{"id":"court_ctb_1409_20","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":1409,"sub_number":20,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"A B","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"A\n\nB\n\n236\n\nRubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) (SC(E)) [2013] 1 AC [2013] 1\n\nSupreme Court\n\n### Rubin and another v Euronance SA and others (Picard and others intervening)\n\n# In re New Cap Reinsurance Corpn Ltd (in liquidation)\n\n# New Cap Reinsurance Corpn Ltd and another v Grant and others\n\n# [2012] UKSC 46\n\n2012 May 21, 22, 23, 24; Oct 24 Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, Lord Mance, Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony, Lord Sumption JJSC, Lord Collins of Mapesbury C\n\nInsolvency - Liquidation - Foreign company - Liquidators of foreign companies seeking to enforce in England judgments of United States and Australian courts to recover moneys transferred to defendants before liquidation - Defendants claiming not to have been present in or submitted to jurisdiction of foreign courts - Whether judgments in personam - Whether ordinary rules for enforcing judgments in personam inapplicable to bankruptcy proceedings - Whether judgments enforceable at common law - Whether alternative method of enforcement through international assistance provisions of Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency - Statutory provisions allowing English court to assist Australian court in insolvency matter and for registration and enforcement of Australian judgment in civil or commercial matter - Whether either provision allowing English court to enforce Australian judgment against defendants - Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 (23 & 24 Geo 5, c 13), s 6 - Insolvency Act 1986 (c 45), s 426(4) - Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments (Australia) Order 1994 (SI 1994/1901), art 4(a) - Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006 (SI 2006/1030), Sch 1, art 21 D E\n\nIn the rst case the company settled a trust under English law to hold funds for consumers who successfully participated in sales promotions organised by it in the United States of America. Following a successful challenge to the promotion under United States consumer protection legislation, resulting in the trust having to pay a substantial sum by way of settlement, it obtained an order from the English High Court appointing the applicants as receivers of the trusts property and the applicants then led for protection before the bankruptcy court in New York under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. The applicants were appointed as legal representatives of the trust, as debtor, with authority to prosecute all causes of action against potential defendants, and they commenced adversary proceedings in New York, being the equivalent of undervalue transaction and preference claims under sections 238 and 239 of the Insolvency Act 1986<sup>1</sup> , against the defendants, the company and its founder and his sons. The defendants, who were not present in New York at the relevant time, did not submit to the courts jurisdiction and did not defend the proceedings. Default and summary judgment was entered against them. The applicants applied to the High Court for enforcement of the orders in England against the defendants under CPR Pts70and73on the ground that the English court had power to do so both at common law and under article 21 of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, scheduled to the F G H\n\n<sup>1</sup> Insolvency Act 1986, s 426(4)(5): see post, para 146.\n\n### 237 [2013] 1 AC Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) Rubin v Eurofinance\n\n- Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006<sup>2</sup> . The judge held that the Chapter 11 proceedings fell within the ambit of the Model Law but that its provisions for co-operation did not extend to the enforcement of judgments. He refused to recognise the New York courts judgment at common law on the ground that it was an in personam judgment which could not be enforced where the defendants had neither been present in nor submitted to the New York courts jurisdiction. On the applicants appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the New York courts judgments made in the A\n- adversary proceedings, despite having the indicia ofjudgments in personam, were none the less judgments in and for the purposes of the collective enforcement regime of the bankruptcy proceedings, that the ordinary rule precluding the enforcement of a foreign judgment in personam where the judgment debtor had neither been present in, nor submitted to the jurisdiction of the courts of, the country where judgment had been given did not apply to such proceedings, and that since there should be an unitary bankruptcy proceeding in the court of the bankrupts domicile which received B\n- worldwide recognition, the judgment of the New York court could be enforced against the defendants at common law. Given that decision, the Court of Appeal deemed it unnecessary to decide whether the judgments could have been enforced under the 2006Regulations. C\n\nIn the second case the defendants were members of a Lloyds syndicate which placed reinsurance with an Australian reinsurance company and had received payments from it shortly before it went into liquidation. The liquidator brought\n\n- proceedings in New South Wales to recover the payments made to the syndicate, on the basis that the company had been insolvent when they were made. The defendants did not accept service of the proceedings or submit to the jurisdiction of the New South Wales court in that matter but did participate in creditors meetings in Australia in relation to some unsettled claims which they had against the company. The New South Wales court held that the payments had been a preference and therefore liable to be set aside, and issued a letter of request asking, inter alia, that the D\n- English court exercise its jurisdiction under section 426(4) of the Insolvency Act 1986 to order the defendants to pay the sum specied in the order. The liquidator and the company issued proceedings in England for relief as sought in the letter of request. The judge held that the English court was entitled to enforce the Australian judgment either at common law, given the decision of the Court of Appeal in the rst case, or under section 426(4). Dismissing the defendants appeal the Court of Appeal, having decided that the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 19333 was E\n- applicable because the insolvency proceedings fell within the ambit of civil or commercial matter in article 4(a) of the Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments (Australia) Order 19944 , held that, by reason of section 6 of that Act, the judgment was enforceable under section 426 but not at common law. F\n\nOn appeal by the defendants in both cases\n\nHeld, (1) allowing the appeal in the rst case (Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony JSC dissenting), that the common law would only enforce a foreign judgment in personam if the judgment debtors had been present or, where the 1933 Act was applicable, resident in the foreign country when the proceedings had been commenced, or if they had submitted to its jurisdiction; that, as a matter of policy, the court would not adopt a more liberal rule in respect of enforcement judgments in the interests of the universality of bankruptcy; that any change in the settled law of the recognition and enforcement of judgments was a matter for the legislature; that,\n\nG\n\nH\n\n<sup>2</sup> Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations <sup>2006</sup>, Sch <sup>1</sup>, art <sup>21</sup>: see post, para <sup>136</sup>. <sup>3</sup> Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act <sup>1933</sup>, s <sup>6</sup>: see post, para <sup>149</sup>. <sup>4</sup> Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments (Australia) Order <sup>1994</sup>, art <sup>4</sup>: The following judgments shall be judgments to which Part I of the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 applies, that is to say (a) any judgment, decree, rule, order or other nal decree for the payment of money (other than in respect of taxes or other charges of a like nature or an order requiring the payment of maintenance) given by a recognised court in respect of a civil or commercial matter . . .\n\n238\n\n### Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) (SC(E)) [2013] 1 AC [2013] 1\n\nmoreover, the Model Law was not designed to provide for the reciprocal enforcement of judgments and so the 2006 Regulations could not be used to enforce a foreign judgment against a third party; and that, accordingly, applying the common law, since the proceedings against the defendants in the rst case had been in personam and they had not submitted to the jurisdiction of the United States bankruptcy court, the orders which it had made against them could not be enforced by the English court (post, paras 10, 115, 128—129, 142—144, 169, 177, 178, 179). A\n\nIn re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 852, HL(E) considered. B\n\nCambridge Gas Transportation Corpn v O–cial Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc [2007] 1 AC 508, PC disapproved.\n\n(2) Dismissing the appeal in the second case, that although the English court could give assistance to the Australian court under section 426 of the Insolvency Act 1986, such assistance did not extend to the enforcement of judgments; that the defendants participation in the Australian insolvency proceeding, albeit not the actual recovery proceedings, was su–cient for them to be taken to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the Australian court responsible for the supervision of that proceeding; that it followed that there could be enforcement in the English court; that since the 1994 Order applied Part I of the 1933 Act to Australian judgments in respect of civil and commercial matters and since insolvency proceedings were not to be excluded from that term, enforcement in such cases would be under the 1933 Act rather than at common law; and that, accordingly, the Australian judgment in the second case would be enforced by the English court on that basis (post, paras 152, 167, 175—177, 178, 203, 205). C D\n\nEngland v Smith [2001] Ch 419, CA distinguished.\n\nPer Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, Lord Mance, Lord Sumption JJSC and Lord Collins of Mapesbury. Declining to sanction a departure from the traditional rules is unlikely to cause serious injustice. Several of the ways in which the claims were put in the United States proceedings in the rst case might have founded proceedings by trustees in England for the benet of the creditors (as beneciaries of the express trust). There are several other avenues available to o–ce-holders. Avoidance claims by a liquidator of an Australian company may be the subject of a request by the Australian court pursuant to section 426(4) of the Insolvency Act 1986, applying Australian law under section 426(5). In appropriate cases, article 23 of the Model Law will allow avoidance claims to be made by foreign representatives under the Insolvency Act 1986. In the cases where the insolvent estate has its centre of main interests in the European Union, judgments will be enforceable under article 25 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 (post, paras 131, 178). E F\n\nDecision of the Court of Appeal in Rubin v Euronance SA [2010] EWCA Civ 895; [2011] Ch 133; [2011] 2 WLR 121; [2011] Bus LR 84; [2011] 1 All ER (Comm) 287 reversed.\n\nDecision of the Court of Appeal in In re New Cap Reinsurance Corpn Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 971; [2012] Ch 538; [2012] 2 WLR 1095; [2012] Bus LR 772; [2012] 1 All ER 755; [2012] 1 All ER (Comm) 1207 a–rmed on di›erent grounds. G\n\nThe following cases are referred to in the judgments:\n\nAdams v Cape Industries plc [1990] Ch 433; [1990] 2 WLR 657; [1991] 1 All ER 929, Scott J and CA\n\nAfrican Farms Ltd, In re [1906] TS 373\n\nAkai Pty Ltd v Peoples Insurance Co Ltd [1998] 1 Lloyds Rep 90\n\nAkande v Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd [1998] IL Pr 110\n\nAl Sabah v Grupo Torras SA [2005] UKPC 1; [2005] 2 AC 333; [2005] 2 WLR 904; [2005] 1 All ER 871, PC\n\nAmin Rasheed Shipping Corpn v Kuwait Insurance Co [1984] AC 50; [1983] 3 WLR 241; [1983] 2 All ER 884; [1983] 2 Lloyds Rep 365, HL(E)\n\nH\n\n239\n\n# [2013] 1 AC Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) Rubin v Eurofinance\n\n| A | Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA, In re (No 10) [1997] Ch 213; [1997]                                                              |\n|---|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n|   | 2 WLR 172; [1996] 4 All ER 796<br>Banque Indosuez SA v Ferromet Rescources Inc [1993] BCLC 112                                                 |\n|   | Barcelona<br>Traction,<br>Light<br>and<br>Power<br>Co<br>Ltd<br>(Second<br>Phase),<br>Case<br>concerning<br>(Belgium v Spain) [1970] ICJ Rep 3 |\n|   | Beals v Saldanha 2003 SCC 72; [2003] 3 SCR 416                                                                                                 |\n|   | Bergerem v Marsh (1921) 6 B & CR 195; 91 LJKB 80                                                                                               |\n| B | Berliner Industriebank AG v Jost [1971] 2 QB 463; [1971] 3 WLR 61; [1971] 2 All<br>ER 1513, CA                                                 |\n|   | Byers v Yacht Bull Corpn [2010] EWHC 133 (Ch); [2010] BCC 368<br>CCIC Finance Ltd v Guangdong International Trust & Investment Corpn [2005]    |\n|   | 2 HKC 589<br>Cambridge Gas Transportation Corpn v O–cial Committee of Unsecured Creditors                                                      |\n|   | of Navigator Holdings plc [2006] UKPC 26; [2007] 1 AC 508; [2006] 3 WLR                                                                        |\n| C | 689; [2006] 3 All ER 829; [2006] 2 All ER (Comm) 695, PC                                                                                       |\n|   | Cavell Insurance Co, In re (2006) 269 DLR (4th) 679                                                                                            |\n|   | Condor Insurance Ltd, In re (2010) 601 F 3d 319<br>Credit Suisse Fides Trust SA v Cuoghi [1998] QB 818; [1997] 3 WLR 871; [1997]               |\n|   | 3 All ER 673, CA                                                                                                                               |\n|   | Desert Sun Loan Corpn v Hill [1996] 2 All ER 847, CA<br>England v Smith [2001] Ch 419; [2000] 2 WLR 1141, CA                                   |\n| D | F-Tex SIA v Lietuvos-Anglijos UAB-Jadecloud-Vilma (Case C-213/10) (unreported)                                                                 |\n|   | 19 April 2012, ECJ                                                                                                                             |\n|   | Flightlease (Ireland) Ltd, In re [2006] IEHC 193; [2012] IESC 12<br>Galbraith v Grimshaw [1910] AC 508, HL(E)                                  |\n|   | German Graphics Graphicsche Maschinen GmbH v van der Schee (Case C-292/08)                                                                     |\n|   | [2009] ECR I-8421, ECJ                                                                                                                         |\n|   |                                                                                                                                                |\n| E | Gibson (Gavin) & Co Ltd v Gibson [1913] 3 KB 379                                                                                               |\n|   | Godard v Gray (1870) LR 6 QB 139                                                                                                               |\n|   | Gourdain v Nadler (Case 133/78) [1979] ECR 733, ECJ<br>Gourmet Resources International Inc Estate v Paramount Capital Corpn (1991)             |\n|   | 3 OR (3d) 286, [1993] IL Pr 583; 14 OR (3d) 319 (Note)                                                                                         |\n|   | HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd, In re [2008] UKHL 21; [2008] 1 WLR                                                                     |\n|   | 852; [2008] Bus LR 905; [2008] 3 All ER 869, HL(E)<br>Hughes v Hannover Ruckversicherungs-Aktiengesellschaft [1997] 1 BCLC 497, CA             |\n| F | Impex Services Worldwide Ltd, In re [2004] BPIR 564                                                                                            |\n|   | Industrial Maritime Carriers (Bahamas) Inc v Sinoca International Inc (The Eastern                                                             |\n|   | Trader) [1996] 2 Lloyds Rep 585<br>Indyka v Indyka [1969] 1 AC 33; [1967] 3 WLR 510; [1967] 2 All ER 689, HL(E)                                |\n|   | Maxwell Communication Corpn, In re (1994) 170 BR 800                                                                                           |\n|   | Metcalfe & Manseld Alternative Investments, In re (2010) 421 BR 685<br>Modern Terminals (Berth 5) Ltd v States Steamship Co [1979] HKLR 512    |\n| G | Morguard Investments Ltd v De Savoye [1990] 3 SCR 1077                                                                                         |\n|   | New Cap Reinsurance Corpn v Grant [2009] NSWSC 662; 257 ALR 740                                                                                |\n|   | New Cap Reinsurance Corpn v Renaissance Reinsurance Ltd [2002] NSWSC 856<br>Nouvion v Freeman (1889) 15 App Cas 1, HL(E)                       |\n|   | Oakley v Ultra Vehicle Design Ltd [2005] EWHC 872 (Ch); [2006] BCC 57; [2006]                                                                  |\n|   | BPIR 115<br>Owens Bank Ltd v Bracco [1992] 2 AC 443; [1992] 2 WLR 621; [1992] 2 All ER                                                         |\n| H | 193, HL(E)                                                                                                                                     |\n|   | Paramount Airways Ltd, In re [1993] Ch 223; [1992] 3 WLR 690; [1992] 3 All ER 1,<br>CA                                                         |\n|   | Pattni v Ali [2006] UKPC 51; [2007] 2 AC 85; [2006] 2 WLR 102; [2007] 2 All<br>ER (Comm) 427, PC                                               |\n\n' 2013 The Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for England and Wales\n\nPicard v Harley International (Cayman) Ltd (unreported) 10 November 2010, US Bankruptcy Ct, Southern District of New York Rein v Stein (1892) 66 LT 469, DC Robertson, Ex p; In re Morton (1875) LR 20 Eq 733 Seagon v Deko Marty Belgium NV (Case C-339/07) [2009] 1 WLR 2168; [2009] Bus LR 1151; [2009] ECR I-767, ECJ Siskina (Owners of cargo lately laden on board) v Distos Cia Naviera SA [1979] AC 210; [1977] 3 WLR 818; [1977] 3 All ER 803, HL(E) Socit Eram Shipping Co Ltd v Cie Internationale de Navigation [2003] UKHL 30; [2004] 1 AC 260; [2003] 3 WLR 21; [2003] 3 All ER 465, HL(E) Solomons v Ross (1764) 1 H Bl 131n Spiliada Maritime Corpn v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460; [1986] 3 WLR 972; [1986] 3 All ER 843, HL(E) Starlight International Inc v Bruce [2002] EWHC 374 (Ch), [2002] IL Pr 617 Stone & Rolls Ltd v Moore Stephens [2009] UKHL 39; [2009] AC 1391; [2009] 3 WLR 455; [2009] Bus LR 1356; [2009] 4 All ER 431; [2010] 1 All ER (Comm) 125, HL(E) SwissAir Schweizerische Luftverkehr-Aktiengesellschaft, In re [2009] EWHC 2099 (Ch); [2010] BCC 667 Television Trade Rentals Ltd, In re [2002] EWHC 211 (Ch); [2002] BCC 807; [2002] BPIR 859 Travers v Holley [1953] P 246; [1953] 3 WLR 507; [1953] 2 All ER 794, CA Trepca Mines Ltd, In re [1960] 1 WLR 1273; [1960] 3 All ER 304, CA Turners & Growers Exporters Ltd v The ship Cornelis Verolme [1997] 2 NZLR 110 Williams v Jones (1845) 13 M&W 628 Williams & Glyns Bank plc v Astro Dinamico Cia Naviera SA [1984] 1 WLR 438; [1984] 1 All ER 760; [1984] 1 Lloyds Rep 453, HL(E) The following additional cases were cited in argument: AWB (Geneva) SA v North American Steamships Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 739; [2007] 2 Lloyds Rep 315; [2007] 2 CLC 117, CA Atlas Shipping A/S, In re (2009) 404 BR 726 Barlow Clowes Gilt Managers Ltd, In re [1992] Ch 208; [1992] 2 WLR 36; [1991] 4 All ER 385 Drumm (A Bankrupt), In re (unreported) 13 December 2010, High Ct of Ireland Faireld Sentry Ltd v Citco Bank Nederland NV [2012] IEHC 81 International Tin Council, In re [1987] Ch 419; [1987] 2 WLR 1229; [1987] 1 All ER 890 Pantmaenog Timber Co Ltd, In re [2003] UKHL 49; [2004] 1 AC 158; [2003] 3 WLR 767; [2003] 4 All ER 18, HL(E) Stegmann, Ex p [1902] TS 40 UBS AG v Omni Holding AG [2000] 1 WLR 916; [2000] 1 All ER (Comm) 42 APPEALS from the Court of Appeal Rubin v Euronance SA On 31 July 2009 Nicholas Strauss QC sitting as a deputy judge of the Chancery Division [2010] 1 All ER (Comm) 81 granted an application by the applicants, David Rubin and Henry Lan, being the foreign representatives of the Consumer Trust, for (1) recognition of proceedings brought under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, including adversary proceedings, in relation to the trust and taking place in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, as a foreign A B C D E F G H Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) (SC(E)) [2013] 1 AC [2013] 1\n\nproceeding under article 2(i) of the United Nations Commission on\n\n### 241 [2013] 1 AC Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) Rubin v Eurofinance\n\n- International Trade Law Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency and (2) recognition of themselves as foreign representatives of the trust under article 2(j), but refused to grant an order that the United States Bankruptcy Courts order of 23 July 2008 be enforced as a judgment of the English courts in accordance with CPR Pts 70 and 73 against the defendants to the New York proceedings, Adrian Roman, Justin Roman, Nicholas Roman and Euronance SA. A B\n\t- On 30 July 2010, the Court of Appeal (Ward, Wilson LJJ and Henderson J) [2011] Ch 133 allowed the applicants appeal against the dismissal of their claim for enforcement and dismissed the defendants cross-appeal against the orders for recognition of the adversary proceedings as part of the Chapter 11 proceedings.\n- On 27 October 2010 the Supreme Court (Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, Lord Mance and Lord Collins of Mapesbury JJSC) allowed an application by the defendants for permission to appeal, pursuant to which they appealed. On 29 November 2011, 3 April 2012 and 24 April 2012 respectively the Supreme Court gave leave to intervene in the appeal to (1) Irving H Picard, as trustee for the substantively consolidated SIPA liquidation (under the (United States) Securities Investor Protection Act 1970) of the business of Bernard L Mado› Investment Securities LLC and C\n- Bernard L Mado›, (2) Asphalia Fund Ltd, and (3) Vizcaya Partners Ltd. The issues for the Supreme Court, as set out in the parties statement of agreed facts and issues, were whether (1) the relevant proceedings should be recognised as a foreign main proceeding in accordance with the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, scheduled to the Cross-Border Insolvency D\n- Regulations 2006; (2) the applicants should be recognised as foreign representatives within the meaning of article 2(j) of the Model Law in relation to those proceedings; and (3) that part of the United States Bankruptcy Courts order of 23 July 2008 relating to the avoidance proceedings be enforced against the defendants as a judgment of the English courts in accordance with CPR Pts 70 and 73. E\n\nThe facts are stated in the judgment of Lord Collins of Mapesbury.\n\nF\n\n# In re New Cap Reinsurance Corpn Ltd\n\nOn 15 March 2011 Lewison J [2011] EWHC 677 (Ch) granted an application by the rst applicant, New Cap Reinsurance Corpn Ltd (in liquidation), and the second applicant, John Raymond Gibbons (the rst applicants liquidator) for an order enforcing in England an order made on\n\n- 11 September 2009 by the Supreme Court of New South Wales that the defendants, AE Grant and others, as members of Lloyds Syndicate 991 for the 1997 and 1998 year accounts, pay the applicants certain commutation payments made by the rst applicant to the defendants, and in respect of which order the court had issued a letter of request to the English High Court requesting assistance in enforcing that order. The judge held that the order of the New South Wales court could not be registered and enforced under the G\n- Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 (as applied to Australia by the Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments (Australia) Order 1994), that the High Court therefore had power to assist the New South Wales court either at common law or under section 426 of the Insolvency Act 1986 and that, in the exercise of his discretion, he would H\n\nRubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) (SC(E)) [2013] 1 AC [2013] 1\n\nArgument\n\n242\n\nassist the New South Wales court by ordering payment of the Australian judgment debt under section 426. A\n\nOn 9 August 2011, the Court of Appeal (Mummery, Lloyd and McFarlane LJJ) [2012] Ch 538 dismissed an appeal by the defendants against the judges order.\n\nOn 30 November 2011 the Supreme Court (Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, Lord Mance, Lord Dyson JJSC) allowed an application by the defendants for leave to appeal, pursuant to which they appealed. On 18 January 2012 the Supreme Court (Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, Lord Mance and Lord Dyson JJSC) allowed an application by the applicants to cross-appeal, pusuant to which they cross-appealed. B\n\nThe issues for the Supreme Court, as set out in the parties statement of agreed facts and issues, were (1) whether the court was being asked to apply section 426(4) of the Insolvency Act 1986 to the enforcement of foreign judgments or (2) whether instead the court was being asked (i) to apply that part of section 588FF(1) of the (Australian) Corporations Act 2001 which empowered the court to make an order directing the defendants to pay money to the claimants and/or (ii) to direct the defendants to pay money to the claimants under the courts general jurisdiction and powers; (3) whether, if the court was being asked to apply section 426(4) to the enforcement of foreign judgments, that section extended to the enforcement of foreign judgments; (4) whether section 6 of the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 had application to judgments for the payment of money in foreign insolvency proceedings; (5) (on the cross-appeal) whether the Australian judgment was a judgment to which Part I of the 1933 Act (as applied by the Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments (Australia) Order 1994) applied; (6) (on the cross-appeal) whether, if the Australian judgment was a judgment to which Part 1 of the 1933 Act applied, the declarations in the Australian judgment (a) were binding under section 8 of the 1933 Act and/or at common law, and/or (b) could form the subject of judicial assistance; (7) whether Rubin v Euronance SA [2011] Ch 133 was rightly decided; (8) whether, if Rubins case was wrong, registration of the Australian judgment under the 1933 Act would be set aside by the English court, and whether the courts below were right to assist the Australian court under section 426(4) of the 1986 Act; (9) whether, if section 426(4) was available but registration of the Australian judgment under the 1933 Act would be set aside, it was appropriate to assist the Australian court under section 426(4); (10) whether the defendants had submitted to the insolvency jurisdiction of the Australian court and, if so, with what consequence; and (11) whether the English court should in any event assist the Australian court at common law. C D E F G\n\nThe facts are stated in the judgment of Lord Collins of Mapesbury.\n\nRobin Knowles QC and Blair Leahy (instructed by Edwards Wildman Palmer UK LLP) for the defendants in the second case.\n\nSection 426(4) of the Insolvency Act 1986 does not provide a procedure by which a judgment of a court having jurisdiction in relation to insolvency law in a relevant country or territory may be enforced in the United Kingdom. It is not concerned with assistance, not enforcement of judgments. Enforcement is dealt with by section 426(1)(2), where it is conned to orders made by courts in other parts of the United Kingdom.\n\nH\n\n### 243 [2013] 1 AC Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) Rubin v Eurofinance Argument\n\n- Although Lloyd LJ [2012] Ch 538, paras 58, 61, 72 refers to assistance by way of enforcement, enforcement is not to be treated as a form of assistance. Since section 426(4) also applies to courts having jurisdiction in other parts of the United Kingdom, if assistance in section 426(4) meant enforcement, section 426(1)(2) would be redundant. Enforcement of judgments, a subject which goes to jurisdiction, has always been a matter for distinct provision and rules. In the context of insolvency law, section 426(4) A\n- is about assisting with information provision, evidence gathering, the conduct of an insolvency administration and the undertaking of proceedings. B\n\nWhere the judgment is one to which Part I of the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 applies, the procedure provided for by that Actregistration, subject to an application to set aside the\n\n- registrationmust be used. Where a relevant country or territory under section 426 of the 1986 Act is also the country of a recognised court under the 1933 Act, section 6 of the 1933 Act requires proceedings for the recovery of a sum payable under a foreign judgment to be by way of registration. The availability of the 1933 Act procedure (albeit not used) precludes reliance on enforcement at common law in respect of the Australian judgment. C\n- At common law the United Kingdom courts will not enforce a foreign money judgment obtained against a defendant not subject to the jurisdiction of the foreign court: see rule 43 of Dicey, Morris & Collins, The Conict of Laws, 15th ed (2012). That position has not been changed by the 1933 and 1986 Acts. [Reference was made to section 426(4) of the 1986 Act and section 4(1)(a)(ii) of the 1933 Act.] The decision of the Court of Appeal in D\n- the Rubin case [2011] Ch 133 that a foreign insolvency judgment could be enforced in England and Wales at common law against a defendant not subject to the jurisdiction of the foreign court is a radical departure from the existing law rather than an incremental development recognisable to the common law and is wrong. Concepts of co-operation and universalism do not justify rewriting the private international law position. Universalism may be accorded to matters of distribution of the insolvent estate (see E\n- Cambridge Gas Transportation Corpn v O–cial Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc [2007] 1 AC 508, paras 16, 22, 25 and In re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 852, paras 6, 9) but not to the collection of assets for the estate. Co-operation enables assistance to be given but enforcement is available only when private international law allows. Private international law is best developed uniformly by comprehensive legislation and international agreement, not by F\n- uncertain development of the common law. In insolvency law certainty is of crucial importance: see In re Flightlease (Ireland) Ltd [2006] IEHC 193; [2012] IESC 12. To leave this area of law subject to the incidence of discretion (at common law, or under section 426) is unsatisfactory. Parties, the courts and other litigants need to know where they stand when litigation begins, not when it comes to an attempt to enforce a judgment. G\n- Marcus Sta› (instructed by Brown Rudnick LLP) for the defendants in the rst case. H\n\nWhether the judgment of a foreign court may be enforced at common law depends on its classication as a judgment in personam, a judgment in rem, or an order of the type recognised in Cambridge Gas Transportation Corpn v\n\n# Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) (SC(E)) [2013] 1 AC [2013] 1\n\n244\n\nArgument\n\nO–cial Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc [2007] 1 AC 508. A\n\nThe order in the present case does not fall within the latter classication. The purpose of the order in the Cambridge Gas case was simply to establish a mechanism of collective execution against the property of the debtor by creditors whose rights were admitted or established. The claims that gave rise to the foreign judgment in the present case were in adversary proceedings to determine or establish the existence of rights. As an in personam judgment that judgment did not meet the requirements of rule 43 of Dicey, Morris & Collins, The Conict of Laws, 15th ed (2012). The defendants were not resident in New York when the proceedings were instituted and they did not submit to the jurisdiction of the New York courts by voluntarily appearing there. A decree pronounced in absentia by a foreign court, to the jurisdiction of which the defendant has not in any way submitted, is by international law a nullity. B C\n\nThe decision in the Rubin case [2011] Ch 133 drives a coach and horses through well established principles of English law in relation to the recognition and enforcement of foreign in personam judgments. The decision means that defendants cannot predict where they might be sued. Such a lack of predictability is contrary to the guiding principles of European law and undermines the principle of commercial certainty which is a constant and important objective of English commercial law. If the law on recognition of foreign judgments is to be changed, that should be done only in respect of countries or territories selected by the legislature so that the consequences of the change can be mapped out in a way which is predictable and therefore fair for all parties. The decision extends relief well beyond the provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law.\n\nRobin Dicker QC and Tom Smith (instructed by Chadbourne & Parke LLP) for the applicants in the rst case.\n\nThe primary purpose of insolvency law is to provide a regime where the liquidator acts in the public interest and not merely in the interests of the creditors and contributories. The community itself has always been recognised as having an interest in such proceedings: see In re Pantmaenog Timber Co Ltd [2004] 1 AC 158, para 52; In re Barlow Clowes Gilt Managers Ltd [1992] Ch 208, 221 and Ex p Stegmann [1902] TS 40, 47.\n\nEnglish law takes the view that fairness between creditors requires that bankruptcy proceedings should have universal application. There should be a single bankruptcy in which all creditors are entitled and required to prove. No one should have an advantage because he happens to live in a jurisdiction where more of the assets or fewer of the creditors are situated: see Cambridge Gas Transportation Corpn v O–cial Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc [2007] 1 AC 508, para 16; In re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 852, para 30; Bergerem v Marsh (1921) 6 B & CR 195 and In re Impex Services Worldwide Ltd [2004] BPIR 564. Common law courts in England and elsewhere refuse to allow execution to issue on a debtors local assets when the debtor is subject to insolvency proceedings in another jurisdiction in which the creditors can participate: see Solomons v Ross (1764) 1 H Bl 131n; Modern Terminals (Berth 5) Ltd v States Steamship Co [1979] HKLR 512 and CCIC Finance Ltd v Guangdong International Trust & Investment Corpn [2005] 2 HKC 589. G H\n\nD\n\nE\n\nF\n\n### 245 [2013] 1 AC Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) Rubin v Eurofinance Argument\n\n- At an early stage of the development of the law of corporate insolvency the potential conict between the locally e›ective winding up of an overseas company in England and an universal winding up in the country of the debtors incorporation was resolved by a judge-made principle which treated the English proceedings as ancillary to the principal winding up: see In re International Tin Council [1987] Ch 419, 446—447. [Reference was also made to the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (2004), A\n- paras 150—152 and Fletcher, The Law of Insolvency, 4th ed (2009), paras 26-001—26-003.] B\n\nThe guiding principles to be applied in relation to foreign insolvency proceedings are, rst, that the court should seek so far as possible to give e›ect to the principle of there being a single insolvency proceeding in relation to an insolvent debtor which has universal e›ect and, secondly, that\n\n- active assistance should be given to that insolvency proceeding. The application of these principles may require the court to recognise and enforce an order made in the course of the foreign insolvency proceedings. The rules governing the recognition of such orders are separate and distinct from the rules governing the recognition and enforcement of judgments in rem and judgments in personam. The Cambridge Gas case establishes that there is a third category of judgment independent of judgments in rem and C\n- judgments in personam, namely, orders which form part of insolvency proceedings. A di›erent approach is taken for each. A similar distinction is recognised under EU law: see Seagon v Deko Marty Belgium NV (Case C-339/07) [2009] 1 WLR 2168; F-Tex SIA v Lietuvos-Anglijos UAB-Jadecloud-Vilma (Case C-213/10) (unreported) 19 April 2012 and German Graphics Graphicsche Maschinen GmbH v van der Schee (Case C-292/08) D\n\n[2009] ECR I-8421. E\n\nAvoidance provisions by which prior transactions can be adjusted and assets recovered to supplement the estate available for distribution to creditors are an integral part of the process of collective enforcement represented by an insolvency proceeding. They are central to the purpose of insolvency proceedings because they are a necessary means of constituting the estate of the debtor against which collective enforcement then takes\n\nplace. F\n\nThe assistance sought in the present case is well within the limits of what the courts can properly provide: see Byers v Yacht Bull Corpn [2010] BCC 368; Oakley v Ultra Vehicle Design Ltd [2006] BCC 57 and UBS AG v Omni Holding AG [2000] 1 WLR 916.\n\n- The relevant parts of the judgment can also be recognised and enforced under the Model Law as implemented by the Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006 (SI 2006/1030). The approach under the Model Law, as enacted by the Regulations, is consistent with that at common law. The court is empowered to grant appropriate relief including any type of relief which is available under the law of the enacting state. In the present case the relief sought reects relief which would have been available under the English statutory scheme if the trust had been in an insolvency procedure in G\n- England. It is therefore a type of relief which is available under English law. Furthermore, the relief sought is in the interests of creditors because it will facilitate the recovery of assets for distribution in accordance with the applicable statutory scheme to the creditors of the trust. [Reference was made to In re Atlas Shipping A/S (2009) 404 BR 726; In re Metcalfe & H\n\n### 246 Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) (SC(E)) [2013] 1 AC [2013] 1 Argument\n\nManseld Alternative Investments (2010) 421 BR 685 and In re Condor Insurance Ltd (2010) 601 F 3d 319.] A\n\nWhether at common law or under the Model Law there is no reason why the court should not exercise its jurisdiction to provide assistance to the Chapter 11 proceeding by recognising and enforcing the relevant parts of the judgment.\n\nGabriel Moss QC and Barry Isaacs QC (instructed by Mayer Brown International LLP) for the applicants in the second case. B\n\nThe judge was right to grant the relief sought in the letter of request under section 426 of the Insolvency Act 1986 and/or the common law. The nature of cross-border insolvency is such that a court in one jurisdiction should render whatever assistance it properly can to a court in another in respect of assets located or persons resident within the territory of the former: see Credit Suisse Fides Trust SA v Cuoghi [1998] QB 818, 827.\n\nSection 426 is not merely concerned with procedure but is part of the substantive insolvency scheme. It imposes a duty on English courts to provide assistance to insolvency courts in relevant countries and territories: see section 426(4)(5)(10). The Australian proceedings were based on section 588FF(1) of the Australian Corporations Act 2001, which corresponds to section 239 of the 1986 Act. The English court was asked to apply that part of section 588FF(1) which empowers the court to make an order directing a person to pay money to a company. In granting this form of assistance the English court was applying Australian insolvency law; it was not applying section 426 to the enforcement of a foreign judgment. The court was also asked to make an order directing a person to pay money under its general jurisdiction and powers. The English court has the power under section 426 to apply its own general jurisdiction and powers by way of assistance to the Australian court: see Hughes v Hannover Ruckversicherungs-Aktiengesellschaft [1997] 1 BCLC 497, 517. The Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice (1982) (Cmnd 8558) refers to the enforcement of foreign insolvency judgments: see para 1902. D E\n\nSection 6 of the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 has no application to judgments for the payment of money in foreign insolvency proceedings. The intention of the 1933 Act was to provide a simpler and more convenient mode of enforcement than the common law provided. The Act applies only to cases where foreign judgments used to be enforced by bringing an action at common law based on the foreign judgment. The position in relation to foreign insolvency judgments before the 1933 Act was governed by section 122 of the Bankruptcy Act 1914. There is no indication that the 1933 Act was intended to a›ect this pre-existing jurisdiction. The Bankruptcy Act 1914 did not feature in the Greer Report, which led to the passing of the 1933 Act: see the Report of the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Committee (1932) (Cmd 4213). F G\n\nThe rules governing insolvency proceedings have diverged signicantly from the general provisions of civil law: see Seagon v Deko Marty Belgium NV (Case C-339/07) [2009] 1 WLR 2168, 2175, 2176—2178, paras 27, 33, 35, 39. The decision of the Court of Appeal [2011] Ch 133 was correct. All that was new in the decision was the application of the principles in Cambridge Gas Transportation Corpn v O–cial Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc [2007] 1 AC 508 and In re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 852 to a foreign\n\nC\n\nH\n\n### 247 [2013] 1 AC Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) Rubin v Eurofinance Argument\n\ninsolvency judgment which required payment of a sum of money. As to In re Flightlease (Ireland) Ltd [2006] IEHC 193; [2012] IESC 12, which declined to follow the reasoning in Cambridge Gas, see In re Drumm (A Bankrupt) (unreported) 13 December 2010 (High Court of Ireland) and Faireld Sentry Ltd v Citco Bank Nederland NV [2012] IEHC 81. A\n\nIn any event the defendants in the present case submitted to the jurisdiction of the Australian court by participating in meetings of creditors of, and submitting proofs of debt in the administration, liquidation and scheme of arrangement relating to, the liquidated company. Having chosen to submit to that Australian insolvency proceeding, they should not be allowed to benet from it without the burden of complying with the orders made in that proceeding. B\n\nPushpinder Saini QC, Adrian Briggs, Shaheed Fatima, Ian Fletcher and Stephen Robins (instructed by Taylor Wessing LLP) for the rst intervener in the rst case, by written submissions. C\n\nAs a matter of English private international law it is necessary to distinguish between (a) judgments in rem and in personam and (b) foreign orders which form integral parts of foreign insolvency proceedings: see Cambridge Gas Transportation Corp v O–cial Committee of Unsecured\n\n- Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc [2007] 1 AC 508, paras 13—15 and Pattni v Ali [2007] 2 AC 85, para 23. The e›ect of this distinction is that where the foreign court seeks assistance in England in respect of the implementation of a foreign insolvency order such assistance (which is discretionary) will not be subject to the English private international law rules regarding the enforcement of foreign judgments in rem or in personam as set out in rule 43 of Dicey, Morris & Collins, The Conict of Laws, 15th D\n- ed (2012). The distinction arises because the enforcement of judgments in rem and in personam is rooted in the doctrine of obligation whereby the successful party to the foreign proceedings is able, when seeking recognition and enforcement in England, to show that the other owes him an obligation by virtue of that others being bound by the foreign judgment as res judicata. By contrast, cross-border judicial assistance and co-operation in insolvency E\n- does not relate to the courts function of resolving disputes between private litigants but to the separate function of administering insolvent estates in a collective process which is performed with regard to the wider public interest: see Ex p Stegmann [1902] TS 40 and In re Barlow Clowes Gilt Managers Ltd [1992] Ch 208, 220—221. English common law takes the view that insolvency proceedings should have universal application. This requires that the estate which the insolvency court administers should be the F\n- worldwide estate of the insolvent debtor. In order for the court which is seised of the administration of the worldwide estate to administer it e›ectively, it will frequently be necessary for courts in other jurisdictions to provide assistance to further that objective, acting under the principle of modied universalism: see In re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 852, para 30 and Credit Suisse Fides Trust SA v Cuoghi [1998] QB 818, 827. To be e›ective, insolvency proceedings must be able to thwart the underhand conduct of debtors and connected creditors. G H\n\nThe proper approach, when determining whether a foreign order is an insolvency order, is to consider whether it is part of foreign insolvency proceedings. It is not correct to consider, in isolation from the context, whether the e›ect of the order is akin to a judgment in rem or in personam,\n\n### 248 Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) (SC(E)) [2013] 1 AC [2013] 1 Argument\n\nnor therefore whether the order establishes rights rather than seeking to enforce them. Judgments in rem and in personam will, by denition, establish rights. In broad terms a foreign order will be part of foreign insolvency proceedings if it is integral to the foreign insolvency laws scheme for the collection and distribution of the assets of the insolvent estate to creditors. In particular, avoidance orders (which are not unique to English or United States insolvency proceedings but are a feature of every developed system of insolvency law) form an integral part of the insolvency proceedings: see Oakley v Ultra Vehicle Design Ltd [2006] BCC 57, para 42; AWB (Geneva) SA v North American Steamships Ltd [2007] 2 Lloyds Rep 315, para 27 and the HIH case [2008] 1 WLR 852, para 19. Where the English court is considering whether to exercise its discretion to assist the foreign court, there is a presumption in favour of assistance, which should therefore be provided unless there is a good reason for it to be refused. It is irrelevant that the person against whom the insolvency order takes e›ect was not present in the foreign country at the time of the issue of the writ. A B C\n\nMichael Driscoll QC and Rosanna Foskett (instructed by Wilsons Solicitors LLP) for the second intervener in the rst case (and instructed by Wedlake Bell LLP) for the third intervener in the rst case, by written submissions.\n\nThe English courts inherent jurisdiction to assist a foreign representative (as that expression is used in article 2 of the UNCITRAL Model Law) should not extend to enforcement of any money judgment against a third party defendant obtained by a foreign representative in a foreign court on the application of principles of a foreign law where the foreign court does not have competent jurisdiction over the defendant according to English private international law, and the inherent jurisdiction should not extend, therefore, to the enforcement of money judgments against defendants. The assistance to be given by the English court should be limited to recognition of the foreign representative and of the rights and powers over the debtors property which his appointment gives him. It should extend to authorising the foreign representative to bring proceedings in England equivalent to those which an English representative could bring based upon principles of English law and not foreign law.\n\nWhilst many national insolvency laws include provisions to avoid certain preferences and fraudulent transfers made by the debtor before the commencement of the insolvency proceedings, those laws operate in materially di›erent ways and have materially di›erent consequences. In particular, an United States Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA) liquidation enables an United States SIPA trustee to bring avoidance claims which an English liquidator or trustee in bankruptcy cannot bring. Moreover, the consequences of a successful avoidance claim in the United States by a SIPA trustee defeats rather than gives e›ect to the fundamental principle of equitable pro rata distribution among all unsecured creditors of the debtor. The English court should not develop new law by assuming to itself a jurisdiction which Parliament has not conferred on it to enforce a money judgment obtained by a foreign representative against a third party in insolvency proceedings before a foreign court where the third party is not, as a matter of English law, subject to the jurisdiction of the foreign court.\n\nThe default judgments were judgments in personam given by a foreign court which did not have competent jurisdiction over the defendants so as to D\n\nE\n\nF\n\nG\n\nH\n\n### 249 [2013] 1 AC Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) Rubin v Eurofinance Argument\n\n- make the default judgments enforceable as of right in an English court: see Adams v Cape Industries plc [1990] Ch 433, 513, 528, 530—544, 549—550, 557—572. They are therefore a nullity as far as the English court is concerned. Until the Court of Appeal decision in the Rubin case [2011] Ch 133 no English court has gone so far as to enforce as a matter of discretion money judgments obtained in such circumstances. The legislature A\n- and the executive through its treaty-making powers are in a better position than the judiciary to develop and extend the laws of co-operation between English courts and others in the eld of cross-border insolvency. A principle of universalism can only properly come about through international treaty. B\n\nKnowles QC replied.\n\nSta› also replied.\n\nC\n\nThe court took time for consideration.\n\n24 October 2012. The following judgments were handed down.\n\n# LORD COLLINS OF MAPESBURY (with whom LORD WALKER OF GESTINGTHORPE and LORD SUMPTION JJSC agreed)\n\nD\n\n# I Introduction\n\n# The appeals\n\n1 There are two appeals before the court: Rubin v Euronance SA (Rubin) and New Cap Reinsurance Corpn Ltd v Grant (New Cap). These appeals raise an important and novel issue in international insolvency\n\n- law. The issue is whether, and if so, in what circumstances, an order or judgment of a foreign court (on these appeals the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, and the New South Wales Supreme Court) in proceedings to adjust or set aside prior transactions, e g preferences or transactions at an undervalue (avoidance proceedings), will be recognised and enforced in England. The appeals also raise the question whether enforcement may be e›ected through the international E\n- assistance provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law (implemented by the Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006 (CBIR)), which applies generally, or the assistance provisions of section 426 of the Insolvency Act 1986, which applies to a limited number of countries, including Australia. F\n- 2 In Rubin a judgment of the US Federal Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the US Bankruptcy Court) in default of appearance for about US\\$10m under State and Federal law in respect of fraudulent conveyances and transfers was enforced in England at common law. In New Cap (in which the Court of Appeal was bound by the prior decision in Rubin) a default judgment of the New South Wales Supreme Court, Equity Division, for about US\\$8m in respect of unfair preferences under Australian law was enforced under the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933, and, alternatively, pursuant to powers under section 426 of the Insolvency Act 1986. G H\n\n3 In each of the appeals it was accepted or found that the party against whom they were given was neither present (nor, for the purposes of the 1933 Act, resident) in the foreign country nor submitted to its jurisdiction (which are the relevant conditions for enforceability at common law and\n\n## 250\n\n# Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) (SC(E)) [2013] 1 AC [2013] 1 Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\nB\n\nC\n\nunder the 1933 Act), but that those conditions did not apply to judgments or orders in foreign insolvency proceedings. A\n\n4 In addition to the arguments on these two appeals, the court has had the great benet of written submissions on behalf of parties to proceedings pending in Gibraltar. Those proceedings are to enforce default judgments entered by the United States Bankruptcy Court for some \\$247m in respect of alleged preferential payments to companies in the British Virgin Islands and Cayman Islands arising out of the notorious Ponzi scheme operated by Mr Bernard Mado›.\n\n5 It has been necessary to emphasise that the judgments in all three matters were in default of appearance, because if the judgment debtors had appeared and defended the proceedings in the foreign courts, the issues on these appeals would not have arisen. The reason is that the judgments would have been enforceable on the basis of the defendants submission to the jurisdiction of the foreign court. Enforcement would have been at common law, or, in the New Cap case either under the common law, or under the 1933 Act which substantially reproduces the common law principlesthere is a subsidiary issue on this appeal as to whether the 1933 Act applies to judgments in insolvency proceedings, dealt with in section IX below.\n\n6 Under the common law a court of a foreign country has jurisdiction to give a judgment in personam where (among other cases) the judgment debtor was present in the foreign country when the proceedings were instituted, or submitted to the jurisdiction of the foreign court by voluntarily appearing in the proceedings. In the case of the 1933 Act the foreign court is deemed to have jurisdiction where the judgment debtor submitted to the jurisdiction by voluntarily appearing in the proceedings otherwise than for the purpose (inter alia) of contesting the jurisdiction; or where the judgment debtor was resident at the time when the proceedings were instituted, or being a body corporate had an o–ce or place of business there: section 4(2)(a)(i)(iv). D E\n\n# The Dicey rule\n\n7 The general principle has been referred to on these appeals, by reference to the common law rule set out in Dicey, Morris & Collins, The Conict of Laws, 14th ed (2006), as Diceys rule 36. This was only by way of shorthand, because the rules in the 1933 Act are not quite identical, and in any event has been purely for convenience, because the rule has no standing beyond the case law at common law which it seeks to re-state. What was rule 36 now appears (incorporating some changes which are not material on this appeal) as rule 43 in the new 15th edition, and I shall refer to it as the Dicey rule. So far as relevant, rule 43 (Dicey, Morris & Collins, The Conict of Laws, 15th ed (2012), vol 1, para 14R-054) states: F G\n\na court of a foreign country outside the United Kingdom has jurisdiction to give a judgment in personam capable of enforcement or recognition as against the person against whom it was given in the following cases:\n\nFirst Case-If the person against whom the judgment was given was, at the time the proceedings were instituted, present in the foreign country.\n\nSecond Case-If the person against whom the judgment was given was claimant, or counterclaimed, in the proceedings in the foreign court.\n\nH\n\n### 251 [2013] 1 AC Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) Rubin v Eurofinance Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\nThird Case-If the person against whom the judgment was given submitted to the jurisdiction of that court by voluntarily appearing in the proceedings.\n\nFourth Case-If the person against whom the judgment was given had before the commencement of the proceedings agreed, in respect of the subject matter of the proceedings, to submit to the jurisdiction of that court or of the courts of that country.\n\nB\n\nA\n\n8 The rst edition of Dicey in 1896 stated (rule 80) that the foreign court would have jurisdiction if the defendant was resident [or present?] in the foreign country so as to have the benet, and be under the protection, of the laws thereof. By the 6th edition in 1949 the formula was repeated by Professor Wortley (rule 68) but without the doubt about presence as a basis\n\n- of jurisdiction. In the 8th edition in 1967 Dr (later Professor) Clive Parry removed the phrase (then rule 189) about the benet and protection of the foreign countrys laws. The rule, subsequently edited by Dr Morris and then by Professor Kahn-Freund, remained in that form until the decision in Adams v Cape Industries plc [1990] Ch 433 (CA), which established that presence in the foreign jurisdiction, as opposed to residence, was a su–cient basis for the recognition of foreign judgments. Then, edited by myself and C\n- later by Professor Briggs, the rule took substantially its present form in the 12th edition in 1993. D\n\n9 The theoretical basis for the enforcement of foreign judgments at common law is that they are enforced on the basis of a principle that where a court of competent jurisdiction has adjudicated a certain sum to be due from one person to another, a legal obligation arises to pay that sum, on which an\n\n- action of debt to enforce the judgment may be maintained: Williams v Jones (1845) 13 M&W 628, 633, per Parke B; Godard v Gray (1870) LR 6 QB 139, 147, per Blackburn J; Adams v Cape Industries plc [1990] Ch 433, 513 and Owens Bank Ltd v Bracco [1992] 2 AC 443, 484, per Lord Bridge of Harwich. As Blackburn J said in Godard v Gray, this was based on the mode of pleading an action on a foreign judgment in debt, and not merely as evidence of the obligation to pay the underlying liability: LR 6 QB 139, 150. E\n- But this is a purely theoretical and historical basis for the enforcement of foreign judgments at common law. It does not apply to enforcement under statute, and makes no practical di›erence to the analysis, nor, in my judgment, to the issues on these appeals. F\n\n10 Consequently, if the judgments in issue on the appeals are regarded as judgments in personam within the Dicey rule, then they will only be\n\n- enforced in England at common law if the judgment debtors were present (or, if the 1933 Act applies, resident) in the foreign country when the proceedings were commenced, or if they submitted to its jurisdiction. It is common ground that the judgment debtors were not present or resident, respectively, in the United States or in Australia, although there is an issue as to whether the New Cap defendants submitted to the jurisdiction of the Australian court, which is dealt with in section VIII below. G\n- H\n\n# Insolvency proceedings and the international dimension\n\n11 There are some general remarks to be made. First, from as early as the mid-18th century the English courts have recognised the e›ect of foreign personal bankruptcies declared under the law of the domicile: Solomons v\n\n## 252\n\n## Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) (SC(E)) [2013] 1 AC [2013] 1 Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\nH\n\nRoss (1764) 1 H Bl 131n, where Dutch merchants were declared bankrupt in Amsterdam, and the Dutch curator was held entitled to recover an English debt in priority to an English creditor of the merchants who had attached the debt after the bankruptcy: see Nadelmann, Conict of Laws: International and Interstate (1972), p 273 and Blom-Cooper, Bankruptcy in Private International Law (1954), pp 107—108. A\n\n12 In Galbraith v Grimshaw [1910] AC 508 Lord Dunedin said that there should be only one universal process of the distribution of a bankrupts property and that, where such a process was pending elsewhere, the English courts should not allow steps to be taken in its jurisdiction which would interfere with that process: B\n\nNow so far as the general principle is concerned it is quite consistent with the comity of nations that it should be a rule of international law that if the court nds that there is already pending a process of universal distribution of a bankrupts e›ects it should not allow steps to be taken in its territory which would interfere with that process of universal distribution . . .: p 513. C\n\n13 Second, in the case of corporations the English courts have exercised a winding up jurisdiction which is wider than that which at common law they have accorded to foreign courts. The court exercises jurisdiction to wind up a foreign company if there is a su–cient connection between the company and England, there are persons who would benet from the making of a winding up order, and there are persons interested in the distribution of assets of the company who are persons over whom the court can exercise jurisdiction: see Dicey, 15th ed, para 30R-036. But as regards foreign liquidations, the general rule is that the English court recognises at common law only the authority of a liquidator appointed under the law of the place of incorporation: Dicey, 15th ed, para 30R-100. That is in contrast to the modern approach in the primary international and regional instruments, the EC Insolvency Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings (Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000) (the EC Insolvency Regulation) and the Model Law, which is that the jurisdiction with international competence is that of the country of the centre of main interests of the debtor (an expression not without its own di–culties). It is ultimately derived from the civil law concept of a traders domicile, and was adopted in substance in the draft EEC Convention of 1980 as a denition of the debtors centre of administration: see Report by M Lemontey on the draft EEC Bankruptcy Convention, Bulletin of the European Communities, Supp 2/82, p 58; American Law Institute, Transnational Insolvency: Global Principles for Co-operation in International Insolvency Cases (2012), Principle 13, pp 83 et seq. D E F G\n\n14 Third, it is not only in recent times that there have been large insolvency proceedings with signicant cross-border implications. Even before then there were the Russian bank cases in the 1930s (arising out of the nationalisation and dissolution of the banks by the Soviet Government) and the Barcelona Traction case in the 1940s and 1950s (see Case concerning Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co Ltd (Second Phase) (Belgium v Spain) [1970] ICJ Rep 3), but there is no doubt that today international co-operation in cross-border insolvencies has become a pressing need. It is only necessary to recall the bankruptcies or liquidations of Bank of Credit\n\n253\n\nF\n\n# [2013] 1 AC Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) Rubin v Eurofinance Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\n- and Commerce International, Maxwell Communications, or Lehman Brothers, each with international businesses, assets in many countries, and potentially competing creditors in di›erent countries with di›erent laws. There is not only a need to balance all these interests but also to provide swift and e›ective remedies to combat the use of cross-border transfers of assets to evade and to defraud creditors. A\n- 15 Fourth, there is no international unanimity or signicant harmonisation on the details of insolvency law, because to a large extent insolvency law reects national public policy, for example as regards priorities or as regards the conditions for the application of avoidance provisions: the process of collection of assets will include, for example, the use of powers to set aside voidable dispositions, which may di›er very considerably from those in the English statutory scheme: In re B\n- HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd (HIH) [2008] 1 WLR 852, para 19, per Lord Ho›mann. C\n\n16 Fifth, there has been a trend, but only a trend, to what is called universalism, that is, the administration of multinational insolvencies by a leading court applying a single bankruptcy law: Jay Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default (2000) 98 Mich L Rev 2276, 2277. What has emerged is what is called by specialists modied universalism.\n\n- 17 The meaning of the expression universalism has undergone a change since the time it was rst used in the 19th century, and it later came to be contrasted with the doctrine of unity. In 1834 Story referred to the theory that assignments under bankrupt or insolvent laws were, and ought to be, of universal operation to transfer movable property, in whatever country it might be situate, and concluded that there was great wisdom in adopting the rule that an assignment in bankruptcy should operate as a D\n- complete and valid transfer of all his movable property abroad, as well as at home, and for a country to prefer an attaching domestic creditor to a foreign assignee or to foreign creditors could E\n\nhardly be deemed consistent with the general comity of nations . . . the true rule is, to follow out the lead of the general principle that makes the law of the owners domicil conclusive upon the disposition of his personal property,\n\nciting Solomons v Ross 1 H Bl 131n as supporting that doctrine: Story, Commentaries on the Conict of Laws, 1st ed (1834), pp 340—341, para 406.\n\n18 Professor Cheshire, in his rst edition (Cheshire, Private International Law (1935), pp 375—376), said that although English law neglects the doctrine of unity it recognizes the doctrine of universality. What he meant was that English law was committed to separate independent bankruptcies in countries where the assets were situate, rather than one bankruptcy in the country of the domicile (the doctrine of unity), but also accepted the title of the foreign trustee to English movables provided that no bankruptcy proceedings had begun within England (universality). He cited Solomons v Ross for this proposition: G H\n\nThe English courts . . . have consistently applied the doctrine of universality, according to which they hold that all movable property, no matter where it may be situated at the time of the assignment by the foreign law, passes to the trustee.\n\nA\n\nC\n\nD\n\nE\n\nH\n\n254 Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) (SC(E)) [2013] 1 AC [2013] 1 Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\n19 In HIH [2008] 1 WLR 852, para 30, Lord Ho›mann said:\n\nThe primary rule of private international law which seems to me applicable to this case is the principle of (modied) universalism, which has been the golden thread running through English cross-border insolvency law since the 18th century. That principle requires that English courts should, so far as is consistent with justice and UK public policy, co-operate with the courts in the country of the principal liquidation to ensure that all the companys assets are distributed to its creditors under a single system of distribution. B\n\nAnd in Cambridge Gas Transportation Corporation v O–cial Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc (Cambridge Gas) [2007] 1 AC 508, para 16 he said, speaking for the Privy Council:\n\nThe English common law has traditionally taken the view that fairness between creditors requires that, ideally, bankruptcy proceedings should have universal application. There should be a single bankruptcy in which all creditors are entitled and required to prove. No one should have an advantage because he happens to live in a jurisdiction where more of the assets or fewer of the creditors are situated.\n\n20 The US Bankruptcy Court accepted in In re Maxwell Communication Corpn (1994) 170 BR 800 (Bankr SDNY) that the United States courts have adopted modied universalism as the approach to international insolvency:\n\nthe United States in ancillary bankruptcy cases has embraced an approach to international insolvency which is a modied form of universalism accepting the central premise of universalism, that is, that assets should be collected and distributed on a worldwide basis, but reserving to local courts discretion to evaluate the fairness of home country procedures and to protect the interests of local creditors.\n\n# II International co-operation and assistance\n\n21 Jurisdiction in international bankruptcy has been the subject of multilateral international instruments at least since the Montevideo Treaty on International Commercial Law of 1889, Title X, although bilateral treaties go back much further, and the subject of international recognition and co-operation in insolvency was the subject of early discussion by the International Law Association (1879), the Institut de droit international (1888—1912) and the Hague Conference on Private International Law (1904): see Nadelmann, pp 299 et seq. F G\n\n22 In more modern times, the European Convention on Certain International Aspects of Bankruptcy (the Istanbul Convention) was concluded under the auspices of the Council of Europe in 1990, but never came into force. The European Community/Union initiative took 40 years to come to fruition. In 1960 the European Community embarked on a project for a Bankruptcy Convention, which resulted in a draft Convention in 1980, to which there was signicant opposition. But the project was renewed in 1989, and this led to the tabling of a draft Convention in 1995, which provided that it would only come into force when signed by all 15 of the then member states. The United Kingdom, however, alone of the states,\n\n### 255 [2013] 1 AC Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) Rubin v Eurofinance Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\ndid not sign the Convention (for political reasons), and it never came into force. In 1999 the project was re-launched as a Council Regulation, which resulted in the EC Insolvency Regulation in 2000 (Council Regulation No 1346/2000). A\n\n23 The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) adopted a Model Law on cross-border insolvency in 1997.\n\n- The Model Law was adopted following initiatives in the 1980s by the International Bar Association and later by INSOL International (the International Association of Restructuring, Insolvency and Bankruptcy Professionals). In 1993 UNCITRAL adopted a resolution to investigate the feasibility of harmonised rules of cross-border insolvencies. In 1994 an expert committee was assembled consisting of members of INSOL and B\n- representatives of the UNCITRAL Secretariat, and following a series of reports and drafts, UNCITRAL adopted the Model Law in May 1997. The Model Law provides for a wide range of assistance to foreign courts and o–ce-holders. It has been implemented by 19 countries and territories, including the United States and Great Britain (although by some states only on the basis of reciprocity). It was not enacted into law in Great Britain until 2006, by the CBIR. C\n- 24 Apart from the EC Insolvency Regulation, none of these instruments deals expressly with the enforcement of judgments in insolvency proceedings. The question whether the Model Law does so by implication will be considered below in section IV. D\n\n25 Consequently, there are four main methods under English law for assisting insolvency proceedings in other jurisdictions, two of which are part of regionally or internationally agreed schemes. First, section 426 of the\n\nInsolvency Act 1986 provides a statutory power to assist corporate as well as personal insolvency proceedings in countries specied in the Act or designated for that purpose by the Secretary of State. All the countries to which it currently applies are common law countries or countries sharing a common legal tradition with England. They include Australia: the Cooperation of Insolvency Courts (Designation of Relevant Countries and Territories) Order 1986 (SI 1986/2123). E F\n\n26 Second, the EC Insolvency Regulation applies to insolvency proceedings in respect of debtors with their centres of main interests (COMI) within the European Union (excluding Denmark). The EC Insolvency Regulation has no role in the present appeal because none of the debtors has its centre of main interests in the European Union.\n\n27 Third, the CBIR came into force on 4 April 2006, implementing the Model Law. The CBIR supplement the common law, but do not supersede it. Article 7 of the Model Law provides: Nothing in this Law limits the power of a court or British insolvency o–ce-holder to provide additional assistance to a foreign representative under other laws of Great Britain. G\n\n28 Article 23 of the Model Law allows avoidance claims to be made by foreign representatives under the Insolvency Act 1986, and the CBIR apply to preferences after they came into force on 4 April 2006. The UNCITRAL Guide to Enactment (to which resort may be had for the purposes of interpretation of the CBIR) also emphasises that the Model Law enables enacting states to make available to foreign insolvency proceedings the type of relief which would be available in the case of a domestic H\n\n256 Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) (SC(E)) [2013] 1 AC [2013] 1 Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\ninsolvency (UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (2005), Annex III, Ch IV, p 311, para 20(b)): A\n\nThe Model Law presents to enacting states the possibility of aligning the relief resulting from recognition of a foreign proceeding with the relief available in a comparable proceeding in the national law . . .\n\n29 Fourth, at common law the court has power to recognise and grant assistance to foreign insolvency proceedings. The common law principle is that assistance may be given to foreign o–ce-holders in insolvencies with an international element. The underlying principle has been stated in di›erent ways: recognition . . . carries with it the active assistance of the court: In re African Farms Ltd [1906] TS 373, 377; This court . . . will do its utmost to co-operate with the US Bankruptcy Court and avoid any action which might disturb the orderly administration of [the company] in Texas under ch 11: Banque Indosuez SA v Ferromet Resources Inc [1993] BCLC 112, 117. B C\n\n30 In Credit Suisse Fides Trust v Cuoghi [1998] QB 818, 827, Millett LJ said:\n\nIn other areas of law, such as cross-border insolvency, commercial necessity has encouraged national courts to provide assistance to each other without waiting for such co-operation to be sanctioned by international convention . . . It is becoming widely accepted that comity between the courts of di›erent countries requires mutual respect for the territorial integrity of each others jurisdiction, but that this should not inhibit a court in one jurisdiction from rendering whatever assistance it properly can to a court in another in respect of assets located or persons resident within the territory of the former.\n\n31 The common law assistance cases have been concerned with such matters as the vesting of English assets in a foreign o–ce-holder, or the staying of local proceedings, or orders for examination in support of the foreign proceedings, or orders for the remittal of assets to a foreign liquidation, and have involved cases in which the foreign court was a court of competent jurisdiction in the sense that the bankrupt was domiciled in the foreign country or, if a company, was incorporated there.\n\n32 An early case of recognition was Solomons v Ross 1 H B1 131n, where, as I have said, the bankruptcy was in Holland, and the bankrupts were Dutch merchants declared bankrupt in Amsterdam, and the Dutch curator was held entitled to recover an English debt: see also Bergerem v Marsh (1921) 6 B & CR 195 (English member of Belgian rm submitted to Belgian bankruptcy proceedings: movable property in England vested in Belgian trustee).\n\n33 One group of cases involved local proceedings which were stayed or orders which were discharged because of foreign insolvency proceedings. Thus in Banque Indosuez SA v Ferromet Resources Inc [1993] BCLC 112 an English injunction against a Texas corporation in Chapter 11 proceedings was discharged; cf In re African Farms Ltd [1906] TS 373 (execution in Transvaal by creditor in proceedings against English company in liquidation in England stayed by Transvaal court), applied in Turners & Growers Exporters Ltd v The Ship Cornelis Verolme [1997] 2 NZLR 110 (Belgian shipowner in Belgian bankruptcy: ship released from arrest); Modern Terminals (Berth 5) Ltd v States Steamship Co [1979] HKLR 512 (stay in\n\nD\n\nE\n\nF\n\nG\n\nH\n\n### 257 [2013] 1 AC Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) Rubin v Eurofinance Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\n- Hong Kong of execution against Nevada corporation in Chapter 11 proceedings in United States federal court in California), followed in CCIC Finance Ltd v Guangdong International Trust & Investment Corpn [2005] 2 HKC 589 (stay of Hong Kong proceedings against Chinese state-owned enterprise in Mainland insolvency). Cases of judicial assistance in the traditional sense include In re Impex Services Worldwide Ltd [2004] BPIR 564, where a Manx order for examination and production of A\n- documents was made in aid of the provisional liquidation in England of an English company. B\n\n34 Cases involving remittal of assets from England to a foreign o–ceholder include In re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 10) [1997] Ch 213 (Luxembourg liquidation of Luxembourg company); and HIH [2008] 1 WLR 852 (the view of Lord Ho›mann and Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe) (Australian liquidation of Australian insurance company);\n\nand In re SwissAir Schweizerische Luftverkehr-Aktiengesellschaft [2010] BCC 667 (Swiss liquidation of Swiss company). C\n\n# III The Cambridge Gas and HIH decisions\n\n35 The opinion of Lord Ho›mann, speaking for the Privy Council, in Cambridge Gas [2007] 1 AC 508 and his speech in the House of Lords in HIH [2008] 1 WLR 852 have played such a major role in the decisions of the Court of Appeal and in the arguments of the parties on these appeals that it is appropriate to put them in context at this point. D\n\n# Cambridge Gas\n\nG\n\nH\n\n36 The broad facts of Cambridge Gas [2007] 1 AC 508 were these. In 1997 a shipping business was initiated by a Swiss businessman, Mr Giovanni Mahler. The investors borrowed \\$300m on the New York bond market and the business bought ve gas transport vessels. The venture was a failure, and ended with a Chapter 11 proceeding in the US Bankruptcy Court in New York. The question for the Privy Council on appeal from the Isle of Man was whether an order of the New York court was entitled to implementation in the Isle of Man. E F\n\n37 The corporate structure of the business was that the investors owned, directly or indirectly, a Bahamian company called Vela Energy Holdings Ltd (Vela). Vela owned (through an intermediate Bahamian holding company) Cambridge Gas, a Cayman Islands company.\n\n38 Cambridge Gas owned directly or indirectly about 70% of the shares of Navigator Holdings plc (Navigator), an Isle of Man company. Navigator owned all the shares of an Isle of Man company which in turn owned companies which each owned one ship.\n\n39 In 2003 Navigator petitioned the US Bankruptcy Court for relief under Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code, which allows insolvent companies, under supervision of the court and under cover of a moratorium, to negotiate a plan of reorganisation with their creditors. The petition was initiated by the investor interests, who proposed a plan to sell the ships nominally by auction but in fact to the previous investors, but the bondholders did not accept this and proposed their own plan under which the assets of Navigator would be vested in the creditors and the equity interests of the previous investors would be extinguished. The judge rejected\n\nthe investors plan and approved the creditors plan.\n\n# Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) (SC(E)) [2013] 1 AC [2013] 1 Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\n40 The mechanism which the plan used to vest the assets in the creditors was to vest the shares in Navigator in their representatives, i e, the creditors committee. That would enable them to control the shipping companies and implement the plan. The plan provided that upon entry of the conrmation order title to all the common stock of Navigator would vest in the creditors committee to enable it to implement the plan. The order of the New York court conrming the plan recorded the intention of the court to send a letter of request to the Manx court asking for assistance in giving e›ect to the plan and conrmation order and such a letter was sent. The committee of creditors then petitioned the Manx court for an order vesting the shares in their representatives. A B\n\n41 At this point it is necessary to emphasise two features of the case. The rst feature is that Navigator was an Isle of Man company and 70% of its common stock was owned directly or indirectly by Cambridge Gas. Under the normal principles of the conict of laws the shares would have been situate in the Isle of Man: Dicey, 15th ed, para 22-045. That is why Lord Ho›mann said, at para 6, that the New York court was aware that the order vesting title to the common stock of Navigator in the creditors committee could not automatically have e›ect under the law of the Isle of Man; and also why he accepted (paras 12—13) that if the judgment were a judgment in rem it could not a›ect title to shares in the Isle of Man. C D\n\n42 The second feature which it is necessary to emphasise is that Cambridge Gas was a Cayman Islands company which (as held by the Manx courts) had not submitted to the jurisdiction of the US Bankruptcy Court. Lord Ho›mann said, at para 8, that the position that Cambridge Gas had not submitted to the jurisdiction of the US Bankruptcy Court bore little relation to economic reality since the New York proceedings had been conducted on the basis that the contest was between rival plans put forward by the shareholders and the creditors; Vela, the parent company of Cambridge Gas, participated in the Chapter 11 proceedings; and they had been instituted by Navigator. Consequently the claim by Cambridge Gas that it had not submitted was highly technical, but there was no appeal from the decisions of the Manx courts that it had not submitted. But Lord Ho›mann also accepted that if the order of the US Bankruptcy Court were to be regarded as a judgment in personam it would not be entitled to recognition or enforcement in the Isle of Man because the New York court had no personal jurisdiction over Cambridge [Gas]: para 10.\n\n43 Nevertheless the Privy Council held that the plan could be carried into e›ect in the Isle of Man. The reasoning was as follows: rst, if the judgment had to be classied as in personam or in rem the appeal would have to be allowed, but bankruptcy proceedings did not fall into either category:\n\n13.... Judgments in rem and in personam are judicial determinations of the existence of rights: in the one case, rights over property and in the other, rights against a person. When a judgment in rem or in personam is recognised by a foreign court, it is accepted as establishing the right which it purports to have determined, without further inquiry into the grounds upon which it did so. The judgment itself is treated as the source of the right.\n\n14. The purpose of bankruptcy proceedings, on the other hand, is not to determine or establish the existence of rights, but to provide a H\n\nG\n\nE\n\nF\n\n### 259 [2013] 1 AC Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) Rubin v Eurofinance Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\nmechanism of collective execution against the property of the debtor by creditors whose rights are admitted or established . . . A\n\n15.... bankruptcy, whether personal or corporate, is a collective proceeding to enforce rights and not to establish them. Of course, as Brightman LJ pointed out in In re Lines Bros Ltd [1983] Ch 1, 20, it may incidentally be necessary in the course of bankruptcy proceedings to establish rights which are challenged: proofs of debt may be rejected; or there may be a dispute over whether or not a particular item of property belonged to the debtor and is available for distribution. There are procedures by which these questions may be tried summarily within the bankruptcy proceedings or directed to be determined by ordinary action. But these again are incidental procedural matters and not central to the purpose of the proceedings.\n\n44 Second, the principle of universality underlay the common law principles of judicial assistance in international insolvency, and those principles were su–cient to confer jurisdiction on the Manx court to assist, by doing whatever it could have done in the case of a domestic insolvency: paras 21—22. Third, exactly the same result could have been achieved by a scheme under the Isle of Man Companies Act 1931. Fourth, it was no objection to implementation of the plan in the Isle of Man that the shares in Navigator belonged to a person (Cambridge Gas) which was not a party to the bankruptcy proceedings for these reasons, at para 26:\n\na share is the measure of the shareholders interest in the company: a bundle of rights against the company and the other shareholders. As against the outside world, that bundle of rights is an item of property, a chose in action. But as between the shareholder and the company itself, the shareholders rights may be varied or extinguished by the mechanisms provided by the articles of association or the Companies Act. One of those mechanisms is the scheme of arrangement under section 152 [of the Isle of Man Companies Act 1931]. As a shareholder Cambridge is bound by the transactions into which the company has entered, including a plan under Chapter 11 or a scheme under section 152.\n\n45 At this point it is necessary to point out that the opinion in Cambridge Gas does not articulate any reason for holding that, in the eyes of the Manx court, the US Bankruptcy Court had international jurisdiction in either of two relevant senses.\n\n46 The rst sense is the jurisdiction of the US Bankruptcy Court in relation to the Chapter 11 proceedings themselves. The entity which was in Chapter 11 was Navigator. The English courts exercise a wider jurisdiction in bankruptcy and (especially) in winding up than they recognise in foreign courts. At common law, the foreign court which is recognised as having jurisdiction in personal bankruptcy is the court of the bankrupts domicile or the court to which the bankrupt submitted (Dicey, 15th ed, vol 2, para 31R-059) and the foreign court with corresponding jurisdiction over corporations is the court of the place of incorporation: Dicey, 15th ed, vol 2, para 30R-100. Under United States law the US Bankruptcy Court has G H\n\njurisdiction over a debtor, and such a debtor must reside or have a domicile or place of business, or property in the United States. From the standpoint of English law, the US Bankruptcy Court had international\n\n' 2013 The Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for England and Wales\n\nD\n\nE\n\nF\n\nB\n\nC\n\n# Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) (SC(E)) [2013] 1 AC [2013] 1 Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\nE\n\nH\n\njurisdiction because although Navigator was not incorporated in the United States, it had submitted to the jurisdiction by initiating the proceedings. A\n\n47 The second sense in which international jurisdiction is relevant is the jurisdiction over the third party, Cambridge Gas, and its shares in Navigator. Cambridge Gas was not incorporated in the United States, and it was held by the Isle of Man courts that it had not submitted to the jurisdiction of the US Bankruptcy Court (and this was, as I have said, accepted with evident reluctance by the Privy Council). The property which was the subject of the order of the US Bankruptcy Court was shares in an Isle of Man company. Consequently the property dealt with by the US Bankruptcy Court was situate, by Manx rules of the conict of laws, in the Isle of Man, and the shareholder relationship was governed by Manx law. B\n\n48 Cambridge Gas [2007] 1 AC 508 was the subject of brief comment a few months later by the Privy Council in Pattni v Ali [2007] 2 AC 85. The decision in that case was simply that a Kenyan judgment deciding that Awas bound to sell shares in a Manx company to B was entitled to recognition in the Isle of Man. It resulted in an order in personam against a person subject to the jurisdiction of the Kenyan court, and was not a judgment in rem against property in the Isle of Man and outside the jurisdiction of the Kenyan court, because the fact that a judicial determination determines or relates to the existence of property rights between parties does not in itself mean that it is in rem. Lord Mance, speaking for the Board, said, at para 23: C D\n\nIn Cambridge Gas . . . the Board touched on the concepts of in personam and in rem proceedings, but held that the bankruptcy order with which it was concerned fell into neither category. Its purpose was simply to establish a mechanism of collective execution against the property of the debtor by creditors whose rights were admitted or established.\n\n# HIH\n\n49 The decision in HIH does not deal with foreign judgments. HIH concerned four Australian insurance companies which were being wound up in Australia and in respect of which provisional liquidators had been appointed in England. The question was whether the English court had power to direct remission of assets collected in England to Australia, notwithstanding that there were di›erences between the English and Australian statutory regimes for distribution which meant that some creditors would benet from remission whilst some creditors would be worse o›. The House of Lords unanimously directed that remission should take place, but the reasons di›ered. F G\n\n50 The reasoning of the majority (Lord Scott of Foscote and Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, with Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers agreeing) was based exclusively on the statutory power to assist foreign insolvency proceedings under section 426 of the Insolvency Act 1986, but Lord Ho›mann (with whom Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe agreed) also considered that such a power existed at common law.\n\n51 Lord Ho›mann characterised the principle of universality as a principle of English private international law that, where possible, there should be a unitary insolvency proceeding in the courts of the insolvents\n\n261\n\nB\n\n# [2013] 1 AC Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) Rubin v Eurofinance Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\ndomicile which receives worldwide recognition and which should apply universally to all the bankrupts assets, at para 6: A\n\nDespite the absence of statutory provision, some degree of international co-operation in corporate insolvency had been achieved by judicial practice. This was based upon what English judges have for many years regarded as a general principle of private international law, namely that bankruptcy (whether personal or corporate) should be unitary and universal. There should be a unitary bankruptcy proceeding in the court of the bankrupts domicile which receives worldwide recognition and it should apply universally to all the bankrupts assets.\n\n- 52 Other parts of Lord Ho›manns speech have already been quoted above, and it is only necessary for present purposes to recall that he said that (a) the process of collection of assets will include, for example, the use of powers to set aside voidable dispositions, which may di›er very considerably from those in the English statutory scheme (para 19) and (b) that the purpose of the principle of universality was to ensure that the debtors assets were distributed under one scheme of distribution, and that the principle required that English courts should co-operate with the courts in the country of the principal liquidation to ensure that all the companys C\n- assets are distributed to its creditors under a single system of distribution: para 30. D\n\n# Subsequent treatment of Cambridge Gas\n\n53 The decision in Cambridge Gas was not applied by the Supreme Court of Ireland in In re Flightlease (Ireland) Ltd [2012] IESC 12 (to which I shall revert) and has been subject to academic criticism. Professor Briggs has expressed the view (2006) 77 BYIL 575, 581 that E\n\nthe decision in [Cambridge Gas] is wrong, for it requires a Manx court to give e›ect to a conscation order made by a foreign court of property belonging to a person who was not subject to the personal jurisdiction of the foreign court. That a Manx court could have done so itself is nothing to the point.\n\nI shall return to the question whether it was correctly decided.\n\n# IV The cases before the court and the issues\n\nRubin\n\nF\n\n54 Euronance SA is a company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands. It was established by Adrian Roman, the second appellant on the Rubin appeal. Euronance SA settled The Consumers Trust (TCT) under a deed of trust made in 2002 under English law, with trustees resident in England, of whom two were accountants and two were solicitors. G\n\n55 TCT was established to carry on a sales promotion scheme in the USA and Canada. The class of beneciaries was made up of persons who had successfully participated in the scheme by claiming validly in certain sales promotions owned and operated by Euronance SA. The trustees were to hold the capital and income of TCT for the beneciaries and subject thereto for Euronance SA as beneciary in default. The promotion, known as the cashable voucher programme, was entered into with participating H\n\n# Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) (SC(E)) [2013] 1 AC [2013] 1 Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\nmerchants in the United States and Canada who, when they sold products or services to their customers, o›ered those customers a cashable voucher comprising a rebate of up to 100% of the purchase price for the product or service. Under the terms of the voucher the rebate was to be paid to customers in three years time provided that certain conditions were followed by the customer involving the completion by the customer of both memory and comprehension tests. A B\n\n56 The participating merchants paid TCT 15% of the face value of each cashable voucher issued by the merchant during a week. TCT retained 40% of the payments received (i e 6% of the face value of each cashable voucher). About one half of the 60% balance received from merchants was paid to Euronance SA (and so e›ectively to Adrian Roman) and the remainder was paid to others involved in the operation of the programme, such as solicitors, accountants and US lawyers. From about 2002 Adrian Romans sons, Nicholas Roman and Justin Roman, each began to receive about 2%. The trustees maintained bank accounts in the USA and Canada where the payments they had received from merchants were kept.\n\n57 Since the trustees only retained 6% of the face value of the issued vouchers, the success of the scheme necessarily involved the consumers either forgetting to redeem the vouchers or being unsuccessful in navigating the process required to be followed in order to obtain payment. When the scheme folded in 2005 the trustees held nearly US\\$10m in bank accounts in the United States and Canada.\n\n58 By about 2005 TCTs business ceased after the Attorney General of Missouri brought proceedings under Missouris consumer protection legislation which resulted in a settlement involving a payment by the trustees of US\\$1,650,000 and US\\$200,000 in costs.\n\n59 When it became clear that further proceedings were likely to be brought by Attorneys General in other states, that the number of consumer claims would increase, and that TCT would not have su–cient funds to meet all the valid claims of its beneciaries, in November 2005 Adrian Roman caused Euronance to apply for the appointment by the High Court of the respondents on the Rubin appeal, David Rubin and Henry Lan, as receivers of TCT for the purposes of causing TCT then to obtain protection under Chapter 11 of Title 11 of the United States Code (Chapter 11). The English court was told that Chapter 11 reorganisation proceedings would result in an automatic stay of proceedings against TCT, would enable the receivers to reject unprotable or burdensome executory contracts, and might result in the recovery as preferential payments of sums paid to consumers and to the Missouri Attorney General.\n\n60 In November 2005 the respondents were appointed as receivers by order of Lewison J, and in the following month, the respondents and the trustees then caused TCT to present a voluntary petition to the US Bankruptcy Court for relief under Chapter 11. TCT was placed into Chapter 11 proceedings in New York as virtually all of its 60,000 creditors were located in the United States or Canada as were its assets. As a matter of United States bankruptcy law, TCT could be the subject matter of a petition for relief under Chapter 11 as a debtor. This is because a trust such as TCT is treated under Chapter 11 as a separate legal entity under the classication of a business trust.\n\nD\n\nE\n\nF\n\nG\n\nH\n\nC\n\n### 263 [2013] 1 AC Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) Rubin v Eurofinance Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\n- 61 A joint plan of liquidation for TCT was prepared, and in September 2007 Lewison J ordered that the respondents (as receivers) be at liberty to seek approval of the plan from the US Bankruptcy Court. Under the terms of the plan the respondents were appointed legal representatives of TCT and given the power to commence, prosecute and resolve all causes of action against potential defendants including the appellants. The US Bankruptcy Court approved the plan in October 2007, and appointed the respondents as A\n- foreign representatives of the debtor to make application to the Chancery Division in London for recognition of the Chapter 11 proceedings as a foreign main proceeding under the CBIR; and to seek aid, assistance and co-operation from the High Court in connection with the Chapter 11 proceedings, and, in particular to seek the High Courts assistance and co-operation in the prosecution of litigation which might be commenced in B\n- the US Bankruptcy Court including the enforcement of judgments of this court that may be obtained against persons and entities residing or owning property in Great Britain . . . C\n\n62 In December 2007 proceedings were commenced in the US Bankruptcy Court by the issue of a complaint against a number of defendants including the appellants. These claims fall within the category of\n\n- adversary proceedings under the US bankruptcy legislation, and I will use this term to refer to them. The adversary proceedings comprised a number of claims including causes of action arising under the US Bankruptcy Code, which related to funds received by TCT from merchants which were paid out to the defendants (including the appellants), or to amounts transferred to the defendants within one year prior to the commencement of the TCT bankruptcy case including the appellants. D\n- 63 The defendants were the appellants and other parties involved with the programme. The appellants were served personally with the complaint commencing the adversary proceedings but did not defend, or participate, in the adversary proceedings, although it appears from a judgment of the US Bankruptcy Court that Euronance SA had led a notice of appearance in the main Chapter 11 proceedings: order of 22 July 2008, paras 42—43. E\n- 64 On 22 July 2008 default and summary judgment was entered against the appellants in the adversary proceedings by the US Bankruptcy Court. The US Bankruptcy Court entered a judgment against the appellants on the ten counts of the complaint. F\n\n65 In November 2008 the respondents applied as foreign representatives to the Chancery Division for, inter alia, (a) an order that the Chapter 11 proceedings be recognised as a foreign main proceeding (b) an\n\norder that the respondents be recognised as foreign representatives within the meaning of article 2(j) of the Model Law in relation to those proceedings; and (c) an order that the US Bankruptcy Courts judgment be enforced as a judgment of the English court in accordance with CPR Pts 70 and 73. G\n\n66 Nicholas Strauss QC, sitting as a deputy judge of the Chancery Division, [2010] 1 All ER (Comm) 81 recognised the Chapter 11 proceedings (including the adversary proceedings) as foreign main proceedings, and the respondents as foreign representatives, but refused to enforce the judgments in the adversary proceedings because (a) at common law the English court will not enforce a judgment in personam contrary to the normal jurisdictional rules for foreign judgments; and (b) there was H\n\nC\n\nD\n\nH\n\nRubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) (SC(E)) [2013] 1 AC [2013] 1 Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\nnothing in CBIR, articles 21(e) (realisation of assets) and 25 (judicial co-operation), which justied the enforcement of judgments in insolvency proceedings. A\n\n67 At rst instance the respondents sought to enforce the entirety of the US Bankruptcy Courts judgment, but before the Court of Appeal they sought an order for the enforcement of those parts of the judgment which were based on state or federal avoidance laws, including fraudulent conveyance under State Fraudulent Conveyance Laws, and under federal law, namely fraudulent transfers under section 548(a) of 11 USC; liability of transferees of avoided transfers under section 550; fraudulent transfers under section 548(b) and liability of transferees of avoided transfers under section 550. B\n\n68 The Court of Appeal (Ward, Wilson LJJ and Henderson J) [2011] Ch 133 allowed an appeal, and held that the judgment was enforceable.\n\n# New Cap\n\n69 In the New Cap appeal the appellants are members of Lloyds Syndicate Number 991 (the syndicate) for the 1997 and 1998 years of account. The respondents are a reinsurance company (New Cap) and its liquidator, a partner in Ernst & Young in Sydney.\n\n70 New Cap is an Australian company, which was licensed as an insurance company in Australia under the (Australian) Corporations Act 2001 (the Australian Act). New Cap did not conduct insurance business in any country other than Australia, and the majority of New Caps business was generated through reinsurance brokers conducting business in Australia and the balance was generated from overseas insurance brokers.\n\n71 New Cap reinsured the syndicate in relation to losses occurring on risks attaching during the 1997 and 1998 years of account under reinsurance contracts which were subject to English law, and contained London arbitration clauses and also (oddly) English jurisdiction clauses. The reinsurance contracts were placed with New Cap by the syndicates Australian broker, which was the sub-broker for the syndicates London broker. E\n\n72 Each reinsurance contract contained a commutation clause. The syndicate and New Cap entered into a commutation agreement to commute the reinsurances with e›ect from 11 December 1998. Under the commutation agreement, New Cap agreed to make a lump sum payment to the syndicate by 31 December 1998 in consideration for its release from liability under the reinsurance contracts. The payments were calculated on the basis of a 7.5% discount and a deduction from premium. New Cap made payment pursuant to the commutation agreements in two instalments of US\\$2,000,000 and US\\$3,980,600 in January 1999. The commutation payments were made from a bank account held by New Cap at the Sydney branch of the Commonwealth Bank of Australia to a bank account in London. F G\n\n73 The second respondent was appointed the administrator of New Cap by a resolution of its directors in April 1999. In September 1999 the creditors of New Cap resolved that New Cap be wound up and the second respondent (the liquidator) was appointed its liquidator. Under the Australian legislation, the winding up is deemed to have commenced on the day on which the administration began.\n\n### 265 [2013] 1 AC Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) Rubin v Eurofinance Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\n- 74 In April 2002 the liquidator caused proceedings to be commenced against the syndicate in the Supreme Court of New South Wales alleging that because New Cap was insolvent when the commutation payments were made in January 1999, and because those payments were made within the period of six months ending on the date when the administrator was appointed, they constituted unfair preferences and were thus voidable transactions under Part 5.7B of the Australian Act. A\n- 75 The syndicate (which does not accept that the payments were preferences) refused to accept service of the Australian proceedings. The liquidator obtained leave from the Australian court to serve the Australian proceedings on the syndicates English solicitors in London. The syndicate did not enter an appearance to the proceedings, but corresponded with the liquidators solicitors, including commenting on an independent experts B\n- report to be used by the respondents as evidence of New Caps insolvency in all of the avoidance proceedings including the proceedings against the syndicate. C\n\n76 The Australian court (White J in a judgment in September 2008, and Barrett J in a judgment in July 2009) recognised that there had been no submission by the syndicate to the jurisdiction of the Australian court in that\n\n- it did not enter an appearance, but White J held that the Australian court had jurisdiction over the syndicate because a cause of action available under the Australian Act for the recovery of a preferential payment to an overseas party made when the company is insolvent was a cause of action which arose in New South Wales for the purposes of the New South Wales provisions for service out of the jurisdiction. D\n- 77 Barrett J gave a reasoned judgment in July 2009 holding the syndicate liable. After the respondents had been given leave to re-open their case so that the orders made by the Australian court would more accurately reect the di›erences between those appellants who were members of the syndicate for the 1997 year of account and those appellants who were members for the 1998 year of account, the Australian court entered nal judgment against the syndicate in its absence on 11 September 2009. The E\n- Australian judgment declared that the commutation payments were voidable transactions within the meaning of part 5.7B of the Australian Act and ordered the syndicate to repay the amount of the commutation payments to the liquidator together with interest. F\n\n78 On the liquidators application the Australian court issued, in October 2009, a letter of request to the High Court in England and Wales requesting that the court act in aid of and assist the Australian court and exercise jurisdiction under section 426 of the Insolvency Act 1986 by: (1) ordering the syndicate to pay the sums specied in the Australian judgment; alternatively (2) allowing the liquidator to commence fresh proceedings under the Australian Act in the English court; (3) granting such further and other relief as the High Court may consider just; and (4) making such further or other orders as may, in the opinion of the High Court, be necessary or appropriate to give e›ect to the foregoing orders. G H\n\n79 On 30 July 2010, the Court of Appeal handed down judgment in Rubin [2011] Ch 133. As a result, the respondents alternative application for permission to commence fresh proceedings against the syndicate under the Australian Act in England pursuant to section 426 of the Insolvency Act\n\n### Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) (SC(E)) [2013] 1 AC [2013] 1 Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\n1986 was adjourned generally, and the respondents were granted permission to seek relief at common law as an alternative to relief under section 426. A\n\n80 In New Cap Lewison J and the Court of Appeal were bound by the decision of the Court of Appeal in Rubin. Lewison J held [2011] EWHC 677 (Ch): (a) the judgment was not enforceable under the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 because, although it applied to Australian judgments, it did not apply to orders made in insolvency proceedings; but (b) the judgment was enforceable under the assistance provision of section 426 of the Insolvency Act 1986 and also at common law. B\n\n81 The Court of Appeal (Mummery, Lloyd and McFarlane LJJ) [2012] Ch 538 a–rmed Lewison Js judgment on these grounds: (a) the 1933 Act applied, and registration would not be set aside for lack of jurisdiction in the foreign court, because of the Rubin decision; (b) section 426 could also be used and was not excluded by section 6 of the 1933 Act; (c) but section 6 would preclude an action at common law; (d) it was not necessary to decide whether the courts power of assistance at common law was exercisable where the statutory power was available. C\n\n# Picard v Vizcaya Partners Ltd\n\n82 This court gave permission for intervention by a written submission on behalf of Mr Irving Picard (the trustee), the trustee for the liquidation in the United States under the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (SIPA) of Bernard L Mado› Investment Securities LLC (Mado›), which was Bernard Mado›s broking company. The trustee is seeking to enforce at common law in Gibraltar judgments of the US Bankruptcy Court against Vizcaya Partners Ltd (Vizcaya), a British Virgin Islands company, for \\$180m, and against Asphalia Fund Ltd (Asphalia), a Cayman Islands company, for \\$67m, representing alleged preferential payments. He is also seeking to enforce a US Bankruptcy Court default judgment in excess of \\$1 billion in the Cayman Islands in Picard v Harley International (Cayman) Ltd (unreported) 10 November 2010. The Gibraltar and Cayman Islands proceedings have been adjourned to await the outcome of the present appeals.\n\n83 In Picard v Vizcaya Partners Ltd proceedings have been brought in Gibraltar to enforce the default judgments against Vizcaya and Asphalia because \\$73m is held there on behalf of Vizcaya which the trustee maintains is available to satisfy the judgments. Vizcaya and Asphalia have also, with the permission of the court, intervened by written submission.\n\n84 There is no agreed statement of facts relating to this aspect of the case, and nothing which is said here about the facts should be taken as representing or reecting any nding. According to Vizcaya and Asphalia the position is as follows. Between 2002 and 2007, a bank in Europe, acting as a custodian trustee for Vizcaya, sent \\$327m to Mado› for investment in securities. Unknown to the bank, or to Vizcaya, or its shareholder Asphalia, Mado› had been engaged in a Ponzi scheme for some 30 years, and their money was never invested in securities. In 2008, at the time of the credit crunch and the banking crisis, the custodian trustee withdrew \\$180m (leaving \\$147m with Mado›) and \\$67m of the \\$180m was paid to Asphalia. G H\n\n85 In late 2008, the Mado› fraud came to light, and the trustee was appointed. The trustee targeted investors who had withdrawn investments\n\nD\n\nE\n\nF\n\n### 267 [2013] 1 AC Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) Rubin v Eurofinance Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\n- from Mado› in the two years before its collapse in December 2008 as a source for recovery of customer property for the benet of other investors who had not withdrawn their investments. The trustee commenced adversary proceedings in the US Bankruptcy Court alleging preference and fraudulent conveyance against Vizcaya and Asphalia under SIPA and under the Bankruptcy Code, the e›ect of which, they say, is that (a) as the trustee argues, a person who, on the basis that he has received customer money A\n- has been required to repay a preference, does not necessarily become a customer and thereby entitled to share with other customers in the bankruptcy; and (b) the trustee may avoid a payment made by the bankrupt to a creditor 90 days before the commencement of the bankruptcy, irrespective of the intention with which the payment is made or received. B\n- 86 The trustee obtained judgments in default, and Vizcaya and Asphalia say that they took no part in the New York proceedings because they had no connection with New York, and in particular (a) Asphalia was not a customer of Mado› but a shareholder of Vizcaya; (b) arguably Vizcaya was not a customer since it had appointed the bank to act as custodian trustee and it was the bank which entered into contracts with Mado›. C\n\t- The issues\n\nG\n\n- 87 The principal issue on these appeals is whether the rules at common law or under the 1933 Act regulating those foreign courts which are to be regarded as being competent for the purposes of enforcement of judgments apply to judgments in avoidance proceedings in insolvency, and, if not, what rules do apply: section V below. The other issues are whether, in the Rubin appeal, enforcement may be e›ected through the assistance provisions of the D\n- Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006 (section VI) or, in the New Cap appeal, section 426 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (section VII); whether the judgments are enforceable as a result of the submission by the judgment debtors to the jurisdiction of the foreign courts (section VIII); and, in the New Cap appeal, if the judgment is enforceable, whether enforcement is at common law or under the 1933 Act: section IX. E\n- V The rst issue: recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in insolvency proceedings F\n\nReasoning of the Court of Appeal in Rubin and the issue on the appeal\n\n88 The Court of Appeal in the Rubin appeal decided that a foreign insolvency judgment could be enforced in England and Wales at common law against a defendant not subject to the jurisdiction of the foreign court under the traditional rule as formulated in the Dicey rule.\n\n89 As I have already said, on the Rubin appeal in the Court of Appeal the receivers sought only to enforce those parts of the judgment which in e›ect related to the avoidance causes of action. The Court of Appeal held that the judgment (as narrowed) was enforceable at common law. The reasoning [2011] Ch 133, paras 38, 41, 43, 45, 48, 50, 61—62, 64 was as follows: (a) the judgment was nal and conclusive, and for denite sums of\n\nmoney, and on the face of the orders was a judgment in personam; (b) it was common ground that the judgment debtors were not resident (this was a slip for present since the action was at common law and not under the 1933 Act) when the proceedings were instituted, and did not submit to the jurisdiction, and so at rst blush had an impregnable defence; (c) Cambridge H\n\n' 2013 The Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for England and Wales\n\n# 268\n\n### Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) (SC(E)) [2013] 1 AC [2013] 1 Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\nGas decided that the bankruptcy order with which it was concerned was neither in personam nor in rem, and its purpose was simply to establish a mechanism of collective execution against the property of the debtor by creditors whose rights were admitted or established: Pattni v Ali [2007] 2 AC 85, para 23; (d) bankruptcy was a collective proceeding to enforce rights and not to establish them: Cambridge Gas [2007] 1 AC 508, para 15; (e) the issue was whether avoidance proceedings which could only be brought by the representative of the bankrupt were to be characterised as part of the bankruptcy proceedings, i e part of the collective proceeding to enforce rights and not to establish them; (f ) the adversary proceedings were part and parcel of the Chapter 11 proceedings; (g) the ordinary rules for enforcing foreign judgments in personam did not apply to bankruptcy proceedings; (h) avoidance mechanisms were integral to and central to the collective nature of bankruptcy and were not merely incidental procedural matters; (i) the process of collection of assets will include the use of powers to set aside voidable dispositions, which may di›er very considerably from those in the English statutory scheme: HIH [2008] 1 WLR 852, para 19; (j) the judgment of the US Bankruptcy Court was a judgment in, and for the purposes of, the collective enforcement regime of the insolvency proceedings, and was governed by the sui generis private international law rules relating to insolvency; (k) that was a desirable development of the common law founded on the principles of modied universalism, and did not require the court to enforce anything that it could not do, mutatis mutandis, in a domestic context; (l) there was a principle of private international law that bankruptcy should be unitary and universal, and there should be a unitary insolvency proceeding in the court of the bankrupts domicile which receives worldwide recognition and should apply universally to all the bankrupts assets; (m) there was a further principle that recognition carried with it the active assistance of the court which included assistance by doing whatever the English court could do in the case of a domestic insolvency; (n) there was no unfairness to the appellants in upholding the judgment because they were fully aware of the proceedings, and after taking advice chose not to participate. It was unnecessary to decide whether the judgment was enforceable under the CBIR: para 63. A B C D E F\n\n90 In short, Ward LJ accepted that the judgment was an in personam judgment, but he decided that the Dicey rule did not apply to foreign judgments in avoidance proceedings because they were central to the collective enforcement regime in insolvency and were governed by special rules.\n\n91 The essential questions on this aspect of the appeals are these. Is the judgment in each case to be regarded as a judgment in personam within the scope of the traditional rules embodied in the Dicey rule, or is it to be characterised as an insolvency order which is part of the bankruptcy proceedings, i e part of the collective proceeding to enforce rights and not to establish them? Is that a distinction which has a role to play? Is there a distinction between claims which are central to the purpose of the proceedings and claims which are incidental procedural matters? As a matter of policy, should the court, in the interests of universality of insolvency proceedings, devise a rule for the recognition and enforcement of judgments in foreign insolvency proceedings which is more expansive, and more favourable to liquidators, trustees in bankruptcy, receivers and other G H\n\n269\n\nB\n\nC\n\n# [2013] 1 AC Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) Rubin v Eurofinance Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\no–ce-holders, than the traditional common law rule embodied in the Dicey rule, or should it be left to legislation preceded by any necessary consultation? A\n\n92 Ward LJs conclusion derives from a careful synthesis of dicta in Lord Ho›manns brilliantly expressed opinion in Cambridge Gas and his equally brilliant speech in HIH, each of which has on these appeals been subjected to an exceptionally detailed analysis. For reasons which will be developed, I do not agree with the conclusions which Ward LJ draws.\n\n- 93 But I begin with two matters on which I accept the respondents analysis. The rst is that avoidance proceedings have characteristics which distinguish them from ordinary claims such as claims in contract or tort. The second is that, if it were necessary to draw a distinction between insolvency orders and other orders, it would not be di–cult to formulate criteria for the distinction, along similar lines to that drawn by the European\n- Court in relation to the Brussels Convention, the Brussels I Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001) and the EC Insolvency Regulation.\n\n# Nature of avoidance proceedings\n\n- 94 In order to achieve a proper and fair distribution of assets between creditors, it will often be necessary to adjust prior transactions and to recover previous dispositions of property so as to constitute the estate which is available for distribution. The principle of equality among creditors which underlies the pari passu principle may require the adjustment of concluded transactions which but for the winding up of the company would have remained binding on the company, and the return to the company of payments made or property transferred under the transactions or the D\n- reversal of their e›ect. Systems of insolvency law use avoidance proceedings as mechanisms for adjusting prior transactions by the debtor and for recovering property disposed of by the debtor prior to the insolvency. Thus under the Insolvency Act 1986 an administrator, or liquidator, or trustee in bankruptcy may, where there has been a transaction at an undervalue, or amounting to an unlawful preference, apply for an order restoring the E\n- position to what it would have been had the transaction not taken place: sections 238 et seq and 339 et seq. Other systems of law have similar mechanisms, but they will di›er in matters such as the period during which such transactions are at risk of reversal and the role of good faith of the parties to the transaction. F\n- 95 The underlying policy is to protect the general body of creditors against a diminution of the assets by a transaction which confers an unfair or improper advantage on the other party, and it is therefore an essential aspect of the process of liquidation that antecedent transactions whose consequences have been detrimental to the collective interest of the creditors should be amenable to adjustment or avoidance: Fletcher, The Law of Insolvency, 4th ed (2009), para 26-002; Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 4th ed (2011), para 13-03. G\n- 96 Thus the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (2005) says: H\n\n150. Many insolvency laws include provisions that apply retroactively from a particular date (such as the date of application for, or commencement of, insolvency proceedings) for a specied period of time\n\nRubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) (SC(E)) [2013] 1 AC [2013] 1 Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\n(often referred to as the suspect period) and are designed to overturn those past transactions to which the insolvent debtor was a party or which involved the debtors assets where they have certain e›ects . . . A\n\n151. It is a generally accepted principle of insolvency law that collective action is more e–cient in maximizing the assets available to creditors than a system that leaves creditors free to pursue their individual remedies and that it requires all like creditors to receive the same treatment. Provisions dealing with avoidance powers are designed to support these collective goals, ensuring that creditors receive a fair allocation of an insolvent debtors assets consistent with established priorities and preserving the integrity of the insolvency estate.\n\n97 In In re Condor Insurance Ltd (2010) 601 F 3d 319, 326, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit said that:\n\nAvoidance laws have the purpose and e›ect of re-ordering the distribution of a debtors assets . . . in favor of the collective priorities established by the distribution statute . . . [and] must be treated as an integral part of the entire bankruptcy system.\n\n98 In di›erent phases of the Australian proceedings in New Cap Barrett J made similar points. He said that in an action for unfair preference under the Australian legislation the liquidator might obtain an order for the payment of money, but the action did not contemplate recovery in the sense applicable to damages and debts; and the proceedings sought to remedy or counter the e›ects of that depletion caused by the payment by New Cap: New Cap Reinsurance Corpn v Renaissance Reinsurance Ltd [2002] NSWSC 856, paras 23, 27. The order does not vindicate property rights which the company itself would have had prior to liquidation, but statutory rights which the liquidator has under the statutory scheme in consequence of winding up. The purpose of the order for the payment of money to a company in liquidation is not to compensate the company, but to adjust the rights of creditors among themselves in such a way as to eliminate the e›ects of favourable treatment a›orded to one or more creditors, to the exclusion of others, in the period immediately before an insolvent administration commences: New Cap Reinsurance Corpn v Grant (2009) 257 ALR 740, paras 20—21. D E F\n\n# Di›erence between insolvency claims and others\n\n99 I also accept that, if there were to be a separate rule for the recognition and enforcement of insolvency orders, it would not normally be di–cult to distinguish between judgments in insolvency proceedings which are peculiarly the subject of insolvency law such as avoidance proceedings, and other judgments of the kind which are covered by the Dicey rule. G\n\n100 In the context of the Brussels Convention, the Brussels I Regulation and the EC Insolvency Regulation, the Court of Justice of the European Union has developed a distinction between claims which derive directly from the bankruptcy or winding up, and which are closely connected with them, on the one hand, and those which do not, on the other hand, and the distinction has been applied by the English court. In my judgment, the distinction is a workable one which could be adapted to other contexts should it be useful or necessary to do so.\n\nC\n\nH\n\nB\n\n271\n\nC\n\nD\n\nF\n\nG\n\n# [2013] 1 AC Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) Rubin v Eurofinance Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\n- 101 Claims which were regarded as bankruptcy claims have been held to include a claim under French law by a liquidator against a director to make good a deciency in the assets of a company (Gourdain v Nadler (Case 133/78) [1979] ECR 733); or a claim under German law to set aside a transaction detrimental to creditors: Seagon v Deko Marty Belgium NV (Case C-339/07) [2009] 1 WLR 2168. Claims outside the category of bankruptcy claims have been held to include an action brought by a seller based on a reservation of title against a purchaser who was insolvent (German Graphics Graphische Maschinen GmbH v van der Schee (Case C-292/08) [2009] ECR I-8421) or a claim by a liquidator as to benecial ownership of an asset: Byers v Yacht Bull Corpn [2010] BCC 368. In Oakley v Ultra Vehicle Design Ltd [2006] BCC 57, para 42 Lloyd LJ (sitting as an additional judge of the Chancery Division) said: A B\n\t- it has been held that a claim by a liquidator to recover pre-liquidation debts, although made in the course of the winding up and so, in a sense, relating to it, does not derive directly from it and is therefore not excluded from the Brussels Convention (and therefore now not from the [Brussels I] Regulation) by article 1.2(b): see In re Hayward decd [1997] Ch 45, and UBS AG v Omni Holding AG [2000] 1 WLR 916. By contrast, proceedings by a liquidator against a director or a third party to set aside a transaction as having been e›ected at an undervalue or on the basis of wrongful or fraudulent trading would be claims deriving directly from the winding up and therefore excluded from the Brussels Convention and now from the [Brussels I] Regulation.\n\n### In personam or sui generis? E\n\n102 I have already quoted the passage in Cambridge Gas [2007] 1 AC 508 in which Lord Ho›mann distinguished between judgments in rem and in personam, on the one hand, and judgments in bankruptcy proceedings, on the other, but it is necessary to repeat it at this point. He said, at paras 13—14:\n\n13.... Judgments in rem and in personam are judicial determinations of the existence of rights: in the one case, rights over property and in the other, rights against a person. When a judgment in rem or in personam is recognised by a foreign court, it is accepted as establishing the right which it purports to have determined, without further inquiry into the grounds upon which it did so. The judgment itself is treated as the source of the right.\n\n14. The purpose of bankruptcy proceedings, on the other hand, is not to determine or establish the existence of rights, but to provide a mechanism of collective execution against the property of the debtor by creditors whose rights are admitted or established.\n\n103 There is no doubt that the order of the US Bankruptcy Court in Cambridge Gas did not fall into the category of an in personam order. Even though the question whether a foreign judgment is in personam or in rem is sometimes a di–cult one (Dicey, 15th ed, para 14-109), that was not a personal order against its shareholders, including Cambridge Gas. The order vested the shares in Navigator in the creditors committee. It did not declare existing property rights. Indeed the whole purpose of what was the H\n\nH\n\n272\n\n## Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) (SC(E)) [2013] 1 AC [2013] 1 Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\nfunctional equivalent of a scheme of arrangement was to alter property rights. But it is not easy to see why it was not an in rem order in relation to property in the Isle of Man in the sense of deciding the status of a thing and purporting to bind the world: see Jowitts Dictionary of English Law, 3rd ed (2010) (ed Greenberg), p 1249. A\n\n104 The judgments in the Rubin and New Cap appeals were based on avoidance legislation which, with some di›erences of substance, performs the same function as the equivalent provisions in the Insolvency Act 1986 and its predecessors. But Ward LJ in Rubin accepted that the judgment was in personam and the Rubin respondents have not sought to argue that it was not an in personam judgment. What they say is that, even if it is in personam, it is within a sui generis category of insolvency orders or judgments subject to special rules. B\n\n105 There can be no doubt that the avoidance orders in the present appeals are in personam. In In re Paramount Airways Ltd [1993] Ch 223, 238 Nicholls LJ said that the remedies under section 238 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (transactions at an undervalue) were primarily of an in personam character, and that accords with the nature of the orders in these appeals. The form of judgment of the US Bankruptcy Court in the Rubin case was that plainti›s have judgment . . . against the defendants in the sums awarded, and the orders of the New South Wales Supreme Court in the New Cap case included orders that the defendants . . . pay to the rst plainti› the sums due under section 588FF(1) of the Australian Corporations Act. C D\n\n# The question of principle and policy\n\n106 Since the judgments are in personam the principles in the Dicey rule are applicable unless the court holds that there is, or should be, a separate rule for judgments in personam in insolvency proceedings, at any rate where those judgments are not designed to establish the existence of rights, but are central to the purpose of the insolvency proceedings or part of the mechanism of collective execution. E\n\n107 Prior to Cambridge Gas [2007] 1 AC 508 and the present cases, there had been no suggestion that there might be a di›erent rule for judgments in personam in insolvency proceedings and other proceedings. There are no cases in England which are helpful. The normal rules for enforcement of foreign judgments were applied to a claim by a liquidator for moneys due to the company (Gavin Gibson & Co Ltd v Gibson [1913] 3 KB 379) and to a claim on a debt ascertained in bankruptcy under German law: Berliner Industriebank AG v Jost [1971] 2 QB 463. A judgment of the US Bankruptcy Court in Chapter 11 proceedings for repayment of a preferential transfer was enforced in Ontario on the basis of the judgment debtors submission to the New York court, without any suggestion that the normal rules did not apply: Gourmet Resources International Inc Estate v Paramount Capital Corpn (1991) 3 OR (3d) 286, [1993] IL Pr 583, appeal dismissed (1993) 14 OR (3d) 319(Note) (Ont CA). F G\n\n108 The principles in the Dicey rule have never received the express approval of the House of Lords or the UK Supreme Court and the leading decisions remain Adams v Cape Industries plc [1990] Ch 433 and the older Court of Appeal authorities which it re-states or re-interprets. But there can be no doubt that the references by the House of Lords in the context of foreign judgments to the foreign court of competent jurisdiction are\n\n### 273 [2013] 1 AC Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) Rubin v Eurofinance Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\n- implicit references to the common law rule: e g Nouvion v Freeman (1889) 15 App Cas 1, 8 and Owens Bank Ltd v Bracco [1992] 2 AC 443, 484. A\n- 109 The Rubin respondents question whether the rules remain sound in the modern world. It is true that the common law rule was rejected in Canada, at rst in the context of the inter-provincial recognition of judgments. The Supreme Court of Canada held that the English rules developed in the 19th century for the recognition and enforcement of\n- judgments of foreign countries could not be transposed to the enforcement of judgments from sister provinces in a single country with a common market and a single citizenship. Instead a judgment given against a person outside the jurisdiction should be recognised and enforced if the subject matter of the action had a real and substantial connection with the province in which the judgment was given: Morguard Investments Ltd v De Savoye B\n- [1990] 3 SCR 1077, para 45. This approach was applied, by a majority, to foreign country judgments in Beals v Saldanha [2003] 3 SCR 416 (applied to the recognition of an English order convening meetings in a scheme of arrangement in In re Cavell Insurance Co (2006) 269 DLR (4th) 679 (Ont CA)). C\n\n110 There is no support in England for such an approach except in the eld of family law. In Indyka v Indyka [1969] 1 AC 33 it was held that a foreign decree of divorce would be recognised at common law if there was a real and substantial connection between the petitioner (or the respondent) and the country where the divorce was obtained. This rule (now superseded by the Family Law Act 1986) was in part devised to avoid limping marriages, i e cases where the parties were regarded as divorced in one country but regarded as married in another country. It has never been adopted outside the family law sphere in the context of foreign judgments. D\n\n- 111 The Supreme Court of Ireland in In re Flightlease (Ireland) Ltd [2012] IESC 12 declined to follow Cambridge Gas (and also the decision of the Court of Appeal in Rubin) and also held that the Dicey rule should not be rejected in favour of a real and substantial connection test. In Flightlease the airline Swissair was in a form of debt restructuring proceeding in Switzerland, where it was incorporated. Flightlease is an Irish company in E\n- the same group as Swissair. An application was before the Swiss courts under the Swiss federal statute on debt enforcement and bankruptcy seeking the return of money paid by Swissair to Flightlease. The proceedings had reached the stage of judgment, but the liquidators of Flightlease were concerned to know whether a Swiss judgment would be enforceable in Ireland so that they could decide whether to appear in the Swiss proceedings. F\n- 112 The Irish Supreme Court held that the judgment would not be enforceable if Flightlease did not appear in the Swiss proceedings for these reasons: (1) the e›ect of the Swiss order would be to establish a liability on Flightlease to repay moneys and would therefore result in a judgment in personam; (2) it would be preferable for any change in the rules relating to the enforcement of foreign judgments to take place in the context of international consensus by way of treaty or convention given e›ect by G\n- legislation. In particular, the Irish Supreme Court said that it would not adopt the approach in Cambridge Gas because it had resulted from legislative changes in the United Kingdom (this appears to have been based on a misapprehension), and should not be adopted in Ireland in the absence of consensus among common law jurisdictions. H\n\n' 2013 The Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for England and Wales\n\nLord Collins of Mapesbury\n\n274\n\nD\n\nE\n\nF\n\n# Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) (SC(E)) [2013] 1 AC [2013] 1\n\n113 But there is no suggestion on this appeal that the principles embodied in the Dicey rule should be abandoned. Instead the Rubin respondents suggest that the principles should not apply to foreign insolvency orders. A\n\n114 The respondents accept that the Dicey rule applies to claims which may be of considerable signicance by an o–ce-holder in a foreign insolvency, such as a claim for breach of contract, or a tort claim, or a claim to recover debts. It is clear that such claims may a›ect the size of the insolvent estate just as much, and often more, than avoidance claims. Like claims to recover money due to the insolvent estate such as restitutionary claims not involving avoidance, avoidance claims may establish a liability to pay or repay money to the bankrupt estate (as in the present cases). There is no di›erence of principle. B\n\n115 The question, therefore, is one of policy. Should there be a more liberal rule for avoidance judgments in the interests of the universality of bankruptcy and similar procedures? In my judgment the answer is in the negative for the following reasons. C\n\n116 First, although I accept that it is possible to distinguish between avoidance claims and normal claims, for example in contract or tort, it is di–cult to see in the present context a di›erence of principle between a foreign judgment against a debtor on a substantial debt due to a company in liquidation and a foreign judgment against a creditor for repayment of a preferential payment. The respondents suggest that a person who sells goods to a foreign company accepts the risk of the insolvency legislation of the place of incorporation. Quite apart from the fact that the suggestion is wholly unrealistic, why should the seller/creditor be in a worse position than a buyer/debtor?\n\n117 The second reason is that if there is to be a di›erent rule for foreign judgments in such proceedings as avoidance proceedings, the court will have to ascertain (or, more accurately, develop) two jurisdictional rules. There are two aspects of jurisdiction which would have to be satised if a foreign insolvency judgment or order is to be outside the scope of the Dicey rule: the rst is the requisite nexus between the insolvency and the foreign court, and the second is the requisite nexus between the judgment debtor and the foreign court.\n\n118 In Cambridge Gas Navigator was an Isle of Man company, and the jurisdiction of the United States Bankruptcy Court depends on whether the debtor resides or has a domicile or place of business, or property, in the United States. The shares in Navigator owned by Cambridge Gas (a Cayman Islands company) were, on ordinary principles of the conict of laws, situated in the Isle of Man, and the shareholder relationship between Navigator and Cambridge Gas was governed by Manx law. The Privy Council, as noted above, did not articulate any rule for the jurisdiction of the US Bankruptcy Court over Navigator (although it had plainly submitted to its jurisdiction) or over Cambridge Gas (which, the Manx courts had held and the Privy Council accepted, had not submitted) or over Cambridge Gas Manx assets. G H\n\n119 Nor did the Court of Appeal in Rubin articulate the reasons why the English court recognised the jurisdiction of the US Bankruptcy Court over TCT, or over the appellants. The receivers appear to have proceeded originally on the basis that the US Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction under\n\nF\n\nH\n\n### 275 [2013] 1 AC Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) Rubin v Eurofinance Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\n- United States bankruptcy law because of TCTs residence and principal place of business in New York (petition, 5 December 2005), but the US Bankruptcy Court, in deciding to appoint the receivers as foreign representatives also noted that TCTs business operations were conducted primarily in the United States, the majority of its creditors, substantially all of its assets, and its centre of main interests, were all in the United States. The basis of jurisdiction of the US Bankruptcy Court under United States law A\n- over the individual defendants in Rubin was that they were subject both to the general jurisdiction of the court (i e connection of the defendant with the jurisdiction) and also to the specic jurisdiction of the court (i e connection of the cause of action with the jurisdiction) because they specically sought out the United States as a place to do business and specically sought out United States merchants and consumers with whom to do business. B\n- Accordingly, the exercise of jurisdiction satised the due process requirements of the Fifth Amendment. C\n\n120 The basis of jurisdiction in New Cap over New Cap itself was of course that it was incorporated in Australia. The basis of jurisdiction over the syndicate under New South Wales law was that the cause of action against the syndicate arose in New South Wales.\n\n121 The respondents do not put forward any principled suggestion for rules which will deal with the two aspects of jurisdiction. They accept, as regards the jurisdictional link between the foreign country and the insolvent estate, that English law has traditionally recognised insolvency proceedings taking place in an individual bankrupts place of domicile, or, in the case of corporations, the place of incorporation, but (because the connection which the trustees of the TCT, or the TCT itself, had with the United States was that the trusts main business was there) they rely on what Lord Ho›mann said in HIH [2008] 1 WLR 852, para 31: D E\n\nI have spoken in a rather old-fashioned way of the companys domicile because that is the term used in the old cases, but I do not claim it is necessarily the best one. Usually it means the place where the company is incorporated but that may be some o›shore island with which the companys business has no real connection. The Council Regulation on insolvency proceedings (Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000) uses the concept of the centre of a debtors main interests as a test, with a presumption that it is the place where the registered o–ce is situated: see article 3.1. That may be more appropriate.\n\n122 They propose that each of these issues be resolved, not by a black letter rule like the common law rule for enforcement of judgments, but instead by an appeal to what was said in oral argument to be the discretion of the English court to assist the foreign court. G\n\n123 On the second aspect, the jurisdictional link between the foreign country and the judgment debtor, they accept that it is necessary for there to be an appropriate connection between the foreign insolvency proceeding and the insolvency order in respect of which recognition and enforcement is sought. They propose that, in the exercise of the discretion, the court should\n\nadopt an approach similar to that taken by the English court in deciding whether to apply provisions of the Insolvency Act 1986, such as section 238 (transactions at an undervalue), to persons abroad, relying on In re Paramount Airways Ltd [1993] Ch 223.\n\n### 276 Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) (SC(E)) [2013] 1 AC [2013] 1 Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\n124 That case decided that there is no implied territorial limitation to the exercise of jurisdiction over any person. The Court of Appeal rejected the argument that the section applied only to British subjects and to persons present in England at the time of the impugned transaction. In particular the physical absence or presence of the party at the time of the transaction bore no necessary relationship to the appropriateness of the remedy. Nor was the test of su–cient connection with England satisfactory because it would hardly be distinguishable from the ambit of the sections being unlimited territorially: p 237. Instead, the approach was to be found in the discretion of the court, rst to grant permission to serve the proceedings out of the jurisdiction, and secondly, to make an order under the section. On both aspects the court would take into account whether the defendant was su–ciently connected with England for it to be just and proper to make the order against him despite the foreign element. A B\n\n125 The Rubin respondents say that In re Paramount Airways Ltd is instructive because, if the facts of the present case were reversed such that TCT had carried on the scheme in England and had been placed into insolvency proceedings here and the appellants were resident in New York, then it can be expected that the English court would have considered that England was the correct forum in which to bring section 238 proceedings to recover payments made to the appellants and would have given permission to serve out of the jurisdiction accordingly. They go on to say that it is implicit in this that the English court would have expected the New York court then to recognise and enforce any judgment of the English court even if the appellants had remained in New York and had not contested the proceedings; and that by the same token that the court seeks and expects the recognition and enforcement abroad of its own insolvency orders, the court should recognise and enforce in England insolvency orders made in insolvency proceedings in other jurisdictions.\n\n126 There is no basis for this line of reasoning. There is no necessary connection between the exercise of jurisdiction by the English court and its recognition of the jurisdiction of foreign courts, or its expectation of the recognition of its judgments abroad. It has frequently been said that the jurisdiction exercised under what used to be RSC Ord 11, r 1 (and is now CPR Practice Direction 6B, paragraph 3.1) is an exorbitant one, in that it was a wider jurisdiction than was recognised in English law as being possessed by courts of foreign countries in the absence of a treaty providing for recognition: see Siskina (Owners of cargo lately laden on board) v Distos Cia Naviera SA [1979] AC 210, 254, per Lord Diplock; Amin Rasheed Shipping Corpn v Kuwait Insurance Co [1984] AC 50, 65, per Lord Diplock and Spiliada Maritime Corpn v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460, 481, per Lord Go› of Chieveley.\n\n127 Outside the sphere of matrimonial proceedings (see Travers v Holley [1953] P 246, disapproved on this aspect in Indyka v Indyka [1969] 1 AC 33) reciprocity has not played a part in the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments at common law. The English court does not concede jurisdiction in personam to a foreign court merely because the English court would, in corresponding circumstances, have power to order service out of the jurisdiction: In re Trepca Mines Ltd [1960] 1 WLR 1273.\n\n128 In my judgment, the dicta in Cambridge Gas and HIH do not justify the result which the Court of Appeal reached. This would not be an\n\nE\n\nF\n\nG\n\nH\n\nD\n\n### 277 [2013] 1 AC Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) Rubin v Eurofinance Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\n- incremental development of existing principles, but a radical departure from substantially settled law. There is a reason for the limited scope of the Dicey rule and that is that there is no expectation of reciprocity on the part of foreign countries. Typically today the introduction of new rules for enforcement of judgments depends on a degree of reciprocity. The EC Insolvency Regulation and the Model Law were the product of lengthy negotiation and consultation. A\n- 129 A change in the settled law of the recognition and enforcement of judgments, and in particular the formulation of a rule for the identication of those courts which are to be regarded as courts of competent jurisdiction (such as the country where the insolvent entity has its centre of interests and the country with which the judgment debtor has a su–cient or substantial connection), has all the hallmarks of legislation, and is a matter for the B\n- legislature and not for judicial innovation. The law relating to the enforcement of foreign judgments and the law relating to international insolvency are not areas of law which have in recent times been left to be developed by judge-made law. As Lord Bridge of Harwich put it in relation to a proposed change in the common law rule relating to fraud as a defence to the enforcement of a foreign judgment, if the law is now in need of reform, it is for the legislature, not the judiciary, to e›ect it: Owens Bank C D\n\t- Ltd v Bracco [1992] 2 AC 443, 489.\n\n130 Furthermore, the introduction of judge-made law extending the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments would be only to the detriment of United Kingdom businesses without any corresponding benet. I accept the appellants point that if recognition and enforcement were simply left to the discretion of the court, based on a factor like su–cient\n\n- connection, a person in England who might have connections with a foreign territory which were only arguably su–cient would have to actively defend foreign proceedings which could result in an in personam judgment against him, only because the proceedings are incidental to bankruptcy proceedings in the courts of that territory. Although I say nothing about the facts of the Mado› case, it might suggest that foreigners who have bona de dealings with the United States might have to face the E\n- dilemma of the expense of defending enormous claims in the United States or not defending them and being at risk of having a default judgment enforced abroad. F\n\n131 Nor is there likely to be any serious injustice if this court declines to sanction a departure from the traditional rule. It would not be appropriate to express a view on whether the o–ce-holders in the present cases would\n\n- have, or would have had, a direct remedy in England, because there might be, or might have been, issues as to the governing law, or issues as to timelimits or as to good faith. Subject to those reservations, several of the ways in which the claims were put (especially those parts of the judgment which were not the subject of these proceedings) in the United States proceedings in Rubin could have founded proceedings by trustees in England for the benet of the creditors (as beneciaries of the express trust). In addition there are G\n- several other avenues available to o–ce-holders. Avoidance claims by a liquidator of an Australian company may be the subject of a request by the Australian court pursuant to section 426(4) of the Insolvency Act 1986, applying Australian law under section 426(5). In appropriate cases, article 23 of the Model Law will allow avoidance claims to be made by H\n\n# Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) (SC(E)) [2013] 1 AC [2013] 1 Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\nforeign representatives under the Insolvency Act 1986. In the cases where the insolvent estate has its centre of main interests in the European Union, judgments will be enforceable under article 25 of the EC Insolvency Regulation. A\n\n132 It follows that, in my judgment, Cambridge Gas [2007] 1 AC 508 was wrongly decided. The Privy Council accepted (in view of the conclusion that there had been no submission to the jurisdiction of the court in New York) that Cambridge Gas was not subject to the personal jurisdiction of the US Bankruptcy Court. The property in question, namely the shares in Navigator, was situate in the Isle of Man, and therefore also not subject to the in rem jurisdiction of the US Bankruptcy Court. There was therefore no basis for the recognition of the order of the US Bankruptcy Court in the Isle of Man. B\n\n# VI Issue 2: Rubin: Enforcement under the Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations\n\n133 In the Rubin appeal it was argued by the respondents that the judgment should also be enforced through the CBIR, implementing the UNCITRAL Model Law.\n\n134 The order made by the deputy judge [2010] 1 All ER (Comm) 81, paras 46, 47 recognised the Chapter 11 proceeding including the adversary proceedings, because bringing adversary proceedings against debtors of the bankrupt is clearly part of collecting the bankrupts assets with a view to distributing them to creditors and the adversary proceedings are part and parcel of the Chapter 11 insolvency proceedings. The Court of Appeal was of the same view [2011] Ch 133, para 61(2)—(3). The appellants no longer maintain that the adversary proceedings should not be recognised under the Model Law. D E\n\n135 The issue which still arises in relation to the Model Law as implemented by the CBIR is whether the court has power to grant relief recognising and enforcing the relevant parts of the judgment.\n\n136 Article 21 provides:\n\n1. Upon recognition of a foreign proceeding, whether main or non-main, where necessary to protect the assets of the debtor or the interests of the creditors, the court may, at the request of the foreign representative, grant any appropriate relief, including (a) staying the commencement or continuation of individual actions or individual proceedings concerning the debtors assets, rights, obligations or liabilities, to the extent they have not been stayed under paragraph l(a) of article 20; (b) staying execution against the debtors assets to the extent it has not been stayed under paragraph l(b) of article 20; (c) suspending the right to transfer, encumber or otherwise dispose of any assets of the debtor to the extent this right has not been suspended under paragraph 1(c) of article 20; (d) providing for the examination of witnesses, the taking of evidence or the delivery of information concerning the debtors assets, a›airs, rights, obligations or liabilities; (e) entrusting the administration or realisation of all or part of the debtors assets located in Great Britain to the foreign representative or another person designated by the court; (f ) extending relief granted under paragraph 1 of article 19; and (g) granting any additional relief that may F G H\n\nC\n\n### 279 [2013] 1 AC Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) Rubin v Eurofinance Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\nbe available to a British insolvency o–ce-holder under the law of Great Britain, including any relief provided under paragraph 43 of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. A\n\n137 The reference to relief under paragragh 43 of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986 (as inserted by section 248 of and Schedule 16 to the Enterprise Act 2002) is a reference to a moratorium on claims in an administration.\n\n138 The Guide to Enactment states, at paras 154, 156:\n\n154. . . . The types of relief listed in article 21, paragraph 1, are typical or most frequent in insolvency proceedings; however, the list is not exhaustive and the court is not restricted unnecessarily in its ability to grant any type of relief that is available under the law of the enacting state and needed in the circumstances of the case . . .\n\n156. It is in the nature of discretionary relief that the court may tailor it to the case at hand. This idea is reinforced by article 22, paragraph 2, according to which the court may subject the relief granted to conditions that it considers appropriate.\n\n139 Article 25 provides (under the heading Co-operation and direct communication between a court of Great Britain and foreign courts or foreign representatives) that: D\n\n1. . . . the court may co-operate to the maximum extent possible with foreign courts or foreign representatives, either directly or through a British insolvency o–ce-holder.\n\n2. The court is entitled to communicate directly with, or to request information or assistance directly from, foreign courts or foreign representatives.\n\n140 Article 27 provides that the co-operation referred to in article 25 may be implemented by any appropriate means, including\n\n(a) appointment of a person to act at the direction of the court; (b) communication of information by any means considered appropriate by the court; (c) coordination of the administration and supervision of the debtors assets and a›airs; (d) approval or implementation by courts of agreements concerning the coordination of proceedings; (e) coordination of concurrent proceedings regarding the same debtor.\n\n141 The respondents say that (a) the power under article 21 is to grant any type of relief that is available under the law of the relevant state, and that the fact that recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is not specically mentioned in article 21 as one of the forms of relief available, does not mean that such relief cannot be granted; (b) the recognition and enforcement of the judgments of a foreign court is the paradigm means of co-operation with that court; and (c) the examples of co-operation in article 27 are merely examples and are not exhaustive. G\n\n142 But the CBIR (and the Model Law) say nothing about the enforcement of foreign judgments against third parties. As Lord Mance JSC pointed out in argument, recognition and enforcement are fundamental in international cases. Recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (but not in insolvency matters) have been the subject of intense international negotiations at the Hague Conference on Private H\n\nE\n\nF\n\nB\n\nC\n\n## 280\n\n# Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) (SC(E)) [2013] 1 AC [2013] 1 Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\nInternational Law, which ultimately failed because of inability to agree on recognised international bases of jurisdiction. A\n\n143 It would be surprising if the Model Law was intended to deal with judgments in insolvency matters by implication. Articles 21, 25 and 27 are concerned with procedural matters. No doubt they should be given a purposive interpretation and should be widely construed in the light of the objects of the Model Law, but there is nothing to suggest that they apply to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments against third parties.\n\n144 The respondents rely on United States decisions but the only case involving enforcement of a foreign judgment in fact supports the appellants argument. The Model Law has been implemented into United States law through Chapter 15 of Title 11 of the United States Code, which has in sections 1521, 1525 and 1527 provisions which are, with modications not relevant for present purposes, equivalent to articles 21, 25 and 27 of the CBIR. In In re Metcalfe & Manseld Alternative Investments (2010) 421 BR 685 (Bankr SDNY) the US Bankruptcy Court ordered that orders made by a Canadian court in relation to a plan of compromise and arrangement under the (Canadian) Companies Creditors Arrangement Act 1985 be enforced. That decision does not assist the respondents because the US Bankruptcy Court applied the normal rules in non-bankruptcy cases for enforcement of foreign judgments in the United States: pp 698—700. In my judgment the Model Law is not designed to provide for the reciprocal enforcement of judgments. C\n\n# VII Issue 3: New Cap: Enforcement through assistance under section 426 of the Insolvency Act 1986\n\n145 In view of my conclusion in the next section (section VIII) that the syndicate submitted to the jurisdiction of the Australian court, the issues on section 426(4)(5) of the Insolvency Act 1986, and their relationship with section 6 of the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 do not arise, but since the matter was fully argued I will express a view on the applicability of section 426(4) to a case such as this. E\n\n146 Section 426(4)(5) of the Insolvency Act 1986 provides:\n\n(4) The courts having jurisdiction in relation to insolvency law in any part of the United Kingdom shall assist the courts having the corresponding jurisdiction in any other part of the United Kingdom or any relevant country or territory.\n\n(5) For the purposes of subsection (4) a request made to a court in any part of the United Kingdom by a court in any other part of the United Kingdom, or in a relevant country or territory is authority for the court to which the request is made to apply, in relation to any matter specied in the request, the insolvency law which is applicable by either court in relation to comparable matters falling within its jurisdiction. In exercising its discretion under this subsection, a court shall have regard in particular to the rules of private international law. G\n\n147 The reference to the application of rules of private international law in section 426(5) is di–cult and obscure: see Dicey, 15th ed, para 30- 119; my discussion in In re Television Trade Rentals [2002] BCC 807, para 17, and the cases there cited; and Al-Sabah v Grupo Torras SA [2005] 2 AC 333, para 47. But nothing turns on it on these appeals.\n\nD\n\nB\n\nF\n\nH\n\nB\n\n### 281 [2013] 1 AC Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) Rubin v Eurofinance Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\n148 The question is whether section 426(4) of the 1986 Act provides a procedure by which a judgment of a court having jurisdiction in relation to insolvency law in a relevant country or territory may be enforced in the United Kingdom. As I have said, Australia is a relevant country. A\n\n149 A further question arises if section 426(4) applies to the enforcement of foreign judgments and that is whether section 426 is ousted by section 6 of the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933, which provides:\n\nNo proceedings for the recovery of a sum payable under a foreign judgment, being a judgment to which this Part of the Act applies, other than proceedings by way of registration of the judgment, shall be entertained by any court in the United Kingdom.\n\n150 Both Lewison J and the Court of Appeal [2012] Ch 538 held that section 426(4) was available as a tool for the enforcement of the judgment. C\n\n151 Section 426(4) has been given a broad interpretation: see Hughes v Hannover Rckversicherungs-Aktiengesellschaft [1997] 1 BCLC 497 (CA); England v Smith [2001] Ch 419 (CA) and HIH [2008] 1 WLR 852. It has been held that the fact that a letter of request has been made is a weighty factor, and public policy and comity favour the giving of assistance: Hughes\n\n- v Hannover, at pp 517—518 and England v Smith, at p 433. Thus in England v Smith the Australian court overseeing the liquidation of the Bond Corporation made an order for the examination of a London partner in Arthur Andersen. It issued a letter of request asking the English court to assist it by making its own order for the examination. The Court of Appeal decided that the order should be made. D\n- 152 But, despite the respondents argument to the contrary, England v Smith was not a case of the enforcement of the Australian order, but rather the making of the courts own order in aid of the Australian liquidation. In my judgment, subsections 426(4) and 426(5) of the 1986 Act are not concerned with enforcement of judgments. Section 426(1)(2), by contrast, deals with enforcement of orders in one part of the United Kingdom in E\n- another part, and refer expressly to the enforcement of such orders (shall be enforced in section 426(1)). Section 426(4) deals with assistance not only for foreign designated countries such as Australia but also to intra-United Kingdom assistance. If section 426(4) applied to intra-United Kingdom enforcement of orders, then section 426(1) would be largely redundant, going beyond what the Court of Appeal [2012] Ch 538, para 57 described as a degree of overlap. F\n- 153 Section 426(1)(4) has its origin in sections 121 and 123 of the Bankruptcy Act 1914. Section 121 of the 1914 Act provided that orders of bankruptcy courts in one part of the United Kingdom were to be enforced in other parts. Section 122 provided that the courts exercising bankruptcy and insolvency jurisdiction in the United Kingdom and every British court elsewhere were to act in aid of, and be auxiliary to, each other; and, upon a request by the non-English court, could exercise the jurisdiction of either court. G H\n\n154 The Report of the Review Committee on the Insolvency Law and Practice (1982) (Cmnd 8558) (the Cork Report) said, at paras 1909—1913, that section 122 was the vital section in this context, and recommended that the section should be extended to winding up. But, despite the Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\n# Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) (SC(E)) [2013] 1 AC [2013] 1\n\nrespondents arguments, I do not discern any recommendation which would suggest that section 426(4) applies to the enforcement of foreign judgments. A\n\n155 Consequently the applicability of section 6 of the 1933 Act does not arise for decision, except in a context which makes little practical di›erence, and to which I will revert.\n\n# VIII Submission\n\n282\n\n156 If the Dicey rule applies the judgments in issue will be enforceable in England if the judgment debtors submitted to the jurisdiction of the foreign court.\n\n# New Cap\n\n157 The Australian court granted leave to serve these proceedings out of the jurisdiction on the syndicate: section IV, above. The syndicate did not enter an appearance, but its solicitors commented in writing on evidence presented to the Australian court about New Caps insolvency and their comments were placed before the Australian judge. C\n\n158 More relevant is the fact that from August 1999 the syndicate submitted proofs of debt (in relation to unsettled claims and outstanding premiums for the 1997, 1998, and 1999 years of account, and not to the reinsurance contracts which are the subject of these proceedings) and attended and participated in creditors meetings. In particular at an adjourned meeting of creditors on 16 September 2009 the syndicate had given a proxy for that meeting to the chairman, and submitted a proof of debt and proxy form for that meeting. The syndicate voted at a meeting of creditors in favour of a scheme of arrangement. The liquidator has admitted claims by the syndicate for the sterling equivalent of more than £650,000, although the liquidator is retaining the dividend in partial settlement of the costs incurred in these proceedings. D E\n\n159 The general rule in the ordinary case in England is that the party alleged to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the English court must have taken some step which is only necessary or only useful if an objection to jurisdiction has been actually waived, or if the objection has never been entertained at all: Williams & Glyns Bank plc v Astro Dinamico Cia Naviera SA [1984] 1 WLR 438, 444 (HL) approving Rein v Stein (1892) 66 LT 469, 471 (Cave J).\n\n160 The same general rule has been adopted to determine whether there has been a submission to the jurisdiction of a foreign court for the purposes of the rule that a foreign judgment will be enforced on the basis that the judgment debtor has submitted to the jurisdiction of the foreign court: Adams v Cape Industries plc [1990] Ch 433, 459 (Scott J) and Akai Pty Ltd v Peoples Insurance Co Ltd [1998] 1 Lloyds Rep 90, 96—97 (Thomas J); see also Desert Sun Loan Corpn v Hill [1996] 2 All ER 847, 856 (CA); Akande v Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd [1998] IL Pr 110; Starlight International Inc v Bruce [2002] IL Pr 617, para 14 (cases of foreign judgments) and Industrial Maritime Carriers (Bahamas) Inc v Sinoca International Inc (The Eastern Trader) [1996] 2 Lloyds Rep 585, 601 (a case involving the question whether the party seeking an anti-suit injunction in support of an English arbitration clause had waived the agreement by submitting to the jurisdiction of the foreign court). G H\n\nF\n\nD\n\nG\n\n### 283 [2013] 1 AC Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) Rubin v Eurofinance Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\n- 161 The characterisation of whether there has been a submission for the purposes of the enforcement of foreign judgments in England depends on English law. The court will not simply consider whether the steps taken abroad would have amounted to a submission in English proceedings. The international context requires a broader approach. Nor does it follow from the fact that the foreign court would have regarded steps taken in the foreign A\n- proceedings as a submission that the English court will so regard them. Conversely, it does not necessarily follow that because the foreign court would not regard the steps as a submission that they will not be so regarded by the English court as a submission for the purposes of the enforcement of a judgment of the foreign court. The question whether there has been a submission is to be inferred from all the facts. B\n- 162 It is in that context that Scott J said at rst instance in Adams v Cape Industries plc [1990] Ch 433, 461 (a case in which the submission issue was not before the Court of Appeal): C\n\nIf the steps would not have been regarded by the domestic law of the foreign court as a submission to the jurisdiction, they ought not . . . to be so regarded here, notwithstanding that if they had been steps taken in an English court they might have constituted a submission. The implication of procedural steps taken in foreign proceedings must . . . be assessed in the context of the foreign proceedings.\n\n163 I agree with the way it was put by Thomas J in Akai Pty Ltd v Peoples Insurance Co Ltd [1998] 1 Lloyds Rep 90, 97:\n\nThe court must consider the matter objectively; it must have regard to the general framework of its own procedural rules, but also to the domestic law of the court where the steps were taken. This is because the signicance of those steps can only be understood by reference to that law. If a step taken by a person in a foreign jurisdiction, such as making a counterclaim, might well be regarded by English law as amounting to a submission to the jurisdiction, but would not be regarded by that foreign court as a submission to its jurisdiction, an English court will take into account the position under foreign law. E F\n\n164 The syndicate did not take any steps in the avoidance proceedings as such which would be regarded either by the Australian court or by the English court as a submission. Were the steps taken by the syndicate in the liquidation a submission for the purposes of the rules relating to foreign judgments?\n\n165 In English law there is no doubt that orders may be made against a foreign creditor who proves in an English liquidation or bankruptcy on the footing that by proving the foreign creditor submits to the jurisdiction of the English court. In Ex p Robertson; In re Morton (1875) LR 20 Eq 733 trustees were appointed over the property of bankrupt potato merchants in a liquidation by arrangement. A Scots merchant received payment of £120\n\nafter the liquidation petition was presented, and proved for a balance of £247 and received a dividend of what is now 20p in the pound. The trustees served a notice of motion, seeking repayment of the £120 paid out of the insolvent estate, out of the jurisdiction. The respondent objected to the jurisdiction of the English court on the ground that he was a domiciled H\n\n' 2013 The Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for England and Wales\n\nLord Collins of Mapesbury\n\n284\n\n# Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) (SC(E)) [2013] 1 AC [2013] 1\n\nScotsman. On appeal from the county court, Bacon CJ held that the court had jurisdiction. He said, at pp 737—738: A\n\nwhat is the consequence of creditors coming in under a liquidation or bankruptcy? They come in under what is as much a compact as if each of them had signed and sealed and sworn to the terms of itthat the bankrupts estate shall be duly administered among the creditors. That being so, the administration of the estate is cast upon the court, and the court has jurisdiction to decide all questions of whatever kind, whether of law, fact, or whatever else the court may think necessary in order to e›ect complete distribution of the bankrupts estate . . . can there be any doubt that the appellant in this case has agreed that, as far as he is concerned . . . the law of bankruptcy shall take e›ect as to him, and under this jurisdiction, to which he is not only subjected, but under which he has become an active party, and of which he has taken the benet . . . [The appellant] is as much bound to perform the conditions of the compact, and to submit to the jurisdiction of the court, as if he had never been out of the limits of England. B C\n\n166 The syndicate objected to the jurisdiction of the Australian court. Barrett J in his judgment of 14 July 2009 accepted that it had made it clear that it was not submitting to its jurisdiction, and he also accepted that as a result the judgment of the Australian court would not be enforceable in England. His judgment is concerned exclusively with the preference claims, and he did not deal with the question of submission by reference to the syndicates participation in the liquidation by way of proof and receipt of dividends. He decided that the court had jurisdiction because the New South Wales rules justied service out of the jurisdiction on the basis that the cause of action arose in New South Wales.\n\n167 I would therefore accept the liquidators submission that, having chosen to submit to New Caps Australian insolvency proceeding, the syndicate should be taken to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the Australian court responsible for the supervision of that proceeding. It should not be allowed to benet from the insolvency proceeding without the burden of complying with the orders made in that proceeding.\n\n# Rubin\n\n168 The position is di›erent in the Rubin appeal. It would certainly have been arguable that Euronance SA had submitted to the jurisdiction of the United States District Court, for these reasons: rst, it was Euronance SA which applied for the appointment by the High Court of Mr Rubin and Mr Lan as receivers of TCT specically for the purpose of causing TCT then to obtain protection under Chapter 11; second, it was Euronance SAwhich represented to the English court that o–ce-holders appointed by the United States court would be able to pursue claims against third parties; third, the judgment of the US Bankruptcy Court states that the court had personal jurisdiction over Euronance SA not only because it did business in the United States but also (as I have mentioned above) because it had led a notice of appearance in the Chapter 11 proceedings: order 22 of July 2008, paras 42—43.\n\n169 But the Rubin appellants did not appear in the adversary proceedings, and it was not argued in these proceedings that Euronance D\n\nE\n\nF\n\nG\n\nH\n\n### 285 [2013] 1 AC Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) Rubin v Eurofinance Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\nSA (or Mr Adrian Roman, who caused Euronance SA to make the application) had submitted to the jurisdiction of the US Bankruptcy Court in any other way and it is not necessary therefore to explore the matter further. A\n\n# IX New Cap: enforcement at common law or under the 1933 Act\n\n170 In view of my conclusion that the Australian judgment in New Cap is enforceable by reason of the syndicates submission, a purely technical point arises on the method of enforcement. The point is whether the enforcement is to be under the 1933 Act or at common law. If insolvency proceedings are excluded from the 1933 Act, then enforcement would be at common law. If they are not excluded, then (as I have said) section 6 has the e›ect of excluding an action at common law on the judgment and making registration under the 1933 Act the only method of enforcement of judgments within Part I of the Act. B C\n\n171 Section 11(2) of the 1933 Act provides that the expression action in personam shall not be deemed to include (inter alia) proceedings in connection with bankruptcy and winding up of companies. But the e›ect of section 4(2)(c) is that in the case of a judgment given in an action other than an action in personam or an action in rem, the foreign court shall be deemed\n\nto have jurisdiction if its jurisdiction is recognised by the English court, i e at common law. Accordingly, the question whether insolvency proceedings are wholly excluded from the operation of the 1933 Act still arises. There is no other provision in the 1933 Act which throws any light on the point. D\n\n172 The main object of the 1933 Act was to facilitate the enforcement of commercial judgments abroad by making reciprocity easier. The only reference to insolvency proceedings in the Report of the Foreign Judgments\n\n- (Reciprocal Enforcement) Committee (1932) (Cmd 4213) (the Greer Report), which recommended the legislation, is the statement (para 4): It is not necessary for our present purposes to consider the e›ect in England of foreign judgments in bankruptcy proceedings . . . The report annexed draft Conventions which had been drawn up in consultation with experts from Belgium, France and Germany. The draft Conventions with Belgium E\n- (article 4(3)(4)) and Germany (article 4(4)) provided that the jurisdictional rules in the Convention did not apply to judgments in bankruptcy proceedings or proceedings relating to the winding up of companies or other bodies corporate, but that the jurisdiction of the original court would be recognised where such recognition was in accordance with the rules of private international law observed by the court applied to. That provision paralleled what became sections 4(2)(c) and 11(2) of the 1933 Act. The F\n- draft Convention with France did not apply to judgments in bankruptcy proceedings etc (article 2(3)), but provided that nothing was deemed to preclude the recognition and enforcement of judgments to which the Convention did not apply: article 2(4). G\n\n173 The Conventions concluded with countries to which the 1933 Act applied adopted similar techniques. It is unnecessary to set them out in detail. But there is no reason to suppose that bankruptcy proceedings were\n\nnot regarded as being civil and commercial matters. Thus the 1961 Convention with the Federal Republic of Germany of 1961 (set out in the Schedule to the Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments (Germany) Order (SI 1961/1199)) provided in article I(6) that the expression judgments in civil and commercial matters did not include H\n\nH\n\n### 286 Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) (SC(E)) [2013] 1 AC [2013] 1 Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\njudgments for nes or penalties, and had a separate provision in article II(2) that the Convention did not apply to judgments in bankruptcy proceedings or proceedings relating to the winding up of companies or other bodies corporate (although, in accordance with the usual technique, it did not rule out recognition and enforcement: article II(3)). Other Conventions simply excluded bankruptcy proceedings from the specic jurisdictional provisions of the Convention, like the draft Conventions annexed to the Greer Report: article IV(5) of the Schedule to the Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments (Austria) Order 1962 (SI 1962/1339), article IV(3) of the Schedule to the Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments (Norway) Order 1962 (SI 1962/636), and article IV(3) of Schedule 1 to the Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments (Italy) Order 1973 (SI 1973/1894). A B\n\n174 The Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments (Australia) Order 1994 (SI 1994/1901) extended the 1933 Act to Australia, implementing the UK-Australia Agreement for the reciprocal enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. The Agreement (set out in the Schedule to the Order) is expressed in article 1(c)(i) to apply to judgments in civil and commercial matters. The Order applies Part I of the Act to judgments in respect of a civil or commercial matter: article 4(a). C D\n\n175 There is no reason to conclude that the phrase civil and commercial matters does not include insolvency proceedings, and the history of the 1933 Act and the Conventions shows that it does. The fact that insolvency was expressly excluded from the operation of the Brussels Convention, the original and revised Lugano Conventions and the Brussels I Regulation in fact suggests that otherwise they would have been within their scope. The respondents relied on a passage in the ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Gourdain v Nadler (Case 133/78) [1979] ECR 733, paras 3—4, as suggesting that the exclusion of bankruptcy in article 1 of the Brussels Convention was an example of a matter excluded from the concept of civil and commercial matters. But it is clear from the context (and from the opinion of Advocate General Reischl) that the court was simply saying that because the expression civil and commercial matters in article 1 had to be given an autonomous meaning, so also was the case with the expression bankruptcy. That the exclusion of bankruptcy proceedings does not a›ect their character as civil or commercial matters is conrmed by the recent ruling in F-Tex SIA v Lietuvos-Anglijos UAB-Jadecloud-Vilma (Case C-213/10) 19 April 2012, where the court said that the Brussels I Regulation was intended to apply to all civil and commercial matters apart from certain well-dened matters and as a result actions directly deriving from insolvency proceedings and closely connected with them were excluded: para 29. E F G\n\n176 It follows that the 1933 Act applies to the Australian judgment and that enforcement should be by way of registration under the 1933 Act.\n\n# X Disposition\n\n177 I would therefore allow the appeal in Rubin, but dismiss the appeal in New Cap on the ground that the syndicate submitted to the jurisdiction of the Australian court.\n\nD\n\nE\n\n### 287 [2013] 1 AC Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) Rubin v Eurofinance Lord Mance JSC\n\n### LORD MANCE JSC A\n\n178 I agree with Lord Collins of Mapesburys reasoning and conclusions in his judgment on these appeals, essentially for the reasons he gives, though without subscribing to his incidental observation (para 132) that the Privy Council decision in Cambridge Gas Transportation Corpn v O–cial Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc [2007] 1 AC 508 was necessarily wrongly decided. This was not argued\n\nbefore the Supreme Court, and I would wish to reserve my opinion upon it. Cambridge Gas is, on any view, distinguishable. B\n\n179 The common law question central to these appeals is whether the Supreme Court should endorse or introduce a special rule of recognition and enforcement, one falling outside the scope of the Dicey rule which Lord Collins has identied (rule 36 in the 14th and rule 43 in the 15th edition) and\n\napplicable to judgments in foreign insolvency proceedings setting aside voidable pre-insolvency transactions. For the principal reasons which Lord Collins gives in paras 95—131, I agree that we should not do so. C\n\n180 Since much weight was placed by the respondents and the Court of Appeal upon the Boards reasoning and decision in Cambridge Gas, I add some observations to indicate why, as the present appellants submitted, it concerned circumstances and proceeded upon factual assumptions and a\n\nlegal analysis which have no parallel in the present case. 181 Cambridge Gas has attracted both Irish judicial dissent and English academic criticism, to which Lord Collins refers in paras 53 and 111—112. Giving the judgment of the Board in Pattni v Ali [2007] 2 AC 85, I said that the purpose of the bankruptcy order with which the Board was concerned in Cambridge Gas was simply to establish a mechanism of collective execution against the property of the debtor [Navigator] by creditors whose rights were admitted or established: para 23.\n\n182 This analysis, admittedly, involved treating the vesting in creditors of shares in Navigator as no di›erent in substance from the vesting in creditors of Navigators shares in its ship-owning subsidiaries. But it is clear from paras 8 and 9 and again 24—26 of the Boards advice in Cambridge Gas that the Board saw no di›erence. It did not regard Cambridge Gas as having\n\n- any interest of value to advance or protect in the shares still held nominally in its name. Their vesting in Navigators creditors was no more than a mechanism for disposing of Navigators assets, which did not a›ect or concern Cambridge Gas. The Board was therefore, in its view (and rightly or wrongly), concerned with distribution of the insolvent companys assets in a narrow and traditional sense. F\n- 183 Amplifying this, the Board approached the situation in Cambridge Gas as follows. The New York court had jurisdiction over Navigators assets, since Navigator had submitted to the New York proceedings. Cambridge Gass shares in Navigator (located in the Isle of Man, Navigators place of incorporation) were completely and utterly worthless [2007] 1 AC 508, para 9. The transfer to Navigators creditors of Cambridge Gass shares in Navigator had the like e›ect to a transfer of G\n- Navigators assets, since Navigator was an insolvent company, in which the shareholders ha[d] no interest of any value: para 26. Cambridge Gass shares in Navigator were vulnerable in the Isle of Man, under section 152 of the Companies Act 1931, to a similar scheme of arrangement to that which the New York Court intended by its Chapter 11 order. More generally, as H\n\nLord Mance JSC\n\n# Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) (SC(E)) [2013] 1 AC [2013] 1\n\nI noted in Stone & Rolls Ltd v Moore Stephens [2009] AC 1391, paras 236—238, in insolvency shareholders interests yield to those of creditors. A\n\n184 It was in this limited context that the Board concluded that the New York and Manx courts orders could be regarded as doing no more than facilitating or enabling collective execution against Navigators property.\n\n185 The Court of Appeal believed on the contrary that the answer to the present cases lay in the Boards general statements in Cambridge Gas [2007] 1 AC 508, paras 19—21 regarding the nature of insolvency proceedings. It is true that proceedings to avoid pre-insolvency transactions can be related to the process of collection of assets. That is, their general purpose and e›ect is to ensure a fair allocation of assets between all who are and were within some specied pre-insolvency period creditors. A dictum of Lord Ho›mann in In re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 852, para 19, quoted by Lord Collins in paras 15 and 52, is to that e›ect, though again uttered in a di›erent context to the present. C\n\n186 However, the Board did not see these considerations as answering or eliminating all questions regarding the existence of jurisdiction or at least its exercise in Cambridge Gas. On the contrary, it went on to examine in close detail in paras 22—26 the limits of the assistance that a court could properly give. In rejecting the argument that the interference with the shareholding held in Cambridge Gass name was beyond the Manx courts jurisdiction (para 26), the only reason it gave related to the nature of shares in an insolvent company. This meant, according to its advice, that Cambridge Gas had no interest of any value to protect and that registration of the shares in Navigators creditors name was no more than a mechanism for giving creditors access to Navigators assets. D E\n\n187 On this basis, the decision in Cambridge Gas is, as Professor Adrian Briggs noted in a penetrating case-note in The British Year Book of International Law 2006, pp 575—581, less remarkable (although, as Professor Briggs also notes, it perhaps still poses problems of reconciliation with the Houses decision in Socit Eram Shipping Co Ltd v Cie Internationale de Navigation [2004] AC 260). But, because the actual decision in Cambridge Gas was so narrowly focused on the nature of a shareholders rights in an insolvent company and was not directly challenged, I prefer to leave open its correctness.\n\n188 Whatever view may be taken as to the validity of the Boards reasoning in Cambridge Gas, it is clear that it does not cover or control the present appeal. The present cases are not concerned with shares, with situations in which shares are, or are treated by the court as, no more than a key to the insolvent companys assets or even with situations in which it is clear that those objecting to recognition and enforcement of the foreign courts orders have no interests to protect. There are, on the contrary, substantial issues as to whether there were fraudulent preferences giving rise to in personam liability in large amounts. The persons allegedly benetting by fraudulent preferences did not appear in the relevant foreign insolvency proceedings in which judgment was given against them. They were (leaving aside any question of submission) outside the international jurisdiction of the relevant foreign courts. G H\n\nB\n\nF\n\n### 289 [2013] 1 AC Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) Rubin v Eurofinance Lord Mance JSC\n\n- 189 Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony JSC takes a di›erent view from Lord Collins, but does not dene either the circumstances in which a foreign court should, under English private international law rules, be recognised as having jurisdiction to entertain bankruptcy proceedings or, if one were (wrongly in my view) to treat the whole area as one of discretion, the factors which might make it either unjust or contrary to public policy to recognise an avoidance order made in such foreign proceedings: see paras 193, 200 A\n- and 201 of Lord Clarke JSCs judgment. The scope of the jurisdiction to entertain bankruptcy proceedings which English private international law will recognise a foreign court as having is described in Dicey (in para 31-064 in the 14th and 15th editions) as a vexed and controversial question. But it would include situations in which the bankrupt or insolvent company had simply submitted to the foreign bankruptcy jurisdiction. On Lord B\n- Clarke JSCs analysis, in such a case (of which Rubin v Euronance is an example), it would be irrelevant that the debtor under the avoidance order had not submitted, and was not on any other basis subject, to the foreign jurisdiction. It would be enough that the judgment debtor had had the chance of appearing and defending before the foreign court. For the reasons given by Lord Collins, I do not accept that this is the common law. C\n- 190 In the light of the above, the Court of Appeal was, in my view, in error in seeing the solution to the present appeals as lying in the advice given by the Board in Cambridge Gas. Even on an assumption that the actual decision in Cambridge Gas can be supported, it cannot and should not be treated as supporting the respondents case that fraudulent preference claims and avoidance orders in insolvency proceedings generally escape the common law rules requiring personal or in rem jurisdiction. D\n\nE\n\nF\n\n# LORD CLARKE OF STONE-CUM-EBONY JSC\n\n191 I would like to pay tribute to the learning in Lord Collins of Mapesburys comprehensive judgment. However, left to myself, I would dismiss the appeal in the Rubin case. Since I am in a minority of one, little is to be gained by my writing a long dissent. I will therefore try to explain my reasons shortly. In doing so, I adopt the terminology and abbreviations used by Lord Collins.\n\n192 I agree with Lord Collins and Lord Mance JSC that the decision of the Privy Council in Cambridge Gas Transportation Corpn v O–cial Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc [2007] 1 AC 508 is distinguishable. The facts there were quite di›erent from those here. However, in so far as it is suggested that Cambridge Gas was wrongly\n\n- decided, I do not agree. Moreover, I do not think that it would be appropriate so to hold because it was not submitted to be wrong in the course of the argument. To my mind the approach which should be adopted is presaged in the speech of Lord Ho›mann in In re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 852 and in his judgment in Cambridge Gas. G\n- 193 As I see it, the issue is simply whether an avoidance order made by a foreign bankruptcy court made in the course of the bankruptcy proceedings, whether personal or corporate, which the court has jurisdiction to entertain, is unenforceable if it can fairly be said to be an order made either in personam or in rem. I would answer that question in the negative. Put another way, the question is whether the English court has jurisdiction under H\n\n### 290 Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) (SC(E)) [2013] 1 AC [2013] 1 Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony JSC\n\nEnglish rules of private international law to enforce an avoidance order made in foreign bankruptcy proceedings in circumstances where, under those rules, the foreign court has jurisdiction to entertain the bankruptcy proceedings themselves. I would answer that question in the a–rmative. It is not, as I understand it, suggested here that the US court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the bankruptcy proceedings themselves. A\n\n194 The relevant paragraphs of Lord Ho›manns judgment in Cambridge Gas are in these terms (as quoted by Lord Collins at para 43 above): B\n\n13.... Judgments in rem and in personam are judicial determinations of the existence of rights: in the one case, rights over property and in the other, rights against a person. When a judgment in rem or in personam is recognised by a foreign court, it is accepted as establishing the right which it purports to have determined, without further inquiry into the grounds upon which it did so. The judgment itself is treated as the source of the right.\n\n14. The purpose of bankruptcy proceedings, on the other hand, is not to determine or establish the existence of rights, but to provide a mechanism of collective execution against the property of the debtor by creditors whose rights are admitted or established . . .\n\n15.... bankruptcy, whether personal or corporate, is a collective proceeding to enforce rights and not to establish them. Of course, as Brightman LJ pointed out in In re Lines Bros Ltd [1983] Ch 1, 20, it may incidentally be necessary in the course of bankruptcy proceedings to establish rights which are challenged: proofs of debt may be rejected; or there may be a dispute over whether or not a particular item of property belonged to the debtor and is available for distribution. There are procedures by which these questions may be tried summarily within the bankruptcy proceedings or directed to be determined by ordinary action. But these again are incidental procedural matters and not central to the purpose of the proceedings.\n\n195 The critical paragraph is para 15, which seems to me to make it clear that it is possible to have an order which is both in personam or in rem and an order of the kind referred to by Lord Ho›mann in para 14. Thus it may be incidentally necessary to establish substantive rights in the course of the bankruptcy proceedings as part of a collective proceeding to enforce rights. In such a case the order will be doing two things. It will be both establishing the right and enforcing it. This can be seen from the examples given in para 15. Proofs of debt may be rejected, which is a process which may involve determining, for example, the substantive rights of the creditor against the debtor. Or it may be necessary to determine whether or not a particular item of property belongs to the debtor and is available for distribution. As para 15 contemplates, such procedures may be tried either summarily within the bankruptcy proceedings or by ordinary action. In either such case Lord Ho›mann describes them as incidental procedures which are not central to the purpose of the bankruptcy proceedings. As I see it, in such a case, an avoidance order may be both an order in personam or in rem and an order in the bankruptcy proceedings. F G\n\n196 I agree with Lord Collins at para 103 that it is not easy to see why the order of the US Bankruptcy Court in Cambridge Gas was not an order in D\n\nE\n\nC\n\nC\n\n# [2013] 1 AC Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) Rubin v Eurofinance Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony JSC\n\nrem. However, that does not to my mind show that Cambridge Gas was wrongly decided but demonstrates that it is possible to have an in rem order which is made as incidental to bankruptcy proceedings but which is enforceable at common law, provided that the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction in the bankruptcy. A\n\n197 The approach is explained by Lord Ho›mann in HIH [2008] 1 WLR 852, para 30 and in Cambridge Gas [2007] 1 AC 508, para 16, both of which are quoted by Lord Collins at para 19 above. In HIH he said: B\n\nThe primary rule of private international law which seems to me applicable to this case is the principle of (modied) universalism, which has been the golden thread running through English cross-border insolvency law since the 18th century. That principle requires that English courts should, so far as is consistent with justice and UK public policy, co-operate with the courts in the country of the principal liquidation to ensure that all the companys assets are distributed to its creditors under a single system of distribution.\n\nIn Cambridge Gas he said:\n\n- The English common law has traditionally taken the view that fairness between creditors requires that, ideally, bankruptcy proceedings should have universal application. There should be a single bankruptcy in which all creditors are entitled and required to prove. No one should have an advantage because he happens to live in a jurisdiction where more of the assets or fewer of the creditors are situated. D\n- 198 At paras 94—98 above Lord Collins discusses the nature of avoidance proceedings. I entirely agree with his analysis. Avoidance provisions requiring the adjustment of prior transactions and the recovery of previous dispositions of property so as to constitute the estate available for distribution are necessary in order to maintain the principle of equality among creditors. At para 15 Lord Collins notes that Lord Ho›mann said at para 19 of HIH that the process of collection of assets will include, for example, the use of powers to set aside voidable dispositions, which may E F\n- di›er very considerably from those in the English statutory scheme. In short, avoidance proceedings, and therefore avoidance orders, are central to the bankruptcy proceedings. As Lord Collins puts it at para 99, avoidance proceedings are peculiarly the subject of insolvency law.\n\n199 I accept that to permit the enforcement of an avoidance order in circumstances of this kind would be a development of the common law.\n\nHowever, it seems to me that it would be a principled development. It would in essence be an application of the principle identied by Lord Ho›mann in the passage quoted above from para 30 of HIH that the principle of modied universalism requires that English courts should, so far as is consistent with justice and United Kingdom public policy, co-operate with the courts in the country of the principal liquidation to ensure that all the companys assets are distributed to its creditors under a single system of distribution. G H\n\n200 The position of the judgment debtor in such a case would be protected by the principle that the English court would only enforce a judgment in a case like this where to do so was consistent with justice and United Kingdom public policy. All would depend upon the facts of the\n\n# Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) (SC(E)) [2013] 1 AC [2013] 1 Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony JSC\n\nparticular case. In the case of Rubin, there would be no injustice in enforcing the judgment against the appellants. A\n\n201 Lord Mance JSC notes at para 189 that I do not dene either the circumstances in which a foreign court should be recognised as having jurisdiction to entertain bankruptcy proceedings or the factors which would make it unjust or contrary to public policy to recognise an avoidance order made in such foreign proceedings. As I see it, these are matters which would be worked out on a case by case basis in (as Lord Ho›mann put it in HIH [2008] 1 WLR 852, para 30) co-operating with the courts in the country of the principal liquidation to ensure that all the companys assets are distributed to its creditors under a single system of distribution. It would not be irrelevant that the debtor under the avoidance order had not submitted. All would depend upon the particular circumstances of the case, including the reasons why the debtor had not submitted. B C\n\n202 In essence, on the critical question, I prefer the reasoning of the Court of Appeal, which is contained in the judgment of Ward LJ [2011] Ch 133, paras 38, 41, 43, 45, 48, 50, 61—62, 64, with whom Wilson LJ and Henderson J agreed. Lord Collins has concisely summarised their reasoning in paras 88—90, substantially as follows: (a) the judgment was nal and conclusive, and for denite sums of money, and on the face of the orders was a judgment in personam; (b) it was common ground that the judgment debtors were not present when the proceedings were instituted, and did not submit to the jurisdiction, and so at rst blush had an impregnable defence; (c) Cambridge Gas decided that the bankruptcy order with which it was concerned was neither in personam nor in rem, and its purpose was simply to establish a mechanism of collective execution against the property of the debtor by creditors whose rights were admitted or established: Pattni v Ali [2007] 2 AC 85, para 23; (d) bankruptcy was a collective proceeding to enforce rights and not to establish them: Cambridge Gas [2007] 1 AC 508, para 15; (e) the issue was whether avoidance proceedings which could only be brought by the representative of the bankrupt were to be characterised as part of the bankruptcy proceedings, i e part of the collective proceeding to enforce rights and not to establish them; (f ) the adversary proceedings were part and parcel of the Chapter 11 proceedings; (g) the ordinary rules for enforcing foreign judgments in personam did not apply to bankruptcy proceedings; (h) avoidance mechanisms were integral to and central to the collective nature of bankruptcy and were not merely incidental procedural matters; (i) the process of collection of assets will include the use of powers to set aside voidable dispositions, which may di›er very considerably from those in the English statutory scheme: HIH [2008] 1 WLR 852, para 19; (j) the judgment of the US Bankruptcy Court was a judgment in, and for the purposes of, the collective enforcement regime of the insolvency proceedings, and was governed by the sui generis private international law rules relating to insolvency; (k) that was a desirable development of the common law founded on the principles of modied universalism, and did not require the court to enforce anything that it could not do, mutatis mutandis, in a domestic context; (l) there was a principle of private international law that bankruptcy should be unitary and universal, and there should be a unitary insolvency proceeding in the court of the bankrupts domicile which receives worldwide recognition and should apply universally to all the bankrupts assets; (m) there was a further principle that recognition carried with it the active D E F G H\n\n# [2013] 1 AC Rubin v Eurofinance SA (SC(E)) Rubin v Eurofinance Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony JSC\n\nassistance of the court which included assistance by doing whatever the English court could do in the case of a domestic insolvency; (n) there was no unfairness to the appellants in upholding the judgment because they were fully aware of the proceedings, and after taking advice chose not to participate [2011] Ch 133, paras 38, 41, 43, 45, 48, 50, 61—62, 64. A\n\nof 58\n\n203 That seems to me to be a correct summary of the views of the Court of\n\n- Appeal. I agree with those views subject to this comment on point (c). I am not sure that in Cambridge Gas the Privy Council decided that the bankruptcy order with which it was concerned was neither in personam nor in rem. It held that the purpose of the order was simply to establish a mechanism of collective execution against the property of the debtor by creditors whose rights were admitted or established. As discussed above, it may well have appreciated that it was also an order in rem. However that may be, I agree with Lord Collins at B\n- para 90 that, in short, the Court of Appeal accepted that the judgment sought to be enforced in the instant cases was an in personam judgment, but decided that the Dicey rule did not apply to foreign judgments in avoidance proceedings because they were central to the collective enforcement regime in insolvency and were governed by special rules. I agree with the reasoning of the Court of Appeal. Put another way, the Dicey rule should in my opinion be modied to include a fth case in which a foreign court has jurisdiction to give C\n- a judgment in personam capable of enforcement or recognition as against the person against whom it is given. That fth case would be if the judgment was given in avoidance proceedings as part of foreign bankruptcy proceedings which the foreign court had jurisdiction to entertain. D\n\n204 I recognise that there are other ways of achieving such a result, as for example by an equivalent provision to the EC Insolvency Regulation: per\n\n- Lord Collins at paras 99—101. I also recognise that it would be possible to adopt a more radical approach not limited to avoidance proceedings. However, so limited, I respectfully disagree with the view expressed by Lord Collins at para 128 that this development would not be an incremental development of existing principles but a radical departure from substantially settled law. For the reasons given in para 199, it would in essence be an application of the principle of modied universalism. It seems to me that in E\n- these days of global commerce, the step taken by the Court of Appeal was but a small step forward. Judgment debtors are protected by the principle that no order would be made if it were contrary to justice or United Kingdom public policy. Moreover, on the facts here, I can see no basis upon which the order made by the Court of Appeal would be either unjust or contrary to public policy. Finally, I do not think that that conclusion is undermined by any absence of reciprocity. F\n- 205 For these reasons, I would dismiss the appeal in the Rubin case on the common law point. On all other issues I agree with the judgment of Lord Collins. G\n\nAppeal in rst case allowed. Appeal in second case dismissed.\n\nCOLIN BERESFORD, Barrister\n\nH","body_zh":"A\n\nB\n\nRubin（鲁宾）诉 Eurofinance SA（欧元金融股份公司）（SC(E)） （SC(E)）[2013] 1 AC [2013] 1\n\nSupreme Court（英国最高法院）\nRubin（鲁宾）及另一人诉 Eurofinance SA（欧元金融股份公司）及其他人（Picard（皮卡德）及其他人介入）\n关于 New Cap Reinsurance Corpn Ltd（新资本再保险公司）（清算中）\nNew Cap Reinsurance Corpn Ltd（新资本再保险公司）及另一人诉 Grant（格兰特）及其他人\n[2012] UKSC 46\n\n2012年5月21日、22日、23日、24日；10月24日 Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe（格斯廷索普的沃克勋爵）、Lord Mance（曼斯勋爵）、Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony（斯通兼埃博尼的克拉克勋爵）、Lord Sumption（萨姆普申勋爵）、Lord Collins of Mapesbury（梅普斯伯里的柯林斯勋爵）JJSC\n\n破产——清算——外国公司——外国公司的清算人寻求在英格兰执行美国和澳大利亚法院作出的判决，以追回在清算前转移给被告的款项——被告主张其未在外国法院所在地出现，亦未接受该等法院的管辖——该等判决是否为对人判决——执行对人判决的一般规则是否不适用于破产程序——该等判决是否可依普通法执行——是否可通过《跨境破产示范法》的国际协助条款采取替代执行方式——成文法规定允许英格兰法院在破产事项中协助澳大利亚法院，并允许登记及执行澳大利亚在民事或商事事项中作出的判决——任一规定是否允许英格兰法院对被告执行澳大利亚判决——Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 (23 & 24 Geo 5, c 13), s 6——Insolvency Act 1986 (c 45), s 426(4)——Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments (Australia) Order 1994 (SI 1994/1901), art 4(a)——Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006 (SI 2006/1030), Sch 1, art 21\n\nD E\n\n在第一案中，该公司依英格兰法设立了一项信托，以持有供在美国成功参与其组织的促销活动的消费者使用的资金。该促销活动根据美国消费者保护立法受到成功挑战，致使该信托必须以和解方式支付一大笔款项；该公司随后取得 English High Court（英格兰高等法院）命令，指定申请人为该信托财产的接管人，申请人继而根据 United States Bankruptcy Code（美国破产法典）第11章向 New York（纽约）的破产法院申请保护。申请人被指定为该信托（作为债务人）的法定代表人，有权对潜在被告提起一切诉讼，并在纽约对被告、该公司、其创始人及其儿子提起对抗程序；该程序相当于 Insolvency Act 1986（《1986年破产法》）第238和239条项下的低价交易及偏颇清偿请求。被告在相关期间未在纽约出现，未接受该法院管辖，亦未对程序提出抗辩。法院对其作出缺席判决及简易判决。申请人以英格兰法院依据普通法及列入 Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006（《2006年跨境破产条例》）的 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency（联合国国际贸易法委员会跨境破产示范法）第21条均有权如此作为为由，根据 CPR 第70和73部分，向 High Court（高等法院）申请在英格兰对被告执行该等命令。\n\nF G H\n\n1 Insolvency Act 1986, s 426(4)(5): 见后文第146段。\n237 [2013] 1 AC Rubin（鲁宾）诉 Eurofinance SA（欧元金融股份公司）（SC(E)） Rubin（鲁宾）诉 Eurofinance（欧元金融）\n\n——Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006 2。法官认为，第11章程序属于《示范法》的适用范围，但其合作规定并不延伸至判决的执行。其以该判决属于对人判决为由，拒绝依普通法承认 New York（纽约）法院的判决；在被告既未在纽约出现亦未接受纽约法院管辖的情况下，该判决不能执行。申请人上诉后，Court of Appeal（上诉法院）认为，纽约法院在对抗程序中作出的判决，尽管具有对人判决的特征，但仍属于且服务于破产程序的集体执行制度；在判决债务人既未在作出判决国家的法院所在地出现、亦未接受该等法院管辖时，禁止执行外国对人判决的一般规则不适用于该等程序；并且，由于破产人住所地法院应当进行统一的破产程序并获得全球承认，纽约法院的判决可依普通法对被告执行。鉴于该决定，上诉法院认为无须决定该等判决是否可根据《2006年条例》执行。\n\nA\n\n——\n\nB\n\n——\n\nC\n\n在第二案中，被告为 Lloyd’s（劳合社）一个承保团的成员；该承保团向一家澳大利亚再保险公司安排再保险，并在该公司进入清算前不久收取了其付款。清算人以该公司付款时已无力偿债为由，在 New South Wales（新南威尔士州）提起程序，要求追回向该承保团支付的款项。被告未接受该程序的送达，亦未就该事项接受 New South Wales（新南威尔士州）法院的管辖，但其确实参与了澳大利亚就其对该公司持有的若干未决请求权而举行的债权人会议。New South Wales（新南威尔士州）法院裁定，该等付款构成偏颇清偿，因此应予撤销，并发出请求书，尤其请求英格兰法院根据 Insolvency Act 1986（《1986年破产法》）第426(4)条行使管辖权，命令被告支付命令中指定的款项。清算人及该公司在英格兰提起程序，请求给予请求书所寻求的救济。法官认为，鉴于上诉法院在第一案中的裁决，英格兰法院有权依普通法或第426(4)条执行澳大利亚判决。上诉法院驳回被告上诉；该院认定，由于破产程序属于 Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments (Australia) Order 1994（《1994年外国判决相互执行（澳大利亚）命令》）第4(a)条所称民事或商事事项的范围，Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933（《1933年外国判决（相互执行）法》）3 适用，并认为，鉴于该法第6条，该判决可根据第426条执行，但不可依普通法执行。\n\nD\n\n——\n\nDismissing the defendants appeal the Court of Appeal, having decided that the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 19333 was\n\nE\n\n——\n\nF\n\n被告在两案中提出上诉后\n\n裁定：(1) 准许第一案的上诉（Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony（斯通兼埃博尼的克拉克勋爵）JSC 持异议意见），普通法仅在判决债务人在程序开始时已在外国出现，或在《1933年法》适用时已在外国居住，或其已接受该外国管辖时，才会执行外国对人判决；作为政策问题，法院不会为促进破产程序的普遍性而在判决执行方面采纳更宽松的规则；对既定的判决承认与执行法律作出任何变更，均属立法机关的事项；此外，《示范法》并非旨在规定判决的相互执行，因此《2006年条例》不得用于对第三方执行外国判决；据此，依普通法，由于第一案中针对被告的程序属于对人程序，且其未接受美国破产法院管辖，该美国破产法院对其作出的命令不得由英格兰法院执行（见后文第10、115、128—129、142—144、169、177、178、179段）。\n\nG\n\nH\n\n2 Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006, Sch 1, art 21: 见后文第136段。3 Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933, s 6: 见后文第149段。4 Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments (Australia) Order 1994, art 4：下列判决应为 Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 第一部分所适用的判决，即：(a) 由获认可法院就民事或商事事项作出的、支付金钱的任何判决、法令、规则、命令或其他最终法令（税款或其他性质类似的收费，或要求支付赡养费的命令除外）……\n\nRubin（鲁宾）诉 Eurofinance SA（欧元金融股份公司）（SC(E)） （SC(E)）[2013] 1 AC [2013] 1\n\n此外，《示范法》并非旨在规定判决的相互执行，因此《2006年条例》不得用于对第三方执行外国判决；据此，依普通法，由于第一案中针对被告的程序属于对人程序，且其未接受美国破产法院管辖，该美国破产法院对其作出的命令不得由英格兰法院执行（见后文第10、115、128—129、142—144、169、177、178、179段）。\n\nA\n\nIn re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd（关于 HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd）[2008] 1 WLR 852, HL(E) 已予审议。\n\nB\n\nCambridge Gas Transportation Corpn（剑桥燃气运输公司）诉 O–cial Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc（Navigator Holdings plc 无担保债权人正式委员会）[2007] 1 AC 508, PC 不予认可。\n\n(2) 驳回第二案的上诉，尽管英格兰法院可根据 Insolvency Act 1986（《1986年破产法》）第426条向澳大利亚法院提供协助，但该协助并不延伸至判决的执行；被告参与澳大利亚破产程序，尽管未参与实际追偿程序，已足以视为其接受负责监督该程序的澳大利亚法院的管辖；因此可在英格兰法院执行；由于《1994年命令》将《1933年法》第一部分适用于澳大利亚法院就民事及商事事项作出的判决，且破产程序不应被排除在该术语之外，此类案件的执行应依据《1933年法》，而非普通法；据此，第二案中的澳大利亚判决将由英格兰法院据此执行（见后文第152、167、175—177、178、203、205段）。\n\nC D\n\nEngland（英格兰）诉 Smith（史密斯）[2001] Ch 419, CA 有别。\n\nPer Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe（格斯廷索普的沃克勋爵）、Lord Mance（曼斯勋爵）、Lord Sumption（萨姆普申勋爵）JJSC 及 Lord Collins of Mapesbury（梅普斯伯里的柯林斯勋爵）。拒绝认可偏离传统规则，不大可能造成严重不公。第一案中，在美国程序中提出请求的若干方式，可能构成受托人在英格兰为债权人利益（作为明示信托的受益人）提起程序的基础。职务持有人尚有数项其他可用途径。澳大利亚公司清算人提出的撤销请求，可成为澳大利亚法院根据 Insolvency Act 1986（《1986年破产法》）第426(4)条提出请求的对象，并根据第426(5)条适用澳大利亚法。在适当案件中，《示范法》第23条将允许外国代表人根据 Insolvency Act 1986（《1986年破产法》）提出撤销请求。在无力偿债财产的主要利益中心位于 European Union（欧洲联盟）的案件中，判决将根据 Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 第25条得到执行（见后文第131、178段）。\n\nE F\n\nCourt of Appeal（上诉法院）在 Rubin（鲁宾）诉 Eurofinance SA（欧元金融股份公司）[2010] EWCA Civ 895; [2011] Ch 133; [2011] 2 WLR 121; [2011] Bus LR 84; [2011] 1 All ER (Comm) 287 一案中的裁决被撤销。\n\nCourt of Appeal（上诉法院）在 In re New Cap Reinsurance Corpn Ltd（关于 New Cap Reinsurance Corpn Ltd）[2011] EWCA Civ 971; [2012] Ch 538; [2012] 2 WLR 1095; [2012] Bus LR 772; [2012] 1 All ER 755; [2012] 1 All ER (Comm) 1207 一案中的裁决基于不同理由获维持。\n\nG\n\n下列案件在判决中被援引：\n\nAdams（亚当斯）诉 Cape Industries plc（开普工业有限公司）[1990] Ch 433; [1990] 2 WLR 657; [1991] 1 All ER 929, Scott（斯科特）法官及 CA\n\nAfrican Farms Ltd（非洲农场有限公司）, In re [1906] TS 373\n\nAkai Pty Ltd（阿凯私人有限公司）诉 Peoples Insurance Co Ltd（人民保险有限公司）[1998] 1 Lloyds Rep 90\n\nAkande（阿坎德）诉 Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd（贝尔富尔·比蒂建筑有限公司）[1998] IL Pr 110\n\nAl Sabah（萨巴赫）诉 Grupo Torras SA（托拉斯集团股份公司）[2005] UKPC 1; [2005] 2 AC 333; [2005] 2 WLR 904; [2005] 1 All ER 871, PC\n\nAmin Rasheed Shipping Corpn（阿明·拉希德航运公司）诉 Kuwait Insurance Co（科威特保险公司）[1984] AC 50; [1983] 3 WLR 241; [1983] 2 All ER 884; [1983] 2 Lloyds Rep 365, HL(E)\n\nH\n\n[2013] 1 AC Rubin（鲁宾）诉 Eurofinance SA（欧元金融股份公司）（SC(E)） Rubin（鲁宾）诉 Eurofinance（欧元金融）\n\nA　Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA（国际信贷商业银行股份公司）, In re (No 10) [1997] Ch 213; [1997]\n\n2 WLR 172; [1996] 4 All ER 796\nBanque Indosuez SA（东方汇理银行）诉 Ferromet Rescources Inc（费罗梅特资源公司） [1993] BCLC 112\nBarcelona Traction, Light and Power Co Ltd（巴塞罗那牵引、照明与动力有限公司）案（第二阶段），Case concerning (Belgium（比利时） v Spain（西班牙）) [1970] ICJ Rep 3\nBeals（比尔斯）诉 Saldanha（萨尔丹哈） 2003 SCC 72; [2003] 3 SCR 416\nBergerem（伯杰雷姆）诉 Marsh（马什） (1921) 6 B & CR 195; 91 LJKB 80\nBerliner Industriebank AG（柏林工业银行股份公司）诉 Jost（约斯特） [1971] 2 QB 463; [1971] 3 WLR 61; [1971] 2 All ER 1513, CA\nByers（拜尔斯）诉 Yacht Bull Corpn（游艇公牛公司） [2010] EWHC 133 (Ch); [2010] BCC 368\nCCIC Finance Ltd（中国检验认证集团金融有限公司）诉 Guangdong International Trust & Investment Corpn（广东国际信托投资公司） [2005] 2 HKC 589\nCambridge Gas Transportation Corpn（剑桥燃气运输公司）诉 O–cial Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc（Navigator Holdings plc 无担保债权人官方委员会） [2006] UKPC 26; [2007] 1 AC 508; [2006] 3 WLR 689; [2006] 3 All ER 829; [2006] 2 All ER (Comm) 695, PC\nCavell Insurance Co（卡维尔保险公司）案，In re (2006) 269 DLR (4th) 679\nCondor Insurance Ltd（秃鹰保险有限公司）案，In re (2010) 601 F 3d 319\nCredit Suisse Fides Trust SA（瑞士信贷信托公司）诉 Cuoghi（库奥吉） [1998] QB 818; [1997] 3 WLR 871; [1997] 3 All ER 673, CA\nDesert Sun Loan Corpn（沙漠太阳贷款公司）诉 Hill（希尔） [1996] 2 All ER 847, CA\nEngland（英格兰）诉 Smith（史密斯） [2001] Ch 419; [2000] 2 WLR 1141, CA\nF-Tex SIA（F-Tex 公司）诉 Lietuvos-Anglijos UAB-Jadecloud-Vilma（立陶宛—英格兰 UAB-Jadecloud-Vilma 公司） (Case C-213/10) (unreported) 19 April 2012, ECJ\nFlightlease (Ireland) Ltd（飞行租赁〈爱尔兰〉有限公司）案，In re [2006] IEHC 193; [2012] IESC 12\nGalbraith（加尔布雷思）诉 Grimshaw（格里姆肖） [1910] AC 508, HL(E)\nGerman Graphics Graphicsche Maschinen GmbH（德国图形印刷机械有限责任公司）诉 van der Schee（范德谢） (Case C-292/08) [2009] ECR I-8421, ECJ\n\nGibson (Gavin) & Co Ltd（吉布森〈加文〉有限公司）诉 Gibson（吉布森） [1913] 3 KB 379\nGodard（戈达尔）诉 Gray（格雷） (1870) LR 6 QB 139\nGourdain（古尔丹）诉 Nadler（纳德勒） (Case 133/78) [1979] ECR 733, ECJ\nGourmet Resources International Inc Estate（国际美食资源公司遗产）诉 Paramount Capital Corpn（派拉蒙资本公司） (1991) 3 OR (3d) 286, [1993] IL Pr 583; 14 OR (3d) 319 (Note)\nHIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd（HIH 伤亡及综合保险有限公司）案，In re [2008] UKHL 21; [2008] 1 WLR 852; [2008] Bus LR 905; [2008] 3 All ER 869, HL(E)\nHughes（休斯）诉 Hannover Ruckversicherungs-Aktiengesellschaft（汉诺威再保险股份公司） [1997] 1 BCLC 497, CA\nImpex Services Worldwide Ltd（环球进出口服务有限公司）案，In re [2004] BPIR 564\nIndustrial Maritime Carriers (Bahamas) Inc（工业海运承运人〈巴哈马〉公司）诉 Sinoca International Inc（新诺卡国际公司） (The Eastern Trader（“东方交易者”号）) [1996] 2 Lloyds Rep 585\nIndyka（因迪卡）诉 Indyka（因迪卡） [1969] 1 AC 33; [1967] 3 WLR 510; [1967] 2 All ER 689, HL(E)\nMaxwell Communication Corpn（麦克斯韦通信公司）案，In re (1994) 170 BR 800\nMetcalfe & Manseld Alternative Investments（梅特卡夫与曼斯菲尔德另类投资公司）案，In re (2010) 421 BR 685\nModern Terminals (Berth 5) Ltd（现代货柜码头〈5号泊位〉有限公司）诉 States Steamship Co（州轮船公司） [1979] HKLR 512\nMorguard Investments Ltd（摩根卫投资有限公司）诉 De Savoye（德萨沃耶） [1990] 3 SCR 1077\nNew Cap Reinsurance Corpn（新资本再保险公司）诉 Grant（格兰特） [2009] NSWSC 662; 257 ALR 740\nNew Cap Reinsurance Corpn（新资本再保险公司）诉 Renaissance Reinsurance Ltd（文艺复兴再保险有限公司） [2002] NSWSC 856\nNouvion（努维翁）诉 Freeman（弗里曼） (1889) 15 App Cas 1, HL(E)\nOakley（奥克利）诉 Ultra Vehicle Design Ltd（超级车辆设计有限公司） [2005] EWHC 872 (Ch); [2006] BCC 57; [2006] BPIR 115\nOwens Bank Ltd（欧文斯银行有限公司）诉 Bracco（布拉科） [1992] 2 AC 443; [1992] 2 WLR 621; [1992] 2 All ER 193, HL(E)\nParamount Airways Ltd（派拉蒙航空有限公司）案，In re [1993] Ch 223; [1992] 3 WLR 690; [1992] 3 All ER 1, CA\nPattni（帕特尼）诉 Ali（阿里） [2006] UKPC 51; [2007] 2 AC 85; [2006] 2 WLR 102; [2007] 2 All ER (Comm) 427, PC\n\n' 2013 The Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for England and Wales（英格兰和威尔士法律报告协会）\n\nPicard（皮卡德）诉 Harley International (Cayman) Ltd（哈雷国际〈开曼〉有限公司） (unreported) 10 November 2010, US Bankruptcy Ct, Southern District of New York（纽约南区美国破产法院）\nRein（莱因）诉 Stein（斯坦） (1892) 66 LT 469, DC\nRobertson（罗伯逊），Ex p；In re Morton（莫顿） (1875) LR 20 Eq 733\nSeagon（西根）诉 Deko Marty Belgium NV（德科·马蒂比利时公司） (Case C-339/07) [2009] 1 WLR 2168; [2009] Bus LR 1151; [2009] ECR I-767, ECJ\nSiskina（“西斯基纳”号最近所载货物的所有人）诉 Distos Cia Naviera SA（迪斯托斯航运公司） [1979] AC 210; [1977] 3 WLR 818; [1977] 3 All ER 803, HL(E)\nSocit Eram Shipping Co Ltd（埃拉姆航运有限公司）诉 Cie Internationale de Navigation（国际航运公司） [2003] UKHL 30; [2004] 1 AC 260; [2003] 3 WLR 21; [2003] 3 All ER 465, HL(E)\nSolomons（所罗门斯）诉 Ross（罗斯） (1764) 1 H Bl 131n\nSpiliada Maritime Corpn（斯皮利亚达海运公司）诉 Cansulex Ltd（坎苏莱克斯有限公司） [1987] AC 460; [1986] 3 WLR 972; [1986] 3 All ER 843, HL(E)\nStarlight International Inc（星光国际公司）诉 Bruce（布鲁斯） [2002] EWHC 374 (Ch), [2002] IL Pr 617\nStone & Rolls Ltd（斯通与罗尔斯有限公司）诉 Moore Stephens（摩尔·斯蒂芬斯） [2009] UKHL 39; [2009] AC 1391; [2009] 3 WLR 455; [2009] Bus LR 1356; [2009] 4 All ER 431; [2010] 1 All ER (Comm) 125, HL(E)\nSwissAir Schweizerische Luftverkehr-Aktiengesellschaft（瑞士航空股份公司）案，In re [2009] EWHC 2099 (Ch); [2010] BCC 667\nTelevision Trade Rentals Ltd（电视贸易租赁有限公司）案，In re [2002] EWHC 211 (Ch); [2002] BCC 807; [2002] BPIR 859\nTravers（特拉弗斯）诉 Holley（霍利） [1953] P 246; [1953] 3 WLR 507; [1953] 2 All ER 794, CA\nTrepca Mines Ltd（特雷普查矿业有限公司）案，In re [1960] 1 WLR 1273; [1960] 3 All ER 304, CA\nTurners & Growers Exporters Ltd（特纳斯与格罗尔斯出口商有限公司）诉 The ship Cornelis Verolme（“科内利斯·维罗尔姆”号船） [1997] 2 NZLR 110\nWilliams（威廉斯）诉 Jones（琼斯） (1845) 13 M&W 628\nWilliams & Glyns Bank plc（威廉斯与格林斯银行公众有限公司）诉 Astro Dinamico Cia Naviera SA（阿斯特罗·迪纳米科航运公司） [1984] 1 WLR 438; [1984] 1 All ER 760; [1984] 1 Lloyds Rep 453, HL(E)\n在辩论中还援引了下列追加案件：\nAWB (Geneva) SA（日内瓦 AWB 公司）诉 North American Steamships Ltd（北美轮船有限公司） [2007] EWCA Civ 739; [2007] 2 Lloyds Rep 315; [2007] 2 CLC 117, CA\nAtlas Shipping A/S（阿特拉斯航运公司）案，In re (2009) 404 BR 726\nBarlow Clowes Gilt Managers Ltd（巴洛·克洛斯金边证券管理有限公司）案，In re [1992] Ch 208; [1992] 2 WLR 36; [1991] 4 All ER 385\nDrumm（德拉姆，一名破产人）案，In re (unreported) 13 December 2010, High Ct of Ireland（爱尔兰高等法院）\nFairfield Sentry Ltd（费尔菲尔德哨兵有限公司）诉 Citco Bank Nederland NV（荷兰花旗信托银行） [2012] IEHC 81\nInternational Tin Council（国际锡业理事会）案，In re [1987] Ch 419; [1987] 2 WLR 1229; [1987] 1 All ER 890\nPantmaenog Timber Co Ltd（潘特梅诺格木材有限公司）案，In re [2003] UKHL 49; [2004] 1 AC 158; [2003] 3 WLR 767; [2003] 4 All ER 18, HL(E)\nStegmann（斯特格曼），Ex p [1902] TS 40\nUBS AG（瑞银集团股份公司）诉 Omni Holding AG（全能控股股份公司） [2000] 1 WLR 916; [2000] 1 All ER (Comm) 42\n来自 Court of Appeal（上诉法院）的上诉\n\nRubin（鲁宾）诉 Eurofinance SA（欧洲金融公司）\n\n2009年7月31日，Nicholas Strauss QC（尼古拉斯·施特劳斯御用大律师）作为 Chancery Division（衡平法庭庭）副法官 [2010] 1 All ER (Comm) 81，准许申请人 David Rubin（大卫·鲁宾）和 Henry Lan（亨利·兰）的申请；二人为 Consumer Trust（消费者信托）的外国代表。该申请请求：（1）将根据 United States Bankruptcy Code（美国破产法）第 11 章就该信托提起、并在 United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York（纽约南区美国破产法院）进行的程序，包括对抗程序，承认为 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency（联合国国际贸易法委员会跨境破产示范法）第 2(i) 条所称的外国程序；以及（2）根据第 2(j) 条承认其本人为该信托的外国代表；但拒绝作出命令，要求依 CPR Pts 70 and 73，将 United States Bankruptcy Court（美国破产法院）2008年7月23日命令作为英国法院的判决书，对纽约程序中的被告 Adrian Roman（阿德里安·罗曼）、Justin Roman（贾斯廷·罗曼）、Nicholas Roman（尼古拉斯·罗曼）和 Euronance SA（欧罗南斯公司）执行。\n\n2010年7月30日，Court of Appeal（上诉法院）（Ward、Wilson LJJ 和 Henderson J）[2011] Ch 133 准许申请人就驳回其执行请求提出的上诉，并驳回被告就将对抗程序承认为第 11 章程序一部分的命令提出的交叉上诉。\n\n2010年10月27日，Supreme Court（最高法院）（Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe、Lord Mance 和 Lord Collins of Mapesbury JJSC）准许被告提出的上诉许可申请，继而被告提起上诉。2011年11月29日、2012年4月3日和2012年4月24日，最高法院分别准许下列人员介入该上诉：（1）Irving H Picard（欧文·H·皮卡德），作为 Bernard L Madoff Investment Securities LLC（伯纳德·L·麦道夫投资证券有限责任公司）和 Bernard L Madoff（伯纳德·L·麦道夫）业务依据 (United States) Securities Investor Protection Act 1970（〈美国〉1970年证券投资者保护法）进行实质合并 SIPA 清算的受托人；（2）Asphalia Fund Ltd（阿斯法利亚基金有限公司）；及（3）Vizcaya Partners Ltd（比斯开合伙人有限公司）。如双方商定事实与争议问题陈述所列，提交最高法院的问题为：（1）是否应依照列入 Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006（2006年跨境破产条例）的联合国国际贸易法委员会跨境破产示范法，将相关程序承认为外国主要程序；（2）是否应在与该等程序有关的范围内，将申请人承认为该示范法第 2(j) 条所称的外国代表；及（3）是否应依 CPR Pts 70 and 73，将美国破产法院2008年7月23日命令中涉及撤销程序的部分作为英国法院的判决书对被告执行。\n\n事实载于 Lord Collins of Mapesbury（梅普斯伯里的柯林斯勋爵）的判决书中。\n\nIn re New Cap Reinsurance Corpn Ltd（新资本再保险有限公司案）\n\n2011年3月15日，Lewison J（刘易森法官）[2011] EWHC 677 (Ch) 准许第一申请人 New Cap Reinsurance Corpn Ltd（in liquidation）（新资本再保险有限公司〈清算中〉）和第二申请人 John Raymond Gibbons（约翰·雷蒙德·吉本斯）（第一申请人的清算人）提出的申请，作出命令在英格兰执行 New South Wales Supreme Court（新南威尔士州最高法院）于 2009年9月11日作出的命令。该命令要求被告 AE Grant（A.E. 格兰特）及其他人作为 Lloyds Syndicate 991（劳合社 991 组合）1997年和1998年会计年度的成员，向申请人支付第一申请人向被告作出的某些终止结算付款；就该命令，该法院已向 English High Court（英格兰高等法院）发出请求协助函，请求协助执行该命令。法官认为，新南威尔士州法院的命令不能依 Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933（1933年外国判决〈互惠执行〉法）（经 Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments (Australia) Order 1994（1994年外国判决〈澳大利亚〉互惠执行令）适用于澳大利亚）登记和执行；因此，高等法院有权依普通法或 Insolvency Act 1986（1986年破产法）第 426 条协助新南威尔士州法院；且在行使其自由裁量权时，其将依第 426 条命令支付澳大利亚判决债务，以协助新南威尔士州法院。\n\n2011年8月9日，Court of Appeal（上诉法院）（Mummery、Lloyd 和 McFarlane LJJ）[2012] Ch 538 驳回被告针对法官命令提出的上诉。\n\n2011年11月30日，Supreme Court（最高法院）（Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe、Lord Mance、Lord Dyson JJSC）准许被告提出的上诉许可申请，继而被告提起上诉。2012年1月18日，最高法院（Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe、Lord Mance 和 Lord Dyson JJSC）准许申请人提出的交叉上诉许可申请，继而申请人提起交叉上诉。\n\n最高法院（Supreme Court）根据当事人共同确认的事实和争议问题陈述所须审理的争议为：（1）法院被请求适用 Insolvency Act 1986 第 426(4)条，以执行外国判决，抑或（2）法院被请求改为（i）适用 (Australian) Corporations Act 2001 第 588FF(1)条中授权法院作出命令、指示被告向原告支付金钱的部分，及/或（ii）根据法院的一般管辖权和权力，指示被告向原告支付金钱；（3）如法院被请求适用第 426(4)条以执行外国判决，该条是否延及外国判决的执行；（4）Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 第 6条是否适用于外国破产程序中作出的金钱给付判决；（5）（就交叉上诉而言）澳大利亚判决是否属于 1933 Act Part I（经 Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments (Australia) Order 1994 适用）所适用的判决；（6）（就交叉上诉而言）如澳大利亚判决属于 1933 Act Part 1 所适用的判决，澳大利亚判决中的宣告性内容是否（a）根据 1933 Act 第 8条及/或普通法具有约束力，及/或（b）能够成为司法协助的对象；（7）Rubin v Eurofinance SA [2011] Ch 133 是否裁判正确；（8）如 Rubin 一案裁判错误，英格兰法院是否会撤销根据 1933 Act 对澳大利亚判决作出的登记，以及下级法院根据 1986 Act 第 426(4)条向澳大利亚法院提供协助是否正确；（9）如第 426(4)条可适用，但根据 1933 Act 对澳大利亚判决作出的登记将被撤销，则根据第 426(4)条向澳大利亚法院提供协助是否适当；（10）被告是否已服从澳大利亚法院的破产管辖权，如是，产生何种后果；以及（11）无论如何，英格兰法院是否应依普通法向澳大利亚法院提供协助。\n\n事实载于 Lord Collins of Mapesbury（梅普斯伯里的柯林斯勋爵）的判决书中。\n\nRobin Knowles QC（罗宾·诺尔斯御用大律师）和 Blair Leahy（布莱尔·利希）（由 Edwards Wildman Palmer UK LLP（爱德华兹·威尔德曼·帕尔默英国有限责任合伙律所）受托）代表第二案的被告。\n\nInsolvency Act 1986 第 426(4)条并未规定一种程序，使得有关国家或地区中对破产法具有管辖权的法院所作判决可在英国执行。该条涉及协助，而非判决执行。判决执行由第 426(1)(2)条处理，该条仅限于由英国其他地区法院作出的命令。\n\n243 [2013] 1 AC Rubin v Eurofinance SA（欧元金融股份公司）(SC(E)) Rubin v Eurofinance 论证\n\n尽管 Lloyd LJ（劳埃德上诉法院法官）[2012] Ch 538, paras 58, 61, 72 提及以执行方式提供协助，执行不应被视为协助的一种形式。由于第 426(4)条也适用于英国其他地区具有管辖权的法院，如第 426(4)条中的协助意指执行，则第 426(1)(2)条将属多余。判决执行这一关乎管辖权的事项，历来均须由独立的规定和规则处理。在破产法的语境中，第 426(4)条是关于协助提供信息、收集证据、开展破产管理以及进行诉讼程序。\n\n如判决属于 Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 Part I 所适用的判决，必须使用该法规定的程序，即登记程序，但该登记可被申请撤销。如根据 1986 Act 第 426条属相关国家或地区的国家或地区，同时也是 1933 Act 所承认法院所在的国家或地区，则 1933 Act 第 6条要求，为追索根据外国判决应付的款项而进行的程序必须通过登记方式进行。1933 Act 程序可供采用这一事实（尽管未被采用），排除了就澳大利亚判决援引普通法下执行的可能性。\n\n根据普通法，英国法院不会执行针对未受外国法院管辖的被告所取得的外国金钱判决：见 Dicey, Morris & Collins, The Conflict of Laws, 15th ed (2012) 的 rule 43。1933 和 1986 Acts 未改变该立场。[另提及 1986 Act 第 426(4)条及 1933 Act 第 4(1)(a)(ii)条。] 上诉法院（Court of Appeal）在 Rubin 一案 [2011] Ch 133 中作出的裁判，即外国破产判决可以依普通法在英格兰和威尔士针对未受外国法院管辖的被告执行，是对既有法律的激进背离，而非普通法所能承认的渐进发展，因此属错误。合作和普遍主义的概念不足以正当化重写国际私法立场。普遍主义可适用于破产财产分配事项（见 Cambridge Gas Transportation Corpn v Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc [2007] 1 AC 508, paras 16, 22, 25 及 In re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 852, paras 6, 9），但不适用于为破产财产收集资产。合作使提供协助成为可能，但仅在国际私法允许时方可执行。国际私法最好通过全面立法和国际协定统一发展，而不应通过普通法的不确定发展来形成。在破产法中，确定性至关重要：见 In re Flightlease (Ireland) Ltd [2006] IEHC 193; [2012] IESC 12。使这一法律领域受制于自由裁量权的行使（无论在普通法下，还是根据第 426条）并不令人满意。当事人、法院和其他诉讼参与人需要在诉讼开始时，而非在试图执行判决时，知悉其法律地位。\n\nMarcus Staff（马库斯·斯塔夫）（由 Brown Rudnick LLP（布朗·鲁德尼克有限责任合伙律所）受托）代表第一案的被告。\n\n外国法院判决是否可依普通法执行，取决于其被归类为对人判决、对物判决，或 Cambridge Gas Transportation Corpn v Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc [2007] 1 AC 508 所承认类型的命令。\n\n本案中的命令不属于后一类别。Cambridge Gas 一案中命令的目的，仅在于建立一种机制，使权利已获承认或确立的债权人可对债务人的财产进行集体执行。本案中导致外国判决的请求，是在对抗程序中提出，以确定或确立权利的存在。作为一项对人判决，该判决不符合 Dicey, Morris & Collins, The Conflict of Laws, 15th ed (2012) 的 rule 43 的要求。诉讼提起时，被告并不居住在纽约，且其未通过自愿在纽约法院出庭而服从纽约法院的管辖。外国法院在被告缺席的情况下作出的判令，如被告未以任何方式服从该法院管辖，则依国际法为无效。\n\nRubin 一案 [2011] Ch 133 的裁判，严重破坏了英格兰法中有关承认和执行外国对人判决的既定原则。该裁判意味着被告无法预见其可能在何地被起诉。这种不可预见性违反欧洲法的指导原则，并损害了商业确定性原则；该原则是英格兰商法一项持续且重要的目标。如应改变有关承认外国判决的法律，则应仅就立法机关选定的国家或地区作出改变，以便能够以可预见、从而对所有当事人公平的方式厘清该改变的后果。该裁判赋予的救济远超 UNCITRAL Model Law 的规定。\n\nRobin Dicker QC（罗宾·迪克尔御用大律师）和 Tom Smith（汤姆·史密斯）（由 Chadbourne & Parke LLP（查德本与帕克有限责任合伙律所）受托）代表第一案的申请人。\n\n破产法的首要目的，是建立一种制度，在该制度下清算人基于公共利益行事，而非仅为债权人和出资人的利益行事。社会本身历来被承认对该等程序具有利益：见 In re Pantmaenog Timber Co Ltd [2004] 1 AC 158, para 52; In re Barlow Clowes Gilt Managers Ltd [1992] Ch 208, 221 及 Ex p Stegmann [1902] TS 40, 47。\n\n英格兰法认为，债权人之间的公平要求破产程序应具有普遍适用性。应有一项单一破产程序，所有债权人均有权且必须申报债权。任何人不应仅因其恰巧居住于资产较多或债权人较少所在的司法管辖区而获得优势：见 Cambridge Gas Transportation Corpn v Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc [2007] 1 AC 508, para 16; In re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 852, para 30; Bergerem v Marsh (1921) 6 B & CR 195 及 In re Impex Services Worldwide Ltd [2004] BPIR 564。英格兰及其他地区的普通法法院拒绝允许就债务人的本地资产发出执行令，前提是债务人正在另一司法管辖区的破产程序中，且债权人可在该程序中参与：见 Solomons v Ross (1764) 1 H Bl 131n; Modern Terminals (Berth 5) Ltd v States Steamship Co [1979] HKLR 512 及 CCIC Finance Ltd v Guangdong International Trust & Investment Corpn [2005] 2 HKC 589。\n\n245 [2013] 1 AC Rubin v Eurofinance SA（欧元金融股份公司）(SC(E)) Rubin v Eurofinance 论证\n\n在公司破产法发展的早期阶段，英格兰境外公司在英格兰进行具有本地效力的清盘与该债务人注册成立地进行普遍清盘之间可能存在的冲突，已通过一项法官创设的原则得到解决；该原则将英格兰程序视为主要清盘程序的附属程序：见 In re International Tin Council [1987] Ch 419, 446—447。[另提及 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (2004), paras 150—152 及 Fletcher, The Law of Insolvency, 4th ed (2009), paras 26-001—26-003。]\n\n对于外国破产程序应适用的指导原则，第一，法院应尽可能使关于同一破产债务人仅有一项具有普遍效力的破产程序这一原则得到实现；第二，应对该破产程序提供积极协助。适用这些原则可能要求法院承认并执行在外国破产程序中作出的命令。规管承认该等命令的规则，与规管承认和执行对物判决及对人判决的规则彼此独立且有别。Cambridge Gas 一案确立，存在独立于对物判决和对人判决之外的第三类判决，即构成破产程序一部分的命令。每一类别均采取不同方法。欧盟法亦承认类似区分：见 Seagon v Deko Marty Belgium NV (Case C-339/07) [2009] 1 WLR 2168; F-Tex SIA v Lietuvos-Anglijos UAB-Jadecloud-Vilma (Case C-213/10) (unreported) 19 April 2012 及 German Graphics Graphicsche Maschinen GmbH v van der Schee (Case C-292/08) [2009] ECR I-8421。\n\n为调整既往交易并追回资产以充实可供分配给债权人的财产的撤销规定，是破产程序所体现的集体执行程序不可或缺的一部分。它们是破产程序宗旨的核心，因为它们是构成债务人财产的必要手段，随后将在该财产上进行集体执行。\n\n本案所寻求的协助完全处于法院可以适当提供的范围之内：参见 Byers v Yacht Bull Corpn [2010] BCC 368；Oakley v Ultra Vehicle Design Ltd [2006] BCC 57；以及 UBS AG v Omni Holding AG [2000] 1 WLR 916。\n\n判决书的相关部分亦可根据《跨境破产条例 2006》（Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006，SI 2006/1030）实施的《示范法》获得承认和执行。该条例所制定的《示范法》下的处理方式与普通法下的处理方式一致。法院有权给予适当救济，包括实施国法律所提供的任何类型救济。在本案中，所寻求的救济反映了若该信托在英格兰处于破产程序中，则依据英格兰成文法制度本可获得的救济。因此，该救济属于英格兰法下可获得的一类救济。此外，所寻求的救济符合债权人的利益，因为其将有助于追回资产，并按照适用的成文法制度向该信托的债权人进行分配。[援引了 In re Atlas Shipping A/S (2009) 404 BR 726；In re Metcalfe & Manseld Alternative Investments (2010) 421 BR 685；以及 In re Condor Insurance Ltd (2010) 601 F 3d 319。]\n\n无论依据普通法还是《示范法》，均无理由认为法院不应行使其管辖权，通过承认和执行判决书的相关部分，向 Chapter 11 程序提供协助。\n\nGabriel Moss QC（加布里埃尔·莫斯御用大律师）和 Barry Isaacs QC（巴里·艾萨克斯御用大律师）（由 Mayer Brown International LLP（Mayer Brown 国际有限责任合伙）受托）代表第二案中的申请人。\n\n法官根据《Insolvency Act 1986》第426条和／或普通法，准予请求书中所寻求的救济，是正确的。跨境破产的性质决定，一法域的法院应当就位于其领土内的资产或居住于其领土内的人员，向另一法域的法院提供其能够适当提供的一切协助：参见 Credit Suisse Fides Trust SA v Cuoghi [1998] QB 818, 827。\n\n第426条并非仅涉及程序，而是实体破产制度的一部分。其对英格兰法院施加义务，要求其向相关国家和地区的破产法院提供协助：参见第426(4)(5)(10)条。澳大利亚程序依据 Australian Corporations Act 2001（《澳大利亚公司法 2001》）第588FF(1)条提起，该条对应于 1986 Act 第239条。请求英格兰法院适用第588FF(1)条中授权法院作出命令、指示某人向公司支付款项的部分。英格兰法院在给予此种形式的协助时，适用的是澳大利亚破产法；其并非将第426条适用于执行外国判决书。法院亦被请求依据其一般管辖权和权力作出命令，指示某人支付款项。英格兰法院有权根据第426条，通过协助澳大利亚法院的方式适用其自身的一般管辖权和权力：参见 Hughes v Hannover Ruckversicherungs-Aktiengesellschaft [1997] 1 BCLC 497, 517。《破产法与实务审查委员会报告》(Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice (1982) (Cmnd 8558))提及外国破产判决书的执行：参见第1902段。\n\n《Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933》（《1933年外国判决（相互执行）法》）第6条不适用于外国破产程序中要求支付款项的判决书。1933 Act 的意图是提供一种比普通法所提供的方式更简便且更便利的执行方式。该法仅适用于过去通过基于外国判决书提起普通法诉讼来执行外国判决书的情形。在 1933 Act 颁布前，外国破产判决书的地位受 Bankruptcy Act 1914（《1914年破产法》）第122条规管。没有迹象表明 1933 Act 意图影响这一既存管辖权。促成 1933 Act 通过的 Greer Report（格里尔报告）并未涉及 Bankruptcy Act 1914：参见 Report of the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Committee (1932) (Cmd 4213)。\n\n规管破产程序的规则已显著偏离民法的一般规定：参见 Seagon v Deko Marty Belgium NV (Case C-339/07) [2009] 1 WLR 2168, 2175, 2176—2178, paras 27, 33, 35, 39。上诉法院 [2011] Ch 133 的裁决是正确的。该裁决的新颖之处仅在于，将 Cambridge Gas Transportation Corpn v O–cial Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc [2007] 1 AC 508 和 In re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 852 中的原则，适用于一项要求支付一笔款项的外国破产判决书。至于拒绝遵循 Cambridge Gas 推理的 In re Flightlease (Ireland) Ltd [2006] IEHC 193; [2012] IESC 12，参见 In re Drumm (A Bankrupt) (unreported) 13 December 2010 (High Court of Ireland) 以及 Faireld Sentry Ltd v Citco Bank Nederland NV [2012] IEHC 81。\n\n无论如何，本案被告通过参加与该已清算公司有关的债权人会议，并在管理、清算及安排计划中提交债权证明，已接受澳大利亚法院的管辖。他们既已选择接受该澳大利亚破产程序的管辖，就不应被允许在从该程序获益的同时，不承担遵守该程序中所作命令的负担。\n\nPushpinder Saini QC（普什平德·赛尼御用大律师）、Adrian Briggs（阿德里安·布里格斯）、Shaheed Fatima（沙希德·法蒂玛）、Ian Fletcher（伊恩·弗莱彻）和 Stephen Robins（斯蒂芬·罗宾斯）（由 Taylor Wessing LLP（泰勒·韦辛有限责任合伙）受托）通过书面陈述，代表第一案中的第一介入人。\n\n作为英格兰国际私法事项，有必要区分：(a) 对物判决和对人判决；以及 (b) 构成外国破产程序不可分割部分的外国命令：参见 Cambridge Gas Transportation Corp v O–cial Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc [2007] 1 AC 508, paras 13—15；以及 Pattni v Ali [2007] 2 AC 85, para 23。这一区分的效果是，如外国法院就执行外国破产命令寻求英格兰的协助，该等协助（属酌情决定）不受 Dicey, Morris & Collins, The Conict of Laws, 15th ed (2012) 第43规则所载关于执行外国对物判决或对人判决的英格兰国际私法规则约束。作出这一区分，是因为对物判决和对人判决的执行植根于义务理论；在英格兰寻求承认和执行时，外国程序中的胜诉方能够证明，另一方因受外国判决书既判事项效力的约束而对其负有义务。相反，破产中的跨境司法协助与合作，并非涉及法院解决私人诉讼当事人之间争议的职能，而是涉及以更广泛公共利益为考量、在集体程序中管理无力偿债财产这一独立职能：参见 Ex p Stegmann [1902] TS 40；以及 In re Barlow Clowes Gilt Managers Ltd [1992] Ch 208, 220—221。英格兰普通法认为，破产程序应具有普遍适用性。这要求破产法院所管理的财产应为无力偿债债务人的全球财产。为使受理全球财产管理的法院能够有效管理该财产，其他法域的法院经常有必要依照修正普遍主义原则提供协助，以推进该目标：参见 In re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 852, para 30；以及 Credit Suisse Fides Trust SA v Cuoghi [1998] QB 818, 827。为有效发挥作用，破产程序必须能够挫败债务人及关联债权人的不正当行为。\n\n在确定外国命令是否属于破产命令时，正确的处理方法是考察其是否构成外国破产程序的一部分。脱离具体语境，孤立地考察该命令的效果是否类似于对物判决或对人判决，因而考察该命令是否确立权利而非寻求执行权利，并不正确。对物判决和对人判决依其定义均会确立权利。概括而言，如外国命令对于外国破产法为向债权人收集和分配无力偿债财产资产所设制度不可或缺，则其将构成外国破产程序的一部分。尤其是，撤销命令（其并非英格兰或美国破产程序所独有，而是每一发达破产法制度的特征）构成破产程序不可或缺的一部分：参见 Oakley v Ultra Vehicle Design Ltd [2006] BCC 57, para 42；AWB (Geneva) SA v North American Steamships Ltd [2007] 2 Lloyds Rep 315, para 27；以及 HIH case [2008] 1 WLR 852, para 19。如英格兰法院正在考虑是否行使其酌处权以协助外国法院，则存在有利于提供协助的推定；因此，除非有充分理由拒绝，否则应提供协助。破产命令所针对的人在传票发出时并未身处外国，对此无关紧要。\n\nMichael Driscoll QC（迈克尔·德里斯科尔御用大律师）和 Rosanna Foskett（罗珊娜·福斯凯特）（由 Wilsons Solicitors LLP（Wilsons 律师事务所有限责任合伙）受托）通过书面陈述，代表第一案中的第二介入人；并（由 Wedlake Bell LLP（Wedlake Bell 有限责任合伙）受托）代表第一案中的第三介入人。\n\n英格兰法院协助外国代表的固有管辖权（该表述见于 UNCITRAL Model Law（联合国国际贸易法委员会示范法）第2条）不应延伸至执行外国代表在外国法院依据外国法原则，对第三方被告取得的任何金钱判决书；在依英格兰国际私法，外国法院对该被告不具有适格管辖权的情况下，该固有管辖权因而亦不应延伸至执行针对被告的金钱判决书。英格兰法院所应给予的协助，应限于承认外国代表，以及承认其任命赋予其对债务人财产享有的权利和权力。该协助应延伸至授权外国代表在英格兰提起与英格兰代表可依据英格兰法原则提起的程序相当的程序，而非依据外国法提起的程序。\n\n尽管许多国家的破产法均包含规定，以撤销债务人在破产程序开始前作出的某些优先受偿和欺诈性转让，但这些法律的运作方式及其后果均存在实质性差异。尤其是，依据 United States Securities Investor Protection Act（美国证券投资者保护法，SIPA）进行的清算，使美国 SIPA 受托人得以提出英格兰清算人或破产受托人不能提出的撤销请求。此外，美国 SIPA 受托人成功提出撤销请求的后果，损害而非贯彻债务人全体无担保债权人之间公平按比例分配这一基本原则。对于外国代表人在外国法院的破产程序中针对第三人取得的金钱判决，如该第三人依英格兰法不受该外国法院管辖，英格兰法院不应通过自行假定议会未赋予其的管辖权来创设新法，以执行该判决。\n\n缺席判决是由对被告不具有适格管辖权的外国法院作出的对人判决，因而不足以使该等缺席判决在英格兰法院当然可执行：参见 Adams v Cape Industries plc [1990] Ch 433, 513, 528, 530—544, 549—550, 557—572。因此，就英格兰法院而言，该等判决无效。在 Rubin 案 [2011] Ch 133 的上诉法院判决作出之前，尚无英格兰法院曾进一步以行使裁量权的方式执行在此等情形下取得的金钱判决。\n\n立法机关以及行政机关通过其缔约权力，比司法机关更适合发展和扩展英格兰法院与其他法院在跨境破产领域的合作法律。普遍主义原则只能通过国际条约适当地形成。\n\nKnowles QC（诺尔斯御用大律师）作答辩。\n\nStaff（斯塔夫）亦作答辩。\n\n法院留待审议。\n\n24 October 2012。以下判决予以宣告。\n\nLORD COLLINS OF MAPESBURY（梅普斯伯里的柯林斯勋爵）（LORD WALKER OF GESTINGTHORPE（盖斯廷索普的沃克勋爵）和 LORD SUMPTION JJSC（萨姆普申大法官）同意）\n\nI 导言\n\n上诉\n\n1 本院现有两宗上诉：Rubin v Eurofinance SA（鲁宾诉欧洲金融股份公司；Rubin 案）及 New Cap Reinsurance Corpn Ltd v Grant（新凯普再保险有限公司诉格兰特；New Cap 案）。该等上诉提出国际破产法中的一项重要且新颖的问题。问题在于，外国法院在调整或撤销先前交易的程序中作出的命令或判决（本上诉中为 United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York（纽约南区美国破产法院）及 New South Wales Supreme Court（新南威尔士州最高法院）作出的命令或判决），例如优先受偿或低价交易（撤销程序），是否以及在何种情形下将在英格兰获得承认和执行。该等上诉还提出，是否可以通过 UNCITRAL Model Law（联合国国际贸易法委员会示范法）的国际协助规定（由 Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006（CBIR）实施，且一般适用）或 Insolvency Act 1986 第426条的协助规定（适用于包括澳大利亚在内的有限数目的国家）实现执行。\n\n2 在 Rubin 案中，United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York（下称美国破产法院）就欺诈性让与和转让，依据州法和联邦法作出约 US$10m 的未出庭缺席判决，并依普通法在英格兰获得执行。在 New Cap 案中（该案的上诉法院受 Rubin 案先前判决的约束），New South Wales Supreme Court, Equity Division（新南威尔士州最高法院衡平法庭）就澳大利亚法下的不公平优先受偿作出约 US$8m 的缺席判决，该判决依据 Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 获得执行，或作为备选，依据 Insolvency Act 1986 第426条赋予的权力获得执行。\n\n3 在每宗上诉中，均获承认或认定，被作出判决的一方既未在该外国境内（就 1933 年法而言，亦未居住于该外国）出现，亦未接受该国法院的管辖；而该等条件本为普通法及 1933 年法下可执行性的相关条件，但不适用于外国破产程序中的判决或命令。\n\n4 除两宗上诉中的论点外，本院还极大受益于代表在 Gibraltar（直布罗陀）待决程序当事方提交的书面陈述。该等程序旨在执行美国破产法院就据称向 British Virgin Islands（英属维尔京群岛）及 Cayman Islands（开曼群岛）公司的优先付款所作出的约 $247m 缺席判决；该等付款源于 Mr Bernard Madoff（伯纳德·麦道夫先生）实施的臭名昭著的庞氏骗局。\n\n5 有必要强调，全部三项事务中的判决均系因未出庭而作出，因为如果判决债务人在外国法院出庭并对程序进行抗辩，本上诉中的争议便不会产生。原因在于，判决将基于被告接受外国法院管辖而具有可执行性。执行将依普通法进行；或在 New Cap 案中，依普通法或依实质上重述普通法原则的 1933 年法进行——本上诉还附带涉及 1933 年法是否适用于破产程序中的判决的问题，载于下文第IX节。\n\n6 根据普通法，外国法院在下列情形（及其他情形）下有管辖权作出对人判决：在程序启动时，判决债务人身处该外国；或者判决债务人通过自愿出庭参与程序而接受外国法院的管辖。就 1933 年法而言，如判决债务人自愿出庭参与程序而接受管辖（但为包括对管辖权提出异议在内的目的而出庭者除外）；或者在程序启动时判决债务人居住于该地，或作为法人团体在该地设有办事处或营业场所，则该外国法院被视为具有管辖权：section 4(2)(a)(i)(iv)。\n\n戴西规则\n\n7 本上诉中所称的一般原则，是参照 Dicey, Morris & Collins, The Conflict of Laws, 14th ed (2006) 所列的普通法规则，即戴西规则36。此仅为简略称谓，因为 1933 年法中的规则并非完全相同；而且无论如何，这样称呼纯为便利，因为该规则除其试图重述的普通法判例外，并不具有任何独立权威。原规则36现载于新版第15版中，作为规则43（纳入了与本上诉无关的一些修改），我将称其为戴西规则。就相关部分而言，规则43（Dicey, Morris & Collins, The Conflict of Laws, 15th ed (2012), vol 1, para 14R-054）规定：\n\n英国以外某外国法院，在下列情形下具有作出可对被作出判决之人执行或予以承认的对人判决的管辖权：\n\n第一种情形——如被作出判决之人在程序启动时身处该外国。\n\n第二种情形——如被作出判决之人是在外国法院程序中的原告，或提出反诉者。\n\n第三种情形——如被作出判决之人通过自愿出庭参与程序而接受该法院的管辖。\n\n第四种情形——如被作出判决之人在程序开始前，就程序标的同意接受该法院或该国法院的管辖。\n\n8 Dicey 1896 年第一版规定（规则80），如被告居住于［或身处？］该外国，从而享受该国法律的利益并受其保护，则外国法院具有管辖权。至 1949 年第6版，Professor Wortley（沃特利教授）重述该表述（规则68），但删除了对在场是否构成管辖权基础的疑问。1967 年第8版中，Dr Clive Parry（克莱夫·帕里博士，后任教授）删除了有关享受并受外国法律保护的措辞（当时为规则189）。该规则其后由 Dr Morris（莫里斯博士）编辑，再后由 Professor Kahn-Freund（卡恩-弗洛因德教授）编辑，均维持该形式，直至 Adams v Cape Industries plc [1990] Ch 433 (CA) 的判决；该判决确立，在外国管辖区域内身处当地而非居住于当地，是承认外国判决的充分基础。此后，该规则由本人编辑，后由 Professor Briggs（布里格斯教授）编辑，并于 1993 年第12版中基本形成其现行形式。\n\n9 普通法下执行外国判决的理论基础是：执行外国判决基于如下原则，即有管辖权的法院裁判某人应向另一人支付某一确定金额时，即产生支付该金额的法律义务，并可据此维持旨在执行判决的债务之诉：Williams v Jones (1845) 13 M&W 628, 633, per Parke B; Godard v Gray (1870) LR 6 QB 139, 147, per Blackburn J; Adams v Cape Industries plc [1990] Ch 433, 513 and Owens Bank Ltd v Bracco [1992] 2 AC 443, 484, per Lord Bridge of Harwich。正如 Blackburn J 在 Godard v Gray 中所述，此系基于在债务之诉中对外国判决的诉讼主张方式，而非仅将其作为支付基础债务义务的证据：LR 6 QB 139, 150。\n\n但这只是普通法下执行外国判决的纯理论和历史基础。它不适用于依制定法进行的执行，对分析亦不产生实际影响，并且依我之判断，对本上诉中的争议也不产生实际影响。\n\n10 因此，如本上诉中争议的判决被视为戴西规则意义上的对人判决，则只有在程序启动时判决债务人身处该外国（或者，如 1933 年法适用，则居住于该外国），或其接受该国管辖时，该等判决方可依普通法在英格兰获得执行。各方均承认，判决债务人并未分别身处或居住于美国或澳大利亚，尽管 New Cap 被告是否接受澳大利亚法院管辖仍存在争议，该问题载于下文第VIII节。\n\n破产程序及国际层面\n\n11 有若干一般性意见需要提出。第一，早在18世纪中叶，英格兰法院已承认依据住所地法宣告的外国个人破产的效力：Solomons v Ross (1764) 1 H Bl 131n，其中荷兰商人在 Amsterdam（阿姆斯特丹）被宣告破产，荷兰破产财产管理人被认定有权优先于该等商人的一名英格兰债权人追收一笔英格兰债权；该债权人在破产后扣押了该债权：参见 Nadelmann, Conflict of Laws: International and Interstate (1972), p 273 and Blom-Cooper, Bankruptcy in Private International Law (1954), pp 107—108。\n\n12 在 Galbraith（加尔布雷斯）v Grimshaw（格里姆肖）[1910] AC 508 一案中，Lord Dunedin（邓尼丁勋爵）表示，对破产人财产的分配应当只有一个普遍程序；如该程序正在其他地方进行，英格兰法院不应允许在其管辖范围内采取会干扰该程序的步骤：\n\n就该一般原则而言，如果法院发现已经存在对破产人财产进行普遍分配的程序正在进行，则不应允许在其领土内采取会干扰该普遍分配程序的步骤；将此作为一项国际法规则，完全符合国家间礼让原则……：p 513。\n\n13 第二，就公司而言，英格兰法院行使的清盘管辖权，比其根据普通法赋予外国法院的管辖权更为广泛。如公司与英格兰之间存在充分联系，有人员将因作出清盘令而受益，并且对公司资产分配具有利害关系的人员属于法院可对其行使管辖权的人员，法院即对外国公司行使清盘管辖权：见 Dicey（戴西），15th ed, para 30R-036。但就外国清算而言，一般规则是，英格兰法院根据普通法仅承认依公司注册地法律任命的清算人的权限：Dicey, 15th ed, para 30R-100。这与主要国际和区域文书中的现代做法形成对比，即 EC Insolvency Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings（《EC破产程序条例》，Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000）（以下简称 EC Insolvency Regulation）及 Model Law（《示范法》）所采取的做法；该做法认为，具有国际管辖权的是债务人主要利益中心所在国的法院（这一表述本身并非没有困难）。其最终源自大陆法中商人住所的概念，并于 1980 年 EEC Convention 草案中实质上被采纳，作为债务人管理中心的定义：见 M Lemontey（勒蒙泰）就 EEC Bankruptcy Convention 草案所作报告，Bulletin of the European Communities, Supp 2/82, p 58；American Law Institute（美国法律学会）, Transnational Insolvency: Global Principles for Co-operation in International Insolvency Cases (2012), Principle 13, pp 83 et seq.\n\n14 第三，具有重大跨境影响的大型破产程序并非仅在近年才出现。在此之前，已有 1930 年代的 Russian bank cases（源于苏维埃政府将银行国有化并予以解散）以及 1940 年代和 1950 年代的 Barcelona Traction case（见 Case concerning Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co Ltd（巴塞罗那牵引、电力和照明有限公司）(Second Phase) (Belgium v Spain) [1970] ICJ Rep 3），但毫无疑问，如今跨境破产中的国际合作已成为迫切需要。只须回顾 Bank of Credit and Commerce International（国际信贷商业银行）、Maxwell Communications（麦克斯韦通讯公司）或 Lehman Brothers（雷曼兄弟）的破产或清算即可；这些企业均拥有国际业务、位于众多国家的资产，以及可能适用不同法律并相互竞争的不同国家债权人。不仅需要平衡所有这些利益，还需要提供迅速而有效的救济，以应对利用跨境资产转移逃避债务及欺诈债权人的行为。\n\n15 第四，在破产法的具体细节上，并不存在国际一致性或重大协调，因为破产法在很大程度上反映国家公共政策，例如关于优先顺位，或关于适用撤销规定的条件：资产归集程序将包括例如行使撤销可撤销处分的权力，而该等权力可能与英格兰法定制度下的权力存在极大差异：In re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd（HIH意外及综合保险有限公司）(HIH) [2008] 1 WLR 852, para 19, per Lord Hoffmann（霍夫曼勋爵）。\n\n16 第五，存在一种趋势，但仅是一种趋势，即所谓的普遍主义，亦即由一个主导法院适用单一破产法管理跨国破产：Jay Westbrook（杰伊·韦斯特布鲁克）, A Global Solution to Multinational Default (2000) 98 Mich L Rev 2276, 2277。由此产生的是专家所谓的修正普遍主义。\n\n17 自该表述于 19 世纪首次使用以来，普遍主义一词的含义已经发生变化，后来又与统一性理论相对照。1834 年，Story（斯托里）提到一种理论，即根据破产或无力清偿法律作出的让与，属于且应当具有普遍效力，以转移动产，无论该动产位于何国；并得出结论认为，采纳以下规则具有高度智慧，即破产中的让与应当在国内外对其全部动产产生完整且有效的转移效力；一国优先保护扣押财产的本国债权人而非外国受让人或外国债权人，几乎不能被视为符合国家间的一般礼让原则……真正的规则是，遵循该一般原则的指引，即将所有人住所地法律视为对其个人财产处分具有决定性效力，\n\n并援引 Solomons（所罗门斯）v Ross（罗斯）1 H Bl 131n 作为支持该理论的依据：Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, 1st ed (1834), pp 340—341, para 406。\n\n18 Professor Cheshire（柴郡教授）在其第一版著作中（Cheshire, Private International Law (1935), pp 375—376）表示，尽管英格兰法忽视统一性理论，但其承认普遍性理论。他的意思是，英格兰法主张在资产所在地国家分别进行独立破产程序，而非在住所地国家进行单一破产程序（统一性理论）；但也承认外国受托人对位于英格兰的动产享有权利，前提是英格兰境内尚未启动破产程序（普遍性理论）。他援引 Solomons v Ross 作为该主张的依据：\n\n英格兰法院……一贯适用普遍性理论；根据该理论，其认为，无论全部动产于依外国法作出让与时位于何处，均转移给受托人。\n\n19 在 HIH [2008] 1 WLR 852, para 30 中，Lord Hoffmann 表示：\n\n在我看来，适用于本案的国际私法首要规则是（修正）普遍主义原则；自 18 世纪以来，该原则一直是贯穿英格兰跨境破产法的主线。该原则要求英格兰法院在符合公正和英国公共政策的范围内，与主清算所在地国家的法院合作，以确保公司的全部资产依单一分配制度分配给其债权人。\n\n并且，在 Cambridge Gas Transportation Corporation（剑桥燃气运输公司）v Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc（导航控股有限公司）(Cambridge Gas) [2007] 1 AC 508, para 16 中，他代表 Privy Council（枢密院）表示：\n\n英格兰普通法传统上认为，债权人之间的公平要求，理想情况下，破产程序应具有普遍适用性。应当只有一个破产程序，所有债权人均有权且必须在其中申报债权。任何人不应仅因其恰好居住在资产更多或债权人更少的司法管辖区而获得优势。\n\n20 US Bankruptcy Court（美国破产法院）在 In re Maxwell Communication Corpn (1994) 170 BR 800 (Bankr SDNY) 中接受了如下观点：美国法院已将修正普遍主义作为国际破产事务的处理方式：\n\n美国在附属破产案件中已采纳一种处理国际破产事务的方法，即修正形式的普遍主义；该方法接受普遍主义的核心前提，即资产应在全球范围内归集和分配，但保留地方法院评估本国程序公平性并保护当地债权人利益的裁量权。\n\nII 国际合作与协助\n\n21 至少自 1889 年《Montevideo Treaty on International Commercial Law》Title X 起，国际破产管辖权一直是多边国际文书的主题，尽管双边条约可追溯至更早时期；破产事务的国际承认与合作问题，也曾由 International Law Association（国际法协会）(1879)、Institut de droit international（国际法学会）(1888—1912) 和 Hague Conference on Private International Law（海牙国际私法会议）(1904) 早期讨论：见 Nadelmann（纳德尔曼）, pp 299 et seq.\n\n22 在较现代时期，European Convention on Certain International Aspects of Bankruptcy（《破产若干国际方面欧洲公约》）（Istanbul Convention）于 1990 年在 Council of Europe（欧洲委员会）主持下缔结，但从未生效。European Community/Union（欧洲共同体/联盟）的倡议历经 40 年才得以实现。1960 年，European Community 启动制定 Bankruptcy Convention 的项目，促成了 1980 年的 Convention 草案，后者遭到显著反对。但该项目于 1989 年重启，并于 1995 年提交 Convention 草案；该草案规定，只有在当时 15 个成员国全部签署后方可生效。然而，United Kingdom（英国）是各国中唯一未签署该 Convention 的国家（出于政治原因），因此该 Convention 从未生效。1999 年，该项目以 Council Regulation 的形式重新启动，并于 2000 年形成 EC Insolvency Regulation (Council Regulation No 1346/2000)。\n\n23 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law（联合国国际贸易法委员会，UNCITRAL）于 1997 年通过了跨境破产 Model Law（《示范法》）。\n\n该 Model Law 是在 International Bar Association（国际律师协会）于 1980 年代提出倡议，以及后来 INSOL International（International Association of Restructuring, Insolvency and Bankruptcy Professionals，国际重组、破产与无力清偿专业人士协会）提出倡议后通过的。1993 年，UNCITRAL 通过决议，调查制定跨境破产协调规则的可行性。1994 年，成立了一个由 INSOL 成员和 UNCITRAL Secretariat（UNCITRAL 秘书处）代表组成的专家委员会；在一系列报告和草案之后，UNCITRAL 于 1997 年 5 月通过了 Model Law。Model Law 规定向外国法院和职务持有人提供广泛协助。其已由 19 个国家和地区实施，包括 United States（美国）和 Great Britain（大不列颠）（尽管一些国家仅以互惠为基础实施）。直至 2006 年，Great Britain 才通过 CBIR 将其制定为法律。\n\n24 除 EC Insolvency Regulation 外，这些文书均未明确处理破产程序中判决书的执行问题。下文第 IV 节将讨论 Model Law 是否通过默示方式处理该问题。\n\n25 因此，英格兰法下协助其他司法管辖区破产程序的主要方法有四种，其中两种属于区域性或国际性约定机制的一部分。第一，Insolvency Act 1986 第 426 条规定了一项法定权力，可协助该法规定的国家，或由国务大臣为此目的指定的国家的公司及个人破产程序。目前适用该条的所有国家，均为普通法国家或与英格兰具有共同法律传统的国家。其中包括 Australia（澳大利亚）：the Cooperation of Insolvency Courts (Designation of Relevant Countries and Territories) Order 1986 (SI 1986/2123)。\n\n26 第二，EC Insolvency Regulation（欧共体破产条例）适用于主要利益中心（COMI）位于欧洲联盟境内（不包括丹麦）的债务人的破产程序。EC Insolvency Regulation（欧共体破产条例）与本次上诉无关，因为没有任何债务人的主要利益中心位于欧洲联盟境内。\n\n27 第三，CBIR（跨境破产条例）于 4 April 2006 生效，以实施Model Law（示范法）。CBIR（跨境破产条例）补充普通法，但不取代普通法。Model Law（示范法）第7条规定：本法的任何规定均不限制法院或英国破产管理人依大不列颠其他法律向外国代表提供额外协助的权力。\n\n28 Model Law（示范法）第23条允许外国代表依据Insolvency Act 1986（1986年破产法）提出撤销请求，且CBIR（跨境破产条例）自其于 4 April 2006 生效后适用于偏颇清偿。UNCITRAL Guide to Enactment（联合国国际贸易法委员会《颁布指南》）（可为解释CBIR（跨境破产条例）之目的而援引）还强调，Model Law（示范法）使制定法国家能够向外国破产程序提供在国内破产程序中可获得的那类救济（UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (2005), Annex III, Ch IV, p 311, para 20(b)）：\n\nModel Law（示范法）向制定法国家提供了这样一种可能性：使因承认外国程序而产生的救济，与本国法律中在可比程序下可获得的救济相一致……\n\n29 第四，依普通法，法院有权承认并向外国破产程序提供协助。普通法原则是，可以向具有国际因素的破产程序中的外国破产管理人提供协助。其基本原则曾以不同方式表述：承认……伴随着法院的积极协助：In re African Farms Ltd [1906] TS 373, 377；本院……将尽最大努力与US Bankruptcy Court（美国破产法院）合作，并避免采取任何可能扰乱[该公司]在Texas（得克萨斯州）依第11章进行有序管理的行动：Banque Indosuez SA v Ferromet Resources Inc [1993] BCLC 112, 117。\n\n30 在Credit Suisse Fides Trust v Cuoghi [1998] QB 818, 827中，Millett LJ（米利特上诉法官）表示：\n\n在其他法律领域，例如跨境破产，商业必要性已促使各国法院在无需等待该等合作获得国际公约认可的情况下相互提供协助……人们日益普遍接受，不同国家法院之间的国际礼让要求相互尊重彼此管辖权的属地完整性，但这不应妨碍一个管辖区的法院，就位于该管辖区境内的资产或居住于该管辖区境内的人，向另一管辖区的法院提供其能够适当提供的任何协助。\n\n31 普通法协助案件所涉事项包括：将英格兰资产归属外国破产管理人，或中止本地程序，或作出支持外国程序的讯问命令，或命令将资产汇往外国清算程序；并且所涉案件中，外国法院均为有管辖权的法院，即破产人为该外国的住所居民，或者如为公司，则该公司在该外国注册成立。\n\n32 早期的一宗承认案件是Solomons v Ross 1 H B1 131n。如我所述，该破产程序在Holland（荷兰）进行，破产人为在Amsterdam（阿姆斯特丹）被宣告破产的荷兰商人，并裁定荷兰破产管理人有权追收一笔英格兰债务：另见Bergerem v Marsh (1921) 6 B & CR 195（比利时商行的英格兰成员接受比利时破产程序：位于英格兰的动产归属比利时受托人）。\n\n33 有一组案件涉及因外国破产程序而中止本地程序或撤销命令。因此，在Banque Indosuez SA v Ferromet Resources Inc [1993] BCLC 112中，针对正进行第11章程序的一家Texas（得克萨斯州）公司的英格兰禁令被撤销；参见In re African Farms Ltd [1906] TS 373（Transvaal（德兰士瓦）法院中止债权人在Transvaal（德兰士瓦）针对一家正在英格兰清算的英格兰公司进行的执行），并适用于Turners & Growers Exporters Ltd v The Ship Cornelis Verolme [1997] 2 NZLR 110（比利时船东处于比利时破产程序中：船舶被解除扣押）；Modern Terminals (Berth 5) Ltd v States Steamship Co [1979] HKLR 512（中止在Hong Kong（香港）对一家在California（加利福尼亚州）美国联邦法院进行第11章程序的Nevada（内华达州）公司的执行），后经CCIC Finance Ltd v Guangdong International Trust & Investment Corpn [2005] 2 HKC 589遵循（中止在Hong Kong（香港）针对一家在Mainland（中国内地）进行破产程序的中国国有企业的程序）。传统意义上的司法协助案件包括In re Impex Services Worldwide Ltd [2004] BPIR 564，其中作出了一项Manx（马恩岛）讯问及提交文件命令，以协助一家英格兰公司在英格兰进行的临时清算程序。\n\n34 涉及将资产从英格兰汇往外国破产管理人的案件包括In re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 10) [1997] Ch 213（Luxembourg（卢森堡）公司在Luxembourg（卢森堡）进行清算）；以及HIH [2008] 1 WLR 852（Lord Hoffmann（霍夫曼勋爵）及Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe（格斯廷索普的沃克勋爵）的观点）（Australian（澳大利亚）保险公司在Australian（澳大利亚）进行清算）；以及In re SwissAir Schweizerische Luftverkehr-Aktiengesellschaft [2010] BCC 667（Swiss（瑞士）公司在Swiss（瑞士）进行清算）。\n\n三、Cambridge Gas和HIH判决\n\n35 Lord Hoffmann（霍夫曼勋爵）代表Privy Council（枢密院）在Cambridge Gas [2007] 1 AC 508中发表的意见，以及其在House of Lords（上议院）就HIH [2008] 1 WLR 852发表的演讲，在Court of Appeal（上诉法院）的裁决及当事人就本次上诉提出的论点中发挥了如此重大的作用，因此宜在此对其加以说明。\n\nCambridge Gas\n\n36 Cambridge Gas [2007] 1 AC 508的概略事实如下。1997年，一名Swiss（瑞士）商人Mr Giovanni Mahler（乔瓦尼·马勒先生）创办了一项航运业务。投资者在New York（纽约）债券市场借入 \\$300m，该业务购入五艘天然气运输船。该项目失败，并以在New York（纽约）US Bankruptcy Court（美国破产法院）进行的第11章程序告终。Privy Council（枢密院）在审理来自Isle of Man（马恩岛）的上诉时所面对的问题是，New York（纽约）法院的一项命令是否有权在Isle of Man（马恩岛）获得执行。\n\n37 该业务的公司结构为：投资者直接或间接拥有一家名为Vela Energy Holdings Ltd（维拉能源控股有限公司）（Vela）的Bahamian（巴哈马）公司。Vela通过一家中间Bahamian（巴哈马）控股公司拥有Cambridge Gas（一家开曼群岛公司）。\n\n38 Cambridge Gas直接或间接拥有Navigator Holdings plc（纳维盖特控股有限公司）（Navigator）约70%的股份，Navigator是一家Isle of Man（马恩岛）公司。Navigator拥有一家Isle of Man（马恩岛）公司的全部股份，该公司继而拥有若干公司，每家公司各拥有一艘船舶。\n\n39 2003年，Navigator向US Bankruptcy Court（美国破产法院）申请依据US Bankruptcy Code（美国破产法）第11章获得救济；该章允许资不抵债公司在法院监督下及在中止令保护下，与其债权人协商重组计划。该申请由投资者利益方提出，其提出一项计划，名义上通过拍卖出售船舶，但实际上出售给原投资者；但债券持有人未接受该计划，并提出其自身计划，根据该计划，Navigator的资产将归属债权人，而原投资者的股权权益将被消灭。法官驳回了投资者的计划，并批准了债权人的计划。\n\n40 该计划用以将资产归属债权人的机制，是将Navigator的股份归属其代表，即债权人委员会。这将使其能够控制航运公司并实施该计划。该计划规定，一经作出确认命令，Navigator全部普通股的所有权即归属债权人委员会，以使其能够实施该计划。New York（纽约）法院确认该计划的命令记载，该法院拟向Manx（马恩岛）法院发出请求书，请求协助使该计划及确认命令生效；该请求书随后已发出。债权人委员会继而向Manx（马恩岛）法院申请一项命令，将股份归属其代表。\n\n41 此时有必要强调本案的两个特点。第一个特点是，Navigator是一家Isle of Man（马恩岛）公司，其70%的普通股由Cambridge Gas直接或间接拥有。根据通常的冲突法原则，该等股份应位于Isle of Man（马恩岛）：Dicey, 15th ed, para 22-045。这就是Lord Hoffmann（霍夫曼勋爵）在第6段表示，New York（纽约）法院知悉将Navigator普通股所有权归属债权人委员会的命令不能当然依Isle of Man（马恩岛）法律生效的原因；也是他承认（第12—13段）若该判决为对物判决，则其不能影响位于Isle of Man（马恩岛）的股份所有权的原因。\n\n42 第二个有必要强调的特点是，Cambridge Gas是一家Cayman Islands（开曼群岛）公司，且其未接受US Bankruptcy Court（美国破产法院）的管辖权（如Manx（马恩岛）法院所认定）。Lord Hoffmann（霍夫曼勋爵）在第8段表示，Cambridge Gas未接受US Bankruptcy Court（美国破产法院）管辖权的立场，与经济现实几乎无关，因为New York（纽约）程序是在股东与债权人提出的相互竞争计划之间进行争议的基础上开展的；Cambridge Gas的母公司Vela参与了第11章程序；且该程序由Navigator提起。因此，Cambridge Gas关于其未接受管辖的主张高度技术化，但其未对Manx（马恩岛）法院认定其未接受管辖的裁决提出上诉。然而，Lord Hoffmann（霍夫曼勋爵）也承认，若US Bankruptcy Court（美国破产法院）的命令被视为对人判决，则其无权在Isle of Man（马恩岛）获得承认或执行，因为New York（纽约）法院对Cambridge Gas不具有属人管辖权：第10段。\n\n43 尽管如此，Privy Council（枢密院）裁定，该计划可在Isle of Man（马恩岛）实施。其推理如下：第一，若该判决必须被归类为对人判决或对物判决，则必须允许该上诉，但破产程序不属于任何一类：\n\n13.……对物判决和对人判决是对权利是否存在的司法认定：前者是对财产权利的认定，后者是对针对某人的权利的认定。当对物判决或对人判决获外国法院承认时，该判决所声称已认定的权利即被接受，无需进一步审查其作出该认定的依据。该判决本身被视为权利的来源。\n\n14. 另一方面，破产程序的目的并非确定或确认权利的存在，而是为其权利已获承认或确定的债权人对债务人的财产进行集体执行提供一种机制……\n\n15……破产，无论是个人破产还是公司破产，均为执行权利而非确立权利的集体程序。当然，正如 Brightman LJ（布莱特曼上诉法院法官）在 In re Lines Bros Ltd [1983] Ch 1, 20 中指出的那样，在破产程序过程中，可能附带需要确立受到质疑的权利：债权证明可能被驳回；或者，某一特定财产项目是否属于债务人并可供分配，可能存在争议。存在可在破产程序中以简易方式审理这些问题，或指示通过通常诉讼予以裁决的程序。但这些同样只是附带的程序事项，而非程序目的的核心。\n\n44 第二，普遍性原则构成国际破产中司法协助普通法原则的基础，而这些原则足以赋予马恩岛法院管辖权，使其通过作出其在本国破产案件中本可作出的任何行为提供协助：第21—22段。第三，依据 Isle of Man Companies Act 1931（1931年马恩岛公司法）制定安排计划，也可实现完全相同的结果。第四，Navigator 的股份属于并非破产程序当事人的人（Cambridge Gas）的事实，并不妨碍在马恩岛实施该计划，理由如下，见第26段：\n\n股份是股东在公司中权益的尺度：即对公司及其他股东享有的一组权利。相对于外部世界，该组权利是一项财产，即一项诉权。然而，在股东与公司本身之间，股东的权利可通过公司章程或 Companies Act（公司法）规定的机制予以变更或消灭。其中一项机制是根据 section 152 [of the Isle of Man Companies Act 1931] 制定的安排计划。作为股东，Cambridge 受公司已进行交易的约束，包括根据 Chapter 11 制定的计划或根据 section 152 制定的安排计划。\n\n45 此处有必要指出，Cambridge Gas 中的意见并未阐明任何理由，说明为何认定，就以下两种相关意义中的任一种而言，美国破产法院具有国际管辖权。\n\n46 第一种意义，是美国破产法院对 Chapter 11 程序本身的管辖权。处于 Chapter 11 程序中的实体是 Navigator。英国法院在破产及（尤其是）清盘方面行使的管辖权，比其承认外国法院所具有的管辖权更为广泛。根据普通法，被承认为对个人破产具有管辖权的外国法院，是破产人住所地法院或破产人服从其管辖的法院（Dicey, 15th ed, vol 2, para 31R-059）；而对公司具有相应管辖权的外国法院，则是公司注册地法院：Dicey, 15th ed, vol 2, para 30R-100。根据美国法律，美国破产法院对债务人具有管辖权，而该债务人必须在美国居住、拥有住所或营业地，或在美国拥有财产。从英国法的角度看，尽管 Navigator 并非在美国注册成立，但其通过提起程序而服从管辖，因此美国破产法院具有国际管辖权。\n\n' 2013 The Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for England and Wales（英格兰和威尔士法律报告协会）\n\nRubin v Eurofinance SA（SC(E)） (SC(E)) [2013] 1 AC [2013] 1 Lord Collins of Mapesbury（梅普斯伯里的柯林斯勋爵）\n\n47 国际管辖权具有相关性的第二种意义，是对第三方 Cambridge Gas 及其在 Navigator 中所持股份的管辖权。Cambridge Gas 并非在美国注册成立，且马恩岛法院认定其未服从美国破产法院的管辖权（如我所述，枢密院虽显然不情愿，仍接受了这一点）。美国破产法院命令所涉财产，是一家马恩岛公司的股份。因此，按照马恩岛冲突法规则，美国破产法院处理的财产位于马恩岛，且股东关系受马恩岛法律管辖。\n\n48 Cambridge Gas [2007] 1 AC 508 在数月后由枢密院于 Pattni v Ali [2007] 2 AC 85 中作了简要评论。该案裁决仅为：肯尼亚判决认定 A 有义务向 B 出售一家马恩岛公司的股份，该判决有权在马恩岛获得承认。该判决导致对受肯尼亚法院管辖之人作出对人判决，而非针对位于马恩岛、且不在肯尼亚法院管辖范围内的财产作出的对物判决，因为司法裁判确定或涉及当事人之间财产权利的存在这一事实，本身并不意味着该裁判为对物裁判。Mance 勋爵代表审判委员会发言时，在第23段称：\n\n在 Cambridge Gas……一案中，审判委员会涉及了对人程序和对物程序的概念，但认定其所关注的破产命令并不属于任何一类。该命令的目的仅是确立一种机制，以便债权人针对债务人的财产进行集体执行，而该等债权人的权利已获承认或确立。\n\nHIH\n\n49 HIH 一案的裁决并未涉及外国判决。HIH 涉及四家正在澳大利亚清盘的澳大利亚保险公司，英国已就该等公司任命临时清算人。问题在于，尽管英国和澳大利亚关于分配的法定制度存在差异，致使一些债权人将因汇回而受益，另一些债权人则将处境更差，英国法院是否有权指示将英国收集的资产汇回澳大利亚。上议院一致指示应当进行汇回，但理由各不相同。\n\n50 多数意见（Foscote 的 Scott 勋爵和 Abbotsbury 的 Neuberger 勋爵，Worth Matravers 的 Phillips 勋爵表示同意）完全基于 Insolvency Act 1986（1986年破产法）section 426 所规定的协助外国破产程序的法定权力，但 Hoffmann 勋爵（Gestingthorpe 的 Walker 勋爵同意其意见）还认为，普通法下亦存在该项权力。\n\n51 Hoffmann 勋爵将普遍性原则界定为英国国际私法的一项原则，即在可能情况下，应当在破产人住所地法院进行统一的破产程序，该程序应获全世界承认，并应普遍适用于破产人的全部资产，见第6段：\n\n尽管缺乏法定规定，公司破产中的一定程度国际合作已通过司法实践得以实现。这是基于英国法官多年来一直视为国际私法一般原则的原则，即破产（无论个人破产还是公司破产）应当是统一和普遍的。应当在破产人住所地法院进行一项统一的破产程序，该程序应获全世界承认，并应普遍适用于破产人的全部资产。\n\n52 Hoffmann 勋爵发言的其他部分已在上文引用；为目前目的，仅须回顾其称：(a) 资产收集过程将包括例如行使撤销可撤销处分的权力，而该等权力可能与英国法定制度中的权力存在极大差异（第19段）；以及 (b) 普遍性原则的目的，是确保债务人的资产按照一种分配方案进行分配，该原则要求英国法院与主要清算所在地国家的法院合作，以确保公司的全部资产在单一分配制度下分配给其债权人：第30段。\n\n对 Cambridge Gas 的后续处理\n\n53 Cambridge Gas 中的裁决未获爱尔兰最高法院在 In re Flightlease (Ireland) Ltd [2012] IESC 12（我将回到该案）中适用，并受到学术批评。Briggs 教授表示以下观点，见 (2006) 77 BYIL 575, 581：\n\n[Cambridge Gas] 中的裁决是错误的，因为它要求马恩岛法院使外国法院作出的没收命令生效，而该命令涉及不受该外国法院对人管辖之人所有的财产。马恩岛法院本可自行作出该命令这一事实，并非要点所在。\n\n我将回到该裁决是否正确的问题。\n\nIV 法院审理的案件及争点\n\nRubin\n\n54 Eurofinance SA 是一家在 British Virgin Islands（英属维尔京群岛）注册成立的公司。该公司由 Adrian Roman（阿德里安·罗曼）设立，后者是 Rubin 上诉案中的第二上诉人。Eurofinance SA 根据一份于2002年依英国法订立的信托契约设立 The Consumers Trust (TCT)（消费者信托），其受托人居住于英国，其中两人为会计师，两人为律师。\n\n55 TCT 的设立目的，是在美国和加拿大开展促销计划。受益人类别由成功参与该计划的人组成，该等人士在 Eurofinance SA 所拥有和运营的某些促销活动中有效地提出索赔。受托人应为受益人持有 TCT 的资本和收入，并在此基础上为作为剩余受益人的 Eurofinance SA 持有。该促销活动称为“可兑现凭证计划”，与美国和加拿大的参与商户订立；该等商户在向客户销售产品或服务时，向客户提供一张可兑现凭证，其中包含最高相当于产品或服务购买价100%的返利。根据凭证条款，返利应于三年后支付给客户，前提是客户遵守某些条件，包括完成记忆和理解测试。\n\n56 参与商户每周向 TCT 支付该商户在该周发出的每张可兑现凭证票面价值的15%。TCT 保留所收款项的40%（即每张可兑现凭证票面价值的6%）。商户支付的60%余额中约有一半支付给 Eurofinance SA（因此实际上支付给 Adrian Roman），其余部分支付给参与该计划运营的其他人员，例如律师、会计师及美国律师。自约2002年起，Adrian Roman 的儿子 Nicholas Roman（尼古拉斯·罗曼）和 Justin Roman（贾斯汀·罗曼）各自开始收取约2%。受托人在美国和加拿大维持银行账户，存放其从商户收到的款项。\n\n57 由于受托人仅保留已发凭证票面价值的6%，该计划的成功必然取决于消费者或者忘记兑付凭证，或者未能成功完成为获得付款而须遵循的程序。该计划于2005年终止时，受托人在美国和加拿大的银行账户中持有近 US$10m。\n\n58 约至2005年，在 Missouri（密苏里州）总检察长依据 Missouri 的消费者保护立法提起程序后，TCT 的业务停止；该程序达成和解，涉及受托人支付 US$1,650,000 及 US$200,000 的费用。\n\n59　当显然其他州的总检察长可能会提起进一步程序、消费者索赔数量将增加，并且 TCT 将没有足够资金满足其受益人所有有效索赔时，Adrian Roman（阿德里安·罗曼）于 2005 年 11 月促使 Eurofinance（欧洲金融公司）向 High Court（英格兰高等法院）申请任命 Rubin 上诉案中的被上诉人 David Rubin（大卫·鲁宾）和 Henry Lan（亨利·兰）为 TCT 的接管人，以促使 TCT 随后根据 United States Code（《美国法典》）Title 11 Chapter 11（Chapter 11）获得保护。英格兰法院获告知，Chapter 11 重整程序将导致对 TCT 的程序自动中止，将使接管人能够拒绝无利可图或负担过重的待履行合同，并可能导致追回作为优先支付而向消费者及 Missouri Attorney General（密苏里州总检察长）支付的款项。\n\n60　2005 年 11 月，Lewison J（刘易森法官）以命令任命被上诉人为接管人；次月，被上诉人与受托人随即促使 TCT 向 US Bankruptcy Court（美国破产法院）提出自愿申请，请求根据 Chapter 11 获得救济。TCT 被置于纽约的 Chapter 11 程序中，因为其几乎全部 60,000 名债权人及其资产均位于美国或加拿大。根据美国破产法，TCT 可以作为债务人而成为根据 Chapter 11 提出救济申请的对象。这是因为，像 TCT 这样的信托在 Chapter 11 下被归类为商业信托，并被视为独立法律实体。\n\n61　为 TCT 制定了一项联合清算计划；2007 年 9 月，Lewison J 命令被上诉人（作为接管人）可向 US Bankruptcy Court 申请批准该计划。根据该计划条款，被上诉人被任命为 TCT 的法定代表人，并被授予对包括上诉人在内的潜在被告提起、进行及解决所有诉讼请求的权力。US Bankruptcy Court 于 2007 年 10 月批准该计划，并任命被上诉人为债务人的外国代表，以便向伦敦 Chancery Division（衡平法庭）申请根据 CBIR 将 Chapter 11 程序承认为外国主要程序；并就 Chapter 11 程序向 High Court 寻求援助、协助及合作，尤其是就可能在 US Bankruptcy Court 提起的诉讼的进行寻求 High Court 的协助与合作，包括执行可能针对居住于或拥有位于 Great Britain（大不列颠）财产的个人及实体取得的该法院判决……\n\n62　2007 年 12 月，通过向包括上诉人在内的若干被告提交诉状，在 US Bankruptcy Court 启动程序。这些请求属于美国破产立法下的对抗程序类别，本文将以该术语指称该等程序。对抗程序包括若干请求，其中包括依据 US Bankruptcy Code（《美国破产法典》）产生的诉讼请求，涉及 TCT 从商户收取并支付给被告（包括上诉人）的资金，或者涉及在 TCT 破产案件开始前一年内转移给包括上诉人在内的被告的款项。\n\n63　被告为上诉人及其他参与该计划的当事人。上诉人被亲自送达启动对抗程序的诉状，但未进行抗辩或参与对抗程序，尽管 US Bankruptcy Court 的一份判决书显示，Eurofinance SA 已在主要 Chapter 11 程序中提交出庭通知：2008 年 7 月 22 日命令，第 42—43 段。\n\n64　2008 年 7 月 22 日，US Bankruptcy Court 在对抗程序中对上诉人作出缺席及即决判决。US Bankruptcy Court 就诉状中的十项罪名项对上诉人作出判决书。\n\n65　2008 年 11 月，被上诉人作为外国代表向 Chancery Division 申请，其中包括：(a) 命令承认 Chapter 11 程序为外国主要程序；(b) 命令承认被上诉人为《示范法》第 2(j) 条所称与该等程序有关的外国代表；以及 (c) 命令依照 CPR 第 70 部和第 73 部，将 US Bankruptcy Court 的判决书作为英格兰法院判决书予以执行。\n\n66　Nicholas Strauss QC（尼古拉斯·施特劳斯御用大律师）以 Chancery Division 副法官身份审理，[2010] 1 All ER (Comm) 81，承认 Chapter 11 程序（包括对抗程序）为外国主要程序，并承认被上诉人为外国代表，但拒绝执行对抗程序中的判决书，理由是：(a) 根据普通法，英格兰法院不会执行违反外国判决通常管辖规则的对人判决；以及 (b) CBIR 第 21(e) 条（资产变现）及第 25 条（司法合作）中没有任何内容证明执行破产程序中的判决书具有正当性。\n\n67　在一审中，被上诉人寻求执行 US Bankruptcy Court 判决书的全部内容；但在 Court of Appeal（上诉法院），其寻求命令执行判决书中基于州或联邦撤销法的部分，包括依据 State Fraudulent Conveyance Laws（州欺诈性转让法）规定的欺诈性转让，以及依据联邦法的欺诈性转让，即依据 11 USC 第 548(a) 条的欺诈性转让；依据第 550 条对已撤销转让受让人的责任；依据第 548(b) 条的欺诈性转让，以及依据第 550 条对已撤销转让受让人的责任。\n\n68　Court of Appeal（Ward、Wilson LJJ 及 Henderson J）[2011] Ch 133 准许上诉，并裁定该判决书可予执行。\n\nNew Cap\n\n69　在 New Cap 上诉案中，上诉人为 Lloyds Syndicate Number 991（劳合社第 991 号辛迪加，以下简称“该辛迪加”）1997 年及 1998 年会计年度的成员。被上诉人为一家再保险公司（New Cap）及其清算人，该清算人为 Sydney（悉尼）Ernst & Young（安永）的一名合伙人。\n\n70　New Cap 是一家澳大利亚公司，根据（澳大利亚）Corporations Act 2001（《2001 年公司法》，以下简称“澳大利亚法”）获准在澳大利亚经营保险公司业务。New Cap 未在澳大利亚以外的任何国家经营保险业务；其大部分业务由在澳大利亚经营业务的再保险经纪人促成，其余业务由海外保险经纪人促成。\n\n71　New Cap 根据受英格兰法管辖、载有 London（伦敦）仲裁条款及（颇为奇怪地）英格兰管辖条款的再保险合同，就该辛迪加 1997 年及 1998 年会计年度所附风险发生的损失为其再保险。再保险合同由该辛迪加的澳大利亚经纪人向 New Cap 安排，该经纪人为该辛迪加伦敦经纪人的分经纪人。\n\n72　每份再保险合同均载有结算条款。该辛迪加与 New Cap 签订结算协议，自 11 December 1998 起对再保险进行结算。根据结算协议，New Cap 同意于 31 December 1998 前向该辛迪加一次性支付款项，以换取其免除再保险合同项下的责任。付款按 7.5% 折扣及从保费中扣减的基础计算。New Cap 于 January 1999 根据结算协议分两期支付 US$2,000,000 和 US$3,980,600。结算付款从 New Cap 在 Commonwealth Bank of Australia（澳大利亚联邦银行）Sydney 分行持有的银行账户支付至伦敦的一个银行账户。\n\n73　第二被上诉人于 April 1999 经 New Cap 董事决议被任命为其管理人。September 1999，New Cap 的债权人决议将 New Cap 清盘，并任命第二被上诉人（清算人）为其清算人。根据澳大利亚立法，清盘被视为于管理开始之日启动。\n\n74　April 2002，清算人促使在 Supreme Court of New South Wales（新南威尔士州最高法院）对该辛迪加启动程序，主张由于 New Cap 在 January 1999 作出结算付款时已无清偿能力，且该等付款是在任命管理人之日终止的六个月期间内作出，因此其构成不公平优先受偿，并因而属于澳大利亚法 Part 5.7B 下可撤销交易。\n\n75　该辛迪加（其不承认该等付款构成优先受偿）拒绝接受澳大利亚程序的送达。清算人获得澳大利亚法院许可，向该辛迪加在伦敦的英格兰律师送达澳大利亚程序。该辛迪加未对该程序提交出庭通知，但与清算人的律师通信，其中包括就被上诉人拟作为 New Cap 无清偿能力证据、用于所有撤销程序（包括针对该辛迪加的程序）的一份独立专家报告发表意见。\n\n76　澳大利亚法院（White J 于 September 2008 作出的判决书，以及 Barrett J 于 July 2009 作出的判决书）承认该辛迪加未接受澳大利亚法院管辖，因为其未提交出庭通知；但 White J 裁定，澳大利亚法院对该辛迪加具有管辖权，因为澳大利亚法规定的、公司无清偿能力时向海外当事人作出的优先付款的追回诉讼请求，为适用 New South Wales（新南威尔士州）域外送达规定而在新南威尔士州产生的诉讼请求。\n\n77　Barrett J 于 July 2009 作出载明理由的判决书，裁定该辛迪加承担责任。在准许被上诉人重新开庭以使澳大利亚法院作出的命令能够更准确反映 1997 年会计年度该辛迪加成员上诉人与 1998 年会计年度成员上诉人之间的差异后，澳大利亚法院于 11 September 2009 在该辛迪加缺席的情况下对其作出终局判决。澳大利亚判决书宣告该等结算付款为澳大利亚法 Part 5.7B 所称的可撤销交易，并命令该辛迪加向清算人返还结算付款金额及利息。\n\n78　应清算人申请，澳大利亚法院于 October 2009 向 England and Wales（英格兰和威尔士）High Court 发出请求书，请求该法院协助并援助澳大利亚法院，并根据 Insolvency Act 1986（《1986 年破产法》）第 426 条行使管辖权：(1) 命令该辛迪加支付澳大利亚判决书中规定的款项；或者 (2) 准许清算人在英格兰法院依据澳大利亚法提起新的程序；(3) 授予 High Court 认为公正的进一步及其他救济；以及 (4) 作出 High Court 认为为使前述命令生效所必需或适当的进一步或其他命令。\n\n79　2010年7月30日，上诉法院（Court of Appeal）在 Rubin [2011] Ch 133 一案中作出判决。因此，被申请人依据《Insolvency Act 1986》第426条，依《Australian Act》在英格兰对该辛迪加提起新程序的备选许可申请，被概括延期审理；被申请人获准寻求普通法救济，作为第426条救济的替代方案。\n\n80　在 New Cap 一案中，Lewison 法官（Lewison J）及上诉法院受 Rubin 一案上诉法院判决的约束。Lewison 法官裁定 [2011] EWHC 677 (Ch)：（a）该判决不能根据《Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933》执行，因为尽管该法适用于澳大利亚判决，但不适用于在破产程序中作出的命令；但（b）该判决可依据《Insolvency Act 1986》第426条的协助规定及普通法执行。\n\n81　上诉法院（Mummery、Lloyd 和 McFarlane 上诉法官（LJJ））[2012] Ch 538 维持了 Lewison 法官的判决，理由如下：（a）1933年法案适用，且因 Rubin 判决之故，登记不会因外国法院缺乏管辖权而被撤销；（b）第426条亦可适用，且不受1933年法案第6条排除；（c）但第6条将排除普通法上的诉讼；（d）无须决定在法定权力可用时，普通法上的法院协助权是否可以行使。\n\nPicard v Vizcaya Partners Ltd（皮卡德诉维斯卡亚合伙有限公司）\n\n82　本院准许代表 Irving Picard 先生（欧文·皮卡德）（受托人）以书面陈述介入。该受托人是依据《Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970》（SIPA）在美国对 Bernard L Madoff Investment Securities LLC（伯纳德·L·麦道夫投资证券有限责任公司）（Madoff）进行清算的受托人；该公司是 Bernard Madoff（伯纳德·麦道夫）的经纪公司。受托人正寻求在直布罗陀根据普通法执行美国破产法院（US Bankruptcy Court）针对 Vizcaya Partners Ltd（维斯卡亚合伙有限公司）（Vizcaya）（一家英属维尔京群岛公司）作出的 $180m 判决，以及针对 Asphalia Fund Ltd（阿斯法利亚基金有限公司）（Asphalia）（一家开曼群岛公司）作出的 $67m 判决，该等判决涉及被指称的优先付款。他还寻求在开曼群岛执行美国破产法院在 Picard v Harley International (Cayman) Ltd (unreported) 10 November 2010 一案中作出的逾 $1 billion 缺席判决。直布罗陀和开曼群岛的程序已延期，以待本次上诉的结果。\n\n83　在 Picard v Vizcaya Partners Ltd 一案中，已在直布罗陀提起程序，以执行针对 Vizcaya 和 Asphalia 的缺席判决，因为有 $73m 为 Vizcaya 持有于该地，且受托人主张该款项可用于清偿该等判决。Vizcaya 和 Asphalia 亦经法院许可，以书面陈述介入。\n\n84　就本案这一方面，不存在经一致同意的事实陈述；本文就事实所述的任何内容，均不应被视为代表或反映任何认定。根据 Vizcaya 和 Asphalia 的说法，情况如下。2002年至2007年间，欧洲一家银行作为 Vizcaya 的保管受托人，向 Madoff 汇出 $327m 用于证券投资。该银行、Vizcaya 或其股东 Asphalia 均不知情的是，Madoff 已实施庞氏骗局约30年，他们的资金从未投资于证券。2008年，在信贷紧缩和银行业危机期间，保管受托人提取了 $180m（在 Madoff 处留下 $147m），其中 $180m 中的 $67m 支付给了 Asphalia。\n\n85　2008年末，Madoff 欺诈案曝光，受托人获任命。受托人将于2008年12月 Madoff 倒闭前两年内从 Madoff 提取投资的投资者作为追索来源，以追回客户财产，供其他未提取其投资的投资者受益。受托人在美国破产法院提起对抗程序，依据 SIPA 和《Bankruptcy Code》指控 Vizcaya 和 Asphalia 涉及优先付款及欺诈性转让；他们称，其效果是：（a）如受托人所主张，因其已收取客户资金而被要求返还优先付款的人，并不当然成为客户，因而不当然有权与其他客户共同参与破产财产分配；以及（b）受托人可撤销破产人在破产程序开始前90日内向债权人作出的付款，而不论该付款作出或收取时的意图为何。\n\n86　受托人取得了缺席判决，Vizcaya 和 Asphalia 称，其未参与纽约程序，是因为其与纽约没有联系，尤其是：（a）Asphalia 并非 Madoff 的客户，而是 Vizcaya 的股东；（b）Vizcaya 可以说并非客户，因为其任命该银行担任保管受托人，而是该银行与 Madoff 订立合同。\n\n争点\n\n87　本次上诉的主要争点是：适用于普通法或1933年法案下、规范哪些外国法院应就判决执行目的被视为具有管辖权的规则，是否适用于破产中的撤销程序判决；如不适用，应适用何种规则：见下文第五节。其他争点是，在 Rubin 上诉中，是否可通过《Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006》的协助规定执行判决（第六节）；或者在 New Cap 上诉中，是否可通过《Insolvency Act 1986》第426条执行判决（第七节）；判决是否因判决债务人服从外国法院管辖而可执行（第八节）；以及在 New Cap 上诉中，如判决可执行，应依据普通法还是1933年法案执行：第九节。\n\nV　第一个争点：破产程序中外国判决的承认与执行\n\nRubin 案中上诉法院的推理及本次上诉的争点\n\n88　Rubin 上诉案中，上诉法院裁定，外国破产判决可以依据普通法在英格兰和威尔士对不受该外国法院管辖的被告执行，而不受 Dicey 规则所表述的传统规则限制。\n\n89　如我已述，在上诉法院审理 Rubin 上诉时，接管人仅寻求执行实际上涉及撤销诉因的判决部分。上诉法院裁定，该判决（经缩小范围后）可依普通法执行。其推理见 [2011] Ch 133，第38、41、43、45、48、50、61—62、64段，内容如下：（a）该判决具有终局性和确定性，且为确定金额；从命令表面看，该判决为对人判决；（b）各方一致认为，判决债务人在程序提起时并非居民（鉴于该诉讼系依据普通法而非1933年法案，此处“居民”系将“目前”误写），且未服从管辖，因此乍看之下具有无懈可击的抗辩；（c）Cambridge Gas 裁定，其所涉的破产命令既非对人性质，亦非对物性质，其目的仅是建立一种由权利获承认或确立的债权人对债务人财产进行集体执行的机制：Pattni v Ali [2007] 2 AC 85，第23段；（d）破产是执行权利而非确立权利的集体程序：Cambridge Gas [2007] 1 AC 508，第15段；（e）争点在于，只能由破产人代表提起的撤销程序，是否应被定性为破产程序的一部分，即执行权利而非确立权利的集体程序的一部分；（f）该对抗程序是 Chapter 11 程序不可分割的一部分；（g）执行外国对人判决的一般规则不适用于破产程序；（h）撤销机制是破产集体性质不可或缺且居于核心地位的组成部分，并非仅属附带的程序事项；（i）资产收集程序将包括行使撤销可撤销处分的权力，该等权力可能与英格兰法定制度下的权力有很大差异：HIH [2008] 1 WLR 852，第19段；（j）美国破产法院的判决，是在破产程序集体执行制度内并为该制度目的作出的判决，受有关破产的特别私法国际法规则管辖；（k）这是以修正普遍主义原则为基础的普通法的理想发展，且并不要求法院执行其在国内情形下经必要变通后不能执行的任何事项；（l）私法国际法有一项原则，即破产应具有单一性和普遍性，应在破产人住所地法院进行单一的破产程序，并获得全球承认，且应普遍适用于破产人的所有资产；（m）还有一项原则，即承认伴随着法院的积极协助，包括作出英格兰法院在国内破产案件中能够作出的任何协助；（n）维持该判决对上诉人并无不公，因为他们完全知悉该程序，并在获得法律意见后选择不参与。无须决定该判决是否可根据 CBIR 执行：第63段。\n\n90　简言之，Ward 上诉法官（Ward LJ）接受该判决为对人判决，但其裁定 Dicey 规则不适用于撤销程序中的外国判决，因为该等程序处于破产集体执行制度的核心地位，并受特别规则管辖。\n\n91　本次上诉在这一方面的核心问题如下。每一案件中的判决，应被视为属于 Dicey 规则所体现的传统规则范围内的对人判决，还是应被定性为构成破产程序一部分的破产命令，即执行权利而非确立权利的集体程序的一部分？该区分是否具有作用？处于程序目的核心地位的请求权与仅属附带程序事项的请求权之间，是否存在区分？作为政策问题，法院是否应当为了破产程序普遍性的利益，制定一项关于承认和执行外国破产程序判决的规则，该规则较 Dicey 规则所体现的传统普通法规则更为广泛，且更有利于清算人、破产受托人、接管人和其他职务持有人；还是应交由立法处理，并在此之前进行任何必要的磋商？\n\n92　Ward 上诉法官的结论，源自对 Hoffmann 勋爵（Lord Hoffmann）在 Cambridge Gas 中措辞精辟的意见以及其在 HIH 中同样精辟的演讲所作的审慎综合；该两者在本次上诉中均受到极为详细的分析。基于下文将阐述的理由，我不同意 Ward 上诉法官所作出的结论。\n\n- 93 但我首先处理两项我接受被申请人分析的事项。第一，撤销程序具有使其区别于合同或侵权等普通请求权的特征。第二，如有必要区分破产裁定与其他裁定，便不难制定区分标准，其思路可类似于欧洲法院就《布鲁塞尔公约》、《布鲁塞尔一号条例》（Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001）及《欧共体破产条例》所作出的区分。\n\n撤销程序的性质\n\n- 94 为了在债权人之间实现适当和公平的资产分配，往往有必要调整先前交易并追回先前对财产的处分，以构成可供分配的财产。构成按比例平等分配原则基础的债权人平等原则，可能要求调整已经完成的交易；若非公司清盘，该等交易本将继续对公司具有约束力，并要求返还根据该等交易所作出的付款或转让的财产，或撤销其效力。破产法律制度将撤销程序用作调整债务人在破产前所作交易及追回债务人在破产前处分财产的机制。因此，根据《Insolvency Act 1986》，如存在不当低价交易或构成违法优先受偿的交易，管理人、清算人或破产受托人可申请命令，使当事人恢复至如该交易未曾发生时本应处于的状态：sections 238 et seq and 339 et seq. 其他法律制度亦有类似机制，但在此类交易面临撤销的期间以及交易当事人善意所起作用等事项上有所不同。\n\n- 95 其基本政策是保护全体债权人免受因赋予交易另一方不公平或不适当利益的交易而导致的资产减少；因此，使后果有损债权人集体利益的先前交易能够被调整或撤销，是清算程序的一个基本方面：Fletcher, The Law of Insolvency, 4th ed (2009), para 26-002; Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 4th ed (2011), para 13-03.\n\n- 96 因此，《UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (2005)》称：\n\n150. 许多破产法包含具有追溯效力的规定，该追溯效力自某一特定日期起算（例如申请破产程序之日或破产程序开始之日），持续一段特定期间（通常称为可疑期间），旨在推翻破产债务人作为当事人参与的，或涉及债务人资产的、具有某些效果的过去交易……\n\n151. 破产法中一项普遍接受的原则是，集体行动在最大化可供债权人使用的资产方面，比允许债权人自由寻求各自救济的制度更为有效；并且该原则要求所有同类债权人获得相同待遇。关于撤销权的规定旨在支持这些集体目标，确保债权人按照既定优先顺位公平分配破产债务人的资产，并维护破产财产的完整性。\n\n97 在 In re Condor Insurance Ltd (2010) 601 F 3d 319, 326 一案中，第五巡回上诉法院（Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit）称：\n\n撤销法的目的和效果，是按照分配法规确立的集体优先顺位……重新安排债务人资产的分配……[并且]必须被视为整个破产制度不可分割的一部分。\n\n98 在 New Cap 的澳大利亚程序的不同阶段，Barrett 法官提出了类似观点。他称，在根据澳大利亚立法提起的不公平优先受偿诉讼中，清算人可以取得支付金钱的命令，但该诉讼并不设想取得适用于损害赔偿和债务意义上的追偿；该程序旨在补救或抵销因 New Cap 所作付款造成的资产减少的效果：New Cap Reinsurance Corpn v Renaissance Reinsurance Ltd [2002] NSWSC 856, paras 23, 27。该命令所维护的不是公司在清算前本会享有的财产权利，而是清算人因清盘并依照法定制度享有的法定权利。命令向处于清算中的公司支付金钱，其目的不是赔偿公司，而是以消除在破产管理开始前紧接期间内给予一个或多个债权人、排除其他债权人的优惠待遇之影响的方式，调整债权人彼此之间的权利：New Cap Reinsurance Corpn v Grant (2009) 257 ALR 740, paras 20—21。\n\n破产请求权与其他请求权之间的区别\n\n99 我还接受以下观点：如应对破产裁定的承认和执行适用单独规则，则通常不难区分一类判决，即在破产程序中作出的、专属于破产法调整对象的判决，例如撤销程序中的判决，和 Dicey rule 所涵盖类型的其他判决。\n\n100 在《布鲁塞尔公约》、《布鲁塞尔一号条例》和《欧共体破产条例》的语境中，欧洲联盟法院（Court of Justice of the European Union）已形成一项区分：一方面，是直接源于破产或清盘并与之密切关联的请求权；另一方面，是并非如此的请求权。英国法院亦适用了该项区分。依我判断，该项区分具有可操作性，如有用或有必要，可适用于其他语境。\n\n- 101 被视为破产请求权的请求包括：根据法国法，清算人向董事提出、要求其补足公司资产不足的请求（Gourdain v Nadler (Case 133/78) [1979] ECR 733）；或根据德国法提出、要求撤销损害债权人的交易的请求：Seagon v Deko Marty Belgium NV (Case C-339/07) [2009] 1 WLR 2168。被认定不属于破产请求权类别的请求包括：出卖人基于所有权保留向已破产的买受人提起的诉讼（German Graphics Graphische Maschinen GmbH v van der Schee (Case C-292/08) [2009] ECR I-8421）；或清算人就某项资产的实益所有权提出的请求：Byers v Yacht Bull Corpn [2010] BCC 368。在 Oakley v Ultra Vehicle Design Ltd [2006] BCC 57, para 42 一案中，Lloyd 上诉法官（Lloyd LJ）（以衡平法院增任法官身份审理）称：\n\n- 已判定，清算人为追收清算前债务提出的请求，尽管是在清盘过程中提出，因而在某种意义上与清盘有关，但并非直接源于清盘，因此不因 article 1.2(b) 而被排除在《布鲁塞尔公约》（因而现亦不被排除在《布鲁塞尔一号条例》）之外：见 In re Hayward decd [1997] Ch 45, and UBS AG v Omni Holding AG [2000] 1 WLR 916。相比之下，清算人针对董事或第三方提起程序，以低价交易、错误交易或欺诈交易为由撤销某项交易的，属于直接源于清盘的请求，因而被排除在《布鲁塞尔公约》之外，并现被排除在《布鲁塞尔一号条例》之外。\n\n对人或自成类别？\n\n102 我已经引述 Cambridge Gas [2007] 1 AC 508 中 Hoffmann 勋爵（Lord Hoffmann）的一段文字，其中他一方面区分对物判决和对人判决，另一方面区分破产程序中的判决；但有必要在此重述。他在 paras 13—14 中称：\n\n13.……对物判决和对人判决，是对权利是否存在的司法认定：前者认定对财产的权利，后者认定针对某人的权利。当对物判决或对人判决获外国法院承认时，该判决被接受为确立其所声称已认定的权利，无须进一步审查其作出该认定所依据的理由。该判决本身被视为该权利的来源。\n\n14. 另一方面，破产程序的目的并非认定或确立权利是否存在，而是为权利已获承认或确立的债权人针对债务人财产进行集体执行提供机制。\n\n103 毫无疑问，Cambridge Gas 一案中美国破产法院（US Bankruptcy Court）的命令并不属于对人命令类别。尽管外国判决属于对人还是对物，有时是一个困难问题（Dicey, 15th ed, para 14-109），但该命令并非针对包括 Cambridge Gas 在内的其股东作出的个人命令。该命令将 Navigator 中的股份归属债权人委员会。该命令并未宣告既有财产权利。事实上，作为安排计划功能上等同物的该项安排，其全部目的就在于改变财产权利。但不容易看出，为什么该命令不是就马恩岛财产作出的对物命令，即以裁定某物的法律地位并意图约束全世界的意义而言：见 Jowitts Dictionary of English Law, 3rd ed (2010) (ed Greenberg), p 1249。\n\n104 Rubin 和 New Cap 上诉中的判决均以撤销立法为基础；尽管在实体内容上存在一些差异，该立法所发挥的功能与《Insolvency Act 1986》及其前身中的相应规定相同。但 Ward 上诉法官（Ward LJ）在 Rubin 一案中接受该判决属于对人判决，而 Rubin 上诉的被申请人并未试图主张该判决不属于对人判决。他们所称的是，即使该判决属于对人判决，其仍属于破产裁定或判决这一自成类别，并受特别规则规制。\n\n105 毫无疑问，本上诉中的撤销命令属于对人命令。在 In re Paramount Airways Ltd [1993] Ch 223, 238 一案中，Nicholls 上诉法官（Nicholls LJ）称，《Insolvency Act 1986》section 238 下的救济措施（不当低价交易）主要具有对人性质，这与本上诉中命令的性质一致。Rubin 一案中美国破产法院判决的形式为，原告……就裁定金额对被告取得判决；New Cap 一案中新南威尔士州最高法院（New South Wales Supreme Court）的命令包括命令被告……向第一原告支付根据 Australian Corporations Act section 588FF(1) 应付的款项。\n\n原则与政策问题\n\n106 既然这些判决属于对人判决，除非法院认定对于破产程序中的对人判决存在或应当存在单独规则，否则 Dicey rule 中的原则即应适用；至少在该等判决并非旨在确立权利是否存在，而是构成破产程序目的的核心部分或集体执行机制的一部分时，亦应如此。\n\n107 在 Cambridge Gas [2007] 1 AC 508 及本案之前，从未有人提出，在破产程序和其他程序中，对人判决可能适用不同规则。英格兰没有任何有帮助的判例。通常的外国判决执行规则已适用于清算人就应付公司款项提出的请求（Gavin Gibson & Co Ltd v Gibson [1913] 3 KB 379），以及依据德国法在破产程序中确定的债务请求：Berliner Industriebank AG v Jost [1971] 2 QB 463。安大略省曾执行美国破产法院（US Bankruptcy Court）在 Chapter 11 程序中作出的、要求返还优先转让款项的判决，其依据是判决债务人服从纽约法院的管辖，且并无任何意见认为通常规则不适用：Gourmet Resources International Inc Estate v Paramount Capital Corpn (1991) 3 OR (3d) 286, [1993] IL Pr 583，上诉驳回，(1993) 14 OR (3d) 319(Note) (Ont CA)。\n\n108 戴西规则（Dicey rule）所载原则从未获得上议院（House of Lords）或英国最高法院（UK Supreme Court）的明确认可；主要判决仍为 Adams v Cape Industries plc [1990] Ch 433，以及该判决重述或重新解释的较早上诉法院（Court of Appeal）判例。然而，毫无疑问，上议院在外国判决的语境中提及具有管辖权的外国法院，是默示提及普通法规则：例如 Nouvion v Freeman (1889) 15 App Cas 1, 8 及 Owens Bank Ltd v Bracco [1992] 2 AC 443, 484。\n\n109 Rubin 被上诉人质疑这些规则在现代社会是否仍然合理。诚然，该普通法规则曾在加拿大被否定，最初是在省际判决承认的语境中。加拿大最高法院（Supreme Court of Canada）认为，英格兰在 19 世纪为承认和执行外国判决而发展出的规则，不能移植于在具有共同市场和单一国籍的单一国家内执行姊妹省份作出的判决。相反，如诉讼标的与作出判决的省份之间具有真实且实质性的联系，则应承认并执行针对管辖范围外人士作出的判决：Morguard Investments Ltd v De Savoye [1990] 3 SCR 1077, para 45。Beals v Saldanha [2003] 3 SCR 416 以多数意见将该方法适用于外国判决（并适用于 In re Cavell Insurance Co (2006) 269 DLR (4th) 679 (Ont CA) 中对一项召集安排计划会议的英格兰命令的承认）。\n\n110 除家庭法领域外，英格兰并不支持这种方法。在 Indyka v Indyka [1969] 1 AC 33 一案中，法院裁定，如申请人（或被申请人）与取得离婚的国家之间具有真实且实质性的联系，则外国离婚判决将依普通法获得承认。该规则（现已被 Family Law Act 1986 取代）部分是为避免“跛足婚姻”，即当事人在一个国家被视为已离婚、而在另一个国家被视为仍处于婚姻关系的情形而制定。它从未在外国判决的语境中被采用于家庭法以外的领域。\n\n111 爱尔兰最高法院（Supreme Court of Ireland）在 In re Flightlease (Ireland) Ltd [2012] IESC 12 中拒绝遵循 Cambridge Gas（以及上诉法院在 Rubin 中的判决），并裁定不应为真实且实质性联系标准而否定戴西规则。在 Flightlease 一案中，航空公司 Swissair 正在其注册成立地瑞士进行一种债务重组程序。Flightlease 是与 Swissair 同属一个集团的爱尔兰公司。根据瑞士关于债务执行和破产的联邦法规，瑞士法院受理了一项申请，要求返还 Swissair 向 Flightlease 支付的款项。该程序已进展至判决阶段，但 Flightlease 的清算人希望知悉瑞士判决是否可在爱尔兰执行，以便其决定是否出席瑞士程序。\n\n112 爱尔兰最高法院裁定，如 Flightlease 未出席瑞士程序，该判决将不可执行，理由如下：（1）瑞士命令的效力将是确定 Flightlease 负有偿还款项的责任，因而构成对人判决；（2）鉴于应通过条约或公约形成国际共识并由立法赋予效力，对有关外国判决执行规则的任何变更最好在该语境中进行。爱尔兰最高法院尤其表示，其不会采纳 Cambridge Gas 所采取的方法，因为该方法源于英国的立法变更（这似乎基于一种误解），且在普通法司法管辖区之间不存在共识的情况下，不应在爱尔兰采纳。\n\n113 但在本次上诉中，并无人主张应放弃戴西规则所体现的原则。相反，Rubin 被上诉人主张，该等原则不应适用于外国破产命令。\n\n114 被上诉人承认，戴西规则适用于外国破产中的破产管理人所提出、可能具有重大意义的请求，例如违约请求、侵权请求或追偿债务的请求。显然，此类请求对破产财产规模的影响，可以与撤销请求一样大，而且往往更大。与追回应付破产财产款项的请求——例如不涉及撤销的返还请求——一样，撤销请求可能确定向破产财产支付或返还款项的责任（如本案）。在原则上并无区别。\n\n115 因此，问题属于政策问题。为了破产及类似程序的普遍性，对撤销判决是否应采取更为宽松的规则？我认为，基于以下理由，答案是否定的。\n\n116 首先，尽管我接受可以区分撤销请求与通常请求，例如合同或侵权请求，但在当前语境下，很难看出，对于处于清算中的公司所享有的一笔重大到期债务，针对债务人作出的外国判决，与要求债权人返还一笔优先付款的外国判决之间，在原则上有何区别。被上诉人主张，向外国公司出售货物的人接受该公司注册成立地破产立法的风险。且不论该主张完全不现实，卖方／债权人为何应处于比买方／债务人更不利的地位？\n\n117 第二个理由是，如对撤销程序等程序中的外国判决适用不同规则，法院将不得不确定（或更准确地说，发展）两套管辖规则。如外国破产判决或命令要排除在戴西规则的适用范围外，必须满足管辖权的两个方面：第一，是破产程序与外国法院之间所需的联系；第二，是判决债务人与外国法院之间所需的联系。\n\n118 在 Cambridge Gas 一案中，Navigator 是一家马恩岛公司，美国破产法院的管辖权取决于债务人是否在美国居住，或在美国具有住所、营业地或财产。Cambridge Gas（一家开曼群岛公司）所拥有的 Navigator 股份，依通常冲突法原则位于马恩岛；Navigator 与 Cambridge Gas 之间的股东关系受马恩岛法管辖。如上所述，枢密院（Privy Council）并未阐明美国破产法院对 Navigator 的管辖权规则（尽管其显然已服从该法院管辖），也未阐明其对 Cambridge Gas 的管辖权规则（马恩岛法院已裁定、且枢密院亦予接受，Cambridge Gas 并未服从管辖），或其对 Cambridge Gas 在马恩岛资产的管辖权规则。\n\n119 上诉法院在 Rubin 一案中也未阐明英格兰法院承认美国破产法院对 TCT 或上诉人具有管辖权的理由。接管人最初似乎以美国破产法院根据美国破产法具有管辖权为依据，理由是 TCT 的住所和主要营业地在纽约（申请书，5 December 2005）；但美国破产法院在决定任命接管人为外国代表人时还指出，TCT 的业务经营主要在美国进行，其大多数债权人、几乎全部资产及其主要利益中心均在美国。美国破产法院依据美国法对 Rubin 一案中各个人被告行使管辖权的依据是：他们既受该法院一般管辖权的管辖（即被告与该管辖区域之间的联系），也受该法院特定管辖权的管辖（即诉因与该管辖区域之间的联系），因为他们特意选择美国作为经商地点，并特意寻求与之经商的美国商家及消费者。因此，行使管辖权符合第五修正案（Fifth Amendment）的正当程序要求。\n\n120 New Cap 一案中，对 New Cap 本身行使管辖权的依据当然是其在澳大利亚注册成立。根据新南威尔士州法，对该辛迪加行使管辖权的依据是，针对该辛迪加的诉因发生于新南威尔士州。\n\n121 被上诉人未就能够处理管辖权这两个方面的规则提出任何有原则的建议。就外国与破产财产之间的管辖联系而言，他们承认，英格兰法传统上承认在个人破产者住所地进行的破产程序，或者就法人而言，在注册成立地进行的破产程序；但是（因为 TCT 的受托人或 TCT 本身与美国之间的联系在于该信托的主要业务位于美国），他们依赖 Lord Hoffmann 在 HIH [2008] 1 WLR 852, para 31 中所述：\n\n我以一种颇为旧式的方式谈及公司的住所，因为这是旧判例所使用的术语，但我并不声称它必然是最佳术语。通常它是指公司注册成立地，但该地可能是一个与公司业务并无真实联系的离岸岛屿。关于破产程序的理事会条例（Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000）使用债务人主要利益中心的概念作为标准，并推定该中心为注册办事处所在地：见 article 3.1。这可能更为适当。\n\n122 他们提议，不应通过类似普通法判决执行规则那样的明文规则解决上述各项问题，而应诉诸在口头辩论中所称的英格兰法院协助外国法院的酌处权。\n\n123 关于第二个方面，即外国与判决债务人之间的管辖联系，他们承认，寻求承认和执行的外国破产程序与破产命令之间必须存在适当联系。他们主张，在行使酌处权时，法院应采取类似于英国法院在决定是否将《Insolvency Act 1986（1986年破产法）》的规定，例如第238条（以不合理低价进行的交易），适用于境外人士时所采取的做法，并援引 In re Paramount Airways Ltd（派拉蒙航空有限公司案）[1993] Ch 223。\n\n124 该案判定，对任何人行使管辖权并不存在默示的地域限制。上诉法院驳回了如下论点：该条仅适用于英国国民，以及在受质疑交易发生时身处英格兰的人。特别是，当事人在交易发生时实际不在场或在场，与救济措施是否适当并无必然联系。与英格兰具有充分联系的标准也并不令人满意，因为这几乎无法与这些条文在地域上不受限制的适用范围相区分：p 237。相反，应当在法院的酌处权中寻求处理方法：第一，准许向管辖区外送达诉讼文书；第二，根据该条作出命令。在这两个方面，法院均会考虑，被告与英格兰是否具有充分联系，以致尽管存在涉外因素，对其作出该命令仍属公正和适当。\n\n125 Rubin 被上诉人称，In re Paramount Airways Ltd（派拉蒙航空有限公司案）具有指导意义，因为如果本案事实相反，即 TCT 在英格兰实施该计划并在此被置于破产程序，而上诉人居住在纽约，则可以预期英国法院会认为，英格兰是提起第238条程序以追回向上诉人支付的款项的适当法院，并会相应准许向管辖区外送达。他们进一步称，这隐含着英国法院会预期纽约法院随后承认并执行英国法院的任何判决，即使上诉人仍留在纽约且未对该程序提出抗辩；同理，既然法院寻求并预期其自身破产命令在境外获得承认和执行，法院也应承认并执行在其他管辖区破产程序中作出的破产命令。\n\n126 此种推理并无依据。英国法院行使管辖权，与其承认外国法院的管辖权，或其预期其判决在境外获得承认之间，并无必然联系。人们经常指出，原属 RSC Ord 11, r 1（现为 CPR Practice Direction 6B, paragraph 3.1）项下行使的管辖权属于过度管辖权，因为在没有规定承认的条约时，该管辖权比英国法承认外国法院所拥有的管辖权更为广泛：参见 Siskina (Owners of cargo lately laden on board) v Distos Cia Naviera SA [1979] AC 210, 254，Lord Diplock；Amin Rasheed Shipping Corpn v Kuwait Insurance Co [1984] AC 50, 65，Lord Diplock；以及 Spiliada Maritime Corpn v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460, 481，Lord Goff of Chieveley。\n\n127 在婚姻诉讼领域之外（参见 Travers v Holley [1953] P 246；其在该方面已被 Indyka v Indyka [1969] 1 AC 33 否定），互惠原则在普通法对外国判决的承认和执行中并未发挥作用。英国法院并不会仅因在相应情形下其有权命令向管辖区外送达，便承认外国法院对人的管辖权：In re Trepca Mines Ltd [1960] 1 WLR 1273。\n\n128 依我判决，Cambridge Gas 和 HIH 中的附带意见并不能证明上诉法院所达成的结论具有正当性。这并非对现有原则的渐进发展，而是对基本已定法律的根本性背离。Dicey 规则范围有限是有理由的，即对外国作出互惠并无期待。当今，通常只有在具备一定程度互惠的情况下，才会引入关于判决执行的新规则。EC Insolvency Regulation 和 Model Law 均是长期谈判和协商的产物。\n\n129 对判决承认和执行既定法律的改变，尤其是制定一项规则以确定哪些法院应被视为具有适格管辖权的法院（例如，无力偿债实体主要利益中心所在国，以及判决债务人与之具有充分或实质性联系的国家），完全具有立法的特征，属于立法机关而非司法创新应处理的事项。有关外国判决执行的法律及有关国际破产的法律，均非近年来留给法官创制法发展的法律领域。正如 Lord Bridge of Harwich 就拟议改变有关欺诈作为抗辩外国判决执行理由的普通法规则所言，如今法律若需要改革，应由立法机关而非司法机关实施：Owens Bank Ltd v Bracco [1992] 2 AC 443, 489。\n\n130 此外，通过法官创制法扩大对外国判决的承认和执行，只会损害英国企业，而不会带来相应利益。我接受上诉人的观点：如果承认和执行仅留给法院酌处，并以充分联系等因素为依据，则在英格兰、可能与某一外国领土具有仅属可争议地充分联系的人，将不得不积极抗辩该外国程序；该程序仅因附属于该领土法院的破产程序，即可能导致针对其作出对人判决。尽管我不就 Madoff 案的事实发表意见，但该案可能表明，与美国进行善意交易的外国人可能面临如下两难境地：在美国花费巨额费用抗辩巨额请求，或者不予抗辩并承担缺席判决在境外被执行的风险。\n\n131 如果本院拒绝认可对传统规则的背离，也不大可能造成任何严重不公。对于本案中的破产管理人是否拥有或曾经拥有在英格兰直接获得救济的途径，不宜发表意见，因为可能存在或曾经存在有关准据法、时限或善意的问题。在保留上述意见的前提下，Rubin 案中美国程序提出的请求中，有若干种主张方式（特别是本程序并未涉及的判决部分）本可构成受托人在英格兰为债权人利益（作为明示信托的受益人）提起程序的依据。此外，破产管理人还可采取若干其他途径。澳大利亚公司清算人提出的撤销请求，可以成为澳大利亚法院根据《Insolvency Act 1986（1986年破产法）》第426(4)条提出请求的对象，并根据第426(5)条适用澳大利亚法。在适当案件中，Model Law 第23条将允许外国代表依据《Insolvency Act 1986（1986年破产法）》提出撤销请求。在无力偿债财产的主要利益中心位于欧洲联盟的案件中，判决将可根据 EC Insolvency Regulation 第25条执行。\n\n132 因此，依我判决，Cambridge Gas [2007] 1 AC 508 的裁决有误。枢密院认为（鉴于其结论是 Cambridge Gas 未接受纽约法院的管辖），Cambridge Gas 不受 US Bankruptcy Court（美国破产法院）的对人管辖权约束。所涉财产，即 Navigator 的股份，位于 Isle of Man（马恩岛），因此也不受美国破产法院的对物管辖权约束。因此，没有任何依据可在马恩岛承认美国破产法院的命令。\n\nVI 问题2：Rubin：根据 Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 执行\n\n133 在 Rubin 上诉中，被上诉人主张，该判决还应通过实施 UNCITRAL Model Law 的 CBIR 获得执行。\n\n134 副法官作出的命令[2010] 1 All ER (Comm) 81, paras 46, 47 承认了 Chapter 11 程序，包括对抗程序，因为针对破产人的债务人提起对抗程序，显然是为向债权人分配而收集破产人资产的一部分，而对抗程序是 Chapter 11 破产程序不可分割的一部分。上诉法院持相同观点[2011] Ch 133, para 61(2)—(3)。上诉人已不再主张不应依据 Model Law 承认对抗程序。\n\n135 就由 CBIR 实施的 Model Law 而言，仍然产生的问题是，法院是否有权给予承认和执行判决相关部分的救济。\n\n136 第21条规定：\n\n1. 在承认外国程序后，无论该程序为主要程序或非主要程序，如为保护债务人的资产或债权人的利益所必需，法院可应外国代表的请求，给予任何适当救济，包括：(a) 暂停提起或继续进行涉及债务人资产、权利、义务或责任的个别诉讼或个别程序，但以其未根据第20条第1款(a)项被暂停的范围为限；(b) 暂停对债务人资产的执行，但以其未根据第20条第1款(b)项被暂停的范围为限；(c) 中止转让、设定负担或以其他方式处分债务人任何资产的权利，但以该权利未根据第20条第1款(c)项被中止的范围为限；(d) 就债务人的资产、事务、权利、义务或责任，规定询问证人、收取证据或提交资料；(e) 将位于大不列颠的债务人全部或部分资产的管理或变现，委托给外国代表或法院指定的另一人；(f) 延长根据第19条第1款给予的救济；以及 (g) 给予根据大不列颠法律可向英国破产管理人提供的任何额外救济，包括《Insolvency Act 1986（1986年破产法）》附表B1第43段规定的任何救济。\n\n137 对《Insolvency Act 1986（1986年破产法）》附表B1第43段（由 Enterprise Act 2002 第248条及附表16插入）项下救济的提述，是指管理程序中对请求权的暂缓。\n\n138 《颁布指南》在第154、156段中称：\n\n154. . . . 第 21 条第 1 款所列的救济类型，是破产程序中典型或最常见的救济类型；但是，该清单并非穷尽性，法院在依制定国法律可获得且案件情形所需的任何类型救济方面的准予能力，不应受到不必要的限制。. . .\n\n156. 酌情救济的性质在于，法院可以就其调整以适应眼前的案件。第 22 条第 2 款进一步强调了这一理念；根据该款，法院可对其准予的救济附加其认为适当的条件。\n\n139. 第 25 条规定（标题为“大不列颠法院与外国法院或外国代表之间的合作与直接沟通”）：\n\n1. . . . 法院可在最大可能范围内与外国法院或外国代表合作，无论是直接合作，还是通过英国破产从业人员进行合作。\n\n2. 法院有权直接与外国法院或外国代表沟通，或直接向其请求信息或协助。\n\n140. 第 27 条规定，第 25 条所述的合作可通过任何适当方式实施，包括：\n\n(a) 任命一人依照法院指示行事；(b) 以法院认为适当的任何方式传递信息；(c) 协调对债务人资产及事务的管理和监督；(d) 由法院批准或实施关于协调程序的协议；(e) 协调涉及同一债务人的同时进行的程序。\n\n141. 被上诉人主张：(a) 第 21 条项下的权力，是准予相关国家法律所提供的任何类型救济的权力；第 21 条未明确将外国判决的承认和执行列为可获得救济形式之一，并不意味着不能准予此类救济；(b) 承认和执行外国法院的判决，是与该法院合作的典型方式；以及 (c) 第 27 条中的合作示例仅为示例，并非穷尽性。\n\n142. 但是，CBIR（以及《示范法》）对于针对第三方执行外国判决未作任何规定。正如 Lord Mance JSC（曼斯勋爵大法官）在辩论中指出，承认和执行在国际案件中至关重要。民商事判决（但不包括破产事项判决）的承认和执行，曾是海牙国际私法会议密集国际谈判的主题；该谈判最终因无法就公认的国际管辖权基础达成一致而失败。\n\nRubin v Eurofinance SA（鲁宾诉欧元金融股份公司）（SC(E)）[2013] 1 AC [2013] 1\nLord Collins of Mapesbury（梅普斯伯里的柯林斯勋爵）\n\n143. 如果《示范法》意图以默示方式处理破产事项判决，将令人意外。第 21、25 和 27 条涉及程序事项。毫无疑问，应依据《示范法》的宗旨对其作目的性解释，并作广义解释，但没有任何迹象表明其适用于针对第三方承认和执行外国判决。\n\n144. 被上诉人援引美国判例，但唯一实际涉及执行外国判决的案件反而支持上诉人的主张。《示范法》通过《美国法典》第 11 编第 15 章被实施为美国法律；其中第 1521、1525 和 1527 节所载规定，经与本案当前目的无关的修改后，等同于 CBIR 第 21、25 和 27 条。在 In re Metcalfe & Manseld Alternative Investments (2010) 421 BR 685 (Bankr SDNY) 一案中，美国破产法院命令执行加拿大法院就根据（加拿大）Companies Creditors Arrangement Act 1985 作出的和解与安排计划所作的命令。该判决并不有助于被上诉人，因为美国破产法院适用了在美国执行外国判决时非破产案件中的通常规则：第 698—700 页。依我判决，《示范法》的设计并非为判决的互惠执行作出规定。\n\nVII 问题 3：新凯普：通过《1986年破产法》第 426 条项下的协助进行执行\n\n145. 鉴于我在下一节（第 VIII 节）中得出结论，认为该辛迪加已服从澳大利亚法院的管辖，因此《1986年破产法》第 426(4)(5) 条所涉问题及其与《1933年外国判决（互惠执行）法》第 6 条之间的关系并不产生；但鉴于该事项已获充分辩论，我将就第 426(4) 条对本案此类案件的适用性发表意见。\n\n146. 《1986年破产法》第 426(4)(5) 条规定：\n\n(4) 对联合王国任何地区的破产法事项具有管辖权的法院，应协助对联合王国任何其他地区或任何相关国家或地区的相应事项具有管辖权的法院。\n\n(5) 就第 (4) 款而言，联合王国任何地区的法院收到联合王国任何其他地区或相关国家或地区法院提出的请求时，该请求授权被请求法院就请求中指明的任何事项，适用任一法院就属于其管辖范围的可比事项所适用的破产法。在行使本款项下酌处权时，法院尤其应考虑国际私法规则。\n\n147. 第 426(5) 条中提及适用国际私法规则，既困难又晦涩：见 Dicey，第 15 版，第 30-119 段；我在 In re Television Trade Rentals [2002] BCC 807，第 17 段中的论述及其中引用的判例；以及 Al-Sabah v Grupo Torras SA [2005] 2 AC 333，第 47 段。但本次上诉并不取决于此。\n\n281 [2013] 1 AC\nRubin v Eurofinance SA（鲁宾诉欧元金融股份公司）（SC(E)）\nRubin v Eurofinance\nLord Collins of Mapesbury（梅普斯伯里的柯林斯勋爵）\n\n148. 问题在于，《1986年法》第 426(4) 条是否提供一种程序，据此，对相关国家或地区的破产法事项具有管辖权的法院所作判决可在联合王国执行。如我所述，澳大利亚是相关国家。\n\n149. 如果第 426(4) 条适用于执行外国判决，则还会产生一个进一步问题，即第 426 条是否被《1933年外国判决（互惠执行）法》第 6 条排除；该条规定：\n\n对于根据外国判决应支付款项的追偿程序，如该判决属于本法本部分适用的判决，除以登记该判决方式进行的程序外，联合王国任何法院均不得受理。\n\n150. Lewison J（卢伊森法官）和上诉法院 [2012] Ch 538 均认定，第 426(4) 条可作为执行该判决的工具。\n\n151. 第 426(4) 条获得了广义解释：见 Hughes v Hannover Rckversicherungs-Aktiengesellschaft [1997] 1 BCLC 497 (CA)；England v Smith [2001] Ch 419 (CA)；以及 HIH [2008] 1 WLR 852。已有判决认为，已提出请求函是一项重要因素，公共政策和礼让原则支持提供协助：Hughes v Hannover，第 517—518 页；以及 England v Smith，第 433 页。因此，在 England v Smith 一案中，监督 Bond Corporation 清算程序的澳大利亚法院作出命令，对 Arthur Andersen（安达信）的一名伦敦合伙人进行审查。该法院发出请求函，请求英国法院通过作出其自身的审查命令予以协助。上诉法院裁定应作出该命令。\n\n152. 但是，尽管被上诉人提出相反主张，England v Smith 并非执行澳大利亚命令的案件，而是英国法院为协助澳大利亚清算程序而作出自身命令的案件。依我判决，《1986年法》第 426(4) 和 426(5) 条并不涉及判决执行。相比之下，第 426(1)(2) 条处理联合王国一地区所作命令在另一地区的执行，并明确提及此类命令的执行（第 426(1) 条中的“应予执行”）。第 426(4) 条不仅处理对澳大利亚等外国指定国家的协助，也处理联合王国内部的协助。若第 426(4) 条适用于联合王国内部命令的执行，则第 426(1) 条将在很大程度上成为多余，其程度超出上诉法院 [2012] Ch 538，第 57 段所称的某种重叠。\n\n153. 第 426(1)(4) 条源自《1914年破产法》第 121 和 123 条。《1914年法》第 121 条规定，联合王国一地区破产法院作出的命令应在其他地区执行。第 122 条规定，联合王国行使破产和无力偿债管辖权的法院，以及其他地区的每一英国法院，应相互协助并作为彼此的辅助机构；并且，在非英格兰法院提出请求时，可以行使任一法院的管辖权。\n\n154. 《破产法与实务审查委员会报告（1982）》（Cmnd 8558）（Cork Report（科克报告））在第 1909—1913 段中称，第 122 条在此背景下是关键条款，并建议将该条扩展至清盘程序。但是，尽管被上诉人提出主张，我并未发现任何建议表明第 426(4) 条适用于外国判决的执行。\n\nLord Collins of Mapesbury（梅普斯伯里的柯林斯勋爵）\nRubin v Eurofinance SA（鲁宾诉欧元金融股份公司）（SC(E)）（SC(E)）[2013] 1 AC [2013] 1\n\n155. 因此，除在实际差别甚微、且我将再行论及的情境外，《1933年法》第 6 条的适用性无须作出裁决。\n\nVIII 服从管辖\n\n156. 如果 Dicey 规则适用，则如判决债务人服从外国法院的管辖，争议中的判决将在英格兰可予执行。\n\n新凯普\n\n157. 澳大利亚法院准许将本程序送达管辖范围外的辛迪加：见上文第 IV 节。该辛迪加未提交出庭答辩，但其律师就向澳大利亚法院提交的有关 New Cap（新凯普）无力偿债的证据提出书面意见，其意见已提交澳大利亚法官。\n\n158. 更为相关的是，自 August 1999 起，该辛迪加提交债权证明（涉及 1997、1998 和 1999 会计年度未结索赔和未付保费，而非本程序标的再保险合同），并出席和参与债权人会议。特别是，在 16 September 2009 举行的一次延期债权人会议上，该辛迪加已就该会议向主席授予委托书，并就该会议提交债权证明和委托书表格。该辛迪加在债权人会议上投票赞成一项安排计划。清算人已承认该辛迪加金额超过 £650,000 的英镑等值债权，但清算人正保留该股息，以部分清偿本程序产生的费用。\n\n159. 英格兰普通案件中的一般规则是，被指称已服从英格兰法院管辖的一方，必须已采取某项步骤；该步骤仅在实际放弃管辖权异议，或从未提出该异议时才属必要或有用：Williams & Glyns Bank plc v Astro Dinamico Cia Naviera SA [1984] 1 WLR 438, 444 (HL)，认可 Rein v Stein (1892) 66 LT 469, 471 (Cave J)。\n\n160 为确定是否已就外国法院的管辖权表示接受，而适用以下规则——即以判决债务人已接受外国法院管辖为依据执行外国判决——亦采纳了同一一般规则：Adams（亚当斯） v Cape Industries plc（开普工业股份有限公司）[1990] Ch 433, 459（Scott J（斯科特法官））及 Akai Pty Ltd（阿凯私人有限公司）v Peoples Insurance Co Ltd（人民保险有限公司）[1998] 1 Lloyds Rep 90, 96—97（Thomas J（托马斯法官））；另见 Desert Sun Loan Corpn（沙漠太阳贷款公司）v Hill（希尔）[1996] 2 All ER 847, 856（CA）；Akande（阿坎德）v Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd（鲍尔弗·比蒂建筑有限公司）[1998] IL Pr 110；Starlight International Inc（星光国际公司）v Bruce（布鲁斯）[2002] IL Pr 617，第14段（外国判决案件）；以及 Industrial Maritime Carriers (Bahamas) Inc（工业海运承运人〔巴哈马〕公司）v Sinoca International Inc（西诺卡国际公司）（The Eastern Trader（东部贸易商号））[1996] 2 Lloyds Rep 585, 601（涉及以下问题的案件：为支持英国仲裁条款而申请禁诉令的一方，是否因接受外国法院管辖而放弃该协议）。\n\n161 就在英国执行外国判决而言，是否已接受管辖权的定性取决于英国法。法院不会仅考虑在外国采取的步骤若在英国诉讼中采取，是否会构成接受管辖。国际背景要求采取更宽泛的做法。外国法院会将外国诉讼中采取的步骤视为接受管辖，并不意味着英国法院也会如此看待。反之，仅因外国法院不会将该等步骤视为接受管辖，也并不必然意味着英国法院在为执行外国法院判决之目的时，不会将其视为接受管辖。是否已接受管辖的问题，应从全部事实中推断。\n\n162 正是在这一背景下，Scott J（斯科特法官）在 Adams v Cape Industries plc（开普工业股份有限公司）[1990] Ch 433, 461 一案的一审中作出如下表述（该案中有关接受管辖的问题并未提交上诉法院）：\n\n如果外国法院的国内法不会将该等步骤视为接受其管辖权，则这里亦不应……将其视为如此，尽管如果该等步骤是在英国法院采取的，则可能构成接受管辖。外国诉讼中所采取程序步骤的含义必须……在外国诉讼的背景下加以评估。\n\n163 我同意 Thomas J（托马斯法官）在 Akai Pty Ltd（阿凯私人有限公司）v Peoples Insurance Co Ltd（人民保险有限公司）[1998] 1 Lloyds Rep 90, 97 一案中的表述方式：\n\n法院必须客观地审议该事项；其必须考虑其自身程序规则的一般框架，也必须考虑采取该等步骤的法院所在地的国内法。这是因为，只有参照该法律，才能理解该等步骤的重要性。如果一人在外国管辖区采取的某一步骤，例如提出反诉，依英国法很可能被视为构成接受管辖，但该外国法院不会将其视为接受其管辖权，英国法院将考虑外国法下的立场。\n\n164 该辛迪加在撤销程序本身中并未采取任何会被澳大利亚法院或英国法院视为接受管辖的步骤。该辛迪加在清算中采取的步骤，是否构成就外国判决规则而言的接受管辖？\n\n165 在英国法中，毫无疑问，可以针对在英国清算或破产程序中申报债权的外国债权人作出命令，其依据是该外国债权人通过申报债权而接受英国法院的管辖。在 Ex p Robertson（罗伯逊）；In re Morton（莫顿）(1875) LR 20 Eq 733 一案中，就处于通过安排进行的清算中的破产马铃薯商人的财产指定了受托人。一名苏格兰商人在提出清算申请后收取了 £120，并就 £247 的余额申报债权，且获得了按现行标准每英镑20便士计算的分配款。受托人送达动议通知，请求返还从无力偿债财产中支付至管辖区外的 £120。被申请人以其为定居于苏格兰的人为由，对英国法院的管辖权提出异议。在对郡法院判决提出上诉后，Bacon CJ（培根首席法官）认为法院具有管辖权。他在第737—738页称：\n\n债权人参加清算或破产程序的后果是什么？他们参加的是一种协议，这种协议与他们每个人都已签署、盖章并宣誓同意其条款——即破产人的财产应在债权人之间妥善管理——并无二致。既然如此，财产管理即交由法院负责，法院有管辖权裁决各种问题，无论是法律问题、事实问题，或为使破产人财产获得完整分配而法院认为必要的任何其他问题……难道还能怀疑，本案上诉人已经同意，就其而言……破产法应对其生效，并在该管辖权下生效；他不仅受该管辖权约束，而且已成为该管辖权下的积极参与者，并已从中受益……[上诉人]同样有义务履行该协议的条件并接受法院管辖，如同他从未离开英格兰范围一样。\n\n166 该辛迪加对澳大利亚法院的管辖权提出异议。Barrett J（巴雷特法官）在其 14 July 2009 判决书中认定，该辛迪加已明确表示其不接受该法院管辖；他还认定，因此澳大利亚法院的判决不能在英国执行。其判决仅涉及优先清偿请求，他并未处理该辛迪加通过申报债权及收取分配款参与清算是否构成接受管辖的问题。他认定法院具有管辖权，因为新南威尔士州规则允许以诉因产生于新南威尔士州为依据进行域外送达。\n\n167 因此，我会接受清算人的主张：该辛迪加既已选择接受 New Cap（新资本）的澳大利亚破产程序，就应视为已接受负责监督该程序的澳大利亚法院管辖。不应允许其在不承担遵守该程序中作出裁定这一负担的情况下，从破产程序中获益。\n\n168 在 Rubin（鲁宾）上诉案中，情况不同。可以主张 Eurofinance SA（欧罗金融股份公司）已接受美国联邦地区法院的管辖，理由如下：第一，正是 Eurofinance SA 向高等法院申请指定 Rubin 先生及 Lan 先生为 TCT 的接管人，特别目的是使 TCT 随后获得 Chapter 11 下的保护；第二，Eurofinance SA 向英国法院陈述，美国法院指定的管理人将能够对第三方提出请求；第三，美国破产法院的判决书载明，该法院对 Eurofinance SA 具有属人管辖权，不仅因为其在美国开展业务，也因为（如我上述所提及）其已在 Chapter 11 程序中提交出庭通知：22 July 2008 命令，第42—43段。\n\n169 但 Rubin 上诉人并未在对抗程序中出庭，且在本程序中并未主张 Eurofinance SA（或促使 Eurofinance SA 提出该申请的 Adrian Roman（阿德里安·罗曼）先生）以任何其他方式接受美国破产法院的管辖，因此无须进一步探究该问题。\n\nIX New Cap（新资本）：依普通法或依据1933年法执行\n\n170 鉴于我得出 New Cap 案中的澳大利亚判决因该辛迪加接受管辖而可执行的结论，出现了一个纯属技术性的执行方式问题。问题在于，执行应依据1933年法，还是依据普通法。如果破产程序被排除在1933年法之外，则应依普通法执行；如果未被排除，则（如我所述）第6条的效果是排除基于该判决提起普通法诉讼，并使依据1933年法登记成为执行该法第一部分所涵盖判决的唯一方法。\n\n171 1933年法第11(2)条规定，action in personam（对人之诉）一语不得视为包括（其中包括）与破产及公司清盘有关的程序。但第4(2)(c)条的效果是，如判决作于既非对人之诉亦非 action in rem（对物之诉）的诉讼中，只要英国法院承认外国法院的管辖权，即依普通法承认其管辖权，则外国法院应视为具有管辖权。因此，破产程序是否完全被排除在1933年法的适用范围之外的问题仍然存在。1933年法中没有其他条文对此问题提供任何线索。\n\n172 1933年法的主要目的，是通过使互惠更容易实现，便利在国外执行商事判决。建议立法的《外国判决（互惠执行）委员会报告（1932）》(Cmd 4213)（Greer Report（格里尔报告））中唯一提及破产程序之处，是如下表述（第4段）：“就我们目前的目的而言，无须考虑外国破产程序判决在英国的效力……”该报告附有经与来自比利时、法国和德国的专家协商拟定的公约草案。与比利时的公约草案（第4(3)(4)条）及与德国的公约草案（第4(4)条）规定，公约中的管辖权规则不适用于破产程序中的判决、有关公司或其他法人团体清盘的程序中的判决，但如原审法院的管辖权符合被申请法院所遵循的国际私法规则，则承认该管辖权。该规定与后来成为1933年法第4(2)(c)条及第11(2)条的规定相对应。与法国的公约草案不适用于破产程序等中的判决（第2(3)条），但规定不得视为有任何事项排除承认及执行该公约不适用的判决：第2(4)条。\n\n173 与适用1933年法的国家缔结的公约采用了类似方法。无须逐一详细列出。但没有理由认为破产程序不被视为民事和商事事项。因此，1961年与德意志联邦共和国缔结的公约（载于《Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments (Germany) Order》(SI 1961/1199)附表）在第I(6)条规定，“民事和商事事项中的判决”一语不包括\n\n关于罚金或处罚的判决，并且在第II(2)条中另行规定，《公约》不适用于破产程序中的判决或与公司或其他法人团体清算有关的程序（但依照通常的技术处理方式，并未排除承认和执行：第II(3)条）。其他《公约》则仅将破产程序排除在《公约》的特定管辖权规定之外，例如附于《格里尔报告》的《公约》草案：1962年《外国判决相互执行（奥地利）令》（SI 1962/1339）附表第IV(5)条、1962年《外国判决相互执行（挪威）令》（SI 1962/636）附表第IV(3)条，以及1973年《外国判决相互执行（意大利）令》（SI 1973/1894）附表1第IV(3)条。A B\n\n174 1994年《判决相互执行（澳大利亚）令》（SI 1994/1901）将1933年法案扩展适用于澳大利亚，以实施英国—澳大利亚关于民商事判决相互执行的协议。该协议（载于该命令的附表）在第1(c)(i)条中规定适用于民商事判决。该命令将该法案第一部分适用于就民事或商事事项作出的判决：第4(a)条。C D\n\n175 没有理由认为“民商事事项”一语不包括破产程序；1933年法案及各项《公约》的历史表明其确实包括破产程序。《布鲁塞尔公约》、原《卢加诺公约》及修订后的《卢加诺公约》以及《布鲁塞尔一号条例》明确将破产排除在适用范围之外这一事实，实际上表明若非如此，破产本应属于其适用范围。被上诉人援引欧盟法院（Court of Justice of the European Union）在 Gourdain（古尔丹）诉 Nadler（纳德勒）案（Case 133/78）[1979] ECR 733，第3—4段裁决中的一段文字，认为该文字表明，《布鲁塞尔公约》第1条中对破产的排除，是被排除在民商事事项概念之外的事项的一个例子。但从上下文（以及总检察长 Reischl（赖施尔）的意见）可清楚看出，法院只是说，由于第1条中的“民商事事项”一语必须赋予自主含义，“破产”一语亦必须如此。破产程序被排除在外并不影响其作为民事或商事事项的性质，这一点得到 F-Tex SIA（F-Tex有限责任公司）诉 Lietuvos-Anglijos UAB-Jadecloud-Vilma（立陶宛—英格兰UAB-Jadecloud-Vilma）案（Case C-213/10）2012年4月19日近期裁决的确认；法院在该案中称，《布鲁塞尔一号条例》旨在适用于除某些明确界定事项外的所有民商事事项，因此，直接源于破产程序且与其密切相关的诉讼被排除在外：第29段。E F G\n\n176 因此，1933年法案适用于该澳大利亚判决，并且应依1933年法案以登记方式执行。\n\nX 处置\n\n177 因此，我会准许 Rubin（鲁宾）案中的上诉，但会驳回 New Cap（新资本）案中的上诉，理由是该辛迪加已服从澳大利亚法院的管辖。\n\nD\n\nE\n\n287 [2013] 1 AC Rubin（鲁宾）诉 Eurofinance SA（欧洲金融股份公司）(SC(E)) Rubin（鲁宾）诉 Eurofinance（欧洲金融） Lord Mance JSC（曼斯大法官）\n\nLORD MANCE JSC（曼斯大法官）A\n\n178 我同意 Lord Collins of Mapesbury（梅普斯伯里的柯林斯勋爵）在其就这些上诉所作判决中的推理及结论，实质上基于其所述理由，尽管我不认同其附带意见（第132段），即英国枢密院（Privy Council）在 Cambridge Gas Transportation Corpn（剑桥燃气运输公司）诉 Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc（Navigator Holdings plc无担保债权人官方委员会）案 [2007] 1 AC 508 中的裁决必然是错误的。该问题未在最高法院（Supreme Court）中提出争辩，我愿保留对此的意见。无论如何，Cambridge Gas（剑桥燃气）案均可予以区分。B\n\n179 这些上诉的核心普通法问题是，最高法院是否应认可或引入一项特别的承认和执行规则，即一项不属于 Lord Collins（柯林斯勋爵）所确认的戴西规则（Dicey rule）范围之内的规则（第14版为规则36，第15版为规则43），并适用于撤销可撤销的破产前交易的外国破产程序中的判决。基于 Lord Collins（柯林斯勋爵）在第95—131段中所述的主要理由，我同意我们不应如此做。C\n\n180 鉴于被上诉人及上诉法院（Court of Appeal）极为重视枢密院司法委员会（Board）在 Cambridge Gas（剑桥燃气）案中的推理及裁决，我补充一些意见，以说明为何，如本案上诉人所主张，该案所涉情形、所依据的事实假设及法律分析，在本案中均无对应之处。\n\n181 Cambridge Gas（剑桥燃气）案既引起爱尔兰司法界的异议，亦受到英国学界的批评，Lord Collins（柯林斯勋爵）在第53段及第111—112段中提及了这些批评。我在 Pattni（帕特尼）诉 Ali（阿里）案 [2007] 2 AC 85 中代表枢密院司法委员会作出判决时曾说，委员会在 Cambridge Gas（剑桥燃气）案中所审议的破产命令，其目的仅仅是建立一种机制，使权利已获承认或确定的债权人得以对债务人 [Navigator（领航者）] 的财产进行集体执行：第23段。\n\n182 诚然，该分析意味着将 Navigator（领航者）的股份归属给债权人，在实质上视为与将 Navigator（领航者）在其船舶所有权附属公司中的股份归属给债权人并无不同。但从委员会在 Cambridge Gas（剑桥燃气）案意见的第8及第9段，以及第24—26段，可清楚看出委员会认为两者并无区别。委员会不认为 Cambridge Gas（剑桥燃气）就仍名义上登记于其名下的股份具有任何有价值的权益可供推进或保护。将该等股份归属给 Navigator（领航者）的债权人，不过是处置 Navigator（领航者）资产的一种机制，并不影响或涉及 Cambridge Gas（剑桥燃气）。因此，委员会认为（无论其观点正确与否），其所涉及的是狭义且传统意义上的对资不抵债公司资产的分配。F\n\n183 对此作进一步说明，委员会在 Cambridge Gas（剑桥燃气）案中采取如下分析。纽约法院对 Navigator（领航者）的资产拥有管辖权，因为 Navigator（领航者）已服从纽约程序。Cambridge Gas（剑桥燃气）持有的 Navigator（领航者）股份（位于马恩岛，即 Navigator（领航者）的注册地）完全且彻底毫无价值 [2007] 1 AC 508，第9段。将 Cambridge Gas（剑桥燃气）持有的 Navigator（领航者）股份转让给 Navigator（领航者）的债权人，其效果等同于转让 Navigator（领航者）的资产，因为 Navigator（领航者）是一家资不抵债公司，股东并无任何有价值的权益：第26段。根据《1931年公司法》第152条，Cambridge Gas（剑桥燃气）持有的 Navigator（领航者）股份在马恩岛可受到与纽约法院拟通过其第11章命令实现的类似安排计划的约束。更一般而言，如我在 Stone & Rolls Ltd（斯通与罗尔斯有限公司）诉 Moore Stephens（摩尔·斯蒂芬斯）案 [2009] AC 1391，第236—238段中所指出，在破产情形下，股东的权益让位于债权人的权益。A\n\n184 正是在这一有限背景下，委员会得出结论，纽约法院和马恩岛法院的命令可被视为仅仅便利或促成对 Navigator（领航者）财产的集体执行。\n\n185 相反，上诉法院认为，本案的答案可见于委员会在 Cambridge Gas（剑桥燃气）案 [2007] 1 AC 508，第19—21段中关于破产程序性质的一般性陈述。确实，撤销破产前交易的程序可以与资产归集过程有关。也就是说，其一般目的和效果是确保在某一特定破产前期间内属于或曾属于债权人的所有人之间公平分配资产。Lord Hoffmann（霍夫曼勋爵）在 In re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd（HIH意外与综合保险有限公司案）[2008] 1 WLR 852，第19段中的附带意见，Lord Collins（柯林斯勋爵）在第15段及第52段援引了该意见，其效果亦同，不过该意见同样是在与本案不同的背景下作出的。C\n\n186 然而，委员会并不认为这些考量足以回答或消除 Cambridge Gas（剑桥燃气）案中关于管辖权存在的问题，或至少关于其行使的问题。恰恰相反，其继而在第22—26段中仔细审查了法院可适当提供协助的限度。在驳回对登记于 Cambridge Gas（剑桥燃气）名下的持股所作干预超出马恩岛法院管辖权的论点时（第26段），其给出的唯一理由与资不抵债公司股份的性质有关。根据其意见，这意味着 Cambridge Gas（剑桥燃气）没有任何有价值的权益需要保护，而且将股份登记在 Navigator（领航者）债权人名下，不过是使债权人得以取得 Navigator（领航者）资产的一种机制。D E\n\n187 基于此，正如 Adrian Briggs（阿德里安·布里格斯）教授在《The British Year Book of International Law 2006》（《2006年英国国际法年鉴》）第575—581页一篇深刻的案例评注中所指出，Cambridge Gas（剑桥燃气）案的裁决就没有那么引人注目（尽管布里格斯教授也指出，该裁决或许仍会与上议院（House of Lords）在 Socit Eram Shipping Co Ltd（Eram航运有限公司）诉 Cie Internationale de Navigation（国际航运公司）案 [2004] AC 260 中的裁决产生难以调和的问题）。但由于 Cambridge Gas（剑桥燃气）案的实际裁决如此狭窄地聚焦于资不抵债公司中股东权利的性质，且未受到直接质疑，我倾向于对其正确性不作定论。\n\n188 无论对委员会在 Cambridge Gas（剑桥燃气）案中推理的有效性持何种看法，显然该案并不涵盖或支配本案上诉。本案并不涉及股份，不涉及股份只是或被法院视为只是开启资不抵债公司资产的钥匙的情形，甚至也不涉及明显可见反对承认和执行外国法院命令的人没有任何权益需要保护的情形。相反，存在重大争议，即是否存在导致大额对人责任的欺诈性优待。据称从欺诈性优待中受益的人，并未出现在对其作出判决的有关外国破产程序中。他们（暂且不论是否服从管辖的问题）不属于有关外国法院的国际管辖范围。G H\n\nB\n\nF\n\n289 [2013] 1 AC Rubin（鲁宾）诉 Eurofinance SA（欧洲金融股份公司）(SC(E)) Rubin（鲁宾）诉 Eurofinance（欧洲金融） Lord Mance JSC（曼斯大法官）\n\n189 Stone-cum-Ebony JSC勋爵克拉克（Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony JSC）与柯林斯勋爵（Lord Collins）持不同观点，但他既未界定根据英国国际私法规则，在何种情形下应承认外国法院具有受理破产程序的管辖权；也未界定，倘若（我认为错误地）将整个领域视为自由裁量问题，哪些因素会使承认该外国程序中作出的撤销令不公正或违反公共政策：见克拉克大法官判决书第193、200和201段。戴西（Dicey）（第14版及第15版第31-064段）将英国国际私法会承认外国法院所具有的受理破产程序管辖权范围，描述为一个棘手且富有争议的问题。但这将包括破产人或无力偿债公司仅仅服从外国破产管辖权的情形。按照克拉克大法官的分析，在该情形下（Rubin v Eurofinance SA 即为一例），撤销令项下的债务人未曾服从、且并无其他依据受该外国管辖权约束，均无关紧要。只要被判决债务人曾有机会在外国法院出庭并进行抗辩，即已足够。基于柯林斯勋爵所述理由，我不接受这属于普通法。\n\n190 依我之见，鉴于上述情况，上诉法院（Court of Appeal）认为本次上诉的解决办法在于枢密院（Privy Council）在 Cambridge Gas 中所提出的意见，实属错误。即使假定 Cambridge Gas 中的实际裁决可以得到支持，该案也不能且不应被视为支持被上诉人的主张，即破产程序中的欺诈性优先偿付请求和撤销令通常不受要求对人管辖权或对物管辖权的普通法规则约束。\n\n石头兼乌木勋爵克拉克大法官\n\n191 我愿对梅普斯伯里勋爵柯林斯（Lord Collins of Mapesbury）全面判决书中所展现的学识表示敬意。然而，若由我独自决定，我将驳回 Rubin 案中的上诉。由于我是唯一持少数意见者，我撰写长篇反对意见并无多大益处。因此，我将尝试简要说明我的理由。在此过程中，我采用柯林斯勋爵所使用的术语和缩略语。\n\n192 我同意柯林斯勋爵和曼斯大法官（Lord Mance JSC）的意见，即枢密院在 Cambridge Gas Transportation Corpn v Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc [2007] 1 AC 508 中的裁决可以区分。该案事实与本案事实颇为不同。然而，就有人主张 Cambridge Gas 被错误裁决而言，我不同意。此外，我认为不宜作出该项认定，因为在辩论过程中并未主张其有误。在我看来，应当采取的方法已由霍夫曼勋爵（Lord Hoffmann）在 In re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 852 中的发言及其在 Cambridge Gas 中的判决所预示。\n\n193 依我所见，问题仅在于：外国破产法院在其有权受理的个人或公司破产程序中作出的撤销令，如可公平地视为对人或对物命令，是否不可执行。对此问题，我将作否定回答。换言之，问题在于，在依英国国际私法规则外国法院有权受理破产程序本身的情形下，英国法院是否有管辖权执行外国破产程序中作出的撤销令。对此问题，我将作肯定回答。据我理解，本案并未主张美国法院（US court）无权受理破产程序本身。\n\n194 霍夫曼勋爵在 Cambridge Gas 判决书中的相关段落如下（如柯林斯勋爵在上文第43段所引）：\n\n13.……对物判决和对人判决是对权利是否存在的司法认定：前者涉及对财产享有的权利，后者涉及针对某人的权利。当外国法院承认对物判决或对人判决时，即接受该判决确立其所声称已经确定的权利，而不再审查其作出该判决的依据。该判决本身被视为权利的来源。\n\n14. 另一方面，破产程序的目的并非确定或确认权利是否存在，而是为权利已获承认或确认的债权人针对债务人财产进行集体执行提供机制……\n\n15.……无论是个人破产还是公司破产，均是为执行权利而非确立权利的集体程序。当然，正如布赖特曼上诉法官（Brightman LJ）在 In re Lines Bros Ltd [1983] Ch 1, 20 中指出，在破产程序过程中，可能附带需要确立受到质疑的权利：债权证明可能被驳回；或者，可能就某项特定财产是否属于债务人并可供分配发生争议。对此类问题，可通过在破产程序中进行简易审理，或指示通过通常诉讼确定。惟此类问题同样属于附带程序事项，而非程序目的的核心。\n\n195 关键段落是第15段。依我看来，该段明确表明，一项命令既可能是对人或对物命令，也可能是霍夫曼勋爵在第14段所指的命令。因此，在作为执行权利的集体程序一部分的破产程序中，可能附带需要确立实体权利。在此情形下，该命令将发挥两项作用：既确立权利，又执行该权利。这可从第15段列举的例子看出。债权证明可能被驳回，该过程可能涉及确定例如债权人对债务人享有的实体权利。或者，可能有必要确定某项特定财产是否属于债务人并可供分配。如第15段所设想，此类程序可在破产程序中通过简易审理进行，也可通过通常诉讼进行。在任一情形下，霍夫曼勋爵均将其描述为并非破产程序目的核心的附带程序。依我所见，在该情形下，撤销令既可能是对人或对物命令，也可能是破产程序中的命令。\n\n196 我同意柯林斯勋爵在第103段的意见，即不难理解为何 Cambridge Gas 中美国破产法院（US Bankruptcy Court）的命令并非对物命令。然而，依我看来，这并不表明 Cambridge Gas 被错误裁决，而是表明可以存在一项附带于破产程序作出的对物命令，该命令在普通法下可以执行，前提是破产法院对该破产程序具有管辖权。\n\n197 霍夫曼勋爵在 HIH [2008] 1 WLR 852 第30段及 Cambridge Gas [2007] 1 AC 508 第16段中解释了该方法，柯林斯勋爵在上文第19段引用了两段文字。在 HIH 中，他说：\n\n在我看来，适用于本案的国际私法首要规则是（经修正的）普遍主义原则。自18世纪以来，该原则一直是贯穿英国跨境破产法的主线。该原则要求英国法院在与司法公正和英国公共政策相一致的范围内，与主要清算地所在国家的法院合作，以确保公司全部资产均在单一分配制度下向其债权人分配。\n\n在 Cambridge Gas 中，他说：\n\n英国普通法传统上认为，债权人之间的公平要求，理想情况下，破产程序应具有普遍适用性。应当只有一个破产程序，所有债权人均有权且必须申报债权。任何人不应仅因其恰好居住在资产较多或债权人较少的管辖区而获得优势。\n\n198 柯林斯勋爵在上文第94至98段讨论了撤销程序的性质。我完全同意其分析。要求调整先前交易并追回先前的财产处分，以构成可供分配的破产财产的撤销性规定，是维持债权人之间平等原则所必需的。柯林斯勋爵在第15段指出，霍夫曼勋爵在 HIH 第19段表示，收集资产的过程将包括例如行使权力撤销可撤销的处分，而该等权力可能与英国法定制度中的权力存在相当大的差异。简言之，撤销程序以及因此撤销令，是破产程序的核心。正如柯林斯勋爵在第99段所言，撤销程序特别属于破产法的事项。\n\n199 我接受，在此类情形下允许执行撤销令将构成普通法的发展。\n\n然而，依我看来，这将是有原则的发展。其本质上将是适用霍夫曼勋爵在上文所引 HIH 第30段中确认的原则，即经修正的普遍主义原则要求英国法院在与司法公正和英国公共政策相一致的范围内，与主要清算地所在国家的法院合作，以确保公司全部资产均在单一分配制度下向其债权人分配。\n\n200 在此类案件中，被判决债务人的地位将受到以下原则保护：英国法院仅会在执行该判决与司法公正和英国公共政策相一致的情况下执行类似本案的判决。一切取决于具体案件的事实。在 Rubin 案中，对上诉人执行该判决不会造成任何不公。\n\n201 曼斯大法官在第189段指出，我既未界定何种情形下应承认外国法院有权受理破产程序，也未界定何种因素会使承认该外国程序中作出的撤销令不公正或违反公共政策。依我所见，这些事项应当在个案基础上加以解决，即（如霍夫曼勋爵在 HIH [2008] 1 WLR 852 第30段所言）通过与主要清算地所在国家的法院合作，以确保公司全部资产均在单一分配制度下向其债权人分配。撤销令项下债务人未曾服从管辖并非无关紧要。一切取决于案件的具体情形，包括债务人未曾服从管辖的原因。\n\n202 实质上，就这一关键问题而言，我更倾向于上诉法院（Court of Appeal）的推理，该推理载于Ward LJ（沃德上诉法院法官）的判决书[2011] Ch 133，第38、41、43、45、48、50、61—62、64段，Wilson LJ（威尔逊上诉法院法官）和Henderson J（亨德森法官）对此表示同意。Lord Collins（柯林斯勋爵）在第88—90段中简明概述了其推理，主要如下：(a) 该判决书为终局性和决定性的判决书，且针对确定金额；从命令表面看，该判决书为对人判决；(b) 各方均承认，在诉讼提起时，判决债务人并未在场，且未接受该管辖权，因此乍看之下其具有无懈可击的抗辩；(c) Cambridge Gas（剑桥燃气）判定，其所涉及的破产命令既非对人命令，亦非对物命令，其目的仅是为权利已获承认或确立的债权人针对债务人财产建立集体执行机制：Pattni v Ali [2007] 2 AC 85，第23段；(d) 破产是一项为执行权利而非确立权利的集体程序：Cambridge Gas [2007] 1 AC 508，第15段；(e) 问题在于，只能由破产人代表提起的撤销程序，是否应被定性为破产程序的一部分，即为执行权利而非确立权利的集体程序的一部分；(f) 对抗程序是Chapter 11程序不可分割的一部分；(g) 执行外国对人判决的一般规则不适用于破产程序；(h) 撤销机制是破产集体性质不可或缺且居于核心地位的组成部分，而非仅属附带的程序性事项；(i) 收集资产的过程将包括行使撤销可撤销处分的权力，该等权力可能与英国法定制度下的权力有相当大的差异：HIH [2008] 1 WLR 852，第19段；(j) 美国破产法院（US Bankruptcy Court）的判决书，是在破产程序集体执行制度中并为该制度之目的作出的判决书，并受与破产有关的特别私法国际法规则管辖；(k) 这是以修正普遍主义原则为基础的普通法理想发展，且不要求法院执行其在国内情境中经必要变通后不能执行的任何事项；(l) 私法国际法有一项原则，即破产应当具有统一性和普遍性，破产人住所地法院应有一项统一的破产程序，获得全球承认，并普遍适用于破产人的全部资产；(m) 还有一项进一步原则，即承认附带法院的积极协助，包括作出英国法院在国内破产案件中能够作出的任何协助；(n) 维持该判决书对上诉人并无不公平之处，因为他们完全知悉该程序，并在征询意见后选择不参与[2011] Ch 133，第38、41、43、45、48、50、61—62、64段。\n\n[2013] 1 AC Rubin v Eurofinance SA（鲁宾诉欧洲金融股份公司）(SC(E)) Rubin v Eurofinance（鲁宾诉欧洲金融） Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony JSC（斯通坎埃博尼的克拉克勋爵大法官）\n\n203 在我看来，这正确概述了上诉法院的观点。我同意该等观点，但对第(c)点作如下评论。我不确定枢密院司法委员会（Privy Council）在Cambridge Gas案中是否判定其所涉及的破产命令既非对人命令亦非对物命令。其裁定，该命令的目的仅是为权利已获承认或确立的债权人针对债务人财产建立集体执行机制。如上所述，其很可能也认识到该命令是一项对物命令。无论如何，我同意柯林斯勋爵于第90段所述，简言之，上诉法院接受了在本案中寻求执行的判决书是一项对人判决，但裁定戴西规则（Dicey rule）不适用于撤销程序中的外国判决书，因为该等程序在破产的集体执行制度中居于核心地位，并受特别规则管辖。我同意上诉法院的推理。换言之，我认为应修改戴西规则，加入外国法院有管辖权作出可对受判决约束之人执行或予以承认的对人判决的第五种情形。该第五种情形是，判决书是在外国法院有管辖权审理的外国破产程序的一部分撤销程序中作出。\n\n204 我承认，实现该结果尚有其他方法，例如采用与《欧共体破产条例》（EC Insolvency Regulation）相当的规定：见柯林斯勋爵第99—101段。我也承认，可以采取不限于撤销程序的更为激进的方法。然而，就此有限范围而言，我谨不同意柯林斯勋爵在第128段中所表达的观点，即该发展并非对既有原则的渐进发展，而是实质上已确定法律的激进背离。基于第199段所述理由，这实质上将是修正普遍主义原则的适用。在当今全球贸易的时代，上诉法院所采取的步骤，在我看来只是向前迈出的一小步。判决债务人受以下原则保护：如作出命令将违反司法公正或英国公共政策，则不会作出该命令。此外，根据本案事实，我看不出上诉法院作出的命令有任何不公正或违反公共政策的依据。最后，我不认为互惠的任何缺失会削弱该结论。\n\n205 基于上述理由，就普通法问题而言，我会驳回鲁宾案中的上诉。就所有其他问题，我同意柯林斯勋爵的判决书。\n\n第一案上诉获准。第二案上诉驳回。\n\nCOLIN BERESFORD（科林·贝雷斯福德），大律师","key_entities":["Je","CIPA"],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":34465,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 22:41:15"}