{"id":"court_ctb_1409_22","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":1409,"sub_number":22,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"1675 [2015] AC Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Singularis Holdings Ltd v","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"1675 [2015] AC Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Singularis Holdings Ltd v\n\nPrivy Council\n\n# Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers\n\n## [2014] UKPC 36\n\n### [on appeal from the Court of Appeal for Bermuda]\n\nB\n\nC\n\nD\n\nA\n\n2014 April 29, 30; Nov 10\n\nLord Neuberger of Abbotsbury PSC, Lord Mance, Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony, Lord Sumption JJSC, Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\nBermuda - Insolvency - Jurisdiction - Company wound up in Cayman Islands - Liquidators seeking order in Bermuda requiring auditors to produce information relating to companys a›airs - Judge purporting to exercise common law power to order production of information which could have been ordered under statute in domestic insolvency - Whether power at common law to assist foreign court of insolvency jurisdiction by making order - Whether order appropriate in circumstances where foreign court could not make equivalent order - Whether court able to exercise powers analogous to statutory powers which were exercisable in domestic insolvency but did not apply to foreign insolvency - Companies Act 1981 (No 59 of 1981), s 195\n\nA Cayman Islands company was wound up in the Cayman Islands and liquidators were appointed. In order to trace the companys assets, the liquidators wished to obtain information relating to the companys a›airs from the companys auditors, a Bermuda registered partnership. They obtained from the Cayman Islands court an order requiring the auditors to transfer or deliver up certain documents but,\n\n- under Cayman Islands law, that order only extended to material belonging to the company. In order to obtain material belonging to the auditors themselves, the liquidators made an application in Bermuda for an order requiring the auditors to produce all documents in their possession relating to the a›airs of the company. Under section 195 of the Bermudan Companies Act 1981<sup>1</sup> , the Supreme Court of Bermuda had power to make such an order but only in relation to a company which that court had ordered to be wound up. However, the Chief Justice, sitting in the E\n- Supreme Court of Bermuda, exercised what he termed a common law power to order the auditors to produce information which they could have been ordered to produce under section 195 if the company had been wound up in Bermuda. On the auditors- appeal, the Court of Appeal for Bermuda doubted whether there was jurisdiction to make such an order in circumstances where section 195 did not apply but set aside the order on the basis that, in any event, it was not an appropriate exercise of discretion because it was an order made in support of a Cayman Islands liquidation which could not have been made by the Cayman Islands court. F G\n\nOn the liquidatorsappeal\n\nHeld, advising that the appeal be dismissed, (1) (Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury PSC and Lord Mance JSC dissenting) that there was a power at common law to assist the o–cers of a foreign court of insolvency jurisdiction or equivalent public o–cers by ordering the production of information in oral or documentary form which was necessary for the administration of a foreign winding up, but the\n\npower was not available to enable them to do something which they could not do under the law by which they had been appointed; and that, although the fact that express provision was made in Bermuda for the powers exercisable on the winding up of companies to which the Companies Act 1981 applied did not exclude the use of H\n\n<sup>1</sup> Companies Act 1981, s 195: see post, para 4.\n\n## Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) [2015] AC v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC)\n\ncommon law powers in relation to other companies which lay outside the scope of the statute altogether, it was not a proper exercise of the power of assistance for the Bermudan court to make the order sought by the liquidators since the material which they sought in Bermuda was not obtainable under the domestic law of the court which had appointed them (post, paras 19, 25, 28—29, 31, 33, 109—115). A\n\nNorwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Comrs [1974] AC 133, HL(E), In re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 852, HL(E) and Rubin v Euronance SA (Picard intervening) [2013] 1 AC 236, SC(E) applied.\n\n(2) That the common law power of the court to recognise and grant assistance to foreign insolvency proceedings was primarily exercised through the existing powers of the court; that, although those powers could be extended or developed through the traditional judicial law-making techniques of the common law, the judiciary could not, by analogy, extend the scope of insolvency legislation to cases where it did not apply, and a domestic court did not have power to assist a foreign court by doing anything which it could properly have done in a domestic insolvency and could not acquire jurisdiction by virtue of any such power; and that, accordingly, the Bermudan court could not, by analogy, apply the statutory powers under the Companies Act 1981 as if the foreign insolvency were a domestic insolvency (post, paras 18, 32, 36, 38, 64, 82—83, 94, 108, 109, 122, 134, 149, 162).\n\nDicta of Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe in Al Sabah v Grupo Torras SA [2005] 2 AC 333, para 35, PC applied.\n\nCambridge Gas Transportation Corpn v O–cial Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc [2007] 1 AC 508, PC and In re Phoenix Kapitaldienst GmbH [2013] Ch 61 not followed. D\n\nQuaere. Whether information which the auditors acquired solely in their capacity as the companys auditors can be regarded as belonging exclusively to them simply because the documents in which they recorded that information are their working papers and as such their property (post, para 30).\n\nDecision of the Court of Appeal for Bermuda [2013] CA (Bda) 7 Civ a–rmed.\n\nThe following cases are referred to in the judgments:\n\nAfrican Farms, In re [1906] TS 373\n\n- Al Sabah v Grupo Torras SA [2005] UKPC 1; [2005] 2 AC 333; [2005] 2 WLR 904; [2005] 1 All ER 871, PC\n- Arab Monetary Fund v Hashim (No 5) [1992] 2 All ER 911\n- Ashworth Hospital Authority v MGN Ltd [2002] UKHL 29; [2002] 1 WLR 2033; [2002] 4 All ER 193, HL(E)\n- Ayerst v C & K (Construction) Ltd [1976] AC 167; [1975] 3 WLR 16; [1975] 2 All ER 537, HL(E)\n\nBanco Nacional de Cuba v Cosmos Trading Corpn [2000] 1 BCLC 813, CA\n\nBank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 10), In re [1997] Ch 213; [1997] 2 WLR 172; [1996] 4 All ER 796\n\nBanque Indosuez SA v Ferromet Resources Inc [1993] BCLC 112\n\nBent v Young (1838) 9 Sim 180\n\n- CCIC Finance Ltd v Guangdong International Trust & Investment Corpn [2005] 2 HKC 589\n- Cambridge Gas Transportation Corpn v O–cial Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc [2006] UKPC 26; [2007] 1 AC 508; [2006] 3 WLR 689; [2006] 3 All ER 829; [2006] 2 All ER (Comm) 695, PC\n- Colonial Government v Tatham (1902) 23 Natal LR 153\n- Crdit Suisse Fides Trust SA v Cuoghi [1998] QB 818; [1997] 3 WLR 871; [1997] 3 All ER 673, CA H\n\nDeutsche Morgan Grenfell Group plc v Inland Revenue Comrs [2006] UKHL 49; [2007] 1 AC 558; [2006] 3 WLR 781; [2007] 1 All ER 449, HL(E)\n\nDreyfus v Peruvian Guano Co (1889) 41 Ch D 151\n\nEngland v Smith [2001] Ch 419; [2000] 2 WLR 1141, CA\n\nE\n\nB\n\nC\n\nG\n\nF\n\n1677\n\n|   | [2015] AC                                                                               | Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC)<br>Singularis Holdings Ltd v                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |\n|---|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| A |                                                                                         | Gurr v Zambia Airways Corpn Ltd [1998] ZASCA 16; [1998] 2 All SA 479 (A)<br>HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd, In re [2008] UKHL 21; [2008] 1 WLR<br>852; [2008] Bus LR 905; [2008] 3 All ER 869, HL(E)<br>Impex Services Worldwide Ltd, In re [2004] BPIR 564<br>Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for England and Wales v Attorney General<br>[1972] Ch 73; [1971] 3 WLR 853; [1971] 3 All ER 1029, CA<br>International Tin Council, In re [1987] Ch 419; [1987] 2 WLR 1229; [1987] 1 All ER |\n| B | 890                                                                                     | Jones v Kaney [2011] UKSC 13; [2011] 2 AC 398; [2011] 2 WLR 823; [2011] 2 All                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |\n| C | ER 671, SC(E)<br>[1998] 4 All ER 513, HL(E)                                             | Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 AC 349; [1998] 3 WLR 1095;<br>McKerr, In re [2004] UKHL 12; [2004] 1 WLR 807; [2004] 2 All ER 409, HL(NI)<br>Masri v Consolidated Contractors International (UK) Ltd (No 4) [2009] UKHL 43;<br>[2010] 1 AC 90; [2009] 3 WLR 385; [2009] Bus LR 1269; [2009] 4 All ER 847;<br>[2010] 1 All ER (Comm) 220; [2009] 2 Lloyd<br>s Rep 473, HL(E)                                                                                                        |\n|   | Matheson Bros Ltd, In re (1884) 27 Ch D 225<br>(A)                                      | Modern Terminals (Berth 5) Ltd v States Steamship Co [1979] HKLR 512<br>Moolman v Builders & Developers (Pty) Ltd [1989] ZASCA 171; [1990] 2 All SA 77                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |\n| D | 164; [1973] 2 All ER 943, HL(E)<br>Orr v Diaper (1876) 4 Ch D 92; 25 WR 23              | Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Comrs [1974] AC 133; [1973] 3 WLR<br>P & O Nedlloyd BV v Arab Metals Co (No 2) (The UB Tiger) [2006] EWCA Civ<br>1717; [2007] 1 WLR 2288; [2007] 2 All ER (Comm) 401; [2007] 2 Lloyd<br>s Rep                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |\n| E | 231, CA<br>1 All ER 505, SC(E)                                                          | Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd [2009] EWHC 1912<br>(Ch); [2009] 2 BCLC 400; (Revenue and Customs Comrs intervening) [2011]<br>UKSC 38; [2012] 1 AC 383; [2011] 3 WLR 521; [2011] Bus LR 1266; [2012]<br>Phoenix Kapitaldienst GmbH, In re [2012] EWHC 62 (Ch); [2013] Ch 61; [2012]                                                                                                                                                                                      |\n|   | 3 WLR 681; [2012] 2 All ER 1217<br>CA (Cayman Islands)<br>673, SC(E)                    | Picard v Primeo Fund 2013 (1) CILR 164, Grand Ct (Jones J); 2014 (1) CILR 379,<br>Prest v Prest [2013] UKSC 34; [2013] 2 AC 415; [2013] 3 WLR 1; [2013] 4 All ER                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |\n| F | PricewaterhouseCoopers<br>1 WLR 4482, PC<br>729, SC(E)                                  | v<br>Saad<br>Investments<br>Co<br>Ltd<br>[2014]<br>UKPC<br>35;<br>[2014]<br>R v Bourne [1939] 1 KB 687; [1938] 3 All ER 615, CCA<br>R (Child Poverty Action Group) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2010]<br>UKSC 54; [2011] 2 AC 15; [2011] 2 WLR 1; [2011] PTSR 185; [2011] 1 All ER                                                                                                                                                                                                       |\n| G | Civ 1587, CA                                                                            | R (Mohamed) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth A›airs (No 1)<br>[2008] EWHC 2048 (Admin); [2009] 1 WLR 2579, DC<br>R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice (CNK Alliance Ltd intervening) [2014] UKSC<br>38; [2015] AC 657; [2014] 3 WLR 200; [2014] 3 All ER 843, SC(E)<br>R (Omar) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth A›airs [2011] EWCA                                                                                                                                   |\n| H | [2013] 3 WLR 439; [2013] 3 All ER 95, CA<br>ER (Comm) 513; [2012] 2 Lloyd<br>ER 980, CA | R (Omar) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth A›airs [2012] EWHC<br>1737 (Admin); [2013] 1 All ER 161, DC; [2013] EWCA Civ 118; [2014] QB 112;<br>Rubin v Euronance SA (Picard intervening) [2012] UKSC 46; [2013] 1 AC 236;<br>[2012] 3 WLR 1019; [2013] Bus LR 1; [2013] 1 All ER 521; [2013] 1 All<br>s Rep 615, SC(E)<br>Seagull Manufacturing Co Ltd, In re [1993] Ch 345; [1993] 2 WLR 872; [1993] 2 All                                                                             |\n\n1678 Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) [2015] AC v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Argument\n\nSmith Kline and French Laboratories Ltd v Global Pharmaceutics Ltd [1986] RPC 394, CA A\n\nTest Claimants in the FII Group Litigation v Revenue and Customs Comrs (formerly Inland Revenue Comrs) [2012] UKSC 19; [2012] 2 AC 337; [2012] 2 WLR 1149; [2012] Bus LR 1033; [2012] 3 All ER 909, SC(E)\n\nTucker (RC) (A Bankrupt), In re, Ex p Tucker (KR) [1990] Ch 148; [1988] 2 WLR 748; [1988] 1 All ER 603, CA\n\nTurners & Growers Exporters Ltd v The Ship Cornelis Verolme [1997] 2 NZLR 110 B\n\nUpmann v Elkan (1871) LR 12 Eq 140; LR 7 Ch App 130\n\nWilliams v Central Bank of Nigeria [2014] UKSC 10; [2014] AC 1189; [2014] 2 WLR 355; [2014] 2 All ER 489, SC(E)\n\nThe following additional case was cited in argument:\n\nAtlas Bulk Shipping A/S, In re; Larsen v Navios International Inc [2011] EWHC 878 (Ch); [2012] Bus LR 1124 C\n\n### APPEAL from Court of Appeal for Bermuda\n\nOn 4 March 2013 Kawaley CJ in the Supreme Court of Bermuda made an order (i) recognising the status of the joint o–cial liquidators of Singularis Holdings Ltd, a Cayman Islands company ordered by the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands to be wound up, and (ii) requiring the companys auditors, PricewaterhouseCoopers, a Bermuda registered partnership, to produce all documents in their possession relating to their a›airs.\n\nThe auditors appealed against the production order. On 18 November 2013 the Court of Appeal for Bermuda (Zacca P, Auld JA and Bell AJA) [2013] CA (Bda) 7 Civ allowed the appeal against the production order.\n\nThe liquidators appealed pursuant to permission granted on 21 March 2014 by the Court of Appeal for Bermuda (Zacca P, Evans and Scott Baker JJA). The issues for the Privy Council, as set out in the parties- statement of agreed facts and issues, were (1) whether the court had power at common law to make an order by way of judicial assistance under or in terms analogous to section 195 of the Bermudan Companies Act 1981 in respect of a company in liquidation in the Cayman Islands; (2), if so, whether assistance should be granted or refused, as a matter of discretion; and (3) in particular, whether the liquidators were entitled to relief which would not be available to them in the Cayman Islands under Cayman Islands law. E F\n\nThe facts are stated in the judgment of Lord Sumption JSC.\n\nGabriel Moss QC, Felicity Toube QC, Stephen Robins and Rod Attride-Stirling (of the Bermudan Bar) (instructed by Blake Morgan LLP) for the liquidators. G\n\nThe Supreme Court of Bermudas common law power to grant judicial assistance in cross-border insolvencies supplies the jurisdiction to require the auditors to disclose documents relating to the company. The fact that the liquidators cannot obtain the relevant documents from the auditors in the Cayman Islands is no basis for refusing to provide such assistance as a matter of discretion. It is necessary to distinguish between (1) recognition-- and judicial assistance- and (2) recognition of insolvency proceedings-- and recognition of judgments--. In its strict narrow sense, recognition-- refers to mandatory rules by which one jurisdiction gives direct e›ect in its D\n\nH\n\n1679\n\n# [2015] AC Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Singularis Holdings Ltd v Argument\n\n- own jurisdiction to a legal act in another. Thus if a winding up order is made in the Cayman Islands as the place of the companys registration, Bermuda in accordance with its common law conicts rules gives e›ect to that to the extent of recognising the Cayman Islands liquidators as the sole authorised agents of the company under Cayman Islands law, able to act on behalf of the company in Bermuda: see Dicey, Morris & Collins, The Conict of Laws, 15th ed (2012), vol 2, rule 179. Bermudan conicts rules do not A\n- however recognise mandatory e›ects- of the Cayman Islands winding up proceedings, such as the statutory stay: see Banque Indosuez SA v Ferromet Resources Inc [1993] BCLC 112, 117. Beyond mandatory common law recognition rules, the case law has developed discretionary judicial assistance: see Dicey, Morris & Collins, 15th ed, paras 30-107, 30-108. Common law judicial assistance has two key di›erences from recognition: B\n- (1) recognition is mandatory, whereas judicial assistance is discretionary; (2) recognition gives e›ect to foreign law, whereas judicial assistance applies domestic law: see Cambridge Gas Transportation Corpn v O–cial Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc [2007] 1 AC 508. It is also important to distinguish between recognising foreign insolvency proceedings and recognising judgments arising from foreign C\n- insolvency proceedings. Common law mandatory conicts rules make entirely di›erent provision for each. Thus a winding up proceeding in the Cayman Islands for a company registered there must be recognised in Bermuda to the extent of the appointment and authority of the liquidators. However, a judgment in personam is only recognised if certain criteria such as submission to jurisdiction are met: see Rubin v Euronance SA (Picard intervening) [2013] 1 AC 236. Where a foreign winding up proceeding is D\n- recognised, in the sense that the authority of the liquidators is accepted, the recognising court is not obliged to o›er any assistance. However, absent good reason not to assist, such as the need to protect local creditors, such assistance should be given: see Rubin v Euronance SA, para 29. E\n\nOutside the European Union and in countries where the UNCITRAL Model Law has not been enacted, judicial assistance in cross-border insolvencies may be classed as of two di›erent types. Model 1 involves the provision of assistance through the commencement of an ancillary insolvency proceeding such as liquidation. The doctrine of ancillary liquidations is one by which the court has a common law power to assist a foreign liquidator by granting relief governed by the local law alone, even if that local law gives rise to the right to obtain relief of a type or character not available in the primary liquidation; conversely, there may be relief available F\n\n- under the law of the main proceedings which is not available under the law of the ancillary winding up: see In re Matheson Bros Ltd (1884) 27 Ch D 225 and In re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 10) [1997] Ch 213. Model 2 involves the provision of assistance without the commencement of an ancillary liquidation. Relief of this type is available where the relief sought is the examination of individuals and the production of documents: see Rubin v Euronance SA [2013] 1 AC 236, paras 29, 31, G\n- 33. Two alternative conceptual foundations for the model 2 power emerge from the authorities. Route A involves a common law hypothesis by which the court may grant assistance as if the foreign company were being wound up locallyon that basis, the foreign company is treated as if it were a company to which the local winding up legislation applies, even if it could H\n\n### 1680 Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) [2015] AC v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Argument\n\nnot in fact fall within the denitions required to make it such a company: see In re African Farms [1906] TS 373; Moolman v Builders & Developers (Pty) Ltd [1990] 2 All SA 77 (A) and Cambridge Gas Transportation Corpn v O–cial Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc [2007] 1 AC 508, para 22. Route B involves the provision of assistance through the exercise of the assisting courts general, non-statutory powers, including inherent equitable and common law powers, or non-insolvency statutory powers, without any reliance on any particular provision of the local winding up legislation. On either basis, in the present case, the liquidators were able to obtain the assistance of the Bermudan Supreme Court, and it is right for them to have that assistance. A B\n\nThe most authoritative statement of the common law assumption in route A continues to be the Cambridge Gas case, para 22. The judgment has two distinct limbs. Firstly, the ordinary rules of private international law relating to the enforcement of foreign judgments do not apply to insolvencythis limb of the judgment was disapproved in Rubin v Euronance SA [2013] 1 AC 236 but it is of no relevance to the present appeal, which is not concerned with recognition of a judgment. Secondly, route A means that a domestic court can provide assistance by doing whatever it could have done in the case of a domestic insolvency. This second limb has been followed widely: see In re Phoenix Kapitaldienst GmbH [2013] Ch 61, para 62; Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd [2009] 2 BCLC 400, para 48; In re Atlas Bulk Shipping A/S [2012] Bus LR 1124, paras 30—32 and Picard v Primeo Fund 2013 (1) CILR 164, para 41. The development of this common law jurisdiction is a legitimate and typical example of the necessary evolution of the common law to meet the changing needs of the times: see Jones v Kaney [2011] 2 AC 398, para 112. The ability of the common law to adapt itself to new circumstances and changing needs is one of its strengths. Such changes are not necessarily incremental but may be radical: see Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 AC 349, 377—379. The role of the common law is to cover those areas which are not governed by statute. Those considerations are particularly relevant in the eld of cross-border insolvency. Commercial necessity in the modern globalised world requires judicial assistance to be given to foreign insolvency proceedings, particularly where large sums are involved and assets or documents are missing: see Crdit Suisse Fides Trust SA v Cuoghi [1998] QB 818, 827, and Turners & Growers Exporters Ltd v The Ship Cornelis Verolme [1997] 2 NZLR 110, 126. It is also essential for o›shore jurisdictions to be able to ensure that they can apply their laws and procedures to make sure that the use of their jurisdiction in cross-border business does not facilitate fraud or the hiding of assets or documents. Such policies have led to the development of the principle of modied universalism: see the Cambridge Gas case [2007] 1 AC 508; In re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 852 and Rubin v Euronance SA [2013] 1 AC 236. Where there is a local proceeding, such as ancillary liquidation, the court having control over that local proceeding is required to assist the main proceeding. Where there is no local proceeding, the argument for judicial assistance is even more compelling, since there is no alternative insolvency proceeding. Whatever needs to be done in the local jurisdiction can only be done by way of judicial assistance. Common law judicial assistance does not require reciprocity. Local creditors and policies C D E F G H\n\n1681\n\n# [2015] AC Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Singularis Holdings Ltd v Argument\n\n- are protected by the fact that the giving of judicial assistance is discretionary. The provision of such assistance at common law is not inconsistent with Al Sabah v Grupo Torras SA [2005] 2 AC 333. The observations, at para 35, in relation to the position at common law are obiter. Further and in any event, the views expressed are not persuasive, since the point was not fully developed in argument. Moreover, para 35 was superseded by the Cambridge Gas case [2007] 1 AC 508, in which the Privy Council set out A\n- detailed views on the question of common law assistance having heard full argument. There is nothing in the local legislation in the present case to forbid the court from granting assistance in this way in cross-border insolvencies. Accordingly, as a matter of jurisdiction, route A enables the court to make an order under section 195 of the Bermudan Companies Act 1981 on the basis of the common law hypothesis identied in the Cambridge B\n- Gas case [2007] 1 AC 508, para 22, as if the company were in ancillary liquidation in Bermuda. C\n\nAlternatively, route B involves the provision of assistance through the exercise of the assisting courts general and non-statutory powers (including inherent and common law powers), without any reliance on any specic provisions of the local winding up legislation: see In re Impex Services Worldwide Ltd [2004] BPIR 564 and Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v BNY\n\n- Corporate Trustee Services Ltd (Revenue and Customs Comrs intervening) [2012] 1 AC 383. Those powers are present in the instant case. There is an inherent and/or common law and/or equitable power to compel discovery or a power in a statutory provision which is not limited in application to local liquidations. The inherent powers of a court of equity are vested in the Supreme Court of Bermuda: see section 12 of the Supreme Court Act 1905. D\n- As a consequence, the equitable jurisdiction to compel discovery in aid of proceedings in some other court remains exercisable by the Supreme Court of Bermuda. A non-statutory power to compel discovery can be exercised by way of judicial assistance in a cross-border insolvency case: see In re Impex Services Worldwide Ltd [2004] BPIR 564 and Rubin v Euronance SA [2013] 1 AC 236. The power to order discovery under Ord 24, r 12 of the E\n- Bermudan Rules of the Supreme Court 1985 applies only to cases falling within that rule, outside its scope the courts general equitable power to compel discovery continues to apply. Accordingly, route B enables the court to make an order under Ord 24, r 12, if it is applicable, or, if it is not, under the courts general equitable jurisdiction to compel discovery, which is preserved by section 12 of the Supreme Court Act 1905. [Reference was made to Dreyfus v Peruvian Guano Co (1889) 41 Ch D 151 and In re Atlas F\n- Bulk Shipping A/S; Larsen v Navios International Inc [2012] Bus LR 1124.] As a matter of discretion, such assistance should be provided to the liquidators. The documents sought are in the possession of the auditors, are not available from any other source and will be crucial to the recovery of assets for the benet of the companys creditors and to the ascertainment of the companys liabilities. The fact that the Cayman Islands court could not itself make an order for production of the documents provides no basis for G\n- refusing assistance. First, the objection does not apply to assistance through the commencement of an ancillary liquidation in which local statutory provisions are applied without any such restriction and there is no principled reason why it should apply to assistance without an ancillary liquidation, which will apply only domestic law. Secondly, to withhold assistance on H\n\n### 1682 Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) [2015] AC v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Argument\n\nthat basis would largely undermine the concept of assistance. If the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands were able to make an e›ective order in those terms, the liquidators would not require assistance from the Supreme Court of Bermuda. The requested court providing common law judicial assistance can only apply its own law. That law will invariably di›er in some respects from the courts having jurisdiction over the applicant who seeks judicial assistance. It cannot be unfair or unreasonable vis-¼-vis the auditors to apply the law of its own country of incorporation in requiring disclosure. Accordingly, the court has jurisdiction at common law to assist the liquidators by requiring the auditors to disclose relevant documents and there is no reason for declining to assist as a matter of discretion. A B\n\nDavid Chivers QC, Paul Smith and Scott Pearman (of the Bermudan and English Bars) (instructed by Herbert Smith Freehills LLP) for the auditors.\n\nThe Bermudan court has no jurisdiction at common law to grant assistance to a foreign liquidator by ordering the disclosure of documents or the examination of witnesses. Developments in the common law of Bermuda may be modelled upon equivalent developments in England or in other common law jurisdictions but it is essential to understand why any particular development is necessarily to be incorporated as part of the common law of Bermuda and special care must be taken where the statutory landscape is di›erent. The common law principle identied in In re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 10) [1997] Ch 213 was that there had developed a practice whereby the English court permitted an English liquidator to transmit to a foreign liquidator funds to enable a pari passu distribution to worldwide creditors to be made. Subject to that principle, an English liquidator was bound by English law, including English insolvency law. Indeed, an English ancillary liquidation might, due to the overriding requirement of English rules of set-o›, prevent rather than promote the worldwide parri passu distribution of assets. Where there is an English liquidation of a foreign company there is no additional assistance-- given to a foreign liquidator. Any remedies sought in the winding up will have to be through the actions of the English liquidator. Further, the common law consequence of the English winding up may either assist or not assist the foreign liquidator depending upon the provisions under consideration. The long arm- reach of the English winding up jurisdiction has meant that English courts have considered assistance from the perspective of an English liquidation. The only common law intervention was to suspend the operation of the English statutory scheme in favour of the foreign liquidation by disapplying- the statutory scheme and directing the remission of assets: see In re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 852, para 9. Beyond that, English law has not developed a general common law power of assistance. The analysis of common law powers in Cambridge Gas Transportation Corpn v O–cial Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc [2007] 1 AC 508 was undertaken in the context of an English jurisprudence based upon the disapplication of English statutory law in the context of a long arm-- jurisdiction to wind up. In countries which have not adopted that model of winding up the question of assistance is very di›erent. The issue is the sourceindeed the very existenceof a power which a foreign liquidator seeks to be exercised by a local court. That cannot be resolved by reference C D E F G H\n\n1683\n\n# [2015] AC Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Singularis Holdings Ltd v Argument\n\nto the existence of a very di›erent English common law power in the context of a very di›erent English juridical position, but if anything can be taken from the English common law position it is that the common law is recognising a single system of distribution under the principles of universalism. A\n\nThe principles of universalism, modied or not, provide no juridical basis to credit the Bermudan court with the power to make an order in terms of section 195 of the Companies Act 1981 in respect of a foreign entity not the subject of its winding up jurisdiction. The principle is concerned with the collection and distribution of assets: see In re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 852, para 6 and Rubin v Euronance SA (Picard intervening) [2013] 1 AC 236, paras 11—20. However, it says nothing, and can say nothing, about the powers of di›erent local courts B\n\n- around the world to make collateral orders as regards how assets are to be collected, let alone what coercive powers of the local court may be exercised in favour of the foreign liquidator. The principle can provide no justication for recognising common law powers to provide assistance to foreign liquidators beyond those which are necessary to give e›ect to the principle, viz, the powers to ensure that there is a unitary system for the collection and distribution of assets. Neither In re African Farms [1906] TS 373 nor the C\n- principle of modied universalism leads to the conclusion that the assisting court has common law powers to treat a foreign liquidator as if he were a domestic liquidator of a domestic company. In re African Farms was concerned with enforcing foreign rights as a matter of comity. It was no part of its ratio that the court had common law powers beyond those involving the collection and distribution of assets. There is no principle brought into D\n- play by Moolman v Builders & Developers (Pty) Ltd [1990] 2 All SA 77 (A) which requires local powers to be given to a foreign liquidator where those powers do not exist in the liquidators home jurisdiction. The case is not authority for the proposition that assistance at common law may include making orders for examination which could not be ordered in a foreign jurisdiction. Cambridge Gas Transportation Corpn v O–cial Committee of E\n- Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc [2007] 1 AC 508 concerns the enforcement of a foreign judgment. The question of what would happen if the foreign liquidation involved a company which could not be wound up in the domestic court was not addressed. It does not stand as authority for the proposition that a domestic court has a common law power to make orders in favour of a foreign liquidator simply because had the company been a domestic company such an order could have been made in favour of a F\n- domestic liquidator. It did not directly address the application of a statutory provision at all. Al Sabah v Grupo Torras SA [2005] 2 AC 333 was cited in the Cambridge Gas case [2007] 1 AC 508 but the analysis at para 35 of the Al Sabah case of the limits on the power of the courts to give assistance was not questioned. The Board should follow its own decision in the Al Sabah case since para 35 is directly on point and should be determinative of the appeal. In re Phoenix Kapitaldienst GmbH [2013] Ch 61 was wrongly G\n- decided and was in any case prior to the decision in Rubin v Euronance SA [2013] 1 AC 236. Accordingly, the court has no jurisdiction at common law to grant assistance to a foreign liquidator by ordering the disclosure of documents or the examination of witnesses. The court has no inherent power or equitable power or power under its rules of court to give such H\n\n### 1684 Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) [2015] AC v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Argument\n\ndisclosure. There are no grounds for extending the common law to give such powers to a foreign liquidator. The application of Cayman law in Bermuda was a universalist principle, but the liquidators claim to the application of a law which went beyond Cayman law was not. Principles of universalism do not require or justify such an extension and any such extension and the circumstances in which such powers may be exercised are matters to be considered by the legislature of Bermuda. [Reference was made to Bent v Young (1838) 9 Sim 180.] A B\n\nMoss QC replied\n\nThe Board took time for consideration.\n\n10 November 2014. The following judgments were handed down.\n\nC\n\nF\n\nH\n\n# LORD SUMPTION JSC\n\n## Introduction\n\n1 This appeal is closely connected with the concurrent appeal in PricewaterhouseCoopers v Saad Investments Co Ltd (SICL--) [2014] 1 WLR 4482. The two appeals concern related companies incorporated in the Cayman Islands, both of which have been ordered by the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands to be wound up. Hugh Dickson, Stephen Akers and Mark Byers of Grant Thornton Special Services (Cayman) Ltd were appointed by that court as the joint o–cial liquidators of both companies. The background to both appeals is set out in the advice of the Board on that appeal, delivered by Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury PSC, and it need not be repeated here. D E\n\n2 The common feature of both appeals is that they concern attempts on the part of the liquidators to obtain from the companies former auditors PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC--), information, whether in oral or documentary form, relating to the companies a›airs. The evidence is that the liquidators have been unable to trace certain assets which they consider must have existed, and that relevant information about those assets is likely to be in the possession of PwC. This has not been accepted in terms, but neither has it been disputed. The Board will proceed on the footing that it is correct.\n\n3 The Grand Court of the Cayman Islands has power under section 103 of the Cayman Islands Companies Law to order any person, whether or not resident in the Islands, who has a relevant connection to a company in liquidation (including its former auditor) to transfer or deliver up to the liquidator any property or documents belonging to the company.-- The Grand Court has made such an order against PwC, and the Board was told that PwC has complied with it. Consistently with the provision conferring the power, it extends only to material belonging to the companies. G\n\n4 Both the SICL and the Singularis appeals concern attempts by the liquidators to obtain material belonging to the auditors themselves, principally their working papers, by invoking the corresponding powers conferred on the Supreme Court of Bermuda. They are in wider terms, which are not limited to information belonging to the company. Section 195 of the Companies Act 1981 of Bermuda provides:\n\n## [2015] AC Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Singularis Holdings Ltd v Lord Sumption JSC\n\nPower to summon persons suspected of having property of company etc\n\n(1) The court may, at any time after the appointment of a provisional liquidator or the making of a winding up order, summon before it any o–cer of the company or persons known or suspected to have in his possession any property of the company or supposed to be indebted to the company, or any person whom the court deems capable of giving information concerning the promotion, formation, trade, dealings, a›airs or property of the company.\n\n(2) The court may examine such person on oath, concerning the matters aforesaid, either by word of mouth or on written interrogatories, and may reduce his answers to writing and require him to sign them.\n\n- (3) The court may require such person to produce any books and papers in his custody or power relating to the company, but, where he claims any lien on books or papers produced by him, the production shall be without prejudice to that lien, and the court shall have jurisdiction in the winding up to determine all questions relating to that lien.--\n- 5 The power of the Bermuda court under section 195 is exercisable only in respect of a company which that court has ordered to be wound up. It was therefore dependent in this case on the existence of a power to wind up a company incorporated outside Bermuda. In the case of SICL the Supreme Court of Bermuda made a winding up order, and then made an order for production and oral examination against PwC in the winding up. However, in the SICL appeal the Board has advised Her Majesty [2014] 1 WLR 4482 that the winding up order must be stayed because (with immaterial exceptions) the court had no jurisdiction to wind up a company incorporated outside Bermuda. The consequence is that all proceedings in the winding up of SICL have ceased to be e›ective, including the order made under section 195. D E\n\n6 In the case of Singularis a di›erent procedure was adopted. No winding up order was ever sought or made in Bermuda. Instead, Kawaley CJ made an order recognising in Bermuda the status of the liquidators by virtue\n\n- of their appointment by the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands, and exercising what he termed a common law power by analogy with the statutory powers contained in section 195 of the Companies Act- to order PwC and Paul Suddaby (an o–cer of PwC) to produce the same documents which they could have been ordered to produce under section 195. PwC were also ordered to have a partner, employee or agent acceptable to the liquidators available to answer oral or written interrogatories. The F G\n- liquidators were given leave to serve the proceedings on Mr Suddaby and any other partners or o–cers-of PwC out of the jurisdiction.\n\n7 The Court of Appeal (Bell AJA, Zacca P and Auld JA) [2013] CA (Bda) 7 Civ set aside the Chief Justices order. Bell AJA and Zacca P doubted whether there was jurisdiction to make a section 195 order at common law in circumstances where section 195 did not apply. But the ground of their\n\ndecision was that it was not in any event an appropriate exercise of discretion, because the court should not make an order in support of a Cayman liquidation which could not have been made by the Cayman court itself. They regarded the liquidators claim as unjustiable forum shopping--. Auld JA agreed with this, but went further. In his view, there H\n\nA\n\nB\n\nC\n\n### 1686 Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) [2015] AC v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Lord Sumption JSC\n\nwas no jurisdiction because the Bermuda court could not disregard the limitation of section 195 of the Bermuda Act to cases where a winding up order could be and had been made. A\n\n8 Accordingly two issues arise on the present appeal. The rst is whether the Bermuda court has a common law power to assist a foreign liquidation by ordering the production of information (in oral or documentary form), in circumstances where (i) the Bermuda court has no power to wind up an overseas company such as Singularis and (ii) its statutory power to order the production of information is limited to cases where the company has been wound up in Bermuda. The second issue is whether, if such a power exists, it is exercisable in circumstances where an equivalent order could not have been made by the court in which the foreign liquidation is proceeding. B\n\n# A common law power?\n\n9 The common law of Bermuda is the same, in every relevant respect, as that of England. The di–culty is that in England the common law concerning cross-border insolvencies has developed to ll the interstices in what is essentially a statutory framework, and the statutory framework di›ers in signicant respects in Bermuda. The main di›erence is that the English courts have jurisdiction to wind up unregistered companies, including those incorporated outside the United Kingdom. This jurisdiction has existed since it was rst conferred by section 199 of the Companies Act 1862 (25 & 26 Vict c 89). It is currently conferred by section 221 of the Insolvency Act 1986. The Bermuda courts have no equivalent power.\n\n10 The English courts have for at least a century and a half exercised a power to assist a foreign liquidation by taking control of the English assets of the insolvent company. The power was founded partly on statute and partly on the practice of judges of the Chancery Division. Its statutory foundation was the power to wind up overseas companies. The exercise of this power generated a body of practice concerning what came to be known as ancillary liquidations. The English court would order the winding up in England of a company already in liquidation or likely to go into liquidation under the law of its incorporation, provided that there was a su–cient connection with England and a reasonable possibility of benet to the petitioners. In theory, the e›ect of the winding up order was to create a statutory trust of the worldwide assets of the company to be dealt with in accordance with English statutory rules of distribution: Ayerst v C & K (Construction) Ltd [1976] AC 167, Banco Nacional de Cuba v Cosmos Trading Corpn [2000] 1 BCLC 813, 819—820 (Sir Richard Scott V-C). In practice, as Millett J pointed out in In re International Tin Council [1987] Ch 419, 446—447, Although a winding up in the country of incorporation will normally be given extraterritorial e›ect, a winding up elsewhere has only local operation.-- The English courts recognised the limits of the international reach of their own proceedings by treating the English winding up as ancillary to the principal winding up in the country of the companys incorporation. They exercised their power of direction over the liquidator by limiting his functions to getting in the English assets and to dealing with them in such a way as to bring about a distribution of the companys worldwide assets on as uniform a basis as was consistent with certain overriding principles of English insolvency law. The earliest reported case in which the practice was E F G H\n\nD\n\nC\n\n# [2015] AC Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Singularis Holdings Ltd v Lord Sumption JSC\n\nrecognised is the decision of Kay J in In re Matheson Bros Ltd (1884) 27 Ch D 225, but it is likely to have been older than that. In these cases, the court is exercising the ordinary powers of the English court to control the winding up of a company, which are wholly statutory. But the court was using them for a purpose which di›ered from that for which they were conferred, and on principles which departed from those applicable by law in the winding up of an English company. To that extent only, the English courts were exercising a common law power. A B\n\n11 In Bermuda, the court has no jurisdiction to conduct an ancillary liquidation, except in the (irrelevant) case of a company to which Part XIII of the Companies Act is expressly applied. The question what if any power the court has to assist a foreign liquidation without conducting an ancillary liquidation of its own, must depend on the nature of the assistance sought.\n\n- Winding up proceedings have at least four distinct legal consequences, to which di›erent considerations may apply. First, the proceedings are a mechanism of collective execution against the property of the debtor by creditors whose rights are admitted or established--, to use the expression of Lord Ho›mann in Cambridge Gas Transportation Corpn v O–cial Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc [2007] 1 AC C\n- 508, para 14. Inherent in this function of a winding up is the statutory trust of the companys assets, to which I have already referred, and an automatic stay of other modes of execution. Second, it provides a procedural framework in which to determine what are the provable rights of creditors in cases where they are disputed. Third, it brings into play statutory powers to vary the rights of persons dealing with the company or its assets by impugning certain categories of transaction. These powers are less extensive D\n- in Bermuda than they are in England, but include the avoidance of dispositions after the commencement of the winding up and fraudulent preferences. Fourth, it brings into play procedural powers, generally directed to enabling the liquidator to locate assets of the company or to ascertain its rights and liabilities. In Bermuda these include the power under section 195 of the Companies Act to order the production of information. In England, the corresponding statutory powers would all be exercisable in an E\n- ancillary liquidation. F\n\n12 The main purpose of the winding up order in England is usually to enable the court to take control of the English assets of the company, so as to remove them from the free-for-all which would have resulted if creditors were entitled to gain priority by levying execution on them. But, even without a winding up, the court could, on ordinary principles of private\n\n- international law, have recognised as a matter of comity the vesting of the companys assets in an agent or o–ce-holder appointed or recognised under the law of its incorporation. For many years before a corresponding rule was recognised for the winding up of foreign companies, the principle had been applied in the absence of any statutory powers to the English moveable assets of a foreign bankrupt which had been transferred to an o–ce-holder in an insolvency proceeding under the law of his domicile. Moreover, while G\n- the same rule did not apply to immovable property, the court would ordinarily appoint the foreign o–ce-holder a receiver of the rents and prots: see Dicey, Morris & Collins, The Conict of Laws, 15th ed (2012), vol 2, rules 216 and 217. The more di–cult question in such cases was whether the court, in the absence of winding up proceedings, could impose a H\n\n### 1688 Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) [2015] AC v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Lord Sumption JSC\n\nstay on creditors trying to levy execution against the English assets equivalent to the automatic stay that would by statute have followed the initiation of winding up proceedings. A\n\n13 That question appears to have been rst addressed in the common law world in the important decision of the full court of the Supreme Court of the Transvaal in In re African Farms Ltd [1906] TS 373. African Farms Ltd was an English company with substantial assets in the Transvaal. It was in liquidation in England. There was no power to wind it up in the Transvaal because the number of members had fallen below the minimum required to qualify it as a company- for the purpose of the statutory power of winding up. The leading judgment was given by the great South African judge Sir James Rose Innes, then Chief Justice of the Transvaal. Having recognised the absence of a statutory power to wind up the company, he continued, at p 377: B C\n\nIt only remains to consider whether we are justied in recognising the position of the English liquidator. And by that expression I do not mean a recognition which consists in a mere acknowledgment of the fact that the liquidator has been appointed as such in England, and that he is the representative of the company here; I mean a recognition which carries with it the active assistance of the court. A declaration, in e›ect, that the liquidator is entitled to deal with the Transvaal assets in the same way as if they were within the jurisdiction of the English courts, subject only to such conditions as the court may impose for the protection of local creditors, or in recognition of the requirements of our local laws. If we are able in that sense to recognise and assist the liquidator, then I thin[k] we should do so; because in that way only will the assets here be duly divided and properly applied in satisfaction of the companys debts. If we cannot do so, then this result follows, that the directors cannot deal with the property here, and that the liquidator cannot prevent creditors seizing it in execution of their judgments. Unnecessary expenses will be incurred, and the estate will be left to be scrambled for among those creditors who are in a position to enforce their claims.--\n\nInnes CJ then considered (p 378) the objection that the grant of assistance to the English liquidator, in a case where the court could not wind up itself, may possibly be open to the objection that we are doing by indirect means what the law has given us no power to do directly.-- He rejected the submission because its acceptance would have prevented the court from recognising the power of the liquidator to dispose of property or rights of the company under the law of its incorporation, contrary to ordinary principles of private international law: see pp 378—380. He went on, at pp 381—382:\n\nThe true test appears to me to be not whether we have the power to order a similar liquidation here, but whether our recognising the foreign liquidation is actually prohibited by any local rules; whether it is against the policy of our laws, or whether its consequences would be unfair to local creditors, or on other grounds undesirable . . . So far from such circumstances being present here, the case before us is one in which every consideration of equity and convenience demands that the position of the English liquidator should be recognised. Unless that can be done then, as\n\nE\n\nD\n\nF\n\nG\n\n# [2015] AC Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Singularis Holdings Ltd v Lord Sumption JSC\n\nalready pointed out, the Transvaal assets are at the mercy of the rst creditor who can manage to secure a writ of execution.-- A\n\nIn the result, the court recognised the liquidator by virtue of his appointment in England as being entitled to the sole administration of the companys assets in the Transvaal, on terms that the liquidator:\n\n- recognise the right of all creditors in this colony to prove their claims against the company before the master; and that the admission or rejection of such claims, the liability of the company therefor to the extent of its assets in the Transvaal, and all questions of mortgage or preference in respect of such assets, shall be regulated by the laws of this colony, as if the company had been placed in liquidation here.-- B\n- The proved claims of local creditors were ordered to be satised rateably from the local assets and the balance made available for distribution to other creditors. Execution of the local judgment creditors judgment was stayed to enable this to be done. C\n\n14 It is right to point out (i) that the recognition of the English liquidators power of disposition over the companys assets in the Transvaal was no more than what he was entitled to as a matter of private international\n\n- law; (ii) that the conduct of what amounted to an ancillary liquidation in the Transvaal was expressed as a discretionary condition of the courts recognition order; and (iii) that the Transvaal court no doubt had the same inherent power as the English court to stay enforcement of its own judgments. But the decision is nevertheless a signicant one, because in substance what the court was doing was to direct the assets of the company D\n- to be dealt with as if it was in liquidation in the Transvaal, when there was no power to conduct a liquidation there. It also deprived an existing judgment creditor of what was on the face of it an accrued and absolute right under his judgment and exposed him to having his debt written down to a gure consistent with the rateable distribution of assets in the Transvaal. The court therefore unquestionably modied the rights of the company and its creditors. Moreover, the sole basis on which it did so was the inherent E\n- power of the court to assist the orderly liquidation of the companys a›airs pursuant to a foreign winding up order. As Innes CJ put it, at p 377, recognition . . . carries with it the active assistance of the court.-- Or, in the words of the concurring judgment of Smith J (at p 390), the basis of the order was the recognition and enforcement of rights and the recognition of a status acquired under a foreign law, unless they conict with the law or policy of the jurisdiction in which they were sought to be enforced. F G\n\n15 The exibility and breadth of the English courts powers in an ancillary liquidation, together in more recent times with the incorporation into English law of a number of international schemes of judicial co-operation, have had the e›ect of arresting the development of the common law in England in this area. However, the issue returned in 2006 with the decision of the Privy Council in Cambridge Gas Transportation\n\nCorpn v O–cial Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc [2007] 1 AC 508. In this case the Privy Council, a–rming the decision of the Sta› of Government Division in the Isle of Man, held that e›ect should be given in the Isle of Man to the judicial reorganisation by a Federal Bankruptcy Court in the United States of a group of Liberian ship-owning H\n\n### 1690 Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) [2015] AC v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Lord Sumption JSC\n\nE\n\nF\n\nG\n\nH\n\ncompanies. The e›ect of the reorganisation was to vest the shares of an Isle of Man company in the committee of creditors, in circumstances where the US court had neither jurisdiction in rem over the shares (because they were rights situated outside its territorial jurisdiction) nor jurisdiction in personam over the shareholders (because they were not present in the US and took no part in the US proceedings). The principal shareholder, Cambridge Gas, objected on the ground that it was not bound by the decision of the US court. The advice of the Board was given by Lord Ho›mann. He discerned in the English case law a consistent aspiration- to produce a result equivalent to that which would obtain if there were a single universal bankruptcy jurisdiction. He regarded this principle of universality- as having been the foundation of the decision in In re African Farms [1906] TS 373, and considered that it justied the Isle of Man courts in giving e›ect to the US reorganisation plan [2007] 1 AC 508, paras 16—21. In his view, and that of the Board, the absence of jurisdiction in rem or in personam in the US court was irrelevant, because the jurisdiction was founded not on any obligation on the part of Cambridge Gas to comply with the judgments of the Federal Bankruptcy Court but on the duty of the Isle of Man court to assist a foreign principal liquidation so as to achieve a universal distribution of the assets on, as far as possible, a common basis. At paras 13—14, he said: A B C D\n\n13.... Judgments in rem and in personam are judicial determinations of the existence of rights: in the one case, rights over property and in the other, rights against a person. When a judgment in rem or in personam is recognised by a foreign court, it is accepted as establishing the right which it purports to have determined, without further inquiry into the grounds on which it did so. The judgment itself is treated as the source of the right.\n\n14. The purpose of bankruptcy proceedings, on the other hand, is not to determine or establish the existence of rights, but to provide a mechanism of collective execution against the property of the debtor by creditors whose rights are admitted or established.--\n\nThe essence of the decision and the reasoning which supported it is to be found, at paras 20—22:\n\n20. . . . But the underlying principle of universality . . . is given e›ect by recognising the person who is empowered under the foreign bankruptcy law to act on behalf of the insolvent company as entitled to do so in England. In addition, as Innes CJ said in the Transvaal case In re African Farms Ltd [1906] TS 373, 377, in which an English company with assets in the Transvaal had been voluntarily wound up in England, recognition which carries with it the active assistance of the court-. . .\n\n21. Their Lordships consider that these principles are su–cient to confer on the Manx court jurisdiction to assist the committee of creditors, as appointed representatives under the Chapter 11 order, to give e›ect to the plan . . .\n\n22. . . . At common law, their Lordships think it is doubtful whether assistance could take the form of applying provisions of the foreign insolvency law which form no part of the domestic system. But the domestic court must at least be able to provide assistance by doing\n\nG\n\nH\n\n# [2015] AC Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Singularis Holdings Ltd v Lord Sumption JSC\n\n- whatever it could have done in the case of a domestic insolvency. The purpose of recognition is to enable the foreign o–ce holder or the creditors to avoid having to start parallel insolvency proceedings and to give them the remedies to which they would have been entitled if the equivalent proceedings had taken place in the domestic forum.-- A\n- The provisions of the domestic system of insolvency of the Isle of Man, which were relevant in Cambridge Gas, were the statutory provisions for sanctioning a scheme of arrangement in the course of a winding up. Because the Isle of Man courts would have had power to wind up Navigator and sanction a scheme of arrangement on terms substantially the same as those of the judicial reorganisation approved by the Federal Bankruptcy Court, it could give e›ect to the reorganisation plan at common law. Why B\n- therefore,- asked Lord Ho›mann (para 25), should the Manx court not provide assistance by giving e›ect to the plan without requiring the creditors to go to the trouble of parallel insolvency proceedings in the Isle of Man?-- Cambridge Gas is authority, if it is correct, for three propositions. The rst is the principle of modied universalism, namely that the court has a common law power to assist foreign winding up proceedings so far as it properly can. The second is that this includes doing whatever it could C\n- properly have done in a domestic insolvency, subject to its own law and public policy. The third (which is implicit) is that this power is itself the source of its jurisdiction over those a›ected, and that the absence of jurisdiction in rem or in personam according to ordinary common law principles is irrelevant. D\n\n16 The rst and second propositions were revisited by Lord Ho›mann in In re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 852. HIH was an Australian insurance company in liquidation in Australia. Awinding up petition had been presented in England and provisional liquidators appointed to conduct an ancillary liquidation. The question at issue was whether the English court should accede to a letter of request from the Australian court inviting it to direct the English provisional liquidators to remit the assets in their hands to the Australian liquidators, in circumstances where they would be distributed there in accordance with statutory priorities which di›ered from those applicable in a domestic winding up in England. At paras 6—7, Lord Ho›mann said: E F\n\n6. Despite the absence of statutory provision, some degree of international co-operation in corporate insolvency had been achieved by judicial practice. This was based on what English judges have for many years regarded as a general principle of private international law, namely that bankruptcy (whether personal or corporate) should be unitary and universal. There should be a unitary bankruptcy proceeding in the court of the bankrupts domicile which receives worldwide recognition and it should apply universally to all the bankrupts assets.\n\n7. This was very much a principle rather than a rule. It is heavily qualied by exceptions on pragmatic grounds; elsewhere I have described it as an aspiration: see Cambridge Gas Transportation Corpn v O–cial Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc [2007] 1 AC 508, 517, para 17. Professor Jay Westbrook, a distinguished American writer on international insolvency has called it a principle of modied universalism-: see also Fletcher, Insolvency in Private\n\n### 1692 Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) [2015] AC v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Lord Sumption JSC\n\nB\n\nInternational Law, 2nd ed (2005), pp 15—17. Full universalism can be attained only by international treaty. Nevertheless, even in its modied and pragmatic form, the principle is a potent one.-- A\n\nReviewing the English case law, Lord Ho›mann discerned in it a golden thread running through English cross-border insolvency law since the 18th century- which, adopting a label devised by Professor Jay Westbrook, he called the principle of (modied) universalism--(para 30):\n\nThat principle requires that English courts should, so far as is consistent with justice and UK public policy, co-operate with the courts in the country of the principal liquidation to ensure that all the companys assets are distributed to its creditors under a single system of distribution.--\n\n17 The Committee in HIH was unanimous in holding that the assets should be remitted to Australia, but they were divided in some aspects of their reasoning. Lord Ho›mann, with whom Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe agreed, considered that the court had an inherent power to direct the remittal of the assets at common law. However, that view was not adopted by the rest of the Committee. Lord Scott of Foscote and Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury considered that the power was wholly derived from section 426 of the Insolvency Act 1986. Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers held that the statutory power was a su–cient jurisdictional basis for the proposed direction, and declined to decide whether jurisdiction could have been established at common law. It is, however, important to appreciate that this di›erence of opinion related not to the principle of universalism itself, nor to the juridical basis of the power to assist a foreign liquidation in general. The di›erence was about whether that power could be exercised in a manner which would deprive creditors proving in England of their statutory right under section 107 of the Insolvency Act 1986 to a pari passu distribution according to English rules of priority. The principle justifying judicial assistance in a foreign insolvency which was stated in In re African Farms [1906] TS 373 and a–rmed in Cambridge Gas was [1906] TS 373, 377 subject to such conditions as the court may impose for the protection of local creditors, or in recognition of the requirements of our local laws- or, as it was put more broadly in HIH itself [2008] 1 WLR 852, para 30, justice and UK public policy--. The division in the Committee in HIH was about whether this meant that it was subject to the mandatory requirements of section 107 of the Insolvency Act 1986. The relevance of section 426 in the view of Lord Scott and Lord Neuberger was that on their construction of that section it authorised the treatment of the assets in accordance with the law of the foreign jurisdiction notwithstanding its inconsistency with mandatory rules of English law: see Lord Scott, at para 61, and Lord Neuberger, at para 68. Absent that provision, the remittal of the assets to Australia would have been contrary to English law. Lord Phillips did not, any more than Lord Scott and Lord Neuberger, question the principle of modied universalism. Indeed, he regarded it as determinative of the manner in which the discretion should be exercised, albeit leaving open the question of its juridical source: see para 44. C D E F G H\n\n18 Cambridge Gas [2007] 1 AC 508 marks the furthest that the common law courts have gone in developing the common law powers of the\n\n# [2015] AC Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Singularis Holdings Ltd v Lord Sumption JSC\n\n- court to assist a foreign liquidation. It has proved to be a controversial decision. So far as it held that the domestic court had jurisdiction over the parties simply by virtue of its power to assist, it was subjected to erce academic criticism and held by a majority of the Supreme Court to be wrong in Rubin v Euronance SA (Picard intervening) [2013] 1 AC 236. So far as it held that the domestic court had a common law power to assist the foreign A\n- court by doing whatever it could have done in a domestic insolvency, its authority is weakened by the absence of any explanation of whence this common law power came and by the direct rejection of that proposition by the Judicial Committee in Al Sabah v Grupo Torras SA [2005] 2 AC 333, a case cited in argument in Cambridge Gas but not in the advice of the Board. Lord Walker, giving the advice of the Board in Al Sabah, had expressed the view that there was no inherent power to set aside Cayman trusts at the B\n- request of a foreign court of insolvency, in circumstances where a corresponding statutory power existed under the Cayman Bankruptcy Law but did not apply in the circumstances. The Board considers it to be clear that although statute law may inuence the policy of the common law, it cannot be assumed, simply because there would be a statutory power to make a particular order in the case of domestic insolvency, that a similar C\n- power must exist at common law. So far as Cambridge Gas suggests otherwise, the Board is satised that it is wrong for reasons more fully explained in the advice proposed by Lord Collins of Mapesbury. If there is a corresponding statutory power for domestic insolvencies there will usually be no objection on public policy grounds to the recognition of a similar common law power. But it cannot follow without more that there is such a power. It follows that the second and third propositions for which D E\n- Cambridge Gas [2007] 1 AC 508 is authority cannot be supported. 19 However, the rst proposition, the principle of modied universalism itself, has not been discredited. On the contrary, it was accepted in principle by Lord Phillips, Lord Ho›man and Lord Walker in HIH [2008] 1 WLR 852, and by Lord Collins of Mapesbury (with whom Lord Walker and Lord Sumption JJSC agreed) in Rubin v Euronance SA [2013] 1 AC 236. Nothing in the concurring judgment of Lord Mance JSC in that case casts doubt on it. At paras 29—33, Lord Collins summarised the position in this way: F\n\n29. Fourth, at common law the court has power to recognise and grant assistance to foreign insolvency proceedings. The common law principle is that assistance may be given to foreign o–ce-holders in insolvencies with an international element. The underlying principle has been stated in di›erent ways: recognition . . . carries with it the active assistance of the court-: In re African Farms Ltd [1906] TS 373, 377; This court . . . will do its utmost to co-operate with the US Bankruptcy Court and avoid any action which might disturb the orderly administration of [the company] in Texas under Chapter 11-: Banque Indosuez SA v Ferromet Resources Inc [1993] BCLC 112, 117.\n\n30. In Crdit Suisse Fides Trust v Cuoghi [1998] QB 818, 827, Millett LJ said: In other areas of law, such as cross-border insolvency, commercial necessity has encouraged national courts to provide assistance to each other without waiting for such co-operation to be sanctioned by international convention . . . It is becoming widely\n\nH\n\nG\n\n### 1694 Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) [2015] AC v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Lord Sumption JSC\n\naccepted that comity between the courts of di›erent countries requires mutual respect for the territorial integrity of each others jurisdiction, but that this should not inhibit a court in one jurisdiction from rendering whatever assistance it properly can to a court in another in respect of assets located or persons resident within the territory of the former.- A\n\n31. The common law assistance cases have been concerned with such matters as the vesting of English assets in a foreign o–ce-holder, or the staying of local proceedings, or orders for examination in support of the foreign proceedings, or orders for the remittal of assets to a foreign liquidation, and have involved cases in which the foreign court was a court of competent jurisdiction in the sense that the bankrupt was domiciled in the foreign country or, if a company, was incorporated there . . . B\n\n33. One group of cases involved local proceedings which were stayed or orders which were discharged because of foreign insolvency proceedings. Thus in Banque Indosuez SA v Ferromet Resources Inc [1993] BCLC 112 an English injunction against a Texas corporation in Chapter 11 proceedings was discharged; cf In re African Farms Ltd [1906] TS 373 (execution in Transvaal by creditor in proceedings against English company in liquidation in England stayed by Transvaal court), applied in Turners & Growers Exporters Ltd v The Ship Cornelis Verolme [1997] 2 NZLR 110 (Belgian shipowner in Belgian bankruptcy: ship released from arrest); Modern Terminals (Berth 5) Ltd v States Steamship Co [1979] HKLR 512 (stay in Hong Kong of execution against Nevada corporation in Chapter 11 proceedings in United States federal court in California), followed in CCIC Finance Ltd v Guangdong International Trust & Investment Corpn [2005] 2 HKC 589 (stay of Hong Kong proceedings against Chinese state-owned enterprise in Mainland insolvency). Cases of judicial assistance in the traditional sense include In re Impex Services Worldwide Ltd [2004] BPIR 564, where a Manx order for examination and production of documents was made in aid of the provisional liquidation in England of an English company.-- C D E\n\nIn the Boards opinion, the principle of modied universalism is part of the common law, but it is necessary to bear in mind, rst, that it is subject to local law and local public policy and, secondly, that the court can only ever act within the limits of its own statutory and common law powers. What are those limits? In the absence of a relevant statutory power, they must depend on the common law, including any proper development of the common law. The question how far it is appropriate to develop the common law so as to recognise an equivalent power does not admit of a single, universal answer. It depends on the nature of the power that the court is being asked to exercise. On this appeal, the Board proposes to conne itself to the particular form of assistance which is sought in this case, namely an order for the production of information by an entity within the personal jurisdiction of the Bermuda court. The fate of that application depends on whether, there being no statutory power to order production, there is an inherent power at common law do so. F G H\n\n20 The fundamental question is whether a power of compulsion of this kind requires a statutory basis. For this purpose, it is important to distinguish between evidence and information. By evidence, the Board\n\n# [2015] AC Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Singularis Holdings Ltd v Lord Sumption JSC\n\n- means evidence to prove facts in legal proceedings. The power to compel a person to give evidence in legal proceedings was not originally statutory. Like the power to order discovery, it was an inherent power of the Court of Chancery, devised by judges to remedy the technical and procedural limitations associated with the proof of fact in courts of common law. In England, it was rst put on a statutory basis by the Perjury Act 1563 (5 Eliz A\n- 1, c 9), which extended the power to issue a subpoena ad testicandum to all courts of record. In Bermuda, its basis is now section 4 of the Evidence Act 1905. The origins of these powers in the procedural history of the English courts go some way to explain why those courts have always disclaimed any inherent power to compel the furnishing of evidence for use in foreign proceedings: see Bent v Young (1838) 9 Sim 180, 192 (Shadwell V-C); Dreyfus v Peruvian Guano Co (1889) 41 Ch D 151; R (Omar) v Secretary of B\n- State for Foreign and Commonwealth A›airs [2013] 1 All ER 161 (Divisional Court), paras 58—63. No such power existed in England until it was created by statute, initially by the Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act 1856 (19 & 20 Vict c 113). C\n\n21 What is sought in this case, however, is not evidence for use in forensic proceedings but information required for the performance of the liquidatorsordinary duty of identifying and taking possession of assets of\n\n- the company. In R (Omar) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth A›airs [2014] QB 112, para 12 the Court of Appeal doubted whether the distinction between evidence and information was helpful, and their doubt was probably justied in that case, where information was being sought for use in foreign proceedings. But the distinction is of broader legal signicance. The courts have never been as D\n- inhibited in their willingness to develop appropriate remedies to require the provision of information when a su–ciently compelling legal policy calls for it. E\n\n22 The classic modern illustration is the jurisdiction recognised by the House of Lords in Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Comrs [1974] AC 133. The House, drawing mainly on the earlier decisions in Orr v Diaper (1876) 4 Ch D 92; 25 WR 23 and Upmann v Elkan (1871) LR 12 Eq\n\n- 140; LR 7 Ch App 130, recognised a common law power to order the production of information about the identity of a wrongdoer where the defendant had been involved, even innocently, in the wrong. Such an order, as they recognised, would not have been available to compel the giving of evidence, because of the long-standing objection of courts of equity to a bill of discovery against a mere witness--: see, in particular, pp 173—174 (Lord F\n- Reid). In Smith Kline and French Laboratories Ltd v Global Pharmaceutics Ltd [1986] RPC 394 the Court of Appeal in England applied the same principle to information about the identity of a wrongdoer outside the jurisdiction. These decisions were founded not on the procedural requirements for proving facts in English litigation, but on the recognition of a duty to provide the information in certain circumstances. The duty of a person who had become involved in anothers wrongdoing was held [1974] G\n- AC 133, 175 (Lord Reid) to be to assist the person who has been wronged by giving him full information and disclosing the identity of the wrongdoers--; cf p 195 (Lord Cross of Chelsea). It is, however, clear that this duty was of a somewhat notional kind. It was not a legal duty in the ordinary sense of the term. Failure to supply the information would not give H\n\n### 1696 Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) [2015] AC v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Lord Sumption JSC\n\nrise to an action for damages. The concept of duty was simply a way of saying that the court would require disclosure. Indeed, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest (pp 181—182) thought that the duty would not arise until the court had held that the conditions were satised. Viscount Dilhorne (p 190) agreed and so, it seems, did Lord Cross: p 198. Lord Kilbrandon, citing with apparent approval the South African decision in Colonial Government v Tatham (1902) 23 Natal LR 153, observed (p 205) that the duty lay rather on the court to make an order necessary to the administration of justice than on the respondent to satisfy some right existing in the plainti›.-- A B\n\n23 The present case is not a Norwich Pharmacal case. The signicance of Norwich Pharmacal in the present context is that it illustrates the capacity of the common law to develop a power in the court to compel the production of information when this is necessary to give e›ect to a recognised legal principle. In the Boards opinion, an analogous power arises in the present case. Relief is not being sought by way of assistance to a litigant who can rely on ordinary forensic procedures for the purpose. It is being sought by the o–cers of a foreign court. The principle of modied universalism is a recognised principle of the common law. It is founded on the public interest in the ability of foreign courts exercising insolvency jurisdiction in the place of the companys incorporation to conduct an orderly winding up of its a›airs on a worldwide basis, notwithstanding the territorial limits of their jurisdiction. The basis of that public interest is not only comity, but a recognition that in a world of global businesses it is in the interest of every country that companies with transnational assets and operations should be capable of being wound up in an orderly fashion under the law of the place of their incorporation and on a basis that will be recognised and e›ective internationally. This is a public interest which has no equivalent in cases where information may be sought for commercial purposes or for ordinary adversarial litigation. The courts have repeatedly recognised not just a right but a duty to assist in whatever way they properly can. The Bermuda court has properly recognised the status of the liquidators as o–cers of that court. The liquidators require the information for the performance of the ordinary functions attaching to that status. Their acknowledged right to take possession of the companys worldwide assets is of little use without the ability to identify and locate them, if necessary with the assistance of the court. The information is unlikely to be available in any other way. None of the reasons which account for the common laws inhibition about the compulsory provision of evidence have any bearing on the present question. The right and duty to assist foreign o–ce-holders which the courts have acknowledged on a number of occasions would be an empty formula if it were conned to recognising the companys title to its assets in the same way as any other legal person who has acquired title under a foreign law, or to recognising the o–ce-holders right to act on the companys behalf in the same way as any other agent of a company appointed in accordance with the law of its incorporation. The recognition by a domestic court of the status of a foreign liquidator would mean very little if it entitled him to take possession of the companys assets but left him with no e›ective means of identifying or locating them. C D E F G H\n\n24 There are two reported cases in which an order for the production of documents or information has been made by way of common law assistance to a foreign court. The rst is Moolman v Builders & Developers (Pty) Ltd\n\n# [2015] AC Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Singularis Holdings Ltd v Lord Sumption JSC\n\n- [1990] 2 All SA 77 (A), a decision of the Supreme Court of South Africa. The appeal arose out of the winding up in the Transkei of a company incorporated there, at a period of South African history when the Transkei was in law a foreign country. The liquidator sought an order of the South African court for the examination of certain persons in South Africa with a view to locating assets of the company. Such an order would have been available to him by statute if there had been an ancillary liquidation in South A\n- Africa, but there was no statutory power to wind up this particular company in South Africa. The court held that a power to make such an order at common law was within the principle of In re African Farms Ltd [1906] TS 373. The second case is In re Impex Services Worldwide Ltd [2004] BPIR 564, a decision of the High Court of the Isle of Man. Section 206 of the Isle of Man Companies Act 1931 conferred a power to order an examination but B\n- only in relation to a Manx company. Deemster Doyle nevertheless gave e›ect by way of common law judicial assistance to a letter of request of the High Court in England seeking the examination of persons in the Isle of Man on behalf of the liquidator of an English company. The Board would not wish to endorse all of the reasoning given in these judgments, in particular those parts which appear to support the concept of applying statutory powers by mere analogy in cases outside their scope. But the Board considers that the decisions themselves were correct in principle. C D\n\n25 In the Boards opinion, there is a power at common law to assist a foreign court of insolvency jurisdiction by ordering the production of information in oral or documentary form which is necessary for the administration of a foreign winding up. In recognising the existence of such a power, the Board would not wish to encourage the promiscuous creation\n\n- of other common law powers to compel the production of information. The limits of this power are implicit in the reasons for recognising its existence. In the rst place, it is available only to assist the o–cers of a foreign court of insolvency jurisdiction or equivalent public o–cers. It would not, for example, be available to assist a voluntary winding up, which is essentially a private arrangement and although subject to the directions of the court is not E\n- conducted by or on behalf of an o–cer of the court. Secondly, it is a power of assistance. It exists for the purpose of enabling those courts to surmount the problems posed for a worldwide winding up of the companys a›airs by the territorial limits of each courts powers. It is not therefore available to enable them to do something which they could not do even under the law by which they were appointed. Thirdly, it is available only when it is necessary for the performance of the o–ce-holders functions. Fourth, the power is F\n- subject to the limitation in In re African Farms Ltd [1906] TS 373 and in HIH [2008] 1 WLR 852 and Rubin [2013] 1 AC 236, that such an order must be consistent with the substantive law and public policy of the assisting court, in this case that of Bermuda. It follows that it is not available for purposes which are properly the subject of other schemes for the compulsory provision of information. In particular, as the reasoning in Norwich Pharmacal [1974] AC 133 and R (Omar) v Secretary of State for Foreign and G\n- Commonwealth A›airs [2013] 1 All ER 161; [2014] QB 112 (at both levels) shows, common law powers of this kind are not a permissible mode of obtaining material for use in actual or anticipated litigation. That eld is covered by rules of forensic procedure and statutory provisions for obtaining evidence in foreign jurisdictions which liquidators, like other litigants or H\n\n### 1698 Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) [2015] AC v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Lord Sumption JSC\n\npotential litigants, must accept with all their limitations. Moreover, in some jurisdictions, it may well be contrary to domestic public policy to make an order which there would be no power to make in a domestic insolvency. Finally, as with other powers of compulsion exercisable against an innocent third party, its exercise is conditional on the applicant being prepared to pay the third partys reasonable costs of compliance. A\n\n26 Order 11, rule 1(2) of the Rules of the Bermuda Supreme Court (as applied by order 11, rule 9(1)) authorises the service of an originating summons, petition, notice of motion or similar originating process out of the jurisdiction without leave in respect of any claim which by virtue of any enactment the court has power to hear and determine--. Because the common law power of the court to compel the production of information in aid of a foreign liquidation is not statutory nor derived from any analogy with the statute, this rule had no application to it. There is a more general power to serve originating process (other than a writ) out of the jurisdiction with the leave of the court under Order 11, rule 9(4), but it is not exercisable against persons whose engagement in the a›airs of a foreign company has no connection with Bermuda and there is no implicit statutory authority for such a course: see In re Seagull Manufacturing Co Ltd [1993] Ch 345. It follows that on any view the Chief Justice had no power to authorise the service out of the jurisdiction on Mr Suddaby or other partners or o–cers of PwC who were not within the jurisdiction of the court. The most that he could do, in a case within the ambit of the power, was order PwC, as the only party present within the jurisdiction, to comply for their own part and to take reasonable steps to procure the co-operation of others. B C D\n\n# Application to the present case\n\n27 The Board has summarised the limitations on the common law power to compel the production of information. Of these limitations, two are potentially relevant in the case of Singularis.\n\n28 The rst arises from PwCs argument that the order sought against them is not consistent with the law or public policy of Bermuda, because the statutory power to compel the production of information under section 195 of the Bermuda Companies Act impliedly excludes the possibility of an equivalent power at common law. The argument is that because section 195 is limited to cases where the company is being wound up in Bermuda, it would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme to recognise a common law power which, if it existed, would be subject to no such limitation. The Board is not persuaded by this. The existence of a statutory power covering part of the same ground may impliedly exclude a common law power covering the whole of it. But it does not necessarily do so. An implied exclusion of non-statutory remedies arises only where the statutory scheme can be said to occupy the eld. This will normally be the case if the subsistence of the common law power would undermine the operation of the statutory one, usually by circumventing limitations or exceptions to the statutory power which are an integral part of the underlying legislative policy: see Deutsche Morgan Grenfell Group plc v Inland Revenue Comrs [2007] 1 AC 558, para 19 (Lord Ho›mann); R (Child Poverty Action Group) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2011] 2 AC 15, paras 27—34 (Lord Dyson JSC). There is, however, no reason to suppose that the limitation of the power under section 195 of the Companies Act to F G H\n\nE\n\nH\n\n## [2015] AC Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Singularis Holdings Ltd v Lord Sumption JSC\n\ncompanies in the course of winding up in Bermuda reects a legislative policy adverse to assisting foreign courts of insolvency jurisdiction. It simply reects the limits of the ambit of the Act. The relevant provisions of the Act have been analysed in the advice of the Board in PricewaterhouseCoopers v Saad Investments Co Ltd [2014] 1 WLR 4482. In summary, the e›ect of section 4 is that it applies to companies incorporated in Bermuda or authorised to carry on business there. However, the fact that express provision is made for the powers exercisable on the winding up of companies to which the Act applies, does not in the Boards opinion exclude the use of common law powers in relation to other companies which lie outside the scope of the statute altogether. A B\n\n29 The second limitation which is relevant presents more formidable problems for the joint liquidators. The material which they seek in Bermuda would not be obtainable under the law of the Cayman Islands pursuant to which the winding up is being carried out there. Where a domestic court has a power to grant ancillary relief in support of the proceedings of a foreign court, it is not necessarily an objection to its exercise that the foreign court had no power to make a corresponding order itself. Thus in Crdit Suisse Fides Trust SA v Cuoghi [1998] QB 818, the English court made a worldwide Mareva injunction in support of Swiss proceedings against C\n\n- Mr Cuoghi in circumstances where the Swiss court could not have made such an order. But that decision cannot be taken to reect a universal principle. The critical factors which justied the order in that case were that there was an unqualied statutory power to give ancillary relief and that the Swiss courts inability to make the order was due to the fact that Mr Cuoghi was not resident in Switzerland whereas he was resident in England. Rather D\n- di›erent considerations apply to the common law power with which the Board is presently concerned. Its whole juridical basis is the right and duty of the Bermuda court to assist the Cayman court so far as it properly can. It is right for the Bermuda court, within the limits of its own inherent powers, to assist the o–cers of the Cayman court to transcend the territorial limits of that courts jurisdiction by enabling them to do in Bermuda that which they E\n- could do in the Cayman Islands. But the order sought would not constitute assistance, because it is not just the limits of the territorial reach of the Cayman courts powers which impede the liquidators work, but the limited nature of the powers themselves. The Cayman court has no power to require third parties to provide to its o–ce-holders anything other than information belonging to the company. It does not appear to the Board to be a proper use of the power of assistance to make good a limitation on the powers of a F\n- foreign court of insolvency jurisdiction under its own law. This was in substance the ground on which the liquidators failed in the Court of Appeal when they characterised the present application as forum shopping--. In the opinion of the Board it is correct. G\n\n30 The liquidators have not contended at any stage of this litigation that the order which they seek can be justied at common law independently of the power of the Bermuda court to assist a foreign court of insolvency jurisdiction. Moreover, they have accepted before the Board that the information which they seek belongs to PwC and was therefore properly excluded from the order made by the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands. Whether this was correct was not therefore a point argued before the Board. None the less, the Board would not wish to part with this case without\n\n### 1700 Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) [2015] AC v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Lord Sumption JSC\n\nexpressing their doubts about whether information which PwC acquired solely in their capacity as the companys auditors can be regarded as belonging exclusively to them simply because the documents in which they recorded that information are their working papers and as such their property. A\n\n# Conclusion\n\n31 The Board will humbly advise Her Majesty that this appeal should be dismissed.\n\n# LORD COLLINS OF MAPESBURY\n\n# Introduction\n\n32 In my opinion the appeal should be dismissed because the ground on which the joint liquidators based their appeal is unsupportable, namely that the court has at common law the ability to exercise powers which are analogous to statutory powers which would have been exercisable in the case of a domestic insolvency, but which do not apply in the international context. This opinion is intended to explain why that conclusion is inescapable in the light of the relationship between the judiciary and the legislature.\n\n33 As the Supreme Court conrmed in Rubin v Euronance SA (Picard intervening) [2013] 1 AC 236 the court has a common law power to assist foreign winding up proceedings so far as it properly can. In my view, in common with Lord Sumption JSC and despite Lord Mance JSCs powerful opinion to the contrary, the Bermuda court has the power to make an order against persons subject to its personal jurisdiction in favour of foreign liquidators for production of information for the purpose of identifying and locating assets of the company, provided they have a similar right under the domestic law of the court which appointed them. I therefore agree with Lord Sumption JSC that this was not a proper case for exercise of that power.\n\n34 The existence of a common law power to order information (otherwise than by analogy with local statutory powers) was not pursued by the liquidators on the appeal, and it was virtually disclaimed by them until questioning by the Board (quoted in Lord Mance JSCs opinion at para 128) may have led them to adopt it as a subsidiary basis for their appeal. F\n\n35 Consequently the parties are entitled to have the views of the Board on the argument which was actually put before it, in essence whether Cambridge Gas Transportation Corpn v O–cial Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc [2007] 1 AC 508 (Cambridge Gas--) correctly decided that the court has a common law power to assist foreign winding up proceedings by exercising powers which are analogous to statutory powers which would have been exercisable in the case of a domestic insolvency, but do not apply to the international insolvency.\n\n36 The primary way in which the case was put by the liquidators was that the common law develops to meet changing circumstances and that in international insolvencies the common law should be developed by the adoption of a principle that where local legislation does not provide for relevant assistance to a foreign o–ce holder, the legislation should be applied by analogy as if-the foreign insolvency were a local insolvency.\n\nB\n\nD\n\nC\n\nE\n\nG\n\nH\n\n# [2015] AC Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Singularis Holdings Ltd v Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\nThis argument was accepted by the Chief Justice. But it involves a fundamental misunderstanding of the limits of the judicial law-making power, and should not go unanswered. A\n\n37 A second reason for dealing with the main point of the liquidators- appeal was that the question whether local legislation could be applied by analogy arose in an appeal in the Cayman Islands Court of Appeal, and that court gave only an interim judgment pending the decision of this Board on\n\n- this appeal: Picard v Primeo Fund 2013 (1) CILR 164. That case, as will appear below, involved anti-avoidance proceedings for the recovery of assets, and not (as in the present case) proceedings to obtain information to recover assets. On the principal argument of the liquidators, there is no material di›erence between this case and the Cayman Islands case. In each case the argument was that the local legislation should, if it does not apply B\n- according to its terms (and there is a question about this in the Cayman Islands case), be applied by analogy or on an as if- basis. The Board took the view that it would be failing in its duty if it did not reach this question on this appeal, and simply left the Cayman Islands Court of Appeal to decide the matter with a possible further appeal to the Privy Council. That appeal has recently been settled, but the point of principle may still arise. C\n- 38 In my judgment the answer to the present appeal is to be found in the following propositions. First, there is a principle of the common law that the court has the power to recognise and grant assistance to foreign insolvency proceedings. Second, that power is primarily exercised through the existing powers of the court. Third, those powers can be extended or developed from existing powers through the traditional judicial law-making techniques of the common law. Fourth, the very limited application of legislation by analogy does not allow the judiciary to extend the scope of insolvency legislation to cases where it does not apply. Fifth, in consequence, those powers do not extend to the application, by analogy as if- the foreign insolvency were a domestic insolvency, of statutory powers which do not actually apply in the instant case. D E\n\n### The practical issue\n\nF\n\n39 Both the Cayman Islands and Bermuda have statutory provisions for the examination of persons connected with an insolvent company. In England the statutory power is contained in the Insolvency Act 1986, section 236.\n\n40 This is an exclusively statutory power, which goes back a very long way. As early as the Statute of Bankrupts Act 1542 (34 & 35 Hen 8, c 4), the authorities (including, among others, the lord chancellor and the chief justices) were given power to examine on oath persons who were suspected of having property (including debts) belonging to the debtor. The Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 (7 & 8 Vict c 110) gave a similar power to the court in the case of companies, and there is a continuous line of statutory authority in both corporate and personal insolvency conrming (and extending) the power thereafter to the present day. G H\n\n41 The provisions of neither the Cayman Islands nor Bermuda statutes apply to the material sought by the liquidators in this case. That is because: (1) the power in section 103 of the Cayman Islands Companies Law to order any person, whether or not resident in the Cayman Islands, who has a relevant connection with a company in liquidation (including its former\n\n### Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) [2015] AC v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\nauditor) to transfer or deliver up to the liquidator any property or documents belonging to the company- extends only to material belonging to the companies (subject to what Lord Sumption JSC says at para 29); and (2) the power to summon persons suspected of having property of company etc- in section 195 of the Companies Act 1981 of Bermuda does not apply because the power is exercisable only in respect of a company which that court has ordered to be wound up, and in the SICL appeal the Board has advised that the winding up order must be stayed because the court has no jurisdiction to wind up a company incorporated outside Bermuda, to which Part XIII of the Companies Act is not expressly applied: PricewaterhouseCoopers v Saad Investments Co Ltd [2014] 1 WLR 4482. A B\n\n42 The problem in this and other similar or analogous cases has arisen largely in relation to those British colonies, dependencies, and overseas territories, such as Bermuda, and the Isle of Man, which do not have the statutory powers to assist foreign o–ce-holders which exist under United Kingdom law. Consequently, except in a rare situation to which I will revert, the practical result of this appeal is largely conned to such countries, or those countries (such as the Cayman Islands) where the extent of the statutory powers is controversial. C\n\n43 Some of these territories do have such powers. The British Virgin Islands has given e›ect to the UNCITRAL Model Law in the Insolvency Act 2003, Part XIX, which contains powers to assist foreign o–ce-holders, but only from countries or territories which are designated by the Financial Services Commission. There are nine such countries or territories, including the United States and the United Kingdom. Section 470 of the Insolvency Act 2003 preserves the power of the court to provide assistance under any other rule of law. D E\n\n44 The Cayman Islands Companies Law, section 241, gives the court power to make orders ancillary to a foreign bankruptcy proceeding (including the power to require a person in possession of information relating to the business or a›airs of a bankrupt: section 241(1)(d)). But the application of these powers to anti-avoidance proceedings has been controversial. The Cayman Islands Court of Appeal reserved pending the outcome of this appeal the question whether the anti-avoidance provisions of its law can be used at common law (in addition to, or alternatively to, its statutory power to do so) in aid of a US bankruptcy proceeding: Picard v Primeo Fund 2014 (1) CILR 379. As mentioned above, the appeal has recently been settled.\n\n45 In the United Kingdom, except where the EU Insolvency Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings (OJ 2000 L160, p 1)) applies, the English court has a very wide power to wind up foreign companies, and where a foreign company is being wound up in England the liquidator is generally free to invoke the relevant provisions of the Insolvency Act 1986 in discharge of his functions, which would include the power to ask for examination under the Insolvency Act 1986, section 236. G H\n\n46 Where the foreign company is not being wound up in England, under the Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006 (SI 2006/1030), which give e›ect to the UNCITRAL Model Law, the court may co-operate to the maximum extent possible with foreign courts or foreign representatives: article 25(1). By article 21(1) of the 2006 Regulations, on recognition of a\n\nF\n\n# [2015] AC Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Singularis Holdings Ltd v Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\n- foreign proceeding, the English court may grant appropriate relief, including the examination of witnesses, and the taking of evidence or the delivery of information concerning (inter alia) the debtors assets. Secondary proceedings may be opened in the United Kingdom, but only where the debtor has an establishment in the United Kingdom and only as regards assets in the United Kingdom. A\n- 47 Under section 426 of the Insolvency Act 1986 the English court with jurisdiction in relation to insolvency is to assist the courts having the corresponding jurisdiction in any other part of the United Kingdom or any relevant country or territory-- (section 426(4)) by applying the law of either jurisdiction (section 426(5), a very di–cult section: see Dicey, Morris & Collins, Conict of Laws, 15th ed (2012), vol 2, para 30-110 et seq). These powers apply to only a limited numbers of countries (including Australia, the Bahamas, and the Isle of Man). B C\n\n48 An order for examination may be made under this section in aid of a foreign liquidation. In England v Smith [2001] Ch 419 it was held, in a case of an order for examination under Australian law of a person concerned with the a›airs of a company, that application of the law of the requesting state should not be circumscribed by limitations to be found in the corresponding provisions of section 236 of the 1986 Act unless some principle of English public policy were infringed.\n\n49 Where the EU Insolvency Regulation applies, a foreign o–ceholder may exercise all the powers conferred on him by the law of the state of the opening of proceedings: article 18(1).\n\n50 Accordingly the statutory powers of the UK courts to assist foreign o–ce-holders to trace assets are very extensive. It follows that the existence of a common law power to order examination will almost certainly never arise in England, and the same is true of the other statutory powers of which foreign o–ce-holders may wish to take advantage. This is subject to what is said below about In re Phoenix Kapitaldienst GmbH [2013] Ch 61, where clawback under the Insolvency Act 1986, section 423 (transactions at an undervalue) was sought and granted, in a case where the EU Insolvency Regulation did not apply because the German company involved was an investment undertaking; the UNCITRAL Model Law did not apply because the 2006 Regulations were not in e›ect at the relevant time; and Germany was not a relevant country for the purposes of section 426(4). E F\n\n# Assistance at common law in international insolvency\n\n51 The UK Supreme Court accepted, and re-conrmed, in Rubin v Euronance SA [2013] 1 AC 236 that at common law the court has power to recognise and grant assistance to foreign insolvency proceedings: para 29. G\n\n52 In my judgment in Rubin v Euronance SA, at para 29, I quoted what Millett LJ had said in Crdit Suisse Fides Trust v Cuoghi [1998] QB 818, 827:\n\nH\n\nD\n\nIn other areas of law, such as cross-border insolvency, commercial necessity has encouraged national courts to provide assistance to each other without waiting for such co-operation to be sanctioned by international convention . . . It is becoming widely accepted that comity between the courts of di›erent countries requires mutual respect for the territorial integrity of each others jurisdiction, but that this should not\n\n## Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) [2015] AC v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\nH\n\ninhibit a court in one jurisdiction from rendering whatever assistance it properly can to a court in another in respect of assets located or persons resident within the territory of the former.-- A\n\n53 The common thread in those cases in which assistance has been given is the application or extension of the existing common law or statutory powers of the court.\n\n54 Most of the cases fall into one of two categories. The rst group consists of cases where the common law or procedural powers of the court have been used to stay proceedings or the enforcement of judgments. Several of these cases were mentioned in Rubin v Euronance SA [2013] 1 AC 236, para 33. They include (subject to what is said below)In re African Farms Ltd [1906] TS 373, where execution in Transvaal by a creditor in proceedings against an English company in liquidation in England was stayed by the Transvaal court, which was applied in Turners & Growers Exporters Ltd v The Ship Cornelis Verolme [1997] 2 NZLR 110 (Belgian shipowner in Belgian bankruptcy: ship released from arrest); and Banque Indosuez SA v Ferromet Resources Inc [1993] BCLC 112, where an English injunction against a Texas corporation in Chapter 11 proceedings was discharged; and two cases in Hong Kong: Modern Terminals (Berth 5) Ltd v States Steamship Co [1979] HKLR 512 (stay in Hong Kong of execution against Nevada corporation in Chapter 11 proceedings in United States federal court in California), followed in CCIC Finance Ltd v Guangdong International Trust & Investment Corpn [2005] 2 HKC 589 (stay of Hong Kong proceedings against Chinese state-owned enterprise in Mainland insolvency). B C D\n\n55 In my judgment too much has been read into In re African Farms Ltd [1906] TS 373. It was not mentioned in any English case until it was cited in argument in In re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 10) [1997] Ch 213, 219, for the proposition that the English court will not allow funds to be transmitted to the jurisdiction of the foreign court of the principal winding up without rst making provision for the local secured, preferential and statutory creditors, and then subsequently approved in Cambridge Gas. It had never been mentioned in the classic company law texts, Buckley, Gore-Browne, and Palmer (nor in Williams on Bankruptcy), nor in Fletcher, Insolvency in Private International Law, 2nd ed (2005). It received only a passing mention in the successive editions of Forsyth on South African private international law now called Private International Law: The Modern Roman-Dutch Law (now 5th ed (2012), p 456), although it has been mentioned (obiter) with approval by the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa: Gurr v Zambia Airways Corpn Ltd [1998] 2 All SA 479 (A). E F G\n\n56 Apart from the stay of execution ordered against a secured creditor (Standard Bank) which had obtained a judgment, the only part of the order in In re African Farms Ltd [1906] TS 373 which is relevant for present purposes is the order that all questions of mortgage or preference be regulated by Transvaal law as if the company had been placed in liquidation in the Transvaal. It is not stated how that was to be achieved, but it is signicant that Innes CJ said, at p 382: Such conditions are not easy to devise; and it is possible that to place the foreign liquidator in such a position as to ensure beyond doubt a distribution such as I have indicated would require reciprocal legislation in the two countries--. Even though the company could not have been wound up in the Transvaal, the decision is\n\n# [2015] AC Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Singularis Holdings Ltd v Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\ncertainly not authority for the proposition that local statutory law may be applied by analogy. A\n\n57 In re Impex Services Worldwide Ltd [2004] BPIR 564 also falls into the category of the use or extension of the existing powers of the court. In that case a Manx order for examination and production of documents was made in aid of the provisional liquidation in England of an English company.\n\n- That was referred to in Rubin v Euronance SA [2013] 1 AC 236, para 33 as a case of judicial assistance in the traditional sense because the order was based on a request by the English court, but the decision was not the subject of examination before the Supreme Court and cannot be said to have been approved by it. The request could not be accommodated under the Manx Companies Act 1931, or under the inherent jurisdiction of the court, but the order was made at common law without articulation of its basis. B\n- 58 A second group of cases is where the statutory powers of the court have been used in aid of foreign insolvencies. The best known example is the use of the long-standing power to wind up foreign companies which are being wound up (or even have been dissolved) in the country of incorporation. In In re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 10) [1997] Ch 213 Sir Richard Scott V-C conducted an exhaustive C\n- analysis of the cases on ancillary liquidations, and concluded (at p 246): (1) Where a foreign company was in liquidation in its country of incorporation, a winding up order made in England would normally be regarded as giving rise to a winding up ancillary to that being conducted in the country of incorporation. (2) The winding up in England would be ancillary in the sense that it would not be within the power of the English D\n- liquidators to get in and realise all the assets of the company worldwide: they would necessarily have to concentrate on getting in and realising the English assets. (3) Since in order to achieve a pari passu distribution between all the companys creditors it would be necessary for there to be a pooling of the companys assets worldwide and for a dividend to be declared out of the assets comprised in that pool, the winding up in England would be ancillary E\n- in the sense, also, that it would be the liquidators in the principal liquidation who would be best placed to declare the dividend and to distribute the assets in the pool accordingly. (4) None the less, the ancillary character of an English winding up did not relieve an English court of the obligation to apply English law, including English insolvency law, to the resolution of any issue arising in the winding up which was brought before the court. F\n- 59 In re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 852 also falls within this category because the majority in the House of Lords decided that the power of the English court to accede to the letter of request from the Australian court, inviting it to direct the English provisional liquidators to remit the assets in their hands to the Australian liquidators derives from section 426 of the Insolvency Act 1986. G\n\n60 As part of the majority in HIH Lord Scott of Foscote (at para 59) re-a–rmed what he had said in In re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 10) [1997] Ch 213: H\n\nThe English courts have a statutory obligation in an English winding up to apply the English statutory scheme and have, in my opinion, in respectful disagreement with my noble and learned friend Lord Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\n1706\n\nSingularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) [2015] AC v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC)\n\nHo›mann, no inherent jurisdiction to deprive creditors proving in an English liquidation of their statutory rights under that scheme.-- A\n\nSee also Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury at para 72.\n\n## The liquidators argument and the Chief Justices decision\n\n61 The primary argument of the liquidators before the Board, which had found favour with the Chief Justice as the principal ground of his decision (which he described as more principled- at para 49), was that the Bermuda court should apply directly the examination provisions of section 195 of the Companies Act 1981 by analogy. B\n\n62 That was said to be based on what Lord Ho›mann had said in Cambridge Gas [2007] 1 AC 508, para 22:\n\nWhat are the limits of the assistance which the court can give? . . . At common law, their Lordships think it is doubtful whether assistance could take the form of applying provisions of the foreign insolvency law which form no part of the domestic system. But the domestic court must at least be able to provide assistance by doing whatever it could have done in the case of a domestic insolvency. The purpose of recognition is to enable the foreign o–ce holder or the creditors to avoid having to start parallel insolvency proceedings and to give them the remedies to which they would have been entitled if the equivalent proceedings had taken place in the domestic forum.-- C\n\n63 In the Court of Appeal in the present case Auld JA had described the development of the common law jurisdiction to grant assistance to a foreign liquidator as if the foreign company were being wound up locally as amounting to impermissible legislation from the bench.-- In answer, the liquidators in their argument to the Board relied on many dicta to the e›ect that the common law develops to meet changing circumstances.\n\n64 In my view to apply insolvency legislation by analogy as if- it applied, even though it does not actually apply, would go so far beyond the traditional judicial development of the common law as to be a plain usurpation of the legislative function.\n\n## Judicial law-making\n\n65 The liquidators are plainly right to say that the common law develops, sometimes radically, to meet changing circumstances. It hardly requires citation of authority to make that point. No one now doubts that judges make law, although English and Scottish judges were slow to acknowledge it until the seminal writings by Lords Reid, Denning and Devlin, citation of which is unnecessary. But there are limits to their power to make law. In Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 AC 349, 378 Lord Go› of Chieveley said:\n\nWhen a judge decides a case which comes before him, he does so on the basis of what he understands the law to be. This he discovers from the applicable statutes, if any, and from precedents drawn from reports of previous judicial decisions. Nowadays, he derives much assistance from academic writings in interpreting statutes and, more especially, the e›ect of reported cases; and he has regard, where appropriate, to decisions of\n\nD\n\nE\n\nF\n\nG\n\nH\n\nD\n\nE\n\n# [2015] AC Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Singularis Holdings Ltd v Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\n- judges in other jurisdictions. In the course of deciding the case before him he may, on occasion, develop the common law in the perceived interests of justice, though as a general rule he does this only interstitially, to use the expression of OW Holmes J in Southern Pacic Co v Jensen (1917) 244 US 205, 221. This means not only that he must act within the connes of the doctrine of precedent, but that the change so made must be seen as a development, usually a very modest development, of existing principle and so can take its place as a congruent part of the common law as a whole. In this process, what Maitland has called the seamless web,- and I myself (The Search for Principle, Proc Brit Acad vol LXIX (1983) 170, 186) have called the mosaic, of the common law, is kept in a constant state of adaptation and repair . . .-- A B\n- 66 What Justice Holmes said in the passage to which Lord Go› referred was: . . . I recognise without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially.-- The point was developed by Justice Cardozo in The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921), at pp 103, 113: C\n\nWe must keep within those interstitial limits which precedent and custom and the long and silent and almost indenable practice of other judges through the centuries of the common law have set to judge-made innovations . . . We do not pick our rules of law full-blossomed from the trees . . . [The judge] legislates only between gaps. He lls the open spaces in the law . . .--\n\n67 More recently similar points have been made by eminent judges of our time. Judge Richard Posner said in How Judges Think (2008), p 86: The amount of legislating that a judge does depends on the breadth of his zone of reasonablenessthe area within which he has discretion to decide a case either way without disgracing himself.--\n\n68 And Lord Bingham of Cornhill said, in The Business of Judging (2000), p 32: On the whole, the law advances in small steps, not by giant bounds.--\n\n69 The approach which is articulated by Lord Sumption JSC is itself an example of the development of the common law since, as Lord Mance JSCs opinion clearly shows, it goes beyond what has previously been understood to be the power of the court to order information. F\n\n# The judiciary and legislation\n\n70 But that is not the issue on this part of the appeal, which is whether, as the liquidators argue, legislation may be extended by the judiciary to apply to cases where the legislature has not applied it. It raises a much more radical question than the familiar question whether a common law rule should be extended or developed or whether the extension or development should be left to Parliament. G\n\n71 The latter question arises frequently and yields di›erent answers. In the human rights context, it was the subject of intense debate in the recent case on assisted suicide: R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice (CNK Alliance Ltd intervening) [2015] AC 657. In the private law area, for example, the majority in Jones v Kaney [2011] 2 AC 398 decided to remove immunity from expert witnesses. The minority thought that that was a question which should be left to consideration by the Law Commission and reform by Parliament. H\n\n' 2015 The Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for England and Wales\n\n### Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) [2015] AC v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\n72 By contrast, in Rubin v Euronance SA [2013] 1 AC 236 the majority considered that a change in the law relating to foreign judgments to apply a di›erent rule (removing the need for a jurisdictional basis) in the context of insolvency was a matter for the legislature. Similarly members of the present Board have at various times made the same point in other contexts: Prest v Prest [2013] 2 AC 415, para 83 (Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury PSC); Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation v Revenue and Customs Comrs (formerly Inland Revenue Comrs) [2012] 2 AC 337, para 200 (Lord Sumption JSC); Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd (Revenue and Customs Comrs intervening) [2012] 1 AC 383, para 174 (Lord Mance JSC). A B\n\n73 But I emphasise that that is not the issue here. Nor is the issue the question whether legislation may inuence the development of a common law rule. A famous early example where that was regarded as legitimate was R v Bourne [1939] 1 KB 687, where a direction was given that the eminent obstetrician Aleck Bourne was entitled as a defence to an abortion charge to rely by analogy on the provision of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 that infanticide could be justied to preserve the life of the mother. C\n\n74 The question of the extent to which statutes may inuence the development of the common law is a well known and controversial one. Professor Atiyah addressed the questions in this way (Common Law and Statute Law-- (1985) 48 MLR 1, 6): D\n\nis [it] possible for the courts to take account of statute law, in the very development of the common law itself? Can the courts, for instance, use statutes as analogies for the purpose of developing the common law? Can they justify jettisoning obsolete cases, not because they have been actually reversed by some statutory provision, but because a statute suggests that they are based on outdated values? Could the courts legitimately draw some general principle from a limited statutory provision, and apply that principle as a matter of common law?--\n\n75 In each of those situations it is not di–cult to nd cases which justify the forms of reasoning which Professor Atiyah identies. But none of them comes anywhere near what the Board is asked to do in this case.\n\n76 Nor is the issue whether a statutory rule may be taken into account in the exercise of a discretion. An example is the use of statutory limitation periods in the exercise of the equitable doctrine of laches: P & O Nedlloyd BV v Arab Metals Co (No 2) [2007] 1 WLR 2288; Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria [2014] AC 1189, para 12.\n\n77 Nor is the issue whether the courts may develop the common law by entering or re-entering a eld regulated by legislation. As Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead said in In re McKerr [2004] 1 WLR 807, para 30, the courts have been slow to do that because otherwise there would inevitably be the prospect of the common law shaping powers and duties and provisions inconsistent with those prescribed by Parliament.--\n\nThe equity of a statute\n\n78 What the liquidators propose is very much more radical. It is that the court should apply legislation, which ex hypothesi does not apply, as if-- it applied.\n\nE\n\nG\n\nH\n\nF\n\n# [2015] AC Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Singularis Holdings Ltd v Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\n- 79 That proposition is reminiscent of the concept of the equity of a statute--. When used properly today, it means no more than interpreting a statute by reference to its purpose or the mischief which it was designed to cure: e g Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for England and Wales v Attorney General [1972] Ch 73, 88. A\n- 80 But it once meant something which has been relegated to the limbo of legal antiquities-- (Loyd, The Equity of a Statute-- (1909) 58 U Pa L Rev 76), and had been formulated in this way: Equitie is a construction made by the judges that cases out of the letter of a statute yet being within the same mischief or cause of the making of the same, shall be within the same remedy that the statute provideth . . .-- (Co Litt Lib I, Ch II, para 21, quoting Bracton). B\n- 81 Under that doctrine the courts felt themselves free to enlarge a statute so as to apply it to situations which were not covered by the words of the statute but were regarded by the courts as within its spirit and analogous: Burrows, The Relationship between Common Law and Statute in the Law of Obligations-- (2012) 128 LQR 232, 241; Atiyah, Common Law and Statute Law-- (1985) 48 MLR 1, 7—8. That concept of the equity of a statute- fell into disfavour in the 18th century and was abandoned by the beginning of the 19th century, and the judges were no longer able in e›ect to C D\n\t- exercise a direct legislative function.\n\n82 The liquidators argument is that the common law rule of assistance in insolvency matters extends to the application of local legislation even though as a matter of its legislative scope it does not apply to the case in hand. In the present case the argument is that, even if section 195 of the Companies Act 1981 does not apply to foreign companies, it should be\n\napplied by analogy or as if- the Cayman Islands company were a Bermuda company. E\n\n83 In my judgment, that argument is not only wrong in principle, but also profoundly contrary to the established relationship between the judiciary and the legislature. To the extent that it depends on some part of the opinion in Cambridge Gas [2007] 1 AC 508, that decision was not only\n\nwrong in its recognition of the New York order regulating the title to Manx shares, as decided in Rubin v Euronance SA [2013] 1 AC 236, it was also wrong to apply the Manx statutory provisions for approval of schemes of arrangement by analogy or as if- they applied. F\n\n# Cambridge Gas\n\n84 The essence of the decision in Cambridge Gas [2007] 1 AC 508 was that the New York order would be recognised, and would be given e›ect because a similar scheme could have been sanctioned as a scheme of arrangement under the Isle of Man law. G\n\n85 The facts of Cambridge Gas are set out in Rubin [2013] 1 AC 236, paras 36 et seq. For present purposes it is only necessary to recall that a gas transport shipping business venture ended in failure, and resulted in a\n\nChapter 11 proceeding in the US Bankruptcy Court in New York. The question for the Privy Council on appeal from the Isle of Man was whether an order of the New York court was entitled to implementation in the Isle of Man. The New York court had rejected the investors plan and accepted the bondholders plan. H\n\n### Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) [2015] AC v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\n86 The corporate structure of the business was that the investors owned, directly or indirectly, a Bahaman company called Vela Energy Holdings Ltd (Vela--). Vela owned (through an intermediate Bahaman holding company) Cambridge Gas, a Cayman Islands company. Cambridge Gas owned directly or indirectly about 70% of the shares of Navigator Holdings plc (Navigator--), an Isle of Man company. Navigator owned all the shares of an Isle of Man company which in turn owned companies which each owned one ship. A B\n\n87 The New York order vested the shares in Navigator (the Isle of Man company) in the creditors committee, which subsequently petitioned the Manx court for an order vesting the shares in their representatives. The Manx Sta› of Government Division acceded to this petition by making an order under the Manx Companies Act 1931, section 101, rectifying the share register by entering the creditors committee as shareholders. In the Privy Council [2007] 1 AC 508, para 23, Lord Ho›mann rejected this solution on this basis: the power was exercisable when the name of any person is, without su–cient cause, entered in or omitted from the register--. But for that purpose it was necessary to show that by the law of the Isle of Man the company was obliged to do so. The source of such an obligation could be found only in an order of the court, pursuant to its common law power of assistance, which required the company to make such an entry. Consequently, the argument based on section 101 was therefore circular. The prior question was whether the court has power to declare that the Chapter 11 plan should be carried into e›ect.\n\n88 The Privy Council held that the plan could be carried into e›ect in the Isle of Man. The reasoning was as follows. First, if the judgment had to be classied as in personam or in rem the appeal would have to be allowed, but bankruptcy proceedings did not fall into either category. Second, the principle of universality underlay the common law principles of judicial assistance in international insolvency, and those principles were su–cient to confer jurisdiction on the Manx court to assist, by doing whatever it could have done in the case of a domestic insolvency. Third, exactly the same result could have been achieved by a scheme of arrangement under the Isle of Man Companies Act 1931, section 152.\n\n89 In Rubin [2013] 1 AC 236, a majority of the Supreme Court (Lord Collins of Mapesbury with whom Lords Walker of Gestingthorpe and Sumption JJSC agreed) decided that Cambridge Gas was wrongly decided because the shares in Navigator owned by Cambridge Gas (a Cayman Islands company) were, on ordinary principles of the conict of laws, situated in the Isle of Man, and the shareholder relationship between Navigator and Cambridge Gas was governed by Manx law. Consequently the property in question, namely the shares in Navigator, was situate in the Isle of Man, and therefore also not subject to the in rem jurisdiction of the US Bankruptcy Court. There was therefore no basis for the recognition of the order of the US Bankruptcy Court in the Isle of Man. Lord Mance JSC, in his concurring judgment, left the correctness of the decision open, and Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony JSC, dissenting, thought that it was correctly decided. G H\n\n90 I have already quoted the passage in Cambridge Gas [2007] 1 AC 508, para 22 in which Lord Ho›mann said that the domestic court must at least be able to provide assistance by doing whatever it could have done in D\n\nE\n\nF\n\nC\n\n# [2015] AC Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Singularis Holdings Ltd v Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\nthe case of a domestic insolvency- and that the purpose of recognition of the foreign o–ce-holders was to to give them the remedies to which they would have been entitled if the equivalent proceedings had taken place in the domestic forum.-- A\n\n91 The e›ect of this part of the opinion in Cambridge Gas was to make an order equivalent to one which could have been made under a Manx scheme of arrangement without going through the statutory procedures for approval of a scheme. The passages in the opinion which are relevant are these: B\n\n24. In the present case it is clear that the New York creditors, by starting proceedings to wind up the Navigator companies and then proposing a scheme of arrangement under section 152 of the Companies Act 1931, could have achieved exactly the same result as the Chapter 11 plan. The Manx statute provides: (1) Where a compromise or arrangement is proposed between a company and its creditors . . . the court may on the application in a summary way of the company or of any creditor or member of the company, or, in the case of a company being wound up, of the liquidator, order a meeting of the creditors . . . to be summoned in such manner as the court directs. (2) If a majority in number representing three-fourths in value of the creditors . . . agree to any compromise or arrangement, the compromise or arrangement shall, if sanctioned by the court, be binding on all the creditors . . . and also on the company or, in the case of a company in the course of being wound up, on the liquidator and contributories of the company.-\n\n25. The jurisdiction is extremely wide. All that is necessary is that the proposed scheme should be a compromise or arrangement and that it should be approved by the appropriate majority. Why, therefore, should the Manx court not provide assistance by giving e›ect to the plan without requiring the creditors to go to the trouble of parallel insolvency proceedings in the Isle of Man? . . .\n\n26. . . . as between the shareholder and the company itself, the shareholders rights may be varied or extinguished by the mechanisms provided by the articles of association or the Companies Act. One of those mechanisms is the scheme of arrangement under section 152. As a shareholder, Cambridge is bound by the transactions into which the company has entered, including a plan under Chapter 11 or a scheme under section 152. It is the object of such a scheme to give e›ect to an arrangement which varies or extinguishes the rights of creditors and shareholders. Thus, in the case of an insolvent company, in which the shareholders have no interest of any value, the court may sanction a scheme which leaves them with nothing . . . The scheme may divest the company of its assets and leave the shareholders with shares in an empty shell. It may extinguish their shares and recapitalise the company by issuing new shares to others for fresh consideration. Or it may, as in this case, provide that someone else is to be registered as holder of the shares. Whatever the scheme, it is, by virtue of section 152, binding on the shareholders when it receives the sanction of the court. The protection for the shareholders is that the court will not sanction a scheme, even if adopted by the statutory majority, if it appears unfair. And no doubt the discretion to refuse assistance in the implementation of an equivalent plan F G H\n\nD\n\nE\n\nC\n\n## Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) [2015] AC v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\n# which has been conrmed in a foreign jurisdiction would be exercised on similar lines. But no such question arises in this case. Although it must be accepted that Cambridge did not technically submit to the jurisdiction in A\n\nNew York, it had no economic interest in the proceedings and ample opportunity to participate if it wished to do so. It would therefore not be unfair for the plan to be carried into e›ect. Their Lordships therefore consider that the Court of Appeal was right to order its implementation.--\n\n92 It is to be noted that Lord Ho›mann said that the New York creditors could have achieved exactly the same result as the Chapter 11 plan by a scheme of arrangement under the Companies Act 1931, section 152, and asked why the Manx court could not provide assistance by giving e›ect to the plan without requiring the creditors to go to the trouble of parallel insolvency proceedings in the Isle of Man.\n\n93 Those proceedings required the calling of meetings and the passage of appropriate resolutions. The majority of the UK Supreme Court decided in Rubin v Euronance SA [2013] 1 AC 236 that Cambridge Gas was wrongly decided on the ground that the New York court did not have jurisdiction over title to shares in a Manx company. The question whether there was any lawful basis for applying the legislation on an as if- basis, or of dispensing with the statutory procedure, did not therefore arise in Rubin v Euronance SA. But for the reasons I have given, in my judgment there can be no doubt that, unless Manx law allowed the relaxation of the statutory procedures for the approval of schemes of arrangement, the judiciary was not entitled to apply those procedures by analogy at common law.\n\n# The application of Cambridge Gas\n\n94 It follows in my view that those courts which have relied on these passages to apply legislation which the legislature had not itself seen t to apply are wrong, including the decision of the Chief Justice in the present case.\n\n95 That conclusion also applies to the decision in In re Phoenix Kapitaldienst GmbH [2013] Ch 61. In that case a company incorporated in Germany for the apparent purpose of investing individuals funds in futures trading was used as a vehicle for a worldwide fraud. The German administrator applied for relief pursuant to the Insolvency Act 1986, section 423 (transactions at an undervalue) against former investors of the company who were resident in England, claiming back initial investment funds and ctitious prots for the benet of the companys creditors by setting aside transactions entered into at an undervalue.\n\n96 As I have said, the EU Insolvency Regulation did not apply because the German company involved was an investment undertaking; the UNCITRAL Model Law did not apply because the 2006 Regulations were not in e›ect at the relevant time; and Germany was not a relevant country for the purposes of section 426(4).\n\n97 Proudman J decided that the court had the power at common law to recognise a foreign administrator and to provide him with the same assistance as it was entitled to provide in a domestic insolvency; and that since proceedings to set aside antecedent transactions were central to the purpose of an insolvency the court therefore had jurisdiction to authorise the administrator to invoke section 423. Applying Cambridge Gas Proudman J\n\nE\n\nF\n\nD\n\nB\n\nC\n\nG\n\nH\n\n# [2015] AC Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Singularis Holdings Ltd v Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\nheld that the power to use the common law to recognise and assist an administrator appointed overseas includes doing whatever the English court could have done in the case of a domestic insolvency--: para 62. A\n\n98 In my judgment that decision is wrong because it involved an impermissible application of legislation by analogy.\n\n- 99 In Picard v Primeo Fund 2013 (1) CILR 164 the US bankruptcy trustee of the principal Bernard Mado› company sought to claw back payments made by the company to a Cayman Islands company. The claims were based on US law (fraudulent transfers and preferential payments) and on Cayman law (preferential payments). The Cayman Islands have mutual assistance provisions (Companies Law (2012 Revision), sections 241—242), but the judge (Jones J) held that they did not apply because the power to make orders ordering the turnover to a foreign representative of any B\n- property belonging to a debtor- did not apply to property which was only recoverable under transaction avoidance provisions. C\n\n100 The judge then went on to decide that the Cayman court was able to apply the Cayman voidable preferences provision of its law (section 145) to the payments made by the US company to the Cayman company, by applying Cambridge Gas and In re Phoenix Kapitaldienst GmbH [2013] Ch 61.\n\nD\n\n101 On 16 April 2014 the Court of Appeal of the Cayman Islands (consisting of Sir John Chadwick P and Mottley and Campbell JJA )2014 (1) CILR 379, reversed Jones J on the rst part of the case and held that the Cayman court was entitled to apply the Cayman anti-avoidance provisions under the assistance provisions of Cayman company law, because the making of a transaction avoidance order restores to the debtor the property which is the subject of that order, and so enables the court to order the\n\nturnover- of that restored property to the foreign representative: para 45. 102 The Court of Appeal did not reach the question whether Jones J E\n\nwas entitled to apply the Cayman anti-avoidance provision at common law. The court had been informed that an issue central to that question, namely whether Cambridge Gas should be followed, was before the Court of Appeal for Bermuda. Because the matter was before this Board and shortly to be\n\nheard, the Court of Appeal was invited to hand down an interim judgment dealing only with the issues on the mutual assistance statutory provisions. The appeal has now been settled. It follows from what I have said that the decision of Jones J on the present aspect of the case was wrong. F\n\n## Al Sabah v Grupo Torras SA\n\n- 103 There was also a prior opinion of the Privy Council, in which what was said is directly contrary to the approach in Cambridge Gas advocated by the liquidators. In Al Sabah v Grupo Torras SA [2005] 2 AC 333 the trustee in bankruptcy of a debtor in The Bahamas obtained from the Bahaman court a letter of request directed to the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands seeking its aid in setting aside two Cayman trusts established by the debtor. The Grand Court (a–rmed by the Court of G\n- Appeal of the Cayman Islands) held that it had jurisdiction to provide such assistance under either section 156 of the Bankruptcy Law of the Cayman Islands or section 122 of the Bankruptcy Act 1914 (which provided for mutual assistance between bankruptcy courts throughout the UK and the Empire) or under the courts inherent jurisdiction, and that it should as a H\n\n### Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) [2015] AC v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\nmatter of discretion grant the Bahaman trustee powers under section 107 of the Cayman Bankruptcy Law to enable him to set aside the trusts. The Privy Council held that (i) section 156 of the Cayman Bankruptcy Law did not apply, but that (ii) section 122 had not been repealed in its application to the Cayman Islands and did apply, so that there was jurisdiction to authorise the Bahaman trustee to exercise the statutory power even though it might not have been available to him if the trusts had been governed by Bahaman law. A\n\n104 But the Board in an opinion given through Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe said, at para 35: B\n\nThe respondents relied in the alternative . . . on the inherent jurisdiction of the Grand Court. This point was not much developed in argument and their Lordships can deal with it quite shortly. If the Grand Court had no statutory jurisdiction to act in aid of a foreign bankruptcy it might have had some limited inherent power to do so. But it cannot have had inherent jurisdiction to exercise the extraordinary powers conferred by section 107 of its Bankruptcy Law in circumstances not falling within the terms of that section. The non-statutory principles on which British courts have recognised foreign bankruptcy jurisdiction are more limited in their scope [citing what is now Dicey, Morris & Collins, Conict of Laws, 15th ed (2012), vol 2, paras 31R-059 et seq] and the inherent jurisdiction of the Grand Court cannot be wider.-- C D\n\n105 The Board plainly considered that the court had no power to apply the Bankruptcy Law in circumstances not falling within- the Law. In In re Phoenix Kapitaldienst GmbH [2013] Ch 61, above, Proudman J distinguished this clear statement on the basis that she should follow what she described as the later and more considered views expressed by Lord Ho›mann and approved by Lord Walker- in the HIH case [2008] 1 WLR 852, namely that the court was able, if consistent with justice and UK public policy, to achieve the aim of a unitary and universal bankruptcy law. In Picard v Primeo Fund 2013 (1) CILR 164 Jones J explained the dictum in Al Sabah as meaning that the common law cannot be invoked to apply provisions of the Bankruptcy Law to achieve an objective outside its scope.\n\n106 Neither of these supposed distinctions is valid. There is nothing in HIH to support Proudman Js suggestion that Lord Walker had changed his view, and Jones Js suggestion that Lord Walker was only directing his intention to objectives outside the scope of the Bankruptcy Law is wholly inconsistent with Lord Walkers plain words that the court does not have an inherent jurisdiction to exercise the powers conferred by the Bankruptcy Law in circumstances not falling within the terms of that section.-- (Emphasis added.)\n\n107 In my judgment Lord Walkers dictum in the opinion in Al Sabah v Grupo Torres [2005] 2 AC 333, para 35 (in which, among others, Lords Ho›mann and Scott concurred) was plainly right, and, to the extent it is inconsistent with the passage in Cambridge Gas applying the Isle of Man scheme of arrangement provisions on an as if- basis, it is to be preferred to Cambridge Gas.\n\n108 I would therefore humbly advise Her Majesty not only that the appeal should be dismissed, but also that to have allowed it on the basis of the liquidators primary argument would have involved Her Majestys judges in a development of the law and their law-making powers which H\n\nE\n\nF\n\nG\n\n# [2015] AC Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Singularis Holdings Ltd v Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\nwould have been wholly inconsistent with established principles governing the relationship between the judiciary and the legislature and therefore profoundly unconstitutional. A\n\n## LORD CLARKE OF STONE-CUM-EBONY JSC\n\n109 I agree that this appeal should be dismissed for the reasons given by Lord Sumption JSC. I add a short judgment of my own on the rst issue raised by Lord Sumption JSC in para 8, namely whether the Bermuda court has a common law power to assist a foreign liquidation by ordering the production of information (in oral or documentary form) in circumstances where (i) the Bermuda court has no power to wind up an overseas company such as Singularis and (ii) its statutory power to order the production of information is limited to cases where the company has been wound up in B\n\nBermuda. The second issue is whether, if such a power exists, it is exercisable in circumstances where an equivalent order could not have been made by the court in which the foreign liquidation is proceeding. C\n\n110 I have reached the conclusion that, for the reasons given by Lord Sumption JSC, the answer to the rst issue is that the Bermuda court does have such a power. The steps which lead me to that conclusion are these. While the recognition of such a power in an ancillary liquidation has not\n\n- thus far been recognised at common law, it is common ground that the common law has developed step by step and that it may be extended or developed in appropriate circumstances. It follows that the question is whether the circumstances are appropriate to justify the recognition of such a power in this class of case. D\n- 111 As Lord Sumption JSC demonstrates in para 20, signicant developments have been made by the common law in the past. They included the power to compel a person to give evidence, which was not originally statutory. As Lord Sumption JSC puts it, like the power to order discovery, it was an inherent power of the Court of Chancery devised by judges to remedy the technical and procedural limitations associated with the proof of facts in courts of common law. I agree with Lord Sumption JSC (at para 23) that the signicance of the Norwich Pharmacal case [1974] AC E\n- 133 in the present context is that it illustrates the capacity of the common law to develop a power in the court to compel the production of information when it is necessary to do so in order to give e›ect to a recognised legal principle. F\n\n112 The recognised legal principle in the present case is the principle of modied universalism derived from Cambridge Gas [2007] 1 AC 508: see\n\n- paras 19 and 23 in Lord Sumption JSCs judgment. I agree with him that it is founded on the public interest in the ability of foreign courts exercising insolvency jurisdiction in the place of the companys incorporation to conduct an orderly winding up of its a›airs on a worldwide basis notwithstanding the territorial limits of their jurisdiction. An important aspect of that public interest is a recognition that in a world of global businesses it is in the interest of every country that companies with G\n- transnational assets and operations should be capable of being wound up in an orderly fashion under the law of the place of their incorporation and on a basis that will be recognised and e›ective internationally. I also agree with Lord Sumption JSC at para 23 (i) that this is a public interest which has no equivalent in cases where information may be sought for commercial H\n\n### Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) [2015] AC v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony JSC\n\npurposes or for ordinary adversarial litigation; (ii) that the Bermuda court has properly recognised the status of the liquidators as o–cers of that court; (iii) that the liquidators require the information for the performance of the ordinary functions attaching to that status; (iv) that the information is unlikely to be available in any other way; (v) that none of the reasons which account for the common laws inhibition about the compulsory provision of evidence have any bearing on the present question; (vi) that the right and duty to assist foreign o–ce-holders which the courts have acknowledged on a number of occasions would be an empty formula if it were conned to recognising the companys title to its assets in the same way as any other legal person who has acquired title under a foreign law, or to recognising the o–ce-holders right to act on the companys behalf in the same way as any other agent of a company appointed in accordance with the law of its incorporation; and (vii) that the recognition by a domestic court of the status of a foreign liquidator would mean very little if it entitled him to take possession of the companys assets but left him with no e›ective means of identifying or locating them. A B C\n\n113 These are powerful factors. What then are the limits? I agree with Lord Sumption JSC that, as he puts it at para 25, the Board would not wish to encourage the promiscuous creation of other common law powers to compel the production of information but that the limits of this power are implicit in the reasons for recognising its existence. He gives four reasons. (1) It is available only to assist the o–cers of a foreign court of insolvency jurisdiction or equivalent public o–cers. It would not, for example, be available to assist a voluntary winding up, which is essentially a private arrangement and although subject to the directions of the court is not conducted by or on behalf of an o–cer of the court. (2) It is a power of assistance and exists for the purpose of enabling those courts to surmount the problems posed for a worldwide winding up of the companys a›airs by the territorial limits of each courts powers; so that it is not available to enable them to do something which they could not do even under the law by which they were appointed. (3) It is available only when it is necessary for the performance of the o–ce-holders functions. (4) It is subject to the limitation that such an order must be consistent with the substantive law and public policy of the assisting court, in this case that of Bermuda. I further agree with Lord Sumption JSC that it follows that it is not available for purposes which are properly the subject of other schemes for the compulsory provision of information. Common law powers of this kind are not a permissible mode of obtaining material for use in actual or anticipated litigation. That eld is covered by rules of forensic procedure and statutory provisions for obtaining evidence in foreign jurisdictions which liquidators, like other litigants or potential litigants, must accept with all their limitations. Moreover, in some jurisdictions, it may well be contrary to domestic public policy to make an order which there would be no power to make in a domestic insolvency. D E F G H\n\n114 I further agree with Lord Sumption JSC, for the reasons he gives in para 28, that the common law power is not impliedly excluded by reason of section 195 of the Bermuda Companies Act but that it cannot be applied on the facts of this case because there is no similar power in the Cayman Islands and it would not be a proper use of the power of assistance to make good a\n\n## [2015] AC Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Singularis Holdings Ltd v Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony JSC\n\nlimitation on the powers of a foreign court of insolvency jurisdiction under its own law. A\n\n115 Like Lord Sumption JSC, I appreciate that it is important that this development should not open the oodgates to di›erent unrelated classes of case. However, I see no reason why it should. I appreciate that Lord Mance JSC has reached a di›erent conclusion. I do not pretend that it is\n\n- possible to predict precisely how the development of the principle, which has been identied by Lord Sumption JSC and which both Lord Collins of Mapesbury and I support, will proceed. I agree with Lord Mance JSC that it is a step forward but do not agree that it is a step leap. I also agree with him (at para 137) that courts have tended to conne remedies of the kind we are discussing to situations where there is a recognisable legal claim to protect, based either on a title or right to property or on some wrongdoing supported B\n- by appropriate evidence. However, there is no reason why the common law should not be developed, provided that the development is measured and supports a recognised principle. C\n\n116 It will not always be easy to draw the line between permissible applications and impermissible applications. However, Lord Sumption JSC has identied, not only the policy, but also the principle derived from the\n\n- policy and some of the limitations to its exercise, which to my mind provide a sensible approach for the future. I respectfully disagree with Lord Mance JSC when he says at para 146 that this is a development which is neither permissible nor appropriate. In doing so, I express no view on Lord Mance JSCs concerns (expressed in paras 120 and 121) as to the breadth of the terms of the order and as to the lack of safeguards to protect against costs D\n- or loss. These may well be sound and can be investigated in a case where such issues fall for decision. That is not this case because of the narrow ground on which the appeal must be dismissed. E\n\n## LORD MANCE JSC\n\n117 There are two potential issues of importance on this appeal: (a) whether the common law power to assist a foreign (Cayman Islands) liquidation enables the Bermudan courts to order anyone within its jurisdiction who may have relevant information or documentation about the companys assets (or, possibly also, its a›airs generally) to attend for questioning about and disclose the same; (b) whether, if this power exists, it should be exercised by ordering such disclosure and questioning when the Cayman Islands courts have no equivalent power over persons within their jurisdiction. F\n\nG\n\n118 I agree with Lord Sumption JSC that the short answer to the second question is negative. So it is unnecessary on this appeal to answer the rst question, although Lord Sumption JSC has devoted the major part of his opinion to this question. I understand why it might be helpful if the Board could give a clear answer to it, but I think it unfortunate that it should try to do so on this appeal, bearing in mind the limitations in the way in which the\n\nquestion has been argued at all lower stages (see para 122 below) and its largely unexplored ramications: see generally paras 130—145 below. H\n\n119 Before addressing the second issue in detail, it is relevantand in my view importantto note three points. The rst is the Chief Justices order which the Court of Appeal set aside, and which the liquidators ask the of 57\n\nSingularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) [2015] AC v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC)\n\nBoard to restore. The respondents, PwC, were (by clause 3a) ordered within 14 days to provide to the joint o–cial liquidators (JOLs--) A\n\nall information they may have, including information and documentation in their possession, power, custody or control, concerning the promotion, formation, trade, dealings, a›airs or property of the company [and] for the avoidance of doubt, such information and documentation to be providedis not to belimited to audit information. . .--\n\nIn addition PwC was (by clause 3d)\n\n1718\n\nLord Mance JSC\n\nrequired to have a partner and/or employee or agent acceptable to the JOLs, examined on oath forthwith, within ten (10) days of being called on to meet by the JOLs, concerning the matters aforesaid, by word of mouth and on written interrogatories, and be required to reduce his/her answer to writing and require him/her to sign this . . .--\n\nBy clause 3e the JOLs were given leave to serve Paul Suddaby and any other partners or o–cers of PwC . . . out of the jurisdiction--, specic liberty was given to examine Paul Suddaby and he was specically ordered to produce information in accordance with clause 3a. Clause 3f provided that\n\nIf PwC . . . does refuse to comply with any of the orders set out herein, it and its partners and o–cers shall be in contempt of court and they may be imprisoned, ned or their assets seized.-- D\n\n120 No doubt in case clause 3 did not go far enough, clause 4 provided:\n\nFurther and without limiting the generality of the foregoing, that the documentation referred to in Exhibit HD-7 of Hugh Dicksons third a–davit dated 7 February 2013 be produced within seven days by PwC . . . , in relation to [Singularis] . . . That the JOLs be able to obtain all information and documentation described herein that is in the possession, power, custody, or control of PwC ..., whether this be in Bermuda, Dubai, or wherever it may be located.--\n\nRedaction was only to be permitted where necessary to protect information of a condential nature belonging to third parties, and clause 4b required that:\n\nthe relevant partners and o–cers of PwC . . . do conrm on oath that all the documents requested have been produced.--\n\nThe only exempt documents were to be those required to be produced in the Cayman Islandsthat is documents actually belonging to Singularis.\n\n121 No provision was made for the JOLs to meet, still less secure, any costs that PwC or its partners, o–cers or agents would incur complying with such an order, and no undertaking was given to meet any such costs or any other loss or liability that might result from doing soeven though PwC had asked the Chief Justice to deal with this aspect. This omission was raised in the Court of Appeal, where it remained relevant in relation to the order against SICL which that court upheld. PwC suggested that costs could be in the order of \\$500,000 and the JOLs argued that management time spent in compliance could not be recovered. The Court of Appeal declined to make any order or require any undertaking in the absence of authority- and particularly in circumstances where the cost of compliance is far from\n\nC\n\nE\n\nF\n\nG\n\nH\n\nB\n\n# [2015] AC Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Singularis Holdings Ltd v Lord Mance JSC\n\nclear--. Absence of authority- is hardly surprising in relation to an order which was itself e›ectively unprecedented. PwCs costs of compliance would clearly be likely to be very substantial. Whether or not they were or could be quantied when the order was made, PwC should have been protected in respect of them. Common justice and established practice relating to freezing injunctions, Anton Pillar orders and Norwich Pharmacal relief should have conrmed the need for an appropriate order or A B\n\nundertaking in that respect.\n\n122 The second point is that, in respect of Singularis, the only basis of Kawaley CJs order against PwC and its o–cers was that the Bermudan courts have a common law power to grant assistance in aid of the Cayman Islands liquidation by applying local procedural remedies, in particular either by directly applying- or by analogy with-section 195 of the\n\n- Bermudan Companies Act 1981, although it was common ground that this section does not in terms apply. This was also the only case put by the JOLs- written submissions to or adjudicated on by the Court of Appeal as well as the only basis on which permission was sought to appeal to the Board. Kawaley CJ considered that he could none the less rely directly on section 195 by virtue of inter alia In re African Farms [1906] TS 373, Cambridge Gas Transportation Corpn v O–cial Committee of Unsecured C\n- Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc [2007] 1 AC 508 and Rubin v Euronance SA (Picard intervening) [2013] 1 AC 236 (paras 8, 49—74), or alternatively that he could proceed by analogy with- it: paras 8, 36—48. The Court of Appeal held the contrary: see para 52, per Bell AJA, para 1, per Zacca P, and paras 4—59, per Auld JA. There is a hint in paras 49(1) and 50 of Auld JAs case that the JOLs may have begun to put their case more D\n- widely in oral submissions by suggesting some wider power based on modied universalism- and independent of the Bermudan statutory power. But, if this is so, it can have received little prominence. Only before the Board has focus been directed to such an argument. As to the submission which was pursued below and accepted by Kawaley CJ, I agree with Lord Sumption JSC and Lord Collins of Mapesbury that there is no basis for E\n- judicial re-fashioning of, or action outside the bounds of but by analogy with, domestic legislation such as section 195. The Chief Justices order cannot therefore be justied on the basis on which he made it. But it is perhaps ironic that so rm a rejection of any possibility of the domestic court exercising the powers conferred on domestic liquidators should be replaced by an embrace of the possibility of the domestic court giving e›ect to the wishes and/or powers of foreign liquidators: see paras 130 et seq below. F\n- 123 Neither court below addressed any observations to the question whether any jurisdiction existed or, if it existed, could properly be exercised to make orders against and serve Paul Suddaby and other partners or o–cers of PwC outside the jurisdiction of the Bermudan court. As paras 119 and 120 above show, the Chief Justices order did that, though without joining Mr Suddaby or any other o–cer or partner in their personal capacities. In their written submissions before the Court of Appeal, the JOLs submitted G\n- that section 195 gave jurisdiction to serve abroad and relied on the English authority of In re Seagull Manufacturing Co Ltd [1993] Ch 345 (decided under a section of the Insolvency Act 1986 using similar terms to section 195). Once one concludes, as the Board has, that section 195 is applicable neither directly nor by analogy, the question becomes whether there can be H\n\n### Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) [2015] AC v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Lord Mance JSC\n\nB\n\nany such common law jurisdiction to order service out, on pain of sanctions, as that for which the JOLs argue. A\n\n124 Approaching the matter on that basis, it is clear that the Chief Justices order must on any view have gone well beyond any jurisdiction which exists at common law in relation to PwCs partners and o–cers outside the Bermudan jurisdiction, as opposed to PwC itself which was within such jurisdiction. The area was examined in Masri v Consolidated Contractors International (UK) Ltd (No 4) [2010] 1 AC 90, para 12, where the House of Lords (in a judgment given by myself with which all other members of the House concurred) spoke in these terms of:\n\nthe limitation of the courts power to enforce the attendance of witnesses or ne defaulting witnesses. From the Statute of Elizabeth 1562 (5 Eliz 1, c 9) onwards, this had been regulated by statute and had never extended beyond the United Kingdom. The procedure enacted in relation to other jurisdictions involves the taking of evidence, on commission or otherwise, with the assistance of the foreign court. The service of a writ of subpoena is still only possible under section 36 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 in respect of persons in one of the parts of the United Kingdom. The limitation of the courts power in this respect corresponds with the principle of international law, summarised robustly by Dr Mann in his Hague lecture The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law-, Recueil des Cours, 1964-I, The Denition of Jurisdiction, p 137): Nor is a state entitled to enforce the attendance of a foreign witness before its own tribunals by threatening him with penalties in case of non-compliance. There is, it is true, no objection to a state, by lawful means, inviting or perhaps requiring a foreign witness to appear for the purpose of giving evidence. But the foreign witness is under no duty to comply, and to impose penalties on him and to enforce them either against his property or against him personally on the occasion of a future visit constitutes an excess of criminal jurisdiction and runs contrary to the practice of states in regard to the taking of evidence as it has developed over a long period of time.- -- C D E\n\n125 The issue in Masri was whether a power under rules (CPR r 71) made under statutory authority extended to enable an order for examination of an o–cer of a judgment creditor company, who was out of the jurisdiction. The House held that, in view of the presumption against extraterritoriality, it did not. In the course of so doing, it considered prior authority on other powers with a statutory basis. In In re Tucker (RC) (A Bankrupt), Ex p Tucker (KR) [1990] Ch 148, section 25(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1914 gave the court power to summon before it for examination any person whom the court may deem capable of giving information respecting the debtor, his dealings or property--. But the Court of Appeal set aside an order obtained by a trustee in bankruptcy for the examination of the debtors brother, a British subject resident in Belgium. Dillon LJ, after noting the limitations of the powers to serve out of the jurisdiction (then contained in RSC Ord 11) and to subpoena witnesses, said against this background that he would not expect section 25(1) to have empowered the English court to haul before it persons who could not be served with the necessary summons within the jurisdiction of the English court--: p 158E—F. F G H\n\n# [2015] AC Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Singularis Holdings Ltd v Lord Mance JSC\n\n126 In contrast, in In re Seagull Manufacturing Co Ltd [1993] Ch 345, section 133 of the Insolvency Act 1986 authorised the public examination of a narrower category of persons, viz A\n\nany person who (a) is or has been an o–cer of the company; or (b) has acted as liquidator or administrator of the company or as receiver or manager . . . or (c) not being a person falling within paragraph (a) or (b), is or has been concerned, or has taken part, in the promotion, formation or management of the company--,\n\nand rule 12.12 of the Insolvency Rules 1986 (SI 1986/1925) gave the court express authority to order service out of the jurisdiction of any process or order requiring to be so served for the purposes of insolvency proceedings. The Court of Appeal upheld an order made for the public examination of a former director living in Alderney. Peter Gibson J, with whose judgment the other members of the court concurred, said (p 354F—H) that:\n\nWhere a company has come to a calamitous end and has been wound up by the court, the obvious intention of this section was that those responsible for the companys state of a›airs should be liable to be subjected to a process of investigation and that investigation should be in public. Parliament could not have intended that a person who had that responsibility could escape liability to investigation simply by not being within the jurisdiction. Indeed, if the section were to be construed as leaving out of its grasp anyone not within the jurisdiction, deliberate evasion by removing oneself out of the jurisdiction would su–ce.--\n\n127 Although the House in Masri [2010] 1 AC 90 regarded impracticability of enforcement as a factor of greater signicance than Peter Gibson J had suggested, it acknowledged the public interest served by section 133, and referred (in para 23) to The universality of a winding up order, in the sense that it relates at least in theory to all assets wherever situate--. That factor being absent in Masri, it could lend no assistance to the argument that CPR r 71 extended extra-territorially. But the important feature of all these cases is that they turned on express statutorily conferred powers. There was no suggestion in any of them of any relevant common E F\n\nlaw power in any of the areas discussed. 128 The third point is that the JOLs case has been at all times and is advanced solely on the basis that PwC have documents and information which it would help the JOLs to inspect and about which it would be helpful\n\nfor them to be able to question PwC and its o–cers. The basis is not that PwC have property or assets of Singularis (beyond the documents which they have already been ordered by the Cayman Islands court to produce); nor is it that PwC have themselves done anything wrong or that they have been or are mixed up in any third partys wrongdoing. The House of Lords authority Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Comrs [1974] AC 133 was not relied upon, or even among the authorities put, before the Supreme Court. It was mentioned in passing during the nal oral submissions in reply of Mr Moss QC for the JOLs, when the transcript records this exchange: G H\n\nLord Mance JSC. If they are accountants, as you told me earlier that they were, then on the face of it there is an advisory relationship and if\n\nD\n\nB\n\nC\n\n## Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) [2015] AC v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Lord Mance JSC\n\nyou wish to know something which you yourself have mislaid or dont have from your accountant advisers one might think there was quite a good case for saying they owed a duty to disclose it to you, to help you. A\n\nMr Moss. There might be an arguable case relating to that advice, but what were interested in are these audit documents which go to the assets of the company. I dont know whether the accounting had anything to do with that at all.\n\nLord Collins. Is there nowhere a Norwich Pharmacal order can be obtained?\n\nMr Moss. Well, yes. Weve had a discussion about this. The problem with Norwich Pharmacal is that it is based on fraud.\n\nLord Collins. Any wrongdoing, I think.\n\nLord Sumption JSC. It is based on wrongdoing generally.\n\nMr Moss. Yes, but it does involve alleging wrongdoing. You would have to allege that PwC became innocently mixed up in that wrongdoing C\n\nLord Clarke JSC. They only have to be innocently mixed up.\n\nMr Moss. Yes.\n\nLord Sumption JSC. Thats a fairly low threshold, after all the Customs and Excise were about as innocent mixed up people almost that you could probably want. D\n\nMr Moss. Yes. The result of that would be if we can get Norwich Pharmacal relief, then the Bermuda courts do have common law powers to give us exactly the type relief that we have here. It actually comes to the same thing. It wouldnt make much sense to send us right back to the Chief Justice to then ask for Norwich Pharmacal relief\n\nLord Mance JSC. It may not be as easy as that. You havent formulated it as Norwich Pharmacal.\n\nMr Moss. Yes, it would have to be abandoned and reformulated as a Norwich Pharmacal, but in substance it comes to the same sort of end. What that perhaps illustrates is that what we have and what we seek to maintain, or rather we have at one stage and the Court of Appeal have taken it away on a rather narrow ground, but we seek to have back is not something that radical in these types of circumstances, where there is a gigantic decit, there has clearly been wrongdoing, documents have been taken and not available. Its exactly the kind of context in which one would expect relief to be given. Its not extravagant in any shape or form.--\n\n129 Contrary to Mr Mosss submission, the JOLs are seeking to do something very radical, and there is a deep dividing line between the basis on which they put their case and Norwich Pharmacal. The JOLs are seeking (a) to justify a far wider and more stringent order than could ever be obtained in Norwich Pharmacal proceedings and (b) to do so on the basis of an unveried assertion that they would, if they had tried, have been able to obtain a Norwich Pharmacal and without exposing themselves to the trouble and di–culty of showing that PwC were mixed up in any sort of wrongdoing about which they have any relevant information or documentation. I see neither force nor attraction in Mr Mosss invitation to prejudge the outcome of normal procedures by short-cutting them.\n\nB\n\nE\n\nF\n\nG\n\nH\n\n# [2015] AC Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Singularis Holdings Ltd v Lord Mance JSC\n\n- 130 In the light of these points, I come to the substance of the argument now presented. That is that a common law power exists to assist any foreign liquidation by ordering any person (whether or not an o–cer or agent of the company) to attend and be interrogated and produce documentation and information, on pain of contempt, in the manner which the JOLs advocate. The only explicit limits to the jurisdiction for which the JOLs now contend is that it should not be inconsistent with the law or policy of the forum. The A\n- negative answer which the Board is giving to the second issue on this appeal means that there would exist a further limitation, that the jurisdiction would not exist or be exercisable to enable an order which could not be made against a person within the jurisdiction of the country of the insolvency. B\n\n131 Lord Sumption JSC now suggests that the principle should be further limited to any court-ordered liquidation (though that, in turn, leaves uncertain the status of any winding up under supervision in any jurisdiction where that possibility, which existed formerly under section 311 of the English Companies Act 1948, still exists). Although Lord Sumption JSC speaks at one point of this as a means of identifying or locating- assets (para 23), elsewhere he speaks of enabling [foreign] courts to surmount the problems posed for a worldwide winding up of the companys a›airs by the territorial limits of each courts powers--: para 25. The order in fact made by the Chief Justice was, as noted, of great width. The scope of the proposed C D\n\ncommon law jurisdiction is therefore uncertain. 132 The suggested jurisdiction is said to follow from the principle of modied universalism--. This is a principle developed in English common law over the last 20 years with the strong support of Lord Ho›mann, though recognised over a 100 years ago in a Transvaal case which was itself until\n\n- recently lost in (unfair) obscurity. In re African Farms [1906] TS 373, was decided by Sir James Innes, who in addition to his own great legal distinction was grandfather of the distinguished wartime humanitarian lawyer Helmuth James von Moltke. The essence of the principle consists, as Lord Sumption JSC notes in his para 14(i), in the recognition by one court of the foreign liquidators power of disposition over the companys assets in the domestic jurisdiction. That justied an order restraining their disposition or E\n- seizure inconsistently with the foreign liquidation. The novelty of this decision lay in the making of such an order in circumstances where there was no power to wind up the company in the domestic forum. In this respect, therefore, the co-operation extended in In re African Farms went a step further than that demonstrated in In re Matheson Bros Ltd (1884) 7 Ch D 225, where Kay J was, in the light of the fact that the English courts would F\n- have had power to wind the relevant foreign company up in England, prepared to secure English assets to prevent English creditors executing against them, pending steps in the companys winding up in its country of incorporation to make the assets available for the companys English creditors pari passu with its foreign creditors. G\n- 133 The principle may also justify an order for the remission of the assets out of the jurisdiction to the foreign liquidator, if the foreign liquidation rules would distribute them in the same way as the domestic jurisdiction. Even if the foreign liquidation rules would distribute them di›erently, but there is express statutory power enabling the remission to take place none the less, the principle may lend support to the exercise of that express statutory power. Beyond that, I do not read the majority of the H\n\n### Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) [2015] AC v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Lord Mance JSC\n\nHouse in In re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 852 as going, and anything that any of its members did say more widely about the existence or scope of a common law power was on any view obiter, since the appeal was decided on the basis that there existed express statutory authority for a remission although the assets would be distributed in the Australian liquidation di›erently from the way in which they would have been distributed in the English liquidation. A\n\n134 I agree with Lord Sumption JSC and Lord Collins that the second and third propositions for which Cambridge Gas Transportation Corpn v O–cial Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc [2007] 1 AC 508 stands cannot be supported. A domestic court does not have power to assist a foreign court by doing anything which it could properly have done in a domestic insolvency; and it cannot acquire jurisdiction by virtue of any such power. As to the rst proposition, for reasons which I explained in Rubin v Euronance SA [2013] 1 AC 236, Cambridge Gas can, if correct, stand for no more than the proposition that a domestic court should, so far as it can consistently with its own law, recognise a foreign bankruptcy order and deal with identiable assets within its jurisdiction consistently with the way in which the foreign insolvency would deal with them. In another earlier decision of the Board, Al Sabah v Grupo Torras SA [2005] 2 AC 333, para 35, Lord Walker said, aptly in my view, that the Cayman court might have had some limited inherent power-- to act in aid of the Bahaman winding up, but that it could not have the suggested power to set aside a voidable disposition modelled on a section in the Cayman Island bankruptcy legislation governing domestic liquidation which did not in terms apply in relation to a Bahaman winding up. B C D\n\n135 Where I part company with Lord Sumption JSC is in his assertion that the hitherto limited principle of modied universalism which I have just described extends to or justies (or would be an empty formula- without) the assumption or exercise of a common law power to haul- anyone before the court (to use Dillon LJs word in Ex p Tucker [1990] Ch 148), to be interrogated and to produce documentation on pain of being in contempt, simply because it would be useful for the foreign liquidator to be able to do so and might enable him to locate some assets (or better understand the companys a›airs). There is a step leap between enforcing rights to identiable assets and obliging third parties to assist with documentation and information in order to discover a companys assets (or, still more widely, in order to enable insolvency practitioners to understand a companys a›airs). Lord Sumption JSC relies in para 23 on the House of Lords decision in Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Comrs [1974] AC 133 as illustrating the capacity of the common law to develop a power in the court to compel the production of information when this is necessary to give e›ect to a recognised legal principle.-- But the reference to a recognised legal principle- begs the question whether the principle of modied universalism extends beyond the protection of identiable assets within the jurisdiction, to enable orders to be made compelling third parties to assist with the provision of information and documentation which may assist the tracing of such assets (or otherwise assist the insolvency practitioners in their understanding of the companys a›airs). E F G H\n\n136 Information is a precious commodity, but it is not one which is generally capable of being extracted in court from private individuals\n\nH\n\n### 1725 [2015] AC Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Singularis Holdings Ltd v Lord Mance JSC\n\n- without special reason; and the potentially intrusive, vexatious and costly nature of the exercise of any power to do so is apparent from the form of the Chief Justices order in this case. The common law has not hitherto accepted any such jurisdiction. The existence of foreign insolvency proceedings, conducted for the benet of creditors, does not appear to me to provide any justication for doing so now. The mere fact that insolvency practitioners are, at least in a compulsory liquidation, o–cers of the foreign court charged A\n- with winding up its a›airs seems quite insu–cient at common law, though it may be a factor which assists determine the scope of Parliaments likely intention where relevant legislation exists. There are many ordinary creditors, litigants and other persons who would like a facility to gather information to discover or trace assets or to assist them to pursue claims or to conduct their a›airs generally. It is unclear what the logic is or would be B\n- for restricting the suggested common law power to foreign insolvencies. However much it may be intended, by using adjectives like promiscuous--, to discourage attempts to bring within this new jurisdiction either domestic insolvencies (if and where no complete common law scheme exists) or situations entirely outside the insolvency context, such attempts seem bound to occur. In the absence of any clear justication for giving insolvency C\n- practitioners the unique common law privilege which the JOLs now claim, such attempts may well be di–cult to resist. Although I disagree with it, such attempts can only be encouraged by the statement at the end of para 21 of Lord Sumption JSCs opinion that The courts have never been as inhibited in their willingness to develop appropriate remedies to require the provision of information when a su–ciently compelling legal policy calls for it.-- D\n- 137 In reality, far from displaying uninhibited willingness to develop appropriate remedies requiring the provision of information, courts have in my view been careful to conne such remedies to situations where there is a recognisable legal claim to protect, based either on a title or right to property or on some wrongdoing supported by appropriate evidence. Thus: (i) A court has jurisdiction to protect identiable property rights, which would E\n- include ordering a person shown to be likely to have property belonging to the company to deliver it up or disclose its whereabouts. (ii) A sustainable case of wrongdoing is the basis for the well-established jurisdiction to order the disclosure of information by or in conjunction with the making of an asset freezing (formerly Mareva) order or a search (Anton Pillar) order. (iii) The legal principle recognised in Norwich Pharmacal is that persons innocently mixed up in wrongdoing could be expected to disclose a limited amount of information and documentation about it to assist the victims. F G\n\n138 On this appeal, no case has been advanced under any of these heads. The rst could cover the disclosure by an agent of information which he held for, or owed a duty to pass to, his principal. As the transcript extract quoted in para 128 above conrms, no case is advanced on any such basis. Moreover, auditors are not agents, they are independent contractors engaged to review a companys accounts and report in accordance with statutory and professional requirementsin which connection there has been no suggestion of any failure or shortcoming on PwCs part. The second and third situations depend on evidence of wrongdoing, which has again not been asserted or attempted to be established. The third situation in particular bears no resemblance to the present case, in which it is said that\n\n## Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) [2015] AC v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Lord Mance JSC\n\ninnocent third parties can be compelled to produce information and documentation, without any allegation or evidence of wrongdoing, on insolvency practitioners showing that this could be useful to enable them to locate assets or better to understand the companys a›airs. A\n\n139 It is notable that, even in the context of wrongdoing, the courts have been at pains to emphasise the narrow scope of the Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction. It is an exceptional one--: Ashworth Hospital Authority v MGN Ltd [2002] 1 WLR 2033, para 57, per Lord Woolf CJ. It depends on the existence of wrongdoing. The person with information must have been mixed up, however innocently in wrongdoing: R (Omar) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth A›airs [2014] QB 112. Originally the jurisdiction was conned to discovery of the identity of the wrongdoer: Ashworth Hospital Authority, para 26, per Lord Woolf CJ; Arab Monetary Fund v Hashim (No 5) [1992] 2 All ER 911, 914, per Ho›mann J, emphasising that it was no authority for imposing on mixed up third parties a general obligation to give discovery or information when the identity of the defendant is already known.-- B C\n\n140 More recently, the Divisional Court has said that Norwich Pharmacal may extend beyond the discovery of the identity of a wrongdoer or of a missing piece of the jigsaw--, but under the strict caveat that the action cannot be used for wide ranging discovery or the gathering of evidence and is strictly conned to necessary information--: R (Mohamed) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth A›airs (No 1) [2009] 1 WLR 2579, para 133, cited by the Court of Appeal in R (Omar) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth A›airs [2011] EWCA Civ 1587 at [4].\n\n141 Lord Sumption JSC suggests (para 20) that it will be possible in the present situation to draw a distinction between information which can permissibly be sought and evidence which cannot. At least two problems arise in this connection. First, it is, as I have noted, unclear whether any distinction or limitation is proposed between on the one hand information and documentation relating to assets and on the other hand information and documentation relating more generally to the companys a›airs. Any such distinction or limitation seems likely in any event to be in practice illusory. An insolvency practitioner is ultimately only interested in assets and their distribution. Any questioning put, or information or documentation sought, will be scrutinised with a view to identifying assets, in whatever form, even if they only consist of potential claims for maladministration or negligence. E F\n\n142 The second problem is that the distinction between information and evidence seems likely also to be illusory. Evidence is at least conned to the issues in identied litigation, domestic or foreign. In contrast, the proposed relief sought against PwC is completely unconned, in nature and scope. The later Omar case [2014] QB 112 highlights (para 12) a justied scepticism about maintaining a distinction between information and evidence which gives cause for caution about further extension by analogy of the Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction to circumstances where identiable wrongdoing is not in issue. The Chief Justices remark in para 80 that PwC . . . is not an overt target for adverse litigation brought by the JOLs at this stage- was I think also shrewd. Who can doubt that the JOLs would, in their examination both of the working papers and other documents and information disclosed by PwC and in their questioning of the partners and G H\n\nD\n\nF\n\n# [2015] AC Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Singularis Holdings Ltd v Lord Mance JSC\n\n- o–cers attending under an order such as that made by the Chief Justice, have a close eye on the possibility that this might show some possible claim against PwC as auditors? The Chief Justices ensuing comment that the court should take a healthily sceptical approach in evaluating the complaints made about the validity and scope of the ex parte orders--, because it seems clear that a combative and sophisticated defensive strategy has been engaged- appears to me in contrast unjustied. The jurisdiction to A\n- make or justication for such an order cannot depend on the defensive strategy adopted to resist it. B\n\n143 The principle now advanced by the JOLs lacks any substantial authority. The two rst instance authorities cited by Lord Sumption JSC in para 24 o›er the weakest of encouragement for the novel jurisdiction now proposed. Moolman v Builders & Developers (Pty) Ltd [1990] 2 All SA 77\n\n- (A) treats the issue as one of applying In re African Farms [1906] TS 373, giving as the only reason that information is necessary if the ultimate aim of recovery of assets is to be realised. The court then in fact applied the statutory provisions of the forum on an as if- basis [1990] 2 All SA 77 (A), sub-paragraph (d) on pp 4—5 and p 16. That I agree with Lord Sumption JSC and Lord Collins is not a sustainable approach. C\n- 144 The judgment in In re Impex Services Worldwide Ltd [2004] BPIR 564 suggests a breadth of common law power which would again be completely unlimited in its scope, enabling the Manx court if it thinks t-- to make an order summoning before it any person whom the court deems capable of giving information concerning the promotion, formation, trade, dealings and a›airs or property of the company--: para 106(8). Deemster Doyle explained this on the basis that (para 107): D E\n\nFriendly and sophisticated jurisdictions which respect the rule of law and human rights need to be aware that if things go wrong in their jurisdiction and entities in the Isle of Man have information, documentation and evidence in their possession custody control or power that would assist them, then the Manx courts, in a proper case and subject to suitable safeguards and protections where necessary, will o›er judicial co-operation and assistance where that is reasonably requested by the judicial authority in that friendly jurisdiction. When the call for help comes the Manx courts will, in proper cases, answer the call positively and provide the necessary co-operation and assistance.--\n\n- English liquidators were the beneciary of the far reaching principle thus promulgated, but I cannot accept that it represents English or Bermudan common law. If there might seem to be a hint in the Deemsters phrase if things go wrong- that the reasoning and order may have been based on wrongdoing, that does not appear to be borne out by the full account of the background and proposed questions given earlier in his judgment. Like the order made by the Chief Justice in the present case, the Deemsters ready G\n- acceptance of the scope of the assistance which might be provided as extending to any information about the companys promotion, formation, trade, dealings and a›airs or property as well as to evidence once again indicates the di–culty that there could be in keeping this novel power within bounds. H\n\n### 1728 Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) [2015] AC v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Lord Mance JSC\n\n145 Lord Collinss approving dictum in Rubin v Euronance SA [2013] 1 AC 236, para 33, quoted by Lord Sumption JSC in his para 19, is found in a paragraph listing a series of authorities on modied universalism, in circumstances where there was no examination in argument or in the Boards opinion of di›erences between them, or between situations where identiable assets were in issue and other situations. But another dictum of Lord Collins in that case is in my view relevant. At para 129, he said that: A B\n\nThe law relating to the enforcement of foreign judgments and the law relating to international insolvency are not areas of law which have in recent times been left to be developed by judge-made law. As Lord Bridge of Harwich put it in relation to a proposed change in the common law rule relating to fraud as a defence to the enforcement of a foreign judgment, if the law is now in need of reform, it is for the legislature, not the judiciary, to e›ect it-: Owens Bank Ltd v Bracco [1992] 2 AC 443, 489.--\n\nThat stands in stark contrast with the development of common law powers which the majority on this appeal supports.\n\n146 The description of In re Impex [2004] BPIR 564 as a case of judicial assistance in the traditional sense- can be seen now to be on any view unsustainable, and Lord Sumption JSC himself says (para 24) that he would not wish to endorse all of the reasoning given- in the judgments in either Moolman [1990] All SA 77 (A) or In re Impex. He instances in particular- those parts which appear to support the concept of applying statutory powers by mere analogy. That leaves openin the context of the JOLs present case that the Bermudan court can assist the Cayman Islands- liquidation without relying on Bermudan lawhow far his approach accepts or disapproves the breadth of the reasoning and orders in In re Impex (see the previous paragraph)or indeed in the present case: see paras 119—120 above. That is another of the unresolved uncertainties about the scope of the proposed new jurisdiction.\n\n147 In these circumstances, and although anything said may be obiter, I am not at present persuaded that it is appropriate to extend the common law power to assist by ordering the provision of information beyond categories which have some recognisable basis in current law, that is cases where there is (a) evidence that the person ordered to provide the information or documentation has property belonging to the insolvent company, or (b) evidence of some wrongdoing by the person so ordered or (c) evidence of some wrongdoing by another person in which the person so ordered was or is innocently mixed up. A general common law power to order the disclosure of information and documentation by, and the questioning of, anyone, either because a foreign liquidator shows that this may assist him identify or recover assets anywhere in the world or, a fortiori, because it would enable him understand the companys a›airs, goes not only beyond anything which it is necessary to contemplate on this appeal, but is also beyond anything that I can, as at present advised, regard as permissible or appropriate. F G H\n\n148 I therefore consider that the appeal must be dismissed, because of the negative answer given to the second issue. But I would, if necessary, also have considered that it should be dismissed on the ground that a negative answer should be given on the rst issue.\n\nD\n\nE\n\nC\n\n# [2015] AC Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Singularis Holdings Ltd v Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury PSC\n\n### LORD NEUBERGER OF ABBOTSBURY PSC A\n\n149 I agree with the other members of the Board that we should humbly advise Her Majesty that this appeal should be dismissed. However, there is an issue which divides the members of the Board. It is whether, as Lord Sumption and Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony JJSC and Lord Collins of Mapesbury consider, the appeal should only be dismissed on the grounds\n\n- (i) that there is no common law power to apply legislation which applies to domestic insolvencies by analogy to foreign insolvencies, and (ii) that the Bermudan courts should not exercise a common law power (the Power--) described by Lord Sumption JSC in para 25, because, as he explains in paras 29—30, the Cayman Islands courts have no such power, or whether, as Lord Mance JSC concludes, the appeal should also be dismissed on the ground (iii) that the common law power in question does not exist. On that B\n- issue, if it is appropriate to decide whether the alleged power exists, I would be in agreement with Lord Mance JSC. C\n\n150 As this is a judgment which dissents from the majority view on ground (iii), and there is little which I wish to add to the judgment of Lord Mance JSC, I can express my reasons relatively shortly.\n\n151 It is unnecessary to decide whether the Power exists, because we are all agreed that, even if it does, it should not be exercised. I accept, of course, that we can decide (albeit, at least arguably, strictly only obiter) whether the Power exists. However, as it is not necessary for us to rule on that issue in order to dispose of this appeal, we should, in my opinion, be very cautious of doing so. While judges in a nal court of appeal, perhaps particularly in a common law system, should give as much guidance as they can as to the substantive and procedural law in any area, they must always bear in mind the risks inherent in determining issues which do not have to be decided in D E\n\norder to dispose of the case before them.\n\n152 As new problems arise, and as societal values and practices, technological techniques and business practices change, it is inevitable that judges can and should introduce new common law principles or procedures or make alterations to established common law principles and procedures.\n\n- However, such developments should always be adopted cautiously, not least because, even with the benet of submissions from advocates and consideration of previous cases, textbooks and articles, the wider implications of any new principle or alteration to an existing principle are very hard to assess. The need for caution in this connection is, in my view, supported by the judicial observations cited by Lord Collins in paras 65—68, although those observations were made in relation to a di›erent aspect of F\n- the need for caution. G\n\n153 In the present case, there is obvious force in the point that the Board should determine whether the common law power alleged by the liquidators exists, as it is an important issue on which the sooner an authoritative decision is given the better, especially in the light of the somewhat confused state of the law as revealed in the judgments in this case.\n\n154 However, that very confusion underlines the need for caution. The extent of the extra-statutory powers of a common law court to assist foreign liquidators is a very tricky topic on which the Board, the House of Lords and the Supreme Court have not been conspicuously successful in giving clear or consistent guidance: see the judgment of Lord Ho›mann on behalf of the Board in Cambridge Gas Transportation Corpn v O–cial Committee of H\n\n### Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) [2015] AC v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury PSC\n\nF\n\nG\n\nH\n\nUnsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc [2007] 1 AC 508, all ve opinions in the House of Lords in In re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 852, and the judgment of Lord Collins of Mapesbury for the majority of the Supreme Court in Rubin v Euronance SA (Picard intervening) [2013] 1 AC 236, discussed by Lord Sumption JSC at paras 16—19, and the judgment of Lord Collins in this case. A\n\n155 The message I take from those cases is that, at least in this area, it would be better for the Board to approach any case in this eld with a view to deciding it on a relatively minimalist basis, rather than by seeking to lay down general principles which it is not necessary to determine, particularly when those principles involve extending the courts powers in a way which may have substantial ramications. While Lord Sumption JSCs explanation of the nature and extent of this alleged common law power appears very attractive, I think it could lead to all sorts of problems and uncertainties, as is implicit in the qualications which Lord Sumption JSC makes, at para 25. It is all very well saying that they can be dealt with when they arise, but the fact that it is apparent that there will be problems and complications if the law is developed in a certain way suggests to me that the development should not be adopted unless it is necessary to do so. Accordingly, as it is unnecessary to decide whether the common law power exists, I would have preferred to leave the issue to be decided when it needs to bewith the benet of the powerful arguments either way contained in the judgments on this appeal, which, with all respect to counsel, range more widely and deeply than the arguments which the Board heard during the hearing. B C D\n\n156 If, however, it is incumbent on me to express a view, I would conclude, in agreement with Lord Mance JSC, that the alleged common law power does not exist. He has set out the grounds for that conclusion convincingly, and they include reasons both of principle and of practicality. Accordingly, I do not propose to repeat those reasons, but there are one or two points I would like to emphasise. E\n\n157 The extreme version of the principle of universality--, as propounded by Lord Ho›mann in Cambridge Gas, has, as Lord Sumption JSC explains, e›ectively disappeared, principally as a result of the reasoning of Lord Collins speaking for the majority in Rubin, and speaking for the Board in this appeal. However, as with the Cheshire Cat, the principles deceptively benevolent smile still appears to linger, and it is now invoked to justify the creation of this new common law power. It is almost as if the Board is suggesting that, while we went too far in Cambridge Gas and should pull back as indicated in Rubin, we do not want to withdraw as completely as we logically ought. In my view, the logic of the withdrawal from the more extreme version of the principle of universality is that we should not invent a new common law power based on the principle.\n\n158 The limitation of the Power to insolvency cases may be seen by many to be questionable. More specically, the limitation to liquidations which are being conducted by o–cers of a foreign court seems to me to be potentially arbitrary. Companies may be in court-imposed liquidation in many jurisdictions when it is just and equitable- to wind them up, even if they are solvent: I do not see why liquidators in such a case should be able to invoke the Power when other people running solvent companies could not do so. Further, there is no reason why a statutory regime should not provide\n\n## [2015] AC Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) Singularis Holdings Ltd v Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury PSC\n\nthat voluntary liquidations are to be conducted under the aegis of the court, and, if so, the Power would seem to apply in such cases. And the status of administrators in administrations may be unclear in this connection. A\n\n159 The need to make subtle distinctions also concerns me. Thus, the distinction between information and documentation which is obtainable under this power, and material for use in actual or anticipated litigation--, appears very likely to give rise to di–cult practical problems. I appreciate\n\n- that these problems can arise in other circumstances, but that is not a reason for extending the circumstances in which these problems may arise; and, as the facts of this case suggest, I suspect that they are particularly likely to arise in relation to the exercise of the Power. Similarly, the question what is necessary for the performance of a liquidators functions, which is said to be a prerequisite for the exercise of the Power, seems to be a fertile area for B\n- uncertainty and dispute. C\n\n160 More broadly, these distinctions seem to me to embody the sort of requirements one would expect to see in a statutory code rather than in judge-made law. As the judicial observations cited by Lord Collins suggest, judge-made law should be limited to very modest development[s] . . . of existing principle--, and should be made in small steps- or within . . . interstitial limits--. Although I accept that the United Kingdom courts have\n\n- been prepared to recognise a new common law right in Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Comrs [1974] AC 133, the right involved was only exercisable in very specic circumstances where a serious wrong had been committed. I do not consider that that decision alters the fact that the creation of the Power would represent a development in the law which is, as Lord Mance JSC puts it, radical--. It may not seem radical in the sense that D\n- it can be said to be a fairly routine feature of the extreme principle of universality- enunciated by Lord Ho›mann in Cambridge Gas [2007] 1 AC 508, but that view is no longer maintainable given that extreme principle has now been rejected by Lord Collins, speaking for the majority of the House of Lords in Rubin [2013] 1 AC 236 and for the Board on this appeal. E\n\n161 The contention that judges should not be creating the Power is reinforced when one considers the extent of domestic statutory law and international convention law in the area of international insolvency. Examples of such laws are described and discussed in paras 40—50 of Lord Collinss judgment. In this highly legislated area, I consider that the Power which is said to arise in this case is one which should be bestowed on the court by the legislature, and not arrogated to the court of its own motion. F\n\n162 I acknowledge the force of the arguments the other way, which are so clearly set out by Lord Sumption JSC. However, as already intimated, while I agree with the judgment of Lord Collins and otherwise agree with the judgment of Lord Sumption JSC, I would for my part reject the existence of the Power, if it is appropriate to decide that issue at all. G\n\nJILL SUTHERLAND, Barrister\n\nH","body_zh":"1675　[2015] AC　Singularis Holdings Ltd（辛古拉里斯控股有限公司）诉 PricewaterhouseCoopers（普华永道）（PC）　Singularis Holdings Ltd 诉\n\nPrivy Council（枢密院）\nSingularis Holdings Ltd 诉 PricewaterhouseCoopers\n[2014] UKPC 36\n[源自 Bermuda（百慕大）上诉法院的上诉]\n\nB\n\nC\n\nD\n\nA\n\n2014年4月29日、30日；11月10日\n\nLord Neuberger of Abbotsbury PSC、Lord Mance、Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony、Lord Sumption JJSC、Lord Collins of Mapesbury\n\nBermuda（百慕大）——破产——管辖权——公司在 Cayman Islands（开曼群岛）被清盘——清算人寻求百慕大法院作出命令，要求审计师提供与公司事务有关的信息——法官声称行使普通法权力，命令提供在国内破产程序中本可依成文法命令提供的信息——普通法是否存在通过作出命令协助外国破产管辖法院的权力——在外国法院不能作出同等命令的情形下，该命令是否适当——法院是否能够行使类似于国内破产程序中可行使、但不适用于外国破产程序的法定权力——Companies Act 1981（No 59 of 1981），第195条\n\n一家开曼群岛公司在开曼群岛被清盘，并任命了清算人。为追查该公司的资产，清算人希望从该公司的审计师——一家在百慕大注册的合伙企业——取得与公司事务有关的信息。他们从开曼群岛法院取得一项命令，要求审计师移交或交出某些文件；但根据开曼群岛法律，该命令仅延及属于该公司的材料。为取得属于审计师自身的材料，清算人在百慕大申请命令，要求审计师提交其占有的、与公司事务有关的所有文件。根据百慕大 Companies Act 1981 第195条，Bermuda Supreme Court（百慕大最高法院）有权作出该等命令，但仅限于该法院已命令清盘的公司。然而，Chief Justice（首席大法官）在百慕大最高法院审理时，行使了其所称的普通法权力，命令审计师提供若该公司在百慕大被清盘则可根据第195条被命令提供的信息。审计师上诉后，Bermuda Court of Appeal（百慕大上诉法院）对第195条不适用的情况下是否有管辖权作出该等命令表示怀疑，但仍撤销该命令，理由是无论如何，该命令并非适当行使裁量权，因为该命令是为支持开曼群岛清算程序而作出，而开曼群岛法院本不能作出该命令。\n\n清算人上诉\n\n裁定，建议驳回上诉，(1)（Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury PSC 和 Lord Mance JSC 持异议）普通法具有通过命令提供为管理外国清盘程序所必需的口头或书面信息，协助外国破产管辖法院的官员或同等公职人员的权力；但该权力不得用于使其实施其根据任命其的法律本不能实施之事；并且，尽管百慕大对适用于 Companies Act 1981 的公司清盘时可行使的权力作出了明文规定，这并不排除对完全处于该法适用范围以外的其他公司行使普通法权力，但百慕大法院作出清算人所请求的命令并非适当行使协助权力，因为他们在百慕大寻求的材料，根据任命他们的法院的国内法无法取得（见后文第19、25、28—29、31、33、109—115段）。\n\nNorwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Comrs [1974] AC 133, HL(E)、In re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 852, HL(E) 及 Rubin v Euronance SA (Picard intervening) [2013] 1 AC 236, SC(E) 适用。\n\n(2) 法院承认并向外国破产程序提供协助的普通法权力，主要通过法院现有权力行使；尽管该等权力可通过普通法传统的司法造法技术加以扩展或发展，司法机关不得通过类推，将破产立法的适用范围扩展至其不适用的情形，且国内法院无权通过实施其在国内破产程序中本可适当实施之事来协助外国法院，亦不得凭借任何该等权力取得管辖权；因此，百慕大法院不得通过类推，将 Companies Act 1981 下的法定权力适用于外国破产程序，视同其为国内破产程序（见后文第18、32、36、38、64、82—83、94、108、109、122、134、149、162段）。\n\n适用 Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe 在 Al Sabah v Grupo Torras SA [2005] 2 AC 333，第35段中的附带意见。\n\nCambridge Gas Transportation Corpn v Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc [2007] 1 AC 508, PC 及 In re Phoenix Kapitaldienst GmbH [2013] Ch 61 未获遵循。\n\n存疑。审计师仅以公司审计师身份取得的信息，是否仅因记录该信息的文件为其工作底稿并因而属于其财产，即可被视为专属于审计师自身（见后文第30段）。\n\n确认 Bermuda Court of Appeal [2013] CA (Bda) 7 Civ 的裁决。\n\n下列案件在判决书中被援引：\n\nAfrican Farms, In re [1906] TS 373\n\nAl Sabah v Grupo Torras SA [2005] UKPC 1; [2005] 2 AC 333; [2005] 2 WLR 904; [2005] 1 All ER 871, PC\n\nArab Monetary Fund v Hashim (No 5) [1992] 2 All ER 911\n\nAshworth Hospital Authority v MGN Ltd [2002] UKHL 29; [2002] 1 WLR 2033; [2002] 4 All ER 193, HL(E)\n\nAyerst v C & K (Construction) Ltd [1976] AC 167; [1975] 3 WLR 16; [1975] 2 All ER 537, HL(E)\n\nBanco Nacional de Cuba v Cosmos Trading Corpn [2000] 1 BCLC 813, CA\n\nBank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 10), In re [1997] Ch 213; [1997] 2 WLR 172; [1996] 4 All ER 796\n\nBanque Indosuez SA v Ferromet Resources Inc [1993] BCLC 112\n\nBent v Young (1838) 9 Sim 180\n\nCCIC Finance Ltd v Guangdong International Trust & Investment Corpn [2005] 2 HKC 589\n\nCambridge Gas Transportation Corpn v Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc [2006] UKPC 26; [2007] 1 AC 508; [2006] 3 WLR 689; [2006] 3 All ER 829; [2006] 2 All ER (Comm) 695, PC\n\nColonial Government v Tatham (1902) 23 Natal LR 153\n\nCrédit Suisse Fides Trust SA v Cuoghi [1998] QB 818; [1997] 3 WLR 871; [1997] 3 All ER 673, CA\n\nH\n\nDeutsche Morgan Grenfell Group plc v Inland Revenue Comrs [2006] UKHL 49; [2007] 1 AC 558; [2006] 3 WLR 781; [2007] 1 All ER 449, HL(E)\n\nDreyfus v Peruvian Guano Co (1889) 41 Ch D 151\n\nEngland v Smith [2001] Ch 419; [2000] 2 WLR 1141, CA\n\nE\n\nB\n\nC\n\nG\n\nF\n\n[2015] AC　Singularis Holdings Ltd 诉 PricewaterhouseCoopers（PC）\nSingularis Holdings Ltd 诉\n\nA　Gurr v Zambia Airways Corpn Ltd [1998] ZASCA 16; [1998] 2 All SA 479 (A)\n\nHIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd, In re [2008] UKHL 21; [2008] 1 WLR 852; [2008] Bus LR 905; [2008] 3 All ER 869, HL(E)\n\nImpex Services Worldwide Ltd, In re [2004] BPIR 564\n\nIncorporated Council of Law Reporting for England and Wales v Attorney General [1972] Ch 73; [1971] 3 WLR 853; [1971] 3 All ER 1029, CA\n\nInternational Tin Council, In re [1987] Ch 419; [1987] 2 WLR 1229; [1987] 1 All ER 890\n\nB　Jones v Kaney [2011] UKSC 13; [2011] 2 AC 398; [2011] 2 WLR 823; [2011] 2 All ER 671, SC(E)\n\n[1998] 4 All ER 513, HL(E)　Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 AC 349; [1998] 3 WLR 1095;\n\nMcKerr, In re [2004] UKHL 12; [2004] 1 WLR 807; [2004] 2 All ER 409, HL(NI)\n\nMasri v Consolidated Contractors International (UK) Ltd (No 4) [2009] UKHL 43; [2010] 1 AC 90; [2009] 3 WLR 385; [2009] Bus LR 1269; [2009] 4 All ER 847; [2010] 1 All ER (Comm) 220; [2009] 2 Lloyd's Rep 473, HL(E)\n\n(A)　Modern Terminals (Berth 5) Ltd v States Steamship Co [1979] HKLR 512\n\nMoolman v Builders & Developers (Pty) Ltd [1989] ZASCA 171; [1990] 2 All SA 77\n\nD　164; [1973] 2 All ER 943, HL(E)\n\nOrr v Diaper (1876) 4 Ch D 92; 25 WR 23　Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Comrs [1974] AC 133; [1973] 3 WLR\n\nP & O Nedlloyd BV v Arab Metals Co (No 2) (The UB Tiger) [2006] EWCA Civ 1717; [2007] 1 WLR 2288; [2007] 2 All ER (Comm) 401; [2007] 2 Lloyd's Rep 231, CA\n\nE　1 All ER 505, SC(E)　Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd [2009] EWHC 1912 (Ch); [2009] 2 BCLC 400; (Revenue and Customs Comrs intervening) [2011] UKSC 38; [2012] 1 AC 383; [2011] 3 WLR 521; [2011] Bus LR 1266; [2012]\n\nPhoenix Kapitaldienst GmbH, In re [2012] EWHC 62 (Ch); [2013] Ch 61; [2012] 3 WLR 681; [2012] 2 All ER 1217\n\nCA (Cayman Islands)\n\n673, SC(E)　Picard v Primeo Fund 2013 (1) CILR 164, Grand Ct (Jones J); 2014 (1) CILR 379,\n\nPrest v Prest [2013] UKSC 34; [2013] 2 AC 415; [2013] 3 WLR 1; [2013] 4 All ER\n\nF　PricewaterhouseCoopers 诉 Saad Investments Co Ltd [2014] UKPC 35; [2014] 1 WLR 4482, PC\n\n729, SC(E)\n\nR v Bourne [1939] 1 KB 687; [1938] 3 All ER 615, CCA\n\nR (Child Poverty Action Group) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2010] UKSC 54; [2011] 2 AC 15; [2011] 2 WLR 1; [2011] PTSR 185; [2011] 1 All ER\n\nG　Civ 1587, CA　R (Mohamed) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No 1) [2008] EWHC 2048 (Admin); [2009] 1 WLR 2579, DC\n\nR (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice (CNK Alliance Ltd intervening) [2014] UKSC 38; [2015] AC 657; [2014] 3 WLR 200; [2014] 3 All ER 843, SC(E)\n\nR (Omar) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2011] EWCA\n\nH　[2013] 3 WLR 439; [2013] 3 All ER 95, CA\n\nER (Comm) 513; [2012] 2 Lloyd's Rep 615, SC(E)\n\nER 980, CA　R (Omar) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2012] EWHC 1737 (Admin); [2013] 1 All ER 161, DC; [2013] EWCA Civ 118; [2014] QB 112;\n\nRubin v Euronance SA (Picard intervening) [2012] UKSC 46; [2013] 1 AC 236; [2012] 3 WLR 1019; [2013] Bus LR 1; [2013] 1 All ER 521; [2013] 1 All\n\nSeagull Manufacturing Co Ltd, In re [1993] Ch 345; [1993] 2 WLR 872; [1993] 2 All\n\n1678　Singularis Holdings Ltd 诉 PricewaterhouseCoopers（PC）　[2015] AC　PricewaterhouseCoopers 诉　辩论\n\nSmith Kline and French Laboratories Ltd v Global Pharmaceutics Ltd [1986] RPC 394, CA　A\n\nTest Claimants in the FII Group Litigation v Revenue and Customs Comrs (formerly Inland Revenue Comrs) [2012] UKSC 19; [2012] 2 AC 337; [2012] 2 WLR 1149; [2012] Bus LR 1033; [2012] 3 All ER 909, SC(E)\n\nTucker (RC) (A Bankrupt), In re, Ex p Tucker (KR) [1990] Ch 148; [1988] 2 WLR 748; [1988] 1 All ER 603, CA\n\nTurners & Growers Exporters Ltd v The Ship Cornelis Verolme [1997] 2 NZLR 110　B\n\nUpmann v Elkan (1871) LR 12 Eq 140; LR 7 Ch App 130\n\nWilliams v Central Bank of Nigeria [2014] UKSC 10; [2014] AC 1189; [2014] 2 WLR 355; [2014] 2 All ER 489, SC(E)\n\n下列补充案件在辩论中被援引：\n\nAtlas Bulk Shipping A/S, In re; Larsen v Navios International Inc [2011] EWHC 878 (Ch); [2012] Bus LR 1124　C\n\n源自 Bermuda Court of Appeal 的上诉\n\n2013年3月4日，Kawaley CJ 在 Bermuda Supreme Court 作出命令：(i) 承认 Singularis Holdings Ltd——一家被 Grand Court of the Cayman Islands（开曼群岛大法院）命令清盘的开曼群岛公司——的共同正式清算人的资格；及 (ii) 要求该公司的审计师 PricewaterhouseCoopers——一家在百慕大注册的合伙企业——提交其占有的、与其事务有关的所有文件。\n\n审计师对文件提交令提出上诉。2013年11月18日，Bermuda Court of Appeal（百慕大上诉法院）（Zacca P（扎卡院长）、Auld JA（奥尔德上诉法官）及 Bell AJA（贝尔代理上诉法官））[2013] CA (Bda) 7 Civ 准许了针对文件提交令的上诉。\n\n清算人依据 Bermuda Court of Appeal（百慕大上诉法院）（Zacca P（扎卡院长）、Evans JA（埃文斯上诉法官）及 Scott Baker JA（斯科特·贝克上诉法官））于2014年3月21日准予的许可提出上诉。根据当事人共同确认的事实及争点陈述，Privy Council（枢密院）须处理的争点为：（1）就一家在 Cayman Islands（开曼群岛）进行清算的公司，法院是否有权依据或按照与 Bermudan Companies Act 1981 第195条类似的条款，以司法协助方式作出命令；（2）如有该项权力，作为酌情决定事项，应当准予还是拒绝提供协助；以及（3）尤其是，清算人是否有权获得其根据 Cayman Islands law（开曼群岛法律）在 Cayman Islands 无法取得的救济。\n\n事实载于 Lord Sumption JSC（萨姆普申大法官）的判决书中。\n\nGabriel Moss QC（加布里埃尔·莫斯御用大律师）、Felicity Toube QC（费莉西蒂·图布御用大律师）、Stephen Robins（斯蒂芬·罗宾斯）及 Rod Attride-Stirling（罗德·阿特赖德-斯特林）（均为 Bermudan Bar（百慕大律师界）成员）（由 Blake Morgan LLP（布莱克·摩根律师事务所）受托）代表清算人。\n\n[2015] AC Singularis Holdings Ltd（辛古拉里斯控股有限公司）诉 PricewaterhouseCoopers（普华永道）（PC）　Singularis Holdings Ltd 诉　论证\n\nBermuda Supreme Court（百慕大最高法院）在跨境破产中提供司法协助的普通法权力，赋予其管辖权以要求审计师披露与该公司有关的文件。清算人无法在 Cayman Islands 从审计师取得相关文件，并非作为酌情决定事项拒绝提供该等协助的理由。必须区分：（1）承认与司法协助；以及（2）承认破产程序与承认判决。在其严格且狭义的意义上，“承认”是指一司法管辖区通过强制性规则，在其本身司法管辖区内直接赋予另一司法管辖区法律行为效力。因此，如在公司注册地 Cayman Islands 作出清盘令，Bermuda 根据其普通法冲突法规则赋予该令效力，其范围为承认 Cayman Islands 清算人为依 Cayman Islands law 获授权的该公司唯一代理人，并能够代表该公司在 Bermuda 行事：见 Dicey, Morris & Collins（戴西、莫里斯和柯林斯）, The Conflict of Laws, 15th ed (2012), vol 2, rule 179。Bermudan conflict of laws rules（百慕大冲突法规则）并不承认 Cayman Islands 清盘程序的强制性效力，例如法定中止：见 Banque Indosuez SA（东方汇理银行股份公司）v Ferromet Resources Inc（费罗梅特资源公司）[1993] BCLC 112, 117。除普通法的强制性承认规则外，判例法还发展出酌情的司法协助：见 Dicey, Morris & Collins, 15th ed, paras 30-107, 30-108。普通法司法协助与承认之间有两项主要区别：（1）承认具有强制性，而司法协助具有酌情性；（2）承认赋予外国法律效力，而司法协助适用本国法律：见 Cambridge Gas Transportation Corpn（剑桥燃气运输公司）v Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc（Navigator Holdings plc（航海者控股公众有限公司）无担保债权人正式委员会）[2007] 1 AC 508。区分承认外国破产程序与承认因外国破产程序产生的判决也同样重要。普通法强制性冲突法规则对二者作出完全不同的规定。因此，对于一家在 Cayman Islands 注册的公司，在 Cayman Islands 进行的清盘程序必须在 Bermuda 获得承认，其范围为承认清算人的任命及权限。然而，对人判决仅在满足诸如服从管辖权等特定条件时才获得承认：见 Rubin v Euronance SA（欧罗南斯股份公司）（Picard（皮卡德）介入）[2013] 1 AC 236。如外国清盘程序已获得承认，即清算人的权限获接受，作出承认的法院并无义务提供任何协助。然而，除非存在不予协助的充分理由，例如需要保护当地债权人，否则应当提供该等协助：见 Rubin v Euronance SA, para 29。\n\n在 European Union（欧洲联盟）以外及尚未颁布 UNCITRAL Model Law（联合国国际贸易法委员会示范法）的国家，跨境破产中的司法协助可分为两种不同类型。模式1涉及通过启动附属破产程序（例如清算）提供协助。附属清算原则，是指法院具有普通法权力，通过授予仅受当地法律规管的救济来协助外国清算人，即使该当地法律赋予取得主清算程序中不可获得之类型或性质救济的权利；反之，主程序法律下可获得的救济，也可能无法根据附属清盘法律获得：见 In re Matheson Bros Ltd（马西森兄弟有限公司案）(1884) 27 Ch D 225 及 In re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA（国际信贷商业银行股份公司案）(No 10) [1997] Ch 213。模式2涉及在不启动附属清算的情况下提供协助。所寻求救济为询问个人及提交文件时，可获得此类救济：见 Rubin v Euronance SA [2013] 1 AC 236, paras 29, 31, 33。判例显示，模式2权力存在两项可供选择的概念基础。路径A涉及一项普通法拟制，据此法院可如同外国公司正在本地清盘般提供协助；在该基础上，即使该外国公司事实上不符合使其成为受本地清盘立法适用之公司所需的定义，该外国公司仍被视为该等公司：见 In re African Farms（非洲农场案）[1906] TS 373；Moolman v Builders & Developers (Pty) Ltd（建造商及开发商（私人）有限公司）[1990] 2 All SA 77 (A) 及 Cambridge Gas Transportation Corpn v Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc [2007] 1 AC 508, para 22。路径B涉及通过行使提供协助的法院的一般性、非制定法权力提供协助，包括固有衡平法及普通法权力，或非破产制定法权力，而不依赖本地清盘立法中的任何具体规定。无论基于何种基础，在本案中，清算人均能够取得 Bermuda Supreme Court 的协助，而且其获得该协助是恰当的。\n\n1680　Singularis Holdings Ltd 诉 PricewaterhouseCoopers（PC）　[2015] AC　PricewaterhouseCoopers（PC）　论证\n\n路径A中普通法假定最具权威性的表述，仍见于 Cambridge Gas 案, para 22。该判决有两个不同部分。第一，关于执行外国判决的通常国际私法规则并不适用于破产；该判决的这一部分在 Rubin v Euronance SA [2013] 1 AC 236 中不获赞同，但与本上诉无关，因为本上诉并不涉及承认判决。第二，路径A意味着本国法院可以通过作出其在本国破产案件中本可作出的任何作为来提供协助。该第二部分已获广泛遵循：见 In re Phoenix Kapitaldienst GmbH（凤凰资本服务有限责任公司案）[2013] Ch 61, para 62；Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd（永续受托人有限公司）v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd（BNY公司受托服务有限公司）[2009] 2 BCLC 400, para 48；In re Atlas Bulk Shipping A/S（阿特拉斯散货航运股份公司案）[2012] Bus LR 1124, paras 30—32 及 Picard v Primeo Fund（普里梅奥基金）2013 (1) CILR 164, para 41。这一普通法管辖权的发展，是普通法为满足时代不断变化的需要而必须演进的正当且典型例子：见 Jones v Kaney [2011] 2 AC 398, para 112。普通法适应新情况及不断变化需要的能力，是其优势之一。该等变化未必是渐进的，也可以是根本性的：见 Kleinwort Benson Ltd（克莱因沃特·本森有限公司）v Lincoln City Council（林肯市议会）[1999] 2 AC 349, 377—379。普通法的作用是涵盖未受制定法规管的领域。这些考量在跨境破产领域尤其相关。现代全球化世界中的商业必要性要求向外国破产程序提供司法协助，尤其是在涉及巨额款项且资产或文件下落不明时：见 Crédit Suisse Fides Trust SA（瑞士信贷菲德斯信托股份公司）v Cuoghi（库奥吉）[1998] QB 818, 827，及 Turners & Growers Exporters Ltd（特纳斯与格罗尔斯出口商有限公司）v The Ship Cornelis Verolme（“科内利斯·费罗尔默”号船）[1997] 2 NZLR 110, 126。同样至关重要的是，离岸司法管辖区必须能够确保其可适用本身法律及程序，以确保其司法管辖区被用于跨境商业活动不会便利欺诈或隐匿资产或文件。该等政策促成修正普遍主义原则的发展：见 Cambridge Gas 案 [2007] 1 AC 508；In re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd（HIH意外及综合保险有限公司案）[2008] 1 WLR 852 及 Rubin v Euronance SA [2013] 1 AC 236。如存在本地程序，例如附属清算，控制该本地程序的法院必须协助主程序。如不存在本地程序，支持司法协助的理由更为有力，因为并无替代的破产程序。凡须在本地司法管辖区完成的事项，只能通过司法协助完成。普通法司法协助不要求互惠。当地债权人及政策因提供司法协助具有酌情性这一事实而受到保护。普通法上提供该等协助并不与 Al Sabah v Grupo Torras SA（托拉斯集团股份公司）[2005] 2 AC 333 相抵触。该案第35段中有关普通法立场的意见属于附带意见。此外，无论如何，该等意见均无说服力，因为该争点在论证中未获充分展开。而且，第35段已被 Cambridge Gas 案 [2007] 1 AC 508 所取代，枢密院在该案中于听取充分论证后，就普通法协助问题阐述了详细意见。本案的本地立法并无任何内容禁止法院以此方式在跨境破产中提供协助。因此，就管辖权而言，路径A使法院能够依据 Cambridge Gas 案 [2007] 1 AC 508, para 22 所确认的普通法拟制，如同该公司正在 Bermuda 进行附属清算般，依 Bermudan Companies Act 1981 第195条作出命令。\n\n或者，路径B涉及通过行使提供协助的法院的一般性及非制定法权力（包括固有权力及普通法权力）提供协助，而不依赖本地清盘立法的任何具体规定：见 In re Impex Services Worldwide Ltd（环球英派克斯服务有限公司案）[2004] BPIR 564 及 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v BNY\n\n- Corporate Trustee Services Ltd（公司受托服务有限公司）（Revenue and Customs Comrs（税务与海关专员）介入）[2012] 1 AC 383。该等权力在本案中存在。法院具有强制证据开示的固有权力和/或普通法权力和/或衡平法权力，或者具有一项适用范围不限于本地清算的法定条文所赋予的权力。衡平法院的固有权力归属于 Supreme Court of Bermuda（百慕大最高法院）：见 Supreme Court Act 1905（1905年《最高法院法》）第12条。\n\n- 因此，百慕大最高法院仍可行使衡平法管辖权，以强制为另一法院的诉讼程序提供协助的证据开示。在跨境破产案件中，可通过司法协助行使强制证据开示的非法定权力：见 In re Impex Services Worldwide Ltd [2004] BPIR 564 和 Rubin v Euronance SA [2013] 1 AC 236。Bermudan Rules of the Supreme Court 1985（1985年《百慕大最高法院规则》）Ord 24, r 12 所规定的命令证据开示的权力，仅适用于该规则范围内的案件；在其范围之外，法院强制证据开示的一般衡平法权力继续适用。因此，途径B使法院得以在 Ord 24, r 12 适用时依据该规则作出命令；或者在其不适用时，依据 Supreme Court Act 1905 第12条所保留的法院一般衡平法管辖权，作出强制证据开示的命令。[提及 Dreyfus v Peruvian Guano Co (1889) 41 Ch D 151 和 In re Atlas Bulk Shipping A/S; Larsen v Navios International Inc [2012] Bus LR 1124。]作为裁量事项，应向清算人提供该等协助。所寻求的文件由审计师持有，无法从任何其他来源取得，并且对于为公司债权人的利益追回资产及确定公司的负债至关重要。开曼群岛法院本身不能作出要求提交该等文件的命令这一事实，并不构成拒绝提供协助的依据。\n\n- 第一，该异议不适用于通过启动附属清算程序提供协助的情形；在该程序中适用本地法定规定而不存在任何此类限制，且没有原则性理由说明其为何应适用于未启动附属清算程序、仅适用国内法的协助。第二，若以该理由拒绝协助，将在很大程度上削弱协助这一概念。如果 Grand Court of the Cayman Islands（开曼群岛大法院）能够自行作出具有该等效力的命令，清算人便无需百慕大最高法院提供协助。提供普通法司法协助的受请求法院只能适用其本国法律。该法律在某些方面必然不同于对寻求司法协助的申请人具有管辖权的法院所适用的法律。要求披露时适用审计师自身注册成立国的法律，对审计师而言不能说是不公平或不合理。因此，法院具有普通法管辖权，可通过要求审计师披露相关文件而协助清算人，并且没有任何裁量上的理由拒绝提供协助。\n\nDavid Chivers QC（大卫·奇弗斯御用大律师）、Paul Smith（保罗·史密斯）和 Scott Pearman（斯科特·皮尔曼）（百慕大及英格兰律师界成员）（由 Herbert Smith Freehills LLP（史密夫斐尔律师事务所）指示）代表审计师。\n\n百慕大法院在普通法上无管辖权通过命令披露文件或询问证人，向外国清算人提供协助。百慕大普通法的发展可以参照英格兰或其他普通法司法管辖区的相应发展，但必须理解为何任何特定发展必然应被纳入百慕大普通法的一部分；在法定制度不同之处，必须格外谨慎。In re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 10) [1997] Ch 213 所确认的普通法原则是，已经形成一种做法，即英格兰法院允许英格兰清算人向外国清算人划转资金，以便向全球债权人作出同等比例分配。除该原则外，英格兰清算人受英格兰法律约束，包括英格兰破产法。事实上，英格兰附属清算可能因英格兰抵销规则的优先要求，而阻碍而非促进资产在全球范围内的同等比例分配。在对外国公司进行英格兰清算时，并不会向外国清算人提供额外协助。清盘中寻求的任何救济必须通过英格兰清算人的行动取得。此外，英格兰清盘的普通法后果可能协助，也可能不协助外国清算人，取决于所涉规定。英格兰清盘管辖权的长臂管辖范围意味着，英格兰法院从英格兰清算的角度审视协助。唯一的普通法干预，是通过不适用法定制度并指示返还资产，使英格兰法定制度的运作让位于外国清算：见 In re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 852, para 9。除此之外，英格兰法并未发展出一般性的普通法协助权力。Cambridge Gas Transportation Corpn v Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc [2007] 1 AC 508 对普通法权力的分析，是在英格兰法理背景下作出的；该背景以在长臂清盘管辖权下不适用英格兰成文法为基础。在未采用该种清盘模式的国家，协助问题截然不同。问题在于外国清算人寻求由本地法院行使的权力之来源，乃至该项权力本身是否存在。该问题不能通过援引处于截然不同英格兰法律地位背景下的一项截然不同的英格兰普通法权力来解决；不过，若能从英格兰普通法立场得出任何结论，那就是普通法正依据普遍主义原则承认单一分配制度。\n\n无论是否经过修正，普遍主义原则均不为百慕大法院赋予法律依据，使其能够就不受其清盘管辖权管辖的外国实体作出具有 Companies Act 1981（1981年《公司法》）第195条效力的命令。该原则关乎资产的收集和分配：见 In re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 852, para 6，以及 Rubin v Euronance SA (Picard intervening) [2013] 1 AC 236, paras 11—20。然而，它对世界各地不同本地法院可就如何收集资产作出何种附带命令，遑论可为外国清算人行使本地法院何种强制权力，既未说明，也不可能说明。该原则不能为承认超出实现该原则所必需范围的、向外国清算人提供协助的普通法权力提供任何正当依据；即除确保存在统一资产收集和分配制度所必需的权力以外的权力。In re African Farms [1906] TS 373 和修正普遍主义原则均不能得出结论：协助法院具有普通法权力，可将外国清算人视为本地公司的本地清算人。In re African Farms 涉及基于礼让执行外国权利。其判决理由并不包括法院具有超出涉及资产收集和分配事项以外的普通法权力。Moolman v Builders & Developers (Pty) Ltd [1990] 2 All SA 77 (A) 并未提出任何原则，要求在该等权力并不存在于清算人本国司法管辖区时向外国清算人赋予本地权力。该案并非以下命题的权威：普通法上的协助可包括作出外国司法管辖区无法作出的询问命令。Cambridge Gas Transportation Corpn v Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc [2007] 1 AC 508 涉及执行外国判决。该案未处理以下问题：若外国清算涉及一家不能由本国法院清盘的公司，将会如何。该案不能作为以下命题的权威：本地法院具有普通法权力，仅因若该公司是一家本地公司即可为本地清算人作出该等命令，便为外国清算人作出命令。该案根本未直接处理法定条文的适用。Cambridge Gas 案 [2007] 1 AC 508 援引了 Al Sabah v Grupo Torras SA [2005] 2 AC 333，但 Cambridge Gas 案并未质疑 Al Sabah 案 para 35 对法院提供协助权力限制的分析。委员会应遵循其在 Al Sabah 案中的自身裁决，因为 para 35 与本案直接相关，并应对本次上诉具有决定性作用。In re Phoenix Kapitaldienst GmbH [2013] Ch 61 判决有误，而且无论如何，该案作出于 Rubin v Euronance SA [2013] 1 AC 236 判决之前。因此，法院在普通法上无管辖权通过命令披露文件或询问证人，向外国清算人提供协助。法院不具有固有权力、衡平法权力或根据其法院规则赋予的权力作出该等披露。没有任何理由扩展普通法以向外国清算人赋予该等权力。在百慕大适用开曼法律属于普遍主义原则，但清算人要求适用超出开曼法律范围的法律则不属于该原则。普遍主义原则并不要求或证明该等扩展具有正当性，任何该等扩展及可行使该等权力的情形，均应由百慕大立法机关审议。[提及 Bent v Young (1838) 9 Sim 180。]\n\nMoss QC（莫斯御用大律师）答复。\n\n委员会保留时间审议。\n\n2014年11月10日。作出以下判决。\n\n萨姆普申勋爵，最高法院大法官\n\n引言\n\n1 本次上诉与 PricewaterhouseCoopers v Saad Investments Co Ltd (SICL) [2014] 1 WLR 4482 的同期上诉密切相关。两宗上诉涉及在 Cayman Islands（开曼群岛）注册成立的关联公司，二者均已被 Grand Court of the Cayman Islands 命令清盘。该法院指定 Grant Thornton Special Services (Cayman) Ltd（均富特别服务〈开曼〉有限公司）的 Hugh Dickson（休·迪克森）、Stephen Akers（斯蒂芬·埃克斯）和 Mark Byers（马克·拜尔斯）为两家公司的共同正式清算人。两宗上诉的背景载于 Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury PSC（阿博茨伯里纽伯格院长勋爵）就该上诉所发表的委员会意见中，无须在此重复。\n\n2 两宗上诉的共同特征是，清算人试图从公司的前审计师 PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC)（普华永道）取得与公司事务有关的资料，无论以口头或文件形式。证据表明，清算人一直无法追查其认为必定存在的若干资产，而关于该等资产的相关资料很可能由普华永道持有。此点尚未被明确承认，但也未受到争议。委员会将以其正确为前提进行审理。\n\n3 开曼群岛大法院（The Grand Court of the Cayman Islands）根据《开曼群岛公司法》（Cayman Islands Companies Law）第103条，有权命令与处于清盘程序的公司具有相关联系的任何人（无论其是否居住在该群岛，包括其前任审计师），向清算人转让或交付属于该公司的任何财产或文件。大法院已对普华永道（PwC）作出该等命令，且司法委员会获告知普华永道已遵从该命令。与授予该项权力的规定一致，该权力仅延及属于该等公司的材料。\n\n4 SICL和Singularis的上诉均涉及清算人试图通过援引授予百慕大最高法院（Supreme Court of Bermuda）的相应权力，取得属于审计师本身的材料，主要是其工作底稿。该等权力的表述范围更广，并不限于属于公司的信息。百慕大《1981年公司法》（Companies Act 1981）第195条规定：\n\n传唤被怀疑持有公司财产等的人员的权力\n\n(1) 法院可在任命临时清算人或作出清盘令后的任何时间，传唤任何公司高级人员、已知或被怀疑持有公司任何财产的人、被认为欠公司债务的人，或法院认为能够提供有关公司发起、设立、业务、交易、事务或财产信息的任何人到庭。\n\n(2) 法院可就上述事项以口头方式或书面质询方式宣誓询问该人，并可将其答复记录成文，并要求其签署。\n\n(3) 法院可要求该人出示其保管或控制的、与公司有关的任何账簿和文件；但如其就其出示的账簿或文件主张任何留置权，则该出示不得损害该留置权，且法院在清盘程序中有管辖权裁定与该留置权有关的一切问题。\n\n5 百慕大法院根据第195条所享有的权力，仅可就该法院已命令清盘的公司行使。因此，在本案中，该权力取决于是否存在对在百慕大以外注册成立的公司作出清盘的权力。就SICL而言，百慕大最高法院作出清盘令，继而在该清盘程序中对普华永道作出提交文件及接受口头询问的命令。然而，在SICL上诉中，司法委员会已向女王陛下建议，载于[2014] 1 WLR 4482的清盘令必须中止，因为除无关紧要的例外情形外，法院对在百慕大以外注册成立的公司并无清盘管辖权。其结果是，SICL清盘程序中的所有程序均已失效，包括根据第195条作出的命令。\n\n6 就Singularis Holdings Ltd（辛古拉里斯控股有限公司）而言，采用了不同程序。百慕大从未申请或作出清盘令。相反，Kawaley CJ（卡瓦利首席大法官）作出命令，承认清算人因获开曼群岛大法院任命而在百慕大具有的身份，并行使其所称、通过类推《公司法》第195条所载法定权力而产生的普通法权力，命令普华永道及Paul Suddaby（保罗·萨达比，普华永道的一名高级人员）提交他们本可被命令依第195条提交的相同文件。普华永道还被命令安排清算人可接受的一名合伙人、雇员或代理人，随时接受口头或书面质询。清算人获准将程序送达给萨达比先生及普华永道在本管辖区外的任何其他合伙人或高级人员。\n\n7 上诉法院（Court of Appeal）（Bell AJA、Zacca P及Auld JA）[2013] CA (Bda) 7 Civ撤销了首席大法官的命令。Bell AJA及Zacca P怀疑，在第195条不适用的情形下，是否具有根据普通法作出第195条命令的管辖权。但其裁决理由是，无论如何，这并非适当行使酌处权，因为法院不应为支持开曼清盘而作出开曼法院本身无法作出的命令。他们认为清算人的请求构成不正当的择地诉讼。Auld JA同意这一点，但更进一步。他认为不存在管辖权，因为百慕大法院不得无视《百慕大法》第195条仅限于可以且已经作出清盘令的案件这一限制。\n\n8 因此，本次上诉提出两个问题。第一个问题是：在以下情形下，百慕大法院是否具有普通法权力，通过命令提交信息（口头或书面形式），协助外国清盘程序：(i) 百慕大法院无权对Singularis此类境外公司进行清盘；及(ii) 其命令提交信息的法定权力仅限于公司已在百慕大清盘的案件。第二个问题是：如该项权力存在，在外国清盘程序进行地的法院本无法作出同等命令的情形下，该权力是否可以行使。\n\n普通法权力？\n\n9 百慕大的普通法在所有相关方面均与英格兰普通法相同。困难在于，英格兰有关跨境破产的普通法已经发展，以填补本质上属法定框架中的空隙，而该法定框架在百慕大存在重大差异。主要差异在于，英格兰法院有管辖权对未注册公司进行清盘，包括在联合王国以外注册成立的公司。该管辖权自《1862年公司法》（Companies Act 1862）（25 & 26 Vict c 89）第199条首次授予以来即已存在。现由《1986年破产法》（Insolvency Act 1986）第221条授予。百慕大法院没有相应权力。\n\n10 至少一个半世纪以来，英格兰法院一直行使一项权力，通过控制无力偿债公司的英格兰资产协助外国清盘程序。该权力部分基于成文法，部分基于衡平法庭法官的实践。其法定基础是对境外公司进行清盘的权力。该权力的行使形成了一套后来被称为附属清盘程序的实践。英格兰法院会命令对已在清盘中或可能依据其注册地法律进入清盘的公司在英格兰进行清盘，条件是该公司与英格兰具有充分联系，并且申请人有合理的获益可能。理论上，清盘令的效力是对公司全球资产设立法定信托，依照英格兰法定分配规则进行处置：Ayerst v C & K (Construction) Ltd [1976] AC 167, Banco Nacional de Cuba v Cosmos Trading Corpn [2000] 1 BCLC 813, 819—820 (Sir Richard Scott V-C)。实际上，正如Millett J在In re International Tin Council [1987] Ch 419, 446—447中指出：“尽管注册成立国的清盘通常会被赋予域外效力，其他地方的清盘则仅具有地方性效力。”英格兰法院通过将英格兰清盘视为附属于公司注册成立国的主要清盘程序，承认其自身程序国际效力的限度。它们通过限制清算人的职能为收集英格兰资产，并以一种在符合英格兰破产法某些优先原则的范围内尽可能使公司全球资产得到统一分配的方式处理该等资产，来行使其对清算人的指示权。承认该实践的最早判例报告是Kay J在In re Matheson Bros Ltd (1884) 27 Ch D 225中作出的裁决，但该实践很可能早于该案。在这些案件中，法院行使的是英格兰法院控制公司清盘的通常权力，该等权力完全属于法定权力。但法院是为不同于授予该等权力之目的的目的而使用该等权力，并依照不同于英格兰公司清盘中依法适用的原则行使该等权力。仅在该范围内，英格兰法院行使的是一项普通法权力。\n\n11 在百慕大，除非属于《公司法》第XIII部分明文适用的公司这一无关情形外，法院无管辖权进行附属清盘。在不自行进行附属清盘的情况下，法院具有何种协助外国清盘程序的权力（如有），必须取决于所请求协助的性质。\n\n清盘程序至少产生四种不同的法律后果，不同考量可能适用于其中每一种。第一，该程序是由权利获得承认或确认的债权人针对债务人财产进行集体执行的机制，借用Lord Hoffmann在Cambridge Gas Transportation Corpn v Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc [2007] 1 AC 508, para 14中的表述。清盘的这一功能内含我已提及的公司资产法定信托，以及对其他执行方式的自动中止。第二，该程序提供一个程序框架，以确定债权人在其权利存在争议时可证明的权利为何。第三，该程序启动法定权力，通过质疑某些类别的交易而变更与公司或其资产进行交易的人的权利。百慕大的该等权力不及英格兰广泛，但包括撤销清盘开始后作出的处分及欺诈性优待。第四，该程序启动程序性权力，一般旨在使清算人能够查找公司资产或确定其权利和负债。在百慕大，该等权力包括根据《公司法》第195条命令提交信息的权力。在英格兰，相应的法定权力均可在附属清盘程序中行使。\n\n12 在英格兰，清盘令的主要目的通常是使法院能够控制公司的英格兰资产，从而使该等资产免于债权人若有权通过对其实施执行而取得优先权所将导致的无序争夺。但是，即使没有清盘，法院也可依照国际私法的一般原则，基于礼让承认公司资产归属于根据其注册地法律任命或认可的代理人或职务持有人。在对外国公司进行清盘适用相应规则之前的多年间，该原则已在没有任何法定权力的情况下，适用于根据其住所地法律下的破产程序转移给职务持有人的外国破产人的英格兰动产。此外，尽管同一规则不适用于不动产，法院通常会任命外国职务持有人为租金及收益的接管人：见Dicey, Morris & Collins, The Conflict of Laws, 15th ed (2012), vol 2, rules 216 and 217。在此类案件中，更困难的问题是，在没有清盘程序的情况下，法院是否能够施加一项\n\n对试图就英国资产申请强制执行的债权人实施中止，其效力相当于依法在启动清盘程序后本应随之产生的自动中止。\n\n13 该问题在普通法世界中似乎最早是在 Transvaal Supreme Court（德兰士瓦最高法院）全体法官作出的重要判决 In re African Farms Ltd [1906] TS 373 中得到处理。African Farms Ltd（阿弗里坎农场有限公司）是一家在德兰士瓦拥有大量资产的英国公司。该公司正在英国进行清算。由于其成员人数已低于为适用法定清盘权而取得公司资格所要求的最低人数，德兰士瓦无权对其进行清盘。主导判决由当时担任德兰士瓦首席大法官的南非杰出法官 Sir James Rose Innes（詹姆斯·罗斯·因尼斯爵士）作出。在确认不存在对该公司进行清盘的法定权力后，他在第377页继续说道：\n\n“现在只剩下考虑我们是否有理由承认英国清算人的地位。所谓承认，我并非指仅仅确认该清算人已在英国获任命为清算人，且其在此代表公司这一事实；我指的是附带法院积极协助的承认。实际上，即宣告清算人有权以与资产位于英国法院管辖范围内相同的方式处置德兰士瓦资产，但须遵守法院为保护当地债权人或承认本地法律要求而施加的条件。若我们能够在该意义上承认并协助清算人，那么我认为我们应当这样做；因为只有通过这种方式，此地资产才能得到适当分配并妥善用于清偿公司的债务。若我们不能这样做，结果便是董事无法处置此地财产，而清算人亦无法阻止债权人依据其判决扣押该财产以供执行。将产生不必要的费用，而财产将任由有能力执行其债权的债权人争夺。”\n\n随后，Innes首席大法官审议了如下异议（第378页）：在法院本身无权进行清盘的案件中，向英国清算人提供协助，可能会被反对为“我们通过间接方式做了法律未赋予我们直接实施权力的事情”。他驳回了该主张，因为接受该主张将会阻止法院承认清算人依公司设立地法律处置公司财产或权利的权力，这与国际私法的一般原则相悖：见第378—380页。他继而在第381—382页说道：\n\n“在我看来，真正的检验标准并非我们是否有权在此命令进行类似的清算，而是我们承认外国清算是否确实受到任何本地规则的禁止；是否违反本地法律的政策，或者其后果是否会对当地债权人不公平，或基于其他理由而不可取……本案远非存在该等情形；在我们面前的案件中，公平与便利的每一项考量都要求承认英国清算人的地位。除非能够如此，否则，如前所述，德兰士瓦资产将任由首个设法取得执行令状的债权人支配。”\n\n最终，法院基于清算人在英国的任命，承认其有权独自管理该公司在德兰士瓦的资产，但条件是该清算人：\n\n（一）承认本殖民地所有债权人均有权向主事官申报其对公司的债权；并且，该等债权的承认或驳回、公司在其德兰士瓦资产范围内对该等债权承担的责任，以及有关该等资产的所有抵押权或优先权问题，均应依本殖民地法律调整，如同该公司已在此地进入清算程序一样。\n\n（二）命令以当地资产按比例清偿当地债权人的已证明债权，并将余额用于向其他债权人分配。为实现此目的，中止执行当地判决债权人的判决。\n\n14 应当指出：（i）承认英国清算人对公司在德兰士瓦资产的处分权，不过是其依国际私法本已享有的权利；（ii）对实质上构成德兰士瓦辅助清算程序的进行，被表述为法院承认命令中的一项酌情条件；以及（iii）德兰士瓦法院毫无疑问拥有与英国法院相同的固有权力，可中止执行其自身的判决。然而，该判决仍具有重要意义，因为实质上法院所做的是命令将公司资产按如同其已在德兰士瓦进入清算程序的方式处理，而当地并无进行清算的权力。该判决还剥夺了一名现有判决债权人表面上依其判决已经取得且绝对的权利，并使其债务面临被削减至与德兰士瓦资产按比例分配相一致的数额。因此，法院无疑修改了公司及其债权人的权利。此外，其作出该等处理的唯一依据，是法院为协助依外国清盘命令有序清算公司事务而享有的固有权力。如Innes首席大法官在第377页所述，“承认……附带法院积极协助”。或者，用Smith法官协同判决中的措辞（第390页），该命令的基础是承认和执行依外国法律取得的权利，以及承认依外国法律取得的身份地位，除非其与请求执行地的法律或政策相冲突。\n\n15 英国法院在辅助清算中的权力具有灵活性和广泛性，加之近年来若干国际司法合作机制被纳入英国法律，已在这一领域阻碍了英国普通法的发展。然而，该问题于2006年随着 Privy Council（枢密院司法委员会）在 Cambridge Gas Transportation Corpn v Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc [2007] 1 AC 508 一案中的判决而再次出现。在该案中，枢密院司法委员会维持了 Isle of Man（马恩岛）Staff of Government Division（政府参谋部庭）的判决，认定应当在马恩岛承认美国联邦破产法院对一组利比里亚船舶所有公司进行的司法重组。该重组的效力是将一家马恩岛公司的股份归属债权人委员会，尽管美国法院对该等股份既无对物管辖权（因为该等股份是位于其属地管辖范围外的权利），亦无对股东的人身管辖权（因为该等股东不在美国境内，亦未参与美国程序）。主要股东 Cambridge Gas（剑桥燃气公司）提出异议，理由是其不受美国法院判决的约束。委员会的意见由 Lord Hoffmann（霍夫曼勋爵）作出。他从英国判例法中识别出一项一贯追求，即达成如同存在单一、普遍破产管辖权时所会产生的结果。他认为，这一普遍性原则构成 In re African Farms [1906] TS 373 判决的基础，并认为其足以证明马恩岛法院使美国重组计划生效具有正当性，[2007] 1 AC 508，第16—21段。在他和委员会看来，美国法院缺乏对物或人身管辖权并不重要，因为该管辖权并非建立在Cambridge Gas有义务遵从联邦破产法院判决之上，而是建立在马恩岛法院有义务协助外国主要清算程序，以便尽可能在共同基础上实现资产的普遍分配之上。他在第13—14段中说道：\n\n13. ……对物判决和对人判决均是对权利存在的司法认定：前者认定的是对财产的权利，后者认定的是针对某人的权利。当一项对物判决或对人判决获外国法院承认时，该判决即被接受为确立其所声称已认定的权利，而无需进一步审查其作出该认定的理由。判决本身被视为权利的来源。\n\n14. 另一方面，破产程序的目的并非确定或确立权利的存在，而是为权利获得承认或确定的债权人提供一项针对债务人财产集体执行的机制。\n\n该判决的实质及支持该判决的推理见于第20—22段：\n\n20. ……然而，普遍性这一基本原则……是通过承认依外国破产法获授权代表无力偿债公司行事的人有权在英国如此行事而得到实施。此外，如Innes首席大法官在德兰士瓦案件 In re African Farms Ltd [1906] TS 373, 377 中所述，在该案中，一家在德兰士瓦拥有资产的英国公司在英国自愿清盘，“承认附带法院积极协助”……\n\n21. 阁下认为，这些原则足以赋予马恩岛法院管辖权，以协助债权人委员会作为Chapter 11命令项下获任命的代表，使该计划生效……\n\n22. ……在普通法下，阁下认为，协助是否可采取适用并非本国制度组成部分的外国破产法规定这一形式，尚属可疑。但本国法院至少必须能够通过实施以下方式提供协助\n\n——在国内破产情形下本可采取的一切措施。承认的目的，是使外国破产管理人或债权人无需启动并行的破产程序，并使其获得如果等同程序在国内法院进行时本应有权获得的救济。\n\n——在 Cambridge Gas 一案中相关的马恩岛国内破产制度规定，是在清盘过程中批准债务重组安排计划的法定规定。由于马恩岛法院本有权对 Navigator 进行清盘，并按照与联邦破产法院批准的司法重组实质上相同的条件批准一项债务重组安排计划，因此其可以依普通法使该重组计划生效。\n\n因此，霍夫曼勋爵在第 25 段中问道，马恩岛法院为何不通过使该计划生效而提供协助，而要求债权人费力在马恩岛启动并行破产程序？——如果 Cambridge Gas 正确，它即构成以下三项命题的判例依据。第一项是修正普遍主义原则，即法院拥有在其适当能够做到的范围内协助外国清盘程序的普通法权力。第二项是，这包括在受其自身法律和公共政策限制的前提下，采取其在国内破产中本可适当采取的一切措施。第三项（系隐含内容）是，该项权力本身即为其对受影响者行使管辖权的来源，而依通常普通法原则缺乏对物或对人管辖权并无关紧要。\n\n16 霍夫曼勋爵在 In re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 852 一案中重新审视了第一项和第二项命题。HIH 是一家在澳大利亚进行清算的澳大利亚保险公司。英国已提交清盘呈请，并指定临时清算人进行附属清算。争议问题是，英国法院是否应接受澳大利亚法院的请求函，指示英国临时清算人将其掌管的资产汇交给澳大利亚清算人；而在该情形下，资产将在澳大利亚依照法定优先顺位分配，该优先顺位不同于英国国内清盘中适用的优先顺位。霍夫曼勋爵在第 6—7 段中称：\n\n6. 尽管缺乏法定规定，通过司法实践已实现了一定程度的公司破产国际合作。这基于英国法官多年来一直视为国际私法一般原则的观点，即破产（无论是个人破产还是公司破产）应当具有统一性和普遍性。应当在破产人住所地法院进行统一的破产程序，该程序获得全球承认，并普遍适用于破产人的全部资产。\n\n7. 这在很大程度上是一项原则，而非一项规则。基于务实理由的例外对其作出了重大限制；我在其他地方将其称为一种愿景：见 Cambridge Gas Transportation Corpn（Cambridge Gas 运输公司） v Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc（Navigator Holdings plc 无担保债权人官方委员会） [2007] 1 AC 508, 517, para 17。杰出的美国国际破产法学者 Jay Westbrook 教授将其称为“修正普遍主义”原则：另见 Fletcher, Insolvency in Private International Law, 2nd ed (2005), pp 15—17。完全普遍主义只能通过国际条约实现。然而，即使以其修正且务实的形式，这一原则仍具有强大效力。\n\n在审视英国判例法时，霍夫曼勋爵发现，自 18 世纪以来，一条贯穿英国跨境破产法的金线——借用 Jay Westbrook 教授所创用的名称——即为“（修正）普遍主义”原则——（第 30 段）：\n\n该原则要求英国法院在符合司法公正和英国公共政策的范围内，与主要清算所在地国家的法院合作，以确保公司的全部资产在单一分配制度下分配给其债权人。\n\n17 HIH 案中的委员会一致认为应将资产汇交至澳大利亚，但其在部分推理方面存在分歧。霍夫曼勋爵及与其意见一致的 Gestingthorpe 的 Walker 勋爵认为，法院依普通法拥有指示汇交资产的固有权力。然而，委员会其余成员并未采纳该观点。Foscote 的 Scott 勋爵和 Abbotsbury 的 Neuberger 勋爵认为，该权力完全源自《Insolvency Act 1986》第 426 条。Worth Matravers 的 Phillips 勋爵认为，法定权力已为拟议指示提供充分的管辖权依据，并拒绝裁决普通法是否能够确立管辖权。然而，重要的是应认识到，这一意见分歧并非涉及普遍主义原则本身，也非涉及一般协助外国清算之权力的法理基础。该分歧在于，该权力是否可以以一种方式行使，从而剥夺在英国申报债权的债权人根据《Insolvency Act 1986》第 107 条、依英国优先顺位规则按比例平等分配的法定权利。In re African Farms [1906] TS 373 中阐述并在 Cambridge Gas 中确认的、为司法协助外国破产提供正当理由的原则是 [1906] TS 373, 377：“须遵守法院为保护当地债权人或承认本地法律要求而可能施加的条件”；或者，如 HIH 本案 [2008] 1 WLR 852, para 30 更广泛地表述，即“司法公正和英国公共政策”。HIH 案中委员会的分歧在于，这是否意味着该原则受《Insolvency Act 1986》第 107 条强制性要求的约束。Scott 勋爵和 Neuberger 勋爵认为第 426 条的相关性在于，依其对该条的解释，尽管与英国法的强制性规则不一致，该条仍授权按照外国法域的法律处理资产：见 Scott 勋爵，第 61 段；Neuberger 勋爵，第 68 段。若无该规定，将资产汇交至澳大利亚将违反英国法。Phillips 勋爵与 Scott 勋爵及 Neuberger 勋爵一样，并未质疑修正普遍主义原则。事实上，他认为该原则决定了应如何行使裁量权，尽管未对其法理来源作出裁决：见第 44 段。\n\n18 Cambridge Gas [2007] 1 AC 508 标志着普通法法院在发展法院协助外国清算的普通法权力方面所达到的最远程度。该判决已证明具有争议性。就其认为国内法院仅凭其协助权力即对当事人具有管辖权而言，该判决受到激烈的学术批评，并在 Rubin v Eurofinance SA（Picard intervening） [2013] 1 AC 236 中被最高法院多数意见认定为错误。就其认为国内法院拥有普通法权力、可以通过采取其在国内破产中本可采取的一切措施来协助外国法院而言，该判决的权威性因未说明此项普通法权力的来源而削弱，并且在 Al Sabah v Grupo Torras SA [2005] 2 AC 333 一案中被司法委员会直接否定；该案在 Cambridge Gas 的辩论中被援引，但未见于委员会的意见书中。Walker 勋爵在 Al Sabah 案中代表委员会发表意见时表示，在开曼破产法院请求撤销开曼信托的情况下，并不存在固有权力，尤其是在《Cayman Bankruptcy Law》规定了相应法定权力但该权力在该情形下不适用时。委员会认为显然，尽管成文法可以影响普通法的政策，但不能仅因在国内破产情形下存在作出特定裁定的法定权力，即推定普通法下必然存在类似权力。就 Cambridge Gas 作出相反暗示而言，委员会确信其属错误，理由载于 Mapesbury 的 Collins 勋爵拟议的意见书中并有更充分说明。若国内破产存在相应的法定权力，通常不会基于公共政策理由反对承认类似的普通法权力。但不能在无其他依据的情况下推断存在该权力。因此，Cambridge Gas [2007] 1 AC 508 所依据的第二项和第三项命题不能成立。19 然而，第一项命题，即修正普遍主义原则本身，并未失去信誉。相反，Phillips 勋爵、霍夫曼勋爵和 Walker 勋爵在 HIH [2008] 1 WLR 852 中，以及 Mapesbury 的 Collins 勋爵（Walker 勋爵和 Sumption 大法官同意其意见）在 Rubin v Eurofinance SA [2013] 1 AC 236 中，原则上均接受了该原则。Mance 大法官在该案中的协同判决并未对其提出任何疑问。Collins 勋爵在第 29—33 段中如此概括该立场：\n\n29. 第四，依普通法，法院有权承认并协助外国破产程序。普通法原则是，可以向具有国际因素的破产程序中的外国破产管理人提供协助。其基本原则曾以不同方式表述：“承认……伴随着法院的积极协助”：In re African Farms Ltd [1906] TS 373, 377；“本院……将尽最大努力与美国破产法院合作，并避免采取任何可能扰乱[该公司]在得克萨斯州依第 11 章进行有序管理的行动”：Banque Indosuez SA v Ferromet Resources Inc [1993] BCLC 112, 117。\n\n30. 在 Crédit Suisse Fides Trust v Cuoghi [1998] QB 818, 827 一案中，Millett 上诉法官称：“在其他法律领域，例如跨境破产，商业上的必要性已促使各国法院相互提供协助，而无须等待该等合作获得国际公约的认可……不同国家法院之间的礼让要求相互尊重彼此管辖权的领土完整性，这一点正日益得到广泛接受；但这不应妨碍一个法域的法院，就位于该法域领土内的资产或居住于该法域领土内的人员，向另一法域的法院提供其能够适当提供的一切协助。”\n\n31. 普通法协助案件涉及的事项包括：将英国资产归属外国破产管理人、暂停本地程序、为支持外国程序作出讯问命令，或作出将资产汇交外国清算程序的命令；并且涉及的案件中，外国法院属于有管辖权的法院，亦即破产人住所位于该外国，或者，如为公司，则该公司在该外国注册成立……\n\n33. 一组案件涉及因外国破产程序而被中止的本地程序，或被解除的命令。因此，在 Banque Indosuez SA（东方汇理银行股份有限公司）v Ferromet Resources Inc（费罗梅特资源公司）[1993] BCLC 112 一案中，针对正处于 Chapter 11 程序中的一家得克萨斯州公司的英格兰禁令被解除；参见 In re African Farms Ltd（非洲农场有限公司）[1906] TS 373（英格兰公司在英格兰清盘程序中，一名债权人在德兰士瓦进行的强制执行被德兰士瓦法院中止），该案适用于 Turners & Growers Exporters Ltd（特纳斯与格罗尔斯出口商有限公司）v The Ship Cornelis Verolme（Cornelis Verolme号船）[1997] 2 NZLR 110（比利时船东处于比利时破产程序中：船舶获准解除扣押）；Modern Terminals (Berth 5) Ltd（现代货柜码头（5号泊位）有限公司）v States Steamship Co（州轮船公司）[1979] HKLR 512（针对一家正于加利福尼亚州美国联邦法院进行 Chapter 11 程序的内华达州公司的强制执行在香港被中止），后为 CCIC Finance Ltd（CCIC财务有限公司）v Guangdong International Trust & Investment Corpn（广东国际信托投资公司）[2005] 2 HKC 589 所遵循（针对一家在中国内地进行破产程序的中国国有企业的香港程序被中止）。传统意义上的司法协助案件包括 In re Impex Services Worldwide Ltd（全球英派克斯服务有限公司）[2004] BPIR 564，其中，马恩岛作出了一项对人员进行审查及提交文件的命令，以协助一家英格兰公司在英格兰进行的临时清盘。\n\n委员会认为，修正普遍主义原则是普通法的一部分，但必须牢记：第一，该原则受当地法律和当地公共政策的约束；第二，法院只能在其自身成文法和普通法权力的范围内行事。这些界限为何？在不存在相关法定权力的情况下，它们必须取决于普通法，包括对普通法作出的任何适当发展。为承认一项相当权力而发展普通法在何种程度上适当，这一问题并不存在单一、普遍的答案。其取决于法院被要求行使的权力的性质。在本次上诉中，委员会拟将讨论限于本案所请求的特定形式的协助，即命令处于百慕大法院对人管辖范围内的实体提供信息。本申请的结果取决于：既然不存在命令提供资料的法定权力，普通法上是否存在作出该命令的固有权力。\n\n20　根本问题是，此类强制权力是否需要法定依据。为此目的，区分证据与信息十分重要。委员会所称的证据，是指为证明法律程序中的事实而提出的证据。强制某人于法律程序中提供证据的权力，最初并非源于成文法。如同命令证据开示的权力，该权力是衡平法院固有的权力，由法官创设，以弥补普通法法院中与事实证明有关的技术及程序限制。在英格兰，该权力首次由 Perjury Act 1563 (5 Eliz 1, c 9) 规定为法定权力，该法将签发 subpoena ad testificandum（出庭作证传票）的权力扩展至所有有记录法院。在百慕大，其依据现为 Evidence Act 1905 第4条。这些权力在英格兰法院程序史中的起源，在一定程度上解释了为何这些法院一直否认其具有强制提供证据以供外国程序使用的任何固有权力：见 Bent v Young（本特 v 杨）(1838) 9 Sim 180, 192 (Shadwell V-C); Dreyfus v Peruvian Guano Co（德雷福斯 v 秘鲁鸟粪公司）(1889) 41 Ch D 151; R (Omar) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs（R（奥马尔）v 外交和联邦事务大臣）[2013] 1 All ER 161 (Divisional Court), paras 58—63。在英格兰，直至该权力最初由 Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act 1856 (19 & 20 Vict c 113) 创设之前，并不存在此类权力。\n\n21　然而，本案所请求的并非供诉讼程序使用的证据，而是清算人为履行其识别并接管公司资产这一通常职责所需的信息。在 R (Omar) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2014] QB 112, para 12 一案中，上诉法院对证据与信息之间的区分是否有助益表示怀疑；在该案中，信息是为供外国程序使用而被请求的，因此其怀疑或许是正当的。但该区分具有更广泛的法律意义。当有足够有力的法律政策要求时，法院从未如此受限于其发展适当救济以要求提供信息的意愿。\n\n22　现代的经典例证是上议院在 Norwich Pharmacal Co（诺里奇制药公司）v Customs and Excise Comrs（海关与消费税委员）[1974] AC 133 一案中承认的管辖权。上议院主要借鉴 Orr v Diaper（奥尔 v 戴珀）(1876) 4 Ch D 92; 25 WR 23 及 Upmann v Elkan（厄普曼 v 埃尔坎）(1871) LR 12 Eq 140; LR 7 Ch App 130 的早期判决，承认普通法有权在被告即使无过错地参与了不法行为时，命令其提供关于不法行为人身份的信息。正如其所承认的，该命令不能用于强制提供证据，因为衡平法院长期反对针对仅为证人的人提出证据开示诉状：尤其见第173—174页（Lord Reid（里德勋爵））。在 Smith Kline and French Laboratories Ltd（史密斯克莱恩与法国实验室有限公司）v Global Pharmaceutics Ltd（环球制药有限公司）[1986] RPC 394 一案中，英格兰上诉法院将同一原则适用于关于管辖区外不法行为人身份的信息。这些判决的依据并非在英格兰诉讼中证明事实的程序要求，而是承认在特定情况下负有提供信息的义务。一名卷入他人不法行为之人的义务，被认定为 [1974] AC 133, 175（Lord Reid）所述的，通过向受害人提供完整信息并披露不法行为人的身份来协助该受害人；参见第195页（Lord Cross of Chelsea（切尔西的克罗斯勋爵））。然而，显然该义务具有某种拟制性质。它并非该术语通常意义上的法律义务。未提供该信息不会产生损害赔偿之诉。义务这一概念仅仅是说明法院将要求披露的一种方式。事实上，Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest（博思—伊—盖斯特的莫里斯勋爵）（第181—182页）认为，该义务在法院认定条件已获满足之前不会产生。Viscount Dilhorne（迪尔霍恩子爵）（第190页）表示同意，Lord Cross 似乎也持相同意见：第198页。Lord Kilbrandon（基尔布兰登勋爵）显然赞同地援引南非判决 Colonial Government v Tatham（殖民政府 v 塔瑟姆）(1902) 23 Natal LR 153，并指出（第205页），该义务更多地在于法院作出司法行政所必需的命令，而非由被申请人满足原告所享有的某项既存权利。\n\n23　本案并非 Norwich Pharmacal 案件。Norwich Pharmacal 在当前语境中的意义在于，它说明了普通法能够在为使一项已获承认的法律原则生效所必需时，发展出法院强制提供信息的权力。委员会认为，本案中存在一项类似的权力。所寻求的救济并非作为对一名可为此依赖通常诉讼程序的诉讼当事人的协助而请求。该救济是由外国法院的官员所请求。修正普遍主义原则是普通法中一项已获承认的原则。该原则建立在公共利益之上，即在公司注册地行使破产管辖权的外国法院，应能够在不受其管辖权地域界限限制的情况下，在全球范围内有序地进行该公司事务的清盘。该公共利益的基础不仅是国际礼让，也在于承认：在一个全球化企业的世界中，每个国家均有利益使拥有跨国资产及业务的公司能够依其注册地法律，并在国际上获得承认和效力的基础上有序清盘。这种公共利益在可能为商业目的或一般对抗式诉讼而请求信息的案件中并无相应者。法院一再承认，不仅有权利，而且有义务以其能够适当采取的任何方式提供协助。百慕大法院已适当地承认清算人作为该法院官员的地位。清算人需要该信息以履行附随该地位的通常职能。其获得承认的接管公司全球资产的权利，如不具备识别和定位这些资产的能力（必要时获得法院协助），便毫无用处。该信息不大可能以任何其他方式获得。导致普通法对强制提供证据有所限制的任何理由，均与当前问题无关。法院多次承认的协助外国破产管理人员的权利和义务，如仅限于以与任何其他依外国法律取得所有权的法律主体相同的方式承认公司对其资产的所有权，或者以与依公司注册地法律获任的任何其他公司代理人相同的方式承认破产管理人员代表公司行事的权利，便会成为空洞的公式。国内法院对外国清算人地位的承认，如仅使其有权接管公司资产，却不给予其任何有效识别或定位该等资产的手段，也将毫无意义。\n\n24　有两宗已报道案件中，法院以普通法协助外国法院的方式作出了提交文件或信息的命令。第一宗是 Moolman（莫尔曼）v Builders & Developers (Pty) Ltd（建筑商与开发商（私人）有限公司）[1990] 2 All SA 77 (A)，由南非最高法院作出判决。该上诉源于一家在特兰斯凯注册成立的公司的清盘；在南非历史上的该时期，特兰斯凯在法律上属于外国。清算人向南非法院申请命令，对南非境内的若干人进行审查，以查找公司的资产。若南非存在辅助清盘，该命令可依成文法向其作出，但南非并无法定权力对该特定公司进行清盘。法院认为，普通法上作出此类命令的权力属于 In re African Farms Ltd [1906] TS 373 确立的原则范围内。第二宗是 In re Impex Services Worldwide Ltd [2004] BPIR 564，由马恩岛高等法院作出判决。Isle of Man Companies Act 1931 第206条授予作出审查命令的权力，但仅适用于马恩岛公司。尽管如此，Deemster Doyle（多伊尔法官）仍以普通法司法协助的方式，使英格兰高等法院所发请求函产生效力；该请求函要求代表一家英格兰公司的清算人，对马恩岛境内人员进行审查。委员会不愿赞同这些判决中给出的所有推理，尤其是不愿赞同其中似乎支持在适用范围以外的案件中仅以类比方式适用法定权力这一概念的部分。但委员会认为，这些判决本身在原则上是正确的。\n\n25 委员会认为，普通法赋予一项权力，即通过命令提供为管理外国清算所必需的口头或书面信息，以协助具有破产管辖权的外国法院。委员会在确认该项权力存在的同时，并不希望鼓励不加区别地创设其他强制提供信息的普通法权力。该项权力的限制已内含于承认其存在的理由之中。第一，该权力仅可用于协助具有破产管辖权的外国法院的官员或同等的公职人员。例如，该权力不可用于协助自愿清算；自愿清算本质上是一项私人安排，尽管受法院指示的约束，但并非由法院官员或代表法院官员进行。第二，这是一项协助权力。其存在是为了使该等法院能够克服各法院权力的地域限制对公司全球清算事务所造成的问题。因此，该权力不得用于使其完成即使依其获任命所依据的法律亦无法完成之事。第三，该权力仅在履行清算管理人职能所必需时方可行使。第四，该权力受 In re African Farms Ltd [1906] TS 373、HIH [2008] 1 WLR 852 及 Rubin [2013] 1 AC 236 所确立的限制，即该等命令必须符合协助法院的实体法和公共政策，本案中即百慕大（Bermuda）的实体法和公共政策。因此，该权力不得用于本应适用其他强制提供信息制度的目的。尤其是，如 Norwich Pharmacal [1974] AC 133 及 R (Omar) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2013] 1 All ER 161; [2014] QB 112（两级审理）中的推理所表明，此类普通法权力并非为在实际或预期诉讼中使用而取得材料的允许方式。该领域由证据程序规则以及在外国司法管辖区取得证据的法定规定所覆盖，清算人同其他诉讼当事人或潜在诉讼当事人一样，必须接受该等规则和规定及其全部限制。此外，在某些司法管辖区，如作出在国内破产程序中无权作出的命令，该命令很可能违反国内公共政策。最后，与其他可针对无过错第三方行使的强制权力一样，行使该权力的条件是申请人愿意支付第三方为遵从命令而产生的合理费用。\n\n26 《百慕大最高法院规则》（Rules of the Bermuda Supreme Court）第 11 号命令第 1(2)条（经第 11 号命令第 9(1)条适用）授权就法院依据任何制定法有权审理和裁决的任何请求，在无需许可的情况下向管辖区外送达传讯令状、呈请书、动议通知书或类似的起诉程序。由于法院为协助外国清算而强制提供信息的普通法权力并非成文法权力，亦非源自与制定法的任何类推，故该规则对其不适用。根据第 11 号命令第 9(4)条，法院经许可后还享有向管辖区外送达起诉程序（令状除外）的更一般权力，但该权力不得针对参与外国公司事务而与百慕大毫无联系的人行使，且对此种做法不存在默示的法定授权：见 In re Seagull Manufacturing Co Ltd [1993] Ch 345。因此，无论从何种角度看，首席大法官均无权授权向不在法院管辖范围内的 Suddaby 先生（Mr Suddaby）或 PwC（普华永道）的其他合伙人或人员进行域外送达。在属于该权力范围的案件中，他至多只能命令作为唯一在管辖区内的当事人的 PwC 就其自身部分予以遵从，并采取合理措施促使其他人合作。\n\n适用于本案\n\n27 委员会已概述强制提供信息的普通法权力所受限制。在这些限制中，有两项可能与 Singularis Holdings Ltd（Singularis控股有限公司）一案有关。\n\n28 第一项源于 PwC 的主张，即针对其寻求作出的命令不符合百慕大的法律或公共政策，因为《百慕大公司法》（Bermuda Companies Act）第 195 条规定的强制提供信息的法定权力，默示排除了普通法下存在同等权力的可能性。该主张认为，由于第 195 条仅限于公司正在百慕大清算的情形，如承认一项不受该等限制的普通法权力存在，则将与该法定制度不一致。委员会不接受该主张。覆盖部分相同事项的法定权力，可能默示排除覆盖全部该等事项的普通法权力，但并非必然如此。仅在可认为法定制度已涵盖该领域时，方会默示排除非法定救济。若普通法权力的存续会损害法定权力的运作，通常即属此种情形；这通常是通过规避作为立法政策基础组成部分的法定权力的限制或例外而发生：见 Deutsche Morgan Grenfell Group plc v Inland Revenue Comrs [2007] 1 AC 558, para 19 (Lord Hoffmann); R (Child Poverty Action Group) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2011] 2 AC 15, paras 27—34 (Lord Dyson JSC)。然而，没有理由认为，《公司法》第 195 条项下的权力仅限于在百慕大进行清算的公司，反映了一项不利于协助具有破产管辖权的外国法院的立法政策。它仅反映了该法的适用范围限制。委员会在 PricewaterhouseCoopers v Saad Investments Co Ltd [2014] 1 WLR 4482 中的意见已分析该法的相关条款。概言之，第 4 条的效力是，该法适用于在百慕大注册成立或获授权在那里经营业务的公司。然而，就该法适用的公司清算时可行使的权力作出明文规定这一事实，委员会认为，并不排除就完全处于制定法范围之外的其他公司行使普通法权力。\n\n29 第二项相关限制为共同清算人带来了更棘手的问题。他们在百慕大寻求取得的材料，无法根据开曼群岛（Cayman Islands）法律在当地进行的清算中取得。国内法院如有权为支持外国法院的程序授予附随救济，则外国法院本身无权作出相应命令，并不必然构成行使该项权力的障碍。因此，在 Crédit Suisse Fides Trust SA v Cuoghi [1998] QB 818 中，英格兰法院为支持针对 Cuoghi 先生（Mr Cuoghi）的瑞士程序作出了全球 Mareva 禁令，尽管瑞士法院本不能作出该命令。但该判决不能被视为反映一项普遍原则。在该案中证明该命令正当的关键因素是，存在一项无条件授予附随救济的法定权力，并且瑞士法院不能作出该命令，是因为 Cuoghi 先生并非居住在瑞士，而是居住在英格兰。委员会目前所关注的普通法权力则适用颇为不同的考量。其全部法理基础在于，百慕大法院有权利和义务在适当可能的范围内协助开曼法院。百慕大法院在其自身固有权力的限度内，通过使开曼法院官员能够在百慕大完成其可在开曼群岛完成之事，协助其超越该法院管辖权的地域限制，是适当的。但所寻求的命令并不构成协助，因为阻碍清算人工作的并非仅是开曼法院权力地域范围的限制，而是该等权力本身的有限性质。开曼法院无权要求第三方向其清算管理人提供公司所有的信息以外的任何信息。委员会认为，为弥补具有破产管辖权的外国法院依其本国法律所受的权力限制而行使协助权力，并非适当用途。这实质上是清算人在上诉法院败诉的理由，当时其将本申请描述为选择法院购物。委员会认为，该结论是正确的。\n\n30 在本诉讼的任何阶段，清算人均未主张其所寻求的命令可在普通法下独立于百慕大法院协助具有破产管辖权的外国法院的权力而获得正当化。此外，他们在委员会面前承认，其所寻求的信息属于 PwC，因而被开曼群岛大法院（Grand Court of the Cayman Islands）作出的命令适当地排除在外。因此，该问题是否正确并非委员会面前争辩的事项。尽管如此，委员会不愿在本案结束时不表示其疑虑，即 PwC 仅以公司审计师身份取得的信息，是否能够仅因记录该等信息的文件是其工作底稿并因而属于其财产，而被视为专属其所有。\n\n结论\n\n31 委员会将谨向女王陛下建议，驳回本上诉。\n\nMAPESBURY 的 COLLINS 勋爵\n\n引言\n\n32 我认为，应当驳回上诉，因为共同清算人据以提起上诉的理由不能成立，即法院在普通法下有能力行使与国内破产案件中本可行使、但在国际情形中并不适用的法定权力相类似的权力。本意见旨在说明，鉴于司法机关与立法机关之间的关系，为何该结论不可避免。\n\n33 如最高法院在 Rubin v Eurofinance SA (Picard intervening) [2013] 1 AC 236 中确认，法院拥有在适当可能的范围内协助外国清算程序的普通法权力。我与 Lord Sumption JSC（萨姆普申大法官）持相同观点，且尽管 Lord Mance JSC（曼斯大法官）提出了有力的相反意见，我认为百慕大法院有权针对受其属人管辖的人作出命令，要求其为外国清算人提供信息，以识别和查找公司资产，前提是清算人根据任命其的法院的国内法享有类似权利。因此，我同意 Lord Sumption JSC 的意见，即本案并非行使该项权力的适当案件。\n\n34 清算人在上诉中并未坚持主张存在一项命令提供信息的普通法权力（而非通过类推当地法定权力），且在委员会质询之前，他们实际上已否认该项主张；该质询载于 Lord Mance JSC 的意见第 128 段，可能促使他们将其作为上诉的附属依据。\n\n35 因此，当事人有权获得委员会对于实际提交其审理的论点的意见；该论点实质上是，Cambridge Gas Transportation Corpn v Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc [2007] 1 AC 508（Cambridge Gas案）是否正确裁定，法院拥有一项普通法权力，可通过行使与国内破产案件中本可行使、但不适用于国际破产的法定权力相类似的权力，协助外国清盘程序。\n\n36 清算人提出案件的主要方式是：普通法会为适应不断变化的情况而发展；在国际破产中，普通法应当通过采纳以下原则而发展，即在当地立法未为外国破产管理人提供相关协助的情况下，应当类推适用该立法，视同该外国破产为当地破产。\n\n该论点获首席大法官采纳。然而，这涉及对司法造法权力界限的根本误解，不应不予回应。\n\n37 处理清算人上诉主要争点的第二个理由是，开曼群岛上诉法院（Cayman Islands Court of Appeal）的一项上诉中也出现了当地立法能否类推适用的问题，该法院仅作出了临时判决，等待本委员会就本上诉作出裁决：Picard v Primeo Fund 2013 (1) CILR 164。如下文所示，该案涉及为追回资产而进行的撤销程序，而非（如本案）为追回资产而获取信息的程序。就清算人的主要论点而言，本案与开曼群岛案件不存在实质区别。在两案中，论点均为：如当地立法不依其条款适用（开曼群岛案件中对此存在疑问），则应当类推适用，或在视同的基础上适用。委员会认为，如不在本上诉中裁决该问题，而仅让开曼群岛上诉法院作出裁决，并可能再向枢密院提出上诉，则委员会将未能履行其职责。该上诉最近已达成和解，但该原则问题仍可能出现。\n\n38 依我之见，本上诉的答案可见于以下命题。第一，普通法的一项原则是，法院有权承认并向外国破产程序提供协助。第二，该权力主要通过法院现有权力行使。第三，这些权力可通过普通法传统的司法造法技术，从既有权力中予以扩展或发展。第四，极为有限的类推适用立法，并不允许司法机关将破产立法的适用范围扩展至其不适用的案件。第五，因此，该等权力并不延伸至类推适用本案实际并不适用的法定权力，视同该外国破产为国内破产。\n\n实际问题\n\n39 开曼群岛和百慕大均设有对与无力偿债公司有关联人士进行讯问的法定规定。在英格兰，该法定权力载于 Insolvency Act 1986, section 236。\n\n40 这是一项纯粹的法定权力，其历史可追溯至很早以前。早在 Statute of Bankrupts Act 1542 (34 & 35 Hen 8, c 4)，当局人员（包括但不限于大法官和首席法官）即被赋予权力，可宣誓讯问被怀疑持有属于债务人的财产（包括债权）的人。Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 (7 & 8 Vict c 110) 在公司案件中赋予法院类似权力；其后，在公司及个人破产领域，均存在一系列连续的法定授权，确认（并扩展）该权力，直至今日。\n\n41 开曼群岛和百慕大法规中的规定均不适用于本案清算人寻求取得的材料。原因是：(1) 开曼群岛 Companies Law, section 103 所规定的权力，允许法院命令与清盘中公司具有相关联系的任何人——无论其是否居住于开曼群岛，包括该公司的前任审计师——向清算人移转或交付属于公司的任何财产或文件；该权力仅延及属于公司的材料（但须以 Lord Sumption JSC 在第29段所述为准）；以及 (2) 百慕大 Companies Act 1981, section 195 中传唤被怀疑持有公司财产等人士的权力不适用，因为该权力仅可就已被该法院命令清盘的公司行使；而在 SICL 上诉中，委员会已建议必须中止清盘命令，因为法院无权对一家在百慕大以外注册成立、且 Companies Act Part XIII 未明确适用于其的公司进行清盘：PricewaterhouseCoopers v Saad Investments Co Ltd [2014] 1 WLR 4482。\n\n42 本案及其他类似或可类比案件中的问题，主要出现在百慕大、马恩岛等英国殖民地、属地和海外领地；这些地区不具有英国法律下为协助外国破产管理人而设的法定权力。因此，除下文将回到的一种罕见情形外，本上诉的实际结果大致仅限于此类国家或地区，或限于法定权力范围存在争议的国家或地区（如开曼群岛）。\n\n43 其中一些领地确实具有此类权力。英属维尔京群岛（British Virgin Islands）已通过 Insolvency Act 2003, Part XIX 实施 UNCITRAL Model Law，其中包含协助外国破产管理人的权力，但仅适用于由 Financial Services Commission 指定的国家或地区。此类国家或地区共有九个，包括美国和英国。Insolvency Act 2003, section 470 保留法院依任何其他法律规则提供协助的权力。\n\n44 开曼群岛 Companies Law, section 241 赋予法院就外国破产程序作出附属命令的权力（包括要求持有与破产人业务或事务有关信息的人提供信息的权力：section 241(1)(d)）。但这些权力是否适用于撤销程序一直存在争议。开曼群岛上诉法院在等待本上诉结果期间，保留了以下问题：其法律中的撤销规定能否根据普通法（除其法定权力之外，或作为其法定权力的替代）被用于协助美国破产程序：Picard v Primeo Fund 2014 (1) CILR 379。如上所述，该上诉最近已达成和解。\n\n45 在英国，除 EU Insolvency Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings (OJ 2000 L160, p 1)) 适用的情形外，英格兰法院对外国公司拥有极为广泛的清盘权力；如外国公司正在英格兰清盘，清算人通常可自由援引 Insolvency Act 1986 的相关规定履行其职能，其中包括根据 Insolvency Act 1986, section 236 请求进行讯问的权力。\n\n46 如外国公司并未在英格兰清盘，则根据实施 UNCITRAL Model Law 的 Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006 (SI 2006/1030)，法院可在最大可能范围内与外国法院或外国代表合作：article 25(1)。根据 2006 Regulations, article 21(1)，在承认外国程序后，英格兰法院可给予适当救济，包括讯问证人、收集证据，或交付有关债务人资产等的信息。可在英国启动次级程序，但仅限于债务人在英国拥有营业机构，且仅涉及位于英国的资产。\n\n47 根据 Insolvency Act 1986, section 426，英格兰对破产事宜具有管辖权的法院，应通过适用任一法域的法律，协助在英国其他任何地区或任何相关国家或地区具有相应管辖权的法院（section 426(4)）（section 426(5)，一项极为困难的条文：见 Dicey, Morris & Collins, Conflict of Laws, 15th ed (2012), vol 2, para 30-110 et seq）。这些权力仅适用于数量有限的国家（包括澳大利亚、巴哈马和马恩岛）。\n\n48 可根据本条作出讯问命令，以协助外国清算。在 England v Smith [2001] Ch 419 中，法院就一名与公司事务有关人士依澳大利亚法律被命令接受讯问的案件裁定，除非违反某项英国公共政策原则，请求国法律的适用不应受到 1986 Act section 236 相应规定中限制的约束。\n\n49 如 EU Insolvency Regulation 适用，外国破产管理人可行使程序启动国法律赋予其的一切权力：article 18(1)。\n\n50 因此，英国法院协助外国破产管理人追查资产的法定权力极为广泛。据此，命令讯问的普通法权力是否存在，几乎绝不会在英格兰产生争议；外国破产管理人可能希望利用的其他法定权力亦是如此。但下文关于 In re Phoenix Kapitaldienst GmbH [2013] Ch 61 所述情况除外：该案寻求并获准依 Insolvency Act 1986, section 423（低价交易）追回财产；EU Insolvency Regulation 不适用，是因为涉案德国公司为投资企业；UNCITRAL Model Law 不适用，是因为 2006 Regulations 在相关时间尚未生效；德国亦非 section 426(4) 所称的相关国家。\n\n国际破产中的普通法协助\n\n51 英国最高法院（UK Supreme Court）在 Rubin v Eurofinance SA [2013] 1 AC 236 中接受并再次确认，根据普通法，法院有权承认并向外国破产程序提供协助：第29段。\n\n52 在我于 Rubin v Eurofinance SA 第29段的判决中，我引用了 Millett LJ 在 Credit Suisse Fides Trust v Cuoghi [1998] QB 818, 827 中所说的话：\n\n在其他法律领域，例如跨境破产，商业需要已促使各国法院在无须等待此类合作获得国际公约认可的情况下相互提供协助……人们日益普遍地接受，不同国家法院之间的礼让要求相互尊重彼此管辖权的属地完整性，但这不应阻碍一个法域的法院，就位于前一法域领土内的资产或居住于该领土内的人，向另一法域的法院提供其能够适当提供的任何协助。\n\n53 在那些已给予协助的案件中，贯穿其中的共同主线，是适用或扩展法院现有的普通法权力或法定权力。\n\n54 大多数案件属于两类之一。第一类包括法院运用普通法权力或程序性权力，中止诉讼程序或判决执行的案件。其中数案曾在 Rubin（鲁宾） v Eurofinance SA（欧洲金融公司） [2013] 1 AC 236, para 33 中提及。这些案件包括（但以下所述者除外）In re African Farms Ltd（非洲农场有限公司案） [1906] TS 373，其中，一名债权人在英格兰清盘中的一家英格兰公司所涉程序中，于德兰士瓦执行的行为被 Transvaal court（德兰士瓦法院）中止；该案被适用于 Turners & Growers Exporters Ltd（特纳斯与格罗尔斯出口商有限公司） v The Ship Cornelis Verolme（“Cornelis Verolme号”船） [1997] 2 NZLR 110（比利时船东处于比利时破产程序中：船舶获解除扣押）；以及 Banque Indosuez SA（东方汇理银行） v Ferromet Resources Inc（费罗梅特资源公司） [1993] BCLC 112，其中，对处于 Chapter 11 程序中的一家得克萨斯公司作出的英格兰禁令被撤销；以及两宗香港案件：Modern Terminals (Berth 5) Ltd（现代货箱码头〔5号泊位〕有限公司） v States Steamship Co（州轮船公司） [1979] HKLR 512（中止在香港对一家处于美国加利福尼亚州联邦法院 Chapter 11 程序中的内华达公司执行），其后在 CCIC Finance Ltd（中检财务有限公司） v Guangdong International Trust & Investment Corpn（广东国际信托投资公司） [2005] 2 HKC 589 中获遵循（中止在香港针对一家处于中国内地破产程序中的中国国有企业的诉讼）。\n\n55 依我判断，对 In re African Farms Ltd [1906] TS 373 作出了过度解读。在该案于 In re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA（国际商业信贷银行） (No 10) [1997] Ch 213, 219 的辩论中被援引之前，任何英格兰案件均未提及该案；援引该案所依据的命题是，英格兰法院不会允许资金被转移至进行主清盘的外国法院管辖区，而不首先为当地有担保债权人、优先债权人及法定债权人作出安排；其后，该案又在 Cambridge Gas 中获认可。公司法经典著作 Buckley、Gore-Browne 和 Palmer（以及 Williams on Bankruptcy）从未提及该案，Fletcher, Insolvency in Private International Law, 2nd ed (2005) 亦未提及。该案仅在 Forsyth 关于南非国际私法、现称为 Private International Law: The Modern Roman-Dutch Law 的历版著作中被顺带提及（现为 5th ed (2012), p 456），尽管该案曾获 Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa（南非最高上诉法院）在附带意见中认可：Gurr（格尔） v Zambia Airways Corpn Ltd（赞比亚航空公司） [1998] 2 All SA 479 (A)。\n\n56 除了针对已获得判决的有担保债权人 Standard Bank（标准银行）作出的中止执行命令外，In re African Farms Ltd [1906] TS 373 中与本案目的相关的命令，仅是规定所有抵押权或优先权问题均应依德兰士瓦法律处理，犹如该公司已在德兰士瓦进入清盘程序。该命令如何实现并未说明，但值得注意的是，Innes CJ（因尼斯首席大法官）在 p 382 说道：此类条件并不容易设计；而且，要使外国清算人处于这样一种地位，即毫无疑问地确保如我所指明的那种分配，可能需要两国制定互惠立法——。即使该公司本不能在德兰士瓦被清盘，该判决当然也并非支持可以通过类推适用当地成文法的依据。\n\n57 In re Impex Services Worldwide Ltd（环球因佩克斯服务有限公司案） [2004] BPIR 564 亦属于运用或扩展法院现有权力的类别。在该案中，为协助一家英格兰公司在英格兰进行临时清盘，作出了马恩岛的审查及提交文件命令。该案在 Rubin v Eurofinance SA [2013] 1 AC 236, para 33 中被称为传统意义上的司法协助案件，因为该命令基于英格兰法院的请求；但该裁决并非最高法院审查的对象，不能认为已获该院认可。该请求不能根据 Manx Companies Act 1931 或法院的固有管辖权予以满足，但该命令在普通法下作出，且未阐明其依据。\n\n58 第二类案件，是法院运用其法定权力协助外国破产程序的案件。最著名的例子，是运用长期存在的权力，对在注册成立地正在清盘（甚至已经解散）的外国公司进行清盘。在 In re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 10) [1997] Ch 213 中，Sir Richard Scott V-C（副大法官理查德·斯科特爵士）对附属清盘案件作出了详尽分析，并得出结论（at p 246）：\n\n（1）外国公司在其注册成立地进行清盘时，在英格兰作出的清盘命令通常会被视为产生了附属于其注册成立地所进行清盘的清盘程序。（2）英格兰的清盘具有附属性质，意即英格兰清算人无权收集和变现该公司在全球范围内的全部资产：他们必然须集中于收集和变现英格兰资产。（3）由于为实现公司全体债权人之间的同等比例分配，必须将该公司在全球范围内的资产汇集，并从该汇集资产中宣布股息，故英格兰的清盘亦具有附属性质，即主清盘程序中的清算人最适合宣布股息并相应分配汇集资产。（4）尽管如此，英格兰清盘的附属性质并不能免除英格兰法院的义务，即对在其面前提出的清盘中产生的任何争议适用英格兰法律，包括英格兰破产法。\n\n59 In re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd（HIH意外及综合保险有限公司案） [2008] 1 WLR 852 亦属于这一类别，因为 House of Lords（上议院）多数意见裁定，英格兰法院同意 Australian court（澳大利亚法院）请求函、应其邀请指示英格兰临时清算人将其掌管的资产汇交澳大利亚清算人的权力，源自 Insolvency Act 1986 的 section 426。\n\n60 作为 HIH 多数意见的一部分，Lord Scott of Foscote（福斯科特的斯科特勋爵）在 para 59 重申了其在 In re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 10) [1997] Ch 213 中所说的话：\n\n英格兰法院在英格兰清盘中负有适用英格兰法定制度的法定义务；依我之见，恕我不能同意我尊贵而博学的朋友 Lord Hoffmann（霍夫曼勋爵），其并无固有管辖权剥夺在英格兰清盘中申报债权的债权人依该制度享有的法定权利——。\n\n另见 Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury（阿伯茨伯里的诺伊贝格尔勋爵）在 para 72 的意见。\n\n清算人的论点及首席大法官的裁决\n\n61 清算人在司法委员会面前提出的主要论点，亦为 Chief Justice（首席大法官）作为其裁决主要依据而采纳的论点（其在 para 49 中称之为“更具原则性”），是 Bermuda court（百慕大法院）应通过类推直接适用 Companies Act 1981 的 section 195 所载审查规定。\n\n62 据称，该论点基于 Lord Hoffmann 在 Cambridge Gas [2007] 1 AC 508, para 22 中所说的话：\n\n法院能够给予协助的界限何在？……在普通法下，诸位勋爵认为，协助能否采取适用不构成国内制度一部分的外国破产法规定的形式，尚存疑问。但国内法院至少必须能够通过作出其在国内破产案件中本可作出的任何行为来提供协助。承认的目的，是使外国破产管理人或债权人无需启动平行破产程序，并给予他们若等同程序在国内法院进行时本可享有的救济——。\n\n63 在本案上诉法院中，Auld JA（奥尔德上诉法官）曾将普通法管辖权的发展——即如同外国公司正在当地清盘般向外国清算人给予协助——描述为“法官席上的不当立法”。作为回应，清算人在向司法委员会提出的论证中援引了许多判词，其效力在于普通法会为适应不断变化的情势而发展。\n\n64 依我之见，通过类推适用破产立法，犹如其已适用，尽管其事实上并不适用，将远远超出普通法传统司法发展的范围，以至于构成对立法职能的明显僭越。\n\n司法造法\n\n65 清算人显然正确地指出，普通法会发展，有时会作出根本性的发展，以适应不断变化的情势。该观点几乎无须援引权威加以证明。现今无人怀疑法官会造法，尽管英格兰和苏格兰法官直到 Lord Reid（里德勋爵）、Lord Denning（丹宁勋爵）及 Lord Devlin（德夫林勋爵）的奠基性著述出现后才缓慢地承认这一点，无须援引这些著述。但其造法权力存在界限。在 Kleinwort Benson Ltd（克莱因沃特·本森有限公司） v Lincoln City Council（林肯市议会） [1999] 2 AC 349, 378 中，Lord Goff of Chieveley（奇夫利的戈夫勋爵）说道：\n\n法官裁决其面前的案件时，是基于其对法律为何的理解作出裁决。他从适用的成文法（如有）以及先前司法裁决报告所载的先例中发现法律。现今，他在解释成文法，尤其是解释已报告案件的效力时，从学术著作中获得大量协助；并在适当情况下参考其他管辖区法官的裁决。在裁决其面前案件的过程中，他有时可以在其所认为的正义利益下发展普通法，但作为一般规则，他仅在法律间隙中如此作为，借用 OW Holmes J（O·W·霍姆斯法官）在 Southern Pacific Co（南太平洋公司） v Jensen（延森） (1917) 244 US 205, 221 中的表述。这不仅意味着他必须在先例原则的界限内行事，还意味着如此作出的变更必须被视为既有原则的发展，通常是极为有限的发展，从而能够作为普通法整体协调一致的一部分而存在。在这一过程中，梅特兰称为“无缝之网”、而我本人在 The Search for Principle, Proc Brit Acad vol LXIX (1983) 170, 186 中称为“马赛克”的普通法，始终处于不断适应和修补的状态……——。\n\n66 Lord Goff 所援引段落中，Justice Holmes（霍姆斯大法官）所说的是：……我毫不犹豫地承认，法官确实会且必须立法，但他们只能在法律间隙中如此作为——。Justice Cardozo（卡多佐大法官）在 The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921), at pp 103, 113 中进一步阐述了这一点：\n\n我们必须保持在先例、习惯，以及普通法数个世纪以来其他法官长期、默默且几乎无法界定的实践为法官制定的创新所设定的间隙界限之内……我们并非从树上摘取盛放的法律规则……〔法官〕仅在空隙之间立法。他填补法律中的开放空间……——。\n\n67 近来，当代的杰出法官也提出了类似观点。Richard Posner（理查德·波斯纳）法官在《How Judges Think》（2008年）第86页中说：“法官进行立法的程度，取决于其合理性范围的宽度——即其在不自取其辱的情况下，可以自由裁量以任一方式裁判案件的范围。”\n\n68 Cornhill的Bingham勋爵（康希尔的宾厄姆勋爵）在《The Business of Judging》（2000年）第32页中说：“总体而言，法律是以小步推进，而非以大步跨越。”\n\n69 Sumption大法官所阐述的方法本身即为普通法发展的一个例子，因为正如Mance大法官的意见清楚表明的那样，该方法超出了此前被理解为法院有权命令提供信息的范围。\n司法与立法\n\n70 但这并非本部分上诉所涉问题；该问题是，如清算人所主张，司法机关是否可以将立法扩展适用于立法机关未使其适用的案件。这比熟悉的问题——普通法规则是否应当扩展或发展，或者该等扩展或发展是否应留待议会——提出了更为根本的问题。\n\n71 后一问题经常出现，并产生不同答案。在人权背景下，该问题是近期协助自杀案件中激烈争论的主题：R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice (CNK Alliance Ltd intervening) [2015] AC 657。在私法领域，例如，Jones v Kaney [2011] 2 AC 398案的多数意见决定取消专家证人的豁免权。少数意见认为，该问题应留待法律委员会审议并由议会改革。\n\n© 2015 The Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for England and Wales（英格兰和威尔士法律报告公司理事会）\nSingularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) [2015] AC　v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC)　Lord Collins of Mapesbury（梅普斯伯里的柯林斯勋爵）\n\n72 相比之下，在Rubin v Euronance SA [2013] 1 AC 236案中，多数意见认为，在破产背景下改变有关外国判决的法律以适用不同规则（取消对管辖权依据的要求）属于立法机关的事项。同样，本委员会成员也曾在其他情境中于不同时间提出同一点：Prest v Prest [2013] 2 AC 415，第83段（Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury PSC（阿伯茨伯里的诺伊贝格主席大法官））；Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation v Revenue and Customs Comrs (formerly Inland Revenue Comrs) [2012] 2 AC 337，第200段（Lord Sumption JSC（萨普申大法官））；Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd (Revenue and Customs Comrs intervening) [2012] 1 AC 383，第174段（Lord Mance JSC（曼斯大法官））。\n\n73 但我强调，这并非本案所涉问题。本案也并非涉及立法是否可以影响普通法规则的发展。一个著名的早期例子，即被认为合法的情形，是R v Bourne [1939] 1 KB 687案；该案中法庭指示，著名产科医师Aleck Bourne（亚历克·伯恩）有权就堕胎指控提出抗辩，类推援引Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929（《1929年婴儿生命保护法》）的规定，即为保全母亲生命而杀害婴儿可以被认定为正当。\n\n74 成文法可以在何种程度上影响普通法的发展，是一个众所周知且有争议的问题。Atiyah教授以如下方式论述该问题（《Common Law and Statute Law》（1985年）48 MLR 1, 6）：\n\n法院是否可能在普通法自身的发展过程中考虑成文法？例如，法院能否为发展普通法之目的，将成文法作为类比？法院能否抛弃已过时的判例，而其理由并非该等判例已被某项成文法规定实际推翻，而是某项成文法表明其建立在过时的价值观之上？法院能否合法地从一项有限的成文法规定中抽取某项一般原则，并将该原则作为普通法事项予以适用？\n\n75 在上述每一种情形中，都不难找到判例来证明Atiyah教授所指出的推理形式具有正当性。但它们均远未达到本案要求本委员会所作之事。\n\n76 本案所涉问题也并非在行使自由裁量权时是否可以考虑成文法规则。例如，在衡平法上的迟延抗辩原则的行使中使用法定时效期间：P & O Nedlloyd BV v Arab Metals Co (No 2) [2007] 1 WLR 2288；Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria [2014] AC 1189，第12段。\n\n77 本案所涉问题也并非法院是否可以通过进入或重新进入受立法规范的领域来发展普通法。正如Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead（伯肯黑德的尼科尔斯勋爵）在In re McKerr [2004] 1 WLR 807，第30段所言，法院对此一直较为谨慎，因为否则不可避免地会出现普通法形成的权力、义务和规定与议会规定者不一致的可能性。\n\n成文法的衡平性\n\n78 清算人所主张的内容要激进得多，即法院应当将依假设不适用的立法，视为其适用而予以适用。\n\n[2015] AC　Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC)　Singularis Holdings Ltd v　Lord Collins of Mapesbury（梅普斯伯里的柯林斯勋爵）\n\n79 该主张使人联想到“成文法的衡平性”这一概念。当今正确使用该概念时，其含义无非是参照成文法的目的或其旨在补救的弊害来解释成文法：例如，Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for England and Wales v Attorney General [1972] Ch 73, 88。\n\n80 但该概念曾经具有一种现已被归入法律古董之列的含义（Loyd, 《The Equity of a Statute》（1909年）58 U Pa L Rev 76），其表述如下：“衡平性是法官作出的一种解释，即不在成文法文字范围之内、但处于制定该法之同一弊害或理由范围内的案件，应适用该成文法所规定的同一救济……”（Co Litt Lib I, Ch II, para 21，引自Bracton）。\n\n81 根据该理论，法院认为其有权扩大成文法的适用，使其适用于不受成文法文字涵盖、但被法院认为符合其精神且具有类同性的情形：Burrows, 《The Relationship between Common Law and Statute in the Law of Obligations》（2012年）128 LQR 232, 241；Atiyah, 《Common Law and Statute Law》（1985年）48 MLR 1, 7—8。成文法衡平性这一概念在18世纪失宠，并在19世纪初被抛弃；法官事实上不再能够行使直接的立法职能。\n\n82 清算人的论点是，破产事项中的普通法协助规则延伸至适用地方立法，即使该立法依其立法适用范围并不适用于当前案件。在本案中，该论点是，即使Companies Act 1981（《1981年公司法》）第195条不适用于外国公司，也应通过类推适用，或视开曼群岛公司为百慕大公司而适用该条。\n\n83 依我判断，该论点不仅在原则上错误，而且与司法机关和立法机关之间既定关系严重相悖。就其依赖Cambridge Gas [2007] 1 AC 508案意见中的任何部分而言，该裁决不仅如Rubin v Euronance SA [2013] 1 AC 236案所判定的那样，在承认规范曼岛股份所有权的纽约命令方面错误，而且通过类推适用、或视为适用曼岛关于批准安排计划的成文法规定，也是错误的。\nCambridge Gas\n\n84 Cambridge Gas [2007] 1 AC 508案裁决的要旨是，应承认纽约命令并使其生效，因为根据曼岛法律，类似安排可以作为安排计划获得批准。\n\n85 Cambridge Gas案的事实载于Rubin [2013] 1 AC 236，第36段及以下各段。就目前目的而言，只须回顾：一项天然气运输航运业务合资项目最终失败，并导致在New York（纽约）United States Bankruptcy Court（美国破产法院）进行Chapter 11（第11章）程序。枢密院在审理来自Isle of Man（曼岛）的上诉时所面对的问题是，纽约法院的命令是否有权在曼岛获得执行。纽约法院驳回了投资者的方案，并接受了债券持有人的方案。\n\nSingularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC) [2015] AC　v PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC)　Lord Collins of Mapesbury（梅普斯伯里的柯林斯勋爵）\n\n86 该企业的公司结构是：投资者直接或间接拥有一家名为Vela Energy Holdings Ltd（Vela）的Bahaman（巴哈马）公司。Vela通过一家中间巴哈马控股公司拥有Cambridge Gas，一家开曼群岛公司。Cambridge Gas直接或间接拥有Navigator Holdings plc（Navigator）约70%的股份；Navigator是一家曼岛公司。Navigator拥有一家曼岛公司的全部股份，而该曼岛公司继而拥有若干公司，每家公司各拥有一艘船舶。\n\n87 纽约命令将Navigator（该曼岛公司）的股份归属债权人委员会，后者随后向曼岛法院申请命令，将该等股份归属其代表。Manx Staff of Government Division（曼岛政府工作人员庭）依据Manx Companies Act 1931（《1931年曼岛公司法》）第101条作出命令，通过将债权人委员会登记为股东而更正股东名册，从而准许了该申请。在枢密院[2007] 1 AC 508，第23段中，Lord Hoffmann（霍夫曼勋爵）基于以下理由否定了这一解决方案：该权力可在任何人的姓名无充分理由被登记于名册中或从名册中遗漏时行使。但为此目的，必须证明依曼岛法律，该公司有义务作此登记。该义务的来源只能是法院根据其普通法协助权力作出的命令，该命令要求公司作出此类登记。因此，基于第101条的论点是循环论证。先决问题是，法院是否有权宣告第11章计划应予实施。\n\n88 枢密院裁定，该计划可以在曼岛实施。其推理如下。第一，如该判决必须被归类为对人判决或对物判决，则应准许上诉，但破产程序不属于任一类别。第二，普遍性原则构成国际破产中司法协助普通法原则的基础，且该等原则足以赋予曼岛法院管辖权，以其在国内破产案件中能够采取的一切方式提供协助。第三，根据Manx Companies Act 1931第152条，完全可以通过安排计划取得完全相同的结果。\n\n89 在Rubin [2013] 1 AC 236案中，最高法院多数意见（Lord Collins of Mapesbury（梅普斯伯里的柯林斯勋爵），Lords Walker of Gestingthorpe（格斯廷索普的沃克勋爵）和Sumption JJSC（萨普申大法官）同意其意见）裁定，Cambridge Gas案裁决错误，因为Cambridge Gas（一家开曼群岛公司）所拥有的Navigator股份，依冲突法的一般原则，位于曼岛，而Navigator与Cambridge Gas之间的股东关系受曼岛法律管辖。因此，相关财产即Navigator股份位于曼岛，故也不受美国破产法院对物管辖权的约束。因此，没有依据在曼岛承认美国破产法院的命令。Lord Mance JSC（曼斯大法官）在其同意判决中对该裁决的正确性未作决定，而Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony JSC（斯通兼埃博尼的克拉克大法官）持不同意见，认为该裁决正确。\n\n90 我已援引 Cambridge Gas（剑桥燃气）[2007] 1 AC 508 第22段的文字，其中 Lord Hoffmann（霍夫曼勋爵）称，国内法院至少必须能够通过实施其在国内破产案件中本可实施的任何措施而提供协助——承认外国破产管理人的目的在于给予他们如同等程序在国内法院进行时本可享有的救济。\n\n91 Cambridge Gas 中该部分意见的效果，是在未履行批准协议安排的法定程序的情况下，作出一项等同于可依曼岛协议安排作出的命令。意见中相关的段落如下：\n\n24. 在本案中显然，纽约债权人通过启动对 Navigator companies（导航者公司）的清盘程序，然后根据 Companies Act 1931（1931年公司法）第152条提出协议安排，本可实现与 Chapter 11 plan（第11章重整计划）完全相同的结果。曼岛法规规定：（1）凡拟在公司与其债权人之间提出和解或安排……法院可应公司、任何债权人或公司成员以简易方式提出的申请，或者在公司正在清盘的情况下应清算人的申请，命令以法院指示的方式召开债权人会议……（2）如代表债权人价值四分之三的多数债权人……同意任何和解或安排，则该和解或安排经法院批准后，对全体债权人……以及公司均具有约束力；或者在正在清盘的公司的情况下，对公司清算人及分担人均具有约束力。\n\n25. 该管辖权极其广泛。所需的仅是拟议方案应属和解或安排，并获得适当多数的批准。因此，曼岛法院为何不通过使该计划生效而提供协助，而要求债权人为在马恩岛进行平行破产程序而大费周章？……\n\n26. ……在股东与公司本身之间，股东权利可以通过公司章程或 Companies Act（公司法）规定的机制予以变更或消灭。其中一种机制是第152条规定的协议安排。作为股东，Cambridge（剑桥公司）受公司已订立的交易约束，包括 Chapter 11 下的计划或第152条下的安排。该等安排旨在使变更或消灭债权人和股东权利的安排生效。因此，在无力偿债公司的情况下，如股东并无任何有价值的利益，法院可以批准一项使其一无所获的安排……该安排可剥夺公司的资产，并使股东持有一家空壳公司的股份。它可以消灭其股份，并通过向他人发行新股以取得新的对价而对公司进行资本重组。或者，如本案中一样，它可规定将他人登记为股份持有人。无论该安排为何，依第152条规定，一经获得法院批准，即对股东具有约束力。对股东的保障在于，即使该安排已获法定多数通过，如其看来不公平，法院亦不会批准该安排。毫无疑问，对于拒绝协助实施已在外国司法管辖区获得确认的同等计划的酌处权，也会按类似原则行使。但本案并无此类问题。尽管必须承认 Cambridge 在技术上并未服从纽约的管辖权，但其在该程序中没有任何经济利益，且如其希望参与，已有充分机会参与。因此，使该计划得以实施并不不公平。诸位法官因此认为，上诉法院命令实施该计划是正确的。\n\n92 值得注意的是，Lord Hoffmann 称，纽约债权人本可通过根据 Companies Act 1931 第152条作出的协议安排，实现与 Chapter 11 计划完全相同的结果；并问，曼岛法院为何不能通过使该计划生效而提供协助，却要求债权人为在马恩岛进行平行破产程序而大费周章。\n\n93 该等程序要求召开会议并通过适当决议。英国最高法院多数法官在 Rubin v Eurofinance SA [2013] 1 AC 236 中裁定，Cambridge Gas 的判决有误，理由是纽约法院对曼岛公司股份的所有权不具管辖权。因此，在 Rubin v Eurofinance SA 中，并未出现是否存在任何合法依据以视同方式适用该立法，或免除法定程序的问题。但基于我已说明的理由，我认为毫无疑问，除非曼岛法律允许放宽批准协议安排的法定程序，否则司法机关无权在普通法下通过类推适用该等程序。\n\nCambridge Gas 的适用\n\n94 我认为，据以援引上述段落来适用立法机关本身未认为适用的立法的法院，均属错误，包括本案首席法官的裁决。\n\n95 该结论亦适用于 In re Phoenix Kapitaldienst GmbH [2013] Ch 61 的裁决。在该案中，一家在德国注册成立、表面目的为将个人资金投资于期货交易的公司，被用作实施全球性欺诈的工具。德国破产管理人依据 Insolvency Act 1986（1986年破产法）第423条（以低价交易），向居住在英格兰的该公司前投资者申请救济，主张通过撤销以低价订立的交易，为公司债权人的利益追回初始投资资金及虚构利润。\n\n96 如我所述，EU Insolvency Regulation（欧盟破产条例）不适用，因为所涉德国公司属于投资企业；UNCITRAL Model Law（联合国国际贸易法委员会示范法）不适用，因为 2006 Regulations（2006年条例）在相关时间尚未生效；而且，就第426(4)条而言，德国并非相关国家。\n\n97 Proudman J（普劳德曼法官）裁定，法院有权在普通法下承认外国破产管理人，并向其提供其有权在国内破产案件中提供的同等协助；且由于撤销先前交易的程序对于破产程序的目的至关重要，法院因而有管辖权授权该管理人援引第423条。Proudman J 适用 Cambridge Gas，认为利用普通法承认及协助在海外任命的管理人的权力，包括实施英格兰法院在国内破产案件中本可实施的任何措施：第62段。\n\n98 我认为该裁决是错误的，因为其涉及以不可允许的方式通过类推适用立法。\n\n99 在 Picard v Primeo Fund 2013 (1) CILR 164 一案中，主要 Bernard Madoff（伯纳德·麦道夫）公司的一名美国破产受托人，寻求追回该公司向一家开曼群岛公司作出的付款。该等请求基于美国法律（欺诈性转让及优先付款）以及开曼法律（优先付款）。开曼群岛设有相互协助规定（Companies Law (2012 Revision)（公司法（2012年修订版））第241—242条），但法官 Jones J（琼斯法官）认为，该等规定不适用，因为作出命令要求向外国代表移交任何属于债务人的财产的权力，并不适用于仅可依交易撤销规定追回的财产。\n\n100 随后，法官裁定，开曼法院可通过适用 Cambridge Gas 和 In re Phoenix Kapitaldienst GmbH [2013] Ch 61，将其法律中的开曼可撤销优先付款规定（第145条）适用于美国公司向开曼公司作出的付款。\n\n101 2014年4月16日，开曼群岛上诉法院（由 Sir John Chadwick P（约翰·查德威克爵士院长）以及 Mottley and Campbell JJA（莫特利和坎贝尔上诉法官）组成）2014 (1) CILR 379，推翻了 Jones J 对本案第一部分的裁决，并裁定开曼法院有权依据开曼公司法的协助规定适用开曼反撤销规定，因为作出交易撤销命令会将该命令标的财产恢复给债务人，从而使法院能够命令将该等恢复的财产移交给外国代表：第45段。\n\n102 上诉法院并未审理 Jones J 是否有权在普通法下适用开曼反撤销规定的问题。法院获告知，该问题的核心争点，即是否应遵循 Cambridge Gas，正在百慕大上诉法院审理。由于该事项已提交本委员会且即将审理，上诉法院受邀作出临时判决，仅处理相互协助法定规定所涉问题。该上诉现已和解。根据我所述，Jones J 就本案当前方面作出的裁决是错误的。\n\nAl Sabah v Grupo Torras SA\n\n103 此前还有一份枢密院意见，其中所述内容直接与清算人主张的 Cambridge Gas 方法相反。在 Al Sabah v Grupo Torras SA [2005] 2 AC 333 一案中，一名巴哈马债务人的破产受托人从巴哈马法院取得一份致开曼群岛大法院的请求书，请求其协助撤销该债务人设立的两项开曼信托。大法院（经开曼群岛上诉法院确认）裁定，其有管辖权根据开曼群岛 Bankruptcy Law（破产法）第156条、Bankruptcy Act 1914（1914年破产法）第122条（规定英国及帝国各地破产法院之间的相互协助），或根据法院固有管辖权提供该等协助；并且，其应作为酌处权事项，授予巴哈马受托人开曼破产法第107条规定的权力，使其能够撤销该等信托。枢密院裁定：（i）开曼破产法第156条不适用；但（ii）第122条在其适用于开曼群岛的范围内尚未被废止，且确实适用，因此有管辖权授权巴哈马受托人行使该项法定权力，即使如该等信托受巴哈马法律管辖，该权力可能对其不可用。\n\n104 但本委员会通过 Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe（盖斯廷索普的沃克勋爵）发表的意见在第35段称：\n\n被申请人备位地援引了大法院（Grand Court）的固有管辖权。该论点在辩论中并未得到充分展开，诸位阁下可以相当简短地处理该论点。倘若大法院并无法定管辖权以协助外国破产程序，其或许具有某些有限的固有权力以提供该等协助。然而，在不符合其《破产法》第107条规定的情形下，其不可能具有固有管辖权行使该条所赋予的非常权力。英国法院据以承认外国破产管辖权的非法定原则，其适用范围较为有限［援引现为 Dicey, Morris & Collins, Conflict of Laws, 15th ed (2012), vol 2, paras 31R-059 et seq］，而大法院的固有管辖权不可能更为宽泛。\n\n105 委员会显然认为，法院无权在不属于该《法律》规定范围的情形下适用《破产法》。在 In re Phoenix Kapitaldienst GmbH [2013] Ch 61（上引）一案中，Proudman 法官（Proudman J）基于如下理由区分了该明确表述：她应遵循 Hoffmann 勋爵（Lord Hoffmann）所表达且 Walker 勋爵（Lord Walker）在 HIH 案 [2008] 1 WLR 852 中认可的、她称之为较晚且经过更周详考虑的观点，即法院如与司法公正及英国公共政策相一致，便能够实现统一及普遍适用的破产法之目标。在 Picard v Primeo Fund 2013 (1) CILR 164 一案中，Jones 法官（Jones J）将 Al Sabah 案中的附带意见解释为：普通法不得被援引以适用《破产法》的规定，从而实现其范围以外的目标。\n\n106 这两项所谓的区分均不成立。HIH 案中没有任何内容支持 Proudman 法官关于 Walker 勋爵已改变其观点的说法，而 Jones 法官关于 Walker 勋爵仅意图针对《破产法》范围以外目标的说法，则完全不符合 Walker 勋爵的明确措辞，即法院并不具有在不符合该条规定的情形下行使《破产法》所赋予权力的固有管辖权。（着重号为原文所加。）\n\n107 我认为，Walker 勋爵在 Al Sabah v Grupo Torres [2005] 2 AC 333, para 35 的意见中所作的附带意见（Hoffmann 勋爵及 Scott 勋爵等人同意该意见）显然正确；在其与 Cambridge Gas 案中以“视同”基础适用马恩岛债务重组安排规定的段落不一致的范围内，应优先遵循 Al Sabah 案，而非 Cambridge Gas 案。\n\n108 因此，我谨建议女王陛下，不仅应驳回上诉，而且若基于清算人的主要论点准许上诉，便会使女王陛下的法官参与一种法律发展及其立法权的行使；该等行为将完全不符合规范司法机关与立法机关关系的既定原则，因而构成深刻的违宪。\n\nLORD CLARKE OF STONE-CUM-EBONY JSC（斯通坎埃博尼的克拉克勋爵，英国最高法院法官）\n\n109 我同意基于 Sumption 勋爵（Lord Sumption JSC）所述理由驳回本次上诉。我就 Sumption 勋爵在第8段提出的第一项争议另行作出简短判决，即：在以下情形下，百慕大法院是否拥有普通法上的权力，通过命令提交信息（口头或书面形式）协助外国清算程序：(i) 百慕大法院无权对诸如 Singularis Holdings Ltd（辛古拉里斯控股有限公司）之类的海外公司进行清盘；及 (ii) 其命令提交信息的法定权力仅限于该公司已在百慕大清盘的案件。第二项争议是，倘若该权力存在，在外国清算程序进行地的法院本无法作出同等命令的情形下，该权力是否可予行使。\n\n110 我得出的结论是，基于 Sumption 勋爵所述理由，第一项争议的答案是百慕大法院确实拥有该等权力。使我得出该结论的步骤如下。尽管在附属清算程序中承认该等权力迄今尚未获普通法承认，但双方均认同普通法是逐步发展的，并且可在适当情形下得到扩展或发展。因此，问题在于，该等情形是否适当，以证明在此类案件中承认该等权力具有正当性。\n\n111 如 Sumption 勋爵在第20段所示，普通法过去已有重大进展。其中包括强制某人提供证据的权力，而该权力最初并非源于制定法。正如 Sumption 勋爵所言，该权力如同命令证据开示的权力一样，是衡平法院（Court of Chancery）法官为补救普通法法院中与事实证明有关的技术性及程序性限制而创设的固有权力。我同意 Sumption 勋爵（第23段）的观点，即 Norwich Pharmacal 案 [1974] AC 133 在当前语境中的重要意义在于，它说明了普通法具有如下能力：在为使一项获承认的法律原则生效而有必要时，发展出法院强制提交信息的权力。\n\n112 本案中获承认的法律原则，是源自 Cambridge Gas [2007] 1 AC 508 的修正普遍主义原则：见 Sumption 勋爵判决第19段及第23段。我同意他的意见，该原则建立在如下公共利益之上：外国法院在公司注册地行使破产管辖权时，尽管其管辖权受地域限制，仍能够在全球范围内有序清盘该公司的事务。该公共利益的一个重要方面是承认：在全球性商业的世界中，各国均有利益使拥有跨国资产及业务的公司能够根据其注册地法律有序清盘，并且该清盘基础将在国际上得到承认并有效。我还同意 Sumption 勋爵在第23段所述：(i) 在可能为商业目的或普通对抗性诉讼寻求信息的案件中，该公共利益并无相当的对应物；(ii) 百慕大法院已适当承认清算人作为该法院人员的地位；(iii) 清算人履行与该地位相联系的一般职能需要该等信息；(iv) 该等信息不太可能通过其他方式获得；(v) 导致普通法对强制提供证据有所抑制的任何理由，均与当前问题无关；(vi) 法院多次确认的协助外国职务持有人的权利及义务，若仅限于如同承认任何其他依外国法律取得所有权的法律人格者一样承认公司的资产所有权，或如同承认依其注册地法律任命的任何其他公司代理人一样承认职务持有人代表公司行事的权利，便会成为空洞公式；及 (vii) 国内法院对外国清算人地位的承认，若仅使其有权占有公司资产，却不给予其任何识别或查找该等资产的有效手段，则意义甚微。\n\n113 这些都是有力因素。那么界限何在？我同意 Sumption 勋爵所述第25段的观点，即委员会不希望鼓励随意创设其他强制提交信息的普通法权力，但该权力的界限已内含于承认其存在的理由之中。他给出了四项理由。(1) 该权力仅可用于协助具有破产管辖权的外国法院人员或相当的公职人员。例如，该权力不得用于协助自愿清盘；自愿清盘本质上是一项私人安排，尽管受法院指示约束，却并非由法院人员或代表法院人员进行。(2) 该权力是协助性权力，其存在目的在于使该等法院克服因各法院权力的地域限制而对公司事务全球性清盘造成的问题；因此，该权力不得用于使其实施即使依其受任所依据的法律也无法实施之事。(3) 该权力仅在履行职务持有人职能所必需时方可行使。(4) 其受如下限制：该等命令必须符合协助法院的实体法及公共政策，本案中即百慕大的实体法及公共政策。我还同意 Sumption 勋爵的意见，由此可知，该权力不得用于本应属于其他强制提交信息制度适当调整对象的目的。此类普通法权力并非为实际或预期诉讼取得材料的许可方式。该领域受司法程序规则及在外国司法管辖区取得证据的制定法规定所规制；清算人与其他诉讼当事人或潜在诉讼当事人一样，必须接受该等规定及其全部限制。此外，在某些司法管辖区，作出本国破产程序中无权作出的命令，很可能违反国内公共政策。\n\n114 我还同意 Sumption 勋爵基于其在第28段所述理由的观点，即普通法权力并未因《百慕大公司法》第195条而被默示排除；但该权力无法适用于本案事实，因为开曼群岛不存在类似权力，并且为了弥补外国破产管辖法院依其本国法律所受权力限制而行使协助权力，并非该权力的适当用途。\n\n115 如同 Sumption 勋爵，我理解重要的是，该项发展不应为不同且无关的案件类别打开闸门。然而，我看不出为何会如此。我理解 Mance 勋爵（Lord Mance JSC）得出了不同结论。我并不声称能够准确预测由 Sumption 勋爵识别、并获 Mapesbury 的 Collins 勋爵（Lord Collins of Mapesbury）及我支持的该原则发展将如何推进。我同意 Mance 勋爵的意见，即这是一项前进一步，但不同意这是一项飞跃。我还同意他（第137段）的意见，即法院往往将我们正在讨论的这类救济限于存在可识别的、需要保护的法律请求权的情形，该请求权以所有权或财产权为基础，或以有适当证据支持的某项不法行为为基础。然而，只要发展是审慎的并支持一项获承认的原则，普通法没有理由不予发展。\n\n116 在允许的申请与不允许的申请之间划定界线，并非总是容易。然而，Sumption 勋爵不仅识别了该政策，也识别了源自该项原则。\n\n- 政策及其行使的一些限制；在我看来，这为未来提供了一种明智的处理方式。我谨不同意 Lord Mance JSC（曼斯勋爵，最高法院大法官）在第146段所称这是一项既不允许也不适当的发展。作此表示时，我并未就 Lord Mance JSC 在第120及121段中对命令条款范围过宽以及缺乏防范费用或损失的保障措施所表达的关切发表意见。这些关切很可能是有根据的，并可在此类问题有待裁判的案件中予以审查。本案并非此类案件，因为上诉必须基于狭窄的理由予以驳回。\n\nLORD MANCE JSC（曼斯勋爵，最高法院大法官）\n\n117 本次上诉涉及两个可能具有重要性的问题：(a) 为协助外国（开曼群岛）的清算而享有的普通法权力，是否使百慕大法院能够命令其管辖范围内任何可能掌握有关该公司资产（或也可能有关其一般事务）之相关信息或文件的人，到庭接受询问并披露该等信息或文件；(b) 如该项权力存在，在开曼群岛法院对其管辖范围内的人并无同等权力的情况下，是否应通过命令作出该等披露及询问来行使该项权力。\n\n118 我同意 Lord Sumption JSC（萨普申勋爵，最高法院大法官）的看法，对第二个问题的简短回答是否定的。因此，本次上诉无须回答第一个问题，尽管 Lord Sumption JSC 已将其意见的大部分篇幅用于该问题。我理解，如委员会能够对此作出明确回答，可能会有所帮助；但考虑到该问题在此前各级审理中所获论证的局限性（见下文第122段）以及其大部分尚未探索的影响，我认为委员会试图在本次上诉中作出该回答是不幸的：一般参见下文第130—145段。\n\n119 在详细讨论第二个问题之前，有必要且在我看来很重要地指出三点。第一点是上诉法院撤销、而清算人请求委员会恢复的首席大法官命令。被申请人 PwC（普华永道）被命令（依第3(a)款）在14日内向共同正式清算人（JOLs）提供：\n\n其可能拥有的所有信息，包括其占有、权力范围内、保管或控制下的有关公司之推介、设立、交易、往来、事务或财产的信息及文件[；]为免生疑问，须提供的信息及文件不限于审计信息。……\n\n此外，PwC 被命令（依第3(d)款）：\n\n由一名获 JOLs 接受的合伙人和/或雇员或代理人立即宣誓接受查问；在 JOLs 要求会面之日起十（10）日内，就上述事项通过口头及书面质询接受查问；并被要求将其答复记录成文，并要求其在其上签字。……\n\n依第3(e)款，JOLs 获准向 Paul Suddaby（保罗·萨达比）及 PwC 的任何其他合伙人或高级人员……在管辖范围外送达；并特别获准查问 Paul Suddaby，且特别命令其依第3(a)款提供信息。第3(f)款规定：\n\n如 PwC……拒绝遵守本命令所载任何命令，其及其合伙人和高级人员即构成藐视法庭，并可能被监禁、罚款或其资产被扣押。\n\n120 毫无疑问，为防第3条规定得不够充分，第4条规定：\n\n进一步且不限制前述规定的一般性，PwC……须于七日内就 [Singularis Holdings Ltd（辛古拉里斯控股有限公司）]……提交 Hugh Dickson（休·迪克森）于 7 February 2013 作出的第三份宣誓书之附件 HD-7 所述文件。JOLs 应能够取得 PwC……占有、权力范围内、保管或控制下的所有本文件所述信息及文件，无论该等信息及文件位于百慕大、迪拜或任何其他地点。\n\n仅在为保护属于第三方的保密性质信息所必需时，方可进行删节；第4(b)款要求：\n\nPwC……的有关合伙人及高级人员宣誓确认，所有被要求提供的文件均已提供。\n\n唯一获豁免的文件是应在开曼群岛提供的文件，即实际上属于 Singularis 的文件。\n\n121 命令并未规定 JOLs 支付，更遑论担保，PwC 或其合伙人、高级人员或代理人为遵守该命令将产生的任何费用；亦未作出承诺支付任何该等费用或因此可能产生的任何其他损失或责任——尽管 PwC 曾要求首席大法官处理此一方面。该遗漏在上诉法院被提出；就该法院维持的针对 SICL 的命令而言，该遗漏仍属相关。PwC 表示费用可能约为 $500,000，而 JOLs 则主张为遵守命令所耗用的管理时间不可追偿。上诉法院以缺乏判例依据为由，拒绝作出任何命令或要求任何承诺——尤其是在“遵守命令的成本远未明确”的情况下。就一项本身实际上前所未有的命令而言，缺乏判例依据并不足为奇。PwC 的遵从费用显然很可能相当可观。无论在作出该命令时该等费用是否已经或能够量化，PwC 均应就该等费用获得保障。一般公平原则及有关冻结禁令、Anton Piller 命令和 Norwich Pharmacal 救济的既定实践，本应确认有必要在该方面作出适当命令或承诺。\n\n122 第二点是，就 Singularis 而言，Kawaley CJ（考利首席大法官）针对 PwC 及其高级人员作出命令的唯一依据，是百慕大法院享有一项普通法权力，可通过适用当地程序性救济措施来协助开曼群岛清算，特别是直接适用或类推适用《Bermudan Companies Act 1981》第195条；尽管各方均承认该条文按其文字并不适用。这也是 JOLs 向上诉法院提交的书面陈述中提出、并由上诉法院裁判的唯一主张，亦是向委员会申请准许上诉的唯一依据。Kawaley CJ 认为，尽管如此，他可凭借包括 In re African Farms [1906] TS 373、Cambridge Gas Transportation Corpn v Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc [2007] 1 AC 508 及 Rubin v Eurofinance SA (Picard intervening) [2013] 1 AC 236（第8、49—74段）在内的判例，直接援引第195条；或者，他可类推适用该条：第8、36—48段。上诉法院作出了相反结论：见 Bell AJA（贝尔上诉法官代理）所作第52段、Zacca P（扎卡院长）所作第1段，以及 Auld JA（奥尔德上诉法官）所作第4—59段。Auld JA 的意见第49(1)及50段暗示，JOLs 可能已在口头陈述中通过主张一种基于修正普遍主义、且独立于百慕大法定权力的更广泛权力，而开始更广泛地提出其主张。但即使如此，该主张所获重视亦很有限。仅在委员会面前，焦点才转向此类论点。至于在下级法院提出并获 Kawaley CJ 接受的主张，我同意 Lord Sumption JSC 及 Lord Collins of Mapesbury（梅普斯伯里柯林斯勋爵）的意见，即没有依据对第195条等国内立法进行司法重塑，或在其界限之外但通过类推方式采取行动。因此，首席大法官的命令不能以其作出该命令所依据的理由获得正当化。但具有讽刺意味的是，如此坚决地否定国内法院行使授予国内清算人的权力之任何可能性，却可能被对国内法院实现外国清算人愿望和/或权力之可能性的接纳所取代：见下文第130段及以下各段。\n\n123 下级两法院均未就如下问题作出任何意见：是否存在管辖权，或如存在，该管辖权是否可适当地行使，以针对百慕大法院管辖范围外的 Paul Suddaby 及 PwC 的其他合伙人或高级人员作出命令并向其送达。如上文第119及120段所示，首席大法官的命令作出了该等规定，尽管并未将 Suddaby 先生或任何其他高级人员或合伙人以其个人身份列为当事人。在向上诉法院提交的书面陈述中，JOLs 主张第195条赋予域外送达的管辖权，并援引英国判例 In re Seagull Manufacturing Co Ltd [1993] Ch 345（该案依据《Insolvency Act 1986》中使用与第195条类似措辞的条文作出裁决）。一旦如委员会所作结论，第195条既不能直接适用，也不能类推适用，问题便成为是否可能存在 JOLs 所主张的此类普通法管辖权，即可在制裁威胁下命令域外送达的管辖权。\n\n124 在此基础上处理该事项，显然无论如何，首席大法官的命令均大大超出普通法就 PwC 本身以外、处于百慕大管辖范围外的 PwC 合伙人及高级人员所存在的任何管辖权；PwC 本身则处于该管辖范围内。该领域曾在 Masri v Consolidated Contractors International (UK) Ltd (No 4) [2010] 1 AC 90 第12段中审查，英国上议院（由本人作出判决，且上议院其他全体成员均表示同意）就以下事项作出如下表述：\n\n法院强制证人到庭或对未履行义务的证人处以罚款的权力限制。自《Statute of Elizabeth 1562》(5 Eliz 1, c 9) 起，此事一直受法规规管，且从未延伸至英国境外。就其他管辖区制定的程序，涉及在外国法院协助下，通过委托取证或其他方式取得证据。根据《Supreme Court Act 1981》第36条，传票的送达至今仅可针对英国各组成部分之一内的人。法院在此方面的权力限制，与国际法原则相一致；Dr Mann（曼恩博士）在其海牙讲演《The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law》, Recueil des Cours, 1964-I, The Definition of Jurisdiction, p 137) 中对此作出了有力概述：一国亦无权通过威胁外国证人如不遵从即施加处罚，来强制其在本国法庭前到庭。诚然，一国可以通过合法手段邀请，或许还可以要求外国证人为提供证言而出庭。但外国证人并无遵从的义务；对其施加处罚，并在其财产上或在其日后访问时对其本人强制执行该等处罚，构成刑事管辖权的越界，并违背各国就取证所形成的长期实践。\n\n125 Masri案中的争点是：依据法定授权制定的规则（CPR r 71）所赋予的权力，是否延伸至可命令对身处管辖区外的判决债权人公司高级人员进行询问。上议院认为，鉴于反对域外适用的推定，该权力并不延伸至此。在作出该结论的过程中，其审议了关于其他具有法定依据的权力的先例。在 In re Tucker (RC) (A Bankrupt), Ex p Tucker (KR) [1990] Ch 148 一案中，《Bankruptcy Act 1914》第25(1)条赋予法院权力，传唤法院认为能够就债务人、其交易或财产提供信息的任何人到庭接受询问。但上诉法院撤销了破产受托人为询问债务人的兄弟——一名居住在比利时的英国国民——所取得的命令。Dillon LJ（狄龙上诉法官）指出向管辖区外送达的权力限制（当时载于 RSC Ord 11）以及传唤证人的权力限制后表示，在此背景下，他不会认为第25(1)条授权英国法院将无法在英国法院管辖区内向其送达必要传票的人带至其面前：p 158E—F。\n\n126 相比之下，在 In re Seagull Manufacturing Co Ltd [1993] Ch 345 一案中，《Insolvency Act 1986》第133条授权对较狭窄类别的人员进行公开询问，即：\n\n任何人，如其(a)现在或曾经是公司的高级人员；或(b)曾担任公司的清算人或管理人，或接管人或经理人……；或(c)不属于(a)或(b)项所述人员，但现在或曾经参与或参加公司的推广、设立或管理，\n\n而《Insolvency Rules 1986》（SI 1986/1925）第12.12条明确授权法院命令向管辖区外送达为破产程序目的而须如此送达的任何程序文件或命令。上诉法院维持了对一名居住在奥尔德尼岛的前董事进行公开询问的命令。Peter Gibson J（彼得·吉布森法官）作出判决，法院其他成员均同意其判决；他指出（p 354F—H）：\n\n当一家公司遭遇灾难性结局并被法院清盘时，本条的明显意图是，应使对公司事务状况负有责任的人接受调查程序，且该调查应当公开进行。议会不可能意图让负有该责任的人仅因不在管辖区内便逃避接受调查的责任。事实上，如果将本条解释为不及于任何不在管辖区内的人，则只要故意离开管辖区便足以规避。\n\n127 尽管上议院在 Masri [2010] 1 AC 90 一案中认为，执行不可行性是比 Peter Gibson J 所认为的更为重要的因素，但其承认第133条所服务的公共利益，并提及（在第23段）“清盘命令的普遍性，亦即其至少在理论上涉及无论位于何处的全部资产”。该因素在 Masri案中并不存在，故无法支持 CPR r 71 具有域外效力的论点。但所有这些案件的重要特征在于，它们均取决于明文授予的法定权力。其中任何一案均未表明，在所讨论的任何领域存在任何相关的普通法权力。\n\n128 第三点是，JOLs（共同正式清算人）始终仅以 PwC（普华永道）持有文件和信息为依据提出案件；JOLs 查阅该等文件和信息将有所帮助，并且其能够就此询问 PwC 及其高级人员也将有所帮助。其依据并非 PwC 持有 Singularis Holdings Ltd（辛古拉里斯控股有限公司）的财产或资产（已被开曼群岛法院命令提交的文件除外）；也并非 PwC 自身作出了任何不当行为，或曾经或目前卷入任何第三方的不当行为。Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Comrs [1974] AC 133 这一上议院判例，并未在最高法院被援引，甚至未被列入向最高法院提交的判例。在 JOLs 的 Mr Moss QC（莫斯御用大律师）作最终口头答复陈述时，该案仅被顺带提及；庭审记录载有如下对话：\n\nLord Mance JSC（曼斯大法官）：如果他们是会计师，正如你早些时候告诉我的那样，那么表面上存在顾问关系；如果你想从你的会计顾问处了解某些你自己遗失或没有的事情，人们或许会认为，有相当充分的理由说他们负有向你披露该等事项以协助你的义务。\n\nMr Moss：就该项建议而言，或许存在可争辩的案件，但我们关心的是涉及公司资产的这些审计文件。我不知道会计工作是否与此有任何关系。\n\nLord Collins（柯林斯勋爵）：难道不能在任何地方取得 Norwich Pharmacal 命令吗？\n\nMr Moss：嗯，可以。我们曾讨论过这一点。Norwich Pharmacal 的问题在于，它以欺诈为基础。\n\nLord Collins：我认为是任何不当行为。\n\nLord Sumption JSC（萨姆普申大法官）：它一般以不当行为为基础。\n\nMr Moss：是的，但它确实涉及指称不当行为。你必须指称 PwC 无辜地卷入了该不当行为。\n\nLord Clarke JSC（克拉克大法官）：他们只须无辜地卷入。\n\nMr Moss：是的。\n\nLord Sumption JSC：毕竟，这是一个相当低的门槛；海关与消费税部门大概几乎是你所能希望找到的最无辜的卷入者。\n\nMr Moss：是的。其结果将是，如果我们能够获得 Norwich Pharmacal 救济，那么百慕大法院确实拥有普通法权力，可给予我们此处所获得的完全相同类型的救济。这实际上归于同一件事。把我们直接送回首席大法官处，然后请求 Norwich Pharmacal 救济，并没有多大意义。\n\nLord Mance JSC：事情未必如此容易。你们并未将其表述为 Norwich Pharmacal。\n\nMr Moss：是的，必须放弃现有主张并将其重新表述为 Norwich Pharmacal，但实质上它会达到同类结果。这或许说明，我们已有且寻求维持的，或者更确切地说，我们曾一度拥有、但上诉法院以相当狭窄的理由将其撤销、而我们寻求恢复的，并非在这类情形下多么激进的事物；在这种情形下，存在巨额赤字，显然发生过不当行为，文件已被取走且无法取得。这正是人们预期会给予救济的情形。无论从何种角度看，这都并非过度。\n\n129 与 Mr Moss 的陈述相反，JOLs 正在寻求实施极为激进的做法，其所依据的基础与 Norwich Pharmacal 之间存在深刻分界。JOLs 正寻求：(a) 为一项远比 Norwich Pharmacal 程序中可能取得的任何命令更广泛、更严格的命令提供正当性；以及(b) 在未经核实的主张基础上这样做，即若其曾作出尝试，便能够取得 Norwich Pharmacal 命令，并且无需承担证明 PwC 卷入任何不当行为的麻烦和困难，且该不当行为须是 PwC 就其持有相关信息或文件的行为。我看不出 Mr Moss 邀请通过走捷径而预先判断正常程序结果的做法有任何说服力或吸引力。\n\n130 鉴于这些要点，我转而讨论现提出论点的实质。该论点是，普通法存在一项权力，可通过命令任何人（无论其是否为公司高级人员或代理人）到庭、接受询问并提交文件和信息，以藐视法庭制裁相威胁的方式，协助任何外国清算程序，正如 JOLs 所主张的那样。JOLs 现主张的管辖权唯一明确限制是，其不应与法院地的法律或政策相抵触。委员会就本次上诉第二项争点作出的否定回答意味着，还将存在进一步限制：该管辖权将不存在，或不得行使以作出一项无法对破产所在国管辖区内人员作出的命令。\n\n131 Lord Sumption JSC 现提出，该原则应进一步限于任何经法院命令进行的清算程序（尽管这反过来使任何受监督清盘的地位仍不确定；在任何仍保留该可能性的管辖区，该可能性曾存在于《English Companies Act 1948》第311条之下）。尽管 Lord Sumption JSC 在一处将此称为识别或定位资产的方式（第23段），但在其他地方，他称其为使外国法院能够克服各法院权力的地域限制给公司事务的全球清盘所造成的问题（第25段）。如前所述，首席大法官实际作出的命令范围极广。因此，所提议的普通法管辖权范围并不确定。\n\n132 所主张的管辖权据称源于“经修正的普遍主义”原则。这是一项在过去20年中于英国普通法中发展起来、得到 Lord Hoffmann（霍夫曼勋爵）强力支持的原则；尽管其早在100多年前已在一宗德兰士瓦案件中获得承认，而该案本身直到最近一直不公平地湮没无闻。In re African Farms [1906] TS 373 由 Sir James Innes（詹姆斯·英尼斯爵士）裁决；除其自身卓越的法律成就外，他还是杰出的战时人道主义律师 Helmuth James von Moltke（赫尔穆特·詹姆斯·冯·毛奇）的祖父。正如 Lord Sumption JSC 在其第14(i)段所指出，该原则的实质在于，一法院承认外国清算人对公司在本国管辖区内资产的处分权。这使得法院有理由作出命令，禁止以与外国清算不一致的方式处分或扣押该等资产。该判决的新颖之处在于，在本国法院无权对该公司进行清盘的情况下作出此种命令。因此，In re African Farms 中给予的协助比 In re Matheson Bros Ltd (1884) 7 Ch D 225 所示的协助更进一步；在后案中，鉴于英国法院本可有权在英国对相关外国公司进行清盘，Kay J（凯法官）准备保全英国资产，以防止英国债权人对其执行，等待在公司注册成立国对该公司进行清盘的步骤，以便使资产可供公司英国债权人与外国债权人按比例平等受偿。\n\n133 该原则还可证明一项将资产移出本管辖区并交付外国清算人的命令是正当的，条件是外国清算规则会以与本国管辖区相同的方式分配该等资产。即使外国清算规则会以不同方式分配该等资产，但存在明文法定权力使得该移交仍可进行，该原则亦可支持行使该明文法定权力。除此之外，我并不认为多数意见的\n\n上议院在 In re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd（HIH 伤亡及综合保险有限公司）[2008] 1 WLR 852 一案中所作裁决被作为依据援引；无论如何，其任何成员就普通法权力的存在或范围所作的较宽泛表述，均属附带意见，因为该上诉是基于存在明确的法定授权可以进行移交而裁决的，尽管相关资产在澳大利亚清算中将以不同于其在英格兰清算中分配的方式进行分配。\n\n134　我同意 Lord Sumption JSC（萨姆普申大法官）和 Lord Collins（柯林斯勋爵）的意见，即 Cambridge Gas Transportation Corpn（Cambridge Gas 运输公司）v Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc（Navigator Holdings plc 无担保债权人正式委员会）[2007] 1 AC 508 所依据的第二项和第三项命题不能成立。国内法院无权通过实施其在国内破产程序中本可适当实施的任何行为来协助外国法院；其亦不能凭借任何此类权力取得管辖权。至于第一项命题，基于我在 Rubin v Eurofinance SA（Eurofinance 股份有限公司）[2013] 1 AC 236 中说明的理由，Cambridge Gas 即使正确，也至多只能支持如下命题：国内法院应在不违反其本国法律的范围内，承认外国破产命令，并按照外国破产程序处理该等资产的方式，处理位于其管辖范围内的可识别资产。在委员会另一项较早的裁决 Al Sabah v Grupo Torras SA（Grupo Torras 股份有限公司）[2005] 2 AC 333，第35段中，Lord Walker（沃克勋爵）表示——我认为恰如其分——开曼群岛法院可能具有某种有限的固有权力，以协助巴哈马清盘程序，但其不可能具有所主张的权力，即撤销一项可撤销处分；该项处分所依据的模式源自开曼群岛破产立法中规范国内清算的一项条文，而该条文并未明文适用于巴哈马清盘程序。\n\n135　我与 Lord Sumption JSC 意见相左之处在于，他断言我刚才所述的、迄今为止有限的修正普遍主义原则，延伸至或证明以下做法正当（或者说，若无此做法，该原则将只是一句空洞的公式）：假定或行使一项普通法权力，将任何人强行带到法院（借用 Dillon LJ（狄龙上诉法官）在 Ex p Tucker [1990] Ch 148 中的用语），对其进行讯问，并要求其在藐视法庭的惩罚压力下提交文件，仅仅因为这将有助于外国清算人这样做，并可能使其能够查找某些资产（或更好地了解公司的事务）。在执行对可识别资产的权利，与强制第三方协助提供文件和信息以发现公司资产（或者，更广泛而言，使破产从业人员能够了解公司的事务）之间，存在重大飞跃。Lord Sumption JSC 在第23段援引上议院在 Norwich Pharmacal Co（Norwich Pharmacal 公司）v Customs and Excise Comrs（海关和消费税专员）[1974] AC 133 一案中的裁决，作为普通法能够发展出一项法院权力、在为实现一项获承认的法律原则所必需时强制提供信息的例证。然而，对“一项获承认的法律原则”的提及，回避了这样一个问题：修正普遍主义原则是否超出保护管辖范围内可识别资产的界限，从而允许作出命令，强制第三方协助提供可能有助于追踪该等资产的信息和文件（或以其他方式协助破产从业人员了解公司的事务）。\n\n136　信息是一种宝贵的商品，但除非有特殊理由，通常不能在法院中从私人个人处强行取得；本案首席大法官所作命令的形式表明，行使任何此类权力均可能具有侵扰性、滋扰性和高成本。普通法迄今未承认任何此类管辖权。为债权人利益而进行的外国破产程序，在我看来并不能为现在承认该管辖权提供任何正当理由。仅仅因为破产从业人员至少在强制清算中是外国法院的官员，负责清盘其事务，在普通法上似乎远远不足，尽管在存在相关立法时，这可能是有助于确定议会可能意图范围的一个因素。许多普通债权人、诉讼当事人和其他人士都希望获得一种机制，以收集信息来发现或追踪资产，或协助其追诉请求权或处理其一般事务。尚不清楚将所主张的普通法权力限制于外国破产程序的逻辑是什么或将会是什么。然而，无论多么意图通过使用“无差别的”之类的形容词来阻止将国内破产程序（如在不存在完整普通法方案的情况下）或完全不属于破产情境的情形纳入这一新管辖权的尝试，此类尝试似乎必然会发生。在没有任何明确理由赋予破产从业人员现由 JOLs（共同正式清算人）主张的独特普通法特权的情况下，此类尝试很可能难以抗拒。尽管我不同意这一点，但 Lord Sumption JSC 意见第21段末尾的表述只能鼓励此类尝试，即：“当有足够令人信服的法律政策要求时，法院从未在其发展适当救济以要求提供信息的意愿方面受到如此限制。”\n\n137　实际上，法院远非表现出不受限制地愿意发展要求提供信息的适当救济；在我看来，法院一直谨慎地将此类救济限于存在可识别的、值得保护的法律请求权的情形，该请求权要么基于对财产的所有权或权利，要么基于有适当证据支持的某种不当行为。因此：（i）法院有管辖权保护可识别的财产权利，这将包括命令已显示很可能持有属于公司财产的人交付该财产或披露其所在地。（ii）存在可维持的不当行为主张，是作出以下命令这一既定管辖权的基础：在作出财产冻结令（原称 Mareva 禁令）或搜查令（Anton Piller 命令）时，或者与之相关联地，命令披露信息。（iii）Norwich Pharmacal 所承认的法律原则是：无辜卷入不当行为的人，可以被要求披露关于该不当行为的有限信息和文件，以协助受害人。\n\n138　在本次上诉中，并未基于上述任何一项提出主张。第一项可涵盖代理人披露其为本人持有或负有义务转交给本人的信息。正如上文第128段所引述的庭审记录摘录所确认的，未在任何此类基础上提出主张。此外，审计师不是代理人；他们是受聘审查公司账目并依照法定和职业要求出具报告的独立承揽人——就此而言，并无人主张 PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC)（普华永道）存在任何失职或不足。第二种和第三种情形均取决于不当行为的证据，而再次并未主张或试图证明该等证据。尤其是第三种情形与本案毫无相似之处；本案主张，无辜第三方可以在不存在任何不当行为指控或证据的情况下，仅凭破产从业人员表明这可能有助于其查找资产或更好地了解公司的事务，即被强制提供信息和文件。\n\n139　值得注意的是，即使在不当行为的情境下，法院也一直竭力强调 Norwich Pharmacal 管辖权的狭窄范围。它是一项“例外性”管辖权：Ashworth Hospital Authority（阿什沃思医院管理局）v MGN Ltd（MGN 有限公司）[2002] 1 WLR 2033，第57段，Lord Woolf CJ（伍尔夫首席大法官）语。它取决于不当行为的存在。掌握信息的人必须曾经卷入不当行为，尽管其可能完全无辜：R (Omar) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs（外交和联邦事务大臣）[2014] QB 112。该管辖权最初仅限于查明不当行为人的身份：Ashworth Hospital Authority，第26段，Lord Woolf CJ 语；Arab Monetary Fund（阿拉伯货币基金）v Hashim (No 5) [1992] 2 All ER 911, 914，Hoffmann J（霍夫曼法官）语，其强调该案并非授权在被告身份已知时，向卷入其中的第三方施加提供一般证据开示或信息义务的依据。\n\n140　较近时，Divisional Court（合议庭）表示，Norwich Pharmacal 可能超出查明不当行为人身份或“拼图中缺失的一块”的范围，但须严格附带以下限制：该诉讼不得被用于广泛的证据开示或收集证据，并且严格限于必要信息：R (Mohamed) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No 1) [2009] 1 WLR 2579，第133段；上诉法院在 R (Omar) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2011] EWCA Civ 1587 第[4]段中援引。\n\n141　Lord Sumption JSC 认为（第20段），在本案情形下，可以区分可被允许寻求的信息与不可被允许寻求的证据。就此至少会产生两个问题。第一，正如我所指出的，尚不清楚是否拟在一方面与资产有关的信息和文件，及另一方面与公司事务更一般地有关的信息和文件之间作出任何区分或限制。无论如何，任何此类区分或限制在实践中似乎都可能是虚幻的。破产从业人员最终只关心资产及其分配。所提出的任何询问，或所寻求的任何信息或文件，均将受到审查，以识别各种形式的资产，即使其仅包括管理不善或疏忽的潜在请求权。\n\n142　第二个问题是，信息与证据之间的区分似乎也可能是虚幻的。证据至少限于已识别的国内或外国诉讼中的争议事项。相反，针对 PwC 所寻求的拟议救济，在性质和范围上完全不受限制。后来的 Omar 一案 [2014] QB 112 强调（第12段），对于维持信息与证据之间的区分存在有理由的怀疑；这使人对通过类推进一步将 Norwich Pharmacal 管辖权扩展至不存在可识别不当行为争议的情形保持谨慎。首席大法官在第80段中指出，“PwC……现阶段并非 JOLs 提起不利诉讼的公开目标”，我认为也很敏锐。谁能怀疑，JOLs 无论是在审查 PwC 所披露的工作底稿和其他文件及信息时，还是在讯问根据首席大法官所作命令出席的合伙人和管理人员时，都会密切关注这是否可能显示出针对作为审计师的 PwC 的某项可能请求权？相比之下，首席大法官随后评论称，法院在评估对单方命令有效性和范围所提出的异议时，应采取一种“健康的怀疑态度”，因为“显然已采取一种对抗性且复杂的防御策略”；在我看来，这一评论没有正当依据。作出此类命令的管辖权或正当性，不能取决于为抗拒该命令而采取的防御策略。\n\n143 联合官方清算人（JOLs）现提出的原则缺乏任何实质性权威依据。萨姆普申大法官（Lord Sumption JSC）在第24段中援引的两项一审判例，对于现拟提出的新管辖权，至多只能提供极其微弱的支持。Moolman（穆尔曼）诉 Builders & Developers (Pty) Ltd（建筑商与开发商（私人）有限公司）[1990] 2 All SA 77 (A) 一案将该问题视为适用 In re African Farms（非洲农场案）[1906] TS 373 的问题，所给出的唯一理由是，如要实现最终追回资产的目标，信息即属必要。该法院随后事实上以仿照适用的方式适用了法院所在地的成文法规定，[1990] 2 All SA 77 (A)，第4—5页的(d)分项及第16页。对此，我同意萨姆普申大法官和柯林斯勋爵（Lord Collins）的看法，即这不是一种可持续的做法。\n\n144 In re Impex Services Worldwide Ltd（英派克斯全球服务有限公司案）[2004] BPIR 564 的判决表明一种范围同样完全不受限制的普通法权力，使马恩岛法院如其认为适宜，得作出命令，传唤任何其认为能够就公司的发起、设立、贸易、交易及事务或财产提供信息的人到庭：第106(8)段。多伊尔法官（Deemster Doyle）基于以下理由作出解释（第107段）：\n\n尊重法治和人权的友好而成熟的司法管辖区，应当意识到：如其司法管辖区内发生问题，而马恩岛实体占有、保管、控制或有权取得可对其有所帮助的信息、文件和证据，则马恩岛法院将在适当案件中，并在必要时遵守适当保障及保护措施的前提下，在该友好司法管辖区的司法机关提出合理请求时，提供司法合作与协助。援助请求一经提出，马恩岛法院将在适当案件中作出积极回应，并提供必要的合作与协助。\n\n英国清算人是由此确立的影响深远原则的受益人，但我不能接受该原则代表英国或百慕大的普通法。多伊尔法官所称“如发生问题”一语，似乎隐约表明该推理和命令可能以不当行为为基础，但其判决此前对背景和拟议问题所作的完整说明并不支持这一点。与本案首席大法官作出的命令一样，多伊尔法官轻易接受所可提供协助的范围可以扩及任何有关公司发起、设立、贸易、交易及事务或财产的信息，以及证据，这再次表明，要将这一新颖权力限制在适当范围内，可能存在困难。\n\n1728 Singularis Holdings Ltd（辛古拉里斯控股有限公司）诉 PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC)（普华永道（PC））[2015] AC\n\nSingularis Holdings Ltd（辛古拉里斯控股有限公司）诉 PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC)（普华永道（PC）） 曼斯大法官（Lord Mance JSC）\n\n145 柯林斯勋爵在 Rubin 诉 Eurofinance SA（欧元金融股份公司）[2013] 1 AC 236 第33段中的获认可论述，被萨姆普申大法官在其第19段中引用，见于一段列举一系列有关修正普遍主义判例的文字；在当时的情形中，论证及司法委员会的意见均未审查这些判例之间的差异，或涉及可识别资产的情形与其他情形之间的差异。然而，我认为柯林斯勋爵在该案中的另一项论述具有相关性。在第129段中，他表示：\n\n关于外国判决执行的法律以及关于国际破产的法律，并非近年来一直任由法官造法发展的法律领域。正如哈里奇的布里奇勋爵（Lord Bridge of Harwich）就拟议修改普通法中将欺诈作为拒绝执行外国判决抗辩理由的规则所说：“如法律现需改革，应由立法机关而非司法机关实施改革”：Owens Bank Ltd（欧文斯银行有限公司）诉 Bracco（布拉科）[1992] 2 AC 443, 489。\n\n这与本次上诉中多数意见所支持的普通法权力的发展形成鲜明对比。\n\n146 将 In re Impex [2004] BPIR 564 称为传统意义上的司法协助案件，如今看来无论如何均难以成立；萨姆普申大法官本人亦表示（第24段），他不愿认可 Moolman [1990] All SA 77 (A) 或 In re Impex 判决中提出的全部推理。他特别指出其中似乎支持仅以类推方式适用成文法权力概念的部分。在联合官方清算人本案的语境下，即百慕大法院无须依赖百慕大法律便可协助开曼群岛清算程序，该说法并未说明其方法在多大程度上接受或否定 In re Impex 中推理和命令的广泛范围（见前段），或本案中推理和命令的广泛范围：见上文第119—120段。这是有关拟议新管辖权范围的另一项未解决的不确定性。\n\n147 在这些情况下，尽管所作任何表述可能属于附带意见，我目前并未被说服，认为适宜将普通法协助权力扩展至命令提供信息，而超出在现行法律中具有某种可识别依据的类别，即以下情形：(a) 有证据表明被命令提供信息或文件的人持有属于无力偿债公司的财产；或(b) 有证据表明被如此命令的人存在某种不当行为；或(c) 有证据表明另一人存在某种不当行为，而被如此命令的人曾经或现正无过错地牵涉其中。一项一般性的普通法权力，如因外国清算人表明这可能协助其在世界任何地方识别或追回资产，或者更有甚者，因这将使其了解公司的事务，便命令任何人披露信息和文件并接受询问，不仅超出了本次上诉中有必要考虑的任何事项，也超出了我根据目前所获意见能够认为可允许或适当的任何范围。\n\n148 因此，我认为本上诉必须驳回，因为第二项问题获得否定回答。但如有必要，我还会认为，应以第一项问题亦应获得否定回答为由驳回上诉。\n\n[2015] AC Singularis Holdings Ltd（辛古拉里斯控股有限公司）诉 PricewaterhouseCoopers (PC)（普华永道（PC））\n\nSingularis Holdings Ltd（辛古拉里斯控股有限公司）诉 Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury PSC（阿博茨伯里的纽伯格勋爵，最高法院院长）\n\n阿博茨伯里的纽伯格勋爵，最高法院院长\n\n149 我同意司法委员会其他成员的意见，即我们应恭请女王陛下，建议驳回本上诉。然而，有一项问题使司法委员会成员意见分歧。该问题是：如萨姆普申勋爵、斯通兼埃博尼的克拉克勋爵（Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony JJSC）及梅普斯伯里的柯林斯勋爵（Lord Collins of Mapesbury）所认为，上诉是否应仅基于以下理由驳回：(i) 不存在以类推方式将适用于国内破产的立法适用于外国破产的普通法权力；及(ii) 百慕大法院不应行使萨姆普申大法官在第25段所述的普通法权力（“该权力”），因为如其在第29—30段所解释，开曼群岛法院并无该等权力；抑或如曼斯大法官所作结论，上诉还应基于理由(iii)予以驳回，即所涉普通法权力并不存在。就该问题而言，如适宜裁定所称权力是否存在，我将同意曼斯大法官。\n\n150 鉴于本判决就理由(iii)持与多数意见不同的立场，而我希望补充于曼斯大法官判决的内容不多，我可以相对简短地说明理由。\n\n151 无须裁定该权力是否存在，因为我们一致同意，即使其存在，也不应予以行使。当然，我承认我们可以裁定该权力是否存在，尽管至少可以说，这严格而言可能仅属附带意见。然而，既然为了处理本上诉，我们无须就该问题作出裁决，我认为我们应极为谨慎，不应这样做。终审上诉法院的法官，或许尤其是在普通法体系中，应尽可能就任何领域的实体法和程序法提供指导；但他们必须始终牢记，裁定无须作出裁定即可处理其面前案件的问题所固有的风险。\n\n152 随着新问题出现，以及社会价值观和惯例、技术方法和商业惯例发生变化，法官能够且应当引入新的普通法原则或程序，或对既有普通法原则和程序作出改变，这是不可避免的。\n\n然而，此类发展始终应当谨慎采纳，尤其因为即使具备律师的陈述，并审阅既往案例、教科书和文章，任何新原则或对既有原则的改动所具有更广泛影响也极难评估。我认为，柯林斯勋爵在第65—68段援引的司法评论支持在这方面应保持谨慎的必要性，尽管这些评论针对的是需要谨慎的不同方面。\n\n153 在本案中，司法委员会应裁定清算人所主张的普通法权力是否存在这一观点，显然具有相当的说服力，因为这是一个重要问题，应尽早作出权威裁决，尤其考虑到本案判决所揭示的法律状况在某种程度上混乱。\n\n154 然而，正是这种混乱突出了保持谨慎的必要性。普通法法院协助外国清算人的法定外权力范围，是一个极为棘手的议题；司法委员会、上议院和最高法院在提供清晰或一致的指导方面并未特别成功：见霍夫曼勋爵（Lord Hoffmann）代表司法委员会在 Cambridge Gas Transportation Corpn（剑桥燃气运输公司）诉 Navigator Holdings plc（导航控股有限公司）无担保债权人正式委员会 [2007] 1 AC 508 一案中的判决、上议院在 In re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd（HIH意外和一般保险有限公司案）[2008] 1 WLR 852 中的全部五项意见，以及柯林斯勋爵代表最高法院多数意见在 Rubin 诉 Eurofinance SA（Picard intervening）[2013] 1 AC 236 一案中的判决；萨姆普申大法官在第16—19段讨论了这些判决，并讨论了柯林斯勋爵在本案中的判决。\n\n155 我从这些案件中得出的信息是，至少在这一领域，司法委员会处理任何案件时，最好着眼于在相对最低限度的基础上作出裁决，而不是试图确立无须裁定的一般原则，特别是在该等原则涉及以可能具有重大影响的方式扩展法院权力之时。萨姆普申大法官对所称普通法权力性质和范围的说明虽显得极具吸引力，但我认为这可能引发各种问题和不确定性，萨姆普申大法官在第25段作出的限定已隐含这一点。说这些问题可在发生时处理固然容易，但若显然在以某种方式发展法律时将会出现问题和复杂情况，这在我看来表明，除非有必要，否则不应采纳该项发展。因此，既然无须裁定该普通法权力是否存在，我本倾向于将该问题留待在需要裁定时再作裁定，并可得益于本次上诉判决中所载双方有力论证；恕我对律师表示尊重，这些论证的范围和深度均超过司法委员会在庭审期间听到的论证。\n\n156 然而，如须由我表明意见，我将与 Lord Mance JSC（曼斯大法官）一致，认定所主张的普通法权力并不存在。他已令人信服地阐明该结论的依据，其中既包括原则方面的理由，也包括实践方面的理由。因此，我不拟重复这些理由，但有一两点我希望强调。\n\n157 正如 Lord Sumption JSC（萨姆普申大法官）所解释，Lord Hoffmann（霍夫曼勋爵）在 Cambridge Gas 中提出的极端普遍性原则，主要因 Lord Collins（柯林斯勋爵）在 Rubin 中代表多数意见以及在本次上诉中代表委员会所作推理，实际上已不复存在。然而，如同柴郡猫一般，该原则看似善意的微笑似乎仍然挥之不去，如今被援引以证明创设这一新的普通法权力正当。委员会的意思几乎仿佛是：虽然我们在 Cambridge Gas 中走得太远，应按 Rubin 所示有所收回，但我们并不希望如逻辑上本应做到的那样彻底撤回。在我看来，从极端普遍性原则中撤回的逻辑结果是，我们不应基于该原则创设一项新的普通法权力。\n\n158 许多人可能认为，将该项权力限于破产案件值得质疑。更具体而言，将其限于由外国法院官员进行的清算，在我看来可能具有任意性。在许多法域中，即使公司具备偿付能力，只要将其清盘属公正和公平，公司仍可能受到法院命令的清算：我不明白，为何此种情形中的清算人可以援引该项权力，而经营具有偿付能力公司的其他人却不能如此。进一步而言，并无理由认为法定制度不能规定自愿清算须在法院监督下进行；如是，该项权力似乎也将适用于此类案件。此外，管理程序中管理人的地位在此方面可能并不明确。\n\n159 需要作出细微区分亦令我担忧。因此，可依此项权力取得的信息和文件，与供实际或预期诉讼使用的材料之间的区分，极可能导致困难的实际问题。我承认，这些问题可能在其他情形中出现，但这并非扩大其可能出现情形的理由；并且，正如本案事实所示，我怀疑这些问题尤其可能在行使该项权力时出现。同样，据称属于行使该项权力前提条件的、为履行清算人职能所必需的事项为何，似乎也是容易产生不确定性和争议的领域。\n\n160 从更广义而言，这些区分在我看来体现了人们预期会在法定法典中见到的那类要求，而非判例法中的要求。正如 Lord Collins 所引述的司法意见所示，判例法应限于对既有原则作出“非常有限的发展……”，并应以“小步”发展，或在“……法律空隙的界限内”发展。尽管我承认英国法院已准备在 Norwich Pharmacal Co（诺维奇制药公司）v Customs and Excise Comrs（海关及消费税专员）[1974] AC 133 中确认一项新的普通法权利，但该项权利仅在已发生严重不法行为的非常特定情形下方可行使。我不认为该判决改变了以下事实：创设该项权力将构成法律上的一项发展，正如 Lord Mance JSC 所言，属于“根本性的”发展。就其可被称为 Lord Hoffmann 在 Cambridge Gas [2007] 1 AC 508 中阐述的极端普遍性原则的相当常规特征而言，它可能看似并不根本；但鉴于该极端原则现已被 Lord Collins 在 Rubin [2013] 1 AC 236 中代表上议院多数意见以及在本次上诉中代表委员会所否定，该观点已无法维持。\n\n161 当考虑到国际破产领域国内成文法和国际公约法的广度时，法官不应创设该项权力这一主张得到进一步加强。此类法律的例子载于并讨论于 Lord Collins 判决书第40—50段。在这一高度立法化的领域，我认为，本案所称产生的该项权力，应由立法机关授予法院，而不应由法院自行僭取。\n\n162 我承认相反观点的论证具有说服力，Lord Sumption JSC 已清楚阐明该等论证。然而，正如先前已表明的，尽管我同意 Lord Collins 的判决意见，并在其他方面同意 Lord Sumption JSC 的判决意见，但如适宜就该问题作出裁断，我本人将否定该项权力的存在。\n\nJILL SUTHERLAND（吉尔·萨瑟兰），大律师","key_entities":["Je","CIPA","Torres"],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":35046,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 22:40:22"}