{"id":"court_ctb_1410_3","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":1410,"sub_number":3,"doc_type":"PETITION","filed_date":"2023-01-30","title":"Exhibit 3 \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_/","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"## Exhibit 3\n\n\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_/\n\nCase 1:09-cv-20423-ASG Document 48 Entered on FZLSD Docket 04/30/2009 Page 1 of 30\n\n### IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA MIAMI DIVISION\n\n### CASE NO.: 09-20423-CTV-GOLD/MCALILEY\n\n### INITED STATES OF AMERICA\n\nPetitioner,\n\nvs.\n\nUBS AG,\n\n> Respondent.\n\n### AfICUS BRIEF OF GOVERNMENT OF SWITZERLAND\n\nJohn C. Dotterrer Florida Bar No. 267260 Jenny Torres Florida Bar No. 785881 JOHN C. DOHERRER COUNSELLORS AT LAW, P.A. 125 Worth Avenue, Suite 310 Palm Beach, FL 33480 Telephone: (561) 802-3808 Facsimile: (561) 802-3318\n\nStephan E. Becker\\* Kemba Eneas Walden\\* PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP 2300 N Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20037 Telephone: (202) 663-8277 Facsimile: (202) 663-8007\n\n\\*Ad,,iittedpro hac vice Case 1:09-cv-20423-ASG Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/30/2009 Page 2 of 30\n\n## TABLE OF CONTENTS\n\n| IN
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) | 15 |\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 1410-3 Filed 01/30/23 Entered 01/30/23 10:05:52 Page 9 of 33\n\nCase 1:09-cv-20423-ASG Document 48 Entered on LSD Docket 04/30/2009 Page 8 of 30\n\nPursuant to the Courts order dated April 13, 2009, the Government of Switzerland respectfully files this brief as ainicus curiae.\n\n### INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE\n\nThe Government of Switzerland has a strong interest in the preservation of the integrity of Swiss law and sovereignty and in promoting respect by the United States of its international treaty obligations to Switzerland. Through the filing of this brief, the Government of Switzerland seeks to make the Court aware of its view that conflicts between the laws of the United States and Switzerland should be avoided, in particular when there is already a treaty in place through which the legal requirements ofthe two nations have been reconciled.\n\n### STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS\n\nThis section reviews (a) the relevant provisions of Swiss domestic law, (b) the availability of Swiss assistance to foreign countries in criminal and civil investigations, (c) the history and content of the intergovernmental information exchange provisions ofthe Swiss-U.S. income tax treaty, (d) the recent announcement by the Government of Switzerland of a change in policy regarding information exchanges on tax evasion and the related initiation of negotiations to amend the Swiss-U.S. treaty, and (e) the status of intergovernmental information exchanges relating to the UBS matter.\n\n### A. Swiss Domestic Law\n\nLike a number of other civil law countries, Switzerland exercises more control over the collection of evidence in legal matters than does the United States. Switzerland considers the taking of evidence within its territory to be a domestic judicial function, and that the Swiss authorities have the sovereign and exclusive right to take compulsory measures against persons, including corporations, that are located in Switzerland. Accordingly, a unilateral attempt by\n\nCase 1:09-cv-20423-ASG Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/30/2009 Page 9 of 30\n\nforeign authorities to compel the release of information from Switzerland without the participation or consent of the Government of Switzerland would be an infringement of Swiss sovereignty.'\n\nThis principle of the civil law derives from the doctrine of territorial jurisdiction in international law.2 Only the nation in which the requested evidence is located has the authority to enforce and execute the gathering of evidence within that nation.\n\nJudicial sovereignty is an important concept in Switzerland. Since 1937, the Swiss\n\nCriminal Code has made it a crime for any person to take evidence on Swiss territory for use by\n\nforeign governments without prior authorization of the appropriate authorities (even ifthere is no\n\nviolation of the privacy laws). Article 271, paragraph I of the Swiss Criminal Code of December\n\n21, 1937 provides:\n\n> 1. Whoever, without authorization, performs acts for a foreign state on Swiss territory reserved to an authority or an official,\n\nwhoever performs such acts for a foreign party or another foreign organization,\n\nwhoever aids and abets such acts,\n\nshall be sentenced to imprisonment for up to three years or a fine, in serious cases, to imprisonment for not less than one year.3\n\nSince 1984, there have been 29 convictions of violations of Article 271.\n\nSee, e.g., The Hague Conference on Private International Law April 1969. Report ofthe US. Delegation to the Eleventh Session ofthe Hague Conference on Private International Law, reprinted in 8 Int'l Legal Materials 785, 806 (1969); D. M. Edwards, Conimission III: Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, in The Eleventh Session of the Hague Conference of Private International Law, 18 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 646, 647 (1969).\n\n2 Oppenheim's International Law, Vol.1 (R. Jennings & A. Watts, eds., 9th ed. 1996), at 458 (\"Territoriality is the primary basis for jurisdiction; even if another state has a concurrent basis for jurisdiction, its right to exercise it is limited if to do so would conflict with the rights of the state having territorial jurisdiction.\").\n\nSchweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch (StGB) [Criminal Codel Dec. 21, 1937, as amended SR 311.0, art. 271 (Switz,), available athtt]ch/d/sr/3/311.0.de,pdf. The English translations of Swiss laws in this brief are unofficial, and in case of any discrepancy the wording of the laws in their original languages should be given precedence.\n\nCase 1:09-cv-20423-ASG Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/30/2009 Page 10 of 30\n\n> There are two principal statutes that protect the privacy of bank account information,\n\nArticle 273 ofthe Swiss Criminal Code and Article 47 of the Federal Act on Banks and Savings\n\nBanks. Article 273 of the Swiss Criminal Code (also enacted in 1937) provides:\n\nWhoever seeks to discover a manufacturing or business secret in order to make it accessible to a foreign official agency or a foreign organization or private enterprise or their agents,\n\nwhoever makes a manufacturing or business secret accessible to a foreign official agency or a foreign organization or private enterprise or their agents,\n\nshall be sentenced to imprisonment for up to three years or a fine, in serious cases, to imprisonment for not less than one year. A fine can be combined with the imprisonment.'\n\nSince 1984. there have been 26 convictions of violations of Article 273.6\n\nArticle 47 of the Federal Act on Banks and Savings Banks provides:\n\n1. Whoever intentionally:\n\n> a. divulges a secret entrusted to him in his capacity as a management body, employee, mandatary or liquidator of a bank, as a officer or employee of an audit company or that he became aware of in this capacity;\n\nb. seeks to induce others to such a violation of professional secrecy\n\nshall be sentenced to imprisonment of up to three years or a fine.\n\n2. Where the offender acts through negligence, he or she is liable to a fine of up to 250,000 Swiss francs.\n\n3. In the case of a repetition of the offense within five years of the conviction taking full legal effect, the monetary penalty will be a minimum of 45 daily penalty units.\n\n6 See Federal Office of Statistics, supra note 4.\n\nSee Bundesamt für Statistik [Federal Office of Statistics], Verurteilungen wegen Straftaten nach dem Strafgesetzbuch (StGB), seit 1984 [Convictions For Offenses Under the Criminal Code (CC), Since 1984] (2007), available at\n\nhttp ://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs!portal/de/index!themen/ 19/03/03/\n\nkey/strafiatenldelikte\\_imeinzelnen.Document. 83251 .xls (translation of relevant excerpt provided in Appendix Tab 1).\n\nStGB SR 311 .0, art. 273 (Switz.), available at htt 11 .0.de.pdf.\n\nCase 1:09-cv-20423-ASG Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/30/2009 Page 11 of 30\n\n> 4, Violation of professional secrecy remains punishable after termination of the official relationship or the practice of the profession.\n\n5. Federal and Cantonal regulations concerning the obligation to testify and to furnish information to a government authority remain reserved.\n\n6. Prosecution and judgment ofthe acts under this provision are the responsibility ofthe cantons. The general provisions of the Swiss Criminal Code shall apply.7\n\nThis statute was originally enacted in 1934. Since 1993, there have been 48 convictions for violations of Article 47,8\n\n### B. Swiss Cooperation In International Law Enforcement\n\nThe Swiss laws described above reflect a national political tradition that places great value\n\non the sovereign independence of the nation and the individual autonomy of its citizens.\n\nHowever, Swiss judicial sovereignty and the laws that protect it are not designed to frustrate\n\nlegitimate foreign government investigations.9 Indeed. Switzerland has been innovative and\n\nproactive in adopting laws and policies to facilitate cooperation with foreign investigations, and its\n\nlaws authorize the i'elease of information otherwise protected by the privacy laws when requests\n\nare made through authorized intergovernmental channels.\n\nFor example, in 1972, Switzerland and the United States signed the Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (\"TMAC\"). which entered into force in 1977.10 The TMAC\n\n10 27 U.S.T. 2019.\n\nStGB SR 952.0, art. 47 (Switz.), available at htt (original German).\n\n8 See Declaration of Rudolf Wyss at ¶ 2, Appendix Tab 2.\n\nThere is a common popular misconception that Switzerland allows bank accounts to be opened anonymously. To the contrary. Switzerland has an aggressive \"know your customer\" law that requires banks to have the identities oftheir customers. See Bundesgesetz Ober die Bekampfung der Geldwscherei und der Terrorismusfinanzierung im Finanzsektor (Geldwaschereigesetz, GwG) [Federal Act on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in the Financial Sector (Anti-Money Laundering Act, AMLA)], StGB Oct. 10, 1997, SR 955.0, arts. 3-5 (Switz.), available at htt An unofficial English translation is available at htt\n\nCase 1:09-cv-20423-ASG Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/30/2009 Page 12 of 30\n\nauthorizes cooperation in obtaining documents, information, and other assistance in investigating a wide range of crimes. It overrides Swiss laws that would otherwise prohibit disclosure of information to foreign parties. The TMAC was the first treaty of its kind for the United States, and subsequently was used as a model for similar U.S. treaties with other countries.11 Switzerland has bilateral agreements on legal assistance with a number of other nations.'2\n\nIn 1981, Switzerland enacted the Federal Act on International Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (\"IMAC\").1' Under this domestic law, all foreign governments, whether or not they have a treaty with Switzerland, can request assistance in criminal matters, provided that they extend reciprocity to requests from Switzerland. Like the TMAC, the IMAC takes precedence over the Swiss privacy laws.'4 Each year the Government of Switzerland processes approximately 1500 to 1800 requests for assistance in criminal matters from other countries.1\n\nSwitzerland has also been an international pioneer in the return of assets deposited in Switzerland by \"politically exposed persons\" (i.e., current or former senior political officials). Under its proactive policy of providing assistance in such matters, Switzerland has returned approximately \\$1.6 billion to the governments of other countries in recent years.'6\n\nSee Pascal Gossin, International Mutual LegalAssistance In Switzerland, in 13 8th International Senior Seminar Visiting Experts' Papers, U.N. Asia and Far East Inst. for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (IJNAFEI) Resource Material Series No. 77 (March 2009), at 19, available at www.unafei.or.jp/englishlpdfPDF\\_rms/no77/08,,p19-22.pdf.\n\nJa'.a122.\n\n16 Press Release, Fed. Dep't of Foreign Affairs, Initiative by the World Bank and UNODC on the Restitution of Stolen Assets (Sep. 18, 2007), available at\n\nSee, e.g., Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-Neth., June 12, 1981, 35 U.S.T. 1361.\n\n12 See list of treaties available at htt (guide to webpage provided in Appendix Tab 3).\n\nBundesgesetz Ober internationale Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen (Rechtshilfegesetz, IRSG) [Federal Act on International Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (\"IMAC\")] StGB March 20, 1981, SR 351.1. Unofficial translation of the IMAC available at htt\n\nCase 1:09-cv-20423-ASG Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/30/2009 Page 13 of 30\n\n### C. The Tax Treaty\n\nAs part of negotiations to update their 1951 income tax treaty, Switzerland and the United\n\nStates agreed on new wording for the provisions on exchange of information. That wording was\n\nincorporated into the Convention Between The United States of America And The Swiss\n\nConfederation For The Avoidance of Double Taxation With Respect To Taxes On Income signed\n\non October 2, 1996 (\"Tax Treaty\").17 Article 26 states in relevant part:\n\n> The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall exchange such information (being information available under the respective taxation laws of the Contracting States) as is necessary for carrying out the provisions of the present Convention for the prevention oftax fraud or the like in relation to the taxes which are the subject of the present Convention. In cases of tax fraud,\n\n(a) the exchange of information is not restricted by Article I (Personal Scope) and\n\n(b) if specifically requested by the competent authority of a Contracting State, the competent authority of the other Contracting State shall provide information under this Article in the form of authenticated copies of unedited original records or documents.\n\nSimultaneously, Switzerland and the United States executed a Memorandum of Understanding\n\nand a Protocol, which elaborated on the meaning ofthe term \"tax fraud or the like\" for purposes of\n\nthe exchange of information provisions.18\n\n18 See Letter of Submittal, id.\n\nhtt]home/recent/media/single.html?id=14599, see, e.g., Press Release, Federal Department of Justice and Police (\"FDJP\"), Philippines Given Access to Over USD 683 Million: Confiscation Ruling Closes Marcos Case (Aug. 5, 2003), available at htt .admin.chfbj/enlhome/dokumentationlmedieninformationen/2003/2003-08-05 .html; Press Release, FDJP, Abacha Assets to be Handed Over to Nigeria: Switzerland Doesn't Provide a Refuge for Funds of Criminal Origin (Feb. 16, 2005), available at htt bj/enlhome/dokumentation/medieninformationenl2005/2005-02- 1 6.html; Press Release, FDJP, Montesinos Torres Affair: USD 50 Million Blocked in Switzerland (Mar. 11, 2003), available at htt mi/2000/ref\\_2000- 11-03 .html.\n\n17 Oct. 2, 1996, S. Treaty Doe. 105-8.\n\nCase 1:09-cv-20423-ASG Document 48 Entered on PLSD Docket 04/30/2009 Page 14 of 30\n\nIn 2002, Switzerland and the United States entered into further discussions regarding the\n\nTax Treaty's exchange of information provisions, and subsequently signed the Mutual Agreement\n\nof January 23, 2003 Regarding the Administration of Article 26 (Exchange of Information) ofthe\n\nSwiss-U.S. Income Tax Convention of October 2, 1996 (\"2003 MOU\").'9 The 2003 MOU\n\nprovided additional guidance for interpreting the term \"tax fraud or the like,\" including 14\n\nhypothetical scenarios20 In an exchange of notes dated January 24, 2003. Switzerland and the\n\nUnited States affirmed the importance of the Tax Treaty and 2003 MOU.21\n\nThere are a number of contemporaneous statements by the U.S. Government\n\nacknowledging that the Tax Treaty's information exchange provisions were limited to cases\n\ninvolving tax fraud. For example, at the time of ratification by the U.S. Senate, the Chief of Staff\n\nof the Joint Committee on Taxation testified as follows:\n\n> The exchange of information provisions of the proposed treaty are somewhat more useful than those ofthe current treaty [the 1951 Income Tax Treaty], but are nonetheless more restrictive than the comparable provisions in tax treaties with other countries. Information generally may be exchanged to carry out the purposes of the proposed treaty. .. . Information may also be exchanged to prevent tax fraudz\n\nA letter from the Department of Treasury to the Senate Finance Committee, included in the\n\nCommittee's report on the Tax Treaty, stated:\n\n> Although the exchange of information provisions of the proposed treaty are not as broad as the U.S. Model provisions, they represent a significant improvement over those in the present treaty. . . . [T]he new treaty and Protocol contain a clear, broad definition of \"tax fraud\" that should lead to improved information exchange. The\n\n20 Id.\n\n22 Bilateral Tax Treaties And Protocol: Hearing Before the Committee On Foreign Relations, 105th Cong. 43-44 (1997) (statement of Kenneth J. Kies, Chief Of Staff, Joint Committee On Taxation), available at htt 1 05\\_senatehearings&docidf:44 11 0.pdf.\n\n19 Available at http ://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/mutual .htm.\n\n21 Treasury News Release KD-3795 (Jan. 24, 2003), available at htt press/releasesfkd3 795 .htm.\n\nCase 1:09-cv-20423-ASG Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/30/2009 Page 15 of 30\n\n33\n\nnew treaty also provides that information will, where possible, be provided in a form that will make it possible for the information to be used in court proceedings. While these measures do not go as far as we would like, the improvement that they will allow in our exchange of information program with Switzerland should make the anti-avoidance provisions of the new treaty far more effective than under the present treaty.23\n\nAccordingly, the apparent implication of the February 6, 2009 Declaration of Barry B. Shott (paragraphs 15-17) that the Internal Revenue Service (\"IRS\") was somehow surprised or disappointed that the Government of Switzerland interprets the Tax Treaty to allow information exchange only in cases of \"tax fraud or the like\" should be viewed in context.\n\nSince the Tax Treaty entered into force, the Government of Switzerland has received an average of three requests per year from the IRS for information under Article 26, and has been able to transmit the requested information in virtually all of the cases. The Government of Switzerland has successfully defended against court challenges brought by affected persons in the Swiss courts seeking to block its ability to provide the infonnation.24\n\n### B. Negotiations To Amend the Treaty\n\nUntil recently, Switzerland's tax treaties have limited agreements to share information to situations in which the underlying offense involved tax fraud, but not tax evasion. Nonetheless, Switzerland has accommodated the interests of other countries in tax collection. Notably, Switzerland remits to the member states of the European Union, on an anonymous basis, a 35 percent withholding tax from interest paid by Swiss paying agents to E.U. residents.25 With respect to U.S. taxpayers, the Qualified Intermediary Agreement concluded between UBS (as well\n\n23 S. Exec. Rep. No. 105-10, at 10 (1997).\n\n24 Declaration of Eric Hess at ¶ 3-4, Appendix Tab 4.\n\n25 See Agreement Providing for Measures Equivalent to Those Laid Down in Council Directive 2003/48/EC on Taxation of Savings Income in the Form of Interest Payments, Switz. E.C., Dec. 29, 2004, O.J. (L 3 85/30), available at htt LexUriServ.do?uri'OJ:L:2004:385: 0030:0042:EN:PDF,\n\nCase 1:09-cv-20423-ASG Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/30/2009 Page 16 of 30\n\nas other Swiss banks) and the IRS provides procedures for reporting and for the withholding of interest paid on U.S. securities.\n\nOn March 13. 2009, the Government of Switzerland announced a decision to modify its tax treaties to allow international administrative assistance in tax matters in full accordance with the standards of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (\"OECD\") by eliminating the currently applied limitation of assistance to \"tax fraud or the like.\" This change in policy is intended to be reflected in revisions to the double taxation treaties to which Switzerland is a party.26 Negotiations between the Government of Switzerland and the U.S. Government to amend the Tax Treaty are already underway. The first meeting was held on April 28, 2009.27\n\n#### E. International Information Exchanges Regarding The UBS Matter\n\nThe Petition and supporting declarations present a confusing and incomplete depiction of the status of intergovernmental cooperation on the provision of information regarding UBS's activities and its customers. UBS has already entered into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement with the U.S. Department of Justice and a settlement with the Securities and Exchange Commission regarding its own conduct. In connection with the tax fraud schemes that were identified as part of that criminal investigation, the Swiss authorities, acting through the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (\"FINMA\"), were able to take exceptional measures, consistent with the requirements of Swiss law, to allow the requested information to be shared with the U.S.\n\n26 See Press Release, Fed. Dep't of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland's Credit Line to the IMF (Mar. 13, 2009), available at htt ukemlo/news/prerel.html.\n\n27 Treasury News Release TG-85 (Apr. 7, 2009), available at http:J/www.treas.gov/ press/releases/tg85 .htm.\n\nCase 1:09-cv-20423-ASG Document 48 Entered on IZLSD Docket 04/30/2009 Page 17 of 30\n\nGovernment on an expedited basis. The U.S. Government agreed to withdraw its pending treaty requests to the Federal Tax Authority as part of this arrangement.28\n\nThe John Doe summons at issue in this case has a vastly different scope than the U.S. treaty requests. In fact, when the IRS was preparing to issue the summons, it informed the Government of Switzerland that that it was doing so to avoid the running of the limitations period and that it did not intend to seek enforcement pending the outcome of the U.S. negotiations with UBS in the criminal case and the progress of the treaty requests.29 The U.S. Government later entered into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement with UBS, the Government of Switzerland took the necessary steps to allow it to provide the information, and the U.S. Government then withdrew the requests after receiving the information. It is therefore unclear why the IRS seems to be relying on complaints about the Swiss response to the treaty requests as a justification for enforcement of the summons.\n\nThe Government of Switzerland has repeatedly expressed its objections to the John Doe summons to U.S. Government officials. Most recently, on April 29, 2009, the Government of Switzerland delivered to the U.S. Department of State a diplomatic note setting forth its concerns regarding the threat this case poses to the negotiation ofthe proposed amendments to the Tax Treaty.'°\n\n28 See Press Release, FINMA, FINMA Makes Possible Settlement between UBS and the US Authorities and Announces the Results of Its Own Investigation (Feb. 18, 2009), available at htt 18 .aspx.\n\n29 Declaration of Urs Zulauf at ¶ 2, Appendix Tab 5.\n\n30 Diplomatic Note (April 29, 2009), Appendix Tab 6.\n\nCase 1:09-cv-20423-ASG Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 04130/20D9 Page 18 of 30\n\n## ARGUMENT\n\n#### I. The U.S. Government's Attempt To Obtain Information From Switzerland Through The Summons Is Inconsistent With The Tax Treaty\n\nThe rules and procedures set out in Article 26 of the Tax Treaty provide the legal basis for Switzerland to exchange information concerning tax issues with the United States. In return, the United States is under an international obligation to respect Article 26 in seeking to obtain information from Switzerland. As explained below, the IRS's attempt to evade Article 26 through use of the summons is inconsistent with the treaty.\n\nThe basic rules for interpreting treaties are set out in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969 (\"Vienna Convention\").' Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides that \"[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith, in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.\"32 The Supreme Court has held similarly that \"[tjhe clear import oftreaty language controls unless 'application of the words of the treaty according to their obvious meaning effects a result inconsistent with the intent or expectations of its signatories.\" Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. V. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 180 (1982) (quoting Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 54 (1963)). The Supreme Court has also affirmed that \"[n]ontextual sources ... often assist us in 'giving effect to the intent of the Treaty parties'.\" United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 366 (1989) (quoting Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 185). In the Stuart case, which involved interpretation of the U.S.-Canada double taxation treaty, the Supreme Court stated that \"a treaty should generally be 'construe[d]\n\n31 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. Switzerland is a party to the Vienna Convention. Although the United States has not ratified the Convention, the U.S. Government and the U.S. courts have consistently accepted that it represents \"customary international law\" binding upon the United States. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. § 301 and 321 (1987); See also Avero Belgium Ins. v. American Airlines, Inc., 423 F.3d 73, 79 & n.8 (2d Cir. 2005); Gonzalez v. Gutierrez, 311 F.3d 942, 949 n.15 (9th Cir. 2002).\n\n32 Restatement (Third) § 325(1).\n\nCase 1:09cv-20423-ASG Document 48 Entered on LSD Docket 04/30/2009 Page 19 of 30\n\nliberally to give effect to the purpose which animates it. ...\" Stuart. 489 U.S. at 368. Of course,\n\na treaty should not be interpreted liberally only when it is to the benefit of the U.S. Government to\n\ndo so.\n\nVienna Convention Article 26 states that a treaty \"is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith,\" a principle commonly referred to aspacta sunt servanda.3'\n\nThe International Court ofJustice has commented on this principle as follows:\n\nArticle 26 combines two elements, which are of equal importance. It provides that \"Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.\" This latter element, in the Court's view, implies that, in this case, it is the purpose of the Treaty, and the intentions of the parties in concluding it, which should prevail over its literal application. The principle of good faith obliges the Parties to apply it in a reasonable way and in such a manner that its purpose can be realized.34\n\nImportantly, this requirement of good faith requires that a party to a treaty refrain from acts calculated to frustrate the purpose of the treaty.3\n\nArticle 26 of the Tax Treaty provides specific rules governing the exchange of information\n\nbetween Switzerland and the United States. According to these rules, the competent authorities of\n\nthe countries are to exchange information as is necessary for carrying out the provisions of the Tax\n\nRestatement (Third) §321.\n\nGahcikovo-Nagyniaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk), 1997 I.C.J. 7, ¶ 142 (Sep. 25).\n\nReport ofthe International Law Commission to the GeneralAssemblv, (1964) 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Cornm'n 177, U.N. Doe. A/5809, available at htt l964.htrn (\"Some members felt that there might be advantage in also stating that a party must abstain from acts calculated to frustrate the objects and purposes of the treaty. The Commission, however, considered that this was implicit in the obligation to perform the treaty in good faith....\"). See also Militaiy and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 275 (June 27) (\"In respect of the claim that the United States activities have been such as to deprive the 1956 FCN Friendship Commerce and Navigation] Treaty of its object and purpose, the Court has to make a distinction. It is unable to regard all the acts complained of in that light; but it does consider that there are certain activities ofthe United States which are such as to undermine the whole spirit of a bilateral agreement directed to sponsoring friendship between the two States parties to it.\").\n\nCase 1:09-cv-20423-ASG Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/30/2009 Page 20 of 30\n\nTreaty and to prevent tax fraud. Article 26 also provides assurances against unauthorized disclosures.36\n\nBy proceeding unilaterally outside of the terms of the Tax Treaty and avoiding the established intergovernmental procedures for the exchange of information, the U.S. Government would frustrate the fundamental purposes ofthe treaty and therefore violate it. More specifically, the treaty's standards and procedures for the exchange of information would become meaningless if a Party to the treaty pursued alternative means of obtaining information from the other. Enforcement of the summons therefore would undermine the implementation of the treaty and be contrary to international law.\n\nThe U.S. Government of course had the authority to withdraw from the Tax Treaty, but it has not done so. The treaty therefore remains valid and binding under both international and U.S. law. The Government of Switzerland respectfully submits that this Court should not allow itself to be used as an instrument for carrying out the breach proposed by the IRS.\n\n#### II. Compliance With The Summons Would Directly Violate Swiss Law\n\nAs discussed above, Switzerland's laws prohibit the release of confidential information to foreign governments when the request has not been made through authorized intergovernmental channels. Ifthe Court were to order UBS to produce evidence from Switzerland, and backed that order with coercive powers, the Court would be substituting its own authority for that of the competent Swiss authorities, and therefore would violate Swiss sovereignty and international law. This violation of sovereignty would be compounded because Swiss law specifically prohibits release of the information. In particular, if UBS were to comply with the summons, it would\n\n36 Tax Treaty. art. 26(1). Case 1:09-cv-20423-ASG Document 48 Entered on LSD Docket 04/30/2009 Page 21 of 30\n\ndirectly violate Articles 271 and 273 of the Swiss Criminal Code and Article 47 of the Federal Act on Banks and Savings Banks.\n\nIn this regard, Article 26(3) of the Tax Treaty states:\n\nIn no case shall the provisions of this Article be construed so as to impose upon either of the Contracting States the obligation to carry out administrative measures at variance with the regulations and practice of either Contracting State or which would be contrary to its sovereignty, security or public policy or to supply particulars which are not procurable under its own legislation or that of the state making application.8\n\nThe U.S. Government therefore agreed that the Government of Switzerland was not obligated to take actions contrary to its own sovereignty or to supply information not procurable under its own legislation. By implication, the U.S. Government acknowledged that it would respect Swiss sovereignty, and that the Government of Switzerland was not expected to stand by passively while the U.S. Government directed a Swiss entity to violate Swiss law.\n\nThat enforcement of the summons would violate Swiss law by itself provides strong grounds for this Court to deny enforcement, or otherwise to decline to impose coercive sanctions on UBS. See, e.g., Societe Iniernationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 211(1958) (\"It is hardly debatable that fear of criminal prosecution [under Article 273 of the Swiss Criminal Code and Article 47 of the Federal Act on Banks and Savings Banks] constitutes a weighty excuse for nonproduction, and this excuse is not weakened because the laws preventing compliance are those of a foreign sovereign.'); In .rc Sealed Case, 825 F.2d 494, 498 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (\"[lIt causes us considerable discomfort to think that a court of law should order a violation of law, particularly on the territory of the sovereign whose law is in question ); United States v. First Nat'l Bank of\n\nPursuant to the first paragraph of Article 27 1(1), it is theoretically possible that the Federal Council could authorize a private person to act for a foreign State. However, such an authorization could be given only for activities which would otherwise be covered by the applicable Swiss procedures for international criminal and administrative assistance, which is not the case here. See Declaration of Rudolf Wyss at ¶ 3, Appendix Tab 2.\n\n38 Tax Treaty, art. 26(3).\n\nCase 1:09-cv-20423-ASG Document 48 Entered on PLSD Docket 04/30/2009 Page 22 of 30\n\nChicago, 699 F.2d 341. 346 (7th Cir. 1983) (\"Although the interest ofthe United States in collecting taxes is of importance to the financial integrity ofthe nation, the interest of Greece, served by its bank secrecy law is also important, and so conceded by Government counsel.\"). See also Restatement (Third) § 442(2) (discouraging sanctions when the requested disclosure of information is prohibited in the country in which the information or person is located); Id. § 441 (\"In general, a state may not require a person ... to do an act in another state that is prohibited by the law of that state or by the law of the state ofwhich heisanational.\").\n\n### III. The IRS Has No Reasonable Expectation Of Receiving Information In Response To \"Fishing Expeditions\"\n\nThe history and context of the Tax Treaty and other relevant treaties indicates that the IRS could not have reasonably expected to be able to enforce a summons of this nature to obtain information from Switzerland.\n\nThe Tax Treaty generally follows the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital (\"OECD Model Convention\"), which does not authorize \"fishing expeditions\" such as the summons at issue in this case. The OECD Model Convention includes a provision for the exchange of information which requires a degree of relevancy or specificity. Article 26 (Exchange of Information) states as follows:\n\n1. The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall exchange such information as is foreseeablv relevant for carrying out the provisions of this Convention or to the administration or enforcement ofthe domestic laws concerning taxes of every kind and description imposed on behalf ofthe Contracting States, or of their political subdivisions or local authorities, insofar as the taxation thereunder is not contrary to the Convention. The exchange of information is not restricted by Articles 1 and\n\nOECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital, art. 26 (2006) (emphasis added). Switzerland took a reservation as follows:\n\n"Switzerland reserves its position on paragraphs I and 5. It will propose to limit the scope of the Article to information necessary for carrying out the provisions ofthe Convention. This reservation shall not apply in cases involving acts of fraud subject to imprisonment according to the laws of both Contracting States.\"\n\nCase 1:09-cv-20423-ASG Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/30/2009 Page 23 of 30\n\nWith respect to the purpose of Article 26, the commentary to the OECD Model Convention indicates that a request for information should include some degree of specificity and not be a means for a \"fishing expedition.\" The Commentary states:\n\nThe standard of \"foreseeably relevant\" is intended to provide for exchange of information in tax matters to the widest possible extent and, at the same time, to clarif,' that Contracting States are not at liberty to engage in \"fishing expeditions\" to request information that is unlikely to be relevant to the tax affairs of a given taxpayer. Contracting States may agree to an alternative formulation of this standard that is consistent with the scope of the Article (e.g. by replacing \"foreseeably relevant\" with \"necessary\" or \"relevant\").40\n\nBecause Article 26 of the Tax Treaty is closely based on the OECD Model Convention, this\n\ncommentary is relevant in interpreting the Tax Treaty.41\n\n> In 2006, the U.S. Government published the United States Model Income Tax Convention\n\nof November 1 5, 2006 (\"U.S. Model Convention\") and the corresponding United States Model\n\nTechnical Explanation Accompanying The United States Model Income Tax Convention of\n\nNovember 15, 2006 (\"U.S. Model Technical Explanation\").42 Article 26 of the U.S. Model\n\nOECD Model Convention, Commentary On Article 26 Concerning The Exchange Of Information, ¶ 24. In other words, Switzerland indicated that it would provide information about individuals when the request related to tax fraud, but not tax evasion. That approach is reflected in the current Tax Treaty.\n\n40 See id.,5.\n\n41 See Dept of the Treasury Technical Explanation of the Convention Between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation for the Avoidance of Double Taxation With Respect to Taxes on Income, available at htt (\"Negotiations took into account the U.S. Treasury Department's current tax treaty policy, the Model Income Tax Convention on Income and Capital, published by the OECD in 1992 and amended in 1994 and 1995 (the 'OECD Model\") and recent tax treaties concluded by both countries\").\n\n42 U.S. Model Income Tax Convention (2007), available at htt press/releases/reports/hpl 6801 .pdf U.S. Model Technical Explanation Accompanying the U.S. Model Income Tax Convention (2007), available at htt ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/ hpl 6802.pdf.\n\nCase 1:09-cv-20423-ASG Document 48 Entered on PLSD Docket 04/30/2009 Page 24 of 30\n\nConvention is nearly identical to the OECD Model Convention.43 Similar to the comments provided with the OECD Model Convention, the U.S. Model Technical Explanation provides guidance for the degree of specificity required for the exchange of information. The guidance to Paragraph of Article 26 oftheU.S.ModelConventionstatesinrelevantpart:\n\nThe information to be exchanged is that which may be relevant for carrying out the provisions of the Convention or the domestic laws of the United States or of the other Contracting State concerning taxes of every kind applied at the national level.... However, the language \"may be\" would not support a request in which a Contracting State simply asked for information regarding all bank accounts maintained by residents of that Contracting State in the other Contracting State, or even all accounts maintained by its residents with respect to a particular bank.44\n\nIndeed, the U.S. Government recently entered into a new treaty on information sharing in tax\n\nmatters with Liechtenstein that requires requests to include the identity of each taxpayer whose tax\n\nor criminal liability is at issue.4\n\n'\n\nIn the case of UBS, the Government of Switzerland adopted a liberal interpretation of the\n\nTax Treaty to allow the release of information where, even though specific individuals were not\n\nidentified, there was sufficient detail about the nature of the alleged tax fraud pattern used by\n\nU.S. Model Technical Explanation, at 86 (emphasis added).\n\nU.S. Model Convention, art. 26, ¶ I states:\n\n"The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall exchange such information as may be relevant for carrying out the provisions of this Convention or the domestic laws of the Contracting States concerning taxes of every kind imposed by a Contracting State to the extent that the taxation thereunder is not contrary to the Convention, including information relating to the assessment or collection of, the enforcement or prosecution in respect of or the determination of appeals in relation to, such taxes\n\nSee Agreement on Tax Cooperation and the Exchange of Information Relating to Taxes, Information Exchange Agreement, U.S.-Liech., Dec. 8, 2008, available at http ://www. ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/ us%20 liechtenstein%2otiea.pdf(\"[a]ny request for information made by a party shall be framed with the greatest degree ofspecificity possible\" including \"the identity of the taxpayer whose tax or criminal liability is at issue\" and evidence of foreseeable relevance with respect to the identified taxpayer). The Department of Treasury stated that \"The Tax Information Exchange Agreement ... with Liechtenstein will provide the United States with access to information it needs to enforce U.S. tax laws, including information related to bank accounts in Liechtenstein.\" Treasury News Release HP-1320 (Dec. 8, 2008), available at htt 320.htm.\n\nCase 1:09-cv-20423-ASG Document 48 Entered on PLSD Docket 04/30/2009 Page 25 of 30\n\ncertain UBS clients. The John Doe summons, however, is so broad and lacking in detail that there is no manner in which compliance with the summons could be carried out consistently with Swiss law or the Tax Treaty.46\n\nAlthough the courts often give the IRS some latitude in issuing summonses, courts have declined to enforce John Doe summonses that are overly broad and vague. See, e.g., In re the Matter ofTax Liabilities: John Does, No. C-88-0137, (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 1992), reprinted in 92 Tax Notes Int'l 26-24 (Tax Analysts) (\"[T]he John Doe summons which the IRS seeks to enforce here is generic both in its terms and purpose. It does not arise from an investigation of any particular misconduct, nor does it seek evidence of particular identified transactions.\"); United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749, 754 (4th Cir. 1973) ('[Wjhere it appears that the purpose of the summons is 'a rambling exploration' of a third party's files, it will not be enforced.\"). Indeed. when Congress considered the John Doe summons process, the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Finance Committee warned against the use of such a summons for \"fishing expeditions:\"\n\nWhile the committee believes it is important to preserve the John Doe summons as an investigative tool which may be used in appropriate circumstances, at the same time, the committee does not intend that the John Doe summons is to be available for purposes of enabling the Service to engage in a possible \"fishing expedition.\" For this reason, the committee intends that when the Service does seek court authorization to serve John Doe summons, it will have specific facts concerning a specific situation to present to the court.\n\nHR. Rep. No. 94-658, at 311(1975), accord, S. Rep. No. 94-938, at 373 (1975). Although the U.S. Government has alleged facts concerning UBS, the charges against UBS have already been settled. No specific facts are alleged concerning any of the thousands of account holders targeted by the summons.\n\n46\n\nSee Declaration of Eric Hess at ¶ 4, Appendix Tab 4.\n\nCase 1:09-cv-20423-ASG Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/30/2009 Page 26 of 30\n\nIn light of the Tax Treaty's history and the current practice of the U.S. Government as reflected in its own model tax treaty and the recent treaty it executed with Liechtenstein, the IRS could not have had a reasonable expectation that \"fishing expedition\" type requests for information in Switzerland would be allowed. The overly broad nature of the summons is clearly inconsistent with the Tax Treaty.\n\n### IV. Imposition Of An Order To Compel Enforcement Of The Summons Would Be Inconsistent With International Comity\n\nIn applying the principle of international comity, U.S. courts engage in a \"balancing test\" in their analysis of potential conflicts between U.S. and foreign law. It is not necessary to conduct an assessment of interests in this case, since it is unambiguous that compliance with the summons would violate the Tax Treaty and Swiss law, and because the summons is unreasonably broad and vague. However, should the Court decide to engage in a balancing of interests, the relevant factors strongly favor the Court declining to enforce the summons.\n\nIn In re Grand Juiy Proceedings (United Stares v. Bank ofNova Scotia,), 740 F.2d 817 (11th Cir. 1984) (\"Nova Scotia I]\"). the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's reliance on the balancing test set out in Section 40 of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law, which recommended that courts evaluate factors such as the vital national interests of the nations, the extent and nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would impose, the extent to which the required conduct would take place in the other country. the nationality of the person, and the extent to which enforcement could reasonably be expected to achieve compliance. The court in Nova Scotia II concluded that the subpoena at issue should be enforced, but that case involved a grand jury investigation of drug trafficking, an alleged lack of good faith by the bank, and other factors not pertinent to this case.\n\nU.S. courts have recognized the strong interest of Switzerland in defending its sovereignty and the integrity of its laws. See, e.g., Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, No. 02 Civ. 666, 2003 WI.\n\n> - 19 -\n\nCase 1:09-cv-20423-ASG Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/30/2009 Page 27 of 30\n\n203011 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2003); Minpeco v. Conticommodily Services, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Cochran Consulting, Inc. v. Uwatec USA, Inc., 102 F.3d 1224 (Fed. Cir. 1996); In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecurn (Union Bank ofSwitzerland), 158 Misc. 2d 222 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993).\n\nAlthough the interests of Switzerland and the United States in enforcing their laws generally should be considered to be of equal value, the summons enforcement proceeding is civil, while the Swiss laws that would be violated by compliance with the summons are criminal. In addition, the information at issue is held by a Swiss company within Switzerland, and accordingly execution of an enforcement order ofthe Court would have to take place within Swiss territory. Moreover, the U.S. request for information in the summons is exceedingly vague, broadly requesting information for thousands of accounts in a manner to which the U.S. Government would not expect any foreign government to provide a response if requested. In this regard, the Tax Treaty itself represents a negotiated compromise between nations intended to reflect the mutual best interests of both countries. Its limitations should be respected.\n\nFinally, the Governments of Switzerland and the United States are currently engaged in negotiations to amend the Tax Treaty in a manner that would broaden the scope of treaty requests to which Switzerland can reply. As explained in the diplomatic note the Government of Switzerland has delivered to the U.S. Department of State, the threatened enforcement of the summons in violation of the Tax Treaty and Swiss law represents an impediment to the successful conclusion of those negotiations.47 The Court should refrain from issuing an order that would interfere with those negotiations and the more general intergovernmental relations between Switzerland and the United States.\n\nAppendix Tab 6. Case 1:09-cv-20423-ASG Document 48 Entered on IZLSD Docket 04/30/2009 Page 28 of 30\n\n## CONCLUSION\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, the Government of Switzerland respectfully urges the Court to\n\ndeny the petition to enforce the summons.\n\n> Respectfully submitted,\n\nBy: s/John C. Dotterrer\n\n> John C. Dotterrer Florida Bar No. 267260 Jenny Torres Florida Bar No. 785881 JOHN C. DOTTERRER COUNSELLORS AT LAW, PA. 125 Worth Avenue, Suite 310 Palm Beach, FL 33480 Telephone: (561) 802-3808 Facsimile: (561) 802-3318\n\nStephari E. Becker\\* Kemba Eneas Walden\\* PILLSBURY WINTHROP SI-JAW PJTTMAN LLP 2300 N Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20037 Telephone: (202) 663-8277 Facsimile: (202) 663-8007\n\n\\*Adn,itted pro hac vice\n\nDated: April 30, 2009 Case 1:09-cv-20423-ASG Document 48 Entered on IZLSD Docket 04/30/2009 Page 29 of 30\n\n### CERTIFICATE OF FILING ANT' SERVICE\n\n1 hereby certitS' that on April 30, 2009, 1 electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing document is being served this day on all counsel of record identified on the attached Service List via transmission of Notices of Electronic Filing generated by CMIECF.\n\n> JOHN C. DOflERRER COUNSELLORS AT LAW, P.A.\n\nBy: s/John C. Dotterrer John C. Dotterrer\n\n33\n\nCase 1:09-cv-20423-ASG Document 48 Entered on IZLSD Docket 04/30/2009 Page 30 of 30\n\n## SERVICE LIST\n\n### United States of America v. UBS AG Case No. 09-20423-GOLD!MCALILEY United States District Court, Southern District of Florida\n\n### Attorneys for Petitioner, United States of America\n\nStuart D. Gibson Department ofJustice Tax Division P.O. Box 403 Ben Franklin Station Washington, D.C. 20044 Stuart. D.Gibsonusdoj .gov\n\n## Attorneys for Respondent, UBS AG\n\nEugene E. Steams esteams@swmwas.com Ana Hirfield Barnett abarnett@swmwas. corn Gordon McRae Mead Jr. gmeadswrnwas.corn Geri Fischman gfischrnanswrnwas.com Stearns Weaver Miller Weissler Alhadeff& S itterson 150 W Flagler Street Suite 2200 Miami, FL 33130\n\nFrancis P. Barron tbarron@cravath.com David N. Greenwald dgreenwaldcravath.com Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP 825 8th Avenue New York, NY 10019-7475 212-474-1000 212-474-3700 (fax)\n\nRichard D. Euliss United States Department of Justice P.O. Box 14198 Ben Franklin Station Washington, D.C. 20044 Richard.D.Euliss@usdoj .gov\n\nJohn F. Savarese jfsavarese@wlrk.com Martin J.E. Arms rnjearms@wlrk.com Ralph M. Levene rrnlevene@wlrk.com Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz 51 W 52T1d Street New York, NY 10019\n\nCase 1:09-cv-20423-ASG Document 48-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/30/2009 Page 5 of 18\n\n### IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA MIAMI DIVISION\n\nCASE NO. 09-20423-CIV-GOLD/MCALILEY\n\n### UNITED STATES OF AMERICA\n\nPetitioner,\n\nvs.\n\nUBS AG,\n\n> Respondent.\n\n### DECLARATION OF RUDOLF WYSS\n\nRudolf Wyss, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1746, declares:\n\n1. 1 am Deputy Director of the Federal Office of Justice (FOJ) in Bern, Switzerland, where I am in charge of the Division of International Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters. 1 have held this position since December 2007, and have worked in the Division since September l, 1996.\n\n2. Based on our review of decisions by Swiss courts, since 1993 there have been 48 convictions for violations of Article 47 of the Swiss Banking Act.\n\n3. The first paragraph of Article 271(1) of the Swiss Penal Code suggests that it is possible that the Federal Council could authorize a private person to act for a foreign State within Switzerland. Based on my review of the relevant scholarly commentary on Article 271 and the practice of the Federal Council, as well as my experience in my role as Deputy Director ofthe FOJ, such an authorization could be given by the competent Federal authority only under\n\nCase 1:09-cv-20423-ASG Document 48-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/30/2009 Page 6 of 18\n\ncircumstances in which international criminal and/or administrative assistance would be possible (see: Basler Kommentar, Niggli/Wiprachtiger,Strafrecht II, Art. 111-392, 2.Auflage, Basel 2007, Th. Hopf, Nr. 6 und Nr. 18 zu Art. 271 StGB;VPB 61.82;Entscheid des Bundesrates vom 25. Juni 1997).\n\nI declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct, Executed this 28th day of April 2009 in Bern, Switzerland\n\nRydoifWyss/ JeputyDirector,FederalOfficeofJustice\n\n2","body_zh":"证物3\n\n________________________________________________________________________________/\n\n案号 1:09-cv-20423-ASG，文件48，于 FLSD 案卷系统 04/30/2009 录入，第1页，共30页\n美国佛罗里达南区联邦地区法院\n迈阿密分院\n案号：09-20423-CTV-GOLD/MCALILEY\n美利坚合众国（United States of America）\n\n申请人，\n\n诉\n\nUBS AG（瑞银集团），\n\n被申请人。\n瑞士政府（Government of Switzerland）法庭之友意见书\n\nJohn C. Dotterrer（约翰·C·多特雷勒），Florida Bar No. 267260\nJenny Torres（珍妮·托雷斯），Florida Bar No. 785881\nJOHN C. DOTTERER COUNSELLORS AT LAW, P.A.（约翰·C·多特雷勒法律顾问专业协会）\n125 Worth Avenue, Suite 310\nPalm Beach, FL 33480\n电话：(561) 802-3808\n传真：(561) 802-3318\n\nStephan E. Becker（斯蒂芬·E·贝克尔）*\nKemba Eneas Walden（肯巴·伊尼亚斯·沃尔登）*\nPILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP（皮尔斯伯里温思罗普肖皮特曼律师事务所）\n2300 N Street, N.W.\nWashington, D.C. 20037\n电话：(202) 663-8277\n传真：(202) 663-8007\n\n*经特别许可出庭。案号 1:09-cv-20423-ASG，文件48，于 FLSD 案卷系统 04/30/2009 录入，第2页，共30页\n\n目录\n\n法庭之友的利益\n\n相关事实陈述\n\nA. 瑞士国内法 1\n\nB. 瑞士关于刑事事项信息交换与合作的国际法律框架 4\n\nC. 税收协定 6\n\nD. 税务事项中的国内及国际谈判 8\n\nE. UBS 的国际信息交换程序 9\n\n论证 11\n\nI. 美国政府试图通过传票从瑞士取得信息，违反税收协定\n\nII. 遵从传票将直接违反瑞士法律 13\n\nIII. UBS 账户持有人对于不因“钓鱼式调查”而披露信息，具有合理期待 15\n\nIV. 作出强制执行传票的命令，将违反国际礼让原则 19\n\n结论\n\n案号 1:09-cv-20423-ASG，文件48，于 FLSD 案卷系统 04/30/2009 录入，第3页，共30页\n\n引证目录\n\n美国案例\n\n美国立法及行政材料\n\nI.R.S. Report No. 18 (1981)\n\nS. Rep. No. 18 (1981)\n\nS. Exec. Rep. No. 8 (1995)\n\n案号 22-50073，文件1410-3，于 01/30/23 提交，并于 01/30/23 10:05:52 录入，第5页，共33页\n\n案号 1:09-cv-20423-ASG，文件48，于 FLSD 案卷系统 04/30/2009 录入，第4页，共30页\n\n美国众议院筹款委员会（U.S. House Committee on Ways and Means），《2001年税收协定的技术说明》，可见：http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_cong_public_laws&docid=f:house.pdf\n\n财政部新闻稿，《美国与瑞士签订新的税收协定》，可见：http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/kd3.htm\n\n财政部新闻稿，《美国与瑞士签订税收协定》，可见：http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1.htm\n\n财政部新闻稿，《美国与瑞士签订税收协定》，可见：http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg8.htm\n\n美国示范所得税协定（2006），可见：http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/hp16801.pdf\n\n《美国示范所得税协定技术说明》（2006），可见：http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/hp16802.pdf\n\n美国财政部，《美利坚合众国政府与瑞士联邦政府关于所得税协定的技术说明》，可见：http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/swiss.pdf\n\n税收协定及公约\n\n《欧洲联盟理事会关于在税务领域相互协助确保追偿与征收税款、关税和其他措施的指令》，可见：http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:150:0028:0038:EN:PDF\n\n《美国—列支敦士登税收信息交换协定》，可见：http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/liechtenstein%20tiea.pdf\n\n《美利坚合众国与瑞士联邦之间关于通过信息交换改进国际税务遵从的协定》，可见：http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/malt.htm\n\n经济合作与发展组织（OECD）《税收协定示范本》及其注释\n\n案号 1:09-cv-20423-ASG，文件48，于 FLSD 案卷系统 04/30/2009 录入，第5页，共30页\n\n《美国—瑞士相互法律协助条约（刑事事项）》，经修订的《美利坚合众国与瑞士联邦之间刑事事项相互法律协助条约》，可见：http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/us-swiss-mlat.pdf\n\n《美国—荷兰相互法律协助条约（刑事事项）》，美利坚合众国与荷兰王国之间刑事事项相互法律协助条约。\n\n《维也纳条约法公约》，联合国《条约法公约》。\n\n瑞士立法及行政材料\n\nSchweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch (StGB)［瑞士刑法典］，SR 311.0，可见：http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/311_0.pdf\n\nSR 312.0，可见：http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/312_0.pdf\n\nBundesgesetz über internationale Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen (Rechtshilfegesetz, IRSG)［联邦刑事事项国际司法协助法］，SR 351.1，可见：http://www.rhf.admin.ch/rhf/de/home/themen/strafrechtliche_rechtshilfe.html\n\nBundesgesetz über die Bekämpfung der Geldwäscherei im Finanzsektor (Geldwäschereigesetz, GwG)［联邦金融部门反洗钱法］，SR 955.0，可见：http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/955_0.pdf\n\nBundesamt für Statistik［联邦统计局］，《自1984年以来根据刑法典（StGB）作出的定罪》，可见：http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/19/03/03/key/straftaten/delikte_im_einzelnen.Document.83251.xls\n\n新闻稿，联邦司法与警察部（Federal Department of Justice and Police），《Montesinos Torres 事件：在瑞士冻结 USD 50 Million》，Mar. 11, 2003，可见：http://www.bj.admin.ch/bj/en/home/dokumentation/medieninformationen/2003/2003-03-11.html\n\n新闻稿，联邦司法与警察部，《菲律宾获准取得逾 USD 683 Million：没收裁定终结 Marcos 案》，Aug. 5, 2003，可见：http://www.bj.admin.ch/bj/en/home/dokumentation/medieninformationen/2003/2003-08-05.html\n\n案号 1:09-cv-20423-ASG，文件48，于 FLSD 案卷系统 04/30/2009 录入，第6页，共30页\n\n新闻稿，联邦司法与警察部，《在瑞士冻结犯罪来源资产》，可见：http://www.bj.admin.ch/bj/en/home/dokumentation/medieninformationen.html\n\n新闻稿，联邦外交部（Federal Department of Foreign Affairs），《瑞士在联合国反腐败公约中的作用》，可见：http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/recent/media/singl.html?id=...\n\n新闻稿，联邦外交部，《瑞士在国际货币基金组织中的作用》，可见：http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/reps/br/ukelo/news.html\n\n国际案例\n\nGabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia)［加布奇科沃—大毛罗斯工程案（匈牙利／斯洛伐克）］，1997 I.C.J. Rep.\n\nAvena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America)［阿韦纳案及其他墨西哥国民案（墨西哥诉美利坚合众国）］，2004 I.C.J. Rep.\n\n未决案件\n\n《美国律师协会国际法期刊》（American Journal of International Law）编辑委员会，《对〈外国民商事判决承认与执行公约〉草案的评注》。\n\n《海牙国际私法会议（Hague Conference on Private International Law）关于外国民商事判决承认与执行公约草案的初步文件》。\n\n《海牙国际私法会议关于外国民商事判决承认与执行公约草案的说明性报告》。\n\n瑞士国际法律援助事务秘书处，《美国请求司法协助时适用的瑞士相互法律协助规则》。\n\n联合国毒品和犯罪问题办公室（United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime），《跨国有组织犯罪公约实施立法指南》。\n\nFINMA（瑞士金融市场监督管理局）新闻稿，《FINMA 允许 UBS 向美国当局移交客户数据》，Feb. 18, 2009，可见：http://www.finma.ch/e/aktuell/pages/mm-ubs-board-20090218.aspx\n\n联合国国际法委员会，《国际法委员会第五十届会议报告》，可见：http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/1998.htm\n\n案件 1:09-cv-20423-ASG 文书 48 于 04/30/2009 录入 FLSD 案卷，第 7 页，共 30 页\n\n《美国对外关系法重述（第二版）》第 40 节（1965 年）19 《美国对外关系法重述（第三版）》（1987 年）\n\n第 3 节\n\n1 11\n\n第 3 节\n\n1 11\n(1\n)\n第\n\n5 11\n第 4 节\n\n1 15\n第\n\n(2\n) 15\n案件 22-50073 文书 1410-3 于 01/30/23 提交，于 01/30/23 10:05:52 录入，第 9 页，共 33 页\n\n案件 1:09-cv-20423-ASG 文书 48 于 04/30/2009 录入 LSD 案卷，第 8 页，共 30 页\n\n根据法院于 April 13, 2009 作出的命令，瑞士政府谨以法庭之友身份提交本意见书。\n法庭之友的利益\n\n瑞士政府对于维护瑞士法律和主权的完整性，以及促进美国尊重其对瑞士承担的国际条约义务，具有重大利益。瑞士政府通过提交本意见书，旨在使法院了解其观点，即应避免美国与瑞士法律之间的冲突，特别是在已经存在一项协调两国法律要求的条约的情况下。\n相关事实陈述\n\n本节审查：(a) 瑞士国内法的相关规定，(b) 瑞士向外国提供刑事和民事调查协助的可得性，(c) 瑞士—美国所得税条约中政府间信息交换条款的历史和内容，(d) 瑞士政府最近宣布改变有关逃税信息交换的政策，以及因此启动谈判以修订瑞士—美国条约，及 (e) 与 UBS 事项有关的政府间信息交换的状况。\nA. 瑞士国内法\n\n与其他若干大陆法系国家一样，瑞士对法律事项中证据的收集行使的控制比美国更多。瑞士认为，在其领土内取得证据属于国内司法职能，且瑞士当局拥有对位于瑞士的个人（包括公司）采取强制措施的主权性和专属性权利。因此，外国当局未经瑞士政府参与或同意而单方面试图强制从瑞士披露信息，将构成对瑞士主权的侵犯。'\n\n大陆法系的这一原则源于国际法上的属地管辖权原则。2 只有被请求证据所在地的国家，才有权在该国境内强制执行和实施证据收集。\n\n司法主权在瑞士是一个重要概念。自 1937 年以来，瑞士《刑法典》将任何人为供外国政府使用而未经主管机关事先授权在瑞士领土上取得证据的行为规定为犯罪（即使不存在违反隐私法的情形）。1937 年 December 21 的瑞士《刑法典》第 271 条第 I 款规定：\n\n1. 任何人未经授权，在瑞士领土上为外国国家实施保留给机关或官员实施的行为，\n\n任何人为外国当事人或其他外国组织实施此类行为，\n\n任何人帮助或教唆实施此类行为，\n\n应处三年以下监禁或罚金；情节严重的，应处一年以上监禁。3\n\n自 1984 年以来，已有 29 起违反第 271 条的定罪。\n\n参见，例如，海牙国际私法会议，April 1969。《美国代表团提交海牙国际私法会议第十一届会议的报告》，转载于 8 Int'l Legal Materials 785, 806 (1969)；D. M. Edwards，《第三委员会：民事或商事事项中的国外取证》，载于《海牙国际私法会议第十一届会议》，18 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 646, 647 (1969)。\n\n2 Oppenheim's International Law，第 1 卷（R. Jennings 和 A. Watts 编，第 9 版 1996），第 458 页（“属地性是管辖权的主要基础；即使另一国家具有并行的管辖权基础，如果行使该管辖权将与拥有属地管辖权国家的权利相冲突，则其行使该管辖权的权利受到限制。”）。\n\nSchweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch (StGB)［《刑法典》］Dec. 21, 1937，经修订，SR 311.0，第 271 条（瑞士），载于 htt]ch/d/sr/3/311.0.de,pdf。本意见书中瑞士法律的英文译文均非官方译文；如有任何差异，应以法律原始语言文本的措辞为准。\n\n案件 1:09-cv-20423-ASG 文书 48 于 04/30/2009 录入 FLSD 案卷，第 10 页，共 30 页\n\n保护银行账户信息隐私的主要法律有两部，即瑞士《刑法典》第 273 条及《银行和储蓄银行联邦法》第 47 条。瑞士《刑法典》第 273 条（同样于 1937 年制定）规定：\n\n任何人为使制造或商业秘密能够被外国官方机构、外国组织或私营企业，或其代理人获取，而试图探知该等制造或商业秘密的，\n\n任何人向外国官方机构、外国组织或私营企业，或其代理人披露制造或商业秘密的，\n\n应处三年以下监禁或罚金；情节严重的，应处一年以上监禁。罚金可与监禁并处。'\n\n自 1984 年以来，已有 26 起违反第 273 条的定罪。6\n\n《银行和储蓄银行联邦法》第 47 条规定：\n\n1. 任何人故意：\n\na. 以银行管理机构成员、雇员、受托人或清算人身份，或者以审计公司高级职员或雇员身份，泄露受托给其的秘密，或泄露其以该身份知悉的秘密；\n\nb. 试图诱使他人实施此类违反职业保密义务的行为，\n\n应处三年以下监禁或罚金。\n\n2. 行为人因过失实施行为的，处不超过 250,000 瑞士法郎的罚金。\n\n3. 在定罪完全发生法律效力后五年内再次犯罪的，金钱罚不得低于 45 个日罚金单位。\n\n6 参见联邦统计局，同上注 4。\n\n参见 Bundesamt für Statistik［联邦统计局］，《自 1984 年以来因违反刑法典（StGB）而被定罪的情况》［Convictions For Offenses Under the Criminal Code (CC), Since 1984］（2007 年），载于 http ://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs!portal/de/index!themen/ 19/03/03/ key/strafiatenldelikte\\_imeinzelnen.Document. 83251 .xls（相关摘录的译文见附录标签 1）。\n\nStGB SR 311 .0，第 273 条（瑞士），载于 htt 11 .0.de.pdf。\n\n案件 1:09-cv-20423-ASG 文书 48 于 04/30/2009 录入 FLSD 案卷，第 11 页，共 30 页\n\n4. 即使官方关系或职业执业终止后，违反职业保密义务的行为仍应受处罚。\n\n5. 关于作证义务及向政府机关提供信息义务的联邦和州规定不受影响。\n\n6. 对本条规定行为的追诉和审判由各州负责。瑞士《刑法典》的一般规定应适用。7\n\n该法最初于 1934 年制定。自 1993 年以来，已有 48 起违反第 47 条的定罪，8\nB. 瑞士在国际执法中的合作\n\n上述瑞士法律反映了一种重视国家主权独立和公民个人自主权的国家政治传统。\n\n然而，瑞士司法主权及保护该主权的法律，并非旨在阻碍外国政府的合法调查。9 实际上，瑞士在制定促进与外国调查合作的法律和政策方面一直具有创新性和主动性；其法律授权在通过获授权的政府间渠道提出请求时，披露原本受隐私法保护的信息。\n\n例如，1972 年，瑞士和美国签署了《刑事事项相互协助条约》［Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters，以下简称“TMAC”］，该条约于 1977 年生效。10 TMAC\n\n10 27 U.S.T. 2019。\n\nStGB SR 952.0，第 47 条（瑞士），载于 htt（德文原文）。\n\n8 参见 Rudolf Wyss 声明第 ¶ 2 段，附录标签 2。\n\n一种常见的公众误解是，瑞士允许匿名开设银行账户。恰恰相反，瑞士实行严格的“了解你的客户”法律，要求银行掌握其客户的身份。参见 Bundesgesetz Ober die Bekampfung der Geldwscherei und der Terrorismusfinanzierung im Finanzsektor (Geldwaschereigesetz, GwG)［《金融部门打击洗钱和恐怖主义融资联邦法》（《反洗钱法》，AMLA）］，StGB Oct. 10, 1997，SR 955.0，第 3-5 条（瑞士），载于 htt。非官方英文译文载于 htt。\n\n案件 1:09-cv-20423-ASG 文书 48 于 04/30/2009 录入 FLSD 案卷，第 12 页，共 30 页\n\n授权在调查广泛类别的犯罪时，就取得文件、信息及其他协助开展合作。该条约优先于原本禁止向外国当事方披露信息的瑞士法律。TMAC 是美国首项此类条约，其后被用作美国与其他国家订立类似条约的范本。11 瑞士与若干其他国家订有双边司法协助协议。12\n\n1981 年，瑞士制定了《刑事事项国际相互协助联邦法》［Federal Act on International Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters，以下简称“IMAC”］。1' 根据该国内法，所有外国政府，无论其是否与瑞士订有条约，均可请求刑事事项协助，前提是其对瑞士的请求给予互惠待遇。与 TMAC 一样，IMAC 优先于瑞士隐私法。'4 瑞士政府每年处理约 1500 至 1800 项来自其他国家的刑事事项协助请求。1\n\n瑞士也是返还由“政治敏感人士”（即现任或前任高级政治官员）存放于瑞士资产方面的国际先驱。根据其在此类事项中提供协助的积极政策，瑞士近年来已向其他国家政府返还约 \\$1.6 billion。'6\n\n参见 Pascal Gossin，《瑞士的国际相互司法协助》，载于《第 138 届国际高级研讨会访问专家论文》，联合国亚洲和远东预防犯罪和罪犯处遇研究所（IJNAFEI）《资源资料系列》第 77 号（March 2009），第 19 页，载于 www.unafei.or.jp/englishlpdfPDF\\_rms/no77/08,,p19-22.pdf。\n\nJa'.a122.\n\n16 新闻稿，联邦外交部，世界银行和 UNODC 关于返还被盗资产的倡议（Sep. 18, 2007），载于\n\n参见，例如，《刑事事项相互协助条约》，美国—荷兰，June 12, 1981，35 U.S.T. 1361。\n\n12 参见条约清单，载于 htt（网页指南见附录标签 3）。\n\nBundesgesetz Ober internationale Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen (Rechtshilfegesetz, IRSG)［《刑事事项国际相互协助联邦法》（“IMAC”）］，StGB March 20, 1981，SR 351.1。IMAC 的非官方译文载于 htt。\n\n案件 1:09-cv-20423-ASG 文书 48 于 04/30/2009 录入 FLSD 案卷，第 13 页，共 30 页\nC. 税收条约\n\n作为更新其 1951 年所得税条约谈判的一部分，瑞士和美国就信息交换条款的新措辞达成一致。该措辞为\n\n并入于1996年10月2日签署的《美利坚合众国与瑞士联邦关于对所得税避免双重征税的协定》（“Tax Treaty”）中。17 第26条相关部分规定：\n\n缔约国主管当局应交换为实施本协定有关规定、为防止就本协定所涉税种发生税务欺诈或类似行为所必需的信息（即根据缔约国各自税法可获得的信息）。在税务欺诈案件中，\n\n(a) 信息交换不受第I条（适用人员范围）的限制；并且\n\n(b) 如一缔约国主管当局提出具体请求，另一缔约国主管当局应依本条以经认证的、未经编辑的原始记录或文件副本形式提供信息。\n\n与此同时，瑞士和美国签署了一份谅解备忘录及一份议定书，对为适用信息交换条款而使用的“税务欺诈或类似行为”一词的含义作了阐释。18\n\n18 参见呈交函，同上。\n\nhtt]home/recent/media/single.html?id=14599，参见，例如，新闻稿，Federal Department of Justice and Police（联邦司法和警察部，以下简称“FDJP”），Philippines Given Access to Over USD 683 Million: Confiscation Ruling Closes Marcos Case（菲律宾获准取得逾USD 683 Million：没收裁定终结马科斯案件）（Aug. 5, 2003），载于htt .admin.chfbj/enlhome/dokumentationlmedieninformationen/2003/2003-08-05 .html；新闻稿，FDJP，Abacha Assets to be Handed Over to Nigeria: Switzerland Doesn't Provide a Refuge for Funds of Criminal Origin（阿巴查资产将移交尼日利亚：瑞士不为犯罪所得资金提供庇护）（Feb. 16, 2005），载于htt bj/enlhome/dokumentation/medieninformationenl2005/2005-02- 1 6.html；新闻稿，FDJP，Montesinos Torres Affair: USD 50 Million Blocked in Switzerland（蒙特西诺斯·托雷斯事件：USD 50 Million在瑞士被冻结）（Mar. 11, 2003），载于htt mi/2000/ref\\_2000- 11-03 .html。\n\n17 Oct. 2, 1996, S. Treaty Doe. 105-8.\n\n案件 1:09-cv-20423-ASG 文件 48 于 04/30/2009 录入 FLSD 案卷 第 14 页，共 30 页\n\n2002年，瑞士和美国就Tax Treaty的信息交换条款进行了进一步磋商，随后于2003年1月23日签署了《关于管理1996年10月2日瑞士—美国所得税协定第26条（信息交换）的相互协议》（“2003 MOU”）。19 2003 MOU就“税务欺诈或类似行为”一词的解释提供了进一步指引，包括14种假设情形。20 在日期为2003年1月24日的照会交换中，瑞士和美国确认了Tax Treaty和2003 MOU的重要性。21\n\n美国政府曾作出多项同期声明，承认Tax Treaty的信息交换条款仅限于涉及税务欺诈的案件。例如，在美国参议院批准该协定时，Joint Committee on Taxation（税收联合委员会）的Chief of Staff（幕僚长）作如下证言：\n\n拟议协定的信息交换条款较现行协定［1951年所得税协定］的相应条款略为有用，但仍比与其他国家所订税收协定中的可比条款更具限制性。一般而言，可以为实施拟议协定之目的交换信息。……亦可为防止税务欺诈而交换信息。\n\nDepartment of Treasury（财政部）致Senate Finance Committee（参议院财政委员会）的一封信，被收录于该委员会关于Tax Treaty的报告中，信中称：\n\n尽管拟议协定的信息交换条款不及美国示范条款广泛，但相较于现行协定中的条款，已构成重大改进。……［新］协定及议定书载有对“税务欺诈”的明确、广泛定义，应能促进信息交换的改善。新协定还规定，在可能的情况下，信息将以使该信息能够用于法院程序的形式提供。尽管这些措施未能达到我们的期望程度，但其将使我们与瑞士的信息交换计划获得改善，从而使新协定的反避税条款远较现行协定下更为有效。23\n\n20 同上。\n\n22 Bilateral Tax Treaties And Protocol: Hearing Before the Committee On Foreign Relations, 105th Cong. 43-44 (1997) （Kenneth J. Kies（肯尼斯·J·基斯），Chief Of Staff, Joint Committee On Taxation的陈述），载于htt 1 05\\_senatehearings&docidf:44 11 0.pdf。\n\n19 载于http ://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/mutual .htm。\n\n21 Treasury News Release KD-3795 (Jan. 24, 2003)，载于htt press/releasesfkd3 795 .htm。\n\n案件 1:09-cv-20423-ASG 文件 48 于 04/30/2009 录入 FLSD 案卷 第 15 页，共 30 页\n\n因此，Barry B. Shott（巴里·B·肖特）于2009年2月6日作出的声明（第15—17段）所显然暗示的，即Internal Revenue Service（美国国内税务局，以下简称“IRS”）对瑞士政府将Tax Treaty解释为仅在“税务欺诈或类似行为”案件中允许信息交换感到某种意外或失望，应结合具体背景予以看待。\n\n自Tax Treaty生效以来，瑞士政府平均每年收到IRS根据第26条提出的三项信息请求，并且实际上在几乎所有案件中均能够传送所请求的信息。瑞士政府还在瑞士法院成功抗辩了受影响人员为阻止其提供该等信息之能力而提起的法院质疑。24\n\nB. 修改协定的谈判\n\n直至近期，瑞士的税收协定一直将信息共享协议限定于基础犯罪涉及税务欺诈而非逃税的情形。尽管如此，瑞士一直照顾其他国家在税收征管方面的利益。尤其是，瑞士以匿名方式向European Union（欧洲联盟）的成员国汇缴瑞士付款代理人向欧盟居民支付的利息所扣缴的35 percent预扣税。25 就美国纳税人而言，UBS（瑞银集团）与IRS订立的Qualified Intermediary Agreement（合格中介机构协议）（以及其他瑞士银行与IRS订立的该等协议）规定了报告程序以及对美国证券所支付利息的扣缴程序。\n\n23 S. Exec. Rep. No. 105-10, at 10 (1997).\n\n24 Eric Hess（埃里克·赫斯）的声明，第 ¶ 3-4，附录标签4。\n\n25 参见Agreement Providing for Measures Equivalent to Those Laid Down in Council Directive 2003/48/EC on Taxation of Savings Income in the Form of Interest Payments, Switz. E.C., Dec. 29, 2004, O.J. (L 3 85/30)，载于htt LexUriServ.do?uri'OJ:L:2004:385: 0030:0042:EN:PDF，\n\n案件 1:09-cv-20423-ASG 文件 48 于 04/30/2009 录入 FLSD 案卷 第 16 页，共 30 页\n\n2009年3月13日，瑞士政府宣布决定修改其税收协定，通过取消目前将协助限定于“税务欺诈或类似行为”的限制，使税务事项中的国际行政协助完全符合Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development（经济合作与发展组织，以下简称“OECD”）的标准。这一政策变化拟通过修订瑞士作为缔约方的避免双重征税协定予以体现。26 瑞士政府与美国政府为修改Tax Treaty进行的谈判已经启动。首次会议于2009年4月28日举行。27\n\nE. 关于UBS事项的国际信息交换\n\n本案申请书及支持性声明对各国政府就提供有关UBS活动及其客户的信息所进行合作的状况作出了令人困惑且不完整的描述。UBS已就其自身行为与U.S. Department of Justice（美国司法部）签订Deferred Prosecution Agreement（暂缓起诉协议），并与Securities and Exchange Commission（证券交易委员会）达成和解。就该刑事调查中查明的税务欺诈计划而言，瑞士当局通过Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority（瑞士金融市场监督管理局，以下简称“FINMA”）行事，得以采取符合瑞士法律要求的特别措施，使所请求的信息能够与美国分享。\n\n26 参见新闻稿，Fed. Dep't of Foreign Affairs（联邦外交部），Switzerland's Credit Line to the IMF（瑞士向International Monetary Fund（国际货币基金组织）的信贷额度）（Mar. 13, 2009），载于htt ukemlo/news/prerel.html。\n\n27 Treasury News Release TG-85 (Apr. 7, 2009)，载于http:J/www.treas.gov/ press/releases/tg85 .htm。\n\n案件 1:09-cv-20423-ASG 文件 48 于 04/30/2009 录入 IZLSD 案卷 第 17 页，共 30 页\n\n政府以加快程序的方式分享该等信息。作为此项安排的一部分，美国政府同意撤回其尚待Federal Tax Authority（联邦税务局）处理的协定请求。28\n\n本案所涉John Doe summons（无名氏传票）的范围与美国的协定请求截然不同。事实上，在IRS准备发出该传票时，其告知瑞士政府，其采取该措施是为避免时效期间届满，并且无意在美国与UBS就刑事案件进行谈判以及协定请求的进展结果出来之前寻求执行。29 此后，美国政府与UBS签订了Deferred Prosecution Agreement，瑞士政府采取了必要步骤，使其能够提供该等信息，而美国政府在收到信息后撤回了有关请求。因此，尚不清楚IRS为何似乎依赖对瑞士就协定请求所作回应的抱怨，作为执行该传票的理由。\n\n瑞士政府已多次向美国政府官员表示其反对该John Doe summons。最近一次是在2009年4月29日，瑞士政府向U.S. Department of State（美国国务院）递交了一份外交照会，阐明其对本案给拟议修改Tax Treaty的谈判所构成威胁的关切。30\n\n28 参见新闻稿，FINMA，FINMA Makes Possible Settlement between UBS and the US Authorities and Announces the Results of Its Own Investigation（FINMA促成UBS与美国当局之间的和解，并公布其自身调查结果）（Feb. 18, 2009），载于htt 18 .aspx。\n\n29 Urs Zulauf（乌尔斯·楚劳夫）的声明，第 ¶ 2，附录标签5。\n\n30 Diplomatic Note (April 29, 2009)，附录标签6。\n\n案件 1:09-cv-20423-ASG 文件 48 于 04130/20D9 录入 FLSD 案卷 第 18 页，共 30 页\n\n论证\n\nI. 美国政府试图通过传票从瑞士获取信息，违反Tax Treaty\n\nTax Treaty第26条规定的规则和程序，为瑞士就税务问题与美国交换信息提供了法律依据。作为交换，美国负有尊重第26条以从瑞士获取信息的国际义务。如以下所述，IRS试图通过使用该传票规避第26条，违反了该协定。\n\n解释条约的基本规则载于1969年5月23日《维也纳条约法公约》（以下简称《维也纳公约》）。31 《维也纳公约》第31条规定：“条约应依诚意解释，并应按照条约用语按其上下文并参照条约之目的及宗旨所具有的通常意义解释。”32 美国联邦最高法院（Supreme Court）亦作出类似认定，即“条约语言的明确含义具有控制力，除非‘依其显而易见的含义适用条约文字，导致的结果与其签署方的意图或期待不一致。’”Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 180 (1982)（引述 Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 54 (1963)）。美国联邦最高法院还确认：“非文本来源……常常有助于我们‘实现条约缔约方的意图’。”United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 366 (1989)（引述 Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 185）。在 Stuart 案中，该案涉及对美加双重征税条约的解释，美国联邦最高法院指出，“一般而言，应‘从宽解释[条约]，以实现赋予其生命力的宗旨……’”Stuart, 489 U.S. at 368。当然，不应仅在从宽解释条约有利于美国政府（U.S. Government）时才如此解释。\n\n31 1155 U.N.T.S. 331。瑞士（Switzerland）是《维也纳公约》的缔约方。尽管美国尚未批准该公约，美国政府及美国法院一贯承认，该公约代表对美国具有约束力的“国际习惯法”。参见 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. § 301 and 321 (1987)；另参见 Avero Belgium Ins. v. American Airlines, Inc., 423 F.3d 73, 79 & n.8 (2d Cir. 2005)；Gonzalez v. Gutierrez, 311 F.3d 942, 949 n.15 (9th Cir. 2002)。\n\n32 Restatement (Third) § 325(1)。\n\n案号 1:09-cv-20423-ASG，文件 48，于 FLSD 案卷 04/30/2009 登记，第 19 页，共 30 页\n\n《维也纳公约》第26条规定，条约“对其当事方具有约束力，并且必须由其善意履行”，该原则通常称为 pacta sunt servanda。33\n\n国际法院（International Court of Justice）就该原则评论如下：\n\n第26条结合了两个同等重要的要素。该条规定：“每一有效条约对其当事方具有约束力，并且必须由其善意履行。”本院认为，后一要素意味着，在本案中，应当优先考虑《条约》的宗旨以及缔约方在订立条约时的意图，而非其字面适用。善意原则要求当事方以合理方式适用该条约，并以能够实现其宗旨的方式适用。34\n\n重要的是，该善意要求规定，条约一方必须避免实施旨在挫败条约宗旨的行为。35\n\n《税收协定》（Tax Treaty）第26条规定了瑞士与美国之间交换信息的具体规则。根据这些规则，两国主管机关应交换为执行《税收协定》规定及防止税务欺诈所必需的信息。《税收协定》第26条还就防止未经授权的披露提供了保障。36\n\n美国政府若单方面在《税收协定》条款之外行事，并规避既定的政府间信息交换程序，将会挫败该条约的基本宗旨，因而违反该条约。更具体而言，若条约一方通过替代手段从另一方取得信息，则该条约关于信息交换的标准和程序将变得毫无意义。因此，执行该传票将破坏该条约的实施，并违反国际法。\n\n美国政府当然有权退出《税收协定》，但其并未如此行事。因此，该条约在国际法和美国法下仍然有效并具有约束力。瑞士政府（Government of Switzerland）谨向本院提交意见，请求本院不要允许自身被用作实施美国国税局（IRS）所提议违约行为的工具。\n\n二、遵从该传票将直接违反瑞士法律\n\n如上所述，当请求并非通过经授权的政府间渠道提出时，瑞士法律禁止向外国政府披露保密信息。若本院命令瑞银集团（UBS）提交来自瑞士的证据，并以强制权力支持该命令，本院将以自身权力取代瑞士主管机关的权力，因而将违反瑞士主权和国际法。由于瑞士法律明确禁止披露该等信息，这一对主权的侵犯将进一步加重。具体而言，若 UBS 遵从该传票，其将\n\n36 Tax Treaty, art. 26(1)。案号 1:09-cv-20423-ASG，文件 48，于 FLSD 案卷 04/30/2009 登记，第 21 页，共 30 页\n\n直接违反《瑞士刑法典》第271条和第273条，以及《银行及储蓄银行联邦法》第47条。\n\n就此而言，《税收协定》第26条第3款规定：\n\n在任何情况下，不得将本条规定解释为对任一缔约国施加下列义务：采取与任一缔约国的法规和惯例相抵触的行政措施，或采取有悖于其主权、安全或公共政策的行政措施，或提供根据其本国立法或提出申请国家的立法无法取得的资料。38\n\n因此，美国政府同意，瑞士政府没有义务采取违反其自身主权的行动，或提供根据其本国立法无法取得的信息。其隐含含义是，美国政府承认其将尊重瑞士主权，且瑞士政府无须在美国政府指示一家瑞士实体违反瑞士法律时袖手旁观。\n\n仅传票的执行将违反瑞士法律这一事实，即为本院拒绝执行传票或以其他方式拒绝对 UBS 施加强制性制裁提供了有力依据。参见，例如，Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 211 (1958)（“对于未提交证据而言，担心受到刑事起诉〔依据《瑞士刑法典》第273条及《银行及储蓄银行联邦法》第47条〕显然构成重要理由，而这种理由并不因阻碍遵从的法律属于外国主权国家的法律而被削弱。”）；In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d 494, 498 (D.C. Cir. 1987)（“想到法院竟会命令违反法律，特别是在其法律受到质疑的主权国家领土上违反法律，令我们深感不安。”）；United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d 341, 346 (7th Cir. 1983)（“尽管美国征收税款的利益对于国家财政完整性十分重要，但希腊的利益，即其银行保密法所服务的利益，也同样重要，政府律师亦承认这一点。”）。另参见 Restatement (Third) § 442(2)（在所请求披露的信息所在国或相关人员所在国禁止披露时，不鼓励实施制裁）；同上 § 441（“一般而言，一国不得要求某人在另一国实施该另一国法律或其国籍国法律所禁止的行为。”）。\n\n根据第271条第1款，联邦委员会（Federal Council）理论上可以授权私人为外国行事。然而，此种授权仅可针对原本会受适用的瑞士国际刑事和行政协助程序涵盖的活动作出，而本案并非如此。参见 Rudolf Wyss 声明第3段，附件标签2。\n\n38 Tax Treaty, art. 26(3)。\n\n案号 1:09-cv-20423-ASG，文件 48，于 FLSD 案卷 04/30/2009 登记，第 22 页，共 30 页\n\n三、IRS 无理由期待通过“钓鱼式调查”获得信息\n\n《税收协定》及其他相关条约的历史和背景表明，IRS 不可能合理期待能够执行此类传票，以从瑞士取得信息。\n\n《税收协定》总体遵循《经合组织所得和资本税收协定范本》（OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital，以下简称《经合组织范本协定》），该范本不授权进行如本案所涉传票般的“钓鱼式调查”。《经合组织范本协定》包含一项信息交换规定，要求具备一定程度的相关性或具体性。第26条（信息交换）规定如下：\n\n1. 缔约国主管机关应交换为实施本协定规定，或管理或执行代表缔约国、其政治分支机构或地方当局征收的各种税类和各种形式的国内税法所可预见相关的信息，但以依该等法律征税不违反本协定为限。信息交换不受第1条和\n\n《经合组织所得和资本税收协定范本》第26条（2006）（着重号为原文所加）。瑞士作出如下保留：\n\n“瑞士保留其对第1款和第5款的立场。瑞士将提议把本条范围限于实施本协定规定所必需的信息。本保留不适用于涉及依两个缔约国法律均可处以监禁的欺诈行为的案件。”\n\n案号 1:09-cv-20423-ASG，文件 48，于 FLSD 案卷 04/30/2009 登记，第 23 页，共 30 页\n\n关于第26条的宗旨，《经合组织范本协定》注释表明，信息请求应包括一定程度的具体性，且不得成为“钓鱼式调查”的手段。该注释规定：\n\n“可预见地相关”这一标准旨在使税务事项中的信息交换在尽可能广泛的范围内进行，同时澄清缔约国不得进行“钓鱼式调查”，以请求不太可能与某一特定纳税人的税务事项相关的信息。缔约国可以商定与本条范围一致的该标准替代表述（例如，以“必要”或“相关”替换“可预见地相关”）。40\n\n由于《税收协定》第26条以 OECD Model Convention（《经济合作与发展组织示范公约》）为重要依据，因此该评注对于解释《税收协定》具有相关性。41\n\n2006年，美国政府发布了 November 15, 2006 的 United States Model Income Tax Convention（《美国所得税示范公约》）（“U.S. Model Convention”）以及相应的 United States Model Technical Explanation Accompanying The United States Model Income Tax Convention of November 15, 2006（《随附于 November 15, 2006《美国所得税示范公约》的美国示范技术说明》）（“U.S. Model Technical Explanation”）。42《U.S. Model Convention》第26条与《OECD示范公约》几乎相同。43\n\n与《OECD示范公约》所附评注类似，《U.S. Model Technical Explanation》就信息交换所需的具体程度提供了指引。《U.S. Model Convention》第26条第1款的指引在相关部分规定：\n\n应当交换的信息，是可能与执行本公约条款，或执行美国或另一缔约国关于在国家层面征收的各种税收的国内法律相关的信息……然而，“可能”这一措辞并不支持如下请求：某一缔约国仅请求获取其居民在另一缔约国开设的所有银行账户的信息，或者甚至请求获取其居民在某一特定银行开设的所有账户的信息。44\n\n事实上，美国政府最近与 Liechtenstein（列支敦士登）订立了一项关于税务事项信息共享的新协定，该协定要求请求中列明每一名其税务或刑事责任存在争议的纳税人的身份。45\n\n在 UBS（瑞银集团）一案中，瑞士政府对《税收协定》采取了宽泛解释，以允许披露信息；即使未指明具体个人，只要关于美国某些 UBS 客户所使用的涉嫌税务欺诈模式性质的细节足够充分即可。然而，该 John Doe 传票范围过宽且缺乏细节，因而不存在任何能够以符合瑞士法律或《税收协定》的方式执行该传票的办法。46\n\nU.S. Model Technical Explanation, at 86（着重号为原文所加）。\n\nU.S. Model Convention, art. 26, ¶ 1 规定：\n\n“缔约国主管当局应交换为执行本公约规定或缔约国关于缔约国征收的各种税收的国内法律而可能相关的信息，但以根据该等国内法律征税不违反本公约为限，包括与该等税收的核定或征收、执行或起诉，或与该等税收有关的上诉裁定相关的信息。”\n\n参见 Agreement on Tax Cooperation and the Exchange of Information Relating to Taxes, Information Exchange Agreement, U.S.-Liech., Dec. 8, 2008, available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/us%20liechtenstein%20tiea.pdf（“一方提出的任何信息请求均应尽可能以最高程度的具体性表述”，包括“其税务或刑事责任存在争议的纳税人的身份”，以及关于该已识别纳税人的可预见相关性证据）。财政部表示：“与列支敦士登达成的《税务信息交换协定》……将使美国能够获得其执行美国税法所需的信息，包括与列支敦士登银行账户有关的信息。”Treasury News Release HP-1320 (Dec. 8, 2008), available at htt 320.htm.\n\n尽管法院通常给予 IRS（美国国税局）在签发传票方面一定的裁量空间，但法院已拒绝执行范围过宽且含糊的 John Doe 传票。参见，例如，In re the Matter of Tax Liabilities: John Does, No. C-88-0137, (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 1992), reprinted in 92 Tax Notes Int'l 26-24 (Tax Analysts)（“IRS 在此寻求执行的 John Doe 传票，在其条款和目的上均属笼统。它并非源自对任何特定不当行为的调查，也未寻求有关任何特定已识别交易的证据。”）；United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749, 754 (4th Cir. 1973)（“如传票的目的显然是对第三方文件进行‘漫无边际的探查’，则不应予以执行。”）。事实上，当 Congress（美国国会）审议 John Doe 传票程序时，House Committee on Ways and Means（美国众议院筹款委员会）和 Senate Finance Committee（美国参议院财政委员会）警告，不得将此类传票用于“钓鱼式调查”：\n\n尽管委员会认为，保留 John Doe 传票作为可在适当情形下使用的调查工具十分重要，但同时，委员会无意使 John Doe 传票可用于使国税局进行可能的“钓鱼式调查”。因此，委员会意在要求，国税局在寻求法院授权送达 John Doe 传票时，应当就某一具体情形向法院提出具体事实。\n\nH.R. Rep. No. 94-658, at 311 (1975), accord, S. Rep. No. 94-938, at 373 (1975)。尽管美国政府指称了有关 UBS 的事实，但针对 UBS 的指控已得到和解。对于传票所针对的数千名账户持有人中的任何一人，均未指称具体事实。参见 Eric Hess（埃里克·赫斯）的声明，¶ 4，附录标签4。\n\n案件 1:09-cv-20423-ASG 文书 48 于 04/30/2009 录入 PLSD 案卷 第 24 页，共 30 页\n\n鉴于《税收协定》的历史，以及美国政府在其自身示范税收协定和其最近与列支敦士登订立的协定中所反映的现行做法，IRS 不可能合理预期瑞士会允许“钓鱼式调查”类型的信息请求。该传票范围过宽，显然与《税收协定》不一致。\n\nIV. 作出强制执行传票的命令将不符合国际礼让原则\n\n在适用国际礼让原则时，美国法院在分析美国法律与外国法律之间潜在冲突时采用“利益衡量测试”。本案无须进行利益评估，因为显然遵守该传票将违反《税收协定》和瑞士法律，并且该传票不合理地范围过宽且含糊。然而，如本院决定进行利益衡量，相关因素强烈支持本院拒绝执行该传票。\n\n在 In re Grand Jury Proceedings (United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia), 740 F.2d 817 (11th Cir. 1984)（“Nova Scotia II”）一案中，美国联邦第十一巡回上诉法院确认地区法院依赖 Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law 第40节所规定的利益衡量测试；该测试建议法院评估诸如各国至关重要的国家利益、不一致的执行行为将造成的困难程度和性质、所要求行为将在何种程度上于另一国家发生、当事人的国籍，以及执行行为在何种程度上可被合理预期促成遵守等因素。Nova Scotia II 法院认定应执行涉案传票，但该案涉及大陪审团对毒品贩运的调查、对该银行缺乏善意的指称，以及与本案无关的其他因素。\n\n美国法院已承认瑞士在捍卫其主权及其法律完整性方面具有强烈利益。参见，例如，Motorola Credit Corp.（摩托罗拉信贷公司） v. Uzan（乌赞）, No. 02 Civ. 666, 2003 WL\n\n— 19 —\n\n案件 1:09-cv-20423-ASG 文书 48 于 04/30/2009 录入 FLSD 案卷 第 27 页，共 30 页\n\n203011 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2003); Minpeco v. Conticommodity Services, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Cochran Consulting, Inc. v. Uwatec USA, Inc., 102 F.3d 1224 (Fed. Cir. 1996); In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum (Union Bank of Switzerland（瑞士联合银行）), 158 Misc. 2d 222 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993)。\n\n尽管瑞士和美国在执行其法律方面的利益通常应被视为具有同等价值，但传票执行程序属于民事程序，而因遵守该传票将被违反的瑞士法律属于刑事法律。此外，涉案信息由一家位于瑞士境内的瑞士公司持有，因此，本院执行命令必须在瑞士领土内实施。再者，该传票中的美国信息请求极其含糊，以广泛方式请求数千个账户的信息；如美国政府提出此类请求，美国政府不会预期任何外国政府作出回应。在此方面，《税收协定》本身体现了国家之间经谈判达成的妥协，旨在反映两国的共同最佳利益。其限制应受到尊重。\n\n最后，瑞士政府和美国政府目前正在谈判修订《税收协定》，以扩大瑞士可以答复的协定请求范围。正如瑞士政府向美国国务院提交的外交照会所说明的，以违反《税收协定》和瑞士法律的方式威胁执行该传票，构成成功完成该等谈判的障碍。47本院应避免作出会干扰该等谈判以及瑞士与美国之间更广泛政府间关系的命令。\n\n附录标签6。案件 1:09-cv-20423-ASG 文书 48 于 04/30/2009 录入 IZLSD 案卷 第 28 页，共 30 页\n\n结论\n\n基于上述理由，瑞士政府恭请本院驳回执行该传票的申请。\n\n谨此提交，\n\n签署人：s/John C. Dotterrer（约翰·C·多特勒）\n\nJohn C. Dotterrer（约翰·C·多特雷勒） Florida Bar No. 267260\nJenny Torres（珍妮·托雷斯） Florida Bar No. 785881\nJOHN C. DOTTERRER COUNSELLORS AT LAW, P.A.（约翰·C·多特雷勒法律顾问事务所，P.A.）\n125 Worth Avenue, Suite 310\nPalm Beach, FL 33480\n电话：(561) 802-3808\n传真：(561) 802-3318\n\nStephari E. Becker（斯蒂法里·E·贝克尔）*\nKemba Eneas Walden（肯巴·伊尼亚斯·沃尔登）*\nPILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP（皮尔斯伯里·温思罗普·肖·皮特曼律师事务所）\n2300 N Street, N.W.\nWashington, D.C. 20037\n电话：(202) 663-8277\n传真：(202) 663-8007\n\n*获准特别出庭\n\n日期：April 30, 2009\nCase 1:09-cv-20423-ASG Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/30/2009 Page 29 of 30\n\n提交及送达证明\n\n本人特此证明，本人于 April 30, 2009，使用 CM/ECF 向法院书记官以电子方式提交了前述文件。本人还证明，前述文件于本日通过 CM/ECF 生成的电子提交通知，送达随附送达清单中列明的所有登记在案律师。\n\nJOHN C. DOTTERRER COUNSELLORS AT LAW, P.A.（约翰·C·多特雷勒法律顾问事务所，P.A.）\n\n签署人：s/John C. Dotterrer\nJohn C. Dotterrer（约翰·C·多特雷勒）\n\nCase 1:09-cv-20423-ASG Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/30/2009 Page 30 of 30\n\n送达清单\n\nUnited States of America（美利坚合众国）诉 UBS AG（瑞银集团）\nCase No. 09-20423-GOLD/MCALILEY\nUnited States District Court, Southern District of Florida（美国佛罗里达南区联邦地区法院）\n\n申请人 United States of America（美利坚合众国）的代理律师\n\nStuart D. Gibson（斯图亚特·D·吉布森）\nDepartment of Justice（司法部）\nTax Division（税务司）\nP.O. Box 403\nBen Franklin Station\nWashington, D.C. 20044\nStuart.D.Gibson@usdoj.gov\n\n被申请人 UBS AG（瑞银集团）的代理律师\n\nEugene E. Stearns（尤金·E·斯特恩斯）\nestearns@swmwas.com\nAna Hirfield Barnett（安娜·赫菲尔德·巴内特）\nabarnett@swmwas.com\nGordon McRae Mead Jr.（小戈登·麦克雷·米德）\ngmead@swmwas.com\nGeri Fischman（杰里·菲施曼）\ngfischman@swmwas.com\nStearns Weaver Miller Weissler Alhadeff & Sitterson（斯特恩斯·韦弗·米勒·魏斯勒·阿尔哈德夫及西特森律师事务所）\n150 W Flagler Street\nSuite 2200\nMiami, FL 33130\n\nFrancis P. Barron（弗朗西斯·P·巴伦）\ntbarron@cravath.com\nDavid N. Greenwald（大卫·N·格林沃尔德）\ndgreenwald@cravath.com\nCravath Swaine & Moore LLP（克拉瓦斯·斯韦因及摩尔律师事务所）\n825 8th Avenue\nNew York, NY 10019-7475\n212-474-1000\n212-474-3700（传真）\n\nRichard D. Euliss（理查德·D·尤利斯）\nUnited States Department of Justice（美国司法部）\nP.O. Box 14198\nBen Franklin Station\nWashington, D.C. 20044\nRichard.D.Euliss@usdoj.gov\n\nJohn F. Savarese（约翰·F·萨瓦雷斯）\njfsavarese@wlrk.com\nMartin J.E. Arms（马丁·J.E. 阿姆斯）\nmjearms@wlrk.com\nRalph M. Levene（拉尔夫·M·莱文）\nrmlevene@wlrk.com\nWachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz（沃切尔·利普顿·罗森及卡茨律师事务所）\n51 W 52nd Street\nNew York, NY 10019\n\nCase 1:09-cv-20423-ASG Document 48-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/30/2009 Page 5 of 18\n\nIN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA\nMIAMI DIVISION（迈阿密分院）\n\nCASE NO. 09-20423-CIV-GOLD/MCALILEY\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA（美利坚合众国）\n\n申请人，\n\n诉\n\nUBS AG（瑞银集团），\n\n被申请人。\n\nRUDOLF WYSS（鲁道夫·维斯）的声明\n\nRudolf Wyss（鲁道夫·维斯）依据 28 U.S.C. §1746 声明：\n\n1. 本人系瑞士伯尔尼 Federal Office of Justice (FOJ)（联邦司法局）副局长，负责刑事事项国际司法协助司。本人自 December 2007 起担任该职务，并自 September 1, 1996 起在该司工作。\n\n2. 根据我们对瑞士法院裁决的审查，自 1993 年以来，因违反 Swiss Banking Act（瑞士银行法）第 47 条而被定罪的案件共有 48 起。\n\n3. Swiss Penal Code（瑞士刑法典）第 271(1) 条第一款表明，Federal Council（联邦委员会）可能授权私人在瑞士境内代表外国行事。根据本人对第 271 条相关学术评注和联邦委员会实践的审查，以及本人作为联邦司法局副局长的经验，此类授权仅可由有管辖权的联邦机关在以下情形下作出：\n\nCase 1:09-cv-20423-ASG Document 48-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/30/2009 Page 6 of 18\n\n国际刑事和/或行政协助可能提供的情形下作出（参见：Basler Kommentar, Niggli/Wiprachtiger, Strafrecht II, Art. 111-392, 2. Auflage, Basel 2007, Th. Hopf, Nr. 6 und Nr. 18 zu Art. 271 StGB; VPB 61.82; Entscheid des Bundesrates vom 25. Juni 1997）。\n\n本人在伪证处罚的约束下声明，前述内容真实、正确。本声明于 April 28, 2009 在瑞士伯尔尼签署。\n\nRudolf Wyss（鲁道夫·维斯）/ Federal Office of Justice（联邦司法局）副局长","key_entities":["Je","Torres","CIPA","Guo"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":48,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":8435,"status":"published","published_at":"2023-01-30 00:00:00","created_at":"2023-01-30","updated_at":"2026-08-23 21:43:14"}