{"id":"court_ctb_1409_9","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":1409,"sub_number":9,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2023-01-30","title":"Exhibit 9 Q.B.","summary_zh":"裁判文书附件（英国判决） —— Ho Wan Kwok 破产案（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo），CTB 22-50073 ECF #1409-9（2023-01-30立案）。该文件为法律先例附件，系英国高等法院女王分座法庭1991年《A 诉 B Bank》案判决，裁定英格兰银行依据《1987年银行法》第39条发出的调证通知优先并推翻了禁止向第三方披露文件的禁令，指示银行必须遵从法定通知提供账户材料。","summary_en":"Exhibit (English Court Judgment) — In re Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo / Guo Wengui), CTB 22-50073 ECF #1409-9 (filed 2023-01-30). This document is an exhibit containing the English High Court Queen's Bench Division judgment in A and Others v. B Bank [1993] Q.B. 312, holding that a statutory production notice issued by the Bank of England under Section 39 of the Banking Act 1987 overrides an injunction restraining document disclosure to third parties, directing the defendant bank to comply with the regulatory notice.","body_en":"# Exhibit 9\n\nQ.B.\n\n## A A AND OTHERS V. B BANK (GOVERNO R AN D COMPANY O F T H E BANK OF ENGLAN D INTERVENING)\n\n20\n\n1991 May 7, 9; 10 Hirst J.\n\n*Banking*—*Deposits*—*Deposit-taking business*—*Injunction restraining disclosure to third parties of documents relating to plaintiffs'*  B *accounts*—*Bank of England issuing statutory notice ordering production of documents*—*Whether notice overriding injunction*— *Whether injunction \"reasonable excuse\" for failing to comply with notice—Banking Act 1987 (c. 22), s. 39(3)(a)(ll)*\n\nIn proceedings initiated in New York by the United States Federal Reserve Board the defendant bank was ordered by subpoena duces tecum to produce to a grand jury documents C relating to accounts held by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs obtained an injunction in the High Court prohibiting the bank from producing the documents to the New York court or to third parties. Subsequently the defendant bank was served by the Bank of England with a notice pursuant to section 39(3)(a) of the Banking Act 1987' requiring it to produce certain classes of documents, including documents covered by the injunction.\n\nOn the defendants' application for directions as to whether *\\*-\\** they were at liberty to comply with the Bank of England's notice notwithstanding the terms of the injunction, or alternatively for variation or discharge of the injunction so as to permit such compliance:—\n\n*Held,* granting the application, that the Act of 1987 placed the Bank of England under a wide public duty to supervise deposit-taking businesses, the fulfilment of which often required j£ it to take urgent action in the interests of those whom the Act was designed to protect; that a notice from the Bank of England under section 39(3)(a) of the Act of 1987 requiring production of documents overrode an injunction restraining disclosure of the documents to a third party, and the existence of an injunction did not constitute a reasonable excuse under section 39(11) for failure to comply with the section 39 notice; and that the injunction should not, in any event, be interpreted as F prohibiting compliance with the notice; that it was proper for such a notice to specify the documents to which it applied by class rather than individually; and that, accordingly, the defendants should be directed to comply with the notice (post, pp. 324B-D, G, 325F-G, 328A, 329A).\n\n*Reg. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, Ex parte Taylor (No. 2)* [1989] 3 All E.R. 353, D.C. and *Bank of England v. <sup>c</sup> Riley* [1992] Ch. 475, C.A. applied.\n\n*E.M.I. Records Ltd. v. Spillane* [1986] 1 W.L.R. 967 and *In re An Inquiry under the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985* [1988] A.C. 660, H.L.(E.) distinguished.\n\nThe following cases are referred to in the judgment:\n\n*Bank of England v. Riley* [1992] Ch. 475; [1992] 2 W.L.R. 840; [1992] 1 All <sup>H</sup> E.R. 769, C.A.\n\n*E.M.I. Records Ltd. v. Spillane* [1986] 1 W.L.R. 967; [1986] 2 All E.R. 1016\n\n1 Blinking Act 1987, s. 39(3)(a)(l 1): sec post, p. 317E-II.\n\n#### 312 Case 22-50073 Doc 1409-9 Filed 01/30/23 Entered 01/30/23 10:03:34 Page 3 of 20\n\n### A v. B Bank [1993]\n\n-\n- *I.T.C. Film Distributors Ltd. v. Video Exchange Ltd.* [1982] Ch. 431; [1982] A 3 W.L.R. 125; [1982] 2 All E.R. 241\n\n*Inquiry under the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985, In re An*  [1988] A.C. 660; [1988] 2 W.L.R. 33; [1988] 1 All E.R. 203, C.A. and H.L.(E.)\n\n- *Parry-Jones v. Law Society* [1969] 1 Ch. 1; [1968] 2 W.L.R. 397; [1968] 1 All E.R. 177, C.A.\n- *Reg. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, Ex parte Rossminster Ltd.* [1980] <sup>R</sup> A.C. 952; [1980] 2 W.L.R. 1; [1980] 1 All E.R. 80, H.L.(E.)\n- *Reg. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, Ex parte T. C. Coombs & Co.*  [1991] 2 A.C. 283; [1991] 2 W.L.R. 682; [1991] 3 All E.R. 623, H.L.(E.)\n- *Reg. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, Ex parte Taylor (No. 2)* [1989] 3 All E.R. 353, D.C.\n\nThe following additional cases, supplied by courtesy of counsel, were cited in argument:\n\n- *Attorney-General v. Times Newspapers Ltd.* [1992] 1 A.C. 191; [1991]\n- 2 W.L.R. 994; [1991] 2 All E.R. 398, H.L.(E.) *Barclays Bank Pic. (trading as Barclaycard) v. Taylor* [1989] 1 W.L.R.\n- 1066; [1989] 3 All E.R. 563, C.A. *Butler v. Board of Trade* [1971] Ch. 680; [1970] 3 W.L.R. 822; [1970] 3 All <sup>D</sup> E.R. 593\n- *Galaxia Maritime S.A. v. Mineralimportexport* [1982] 1 W.L.R. 539; [1981] 1 All E.R. 796, C.A.\n- *Goddard v. Nationwide Building Society* [1987] Q.B. 670; [1986] 3 W.L.R. 734; [1986] 3 All E.R. 264, C.A.\n- *Helliwell v. Piggott-Sims* [1980] F.S.R. 356, C.A.\n- *Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co.* [1989] Q.B. 728; [1989] <sup>F</sup> 3 W.L.R. 314; [1989] 3 All E.R. 252 C\n- *Reg. v. Gaming Board for Great Britain, Ex parte Benaim and Khaida*  [1970] 2 Q.B. 417; [1970] 2 W.L.R. 1009; [1970] 2 All E.R. 528, C.A.\n- *Reg. v. Harz* [1967] 1 A.C. 760; [1967] 2 W.L.R. 297; [1967] 1 All E.R. 177, H.L.(E.)\n- *Reg.* v. *Lewes Justices, Ex parte Secretary of State for the Home Department*  [1973] A.C. 388; [1972] 3 W.L.R. 279; [1972] 2 All E.R. 1057, H.L.(E.)\n- *Reg. v. Licensing Authority Established under the Medicines Act 1968,* \\*\\* *Ex parte Smith Kline & French Laboratories Ltd.* [1990] 1 A.C. 64; [1989] 2 W.L.R. 397; [1989] 1 All E.R. 578, H.L.(E.)\n- *Reg. v. Licensing Authority Established under the Medicines Act 1968, Ex parte Smith Kline & French Laboratories Ltd. (No. 2)* [1990] 1 Q.B. 574; [1989] 2 W.L.R. 378; [1989] 2 All E.R. 113, C.A.\n- *Reg. v. Sang* [1980] A.C. 402; [1979] 2 W.L.R. 439; [1979] 2 All E.R. 46, C.A. G\n- *Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council* [1956] A.C. 736; [1956] 2 W.L.R.\n- 88; [1956] 1 All E.R. 855, H.L.(E.) *Tournier v. National Provincial and Union Bank of England* [1924] 1 K.B. 461, C.A.\n\n#### SUMMONS\n\nA New York grand jury ordered the defendants, B Bank, to produce certain documents. The plaintiffs, A and others, who were customers of the defendants, obtained an injunction before Morland J. on 13 August 1990 restraining the defendants from delivering up or disclosing to the\n\n**C**\n\n#### **Q.B. A v. B Bank**\n\n- A United States court or to third parties otherwise than in connection with and for the purposes of the business and trading of the plaintiffs, any documents relating to the plaintiffs' accounts with the defendants, and ordering the latter to return to their London branch certain documents which had been removed from the jurisdiction. The Bank of England on 26 April 1991 served a notice on the defendants under section 39(3)(a) of the Banking Act 1987 requiring them to produce among others the\n- *\"* documents covered by the injunction. By a summons dated 30 April 1991 the defendants applied to the judge in chambers for directions as to whether notwithstanding the order of Morland J. they were at liberty to comply with the notice and, if so, on what terms if any; and, further or alternatively, variation or discharge of that order so as to allow them to comply with the notice. The Bank of England was granted leave to *Q* intervene in the plaintiffs' action on 7 May 1991. The summons was\n- heard in chambers but judgment was given in open court at the request of the parties.\n\nThe facts are stated in the judgment.\n\n*Michael Beloff Q.C.* and *Ali Malek* for the defendants. *Trevor Philipson Q.C.* and *Timothy Wormington* for the plaintiffs. D *Gordon Langley Q.C.* and *Thomas Keith* for the Bank of England.\n\n*Cur. adv. vult.*\n\n10 May. HIRST J. read the following judgment.\n\n### *Introduction*\n\ng This is an application by the defendants, B Bank, in relation to an injunction granted by Morland J. on 13 August 1990 in favour of the plaintiffs, A and others, which was in the following terms:\n\n\"It is ordered: 1. The [defendants] whether by [themselves, their] servants or agents or otherwise howsoever be restrained until trial or further order from: (a) delivering up or disclosing to the grand <sup>p</sup> jury in the County of New York empanelled in the matter of the *People of the State of New York v. John Doe (B Bank)* or, without the prior consent of the plaintiffs, delivering up or disclosing to any third party otherwise than in connection with and for the purposes of the business and trading of the plaintiffs or any of them, all documents and information contained therein held by [these defendants] at [their] branches in London or elsewhere within this G jurisdiction concerning or relating to the plaintiffs' accounts with the [defendants] or any of them or otherwise relating to the business of the plaintiffs or any of them; (b) without the prior written consent of the plaintiffs' solicitors herein, removing from the jurisdiction of this court any of the documents referred to in subclause (a) hereof or any copies thereof. 2. The [defendants] do return forthwith to [their] London branch or branches from which such documents emanated any documents or copies thereof of the type described in paragraph 1(a) of this order which the [defendants have] already removed from the jurisdiction in connection with the said subpoena, and [defendants are] hereby restrained until trial or\n\nfurther order without the prior written consent of the plaintiffs from A delivering up or disclosing such documents to the said grand jury or any other third party.\"\n\nThe background to this injunction, as is apparent from its terms, was that the defendants had been ordered by a subpoena duces tecum issued in New York on 24 July 1990 to produce the documents referred to in the injunction. B\n\nOn 26 April 1991 the Bank of England, who have entered the action as interveners pursuant to my order made on the first day of the hearing last Tuesday, served on the defendants a notice pursuant to section 39(3)(a) of the Banking Act 1987, requiring them to produce at Threadneedle Street at noon on 9 May 1991 a number of specified documents (comprising all or some of the documents covered by the injunction) and stated to concern or relate to the accounts or related ^ business of seven of the plaintiffs including A, on the ground that they were reasonably required by the Bank of England for the performance of its functions under the Act.\n\nThe notice specified various classes of documents related to the acquisition of three United States banks by a U.S. bank holding company. The last paragraph stated: D\n\n\"The documents specified above relate specifically to photocopies numbering approximately 5,000 pages, which were transported on 22 March 1991 from [a Middle East state] to the London offices of [a London firm of solicitors].\"\n\nThe present application seeks:\n\n\" 1. Directions as to whether notwithstanding the order made in these proceedings on 13 August 1990 by Morland J. ('the August 1991 order') the [defendants are] at liberty to comply with the notice served by the Bank of England on 26 April 1991 pursuant to section 39 of the Banking Act 1987 ('the section 39 notice') by the production of the documents set out therein and if so on what terms if any. 2. Further or alternatively an order varying or discharging F the August 1991 order so as to permit production by the [defendants] of the documents covered by the section 39 notice.\"\n\nThe summons was issued on 30 April 1991. On the following day I gave directions for expedition, and also for the service of evidence, which was most commendably complied with by all concerned during the intervening five days, which included the May bank holiday weekend. G\n\nThe defendants are an authorised institution under the Act, and are anxious to comply with the section 39 notice, but are concerned that compliance might breach the terms of the injunction. By and large, apart from one very important exception concerning the question whether the section 39 notice overrides the injunction, the defendants go along with the Bank of England's arguments.\n\nThe Bank of England submits that the section 39 notice does indeed override the injunction, on the assumption (which the Bank of England does not accept) that the injunction itself when properly construed precludes the defendants from complying with the section 39 notice.\n\np\n\n315\n\nA Alternatively, they submit that the injunction should be varied in order to give effect to the mandatory terms of section 39, so as to permit the defendants to comply with the notice.\n\nThe plaintiffs join issue with the Bank of England on all these points. In addition, they raise two further issues, (i) The plaintiffs challenge the validity of the section 39 notice, on the footing that it was not issued for the purpose of the Bank exercising its own supervisory\n\n- \" functions under the Act, but rather for the purpose of enabling the U.S. Federal Reserve Board to pursue its own inquiries in relation to its own functions as the U.S. regulatory authority; it is also contended that the notice is defective in form, (ii) The plaintiffs contend that variation should be refused on the ground that the information which led the Bank of England to issue the section 39 notice became available to them *Q* as a result of a serious contempt of court committed by the defendants\n- in breach of the injunction. The circumstances of the breach (which followed a previous less significant breach) were drawn to the plaintiffs' attention by the defendants' solicitors by letter dated 30 April 1991 as follows:\n\n\"We regret to have to inform you that a further breach has now Pj come to our attention and we are instructed by our clients to write to you about it. A full investigation of the facts is currently being carried out, but in the meantime we can inform you of the following. It would appear that, separately from the files referred to in the correspondence in December 1990, a substantial quantity of further files were moved from London to [a Middle East state]. Among these files, there is documentation concerning the affairs of E your clients. Further, representatives of the U.S. Federal Reserve Board have had access to a large quantity of files in [that state] and copies of certain of them which have been returned to London, and among these files is documentation concerning the affairs of your clients.\"\n\n- In support of the connection between this breach and the Bank of F England subsequently issuing the section 39 notice, the plaintiffs of course rely upon the reference to the Middle East state in the paragraph quoted above from the notice itself. Both the defendants and the Bank of England, while not expressly acknowledging the link, invite the court to proceed for present purposes on the assumption that without the defendants' breach the Bank of England would not have issued the Q section 39 notice in its present form. Their submission is, however, that\n- this factor in no way affects the validity of the notice or the propriety of the variation.\n\n# *Banking Act 1987*\n\nSection 1(1) provides:\n\n\"The Bank of England (in this Act referred to as 'the Bank') shall have the powers conferred on it by this Act and the duty generally to supervise the institutions authorised by it in the exercise of those powers.\"\n\n316 Case 22-50073 Doc 1409-9 Filed 01/30/23 Entered 01/30/23 10:03:34 Page 7 of 20\n\n**Hirst J. A v. B Bank [1993]**\n\nSection 3(1) lays down the restriction on acceptance of deposits, which A is the cornerstone of the Bank of England's power to regulate banks and other deposit-taking institutions in the United Kingdom:\n\n\"Subject to section 4 below, no person shall in the United Kingdom accept a deposit in the course of carrying on (whether there or elsewhere) a business which for the purposes of this Act is a deposit-taking business unless that person is an institution for the g time being authorised by the Bank under the following provisions of this Part of this Act.\"\n\nSection 8 lays down procedures for an application. Section 9(1) and (2) provides:\n\n\"(1) The Bank may, on an application duly made in accordance with section 8 above and after being provided with all such C information, documents and reports as it may require under that section, grant or refuse the application. (2) The Bank shall not grant an application unless satisfied that the criteria specified in Schedule 3 to this Act are fulfilled with respect to the applicant.\"\n\nSection 11 permits the revocation of an authorisation if, inter alia, it appears that any of the criteria specified in Schedule 3 is not or has not D been fulfilled by the institution concerned. Schedule 3 lays down a very wide range of considerations, for example:\n\n\"1(2) In determining whether a person is a fit and proper person to hold any particular position, regard shall be had to his probity, to his competence and soundness of judgement for fulfilling the responsibilities of that position, to the diligence with which he is E fulfilling or likely to fulfil those responsibilities and to whether the interests of depositors or potential depositors of the institution are, or are likely to be, in any way threatened by his holding that position. (3) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions, regard may be had to the previous conduct and activities in business or financial matters of the person in question and, in particular, to any evidence that he has—(a) committed an offence involving fraud or other dishonesty or violence; *(b)* contravened any provision made by or under any enactment appearing to the Bank to be designed for protecting members of the public against financial loss due to dishonesty, incompetence or malpractice . . . (c) engaged in any business practices appearing to the Bank to be deceitful or oppressive or otherwise improper (whether unlawful or not) or G which otherwise reflect discredit on his method of conducting business; *(d)* engaged in or been associated with any other business practices or otherwise conducted himself in such a way as to cast doubt on his competence and soundness of judgement.\"\n\nIn addition, as one of the \"minimum criteria\" for authorisation, it is laid down that the business must be conducted in a prudent manner, as H follows:\n\n\"4(1) The institution conducts, or, in the case of an institution which is not yet carrying on a deposit-taking business, will conduct\n\n## **Q.B. A v. B Bank Hirst J.**\n\nA its business in a prudent manner. (2) An institution shall not be regarded as conducting its business in a prudent manner unless it maintains or, as the case may be, will maintain net assets which, together with other financial resources available to the institution of such nature and amount as are considered appropriate by the Bank, are—(a) of an amount which is commensurate with the nature and scale of the institution's operations; and *(b)* of an amount B and nature sufficient to safeguard the interests of its depositors and potential depositors, having regard to the particular factors mentioned in sub-paragraph (3) below and any other factors appearing to the Bank to be relevant. (3) The particular factors referred to above are—(a) the nature and scale of the institution's operations; and *(b)* the risks inherent in those operations and, if the institution is a *Q* body corporate, in the operations of any other body corporate in the same group so far as capable of affecting the institution.\"\n\nIt is noteworthy, though perhaps it goes without saying, that in order to make the requisite evaluation of prudence, the Bank of England will require information both as to assets (comprising, inter alia, loans to customers) and deposits (comprising, inter alia, money deposited by\n\nD customers).\n\nSection 39 is sidenoted \"Power to obtain information and require production of documents.\" Subsection (1) empowers the Bank by notice in writing served on an authorised institution to require them to provide to the Bank such information as the Bank may reasonably require for the performance of its functions under the Act. Subsection (3) (of which P paragraph (a) is the critical one giving rise to the present notice) provides:\n\n\"The Bank may—*(a)* by notice in writing served on an authorised institution require it to produce, within such time and at such place as may be specified in the notice, such document or documents of such description as may be so specified; *(b)* authorise an officer, servant or agent of the Bank, on producing evidence of his authority, to require any such institution to provide him forthwith with such information, or to produce to him forthwith such documents, as he may specify, being such information or documents as the Bank may reasonably require for the performance of its functions under this Act.\"\n\nQ Subsequent subsections empower the bank to take copies of documents obtained, and also to require information from directors and other officers. Subsection (11) provides:\n\n\"Any person who without reasonable excuse fails to comply with a requirement imposed on him under this section shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a <sup>H</sup> term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding the fifth level on the standard scale or to both.\"\n\nBoth the plaintiffs and the defendants strongly rely on this subsection on the footing that the injunction constitutes a \"reasonable excuse.\"\n\n317\n\n318 Case 22-50073 Doc 1409-9 Filed 01/30/23 Entered 01/30/23 10:03:34 Page 9 of 20\n\n**Hirst J. A v. B Bank [1993]**\n\nTwo neighbouring sections of the Act are relied upon by the Bank of A England in support of their construction of section 39. By section 38, an authorised institution other than one whose principal place of business is outside the United Kingdom is obliged to make a report to the Bank of England when it has entered into a large transaction, as defined by the section, with consequent large exposure to risk. This of course would involve disclosing a customer's confidential information. Section 40 provides: \"\n\n\"(1) Any officer, servant or agent of the Bank may, on producing if required evidence of his authority, enter any premises occuped by a person on whom a notice has been served under section 39 above for the purpose of obtaining there the information or documents required by that notice and of exercising the powers conferred by subsection (5) of that section. (2) Any officer, servant or agent of C the Bank may, on producing if required evidence of his authority, enter any premises occupied by any person on whom a notice could be served under section 39 above for the purpose of obtaining there such information or documents as are specified in the authority, being information or documents that could have been required by such a notice; but the Bank shall not authorise any person to act *^*  under this subsection unless it has reasonable cause to believe that if such a notice were served it would not be complied with or that any documents to which it would relate would be removed, tampered with or destroyed. (3) Any person who intentionally obstructs a person exercising rights conferred by this section shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not E exceeding the fifth level on the standard scale or to both.\"\n\nThere is, it should be noted, no exception for reasonable excuse in this section.\n\nSection 82 provides:\n\n\"Except as provided by the subsequent provisions of this Part of p this Act—*(a)* no person who under or for the purposes of this Act receives information relating to the business or other affairs of any person; and *(b)* no person who obtains any such information directly or indirectly from a person who has received it as aforesaid, shall disclose the information without the consent of the person to whom it relates and (if different) the person from whom it was received as aforesaid.\" G\n\nSection 83 stipulates that section 82 does not preclude the disclosure of information in any case in which disclosure is for the purpose of enabling or assisting the Bank to discharge its functions under the Act.\n\nSection 84 provides that section 82 does not preclude the disclosure by the Bank of information to a numerous class of specified persons, including, most significantly, \"for the purpose of enabling or assisting an authority in a country or territory outside the United Kingdom to exercise—*(a)* functions corresponding to those of—(i) the Bank under this Act:\" subsection (6)(a). Section 86 provides that section 82 also\n\n319 **Q.B. A v. B Bank Hirst J.**\n\nA applies to information which has been supplied to the Bank of England for the purpose of its functions under the Act by a relevant supervisory authority in a foreign country.\n\n# *The basis for the section 39 notice*\n\nThis is set out in an affidavit sworn by Mr. Roger Anthony Barnes, who is an assistant director of the Bank of England and the head of the Banking Supervision Division, in which capacity he is the senior official in the division responsible for the supervision of institutions authorised under the Act; it was he who authorised and signed the section 39 notice, after discussion with the officers of the Bank of England immediately responsible for conducting the supervision of the defendants. His evidence is as follows, retaining for convenience the original C paragraph numbers:\n\n- \"5. In reaching my decision that the notice should be served I discussed the matter with the above mentioned persons. I was also aware of certain information recently imparted to the Bank on the subject matter of the investigation of the defendants (to which I referred in my first affidavit) by the Board of Governors of the j-v Federal Reserve System and, in addition, certain information which had been obtained by the Bank in the course of its previous supervision on the [defendants]. All this information is subject to the confidentiality provisions of Part V of the Act of 1987 which restrict its disclosure. The information concerning the board's investigation was also imparted to the Bank expressly on terms that it was highly sensitive and with a request that it be kept confidential. E The Bank is in any event concerned that disclosure of the particulars of any of this information would compromise not only the proper conduct of that investigation but also the effectiveness of the Bank's supervision. The Bank is also concerned that disclosure of such information, where the matters at issue are not yet proved, could have a negative effect upon the [defendants].\n- \" \"6. However, given the importance of receiving the information required under the section 39 notice to the Bank's supervision of the [defendants] and in order to support the [defendants'] application, I am able to state in broad terms the grounds of the investigation and the reasons for the Bank's supervisory concern. I have been informed by J. Virgil Mattingly Jr., general counsel of the board, that from information reviewed to date the board believes that the G [defendants have] acquired, directly or indirectly, control of one U.S. bank holding company (and its subsidiary banks) and two other U.S. banks in violation of section 3 of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as amended (12 U.S.C. 1842). I am informed and believe that, under this Act, a company may not acquire, directly or indirectly, more than 25 per cent, of the shares of a bank without prior approval of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. I am informed and believe that the [defendants have] never obtained such approval from the Board of Governors.\n\n\"7. I am also informed by the general counsel of the board that the [defendants] and [their] agents also appear to have made false and\n\n320 Case 22-50073 Doc 1409-9 Filed 01/30/23 Entered 01/30/23 10:03:34 Page 11 of\n\nfraudulent statements to the Board of Governors regarding the A ownership and control of the bank holding company and one of the other two banks referred to above in violation of two criminal statutes applicable to false statements made to a U.S. government or bank supervisory agency (18 U.S.G. 1001 and 1005).\n\n\"8. If true, these matters are of concern to the Bank as supervisor of the [defendants] and raise questions as to the continued fulfilment of the minimum criteria for authorisation set out in Schedule 3 to *°*  the Banking Act 1987, which includes inter alia the requirement that directors, controllers and managers of authorised institutions shall be fit and proper to hold their positions and that the business of the institution will be carried on with integrity and skill and in a prudent manner.\n\n\"9. I carefully considered the information before me before deciding *Q*  to issue the notice. I also had in mind the terms of section 39 of the Act of 1987. I was quite satisfied, in the light of that information and my discussions with the persons referred to in paragraph 4, that the documents the subject of the notice were required and indeed were necessary in order for the Bank to discharge its supervisory functions in respect of the [defendants] under the Act.\n\n\"10. I was also satisfied that it was reasonable for the Bank to D require the production of these documents. I am informed by the general counsel of the board that on the information available it appears that 'A' entered into nominee arrangements with the defendant whereby the [defendants] gained control of (or the ability to control) all of the stock of the two other banks referred to in paragraph 6 above. The documents relating to 'A' which are the g subject of the notice are therefore directly relevant to any determination regarding the possible offences identified in paragraphs 6 and 7 above as well as to the consideration of what if any action should be taken by the Bank in respect of the [defendants'] authorisation if such offences are proved.\n\n\"11. I do not know whether and if so on what basis any challenge may be made to the notice. I understand, however, that it may be F suggested that the Bank issued the notice not because it required the documents for the performance of its functions under the Act but simply to provide a conduit for information to the Board and without regard to the Bank's own functions. If that suggestion is made it is not true for the reasons stated above.\n\n\"12. I would acknowledge that: (i) I was aware that the Board was *Q*  seeking production of the documents the subject of the notice from the [defendants] for the purpose of its supervisory functions over the [defendants], and (ii) if the Bank had not received the information about the subject matter of that investigation the Bank would not have issued the notice. However, I reached my decision on the basis to which I have deposed in paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 above. \"\n\n\"13. I would add that it is of importance to the Bank for the purposes of its own domestic supervision and in order to safeguard the interests of depositors that: (a) it is aware of any serious\n\nA breaches of local law in any other jurisdictions in which an authorised institution conducts its business and of any steps taken by overseas supervisors in the event of such breaches; and (b) where, because of the multi-national nature of an institution, the Bank is in part dependent upon overseas supervision, that supervision is conducted in an effective manner. The Bank, in pursuance of its functions under the Act of 1987, is concerned that it should be able B to assist overseas supervisors for the purposes set out above.\"\n\n# *Does section 39 override the injunction?*\n\nThis is the main issue of principle which I have to decide, and is one on which the defendants side with the plaintiffs against the submission C on the part of the Bank of England that the answer to this question is in the affirmative.\n\n- Mr. Beloff submitted that there is no basis for the implication of a term to create an exception to the prohibition contained in the injunction to the effect of \"otherwise than pursuant to a section 39 notice.\" The concept of an implied term, with its inevitable uncertainties, is inconsistent with the nature of an injunction, breach of which may give\n- D rise to the sanctions attendant upon contempt of court. Parliament could by legislation have provided for the revocation or variation of an injunction, but did not do so in section 39. Section 39 is not itself a legislative provision, so the issue is whether Parliament intended by the legislation conferring such powers on the Bank of England that a section 39 notice should revoke or vary an injunction, or permit a party\n- g subject to the injunction to act in apparent breach thereof without attracting the sanctions of contempt of court. It would be surprising, Mr. Beloff submitted, if Parliament had given the Bank of England the right to issue notices calling for the immediate production of documents which ipso facto overrode court orders, and constitutionally anomalous to allow an executive order to override a judicial order, since it would deny the court an opportunity to balance competing interests; the court F should be slow to conclude that it was excluded from this arena.\n\nMr. Beloff further submitted that section 39(11) was a pointer in the opposite direction, and that a court order provided a classic instance of a \"reasonable excuse\" within that subsection.\n\nIn this context Mr. Beloff relied on the decision of the House of Lords in *In re An Inquiry under the Company Securities (Insider Dealing)*\n\n*Q Act 1985* [1988] A.C. 660, where the question arose whether a journalist had a reasonable excuse under section 178 of the Financial Services Act 1986 to refuse to answer questions put to him by inspectors, having regard to the terms of section 10 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, which provides:\n\n> \"No court may require a person to disclose, nor is any person guilty of contempt of court for refusing to disclose, the source of information contained in a publication for which he is responsible, unless it be established to the satisfaction of the court that disclosure is necessary in the interests of justice or national security or for the prevention of disorder or crime.\"\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1409-9 Filed 01/30/23 Entered 01/30/23 10:03:34 Page 13 of\n\n322\n\nLord Griffiths, in the leading judgment, stated, at p. 702: A\n\n\"The parties to this appeal are rightly agreed that whether or not Mr. Warner has a 'reasonable excuse' to refuse to answer the inspectors' questions depends upon whether he is entitled to rely upon the public interest in protecting his source and that the test to be applied must be the same whether that question arises in judicial proceedings or in the course of an inquiry such as this. The only g head of public interest upon which the inspectors rely is the prevention of crime, and so the question to be answered is whether on the material before it the court should have been satisfied that disclosure of Mr. Warner's sources is 'necessary .. . for the prevention of . . . crime' within the meaning of section 10.\"\n\nMr. Beloff submitted that, by parity of reasoning, the same words in *Q*  section 39(11) should be given a wide meaning, and not the somewhat narrow interpretation sought by Mr. Langley relying on *Bank of England*  v. *Riley* [1992] Ch. 475.\n\nIt was submitted that the Bank of England would not be prejudiced by having to make an application for the variation of a court order in the same manner as any other third party seeking a variation which affects its rights of interests. D\n\nFinally, Mr. Beloff placed strong reliance on the decision of Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V.-C. in *E.M.I. Records Ltd. v Spillane*  [1986] 1 W.L.R. 967, which concerned the position of a solicitor, who held a document disclosed on discovery by the opposite party in litigation subject to the usual implied undertaking, when confronted by a notice from the Customs and Excise to produce the document to them £ pursuant to their wide powers under the VAT legislation. The Vice-Chancellor held that, the opposite party not in fact consenting, the solicitor could not disclose the document to the Customs and Excise without committing a contempt of court unless the undertaking was varied by the court: see p. 976c\n\nMr. Langley on behalf of the Bank of England submitted that the basis of the injunction was the relationship of confidence subsisting F between the Bank and its customer, and that it was well established that the duty of confidence was overridden by the duty to comply with the law, as shown by *Reg. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, Ex parte Taylor (No. 2)* [1989] 3 All E.R. 353 in which it was held by the Divisional Court (Glidewell L.J. and Tucker J.) that where the Inland Revenue gave notice to a professional man under section 20 of the ^ Taxes Management Act 1970 requiring the delivery of documents, the professional man was obliged to comply, even though the documents might disclose not only his own affairs but also those of his clients; particular attention was directed to a quotation from the judgment of Diplock L.J. in *Parry-Jones v. Law Society* [1969] 1 Ch. 1, 9, which is quoted in *Taylor's* case [1989] 3 All E.R. 353, 360: **u**\n\n\"What we are concerned with here is the contractual duty of confidence, generally implied though sometimes expressed, between a solicitor and client. Such a duty exists not only between solicitor and client, but, for example, between banker and customer, doctor\n\n- A and patient and accountant and client. Such a duty of confidence is subject to, and overridden by, the duty of any party to that contract to comply with the law of the land. If it is the duty of such a party to a contract, whether at common law or under statute, to disclose in defined circumstances confidential information, then he must do so, and any express contract to the contrary would be illegal and void.\"\n- B\n\nIt was manifest that the powers under section 39 overrode the duty of confidence, in particular having regard to the requirements of Schedule 3, where breach of customers' confidence was inevitable, for example, when disclosing loans or deposits for the purposes of that Schedule; the same applied to disclosure of large exposures under\n\nsection 38. ^ It was, Mr. Langley submitted, for the very reason that section 39 overrode confidence that the provisions of sections 82 to 84 were incorporated by Parliament, laying down careful guidelines for the preservation of confidence by the recipients of information under the Act, subject to specified exceptions.\n\nSince the Act overrode the duty of confidence, it must also override rj) inter partes orders made on that basis, otherwise the Bank could not\n\nproperly discharge its public duty of supervision. As to section 39(11) Mr. Langley relied on the decision of the Court of Appeal (Dillon and Ralph Gibson L.JJ.) in *Bank of England v. Riley*  [1992] Ch. 475 where the question was whether the defendant was entitled to refuse to answer interrogatories or disclose documents in reliance upon the privilege against self-incrimination, or whether that\n\n- E privilege was excluded by section 42 of the Act which entitles the Bank of England, inter alia, to require a person to attend and answer questions where the Bank has reasonable grounds for suspecting that a person is guilty of contravening various sections of the Act. In the course of his judgment, with which Dillon L.J. agreed, Ralph Gibson L.J. approved the conclusion of Morritt J. as follows, at pp. 845-846:\n- F \"The existence of the defence of 'reasonable excuse' in section 42(4) of the Act of 1987, which was not present in any guise in the provisions considered in *Reg. v. Harz; Reg. v. Power* [1967] 1 A.C. 760, could not itself justify construing section 42 as retaining the privilege under the concept of 'reasonable excuse,' which was clearly necessary to cover such matters as physical inability to comply with a requirement for information or documents arising from illness or accidental destruction of papers, etc.\"\n\nFinally, Mr. Langley submitted that there was a strong presumption against the court having made an order which could have the effect of overriding or emasculating section 39, and that it would be wrong to construe the injunction as being inconsistent with powers expressly given by Parliament to the Bank of England.\n\nMr. Philipson supported Mr. Beloff's arguments, and drew particular attention to the very wide powers conferred on the Customs and Excise as shown in *E.M.I. Records Ltd.* v. *Spillane* [1986] 1 W.L.R. 967, which were nonetheless held by Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V.-C. not to\n\n**Hirst J. A v. B Bank [1993]**\n\noverride the cross-undertaking; this should apply a fortiori, he submitted, A to the injunction in the present case.\n\nMr. Philipson also submitted that the Bank of England could properly exercise their supervisory powers under the Act without the breaching of customers' confidences, and even went so far as to submit that the Schedule 3 information could be so furnished by clothing details of customers' loans or deposits with anonymity.\n\nIn considering these submissions it is very important first to establish the statutory purpose of the Act. This is contained in section 1, which provides that the Bank of England shall have the powers conferred on it by the Act, and also \"the duty generally to supervise the institutions authorised by it in the exercise of those powers.\" The scope of this public duty is extremely wide, since the authorised institutions include, under section 3, all \"deposit-taking businesses,\" of which banks are C probably the most important, but by no means the only relevant institutions.\n\nIn fulfilling this duty the Bank may often be faced with situations where extremely urgent action is required, and where delay could result in losses to, possibly, very substantial numbers of customers of such institutions, embracing both corporate and private customers, whose j-) interests the Act is designed to protect. I reject the argument put forward both by Mr. Beloff and Mr. Philipson that the Bank of England will suffer no \"inconvenience\" if they have to apply to vary an injunction before they can set the section 39 process in motion; in most cases they will probably not even know of the existence of an injunction until after the notice is served; and it is idle to suggest that, once this present case is decided, no similar points to those taken here by the plaintiffs will be E raised in future. It is noteworthy that, even in the present case, where every effort has been made to accelerate matters, the generous timelimit given by the notice has in fact already been exceeded.\n\nIt is manifest, as Mr. Langley submitted, that the fulfilment of the Bank's public duty overrides their duty of confidence to their customers: *Reg. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, Ex parte Taylor (No. 2)* [1989] F 3 All E.R. 353 and the cases there cited. This is shown clearly by Schedule 3, by section 38, and by sections 82 to 84, and Mr. Philipson's argument to the contrary, suggesting that the Schedule 3 information could be clothed in anonymity, carries no weight and is not in accordance with the terms of the Act itself; indeed the identity of a borrower might well be relevant in some cases on the issue of prudence. \"\n\nBoth Mr. Beloff and Mr. Philipson place strong reliance on section 39(11), but in my judgment an injunction does not qualify as a \"reasonable excuse\" within the terms of that subsection. The situations envisaged by that subsection seem to me well illustrated by *Bank of England v. Riley* [1992] Ch. 475, which was dealing with the same words in another section of the same Act. *In re An Inquiry under the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985* [1988] A.C. 660 was dealing with a <sup>H</sup> different statute in an entirely different situation, where the journalist had a statutory right, subject to exceptions, to protect his sources of information, so that it was natural for the court, in evaluating a\n\n325\n\n#### **Q.B. A v. B Bank Hirst J.**\n\nA reasonable excuse under the Financial Services Act 1986, to focus on that statutory right and its exceptions.\n\nThe terms of section 40 seem to me strongly to support the conclusions reached so far. Section 40(1) allows the Bank of England's officers to enter the premises of a person on whom a section 39 notice has been served for the purpose of obtaining the information or documents required, with no protection of reasonable excuse accorded\n\n\" to the person on whom the notice was served; indeed any obstsuction will, under subsection (3), expose that person to the risk of prosecution.\n\nSection 40(2) only applies where there is cause to believe that the notice will not be complied with, or that documents will be mutilated or destroyed, and is therefore, contrary to Mr. Beloff's argument, not available to the Bank of England where no such belief exists, however *Q* urgent the case.\n\n- Mr. Beloff and Mr. Philipson understandably place strong reliance on *E.M.I. Records Ltd. v. Spillane* [1986] 1 W.L.R. 967, and rightly invite me to pay very careful regard to it. However, Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V.-C. was dealing with a different statute, which did not concern statutory regulatory powers, and which does not in my judgment have the same considerations of urgency. I do not therefore consider\n- D that I should be departing from the Vice-Chancellor's decision by reaching a different conclusion on the present Act.\n\nI bear fully in mind Mr. Philipson's salutary warning, based on statements by Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V.-C. in *E.M.I. Records Ltd. v. Spillane,* at p. 973, that where the court is considering powers of a draconian nature, which gravely impinge on the citizen's ordinary\n\ng rights, the court should look jealously at the legislation, and if there is any ambiguity, resolve it in favour of existing legal rights. Here in my judgment there is no such ambiguity.\n\nNor am I troubled by the suggestion put forward by both Mr. Beloff and Mr. Philipson that a conclusion in favour of the Bank of England on this point will introduce an element of doubt into an area where certainty is important, since authorised institutions will be familiar with\n\nF the Act, and will have no difficulty in recognising a section 39 notice as an exception.\n\nFor all these reasons I have come to the conclusion, and I hold, that section 39 does override the injunction.\n\nI also consider (though this may only be expressing the same conclusion in another way) that, for the reasons given by Mr. Langley,\n\n*~* the injunction as at present framed should be interpreted as not prohibiting compliance with the section 39 notice.\n\n# *Validity of the section 39 notice*\n\nIt is convenient first to consider a jurisdictional point raised by Mr. Beloff, who submitted that the only proper mode of challenge by the plaintiffs to the validity of the notice must be by way of judicial review against the Bank of England, rather than by way of an action against the defendants for injunctive relief, since in a normal case (i.e. one without an injunction) there would be no question of a customer having locus in any court other than by way of judicial review.\n\n## **Hirst J. A v. B Bank [1993]**\n\nI have no doubt that judicial review is a proper, and perhaps in the A ordinary run of cases (where no injunction exists) the proper mode of challenge. However, where, as in the present case, there is an injunction in force, it seems to me that Mr. Langley and Mr. Philipson are right in saying that it is open to the court to consider the issue of validity, since, if the notice were indeed invalid, it could not override the injunction or give grounds for a variation.\n\nIt is common ground that it is a prerequisite of the notice that the *°*  documents sought are such as the Bank \"may reasonably require for the performance of its functions under this Act.\"\n\nMr. Langley submitted that, under the plain terms of the statute, it was the Bank and the Bank alone who were empowered to make the necessary judgment, with no interposition (as in some other statutes) of a judicial officer, e.g., a commissioner in relation to certain statutory *Q*  powers of the revenue. Mr. Barnes' affidavit quoted above showed beyond question, he submitted, that the Bank of England had asked themselves the right question (paragraph 9) and that they did indeed require the production of the documents reasonably for the purposes of their own domestic supervision (paragraphs 8, 10 and 13).\n\nHe further submitted that in any event, the Bank were entitled to the benefit of a presumption that the notice was validly issued, and that D this presumption could only be displaced by evidence of facts which could not be reconciled with the Bank having the required reasonable opinion. In support of this submission he relied on the recent decision of the House of Lords in *Reg. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, Ex parte T. C. Coombs & Co.* [1991] 2 A.C. 283, 302F where the House of Lords held, in the words of Lord Lowry, who gave the leading judgment in £ which the other Lords of Appeal concurred, that\n\n\"the presumption that the inspector [in a revenue case] acted intra vires when giving the notice can only be displaced by evidence which cannot be reconciled with the inspector having the required reasonable opinion.\"\n\nIn reaching this conclusion Lord Lowry cited the classic passage from p Lord Diplock's speech in *Reg. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, Ex parte Rossminster Ltd.* [1980] A.C. 952, 1013:\n\n\"Where Parliament has designated a public officer as decisionmaker for a particular class of decisions the High Court, acting as a reviewing court under Order 53, is not a court of appeal. It must proceed on the presumption omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta until ~ that presumption can be displaced by the applicant for review upon whom the onus lies of doing so. Since no reasons have been given by the decision-maker and no unfavourable inference can be drawn [from] this fact because there is obvious justification for his failure to do so, the presumption that he acted intra vires can only be displaced by evidence of facts which cannot be reconciled with there having been reasonable cause for his belief that the documents H might be required as evidence ... \"\n\nMr. Philipson, relying on the final paragraph of the notice itself quoted above, and upon a minute textual analysis of Mr. Barnes'\n\n327 Case 22-50073 Doc 1409-9 Filed 01/30/23 Entered 01/30/23 10:03:34 Page 18 of\n\n- A affidavit, submitted that it was plain that the real purpose of the Bank of England was to obtain the documents for the Federal Reserve Board, and not for the purpose of exercising its own supervisory function. The statute did not, he submitted, make it part of the functions of the Bank to act as an information-collecting agency for a foreign regulatory authority. Mr. Barnes' affidavit showed no more than that the Bank might exercise their own supervisory function once they had the result\n- B of the Federal Reserve Board inquiry in their hands, so that supervision was no more than a secondary purpose which did not qualify.\n\nAs to the presumption, Mr. Philipson, while prepared to acknowledge that it would apply to the reasonableness test, submitted that it did not apply when considering whether the Bank of England was acting in performance of its functions.\n\n- *Q* In considering these submission, I am bound to say that I found Mr. Philipson's standpoint unreal in the banking world of the 1990s. Clearly there is a Federal Reserve Board investigation afoot, as Mr. Barnes acknowledges. Clearly this is based, at least in part, on the documents they obtained in the Middle East country; and clearly the inference can be fairly drawn that it was as a result of this information that the Federal Reserve Board alerted the Bank of England.\n- D However, Mr. Philipson seeks in effect to draw a line down the centre of the Atlantic, and to suggest that in some way the supervisory operations of the Federal Reserve Board and those of the Bank of England are separate and unconnected. In fact, in the world of international banking today, supervisory authorities in various countries can, should, and no doubt do regularly co-operate on matters of mutual p supervisory concern as sections 84(6) and 86 confirm.\n\nAlthough Mr. Philipson demurred when the suggestion was put to him, it is palpably clear that his submission amounts to a direct challenge to Mr. Barnes' affidavit, which contains the clearest possible evidence that the Bank of England did indeed require these documents for the purposes of its own supervisory functions; this will of course involve collaboration and co-ordination with the Federal Reserve Board's F supervision, on which, as he states expressly in paragraph 13(b), the Bank of England is in part dependent. I accept Mr. Barnes' evidence in its entirety and find that the documents are reasonably required for the performance of the Bank of England's own functions under the Act.\n\nI should add that in any event the Bank of England are in my judgment entitled to the presumption of regularity both as to Q reasonableness and as to the scope of their functions, and Mr. Philipson has not been able to point to any evidence of fact which cannot be reconciled with them having the required reasonable opinion.\n\nMr. Philipson also submitted that the notice was defective in form, on the grounds that it specified the documents by class and not individually, and that it contained certain other matter which was alleged to be ambiguous, but which I shall not quote, so as not to imperil \" anonymity.\n\nThis was never a very promising argument, seeing that the notice is addressed to the defendants and not to the plaintiffs, and the defendants themselves have made it clear that they have no difficulty in understanding\n\nit and complying with it. In my judgment it is proper for documents to A be specified by class in a section 39 notice, and none of the other objections put forward has any substance.\n\n## *Variation of the injunction*\n\nThis question only arises if I am wrong on the main point of principle, but I think it proper to consider it nonetheless. B\n\nMr. Philipson addressed an impassioned argument that it would be quite wrong for the court to vary the injunction at the behest of the defendants, seeing that they had flouted Morland J.'s order, as a result of which the documents had come into the hands of the Federal Reserve Board, who had in turn passed the information to the Bank of England; and that it would be the antithesis of justice that the consequence of this *Q*  misconduct should be the discharge of the very injunction which had been designed to protect the plaintiffs from these consequences. He submitted that the court should not in principle vary the injunction at the behest of the contemner, and thus increase the adverse consequences upon the plaintiffs. In support of this argument he cited *I.T.C. Film Distributors Ltd.* v. *Video Exchange Ltd.* [1982] Ch. 431, 441 where Warner J. held that where a party to litigation had obtained documents D in contempt of court, the court should not countenance the contempt by admitting the evidence.\n\nI can well understand the plaintiffs' sense of indignation at the defendants' breaches of the injunction, and the court will have to consider very carefully all aspects of those breaches when the inevitable contempt proceedings are heard. P\n\nHowever^ in the present context, Mr. Philipson's arguments seem to me completely beside the point. The defendants are the recipients of the section 39 notice, not the issuers. As they made clear throughout the case, they are neutral as to the outcome, and their purpose in coming to the court, as the terms of their application expressly show, is to seek directions in the situation which has arisen. Very rightly, Mr. Beloff has presented arguments to the court, which have been of considerable F assistance, and which were in favour of the plaintiffs and not of the Bank of England on the main issue of principle. There is therefore no question, in contrast to *I.T.C. Film Distributors Ltd. v. Video Exchange Ltd.*, of the defendants seeking to draw benefit from their own contempt.\n\nThere is, needless to say, no suggestion that the Bank of England are in contempt, and, for the same reasons as have led me to conclude Q that the injunction is overridden, I should have had no hesitation in varying the injunction if it had been necessary to do so. Indeed, for the sake of clarity, and for the avoidance of any doubt, I propose in any event to insert an exception to cover the section 39 notice, and I will hear counsel as to the appropriate wording.\n\nI should add that I shall not accede to Mr. Philipson's invitation to qualify the variation by debarring the Bank of England from \"• communicating the documents to the Federal Reserve Board, since in my view that would frustrate the purposes of section 84(6), and would also impede the proper co-ordination of supervision between the Bank\n\n329\n\n#### **Q.B. A v. B Bank Hirst J.**\n\nA of England and the Federal Reserve Board, in relation to the international activities of the defendants.\n\n## *Conclusion*\n\nAs a result, I direct the defendants to comply with the section 39 notice, and I will hear counsel as to any other appropriate orders, <sup>R</sup> including of course the wording of the exception to be inserted in the injunction.\n\nFinally, I cannot stress too strongly the importance which should be attached to the Bank of England having, within the limits laid down by the Act and the general law, unfettered and unimpeded scope for the exercise of their most important public duties of regulation under the Act in the interests of the public, who are surely entitled to rely on C the Bank of England to exercise those powers with integrity.\n\n*Order accordingly.*\n\n*Solicitors: Stephenson Harwood; Berwin Leighton; Freshfields.*\n\n[Reported by JOHN SPENCER ESQ., Barrister]\n\n[COURT OF APPEAL]\n\n## REGINA v. DABHADE\n\n1992 July 7; 29 Stuart-Smith L.J., Leonard and Wright JJ.\n\n*Crime*—*Double jeopardy*—*Autrefois acquit—Charge of obtaining property by deception incorrectly framed*—*Further charge of theft based on same facts*—*First charge dismissed on prosecution offering no evidence*—*Whether defendant open to conviction on second charge*—*Whether same charges in substance*—*Whether jeopardy of conviction on first charge*\n\n/\"«\n\nF\n\nE\n\nThe appellant was given a cheque signed by his employers in blank for the payment of a bill. He completed it by drawing it to \"cash\" in the sum of £6,000, cashed it and appropriated the money. He was charged under section 15(1) of the Theft Act 1968 with dishonestly obtaining £6,000 from his employers by falsely representing himself as the payee on the cheque. Before the stipendiary magistrate he elected summary trial and pleaded H not guilty. On the date set for the hearing a further charge of theft of the same sum was preferred. The magistrate declined jurisdiction on the second charge and committed the appellant for trial to the Crown Court. On the same day, the prosecution offered no evidence on the first charge and the magistrate","body_zh":"证物 9\n\nQ.B.\n\nA及其他人诉B银行（英格兰银行行长及公司作为参加人）\n\n1991年5月7日、9日及10日；Hirst法官。\n\n银行业——存款——吸收存款业务——禁止向第三方披露与原告在B银行账户有关文件的禁令——英格兰银行发出法定通知，命令提交文件——该通知是否优先于禁令——该禁令是否构成未遵从通知的“合理理由”——Banking Act 1987（1987年银行法）(c. 22), s. 39(3)(a)(ii)\n\n在由United States Federal Reserve Board（美国联邦储备委员会）于纽约发起的程序中，被告银行被传票要求向大陪审团提交与原告所持账户有关的文件。原告从High Court（高等法院）取得禁令，禁止银行向纽约法院或第三方提交该等文件。其后，被告银行获英格兰银行依据Banking Act 1987（1987年银行法）第39(3)(a)条送达通知，要求其提交若干类别的文件，包括受该禁令涵盖的文件。\n\n就被告申请指示以确定其是否尽管受该禁令条款约束仍可遵从英格兰银行的通知，或作为替代请求，变更或解除禁令以允许该等遵从：—\n\n裁定，准许该申请，1987年法案赋予英格兰银行广泛的监督吸收存款业务的公共职责，履行该职责常要求其为保护法案旨在保护之人的利益而采取紧急行动；英格兰银行依据1987年法案第39(3)(a)条发出的要求提交文件的通知，优先于禁止向第三方披露该等文件的禁令，而禁令的存在并不构成第39(11)条所指未遵从第39条通知的合理理由；并且，无论如何，该禁令不应被解释为禁止遵从该通知；该通知按类别而非逐一指明其所适用的文件，属适当做法；因此，应指示被告遵从该通知（后文，第324B-D、G页，第325F-G页，第328A页，第329A页）。\n\nReg. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, Ex parte Taylor (No. 2) [1989] 3 All E.R. 353, D.C.及Bank of England v. Riley [1992] Ch. 475, C.A.予以适用。\n\nE.M.I. Records Ltd. v. Spillane [1986] 1 W.L.R. 967及In re An Inquiry under the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 [1988] A.C. 660, H.L.(E.)予以区分。\n\n判决书中提及下列案件：\n\nBank of England v. Riley [1992] Ch. 475; [1992] 2 W.L.R. 840; [1992] 1 All E.R. 769, C.A.\n\nE.M.I. Records Ltd. v. Spillane [1986] 1 W.L.R. 967; [1986] 2 All E.R. 1016\n\nBanking Act 1987（1987年银行法）, s. 39(3)(a)(ii)：见后文，第317E-II页。\n\n312　Case 22-50073 Doc 1409-9 Filed 01/30/23 Entered 01/30/23 10:03:34 Page 3 of 20\n\nA诉B银行 [1993]\n\nI.T.C. Film Distributors Ltd. v. Video Exchange Ltd. [1982] Ch. 431; [1982] 3 W.L.R. 125; [1982] 2 All E.R. 241\n\nInquiry under the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985, In re An [1988] A.C. 660; [1988] 2 W.L.R. 33; [1988] 1 All E.R. 203, C.A. and H.L.(E.)\n\nParry-Jones v. Law Society [1969] 1 Ch. 1; [1968] 2 W.L.R. 397; [1968] 1 All E.R. 177, C.A.\n\nReg. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, Ex parte Rossminster Ltd. [1980] A.C. 952; [1980] 2 W.L.R. 1; [1980] 1 All E.R. 80, H.L.(E.)\n\nReg. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, Ex parte T. C. Coombs & Co. [1991] 2 A.C. 283; [1991] 2 W.L.R. 682; [1991] 3 All E.R. 623, H.L.(E.)\n\nReg. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, Ex parte Taylor (No. 2) [1989] 3 All E.R. 353, D.C.\n\n以下额外案件由律师惠予提供，并在辩论中被援引：\n\nAttorney-General v. Times Newspapers Ltd. [1992] 1 A.C. 191; [1991] 2 W.L.R. 994; [1991] 2 All E.R. 398, H.L.(E.)\n\nBarclays Bank Plc. (trading as Barclaycard) v. Taylor [1989] 1 W.L.R. 1066; [1989] 3 All E.R. 563, C.A.\n\nButler v. Board of Trade [1971] Ch. 680; [1970] 3 W.L.R. 822; [1970] 3 All E.R. 593\n\nGalaxia Maritime S.A. v. Mineralimportexport [1982] 1 W.L.R. 539; [1981] 1 All E.R. 796, C.A.\n\nGoddard v. Nationwide Building Society [1987] Q.B. 670; [1986] 3 W.L.R. 734; [1986] 3 All E.R. 264, C.A.\n\nHelliwell v. Piggott-Sims [1980] F.S.R. 356, C.A.\n\nLibyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co. [1989] Q.B. 728; [1989] 3 W.L.R. 314; [1989] 3 All E.R. 252, C.A.\n\nReg. v. Gaming Board for Great Britain, Ex parte Benaim and Khaida [1970] 2 Q.B. 417; [1970] 2 W.L.R. 1009; [1970] 2 All E.R. 528, C.A.\n\nReg. v. Harz [1967] 1 A.C. 760; [1967] 2 W.L.R. 297; [1967] 1 All E.R. 177, H.L.(E.)\n\nReg. v. Lewes Justices, Ex parte Secretary of State for the Home Department [1973] A.C. 388; [1972] 3 W.L.R. 279; [1972] 2 All E.R. 1057, H.L.(E.)\n\nReg. v. Licensing Authority Established under the Medicines Act 1968, Ex parte Smith Kline & French Laboratories Ltd. [1990] 1 A.C. 64; [1989] 2 W.L.R. 397; [1989] 1 All E.R. 578, H.L.(E.)\n\nReg. v. Licensing Authority Established under the Medicines Act 1968, Ex parte Smith Kline & French Laboratories Ltd. (No. 2) [1990] 1 Q.B. 574; [1989] 2 W.L.R. 378; [1989] 2 All E.R. 113, C.A.\n\nReg. v. Sang [1980] A.C. 402; [1979] 2 W.L.R. 439; [1979] 2 All E.R. 46, C.A.\n\nSmith v. East Elloe Rural District Council [1956] A.C. 736; [1956] 2 W.L.R. 88; [1956] 1 All E.R. 855, H.L.(E.)\n\nTournier v. National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 K.B. 461, C.A.\n\n传票\n\n纽约大陪审团命令被告B银行提交若干文件。作为被告客户的原告A及其他人，于1990年8月13日在Morland法官前取得禁令，禁止被告向美国法院或第三方交付或披露与原告在被告处账户有关的任何文件，但为与原告或其中任何一人的业务及贸易有关并用于该等业务及贸易的情形除外；并命令被告将已移出管辖范围的若干文件返还其伦敦分行。1991年4月26日，英格兰银行依据Banking Act 1987（1987年银行法）第39(3)(a)条向被告送达通知，要求其提交包括受禁令涵盖文件在内的文件。被告通过日期为1991年4月30日的传票，申请法官在内庭作出指示，以确定其是否尽管有Morland法官的命令，仍可遵从该通知；若可遵从，则在何种条件下遵从（如有）；以及进一步或作为替代请求，变更或解除该命令，以允许其遵从该通知。英格兰银行于1991年5月7日获准介入原告的诉讼。该传票在内庭审理，但应各方请求，判决在公开法庭作出。\n\n事实载于判决书中。\n\nMichael Beloff Q.C.及Ali Malek代表被告。Trevor Philipson Q.C.及Timothy Wormington代表原告。Gordon Langley Q.C.及Thomas Keith代表英格兰银行。\n\nCur. adv. vult.\n\n5月10日。HIRST法官宣读以下判决书。\n\n引言\n\n这是被告B银行提出的申请，涉及Morland法官于1990年8月13日为原告A及其他人作出的禁令，其条款如下：\n\n“现命令如下：1. 禁止[被告]，无论其本人、其雇员或代理人，或以其他任何方式，在审判前或直至另有命令：(a) 向在People of the State of New York v. John Doe (B Bank)案中组成的纽约县大陪审团交付或披露，或者未经原告事先同意，向任何第三方交付或披露任何由[该等被告]在其位于伦敦或本司法管辖区内其他地点的分行持有的、关于或涉及原告与[被告]或其中任何一人的账户，或以其他方式关于原告或其中任何一人的业务的所有文件及其中所载信息；但与原告或其中任何一人的业务及贸易有关并用于该等业务及贸易的情形除外；(b) 未经本案原告律师事先书面同意，将本款(a)项所述任何文件或其副本移出本法院的管辖范围。2. [被告]应立即向作出该等文件的其伦敦分行返还任何属于本命令第1(a)段所述类型、且[被告]已就所述传票而移出管辖范围的文件或其副本；并据此禁止[被告]在审判前或直至另有命令，未经原告事先书面同意，向所述大陪审团或任何其他第三方交付或披露该等文件。”\n\n如其条款所显示，该禁令的背景是，被告已被1990年7月24日在纽约发出的文件提交传票命令提交禁令所述文件。\n\n1991年4月26日，英格兰银行依据我在上周二即聆讯第一日作出的命令作为参加人进入本案，并根据Banking Act 1987（1987年银行法）第39(3)(a)条向被告送达通知，要求其于1991年5月9日中午在Threadneedle Street提交若干指定文件（包括受禁令涵盖的全部或部分文件）；该等文件被称述为与包括A在内的七名原告的账户或相关业务有关，理由是英格兰银行为履行其在该法案下的职能而合理需要该等文件。\n\n该通知指明了与一家美国银行控股公司收购三家美国银行有关的各类文件。最后一段载明：\n\n“上述指定文件具体涉及约5,000页的影印件，该等影印件于1991年3月22日从[一中东国家]运送至[一家伦敦律师事务所]的伦敦办事处。”\n\n本申请请求：\n\n“1. 请求指示：尽管Morland法官于1990年8月13日在本程序中作出的命令（‘1991年8月命令’），[被告]是否可通过提交其中所列文件而遵从英格兰银行于1991年4月26日依据Banking Act 1987（1987年银行法）第39条送达的通知（‘第39条通知’）；如可遵从，则在何种条件下遵从（如有）。2. 进一步或作为替代请求，作出变更或解除1991年8月命令的命令，以允许[被告]提交受第39条通知涵盖的文件。”\n\n该传票于1991年4月30日发出。次日，我作出加速办理的指示，并就送达证据作出指示；在其后的五天内，包括五月银行假日周末，所有有关人士均极为值得赞许地遵从了该等指示。\n\n被告是该法案下的获授权机构，并急于遵从第39条通知，但担心遵从可能违反禁令条款。总体而言，除关于第39条通知是否优先于禁令这一极为重要的例外问题外，被告赞同英格兰银行的论点。\n\n英格兰银行主张，第39条通知确实优先于禁令；该主张以一项假设为前提，即禁令本身经正确解释后禁止被告遵从第39条通知，而英格兰银行并不接受该项假设。\n\n或者，他们主张应当变更该禁令，以使其符合第39条的强制性规定，从而允许被告遵守该通知。\n\n原告就所有这些问题与英格兰银行（Bank of England）相争。此外，他们提出另外两个问题：(i) 原告质疑第39条通知的有效性，理由是该通知并非为使英格兰银行行使其根据该法所享有的自身监管职能而发出，而是为使美国联邦储备委员会（U.S. Federal Reserve Board）能够就其作为美国监管机构所享有的自身职能进行调查而发出；另有人主张该通知在形式上存在瑕疵；(ii) 原告主张应拒绝变更，理由是促使英格兰银行发出第39条通知的信息，是其因被告违反禁令、构成严重藐视法庭行为而获得的。被告的律师于1991年4月30日以函件形式将该违反行为的情形（此前曾发生过一次较不严重的违反行为）告知原告，内容如下：\n\n“我们遗憾地通知您，我们现已注意到又一次违反行为；我们的客户指示我们就此致函您。目前正在对事实进行全面调查，但与此同时，我们可以向您说明以下情况。看来，除1990年12月通信中提及的档案外，又有大量档案从伦敦移往[某中东国家]。这些档案中包括与贵方客户事务有关的文件。此外，美国联邦储备委员会的代表曾查阅[该国]的大量档案，以及其中某些已被送回伦敦的档案副本；这些档案中包括与贵方客户事务有关的文件。”\n\n为支持该违反行为与英格兰银行后来发出第39条通知之间的关联，原告当然援引了上文从该通知本身所引段落中对该中东国家的提及。被告和英格兰银行均未明确承认该关联，但均请法院为目前目的基于如下假设行事：若无被告的违反行为，英格兰银行不会以其现有形式发出第39条通知。然而，他们主张，该因素丝毫不影响该通知的有效性或变更的适当性。\n\n1987年银行法\n\n第1(1)条规定：\n\n“英格兰银行（在本法中称为‘银行’）应享有本法赋予其的权力，并负有一般性义务，即在行使该等权力时监督由其授权的机构。”\n\n316 Case 22-50073 Doc 1409-9 Filed 01/30/23 Entered 01/30/23 10:03:34 Page 7 of 20\n\nHirst J.（赫斯特法官） A 诉 B Bank（B银行） [1993]\n\n第3(1)条规定了对接受存款的限制；该限制是英格兰银行监管英国银行及其他吸收存款机构权力的基石：\n\n“在不违反下文第4条的前提下，任何人不得在英国境内，在经营（无论在该地或其他地方）就本法而言属于吸收存款业务的过程中接受存款，除非该人是根据本法本部分以下规定现时获银行授权的机构。”\n\n第8条规定了申请程序。第9(1)和(2)条规定：\n\n“(1) 银行可以在依照上文第8条适当提出申请，并已获得其根据该条可能要求的一切信息、文件和报告后，批准或拒绝该申请。(2) 除非确信本法附表3规定的标准就申请人而言已经满足，否则银行不得批准申请。”\n\n第11条允许在以下情形中撤销授权：例如，如显示有关机构未满足或未曾满足附表3规定的任何标准。附表3规定了极其广泛的考量因素，例如：\n\n“1(2) 在确定某人是否为适合担任任何特定职位的人时，应考虑其诚实正直、其为履行该职位责任所具备的胜任能力和判断力是否稳健、其履行或可能履行该等责任时的勤勉程度，以及该机构存款人或潜在存款人的利益是否因其担任该职位而在任何方面受到或可能受到威胁。(3) 在不影响前述规定一般性的前提下，可以考虑有关人员在商业或金融事务方面的既往行为和活动，尤其是考虑任何显示其曾有以下行为的证据：(a) 实施涉及欺诈、其他不诚实行为或暴力的犯罪；(b) 违反任何由或根据任何制定法作出的规定，而银行认为该规定旨在保护公众免受因不诚实、无能或不当执业造成的经济损失……(c) 从事银行认为具有欺骗性、压迫性或以其他方式不当的商业做法（不论是否合法），或者以其他方式有损其经营方式声誉的商业做法；(d) 从事或与任何其他商业做法有关联，或者以其他方式行事，以致令人对其胜任能力和判断力的稳健性产生怀疑。”\n\n此外，作为授权的“最低标准”之一，规定业务必须以审慎方式经营，具体如下：\n\n“4(1) 该机构以审慎方式经营其业务；或者，如该机构尚未经营吸收存款业务，则将以审慎方式经营其业务。(2) 除非该机构维持，或者视情况将维持净资产，且该等净资产连同机构可获得的、银行认为在性质和数额上适当的其他财务资源：(a) 其数额与该机构业务的性质和规模相称；以及(b) 鉴于下文第(3)款所述的特定因素及银行认为相关的任何其他因素，其数额和性质足以保障其存款人和潜在存款人的利益，否则不得视为该机构以审慎方式经营其业务。(3) 上述特定因素为：(a) 该机构业务的性质和规模；以及(b) 该等业务固有的风险；如该机构为法人团体，则还包括同一集团内任何其他法人团体业务所固有的、在能够影响该机构的范围内的风险。”\n\n值得注意的是，尽管这或许不言自明，为作出所需的审慎性评估，英格兰银行将需要有关资产（包括但不限于对客户的贷款）和存款（包括但不限于客户存入的款项）的信息。\n\n第39条的旁注为“取得信息及要求提交文件的权力”。第(1)款授权银行向获授权机构送达书面通知，要求其向银行提供银行为履行其根据该法所享有的职能而可合理要求的信息。第(3)款（其中(a)项是导致本通知的关键规定）规定：\n\n“银行可以——(a) 向获授权机构送达书面通知，要求其在通知中规定的时间内及地点提交通知中规定的某一文件或某类文件；(b) 授权银行的一名高级职员、雇员或代理人，在出示其授权证明后，要求任何该等机构立即向其提供其可能指明的信息，或立即向其提交其可能指明的文件；该等信息或文件应为银行为履行其根据本法所享有的职能而可合理要求的信息或文件。”\n\n其后各款授权银行复制所取得的文件，并要求董事及其他高级职员提供信息。第(11)款规定：\n\n“任何人在无合理辩解的情况下未遵守根据本条向其施加的要求，即构成犯罪；经简易程序定罪，可处不超过六个月的监禁，或不超过标准等级表第五级的罚款，或并处两者。”\n\n原告和被告均强烈依赖该款，理由是该禁令构成“合理辩解”。\n\n318 Case 22-50073 Doc 1409-9 Filed 01/30/23 Entered 01/30/23 10:03:34 Page 9 of 20\n\nHirst J.（赫斯特法官） A 诉 B Bank（B银行） [1993]\n\n该法相邻的两个条文被英格兰银行援引，以支持其对第39条的解释。根据第38条，除主要营业地点位于英国境外的机构外，获授权机构在与一项由该条界定的大额交易达成交易并因此面临重大风险敞口时，有义务向英格兰银行提交报告。这当然会涉及披露客户的保密信息。第40条规定：\n\n“(1) 银行的任何高级职员、雇员或代理人，在被要求时出示其授权证明后，可以进入任何由已根据上文第39条获送达通知的人占用的场所，以取得该通知所要求的信息或文件，并行使该条第(5)款赋予的权力。(2) 银行的任何高级职员、雇员或代理人，在被要求时出示其授权证明后，可以进入任何由可能根据上文第39条获送达通知的人占用的场所，以取得该授权书中指明的信息或文件；该等信息或文件应为可由该等通知要求提供的信息或文件；但除非银行有合理理由相信，如送达该等通知，其将不会获遵守，或该通知所涉任何文件将被移走、篡改或销毁，否则银行不得授权任何人根据本款行事。(3) 任何人故意妨碍他人行使本条赋予的权利，即构成犯罪；经简易程序定罪，可处不超过六个月的监禁，或不超过标准等级表第五级的罚款，或并处两者。”\n\n应当指出，本条没有合理辩解的例外规定。\n\n第82条规定：\n\n“除本法本部分后续规定另有规定外——(a) 任何人为根据本法或为本法之目的而收到与任何人业务或其他事务有关的信息；及(b) 任何人直接或间接从如上所述已收到该等信息的人处取得任何该等信息，未经该信息所涉之人的同意，以及（如非同一人）如上所述提供该信息之人的同意，均不得披露该信息。”\n\n第83条规定，如在任何情况下披露信息是为了使银行能够或协助银行履行其根据该法所享有的职能，则第82条不妨碍该信息的披露。\n\n第84条规定，第82条并不妨碍银行向数量众多的特定人士类别披露信息，其中最重要的是，“为使位于联合王国以外某一国家或地区的主管机关能够行使或协助其行使——(a) 与下列机关的职能相对应的职能——(i) 银行根据本法所享有的职能：”第(6)(a)款。第86条规定，第82条还\n\nA v. B Bank，Hirst 法官\n\n适用于相关外国监管机构为英格兰银行（Bank of England）履行其在本法下的职能而向其提供的信息。\n\n第39条通知的依据\n\n该依据载于 Roger Anthony Barnes 先生宣誓作出的宣誓书中。Barnes 先生是英格兰银行的助理主任兼银行监管司司长；以该身份，他是该司中负责监督根据本法获授权机构的高级官员。他在与直接负责对被告实施监管的英格兰银行工作人员讨论后，授权并签署了第39条通知。他的证词如下，为方便起见，保留原有 C 段落编号：\n\n“5. 在作出应当送达该通知的决定时，我与上述人员讨论了该事项。我亦知悉，联邦储备系统理事会（Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System）最近就其对被告的调查事项向银行提供的某些信息（我在第一份宣誓书中提及该等信息），以及银行在此前对被告实施监管过程中获得的某些信息。所有该等信息均受 1987 年法案第五部分保密规定的约束，该等规定限制其披露。有关理事会调查的信息亦是在明确表明其具有高度敏感性并要求予以保密的条件下提供给银行的。无论如何，银行担心披露任何该等信息的详情，不仅会损害该项调查的适当进行，也会损害银行监管的有效性。银行还担心，在争议事项尚未得到证明的情况下披露该等信息，可能会对被告产生不利影响。\n\n“6. 然而，鉴于获得第39条通知所要求的信息对于银行监管被告的重要性，并为支持被告的申请，我能够概括说明调查的理由及银行监管关切的原因。理事会总法律顾问 J. Virgil Mattingly Jr. 告知我，根据迄今审阅的信息，理事会认为，被告直接或间接取得了一家美国银行控股公司（及其附属银行）和另外两家美国银行的控制权，违反了经修订的 1956 年《银行控股公司法》（Bank Holding Company Act of 1956）第3条（12 U.S.C. 1842）。据告知并相信，根据该法，公司未经联邦储备系统理事会事先批准，不得直接或间接取得一家银行超过 25 per cent, 的股份。据告知并相信，被告从未获得理事会的此类批准。\n\n“7. 理事会总法律顾问还告知我，被告及其代理人似乎还就上述银行控股公司及另外两家银行之一的所有权和控制权，向理事会作出了虚假和欺诈性陈述，违反了适用于向美国政府或银行监管机构作出虚假陈述的两项刑事法规（18 U.S.G. 1001 and 1005）。\n\n“8. 如果属实，这些事项会引起作为被告监管机构的银行的关切，并对被告是否持续符合 1987 年《银行法》（Banking Act 1987）附表3规定的最低授权标准提出疑问。该等标准尤其包括以下要求：获授权机构的董事、控制人及管理人员必须适合并适当地担任其职位，且该机构的业务将以诚信、技能和审慎方式经营。\n\n“9. 在决定发出通知之前，我仔细考虑了提交给我的信息。我亦考虑到 1987 年法案第39条的条款。鉴于该等信息以及我与第4段所述人员的讨论，我完全确信，通知所涉文件为使银行能够履行其根据本法对被告的监管职能所需要，而且确有必要。\n\n“10. 我还确信，银行要求提交这些文件是合理的。理事会总法律顾问告知我，根据现有信息，‘A’似乎与被告订立了代名人安排，据此被告取得了对上文第6段所述另外两家银行全部股份的控制权（或控制该等股份的能力）。因此，通知所涉与‘A’有关的文件，与就上文第6及第7段所识别的可能违法行为作出的任何认定直接相关，也与在该等违法行为得到证明时考虑银行应就被告的授权采取何种行动直接相关。\n\n“11. 我不知道是否会对通知提出任何质疑；如会提出，也不知道其依据为何。然而，我理解，可能有人会主张，银行发出该通知并非因为其履行本法下职能需要这些文件，而只是为了向理事会提供信息通道，且未顾及银行自身的职能。如作出该主张，则基于上述理由，该主张并不属实。\n\n“12. 我承认：(i) 我知道理事会正为履行其对被告的监管职能，而向被告寻求取得通知所涉文件；以及 (ii) 如果银行未收到有关该项调查事项的信息，银行本不会发出该通知。然而，我是基于我在上文第8、第9及第10段中所宣誓陈述的依据作出决定的。\n\n“13. 我还要补充，为了银行自身国内监管的目的，并为保障存款人的利益，下列事项对银行具有重要性：(a) 银行知悉获授权机构开展业务的任何其他司法管辖区内发生的任何严重违反当地法律的行为，以及在发生该等违反行为时海外监管机构采取的任何措施；以及 (b) 在由于某一机构的跨国性质，银行部分依赖海外监管的情况下，该等监管以有效方式进行。银行在履行其 1987 年法案下的职能时，关切其应能够为实现上述目的协助海外监管机构。”\n\n第39条是否优先于禁令？\n\n这是我必须裁定的主要原则问题。被告与原告一致反对英格兰银行所提出的主张，即该问题的答案为肯定。\n\nBeloff 先生主张，没有依据可推定一项条款，以创设对禁令所含禁止规定的例外，即“除非依第39条通知行事”。默示条款这一概念及其不可避免的不确定性，与禁令的性质不一致；违反禁令可能导致藐视法庭所附随的制裁。议会本可通过立法规定撤销或变更禁令，但其未在第39条中如此规定。第39条本身并非立法规定，因此问题在于，议会是否意图通过赋予英格兰银行该等权力的立法，使第39条通知撤销或变更禁令，或允许受禁令约束的一方在表面上违反该禁令的情况下行事而不招致藐视法庭制裁。Beloff 先生主张，若议会赋予英格兰银行发出通知、要求立即提交文件的权利，而该等通知当然优先于法院命令，将令人惊讶；允许行政命令优先于司法命令在宪法上亦属反常，因为这会剥夺法院权衡相互竞争利益的机会；法院应当谨慎认定其被排除在该领域之外。\n\nBeloff 先生进一步主张，第39(11)条指向相反方向，且法院命令构成该款所称“合理理由”的典型情形。\n\n在此背景下，Beloff 先生援引上议院（House of Lords）在 In re An Inquiry under the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 [1988] A.C. 660 一案中的裁决。该案中产生的问题是，鉴于 1981 年《藐视法庭法》（Contempt of Court Act 1981）第10条的规定，记者是否依据 1986 年《金融服务法》（Financial Services Act 1986）第178条有合理理由拒绝回答监察员向其提出的问题。第10条规定：\n\n“任何法院不得要求任何人披露，也不得因任何人拒绝披露其负责的出版物所含信息的来源而认定其犯有藐视法庭罪，除非法院确信，为司法公正、国家安全或防止骚乱或犯罪之利益，披露属必要。”\n\nGriffiths 勋爵在主导判决中于第702页陈述：\n\n“本次上诉的当事人正确地一致认为，Warner 先生是否有‘合理理由’拒绝回答监察员的问题，取决于他是否有权依赖保护其信息来源的公共利益；无论该问题是在司法程序中，还是在本案此类调查过程中出现，所应适用的标准必须相同。监察员所依赖的唯一公共利益事项是防止犯罪，因此需要回答的问题是，基于提交给它的材料，法院是否应当确信，披露 Warner 先生的信息来源在第10条的含义内‘为防止……犯罪……属必要’。”\n\nBeloff 先生主张，基于同等推理，第39(11)条中的相同措辞应被赋予宽泛含义，而不应采用 Langley 先生援引 Bank of England v. Riley [1992] Ch. 475 所主张的较为狭窄的解释。\n\n有人主张，英格兰银行不会因必须如任何其他寻求变更影响其权利或利益的第三方一样，申请变更法院命令而受到不利影响。\n\n最后，Beloff先生强烈依赖于 Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V.-C. 在 E.M.I. Records Ltd. v Spillane [1986] 1 W.L.R. 967 一案中的判决；该案涉及一名律师的地位：该律师持有诉讼中对方当事人在证据开示程序中披露的一份文件，且受通常默示承诺的约束；其后，海关与消费税局（Customs and Excise）根据其在增值税立法下的广泛权力，向其发出通知，要求其向该局提交该文件。副大法官认为，在对方当事人事实上未予同意的情况下，除非法院变更该承诺，否则该律师不得向海关与消费税局披露该文件，违者即构成藐视法庭：见第976页c栏。\n\n代表英格兰银行（Bank of England）的 Langley先生主张，禁令的依据是英格兰银行与其客户之间持续存在的保密关系；而正如 Reg. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, Ex parte Taylor (No. 2) [1989] 3 All E.R. 353 所示，保密义务受遵守法律之义务的优先效力所排除，这一点已获充分确立。在该案中，分庭法院（Divisional Court）（Glidewell L.J. 和 Tucker J.）认为，税务局（Inland Revenue）根据 Taxes Management Act 1970 第20条向专业人士发出通知，要求交付文件时，该专业人士有义务遵从，即使该等文件可能披露的不仅是其自身事务，也包括其客户的事务；特别提请注意 Diplock L.J. 在 Parry-Jones v. Law Society [1969] 1 Ch. 1, 9 一案判决中所作的一段引文，该引文载于 Taylor案 [1989] 3 All E.R. 353, 360：\n\n“我们在此所关注的是律师与客户之间通常为默示、但有时为明示的合同保密义务。此种义务不仅存在于律师与客户之间，例如，也存在于银行家与客户、医生与病人以及会计师与客户之间。任何合同一方均有遵守本国法律的义务，此种保密义务从属于且受该义务的优先效力所排除。如果合同一方无论依据普通法还是成文法，有义务在明确界定的情形下披露保密信息，则其必须如此行事；任何与此相反的明示合同均属非法且无效。”\n\n显然，第39条规定的权力排除了保密义务，尤其是考虑到附表3的要求；在该附表下，违反对客户的保密义务不可避免，例如，为该附表之目的披露贷款或存款时即是如此；第38条下对大额风险暴露的披露亦同。Langley先生主张，正是由于第39条排除了保密义务，议会才纳入第82至84条的规定，为根据本法接收信息者如何维护保密性制定审慎的指引，但受所规定例外情形的限制。\n\n既然本法排除了保密义务，它也必然排除以该义务为基础作出的当事人之间命令，否则英格兰银行便无法妥善履行其监督的公共职责。关于第39(11)条，Langley先生依赖上诉法院（Court of Appeal）（Dillon 和 Ralph Gibson L.JJ.）在 Bank of England v. Riley [1992] Ch. 475 一案中的判决。该案所涉问题是，被告是否有权依赖反对自证其罪的特权而拒绝回答书面质询或披露文件，抑或该特权是否已被本法第42条排除；该条尤其赋予英格兰银行如下权力：如该行有合理理由怀疑某人违反本法若干条款，即可要求该人到场并回答问题。在其判决过程中，Ralph Gibson L.J. 的意见获 Dillon L.J. 赞同；Ralph Gibson L.J. 认可了 Morritt J. 在第845至846页作出的如下结论：\n\n“1987年法案第42(4)条中存在‘合理理由’这一抗辩，而在 Reg. v. Harz; Reg. v. Power [1967] 1 A.C. 760 所审议的规定中不存在任何形式的该项抗辩；这一事实本身并不能证明，应将第42条解释为通过‘合理理由’这一概念保留该特权。该概念显然有必要涵盖诸如因疾病导致身体无法遵从提供信息或文件的要求，或文件意外毁损等事项。”\n\n最后，Langley先生主张，法院不会作出可能具有排除或削弱第39条效力的命令，这一点存在强烈推定；将禁令解释为与议会明确赋予英格兰银行的权力不一致，乃属错误。\n\nPhilipson先生支持 Beloff先生的论点，并特别提请注意 E.M.I. Records Ltd. v. Spillane [1986] 1 W.L.R. 967 所显示的海关与消费税局获授的极为广泛的权力；然而，Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V.-C. 仍认为该等权力不排除交叉承诺；Philipson先生主张，更有理由应将此适用于本案的禁令。\n\nPhilipson先生还主张，英格兰银行可以在不违反客户保密义务的情况下，妥善行使其在本法下的监督权力；他甚至主张，附表3所要求的信息可通过使客户贷款或存款的详细资料匿名化而提供。\n\n在审议这些主张时，首先确定本法的法定目的至关重要。这载于第1条，该条规定，英格兰银行应拥有本法赋予其的权力，并且“在行使该等权力时，通常负有监督其所授权机构的职责。”此项公共职责的范围极为广泛，因为第3条所称的获授权机构包括所有“吸收存款业务”，银行可能是其中最重要的机构，但绝非唯一相关的机构。\n\n在履行此项职责时，英格兰银行常常可能面临需要采取极紧急行动的情形；若有延误，可能导致该等机构数量或许极为庞大的客户蒙受损失，其中包括公司客户和私人客户，而本法正旨在保护其利益。我驳回 Beloff先生和 Philipson先生共同提出的论点，即英格兰银行如在启动第39条程序前必须申请变更禁令，便不会遭受任何“不便”；在大多数案件中，该行很可能直到送达通知后才会知悉禁令的存在；并且，认为一旦本案作出裁决，原告在此提出的类似论点将来不会再被提出，乃是无稽之谈。值得注意的是，即使在本案中，尽管已尽一切努力加速处理，通知所给予的宽裕期限事实上也已经超过。\n\n正如 Langley先生所主张，英格兰银行履行其公共职责的义务显然优先于其对客户所负的保密义务：Reg. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, Ex parte Taylor (No. 2) [1989] 3 All E.R. 353 及该案所引述的案件。附表3、第38条以及第82至84条清楚显示了这一点；Philipson先生提出相反主张，称附表3所要求的信息可以匿名化，毫无分量，且不符合本法本身的条文；事实上，在某些案件中，借款人的身份很可能与审慎性问题相关。\n\nBeloff先生和 Philipson先生均强烈依赖第39(11)条，但我认为，禁令不构成该款所称的“合理理由”。在我看来，该款所设想的情形由 Bank of England v. Riley [1992] Ch. 475 得到很好说明，该案处理的是同一法案另一条款中的相同用语。In re An Inquiry under the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 [1988] A.C. 660 所处理的是一部不同的法令及完全不同的情形；在该案中，记者享有一项法定权利，可在例外情形的限制下保护其信息来源，因此，法院在评估 Financial Services Act 1986 下的合理理由时，自然会着眼于该项法定权利及其例外。\n\n第40条的条文在我看来强有力地支持迄今所得出的结论。第40(1)条允许英格兰银行的人员为取得第39条通知所要求的信息或文件而进入收到该通知之人的场所；并未向收到通知的人提供合理理由的保护；事实上，任何妨碍行为均会根据第(3)款使该人面临被起诉的风险。\n\n第40(2)条仅在有理由相信该通知不会得到遵从，或文件将被损毁或毁灭时适用；因此，与 Beloff先生的主张相反，在不存在该等相信时，无论案件多么紧急，英格兰银行均不得援引该条。\n\nBeloff先生和 Philipson先生可以理解地强烈依赖 E.M.I. Records Ltd. v. Spillane [1986] 1 W.L.R. 967，并且正当地请我极为审慎地予以考虑。然而，Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V.-C. 所处理的是一部不同的法令，该法令并不涉及法定监管权力，而且在我看来也不具有同样的紧急性考量。因此，我认为，在本法下得出不同结论，并不意味着我背离副大法官的判决。\n\n我充分注意到 Philipson先生基于 Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V.-C. 在 E.M.I. Records Ltd. v. Spillane 第973页所作陈述而提出的有益警示：当法院审议具有严厉性质、严重影响公民通常权利的权力时，法院应严格审视立法；如有任何歧义，应作有利于既有法律权利的解释。在本案中，我认为不存在此种歧义。\n\n我也不受 Beloff先生和 Philipson先生共同提出的意见所困扰，即在此问题上作出有利于英格兰银行的结论，会在一个确定性十分重要的领域引入不确定因素；因为获授权机构将熟悉本法，并且不难将第39条通知识别为例外情形。\n\n基于上述所有理由，我得出结论，并裁定，第39条确实排除该禁令的效力。\n\n我还认为（尽管这可能只是以另一种方式表达同一结论），基于 Langley先生所述理由，按禁令目前的措辞，应将其解释为不禁止遵从第39条通知。\n\n第39条通知的有效性\n\n首先审议 Beloff先生提出的一个管辖权问题较为便利。他主张，原告对该通知有效性提出质疑的唯一适当方式，必须是针对英格兰银行提起司法审查，而非针对被告提起请求禁令救济的诉讼；因为在通常案件中（即不存在禁令的案件），除通过司法审查外，不存在客户在任何法院取得诉讼资格的问题。\n\n我毫不怀疑，司法审查是适当的、并且在通常案件中（不存在禁令的情形下）或许是适当的质疑方式。然而，在本案这种禁令仍然有效的情形下，我认为Langley先生（兰利先生）和Philipson先生（菲利普森先生）所言正确，即法院可以审议有效性问题；因为，如果该通知确实无效，它便不能凌驾于禁令之上，亦不能构成变更禁令的理由。\n\n双方一致认为，该通知的前提条件是，所要求的文件必须是英格兰银行（Bank of England）“为履行其根据本法所负职能而可能合理需要”的文件。\n\nLangley先生提出，根据法条的明确措辞，有权作出必要判断的只能是英格兰银行本身，不存在司法官员的介入（如某些其他法令中所规定的介入），例如税收机关行使某些法定权力时由专员介入。他提出，上文引述的Barnes先生（巴恩斯先生）宣誓书毫无疑问地表明，英格兰银行已向自身提出正确的问题（第9段），并且其确实为自身国内监管之目的而合理地要求提交该等文件（第8、10及13段）。\n\n他进一步提出，无论如何，英格兰银行均有权受益于该通知系有效发出的推定，而只有不能与英格兰银行已形成所要求的合理意见相一致的事实证据，方可推翻该推定。为支持该主张，他援引了上议院（House of Lords）近期在Reg. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, Ex parte T. C. Coombs & Co. [1991] 2 A.C. 283, 302F一案中的判决；上议院在该案中认为，正如作出主导性判决且其他上诉法官均表示赞同的Lowry勋爵（洛里勋爵）所述：\n\n“税务稽查员［在税务案件中］发出该通知时系在其权限范围内行事的推定，只能由无法与该稽查员已形成所要求的合理意见相一致的证据予以推翻。”\n\n在得出该结论时，Lowry勋爵援引了Diplock勋爵（迪普洛克勋爵）在Reg. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, Ex parte Rossminster Ltd. [1980] A.C. 952, 1013一案判词中的经典段落：\n\n“当议会指定某一公职人员作为某一类决定的决策者时，高等法院（High Court）作为根据Order 53进行审查的法院，并非上诉法院。在负有举证责任的审查申请人能够推翻该推定之前，法院必须依据omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta的推定行事。由于决策者未给出理由，且不能因其未给出理由这一事实而作出不利推论，因为其未如此行事显然具有正当理由，故其在权限范围内行事的推定，只能由无法与其有合理理由相信该等文件可能被要求作为证据这一事实相一致的事实证据予以推翻……”\n\nPhilipson先生援引上文引述的通知最后一段，并对Barnes先生宣誓书进行了细致的文本分析，提出英格兰银行的真正目的显然是为联邦储备委员会（Federal Reserve Board）取得文件，而不是为行使其自身的监管职能。他提出，法令并未将作为外国监管机关的信息收集机构列为英格兰银行职能的一部分。Barnes先生的宣誓书至多表明，英格兰银行可能会在其掌握联邦储备委员会调查结果后行使自身监管职能，因此监管至多只是一个不具资格的次要目的。\n\n关于该推定，Philipson先生虽然准备承认其适用于合理性检验，但提出，在审议英格兰银行是否为履行其职能而行事时，该推定并不适用。\n\n在审议这些主张时，我必须说，我认为Philipson先生的立场在1990年代的银行业中并不现实。显然，正如Barnes先生所承认的，联邦储备委员会正在进行调查。显然，该调查至少部分基于其在中东国家取得的文件；并且，显然可以公平地推断，正是由于这些信息，联邦储备委员会向英格兰银行发出了警示。\n\n然而，Philipson先生实际上试图在大西洋中央划出一条界线，并主张联邦储备委员会的监管活动与英格兰银行的监管活动在某种意义上彼此分离、互不关联。事实上，在当今国际银行业中，各国监管机关可以、应当并且无疑经常就在相互监管关切事项上进行合作，正如第84(6)条和第86条所确认。\n\n尽管Philipson先生在向其提出该意见时表示异议，但显而易见的是，他的主张构成对Barnes先生宣誓书的直接质疑；该宣誓书以最明确的方式证明，英格兰银行确实为其自身监管职能之目的需要这些文件；这当然将涉及与联邦储备委员会监管工作的合作与协调，正如Barnes先生在第13(b)段明确陈述的那样，英格兰银行在一定程度上依赖该监管工作。我完全接受Barnes先生的证据，并认定，为履行英格兰银行根据本法所负的自身职能，合理地需要该等文件。\n\n我还应补充，无论如何，我认为英格兰银行就合理性及其职能范围均有权享有合法性推定，而Philipson先生未能指出任何不能与其已形成所要求的合理意见相一致的事实证据。\n\nPhilipson先生还提出，该通知在形式上存在瑕疵，理由是其按类别而非逐份列明文件，并且其中载有其他被指称为含义不明确的内容；但为免危及匿名性，我将不予引述。\n\n这从来就不是一个很有希望的论点，因为该通知是致被告而非原告，且被告自身已明确表示，他们在理解及遵守该通知方面不存在任何困难。我认为，在第39条通知中按类别列明文件是适当的，而所提出的其他异议均无实质依据。\n\n禁令的变更\n\n只有在我对主要原则问题的判断有误时，才会产生这一问题，但我仍认为审议该问题是适当的。\n\nPhilipson先生提出强烈主张，法院应被告之请求变更禁令将极不恰当，因为被告曾藐视Morland法官（莫兰德法官）的命令，致使文件落入联邦储备委员会之手，而该委员会继而将有关信息转交英格兰银行；若该不当行为的后果竟是解除原本旨在保护原告免受这些后果影响的禁令，将完全背离正义。他提出，原则上法院不应应藐视法庭者之请求变更禁令，从而加重原告所承受的不利后果。为支持该论点，他援引I.T.C. Film Distributors Ltd. v. Video Exchange Ltd. [1982] Ch. 431, 441一案，其中Warner法官（华纳法官）认定，如诉讼一方当事人藐视法庭取得文件，法院不应通过采纳该证据而纵容该藐视行为。\n\n我完全能够理解原告对于被告违反禁令所产生的愤慨，且法院在不可避免地审理藐视法庭程序时，必须极其慎重地考虑该等违反行为的所有方面。\n\n然而，在当前情形下，我认为Philipson先生的论点完全偏离了要点。被告是第39条通知的收件人，而非发出人。正如他们在整个案件中明确表示的，他们对结果持中立态度，而他们向法院提出申请的目的，正如其申请措辞明确显示的，是就已经产生的情形寻求指示。Beloff先生（贝洛夫先生）非常恰当地向法院提出了论点，这些论点提供了重大帮助，并且在主要原则问题上支持原告而非英格兰银行。因此，与I.T.C. Film Distributors Ltd. v. Video Exchange Ltd.不同，不存在被告试图从其自身藐视法庭行为中获益的问题。\n\n毋庸置疑，并无人主张英格兰银行藐视法庭；并且，基于使我得出禁令已被凌驾这一结论的相同理由，如有必要，我本会毫不犹豫地变更禁令。事实上，为清楚起见并避免任何疑问，无论如何我拟加入一项例外，以涵盖第39条通知，并将就适当措辞听取律师意见。\n\n我还应补充，我不会接受Philipson先生的请求，即通过禁止英格兰银行向联邦储备委员会传递文件来限制该变更，因为我认为这将挫败第84(6)条的目的，并将妨碍英格兰银行与联邦储备委员会就被告国际业务进行适当的监管协调。\n\n女王座法庭 A v. B Bank Hirst法官\n\n结论\n\n因此，我命令被告遵守第39条通知，并将就任何其他适当命令听取律师意见，其中当然包括拟插入禁令的例外条款的措辞。\n\n最后，我再怎么强调也不为过：在本法及一般法律规定的限度内，应当重视英格兰银行具有不受束缚、不受阻碍的空间，以行使其根据本法承担的、为公众利益实施监管这一极其重要的公共职责；公众当然有权依赖英格兰银行诚信地行使这些权力。\n\n据此作出命令。\n\n律师事务所：Stephenson Harwood（史蒂芬森·哈伍德律师事务所）；Berwin Leighton（贝尔温·莱顿律师事务所）；Freshfields（富而德律师事务所）。\n\n［由大律师JOHN SPENCER ESQ.（约翰·斯宾塞）报道］\n\n［上诉法院（COURT OF APPEAL）］\nREGINA v. DABHADE\n\n1992 July 7; 29 Stuart-Smith法官（斯图亚特-史密斯法官）、Leonard法官（伦纳德法官）及Wright法官（赖特法官）。\n\n刑事——禁止双重追诉——先前无罪抗辩——以欺骗手段取得财产的指控错误拟定——基于相同事实的进一步盗窃指控——控方表示不提交证据后首项指控被驳回——被告是否仍可就第二项指控被定罪——两项指控实质上是否相同——第一项指控中是否面临被定罪的风险\n\n上诉人获其雇主交付一张已签名但金额及收款人留空的支票，用以支付账单。他将支票填写为向“cash”支付£6,000，将其兑现并侵占该款项。其被控根据Theft Act 1968第15(1)条，以虚假表示其为支票收款人的方式，不诚实地从其雇主处取得£6,000。在津贴治安法官（stipendiary magistrate）面前，他选择简易审判并作无罪答辩。在定为审理的日期，控方又提出一项盗窃同一数额款项的指控。治安法官对第二项指控拒绝行使管辖权，并将上诉人移送王室法院（Crown Court）审判。同日，控方对第一项指控表示不提交证据，而治安法官","key_entities":["Je","Guo","CIPA"],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":9998,"status":"published","published_at":"2023-01-30 00:00:00","created_at":"2023-01-30","updated_at":"2026-08-23 20:52:04"}