{"id":"court_ctb_1409_4","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":1409,"sub_number":4,"doc_type":"EXHIBIT","filed_date":null,"title":"Exhibit 4 A","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"# Exhibit 4\n\nA\n\nB\n\nD\n\n### GASES\n\n**DETERMINED BY THE**\n\n### CHANCERY DIVISION\n\n**AND IN**\n\n### LUNACY\n\n**AND ON APPEAL THEREFROM IN THE**\n\n### COURT OF APPEAL\n\n#### [COURT OF APPEAL]\n\n#### PARRY-JONES v. LAW SOCIETY AND OTHERS\n\n*Solicitor*—*Discipline*—*Powers of Law Society*—*Investigation of complaint*—*Notice to solicitor to produce documents connected with his practice as solicitor and to produce accounts—Investigating officer*—*Solicitor's claim that documents subject to professional privilege*—*Whether professional privilege applicable*—*Power of Law Society to inspect before nature of complaint communicated to solicitor*—*Whether account and trust account rules ultra vires —Solicitors Act,* 1957 (5 *&* 6 *Eliz.* 2, *c.* 27), *s.* 29 *<sup>1</sup>—Solicitors'*\n\n#### [Reported by MARCEL BERLINS, ESQ.]\n\n1 Solicitors Act, 1957, s. 29: \" (1) The council shall make rules—(a) as to the opening and keeping by solicitors of accounts at banks for clients' money; and (£>) as to the keeping by solicitors of accounts containing particulars and information as to moneys received, held or paid by them for or on account of their clients; and (c) empowering the council to take such action as may be necessary to enable them to ascertain whether or not the rules are being complied with; Provided that any such rules shall not come into operation until they have been approved by the Master of the Rolls. (2) The council shall also make rules—*(a)* as to the opening and keeping by every solicitor who is\n\na sole trustee, or who is co-trustee only with one or more of his partners, clerks or servants, of an account at a bank for moneys of any trust of which he is such a sole trustee or co-trustee; and *(b)* as to the keeping by every such solicitor of accounts containing particulars and information as to moneys received, held or paid by him for or on account of any such trust; and (c) empowering the council to take such action as may be necessary to enable them to ascertain whether or not the rules are being complied with. (3) If a solicitor fails to comply with any rules made under this section, any person may make a complaint in respect of that failure to the disciplinary committee. . . .\"\n\nC.A,\n\n1967 *Nov.* 15\n\nLORD DENNINO M.R., DIPLOCK and\n\nSALMON L JJ.\n\n1 Ch. 1969. 1\n\nC. A. 1967 Parry-Jones v. Law Society\n\n**2** CHANCERY DIVISION **[1969]**\n\n*Accounts Rules,* 1945 *(S.R. & O.* 1944, *No.* 781), *r.* 11 <sup>2</sup>—*Solicitors' Trust Accounts Rules,* 1945 *(S.R. & O.* 1944, *No.* 781), *r.* II. <sup>3</sup>\n\n*Statutory Instrument*—*Validity*—*Whether ultra vires*—*Rules made by Law Society*—*Solicitors' Accounts Rules,* 1945, *r.* 11—*Solicitors' Trust Accounts Rules,* 1945, *r.* 11.\n\n*Natural Justice*—*Opportunity to meet charge*—*Solicitor*—*Investigation by Law Society of complaint*—*Whether judicial proceeding*— *Whether natural justice requires solicitor to be told details of complaint.*\n\n*Practice*—*Discovery*—*Privilege*—*Professional privilege*—*Law Society's notice to solicitor to produce documents and accounts relating to his practice*—*Whether professional privilege applicable.*\n\nOn February 9, and March 3, 1967, the Law Society served on a solicitor a written notice pursuant to rule 11 of the Solicitors' Accounts Rules, 1945, and rule 11 of the Solicitors' Trust Accounts Rules, 1945, requiring him to produce for inspection his books of account and any other necessary documents relating to (a) his practice as a solicitor and (b) every trust of which he was a trustee. On February 22 the solicitor issued a specially indorsed writ (later amended to include the second notice) seeking injunctions restraining the Law Society and its officials concerned from having access pursuant to the notices to confidential information relating to any client of his without the express authority of such client, and without prior information to him of the nature and content of complaint made to or by the society; and from having access to any accounts in respect of which it was or might be alleged (without his knowledge) that he was a solicitor-trustee. The writ also sought an order that the solicitor was entitled to full particulars of any complaint or representation made by or to the Law Society in regard to his conduct as a solicitor, and that the defendants were not entitled to proceed on the notices until after the complaints had been\n\n2 Solicitors' Accounts Rules, 1945 (made under s. 1 of the Solicitors' Act, 1933, but by virtue of s. 88 (2) of the Act of 1957 having effect as if made under s. 29 of that Act), r. 11: \" (1) In order to ascertain whether these rules have been complied with, the council, acting either—*(a)* on their own motion; or *(b)* on a written statement or request transmitted to them by or on behalf of the governing body of a provincial Law Society or a committee thereof; or (c) on a written complaint lodged with them by a third party; may require any solicitor-trustee to produce at a time and place to be fixed by the council, all books of account, bank pass books, looseleaf bank statements, statements of account, vouchers, **and**  documents relating to all or any of the trusts of which he is solicitortrustee for the inspection of any person appointed by the council, and such person shall be directed to prepare for the information of the council a report on the result of such inspection. Such report may be used as a basis for proceedings under the Solicitors Acts, 1932 to 1941. (2) Upon being required so to do a solicitor-trustee shall produce such books of account, bank pass books, loose leaf bank statements, statements of accounts, vouchers and documents at the time and place fixed. . . .\"\n\n3 Solicitors' Trust Accounts Rules, 1945, r. 11, is in similar terms to r. 11 of the Solicitors' Accounts Rules, 1945.\n\n**B**\n\n**D**\n\n#### **1 Ch.** CHANCERY DIVISION **3**\n\nA received by him and he had replied to or taken appropriate steps c with regard to them. 1967\n\nBuckley J. on a motion by the Law Society and the officials concerned, ordered that the indorsement on the writ be struck any- ones out as disclosing no cause of action. Law Society\n\nOn appeal by the solicitor: —\n\n*Held,* dismissing the appeal (1) that the contractual duty of B confidence was overriden by the duty to obey the general law; that section 29 of the Solicitors Act, 1957, in enabling the council of the Law Society to \" take such action as may be necessary,\" empowered it to make rules whereby it could inspect a solicitor's books and supporting documents in order to see that the rules were complied with, even if it meant disclosing the client's affairs; and that, accordingly, the account and *Q* trust account rules were valid rules which overrode any privilege or confidence which otherwise might subsist between solicitor and client.\n\n*Per* Diplock L.J. Privilege is irrelevant when one is not concerned with judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings (post, p. 9D).\n\n(2) That since the inspection of books or documents pursuant to the rules was neither a judicial or quasi-judicial inquiry but j} only an inquiry as to whether or not there was prima facie evidence that the ground of complaint existed, natural justice did not require a solicitor to be told what had instigated the Law Society to make the inquiries, which it was entitled to make without instigation, nor entitle him to particulars of the complaint, if any, against him.\n\n*Wiseman* v. *Borneman* [1968] Ch. 429 ; [1968] 2 W.L.R. 320 ; p [1967] 3 All E.R. 1045, C.A. followed.\n\nDecision of Buckley J. [1968] Ch. 195; [1967] 3 W.L.R. 1305; [1967] 3 All E.R. 248 affirmed.\n\nAPPEAL from Buckley J.<sup>4</sup>\n\nOn February 9, and March 3, 1967, the Law Society served on the plaintiff, Aneurin Glanmor Parry-Jones, a solicitor of the F High Court, a written notice pursuant to rule 11 of the Solicitors' Accounts Rules, 1945, and rule 11 of the Solicitors' Trust Accounts Rules, 1945, requiring him to produce for inspection his books of account and any other necessary documents relating to (a) his practice as a solicitor and (b) every trust of which he was a trustee.\n\nQ On February 22, 1967, the plaintiff issued a specially indorsed writ, amended on March 13, 1967, against the defendants, the Law Society, its Secretary General, Sir Thomas Lund, Robert Frederick Payne and Paul Arthur Leach, the chairman and secretary of its professional purposes committee, John Frederick Warren, the clerk\n\n> 4 [1968] Ch. 195; [1967] 3 W.L.R. 1305; [1967] 3 All E.R. 248.\n\n- A -\n\n#### **4** CHANCERY DIVISION **[1969]**\n\nc - A - to the disciplinary committee, and John Albert Hilary Harden, A 1967 claiming\n\nParry-Jones \" <sup>a</sup> <sup>n</sup> injunction against the defendants and each of them by Law Society their respective officers and/or agents .. . (1) restraining the defendants and each of them from all or any steps pursuant to,\" the two notices, \". . . in so far as the said notices purport without lawful authority to empower the <sup>B</sup> defendants or any of them to have access to confidential information relating to any client of the plaintiff without the express authority of such client to such access; (2) restraining the defendants and each of them from all or any steps as aforesaid without prior information to the plaintiff of the nature and content of any complaint made to or by the defendants or any of them; (3) restraining the defendants and each of them from all or any steps as aforesaid in respect C of any accounts of the plaintiff in regard to which it is or may be alleged that the plaintiff is a solicitor-trustee in so far as the plaintiff is not aware of any accounts in respect whereof he can be termed a solicitor-trustee, and in so far as the plaintiff has habitually maintained proper accounts of clients' moneys in which there has not been and there is not at the date hereby or at the date of the amendment hereof any D deficiency; (4) and the plaintiff further claims an order that he is entitled to full particulars of any complaint or representation made by or to the defendants or any of them in regard to the conduct of the plaintiff as a solicitor, and that the defendants shall not be entitled in any event to proceed on the said notice save in reference to and after the receipt by the plaintiff of particulars of such complaints or repre- E sentations in order that the plaintiff may reply to or take appropriate steps in regard to the same.\"\n\n> On July 11, 1967, the defendants applied for an order that the indorsement on the plaintiff's writ be struck out under R.S.C. Ord. 18, r. 19, and under the inherent jurisdiction of the court, on the ground, inter alia, that it disclosed no reasonable cause F of action against any of the defendants. Buckley J. giving judgment in open court on July 21, ordered<sup>4</sup> that the claims indorsed on the writ be struck out and dismissed the action.\n\n> The plaintiff appealed contending (a) that the society could not require him to produce for inspection information privileged because subject to an obligation of confidence (between solicitor G and client and that rules purporting to empower the society so to do were accordingly ultra vires; (b) that natural justice required that a solicitor should be given details of any complaint against him as a result of which an inspection under rule 11 was made.\n\n> > *1* [1968] Ch. 195.\n\n### 1 Ch. CHANCERY DIVISION **5**\n\nA The appellant in person. First, rule 11 of the Solicitors' Account Rules is ultra vires because it conflicts with section 46 (6) 1967 of the Solicitors Act, 1957. If this were not so, it would mean that parry-Jones solicitors would in effect have no privilege. The Law Society Law society cannot require a solicitor to produce information which, either by contractual obligation, or because of privilege, he is not at B liberty to produce. The privilege contained in rule 5 of the rules dealing with accountant's reports in the Solicitors' Accounts Compensation Fund and Practice Rules, ought to be implied in rule 11 of the Solicitors' Accounts Rules, 1945. An accountant, in his annual inspection, does no more and no less than the Law Society does under rule 11. Therefore the same principles re-C garding privilege should apply.\n\nSecondly, the requirements of natural justice should apply. [Reference was made to *Lau Liat Meng* v. *Disciplinary Committee.<sup>5</sup> ]* Natural justice requires that notice be given to the solicitor of the complaint against him, as a result of which the Law Society is investigating. Practically it would be far better D for the Law Society in its investigation, if the solicitor has the\n\nopportunity to know what the complaint concerns. *T. H. Bingham* for the respondents. Rules made by the Law Society must be capable of dealing with the situation where a solicitor has something to hide. The rules do no more than reflect the duty imposed on the council by section 29 of the Solicitors\n\nE Act, 1957. That section is very wide and unequivocal in its language. It is not subject to any privilege or any saving clause. If a solicitor were to be entitled to refuse inspection of documents, this would enable a fraudulent solicitor to prevent an investigating accountant from doing his duty. These rules are the only way to deal with possibly fraudulent solicitors.\n\np Does the power of investigation override the implied contractual confidence between solicitor and client? This is a public policy point, and there are two issues involved. One is that the Law Society, which looks after solicitors' matters should be entitled to investigate solicitors. The other is that confidential matters between solicitors and clients should not be disclosed. If there G is conflict, the power to investigate must override the confidence.\n\nThere must be implied in any contract between solicitor and client a term that the solicitor must comply with the law. A right to confidence cannot prevail over a statute. Section 29 of the Act of 1957 overrides any duty of confidence owed by the solicitor to the client.\n\n> 6 [1968] A.C. 391; [1967] 3 W.L.R. 877, P.C.\n\nc - A -\n\n#### 6 CHANCERY DIVISION **[1969]**\n\n■ryjones\n\nc. A. With regard to the natural justice argument, the investigation A. 1967 by the accountant is not a judicial proceeding. Under rule 11 of t n e Solicitors' Accounts Rules, 1945, which gives the council wide v. . powers, it is not necessary for them to divulge the source of the complaint. It would be undesirable if the council did have to divulge this as (a) people would no longer report possible malpractices to the Law Society and (b) there would be the possibility B of an action against the informant.\n\n> The appellant in reply. It cannot be contended that these wide powers are necessary. In the case of a fraudulent solicitor, because of the procedure which provides for notice of an inspection to be given, he will have enough time to \"cook his books,\" or abscond. The Law Society must be under an obligation to disclose C under which section of rule 11 they are proceeding. If for instance a complaint has been made, it would be quite inappropriate for them to act under section *(a).*\n\n> LORD DENNING M.R. For many years now the Law Society have made rules about clients' money. Every solicitor has to D keep his clients' money in a separate account relating to clients' money. This has been a very important safeguard for clients all over the country. Every solicitor has also every year to engage an accountant to examine his accounts and to give a certificate that he is complying with the rules. In addition, the Council of the Law Society can send down an accountant of their own E choice to make an investigation of the solicitor's books to see if he is complying with the rules.\n\n> On February 9, 1967, and also on March 3, 1967, the Law Society wrote to Mr. Parry-Jones requiring him to produce at his office his various books of account for the inspection of Mr. Harden, the Law Society's investigating accountant. As far as we F know, Mr. Parry-Jones has complied with that request and the investigation has been held. But in the course of it, Mr. Parry-Jones raised two points of some importance. And he has brought an action to test the position. The first point is this. He says that he is not bound to produce to the accountant a document or information which is privileged from production. We all know that, as between solicitor and client, there are two privileges. The first is the privilege relating to legal proceedings, commonly called legal professional privilege. A solicitor must not produce or disclose in any legal proceedings any of the communications between himself and his client without the client's consent. The second\n\n#### 1 Ch. **CHANCERY DIVISION 7**\n\n- A privilege arises out of the confidence subsisting between solicitor and client similar to the confidence which applies between doctor and patient, banker and customer, accountant and client, and the like. The law implies a term into the contract whereby a professional man is to keep his client's affairs secret and not to disclose them to anyone without just cause (see *Tournier* v. *National Pro-*\n- B *vincial & Union Bank of England*<sup>1</sup> ). This particularly applies in the relationship of solicitor and client. The solicitor is not to disclose his client's affairs to anyone at all except under the most special and exceptional circumstances. In reliance on these principles, Mr. Parry-Jones says that the accountant sent by the Law Society should not be allowed to see documents or information C relating to a client's affairs.\n\nWe have been into the matter with the help of Mr. Parry-Jones (who has argued his case very well on his own behalf) and Mr. Bingham on behalf of the Law Society. In my opinion the contract between solicitor and client must be taken to contain this implication: the solicitor must obey the law, and, D in particular, he must comply with the rules made under the authority of statute for the conduct of the profession. If the rules require him to disclose his client's affairs, then he must do so.\n\nThe rules are made under section 29 of the Solicitors Act, 1957. It says:\n\nE\n\n\" (1) The council shall make rules—*(a)* as to the opening and keeping by solicitors of accounts at banks for clients' money; and *(b)* as to the keeping by solicitors of accounts containing particulars and information as to moneys received, held or paid by them for or on account of their clients; and (c) empowering the council to take such action p as may be necessary to enable them to ascertain whether or not the rules are being complied with; . . .\"\n\nAll the matters contained in (a), *(b)* and (c) are clients' matters. The books and accounts contain information as to clients' affairs. By enabling the council to \"take such action as may be necessary,\" the statute imports that rules can be made G whereby the council can look into the solicitor's books and supporting documents in order to see that the rules are complied with, even if it does mean disclosing the clients' affairs.\n\nUnder the statute the council have made rule 11 (1) of the Solicitors' Accounts Rules, 1945, which says:\n\n> 1  **[1924] 1 K.B. 461, 479-481; 40 T.L.R. 214, C.A.**\n\nc. A. 1967 Parry-Jones v. Law Society LORD DENNING **M.R.**\n\n### **a CHANCERY DIVISION [1969]**\n\n#### C.A. 1967 Parry-Jones v. Law Society\n\nLORD DENNING M.R.\n\n\" In order to ascertain whether these rules have been complied with, the council, acting either—(a) on their own motion; or *(b)* on a written statement or request transmitted to them by or on behalf of the governing body of a provincial Law Society or a committee thereof; or (c) on a written complaint lodged with them by a third party; may require any solicitor to produce\"\n\nhis books, and so forth. In my opinion that rule is a valid rule which overrides any privilege or confidence which otherwise might subsist between solicitor and client. It enables the Law Society for the public good to hold an investigation, even if it involves getting information as to clients' affairs. But they and their accountant must, of course, themselves respect the obligation of confidence. They must not use it for any purpose except the investigation, and any consequential proceedings. If there should be subsequent application to the disciplinary committee, the information can be used for that purpose. In all other respects the usual rules of legal professional privilege apply—see section 46 (6) of the Act. B D\n\nThen Mr. Parry-Jones raised another point. He said that if the council act under rule 11 (1) (c) on a written complaint lodged by a third party, then that complaint should be shown to him, the solicitor. He says he is entitled to know who is making the complaint and the nature of it. Such is required, he says, by natural justice. I would point out that under rule 11 (4) it is provided that, before instituting an inspection on a written complaint alleged by a third party, the council shall require prima facie evidence that the ground of complaint exists. That shows that the council have only to inquire whether there is prima facie evidence. As we held a few days ago in *Wiseman* v. *Borneman,<sup>2</sup>* a prima facie case stands on a very different footing from an actual determination. Where the only inquiry is as to whether there is prima facie evidence, natural justice does not require that the party should be given notice of it. Nor do I think the solicitor is entitled to know whether the council are acting under *(a), (b)* or (c) of rule 11 (1). The rule does not require it. The council are entitled to send their accountant to make an investigation without disclosing on which ground they are acting. The solicitor is not entitled to be told the particulars of the complaint.\n\nIn the result I am of opinion that all the claims which\n\n2 [1968] Ch. 429; [1968] 2 W.L.R. 320; [1967] 3 All E.R. 1045, C.A.\n\n#### 1 Ch. CHANCERY DIVISION 9\n\nA Mr. Parry-Jones raises by the indorsement on the writ in this C.A. action are not well-founded. The judge was quite right to 1967 strike it out and dismiss the action. Parry-Jones\n\nI would, therefore, dismiss the appeal. Law Society\n\nDIPLOCK L.J. I agree. I think this action is obviously *\"* misconceived. If I did not think so, then I should not think it right to strike it out under the summary procedure.\n\nThe foundation of Mr. Parry-Jones' case is the submission that an inspection of documents under rule 11 of the Solicitors' Accounts Rules, 1945, is in the nature of a judicial proceeding. *Q* In my view it is no more in the nature of a judicial proceeding than an inspection by a factory inspector under the Factories Act of factory premises. Of course, the result of it may lead to subsequent judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, but that does not make the inquiry or inspection a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding itself.\n\nD So far as Mr. Parry-Jones' point as to privilege is concerned, privilege, of course, is irrelevant when one is not concerned with judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings because, strictly speaking, privilege refers to a right to withhold from a court, or a tribunal exercising judicial functions, material which would otherwise be admissible in evidence. What we are concerned p with here is the contractual duty of confidence, generally implied though sometimes expressed, between a solicitor and client. Such a duty exists not only between solicitor and client, but, for example, between banker and customer, doctor and patient and accountant and client. Such a duty of confidence is subject to, p and overridden by, the duty of any party to that contract to comply with the law of the land. If it is the duty of such a party to a contract, whether at common law or under statute, to disclose in defined circumstances confidential information, then he must do so, and any express contract to the contrary would be illegal and void. For example, in the case of banker and customer, the duty of confidence is subject to the overriding duty of the banker at common law to disclose and answer questions as to his customer's affairs when he is asked to give evidence on them in the witness box in a court of law. I think that similar provisions as to disclosure apply to doctors under the National Health Act. I agree with Lord Denning M.R.\n\n#### 10 CHANCERY DIVISION **[1969]**\n\nE\n\nthat section 29 of the Solicitors' Act, 1957, which deals with A accounts (the whole of the material in which consists of information about clients' affairs because it is the clients' accounts only which are dealt with in this section) and empowers the council to take such action as may be necessary to enable them to ascertain whether or not the rules are being complied with, necessarily empowers the council to make rules which entitle B the council of the Law Society to override that privilege. They have in my view made such a rule in rule 11 of the Solicitors' Account Rules, 1945, and there is accordingly nothing in the first point which Mr. Parry-Jones raises.\n\nAs regards the second point, that he is entitled under rules of natural justice to see a complaint, if indeed there was a C complaint laid against him, I agree with Lord Denning M.R. that there is nothing in that point at all. It is also founded upon the assumption that the inspection is a judicial or quasijudicial inquiry. It is nothing of the sort and I can see no reason why Mr. Parry-Jones should have any right to know what has instigated the Law Society to make the inquiries which D they are entitled to make without any instigation at all.\n\nSALMON L.J. I agree with both the judgments which have been delivered.\n\n*Appeal dismissed with costs.*\n\nSolicitors: *Hempsons.*\n\n## :ROSS **J. TRIGGS v. STAINES URBAN DISTRICT COUNCIL**\n\n#### **[1967 S. No. 2939]**\n\n*Contract*—*Consideration*—*Vendor and purchaser*—*Agreement under seal regulating use of land*—*Covenant by local authority not to exercise statutory powers*—*Whether void covenant whole consideration for option.*\n\n*Town Planning*—*Agreement regulating use of land*—*Sports ground*— *Covenant by planning authority restricting right of compulsory*\n\n[Reported by MRS. ROSALIE LONG, Barrister-at-Law.]\n\n**C.A.**  1967 Parry-Jones v. Law Society\n\n**DlPLOCK L.J**\n\n![](_page_10_Picture_17.jpeg)","body_zh":"证物 4\n\nA\n\nB\n\nD\n案件\n\n由 Chancery Division（衡平分庭）\n\n以及\n精神失常管辖（In Lunacy）所裁决\n\n且经上诉至\nCourt of Appeal（上诉法院）\n[上诉法院]\nPARRY-JONES 诉 LAW SOCIETY（律师协会）及其他人\n\n事务律师——纪律处分——律师协会之权力——投诉调查——要求事务律师出示与其事务律师执业相关的文书并出示账目的通知——调查官员——事务律师主张文书受执业特权保护——执业特权是否适用——律师协会在将投诉性质告知事务律师之前进行查验的权力——账目及信托账目规则是否越权——Solicitors Act, 1957 (5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 27), s. 29 1——事务律师……\n[案件报告人：MARCEL BERLINS, ESQ.]\n\n1 Solicitors Act, 1957, s. 29：“(1) 理事会应制定以下规则——(a) 关于事务律师在银行为客户款项开立及保留账户；及 (b) 关于事务律师保留载有关于其为客户或代表客户所接收、持有或支付的款项之详细账目及信息的账目；及 (c) 授权理事会采取必要行动以使其能够查明规则是否正得到遵守；但任何此类规则在获得 Master of the Rolls（民事上诉法院院长/卷宗主事官）批准之前不得生效。(2) 理事会亦应制定以下规则——(a) 关于每一名作为\n\n独任受托人，或仅与其一名或多名合伙人、办事员或雇员共同担任受托人的事务律师，在银行为其作为此类独任受托人或共同受托人的任何信托的款项开立及保留账户；及 (b) 关于每名此类事务律师保留载有关于其为任何此类信托或代表任何此类信托所接收、持有或支付款项之详细账目及信息的账目；及 (c) 授权理事会采取必要行动以使其能够查明规则是否正得到遵守。(3) 如事务律师未能遵守根据本条制定的任何规则，任何人均可就该不遵守行为向纪律委员会提出投诉。……”\n\n上诉法院\n\n1967年11月15日\n\nLORD DENNING M.R.（民事上诉法院院长丹宁勋爵）、DIPLOCK（迪普洛克）及\n\nSALMON（萨尔蒙）高等法院上诉法官（L JJ.）\n\n1 Ch. 1969. 1\n\n上诉法院 1967年 Parry-Jones 诉 Law Society\n\n2 衡平分庭 [1969]\n\nAccounts Rules, 1945 (S.R. & O. 1944, No. 781), r. 11 2——Solicitors' Trust Accounts Rules, 1945 (S.R. & O. 1944, No. 781), r. 11. 3\n\n法定文书——有效性——是否越权——律师协会制定的规则——Solicitors' Accounts Rules, 1945, r. 11——Solicitors' Trust Accounts Rules, 1945, r. 11。\n\n自然正义——对指控作出抗辩的机会——事务律师——律师协会对投诉的调查——是否属司法程序——自然正义是否要求告知事务律师投诉的细节。\n\n诉讼程序——证据开示——特权——执业特权——律师协会要求事务律师出示与其执业相关的文书及账目的通知——执业特权是否适用。\n\n1967年2月9日和3月3日，律师协会依据 Solicitors' Accounts Rules, 1945 第11条规则以及 Solicitors' Trust Accounts Rules, 1945 第11条规则，向一名事务律师送达了书面通知，要求其出示账簿及任何其他必要文书以供查验，该等文书涉及 (a) 其作为事务律师的执业活动，以及 (b) 其作为受托人的每一项信托。2月22日，该事务律师申请发出了附有专门批注的传票（后经修改以包含第二份通知），申请禁令以禁止律师协会及其相关官员依据上述通知，在未经该等客户明示授权且事先未向其告知向协会提出的或由协会提出的投诉之性质及内容的情况下，接触涉及其任何客户的机密信息；并禁止接触据称或可能据称（在其不知情的情况下）其作为事务律师受托人相关的任何账目。该传票还请求法院下达裁定，确认该事务律师有权获得向律师协会提出的或由律师协会提出的有关其作为事务律师的行为的任何投诉或陈述的全部详尽信息，并且被告在投诉已\n\n2 Solicitors' Accounts Rules, 1945（根据 Solicitors' Act, 1933 第1条制定，但凭借 1957 年法案第 88 (2) 条具有如同根据该法案第 29 条制定的效力）, r. 11：“(1) 为查明这些规则是否已得到遵守，理事会无论是——(a) 依职权主动；或 (b) 根据由地方律师协会的管理机构或其委员会或代表其转交予理事会的书面声明或请求；或 (c) 根据第三方存入理事会的书面投诉；均可要求任何事务律师受托人在理事会确定的时间和地点，出示与其作为事务律师受托人的所有或任何信托相关的全部账簿、银行存折、活页银行对账单、账目报表、凭单和文书，以供理事会委派的任何人查验，且该人应被指示为理事会的信息准备一份关于此类查验结果的报告。该报告可作为根据 Solicitors Acts, 1932 to 1941 提起诉讼程序的依据。(2) 在被要求如此行事时，事务律师受托人应在确定的时间和地点出示此类账簿、银行存折、活页银行对账单、账目报表、凭单和文书。……”\n\n3 Solicitors' Trust Accounts Rules, 1945 第11条规则具有与 Solicitors' Accounts Rules, 1945 第11条规则相似的条款。\n\nB\n\nD\n1 Ch. 衡平分庭 3\n\nA 被其收到且其已对该等投诉作出回复或采取适当措施之前，无权依据上述通知采取行动。1967年\n\nBuckley J.（巴克利法官）在律师协会及相关官员提出动议后，裁定驳回传票上的批注，理由是其未披露任何诉由。Parry-Jones 诉 Law Society\n\n在该事务律师提起上诉后：——\n\n判决，驳回上诉：(1) 保密的合同义务受服从一般法律之义务的规制；Solicitors Act, 1957 第29条在使律师协会理事会能够“采取必要行动”时，授权其制定规则以查验事务律师的账簿及支持文书从而确认规则是否得到遵守，即便这意味着披露客户的事务；因此，账目及信托账目规则是有效规则，优先于事务律师与客户之间在其他情况下可能存在的任何特权或保密关系。\n\nDiplock L.J. 认为：当不涉及司法或准司法程序时，特权是不相关的（见后文第 9D 页）。\n\n(2) 鉴于依据规则对账簿或文书的查验既非司法调查亦非准司法调查，而仅仅是对是否存在投诉理由成立的初步表面证据所作的调查，自然正义并不要求必须告知事务律师促使律师协会进行该等调查的起因（律师协会本就有权在没有起因促使的情况下进行该等调查），亦不赋予其获得针对他的投诉（若有）的详尽信息的权利。\n\n遵循 Wiseman v. Borneman [1968] Ch. 429 ; [1968] 2 W.L.R. 320 ; [1967] 3 All E.R. 1045, C.A.。\n\n维持 Buckley J. 的裁决 [1968] Ch. 195; [1967] 3 W.L.R. 1305; [1967] 3 All E.R. 248。\n\n对 Buckley J. 裁决的上诉 4\n\n1967年2月9日和3月3日，律师协会依据 Solicitors' Accounts Rules, 1945 第11条规则以及 Solicitors' Trust Accounts Rules, 1945 第11条规则，向原告——High Court（高等法院）事务律师 Aneurin Glanmor Parry-Jones 送达了书面通知，要求其出示账簿及任何其他必要文书以供查验，该等文书涉及 (a) 其作为事务律师的执业活动，以及 (b) 其作为受托人的每一项信托。\n\n1967年2月22日，原告申请发出了一份附有专门批注的传票，并于1967年3月13日进行了修改，起诉被告——律师协会、其秘书长 Sir Thomas Lund（托马斯·伦德爵士）、其专业目的委员会主席和秘书 Robert Frederick Payne（罗伯特·弗雷德里克·佩恩）及 Paul Arthur Leach（保罗·亚瑟·利奇）、纪律委员会书记官 John Frederick Warren（约翰·弗雷德里克·沃伦）\n\n4 [1968] Ch. 195; [1967] 3 W.L.R. 1305; [1967] 3 All E.R. 248.\n\n- A -\n4 衡平分庭 [1969]\n\n以及 John Albert Hilary Harden（约翰·阿尔伯特·希拉里·哈登），诉请\n\nParry-Jones 诉 Law Society “针对被告以及每一名被告，通过其各自的官员和/或代理人发布禁令……(1) 禁止被告及每一名被告依据”上述两份通知“采取全部或任何步骤，只要上述通知意图在无合法授权的情况下授权被告或其任何人接触涉及原告任何客户的机密信息而未经该等客户对此类接触的明示授权；(2) 禁止被告及每一名被告在事先未向原告告知向被告或其任何人提出的或由被告或其任何人提出的任何投诉的性质及内容的情况下，采取前述全部或任何步骤；(3) 禁止被告及每一名被告就据称或可能据称原告为事务律师受托人的原告任何账目采取前述全部或任何步骤，只要原告不知晓任何可将其称为事务律师受托人的账目，并且只要原告惯常保持着适当的客户款项账目，其中在本文书签署之日或其修改之日未曾存在且不存在任何亏空；(4) 原告进一步请求法院下达裁定，确认其有权获得向被告或其任何人提出的或由被告或其任何人提出的关于原告作为事务律师之行为的任何投诉或陈述的全部详尽信息，并且被告在任何情况下均无权继续执行上述通知，除非是就原告收到此类投诉或陈述的详尽信息而言并在原告收到之后，以便原告可对该等内容作出回复或采取适当措施。”\n\n1967年7月11日，被告根据 R.S.C. Ord. 18, r. 19 以及法院的固有管辖权申请裁定驳回原告传票上的批注，理由包括但不限于其未披露针对任何被告的合理诉由。Buckley J. 于7月21日在公开法庭作出判决，裁定4驳回传票上批注的诉请，并驳回了本诉。\n\n原告提起上诉，主张：(a) 协会不得要求其出示因受保密义务（在事务律师与客户之间）约束而享有特权的信息，且意图授权协会如此行事的规则相应地属越权；(b) 自然正义要求应当向事务律师提供针对他的任何投诉的细节，而依据第11条规则所进行的查验正是基于该等投诉而作出的。\n\n4 [1968] Ch. 195.\n1 Ch. 衡平分庭 5\n\n上诉人本人到庭。首先，Solicitors' Accounts Rules 第11条规则属越权，因为其与 Solicitors Act, 1957 第 46 (6) 条相抵触。如果不是这样，这将意味着事务律师实际上将不再享有任何特权。律师协会不得要求事务律师出示无论基于合同义务还是基于特权他均无权出示的信息。在 Solicitors' Accounts Compensation Fund and Practice Rules 中处理会计师报告的规则第5条规则中所包含的特权，应当被默示在 Solicitors' Accounts Rules, 1945 第11条规则中。会计师在其年度查验中，所做的不多也不少，正与律师协会根据第11条规则所做的相同。因此，关于特权的相同原则应当适用。\n\n其次，自然正义（natural justice）的要求应当适用。[援引了 Lau Liat Meng v. Disciplinary Committee（刘烈明诉纪律委员会案）5 ]。自然正义要求，必须将针对事务律师的投诉通知该律师本人，正是因为该投诉，Law Society（律师协会）才展开调查。从实际角度而言，如果事务律师有机会了解投诉涉及的内容，对于律师协会进行调查也会大有裨益。\n\nT. H. Bingham 代表被上诉人。律师协会制定的规则必须能够应对事务律师有所隐瞒的情形。这些规则不过是体现了《Solicitors Act, 1957（1957年事务律师法）》第 29 条赋予理事会的职责。该条的措辞非常宽泛且明确无误。它不受任何特权或任何保留条款的限制。如果事务律师有权拒绝查阅文件，这将使欺诈性的事务律师能够阻止调查会计师履行其职责。这些规则是应对可能存在欺诈行为的事务律师的唯一途径。\n\n调查权是否优于事务律师与委托人之间的合同默示保密义务？这是一个公共政策问题，涉及两个争议点。其一是，主管事务律师事务的律师协会应当有权对事务律师进行调查。其二是，事务律师与委托人之间的机密事项不应被披露。如果两者存在冲突，调查权必须优于保密义务。\n\n在事务律师与委托人之间的任何合同中，都必须默示包含一项条款，即事务律师必须遵守法律。保密权不能凌驾于成文法之上。1957 年法案第 29 条优于事务律师对委托人负有的任何保密义务。\n\n6 [1968] A.C. 391; [1967] 3 W.L.R. 877, P.C.\n\n6 CHANCERY DIVISION [1969]\n\nParry-Jones v. Law Society\n\n上诉法院。关于自然正义的论点，会计师进行的调查并非司法程序。根据赋予理事会广泛权力的《Solicitors' Accounts Rules, 1945（1945年事务律师账目规则）》第 11 条，理事会没有必要透露投诉的来源。如果理事会必须透露这一点，那将是不可取的，因为 (a) 人们将不再向律师协会举报可能存在的不当执业行为，并且 (b) 可能会引发针对举报人的诉讼。\n\n上诉人答辩。不能主张这些广泛的权力是必要的。在涉嫌欺诈的事务律师一案中，由于规定了必须发出查阅通知的程序，他将有足够的时间去“做假账”或潜逃。律师协会必须有义务披露他们是依据第 11 条的哪一项规定采取行动的。例如，如果有人提出了投诉，那么他们根据 (a) 项采取行动就是完全不恰当的。\n\n主事官丹宁勋爵（LORD DENNING M.R.）。多年以来，律师协会一直就委托人的资金制定规则。每位事务律师都必须将委托人的资金存放在专门用于委托人资金的独立账户中。对全国各地的委托人而言，这一直是一项非常重要的保障。每位事务律师每年还必须聘请一名会计师审查其账目，并出具一份证明其遵守规则的证书。此外，律师协会理事会还可以派出一名由其自行选定的会计师，对事务律师的账册进行调查，以查明其是否遵守规则。\n\n1967年2月9日以及1967年3月3日，律师协会致函 Parry-Jones（帕里-琼斯）先生，要求他在其办公室出示其各类账册，供律师协会的调查会计师 Harden（哈登）先生查阅。据我们所知，帕里-琼斯先生已遵从了该要求，调查也已进行。但在调查过程中，帕里-琼斯先生提出了两个具有相当重要性的论点。并且他提起了诉讼以检验法律立场。第一点如下。他表示，他没有义务向会计师出示享有免于出示特权的文件或信息。我们都知道，在事务律师与委托人之间，存在两种特权。第一种是与法律诉讼相关的特权，通常称为法律职业特权（legal professional privilege）。未经委托人同意，事务律师不得在任何法律诉讼中出示或披露其与委托人之间的任何往来沟通。第二种\n\n1 Ch. CHANCERY DIVISION 7\n\n特权产生于事务律师与委托人之间存在的信任与保密关系，类似于医生与患者、银行与客户、会计师与委托人等之间适用的保密关系。法律在合同中默示了一项条款，即专业人士应当对其委托人的事务保密，无正当理由不得向任何人披露（参见 Tournier v. National Provincial & Union Bank of England（图尼埃诉英格兰国民普罗文夏尔联合银行案）1 ）。这尤其适用于事务律师与委托人的关系。除在最特殊和例外的极个别情况下，事务律师绝不得向任何人披露其委托人的事务。基于这些原则，帕里-琼斯先生表示，不应允许律师协会派出的会计师查看涉及委托人事务的文件或信息。\n\n在帕里-琼斯先生（他为自己进行了非常出色的辩护）和代表律师协会的 Bingham（宾厄姆）先生的协助下，我们审理了此事。依我之见，事务律师与委托人之间的合同必须被视为包含这一默示条款：事务律师必须服从法律，特别是必须遵守依据成文法授权为行业规范而制定的规则。如果规则要求他披露其委托人的事务，那么他就必须照办。\n\n这些规则是根据《1957年事务律师法》第 29 条制定的。该条规定：\n\n“ (1) 理事会应制定规则——(a) 关于事务律师在银行为委托人资金开立和维护账户；(b) 关于事务律师保存包含其为委托人或代表委托人收受、持有或支付的款项的明细和信息的账目；以及 (c) 授权理事会采取必要行动，以使其能够查明规则是否得到遵守；……”\n\n(a)、(b) 和 (c) 中包含的所有事项均为委托人的事务。账册和账目包含关于委托人事务的信息。通过使理事会能够“采取必要行动”，该成文法包含的含义是：可以制定规则，使理事会能够审查事务律师的账册和辅助文件，以查明规则是否得到遵守，即使这确实意味着会披露委托人的事务。\n\n根据该成文法，理事会制定了《1945年事务律师账目规则》第 11 条第 (1) 款，该款规定：\n\n1 [1924] 1 K.B. 461, 479-481; 40 T.L.R. 214, C.A.\n\n上诉法院 1967 Parry-Jones v. Law Society 丹宁勋爵\n\nCHANCERY DIVISION [1969]\n上诉法院 1967 Parry-Jones v. Law Society\n\n主事官丹宁勋爵\n\n“为了查明这些规则是否得到遵守，理事会可以——(a) 依其职权；或 (b) 根据由郡律师协会管理机构或其下属委员会转交或代表其转交的书面陈述或请求；或 (c) 根据第三方提交的书面投诉——要求任何事务律师出示”\n\n其账册等等。依我之见，该规则是一项有效规则，它优于事务律师与委托人之间原本可能存在的任何特权或保密关系。它使律师协会为了公共利益能够进行调查，即使调查涉及获取有关委托人事务的信息。但是，律师协会及其会计师当然也必须恪守保密义务。除用于调查及任何后续程序外，他们不得将其用于任何其他目的。如果随后向纪律委员会提出申请，该信息可以用于该目的。在所有其他方面，通行的法律职业特权规则均适用——见该法案第 46 条第 (6) 款。\n\n随后帕里-琼斯先生提出了另一点。他表示，如果理事会是根据第三方提交的书面投诉依第 11 条第 (1) 款第 (c) 项采取行动，那么应当将该投诉向他这位事务律师出示。他主张他有权知道是谁提出了投诉以及投诉的性质。他表示，这是自然正义的要求。我想指出的是，根据第 11 条第 (4) 款的规定，在根据第三方主张的书面投诉启动查阅之前，理事会应要求存在投诉事由的表面证据（prima facie evidence）。这表明理事会只需调查是否存在表面证据。正如我们几天前在 Wiseman v. Borneman（怀斯曼诉博内曼案）2 中所裁定的那样，表面证据案件（prima facie case）与实际裁决具有截然不同的性质。在仅仅调查是否存在表面证据的情况下，自然正义并不要求将该情况通知当事人。我也不认为事务律师有权知晓理事会是根据第 11 条第 (1) 款的 (a)、(b) 还是 (c) 项采取行动。规则并未作此要求。理事会有权派出其会计师进行调查，而无需披露他们是基于何种理由采取行动。事务律师无权被告知投诉的详细内容。\n\n因此，我认为帕里-琼斯先生在本案令状背书中所提出的所有权利主张都是缺乏根据的。法官予以剔除并驳回诉讼是完全正确的。\n\n因此，我主张驳回上诉。\n\n上诉法院法官迪普洛克（DIPLOCK L.J.）。我同意。我认为本案诉讼显然是建立在错误构想之上的。如果我不这样认为，我就不会认为依据简易程序将其剔除是正确的。\n\n帕里-琼斯先生的主张根基在于：根据《1945年事务律师账目规则》第 11 条进行的文件查阅具有司法程序的性质。依我之见，这与工厂检查员根据《Factories Act（工厂法）》对工厂场所进行的检查相比，丝毫不更具司法程序性质。当然，查阅的结果可能会导致随后的司法或准司法程序，但这本身并不会使调查或查阅变成司法或准司法程序。\n\n关于 Parry-Jones（帕里-琼斯）先生就特权提出的论点，在不涉及司法或准司法程序的情况下，特权当然是不相关的，因为严格来说，特权是指向法院或行使司法职能的法庭拒绝提交在其他情况下可采为证据的材料的权利。我们在此所关注的是事务律师与委托人之间的合同保密义务，这种义务通常是默示的，尽管有时是明示的。这种义务不仅存在于事务律师与委托人之间，例如，也存在于银行家与客户、医生与患者以及会计师与客户之间。这种保密义务受制于并从属于该合同任何一方遵守国家法律的义务。如果根据普通法或制定法，该合同的一方有义务在特定情况下披露机密信息，则其必须这样做，任何相反的明示合同均属违法且无效。例如，在银行家与客户的案件中，保密义务受制于银行家在普通法上的优先义务，即当他在法院的证人席上被要求就其客户的事务作证时，必须披露并回答相关问题。我认为关于披露的类似规定根据《National Health Act（国民健康法）》适用于医生。我同意主事官 Lord Denning（丹宁勋爵）的意见，\n\n10 CHANCERY DIVISION [1969]（大法官法庭判例汇编 [1969]）\n\n《Solicitors' Act, 1957（1957年事务律师法）》第 29 条涉及账目（其中的全部材料均由有关客户事务的信息组成，因为该条仅处理客户账目），并授权理事会采取必要行动以使其能够确定规则是否得到遵守，该条必然授权理事会制定赋予 Law Society（律师协会）理事会凌驾于该特权之上的规则。在我看来，他们已经在《Solicitors' Account Rules, 1945（1945年事务律师账目规则）》第 11 条中制定了这样一项规则，因此，帕里-琼斯先生提出的第一点论点毫无根据。\n\n关于第二点，即根据自然公正原则，如果有针对他的投诉提出，他有权查看该投诉，我同意主事官丹宁勋爵的意见，即该点完全不成立。它同样建立在认为该项检查属于司法或准司法调查的假设之上。它根本不是那一类调查，而且我看不出有任何理由认为帕里-琼斯先生有权知晓究竟是什么促使律师协会进行了调查，而律师协会完全有权在没有任何促动的情况下进行此类调查。\n\nSALMON L.J.（萨尔蒙上诉法院法官）：我同意已发表的两份判决意见。\n\n驳回上诉，诉讼费用由上诉人承担。\n\n事务律师：Hempsons。\n:ROSS J. TRIGGS 诉 STAINES URBAN DISTRICT COUNCIL（斯坦斯城市区议会）\n[1967 S. No. 2939]\n\n合同——对价——卖方与买方——规范土地使用的盖印协议——地方当局不执行法定权力的承诺——无效承诺是否构成期权的全部对价。\n\n城市规划——规范土地使用的协议——运动场——规划当局限制强制权利的承诺\n\n[由大律师 ROSALIE LONG（罗莎莉·朗）夫人报告。]\n\n上诉法院 1967 Parry-Jones 诉 Law Society（律师协会）\n\nDIPLOCK L.J.（迪普洛克上诉法院法官）","key_entities":["Je"],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":4450,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 13:56:58"}