where an organ of the foreign judicial authority was seized of and in control of proceedings in which it would ultimately determine the rights between the parties to those proceedings or the guilt of an accused person. Fishing or mere investigation was not permissible. It was therefore difficult to see how a purely investigatory authority could be a court. *Re State of Norway's Application* [1987] 1 QB 433 and *Rio Tinto Zinc Corp & Ors v Westinghouse Electric Corp* [1978] AC 547 applied\n\t- (at 793H-794A).\n\n(3) Although a magistrate in Italy acting as public prosecutor fell within the judicial umbrella according to Italian law, it was clear that he had a distinct and 13\n\n**A B C D E F 786** Hong Kong Cases **[1995] 2 HKC** separate role as investigator and prosecutor. Such a magistrate performing the function of public prosecutor under Italian law was not a court or tribunal within s 75 (at 794B, 795H). (4) The court, in the interests of international comity, should strive to give effect to a letter of request if at all possible. The letter should stand or fall on its own. The function of the Crown Solicitor was little more than that of a conduit for placing the letter before the court although he would help to ensure that there was no glaring omission or error in the letter (at 796G-H). (5) If objection was taken to the letter or an order made on it, it was permissible to look at any material then provided to see whether jurisdiction exists. Even if there was initial non-disclosure, it remained a matter of discretion whether to set aside the order or not (at 796H-I). (6) Provided any non-disclosure was not deliberate and the matter undisclosed was not seriously prejudicial, the usual approach should be to exercise discretion in favour of the requesting court (at 796I-797A). **Cases referred to** *Binoy & Court of the Special Judge Delhi, India, Re* [1995] 1 HKC 305 *Crown Solicitor v Datuk Dr Jeffrey Kitingan* [1994] 1 HKC 516 *Extradition Act 1870, Re* [19691 1 WLR 12 *State of Norway's Application, Re* [1987] 1 QB 433 *Rio Tinto Zinc Corp & Ors v Westinghouse Electric Corp* [1978] AC 547 *Schtraks v Government of Israel & Ors* [1964] AC 557 **Legislation referred to** Evidence Ordinance (Cap 8) ss 75, 76 Rules of the Supreme Court (Cap 4) O 41 r 5(2), O 70 Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act 1990 [UK] Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdiction) Act 1975 [UK] **Other sources referred to**\n\nEuropean Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters\n\n## **Application**\n\nThis was an application to set aside an ex parte order made under O 70 of the Rules of the Supreme Court pursuant to various letters of request made by the Public Prosecutor's Office at the Ordinary Court of Milan, Italy. The facts appear sufficiently in the following judgment.\n\n*Barrie Barlow (Wilkinson & Grist) for the first applicant. Raymond Faulkner (Haldanes) for the second applicant. Geoffrey Ma QC & Paul Shieh (Crown Solicitor) for the respondent.*\n\n**I Barnett J:** On 29 April 1994, a master gave effect to letters of request which, in the order made ex parte, are recited as 'of the Court of Milan'. The order required that among others Acceptor Corp Ltd (Acceptor) by its duly authorised officer be examined in relation to specified matters.\n\n**G**\n\n**H**\n\n|              | Re Troielli and the Prosecutor's Office at the Ordinary Court of |     |\n|--------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|\n| [1995] 2 HKC | Milan, Italy (Barnett J)                                         | 787 |\n\n**A** By summons dated 10 May 1994, Acceptor applied to set aside the order. By summons dated 16 June 1994 one Gianfranco Troielli applied to be added as a party and to have the order set aside. These two summonses are now before me.\n\n**B** Mr Troielli's application to be joined was not opposed. That part of the application I granted.\n\nThe substantive part of the applications by Acceptor and Mr Troielli (the applicants) falls into three parts:\n\n- 1. The master lacked jurisdiction.\n- 2. There was material misdirection or non-disclosure when the ex parte application was made.\n\t- 3. Paragraphs 3(a), 4(a) and 5 of the order provided for general discovery.\n\n# *Jurisdiction*\n\n**C**\n\n**E**\n\n**I**\n\n**D** Jurisdiction to give effect to a letter of request from a court or tribunal in another country is conferred on the High Court by Pt VIII of the Evidence Ordinance (Cap 8) (the Ordinance).\n\nMr Barlow who appeared for Mr Troielli and Mr Faulkner who represented Acceptor submitted that in order to assume jurisdiction the High Court must be satisfied of three matters:\n\n- 1. The request must be made by or on behalf of a court or tribunal.\n\t- 2. The evidence sought must be for the purposes of criminal proceedings which have been instituted or whose institution is likely before the requesting court if the evidence is obtained.\n- **F** 3. The criminal proceedings are not of a political character.\n\nAssuming that jurisdiction has been established it was also submitted that under s 76(1) of the Ordinance a residual discretion is conferred on the High Court to refuse an order in appropriate circumstances.\n\n**G** Mr Ma QC appeared for the Crown Solicitor who made the application for the order pursuant to O 70 on behalf of the requesting authority in Italy. Mr Ma did not, as I understood him, dissent from any of the three jurisdictional points made by the applicants. He contested, however, the applicants' arguments that the request failed on all three points.\n\n**H** *The letters of request*\n\n> The request is contained in five documents or letters and numerous attachments. The first letter dated 7 June 1993 is headed 'Prosecutor's Office at Ordinary Court of Milan' and was signed by 'The Assistant Public Prosecutor Dott Antonio Di Pietro'. The letter reads at least in part:\n\nSubject: Demand for Judicial help in criminal matter in the criminal proceeding n 8655/92 mod 21 against PACINI BATTAGLIA Pierfrancesco and others. (Account 567.159140 - 201).\n\n| 788 | Hong Kong Cases | [1995] 2 HKC |\n|-----|-----------------|--------------|\n|-----|-----------------|--------------|\n\n**A** This Prosecutor's Office, Judicial Authority of Italian Repubblic, as an international courtesy and with assurance of reciprocity, is proceeding within an extensive investigation concerning crimes against Pubblic Administration also with respect to PACINI BATTAGLIA Pierfrancesco (of Italian nationality) born in Bientina on February 21st 1934 for the crimes of abetment in aggravated extortion and/or bribery and illicit financing of political parties.\n\nIn particular, at present the above mentioned is subjected to the investigations as he has paid, directly or indirectly, in some Banks of Hong Kong large sums of money to public officers and to Italian political representatives.\n\nIn this framework it's necessary to acquire the whole documentation concerning the current account used by the above mentioned to transfer large sums of money so abstracted.\n\nIt's likewise necessary to order the attachment of the sums paid on the mentioned current account, as well as on those to which the very sums result to have been in case transferred afterwards.\n\n**D** PACINI BATTAGLIA Pierfrancesco has been interrogated before the Pubblic Prosecutor; on this occasion he has delivered the ample statements attached to this letter. From them we infer that above mentioned payments on current accounts have been made on the following current account:\n\n**E** Current account n 567159140-201 open in the name of TASH KURGHAN COMPANY LTD of HONG KONG in BANK SHANGAY BANKING CORPORATION of HONG KONG.\n\n**F** The letter then went on to indicate the information being sought, which was certainly far more than this court would be prepared to contemplate, and wound up in a somewhat florid and general vein. It left a great deal to be desired.\n\nA second letter, which clarified the name of the bank, was issued by Dr Di Pietro who signed as 'Solicitor General' on 25 August 1993. This letter referred to criminal proceedings against 'Ferranti Enrico and others'.\n\n**G H** A third letter dated 7 January 1994 was issued by 'Milano District Attorney Dr A Di Pietro-Asstnt' and was headed 'Office of the District Attorney c/o Milano Ordinary Court'. This letter plainly attempted to grapple with some of the defects which had no doubt been drawn to Dr Di Pietro's attention by the Crown Solicitor. After asking for judicial assistance in respect of the two men who had been specifically named in the earlier letters, it went on:\n\nIn summary, this Office has informed the HONG KONG counterpart that proceedings were being instituted against PACINI BATTAGLIA Pierfrancesco (born at Bienfina on Feb 21st, 1934) and others (including FERRANTI Enrico, born in Rome on Aug 26th, 1944) for the crimes of concurrence in aggravated corruption and illegal financing of political parties.\n\nOn this subject we are dispatching a copy of the records of questioning of PACINI BATTAGLIA on June 4th 1993 (Att 3) and of July 19th 1993 (Att 4), **B**\n\n**C**\n\n**I**\n\n|              | Re Troielli and the Prosecutor's Office at the Ordinary Court of |     |\n|--------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|\n| [1995] 2 HKC | Milan, Italy (Barnett J)                                         | 789 |\n\n**A** as well as a copy of the same document sent by PACINI BATTAGLIA defending counsel Mr Giuseppe LUCIBELLO (Att 5).\n\n**B**\n\n**C**\n\n**D**\n\n**G**\n\n**H**\n\nIt was inferred from all above documents (and is still our belief) that PACINI BATTAGLIA, around Nov 9th 1990 has made a US\\$880.000 payment into the account no 567-159140-201 at the HONG KONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION (1, Queen's Road Central Hong Kong) in favour of TASH KURGHAN COMPANY LIMITED of Hong Kong.\n\nThe scope of the request is the identification by name and personal full particulars of the account holder and of any other person who may have used the abovesaid account and of any other account into which these sums of money might have been transferred, and the sequestration of any available residual amount.\n\nFirst of all, we wish to clarify that the District Attorney Office c/o Milano Ordinary Court, like all other Italian Republic District Attorneys is, for all intents and purposes, a judiciary Authority before the Italian and the International Low (see art 24 of the European Agreement on Judicial Assistance signed at\n\nThe investigation on PACINI BATTAGLIA, which began some time ago, is now practically completed and has become a formal criminal proceedings, registered in the Notice of Crimes Registrar under no 8655/92.\n\n**E** Such Registrar is the official document for the purpose of identification of criminal proceedings, as per art 355 of the Criminal Procedure Code (see Att 8). A statement of the Registrar Officer, stating that criminal proceedings against PACINI and FERRANTI are in course is also produced (Att 9).\n\nStrasbourg on Apr 20th, 1959).\n\n**F** It can be seen immediately that Dr Di Pietro was attempting to deal with the first two requirements of the Ordinance.\n\nThe same letter went on to explain in detail the case against Battaglia and Ferranti and other named persons arising out of the cheating of a company ENI to the benefit of another company called Montedison. It continued:\n\nThis behaviour caused a financial damage to ENI in the way of lost interests and a personal profit of 10.5 Million US\\$ to Montedison executives. FERRANTI took care of the operation, through PACINI BATTAGLIA and the false invoice ALLIED ENGINEERING; PACINI BATTAGLIA, FERRANTI, CAGLIARI GAROFANO, SAMA and GARDINI have therefore concurrently committed the crime of corruption, a violation of arts 312 and 321 of Criminal Code (Att 19).\n\nThese are crimes against the Public Administration, certainly not of a political nature.\n\n**I** PACINI BATTAGLIA, once received the abovesaid sum, took care of its distribution to various persons in several accounts, as instructed by BALZAMO (see records of PACINI questioning of July 19th 1993, Att 4).\n\n**790** Hong Kong Cases **[1995] 2 HKC**\n\n**A** In more detail, for the scope of this request, BALZAMO instructed PACINI BATTAGLIA to transfer the 880.000 US\\$ into the bank account n°567- 159140-201 at the HONG KONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION to the credit of TASH KURGHAN COMPANY LIMITED of HONG KONG.\n\n**B** It seems therefore necessary to uncover the account holder identity, as well as that of all others who may have used that or other accounts where the money might have been subsequently transferred. It seems further necessary to proceed and sequestrate whatever amount may still be found, as an income generated through a crime.\n\n**C** Information from the holder is required so that he may explain on whose behalf the operations have been carried out. All the above being stated, the following specific requests are made, in compliance with your request for clarification ref AGC MIS 440/93 of Aug 3rd 1993. We trust that you will satisfy them as an international courtesy, with our commitment of reciprocity.\n\n**D** Inter alia, the letter is there grappling with the third requirement of the Ordinance.\n\nIn the letter there followed requests seeking documents and the questioning of representatives of the company Tash Kurghan and of the bank in relation to the bank account. The letter then continued:\n\n**E F** These documents and the information requested above are directly related to the proceedings indicated in the opening remarks. It is believed that, following this course of action, it may be possible to find out who received the money arising from the corruption and the falsification of Company's accounting brought about by FERRANTI, GAROFANO, PACINI BATTAGLIA and others. This hitherto unknown beneficiary will be held responsible under Italian law for concurrence in the above crimes and/or for handling of stolen property (see Att 20).\n\nNone of these crimes bears any political connotation.\n\n**G** The writing Judicial Authority is not opposed to the use of the information given for the purpose of justice by the answering Authority.\n\nThis office is committed to refrain from using any received information or documentation for purposes other than those indicated above.\n\n**H** On a courtesy basis it is asked, if at all possible, that the Assistant District Attorney Dr Antonio DI PETRO be present during the questioning of witnesses.\n\nIt is perhaps hardly surprising that the applicants complain that the request is all part of an ongoing criminal investigation rather than criminal proceedings as would be understood in Hong Kong.\n\n**I** A fourth letter was dated 17 January 1994; it was entitled 'District Attorney's Office at the Ordinary Court of Milan' and signed 'The District Attorney's Office Dott Antonio Di Pietro — Substitute —'.\n\n|              | Re Troielli and the Prosecutor's Office at the Ordinary Court of |     |\n|--------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|\n| [1995] 2 HKC | Milan, Italy (Barnett J)                                         | 791 |\n\n- **A** This letter disclosed that one Agostino Ruju had been detained under the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure (the Code) and under interrogation confessed that, through Acceptor, he had set up a number of companies in Hong Kong for Mr Troielli to enable Mr Troielli to receive what he understood to be commissions. The letter therefore sought to widen the\n- **B** request to include the questioning of Acceptor generally in relation to such companies and in particular in relation to seven named companies including Tash Kurghan.\n\nFinally, the Crown Solicitor received a letter dated 1 February 1994 making a number of small corrections to the previous letter. It was signed\n\n**C** 'The Attorney General of the Republic/S/Dr Antonio Di Pietro (Assistant)' and was chopped with the stamp of 'The Attorney General's Office in the Milan Ordinary Court'.\n\nThe letters themselves were relatively short running to about 24 pages. They were accompanied, however, by over 100 pages of transcripts of\n\n- **D** interrogations of various persons under investigation by Dr Di Pietro's office and other documents. Altogether it was a pretty indigestible mass of material. It is not clear whether the master attempted to deal with the material on her own or whether the Crown Solicitor was asked to appear in support of the application. At all events the master plainly satisfied\n- **E** herself that the three requirements of the Ordinance had been met and made the order. Given the passages in the letters dealing with these requirements and given the assertions to like effect in the supporting affidavit, the master's order is hardly surprising. The contention is, however, that the master was wrong in assuming jurisdiction.\n- **F** Available to me but not to the master are affidavits of Italian law from a number of eminent Italian jurists and lawyers. There is really little dispute between them. I see no point therefore in analysing their affidavits in detail. For the purposes of this application it is enough to paint in the consensual picture.\n- **G** Under the constitution of the Italian Republic there is established 'The Judiciary'. It is composed of magistrates who are assigned by the Superior Council of the Judiciary to act as judges (in the sense that we understand that word) or as prosecutors under the Pubblico Ministero who has the 'obligation to conduct criminal proceedings'. The judiciary has control over the criminal police. The judiciary is autonomous and independent.\n- **H I** The Code prescribes the manner in which the judiciary shall discharge its functions and confers various powers on it. The Code, which came into effect in 1989, provides for an accusatorial (again as we understand this word) procedure at trial as opposed to the previous inquisitorial nature of the proceedings.\n\t- Upon complaint being made of a criminal offence, a prosecutor makes a formal entry in the Register prescribed by the Code and opens a file. With the help of the police, he assembles material/evidence pointing to the\n\n**A B** guilt or otherwise of the person or persons under investigation. When the prosecutor has completed his investigation or upon expiry of the relevant time limit imposed by the Code, he will submit his file to a judge of preliminary investigation (JPI). In so far as it is possible to make comparisons, the JPI would appear akin to a magistrate in Hong Kong hearing committal proceedings. The JPI can commit for trial before a judge; close or terminate the case; or deal summarily with the offender and impose a penalty. The latter course seems to involve a combination of plea bargaining and a plea of guilty.\n\n**C** Up to this point a judge of trial has no part to play. The conduct of the proceedings is entirely in the hands of the prosecutor who has, amongst his powers, power to issue letters rogatory to foreign jurisdictions.\n\n**D E** If a person is committed for trial, a file is prepared for the trial judge. This file is selective and by no means contains all of the material/evidence in the prosecutor's file. I was referred to various sections of the Code but, perhaps because of difficulties of translation, it is not clear exactly what is put in the file for the judge. What is clear, however, is that the trial judge can determine what will be used in evidence (in the sense that we understand that word) and has powers to issue letters rogatory to foreign jurisdictions. Otherwise, it appears that the trial is conducted very much along the lines of a criminal trial in Hong Kong.\n\nOne issue that divided the expert is 'proceedings'. Mr Piercamillo Davigo, who has succeeded Dr Di Pietro as Deputy Public Prosecutor and assumed responsibility for this case, and who has served as both judge and magistrate, deposed that in the Code:\n\n**F** the word 'proceedings' (procedimento) includes the preliminary investigations stage as well as the trial stage, whilst the latter by itself is referred to as 'trial' (processo). 'Criminal proceedings' begin when the public prosecutor receives notification that a crime has been committed and continue throughout the investigation until the case is at an end.\n\n**G** Mr Nicola Mazzacuva, who has an impressive record both in the judiciary and in academia, disagreed with Mr Davigo. He deposed:\n\n**H** In the most authoritative commentaries to the CCP the terms 'proceedings' (procedimento) and 'trial' (processo) have completely different meanings. The proceedings phase is characterised by the partisan activity of the public prosecutor's office in charge of the investigation whereas the trial phase is characterised by the intervention of the court. In my opinion, there is a precise technical-legal distinction between the proceedings and the trial proper which reflects the accusatory nature of the CCP which gives predominant weight to a hearing in open court.\n\n**I** Mr Mazzacuva disappointingly did not cite the commentaries he mentioned. Despite the fluency and clarity of his affidavit, I am unable to accept his view. Having regard to art 112 of the Constitution, which imposes an\n\nRe Troielli and the Prosecutor's Office at the Ordinary Court of **[1995] 2 HKC** Milan, Italy (Barnett J)\n\n**793**\n\n**A B** obligation on the Pubblico Ministero 'to conduct criminal proceedings', and the procedure for dealing with criminal cases that I have outlined, I find that as a matter of Italian law criminal proceedings commence with the registration of a complaint and end either when the JPI refuses to commit or declines to deal with the case summarily, or when a trial concludes.\n\nAlthough criminal proceedings were undoubtedly on foot in Italy, the applicants' primary argument is that the request did not come from 'a court or tribunal'. They submitted that s 75 of the Ordinance must be interpreted according to Hong Kong law and that these words should be\n\n**C** accorded the meaning that Hong Kong law plainly calls for, that is, an organ dealing with the trial process.\n\n**D**\n\n**H**\n\nMr Ma argued that s 75 should be given a broad construction and 'court or tribunal' interpreted as 'the judiciary or judicial authorities' of another country. That will enable s 75 to embrace a system such as that to be found in Italy. Judicial comity requires that the Hong Kong courts should entertain\n\nletters of request from the judiciary of other countries. That being so, Mr Ma said that under Italian law magistrates performing the function of a public prosecutor come under the judicial umbrella. They are involved in criminal proceedings from start to finish, which includes\n\n**E** the trial stage. When issuing letters, as they are empowered to do, magistrates are carrying out the functions of the judiciary. Magistrates are therefore a court or tribunal as widely construed or at least are acting on behalf of the Italian courts.\n\n**F** There is no direct authority on this point. In *Re State of Norway's Application* [1987] 1 QB 433 the Court of Appeal decided that in order to determine whether proceedings in a foreign court are proceedings in a civil matter, the requested court should first consider whether they are civil proceedings by the law of the requesting court and, if so, accept that\n\n**G** categorisation and jurisdiction if it is not in conflict with any fundamental principle of its own law. Such an approach appears to have been adopted by Sears J in his judgment in *Re Binoy & Court of the Special Judge Delhi, India* [1995] 1 HKC 305.\n\nThe tail cannot, of course, be allowed to wag the dog. That the requesting party considers that it falls within the definition of court or tribunal cannot confer jurisdiction on a Hong Kong court if the requesting party is not a court within the meaning of s 75 according to Hong Kong law.\n\nI am unable to accept Mr Ma's submission. In my judgment, Pt VIII of the Ordinance plainly contemplates the situation where an organ of the foreign judicial authority is seized of and in control of proceedings in which it will ultimately determine the rights between the parties to those\n\n**I** proceedings or the guilt of an accused person. That, I think, is demonstrated by the nature and extent of orders that may be made under s 76. Further, all the leading authorities such as *Norway* and *Rio Tinto Zinc Corp & Ors*\n\n| 794 | Hong Kong Cases | [1995] 2 HKC |\n|-----|-----------------|--------------|\n|-----|-----------------|--------------|\n\n**A** *v Westinghouse Electric Corp* [1978] AC 547 are clear that fishing or mere investigation is not permissible. It is therefore difficult to see how a purely investigatory authority can be a court.\n\n**B** In the latter case, the House of Lords had no difficulty in deciding that a United States grand jury was not a court. That decision must be applied with some caution however in view of the wholly exceptional facts of that case.\n\nIn the present case, although a magistrate in Italy acting as public prosecutor falls within the judicial umbrella according to Italian law, it is clear that he has a distinct and separate role as investigator and prosecutor.\n\n**C** If Mr Ma is right in his contention, it would have been easy for the legislature to have used an expression such as 'judicial authorities' in s 75. That the legislature chose not to do so but to use words which have a wellknown and restricted meaning in our jurisdiction militates against Mr Ma's argument.\n\n**D E** In fact, wider words have been used elsewhere. The third letter of request refers to the 'European Agreement on Judicial Assistance' signed at Strasbourg in 1959. The correct title is in fact the 'European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters' (the Convention). This was picked up by Professor Mario Pisani who made an affidavit on behalf of Dr Di Pietro. (Two translations were made of this affidavit. It is still difficult to follow.) In para 3 Professor Pisani said:\n\n*During the phase of preliminary investigation*, and that is when the (possible) prospect of judgment has not yet matured, there still are no judges, nor any magistrates called upon to make a decision with regard to the charge.\n\n**F** Therefore, during this phase, *the pubblico ministero's office is the only one that may set in action any international rogatory commission*, it should be noted, with the intention of gathering the necessary elements for the preparation of the charge.\n\n**G**\n\n**I**\n\n*The Italian proceedings in which the rogatory commission in question may be included is precisely during the phase of preliminary investigation.*\n\n**H** f) The (Italian CCP) provision according to which, besides courts and tribunals with criminal jurisdiction authority, each 'prosecuting authority' (and moreover only the authorities assimilated thereto) is also lawfully authorized to request rogatory commissions overseas, finds a very significant parallel, even at historical level, in the recent provisions of the Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act of 1990, which, in art 4 (see Annexure No 4) regulates the 'United Kingdom evidence for use overseas'.\n\nI note that there Professor Pisani seems to be drawing a clear distinction between courts and tribunals and an investigating authority such as a magistrate discharging the function of public prosecutor.\n\nThe Convention refers expressly to 'judicial authorities'. Article 15 provides, inter alia:\n\n|              | Re Troielli and the Prosecutor's Office at the Ordinary Court of |     |\n|--------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|\n| [1995] 2 HKC | Milan, Italy (Barnett J)                                         | 795 |\n\n- **A** 4. Requests for mutual assistance, other than those provided for in paras 1 and 3 of this article and, in particular, requests for investigation preliminary to prosecution, may be communicated directly between the judicial authorities.\n\t- 5. In cases where direct transmission is permitted under this Convention, it may take place through the International Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol).\n\nArticle 24 provides:\n\n# **Article 24**\n\n**C** A Contracting Party may, when signing the Convention or depositing its instrument of ratification or accession, by a declaration addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, define what authorities it will, for the purpose of the Convention, deem judicial authorities.\n\n**D** Both Italy and UK are parties to the Convention. To give effect to the Convention, UK at least would have to pass domestic legislation. I have not been referred to any such legislation but it seems likely that wide wording to accord with the Convention would be required. Wider wording was used in the Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act 1990 where, in relation to obtaining in UK evidence for use overseas, s 4 reads:\n\n- **E** 4(1) This section has effect where the Secretary of State receives —\n\t- (a) from a court or tribunal exercising criminal jurisdiction in a country or territory outside the United Kingdom or a *prosecuting authority* in such a country or territory; or\n\t- (b) from any other authority in such a country or territory which appears to him to have the function of making requests of the kind to which this section applies,\n\na request for assistance in obtaining evidence in the United Kingdom in connection with criminal proceedings that have been instituted, or a *criminal investigation* that is being carried on, in that country or territory. (My emphasis.)\n\n- **G** The Ordinance is of course derived from the Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act 1975. Plainly, UK deemed the 1975 Act not wide enough to embrace what appears to be a more liberal approach to assisting other countries in criminal investigation. There is no reason to believe that the Ordinance should be construed differently.\n- **H** It is clear to me that, whatever title or label he may have, a magistrate performing the function of public prosecutor under Italian law is not a court or tribunal within the meaning of s 75.\n\nI also reject Mr Ma's submission that the magistrate's request was made 'on behalf of a court or tribunal'. There were interesting arguments as to whether the public prosecutor was seeking evidence in the sense that it is used in the trial process or mere material as part of his investigatory function. Article 431 of the Code provides that the file for trial will contain, inter alia:\n\n**F**\n\n**I**\n\n**B**\n\n**B**\n\n**E**\n\n**F**\n\n**G**\n\n**796** Hong Kong Cases **[1995] 2 HKC**\n\n**A** The minutes of the deeds obtained in the probatory objection … and of those acquired abroad in consequence of a rogatory commission.\n\nThe product of a letter of request may therefore certainly be evidence. Whether it is obtained by or on behalf of a court depends upon the facts as found. I find the facts to be that Dr Di Pietro as public prosecutor made the request in his own right and not on behalf of a court.\n\nIt follows that this court does not have jurisdiction to entertain the letter of request. Accordingly the order of the master is set aside.\n\n**C D** In the circumstances, I deal only briefly with other grounds advanced by the applicants as to why the order should be set aside. All but one can, I think, be dealt with together. The applicants said that the affidavit by an officer of the Crown Solicitor is defective because it contains statements of information and belief which are inadmissible either because these are not interlocutory proceedings or because the sources have not been disclosed: O 41 r 5(2). Therefore, the affidavit did no more than exhibit the letters of request which is insufficient for the purposes of O 70.\n\nNext, the applicants maintained that the material placed before the court did not and could not help the Crown Solicitor because, this being an application to set aside an order made ex parte, it is necessary to look at the material which was before the master to see whether she was properly satisfied that she had jurisdiction.\n\nThen they said that Dr Di Pieto failed to disclose the nature and state of the proceedings, and that the 'clean hands campaign' as these proceedings have been called, has led to political uproar in Italy so that it is arguable that the proceedings are of a political character.\n\nIn *Westinghouse*, Lord Keith of Kinkel said at p 654:\n\nIn the face of a statement in letters rogatory that a certain person is a necessary witness for the applicant, I am of opinion that the court of request should not be astute to examine the issues in the action and the circumstances of the case with excessive particularity for the purpose of determining in advance whether the evidence of that person will be relevant and admissible.\n\n**H I** In my judgment, that principle should apply to the overall approach by this court to a letter of request. This court in the interests of international comity should strive to give effect to a letter of request if at all possible. The letter should stand or fall on its own. The function of the Crown Solicitor is little more than that of a conduit for placing the letter before this court although plainly he will help, as in this case, to ensure that there is no glaring omission or error in the letter. If objection is subsequently taken to the letter or order made on it, it is in my view permissible to look at any material then provided to see whether jurisdiction exists. Even if there was initial non-disclosure (which in my view there was not in this case) it remains a matter of discretion whether to set aside the order or not. Provided any non-disclosure was not deliberate and the matter undisclosed\n\n|              | Re Troielli and the Prosecutor's Office at the Ordinary Court of |     |\n|--------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|\n| [1995] 2 HKC | Milan, Italy (Barnett J)                                         | 797 |\n\n**A** was not seriously prejudicial, the usual approach should be to exercise discretion in favour of the requesting court.\n\nThe question then remaining was whether the proceedings are of a political character. There has been immense political debate and upheaval in Italy as a result of this campaign. Two governments have fallen. Because\n\n- **B** politicians exclusively are being targeted by the campaign, it is contended that the proceedings are political. Absent, however, a motive on the part of the prosecutor other than to see justice done, I do not see that on the authorities the proceedings here were political in character. There is no real evidence that Dr Di Pietro, his assistants or successor had or have any\n- **C** such motive or purpose The authorities are to be found in *Schtraks v Government of Israel & Ors* [1964] AC 557 in *Re Extradition Act 1870* [1969] 1 WLR 12 and a decision of Jones J in *Crown Solicitor v Datuk Dr Jeffrey Kitingan* [1994] 1 HKC 516 delivered on 20 January 1994.\n\n**D** As far as fishing is concerned, Mr Ma conceded that para 5(a) of the order is too wide and must be 'blue pencilled'. On the material disclosed by the letters, I would not be disposed to blue pencil further.\n\nAs I said, the master's order must be set aside. I make an order nisi that the applicants have their costs.\n\nReported by Victor T Gidwani\n\n| E |  |  |\n|---|--|--|\n| F |  |  |\n| G |  |  |\n| H |  |  |\n|   |  |  |\n\n**I**","body_zh":"关于 Troielli（特罗耶利）及意大利米兰普通法院检察官办公室 [1995] 2 HKC，意大利米兰（Barnett 法官）\n\n关于 Troielli（特罗耶利）等人与意大利米兰普通法院检察官办公室\n\n高等法院－杂项程序 1994 年第 620 号 BARNETT 法官 1995 年 6 月 26－28 日、7 月 14 日\n\n证据－请求书－管辖权－外国请求方是否为法院或审裁处－“法院”的含义－意大利履行调查员及检察官职责的裁判官并非香港法律下的法院或审裁处－《证据条例》（第 8 章）第 75 条\n\n词语及短语－“法院”－《证据条例》（第 8 章）第 75 条\n\n根据“意大利米兰普通法院检察官办公室”提出的请求书，一名聆案官作出单方命令，要求 A 有限公司的正式授权人员就特定事项接受讯问。A 有限公司与 T（申请人）经由传票申请撤销该命令，理由是聆案官缺乏管辖权、审理单方申请时存在重大误导或未披露，以及该命令规定了一般文件披露。\n\n关于管辖权问题，申请人主张，为行使管辖权，法院必须确信：该请求须由法院或审裁处提出或代表其提出；所寻求的证据须用于已在请求法院提起的刑事程序，或在取得证据后可能在该请求法院提起的刑事程序；且该刑事程序不具有政治性质。此外，根据《证据条例》（第 8 章）（该条例）第 76(1) 条，法院具有在适当情况下拒绝作出命令的剩余酌处权。\n\n裁定，撤销该命令：\n\n(1) 《该条例》第 VIII 部赋予高等法院管辖权，以执行来自另一国家法院或审裁处的请求书。即使请求方认为其符合“法院或审裁处”的定义，如该请求方依香港法律并非《该条例》第 75 条所指的法院，亦不能赋予香港法院管辖权。Re State of Norway's Application（挪威国申请案）[1987] 1 QB 433 及 Re Binoy & Court of the Special Judge Delhi, India（比诺伊及印度德里特别法官法院案）[1995] 1 HKC 305 经审议（见第 787D、793G 页）。\n\n(2) 《该条例》第 VIII 部显然预设这样一种情形：外国司法机关的某一机构受理并控制某项程序，并将最终裁定该程序当事人之间的权利，或被告人的罪责。不允许进行摸索性调查或单纯调查。因此，很难认为纯粹的调查机关可以是法院。Re State of Norway's Application（挪威国申请案）[1987] 1 QB 433 及 Rio Tinto Zinc Corp & Ors v Westinghouse Electric Corp（力拓锌业公司等诉西屋电气公司）[1978] AC 547 获适用（见第 793H－794A 页）。\n\n(3) 虽然意大利一名以公诉人身份行事的裁判官，依意大利法律属于司法体系，但显然其作为调查员及检察官具有独立的双重角色。该等依意大利法律履行公诉人职能的裁判官，并非第 75 条所指的法院或审裁处（见第 794B、795H 页）。\n\n(4) 法院为国际礼让起见，应尽一切可能努力执行请求书。该请求书本身应足以成立或不能成立。官方律师的职能仅仅是将该请求书提交法院的传递渠道，尽管其会协助确保该请求书不存在明显遗漏或错误（见第 796G－H 页）。\n\n(5) 如对该请求书或据此作出的命令提出异议，可审视当时提供的任何材料，以确定是否存在管辖权。即使最初存在未披露，是否撤销该命令仍属酌处事项（见第 796H－I 页）。\n\n(6) 如任何未披露并非故意，且未披露事项并未造成严重不利影响，通常应行使酌处权以有利于请求法院（见第 796I－797A 页）。\n\n所引案例\n\nRe Binoy & Court of the Special Judge Delhi, India（比诺伊及印度德里特别法官法院案）[1995] 1 HKC 305\n\nCrown Solicitor v Datuk Dr Jeffrey Kitingan（官方律师诉拿督杰弗里·基廷甘博士）[1994] 1 HKC 516\n\nRe Extradition Act 1870（1870 年引渡法案）[1969] 1 WLR 12\n\nRe State of Norway's Application（挪威国申请案）[1987] 1 QB 433\n\nRio Tinto Zinc Corp & Ors v Westinghouse Electric Corp（力拓锌业公司等诉西屋电气公司）[1978] AC 547\n\nSchtraks v Government of Israel & Ors（施特拉克斯诉以色列政府等）[1964] AC 557\n\n所引法例\n\n《证据条例》（第 8 章）第 75、76 条\n\n《最高法院规则》（第 4 章）第 41 命令第 5(2) 条规则、第 70 命令\n\nCriminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act 1990 [UK]\n\nEvidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdiction) Act 1975 [UK]\n\n所引其他资料\n\nEuropean Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters\n\n申请\n\n这是根据《最高法院规则》第 70 命令，就意大利米兰普通法院公诉人办公室提出的多份请求书而作出的、申请撤销单方命令的申请。事实已在下述判决书中充分载明。\n\nBarrie Barlow（巴里·巴洛）（Wilkinson & Grist）代表第一申请人。Raymond Faulkner（雷蒙德·福克纳）（Haldanes）代表第二申请人。Geoffrey Ma QC（马浩辉御用大律师）及 Paul Shieh（谢华渊）（官方律师）代表答辩人。\n\nBarnett 法官：1994 年 4 月 29 日，一名聆案官执行了请求书；该请求书在单方作出的命令中被称为“米兰法院的”请求书。该命令要求包括 Acceptor Corp Ltd（Acceptor 公司）在内的各方，由其正式授权人员就指明事项接受讯问。\n\n通过日期为 1994 年 5 月 10 日的传票，Acceptor 公司申请撤销该命令。通过日期为 1994 年 6 月 16 日的传票，一名名为 Gianfranco Troielli（詹弗兰科·特罗耶利）的人申请加入为当事人并撤销该命令。现该两份传票均在本人席前审理。\n\n无人反对 Troielli 先生加入为当事人的申请。本人准许该部分申请。\n\nAcceptor 公司及 Troielli 先生（申请人）的申请的实质部分分为三项：\n\n1．聆案官缺乏管辖权。\n\n2．提出单方申请时存在重大误导或未披露。\n\n3．该命令第 3(a)、4(a) 及 5 段规定了一般文件披露。\n\n管辖权\n\n《证据条例》（第 8 章）（该条例）第 VIII 部赋予高等法院管辖权，以执行来自另一国家法院或审裁处的请求书。\n\n代表 Troielli 先生出庭的 Barlow 先生及代表 Acceptor 公司的 Faulkner 先生主张，为行使管辖权，高等法院必须确信三项事项：\n\n1．该请求须由法院或审裁处提出或代表其提出。\n\n2．所寻求的证据须用于已在请求法院提起的刑事程序，或在取得证据后可能在该请求法院提起的刑事程序。\n\n3．该刑事程序不具有政治性质。\n\n申请人还主张，假定管辖权已经确立，根据《该条例》第 76(1) 条，高等法院获赋予在适当情况下拒绝作出命令的剩余酌处权。\n\n马浩辉御用大律师代表官方律师出庭；官方律师代表意大利请求机关，根据第 70 命令提出作出该命令的申请。就本人所理解，马先生并不反对申请人提出的任何一项管辖权要点。然而，他反驳申请人所称该请求在全部三项要点上均告失败的论点。\n\n请求书\n\n该请求载于五份文件或信函及大量附件中。第一封日期为 1993 年 6 月 7 日的信函，标题为“米兰普通法院检察官办公室”，由“助理公诉人 Dott Antonio Di Pietro（安东尼奥·迪彼得罗博士）”签署。该信函至少部分内容如下：\n\n主题：关于刑事程序第 8655/92 mod 21 号中针对 PACINI BATTAGLIA Pierfrancesco（皮耶尔弗朗切斯科·帕奇尼·巴塔利亚）及其他人的刑事事项司法协助请求。（账户 567.159140 - 201）。\n\n本检察官办公室，作为意大利共和国的司法机关，基于国际礼让并保证互惠，正在进行广泛调查，调查涉及针对公共行政的犯罪，包括针对 PACINI BATTAGLIA Pierfrancesco（意大利国籍）的调查；其于 1934 年 2 月 21 日出生于 Bientina，涉嫌教唆加重敲诈和／或行贿罪，以及非法资助政党罪。\n\n具体而言，目前正对上述人士进行调查，因其直接或间接向香港若干银行的公职人员及意大利政治代表支付了巨额款项。\n\n在此框架下，有必要取得有关上述人士用于转移如此抽逃的巨额款项的往来账户的全部文件。\n\n同样有必要命令扣押存入该往来账户的款项，以及该等款项其后可能已转入的账户中的款项。\n\nPACINI BATTAGLIA Pierfrancesco 已在公诉人面前接受讯问；在该场合，他提交了附于本函的大量陈述。我们从中推断，上述存入往来账户的款项已存入下列往来账户：\n\n以香港 TASH KURGHAN COMPANY LTD（塔什库尔干有限公司）名义开立于香港 BANK SHANGAY BANKING CORPORATION（香港上海银行公司）的往来账户第 567159140-201 号。\n\n该信函随后说明了所寻求的信息，其范围肯定远超本法院愿意考虑的程度，并以颇为浮夸和概括的措辞作结。该信函甚不令人满意。\n\n第二封澄清该银行名称的信函，由 Di Pietro 博士于 1993 年 8 月 25 日以“Solicitor General”身份签署发出。该信函提及针对“Ferranti Enrico（恩里科·费兰蒂）及其他人”的刑事程序。\n\n第三封日期为 1994 年 1 月 7 日的信函，由“Milano District Attorney Dr A Di Pietro-Asstnt”发出，标题为“Office of the District Attorney c/o Milano Ordinary Court”。该信函显然试图处理若干缺陷，而官方律师无疑已向 Di Pietro 博士指出这些缺陷。在就先前信函中特别点名的两人请求司法协助后，信中续称：\n\n概言之，本办公室已通知香港对应机关，正在对 PACINI BATTAGLIA Pierfrancesco（1934 年 2 月 21 日出生于 Bientina）及其他人（包括 FERRANTI Enrico，1944 年 8 月 26 日出生于罗马）提起程序，罪名为共同实施加重贪污罪及非法资助政党罪。\n\n就此，我们随函发送 PACINI BATTAGLIA 于 1993 年 6 月 4 日（附件 3）及 1993 年 7 月 19 日（附件 4）接受讯问的记录副本，以及 PACINI BATTAGLIA 的辩护律师 Giuseppe LUCIBELLO（朱塞佩·卢奇贝洛）先生发送的同一文件副本（附件 5）。\n\n从上述全部文件可推断出（且我们仍相信），PACINI BATTAGLIA 约于 1990 年 11 月 9 日，向 HONG KONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION（香港上海汇丰银行）（香港皇后大道中 1 号）的第 567-159140-201 号账户，存入 US$880.000，以惠及香港 TASH KURGHAN COMPANY LIMITED（塔什库尔干有限公司）。\n\n该请求的范围是：确认该账户持有人的姓名及完整个人资料、可能使用上述账户的任何其他人的姓名及完整个人资料，以及该等款项可能已转入的任何其他账户，并扣押任何可供扣押的余额。\n\n首先，我们希望澄清，District Attorney Office c/o Milano Ordinary Court（米兰普通法院地区检察官办公室）与意大利共和国所有其他地区检察官一样，就一切意图和目的而言，均属意大利法及国际法下的司法机关（见于\n\n对PACINI BATTAGLIA（帕奇尼·巴塔利亚）的调查始于一段时间之前，现已基本完成，并已成为正式刑事程序，登记于犯罪通知登记册，编号为8655/92。\n\nE 该登记册是根据《刑事诉讼法典》第355条为识别刑事程序目的而设的正式文件（见Att 8）。另附一份登记官的声明，说明针对PACINI及FERRANTI（费兰蒂）的刑事程序正在进行（Att 9）。\n\n1959年4月20日在Strasbourg（斯特拉斯堡）签署的《欧洲司法协助协定》第24条）。\n\nF 可以立即看出，Di Pietro（迪彼得罗）博士正试图处理该命令的前两项要求。\n\n同一封信继而详细说明了针对Battaglia（巴塔利亚）、Ferranti及其他具名人士的案件；该案件源于欺骗一间名为ENI（埃尼）的公司，使另一间名为Montedison（蒙特迪森）的公司获益。信中继续写道：\n\n该行为通过利息损失对ENI造成财务损失，并使Montedison的高管获得10.5 Million US\\$的个人利益。FERRANTI通过PACINI BATTAGLIA及虚假发票ALLIED ENGINEERING负责该项操作；因此，PACINI BATTAGLIA、FERRANTI、CAGLIARI GAROFANO（卡利亚里·加罗法诺）、SAMA（萨马）及GARDINI（加尔迪尼）共同实施了贪污罪，违反《刑法典》第312条及第321条（Att 19）。\n\n这些均为危害公共行政的犯罪，显然不具有政治性质。\n\nI PACINI BATTAGLIA在收到上述款项后，按照BALZAMO（巴尔扎莫）的指示，负责将其分配至若干不同人士的多个账户（见1993年7月19日PACINI接受讯问的记录，Att 4）。\n\n790 Hong Kong Cases [1995] 2 HKC\n\nA 更具体而言，就本请求而言，BALZAMO指示PACINI BATTAGLIA将880.000 US\\$转入HONG KONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION（香港上海汇丰银行有限公司）账户n°567-159140-201，该账户以HONG KONG（香港）的TASH KURGHAN COMPANY LIMITED（塔什库尔干有限公司）名义开立。\n\nB 因此，似有必要查明账户持有人的身份，以及所有其他可能使用该账户或其后可能已转入该款项的其他账户的人士的身份。似亦有必要采取行动，扣押可能仍可查得的任何款项，作为犯罪所得。\n\nC 要求取得账户持有人的资料，以便其说明该等操作是代表何人进行。鉴于上述一切，现依照贵方1993年8月3日编号AGC MIS 440/93的澄清请求，提出以下具体请求。我们相信，贵方将基于国际礼让并在我方承诺互惠的基础上满足该等请求。\n\nD 尤其是，该信正处理该命令的第三项要求。\n\n信中随后提出请求，要求取得与该银行账户有关的文件，并讯问Tash Kurghan公司的代表及银行代表。该信继而继续写道：\n\nE F 上述所请求的文件及资料与开头所指明的程序直接相关。相信遵循该行动步骤，可能查明谁收取了因FERRANTI、GAROFANO、PACINI BATTAGLIA及其他人士所实施的贪污及伪造公司账目而产生的款项。该迄今身份不明的受益人将根据意大利法律，就共同实施上述犯罪及／或处理赃物承担责任（见Att 20）。\n\n这些犯罪均不带有任何政治含义。\n\nG 发函司法机关不反对受函机关为司法目的使用所提供的资料。\n\n本办公室承诺不将任何收到的资料或文件用于上述所指目的以外的用途。\n\nH 谨请，如有可能，允许Assistant District Attorney Dr Antonio DI PETRO（助理地区检察官安东尼奥·迪彼得罗博士）在讯问证人期间在场。\n\n申请人抱怨该请求完全属于正在进行的刑事调查，而非香港所理解的刑事程序，这或许并不令人意外。\n\nI 第四封信日期为1994年1月17日；其标题为“District Attorney's Office at the Ordinary Court of Milan（米兰普通法院地区检察官办公室）”，签署为“The District Attorney's Office Dott Antonio Di Pietro — Substitute —（地区检察官办公室，安东尼奥·迪彼得罗博士——代行者——）”。\n\nRe Troielli and the Prosecutor's Office at the Ordinary Court of\n\n[1995] 2 HKC　Milan, Italy (Barnett J)　791\n\nA 该信披露，一名名为Agostino Ruju（阿戈斯蒂诺·鲁尤）的人士已根据《意大利刑事诉讼法典》（the Code）被羁押，并在讯问中供认，其通过Acceptor（阿克塞普特），为Troielli（特罗耶利）先生在香港设立了若干公司，以使Troielli先生能够收取他所理解的佣金。因此，该信寻求扩大该项\n\nB 请求，以包括就该等公司一般性讯问Acceptor，尤其是就包括Tash Kurghan在内的七家具名公司进行讯问。\n\n最后，Crown Solicitor（政府律师）收到一封日期为1994年2月1日的信函，对前一封信作出若干小幅更正。该信签署为\n\nC “The Attorney General of the Republic/S/Dr Antonio Di Pietro (Assistant)（共和国总检察长／签／安东尼奥·迪彼得罗博士〔助理〕）”，并加盖“The Attorney General's Office in the Milan Ordinary Court（米兰普通法院总检察长办公室）”印章。\n\n信函本身相对简短，共约24页。然而，随附有Dr Di Pietro办公室调查的不同人士的讯问笔录及其他文件，共逾100页。整体而言，这是一大堆颇难消化的材料。不清楚聆案官是否试图自行处理该等材料，或是否要求Crown Solicitor出庭支持该申请。无论如何，聆案官显然确信\n\nE 该命令的三项要求均已满足，并作出了该命令。鉴于信函中处理这些要求的段落，以及支持宣誓书中作出的同样断言，聆案官作出该命令并不令人意外。然而，主张认为，聆案官错误地假定其具有管辖权。\n\nF 我可获得、但聆案官不可获得的，是若干杰出意大利法学家及律师就意大利法所作的宣誓书。其间实际上几乎没有争议。因此，我认为没有必要详细分析其宣誓书。就本申请而言，概述各方一致认可的图景已经足够。\n\nG 根据意大利共和国宪法，设立有“The Judiciary（司法机关）”。其由司法官组成，这些司法官由司法机关最高委员会指派，以法官身份（按我们对该词的理解）或以Pubblico Ministero（检察机关）下的检察官身份行事；后者负有“进行刑事程序的义务”。司法机关控制刑事警察。司法机关自主且独立。\n\nH I 《法典》规定司法机关履行其职能的方式，并赋予其各种权力。该《法典》于1989年生效，规定审判采用对抗式程序（同样按我们对该词的理解），有别于此前程序的纠问式性质。\n\n收到刑事犯罪投诉后，检察官在《法典》规定的登记册中作出正式登记，并建立案卷。在警方协助下，他收集指向被调查人士有罪或无罪的材料／证据。当检察官完成调查，或《法典》规定的相关期限届满时，他将把案卷提交给预审法官（JPI）。就可以作出的比较而言，JPI看来类似于香港处理交付审判程序的裁判官。JPI可以将案件交付法官审判；结案或终止案件；或对罪犯作出简易处理并施加处罚。后一做法似乎涉及认罪协商与认罪答辩的结合。\n\nC 至此，审判法官尚未发挥任何作用。程序的进行完全由检察官掌握；在其权力之中，包括向外国司法管辖区发出请求书的权力。\n\nD E 如某人被交付审判，则会为审判法官准备案卷。该案卷经过筛选，绝不包含检察官案卷中的所有材料／证据。有人向我援引《法典》的各种条文，但或许因翻译困难，并不清楚究竟哪些材料会放入供法官使用的案卷。然而，明确的是，审判法官可决定哪些材料将作为证据使用（按我们对该词的理解），并有权向外国司法管辖区发出请求书。在其他方面，审判看来大体按照香港刑事审判的方式进行。\n\n专家之间存在分歧的一个问题是“程序”。Piercamillo Davigo（皮耶尔卡米洛·达维戈）先生接替Dr Di Pietro担任副检察官并承担本案责任，且曾担任法官及裁判官；他在宣誓书中陈述，《法典》中：\n\nF “程序”（procedimento）一词包括初步调查阶段及审判阶段，而后者本身称为“审判”（processo）。“刑事程序”始于公诉人收到犯罪已实施的通知，并在整个调查期间持续，直至案件结束。\n\nG Nicola Mazzacuva（尼古拉·马扎库瓦）先生在司法界和学术界均有令人瞩目的履历，他不同意Davigo先生。他在宣誓书中陈述：\n\nH 在对CCP最具权威性的评注中，“程序”（procedimento）与“审判”（processo）两词具有完全不同的含义。程序阶段的特征是负责调查的公诉人办公室的当事方活动，而审判阶段的特征则是法院的介入。在我看来，程序与正式审判之间存在精确的技术法律区分，这反映了CCP的对抗式性质；该性质赋予公开法庭聆讯以主导性权重。\n\nI 遗憾的是，Mazzacuva先生没有引用他所提及的评注。尽管其宣誓书流畅且清晰，我无法接受其观点。考虑到宪法第112条，该条向Pubblico Ministero施加\n\nRe Troielli and the Prosecutor's Office at the Ordinary Court of [1995] 2 HKC Milan, Italy (Barnett J)\n\nA B “进行刑事程序”的义务，以及我所概述的处理刑事案件的程序，我认定，就意大利法而言，刑事程序自投诉登记时开始，并于JPI拒绝交付审判或拒绝对案件作出简易处理时，或于审判结束时终止。\n\n尽管意大利无疑正在进行刑事程序，申请人的主要论点是，该请求并非来自“一家法院或审裁处”。他们主张，《条例》第75条必须依香港法解释，而这些词语应当\n\nC 被赋予香港法显然所要求的含义，即处理审判程序的机构。\n\nD\n\nH\n\nMa先生主张，应对《条例》第75条作宽泛解释，并将“法院或审裁处”解释为另一国家的“司法机关或司法当局”。这将使第75条涵盖意大利所存在的制度。司法礼让要求香港法院应当受理\n\n其他国家司法机关发出的请求函。既然如此，Ma先生表示，根据意大利法律，履行公诉人职能的治安法官属于司法体系的一部分。他们自始至终参与刑事诉讼，其中包括审判阶段。在签发请求函时，既然他们有权如此行事，治安法官即是在履行司法机关的职能。因此，治安法官按广义解释属于法院或审裁处，或者至少是代表意大利法院行事。\n\n对此并无直接权威判例。在 Re State of Norway's Application（挪威王国申请案）[1987] 1 QB 433 中，上诉法院裁定，为确定外国法院的程序是否属于民事事项程序，受请求法院应首先考虑该程序依请求法院所在地法律是否为民事程序；如是，则应接受该分类及管辖权，只要其不与本国法律的任何基本原则相冲突。Sears J（西尔斯法官）在 Re Binoy & Court of the Special Judge Delhi, India（Re Binoy及印度德里特别法官法院案）[1995] 1 HKC 305 的判决中，似乎采取了该做法。\n\n当然，不能让尾巴摇狗。请求方认为其符合“法院或审裁处”的定义，并不能在请求方依香港法律并非第 75 条所指法院的情况下，赋予香港法院管辖权。\n\n我不能接受 Ma先生的陈述。依我判决，《条例》第 VIII 部显然设想的是如下情形：外国司法机关的一个机构受理并控制某项程序，且其最终将裁定该程序当事人之间的权利，或被告人的罪责。我认为，第 76 条下可作出的命令的性质及范围证明了这一点。此外，所有主要权威判例，例如 Norway 和 Rio Tinto Zinc Corp & Ors v Westinghouse Electric Corp（Rio Tinto Zinc Corp等诉Westinghouse Electric Corp案）[1978] AC 547，均明确表明，不允许进行钓鱼式取证或仅仅调查。因此，难以看出纯粹的调查机关如何能够成为法院。\n\n794　香港案例　[1995] 2 HKC\n\n在后一案件中，上议院毫不困难地裁定，美国大陪审团并非法院。然而，鉴于该案事实极为特殊，该裁定必须谨慎适用。\n\n在本案中，尽管依意大利法律，作为公诉人行事的意大利治安法官属于司法体系的一部分，但显然他作为调查人员及公诉人具有明确且独立的角色。\n\n如果 Ma先生的主张正确，立法机关本可轻易在第 75 条中使用诸如“司法机关”之类的表述。立法机关选择不这样做，而使用在本司法管辖区具有众所周知且受限含义的措辞，这不利于 Ma先生的论点。\n\n事实上，其他地方使用了更宽泛的措辞。第三份请求函提及于 1959 年在斯特拉斯堡签署的“European Agreement on Judicial Assistance（欧洲司法协助协定）”。其正确名称实际上是“European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters（欧洲刑事司法协助公约）”（《公约》）。Mario Pisani教授（马里奥·皮萨尼教授）代表 Di Pietro博士（迪·彼得罗博士）作出的宣誓书注意到了这一点。（该宣誓书有两份译本，但仍然难以理解。）在第 3 段中，Pisani教授称：\n\n在初步调查阶段，即作出判决的（可能）前景尚未成熟时，仍不存在法官，亦不存在被要求就指控作出裁决的治安法官。\n\n因此，在此阶段，公诉机关是唯一可以启动任何国际司法委托的人；应当指出的是，其目的在于收集准备指控所需的必要要素。\n\n有关司法委托可能纳入的意大利程序，恰恰正处于初步调查阶段。\n\nf) 《意大利刑事诉讼法典》的规定，即除具有刑事管辖权的法院及审裁处外，每一“检察机关”（且仅包括与之同等的机关）亦依法获授权请求境外司法委托，与 1990 年《刑事司法（国际合作）法》近期的规定，即使在历史层面上，也具有极其重要的对应之处；该法第 4 条（见附件 No 4）规范“United Kingdom evidence for use overseas（供境外使用的英国证据）”。\n\n我注意到，Pisani教授在此似乎明确区分了法院及审裁处，与诸如履行公诉人职能的治安法官之类的调查机关。\n\n《公约》明确提及“司法机关”。第 15 条尤其规定：\n\nRe Troielli and the Prosecutor's Office at the Ordinary Court of Milan, Italy（Re Troielli及意大利米兰普通法院检察官办公室案）（Barnett J（巴尼特法官））　795\n\n4．除本条第 1 款和第 3 款规定的请求外，互助请求，特别是起诉前调查请求，可以由司法机关之间直接传送。\n\n5．在本《公约》允许直接传送的情形下，可通过国际刑事警察组织（Interpol）进行传送。\n\n第 24 条规定：\n\n第 24 条\n\n缔约方可在签署《公约》时，或交存其批准书或加入书时，通过致送欧洲委员会秘书长的声明，界定其就《公约》而言视为何种机关属于司法机关。\n\n意大利和英国均为《公约》缔约方。为实施《公约》，至少英国必须通过国内立法。我未获引述任何此类立法，但似乎很可能需要符合《公约》的宽泛措辞。在 1990 年《刑事司法（国际合作）法》中使用了更宽泛的措辞；就取得供境外使用的英国证据而言，第 4 条规定：\n\n4(1) 本条适用于国务大臣收到下列请求的情形——\n\n(a) 来自在联合王国以外国家或地区行使刑事管辖权的法院或审裁处，或该等国家或地区的检察机关；或\n\n(b) 来自该等国家或地区的任何其他机关，而该机关看来具有提出本条所适用种类请求的职能，\n\n该请求旨在取得与已在该国家或地区提起的刑事程序，或正在进行的刑事调查有关的、位于联合王国的证据协助。（强调为本人所加。）\n\n《条例》当然源自 Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act 1975。显然，英国认为 1975 年法案不足以涵盖看来是对协助其他国家进行刑事调查采取的更宽松做法。没有理由认为《条例》应作不同解释。\n\n我清楚地认为，无论其可能具有何种称谓或标签，依意大利法律履行公诉人职能的治安法官，并非第 75 条所指的法院或审裁处。\n\n我亦驳回 Ma先生提出治安法官的请求是“代表法院或审裁处”作出的主张。对于公诉人是在审判程序所用的意义上寻求证据，还是仅作为其调查职能的一部分寻求材料，存在有意思的争议。《法典》第 431 条规定，审判卷宗将尤其包括：\n\n796　香港案例　[1995] 2 HKC\n\n在证据异议中取得的行为记录……以及因司法委托而在境外取得的行为记录。\n\n因此，请求函的成果当然可能构成证据。其是否由法院取得或代表法院取得，取决于所认定的事实。我认定的事实是，Di Pietro博士作为公诉人以其自身名义提出请求，而非代表法院提出请求。\n\n因此，本院无管辖权受理该请求函。相应地，聆案官的命令予以撤销。\n\n在此情形下，我仅简要处理申请人提出的、说明该命令为何应予撤销的其他理由。我认为，除一项外，其余均可一并处理。申请人称，律政专员办事处官员的宣誓书存在瑕疵，因为其中载有基于资料及相信作出的陈述，该等陈述不可采纳，理由是这并非中间程序，或资料来源未予披露：O 41 r 5(2)。因此，该宣誓书仅将请求函作为附件，这不足以符合 O 70 的目的。\n\n随后，申请人主张，提交法院的材料未能且不可能协助律政专员，因为这是申请撤销一项单方面作出的命令，故必须审视聆案官当时掌握的材料，以确定她是否适当地确信自己具有管辖权。\n\n其后，他们称 Di Pietro博士未披露程序的性质及状态，而且被称为“清洁之手运动”的该等程序已导致意大利发生政治动荡，因此可争辩该程序具有政治性质。\n\n在 Westinghouse 案中，Kinkel勋爵于第 654 页称：\n\n面对司法委托书中载明某人为申请人的必要证人的陈述，我认为，请求法院不应过于仔细地审查诉讼争点及案件情况，以预先确定该人的证据是否相关及可采纳。\n\n依我判决，该原则应适用于本院对请求函的整体处理方式。为国际礼让之利益，本院应尽可能努力使请求函生效。该请求函应自行成立或不成立。律政专员的职能不过是将请求函提交本院的传递渠道，尽管显然他会如本案般协助确保请求函不存在明显遗漏或错误。如其后对请求函或据此作出的命令提出异议，我认为，可以审视届时提供的任何材料，以确定是否存在管辖权。即使最初未作披露（依我看来，本案并无未作披露），是否撤销命令仍属酌情决定事项。只要任何未披露并非故意，且未披露事项\n\nRe Troielli and the Prosecutor's Office at the Ordinary Court of Milan, Italy（Re Troielli及意大利米兰普通法院检察官办公室案）（Barnett J（巴尼特法官））　797\n\n未造成严重不利影响，通常的做法应是行使酌情权而有利于请求法院。\n\n余下的问题是，该程序是否具有政治性质。该运动已在意大利引发巨大的政治辩论和动荡。两个政府已经垮台。由于\n\n政治人物被该运动专门针对，便有人主张该程序具有政治性。然而，在检察官并无除伸张正义以外动机的情况下，依据判例权威，我不认为本案程序具有政治性质。没有任何实质证据表明 Di Pietro（迪彼得罗）博士、其助理或继任者曾有或现有任何该等动机或目的。相关判例权威见于 Schtraks v Government of Israel & Ors [1964] AC 557（施特拉克斯诉以色列政府等案）、Re Extradition Act 1870 [1969] 1 WLR 12（1870年引渡法案再审案），以及 Jones（琼斯）法官于 20 January 1994 作出的 Crown Solicitor v Datuk Dr Jeffrey Kitingan [1994] 1 HKC 516（律政司诉杰弗里·基廷根拿督博士案）裁决。\n\n就滥行探查而言，Ma（马）先生承认，该命令第 5(a) 段范围过宽，必须予以“蓝铅笔删改”。根据信函所披露的材料，我不会倾向于作进一步的蓝铅笔删改。\n\n如我所述，书记官的命令必须撤销。我作出临时命令，申请人应获得其诉讼费用。\n\n由 Victor T Gidwani（维克托·T·吉德瓦尼）报道。","key_entities":["Je","CCP","RICO"],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":6235,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 19:13:06"}