{"id":"court_ctb_1409_21","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":1409,"sub_number":21,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2023-01-30","title":"Re Global Brands Group Holding Ltd (In Liq) ———— [2022] HKCFI 1789","summary_zh":"裁判文书附件（香港判决） —— Ho Wan Kwok 破产案（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo），CTB 22-50073 ECF #1409-21（2023-01-30立案）。该文件为法律先例附件，系香港高等法院原讼法庭关于《Re Global Brands Group Holding Ltd (In Liq)》案的判决，确立跨国破产认可主要依据公司主要利益中心（COMI）准则，并确认百慕大临时清盘人收取及转移公司在香港资产（包括8,399,057.66港元等账户余额）的权力。","summary_en":"Exhibit (Hong Kong Court Judgment) — In re Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo / Guo Wengui), CTB 22-50073 ECF #1409-21 (filed 2023-01-30). This document is an exhibit containing the Hong Kong Court of First Instance judgment in Re Global Brands Group Holding Ltd (In Liq) [2022] HKCFI 1789, which held that foreign insolvency recognition should primarily follow the company's Centre of Main Interests (COMI) and authorized the provisional liquidator to take possession of assets in Hong Kong, including HK$8,399,057.66.","body_en":"# **Re Global Brands Group Holding Ltd (In Liq)**\n\n# **———— [2022] HKCFI 1789**\n\n**(Court of First Instance)**\n\n**(Miscellaneous Proceedings No 644 of 2022) ————**\n\n**Harris J in Chambers**\n\n**1, 23 June 2022**\n\n*Company law — insolvency — foreign insolvency proceedings — recognition and assistance — provisional liquidator appointed in place of company's incorporation — approach where liquidation not taking place in jurisdiction of company's centre of main interest — in circumstances, order made limited to confirming provisional liquidator's power to receive and transfer out company's assets in Hong Kong*\n\n*Conflict of laws — corporations and corporate insolvency — cross-border insolvency — recognition and assistance — future approach — criteria primarily to be determined by location of company's centre of main interest — limited exceptions*\n\n公司法 *—* 清盤 *—* 外地清盤法律程序 *—* 認可和協助 *—* 任命臨時清盤人代替公司法團 *—* 當清盤不在公司主要利益中心的司法管轄權範圍內進行時的做法 *—* 在某些情況下,命令僅限於確認臨時清盤人收取及轉移公司在香港的資產的權力\n\n法律衝突 *—* 法團和法團清盤 *—* 跨國界清盤 *—* 認可和協助 *—* 未來的做法 *—* 準則主要由公司主要利益中心的地點來確定 *—* 有限制的例外情況\n\n**C was an investment holding company incorporated in Bermuda and listed on the Main Board of the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. Upon C's application to the Bermuda Court in September 2021, a provisional liquidator (PL) was appointed over C for restructuring purposes who continued in office on the making of the winding-up order by the Bermuda Court in November 2021. PL tried to take possession of C's assets in Hong Kong, specifically certain cash balances held by Rs, and applied for an order for recognition and assistance.**\n\n**Held, allowing PL's application to make the order as set out below, that:**\n\n**(1) Hong Kong did not have any legislation dealing with cross-border insolvency and restructuring, it had largely been**\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1409-21 Filed 01/30/23 Entered 01/30/23 10:03:34 Page 2 of\n\n**left to the Judiciary to use common law tools to address challenges that arose in this area. To date, the criteria for granting recognition and assistance were: (i) that the foreign insolvency proceedings were collective insolvency proceedings; and (ii) that the foreign insolvency proceedings were opened in the company's country of incorporation. It was open to the court to develop the common law principles in a manner better suited to the circumstances in which transnational insolvencies currently arose in Hong Kong and the development of the principles in comparable jurisdictions, provided that such development was consistent with modified universalism (Solicitor (24/07) v Law Society of Hong Kong (2008) 11 HKCFAR 117, Rubin v Eurofinance SA [2013] 1 AC 236, Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers [2015] AC 1675 considered). (See paras.10, 16–21, 26.)**\n\n- **(2) In future, the criteria for recognition should primarily be determined by the location of a company's centre of main interests (COMI). The use of companies incorporated in offshore jurisdictions as holding companies and intermediate subsidiaries for business groups conducting their activities in Hong Kong and the Mainland was widespread. It was rare for such companies to conduct any business in their place of incorporation. When such companies were put into provisional or final liquidation at least one of the liquidators appointed by the offshore court would be based in Hong Kong from where they conducted the liquidation. Treating the place of incorporation as the natural home or commercially most relevant jurisdiction for the purpose of determining which jurisdiction was the appropriate place for the seat of a principal liquidation was highly artificial. Adopting the COMI criteria would also bring Hong Kong in line with the approach in the Mainland. Accordingly, the criteria to be adopted were that: (i) the foreign proceedings constituted a collective insolvency process; and (ii) those proceedings (subject to limited exceptions) were conducted in the jurisdiction in which the company's COMI was located (Re Lamtex Holdings Ltd [2021] 2 HKLRD 177 considered). (See paras.17, 32.)**\n- **(3) In determining a company's COMI, the court would consider factors including the location of directors, principal officers and board meetings, notices of relocation, location of operations, assets, bank accounts, books and records and where the restructuring activities took place (Re Ocean Rig UDW Inc 570 BR 687 (Bank SDNY Aug 24, 2017) applied; Re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 852, Re Opti-Medix Ltd [2016] 4 SLR 312, Re Zetta Jet Pte Ltd**\n\n**[2019] 4 SLR 1343, Re Investin Quay House Ltd [2021] EWHC 2371 (Ch) considered). (See paras.34–38.)**\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1409-21 Filed 01/30/23 Entered 01/30/23 10:03:34 Page 3 of 40\n\n- **(4) The recognition regime was distinct from the winding-up jurisdiction. The fact that the debtor could be, or had been, wound up in Hong Kong was not of itself a bar to the court granting assistance (Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers [2015] AC 1675 considered). (See para.39.)**\n- **(5) In the absence of a winding-up order in Hong Kong, it was not possible for a foreign liquidator to conduct a winding-up in Hong Kong which required the liquidator to exercise the powers available to a Hong Kong liquidator under the Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (Cap.32). Nor did the common law power of assistance permit the court in such circumstances to grant powers analogous to those available to a liquidator under that Ordinance. However, the court could grant powers intended to assist a foreign liquidator whose appointment had been recognised on orthodox principles of private international law (Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers [2015] AC 1675 considered; Re Up Energy Development Group Ltd [2022] 2 HKLRD 993 explained). (See paras.46–47.)**\n- **(6) The correct approach to assessing whether a foreign liquidation should be recognised was first to determine if at the time the application for recognition was made the liquidation was taking place in the jurisdiction of the company's COMI. If it was not, recognition and assistance should be declined, unless:**\n\t- **(i) it was limited to recognition of a liquidator's authority, if appointed in the place of incorporation, to represent a company and orders that were an incident of that authority; which might be described as managerial assistance; or**\n\t- **(ii) recognition and limited and carefully prescribed assistance were required as a matter of practicality (Re Opti-Medix Ltd [2016] 4 SLR 312 referred to). (See para.50.)**\n- **(7) In the present case, the Court would grant an order for recognition of PL with assistance limited to the power to receive and transfer out of Hong Kong the account balances in question. PL was C's lawful agent as a matter of the law of its place of incorporation and entitled to direct that its assets be transferred from accounts in Hong Kong to accounts in Bermuda. The order simply confirmed the position under orthodox principles of private international law and gave PL assistance which was more managerial in nature than a type associated specifically with insolvency. (See paras.14, 48, 50.)**\n\n**(8) (Obiter) The Court's preliminary view is that in future the Hong Kong court should generally decline to recognise soft-touch provisional liquidators appointed by offshore jurisdictions adopting a debtor in possession model. Hong Kong has consciously decided not to enact legislation providing for this kind of debt moratorium. (See para.12.)**\n\n# **Application**\n\n**This was an application by the provisional liquidator of the subject company appointed in Bermuda for an order seeking recognition and assistance from the Hong Kong court.**\n\n- **Mr Look Chan Ho, instructed by Stephenson Harwood, for the applicant (provisional liquidator of Global Brands Group Holding Ltd).**\n- **The 1st respondent (Computershare Hong Kong Trustees Ltd) was not represented and did not appear.**\n- **The 2nd respondent (Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp Ltd) was not represented and did not appear.**\n\n# **Legislation mentioned in the judgment**\n\n**Bankruptcy Code [United States] Chs.11, 15**\n\n**Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (Cap.32) ss.193, 327**\n\n**Companies Ordinance (Cap.32) (predecessor) s.327**\n\n# **Cases cited in the judgment**\n\n**Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd v Bank of Credit & Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd, Macau Branch [1997] HKLRD 304**\n\n- **Bear Stearns High-Grade Strategies Master Fund Ltd, Re 381 BR 37**\n- **CEFC Shanghai International Group Ltd, Re [2020] 1 HKLRD 676, [2020] 4 HKC 62, [2020] HKCFI 167**\n\n**Cambridge Gas Transportation Corpn v Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc [2006] UKPC 26, [2007] 1 AC 508, [2006] 3 WLR 689, [2006] 3 All ER 829**\n\n**Chen Li Hung v Ting Lei Miao (2000) 3 HKCFAR 9, [2000] 1 HKLRD 252, [2000] 1 HKC 461**\n\n- **China Bozza Development Holdings Ltd, Re [2021] 2 HKLRD 977, [2021] 4 HKC 560, [2021] HKCFI 1235**\n- **China Fishery Group Ltd, Re [2019] 1 HKLRD 875, [2019] 6 HKC 189, [2019] HKCFI 174**\n- **China Huiyuan Juice Group Ltd, Re [2021] 1 HKLRD 255, [2021] 1 HKC 387, [2020] HKCFI 2940**\n\n**China Medical Technologies Inc (No 1), Re [2018] HKCA 111, [2018] HKCLC 65**\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1409-21 Filed 01/30/23 Entered 01/30/23 10:03:34 Page 5 of 40\n\n- **Creative Finance Ltd Case No. 14-10358 (REG)**\n- **Eurofood IFSC Ltd, Re [2006] Ch 508, [2006] 3 WLR 309, [2006] BCC 397, [2006] ILPr 23**\n- **Gibbs (Antony) & Sons v La Société Industrielle Et Commerciale Des Métaux (1890) 25 QBD 399**\n- **HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd, Re [2008] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 WLR 852, [2008] 3 All ER 869, [2008] Bus LR 905**\n- **HNA Group Co Ltd, Re; sub nom Re Jiang Wenyu [2021] HKCFI 2897, [2021] HKEC 4405**\n- **Hsin Chong Group Holdings, Re (Joint and Provisional Liquidators of) [2019] HKCFI 805, [2019] HKEC 945**\n- **Information Security One Ltd, Re [2007] 3 HKLRD 780**\n- **Investin Quay House Ltd, Re [2021] EWHC 2371 (Ch), [2022] BCC 497**\n- **Irish Shipping Ltd, Re [1985] HKLR 437**\n- **Joint Administrators of African Minerals Ltd v Madison Pacific Trust Ltd [2015] 4 HKC 215**\n- **Joint Official Liquidators of A Co v B [2014] 4 HKLRD 374**\n- **Kam Leung Sui Kwan v Kam Kwan Lai (2015) 18 HKCFAR 501, [2015] 6 HKC 644**\n- **Kireeva v Bedzhamov [2021] EWHC 2281 (Ch), [2021] BPIR 1465**\n- **Kireeva v Bedzhamov [2022] EWCA Civ 35, [2022] 2 All ER (Comm) 212, [2022] BCC 603**\n- **Lee Wah Bank, Re (1926) 2 Malayan Cases 81**\n- **Legend International Resorts Ltd, Re [2006] 2 HKLRD 192, [2006] 3 HKC 565**\n- **Li Yiqing v Lamtex Holdings Ltd, Re [2021] 2 HKLRD 177, [2021] HKCFI 622**\n- **Moody Technology Holdings Ltd, Re [2020] 2 HKLRD 187, [2020] 4 HKC 78, [2020] HKCFI 416**\n- **Nuoxi Capital Ltd v Peking University Founder Group Co Ltd [2022] 2 HKC 1, [2021] HKCFI 3817**\n- **Ocean Rig UDW Inc, Re 570 BR 687 (Bank. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2017); aff'd 585 BR 31 (S.D.N.Y. April 5, 2018)**\n- **Opti-Medix Ltd, Re [2016] SGHC 108, [2016] 4 SLR 312**\n- **Riverrock Securities Ltd v International Bank of St Petersburg (Joint Stock Co) [2020] EWHC 2483 (Comm), [2021] 2 All ER (Comm) 1121, [2020] 2 CLC 547**\n- **Rubin v Eurofinance SA [2012] UKSC 46, [2013] 1 AC 236, [2012] 3 WLR 1019, [2013] 1 All ER 521**\n- **Russo-Asiatic Bank, Re The (1929-30) 24 HKLR 16**\n- **Shenzhen Everich Supply Chain Co Ltd, Re [2020] HKCFI 965, [2020] HKEC 1188**\n\n- **Silver Starlight Ltd v China CITIC Bank Corp Ltd, Tianjin Branch [2021] HKCA 1248, [2021] HKEC 3771**\n- **Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers [2014] UKPC 36, [2015] AC 1675, [2015] 2 WLR 971, [2015] BCC 66**\n\n**Solicitor (24/07) v Law Society of Hong Kong (2008) 11 HKCFAR 117, [2008] 2 HKLRD 576, [2008] 2 HKC 1**\n\n**Stichting Shell Pensioenfonds v Krys [2014] UKPC 41, [2015] AC 616, [2015] 2 WLR 289, [2015] BCC 205**\n\n**Tchenguiz v Grant Thornton UK LLP [2017] EWCA Civ 83, [2018] QB 695, [2018] 2 WLR 834**\n\n**Up Energy Development Group Ltd, Re [2022] 2 HKLRD 993, [2022] HKCFI 1329**\n\n**Z-Obee Holdings Ltd [2018] 1 HKLRD 165**\n\n**Zetta Jet, Re [2019] SGHC 53, [2019] 4 SLR 1343**\n\n# **DECISION**\n\n# **Harris J in Chambers**\n\n# **The Application**\n\n**1. On 25 May 2022 the Provisional Liquidator of Global Brands Group Holdings Ltd (Provisional Liquidator and the Company respectively) issued an originating summons to which Computershare Hong Kong Trustee Ltd (Computershare) and The Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Ltd (HSBC) are Respondents seeking an order for recognition and assistance. The Company is incorporated in Bermuda and was wound up in Bermuda on 5 November 2021. The circumstances of the application provide an opportunity to consider in more detail an issue I discuss in Re Li Yiqing v Lamtex Holdings Ltd,** ¹ **namely, whether in future the Hong Kong court will recognise and assist a foreign insolvency process conducted in the place of company's centre of main interests (COMI) and it is not sufficient, nor necessary, that the foreign insolvency process is conducted in a company's place of incorporation.**\n\n# **Background**\n\n**2. The Provisional Liquidator, John McKenna, had been appointed on 16 September 2021 and continued in office on the making of the winding-up order. The principle reason for seeking recognition and assistance from the Hong Kong court is to obtain the proceeds of the sale of shares held by Computershare in Hong Kong on behalf of the Company, totalling approximately HK\\$9**\n\n¹ [2021] HKCFI 622; [2021] HKCLC 329.\n\n**million, and the rather more modest balance held by HSBC in the Company's bank account in Hong Kong, which totals approximately US\\$5,000. The originating summons also seeks certain other general powers. I will explain them later in this judgment.**\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1409-21 Filed 01/30/23 Entered 01/30/23 10:03:34 Page 7 of 40\n\n**3. In his affidavit in support of the application the Provisional Liquidator explains the background to the Company and the circumstances leading up to its liquidation in Bermuda. The Company is an investment holding company. The Company, along with its subsidiaries (Group), were engaged in the business design, development, marketing and sale of branded children's, men's and women's apparel, footwear, fashion accessories and related lifestyle products in North America and Europe. The Company and its subsidiaries were also engaged in brand management and offered expertise in expanding its clients' branded assets new product categories, new regions and retail collaborations, as well as assisting in distribution of licensed products on a global basis.**\n\n**4. The Company was listed on the Main Board of The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (HKEX) Ltd in 2014 as a result of a spin-off from Li & Fung of which it had formed part. Due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and geopolitical uncertainties, as well as structural shifts in the retail industry, the business of the Company and its subsidiaries was seriously challenged. As a result, the Company had been facing immense financial difficulties since 2020. For the year ended 31 March 2020, the Group reported: (a) a net loss after tax of US\\$586,590,000; (b) current liabilities exceeding current assets by US\\$772,125,000; and (c) cash and cash equivalents amounting to US\\$83,880,000. For the six months ended 30 September 2020, the Group reported: (a) a net loss after tax of US\\$119,838,000; (b) that current liabilities exceed current assets by US\\$899,391,000; and (c) that the Group's cash and cash equivalents were US\\$55,805,000.**\n\n**5. From around January 2021, the Company actively engaged in discussions with the lenders of a syndicated loan to the Group (Lenders) of which the Company was a guarantor, other creditors, and potential investors in relation to revising repayment obligations of loans and injecting new equity from prospective investors. The Company also explored different debt restructuring options including potential transactions or corporate actions involving the sale, disposal and/or restructuring of various assets or businesses of the Group (collectively, \"Restructuring\").**\n\n**6. While the Company explored various restructuring options to improve its financial position, the board of the Company resolved that it was in the interests of the Company and its creditors to commence its own winding-up proceedings and apply to the Bermuda Court to appoint a provisional liquidator with limited powers, which could maximise the chance of success of the**\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1409-21 Filed 01/30/23 Entered 01/30/23 10:03:34 Page 8 of 40\n\n> **restructuring and provide a moratorium on claims against the Company to avoid a potential disorderly liquidation by the Company's creditors. The appointment was apparently intended to create an environment for a successful restructuring. The board could continue to manage the Group's business operations, a provisional liquidator would monitor and consult with the board on implementing a group-wide and coordinated debt restructuring plan, and the business of the Group could continue to operate to generate revenue as a whole instead of assets being subject to fire sale at a significant discount.**\n\n> **7. On 10 September 2021, the Company presented a petition to the Bermuda Court for the winding-up of the Company (Petition) and made an application for appointment of Mr McKenna as provisional liquidator of the Company on a \"limited powers\" basis for restructuring purposes only. Suffice to say the attempts to restructure proved unsuccessful, the board recognised that a winding-up would be in creditors' best interests and the Company applied successfully for a winding-up order on 5 November 2021.**\n\n> **8. Since his appointment, the Provisional Liquidator has been trying to take possession of the Company's assets in Hong Kong. The Company's assets in Hong Kong are:**\n\n- **(1) cash balances in the sum of about HK\\$8 million held by Computershare, which represents a surplus arising from the Group's employee share schemes; and**\n- **(2) cash balances in the sum of about US\\$4,800 held in the Company's bank accounts with HSBC.**\n\n**Both Computershare and HSBC require the Provisional Liquidator to obtain a recognition order before they will release the cash balances. Nearly all the Company's creditors are in Hong Kong. As is to be expected as it is a holding company, the creditors are largely financial or professional companies and are all unsecured. The remainder of the liquidation will be straightforward. The Provisional Liquidator will adjudicate proofs, which seems likely to be uncontroversial, and declare a dividend to be paid out of the assets, which he will receive if a recognition and assistance is granted, which consists of the monies I have referred to in the previous paragraph.**\n\n**9. The Provisional Liquidator accepts that before the Bermuda liquidation the Company's COMI was probably in Hong Kong. In the light of the Provisional Liquidator's activities after the Bermuda liquidation commenced the COMI may have become either Hong Kong or Bermuda. For the purposes of this decision the Provisional Liquidator accepts that the core requirements that need to be satisfied**\n\n**before the Hong Kong court will exercise its winding-up jurisdiction over a foreign company are satisfied.**²\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1409-21 Filed 01/30/23 Entered 01/30/23 10:03:34 Page 9 of 40\n\n# **Recognition and Assistance in Hong Kong — Background**\n\n**10. Commencing in 2014 recognition and assistance has increasingly been used to address issues arising in transnational restructuring and insolvency in Hong Kong that largely arise as a consequence of the extensive use of holding companies incorporated in offshore jurisdictions rather than Hong Kong or the Mainland, although the business groups affected commonly consist of operating and asset owning companies in Hong Kong and the Mainland. This practice has become the norm in the case of companies listed on the HKEX. The operating and asset owning subsidiaries are commonly separated from the holding company by a layer of intermediate subsidiaries incorporated in an offshore jurisdiction different from the holding company. The most common structure recently adopted would appear to involve a Cayman holding company and intermediate subsidiaries incorporated in the British Virgin Islands. The business groups have no assets, creditors or debtors in the offshore jurisdictions. When such business groups encounter financial difficulties and creditors and the companies themselves are considering what steps to take to protect their interests they encounter problems arising from the artificial structure of the group, which it is difficult to address because unlike comparable jurisdictions Hong Kong has neither legislation dealing with rehabilitation of distressed businesses nor legislation dealing with transnational insolvency other than the discretionary power given to the court by s.327 of the Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (Cap.32) (Ordinance), to wind up a foreign company. The absence of the tools available in other jurisdictions, including the Mainland, to address these issues has been a well-publicised source of concern to those involved in restructuring and insolvency for over two decades. In the absence of any legislation to address these issues the Court has worked with practitioners to use common law techniques to address them so far as the common law permits. There have been two major problem areas.**\n\n**11. The first concerns the restrictions that exist on winding up a foreign incorporated company. It is not necessary to explore this issue in depth as it is comprehensively dealt with in a number of authorities well known to practitioners. In summary the court has adopted what Ma CJ and Lord Millett NPJ refer to in the Court of Final Appeal's judgment in Kam Leung Sui Kwan v Kam Kwan**\n\n² *Silver Starlight Ltd v China CITIC Bank Corporation Ltd, Tianjin Branch* [2021] HKCA 1248; [2021] HKCLC 1347 at [15] (G Lam JA).\n\n**Lai.** 3 **as \"necessary self-imposed constraints on the making of a winding-up order against a foreign company\" . In some cases, these are easy to satisfy. Others less so resulting in delay in creditors or shareholders being able to take action in Hong Kong to protect their economic interests while complicated questions concerning jurisdiction are resolved. It was this problem that led to the application and decision in Joint Official Liquidators of A Co v B.** 4 **The liquidators appointed in the Cayman Islands, where the Company was incorporated, initially sought (ultimately successfully) to wind up the Company in Hong Kong, but pending the determination of the petition wished to be able to obtain documents from the Company's bankers in Hong Kong concerning a substantial fraud. The bankers refused to provide them without an order of the Hong Kong court confirming the liquidators' authority to represent the company in Hong Kong.**\n\n**12. The second issue concerns the problems caused by Hong Kong's lack of any legislation facilitating debt restructuring and rehabilitation of financially distressed companies. In the period following the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 and 1998 the practice was developed of companies, mainly listed companies, being put into a form of soft-touch provisional liquidation in Hong Kong to facilitate a debt restructuring. This practice was brought to a halt by the Court of Appeal's decision in Re Legend International Resorts Ltd,** ⁵ **which determined that the power to appoint provisional liquidators conferred by s.193 of the Ordinance could not be used to appoint provisional liquidators for the principle purpose of restructuring a company. Many of these companies were incorporated in offshore jurisdictions. To circumvent the practical problem to which the Court of Appeal's decision gave rise a technique was developed,**⁶ **which involved a company incorporated in an offshore jurisdiction being put into soft-touch provisional liquidation in its domestic jurisdiction, the courts of those jurisdictions treating this as a proper use of the power to appoint provisional liquidators, and the provisional liquidators being recognised in Hong Kong and assistance being provided in the form of the limited powers necessary for provisional liquidators to participate in the restructuring process in Hong Kong. Unfortunately, it has become increasingly apparent that what is commonly referred to as the Z-Obeetechnique has been abused by certain insolvency**\n\n³ (2015) 18 HKCFAR 501. See [18]–[24] in which Ma CJ and Lord Millett NPJ explain the constraints, commonly referred to as \"the 3 core requirements\" and their application.\n\n⁴ [2014] 4 HKLRD 374.\n\n⁵ [2006] 2 HKLRD 192; [2006] 3 HKC 565.\n\n⁶ *Z-Obee Holdings Ltd* [2018] 1 HKLRD 165; *Re Joint and Provisional Liquidators of Hsin Chong Group Holdings* [2019] HKCFI 805; *Re Moody Technology Holdings Ltd* [2020] 2 HKLRD 187.\n\n**practitioners and offshore law firms.** 7 **It seems to me tolerably clear that many of the offshore soft-touch provisional liquidations adopt a debtor in possession model, which has been rejected in Hong Kong, the principal purpose of which, viewed from the Company's point of view, is to obtain so far as possible a moratorium on action being taken to recover unpaid debts. The application to appoint provision liquidators in the present case would appear to be an example. Hong Kong has consciously decided not to enact legislation that provides for this kind of debt moratorium. Although it is not an issue that I need to decide in the present case and is one which requires detailed consideration, my preliminary view is that in future the Hong Kong court should generally decline to recognise soft-touch provisional liquidators appointed by offshore jurisdictions on the kind of terms I have summarised.**\n\n**13. There is another consideration. As I have already explained the businesses of companies of the sort with which I am concerned are carried on in China; primarily the Mainland. The Mainland has a different economic system to Hong Kong. Reconciling the differences between the Hong Kong and the Mainland systems can be challenging. It requires an understanding of the different insolvency systems and the different social and economic considerations, which are reflected in the differing statute law and the decisions that judges and others involved in the insolvency and restructuring process are required to make. To take one example, the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law gives primacy to rehabilitation of businesses reflecting the importance placed in the Mainland on maintaining economic and social stability. Consistent with this the Mainland favours debtor in possession solutions. As I have explained Hong Kong does not. Hong Kong and Mainland judges are familiar with these issues and are well placed to deal with them; courts outside China considerably less so. Relevant to this are the concerns that have recently been expressed by two leading academics in the field of international insolvency, Professor Jay Westbrook of the University of Texas at Austin and Professor Christoph Paulus of Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin,**⁸ **about judicial decision making and bankruptcy law becoming increasingly remote from territorial or political control. The suggestion that a Chinese business can avoid the supervision of its affairs by Chinese courts**⁹ **when bankrupt by using a company incorporated in, what has been called by the European Court of Justice, amongst others, a \"letter box**\n\n⁷ See for example *Re China Bozza Development Holdings Ltd* [2021] 2 HKLRD 977; [2021] HKCFI 1235.\n\n⁸ International Insolvency Institute's podcast 23 April 2022.\n\n⁹ Whether the courts of the Hong Kong SAR or the Mainland.\n\n**jurisdiction\"** ¹⁰ **invites the question that Professor Westbrook and Professor Paulus pose as to the extent to which it is congruent with the purpose of insolvency law and the expectations of creditors to allow a commercial enterprise to use a bankruptcy process in a jurisdiction with which it or its debt**¹¹ **has no economic or social connection rather than one in which it carries on business. The question is relevant to the issue, which I am considering, which in practice amounts to this: should a jurisdiction in which a company's business is conducted recognise an insolvency process conducted in a place with which the company has no material economic connection.**\n\n# **The Order**\n\n**14. I will grant an order for recognition of the Provisional Liquidator with assistance limited to the power to receive and transfer out of Hong Kong the balances in the account to which I have referred in [8]. My reasons for so ordering are explained in [48]–[50]. The majority of the remainder of this decision concerns the basis on which in future Hong Kong should grant recognition and assistance to foreign insolvency practitioners. The decision is divided into sections addressing the following:**\n\n- **(1) The established principles for common law recognition and assistance relevant to this application.**\n- **(2) COMI as the criteria for recognition and assistance.**\n- **(3) Principles of recognition — modified universalism.**\n- **(4) Modified universalism — criteria for determining home or principal jurisdiction in comparative authorities.**\n- **(5) Adopting the COMI criteria in Hong Kong.**\n- **(6) Authorities in Hong Kong.**\n- **(7) The recent case of Up-Energy.**\n- **(8) Conclusion.**\n\n# **Principles of common law recognition and assistance**\n\n**15. There is a distinction between recognition and assistance. Recognition concerns acknowledging and confirming the status of a foreign insolvency process and officer. Assistance involves granting**\n\n¹⁰ *Re Eurofood IFSC Ltd* [2006] Ch 508; *Creative Finance Ltd* Case No. 14-10358 (REG) 13 January 2016; *Re Bear Stearns High-Grade Strategies Master Fund, Ltd* 381 BR 37 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff'd 389 BR 325 (S.D.N.Y.) (Sweet J).\n\n¹¹ As opposed, for example, to US\\$ debt governed by United States Law, which would have an economic connection with the United States and might be compromised under *Chapter 11* of the *United States Bankruptcy Code* and normally recognised in Hong Kong in accordance with the *Rule in Gibbs, Antony Gibbs & Sons v La Société Industrielle Et Commerciale Des Métaux* (1890) 25 QBD 399.\n\n**expressly to the foreign insolvency officer powers to act in the local jurisdiction. The distinction is well understood. In Kireeva v Bedzhamov,** ¹² **Snowden J held:**\n\n[T]here is a conceptual distinction between the principles that apply to the decision whether to recognise a foreign bankruptcy, and the principles that apply to the question of what, if any, further assistance ought to be given by the English court to a foreign trustee in bankruptcy following recognition.\n\n#### **In Net International Property Ltd v ADV Eitan Erez,** ¹³ **Webster JA explains the distinction in more detail:**\n\nThe starting point on the issues of recognition and assistance is to determine what, if any, is the difference between recognition and assistance. There is, at least in theory, a difference between the two principles. Recognition is the formal act of the local court recognising or treating the foreign office holder as having status in the BVI in accordance with his or her appointment by the foreign court. In this case, this means recognising the Trustee's position granted by the courts of Israel as being the trustee in bankruptcy of the assets of Mrs. Sofer and treating him as the trustee of those assets in the BVI.\n\nAssistance goes further. If granted by the BVI court, it allows the Trustee to deal with the BVI assets of Mrs. Sofer, namely, her legal and beneficial interest in the shares of Net International. Put another way, recognition gives the foreign office holder status in the BVI and assistance gives him or her power to deal with the BVI assets. However, the dividing line between the two principles is blurred in practice because recognition by itself is generally of little assistance to the foreign office holder unless it is accompanied by the grant of assistance to deal with the local assets. Viewed in this way, recognition is generally treated as recognition and assistance. The blurring of the lines between the two concepts is illustrated by the judgment of the Supreme Court of Transvaal, South Africa, in *Re African Farms Ltd* …\n\nNotwithstanding the blurring of the lines between recognition and assistance, it is important to bear in mind that recognition does not necessarily include assistance. In this case, the trial judge's order recognising the Trustee included assistance.\n\n#### **A simple practical example of the distinction is to be found in my decision in Re China Bozza Development Holdings Ltd.** ¹⁴ **I held:**\n\n¹² [2021] EWHC 2281 (Ch); [2021] BPIR 1465 at [107].\n\n¹³ (Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal, 22 February 2021) at [19]–[21].\n\n¹⁴ [2021] HKCFI 1235; [2021] HKCLC 831 at [23].\n\n[N]otwithstanding my misgivings about how this matter has developed the JPLs should be recognised and I will so order. However, granting an order providing active assistance is a different matter. I am not currently satisfied that I should make an order granting the type of general assistance which I have on previous occasions …\n\n**16. The authorities establish that the orthodox common law position is that the court may recognise foreign insolvency proceedings that comply with two criteria.**¹⁵ **First, that the foreign insolvency proceedings are collective insolvency proceedings; and secondly, that the foreign insolvency proceedings are opened in the company's country of incorporation. Part of the rationale for recognising and assisting foreign officeholders appointed in the country of incorporation is to be found in ordinary conflict of laws principles for corporations as opposed to pure insolvency law. As Lord Sumption explains in Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers:** 16\n\n12. [E]ven without a winding up, the court could, on ordinary principles of private international law, have recognised as a matter of comity the vesting of the company's assets in an agent or office-holder appointed or recognised under the law of its incorporation. For many years before a corresponding rule was recognised for the winding up of foreign companies, the principle had been applied in the absence of any statutory powers to the English moveable assets of a foreign bankrupt which had been transferred to an office-holder in an insolvency proceeding under the law of his domicile.\n\n# **COMI as the criteria for recognition and assistance**\n\n**17. To date the court in Hong Kong has not used COMI as the yardstick for granting common law recognition or assistance. The criteria applied are those explained in the previous paragraph. It is, however, open to the court as a matter of principle and authority to develop these common law principles. As the then Chief Justice Li observed in Solicitor (24/07) v Law Society of Hong Kong:** 17 **\"[t]he great strength of the common law lies in its capacity to develop to meet the changing needs and circumstances of the society in which it functions\". For the reasons discussed in the**\n\n¹⁵ See *Re CEFC Shanghai International Group Ltd* [2020] HKCFI 167; [2020] HKCLC 1 at [8].\n\n¹⁶ [2014] UKPC 36; [2015] AC 1675.\n\n¹⁷ (2008) 11 HKCFAR 117 at [19].\n\n**remainder of this judgment in my view the criteria to be adopted in future in determining whether or not foreign insolvency proceedings should be recognised and assisted are, in short, that the foreign proceedings constitute a collective insolvency process and that the proceedings (subject to limited exceptions) are conducted in the jurisdiction in which the Company's COMI is located.**\n\n**18. As I have already explained Hong Kong is unusual in not having any legislation dealing with cross-border insolvency and restructuring. The Government has largely left it to the Judiciary to use common law tools to address the challenges that have arisen in this area as Hong Kong's economy has developed in line with the Mainland's rapid economic expansion. This is not an oversight. On 14 May 2021 the Secretary for Justice and the Supreme Court signed a \"Record of Meeting of the Supreme People's Court and the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region on Mutual Recognition of and Assistance to Bankruptcy (Insolvency) Proceedings between the Courts of the Mainland and of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region\". This Cooperation Mechanism consists of two parts. The first is the Record of meeting. The second is \"The Supreme People's Court's Opinion on Taking Forward a Pilot Measure in relation to the Recognition and Assistance to Insolvency Proceedings in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.\"** ¹⁸ **As is explained in both documents the purpose of the Mechanism is to facilitate economic integration and development in Hong Kong and the Mainland. Paragraphs 3 and 5 of the Record of Meeting make it clear that the parties expect the High Court to grant assistance to Mainland Administrators and cooperate on the implementation and improvement of the Mechanism. The absence of relevant legislation and the purpose of the Cooperation Mechanism are relevant to a consideration of the development of common law assistance in Hong Kong, its necessity and what form it might take. Hong Kong is not in the same position as jurisdictions, which have enacted comprehensive statutory codes to regulate recognition and assistance of foreign insolvencies. As the Cooperation Mechanism to which I have referred demonstrates, the absence of a statutory code to regulate recognition and assistance does not imply that the court is to take a restrictive view of its ability to develop the common law principles to address the issues that come before it. It is clear that the opposite is the case.**\n\n**19. In Rubin v Eurofinance SA** ¹⁹ **Lord Collins at [129] describes the limits of a court's ability to develop the law in this field. Lord Collins says this:**\n\n¹⁸ 最高人民法院關於開展認可和協助香港特別行政區破產程序試點工作的意見\n\n¹⁹ [2012] UKSC 46; [2013] 1 AC 236.\n\nA change in the settled law of the recognition and enforcement of judgments, and in particular the formulation of a rule for the identification of those courts which are to be regarded as courts of competent jurisdiction (such as the country where the insolvent entity has its centre of interests and the country with which the judgment debtor has a sufficient or substantial connection), has all the hallmarks of legislation, and is a matter for the legislature and not for judicial innovation. The law relating to the enforcement of foreign judgments and the law relating to international insolvency are not areas of law which have in recent times been left to be developed by judge-made law. As Lord Bridge of Harwich put it in relation to a proposed change in the common law rule relating to fraud as a defence to the enforcement of a foreign judgment, 'if the law is now in need of reform, it is for the legislature, not the judiciary, to effect it': *Owens Bank Ltd v Bracco [1992] 2 AC 443*, 489.\n\n**20. It can readily be understood why the courts in England would approach the development of the common law relating to international insolvency as Lord Collins describes. Judge initiated developments in the law, which in the context of a system, which has introduced deliberate and comprehensive legislation to regulate cross-border insolvency, may be viewed as judicial overreach, are not necessarily to be viewed similarly in a jurisdiction, which lacks comparable legislation and whose current circumstances justify modifying the common law to implement more effectively an established legal principle. The development of the basis upon which foreign liquidations are recognised which I am considering does not involve the creation of a new legal principle. It involves a modification of an existing one, namely, recognition and assistance of a foreign insolvency process. The purpose of the modification is to implement the principle in a manner better suited to the circumstances in which transnational insolvencies currently arise in Hong Kong and the development of the principle in comparable jurisdictions.**\n\n**21. It is apparent from its terms that the Cooperation Mechanism is premised on the assumption that the common law as practiced in Hong Kong has developed to provide for judicial assistance to insolvencies conducted in different jurisdictions; albeit in the China context different legal jurisdictions within one unitary State. There are many examples of common law assistance being granted by the Hong Kong court to foreign insolvency office holders. In [43]–[44] I give a number of examples of the Court of Final Appeal and the Court of Appeal recognising the court's power to do so. In the case of administrators from the Mainland the Court of First Instance has made a number of orders for recognition and assistance in recent years: Re Liquidator of CEFC Shanghai**\n\n**International Group Ltd;** 20 **Re Shenzhen Everich Supply Chain Co, Ltd;** 21 **Re HNA Group Co Ltd;** 22 **Nuoxi Capital Ltd v Peking University Founder Group Company Ltd.** 23\n\n# **Principles of recognition — modified universalism**\n\n**22. Underpinning the principle of recognition is the principle that the insolvency law of a company's home insolvency jurisdiction is applicable across the world. This is illustrated by the English Court of Appeal's decision in Tchenguiz v Grant Thornton UK LLP,** 24 **which concerned whether Icelandic Insolvency Law applied throughout the European Economic Area, including England, by virtue of Article 10 of the Parliament and Council Directive 2001/24/EC, given effect in England by the Credit Institutions (Reorganisation and Winding Up) Regulations 2004. Briggs LJ explains the character of the extraterritorial effect of Icelandic bankruptcy law in the following paragraphs:**²⁵\n\n- 66. This much more confined part of the appeal also breaks down into two sections. The first raises the question whether Icelandic insolvency law (and its equivalents in all other home member states) is 'internationalised' by virtue of the Winding up Directive (and the Insolvency Regulation) regardless whether, viewed separately, it has purely domestic or both domestic and extraterritorial effect. The judge concluded that it was internationalised in that sense, and the claimants' third ground of appeal challenges that conclusion. …\n- 68. The answer to the first of those questions flows in my view inexorably from the analysis of the purposes and terms of the Insolvency Instruments, as described above. The very essence of the universalism sought to be achieved by making the insolvency law of the home member state applicable across the territory of all member states depends upon that being achieved in relation to every potential home member state in which a credit institution is regulated and has its head office regardless whether, apart from those instruments, that state's insolvency law would be anything more than domestic in its application. If that were not so, then the creation of a universally applicable law (subject to strict exceptions) for\n\n²⁰ *Supra* footnote 14.\n\n²¹ [2020] HKCFI 965, [2020] HKEC 1188.\n\n²² [2021] HKCFI 2897.\n\n²³ [2022] 2 HKC 1; [2021] HKCFI 3817.\n\n²⁴ [2017] EWCA Civ 83; [2018] QB 695.\n\n²⁵ *Ibid* [68].\n\nthe insolvency of credit institutions, and other entities, would fall at the first hurdle, in relation to any home member state the insolvency law of which did not already have cross-border effect.\n\n**23. Consistent with this principle the aim of modified universalism is that there should be a unitary bankruptcy proceeding in the court of the home insolvency jurisdiction which receives world-wide recognition and it should apply universally to all the bankrupt's assets. This is explained by Lord Hoffmann in Re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd:** 26\n\n6. Despite the absence of statutory provision, some degree of international co-operation in corporate insolvency had been achieved by judicial practice. This was based upon what English judges have for many years regarded as a general principle of private international law, namely that bankruptcy (whether personal or corporate) should be unitary and universal. There should be a unitary bankruptcy proceeding in the court of the bankrupt's domicile which receives worldwide recognition and it should apply universally to all the bankrupt's assets.\n\n**24. Universalism is to be contrasted with territorialism where each country is regarded as determining according to its own law the distribution of the assets of an insolvent company located within its territorial jurisdiction.**²⁷ **Modified universalism is a compromise between these two opposites, recognising that the theoretical ideal of universality must in some circumstances give way to the practical reality of territorial or local interests. Lord Hoffmann describes the principle in HIH in the paragraph immediately following the one I have just quoted:**²⁸\n\n7. This was very much a principle rather than a rule. It is heavily qualified by exceptions on pragmatic grounds; elsewhere I have described it as an aspiration: see *Cambridge Gas Transportation Corp u Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc* [2007] 1 AC 508, 517, para 17. Professor Jay Westbrook, a distinguished American writer on international insolvency has called it a principle of 'modified universalism': see also *Fletcher, Insolvency in Private*\n\n²⁶ [2008] UKHL 21; [2008] 1 WLR 852 at [6].\n\n²⁷ *Stichting Shell Pensioenfonds v Krys* [2014] UKPC 41; [2015] AC 616 at [15] (Lord Sumption and Lord Toulson).\n\n²⁸ *Supra* at [7].\n\n*International Law*, 2nd ed (2005), pp 15-17. Full universalism can be attained only by international treaty. Nevertheless, even in its modified and pragmatic form, the principle is a potent one.\n\n**This principle has been part of the English common law since the 18th century.** 29\n\n**25. In Singularis the Privy Council considered three propositions derived from the decision of the Privy Council in Cambridge Gas Transportation Corpn v Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc.** 30 **\"First the principle of modified universalism, namely, that the court has a common law power to assist foreign winding up proceedings so far as it properly can. The second is that this includes doing whatever it [the court] could properly have done in a domestic insolvency, subject to its own law and public policy. The third (which is implicit) is that this power is itself the source of its jurisdiction over those affected, and that the absence of jurisdiction in rem or in personam according to ordinary common law principles is irrelevant.\"** ³¹ **The Privy Council concluded that the 2nd and 3rd principles had been wrongly decided, but not the first, which Lord Sumption explains in [19]:**\n\n- 19. However, the first proposition, the principle of modified universalism itself, has not been discredited. On the contrary, it was accepted in principle by Lord Phillips, Lord Hoffman and Lord Walker in *HIH* [2008] 1 WLR 852, and by Lord Collins of Mapesbury (with whom Lord Walker and Lord Sumption JJSC agreed) in *Rubin v Eurofinance SA* [2013] 1 AC 236. Nothing in the concurring judgment of Lord Mance JSC in that case casts doubt on it. At paras 29–33, Lord Collins summarised the position in this way:\n\t- 29. 'Fourth, at common law the court has power to recognise and grant assistance to foreign insolvency proceedings. The common law principle is that assistance may be given to foreign office-holders in insolvencies with an international element. The underlying principle has been stated in different ways: \"recognition … carries with it the active assistance of the court\": *In re African Farms Ltd* [1906] TS 373, 377;\n\n²⁹ *Re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd supra* at [30]; *Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers supra* at [19] and [23]; *Riverrock Securities Ltd v International Bank of St Petersburg (Joint Stock Co)* at [80] (Foxton J); *Kireeva v Bedzhamov* [2022] EWCA Civ 35 at [81]–[88] (Newey LJ).\n\n³⁰ [2006] UKPC 26; [2007] 1 AC 508; [2006] 3 WLR 689; [2006] 3 All ER 829.\n\n³¹ *Supra* Lord Sumption [15].\n\n\"This court … will do its utmost to co-operate with the US Bankruptcy Court and avoid any action which might disturb the orderly administration of [the company] in Texas under Chapter 11\": *Banque Indosuez SA v Ferromet Resources Inc* [1993] BCLC 112, 117.\n\n- 30. In *Crédit Suisse Fides Trust v Cuoghi* [1998] QB 818, 827, Millett LJ said: \"In other areas of law, such as cross-border insolvency, commercial necessity has encouraged national courts to provide assistance to each other without waiting for such co-operation to be sanctioned by international convention … It is becoming widely accepted that comity between the courts of different countries requires mutual respect for the territorial integrity of each other's jurisdiction, but that this should not inhibit a court in one jurisdiction from rendering whatever assistance it properly can to a court in another in respect of assets located or persons resident within the territory of the former.\"\n- 31. The common law assistance cases have been concerned with such matters as the vesting of English assets in a foreign office-holder, or the staying of local proceedings, or orders for examination in support of the foreign proceedings, or orders for the remittal of assets to a foreign liquidation, and have involved cases in which the foreign court was a court of competent jurisdiction in the sense that the bankrupt was domiciled in the foreign country or, if a company, was incorporated there ….\n- 33. One group of cases involved local proceedings which were stayed or orders which were discharged because of foreign insolvency proceedings. Thus in *Banque Indosuez SA v Ferromet Resources Inc* [1993] BCLC 112 an English injunction against a Texas corporation in Chapter 11 proceedings was discharged; cf *In re African Farms Ltd* [1906] TS 373 (execution in Transvaal by creditor in proceedings against English company in liquidation in England stayed by Transvaal court), applied in *Turners & Growers Exporters Ltd v The Ship \"Cornelis Verolme\"* [1997] 2 NZLR 110 (Belgian shipowner in Belgian bankruptcy: ship released from arrest); *Modern Terminals (Berth 5) Ltd v States Steamship Co* [1979] HKLR 512 (stay in Hong Kong of execution against Nevada corporation in Chapter 11 proceedings in United States federal court in\n\nCalifornia), followed in *CCIC Finance Ltd v Guangdong International Trust & Investment Corpn* [2005] 2 HKC 589 (stay of Hong Kong proceedings against Chinese state-owned enterprise in Mainland insolvency). Cases of judicial assistance in the traditional sense include *In re Impex Services Worldwide Ltd* [2004] BPIR 564, where a Manx order for examination and production of documents was made in aid of the provisional liquidation in England of an English company.\n\nIn the Board's opinion, the principle of modified universalism is part of the common law, but it is necessary to bear in mind, first, that it is subject to local law and local public policy and, secondly, that the court can only ever act within the limits of its own statutory and common law powers. What are those limits? In the absence of a relevant statutory power, they must depend on the common law, including any proper development of the common law. The question how far it is appropriate to develop the common law so as to recognise an equivalent power does not admit of a single, universal answer. It depends on the nature of the power that the court is being asked to exercise. On this appeal, the Board proposes to confine itself to the particular form of assistance which is sought in this case, namely an order for the production of information by an entity within the personal jurisdiction of the Bermuda court. The fate of that application depends on whether, there being no statutory power to order production, there is an inherent power at common law do so.\n\n**26. It is clear from this passage that modified universalism is the foundation of the common law power to recognise and assist a foreign insolvency process and that the power may be developed if the development is consistent with modified universalism and is consistent with the applicable domestic legal framework. Although the formulation of the principle in Singularis is considerably more restrictive than that to be found in Cambridge Gas, as is apparent from the final paragraph of the extract of Lord Collin's judgment that I have quoted, it envisages further development of the common law power of assistance.**\n\n# **Modified universalism — criteria for determining home or principle jurisdiction in comparative authorities**\n\n**27. Universalism and modified universalism are premised on there being a home or principal insolvency jurisdiction. The criteria**\n\n**for determining the home or principal insolvency jurisdiction have evolved over time. First, there is the concept of the debtor's domicile.** ³² **Secondly, there is the concept of the debtor's country of incorporation: In Singularis, Lord Sumption talks of the common law principle of modified universalism treating the place of incorporation as being the principal insolvency jurisdiction:**\n\nThe principle of modified universalism is a recognised principle of the common law. It is founded on the public interest in the ability of foreign courts exercising insolvency jurisdiction in the place of the company's incorporation to conduct an orderly winding up of its affairs on a world-wide basis, notwithstanding the territorial limits of their jurisdiction.\" 33\n\n**Thirdly, there is the concept of COMI. Lord Hoffmann explains in HIH.** ³⁴ **The emergence of the criteria for assessing the most appropriate country to be treated as the principal jurisdiction in which a transnational insolvency is to be conducted:**\n\nIn some cases there may be some doubt about how to determine the appropriate jurisdiction which should be regarded as the seat of the principal liquidation. I have spoken in a rather old-fashioned way of the company's domicile because that is the term used in the old cases, but I do not claim it is necessarily the best one. Usually it means the place where the company is incorporated but that may be some offshore island with which the company's business has no real connection. The Council Regulation on insolvency proceedings ((EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000) uses the concept of the '*centre of a debtor's main interests*' as a test, with a presumption that it is the place where the registered office is situated: see article 3.1. That may be more appropriate.\n\n**28. Assuming one uses the old concept of domicile, there appear to be two schools of thought on the meaning of \"domicile\" of a company. One view is that the domicile of a company is in its place of incorporation. Lord Collins explains this in Rubin v Eurofinance SA:** 35\n\n31. The common law assistance cases have been concerned with such matters as the vesting of English assets in a foreign officeholder, or the staying of local proceedings, or orders for examination in support of the foreign proceedings, or\n\n³² *Re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd supra* at [6] and [8]; see also *Stichting Shell Pensioenfonds v Krys supra* at [14].\n\n³³ *Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers supra* at [23].\n\n³⁴ *Supra* at [31].\n\n³⁵ *Supra* at [31].\n\n### 338 **HONG KONG LAW REPORTS & DIGEST** [2022] 3 HKLRD 316\n\norders for the remittal of assets to a foreign liquidation, and have involved cases in which the foreign court was a court of competent jurisdiction in the sense that the bankrupt was domiciled in the foreign country or, if a company, was incorporated there.\n\n**The alternative view is that the domicile of a company is in its principal place of business, which may or may not be the country of incorporation. This is explained by Murison CJ in Re Lee Wah Bank:** 36\n\nThe general principle in cases of this kind is clear enough. It is laid down by Vaugham Williams J in *In re English Scottish and Australian Chartered Bank* [[1893] 3 Ch 385] thus: — 'Where there is a liquidation of the concern the general principle is — ascertain what is the domicile of the company in liquidation; let the Court of the country of domicile act as the principal Court to govern the liquidation; and let the other Courts act as ancillary, as far as they can, to the principal liquidation.' The domicile of a trading company is fixed by the situation of its principal place of business ( *Jones v Scottish Accident Insurance Company Ltd* [(1886) 17 QBD 421]) and there is no doubt at all that in this case the domicile of the liquidating Company is Hong Kong.\n\n**29. In Singapore, the common law recognition regime has developed to embrace the COMI concept for reasons explained by Abdullah JC in Re Opti-Medix Ltd:** 37\n\nUnder a universalist approach, one court takes the lead while other courts assist in administering the liquidation …\n\nA consequence of a greater sensitivity to universalist notions in insolvency is a greater readiness to go beyond traditional bases for recognising foreign insolvency proceedings. As the winding up of a company by the court of the place of incorporation accords with legal logic, there may be a natural tendency to regard a liquidator appointed by that court as having primacy or legitimacy. However, the place of incorporation may be an accident of many factors, and may be far removed from the actual place of business. The approach of identifying the COMI has much to commend it as a matter of practicality\n\n**30. The position adopted in Hong Kong has historically been that a liquidator appointed in the place of incorporation is**\n\n³⁶ (1926) 2 Malayan Cases 81, 84.\n\n³⁷ *Re Opti-Medix Ltd* [2016] SGHC 108; [2016] 4 SLR 312 at [17]–[18] (Aedit Abdullah JC).\n\n**recognised.**³⁸ **However, it would be incorrect to say that the Hong Kong recognition criteria has exclusively been tied to the debtor's country of incorporation. There are instances of the Hong Kong court granting, or being willing to grant, recognition to insolvency office-holders appointed in a foreign jurisdiction which was not the jurisdiction of incorporation. In Re The Russo-Asiatic Bank,** ³⁹ **the Court recognised liquidators appointed by the English court over a Russian bank. In Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd v Bank of Credit & Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd, Macau Branch,** ⁴⁰ **the Court of Appeal recognised liquidators appointed in Macau over a Cayman-incorporated bank. In Joint Administrators of African Minerals Ltd v Madison Pacific Trust Ltd,** ⁴¹ **I took the view that there was no objection in principle to granting recognition to an English administrator over a Bermuda-incorporated company with its COMI in England.**\n\n# **Adopting the COMI criteria in Hong Kong**\n\n**31. In Re Li Yiqing v Lamtex Holdings Ltd** ⁴² **at [22] and [26] I suggested that the Hong Kong court should, as Singapore has done, consider whether common law recognition based on place of incorporation is consistent with contemporary commercial practice in the SAR and the Mainland:**\n\n22. It is becoming increasingly apparent that it is desirable, and it might reasonably be suggested essential, that the Hong Kong courts are able to deal with recognition and assistance using methods that are consistent with commercial practice in the SAR and the Mainland. In response to suggestions for legislation to address this subject, it has been the Government's position that for the time being it is a matter for the courts of Hong Kong to address using the techniques available at common law. The current position in Hong Kong is that the court recognises only insolvency practitioners appointed in the place of incorporation. In my view we have reached the stage at which this question needs to be reconsidered at there is much in my view to be said in support of Abdullah J's conclusion that the common law in this area contains sufficient flexibility to develop so as to be consistent with commercial practice and there is nothing in principle preventing recognition of liquidators appointed\n\n³⁸ *Re China Fishery Group Ltd* [2019] HKCFI 174; [2019] HKCLC 45 at [24]–[25].\n\n³⁹ (1929-30) 24 HKLR 16.\n\n⁴⁰ [1997] HKLRD 304.\n\n⁴¹ [2015] 4 HKC 215; [2015] HKCLC 323.\n\n⁴² *Supra* footnote 1.\n\n### 340 **HONG KONG LAW REPORTS & DIGEST** [2022] 3 HKLRD 316\n\nin a company's COMI or a jurisdiction with which it has a sufficiently strong connection to justify recognition, just as the Hong Kong court will exercise its discretion to wind up a foreign incorporated company if the connection between it and Hong Kong is substantial and the other core requirements are satisfied.⁴³ It might, I appreciate, be objected that there is a material difference in the case of the jurisdiction to wind up a foreign incorporated company, namely, the power is expressly conferred by statute. This takes me back to *Singularis*. 44\n\n26. As I have already observed Hong Kong has no legislation dealing with recognition of foreign insolvencies. Issues such as recognition of foreign soft-touch provisional liquidation do not involve using the common law to extend legislation. In Hong Kong it is purely a matter of common law. *Singularis* is authority that the common law generally permits recognition and assistance of foreign liquidations. The issue I am currently considering is whether the common law of Hong Kong should be extended to permit recognition of insolvencies in places other than a company's place of incorporation and in particular in which its COMI or something similar is to be found. I can see no doctrinal reason why it should not be.\n\n**32. In my view the criteria for recognition should in future primarily be determined by the location of a company's COMI. As I suggest in Lamtex,** ⁴⁵ **this better reflects the current commercial practice in Hong Kong. The use of companies incorporated in offshore jurisdictions as holding companies and intermediate subsidiaries for business groups conducting their activities in Hong Kong and the Mainland is widespread. The connection between such companies and the place of their incorporation is entirely formal. It is rare for such companies to conduct any business in the jurisdiction and I imagine commonly no director or employee ever visits them. Normally in my experience when such companies are put into provisional or final liquidation two or three liquidators are appointed by the offshore court at least one of whom, commonly two, are based in Hong Kong from where they conduct the liquidation. Treating the place of incorporation in such circumstances as being the natural home or commercially most relevant jurisdiction of the company for the purpose of determining, which jurisdiction**\n\n**316 2022/8/10—18:3**\n\n…\n\n⁴³ See the authorities discussed in *Re China Huiyuan Juice Group Ltd* [2021] 1 HKLRD 255, [18]–[29].\n\n⁴⁴ *Supra* at [11].\n\n⁴⁵ *Supra*.\n\n**is the appropriate place for the seat of a principal liquidation is highly artificial. It also encounters problems of the type discussed recently by Linda Chan J in Re Up Energy Development Group Ltd,** 46 **namely, the need in the case of a genuine liquidation (as opposed to the type of soft-touch provisional liquidation that I have referred to in [12]) for the liquidator to be able to access the wide, express powers provided for in the Ordinance, which cannot be granted by way of recognition at common law. I discuss Up Energy in more detail later in [46]. If a company's COMI is in Hong Kong I would not normally expect there to be any difficulty in a petitioner demonstrating that the court can properly exercise its discretion to wind up a foreign incorporated company.** ⁴⁷ **A winding up order made in Hong Kong will allow the liquidator to use the powers available under the Ordinance and, importantly, seek recognition and assistance in the Mainland, which is normally where a company's business is primarily conducted and its assets located. The Cooperation Mechanism I have referred to in [18] permits the relevant Mainland courts to recognise liquidators appointed in Hong Kong over companies whose COMI is located in Hong Kong at the time the application for recognition and assistance is commenced. Adopting the COMI criteria would bring Hong Kong in line with the approach in the Mainland, which is of itself desirable.**\n\n**33. Adopting and framing the COMI criteria requires consideration of five subsidiary questions. First, it is necessary to decide the relevant date for determining COMI. There are three alternatives:**\n\n- **(1) the COMI location as at the date of commencement of the foreign insolvency proceedings;**\n- **(2) the COMI location as at the date of the hearing of the foreign officeholder's recognition application in Hong Kong; and**\n- **(3) the COMI location as at the date the foreign office-holder's Hong Kong recognition application is made. This approach would be consistent with the position under Article 6 of The Supreme People's Court's Opinion on Taking Forward a Pilot Measure in relation to the Recognition of and Assistance to Insolvency Proceedings in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, which forms part of the Cooperation Mechanism. See also Re Zetta Jet.** 48\n\n**34. Secondly, it is necessary to decide the elements of COMI. There are four established approaches. All are similar. Under the**\n\n⁴⁶ [2022] 2 HKLRD 993.\n\n⁴⁷ See [11].\n\n⁴⁸ [2019] SGHC 53; [2019] 4 SLR 1343 at [52]–[61] (Aedit Abdullah J).\n\n**Cooperation Mechanism, COMI generally means the place of incorporation, although other factors are also relevant, including the place of the debtor's principal office, the debtor's principal place of business, and the place of the debtor's principal assets (Article 4 of the Cooperation Mechanism). In the context of the common law Lord Hoffmann in HIH**⁴⁹ **regarded the following as the key COMI elements — the place of incorporation, the place of central management, and the location of assets and liabilities. In Re Opti-Medix Ltd,** ⁵⁰ **the Singapore court suggested the following common law COMI test:**\n\nThe COMI will likely be the place where most dealings occur, most money is paid in and out, and most decisions are made. It is thus the place where the bulk of the business is carried out, and for that reason, provides a strong connecting factor to the courts there …\n\nI would note that on a common law adoption of the COMI test, there need not necessarily be a presumption in favour of the registered office, as there is under the Model Law or the EU Insolvency Regulation. However, such a presumption provides a sound default rule in the absence of evidence to the contrary, and provides certainty and regularity. The adoption of such a presumption would also harmonise the results on common law and statutory applications of the COMI test.\n\n#### **35. ICC Judge Mullen explains the key COMI considerations under the EU Insolvency Regulation, in Re Investin Quay House Ltd:** 51\n\n[T]here is a presumption that the COMI of a company corresponds to the place in which it is registered. Ms Staynings took me to factors that have been held to be relevant in rebutting the presumption, which include —\n\n- i) Where the majority of the company's administration is undertaken in the UK, particularly if the company's creditors would consider the UK to be the place where the important functions are carried out …;\n- ii) Where day to day conduct of the business and activities of the company was handled by an agent appointed in England and dealings with third parties were arranged from offices in London, particularly since a third party\n\n⁴⁹ *Supra* at [31].\n\n⁵⁰ *Supra* at [18] and [25].\n\n⁵¹ *Re Investin Quay House Ltd* [2021] EWHC 2371 (Ch) at [35].\n\nwould not have known that board meetings took place in Jersey …;\n\n- iii) Where a company is a 'letterbox' company that does not carry out any business in the country where its office is situated …; and\n- iv) Generally, factors going to the 'head office functions test', including the law governing the main contracts, the location of business relations with clients, the location of creditors, and the management of the company …\n\nI bear in mind of course that the question is fact specific and the cases cited are simply examples of factors that the court has considered relevant in the particular circumstances of those cases.\n\n#### **36. The term COMI is not defined in the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. The key COMI considerations are summarised by Abdullah JC in Re Zetta Jet** ⁵² **at [29] and [85]:**\n\nThe term 'COMI' is not … defined in the Model Law or the Singapore Model Law. There is only a presumption under Art 16(3) of the Singapore Model Law that the place of the debtor's registered office is its COMI …\n\nI will assess the various factors raised by the parties in the following categories:\n\n- (a) the location from which control and direction was administered;\n- (b) the location of clients;\n- (c) the location of creditors;\n- (d) the location of employees;\n- (e) the location of operations;\n- (f) dealings with third parties; and\n- (g) the governing law.\n\n**37. A more comprehensive discussion of the criteria for determining COMI under the Model Law is to be found in the judgment of Glenn J in Re Ocean Rig UDW Inc,** ⁵³ **which concerned an application for recognition under Chapter 15 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. The case concerns the restructuring of the debt of four companies through a scheme of arrangement sanctioned in the Cayman Islands. One which was incorporated in the Cayman Islands was the holding company of the other three, which were incorporated in the Republic of the Marshall Islands. Until sometime**\n\n⁵² *Supra*.\n\n⁵³ 570 BR 687 (Bank. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2017); the decision was upheld on appeal 585 BR 31 (S.D.N.Y. April 5, 2018).\n\n**in 2016 each of the companies had its COMI in the Marshall Islands. It was the companies' case that subsequently the COMI was moved to the Cayman Islands. Whether or not this was correct was relevant because recognition under Chapter 15 requires that a company is in an insolvency process in the location of its \"centre of main interests\", in which case it is a \"foreign main proceeding\", or in a place in which it has an \"establishment\", in which case it is a \"foreign non-main proceeding\": the terms in quotes being defined in Chapter 15, which adopts the UNCITRAL Model Code on cross-border insolvency. The legal framework and the issue is summarised by Glenn J at p.695:**\n\n[O]f course, more than good intentions are required before a U.S. bankruptcy court can recognize a foreign proceeding as either a foreign main or foreign non-main proceeding. For example, a so-called 'letter box company,' with no real establishment or other required indicia for its proposed COMI, cannot support recognition. See *In re Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund, Ltd.*, 374 BR 122, 129-31 & n.8 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), *aff'd*, 389 BR 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (stating that 'the COMI presumption may be overcome particularly in the case of a \"letterbox\" company not carrying out any business' in the country where its registered office is located) (citation omitted). The question that must be addressed here is whether the Foreign Debtors' change of COMI from the RMI to the Cayman Islands satisfies the requirements of the Bankruptcy Code, permitting this Court to recognize the Cayman Proceedings as a foreign main proceeding. A U.S, bankruptcy court that is asked to recognize a foreign proceeding as a foreign main proceeding must decide where a foreign debtor has its center of main interest.\n\n**38. It is not necessary for me to consider the detailed analysis by Glenn J of the evidence relied on as demonstrating that the COMI for each company had moved from the Marshall Islands to the Cayman Islands. It is sufficient to note that Glenn J considered evidence of the following matters as being relevant: the location of directors and board meetings, the location of the companies' principal officers, notices of relocation to the Cayman Islands, location of operations, location of assets, location of bank accounts, location of books and records and the location in which the restructuring activities took place. Glenn J concluded that the COMI of each of the companies was in the Cayman Islands and the proceedings in the Cayman Islands to restructure the debt were \"foreign main proceedings\". His conclusion is contained in the following passages on p.704.**\n\n[I]n assessing these factors, a chapter 15 debtor's COMI is determined as of the filing date of the chapter 15 petition, without regard to the debtor's historic operational activity. See *In re Fairfield Sentry*, 714 F.3d at 137 ('[A] debtor's COMI should be determined based on its activities at or around the time the chapter 15 petition is filed, as the statutory text suggests.'). However, as discussed in greater detail below, to the extent that a debtor's COMI has shifted prior to filing its chapter 15 petition, courts may engage in a more holistic analysis to ensure that the debtor has not manipulated COMI in bad faith.\n\nThe JPLs submit that, as of the Petition Date, each Debtor's 'center of main interests' within the meaning of chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code was in the Cayman Islands and that COMI was not manipulated prior to the filing in bad faith. As explained more fully below, the Court agrees. The Court concludes that the Cayman Proceedings are foreign main proceedings based on the facts discussed at considerable length in Section F. of the Background section (I.) above. Those facts establish that, among other things, the Foreign Debtors (i) conduct their management and operations in the Cayman Islands; (ii) have offices in the Cayman Islands; (iii) hold their board meetings in the Cayman Islands; (iv) have officers with residences in the Cayman Islands; (v) have bank accounts in the Cayman Islands; (vi) maintain their books and records in the Cayman Islands; (vii) conducted restructuring activities from the Cayman Islands; (viii) provided notices of relocation to the Cayman Islands to paying agents, indenture trustees, administrative and collateral agents, and investment service providers; and (ix) filed a Form 6-K with the SEC showing that their office was in the Cayman Islands.\n\n**In my view similar matters are relevant to the Hong Kong court's determination of whether or not the COMI of a company is in the jurisdiction of the foreign insolvency proceedings.**\n\n**39. Thirdly, how the relationship between the COMI criteria and the Hong Kong court's winding-up jurisdiction may be relevant; a subject I touched on in [32]. The position in my view is as follows. The recognition regime is distinct from the winding-up jurisdiction. The Court may recognise foreign insolvency proceedings whether or not the debtor may be wound up in Hong Kong: Singularis Holdings Ltd.** ⁵⁴ **The fact that the debtor could be, or has been, wound up in Hong Kong is not of itself a bar to the Court granting assistance to the foreign insolvency office-holders. Recognition as an ancillary liquidation is one form of assistance that may be granted to foreign insolvency office-holders.**\n\n⁵⁴ *Supra* at [5] and [13].\n\n#### 346 **HONG KONG LAW REPORTS & DIGEST** [2022] 3 HKLRD 316\n\n**40. Fourthly, whether an inconsistency between the principles of private international law and the principles of recognition and assistance, the former supporting recognition of foreign office-holders appointed in the country of incorporation as the company's lawful agents in accordance with agency theory and ordinary conflict of laws principles for corporations and the latter supporting recognition largely determined by COMI, will cause practical problems. In my view not. The COMI test is relevant in cases in which a foreign liquidator requires more than an order that confirms the liquidator's status and rights arising from his appointment in the place of incorporation (which is justified by orthodox principles of private international law) and seeks a power necessary to exercise a right in furtherance of a liquidation (which engages the principle of modified universalism); the sort of order referred to by Lord Sumption in [23] of Singularis,** ⁵⁵ **albeit on the assumption that the Liquidator had been appointed in the place of incorporation and this justifies recognition:**\n\n[T]he right and duty to assist foreign office-holders which the courts have acknowledged on a number of occasions would be an empty formula if it were confined to recognising the companies title to its assets in the same way as any other legal person who has acquired title under a foreign law, or to recognising the office-holders right to act on the company's behalf in the same way as any other agent or company appointed in accordance with the law of its incorporation. The recognition by a domestic court of the status of a foreign liquidator would mean very little if it entitled him to take possession of the company's assets but left him with no effective means of identifying or locating them.\n\n**41. Fifthly, cases where the location of the COMI is unclear. In my view where the location of COMI is unclear, the Court may nevertheless grant recognition and assistance if for practical reasons it is necessary and the foreign insolvency process is in the place of incorporation. This type of pragmatic approach was supported by Abdullah JC in Re Opti-Medix Ltd:** 56\n\nAside from a common law COMI test, the recognition of the Tokyo order could also be justified on practical grounds. Where the interests of the forum are not adversely affected by a foreign order, the courts should lean towards recognition. This approach could be justified on the bases of not only comity but also of business practicality. In the present case, the interests of Singapore creditors were protected by the undertaking …, and there was no\n\n⁵⁵ *Supra*.\n\n⁵⁶ *Supra* at [26].\n\ncompeting jurisdiction interested in the winding up of the Companies. On the other hand, the jurisdiction which had the greatest interest, Japan, had moved in favour of liquidation. To hinder the orderly dissolution of the Companies in this situation would serve no purpose. The decisions in both *Re Lee Wah Bank* … and *Re RussoAsiatic Bank* … could perhaps be explained on this practical basis.\n\n**42. In my view none of the subsidiary matters I have considered suggest that adopting the COMI criteria conflicts in a material and problematic way with other principles and practical considerations, which are potentially engaged.**\n\n# **Authorities in Hong Kong**\n\n**43. The authorities show the following types of specific assistance having been granted. In Re Irish Shipping Ltd** ⁵⁷ **concerned a petition to winding up an unregistered company pursuant to s.327 of the Companies Ordinance (Cap.32). The company was incorporated and in liquidation in Ireland. The petition was presented by the company's liquidator. Jones J in accepting that assistance in the form of an ancillary liquidation should be granted says this:**\n\nAnother factor that I have taken into account in exercising my discretion is the comity of nations whereby it is desirable that the court should assist the liquidator in another jurisdiction to carry out his duties unless good reasons to the contrary have been put forward and I find none in this case. The jurisdiction of this court in the liquidation would be ancillary as far as possible to the winding up in Ireland and would provide assistance to the official liquidator in the collection and preservation of the assets within Hong Kong.\n\n**In Re Information Security One Ltd** ⁵⁸ **the winding-up petition was brought by the company in compulsory liquidation in the Cayman Islands in which it was incorporated acting by its joint and several liquidators. Kwan J as she then was held that:**\n\n8. Authorities for the proposition that an ancillary liquidation may be brought in Hong Kong in respect of a foreign company where there is principal liquidation in its place of incorporation are found in *Re Irish Shipping Ltd* [1985] HKLR 437 and *Re Zhu Kuan Group Co Ltd* (unrep., HCCW No 874 of 2003) …\n\n⁵⁷ [1985] HKLR 437, 439, 445 (Jones J).\n\n⁵⁸ [2007] 3 HKLRD 780 at [1]–[2] and [8] (Kwan J).\n\n**Similarly, in Re China Medical Technologies Inc (No 1)** ⁵⁹ **where the Court of Appeal permitted Cayman Liquidators to act on behalf of the debtor in Hong Kong. Barma JA explains the situation in [5]–[6] and [24]:**\n\nThe Company, incorporated in the Cayman Islands, was not registered in Hong Kong. It was the holding company of a group of companies which developed, manufactured and marketed surgical and medical equipment in China. It was wound up in the Cayman Islands in July 2012 and placed into bankruptcy in New York in August 2012…\n\nThe petition to wind up the Company in Hong Kong was, as noted above, brought by the Company itself, acting through its Cayman Islands Joint Official Liquidators …\n\nIn the present case, it is pertinent to note that while the winding up order sought is in respect of an insolvent company, the petition is not in fact brought by a creditor, but by the Company itself, acting through its liquidators appointed in its home jurisdiction, by the courts of its place of incorporation.\n\n#### **44. The following cases demonstrate that it is permissible for foreign insolvency office-holders to take possession of the debtor's assets: In Singularis Holdings Ltd** ⁶⁰ **Lord Sumption explains that:**\n\nThe English courts have for at least a century and a half exercised a power to assist a foreign liquidation by taking control of the English assets of the insolvent company.\n\n#### **The Court of Final Appeal in Chen Li Hung v Ting Lei Miao** 61 **recognised and assisted Taiwanese bankruptcy trustees. Bokhary PJ held:**\n\nBy suing to establish that shares registered in other persons' names are beneficially owned by a bankrupt, his trustees in bankruptcy would be doing nothing materially different from suing to recover debts due to him. And I am satisfied that we should proceed on the footing that under the law in operation where they were appointed, the Trustees have the right to sue in their own names here with a view to getting the disputed 1.25 million Nikko shares into Mr Ting's estate. This is because it is not in dispute that every step taken by the Trustees, including every step which they have taken in Hong Kong, is in conformity with directions obtained by them from the bankruptcy court in Taiwan …\n\n⁵⁹ [2018] HKCA 111; [2018] HKCLC 65.\n\n⁶⁰ *Supra* at [10].\n\n⁶¹ (2000) 3 HKCFAR 9 at 16–17, 21.\n\nI hold that the Taiwanese bankruptcy order extends to Mr Ting's assets situated in Hong Kong…\n\nIn my judgment, the Taiwanese bankruptcy order is to be given effect by the Hong Kong courts…\n\nThat the Trustees act in accordance with the directions of the Taiwanese bankruptcy court is an unremarkable matter consistent with routine insolvency practice the world over.\n\n**45. It is permissible to grant foreign insolvency office-holders the power to gather information from third parties. Continuing from his explanation quoted in [25] above Lord Sumption explains in Singularis:** 62\n\n[T]here is a power at common law to assist a foreign court of insolvency jurisdiction by ordering the production of information in oral or documentary form which is necessary for the administration of a foreign winding up. In recognising the existence of such a power, the Board would not wish to encourage the promiscuous creation of other common law powers to compel the production of information. The limits of this power are implicit in the reasons for recognising its existence. In the first place, it is available only to assist the officers of a foreign court of insolvency jurisdiction or equivalent public officers. It would not, for example, be available to assist a voluntary winding up, which is essentially a private arrangement and although subject to the directions of the court is not conducted by or on behalf of an officer of the court. Secondly, it is a power of assistance. It exists for the purpose of enabling those courts to surmount the problems posed for a world-wide winding up of the company's affairs by the territorial limits of each court's powers. It is not therefore available to enable them to do something which they could not do even under the law by which they were appointed. Thirdly, it is available only when it is necessary for the performance of the office-holder's functions. Fourth, the power is subject to the limitation in *In re African Farms Ltd* and in *HIH* and *Rubin*, that such an order must be consistent with the substantive law and public policy of the assisting court … It follows that it is not available for purposes which are properly the subject of other schemes for the compulsory provision of information.\n\n**Also in Singularis a stay was imposed on creditors trying to levy execution against local assets.** 63\n\n⁶² *Supra*.\n\n⁶³ *Supra* at [12]–[14] and [19] (Lord Sumption), and [54] (Lord Collins).\n\n# *Re Up Energy Development Group Ltd*\n\n**46. Mr Ho drew my attention to a very recent decision of Linda Chan J in Re Up Energy Development Group Ltd.** ⁶⁴ **As Chan J notes in the first paragraph of her judgment Up Energy is an unusual case. Up Energy is incorporated in Bermuda, listed in Hong Kong and its business was conducted in the Mainland. The winding-up petition in Hong Kong came on for substantive hearing before Chan J on 10 January 2022. As I understand the position the company sought initially to have the petition adjourned until after a hearing to convene a meeting of creditors, which it intended would be made before me a few months later. Chan J was not satisfied that all the relevant issues had been properly addressed before her and adjourned the petition for further argument on 14 February 2022. Chan J ordered further submissions to be made. The company was wound up in Bermuda on 11 March 2022. The company had been put into soft-touch provisional liquidation in 2017, which was recognised by an order made by me in August 2017. Obviously this proved unsuccessful. The Company argued that it should not be wound up in Hong Kong and instead the liquidation in Bermuda should be recognised and the powers necessary to conduct the liquidation in Hong Kong extended to the liquidators by way of common law recognition. Chan J rejected this argument. Chan J held, and I simplify, that it was not possible for a foreign liquidator to conduct a winding up in Hong Kong, which required the liquidators to exercise the powers available to a Hong Kong liquidator under the Ordinance. The common law power of assistance did not permit the court \"to make the provisions under the CWUO available to the Bermuda liquidators or the Company in the absence of a winding up order made by the Hong Kong court.\"** ⁶⁵ **Mr Ho in the present case agreed that Chan J's conclusion represented the current orthodox view for the reasons explained in Rubin v Eurofinance** 66 **and Singularis.** ⁶⁷ **I agree. So far as the present case is concerned what requires consideration is sub-paragraph (3) of [81], which contains Chan J's determinations. Chan J says this: \"In the absence of a winding up order [in Hong Kong] made against the [c]ompany, the court does not have power under the common law to confer any powers on the Bermuda Liquidators or make any provisions under the [Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (Cap.32)] available to the [c]ompany.\" Mr Ho quite properly brought it to my attention, because although the second part of the sentence, which concerns the issue that I understand was**\n\n⁶⁴ *Supra*.\n\n⁶⁵ [59].\n\n⁶⁶ *Supra*.\n\n⁶⁷ *Supra*.\n\n**central in the case is not relevant to the present matter as the order sought does not require a power under the Ordinance to be extended to the Liquidator, the first part of the sentence suggests that no powers at all can be conferred at common law.**\n\n**47. As I have explained, in the present case the order that I have made is justified by established principles of private international law. As Lord Sumption demonstrates in the parts of Singularis referred to in [16] above the court is not constrained from granting any assistance at all to a foreign liquidator. The court can grant assistance to facilitate a foreign liquidator whose appointment has been recognised on orthodox principles of private international and which engages the principles of modified universalism. As Chan J refers at length to Singularis in her judgment I think a fair reading of [81(3)] is that her Ladyship had in mind (A) an argument that the common law allowed powers analogous to those provided in the Ordinance to be granted to foreign liquidators rather than (B) powers intended to assist a foreign liquidator effectively to exercise rights that a domestic court recognises because the liquidator had been appointed in the place of incorporation; in other words the situation discussed by Lord Sumption in [23] of Singularis. I am concerned with the latter type of case. For the reasons I have explained in earlier paragraphs, in my view it is entirely consistent with modified universalism and the established common law principles of recognition and assistance for the Hong Kong court to grant powers intended to assist a foreign liquidator appointed in the jurisdiction of a company's COMI effectively to exercise rights, which arise from the liquidator's status in the COMI jurisdiction.**\n\n# **Form of Order**\n\n**48. I will grant an order in the form annexed to this judgment. In [1] I will order that the liquidation is recognised. This I do on the basis discussed in [39]–[40] alternatively on practical grounds. The Liquidator is the lawful agent of the Company as a matter of the law of its place of incorporation and entitled to direct that its assets are transferred from accounts in Hong Kong to accounts in Bermuda. Paragraph 2 confirms that the Provisional Liquidator has the power to secure and obtain the Company's assets and documents in Hong Kong. This is simply confirming the position under orthodox principles of private international law and gives the Provisional Liquidator assistance, which might fairly be described as more managerial in nature than of a type associated specifically with insolvency.**\n\n**49. Paragraph 3 permits the transfers of the relevant sums of money as directed by the Provisional Liquidator. Paragraphs 4 and 5 are self-explanatory.**\n\n# **Conclusion**\n\n**50. In my view the correct approach to assessing whether or not a foreign liquidation should be recognised is first to determine if at the time the application for recognition is made the foreign liquidation is taking place in the jurisdiction of the Company's COMI. If it is not recognition and assistance should be declined unless the application falls within one of the following two categories. First, it is limited to recognition of a liquidator's authority, if appointed in the place of incorporation, to represent a company and orders that are an incident of that authority; which might be described as managerial assistance. As the Provisional Liquidator in the present case only requires an order that demonstrates to Computershare and HSBC that as the lawful agent of the Company he is entitled to direct the monies to be transferred to another bank account in my view the application, when the superfluous paragraphs dealing with more general assistance in the originating summons are deleted, is justified by established principles of private international law. Secondly, recognition and limited and carefully prescribed assistance which does not fall within the first category required by a liquidator appointed in the place of incorporation as a matter of practicality; the type of situation in other words, which Abdullah JC describes as justifying assistance on practical grounds in Opti-Medix.**\n\n**316 2022/8/10—18:3**\n\n# **Reported by Ken TC Lee**\n\n# **Appendix**\n\n# *Order*\n\n**UPON the application of Mr. John Christopher McKenna of Finance & Risk Services Ltd in his capacity as the sole provisional liquidator of Global Brands Group Holding Ltd (In Liquidation in Bermuda) (Company) by way of ex parte originating summons filed on 25 May 2022**\n\n**AND UPON reading the Letter of Request issued by the Supreme Court of Bermuda dated 28 March 2022, the Affidavit of John Christopher McKenna filed on 26 May 2022 and the exhibit referred to therein, and the 2nd Affidavit of Lau Po Wa Vivian filed on 27 May 2022 and the exhibit referred to therein**\n\n**AND UPON hearing counsel for the Applicant, the 1st and 2nd Respondents being absent**\n\n# **IT IS ORDERED THAT:**\n\n- **(1) The liquidation of the Company pursuant to the order of the Supreme Court of Bermuda (Bermuda Court) dated 5 November 2021 and the appointment of John Christopher McKenna of Finance & Risk Services Ltd, Suite 502, 26 Bermudiana Road, Hamilton, Bermuda, as provisional liquidator (Provisional Liquidator) pursuant to the order of the Bermuda Court dated 16 September 2021, and his continuation in office pursuant to the order of the Bermuda Court dated 5 November 2021, be recognised by this Court.**\n- **(2) The Provisional Liquidator has and may exercise in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region the following powers:**\n\t- **a) to locate, protect, secure and take into their possession and control the books, papers, and records of the Company including the accountancy and statutory records within the jurisdiction of this Court. The books, records and documents of the Company include:**\n\t\t- **i. Emails exchanged and other correspondences between the Company and its auditors, and the Company and other third parties; and**\n\t\t- **ii. Documents and information provided by the Company to its auditors and provided by the**\n\n**auditors to the Company in relation to the audit work;**\n\n- **b) to take all necessary steps to prevent any disposal of the Company's assets and, in particular, to secure any credit balances in any bank accounts in the name or under the control of the Company within this jurisdiction;**\n- **c) to operate and open or close any bank accounts in the name and on behalf of the Company for the purpose of collecting the assets and paying the costs and expenses of the Provisional Liquidator;**\n- **d) to retain and employ barristers, solicitors or attorneys, accountants and/or such other agents or professional persons as the Provisional Liquidator considers appropriate for the purpose of advising or assisting in the execution of their powers and duties under this Order; and**\n- **e) to bring legal proceedings and make applications to this Court, whether in his own name or in the name of the Company.**\n- **(3) Subject to any adjustments for additional interest accrued and for bank charges or fees incurred, the following balances comprising receivables due in respect of dividends and interest income derived from shares that are not vested under the Company's 2014 and 2016 share award schemes (GBG Share Award Schemes) because of staff termination standing to the credit of the 1st Respondent, the trustee for the GBG Share Award Schemes, and maintained with the 2nd Respondent, be delivered up to the Company in accordance with the instructions issued by the Provisional Liquidator:**\n\n| Type of
account | Name of Account | Account number | Balances (HKD) |\n|------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------------------------------|\n| Cash
Custodian
Account | Computershare
Hong Kong
Trustees Ltd
Account No. 0018 | 848-XXXXXX-001 | 64,860.54 or any
balances remaining
therein |\n| Cash
Custodian
Account | Computershare
Hong Kong
Trustees Ltd
Account No. 0047 | 741-XXXXXX-001 | 8,399,057.66 or
any balances
remaining therein |\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 1409-21 Filed 01/30/23 Entered 01/30/23 10:03:34 Page 40 of 40\n\nRe Global Brands Group Holding Ltd (In Liq) [2022] 3 HKLRD 316 *Harris J in Chambers*\n\n| Type of
account | Name of Account | Account number | Balances (HKD) |\n|--------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|----------------|\n| | Computershare
Hong Kong
Trustees Ltd
Account No. 0047
- No.2 Account | | |\n\n- **(4) The sum of HK\\$135,250 be returned by the 1st Respondent to the Company in accordance with the instructions issued by the Provisional Liquidator. Such sum is the total amount deducted by the 1st Respondent from the cash balance held by them as trustee under the GBG Share Award Schemes to set off their outstanding fees for the months of April to August 2021.**\n- **(5) The following balances standing to the credit of the Company maintained with the 2nd Respondent, subject to any adjustments for additional interest accrued and for bank charges or fees incurred be delivered up to the Company in accordance with the instructions issued by the Provisional Liquidator:**\n\n| Type of account | Account number | Balances |\n|---------------------|----------------|--------------|\n| EUR Current Account | 848-XXXXXX-220 | EUR 9.85 |\n| HKD Current Account | 848-XXXXXX-001 | HKD 730.01 |\n| USD Current Account | 848-XXXXXX-201 | USD 4,748.79 |\n\n- **(6) The Provisional Liquidator does have liberty to apply; and**\n- **(7) The costs of this application be paid out of the assets of the Company as an expense of the liquidation.**","body_zh":"关于 Global Brands Group Holding Ltd（环球品牌集团控股有限公司）（清盘中）\n———— [2022] HKCFI 1789\n\n（原讼法庭（Court of First Instance））\n\n（杂项法律程序第 644 号，2022 年）————\n\nHarris法官于内庭审理\n\n2022年6月1日、23日\n\n公司法 — 无力偿债 — 外地无力偿债法律程序 — 认可和协助 — 在公司注册成立地委任临时清盘人 — 当清盘并非在公司主要利益中心所在地司法管辖区进行时的处理方法 — 在有关情况下，作出的命令仅限于确认临时清盘人收取及转移公司在香港资产的权力\n\n法律冲突 — 法团及法团清盘 — 跨境清盘 — 认可和协助 — 未来处理方法 — 准则主要由公司主要利益中心所在地确定 — 有限例外情况\n\nC是一家于百慕大注册成立、并在香港联合交易所主板上市的投资控股公司。应C向百慕大法院提出的申请，百慕大法院于2021年9月为重组目的委任了一名C的临时清盘人（PL）；在百慕大法院于2021年11月作出清盘令后，PL继续在任。PL试图接管C在香港的资产，具体为由R等答辩人持有的若干现金余额，并申请一项认可和协助命令。\n\n裁定，准许PL的申请，并按下文所述作出命令，理由如下：\n\n（1）香港并无处理跨境无力偿债及重组的任何立法，因此，主要由司法机构运用普通法工具处理在此领域出现的挑战。迄今为止，授予认可和协助的准则为：(i) 外地无力偿债法律程序属于集体无力偿债程序；及(ii) 外地无力偿债法律程序在公司注册成立国启动。只要此种发展符合经修正的普遍主义原则，法院可按更适合目前香港跨国无力偿债案件出现情形及可比司法管辖区原则发展情况的方式，发展普通法原则（Solicitor (24/07) v Law Society of Hong Kong (2008) 11 HKCFAR 117、Rubin v Eurofinance SA [2013] 1 AC 236、Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers [2015] AC 1675 经审议）。见第10、16–21、26段。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 1409-21 于 01/30/23 提交，于 01/30/23 10:03:34 登记第 2 页，共 40 页\n\n（2）今后，认可的准则应主要由公司的主要利益中心（COMI）所在地确定。广泛采用在离岸司法管辖区注册成立的公司作为在香港及内地开展业务的企业集团之控股公司及中间附属公司。此类公司很少在其注册成立地开展任何业务。当此类公司被置于临时或最终清盘时，至少一名由离岸法院委任的清盘人会驻于香港，并在香港进行清盘。为确定哪个司法管辖区是主要清盘所在地的适当地点这一目的，将注册成立地视为自然归属地或在商业上最具相关性的司法管辖区，极不自然。采用COMI准则也会使香港与内地的处理方法一致。因此，应采用的准则是：(i) 外地程序构成集体无力偿债程序；及(ii) 该等程序（受限于有限例外情况）在公司COMI所在地司法管辖区进行（Re Lamtex Holdings Ltd [2021] 2 HKLRD 177 经审议）。见第17、32段。\n\n（3）在确定公司的COMI时，法院会考虑包括董事、主要高级人员及董事会会议所在地、迁址通知、经营所在地、资产、银行账户、账簿和记录所在地，以及重组活动进行地点等因素（Re Ocean Rig UDW Inc 570 BR 687 (Bank SDNY Aug 24, 2017) 获适用；Re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 852、Re Opti-Medix Ltd [2016] 4 SLR 312、Re Zetta Jet Pte Ltd [2019] 4 SLR 1343、Re Investin Quay House Ltd [2021] EWHC 2371 (Ch) 经审议）。见第34–38段。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 1409-21 于 01/30/23 提交，于 01/30/23 10:03:34 登记第 3 页，共 40 页\n\n（4）认可制度有别于清盘管辖权。债务人可以或已经在香港被清盘这一事实，本身并不妨碍法院授予协助（Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers [2015] AC 1675 经审议）。见第39段。\n\n（5）在香港没有清盘令的情况下，外地清盘人不可能在香港进行清盘，因为这将要求清盘人行使《公司（清盘及杂项条文）条例》（第32章）赋予香港清盘人的权力。普通法上的协助权力亦不允许法院在该等情况下授予类似于该条例赋予清盘人的权力。然而，法院可按正统国际私法原则，授予旨在协助其委任已获认可的外地清盘人的权力（Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers [2015] AC 1675 经审议；Re Up Energy Development Group Ltd [2022] 2 HKLRD 993 获阐释）。见第46–47段。\n\n（6）评估是否应认可外地清盘的正确方法，是首先确定在提出认可申请时，该清盘是否正在公司COMI所在地司法管辖区进行。如非如此，应拒绝认可和协助，除非：\n\n（i）该项认可仅限于认可清盘人（如其在注册成立地获委任）代表公司的权限，以及作为该权限附带事项的命令；该等协助可称为管理性协助；或\n\n（ii）作为实际需要，须给予认可及有限且经审慎规定的协助（Re Opti-Medix Ltd [2016] 4 SLR 312 获援引）。见第50段。\n\n（7）在本案中，法院将作出认可PL的命令，协助仅限于收取有关账户余额并将其转移出香港的权力。根据其注册成立地法律，PL为C的合法代理人，并有权指示将其资产从香港账户转移至百慕大账户。该命令仅确认正统国际私法原则下的法律地位，并给予PL性质上更属管理性、而非与无力偿债特别相关的协助。见第14、48、50段。\n\n（8）（附带意见）法院的初步意见是，今后香港法院通常应拒绝认可由采用债务人自行管理模式的离岸司法管辖区所委任的“软性接管”临时清盘人。香港已明确决定不制定为此类债务暂缓偿付提供规定的立法。见第12段。\n\n申请\n\n本案是由在百慕大获委任的标的公司临时清盘人提出的申请，寻求香港法院作出认可和协助命令。\n\nLook Chan Ho先生，由Stephenson Harwood律师行指示，代表申请人（Global Brands Group Holding Ltd的临时清盘人）。\n\n第一答辩人Computershare Hong Kong Trustees Ltd未获代表，亦未出庭。\n\n第二答辩人Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp Ltd未获代表，亦未出庭。\n\n判决书中提及的立法\n\n《破产法典》[美国] 第11、15章\n\n《公司（清盘及杂项条文）条例》（第32章）第193、327条\n\n《公司条例》（第32章）（前身法例）第327条\n\n判决书中引用的案件\n\nBank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd v Bank of Credit & Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd, Macau Branch [1997] HKLRD 304\n\nBear Stearns High-Grade Strategies Master Fund Ltd, Re 381 BR 37\n\nCEFC Shanghai International Group Ltd, Re [2020] 1 HKLRD 676, [2020] 4 HKC 62, [2020] HKCFI 167\n\nCambridge Gas Transportation Corpn v Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc [2006] UKPC 26, [2007] 1 AC 508, [2006] 3 WLR 689, [2006] 3 All ER 829\n\nChen Li Hung v Ting Lei Miao (2000) 3 HKCFAR 9, [2000] 1 HKLRD 252, [2000] 1 HKC 461\n\nChina Bozza Development Holdings Ltd, Re [2021] 2 HKLRD 977, [2021] 4 HKC 560, [2021] HKCFI 1235\n\nChina Fishery Group Ltd, Re [2019] 1 HKLRD 875, [2019] 6 HKC 189, [2019] HKCFI 174\n\nChina Huiyuan Juice Group Ltd, Re [2021] 1 HKLRD 255, [2021] 1 HKC 387, [2020] HKCFI 2940\n\nChina Medical Technologies Inc (No 1), Re [2018] HKCA 111, [2018] HKCLC 65\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 1409-21 于 01/30/23 提交，于 01/30/23 10:03:34 登记第 5 页，共 40 页\n\nCreative Finance Ltd Case No. 14-10358 (REG)\n\nEurofood IFSC Ltd, Re [2006] Ch 508, [2006] 3 WLR 309, [2006] BCC 397, [2006] ILPr 23\n\nGibbs (Antony) & Sons v La Société Industrielle Et Commerciale Des Métaux (1890) 25 QBD 399\n\nHIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd, Re [2008] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 WLR 852, [2008] 3 All ER 869, [2008] Bus LR 905\n\nHNA Group Co Ltd, Re; sub nom Re Jiang Wenyu [2021] HKCFI 2897, [2021] HKEC 4405\n\nHsin Chong Group Holdings, Re (Joint and Provisional Liquidators of) [2019] HKCFI 805, [2019] HKEC 945\n\nInformation Security One Ltd, Re [2007] 3 HKLRD 780\n\nInvestin Quay House Ltd, Re [2021] EWHC 2371 (Ch), [2022] BCC 497\n\nIrish Shipping Ltd, Re [1985] HKLR 437\n\nJoint Administrators of African Minerals Ltd v Madison Pacific Trust Ltd [2015] 4 HKC 215\n\nJoint Official Liquidators of A Co v B [2014] 4 HKLRD 374\n\nKam Leung Sui Kwan v Kam Kwan Lai (2015) 18 HKCFAR 501, [2015] 6 HKC 644\n\nKireeva v Bedzhamov [2021] EWHC 2281 (Ch), [2021] BPIR 1465\n\nKireeva v Bedzhamov [2022] EWCA Civ 35, [2022] 2 All ER (Comm) 212, [2022] BCC 603\n\nLee Wah Bank, Re (1926) 2 Malayan Cases 81\n\nLegend International Resorts Ltd, Re [2006] 2 HKLRD 192, [2006] 3 HKC 565\n\nLi Yiqing v Lamtex Holdings Ltd, Re [2021] 2 HKLRD 177, [2021] HKCFI 622\n\nMoody Technology Holdings Ltd, Re [2020] 2 HKLRD 187, [2020] 4 HKC 78, [2020] HKCFI 416\n\nNuoxi Capital Ltd v Peking University Founder Group Co Ltd [2022] 2 HKC 1, [2021] HKCFI 3817\n\nOcean Rig UDW Inc, Re 570 BR 687 (Bank. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2017); aff'd 585 BR 31 (S.D.N.Y. April 5, 2018)\n\nOpti-Medix Ltd, Re [2016] SGHC 108, [2016] 4 SLR 312\n\nRiverrock Securities Ltd v International Bank of St Petersburg (Joint Stock Co) [2020] EWHC 2483 (Comm), [2021] 2 All ER (Comm) 1121, [2020] 2 CLC 547\n\nRubin v Eurofinance SA [2012] UKSC 46, [2013] 1 AC 236, [2012] 3 WLR 1019, [2013] 1 All ER 521\n\nRusso-Asiatic Bank, Re The (1929-30) 24 HKLR 16\n\nShenzhen Everich Supply Chain Co Ltd, Re [2020] HKCFI 965, [2020] HKEC 1188\n\nSilver Starlight Ltd v China CITIC Bank Corp Ltd, Tianjin Branch [2021] HKCA 1248, [2021] HKEC 3771\n\nSingularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers [2014] UKPC 36, [2015] AC 1675, [2015] 2 WLR 971, [2015] BCC 66\n\nSolicitor (24/07) v Law Society of Hong Kong (2008) 11 HKCFAR 117, [2008] 2 HKLRD 576, [2008] 2 HKC 1\n\nStichting Shell Pensioenfonds v Krys [2014] UKPC 41, [2015] AC 616, [2015] 2 WLR 289, [2015] BCC 205\n\nTchenguiz v Grant Thornton UK LLP [2017] EWCA Civ 83, [2018] QB 695, [2018] 2 WLR 834\n\nUp Energy Development Group Ltd, Re [2022] 2 HKLRD 993, [2022] HKCFI 1329\n\nZ-Obee Holdings Ltd [2018] 1 HKLRD 165\n\nZetta Jet, Re [2019] SGHC 53, [2019] 4 SLR 1343\n\n裁决\n\nHarris法官于内庭审理\n\n本申请\n\n1. 2022年5月25日，Global Brands Group Holdings Ltd（环球品牌集团控股有限公司）的临时清盘人（分别称为“临时清盘人”和“本公司”）发出一份原诉传票，以Computershare Hong Kong Trustee Ltd（香港中央证券信托有限公司）（“Computershare”）及The Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Ltd（香港上海汇丰银行有限公司）（“HSBC”）为答辩人，请求作出承认及协助命令。本公司于百慕大注册成立，并于2021年11月5日在百慕大被清盘。本申请的情形提供了一个机会，使我能够更详细地考虑我在Re Li Yiqing v Lamtex Holdings Ltd, 1中讨论的问题，即：未来香港法院是否将承认及协助在公司主要利益中心（COMI）所在地进行的外国破产程序，以及外国破产程序在公司注册成立地进行既非充分条件，亦非必要条件。\n\n背景\n\n2. 临时清盘人John McKenna（约翰·麦肯纳）于2021年9月16日获委任，并在作出清盘令后继续任职。向香港法院寻求承认及协助的主要原因，是为了取得Computershare在香港代表本公司持有的股份出售所得款项，合计约HK$9 million，以及HSBC在本公司香港银行账户中持有的较为有限的余额，合计约US$5,000。原诉传票还请求授予某些其他一般权力。我将在本判决书后文加以说明。\n\n1 [2021] HKCFI 622; [2021] HKCLC 329.\n\n案件22-50073 文件1409-21 于01/30/23提交于01/30/23 10:03:34录入第7页，共40页\n\n3. 临时清盘人在支持本申请的宣誓书中说明了本公司的背景及导致其在百慕大清盘的情形。本公司是一家投资控股公司。本公司及其子公司（“集团”）从事北美和欧洲品牌儿童、男士和女士服装、鞋类、时尚配饰及相关生活方式产品的业务设计、开发、营销和销售。本公司及其子公司亦从事品牌管理，并就拓展其客户的品牌资产至新产品类别、新地区及零售合作提供专业知识，同时协助在全球范围内分销获许可产品。\n\n4. 本公司于2014年因自Li & Fung（利丰）分拆而在The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (HKEX) Ltd（香港联合交易所有限公司）主板上市，此前本公司构成利丰的一部分。由于持续的COVID-19疫情及地缘政治不确定性，以及零售业的结构性变化，本公司及其子公司的业务受到严重挑战。因此，本公司自2020年起一直面临巨大的财务困难。截至2020年3月31日止年度，集团报告：(a) 税后净亏损US$586,590,000；(b) 流动负债超过流动资产HK$772,125,000；及(c) 现金及现金等价物为US$83,880,000。截至2020年9月30日止六个月，集团报告：(a) 税后净亏损US$119,838,000；(b) 流动负债超过流动资产US$899,391,000；及(c) 集团的现金及现金等价物为US$55,805,000。\n\n5. 自约2021年1月起，本公司积极与向集团提供银团贷款的贷款人（“贷款人”）（本公司为该贷款的保证人）、其他债权人及潜在投资者进行讨论，讨论内容涉及修订贷款偿还义务及由潜在投资者注入新的股本。本公司亦探索不同的债务重组方案，包括可能涉及出售、处置及/或重组集团各项资产或业务的潜在交易或公司行动（统称“重组”）。\n\n6. 在本公司探索各种重组方案以改善其财务状况的同时，本公司董事会决议，为本公司及其债权人的利益，应启动本公司自身的清盘程序，并向Bermuda Court（百慕大法院）申请委任一名具有有限权力的临时清盘人，此举可最大限度提高重组成功的机会，并就针对本公司的债权提供暂缓，以避免本公司债权人可能进行的无序清盘。\n\n案件22-50073 文件1409-21 于01/30/23提交于01/30/23 10:03:34录入第8页，共40页\n\n重组，并就针对本公司的债权提供暂缓，以避免本公司债权人可能进行的无序清盘。该项委任显然旨在为成功重组创造环境。董事会可继续管理集团的业务运营；临时清盘人将监督并就实施全集团协调一致的债务重组计划与董事会协商；集团业务可作为整体继续运营以产生收入，而非使资产以大幅折价被迫出售。\n\n7. 2021年9月10日，本公司向百慕大法院提交了对本公司进行清盘的呈请（“呈请”），并申请委任麦肯纳先生为本公司的临时清盘人，且仅为重组目的按“有限权力”基础获委任。毋庸赘言，重组尝试被证明未获成功，董事会认识到清盘将最符合债权人的利益，本公司遂于2021年11月5日成功申请获得清盘令。\n\n8. 自获委任以来，临时清盘人一直试图接管本公司在香港的资产。本公司在香港的资产为：\n\n(1) Computershare持有的约HK$8 million现金余额，代表集团雇员股份计划产生的盈余；及\n\n(2) 本公司在HSBC的银行账户中持有的约US$4,800现金余额。\n\nComputershare及HSBC均要求临时清盘人在其释放现金余额前取得承认令。本公司的几乎所有债权人均在香港。正如控股公司应有的情形，债权人大多为金融或专业公司，且均为无担保债权人。清盘的其余部分将很直接。临时清盘人将裁定债权证明，这似乎不大可能存在争议，并将从资产中宣派股息；如获授承认及协助，他将收到该等资产，即我在上一段提及的款项。\n\n9. 临时清盘人承认，在百慕大清盘之前，本公司的COMI可能在香港。鉴于百慕大清盘开始后临时清盘人的活动，COMI可能已变为香港或百慕大。就本裁决而言，临时清盘人承认，在香港法院对外国公司行使其清盘管辖权之前须满足的核心要求已经得到满足。2\n\n案件22-50073 文件1409-21 于01/30/23提交于01/30/23 10:03:34录入第9页，共40页\n\n香港的承认及协助——背景\n\n10. 自2014年起，承认及协助日益被用于处理香港跨境重组及破产所产生的问题；这些问题主要源于广泛使用在离岸司法管辖区而非香港或中国内地注册成立的控股公司，尽管受影响的商业集团通常由在香港和中国内地经营并拥有资产的公司组成。对于在HKEX上市的公司而言，这种做法已成为常态。经营及拥有资产的子公司通常通过一层在与控股公司不同的离岸司法管辖区注册成立的中间子公司，与控股公司相分隔。最近最常采用的结构看来涉及一家开曼群岛控股公司及在英属维尔京群岛注册成立的中间子公司。该等商业集团在离岸司法管辖区没有资产、债权人或债务人。当该等商业集团遇到财务困难，而债权人与公司自身正在考虑采取何种措施保护其利益时，它们会遇到由集团人为结构所产生的问题；由于与可比司法管辖区不同，香港既无处理陷入困境企业重整的立法，也无处理跨境破产的立法，唯一例外是《公司（清盘及杂项条文）条例》（第32章）（“条例”）第327条赋予法院对外国公司进行清盘的酌情权，因此难以处理这些问题。其他司法管辖区（包括中国内地）可用于处理这些问题的工具在香港缺失，二十多年来一直是重组及破产领域相关人士广为关注的问题。在没有任何处理这些问题的立法的情况下，法院一直与执业人士合作，在普通法允许的范围内使用普通法技术处理这些问题。存在两个主要问题领域。\n\n11. 第一个涉及对外国注册成立公司进行清盘时存在的限制。无须深入探讨该问题，因为若干为执业人士所熟知的判例已对此作出全面处理。概言之，法院采纳了终审法院在Kam Leung Sui Kwan v Kam Kwan Lai. 3一案判决中Ma CJ（马道立首席法官）及Lord Millett NPJ（米列勋爵非常任法官）所称的“对外国公司作出清盘令所必需的自我施加限制”。在某些案件中，这些限制很容易满足；在另一些案件中则不然，导致在有关管辖权的复杂问题获解决期间，债权人或股东在香港采取行动保护其经济利益受到延误。正是这一问题导致Joint Official Liquidators of A Co v B. 4一案的申请及裁决。获委任于本公司注册成立地开曼群岛的清盘人，最初寻求（最终成功）在香港对本公司进行清盘，但在呈请获裁定之前，希望能够从本公司在香港的银行取得有关一项重大欺诈的文件。银行拒绝在没有香港法院命令确认清盘人有权在香港代表本公司的情况下向其提供该等文件。\n\n12. 第二个问题涉及香港缺乏任何促进陷入财务困境公司的债务重组及复苏的立法所造成的问题。在1997年及1998年亚洲金融危机之后的一段时期，形成了一种做法，即将公司（主要为上市公司）置于香港一种轻触式临时清盘程序中，以促进债务重组。该做法因上诉法院在 Re Legend International Resorts Ltd（传奇国际度假村有限公司）5 一案中的判决而停止；该判决认定，根据该条例 s.193 授予委任临时清盘人的权力，不得用于以重组公司为主要目的而委任临时清盘人。这些公司中有许多是在离岸司法管辖区注册成立。为规避上诉法院判决所引起的实际问题，发展出一种技巧，6 即将在离岸司法管辖区注册成立的公司置于其本土司法管辖区的轻触式临时清盘程序中，该等司法管辖区的法院将此视为适当行使委任临时清盘人的权力，并在香港承认该等临时清盘人，且以授予临时清盘人参与香港重组程序所必需的有限权力的形式提供协助。不幸的是，日益明显的是，通常被称为 Z-Obee 技巧的做法已被某些破产\n\n3 (2015) 18 HKCFAR 501。参见 [18]–[24]，其中 Ma CJ（马道首席法官）及 Lord Millett NPJ（米列非常任法官）解释了通常被称为“3项核心要求”的限制及其适用。\n\n4 [2014] 4 HKLRD 374。\n\n5 [2006] 2 HKLRD 192; [2006] 3 HKC 565。\n\n6 Z-Obee Holdings Ltd（Z-Obee控股有限公司）[2018] 1 HKLRD 165；Re Joint and Provisional Liquidators of Hsin Chong Group Holdings（新昌集团控股的共同及临时清盘人）[2019] HKCFI 805；Re Moody Technology Holdings Ltd（穆迪科技控股有限公司）[2020] 2 HKLRD 187。\n\n从业人员及离岸律师事务所所滥用。在我看来，相当明确的是，许多离岸轻触式临时清盘采用债务人自行管理模式；该模式已被香港否决。从公司的角度看，其主要目的在于尽可能取得一项暂停采取行动追收未偿债务的安排。本案申请委任临时清盘人看来即为一例。香港已审慎决定不制定提供此类债务暂缓安排的立法。尽管这并非我在本案中需要裁定的问题，且需要详细考量，但我的初步观点是，香港法院日后通常应拒绝承认由离岸司法管辖区按我所概述的这类条件委任的轻触式临时清盘人。\n\n13. 还有另一项考虑因素。如我已解释，就我所关注的这类公司而言，其业务是在中国开展；主要是在内地。内地的经济制度不同于香港。协调香港与内地制度之间的差异可能具有挑战性。这需要理解不同的破产制度以及不同的社会和经济考量；这些考量反映于不同的成文法，以及法官和其他参与破产及重组程序者须作出的决定之中。举一例而言，《企业破产法》优先强调企业复苏，反映了内地对维持经济及社会稳定的重视。与此一致，内地倾向于债务人自行管理的解决方案。如我已解释，香港并非如此。香港及内地法官熟悉这些问题，并处于妥善处理这些问题的有利位置；中国以外的法院则远非如此。与此相关的是，国际破产领域两位领先学者——University of Texas at Austin（奥斯汀得克萨斯大学）的 Professor Jay Westbrook（杰伊·韦斯特布鲁克教授）及 Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin（柏林洪堡大学）的 Professor Christoph Paulus（克里斯托夫·保卢斯教授）8——近期就司法裁决及破产法日益脱离地域或政治控制所表达的担忧。一家中国企业在破产时通过使用一家在欧洲法院及其他机构所称的“信箱\n\n7 例如参见 Re China Bozza Development Holdings Ltd（中国博扎发展控股有限公司）[2021] 2 HKLRD 977；[2021] HKCFI 1235。\n\n8 International Insolvency Institute（国际破产协会）播客，23 April 2022。\n\n9 香港特别行政区或内地的法院。\n\n司法管辖区”10 注册成立的公司，即可避免由中国法院监督其事务这一主张，9 引出了 Professor Westbrook（韦斯特布鲁克教授）及 Professor Paulus（保卢斯教授）所提出的问题：允许一家商业企业使用其或其债务11 与之不存在经济或社会联系的司法管辖区的破产程序，而非使用其开展业务所在司法管辖区的破产程序，在何种程度上符合破产法的目的及债权人的期望。该问题与我正在考量的问题有关；在实践中，该问题归结为：公司业务开展所在的司法管辖区，是否应承认在该公司与之不存在实质经济联系之地进行的破产程序。\n\n该命令\n\n14. 我将作出承认临时清盘人的命令，所提供的协助仅限于收取及从香港转出我在 [8] 中所提及账户内余额的权力。我作出该命令的理由载于 [48]–[50]。本裁决其余大部分内容涉及香港日后应据以向外国破产从业人员给予承认及协助的基础。本裁决分为以下各节：\n\n(1) 与本申请有关的普通法承认及协助的既定原则。\n(2) 作为承认及协助标准的 COMI。\n(3) 承认原则——修正普遍主义。\n(4) 修正普遍主义——比较法权威中确定本土或主要司法管辖区的标准。\n(5) 在香港采用 COMI 标准。\n(6) 香港的判例。\n(7) 近期的 Up-Energy（优能）案件。\n(8) 结论。\n\n普通法承认及协助原则\n\n15. 承认与协助之间存在区别。承认涉及确认和认可外国破产程序及人员的地位。协助则涉及明确授予外国破产人员在本地司法管辖区行事的权力。该区别广为理解。在 Kireeva v Bedzhamov（基列耶娃诉别扎莫夫）12 一案中，Snowden J（斯诺登法官）认为：\n\n在决定是否承认外国破产时所适用的原则，与在承认之后英国法院应否向外国破产受托人提供任何进一步协助这一问题所适用的原则，两者在概念上存在区别。\n\n在 Net International Property Ltd v ADV Eitan Erez（Net International Property有限公司诉ADV Eitan Erez）13 一案中，Webster JA（韦伯斯特上诉法官）对该区别作出更详细说明：\n\n关于承认及协助问题的出发点，是确定承认与协助之间（如有）存在何种差异。至少在理论上，这两项原则之间存在差异。承认是本地法院正式承认或将外国任职人视为根据外国法院对其作出的委任而在 BVI 具有地位的行为。在本案中，这意味着承认以色列法院授予受托人的地位，即其为 Mrs. Sofer（索弗女士）资产的破产受托人，并将其视为该等资产在 BVI 的受托人。\n\n协助则更进一步。若由 BVI 法院授予，协助允许受托人处理 Mrs. Sofer 在 BVI 的资产，即其在 Net International 的股份中享有的法定及实益权益。换言之，承认赋予外国任职人在 BVI 的地位，而协助赋予其处理 BVI 资产的权力。然而，在实践中，两项原则之间的分界线并不清晰，因为承认本身通常对外国任职人帮助甚微，除非同时授予其处理本地资产的协助。如此看来，承认通常被视为承认及协助。南非 Transvaal（德兰士瓦）最高法院在 Re African Farms Ltd（非洲农场有限公司）一案中的判决说明了这两个概念之间界线的模糊……\n\n尽管承认与协助之间的界线并不清晰，仍须牢记承认并不必然包括协助。在本案中，初审法官承认受托人的命令包括协助。\n\n12 [2021] EWHC 2281 (Ch); [2021] BPIR 1465 at [107]。\n\n13 (Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal（东加勒比上诉法院）, 22 February 2021) at [19]–[21]。\n\n承认与协助之间区别的一个简单实际例子，可见于我在 Re China Bozza Development Holdings Ltd（中国博扎发展控股有限公司）14 一案中的裁决。我认为：\n\n尽管我对本案的发展方式有所疑虑，JPLs 仍应获承认，我将作出相应命令。然而，作出提供积极协助的命令则是另一回事。我目前并不确信应作出命令，授予我在先前场合曾授予的那类一般性协助……\n\n14 [2021] HKCFI 1235; [2021] HKCLC 831 at [23]。\n\n16. 判例确立，正统普通法立场是，法院可承认符合两项标准的外国破产程序。15 第一，外国破产程序属于集体破产程序；第二，外国破产程序在公司注册成立地启动。承认及协助在注册成立地获委任的外国任职人的部分理据，源于适用于公司的通常冲突法原则，而非纯粹的破产法。正如 Lord Sumption（萨姆普申勋爵）在 Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers（Singularis Holdings有限公司诉PricewaterhouseCoopers）16 一案中所解释：\n\n12. 即使没有清盘，法院仍可基于通常的国际私法原则，出于礼让，承认公司的资产归属于根据其注册成立地法律获委任或承认的代理人或任职人。在适用于外国公司清盘的相应规则获得承认之前多年，该原则已在不存在任何法定权力的情况下，适用于已在其住所地法律下的破产程序中转归任职人的外国破产人位于英国的动产资产。\n\n作为承认及协助标准的 COMI\n\n17. 迄今为止，香港法院并未将 COMI 作为授予普通法承认或协助的衡量标准。所适用的标准是上一段所说明的标准。然而，从原则和法律依据上说，法院可以发展这些普通法原则。正如时任首席法官 Li（李国能）在 Solicitor (24/07) v Law Society of Hong Kong 一案中所指出：“普通法的伟大力量在于其能够发展，以满足其所运作的社会不断变化的需要和情势。”基于下文所讨论的理由，\n\n15 见 Re CEFC Shanghai International Group Ltd [2020] HKCFI 167; [2020] HKCLC 1 第 [8] 段。\n\n16 [2014] UKPC 36; [2015] AC 1675。\n\n17 (2008) 11 HKCFAR 117 第 [19] 段。\n\n在我看来，今后确定是否应承认和协助外国破产程序时应采用的标准，简言之，是该外国程序构成集体破产程序，且该程序（受限于有限例外）在公司主要利益中心所在地的管辖区进行。\n\n18. 如我已经说明，香港在没有任何处理跨境破产和重组的立法这一点上并不寻常。随着香港经济伴随内地经济快速扩张而发展，政府在很大程度上交由司法机关运用普通法工具，应对该领域中出现的挑战。这并非疏漏。2021 年 5 月 14 日，律政司司长与最高人民法院（Supreme People's Court）签署了《最高人民法院与香港特别行政区政府关于内地与香港特别行政区法院相互认可和协助破产（清盘）程序的会谈纪要》。该合作机制由两部分组成。第一部分是《会谈纪要》。第二部分是《最高人民法院关于开展认可和协助香港特别行政区破产程序试点工作的意见》。18 如两份文件所说明，该机制的目的是促进香港和内地的经济一体化与发展。《会谈纪要》第 3 段和第 5 段明确表明，各方期望香港高等法院（High Court）向内地管理人提供协助，并就该机制的实施和完善开展合作。缺乏相关立法以及该合作机制的目的，与考量香港普通法协助的发展、其必要性以及其可能采取的形式有关。香港与已制定全面成文法体系以规范外国破产承认和协助的司法管辖区并非处于同一地位。正如我所提及的合作机制所表明，缺乏规范承认和协助的成文法体系，并不意味着法院应对其发展普通法原则以处理提交至其面前的问题的能力采取限制性看法。显然，情况恰恰相反。\n\n19. 在 Rubin v Eurofinance SA 一案中，19 Lord Collins（柯林斯勋爵）在第 [129] 段说明了法院在该领域发展法律的能力限度。柯林斯勋爵称：\n\n18 最高人民法院关于开展认可和协助香港特别行政区破产程序试点工作的意见\n\n19 [2012] UKSC 46; [2013] 1 AC 236。\n\n对既定的判决承认与执行法律作出改变，尤其是制定一项规则以识别哪些法院应被视为有管辖权的法院（例如，无力偿债实体的主要利益中心所在国，以及判决债务人与之有充分或实质联系的国家），具有立法的一切特征，属于立法机关的事项，而非司法创制。关于外国判决执行的法律和关于国际破产的法律，并非近年来一直交由法官创制的法律加以发展的法律领域。正如 Lord Bridge of Harwich（哈里奇的布里奇勋爵）就拟议修改有关以欺诈作为抗辩以阻止执行外国判决的普通法规则所言：“如果法律现已需要改革，应由立法机关而非司法机关来实施改革”：Owens Bank Ltd v Bracco [1992] 2 AC 443, 489。\n\n20. 很容易理解为何英格兰法院会如 Lord Collins 所述那样处理国际破产普通法的发展。在已经引入有意且全面的立法以规范跨境破产的制度背景下，由法官主导的法律发展可能被视为司法越权；但在缺乏可比立法、且其当前情势足以证明应修改普通法以更有效地实施既定法律原则的司法管辖区内，这种发展未必应被作同样看待。我正在考虑的关于承认外国清盘所依据基础的发展，并不涉及创设一项新的法律原则。它涉及对既有原则的修改，即对外国破产程序的承认和协助。该修改的目的，是以一种更适合跨国破产目前在香港出现的情势以及该原则在可比司法管辖区的发展状况的方式实施该原则。\n\n21. 从其条款可见，该合作机制以如下假设为前提：在香港实施的普通法已经发展至可为在不同司法管辖区进行的破产程序提供司法协助；尽管在中国语境下，这是一个单一国家内部不同法律管辖区之间的情形。香港法院已向外国破产程序管理人提供普通法协助的例子众多。在第 [43]–[44] 段中，我列举了若干香港终审法院（Court of Final Appeal）和香港上诉法院（Court of Appeal）确认法院有权如此行事的例子。就内地管理人而言，香港原讼法庭（Court of First Instance）近年来已作出多项承认和协助命令：Re Liquidator of CEFC Shanghai International Group Ltd（上海华信国际集团有限公司清盘人）；20 Re Shenzhen Everich Supply Chain Co, Ltd（深圳易瑞供应链有限公司）；21 Re HNA Group Co Ltd（海航集团有限公司）；22 Nuoxi Capital Ltd（诺熙资本有限公司）v Peking University Founder Group Company Ltd（北大方正集团有限公司）。23\n\n承认原则——修正普遍主义\n\n22. 承认原则的基础是，公司本国破产管辖地的破产法在全世界范围内适用。这一点可由英格兰上诉法院（English Court of Appeal）在 Tchenguiz v Grant Thornton UK LLP 一案中的判决加以说明，24 该案涉及鉴于欧洲议会和理事会第 2001/24/EC 号指令第 10 条（该指令通过《2004 年信贷机构［重组和清盘］条例》在英格兰生效），冰岛破产法是否在包括英格兰在内的整个欧洲经济区适用。Briggs LJ（布里格斯上诉法官）在以下段落中说明了冰岛破产法域外效力的性质：25\n\n66. 上诉中这一范围更为有限的部分也可分为两个部分。第一部分提出如下问题：无论冰岛破产法（以及所有其他母国成员国的相应法律）单独来看仅具有国内效力，还是同时具有国内和域外效力，是否因清盘指令（和《破产条例》）而被“国际化”。法官得出结论认为，它在该意义上已被国际化，上诉人的第三项上诉理由对该结论提出异议。……\n\n68. 在我看来，第一项问题的答案必然源于上述对破产文书目的和条款的分析。通过使母国成员国的破产法适用于所有成员国的全部领土而力图实现的普遍主义，其本质有赖于：对于每一个可能的母国成员国均实现这一点；该等国家中的信贷机构受监管并设有总部，而不论除该等文书外该国破产法在适用上是否会具有超出国内效力的任何效力。若非如此，就信贷机构及其他实体的破产而言，创设一套普遍适用的法律（受严格例外限制）这一目标，将在第一关即告失败，即在任何其破产法尚不具有跨境效力的母国成员国中失败。\n\n20 同上，脚注 14。\n\n21 [2020] HKCFI 965, [2020] HKEC 1188。\n\n22 [2021] HKCFI 2897。\n\n23 [2022] 2 HKC 1; [2021] HKCFI 3817。\n\n24 [2017] EWCA Civ 83; [2018] QB 695。\n\n25 同上，第 [68] 段。\n\n23. 与该原则一致，修正普遍主义的目标是，本国破产管辖地的法院应有一个获得全球承认的统一破产程序，并且该程序应普遍适用于破产人的全部资产。Lord Hoffmann（霍夫曼勋爵）在 Re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd 一案中对此作出说明：26\n\n6. 尽管缺乏成文规定，公司破产领域的一定程度国际合作已经通过司法实践得以实现。这是基于英格兰法官多年来一直视为国际私法一般原则的一项原则，即破产（无论是个人破产还是公司破产）应是统一且普遍的。本应由破产人住所地法院进行一项获得全球承认的统一破产程序，并且该程序应普遍适用于破产人的全部资产。\n\n24. 普遍主义应与属地主义相区别；在属地主义下，各国被视为根据其自身法律决定如何分配位于其属地管辖范围内的无力偿债公司资产。27 修正普遍主义是在这两个对立概念之间的折衷，承认普遍性的理论理想在某些情形下必须让位于属地或地方利益的现实需要。Lord Hoffmann 在 HIH 一案中于我刚刚引述的段落紧接之后的一段如此说明该原则：28\n\n7. 这更多是一项原则而非一项规则。它基于务实理由受到例外的严格限制；我曾在其他地方将其称为一种愿景：见 Cambridge Gas Transportation Corp v Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc [2007] 1 AC 508, 517, 第 17 段。国际破产领域的杰出美国学者 Professor Jay Westbrook（杰伊·韦斯特布鲁克教授）将其称为“修正普遍主义”原则：亦见 Fletcher, Insolvency in Private International Law，第 2 版（2005 年），第 15–17 页。完全普遍主义只能通过国际条约实现。然而，即使以其修正和务实的形式，该原则仍具有强大的效力。\n\n该原则自 18 世纪以来一直是英格兰普通法的一部分。29\n\n25. 在 Singularis 一案中，Privy Council（枢密院司法委员会）审议了源自 Privy Council 在 Cambridge Gas Transportation Corpn（剑桥燃气运输公司） v Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc（Navigator Holdings plc 无担保债权人正式委员会）一案判决的三项命题。30 “第一项是修正普遍主义原则，即法院在其能够适当行使的范围内，拥有协助外国清盘程序的普通法权力。第二项是，这包括作出其〔法院〕本可在国内破产程序中适当作出的任何行为，但须受其本国法律和公共政策的限制。第三项（属默示）是，该权力本身即为其对受影响者行使管辖权的来源，并且根据通常普通法原则不存在对物或对人管辖权并不相关。”31 Privy Council 的结论是，第二项和第三项原则被错误裁定，但第一项原则并非如此；Lord Sumption（萨姆普申勋爵）在〔19〕中解释如下：\n\n19. 然而，第一项命题，即修正普遍主义原则本身，并未失去信誉。相反，Lord Phillips（菲利普斯勋爵）、Lord Hoffman（霍夫曼勋爵）及 Lord Walker（沃克勋爵）在 HIH [2008] 1 WLR 852 一案中原则上接受了该原则；Lord Collins of Mapesbury（梅普斯伯里柯林斯勋爵）（Lord Walker 及 Lord Sumption JJSC 同意其意见）在 Rubin v Eurofinance SA [2013] 1 AC 236 一案中亦然。Lord Mance JSC（曼斯大法官）在该案中的协同判决没有任何内容对该原则提出质疑。在第29至33段中，Lord Collins 如下概括该立场：\n\n29. “第四，根据普通法，法院有权承认并向外国破产程序提供协助。普通法原则是，可向具有国际因素的破产程序中的外国破产管理人提供协助。其基本原则曾以不同方式表述：‘承认……带有法院积极协助的含义’：In re African Farms Ltd [1906] TS 373, 377；\n\n29 Re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd 同上〔30〕；Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers 同上〔19〕及〔23〕；Riverrock Securities Ltd v International Bank of St Petersburg (Joint Stock Co)〔80〕（Foxton J）；Kireeva v Bedzhamov [2022] EWCA Civ 35〔81〕–〔88〕（Newey LJ）。\n\n30 [2006] UKPC 26；[2007] 1 AC 508；[2006] 3 WLR 689；[2006] 3 All ER 829。\n\n31 同上，Lord Sumption〔15〕。\n\n“本院……将尽其最大努力与 US Bankruptcy Court（美国破产法院）合作，并避免采取任何可能扰乱〔该公司〕在 Texas（得克萨斯州）依 Chapter 11 进行有序管理的行动”：Banque Indosuez SA v Ferromet Resources Inc [1993] BCLC 112, 117。\n\n30. 在 Crédit Suisse Fides Trust v Cuoghi [1998] QB 818, 827 一案中，Millett LJ（米利特上诉法官）称：“在其他法律领域，例如跨境破产，商业必要性已促使各国法院相互提供协助，而无需等待此种合作获得国际公约认可……不同国家法院之间的礼让日益被广泛接受为要求相互尊重彼此管辖权的属地完整性，但这不应阻碍一个管辖区的法院，就位于该管辖区领土内的资产或居住于该管辖区领土内的人员，向另一管辖区的法院提供其能够适当提供的任何协助。”\n\n31. 普通法协助案件所涉及的事项包括将英格兰资产归属外国破产管理人、暂缓本地程序、为支持外国程序而作出的审查命令，或将资产汇交外国清算的命令；并且此类案件中，外国法院属于有管辖权的法院，意即破产人住所地位于该外国，或者如为公司，则该公司在该外国注册成立……\n\n33. 一组案件涉及因外国破产程序而被暂缓的本地程序或被撤销的命令。因此，在 Banque Indosuez SA v Ferromet Resources Inc [1993] BCLC 112 一案中，针对正进行 Chapter 11 程序的 Texas 公司所作出的英格兰禁令被撤销；参见 In re African Farms Ltd [1906] TS 373（Transvaal（德兰士瓦）法院暂缓债权人针对在 England（英格兰）清算的英格兰公司在 Transvaal 进行的执行），该案适用于 Turners & Growers Exporters Ltd v The Ship “Cornelis Verolme” [1997] 2 NZLR 110（Belgian（比利时）破产中的比利时船东：船舶解除扣押）；Modern Terminals (Berth 5) Ltd v States Steamship Co [1979] HKLR 512（Hong Kong（香港）暂缓执行针对在 United States federal court in California（加利福尼亚州美国联邦法院）进行 Chapter 11 程序的 Nevada（内华达州）公司的判决），后续在 CCIC Finance Ltd v Guangdong International Trust & Investment Corpn [2005] 2 HKC 589 一案中得到遵循（暂缓针对在 Mainland（中国内地）进行破产程序的中国国有企业的香港程序）。传统意义上的司法协助案件包括 In re Impex Services Worldwide Ltd [2004] BPIR 564，其中，为协助一间英格兰公司在 England 进行的临时清算，作出了 Manx（马恩岛）审查及提交文件命令。\n\n依委员会意见，修正普遍主义原则是普通法的一部分，但必须牢记，第一，该原则受本地法律和本地公共政策约束；第二，法院始终只能在其本身的制定法和普通法权力界限内行事。这些界限为何？在不存在相关制定法权力时，必须取决于普通法，包括对普通法作出的任何适当发展。应在何种程度上发展普通法，以承认一项等同权力的问题，并不存在单一、普遍的答案。其取决于要求法院行使的权力性质。在本次上诉中，委员会拟将自身限于本案所寻求的特定协助形式，即 Bermuda court（百慕大法院）对处于其对人管辖权范围内的实体作出提交信息的命令。该申请的成败取决于，在不存在命令提交的制定法权力的情况下，普通法上是否存在作出该命令的固有权力。\n\n26. 从该段可清楚看出，修正普遍主义是承认和协助外国破产程序的普通法权力之基础，且若该发展符合修正普遍主义并符合适用的国内法律框架，该权力可以发展。尽管 Singularis 中对该原则的表述比 Cambridge Gas 中的表述严格得多，正如我所引述的 Lord Collins 判决摘录最后一段所显示，但其设想进一步发展普通法上的协助权力。\n\n修正普遍主义——比较法判例中确定本国或主要管辖地的标准\n\n27. 普遍主义和修正普遍主义均以前提为存在一个本国或主要破产管辖地。确定本国或主要破产管辖地的标准随时间演变。第一，存在债务人住所地的概念。32 第二，存在债务人注册成立国的概念：在 Singularis 一案中，Lord Sumption 谈到，修正普遍主义的普通法原则将注册成立地视为主要破产管辖地：\n\n修正普遍主义原则是普通法所承认的原则。其基础是公共利益，即在公司注册成立地行使破产管辖权的外国法院，有能力不受其管辖权属地界限的限制，在全球范围内对该公司的事务进行有序清盘。”33\n\n第三，存在 COMI 的概念。Lord Hoffmann 在 HIH 一案中作出解释。34 评估应被视为进行跨国破产程序的主要管辖地之最适当国家的标准由此出现：\n\n在某些案件中，如何确定应被视为主要清算所在地的适当管辖地，可能存在某些疑问。我以较为传统的方式谈及公司的住所地，因为这是旧案所使用的术语，但我并不认为这必然是最佳术语。通常其指公司注册成立地，但该地可能是与公司业务没有实际联系的某个离岸岛屿。Council Regulation on insolvency proceedings（《破产程序理事会条例》）（(EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000）使用“债务人主要利益中心”的概念作为标准，并推定其为注册办事处所在地：见第3.1条。这可能更为适当。\n\n28. 假定采用住所地这一旧概念，对于公司的“住所地”含义，似乎存在两种观点。一种观点认为，公司的住所地位于其注册成立地。Lord Collins 在 Rubin v Eurofinance SA 一案中作出如下解释：35\n\n31. 普通法协助案件所涉及的事项包括将英格兰资产归属外国破产管理人、暂缓本地程序、为支持外国程序而作出的审查命令，或将资产汇交外国清算的命令；并且此类案件中，外国法院属于有管辖权的法院，意即破产人住所地位于该外国，或者如为公司，则该公司在该外国注册成立。\n\n另一种观点认为，公司的住所地位于其主要营业地，该地可能是也可能不是其注册成立国。Murison CJ（默里森首席大法官）在 Re Lee Wah Bank 一案中作出如下解释：36\n\n此类案件的一般原则已足够明确。Vaugham Williams J（沃恩·威廉斯法官）在 In re English Scottish and Australian Chartered Bank [[1893] 3 Ch 385] 一案中作出如下阐述：——“在对企业进行清算时，一般原则是——确定被清算公司的住所地；由住所地国家的法院作为主管法院管理清算；其他法院则应在其能够做到的范围内，作为辅助法院协助主管清算。”贸易公司的住所地由其主要营业地所在地确定（Jones v Scottish Accident Insurance Company Ltd [(1886) 17 QBD 421]），毫无疑问，本案中被清算公司的住所地是 Hong Kong（香港）。\n\n29. 在 Singapore（新加坡），普通法承认制度已发展为采纳 COMI 概念，理由由 Abdullah JC（阿卜杜拉司法专员）在 Re Opti-Medix Ltd 一案中说明：37\n\n根据普遍主义方法，一家法院居于主导地位，其他法院则协助管理清算……\n\n破产领域对普遍主义理念更为敏感的结果，是更愿意超越承认外国破产程序的传统基础。由于由注册成立地法院对公司进行清盘符合司法逻辑，人们或会自然倾向于认为该法院任命的清算人具有优先地位或正当性。然而，注册成立地可能是多项因素偶然造成的结果，并可能与实际营业地相距甚远。从实务角度看，确定 COMI 的方法极具可取之处。\n\n30. Hong Kong 所采取的立场，历来是由注册成立地任命的清算人\n\n36 (1926) 2 Malayan Cases 81, 84。\n\n37 Re Opti-Medix Ltd [2016] SGHC 108；[2016] 4 SLR 312〔17〕–〔18〕（Aedit Abdullah JC）。\n\n338 HONG KONG LAW REPORTS & DIGEST [2022] 3 HKLRD 316\n\n获承认。38 然而，若称香港的承认标准一贯且仅取决于债务人的注册成立地，则并不正确。香港法院曾在并非注册成立地的外国司法管辖区任命破产管理人员的情形下，给予或愿意给予承认。在 Re The Russo-Asiatic Bank（鲁索—亚细亚银行案）39 中，法院承认了英格兰法院就一家俄罗斯银行任命的清算人。在 Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd v Bank of Credit & Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd, Macau Branch（国际信贷商业银行〈海外〉有限公司诉国际信贷商业银行〈海外〉有限公司澳门分行案）40 中，上诉法院承认了澳门就一家在开曼群岛注册成立的银行任命的清算人。在 Joint Administrators of African Minerals Ltd v Madison Pacific Trust Ltd（African Minerals Ltd 联合管理人诉 Madison Pacific Trust Ltd 案）41 中，我认为，在原则上不反对承认英格兰就一家在百慕大注册成立、其 COMI 位于英格兰的公司任命的管理人。\n\n在香港采用 COMI 标准\n\n31. 在 Re Li Yiqing v Lamtex Holdings Ltd（李一清诉 Lamtex Holdings Ltd 案）42 第[22]及[26]段中，我曾建议，香港法院应当如新加坡所作的那样，考虑以注册成立地为基础的普通法承认是否符合香港特别行政区及中国内地当代的商业惯例：\n\n22. 日益明显的是，香港法院能够以符合香港特别行政区及中国内地商业惯例的方法处理承认及协助，实属可取，且或可合理地认为属必要。对于制定法律以处理该问题的建议，政府的立场一直是，目前应由香港法院运用普通法所提供的技术处理。香港目前的立场是，法院仅承认在注册成立地任命的破产从业人员。我认为，我们已到需要重新考虑这一问题的阶段，因为我认为，有诸多理由支持 Abdullah J 的结论，即该领域的普通法具有足够的灵活性，可以发展至符合商业惯例，并且在原则上没有任何理由阻止承认在公司的 COMI 所在地或与公司具有足够强联系、足以证明承认合理性的司法管辖区任命的清算人，正如香港法院在外国注册成立公司与香港之间存在实质联系且其他核心要求获满足时，将行使其酌情权将该公司清盘一样。43 我理解，有人或会反对称，在对外国注册成立公司进行清盘的司法管辖权情形中存在实质差异，即该项权力由成文法明文授予。这使我回到 Singularis。44\n\n38 Re China Fishery Group Ltd [2019] HKCFI 174; [2019] HKCLC 45 第[24]–[25]段。\n\n39 (1929-30) 24 HKLR 16。\n\n40 [1997] HKLRD 304。\n\n41 [2015] 4 HKC 215; [2015] HKCLC 323。\n\n42 同上，脚注1。\n\n340 《香港法律汇报及摘要》 [2022] 3 HKLRD 316\n\n26. 正如我已指出，香港没有处理承认外国破产程序的立法。诸如承认外国“软触式”临时清盘的问题，并不涉及运用普通法扩展立法。在香港，这纯属普通法问题。Singularis 是以下观点的权威判例：普通法一般允许承认及协助外国清盘程序。我目前考虑的问题是，香港普通法是否应予扩展，以允许承认公司注册成立地以外地方的破产程序，尤其是其 COMI 或类似所在地的破产程序。我看不出任何法理上的理由说明不应如此。\n\n32. 我认为，承认标准日后应主要由公司的 COMI 所在地决定。正如我在 Lamtex45 一案中所建议，这更能反映香港目前的商业惯例。广泛存在的做法是，经营活动在香港及中国内地进行的企业集团，使用在离岸司法管辖区注册成立的公司作为控股公司及中间附属公司。该等公司与其注册成立地之间的联系纯属形式上的联系。此类公司很少在该司法管辖区开展任何业务，我认为通常没有任何董事或雇员曾到访该等司法管辖区。根据我的经验，通常当该等公司进入临时清盘或最终清盘时，离岸法院会任命两至三名清算人，其中至少一名、通常两名驻在香港，并从香港进行清盘。在此等情形下，将注册成立地视为公司自然归属地或为确定哪一司法管辖区\n\n316 2022/8/10—18:3\n\n……\n\n是主要清盘程序所在地的适当地点而在商业上最具关联性的司法管辖区，是高度人为的。此做法还会遇到 Linda Chan J 最近在 Re Up Energy Development Group Ltd（Up Energy Development Group Ltd 案）46 中讨论的那类问题，即在真正清盘的情况下（而非我在第[12]段提及的“软触式”临时清盘），清算人必须能够取得《条例》规定的广泛明文权力，而该等权力不能通过普通法上的承认予以授予。我稍后在第[46]段会更详细讨论 Up Energy。若公司的 COMI 位于香港，我通常预期申请人不会难以证明法院可适当地行使其酌情权，将一家外国注册成立公司清盘。47 在香港作出的清盘令将使清算人能够使用《条例》规定的权力，并且重要的是，能够在中国内地寻求承认及协助；公司的业务通常主要在中国内地经营，其资产亦通常位于中国内地。我在第[18]段提及的合作机制允许相关内地法院承认由香港就公司任命的清算人，条件是在提出承认及协助申请时，该公司的 COMI 位于香港。采用 COMI 标准将使香港与中国内地所采取的做法一致，而这本身即属可取。\n\n33. 采用并界定 COMI 标准，需要考虑五个附属问题。第一，必须决定确定 COMI 的相关日期。有三种选择：\n\n(1) 外国破产程序开始之日的 COMI 所在地；\n\n(2) 在香港聆讯外国破产管理人员承认申请之日的 COMI 所在地；及\n\n(3) 提出外国破产管理人员在香港的承认申请之日的 COMI 所在地。该做法将符合《最高人民法院关于开展认可和协助香港特别行政区破产程序试点工作的意见》第6条下的立场，该意见构成合作机制的一部分。另见 Re Zetta Jet。48\n\n34. 第二，必须决定 COMI 的要素。有四种既定做法，均相似。根据合作机制，COMI 通常指注册成立地，但其他因素亦属相关，包括债务人的主要办事处所在地、债务人的主要营业地及债务人主要资产所在地（合作机制第4条）。在普通法语境下，Lord Hoffmann 在 HIH49 一案中认为，下列是 COMI 的关键要素——注册成立地、中央管理地以及资产与负债所在地。在 Re Opti-Medix Ltd（Opti-Medix Ltd 案）50 中，新加坡法院提出下列普通法 COMI 检验标准：\n\nCOMI 很可能是大多数交易发生、大多数款项收付及大多数决定作出的地点。因此，该地点是大部分业务开展之处，并因此与当地法院具有强有力的联系因素……\n\n我应指出，在普通法采用 COMI 检验标准时，不一定需要如《示范法》或《欧盟破产条例》下那样，作出有利于注册地址的推定。然而，在没有相反证据的情况下，此种推定提供了稳妥的默认规则，并提供确定性及一致性。采用此种推定还会使普通法及成文法下适用 COMI 检验标准的结果趋于一致。\n\n35. ICC Judge Mullen 在 Re Investin Quay House Ltd（Investin Quay House Ltd 案）51 中解释了《欧盟破产条例》下 COMI 的关键考量因素：\n\n[T] 对于公司的 COMI 与其注册地相对应，存在一项推定。Staynings 女士向我列举了被认为与推翻该推定有关的因素，包括——\n\ni) 公司大部分行政管理工作在英国进行，尤其是在公司的债权人会认为英国是重要职能履行地的情况下……；\n\nii) 公司业务及活动的日常经营由在英格兰任命的一名代理人处理，并且与第三方的交易由伦敦办事处安排，尤其是因为第三方不会知道董事会会议在泽西举行……；\n\niii) 公司是“信箱”公司，且未在其办事处所在地国家开展任何业务……；及\n\niv) 一般而言，与“总办事处职能检验”有关的因素，包括主要合同的准据法、与客户的商业关系所在地、债权人所在地及公司的管理……\n\n当然，我牢记该问题取决于具体事实，而所援引的案件仅是法院在该等案件的特定情形下认为相关因素的示例。\n\n36. COMI 一词并未在《联合国国际贸易法委员会跨境破产示范法》中定义。Abdullah JC 在 Re Zetta Jet52 第[29]及[85]段概述了 COMI 的关键考量因素：\n\n“COMI”一词并未……在《示范法》或《新加坡示范法》中定义。《新加坡示范法》第16(3)条仅推定债务人注册办事处所在地为其 COMI……\n\n我将按下列类别评估各方提出的各种因素：\n\n(a) 实施控制及指挥的所在地；\n\n(b) 客户所在地；\n\n(c) 债权人所在地；\n\n(d) 雇员所在地；\n\n(e) 营运所在地；\n\n(f) 与第三方的交易；及\n\n(g) 准据法。\n\n37. 关于《示范法》下确定 COMI 标准的更全面讨论，见 Glenn J 在 Re Ocean Rig UDW Inc（Ocean Rig UDW Inc 案）53 中作出的判决，该案涉及根据《美国破产法典》第15章提出的承认申请。该案涉及四家公司的债务通过在开曼群岛获批准的协议安排进行重组。其中一家在开曼群岛注册成立的公司是其余三家公司的控股公司，后者均在马绍尔群岛共和国注册成立。直至某一时期\n\n52 同上。\n\n53 570 BR 687 (Bank. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2017)；该裁决在上诉中获维持，585 BR 31 (S.D.N.Y. April 5, 2018)。\n\n2016年，各公司的主要利益中心（COMI）均位于马绍尔群岛。各公司主张，此后其COMI已迁至开曼群岛。此项主张是否正确具有相关性，因为根据第15章获得承认，要求一家公司在其“主要利益中心”所在地处于破产程序中，在此情况下该程序为“外国主要程序”；或者在其拥有“营业机构”的地点处于破产程序中，在此情况下该程序为“外国非主要程序”：引号内的术语均由第15章界定，该章采纳了联合国国际贸易法委员会跨境破产示范法。Glenn法官在第695页概述了法律框架及争议问题：\n\n当然，在美国破产法院能够将外国程序承认为外国主要程序或外国非主要程序之前，仅有良好意图是不够的。例如，一家所谓的“信箱公司”，如对于其拟定的COMI并无实际营业机构或其他必要的表征，便不能支持获得承认。见 In re Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund, Ltd., 374 BR 122, 129-31 & n.8 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 389 BR 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)（指出，“COMI推定可以被推翻，尤其是在一家‘信箱’公司并未在其注册办事处所在国开展任何业务的情况下”）（引文略）。此处必须处理的问题是，外国债务人将其COMI从马绍尔群岛共和国（RMI）变更至开曼群岛，是否符合《破产法》的要求，从而允许本院将开曼程序承认为外国主要程序。被请求将外国程序承认为外国主要程序的美国破产法院，必须决定外国债务人的主要利益中心位于何处。\n\n38. 我无须审议Glenn法官对于据以证明各公司的COMI已从马绍尔群岛迁至开曼群岛的证据所作的详细分析。指出Glenn法官认为下列事项的证据具有相关性，已属充分：董事及董事会会议所在地、公司主要高级人员所在地、迁往开曼群岛的通知、运营所在地、资产所在地、银行账户所在地、账簿和记录所在地，以及重组活动进行所在地。Glenn法官结论认为，各公司的COMI均位于开曼群岛，而在开曼群岛进行的债务重组程序属于“外国主要程序”。其结论载于第704页以下段落：\n\n在评估这些因素时，第15章债务人的COMI应以第15章申请的提交日期为准确定，而不考虑债务人历史上的经营活动。见 In re Fairfield Sentry, 714 F.3d at 137（“[A]债务人的COMI应当根据其在提交第15章申请时或前后所进行的活动确定，正如法条文本所表明的那样。”）。然而，如下文将更详细讨论，在债务人于提交其第15章申请前已变更COMI的范围内，法院可进行更全面的分析，以确保债务人并非出于恶意操纵COMI。\n\n联合临时清盘人（JPLs）主张，截至申请日，就《破产法》第15章而言，各债务人的“主要利益中心”均位于开曼群岛，且COMI在提交申请前并非出于恶意而被操纵。如以下更充分说明，本院同意。本院基于上文背景部分（I.）F节中详尽讨论的事实，认定开曼程序属于外国主要程序。这些事实证明，除其他事项外，外国债务人：(i) 在开曼群岛进行管理和运营；(ii) 在开曼群岛设有办事处；(iii) 在开曼群岛举行董事会会议；(iv) 其高级人员居住于开曼群岛；(v) 在开曼群岛设有银行账户；(vi) 在开曼群岛保存账簿和记录；(vii) 从开曼群岛开展重组活动；(viii) 向付款代理人、契约受托人、行政代理人和担保品代理人以及投资服务提供商发出了迁往开曼群岛的通知；以及 (ix) 向美国证券交易委员会（SEC）提交了表明其办事处位于开曼群岛的 Form 6-K。\n\n我认为，类似事项与香港法院决定公司的COMI是否位于外国破产程序管辖区内有关。\n\n39. 第三，COMI标准与香港法院清盘管辖权之间的关系如何可能具有相关性；我在[32]中曾提及该问题。我认为，立场如下。承认制度不同于清盘管辖权。无论债务人能否在香港被清盘，法院均可承认外国破产程序：Singularis Holdings Ltd 54。债务人可在香港被清盘或已在香港被清盘这一事实，本身并不妨碍法院向外国破产程序管理人提供协助。承认为辅助清盘，是可向外国破产程序管理人提供的一种协助形式。\n\n54 同上，[5]及[13]。\n346 HONG KONG LAW REPORTS & DIGEST [2022] 3 HKLRD 316\n\n40. 第四，国际私法原则与承认及协助原则之间的不一致是否会导致实际问题：前者根据代理理论以及适用于公司的通常法律冲突原则，支持承认在公司注册成立地获任命的外国程序管理人为公司的合法代理人；后者则支持主要由COMI决定的承认。我认为不会。COMI检验适用于下列案件：外国清算人所要求的不仅是一项确认其地位及其因在注册成立地获任命而产生的权利的命令（该命令由正统国际私法原则所正当化），而是寻求行使某项权利以推进清盘所必需的权力（该项请求涉及修正普及主义原则）；即Lord Sumption勋爵在Singularis第[23]段所提述的那类命令，55 尽管其前提是假定清算人已在注册成立地获任命，且这足以正当化承认：\n\n法院多次确认的协助外国程序管理人的权利和义务，如果仅限于以承认任何其他根据外国法律取得所有权的法律主体相同的方式承认公司对其资产的所有权，或仅限于以承认任何其他依其注册成立地法律获任命的代理人或公司相同的方式承认程序管理人代表公司行事的权利，则将成为空洞的公式。国内法院承认外国清算人的地位，如果仅赋予其占有公司资产的权利，却未赋予其识别或查找该等资产的有效手段，意义甚微。\n\n41. 第五，COMI所在地不明的案件。我认为，若COMI所在地不明，只要基于实际理由有必要，且外国破产程序在注册成立地进行，法院仍可给予承认和协助。Abdullah暂委法官在 Re Opti-Medix Ltd 56 中支持这种务实做法：\n\n除普通法上的COMI检验外，承认东京命令亦可基于实际理由获得正当化。如外国命令不会对法院地的利益产生不利影响，法院应倾向于承认。这种做法不仅可以基于礼让，也可以基于商业实用性获得正当化。在本案中，新加坡债权人的利益已受到该项承诺……的保护，并且不存在\n\n55 同上。\n\n56 同上，第[26]段。\n\n对公司清盘具有利益的竞争性管辖区。另一方面，拥有最大利益的管辖区日本，已采取支持清盘的行动。在此情形下，阻碍公司的有序解散不会产生任何目的。Re Lee Wah Bank … 及 Re RussoAsiatic Bank … 中的判决，或许可以基于这一实际理由得到解释。\n\n42. 我认为，我所审议的任何附属事项均未表明，采纳COMI标准会与其他可能被适用的原则和实际考量产生实质性且有问题的冲突。\n\n香港的判例\n\n43. 判例显示已获准的下列类型的具体协助。在 Re Irish Shipping Ltd 57 一案中，涉及根据《公司条例》（第32章）第327条对一间未注册公司提出清盘呈请。该公司在爱尔兰注册成立并正在清盘。该呈请由公司清算人提出。Jones法官在接受应给予辅助清盘形式的协助时指出：\n\n我在行使酌处权时考虑的另一因素是国家间礼让，据此，除非提出相反的充分理由，否则法院应协助另一管辖区的清算人履行其职责；而我在本案中未发现此等理由。本院在清盘中的管辖权将在可行范围内辅助爱尔兰的清盘，并将协助法定清算人收集和保全位于香港的资产。\n\n在 Re Information Security One Ltd 58 一案中，清盘呈请由在其注册成立地开曼群岛正被强制清盘的公司，通过其共同及分别清算人提出。当时担任法官的Kwan法官裁定：\n\n8. 支持在公司注册成立地存在主要清盘的情况下，可就外国公司在香港提起辅助清盘的判例，可见于 Re Irish Shipping Ltd [1985] HKLR 437 及 Re Zhu Kuan Group Co Ltd (unrep., HCCW No 874 of 2003) …\n\n57 [1985] HKLR 437, 439, 445 (Jones J).\n\n58 [2007] 3 HKLRD 780 at [1]–[2] and [8] (Kwan J).\n\n同样，在 Re China Medical Technologies Inc (No 1) 59 一案中，上诉法院允许开曼清算人在香港代表债务人行事。Barma上诉法官在[5]–[6]及[24]中说明情况如下：\n\n该公司在开曼群岛注册成立，未在香港注册。其为一组在中国开发、制造及销售外科和医疗设备的公司之控股公司。该公司于2012年7月在开曼群岛被清盘，并于2012年8月在纽约进入破产程序……\n\n如上所述，对该公司在香港进行清盘的呈请，由该公司本身通过其开曼群岛共同法定清算人提出……\n\n在本案中，值得注意的是，尽管所请求的清盘命令是针对一家无力偿债公司，该呈请实际上并非由债权人提出，而是由该公司本身通过其在本土管辖区、即其注册成立地法院任命的清算人提出。\n\n44. 下列案件表明，外国破产程序管理人可占有债务人的资产：在 Singularis Holdings Ltd 60 一案中，Lord Sumption勋爵说明：\n\n至少在一个半世纪以来，英格兰法院一直行使权力，通过控制无力偿债公司在英格兰的资产协助外国清盘。\n\n终审法院在 Chen Li Hung v Ting Lei Miao 61 一案中承认并协助了台湾破产受托人。Bokhary常任法官裁定：\n\n通过提起诉讼以确立登记在他人名下的股份由破产人实益拥有，其破产受托人所做的事情与提起诉讼追讨应付给他的债务，并无实质不同。我确信，我们应当以如下基础推进：根据其获委任地适用的法律，受托人有权以自己的名义在此提起诉讼，以使存在争议的125万股Nikko股份纳入Ting先生（丁先生）的破产财产。这是因为，无争议的是，受托人采取的每一项措施，包括其在香港采取的每一项措施，均符合其从台湾破产法院获得的指示……\n\n59 [2018] HKCA 111; [2018] HKCLC 65.\n\n60 Supra at [10].\n\n61 (2000) 3 HKCFAR 9 at 16–17, 21.\n\n我裁定，台湾破产命令延及Ting先生位于香港的资产……\n\n依我判断，香港法院应使台湾破产命令发生效力……\n\n受托人依照台湾破产法院的指示行事，是一项平常事项，符合世界各地的日常破产实务。\n\n45. 准许授予外国破产管理人向第三方收集资料的权力。延续上文[25]所引萨姆普申勋爵（Lord Sumption）在Singularis（Singularis案）中的解释如下：62\n\n普通法赋予协助具有破产管辖权的外国法院的权力，即命令提供为管理外国清盘所必需的口头或书面资料。在承认该项权力存在时，委员会并不希望鼓励不加节制地创设其他普通法权力以强制提供资料。该项权力的限制隐含于承认其存在的理由之中。第一，该权力仅可用于协助具有破产管辖权的外国法院的官员或同等的公职人员。例如，该权力不可用于协助自愿清盘；自愿清盘本质上是一项私人安排，尽管受法院指示约束，却并非由法院官员或代表法院官员进行。第二，该权力是一项协助权力。其存在目的在于使该等法院能够克服因各法院权力的地域限制而对公司事务全球清盘造成的问题。因此，该权力不可用于使其能够进行即使依其获委任所依据的法律也无法进行的事项。第三，该权力仅在为履行破产管理人职能所必需时方可行使。第四，该权力受In re African Farms Ltd以及HIH和Rubin案所规定的限制，即该等命令必须符合提供协助法院的实体法及公共政策……因此，该权力不可用于本应适用其他强制提供资料制度的目的。\n\n在Singularis案中，法院还对试图对本地资产采取强制执行的债权人施加了中止令。63\n\n62 Supra.\n\n63 Supra at [12]–[14] and [19] (Lord Sumption), and [54] (Lord Collins).\nRe Up Energy Development Group Ltd\n\n46. Ho先生（Mr Ho）提请我注意Linda Chan J（陈法官）在Re Up Energy Development Group Ltd（优派能源发展集团有限公司案）中作出的一项非常近期的裁决。64 正如陈法官在其判决书第一段所指出，Up Energy是一个不寻常的案件。Up Energy Development Group Ltd（优派能源发展集团有限公司）在百慕大注册成立、在香港上市，其业务在内地开展。香港的清盘呈请于2022年1月10日在陈法官席前进行实质聆讯。据我理解，公司最初寻求将该呈请延期，直至数月后拟在本人席前提出的召开债权人会议申请聆讯之后。陈法官认为其面前并非所有相关问题均已得到妥善处理，因此将呈请延期至2022年2月14日作进一步陈词。陈法官命令提交进一步陈述。该公司于2022年3月11日在百慕大被清盘。该公司于2017年被置于“软接触式”临时清盘，该临时清盘获本人于2017年8月作出的命令承认。显然，此举并未成功。公司主张，不应在香港对其进行清盘，而应承认百慕大的清盘，并通过普通法上的承认，将在香港进行清盘所必需的权力授予清盘人。陈法官驳回了该项主张。陈法官裁定，简言之，外国清盘人不可能在香港进行清盘，因为这要求清盘人行使《条例》项下可供香港清盘人行使的权力。普通法上的协助权力不允许法院“在香港法院未作出清盘令的情况下，使CWUO项下的条文可供百慕大清盘人或公司使用。”65 本案中的Ho先生同意，基于Rubin v Eurofinance 66和Singularis 67所阐明的理由，陈法官的结论代表当前的正统观点。我同意。就本案而言，需要考虑的是载有陈法官裁定的[81]第(3)项。陈法官称：“在未对该公司作出[香港]清盘令的情况下，法院无权依据普通法向百慕大清盘人授予任何权力，或使[《公司（清盘及杂项条文）条例》（第32章）]项下的任何条文可供该公司使用。”Ho先生恰当地提请我注意该段，因为尽管该句的后半部分涉及我理解为本案核心的问题，但其与本案事项无关，因为所寻求的命令并不要求向清盘人延伸《条例》项下的权力，该句的前半部分却表明普通法根本不得授予任何权力。\n\n64 Supra.\n\n65 [59].\n\n66 Supra.\n\n67 Supra.\n\n47. 正如我所解释，在本案中，我作出的命令由既定的国际私法原则所支持。如萨姆普申勋爵在上文[16]所提及的Singularis案部分所表明，法院并非完全不得向外国清盘人提供任何协助。法院可以向其任命已依正统国际私法原则获承认、且涉及修正普遍主义原则的外国清盘人提供协助。鉴于陈法官在其判决书中长篇援引Singularis案，我认为，对[81(3)]的公平理解是，法官阁下考虑的是：(A)普通法准许向外国清盘人授予与《条例》所规定者相类似的权力的论点，而非(B)旨在协助外国清盘人有效行使本地法院因该清盘人在注册成立地获任命而承认的权利的权力；换言之，即萨姆普申勋爵在Singularis案[23]中所讨论的情形。我所关注的是后一类案件。基于我在前述各段所解释的理由，我认为，香港法院授予旨在协助于公司主要利益中心（COMI）司法管辖区获任命的外国清盘人有效行使因其在COMI司法管辖区的清盘人身份而产生的权利的权力，完全符合修正普遍主义以及既定普通法上的承认与协助原则。\n\n命令形式\n\n48. 我将按照附于本判决书的形式作出命令。在[1]中，我将命令承认该清盘。此项命令基于[39]–[40]所讨论的基础，或基于实际理由而作出。根据其注册成立地的法律，清盘人是公司的合法代理人，并有权指示将其资产从香港账户转移至百慕大账户。第2段确认临时清盘人有权在香港特别行政区保全并取得公司的资产及文件。这只是确认正统国际私法原则下的立场，并向临时清盘人提供协助；该协助可恰当地描述为较具管理性质，而非特别与破产相关的类型。\n\n49. 第3段准许按照临时清盘人的指示转移有关款项。第4及第5段不言自明。\n\n结论\n\n50. 我认为，评估是否应承认外国清盘的正确方法，首先是确定在提出承认申请时，该外国清盘是否正在公司COMI所在的司法管辖区进行。如非如此，则应拒绝承认及协助，除非申请属于以下两类之一。第一，申请仅限于承认在注册成立地获任命的清盘人代表公司的权限，以及附随于该权限的命令；这可称为管理性协助。由于本案中的临时清盘人仅需要一项命令，向Computershare和HSBC证明其作为公司的合法代理人有权指示将款项转移至另一银行账户，因此，我认为，在删除原诉传票中涉及较一般性协助的多余段落后，该申请由既定国际私法原则所支持。第二，由于实际需要，对在注册成立地获任命的清盘人作出的承认以及有限且审慎规定的协助，而该协助不属于第一类；换言之，即Abdullah JC（Abdullah司法委员）在Opti-Medix案中所述的以实际理由证明协助正当的情形类型。\n\n316 2022/8/10—18:3\n由Ken TC Lee记录\n附录\n命令\n\n应Finance & Risk Services Ltd（财务与风险服务有限公司）的John Christopher McKenna先生以其作为Global Brands Group Holding Ltd（In Liquidation in Bermuda）（百慕大清盘中的环球品牌集团控股有限公司）（公司）唯一临时清盘人的身份，于2022年5月25日提交的单方面原诉传票所提出的申请\n\n并已阅览百慕大最高法院（Supreme Court of Bermuda）于2022年3月28日发出的请求书、John Christopher McKenna于2022年5月26日提交的誓章及其中所提述的证物，以及Lau Po Wa Vivian于2022年5月27日提交的第二份誓章及其中所提述的证物\n\n并已聆听申请人律师陈词，第一及第二答辩人均缺席\n\n现命令：\n\n(1) 本院承认百慕大最高法院（百慕大法院）于2021年11月5日作出的命令所进行的公司清盘，以及百慕大法院于2021年9月16日作出的命令所任命的Finance & Risk Services Ltd、地址为Suite 502, 26 Bermudiana Road, Hamilton, Bermuda的John Christopher McKenna为临时清盘人（临时清盘人），及其根据百慕大法院于2021年11月5日作出的命令继续任职。\n\n(2) 临时清盘人在香港特别行政区拥有并可行使以下权力：\n\na) 在本院管辖范围内查找、保护、保全并纳入其占有及控制范围的公司账簿、文件及记录，包括会计及法定记录。公司的账簿、记录及文件包括：\n\ni. 公司与其审计师之间，以及公司与其他第三方之间往来的电子邮件及其他通信；以及\n\nii. 公司向其审计师提供，以及审计师就审计工作向公司提供的文件及资料；\n\nb) 采取一切必要措施，防止处分公司的任何资产，尤其是保全在本司法管辖区内以公司名义开立或由公司控制的任何银行账户中的任何贷方余额；\n\nc) 为收集资产及支付临时清盘人的成本和费用之目的，以公司名义并代表公司操作、开立或关闭任何银行账户；\n\nd) 为就根据本命令行使其权力和履行其职责提供意见或协助之目的，聘用大律师、事务律师或律师、会计师和/或临时清盘人认为适当的其他代理人或专业人士；以及\n\ne) 以其本人名义或以公司名义提起法律程序并向本法院提出申请。\n\n(3) 在就额外应计利息及已发生的银行收费或费用作出任何调整的前提下，下列余额系因员工离职而未根据公司2014年及2016年股份奖励计划（GBG Share Award Schemes）归属的股份所产生的应收股息及利息收入，记入作为GBG Share Award Schemes受托人的第一答辩人名下，并由第二答辩人维持，应按照临时清盘人发出的指示交付予公司：\n\n账户类型　账户名称　账户号码　余额（HKD）\n\n现金保管账户　Computershare Hong Kong Trustees Ltd（香港Computershare受托人有限公司）Account No. 0018　848-XXXXXX-001　64,860.54或其中任何剩余余额\n\n现金保管账户　Computershare Hong Kong Trustees Ltd（香港Computershare受托人有限公司）Account No. 0047　741-XXXXXX-001　8,399,057.66或其中任何剩余余额\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1409-21 Filed 01/30/23 Entered 01/30/23 10:03:34 Page 40 of 40\n\n关于Global Brands Group Holding Ltd（环球品牌集团控股有限公司）（清盘中）[2022] 3 HKLRD 316，Harris J（Harris法官）于内庭审理\n\n账户类型　账户名称　账户号码　余额（HKD）\n\nComputershare Hong Kong Trustees Ltd（香港Computershare受托人有限公司）Account No. 0047 - No.2 Account\n\n(4) 第一答辩人应按照临时清盘人发出的指示向公司返还HK$135,250。该款项为第一答辩人作为GBG Share Award Schemes受托人，从其持有的现金余额中扣除以抵销其2021年4月至8月尚未支付费用的总额。\n\n(5) 在就额外应计利息及已发生的银行收费或费用作出任何调整的前提下，由第二答辩人维持并记入公司名下的下列余额，应按照临时清盘人发出的指示交付予公司：\n\n账户类型　账户号码　余额\n\nEUR活期账户　848-XXXXXX-220　EUR 9.85\n\nHKD活期账户　848-XXXXXX-001　HKD 730.01\n\nUSD活期账户　848-XXXXXX-201　USD 4,748.79\n\n(6) 临时清盘人有权随时申请；以及\n\n(7) 本申请的费用应作为清盘费用从公司的资产中支付。","key_entities":["Je","CIPA"],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":15795,"status":"published","published_at":"2023-01-30 00:00:00","created_at":"2023-01-30","updated_at":"2026-08-23 21:45:09"}