{"id":"court_ctb_1409_8","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":1409,"sub_number":8,"doc_type":"RESPONSE","filed_date":"2023-01-30","title":"Exhibit 8 Nam Tai Electronics Inc","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"# Exhibit 8\n\n### **Nam Tai Electronics Inc**\n\n### **and**\n\n### **PricewaterhouseCoopers**\n\n**Li CJ, Bokhary, Chan and Ribeiro PJJ and McHugh NPJ Final Appeal No 1 of 2007 (Civil) 15, 31 January 2008**\n\nC D *Contract law — breach of confidence — duty of confidentiality — qualifications — could be self-defence disclosure by professional confidant where proceedings instituted against confidant by former client-confider or by third party — whether could be disclosure where hostile allegation by confider but no proceedings term permitting such disclosure could be implied — but generally not proper response to unparticularised allegation to plunge at once into disclosure of confidential information*\n\nE *Professions — auditors — plaintiff objected to defendant-auditors being appointed liquidators of its subsidiary — plaintiff stated that there was conflict of interest due to defendant's prior due diligence review of subsidiary, conducted before plaintiff acquired subsidiary — defendant then specifically responded by disclosing confidential information that it had made negative recommendation regarding acquisition — whether defendant-auditor in breach of confidence*\n\n*Contract law — implied terms — confidentiality*\n\nG H I J **P was a public listed company in the US, and D was a wellknown international accounting firm which acted as its auditor. The relationship between P and D had begun to sour. P agreed to subscribe for controlling shares in a publicly listed Hong Kong company (C), pursuant to which D conducted a due diligence review of C. D gave a negative review of C, in which it questioned the integrity of its management. P took a strong objection to these criticisms and D resigned as P's auditors. In fact the relationship between P and D had begun to sour shortly before the due diligence review. P then proceeded with the acquisition of C (the Acquisition). Subsequently, C went into liquidation and D wished to be appointed as its liquidator. However, P expressed objections to C's creditors against D's appointment in terms of a conflict of interest by reason of its prior involvement in the due diligence (P's allegation). D then submitted a proposal to be appointed liquidator to C's creditors which stated that it had conducted a due diligence of C for P, and disclosed the confidential information that it had made a negative recommendation against the acquisition but that P had nevertheless gone ahead with it (the negative disclosure). P brought proceedings against D for breach of its duty of confidentiality to P, which was dismissed at first instance and by the Court of Appeal. P appealed to the Court of Final Appeal.**\n\n12)BV11(08)\\_p62-90.indd 62 11/25/09 6:50:09 PM\n\nA\n\nB\n\nF\n\nB\n\nA **Held, allowing P's appeal and awarding nominal damages of \\$100 as P suffered no pecuniary loss (***per* **Ribeiro PJ, the other Judges agreeing), that:**\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1409-8 Filed 01/30/23 Entered 01/30/23 10:03:34 Page 3 of 30\n\n> **(1) D was under a duty of confidentiality to P regarding the information imparted to it in the due diligence review and the**\n\n> **contents of its report. The duty imposed on P an obligation not to disclose or to make any use of the confidential information or to cause any use to be made of it by others otherwise than for P's benefit, unless with P's consent. Such duty survived the termination of the client relationship. The court was astute to**\n\n- C **protect a former client's confidences and would restrain conduct on the part of the confidant which exposed the former client to an avoidable risk of disclosure (***Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England* **[1924] 1 KB 461,** *Bolkiah v KPMG* **[1999] 2 AC 222 applied). (See paras.33–34.)**\n- D E F **(2) There were qualifications to the duty of confidentiality arising out of the parties' contractual relationship, including: (a) disclosure made with P's express or implied consent (the consent qualification); or (b) disclosures properly required by D's interests (the self-interest qualification), the self-interest qualification being the reflection of an implied term permitting the confidant to disclose confidential information where this was necessary for the business efficacy of their ordinary contractual transactions or as a matter of law (***Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England* **[1924] 1 KB 461,** *FDC Co Ltd & Others v Chase Manhattan Bank NA* **[1990] 1 HKLR 277 considered). (See paras.35–36, 42–45.)**\n- G H **(3) And it was well established that a professional confidant could make self-defence disclosures in two situations, namely when: (a) legal proceedings; or (b) professional disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the confidant by the client. Disclosure in this situation was justified on the basis of implied waiver reflecting the consent qualification or on the basis of the self-interest qualification. It also now appeared to be accepted that a defensive disclosure might be permitted outside these categories in order for the confidant to defend himself in legal proceedings or disciplinary proceedings initiated by a third party. This situation rested on the self-interest qualification; the consent qualification not applying (***Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England* **[1924] 1 KB 461,** *Paragon Finance Plc*\n- I J *& Others v Freshfields* **[1999] 1 WLR 1183,** *Lillicrap & Another v Nalder & Son* **[1993] 1 WLR 94,** *Hassneh Insurance Co of Israel & Others v Steurt J Mew* **[1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep 243,** *R v Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales, ex p Brindle & Others* **[1994] BCC 297,** *Nederlandse Reassurantie Groep Holding NV v Bacon & Woodrow (No 1)* **[1995] 1 All ER 976 considered). (See paras.46–54.)**\n\n12)BV11(08)\\_p62-90.indd 63 11/25/09 6:50:09 PM\n\n30\n\n#### 64 **HONG KONG COURT OF FINAL APPEAL REPORTS** (2008) 11 HKCFAR\n\n- A B **(4) Dealing with the present case, the Court accepted that a term permitting a defensive disclosure by the confidant when confronted with a hostile allegation made by the confider could in principle be implied as an aspect of the consent or self-interest qualifications in addition to the established situations discussed above (***Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Plowman* **(1994–1995) 183 CLR 10 applied). (See para.58.)**\n- C **(5) Here, first, such a term would be implied. P and D should be taken to have impliedly agreed that disclosure of otherwise confidential information might be made where this was fairly required for the protection or in furtherance of either party's legitimate interests. (See para.60.)**\n- **(6) Second, D's efforts at securing the appointment as C's liquidator were undertaken as part of its ordinary professional activities and were in pursuit of its legitimate interests. (See para.64.)**\n- D E F G **(7) Third, however, the negative disclosure was not fairly required to be made in the protection of such legitimate interests and it therefore constituted a breach of the duty of confidentiality owed to P as a former client. From the perspective of both D and C's creditors, P's allegation, reasonably understood, was of an equivocal character, capable of bearing different meanings, some of which had nothing to do with D making either a positive or negative recommendation, and did not justify the specific response of the negative disclosure. For example, from D's perspective, D's criticisms of C's management in the due diligence, which P had rejected, might well have been seen by P as giving rise to a potential conflict of interest between D's interest in upholding the assessment it had already made in the due diligence and its duty to act as an impartial liquidator. Indeed, an allegation of conflict founded on a perceived impediment to D acting impartially as liquidator because of possible preconceptions regarding past management misdeeds was wholly consistent with D having given a negative, and not a positive, recommendation. So understood, it was a non sequitur to suggest that the negative disclosure was a required response. (See paras.65–76, 72–73.)**\n- **(8) It could not generally be the proper response to an unparticularised adverse allegation for the confidant to plunge at once into a disclosure of confidential information; this would be unacceptably destructive of the law of confidence. It was reasonable to expect him first to consider other options: to demand clarification or to take other steps aimed at challenging the adverse allegation without disseminating confidential information. (See para.81.)**\n- J **(9) The equivocal nature of P's allegation also meant that there was no basis for the negative disclosure to come within the compass of any waiver of confidentiality on P's part. (See para.75.)**\n\n12)BV11(08)\\_p62-90.indd 64 11/25/09 6:50:09 PM\n\nH\n\nI\n\nA **(10) (***Obiter***) The negative disclosure might well have been justified as a response if P had falsely alleged that D had positively recommended the Acquisition. (See para.74.)**\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1409-8 Filed 01/30/23 Entered 01/30/23 10:03:34 Page 5 of 30\n\n> B 合約法—洩漏機密—保密責任—限制—假如客戶/告密者或第三方 針對專業保密者提起法律程序,則該專業保密者可披露機密資料以作自 辯—假如告密者只向保密者提出敵對指控而沒有提起法律程序,該保 密者可否披露機密資料—可引入隱含條款以容許此類披露—但一般來 說,對於未載有詳情的指控,立即披露機密資料並非恰當的回應方法\n\n- C 專業與專業人士—核數師—原告人反對委任被告人核數師為原告人的 附屬公司的清盤人—原告人指稱,由於被告人曾在原告人收購該附屬公 司前對該附屬公司進行盡職審查,故此被告人身處利益衝突之境況—被 告人於是作出具體回應,披露機密資料,即被告人曾對收購交易提出負 面建議—被告人核數師曾否洩漏機密\n- D 合約法—隱含條款—保密責任\n\nJ\n\n原告人是一家在美國上市的公司。被告人是一家有名的國際會計師行, 亦擔任原告人的核數師。雙方的關係已開始變壞。原告人同意認講一家 香港上市公司(下稱C)的控權股份,被告人於是對C進行盡職審查。被\n\n- E 告人在審查報告內對C作出負面評價,質疑C的管理層的誠信。原告人 對此等批評表示強烈反對,而被告人辭任原告人的核數師。事實上,雙 方的關係在進行上述盡職審查前不久已開始轉差。原告人隨後進行對C 的收購(下稱\"收購交易\")。其後,C進行清盤,而被告人有意獲委任為 C的清盤人,但原告人對C的債權人表示反對委任被告人,理由為被告人\n- F G 先前曾參與盡職審查,故此身處利益衝突之境況(下稱\"原告人的指 稱\")。後來,被告人向C的債權人提交一份清盤提議書,當中不但指出 它曾代表原告人對C進行盡職審查,而且披露機密資料,即它曾給予負 面評價和表示不贊成收購交易,但原告人繼續進行收購交易(下稱\"涉案 披露\")。原告人入稟法院,控告被告人違反對原告人的保密責任。原 告人經原審後被判敗訴,其上訴亦遭上訴法庭駁回。原告人現上訴至終 審法院。\n\n**裁決**—上訴得直,而由於原告人沒有蒙受金錢損失,因此判給 100元 作為象徵式賠償(判詞由常任法官李義作出,其內容得到其餘四位法官 贊同)﹕\n\n- H I (1) 就被告人在盡職審查過程中獲給予的資料和其報告的內容而言,被 告人對原告人負有保密責任。根據該責任,除非得到原告人的同 意,否則被告人不得為原告人利益以外的任何目的而使用或促致他 人使用相關的機密資料。該責任在保密者與客戶的關係完結後仍然 持續。法庭須致力保護前客戶的秘密,並會制止保密者作出任何令 前客戶資料承受可避免的被洩露風險的行為(引用Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 KB 461,Bolkiah v KPMG [1999] 2 AC 222)。(見第 33至 34段)\n\t- (2) 源於與訟各方的合約關係的保密責任,乃受到下列限制:(a)在原 告人的明示或隱含的同意下的資料披露(下稱\"'同意'限制\");或\n\t- (b)為著被告人的利益而有需要作出的資料披露(下稱\"'自身利益' 限制\")。\"自身利益\"限制體現於隱含條款之中,該條款容許保密\n\n12)BV11(08)\\_p62-90.indd 65 11/25/09 6:50:09 PM\n\nA 者為確保正常合約交易的商業效力或為符合法律要求而作出必要的 資料披露(Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 KB 461,FDC Co Ltd & Others v Chase Manhattan Bank NA[1990] 1 HKLR 277予以考慮)。(見第 35至 36、42至 45段)\n\n- B C D (3) 根據已確立的法律,一名專業保密者可在兩種情況下作出自我保 護性質的資料披露,即當客戶針對該保密者而提起(a)法律程序; 或(b)專業紀律程序之時。此等情況下的資料披露,可建基於反 映\"同意\"限制的隱含豁免,也可建基於\"自身利益\"限制。此外, 現時看來已獲接受的一點是,法律容許在上述情況以外作出具辯護 性質的資料披露,讓保密者能在由第三方提起的法律程序或紀律程 序中作自辯。這情況乃建基於\"自身利益\"限制,\"同意\"限制則不適 用(Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 KB 461,Paragon Finance Plc & Others v Freshfields [1999] 1 WLR 1183,Lillicrap & Another v Nalder & Son [1993] 1 WLR 94,Hassneh Insurance Co of Israel & Others v Steurt J Mew [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep 243,R v Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales, ex p Brindle & Others [1994] BCC 297,Nederlandse Reassurantie Groep Holding NV v Bacon & Woodrow (No 1) [1995] 1 All ER 976予以考 慮)。(見第 46至 54段)\n- E (4) 就處理本案而言,本院接受,除了上文所論及的已確立情況之外, 原則上可作為\"同意\"限制或\"自身利益\"限制的一部份而在合約內 加入隱含條款,以容許保密者在面對告秘者的敵對指控時披露資料 以保護自己(引用Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Plowman (1994—1995) 183 CLR 10)。(見第 58段)\n- F (5) 在本案中,首先,與訟雙方的合約包含上述隱含條款。原告人和被 告人應視已藉默示方式同意,假如有公平需要保護或促進任何一方 的合法利益,則本應是機密的資料亦可予以披露。(見第 60段)\n- (6) 第二,涉案披露是在促進被告人的合法利益的情況下作出的,因為 被告人為了獲委任為C的清盤人而付出的努力,是其日常專業活動 的一部份。(見第 64段)\n- G H I (7) 第三,不過,涉案披露並非是為保謢此等合法利益而公平所需,故 構成被告人違反其對前客戶所肩負的保密責任。從被告人及C的債 權人的角度去看,原告人的指稱按合理解釋屬於模稜兩可以及可表 示不同的意思,其中一些意思與被告人作出正面或負面建議無關, 不足以支持被告人作出涉案披露作為具體回應。舉例說,從被告人 的角度看,被告人在盡職審查時對C的管理層的批評,或會被拒納 該等批評的原告人視為引發潛在的利益衝突,即被告人在維護其 於盡職審查時所作的評估的利益與它不偏不倚地擔任清盤人一職 的責任之間的衝突。事實上,指被告人因可能對C過往管理不善抱 有先入為主的觀念而無法不偏不倚地擔任清盤人的說法,與被告 人曾作出負面而非正面的建議是完全一致的。按此理解,指涉案披 露是無可避免的回應,實屬不合前提的論點。(見第 65至 76、72至 73段)\n- J (8) 一般來說,對於未載有詳情的敵對指控,保密者立即披露機密資料 並非恰當的回應方法。這做法會對關乎保密責任的法律造成無法接 受的破壞。合理的做法是期望保密者先考慮其他選擇:即在不透露 機密資料下要求指控者作澄清或採取其他步驟以質疑該敵對指控。 (見第 81段)\n\n12)BV11(08)\\_p62-90.indd 66 11/25/09 6:50:09 PM\n\n|  |  | (2008) 11 HKCFAR |\n|--|--|------------------|\n|--|--|------------------|\n\n- A (9) 原告人的指稱模稜兩可,亦表示沒有基礎支持指涉案披露屬於原告 人豁免將資料保密的範圍的說法。(見第 75段)\n\t- (10) (附帶意見)若然原告人曾作虛假指稱,指被告人曾正面地建議進行 收購交易,則被告人或有理由以涉案披露作為回應。(見第 74段)\n- B **Sir John Swaine SC, instructed by Wilkinson & Grist, for the appellant. Mr Joseph Fok SC and Mr Alexander Stock, instructed by Barlow Lyde & Gilbert, for the respondent.**\n\n**Cases cited in the judgment**\n\n- C **Benecke v National Australia Bank (1993) 35 NSWLR 110**\n\t- **Bolkiah v KPMG [1999] 2 AC 222, [1999] 2 WLR 215, [1999] 1 All ER 517**\n\t\t- **Contract Corp (Winding Up: Production of Documents), Re (1871– 72) LR 7 Ch App 207**\n- D **Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Plowman (1994–1995) 183 CLR 10 FDC Co Ltd & Others v Chase Manhattan Bank NA [1990] 1 HKLR 277, [1985] 2 HKC 470**\n\t- **Hassneh Insurance Co of Israel & Others v Steurt J Mew [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep 243**\n- E **Lillicrap & Another v Nalder & Son [1993] 1 WLR 94, [1993] 1 All ER 724**\n\n**Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1**\n\n- **Nam Tai Electronics Inc v PricewaterhouseCoopers [2005] 2 HKLRD 461**\n- F **Nam Tai Electronics Inc v PricewaterhouseCoopers [2006] 4 HKLRD 121**\n\n**Nederlandse Reassurantie Groep Holding NV v Bacon & Woodrow (No 1) [1995] 1 All ER 976, [1995] 2 Lloyd's Rep 77**\n\n- **Paragon Finance Plc & Others v Freshfields [1999] 1 WLR 1183**\n- G **R v Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales & Others, ex p Brindle & Others [1994] BCC 297 Solicitor v Law Society (2006) 9 HKCFAR 175, [2006] 2 HKLRD**\n\t- **116**\n\n**Sunderland v Barclays Bank Ltd (1937–46) 5 LDAB 163**\n\n- H **Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 KB 461**\n\t- **Woodhouse AC Israel Cocoa Ltd SA & Another v Nigerian Produce Marketing Co Ltd [1972] AC 741, [1972] 2 WLR 1090, [1972] 2 All ER 271**\n- I\n\n**Cases in List of Authorities not cited in the judgment Arklow Investments Ltd v Maclean [2000] 1 WLR 594 Barclays Bank Plc v Taylor [1989] 1 WLR 1066, [1989] 3 All ER 563**\n\nJ **Baron Investments (Holdings) Ltd, Re [2000] 1 BCLC 272 Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome [1972] AC 1027, [1972] 2 WLR 645, [1972] 1 All ER 801**\n\n12)BV11(08)\\_p62-90.indd 67 11/25/09 6:50:09 PM\n\n30\n\n| 68      | HONG KONG COURT OF FINAL APPEAL REPORTS                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | (2008) 11 HKCFAR |   |\n|---------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|---|\n| HKC 23  | China Light & Power Co Ltd v Ford [1996] 1 HKLR 7, [1996] 2                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |                  | A |\n| 62      | Cornelius v De Taranto [2001] EWCA Civ 1511, (2000) 68 BMLR                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |                  |   |\n|         | Duncan v Medical Practitioners Disciplinary Committee [1986] 1<br>NZLR 513                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |                  | B |\n|         | El Jawhary v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No<br>[1993] BCLC 396                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | 1)               |   |\n|         | Harris v Digital Pulse Pty Ltd (2003) NSWLR 298<br>Hurt, Re (1988) 80 ALR 236                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |                  |   |\n|         | Indata Equipment Supplies Ltd v ACL Ltd [1998] FSR 248<br>Joint & Several Liquidators of Kong Wah Holdings Ltd v Grande<br>Holdings Ltd (2006) 9 HKCFAR 766, [2007] 1 HKLRD 116<br>Lee Gleeson Pty Ltd v Sterling Estates Pty Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR                                                            |                  | C |\n| 571     | Maxwell Communication Corp Plc, Re [1992] BCC 372, [1992]<br>BCLC 465                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |                  | D |\n|         | Newcastle Upon Tyne City Council v Allan [2005] ICR 1170, [2005]<br>IRLR 505                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |                  |   |\n|         | Recover Ltd, Re [2003] EWHC 536, [2003] 2 BCLC 186<br>Schuppan, Re [1996] 2 All ER 664, [1997] 1 BCLC 211<br>Webster v James Chapman & Co [1989] 3 All ER 939<br>Young v Robson Rhodes [1999] 3 All ER 524                                                                                                   |                  | E |\n| ch.12.C | Other materials mentioned in the judgment<br>Chitty on Contracts (29th ed., 2004) Vol.1, para.22-044<br>McPherson's Law of Company Liquidation (2001) p.380<br>Pattenden, Rosemary, The Law of Professional-Client Confidentiality:<br>Regulating the Disclosure of Confidential Personal Information (2003) |                  | F |\n|         | Toulson and Phipps, Confidentiality (2nd ed., 2006) para.3-171                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |                  | G |\n|         |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |                  |   |\n\n### **Li CJ**\n\n**1. I agree with the judgment of Mr Justice Ribeiro PJ.**\n\n### **Bokhary PJ**\n\n**2. Disclosure of matters to which an obligation of confidentiality attaches can, at least in general, be justified by showing that the disclosure was fairly required in the pursuit or protection of a legitimate interest. In the ordinary way, a firm of accountants would be pursuing a legitimate interest when seeking appointment as a liquidator. And it would ordinarily be protecting that interest when endeavouring to meet a suggestion that it lacks the requisite impartiality.**\n\n**3. The present situation is somewhat out of the ordinary. This is because the firm had earlier conducted a due diligence review on the**\n\n12)BV11(08)\\_p62-90.indd 68 11/25/09 6:50:09 PM\n\nH\n\nI\n\n(2008) 11 HKCFAR 69 Nam Tai Electronics Inc v PricewaterhouseCoopers *Bokhary PJ*\n\nA **company of which it later sought to be the liquidator. I proceed on the assumption that the firm was nevertheless pursuing a legitimate interest when seeking appointment as the company's liquidator. But that assumption does not bring the firm success. What it disclosed was that it had recommended against acquisition. Its stance is that such**\n\n30\n\n- B **disclosure was made in order to meet its former client's suggestion to the effect that having conducted the due diligence review deprived it of the impartiality that a liquidator must have. But that suggestion did not imply that it had recommended in favour of acquisition. Nor does the question of its impartiality turn on whether its recommendation**\n- C **had been in favour of or against acquisition. For these reasons and those more fully stated by Mr Justice Ribeiro PJ, I do not regard the disclosure as fairly required.**\n\n**4. A sum of \\$100.00 is an appropriate one to represent damages which are nominal but not intended to be derisory. As to the measure**\n\nD **of damages and how costs should be dealt with, I agree with my brother Ribeiro. So I, too, would allow the appeal in the terms which he proposes.**\n\n### **Chan PJ**\n\nE **5. I agree with the judgment of Mr Justice Ribeiro PJ.**\n\n### **Ribeiro PJ**\n\n**6. The question which falls to be considered was formulated by the Appeal Committee as follows:**\n\nF\n\nG\n\nIn what circumstances, and to what extent, may a duty of confidentiality be relaxed to allow a person subject to that duty to defend himself against an adverse allegation made against him by the person to whom that duty is owed?\n\n### *A. The parties*\n\nH **7. The plaintiff (Nam Tai) is a company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands and listed on the NASDAQ, a securities exchange in the United States. Nam Tai manufactures electronic products and supplies them to well known producers of electronic consumer goods. It was founded by Mr Koo Ming Kown (Mr Koo) who is a director of Nam Tai and its senior executive officer.**\n\nI J **8. The defendant, (PWC) is a well-known firm of certified public accountants in Hong Kong. It is associated with a large international network of accountancy firms trading under the same name. From 1989 until November 1998, PWC acted as Nam Tai's auditors. Mr Robert Nield (Mr Nield) was the audit engagement and client relationship partner.**\n\n12)BV11(08)\\_p62-90.indd 69 11/25/09 6:50:09 PM\n\n### *B. The relationship between the parties*\n\n**9. Although the professional relationship between the parties had initially been close and cordial, it deteriorated and came to an end in late 1998. In early 1999, further contentious issues arose between them. For present purposes, there were three material facets to that relationship and its souring.**\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1409-8 Filed 01/30/23 Entered 01/30/23 10:03:34 Page 10 of 30\n\n### *B.1 The audit relationship*\n\nC D E **10. First, it appears that Nam Tai became dissatisfied with PWC as its auditors in the course of the audit for the year ended 31 December 1997. There had been differences between them as to whether a tax refund from the Beijing authorities and whether the full amount of a debt plus interest, owed by a company called Tele-Art Inc (\"Tele-Art\", discussed further below), could properly be recognized as receivables. Mr Nield's impression was that Mr Koo thought that PWC did not believe the representations Mr Koo had made. He was somewhat surprised by Nam Tai's attitude and recalled that he \"was horrified\" at how badly the audit clearance meeting on 11 March 1998 had gone. At the end of April 1998, Nam Tai indicated that it was considering a change of auditors. In the circumstances described below, PWC resigned as Nam Tai's auditors on 26 November 1998.**\n\n### *B.2 The due diligence review*\n\n**11. The second facet of the relationship involved the due diligence review conducted by PWC in respect of a company called Albatronics (Far East) Co Ltd (Albatronics) on Nam Tai's behalf between September and November 1998. Albatronics was a Hong Kong listed company involved in trading and distributing electronic products, notably products manufactured by Sony, the well-known Japanese consumer electronics company.**\n\nH I J **12. On 11 September 1998, Nam Tai had entered into an agreement (the subscription agreement) with Albatronics to take up 700 million new shares in that company for just over HK\\$70 million in cash, thereby acquiring a controlling interest. Although Albatronics's auditors, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, had given it an unqualified audit opinion for the year ended 31 March 1998, it is clear that by September 1998, Albatronics was in serious financial trouble and was being referred to as a \"distressed\" company. Moreover, the directors had disclosed to Nam Tai that there were significant \"unrecorded losses\" which, as Nam Tai understood, meant that Albatronics's stated net assets had to be reduced by about HK\\$250 million. This was reflected in the terms of the subscription agreement which provided that there would be no liability for breach of warranty unless a breach**\n\n12)BV11(08)\\_p62-90.indd 70 11/25/09 6:50:09 PM\n\nA\n\nB\n\nF\n\nG\n\nA **resulted in the company's consolidated net assets as at 31 July 1998 being reduced by more than HK\\$250 million.**\n\n30\n\n**13. Mr Koo's evidence was that he believed that injection of the HK\\$70 million would enable Albatronics to trade itself out of its distressed condition provided that the creditors, consisting of a**\n\nB C **series of Japanese banks and suppliers including Sony, were prepared to continue providing support. Because Nam Tai had ample surplus cash, Mr Koo was prepared to go ahead with the acquisition without any due diligence review. However, he was, somewhat reluctantly, persuaded that such a review should take place and PWC was given the job.**\n\n**14. The PWC engagement partner for the due diligence review was Mr Neal Stow. Its main objective was to see if there were hidden liabilities exceeding the \\$250 million already disclosed. The engagement letter dated 18 September 1998 which was signed**\n\n- D **by Mr Ed Chan, Nam Tai's then Chief Financial Officer, made it clear that the review would be limited in scope, based mainly on internal management information and discussion with key staff of Albatronics.**\n- E **15. On 10 November 1998, PWC delivered its due diligence report. It noted that Albatronics was \"technically insolvent\" and would be \"dependent upon its bankers and Nam Tai to provide continued financial support\". It indicated that a write down of net assets by a further HK\\$22 million beyond an acknowledged requirement for a write down of HK\\$240 million was needed. Significantly, the report**\n- F G **called into question the integrity of Albatronics's management, suggesting that they had deliberately misled the company's auditors, mis-stated its assets in a published circular and indulged in business practices which would be unacceptable for a US listed company subject to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The report questioned the wisdom of proceeding with the acquisition, stating:**\n\nWe have not been instructed to advise you either as to the proposed transaction or the terms of the Circular. However, in view of the advice which we understand that you have received from Johnson,\n\n- H Stokes and Master [a firm of solicitors], you may wish to consider with them and your financial advisors whether or not you wish to continue with the transaction on the current basis and whether or not you should seek to have the terms of the Circular and any announcement corrected.\n- I\n\n**16. Mr Koo was obviously well aware of the financial straits of Albatronics. But he took strong exception to the report's damning criticisms of that company's management. As Mr Nield reported on 26 November 1998, Mr Koo said that he disagreed with the review's**\n\nJ **findings and asserted that there was \"no evidence for saying their directors are thieves\".**\n\n12)BV11(08)\\_p62-90.indd 71 11/25/09 6:50:09 PM\n\n### 72 **HONG KONG COURT OF FINAL APPEAL REPORTS** (2008) 11 HKCFAR\n\nA **17. On the same day, PWC resigned as Nam Tai's auditors. It had decided that it could not remain Nam Tai's auditors without also auditing Albatronics and were unwilling to assume the latter role in view of their concerns about the integrity of that company's management.**\n\n30\n\nB **18. Nam Tai's unhappiness with the due diligence report was reflected in a dispute regarding fees with Nam Tai denying Ed Chan's authority to sign the engagement letter. Eventually, PWC accepted payment of HK\\$500,000 in settlement of its bill for HK\\$1,245,264.75 with a view to bringing the matter to a close.**\n\nC\n\n### *B.3 Litigation over the Tele-Art debt*\n\nD E **19. Thirdly, the differences concerning the Tele-Art debt took on a further dimension when they resulted in litigation. Tele-Art was another BVI company listed on the NASDAQ. It too fell into financial difficulties and was the subject of a judgment debt which Nam Tai acquired as assignee. This was done in the context of some personal animosity between Mr Koo and Mr Elmer Yuen, Tele-Art's founder. Tele-Art's principal asset in mid-1998 was a parcel of Nam Tai shares worth some US\\$5 million and Nam Tai believed that it could recover in full the acquired debt with interest by setting off those amounts against the Nam Tai shares held by Tele-Art.**\n\nF G **20. On 17 July 1998, the BVI court made an order winding-up Tele-Art on Nam Tai's petition and, at Nam Tai's behest, appointed Mr David Hague (Mr Hague), a PWC partner introduced by Mr Nield, as liquidator. Nam Tai then gave notice of an intended redemption of the shares held by Tele-Art as a set-off against Tele-Art's debt. However, the other principal creditor of Tele-Art was the Bank of China which claimed to have a charge over those shares. Since an issue of priorities had evidently arisen between Nam Tai and the Bank of China, on 23 January 1999, Mr Hague obtained an injunction from the BVI court restraining Nam Tai from proceeding with its notice of redemption until that issue was determined.**\n\nH I J **21. Nam Tai countered on 25 February 1999 with an application to remove Mr Hague as Tele-Art's liquidator, alleging that he was biased in the performance of his duties and had a conflict of interest, an allegation firmly denied by Mr Hague. That application was dismissed by the BVI court on 4 September 2000. Nam Tai's appeal was dismissed by the BVI Court of Appeal on 19 January 2001 and, on 20 June 2001, leave to appeal to the Privy Council was refused. However, that was not the end of the litigation since the priorities question still remained to be dealt with and Nam Tai had issued a fresh application for removal of Mr Hague on the ground of misconduct. Further discussion of that litigation is unnecessary.**\n\n**22. It is against the background of the foregoing matters that the disclosure complained of was made.**\n\n12)BV11(08)\\_p62-90.indd 72 11/25/09 6:50:09 PM\n\nB\n\nC\n\n#### A *C. The acquisition and liquidation of Albatronics*\n\n**23. As noted above, after 26 November 1998, Nam Tai was no longer a client of PWC, the relationship having ended with a degree of acrimony, at least as perceived by Nam Tai. Notwithstanding PWC's adverse recommendation, Nam Tai proceeded in December 1998 to complete its acquisition of a controlling interest in Albatronics in accordance with the subscription agreement.**\n\n30\n\n**24. In the following six months or so, an attempt was made to re-structure Albatronics financially. During this process, PWC assumed the role of advising Sony, one of the principal creditors. According to Mr Koo, the needed support of the creditors was not forthcoming**\n\n**so that on 17 June 1999, the board of Albatronics announced that it had resolved to put the company into voluntary liquidation.**\n\n#### D *D. The bid for appointment as liquidator of Albatronics and the disclosure*\n\n**25. News of the decision to liquidate Albatronics was keenly received by the large accountancy firms in Hong Kong. On 16 June 1999, the**\n\n- E **day before the public announcement was made, Mr Colin Farrell, a PWC partner who had been advising Sony on tax matters, sent an e-mail to senior members of the partnership stating:**\n- F FYI. A Deloitte financial report on the break-up of the Albatronics group estimated the liquidation fees at HK\\$23m, so of potential financial interest.\n\n### **He added:**\n\nG The potential perceived problem, I believe, is our old relationship with Nam Tai, the Albatronics group's majority shareholders.\n\nH **26. However, the PWC partners who would potentially be involved concluded that acting as liquidator of Albatronics would present no conflict of interest problems, principally on the footing that PWC had never had a professional relationship with Albatronics. This conclusion was reached notwithstanding the recent problems in their relationship with Nam Tai which Mr Farrell had noted and despite their awareness that Nam Tai had expressed objections against their appointment.**\n\n- I J **Conscious of keen competition for the job from the other big firms, PWC launched a vigorous lobbying campaign aimed at convincing the creditors that PWC should be appointed. In doing so, PWC decided to disclose what is acknowledged to have been confidential information concerning the due diligence review it had conducted for Nam Tai, which is what the present case is about.**\n\t- **27. The disclosure came about as follows. On 28 June 1999, PWC made a presentation to Sumitomo Bank using a document entitled**\n\n12)BV11(08)\\_p62-90.indd 73 11/25/09 6:50:10 PM\n\nA **\"Liquidations Capabilities Overview\" which was also circulated to the other bank creditors. It stated:**\n\nIn September 1998, PWC conducted due diligence for Nam Tai in respect of its potential acquisition in Albatronics. We recommended that Nam Tai not make the acquisition. Nam Tai did not take our recommendation and proceeded to invest in Albatronics.\n\nC **While it was publicly known that PWC had conducted a due diligence review and that Nam Tai had thereafter proceeded to make its investment in Albatronics, the fact that PWC had made a recommendation against the acquisition was not in the public domain and was clearly confidential.**\n\nD **28. Disclosure of that confidential advice was repeated in identical terms in a document headed \"Liquidation Proposal of Albatronics\" (the Proposal) which was sent to Sony's solicitors on 17 August 1999 and distributed to the other creditors. I shall refer to the disclosure of the confidential recommendation against proceeding with the acquisition as \"the negative disclosure\".**\n\nE **29. PWC's case is that the negative disclosure was justified since it was made in order to counter Nam Tai's contention that PWC should not be appointed liquidator because PWC would have a conflict of interest in that role by reason of its prior involvement in the due diligence review.**\n\n### *E. The present proceedings*\n\n**30. The negative disclosure contained in the Proposal is the basis of Nam Tai's action against PWC. Initially, the claim was brought on the basis of malicious falsehood and libel. Those causes of action have fallen away and the only live claim is one for breach of confidence.**\n\nH **31. As noted above, in answer to Nam Tai's claim, PWC asserts that the negative disclosure was justified as a defensive response to Nam Tai's objection to its appointment as liquidator. PWC contends that a disclosure in such circumstances falls outside the scope of its duty of confidentiality and that no liability for breach of confidence ensues.**\n\n**32. That argument was accepted by Waung J at first instance1 and also in the Court of Appeal (Rogers V-P, Le Pichon and Cheung JJA).2 Its correctness is challenged on this appeal.**\n\n12)BV11(08)\\_p62-90.indd 74 11/25/09 6:50:10 PM\n\nB\n\nF\n\nG\n\nI\n\n<sup>1</sup> [2005] 2 HKLRD 461.\n\n<sup>2</sup> [2006] 4 HKLRD 121.\n\n#### A *F. The legal principles*\n\n### *F.1 The duty of confidentiality*\n\nB **33. It is common ground that PWC undertook a duty of confidentiality to Nam Tai regarding the information imparted to it in the due diligence review and in respect of the contents of the due diligence report.**\n\n**34. Such a duty imposed an obligation on PWC not to communicate the information to a third party and not to misuse the confidential information, that is to say, not to make any use of it or**\n\n- C **to cause any use to be made of it by others otherwise than for Nam Tai's benefit, unless with Nam Tai's consent.3 It was a duty which survived termination of the client relationship and continued to bind PWC to preserve the confidentiality arising during the subsistence of that relationship.4 The court is astute to protect a former client's**\n- D **confidences and will restrain conduct on the part of the confidant which exposes the former client to an avoidable risk of disclosure.5**\n\n### *F.2 Limits on the scope of the duty of confidentiality*\n\nE F **35. The present appeal concerns the limits of or qualifications to that duty. In cases like the present, where the duty of confidentiality arises out of the parties' contractual relationship, the starting-point is the influential decision of the English Court of Appeal in the**  *Tournier* **case.6 In the context of a banker-customer contract, Bankes LJ**\n\n**identified the limits of the duty of confidentiality as follows:**\n\nOn principle I think that the qualifications can be classified under four heads: (a) Where disclosure is under compulsion by law; (b) where there is a duty to the public to disclose; (c) where the interests of the bank require disclosure; (d) where the disclosure is made by the express or implied consent of the customer.**<sup>7</sup>**\n\nH **36. It is PWC's case that the negative disclosure, being a defensive response to Mr Koo's allegation that PWC should not be appointed liquidator of Albatronics because it would have a conflict of interest in that role, fell within either or both of the last two qualifications on the duty: as a disclosure properly required by PWC's interests or as one made with Nam Tai's express or implied consent. I shall refer**\n\nG\n\n12)BV11(08)\\_p62-90.indd 75 11/25/09 6:50:10 PM\n\nI\n\n<sup>3</sup> *Bolkiah v KPMG* [1999] 2 AC 222 at p.235.\n\n<sup>4</sup> *Ibid*. See also *Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England* [1924] 1 KB 461 at pp.473 and 485.\n\nJ <sup>5</sup> *Bolkiah v KPMG* [1999] 2 AC 222 at p.237.\n\n<sup>6</sup> *Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England* [1924] 1 KB 461.\n\n<sup>7</sup> At p.473.\n\nA **to these two heads of qualification as \"the self-interest qualification\" and \"the consent qualification\" respectively.**\n\n### *F.3 The consent qualification generally*\n\nB C **37. Subject to presently inapplicable exceptions, a party may obviously waive a right enjoyed under a contract. The consent qualification is an example of such a waiver. The waiver may be express or implied from the conduct of the confider. It is a question of fact whether, viewed objectively, the confider has consented to disclosure and the duty of confidentiality has been waived.**\n\nD **38. In** *Sunderland v Barclays Bank Ltd***, 8 for instance, it was held that the conduct of the customer in handing the telephone to her husband who then demanded an explanation for the bank's dishonouring of the customer's cheque justified the bank manager in thinking that she had impliedly consented to the bank informing her husband of its reason for doing so, waiving confidentiality.**\n\nE **39. In** *Mann v Carnell***, 9 a case involving legal professional privilege, the question of fact was approached by asking whether the conduct of the client was inconsistent with maintaining the confidentiality of the privileged communication. In their joint judgment, the majority in the High Court of Australia stated:10**\n\nLegal professional privilege exists to protect the confidentiality of communications between lawyer and client. It is the client who is entitled to the benefit of such confidentiality, and who may relinquish that entitlement. It is inconsistency between the conduct of the client and maintenance of the confidentiality which effects a waiver of the privilege.\n\n#### G **Stressing the objective nature of this approach, their Honours added:**\n\nWaiver may be express or implied. Disputes as to implied waiver usually arise from the need to decide whether particular conduct is inconsistent with the maintenance of the confidentiality which the privilege is intended to protect. When an affirmative answer is given to such a question, it is sometimes said that waiver is 'imputed by operation of law'. This means that the law recognises the inconsistency and determines its consequences, even though such consequences may not reflect the subjective intention of the party who has lost the privilege.**<sup>11</sup>**\n\n12)BV11(08)\\_p62-90.indd 76 11/25/09 6:50:10 PM\n\nF\n\nH\n\nI\n\n<sup>8</sup> (1937–46) 5 LDAB 163.\n\n<sup>9</sup> (1999) 201 CLR 1.\n\n<sup>10</sup> Gleeson, Gaudron, Gummow and Callinan JJ at p.13.\n\n<sup>11</sup> *Ibid*, citing *Benecke v National Australia Bank* (1993) 35 NSWLR 110.\n\n30\n\n(2008) 11 HKCFAR 77 Nam Tai Electronics Inc v PricewaterhouseCoopers *Ribeiro PJ*\n\n- A **40. I would add that in cases of implied waiver the conduct must clearly convey the meaning of the waiver relied on. As is pointed out by the editors of** *Chitty on Contracts***, 12 cases of waiver are analogous to cases of promissory estoppel where it is well-established that clear and unequivocal conduct founding the estoppel is required. In** *Woodhouse*  **13**\n- B *AC Israel Cocoa Ltd SA & Another v Nigerian Produce Marketing Co Ltd***, Lord Pearson drew the parallel in the following terms:**\n\nThis is not an appropriate case for a general examination of the principle which is sometimes known as \"promissory estoppel\",\n\n- C D though it is far removed from the familiar kind of estoppel by representation of fact and seems, at any rate in a case of this kind, to be more like a waiver of contractual rights. In a case of this kind the alleged \"representation\" or promise or assurance ought to be reasonably clear and definite both as to the terms of the contract which is being waived and as to the duration of the waiver. It may\n- be that the \"representation\" or promise or assurance has to have at least as much precision as would be needed for a variation of the contract.\n- E **41. A disclosure made on the basis of a waiver is not permitted to exceed the scope of the waiver established. Thus, in** *Lillicrap & Another v Nalder & Son***, 14 a case involving a suit against solicitors, Dillon LJ pointed out that the client's waiver generally \"can only extend to matters which are relevant to an issue in the proceedings**\n- F **and, privilege apart, admissible in evidence. There is no waiver for a roving search into anything else in which the solicitor or any other solicitor may have happened to have acted for the clients.\" Similarly, in** *Paragon Finance Plc & Others v Freshfields***, 15 a client suing its former solicitors for negligence in the handling of a transaction was held to**\n- G **have waived confidentiality regarding that firm, but not in respect of the solicitors subsequently instructed to pursue and settle the client's claims arising out of that transaction against a third party.**\n\n#### H *F.4 The self-interest qualification generally*\n\n**42. As explained in** *Tournier* **and subsequent cases, the self-interest qualification is the reflection of an implied term permitting the confidant to disclose confidential information where such disclosure is necessary for the business efficacy of their ordinary contractual transactions.**\n\n12)BV11(08)\\_p62-90.indd 77 11/25/09 6:50:10 PM\n\nJ <sup>13</sup> [1972] AC 741 at p.762. <sup>14</sup> [1993] 1 WLR 94 at p.99.\n\nI\n\n<sup>12</sup> *Chitty on Contracts* (29th ed., 2004) Vol.1, para.22-044.\n\n<sup>15</sup> [1999] 1 WLR 1183.\n\n### 78 **HONG KONG COURT OF FINAL APPEAL REPORTS** (2008) 11 HKCFAR\n\nA B **43. Thus, in** *Tournier***, Bankes LJ gave as an example of the selfinterest qualification's operation, a disclosure \"where a bank issues a writ claiming payment of an overdraft stating on the face of the writ the amount of the overdraft\".16 Scrutton LJ also referred to the bank \"collecting or suing for an overdraft\" and to making disclosure in its own interests \"to an extent reasonable and proper for carrying on the business of the account, as in giving a reason for declining to honour cheques drawn or bills accepted by the customer, when there are insufficient assets\".17**\n\n30\n\nC D E **44. So viewed, the self-interest qualification is of limited scope. This was the approach of the Court of Appeal in** *FDC Co Ltd & Others v Chase Manhattan Bank NA***, 18 where a bank with headquarters in New York and a branch in Hong Kong found itself sandwiched between, on the one hand, an order of a United States court compelling it to disclose information about accounts maintained by customers with the Hong Kong branch and, on the other, an injunction issued by the Hong Kong court preventing such disclosure. Faced with the prospect of severe penalties if it failed to comply with the New York order, the bank would have considered it very much in its own interests to make the disclosure. But, as Huggins V-P pointed out, the information was not needed in the United States of America \"in the ordinary course of banking business\" but \"solely for the purpose of its being disclosed to the United States' Government\"19 so that the self-interest qualification, understood in the narrow sense discussed above, was held to be inapplicable. Silke JA put it as follows:**\n\nWhile I fully accept that the financial implication of this and of the foreign proceedings, on the face of it, would suggest that it would be in the interests of the Bank to disclose and therefore to excuse them under a *Tournier* exception from the performance of their obligation, I do not read that exception to be in reality such cover. It must mean in the interests of ordinary banking practice, such as when they find it necessary to sue upon an overdraft or matters of that kind. The issues here are very much wider than those narrow interests of the Bank as I see them to be.**<sup>20</sup>**\n\n**45. However, developments in the law indicate that the self-interest qualification is now more liberally applied and regarded as extending beyond the narrow confines described above. In particular, as discussed**\n\n12)BV11(08)\\_p62-90.indd 78 11/25/09 6:50:10 PM\n\nJ\n\nI\n\nF\n\nG\n\nH\n\n<sup>16</sup> *Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England* [1924] 1 KB 461 at p.473.\n\n<sup>17</sup> At p.481.\n\n<sup>18</sup> [1990] 1 HKLR 277.\n\n<sup>19</sup> At p.284.\n\n<sup>20</sup> [1990] 1 HKLR 277 at p.292.\n\nA B **in the section which follows, it has been held to encompass a \"selfdefence exception\" (to adopt the expression used by Professor Rosemary Pattenden in her valuable textbook discussion21) based upon a broader view of the requirements of business efficacy or of the terms which may be implied as a matter of law in the confidentiality context.**\n\n# *F.5 Disclosure in self-defence: litigation and disciplinary proceedings*\n\nC D **46. It is well-established that a professional confidant is entitled to make a defensive disclosure in two situations. The first of these is where legal proceedings are brought against him by the client (by which term I include a former client), for example, in an action for professional negligence. The legal basis of this exception was explained in** *Paragon Finance Plc & Others v Freshfields***22 by Lord Bingham of**\n\n**Cornhill CJ in the following terms:**\n\nWhen a client sues a solicitor who has formerly acted for him, complaining that the solicitor has acted negligently, he invites the court to adjudicate on questions directly arising from the confidential relationship which formerly subsisted between them. Since court proceedings are public, the client brings that formerly confidential relationship into the public domain. He thereby waives any right to claim the protection of legal professional privilege in relation to any communication between them so far as necessary for the just determination of his claim; or, putting the same proposition in different terms, he releases the solicitor to that extent from the obligation of confidence by which he was formerly bound. This is an implication of law, the rationale of which is plain. A party cannot deliberately subject a relationship to public scrutiny and at the same time seek to preserve its confidentiality. He cannot pick and choose, disclosing such incidents of the relationship as strengthen his claim for damages and concealing from forensic scrutiny such incidents as weaken it. He cannot attack his former solicitor and deny the solicitor the use of materials relevant to his defence.\n\n**47. A similar approach had been adopted in the earlier case of**  *Lillicrap & Another v Nalder & Son***, 23 where Dillon LJ approved May J's formulation in the lower court which was as follows:**\n\nI\n\nE\n\nF\n\nG\n\nH\n\n12)BV11(08)\\_p62-90.indd 79 11/25/09 6:50:10 PM\n\nJ <sup>21</sup> Rosemary Pattenden, *The Law of Professional-Client Confidentiality* (2003) ch.12.C. <sup>22</sup> [1999] 1 WLR 1183 at p.1188.\n\n<sup>23</sup> [1993] 1 WLR 94, citing May J at p.99.\n\n#### 80 **HONG KONG COURT OF FINAL APPEAL REPORTS** (2008) 11 HKCFAR\n\nA client who sues his solicitor invites the court to adjudicate the dispute and thereby, in my judgment, waives privilege and confidence to the extent that is necessary to enable the court to do so fully and fairly in accordance with the law including the law of evidence.\n\n### **Similarly, Russell LJ stated:**\n\n… by bringing civil proceedings against his solicitor, a client impliedly waives privilege in respect of all matters which are relevant to the suit he pursues and, most particularly, where the disclosure of privileged matters is required to enable justice to be done.**<sup>24</sup>**\n\n### **48. And in** *Nederlandse Reassurantie Groep Holding NV v Bacon & Woodrow (No 1)***, 25 in a passage approved in the** *Paragon* **case,26 Colman J provided the following explanation of the** *Lillicrap* **decision:**\n\nThe true analysis of what the courts are doing in such cases of socalled implied waiver of privilege is, in my judgment, to prevent the unfairness which would arise if the plaintiff were entitled to exclude from the court's consideration evidence relevant to a defence by relying upon the privilege arising from the solicitor's duty of confidence. The client is thus precluded from both asserting that the solicitor has acted in breach of duty and thereby caused the client loss and, to make good that claim, opening up the confidential relationship between them and at the same time seeking to enforce against that same solicitor a duty of confidence arising from their professional relationship in circumstances where such enforcement would deprive the solicitor of the means of defending the claim. It is fundamental to this principle that the confidence which privilege would otherwise protect arises by reason of the same professional relationship between the parties to the litigation. The underlying unfairness which the principle aims to avoid arises because the claim is asserted and the professional relationship opened for investigation against the very party whose duty of confidence is the basis of the privilege. It is against the unfairness of both opening the relationship by asserting the claim and seeking to enforce the duty of confidence owed by the defendant that the principle is directed.**<sup>27</sup>**\n\nI **49. The rationale for recognizing a self-defence exception in litigation cases therefore has two aspects. The first involves an application of the doctrine of implied waiver reflecting the consent qualification. The client who brings an action complaining about the**\n\n12)BV11(08)\\_p62-90.indd 80 11/25/09 6:50:10 PM\n\nC\n\nA\n\nB\n\nD\n\nE\n\nF\n\nH\n\nG\n\n<sup>24</sup> At p.101.\n\n<sup>25</sup> [1995] 1 All ER 976.\n\n<sup>26</sup> [1999] 1 WLR 1183 at p.1191.\n\n<sup>27</sup> [1995] 1 All ER 976 at p.986.\n\n30\n\n- A **professional's conduct in the course of their confidential relationship must know that this entails a public airing of the claim and the defence. The client may therefore be taken to have consented to a waiver of confidentiality. Secondly, in the cases cited, disclosure of the client's confidences has been justified as an implicit requirement of fairness**\n- B C **in the specific context of legal proceedings initiated by the confider, reflecting recognition of the confidant's entitlement to protect its own interests in that context. It may be noted that Lord Bingham CJ in the** *Paragon* **case28 indicated that the term was an implication of law. As we shall see, it has been suggested elsewhere29 that the implication is made as a matter of business efficacy.**\n\n**50. The second category of cases where a self-defence exception is generally recognized involves professional disciplinary proceedings initiated against the confidant by the client.** *R v Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales & Others, ex p Brindle & Others***, 30 is an**\n\n- D **instance. While Hirst LJ pointed out that the duty of confidentiality owed to the client in such circumstances will often be overridden by compulsion of law (where the professional body has relevant statutory powers31) or may be justified as a disclosure in the public interest, his Lordship went on to say that, alternatively, the accountants against**\n- E **whom a complaint had been made \"would be entitled to produce any such documents as were required to further their own defence\" by virtue of the** *Tournier* **principles. Although cases involving disciplinary proceedings do not appear to have received detailed analysis, it is my view that the approach adopted to defensive disclosures in litigation**\n- F **cases is equally applicable in the disciplinary context.**\n\n## *F.6 Disclosure in self-defence: litigation and complaints involving third parties*\n\n- G **51. It appears now to be accepted that a confidant who owes a duty of confidentiality to his client may be entitled to disclose information covered by that duty in order to defend himself in legal proceedings brought by a third party. Similarly, it appears to be accepted that such disclosure may be permissible in disciplinary proceedings initiated**\n- H **against a professional confidant, not by the client, but by a third party. As such proceedings are not brought by the client to whom the duty is owed, disclosure in these cases cannot be justified on the basis of a waiver by the client. Justification, applying** *Tournier* **principles, rests on the self-interest qualification applied in the context of \"self-**\n- I **defence\".**\n\nJ\n\n12)BV11(08)\\_p62-90.indd 81 11/25/09 6:50:10 PM\n\n<sup>28</sup> *Paragon Finance Plc & Others v Freshfields* [1999] 1 WLR 1183 at p.1188.\n\n<sup>29</sup> By Colman J in *Hassneh Insurance Co of Israel & Others v Steurt J Mew* [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep 243.\n\n<sup>30</sup> [1994] BCC 297 at p.312.\n\n<sup>31</sup> As in *Solicitor v Law Society of Hong Kong* (2006) 9 HKCFAR 175.\n\n### 82 **HONG KONG COURT OF FINAL APPEAL REPORTS** (2008) 11 HKCFAR\n\n### **52. Thus, in** *Tournier* **itself, Atkin LJ stated:**\n\n… the bank have the right to disclose such information when, and to the extent to which it is reasonably necessary for the protection of the bank's interests, either as against their customer *or as against third parties* in respect of transactions of the bank for or with their customer …**<sup>32</sup>** (Italics supplied.)\n\nC D **His Lordship accordingly recognized that in the context of the selfinterest qualification, the implied term extends to permitting the bank to make such defensive disclosures where the third party's attack arises \"in respect of transactions of the bank for or with their customer\". The fairness of such a rule is evident since the bank would be claiming the right to defend itself against potential liability to a third party which it attracted by virtue of its having processed the customer's transactions: a course of action to which the customer may be taken impliedly to have agreed.**\n\nE F G **53. In** *Hassneh Insurance Co of Israel & Others v Steurt J Mew***, 33 Colman J held that the principle extends to permitting a disclosure made, not merely in \"self-defence\", but in the enforcement of the confidant's rights asserted against a third party.** *Hassneh Insurance* **was a case where a reassurer's disclaimer of liability was upheld against the reassured in confidential arbitration proceedings. In consequence, the reassured sought to bring a claim against the placing brokers and wished to disclose the documents discovered in the arbitration as well as the award and reasons for the award in aid of that claim. The reassurers objected and claimed injunctions against such disclosure. Colman J held that confidentiality of the documents used in the arbitration had to be preserved but that the award and reasons could be used in the subsequent proceedings. Basing himself on** *Tournier***, Colman J's reasoning was as follows:34**\n\nImplicit in all these formulations of the scope of the duty of confidence is that the bank should be able to disclose the information if to withhold it would or might prejudice the bank in the establishment or protection of its own legal rights *vis-à-vis* the customer or third parties. The essence of the matter is that it might need to disclose the information either as the foundation of a defence to a claim by a third party, or as the basis for a cause of action against a third party.\n\nIn my judgment, a similar qualification must be implied as a matter of business efficacy in the duty of confidence arising under an agreement to arbitrate. If it is reasonably necessary for the\n\n12)BV11(08)\\_p62-90.indd 82 11/25/09 6:50:10 PM\n\nB\n\nH\n\nI\n\n<sup>32</sup> *Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England* [1924] 1 KB 461 at p.486.\n\n<sup>33</sup> [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep 243.\n\n<sup>34</sup> At p.249.\n\n(2008) 11 HKCFAR 83 Nam Tai Electronics Inc v PricewaterhouseCoopers *Ribeiro PJ*\n\nA establishment or protection of an arbitrating party's legal rights *vis-à-vis* a third party, in the sense which I have described, that the award should be disclosed to that third party in order to found a defence or as the basis for a cause of action, so to disclose it would not be a breach of the duty of confidence.\n\n### B\n\n**Colman J therefore justified this extension (in relation to disclosure of the award and reasons, but not the documents) on the basis of a term implied as a matter of business efficacy in the arbitration agreement between the original parties to the dispute. As previously noted,**\n\nC **Lord Bingham CJ's approach in** *Paragon* **differed in that his Lordship approached the term as one implied by law.**\n\n**54. It is unnecessary, and may not be possible in the present state of the authorities, to attempt to resolve that difference. The present appeal does not involve claims or complaints by or against third**\n\nD **parties. However, the \"third party\" cases are relevant as indicating that justified disclosures \"in self-defence\" outside the well-established categories of litigation or disciplinary proceedings brought by the client have come to be recognized as justifiable on the basis of the self-interest qualification.**\n\nE\n\n### *F.7 Disclosure in self-defence: other cases*\n\nF **55. Does the self-interest qualification reflected in a self-defence exception operate in a case like the present? Nam Tai has not initiated any litigation or disciplinary proceedings against PWC. It cannot therefore be taken to have thereby waived confidentiality. Neither is PWC being sued or being made the subject of a disciplinary complaint by a third party, whether in connection with any transactions undertaken with or for Nam Tai or otherwise. Nor is PWC seeking to establish**\n\nG **its legal rights in litigation or equivalent proceedings against a third party.**\n\n**56. What PWC asserts is an entitlement to make disclosure in \"self-defence\" by virtue of the fact that Nam Tai had communicated to the creditors its objection against PWC being appointed as liquidator**\n\n- H **of Albatronics, alleging that PWC's prior involvement in the due diligence review meant that it would have a conflict of interest** *qua* **liquidator. The negative disclosure is sought to be justified simply on the basis that a defensive response to that allegation was fairly required. Given the principles discernible from the existing authorities, is such**\n- I **a self-defence exception capable of arising in such circumstances, and if so, subject to what conditions?**\n\n12)BV11(08)\\_p62-90.indd 83 11/25/09 6:50:10 PM\n\n**57. Mr Joseph Fok SC,35 who argued the appeal on PWC's behalf with conspicuous ability, submits that there is no reason in**\n\n<sup>35</sup> Appearing with Mr Alexander Stock.\n\nA **principle why such an exception should not arise in the present case. He contends that it can properly be founded on either or both of the consent and self-interest qualifications.**\n\n30\n\n**58. I would accept that a term permitting a defensive disclosure by the confidant when confronted with a hostile allegation made by the confider may in principle be implied as an aspect of the self-interest or consent qualifications in situations other than those established in the cases discussed above.**\n\n**59. Mr Fok invited the Court to adopt Brennan J's broad approach in** *Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Plowman***. 36 In discussing the**  *Tournier* **principles and the decision in the** *Hassneh Insurance* **case,37 his Honour stated:**\n\nI would imply an obligation of confidentiality as a matter of business efficacy but limit the implication by reason of the likelihood that one or other party would have reserved the right to disseminate otherwise confidential material in certain situations.\n\nE **In particular, Brennan J took one such situation to involve cases \"where disclosure of the material is fairly required for the protection of the party's legitimate interests.\"38 Mr Fok submitted that such a term, implied in the present case, justifies PWC in making the negative disclosure.**\n\nF G **60. I would accept the implication of such a term in the present case in the context of a claim to make a disclosure in \"self-defence\". Nam Tai and PWC should be taken to have impliedly agreed (whether as a matter of business efficacy or by implication of law) that disclosure of otherwise confidential information may be made where such disclosure is fairly required for the protection — by which I include furtherance — of either party's legitimate interests. I shall refer to this term as \"the defensive disclosure term\". That, however, is not the end of the inquiry. As is pointed out in the textbook by Toulson and Phipps:39**\n\nH What is \"fairly required\" and what are \"legitimate interests\" will necessarily depend on the circumstances and nature of the relationship between the confider and confidant.\n\nI **61. It can readily be seen that the requirements of the defensive disclosure term are met in the litigation and disciplinary proceedings cases discussed in Sections F.5 and F.6 above. However, each disclosure**\n\n12)BV11(08)\\_p62-90.indd 84 11/25/09 6:50:10 PM\n\nD\n\nB\n\nC\n\n<sup>36</sup> (1994–1995) 183 CLR 10.\n\n<sup>37</sup> *Hassneh Insurance Co of Israel & Others v Steurt J Mew* [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep 243.\n\n<sup>38</sup> (1994–1995) 183 CLR 10 at p.36.\n\n<sup>39</sup> *Toulson and Phipps, Confidentiality* (2006) at §3-171.\n\nA **which is said to be a defensive response needs to be individually scrutinized, asking whether it was made for the protection or in furtherance of the party's legitimate interests and whether such disclosure was fairly required.**\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1409-8 Filed 01/30/23 Entered 01/30/23 10:03:34 Page 25 of 30\n\n### B\n\n### *G. The principles applied*\n\n## *G.1 Was the negative disclosure made in furtherance of PWC's legitimate interests?*\n\nC D **62. Sir John Swaine SC, appearing for Nam Tai, submitted that it was self-evident that PWC was fixed with confidential information gained in the due diligence review which it could not avoid misusing if it were to be appointed liquidator. Accordingly, so the argument ran, PWC could not legitimately seek appointment and therefore could not justify the negative disclosure made in furtherance of its**\n\n**attempts at securing the same.**\n\n**63. I am unable to accept that argument. Whether PWC would have been precluded from acting as liquidator by reason of confidential information acquired in conducting the due diligence review has not**\n\n- E **been explored. As the creditors decided against appointing PWC in any event, there was never any cause to investigate that question and, in the absence of such investigation, the disqualification of PWC cannot simply be taken as self-evident.**\n- F **64. PWC's efforts at securing appointment as liquidator of Albatronics were undertaken as part of the firm's ordinary professional activities and therefore, in my view, in pursuit of its legitimate interests. The negative disclosure formed part of those efforts and is to be regarded, for the purposes of the defensive disclosure term, as having been made in furtherance of PWC's legitimate interests.**\n- G\n\n### *G.2 Was the negative disclosure fairly required?*\n\n**65. It is in relation to this requirement of the defensive disclosure term that PWC encounters difficulties. For PWC to show that the**\n\n- H **negative disclosure was fairly required as a defensive response to Nam Tai's allegation of conflict of interest, it must first of all establish that, reasonably understood, the negative disclosure was actually** *a response* **to the allegation. Whether that is made out must be considered both from the perspective of PWC and from the perspective of the creditors**\n- I J **to whom Nam Tai communicated the allegation. It must, in other words, have been reasonable for PWC to understand that it was being attacked in a manner which justified its particular response. Equally, for that response consisting of the negative disclosure made to the creditors to be justified, it had to address Nam Tai's allegation as it would reasonably have been understood by the creditors.**\n\t- **66. If the negative disclosure constitutes a response to the allegation, it would then be necessary to ask: Was it necessary to**\n\n12)BV11(08)\\_p62-90.indd 85 11/25/09 6:50:10 PM\n\n86 **HONG KONG COURT OF FINAL APPEAL REPORTS** (2008) 11 HKCFAR\n\nA **make the negative disclosure or ought PWC reasonably to have taken other steps before resorting to the dissemination of confidential information? Did the disclosure exceed what was fairly required by way of self-defence?**\n\n30\n\n### **G.2a From PWC's perspective**\n\n**67. Whether PWC reasonably understood Nam Tai's allegation to have a meaning which justified the making of the negative disclosure must be considered in the light of the circumstances of the parties' relationship, known to them both.**\n\nC **68. It is of course elementary and was no doubt appreciated as a practical matter by all concerned that a liquidator has a duty to act impartially. As SirWM James LJ stated in** *Gooch's Case***: 40**\n\n… it is of the utmost importance that the liquidator should, as the officer of the Court, maintain an even and impartial hand between all the individuals whose interests are involved in the winding-up. He should have no leaning for or against any individual whatever.\n\nE F G **69. Nam Tai's allegation of conflict of interest was made against the background discussed in Sections B.1, B.2 and B.3 above, involving the souring and termination of their audit relationship; Mr Koo's vehement disagreement with the findings of the due diligence review concerning the integrity of Albatronics's management; his refusal to pay the fees in full; and the on-going BVI litigation between Nam Tai and Mr Hague, a PWC partner. In that context, upon being told that PWC was seeking appointment as liquidator, it would hardly have been surprising if Nam Tai became concerned about PWC's ability to act impartially as liquidator** *vis-à-vis* **itself and it would have been natural for PWC reasonably to interpret Nam Tai's objection, expressed in terms of a potential conflict of interest, as reflecting such a concern.**\n\nH I **70. Indeed, there is little doubt that PWC did in fact realise that such anxiety might well have underlain Nam Tai's allegation of conflict since it was at pains to address that possible concern in the Proposal. In the section headed \"Independence\" it noted that Nam Tai \"has raised concerns regarding our ability to act as independent Liquidators of Albatronics … because of our previous dealing with it.\" The Proposal went on to tell the creditors about PWC's resignation as Nam Tai's auditors, about its conduct of the due diligence review (in the course of which it made the negative disclosure) and about the fact that there was on-going litigation with Nam Tai in connection with Tele-Art in the BVI. It asserted that these three matters:**\n\n12)BV11(08)\\_p62-90.indd 86 11/25/09 6:50:10 PM\n\nD\n\n<sup>40</sup> *Re Contract Corp (Winding Up: Production of Documents)* (1871–72) LR 7 Ch App 207 at p.211. And see the cases cited in *McPherson's Law of Company Liquidation* (2001) at p.380.\n\nA\n\nI\n\n… do not in any way impair our independence in acting as Liquidator of Albatronics. In fact the above confirms our true independence in this matter.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1409-8 Filed 01/30/23 Entered 01/30/23 10:03:34 Page 27 of 30\n\n- B C **71. It is therefore evident that from PWC's perspective, knowing that Nam Tai would have considered some bad blood to exist between the parties, Nam Tai's allegation could reasonably be understood as expressing its anxiety about PWC's potential lack of impartiality. Concern about a possible tendency on PWC's part to prefer the interests of others involved in the liquidation over the interests of**\n- **Nam Tai may well have been expressed in terms of a potential conflict of interest.**\n\nD **72. Moreover, given the damning remarks PWC had made in the due diligence report concerning the integrity of the management of Albatronics, remarks which Mr Koo had rejected, Nam Tai would naturally have been concerned that, if appointed liquidator, PWC would not assume the office with a fresh and open mind, but would be inclined to vindicate the condemnatory views it had already expressed. This again may well have been seen by Nam Tai as giving rise to a potential conflict between PWC's interest in upholding the**\n\nE **assessment it had already made in the due diligence exercise and its duty to act as an impartial and open-minded liquidator.**\n\n**73. It is therefore my view that reasonably understood in the light of the parties' mutual dealings, the content of Nam Tai's allegation was** *not* **such as to justify a response in the terms of the**\n\n- F **negative disclosure. The statement that PWC would have a conflict of interest if appointed was capable of bearing different meanings, some of which had nothing to do with PWC making either a positive or negative recommendation regarding Nam Tai's acquisition of Albatronics. Indeed, an allegation of conflict founded on a perceived**\n- G H **impediment to PWC acting impartially as liquidator because of its possible preconceptions regarding past management misdeeds is an allegation which is wholly consistent with PWC having given a negative, and not a positive, recommendation. So understood, it is a** *non sequitur* **to suggest that the disclosure that PWC had made a negative recommendation was a required response.**\n\t-\n\n**G.2b From the creditors' perspective 74. Nam Tai's conflict of interest allegation was no less equivocal from the perspective of the creditors. It was an opaque criticism and would not have suggested any particular objections to the creditors. They could reasonably have thought that Nam Tai's objection had something to do with PWC having been given confidential**\n\nJ **information for the due diligence review which would impede its carrying out the duties of liquidator, or that the objection was related to some dispute which had arisen in the course of the review with the same consequence, or they might simply have acknowledged that Nam Tai's opposition was founded upon some undisclosed complaint,**\n\n12)BV11(08)\\_p62-90.indd 87 11/25/09 6:50:11 PM\n\nA B **whether or not justified, to which they were not privy. A complaint of such an equivocal character is incapable of justifying the negative disclosure which specifically addresses PWC's recommendation against acquisition. The negative disclosure might well have been justified as a response if Nam Tai had falsely alleged that PWC had positively recommended acquisition, but no such meaning can be attributed to the objection which Nam Tai in fact raised.**\n\nC D **75. Neither does waiver provide a basis for justified disclosure in such circumstances. Its equivocal nature prevents Nam Tai's objection from reasonably being understood to constitute an implied waiver of its right to confidentiality concerning PWC's recommendations in the due diligence report. As previously noted,41 any waiver must be clear and definite and, for any particular disclosure to be justified, it must fall within the scope of the waiver relied upon. Nam Tai's allegation bears no such clarity and there is no basis for holding that the negative disclosure came within the compass of any waiver of confidentiality on Nam Tai's part.**\n\nE F **76. Given this conclusion, the question whether the negative disclosure was fairly required to be made in the protection of PWC's legitimate interests must be answered in the negative. It is therefore unnecessary to go on to consider whether PWC ought reasonably to have resorted to other measures before plunging into a disclosure. It should however be obvious that a disclosure of confidential information in the confidant's own interests without the confider's express consent is fraught with danger since reliance on implied consent or upon the self-interest qualification is likely to be susceptible to challenge and subject to a degree of uncertainty.**\n\n### *G.3 The view of the courts below*\n\nG H **77. I am accordingly, with respect, unable to agree with Waung J's view that that Nam Tai's allegation of conflict necessarily implies a general waiver of confidentiality connected with the work done by PWC in the due diligence review.42 Nor am I able to accept that the opaque objection \"put the due diligence work … into the public domain of the creditors\" destroying the confidentiality of the report.43 While I would agree in principle with his Lordship's statement that \"it is only fair that the person who has [the] right of confidence does not abuse it by making an attack,\"44 I do not consider that Nam Tai's objection can reasonably be understood to constitute such abuse.**\n\n12)BV11(08)\\_p62-90.indd 88 11/25/09 6:50:11 PM\n\nI\n\n<sup>41</sup> Section F.3 above.\n\n<sup>42</sup> Judgment §47.\n\n<sup>43</sup> Judgment §49.\n\n<sup>44</sup> Judgment §48.\n\nA **78. In the Court of Appeal, Le Pichon JA (with whom the other members of the Court agreed) considered this a case where the negative disclosure was fairly required or necessary as a matter of self-defence, stating:**\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1409-8 Filed 01/30/23 Entered 01/30/23 10:03:34 Page 29 of 30\n\n> B In order to dispel any notion of conflict arising, PwC was entitled to respond and its response had to address the unarticulated and therefore unintelligible accusation of conflict of interest. Given public knowledge that it had carried out due diligence on behalf of Nam Tai, that Nam Tai did make the acquisition of Albatronics and\n\n- C D that Albatronics went into deep financial trouble shortly thereafter, it required nothing less than the disclosure that PwC had advised negatively. Had PwC gone further and disclosed details of its findings, Nam Tai might have been in a better position to complain. But that did not happen. PwC limited its disclosure to the minimum which was its negative recommendation. In my view, that disclosure was \"fairly required\" or \"necessary\" to meet the unparticularised allegations of conflict made against it.**<sup>45</sup>**\n- E **79. With respect to her Ladyship, if Nam Tai's accusation of conflict of interest was \"unarticulated and therefore unintelligible\", it is hard to see how the disclosure made by PWC regarding the particular recommendation made concerning acquisition of Albatronics can properly be regarded as a defensive response addressing the same. The proposition may be tested as follows. Suppose Nam Tai had simply said**\n- F G **to the creditors: \"We have had dealings with PWC in the past and we object to its appointment as liquidator.\" Surely it could not be said that by virtue of the lack of particularity in Nam Tai's objection, PWC thereby became entitled to make disclosure of whatever confidential information it happened to believe might meet some unarticulated premise to Nam Tai's statement.**\n\n**80. But that is the effect of the passage cited above. PWC had evidently worked out for itself that, given knowledge on the part of the creditors that it had done the due diligence review and that Nam Tai had thereafter proceeded with the acquisition, it was quite possible**\n\n- H **or even likely that the creditors would put two and two together and assume that Nam Tai had made the acquisition on the basis of a positive recommendation by PWC. If that was their assumption then PWC could no doubt see that the creditors might object to its appointment as liquidator for fear of PWC seeking to sustain its**\n- I **positive recommendation and therefore possibly failing to pursue all available avenues for the recovery of assets. On this line of reasoning, it was perfectly understandable that PWC would desire to make the disclosure that it had in fact made a negative recommendation.**\n\n12)BV11(08)\\_p62-90.indd 89 11/25/09 6:50:11 PM\n\nJ\n\n<sup>45</sup> Judgment §23.\n\nA **However, such thinking represents PWC's own projection of what the creditors might assume and how to dispel any such assumption. It was not a response to anything said by Nam Tai, reasonably understood.**\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1409-8 Filed 01/30/23 Entered 01/30/23 10:03:34 Page 30 of 30\n\n> B C D **81. Mr Fok SC invited the Court to hold that so long as the negative disclosure represented a defensive response to one of several contentions possibly underlying Nam Tai's allegation of conflict of interest, such disclosure ought to be regarded as justified. I am unable to accept that submission. A disclosure must be shown clearly and objectively to fall within either the consent or self-interest qualifications if it is to be justified. To permit disclosures on the basis of what the confidant may believe, without clear objective justification, to underlie an opaque statement made by the confider would be unacceptably destructive of the protection afforded by the law to the former client's confidences. It cannot generally be the proper response to an unparticularised adverse allegation for the confidant to plunge at once into a disclosure of confidential information. It is reasonable to expect him first to consider other options: to demand clarification or to take other steps aimed at challenging the adverse allegation without disseminating confidential information.**\n\n### *H. Conclusion and relief*\n\n**82. For the foregoing reasons I conclude that PWC's making of the negative disclosure constituted a breach of the duty of confidentiality owed to Nam Tai as a former client.**\n\nF G **83. Sir John Swaine accepts that Nam Tai suffered no pecuniary loss in consequence and has not sought to support the claim for exemplary damages set out in Nam Tai's pleadings. In the circumstances, an award of nominal damages should be made. I would accordingly allow the appeal and order PWC to pay to Nam Tai the sum of HK\\$100 by way of nominal damages. I would direct that the parties be at liberty to file and serve submissions in writing as to the costs in this Court and below. Such submissions should be filed and served as follows: by Nam Tai within 21 days of the date of this judgment and by PWC in response within 21 days thereafter.**\n\n### **McHugh NPJ**\n\n**84. I agree with the judgment of Mr Justice Ribeiro PJ.**\n\n### **Li CJ**\n\nI J **85. The Court unanimously allows the appeal and orders PWC to pay to Nam Tai the sum of \\$100 by way of nominal damages. The Court makes the directions concerning the filing of submissions as to costs set out in the concluding paragraph of Mr Justice Ribeiro's judgment.**\n\n12)BV11(08)\\_p62-90.indd 90 11/25/09 6:50:11 PM\n\nH","body_zh":"证物8\n\nNam Tai Electronics Inc（南太电子公司）\n及\nPricewaterhouseCoopers（普华永道）\n\nLi CJ（李国能首席法官）、Bokhary PJ（包致金常任法官）、Chan PJ（陈兆恺常任法官）及 Ribeiro PJ（李义常任法官）以及 McHugh NPJ（麦克休非常任法官）民事终审上诉案第 1 号（2007 年），2008 年 1 月 31 日，第 15、31 页\n\n合同法——违反保密义务——保密责任——限制条件——如前客户／信赖披露人或第三方对专业受托保密人提起诉讼，专业受托保密人是否可为自我辩护而披露——如信赖披露人提出敌对指控但未提起诉讼，是否可披露——是否可推定包含允许该等披露的条款——但一般而言，对未具体说明的指控，立即披露保密资料并非适当回应\n\n专业人士——审计师——原告反对任命被告审计师为其附属公司的清算人——原告称，由于被告在原告收购该附属公司之前曾对其进行尽职调查，故存在利益冲突——被告继而作出具体回应，披露其曾就收购作出负面建议的保密资料——被告审计师是否违反保密义务\n\n合同法——默示条款——保密\n\nP是一家在美国上市的公司，D是一家知名国际会计师事务所，并担任其审计师。P与D之间的关系开始恶化。P同意认购一家在香港上市的公司（C）的控股股份，据此D对C进行了尽职调查。D对C作出负面评估，质疑其管理层的诚信。P强烈反对这些批评，而D辞任P的审计师。事实上，P与D之间的关系在进行尽职调查前不久已开始恶化。P随后继续收购C（该收购）。其后，C进入清算，而D希望被任命为其清算人。然而，P以D先前参与尽职调查而存在利益冲突为由，向C的债权人表示反对任命D（P的指控）。D随后向C的债权人提交了一项申请担任清算人的建议书，其中称其曾为P对C进行尽职调查，并披露其曾作出不建议收购的负面建议、但P仍继续进行该收购的保密资料（该负面披露）。P以D违反其对P所负的保密责任为由对D提起诉讼。该诉讼在一审及上诉法院均被驳回。P向 Court of Final Appeal（终审法院）提起上诉。\n\n12)BV11(08)\\_p62-90.indd 62 11/25/09 6:50:09 PM\n\nA\n\nB\n\nF\n\nB\n\nA 裁定，准许P的上诉，并因P未遭受金钱损失而判给名义损害赔偿 $100（Ribeiro PJ 撰写判词，其他法官同意），理由如下：\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1409-8 Filed 01/30/23 Entered 01/30/23 10:03:34 Page 3 of 30\n\n(1) 就在尽职调查中向D提供的资料以及其报告内容而言，D对P负有保密责任。该责任使D负有义务，除非经P同意，不得披露或以非为P利益之目的使用该等保密资料，亦不得促使他人作出该等使用。该责任在客户关系终止后仍然存续。法院会谨慎保护前客户的秘密，并会制止受托保密人作出使前客户面临可避免披露风险的行为（Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 KB 461, Bolkiah v KPMG [1999] 2 AC 222 applied）。（见第33–34段。）\n\n(2) 源于双方合同关系的保密责任存在限制条件，包括：(a) 经P明示或默示同意作出的披露（同意限制条件）；或(b) 为D的利益而适当需要作出的披露（自身利益限制条件）。自身利益限制条件反映了一项默示条款，即如为使其通常合同交易具有商业效力或依法有此必要，允许受托保密人披露保密资料（Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 KB 461, FDC Co Ltd & Others v Chase Manhattan Bank NA [1990] 1 HKLR 277 considered）。（见第35–36、42–45段。）\n\n(3) 此外，已经确立的是，专业受托保密人可在以下两种情况下作出自我辩护性披露，即：(a) 客户对受托保密人提起法律程序；或(b) 客户对受托保密人提起专业纪律程序。在该情况下，披露可基于反映同意限制条件的默示放弃，或基于自身利益限制条件而获正当化。现时亦似乎已获接受的是，在此等类别以外，如第三方提起的法律程序或纪律程序中受托保密人为作出自我辩护，亦可允许其作出防御性披露。此种情况以自身利益限制条件为基础；同意限制条件并不适用（Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 KB 461, Paragon Finance Plc & Others v Freshfields [1999] 1 WLR 1183, Lillicrap & Another v Nalder & Son [1993] 1 WLR 94, Hassneh Insurance Co of Israel & Others v Steurt J Mew [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep 243, R v Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales, ex p Brindle & Others [1994] BCC 297, Nederlandse Reassurantie Groep Holding NV v Bacon & Woodrow (No 1) [1995] 1 All ER 976 considered）。（见第46–54段。）\n\n12)BV11(08)\\_p62-90.indd 63 11/25/09 6:50:09 PM\n\n64 HONG KONG COURT OF FINAL APPEAL REPORTS（2008）11 HKCFAR\n\n(4) 就本案而言，法院接受，除上述既定情况外，原则上可作为同意限制条件或自身利益限制条件的一部分，推定存在一项条款，允许受托保密人在面对信赖披露人提出的敌对指控时作出防御性披露（Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Plowman (1994–1995) 183 CLR 10 applied）。（见第58段。）\n\n(5) 在本案中，首先，应推定存在该条款。应视为P与D已默示同意，如为保护或促进任何一方的合法利益而公平地需要，可披露原本属保密的资料。（见第60段。）\n\n(6) 其次，D为取得被任命为C清算人的努力，是作为其日常专业活动的一部分进行，并为追求其合法利益。（见第64段。）\n\n(7) 第三，然而，为保护该等合法利益，并无公平需要作出负面披露，因此该披露构成违反其作为前客户对P所负的保密责任。从D及C债权人的角度看，合理理解P的指控后，该指控具有模棱两可的性质，可有不同含义，其中一些与D作出正面或负面建议毫无关系，因而并不证明针对性地作出负面披露具有正当性。例如，从D的角度看，P已拒绝D在尽职调查中对C管理层作出的批评，P很可能认为，这导致D在维护其已在尽职调查中作出的评估的利益，与其作为公正清算人的责任之间可能存在利益冲突。事实上，基于认为D因对过去管理层不当行为可能已有先入之见而无法公正担任清算人的障碍所提出的利益冲突指控，完全可以与D作出负面而非正面建议相一致。按此理解，认为负面披露是必要回应并不合逻辑。（见第65–76、72–73段。）\n\n(8) 一般而言，对于未具体说明的不利指控，受托保密人立即着手披露保密资料，不可能是适当回应；这将以不可接受的方式破坏保密法。他人可合理期待其先考虑其他选择：要求澄清，或采取其他措施质疑不利指控，而不散播保密资料。（见第81段。）\n\n(9) P指控的模棱两可性质亦意味着，没有依据使负面披露落入P作出的任何保密义务放弃范围内。（见第75段。）\n\n12)BV11(08)\\_p62-90.indd 64 11/25/09 6:50:09 PM\n\n(10) （附带意见）如P曾虚假指称D正面建议进行该收购，则负面披露很可能可作为回应而获正当化。（见第74段。）\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1409-8 Filed 01/30/23 Entered 01/30/23 10:03:34 Page 5 of 30\n\n合同法——泄露机密——保密责任——限制——假如客户／告密者或第三方针对专业保密者提起法律程序，则该专业保密者可披露机密资料以作自辩——假如告密者只向保密者提出敌对指控而没有提起法律程序，该保密者可否披露机密资料——可引入默示条款以容许此类披露——但一般来说，对于未载有详情的指控，立即披露机密资料并非恰当的回应方法\n\n专业与专业人士——核数师——原告人反对委任被告人核数师为原告人的附属公司的清盘人——原告人指称，由于被告人曾在原告人收购该附属公司前对该附属公司进行尽职审查，故此被告人身处利益冲突之境况——被告人于是作出具体回应，披露机密资料，即被告人曾对收购交易提出负面建议——被告人核数师曾否泄露机密\n\n合同法——默示条款——保密责任\n\n原告人是一家在美国上市的公司。被告人是一家有名的国际会计师行，亦担任原告人的核数师。双方的关系已开始变坏。原告人同意认购一家香港上市公司（下称C）的控权股份，被告人于是对C进行尽职审查。被告人在审查报告内对C作出负面评价，质疑C的管理层的诚信。原告人对此等批评表示强烈反对，而被告人辞任原告人的核数师。事实上，双方的关系在进行上述尽职审查前不久已开始转差。原告人随后进行对C的收购（下称“收购交易”）。其后，C进行清盘，而被告人有意获委任为C的清盘人，但原告人对C的债权人表示反对委任被告人，理由为被告人先前曾参与尽职审查，故此身处利益冲突之境况（下称“原告人的指称”）。后来，被告人向C的债权人提交一份清盘提议书，当中不但指出它曾代表原告人对C进行尽职审查，而且披露机密资料，即它曾给予负面评价和表示不赞成收购交易，但原告人继续进行收购交易（下称“涉案披露”）。原告人入禀法院，控告被告人违反对原告人的保密责任。原告人经原审后被判败诉，其上诉亦遭上诉法庭驳回。原告人现上诉至终审法院。\n\n裁决——上诉得直，而由于原告人没有蒙受金钱损失，因此判给 100元作为象征式赔偿（判词由常任法官李义作出，其内容得到其余四位法官赞同）：\n\n(1) 就被告人在尽职审查过程中获给予的资料和其报告的内容而言，被告人对原告人负有保密责任。根据该责任，除非得到原告人的同意，否则被告人不得为原告人利益以外的任何目的而使用或促致他人使用相关的机密资料。该责任在保密者与客户的关系完结后仍然持续。法庭须致力保护前客户的秘密，并会制止保密者作出任何令前客户资料承受可避免的被泄露风险的行为（引用Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 KB 461, Bolkiah v KPMG [1999] 2 AC 222）。（见第 33至 34段）\n\n(2) 源于诉讼各方的合同关系的保密责任，受到下列限制：(a) 在原告人的明示或默示同意下作出的资料披露（下称“同意”限制）；或(b) 为着被告人的利益而有需要作出的资料披露（下称“自身利益”限制）。“自身利益”限制体现于默示条款之中，该条款容许保密者为确保正常合同交易的商业效力或为符合法律要求而作出必要的资料披露（Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 KB 461, FDC Co Ltd & Others v Chase Manhattan Bank NA [1990] 1 HKLR 277予以考虑）。（见第 35至 36、42至 45段）\n\n- B C D (3) 根据已确立的法律，一名专业保密者可在两种情况下作出自我保护性质的资料披露，即当客户针对该保密者而提起(a)法律程序；或(b)专业纪律程序之时。此等情况下的资料披露，可建基于反映“同意”限制的隐含豁免，也可建基于“自身利益”限制。此外，现时看来已获接受的一点是，法律容许在上述情况以外作出具辩护性质的资料披露，让保密者能在由第三方提起的法律程序或纪律程序中作自辩。这情况乃建基于“自身利益”限制，“同意”限制则不适用(Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 KB 461, Paragon Finance Plc & Others v Freshfields [1999] 1 WLR 1183, Lillicrap & Another v Nalder & Son [1993] 1 WLR 94, Hassneh Insurance Co of Israel & Others v Steurt J Mew [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep 243, R v Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales, ex p Brindle & Others [1994] BCC 297, Nederlandse Reassurantie Groep Holding NV v Bacon & Woodrow (No 1) [1995] 1 All ER 976予以考虑)。(见第46至54段)\n\n- E (4) 就处理本案而言，本院接受，除了上文所论及的已确立情况之外，原则上可作为“同意”限制或“自身利益”限制的一部分而在合约内加入隐含条款，以容许保密者在面对告秘者的敌对指控时披露资料以保护自己(引用Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Plowman (1994–1995) 183 CLR 10)。(见第58段)\n\n- F (5) 在本案中，首先，与讼双方的合约包含上述隐含条款。原告人和被告人应视为已藉默示方式同意，假如有公平需要保护或促进任何一方的合法利益，则本应是机密的资料亦可予以披露。(见第60段)\n\n- (6) 第二，涉案披露是在促进被告人的合法利益的情况下作出的，因为被告人为获委任为C的清盘人而付出的努力，是其日常专业活动的一部分。(见第64段)\n\n- G H I (7) 第三，不过，涉案披露并非为保护此等合法利益而公平所需，故构成被告人违反其对前客户所肩负的保密责任。从被告人及C的债权人的角度看，原告人的指称按合理解释属于模棱两可及可表示不同的意思，其中一些意思与被告人作出正面或负面建议无关，不足以支持被告人作出涉案披露作为具体回应。举例说，从被告人的角度看，被告人在尽职审查时对C的管理层的批评，或会被拒纳该等批评的原告人视为引发潜在的利益冲突，即被告人在维护其于尽职审查时所作的评估的利益与它不偏不倚地担任清盘人一职的责任之间的冲突。事实上，指被告人因可能对C过往管理不善抱有先入为主的观念而无法不偏不倚地担任清盘人的说法，与被告人曾作出负面而非正面的建议是完全一致的。按此理解，指涉案披露是无可避免的回应，实属不合前提的论点。(见第65至76、72至73段)\n\n- J (8) 一般来说，对于未载有详情的敌对指控，保密者立即披露机密资料并非恰当的回应方法。这做法会对关乎保密责任的法律造成无法接受的破坏。合理的做法是期望保密者先考虑其他选择：即在不透露机密资料下要求指控者作澄清或采取其他步骤以质疑该敌对指控。(见第81段)\n\n12)BV11(08)\\_p62-90.indd 66 11/25/09 6:50:09 PM\n\n(2008) 11 HKCFAR\n\n- A (9) 原告人的指称模棱两可，亦表示没有基础支持指涉案披露属于原告人豁免将资料保密的范围的说法。(见第75段)\n\n- (10) (附带意见)若然原告人曾作虚假指称，指被告人曾正面地建议进行收购交易，则被告人或有理由以涉案披露作为回应。(见第74段)\n\n- B Sir John Swaine SC（资深大律师约翰·斯温爵士），由Wilkinson & Grist（威尔金森及格里斯特律师事务所）委托，代表上诉人。Mr Joseph Fok SC（资深大律师霍兆刚）及Mr Alexander Stock（亚历山大·斯托克），由Barlow Lyde & Gilbert（巴洛莱德及吉尔伯特律师事务所）委托，代表答辩人。\n\n判决书中援引的案例\n\n- C Benecke v National Australia Bank (1993) 35 NSWLR 110\n\n- Bolkiah v KPMG [1999] 2 AC 222, [1999] 2 WLR 215, [1999] 1 All ER 517\n\n- Contract Corp (Winding Up: Production of Documents), Re (1871–72) LR 7 Ch App 207\n\n- D Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Plowman (1994–1995) 183 CLR 10\n\nFDC Co Ltd & Others v Chase Manhattan Bank NA [1990] 1 HKLR 277, [1985] 2 HKC 470\n\n- Hassneh Insurance Co of Israel & Others v Steurt J Mew [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep 243\n\n- E Lillicrap & Another v Nalder & Son [1993] 1 WLR 94, [1993] 1 All ER 724\n\nMann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1\n\n- Nam Tai Electronics Inc v PricewaterhouseCoopers [2005] 2 HKLRD 461\n\n- F Nam Tai Electronics Inc v PricewaterhouseCoopers [2006] 4 HKLRD 121\n\nNederlandse Reassurantie Groep Holding NV v Bacon & Woodrow (No 1) [1995] 1 All ER 976, [1995] 2 Lloyd's Rep 77\n\n- Paragon Finance Plc & Others v Freshfields [1999] 1 WLR 1183\n\n- G R v Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales & Others, ex p Brindle & Others [1994] BCC 297\n\nSolicitor v Law Society (2006) 9 HKCFAR 175, [2006] 2 HKLRD 116\n\nSunderland v Barclays Bank Ltd (1937–46) 5 LDAB 163\n\n- H Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 KB 461\n\n- Woodhouse AC Israel Cocoa Ltd SA & Another v Nigerian Produce Marketing Co Ltd [1972] AC 741, [1972] 2 WLR 1090, [1972] 2 All ER 271\n\n- I\n\n权威目录中列出但未在判决书中援引的案例\n\nArklow Investments Ltd v Maclean [2000] 1 WLR 594\n\nBarclays Bank Plc v Taylor [1989] 1 WLR 1066, [1989] 3 All ER 563\n\nJ Baron Investments (Holdings) Ltd, Re [2000] 1 BCLC 272\n\nCassell & Co Ltd v Broome [1972] AC 1027, [1972] 2 WLR 645, [1972] 1 All ER 801\n\n12)BV11(08)\\_p62-90.indd 67 11/25/09 6:50:09 PM\n\n68　香港终审法院判例汇编　(2008) 11 HKCFAR\n\nHKC 23　China Light & Power Co Ltd v Ford [1996] 1 HKLR 7, [1996] 2 HKC 62\n\nA Cornelius v De Taranto [2001] EWCA Civ 1511, (2000) 68 BMLR\n\nDuncan v Medical Practitioners Disciplinary Committee [1986] 1 NZLR 513　B\n\nEl Jawhary v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 1) [1993] BCLC 396\n\nHarris v Digital Pulse Pty Ltd (2003) NSWLR 298\n\nHurt, Re (1988) 80 ALR 236\n\nIndata Equipment Supplies Ltd v ACL Ltd [1998] FSR 248\n\nJoint & Several Liquidators of Kong Wah Holdings Ltd v Grande Holdings Ltd (2006) 9 HKCFAR 766, [2007] 1 HKLRD 116\n\nLee Gleeson Pty Ltd v Sterling Estates Pty Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 571　C\n\nMaxwell Communication Corp Plc, Re [1992] BCC 372, [1992] BCLC 465　D\n\nNewcastle Upon Tyne City Council v Allan [2005] ICR 1170, [2005] IRLR 505\n\nRecover Ltd, Re [2003] EWHC 536, [2003] 2 BCLC 186\n\nSchuppan, Re [1996] 2 All ER 664, [1997] 1 BCLC 211\n\nWebster v James Chapman & Co [1989] 3 All ER 939\n\nYoung v Robson Rhodes [1999] 3 All ER 524　E\n\nch.12.C　判决书中提及的其他材料\n\nChitty on Contracts (29th ed., 2004) Vol.1, para.22-044\n\nMcPherson's Law of Company Liquidation (2001) p.380\n\nPattenden, Rosemary, The Law of Professional-Client Confidentiality: Regulating the Disclosure of Confidential Personal Information (2003)　F\n\nToulson and Phipps, Confidentiality (2nd ed., 2006) para.3-171　G\n\nLi CJ（李国能首席法官）\n\n1. 我同意Ribeiro PJ（列显伦常任法官）的判决书。\n\nBokhary PJ（包致金常任法官）\n\n2. 对负有保密义务的事项作出披露，至少一般而言，可以通过证明该披露为追求或保护一项合法利益而属公平所需予以正当化。通常，会计师事务所在寻求获委任为清盘人时，是在追求一项合法利益。而在努力应对其缺乏清盘人必须具备的公正性的说法时，通常是在保护该利益。\n\n3. 本案情况略有不同。这是因为该事务所先前曾对其后来寻求担任清盘人的公司进行尽职审查。我假定，该事务所在寻求获委任为该公司的清盘人时，仍是在追求一项合法利益。但这一假定并未使该事务所胜诉。其所披露的是，它曾建议不要收购。其立场是，该披露是为了应对其前客户所作的说法，即它曾进行尽职审查，因而丧失了清盘人必须具备的公正性。但该说法并不意味着它曾建议进行收购。其是否公正，亦不取决于其建议是赞成还是反对收购。基于这些理由及Ribeiro PJ所更详尽阐述的理由，我不认为该披露属公平所需。\n\n4. $100.00这一金额适宜作为损害赔偿，以体现名义性但并非意在象征性的损害。至于损害赔偿的衡量标准及讼费应如何处理，我同意Ribeiro法官同仁的意见。因此，我也会按其所建议的条款准许上诉。\n\nChan PJ（陈兆恺常任法官）\n\n5. 我同意Ribeiro PJ的判决书。\n\nRibeiro PJ（列显伦常任法官）\n\n6. 上诉委员会所拟定、须予考虑的问题如下：\n\n在何种情况下及在何种程度上，可放宽保密义务，以容许受该义务约束的人针对其对负有该义务之人作出的不利指控为自己辩护？\n\nA. 当事人\n\n7. 原告人Nam Tai（南太电子）是一家在British Virgin Islands（英属维尔京群岛）注册成立并在United States（美国）证券交易所NASDAQ（纳斯达克）上市的公司。南太电子生产电子产品，并向知名电子消费品制造商供应产品。该公司由Mr Koo Ming Kown（顾明均先生）创立；顾先生是南太电子的董事及其高级行政人员。\n\n8. 被告人PWC（普华永道）是Hong Kong（香港）一家知名的注册会计师事务所。它与一个以相同名称经营的大型国际会计师事务所网络有关联。自1989年至1998年11月，普华永道担任南太电子的核数师。Mr Robert Nield（罗伯特·尼尔德先生）是审计业务及客户关系合伙人。\n\n12)BV11(08)\\_p62-90.indd 69 11/25/09 6:50:09 PM\n\nB. 当事人之间的关系\n\n9. 尽管当事人之间的专业关系起初密切且融洽，但该关系于1998年末恶化并告终。1999年初，双方之间又出现进一步的争议问题。就目前而言，该关系及其恶化有三个重要方面。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1409-8 Filed 01/30/23 Entered 01/30/23 10:03:34 Page 10 of 30\n\nB.1 审计关系\n\n10. 首先，看来南太电子在截至1997年12月31日止年度的审计过程中，对普华永道作为其核数师感到不满。双方对北京当局的退税，以及一家名为Tele-Art Inc（Tele-Art，下文进一步论述）的公司所欠债务连同利息的全额，是否可适当地确认作应收款项，存在分歧。尼尔德先生的印象是，顾先生认为普华永道不相信顾先生所作的陈述。他对南太电子的态度颇感意外，并回忆称，他对1998年3月11日的审计结案会议进展如此糟糕“感到震惊”。1998年4月底，南太电子表示正在考虑更换核数师。在下文所述的情况下，普华永道于1998年11月26日辞任南太电子的核数师。\n\nB.2 尽职审查\n\n11. 该关系的第二方面涉及普华永道于1998年9月至11月期间代表南太电子，就一家名为Albatronics (Far East) Co Ltd（Albatronics（远东）有限公司）的公司进行的尽职审查。Albatronics是一家在香港上市的公司，从事电子产品的贸易和分销，尤其是由知名日本消费电子公司Sony（索尼）制造的产品。\n\n12. 1998年9月11日，南太电子与Albatronics订立协议（该认购协议），以略高于HK$70 million的现金认购该公司7亿股新股，从而取得控股权益。尽管Albatronics的核数师Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu（德勤·关黄陈方会计师行）就截至1998年3月31日止年度出具了无保留审计意见，但显然截至1998年9月，Albatronics已陷入严重财政困境，并被称为“困境中的”公司。此外，董事已向南太电子披露存在重大“未入账亏损”；按南太电子的理解，这意味着Albatronics所述的净资产必须减少约HK$250 million。这反映在认购协议的条款中，该协议规定，除非违反保证导致该公司于1998年7月31日的合并净资产减少超过HK$250 million，否则不对违反保证承担责任。\n\n12)BV11(08)\\_p62-90.indd 70 11/25/09 6:50:09 PM\n\n13. 顾先生的证据是，他相信注入该HK$70 million将使Albatronics能够摆脱困境而继续经营，前提是由一系列日本银行及包括Sony在内的供应商组成的债权人，愿意继续提供支持。由于南太电子拥有充裕的剩余现金，顾先生原本准备在不进行任何尽职审查的情况下继续进行收购。然而，他颇不情愿地被说服应进行该项审查，因而将该工作交由普华永道办理。\n\n14. 普华永道负责尽职审查的业务合伙人是Mr Neal Stow（尼尔·斯托先生）。其主要目标是查明是否存在超过已披露的$250 million的隐藏负债。日期为1998年9月18日的业务委托书已签署\n\n由当时担任 Nam Tai（南太）首席财务官的 Mr Ed Chan（陈艾德先生）作出的说明，明确表示该审查范围将受到限制，主要基于内部管理信息以及与 Albatronics（阿尔巴电子）主要员工的讨论。\n\n15. 1998年11月10日，PWC（普华永道）提交了其尽职调查报告。报告指出，Albatronics“在技术上已资不抵债”，并将“依赖其银行及 Nam Tai 提供持续的财务支持”。报告表明，除已确认须减记 HK$240 million 外，还需要进一步减记 HK$22 million 的净资产。尤为重要的是，报告对 Albatronics 管理层的诚信提出质疑，认为他们蓄意误导公司审计师、在已公布的通函中错误陈述其资产，并从事对于受《反海外腐败法》约束的美国上市公司而言不可接受的商业做法。报告质疑继续进行该收购是否明智，并称：\n\n我们未受指示就拟议交易或该通函的条款向贵方提供意见。然而，鉴于我们了解到贵方已从 Johnson, Stokes and Master（约翰逊、斯托克斯及马斯特律师事务所）[一家律师事务所] 获得意见，贵方或许希望与该所及贵方的财务顾问考虑，是否希望按目前基础继续进行该交易，以及是否应寻求更正该通函及任何公告的条款。\n\n16. Mr Koo（库先生）显然十分了解 Albatronics 的财务困境。但他强烈反对该报告对该公司管理层所作的严厉批评。正如 Mr Nield（尼尔德先生）于1998年11月26日报告所述，Mr Koo 表示其不同意该审查的结论，并断言“没有证据可以说他们的董事是贼”。\n\n17. 同日，PWC 辞任 Nam Tai 的审计师。其已决定，若不同时审计 Albatronics，便不能继续担任 Nam Tai 的审计师；鉴于其对该公司管理层诚信的担忧，其不愿承担后者的角色。\n\n18. Nam Tai 对尽职调查报告的不满，亦反映在有关费用的争议中；Nam Tai 否认 Ed Chan 有权签署业务约定书。最终，PWC 接受 HK$500,000，以结清其金额为 HK$1,245,264.75 的账单，旨在使此事告一段落。\n\nB.3 有关 Tele-Art 债务的诉讼\n\n19. 第三，关于 Tele-Art（泰利艺术）债务的分歧，在导致诉讼时又呈现出新的层面。Tele-Art 是另一家在 NASDAQ（纳斯达克）上市的 BVI（英属维尔京群岛）公司。其亦陷入财务困境，并成为一笔判决债务的债务人；Nam Tai 作为受让人取得了该债务。此事发生于 Mr Koo 与 Tele-Art 创始人 Mr Elmer Yuen（袁艾尔默先生）之间存在某些个人敌意的背景下。1998年年中，Tele-Art 的主要资产是一批价值约 US$5 million 的 Nam Tai 股份，而 Nam Tai 相信，其可通过将该等款项与 Tele-Art 持有的 Nam Tai 股份相抵销，连同利息全额收回所取得的债务。\n\n20. 1998年7月17日，BVI court（英属维尔京群岛法院）应 Nam Tai 的呈请作出将 Tele-Art 清盘的命令，并应 Nam Tai 的要求，委任由 Mr Nield 介绍的 PWC 合伙人 Mr David Hague（戴维·黑格先生，以下简称“Mr Hague”）为清盘人。Nam Tai 随后发出通知，拟赎回 Tele-Art 持有的股份，以抵销 Tele-Art 的债务。然而，Tele-Art 的另一主要债权人为 Bank of China（中国银行），后者声称对该等股份享有抵押权。由于 Nam Tai 与 Bank of China 之间显然产生了优先权问题，1999年1月23日，Mr Hague 从 BVI court 取得禁令，在该问题得到裁定之前，禁止 Nam Tai 根据其赎回通知继续行事。\n\n21. 1999年2月25日，Nam Tai 提出申请，要求免除 Mr Hague 担任 Tele-Art 清盘人，指称其履行职责时存在偏颇及利益冲突；Mr Hague 坚决否认该指称。该申请于2000年9月4日被 BVI court 驳回。Nam Tai 的上诉于2001年1月19日被 BVI Court of Appeal（英属维尔京群岛上诉法院）驳回，并于2001年6月20日被拒绝准许向 Privy Council（枢密院）上诉。然而，诉讼并未至此结束，因为优先权问题仍有待处理，而 Nam Tai 已以行为失当为由再次申请免除 Mr Hague。无需进一步讨论该诉讼。\n\n22. 被投诉的披露正是在上述事项的背景下作出。\n\nC. Albatronics 的收购及清盘\n\n23. 如上所述，1998年11月26日后，Nam Tai 不再是 PWC 的客户；双方关系已终止，至少在 Nam Tai 看来，终止过程带有一定程度的敌意。尽管 PWC 提出不利建议，Nam Tai 仍于1998年12月按照认购协议完成对 Albatronics 控股权益的收购。\n\n24. 在其后约六个月内，曾尝试对 Albatronics 进行财务重组。在此过程中，PWC 承担了向主要债权人之一 Sony（索尼）提供意见的角色。根据 Mr Koo 所述，未能获得债权人所需的支持，因此 Albatronics 董事会于1999年6月17日宣布，已决议将公司进行自愿清盘。\n\nD. 争取获委任为 Albatronics 清盘人的竞逐及披露\n\n25. Albatronics 决定清盘的消息，受到香港大型会计师事务所的热切关注。1999年6月16日，即公开公告作出前一日，曾就税务事宜向 Sony 提供意见的 PWC 合伙人 Mr Colin Farrell（科林·法雷尔先生）向该合伙企业的高级成员发送电邮，称：\n\n供参考。德勤关于分拆 Albatronics 集团的一份财务报告估计，清盘费用为 HK$23m，故具有潜在财务利益。\n\n他补充道：\n\n我认为，潜在的观感问题是我们与 Nam Tai 的旧有关系；Nam Tai 是 Albatronics 集团的大股东。\n\n26. 然而，可能参与其中的 PWC 合伙人得出结论，担任 Albatronics 的清盘人不会产生任何利益冲突问题，主要依据是 PWC 从未与 Albatronics 存在专业关系。尽管双方近期与 Nam Tai 的关系出现问题，正如 Mr Farrell 所指出，且尽管其知悉 Nam Tai 已对其获委任表示反对，仍得出了这一结论。\n\n意识到其他大型事务所对该职位的激烈竞争，PWC 发起了积极的游说活动，旨在说服债权人应委任 PWC。在此过程中，PWC 决定披露其为 Nam Tai 进行的尽职调查审查中所涉、且被承认属保密的信息，这正是本案所关涉的事项。\n\n27. 该披露发生如下。1999年6月28日，PWC 使用一份题为“Liquidations Capabilities Overview（清盘能力概览）”的文件向 Sumitomo Bank（住友银行）作出陈述；该文件亦分发给其他银行债权人。文件称：\n\n1998年9月，PWC 就 Nam Tai 对 Albatronics 的潜在收购为其进行了尽职调查。我们建议 Nam Tai 不要进行该收购。Nam Tai 没有采纳我们的建议，仍继续投资于 Albatronics。\n\n尽管公众知悉 PWC 曾进行尽职调查审查，以及 Nam Tai 此后继续对 Albatronics 作出投资，但 PWC 曾作出反对收购的建议这一事实并不属于公共领域，且显然属保密信息。\n\n28. 该保密意见的披露，以完全相同的措辞重复载于一份题为“Liquidation Proposal of Albatronics（Albatronics 清盘建议书）”（以下简称“该建议书”）的文件中；该文件于1999年8月17日发送给 Sony 的律师，并分发给其他债权人。我将披露反对继续进行收购的保密建议称为“否定性披露”。\n\n29. PWC 的立场是，否定性披露具有正当性，因为作出该披露是为了回应 Nam Tai 的主张，即 PWC 不应获委任为清盘人，理由是 PWC 先前参与尽职调查审查，因而在该角色中会存在利益冲突。\n\nE. 本诉讼程序\n\n30. 该建议书所载的否定性披露，是 Nam Tai 对 PWC 提起诉讼的基础。起初，该项索赔基于恶意虚假陈述及诽谤提出。该等诉因现已不再存在，唯一仍有效的索赔是违反保密义务的索赔。\n\n31. 如上所述，PWC 回应 Nam Tai 的索赔时主张，否定性披露是对 Nam Tai 反对其获委任为清盘人的防御性回应，因而具有正当性。PWC 主张，在该等情况下作出的披露不属于其保密义务的范围，且不会因此产生违反保密义务的责任。\n\n32. 该论点获 Waung J（沃恩法官）在一审中接受，亦获 Court of Appeal（上诉法院）（Rogers V-P（罗杰斯副庭长）、Le Pichon（黎佩琼）及 Cheung JJA（张上诉法官））接受。其正确性在本次上诉中受到质疑。\n\n1 [2005] 2 HKLRD 461.\n\n2 [2006] 4 HKLRD 121.\n\nF. 法律原则\n\nF.1 保密义务\n\n33. 双方一致同意，PWC 就在尽职调查审查中向其提供的信息，以及就尽职调查报告的内容，向 Nam Tai 承担保密义务。\n\n34. 该义务要求 PWC 不得向第三方传达该信息，亦不得不当使用保密信息，即除非经 Nam Tai 同意，不得作出任何使用，或促使他人作出任何使用，而非为 Nam Tai 的利益而使用该等信息。3 该义务在客户关系终止后仍然存续，并继续约束 PWC 维护在该关系存续期间产生的保密性。4 法院谨慎保护前客户的保密信息，并会制止受信人作出使前客户面临本可避免的披露风险的行为。5\n\nF.2 保密义务范围的限制\n\n35. 本次上诉涉及该义务的限制或限定。在本案此类保密义务源于双方合同关系的案件中，出发点是 English Court of Appeal（英格兰上诉法院）在 Tournier case（图尔尼案）中作出的具有影响力的判决。6 在银行与客户合同的背景下，Bankes LJ（班克斯上诉法官）将保密义务的限制界定如下：\n\n原则上，我认为这些限定可归纳为四类：(a) 法律强制要求披露的情形；(b) 为公共利益而有披露义务的情形；(c) 银行利益要求披露的情形；(d) 经客户明示或默示同意而作出的披露。7\n\n36. PWC 的立场是，否定性披露是对 Mr Koo 指称 PWC 不应获委任为 Albatronics 清盘人、因为其在该角色中将存在利益冲突的防御性回应，属于该义务后两项限定中的一项或两项：即 PWC 利益正当要求的披露，或经 Nam Tai 明示或默示同意作出的披露。我将称\n\n3 Bolkiah v KPMG（毕马威）[1999] 2 AC 222，第235页。\n\n4 同上。另参见 Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England（英格兰国民省级及联合银行）[1924] 1 KB 461，第473页及第485页。\n\n5 Bolkiah v KPMG [1999] 2 AC 222，第237页。\n\n6 Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 KB 461。\n\n7 第473页。\n\n分别将这两类限定称为“自身利益限定”和“同意限定”。\n\nF.3 同意限定的一般原则\n\n37. 在目前不适用的例外情形之外，一方当事人显然可以放弃其根据合同享有的权利。同意限定即为此类放弃的一例。该放弃可以明示作出，亦可从保密信息提供者的行为中默示推定。应以客观标准判断保密信息提供者是否已同意披露，以及保密义务是否已被放弃，此为事实问题。\n\n38. 例如，在 Sunderland v Barclays Bank Ltd（巴克莱银行）案中，法院裁定，客户将电话交给其丈夫，而该丈夫随后要求解释银行为何拒付该客户的支票，该客户的行为足以使银行经理认为她已默示同意银行告知其丈夫拒付的理由，因而放弃保密权。\n\n39. 在涉及法律专业保密特权的 Mann v Carnell 案中，法院通过考察客户的行为是否与维持受特权保护的通信之保密性不一致来处理该事实问题。澳大利亚高等法院（High Court of Australia）的多数法官在其共同判决中指出：\n\n法律专业保密特权旨在保护律师与客户之间通信的保密性。客户有权享受该等保密性的利益，并可放弃该项权利。导致特权被放弃的，是客户的行为与维持保密性之间的不一致。\n\n强调该方法的客观性质后，诸位法官又补充道：\n\n放弃可以是明示或默示的。关于默示放弃的争议，通常源于须判断特定行为是否与该特权旨在保护的保密性之维持不一致。当对此问题作出肯定答复时，有时称该放弃是“依法归责”。这意味着，即使该等后果未反映丧失特权的一方当事人的主观意图，法律仍承认这种不一致并确定其后果。11\n\n8 (1937–46) 5 LDAB 163。\n\n9 (1999) 201 CLR 1。\n\n10 Gleeson、Gaudron、Gummow 及 Callinan 法官，第13页。\n\n11 同上，引用 Benecke v National Australia Bank（澳大利亚国民银行）(1993) 35 NSWLR 110。\n\n(2008) 11 HKCFAR 77 Nam Tai Electronics Inc（南太电子有限公司）v PricewaterhouseCoopers（普华永道） Ribeiro PJ\n\n40. 我还要补充，在默示放弃的案件中，有关行为必须清楚地传达所主张放弃的含义。正如 Chitty on Contracts 12 的编者所指出，放弃案件类似于允诺禁反言案件；后者已确立要求构成禁反言基础的行为必须清楚且明确。在 Woodhouse AC Israel Cocoa Ltd SA & Another v Nigerian Produce Marketing Co Ltd 案中，Lord Pearson 以下述方式说明两者之间的对应关系：\n\n本案并不适宜对有时被称为“允诺禁反言”的原则作一般性审查，尽管它与通常基于事实陈述的禁反言相去甚远，而且至少在此类案件中，更类似于对合同权利的放弃。在此类案件中，所称的“陈述”、允诺或保证，就被放弃的合同条款以及放弃持续的期限而言，均应具有合理的清楚性和确定性。该“陈述”、允诺或保证可能至少须具备变更合同所需的同等精确性。\n\n41. 基于放弃作出的披露，不得超出已确立放弃的范围。因此，在涉及针对律师提起诉讼的 Lillicrap & Another v Nalder & Son 案中，Dillon LJ 指出，客户的放弃通常“只能延及与诉讼中的争点相关，且除特权外可作为证据采纳的事项。不得为了漫游式搜寻其他任何事项而主张放弃；该等其他事项可能仅仅是该律师或任何其他律师曾碰巧为客户办理过的事项。”同样，在 Paragon Finance Plc & Others v Freshfields 案中，客户因前任律师在处理一项交易时存在过失而起诉该律师事务所，法院裁定该客户已放弃就该律师事务所而言的保密性，但并未放弃就其后来受委托追索并和解该客户因该项交易对第三方提出的索赔的律师而言的保密性。\n\nF.4 自身利益限定的一般原则\n\n42. 如 Tournier 案及后续案件所说明，自身利益限定反映了一项默示条款：在披露保密信息为使当事人日常合同交易具备商业效力所必需时，允许受信人披露该等保密信息。\n\n13 [1972] AC 741，第762页。14 [1993] 1 WLR 94，第99页。\n\n12 Chitty on Contracts（第29版，2004年）第1卷，第22-044段。\n\n15 [1999] 1 WLR 1183。\n\n78 香港终审法院判例汇编 (2008) 11 HKCFAR\n\n43. 因此，在 Tournier 案中，Bankes LJ 举例说明自身利益限定的适用，即“银行发出传票，要求偿还透支款项，并在传票正面载明透支金额”的情形。16 Scrutton LJ 亦提及银行“追收或起诉追讨透支款项”，以及为其自身利益而在经营账户业务时于合理和适当的范围内作出披露，例如，在资产不足时说明拒绝兑付客户开出的支票或拒绝支付客户承兑的票据的理由。17\n\n44. 如此理解，自身利益限定的范围有限。这正是上诉法院在 FDC Co Ltd & Others v Chase Manhattan Bank NA（大通曼哈顿银行）案中所采取的方法；该案中，一家总部设于纽约、在香港设有分行的银行，夹在一方面美国法院命令其披露客户在香港分行维持的账户信息，另一方面香港法院发出的禁令禁止该等披露之间。若不遵从纽约命令，该银行将面临严厉处罚，故该银行会认为作出披露极符合其自身利益。但是，正如 Huggins V-P 所指出，该等资料在美国并非“在通常银行业务过程中”所需，而是“仅为向美国政府披露之目的”，19 因此，按上述狭义理解的自身利益限定被裁定不适用。Silke JA 表述如下：\n\n我完全接受，本案及外国诉讼所涉的财务影响，表面上会表明披露符合银行利益，因而可根据 Tournier 案的例外免除其履行义务；但我不认为该例外实际上具有如此广泛的涵盖范围。它必然是指符合通常银行实务的利益，例如银行发现有必要起诉追讨透支款项或类似事项时。本案争点远比我所理解的银行这些狭隘利益广泛得多。20\n\n45. 然而，法律的发展表明，自身利益限定现已获得较为宽松的适用，并被认为延伸至上述狭窄范围之外。尤其是，如下节所述，该限定已被裁定包括“自我辩护例外”（采用 Rosemary Pattenden 教授在其有价值的教科书论述中所使用的表述21），该例外基于对商业效力要求或在保密情境中可依法默示纳入的条款的更宽泛理解。\n\nF.5 为自我辩护而披露：诉讼及纪律程序\n\n46. 已确立的是，负有保密义务的专业人士有权在两种情形下作出辩护性披露。第一种情形是客户对其提起法律程序时（本文所称客户包括前客户），例如在专业过失诉讼中。该例外的法律基础，由 Cornhill CJ 的 Lord Bingham 在 Paragon Finance Plc & Others v Freshfields 22 案中作如下解释：\n\n当客户起诉曾为其行事的律师，指称该律师存在过失时，客户即邀请法院就直接源于双方此前存在的保密关系的问题作出裁决。由于法院程序是公开的，客户将此前的保密关系带入公共领域。因此，就其主张获得公正裁断所必需的范围内，客户放弃了主张法律专业保密特权保护其与律师之间任何通信的权利；或者，换言之，客户在该范围内免除了律师此前受其约束的保密义务。这是法律上的默示，其理由显而易见。一方当事人不能故意使某一关系接受公众审视，同时又试图维持其保密性。他不能任意取舍，披露该关系中增强其损害赔偿主张的情节，同时向司法审查隐瞒削弱该主张的情节。他不能攻击其前任律师，同时又拒绝该律师使用与其辩护相关的材料。\n\n47. 在较早的 Lillicrap & Another v Nalder & Son 案中亦采取了类似方法；Dillon LJ 认可下级法院 May J 的如下表述：\n\n21 Rosemary Pattenden, The Law of Professional-Client Confidentiality (2003) 第12.C章。22 [1999] 1 WLR 1183，第1188页。\n\n23 [1993] 1 WLR 94，引用 May J 于第99页的意见。\n\n80 香港终审法院判例汇编 (2008) 11 HKCFAR\n\n客户起诉其律师，即邀请法院裁决争议，因而依我判断，在使法院能够依照包括证据法在内的法律充分且公正地作出裁决所必需的范围内，放弃特权和保密性。\n\n同样，Russell LJ 表示：\n\n……客户通过对其律师提起民事程序，默示放弃与其所追究的诉讼相关的一切事项上的特权，尤其是在为实现公正而必须披露享有特权事项的情形下。24\n\n48. 在 Nederlandse Reassurantie Groep Holding NV v Bacon & Woodrow (No 1) 25 案中，Colman J 在一段获 Paragon 案认可的论述中，作出以下对 Lillicrap 判决的解释：\n\n在我看来，对法院在此类所谓默示放弃特权案件中所作行为的真正分析，是防止如下不公平：原告若依赖因律师保密义务而产生的特权，便有权将与抗辩相关的证据排除在法院审酌范围之外。因而，当事人既不得主张律师违反义务并因此致其遭受损失，同时为证明该主张而揭开双方之间的保密关系，却又在会使律师丧失抗辩手段的情形下，试图对该同一律师强制执行因其专业关系而产生的保密义务。该原则的根本在于：本应受特权保护的保密关系，是因诉讼当事人之间的同一专业关系而产生。该原则旨在避免的根本不公平，在于针对保密义务构成特权基础的同一方提出主张，并将该专业关系公开供调查。该原则所针对的不公平，正是既通过提出该主张而揭开该关系，又试图强制执行被告所负保密义务的行为。27\n\n49. 因此，在诉讼案件中承认自我辩护例外的理据有两个方面。第一方面涉及适用反映同意限定条件的默示放弃原则。就专业人士在其与客户的保密关系存续期间的行为提出异议而提起诉讼的客户，必须知道这将导致该主张和抗辩在公开场合受到审理。因此，可以视为该客户已同意放弃保密性。第二，在所引述的案件中，披露客户秘密的正当性在于：在由提供秘密者提起的法律程序这一特定情境中，公平原则构成一项默示要求，并反映出对受托秘密者有权在该情境中保护其自身利益的承认。应当指出，Lord Bingham CJ（宾厄姆首席大法官）在 Paragon 案28中表示，该条款属于法律上的默示条款。如下文所述，另有观点29认为，该默示是基于商业效能而作出的。\n\n12)BV11(08)\\_p62-90.indd 80 11/25/09 6:50:10 PM\n\nC\n\nA\n\nB\n\nD\n\nE\n\nF\n\nH\n\nG\n\n24 见第101页。\n\n25 [1995] 1 All ER 976。\n\n26 [1999] 1 WLR 1183 at p.1191。\n\n27 [1995] 1 All ER 976 at p.986。\n\n50. 通常承认自我辩护例外的第二类案件，是客户针对受托秘密者发起的专业纪律程序。R v Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales & Others, ex p Brindle & Others（R v Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales & Others, ex p Brindle & Others），30即为一例。Hirst LJ（赫斯特上诉法官）指出，在该等情形下对客户负有的保密义务，往往会被法律强制要求所凌驾（即专业机构拥有相关法定权力时31），或可作为为公共利益而作出的披露而获正当化；但阁下继而表示，遭受投诉的会计师根据 Tournier 原则，“有权出示其自身辩护所需的任何该等文件”。尽管涉及纪律程序的案件似乎尚未受到详细分析，但我认为，在诉讼案件中就防御性披露所采取的方法，同样适用于纪律程序情境。\n\nF.6 为自我辩护而披露：涉及第三方的诉讼和投诉\n\n51. 现时似乎已获接受的是，对其客户负有保密义务的受托秘密者，可能有权为在第三方提起的法律程序中为自己辩护，而披露受该义务涵盖的信息。同样，似乎也已获接受的是，在并非由客户而是由第三方针对专业受托秘密者发起的纪律程序中，该等披露可能获准。由于该等程序并非由其负有义务的客户提起，故在这些案件中，披露不能以客户放弃为依据而获正当化。适用 Tournier 原则，正当性建立在“自我辩护”情境中适用的自身利益限定条件之上。\n\nJ\n\n12)BV11(08)\\_p62-90.indd 81 11/25/09 6:50:10 PM\n\n28 Paragon Finance Plc & Others v Freshfields [1999] 1 WLR 1183 at p.1188。\n\n29 Colman J（科尔曼法官）在 Hassneh Insurance Co of Israel & Others v Steurt J Mew [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep 243 一案中所述。\n\n30 [1994] BCC 297 at p.312。\n\n31 如 Solicitor v Law Society of Hong Kong (2006) 9 HKCFAR 175。\n\n82 HONG KONG COURT OF FINAL APPEAL REPORTS（香港终审法院报告）（2008）11 HKCFAR\n\n52. 因此，在 Tournier 案本身中，Atkin LJ（阿特金上诉法官）表示：\n\n……银行有权在为保护银行自身利益而合理必要时，并在该合理必要的范围内，披露该等信息；无论是针对其客户，还是针对就银行为其客户或与其客户进行的交易提出的第三方……32（斜体为原文所加。）\n\nC D 因此，阁下承认，在自身利益限定条件的情境下，默示条款延伸至允许银行在第三方的攻击“涉及银行为其客户或与其客户进行的交易”时作出该等防御性披露。该规则的公平性显而易见，因为银行主张有权就其因处理客户交易而招致的、对第三方的潜在责任进行自我辩护：客户可被视为已默示同意该种做法。\n\nE F G 53. 在 Hassneh Insurance Co of Israel & Others v Steurt J Mew（Hassneh Insurance Co of Israel & Others v Steurt J Mew）一案中，33 Colman J（科尔曼法官）裁定，该原则延伸至不仅允许为“自我辩护”而作出的披露，也允许为执行受托秘密者针对第三方主张的权利而作出的披露。Hassneh Insurance 是一宗案件，其中再保险人的免责声明在保密仲裁程序中获维持而对再保险受让人有效。因此，再保险受让人寻求对安排经纪人提出索赔，并希望为支持该索赔而披露仲裁中发现的文件以及裁决和裁决理由。再保险人提出反对，并申请禁令以阻止该等披露。Colman J 裁定，仲裁中使用的文件的保密性必须予以维持，但裁决和理由可在后续程序中使用。Colman J 以 Tournier 为依据，其推理如下：34\n\n在所有这些关于保密义务范围的表述中，均默示银行应能够披露信息，倘若不披露将会或可能损害银行针对客户或第三方确立或保护其自身法律权利。问题的实质在于，银行可能需要披露该信息，作为对第三方索赔进行抗辩的基础，或作为针对第三方提起诉因的依据。\n\n依我判决，在仲裁协议下产生的保密义务中，必须基于商业效能默示一项类似的限定条件。倘若为仲裁一方针对第三方确立或保护其法律权利而合理必要——即在我所描述的意义上，为提出抗辩或作为诉因依据而应向该第三方披露裁决——则作出该等披露不会违反保密义务。\n\n12)BV11(08)\\_p62-90.indd 82 11/25/09 6:50:10 PM\n\nB\n\nH\n\nI\n\n32 Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 KB 461 at p.486。\n\n33 [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep 243。\n\n34 见第249页。\n\n(2008) 11 HKCFAR 83 Nam Tai Electronics Inc（南太电子股份有限公司）v PricewaterhouseCoopers（普华永道） Ribeiro PJ（里贝罗常任法官）\n\nA 因此，Colman J 以原争议当事人之间仲裁协议中基于商业效能默示的条款为依据，为该项延伸提供正当性（就裁决及理由的披露而言，而非就文件而言）。如前所述，Lord Bingham CJ（宾厄姆首席大法官）在 Paragon 案中所采取的方法不同，阁下将该条款视为法律默示的条款。\n\nC 54. 鉴于目前判例状况，试图解决该项差异既无必要，也未必可能。本次上诉并不涉及第三方提出或针对第三方提出的索赔或投诉。然而，“第三方”案件的相关性在于表明，在客户提起的、已确立的诉讼或纪律程序类别以外，为“自我辩护”而作出的正当披露，已被承认为可基于自身利益限定条件而获正当化。\n\nE\n\nF.7 为自我辩护而披露：其他案件\n\nF 55. 反映于自我辩护例外中的自身利益限定条件，是否适用于本案这类情形？Nam Tai 未曾针对 PWC 发起任何诉讼或纪律程序。因此，不能视为其已借此放弃保密性。PWC 亦未被第三方起诉或成为第三方纪律投诉的对象，无论该投诉是否与为 Nam Tai 或与 Nam Tai 进行的任何交易有关。PWC 也并非寻求在针对第三方的诉讼或等同程序中确立其法律权利。\n\n56. PWC 所主张的是，鉴于 Nam Tai 已向债权人表示反对任命 PWC 为 Albatronics 的清算人，并声称 PWC 先前参与尽职审查，意味着其作为清算人将存在利益冲突，PWC 有权以“自我辩护”为由作出披露。该否定性披露所主张的正当性，仅在于对该项指控作出防御性回应具有公平上的必要。根据现有判例可辨识的原则，在该等情形下能否产生此种自我辩护例外；如能，又须满足何种条件？\n\n12)BV11(08)\\_p62-90.indd 83 11/25/09 6:50:10 PM\n\n57. Joseph Fok SC（霍兆刚资深大律师），35其以显著的能力代表 PWC 就本上诉进行辩论，主张原则上没有理由认为该例外不应在本案中产生。他认为，该例外可适当地以同意限定条件或自身利益限定条件，或二者兼为依据。\n\n35 与 Alexander Stock（亚历山大·斯托克）共同出庭。\n\nA\n\n58. 我接受如下观点：当受托秘密者面对由提供秘密者作出的敌对指控时，允许其作出防御性披露的条款，原则上可作为自身利益或同意限定条件的一项内容，在上述案件所确立的情形以外予以默示。\n\n59. Fok 先生邀请法院采纳 Brennan J（布伦南法官）在 Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Plowman（Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Plowman）一案中采取的宽泛方法。36阁下在讨论 Tournier 原则及 Hassneh Insurance 案37的判决时表示：\n\n我会基于商业效能默示一项保密义务，但因一方或另一方很可能会保留在某些情形下传播原本保密材料的权利，而对该默示作出限制。\n\nE 特别是，Brennan J 将其中一种情形视为“为保护一方的正当利益而公平地需要披露该材料”的案件。38 Fok 先生主张，本案中默示的该条款，证明 PWC 作出否定性披露具有正当性。\n\n60. 在本案中，就以“自我保护”为由进行披露的主张而言，我会接受默示该等条款。Nam Tai（南太）和PWC（普华永道）应被视为已默示同意（无论是出于商业效力的需要，还是基于法律上的默示），在为保护——其中包括促进——任何一方的合法利益而公平地需要作出披露时，可以披露原本属于保密的信息。我将该条款称为“防御性披露条款”。然而，审查并未至此终结。正如Toulson and Phipps（托尔森和菲普斯）的教科书所指出：39\n\n何为“公平地需要”，何为“合法利益”，必然取决于保密信息提供方与保密信息受领方之间关系的具体情形和性质。\n\n61. 不难看出，上文F.5和F.6节所讨论的诉讼及纪律处分程序案件，均符合防御性披露条款的要求。然而，每一项被称为防御性回应的披露，均须逐项审查，考察其是否为保护或促进一方的合法利益而作出，以及该披露是否为公平地需要。\n\n36 (1994–1995) 183 CLR 10.\n\n37 Hassneh Insurance Co of Israel & Others v Steurt J Mew [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep 243.\n\n38 (1994–1995) 183 CLR 10 at p.36.\n\n39 Toulson and Phipps, Confidentiality (2006) at §3-171.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1409-8 Filed 01/30/23 Entered 01/30/23 10:03:34 Page 25 of 30\n\nG. 所适用的原则\n\nG.1 负面披露是否为促进PWC的合法利益而作出？\n\n62. 代表Nam Tai出庭的Sir John Swaine SC（施韦恩御用大律师）主张，不言而喻，PWC在尽职审查中取得了保密信息；若其获任为清盘人，则无法避免不当使用该等信息。因此，该论点认为，PWC不能合法地寻求获任，因而不能为其为促进取得该任命所作的负面披露提供正当理由。\n\n63. 我不能接受该论点。PWC是否因在进行尽职审查时取得的保密信息而不得担任清盘人，尚未经过探究。由于债权人最终决定不任命PWC，因此从未有理由调查该问题；在缺乏该等调查的情况下，不能仅仅将PWC不具资格一事视为不言而喻。\n\n64. PWC为争取获任为Albatronics（阿尔巴电子）的清盘人所作的努力，是该事务所正常专业活动的一部分，因此，在我看来，是为追求其合法利益而作出。负面披露构成该等努力的一部分，就防御性披露条款而言，应视为为促进PWC的合法利益而作出。\n\nG.2 负面披露是否为公平地需要？\n\n65. 就防御性披露条款的这一要求而言，PWC遇到了困难。为证明负面披露作为对Nam Tai提出的利益冲突指控的防御性回应，是公平地需要，PWC首先必须证明，从合理理解的角度而言，该负面披露实际上是对该指控的回应。是否能够证明这一点，必须同时从PWC的角度和Nam Tai向其传达该指控的债权人的角度加以考虑。换言之，PWC必须能够合理地理解，其正以一种足以使其特定回应具有正当性的方式受到攻击。同样，为使向债权人作出的负面披露这一回应具有正当性，该回应必须针对债权人会合理理解的Nam Tai指控。\n\n66. 如负面披露构成对该指控的回应，则继而有必要问：作出负面披露是否必要，还是PWC在诉诸散布保密信息之前，本应合理地采取其他措施？该披露是否超出以自我保护方式公平地需要的范围？\n\n香港终审法院判例汇编（2008）11 HKCFAR\n\nG.2a 从PWC的角度\n\n67. PWC是否合理地理解Nam Tai的指控具有足以使作出负面披露具有正当性的含义，必须结合双方均知悉的双方关系情形加以考虑。\n\n68. 当然，清盘人负有公正行事的义务，这是基本常识，毫无疑问所有有关人士在实际层面均已认识到这一点。正如Sir W M James LJ（詹姆斯上诉法官）在Gooch's Case（古奇案）中所述：40\n\n……清盘人作为法院的人员，在清盘中所有利益受到牵涉的个人之间维持均衡和公正的立场，至关重要。他不得偏袒或反对任何个人。\n\n69. Nam Tai提出利益冲突指控的背景，是上文B.1、B.2和B.3节所讨论的情况，包括双方审计关系恶化及终止；Mr Koo（顾先生）强烈不同意尽职审查中关于Albatronics管理层诚信的调查结果；其拒绝全额支付费用；以及Nam Tai与PWC合伙人Mr Hague（黑格先生）之间正在进行的英属维尔京群岛诉讼。在该背景下，当得知PWC正在寻求获任为清盘人时，Nam Tai担忧PWC是否有能力作为相对于自身的公正清盘人行事，几乎不足为奇；PWC将Nam Tai以潜在利益冲突措辞表达的反对合理地理解为反映此种担忧，也是自然的。\n\n70. 事实上，几乎毫无疑问，PWC确实意识到此种疑虑很可能构成Nam Tai利益冲突指控的基础，因为其在《建议书》中着力回应了该项可能的担忧。在题为“独立性”的一节中，其指出Nam Tai“因我们此前与其的往来，已对我们作为Albatronics独立清盘人行事的能力提出担忧……”。《建议书》继而向债权人说明PWC辞任Nam Tai审计师一事、其进行尽职审查的情况（其在审查过程中作出了负面披露），以及其与Nam Tai就Tele-Art在英属维尔京群岛存在正在进行的诉讼这一事实。其主张，这三项事项：\n\n40 Re Contract Corp (Winding Up: Production of Documents) (1871–72) LR 7 Ch App 207 at p.211. 另见McPherson（麦克弗森）的 McPherson's Law of Company Liquidation (2001) at p.380 所引案例。\n\n……绝不会损害我们作为Albatronics清盘人的独立性。事实上，上述事项证实了我们在本案中的真正独立性。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1409-8 Filed 01/30/23 Entered 01/30/23 10:03:34 Page 27 of 30\n\n71. 因此，显然，从PWC的角度看，鉴于其知道Nam Tai会认为双方之间存在某些嫌隙，Nam Tai的指控可以被合理地理解为表达其对PWC可能缺乏公正性的担忧。对PWC可能倾向于优先考虑参与清盘的其他人士的利益，而非Nam Tai利益的担忧，很可能以潜在利益冲突的措辞表达。\n\n72. 此外，鉴于PWC在尽职审查报告中就Albatronics管理层的诚信作出了严厉的批评，而Mr Koo对此予以否认，Nam Tai自然会担忧，如PWC获任为清盘人，其不会以崭新和开放的态度履行该职务，而会倾向于维护其已表达的谴责性观点。Nam Tai同样很可能认为，这导致PWC在维护其已在尽职审查中作出的评估这一利益，与其作为公正且思想开放的清盘人行事的义务之间存在潜在冲突。\n\n73. 因此，我认为，结合双方相互往来的情况予以合理理解，Nam Tai指控的内容不足以使以负面披露的方式作出回应具有正当性。关于PWC如获任将存在利益冲突的陈述，可以具有不同含义，其中一些含义与PWC是否就Nam Tai收购Albatronics作出肯定或否定建议毫无关系。事实上，基于认为PWC因其对过去管理层不当行为可能存有先入之见而无法作为清盘人公正行事的障碍所提出的利益冲突指控，完全可以与PWC作出否定而非肯定建议相一致。如此理解，认为披露PWC曾作出否定建议是必要回应，属于不合逻辑的推论。\n\nG.2b 从债权人的角度\n\n74. 从债权人的角度而言，Nam Tai的利益冲突指控同样含糊不清。这是一项晦涩的批评，不会使债权人想到任何具体异议。他们可以合理地认为，Nam Tai的异议与PWC在尽职审查中获知的保密信息有关，而该等信息将妨碍其履行清盘人的职责；或者，该异议与审查过程中发生的某项争议有关，并具有同样后果；又或者，他们可能仅会确认，Nam Tai的反对基于某项未披露的投诉，无论该投诉是否有理，而他们并不知情。此种含糊性质的投诉，不能使专门针对PWC不建议收购的负面披露具有正当性。若Nam Tai曾错误地指称PWC肯定建议收购，则负面披露很可能可作为回应而具有正当性；但对Nam Tai实际提出的异议，不能赋予此种含义。\n\n75. 在该等情形下，弃权也不能构成正当披露的依据。Nam Tai异议的含糊性质，妨碍将其合理地理解为默示放弃其就PWC在尽职审查报告中所作建议享有的保密权。正如先前所述，41 任何弃权均必须明确且确定；为使任何特定披露具有正当性，其必须落入所援引弃权的范围内。Nam Tai的指控并无此种明确性，也没有任何依据认为负面披露属于Nam Tai所作任何保密性弃权的范围。\n\n76. 鉴于该结论，对于负面披露是否为保护PWC合法利益而公平地需要作出的问题，必须作出否定回答。因此，无须继续考虑PWC在贸然作出披露之前，是否本应合理地采取其他措施。然而，应当显而易见的是，保密信息受领方在未获保密信息提供方明确同意的情况下，为自身利益披露保密信息，充满风险，因为依赖默示同意或自利限制，可能容易受到质疑，并存在一定程度的不确定性。\n\nG.3 下级法院的观点\n\n77. 因此，恕我不能同意Waung J（汪法官）的观点，即Nam Tai（南太）提出的利益冲突指称必然意味着对与PWC（普华永道）在尽职调查审查中所完成的工作有关的保密义务作出全面豁免。42 我也不能接受如下含糊的异议：“将尽职调查工作……置于债权人的公共领域”，从而毁灭该报告的保密性。43 虽然我原则上同意阁下所述：“享有保密权利的人不得通过提出攻击而滥用该权利”，44 但我认为，不能合理地将Nam Tai的异议理解为构成此类滥用。\n\n12)BV11(08)_p62-90.indd 88 11/25/09 6:50:11 PM\n\n41 上文F.3节。\n\n42 判决书§47。\n\n43 判决书§49。\n\n44 判决书§48。\n\n78. 在Court of Appeal（上诉法院），Le Pichon JA（陆佩贞上诉法官）（其他法官均同意其意见）认为，本案属于为自卫而公平需要或必要作出消极披露的案件，并指出：\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1409-8 Filed 01/30/23 Entered 01/30/23 10:03:34 Page 29 of 30\n\n为消除任何可能产生的利益冲突观念，PwC有权作出回应，而其回应必须针对该未被阐明、因而无法理解的利益冲突指控。鉴于公众知悉其曾代表Nam Tai进行尽职调查，Nam Tai确实收购了Albatronics，且Albatronics此后不久即陷入严重财务困境，所需披露的程度不低于PwC曾提出否定意见这一事实。倘若PwC进一步披露其调查结果的细节，Nam Tai或许更有理由提出异议。但该情况并未发生。PwC将其披露限于最低限度，即其否定性建议。在我看来，该披露为应对针对其提出的未具体说明的利益冲突指称而“公平需要”或“必要”。45\n\n79. 恕我不能同意阁下的意见。若Nam Tai关于利益冲突的指控“未被阐明、因而无法理解”，则难以看出PWC就收购Albatronics所作的特定建议而作出的披露，如何能够适当地被视为针对该指控的防御性回应。可作如下检验。假设Nam Tai仅向债权人表示：“我们过去曾与PWC有业务往来，并反对其获委任为清盘人。”当然，不能认为仅因Nam Tai的异议欠缺具体说明，PWC便因此有权披露其碰巧认为可能回应Nam Tai该项陈述中某项未被阐明前提的任何保密信息。\n\n80. 然而，这正是上述引文所产生的效果。PWC显然自行推断，鉴于债权人知悉其曾进行尽职调查审查，以及Nam Tai此后继续进行收购，债权人完全可能，甚至很可能，会将两者联系起来，并假定Nam Tai是根据PWC的肯定性建议进行该收购的。若这是他们的假定，则PWC无疑可以预见，债权人可能会因担心PWC试图维持其肯定性建议，从而可能未能穷尽一切可用途径追回资产，而反对其获委任为清盘人。按照这一推理，PWC希望披露其事实上曾提出否定性建议，是完全可以理解的。\n\n12)BV11(08)_p62-90.indd 89 11/25/09 6:50:11 PM\n\n45 判决书§23。\n\n然而，这种想法反映的是PWC自身对债权人可能作何假定以及如何消除任何此类假定的推测。按合理理解，这并非对Nam Tai所说任何内容的回应。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1409-8 Filed 01/30/23 Entered 01/30/23 10:03:34 Page 30 of 30\n\n81. Fok SC（霍资深大律师）请求法院裁定，只要消极披露构成对可能构成Nam Tai利益冲突指称基础的若干主张之一的防御性回应，该披露即应被视为正当。我不能接受该项主张。披露如要正当，必须清楚且客观地证明其属于同意或自身利益这两项例外之一。若允许基于受托保密人可能认为委托保密人所作含糊陈述背后所依据的内容、但缺乏明确客观正当理由而作出披露，将不可接受地损害法律对前客户保密事项所给予的保护。对于一项未具体说明的不利指称，受托保密人通常不应立即着手披露保密信息作为回应。合理的预期是，他首先应考虑其他选择：要求澄清，或采取其他旨在质疑该不利指称而不传播保密信息的措施。\n\nH. 结论及救济\n\n82. 基于上述理由，我认定PWC作出消极披露，构成违反其作为Nam Tai前客户而对其负有的保密义务。\n\n83. Sir John Swaine（斯韦恩爵士）承认，Nam Tai并未因此遭受任何金钱损失，且未寻求支持Nam Tai诉状中提出的惩罚性损害赔偿请求。在此情形下，应裁定名义损害赔偿。因此，我会准许上诉，并命令PWC向Nam Tai支付HK\\$100，作为名义损害赔偿。我会指示各方可就本院及下级法院的诉讼费用提交并送达书面陈词。该等陈词应按如下方式提交并送达：Nam Tai须在本判决书日期起21日内提交并送达；PWC则须在其后21日内提交并送达答复。\n\nMcHugh NPJ（麦休非永久法官）\n\n84. 我同意Ribeiro PJ（里贝罗常任法官）的判决书。\n\nLi CJ（李首席法官）\n\n85. 法院一致准许上诉，并命令PWC向Nam Tai支付\\$100，作为名义损害赔偿。法院作出Ribeiro法官判决书结论段所载关于提交诉讼费用陈词的指示。\n\n12)BV11(08)_p62-90.indd 90 11/25/09 6:50:11 PM","key_entities":["Je","CIPA"],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":12417,"status":"published","published_at":"2023-01-30 00:00:00","created_at":"2023-01-30","updated_at":"2026-08-23 21:36:08"}