{"id":"court_ctb_141_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":141,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2022-03-01","title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION |        |              | -------------------","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"## **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n|        |              | -----------------------------------------------------------------X |                                        |\n|--------|--------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|\n| In re: |              |                                                                    | :<br>:<br>Chapter 11                   |\n|        | Ho Wan Kwok, |                                                                    | :<br>:<br>Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)<br>: |\n|        |              | Debtor.                                                            | :<br>Ref. Dkt. Nos. 57, 83, 98<br>:    |\n\n-----------------------------------------------------------------X\n\n## **DEBTOR'S SUPPLEMENT TO OBJECTION TO MOTION OF PACIFIC ALLIANCE ASIA OPPORTUNITY FUND L.P. FOR ENTRY OF AN ORDER CONFIRMING THE INAPPLICABILITY OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, RELIEF FROM THE AUTOMATIC STAY PURSUANT TO SECTION 362(d)(2) OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE**\n\nHo Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\"), through his below proposed counsel, in accordance with\n\nthe Court's instructions at the March 22, 2022 preliminary hearing on the PAX Motion, [1](#page-0-0) hereby\n\nfiles this supplement to his Objection to the PAX Motion [Dkt. No. 83] and response to paragraphs\n\n8 through 11 of PAX's Reply in respect of the PAX Motion [Dkt. No. 98].[2](#page-0-1)\n\n1. The February 9 Contempt Order does not bind this Court or preclude proper\n\nfindings as to the extent to which the estate holds an interest in the Lady May vessel.\n\n(i) In connection with the February 9 Contempt Order, PAX asked only for a determination that the Debtor held a sufficient beneficial interest in the Lady May under CPLR § 5225 to support a levy — not for a determination of the vessel's actual ownership.\n\n<span id=\"page-0-0\"></span><sup>1</sup> *Motion of Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. for Entry of an Order Confirming the Inapplicability of the Automatic Stay or, in the Alternative, Relief from the Automatic Stay Pursuant to Section 362(d)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code*, dated March 1, 2022 [Dkt. No. 57] (the \"PAX Motion\").\n\n<span id=\"page-0-1\"></span><sup>2</sup> In accordance with the Court's instructions, this supplement responds only to the arguments and assertions made in paragraphs 8 through 11 of the PAX Reply. To the extent that PAX or any other party in interest raises additional *res judicata*, collateral estoppel, Rooker-Feldman, or other arguments with respect to the PAX Motion or any other matters in this case, the Debtor reserves all rights to respond, including the right to raise any applicable legal or equitable arguments in respect thereof.\n\n- (ii) The NY State Court determined the exact question that PAX requested it determine, and no more.\n- (iii) In any event, the NY State Court could not have determined ownership of the Lady May, as that court, pursuant to federal law, did not have jurisdiction to determine ownership of the vessel.\n- (iv) The Rooker-Feldman doctrine cannot apply because the NY State Court's findings are not final; rather, they are pending appeal.\n- (v) Moreover, Rooker-Feldman does not apply to ancillary proceedings (*e.g.*, the proceeding that resulted in entry of the February 9 Contempt Order), but to only final judgments on the merits concerning liability.\n- (vi) *Res judicata* does not apply because the current title holder who asserts ownership of the Lady May (HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC) (\"HK International\") was not a party to the NY State Court action, and any decision as to HK International's interests and the estate's interests in the Lady May necessarily requires that HK International be a party; there is, therefore, no identity of parties as between the NY State Court action and here.\n- (vii) *Res judicata* also does not apply because the precise questions to be decided there, whether the Debtor held a sufficient beneficial interest in the Lady May to support a levy; versus here, the extent to which any interest in the Lady May is estate property — are different; there is, therefore, no identity of issues as between the NY State Court action and here.\n- (viii) Collateral estoppel is similarly inapplicable for substantially the same reasons.\n- 2. The February 9 Contempt Order ruled on one narrow question whether the Debtor\n\nheld a sufficient beneficial interest in or had sufficient control over the Lady May under CPLR §\n\n5225 such that PAX could have levied upon that interest. This is the precise question on which PAX requested that the NY State Court rule,[3](#page-2-0) and on which that court did so rule.[4](#page-2-1)\n\n3. PAX concedes that HK International holds legal title to the Lady May.[5](#page-2-2) The February 9 Contempt Order did *not* resolve the ultimate question of who actually owns the Lady May, or the extent of the Debtor's beneficial interest in the vessel relative to the asserted competing interests of the current title holder, HK International, or any other parties. Nor could it have. The NY State Court did not have jurisdiction to determine title and ownership over the Lady May because such matters invoke the exclusive admiralty/maritime jurisdiction of the federal courts.[6](#page-2-3)\n\n4. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, an \"exceedingly narrow\" doctrine that applies only in the rarest of circumstances,[7](#page-2-4) cannot apply here. The \"limited scope\" of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply: (i) where, as here, there is a pending appeal of the order, and there is\n\n<span id=\"page-2-0\"></span><sup>3</sup> See Pre-Hearing Brief in Support of Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.'s Motion for a Final Order of Civil Contempt against Defendant Kwok, dated February 1, 2022, in PAX v. Kwok, et al., Index No. 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), ECF No. 1172 (\"PAX Pre-Hearing Brief\"), at 8 (\"The extent of PAX's ongoing 'prejudice' turns on PAX showing whether it could ultimately levy on the Lady May to satisfy its more-than-\\$116 million judgment against Kwok. Under CPLR § 5225, an interest in 'money or other personal property,' like the Lady May, is leviable where the debtor holds the requisite 'interest.' To satisfy this requirement, '**[i]t is not necessary that the judgment debtor have legal title to the property; a beneficial interest is sufficient**.'\") (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).\n\n<span id=\"page-2-1\"></span><sup>4</sup> Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. v. Kwok, Case No. 652077/2017, 2022 WL 406636, at \\*5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 9, 2022) (\"The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that Kwok holds a beneficial interest in and controls the Lady May.\").\n\n<span id=\"page-2-2\"></span><sup>5</sup> PAX Pre-Hearing Brief, at 9 (\"As an initial matter, Kwok argues that he never held legal title to HK International or HK USA. PAX does not dispute this, but that is not the relevant fact.\").\n\n<span id=\"page-2-3\"></span><sup>6</sup> See 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (\"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of: (1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled….\"); Ward v. Peck, 59 U.S. 267, 267 (1855) (\"In this country ... the ancient jurisdiction over petitory suits or causes of property has been retained [by courts of admiralty].\"); Matsuda v. Wada, 128 F. Supp. 2d 659, 669 (D. Haw. 2000) (\"It is well settled that the admiralty jurisdiction of federal courts extends to petitory and possessory suits concerning vessels.\"); Kawa Leasing, Ltd. v. Yacht Sequoia, 544 F.Supp. 1050, 1064-65 (D. Md. 1982) (action to quiet title was action in admiralty invoking admiralty jurisdiction of federal court).\n\n<span id=\"page-2-4\"></span><sup>7</sup> See VanderKodde v. Elliott, 951 F.3d 397, 400-01 (6th Cir. 2020) (\"In Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., the Supreme Court made clear that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine — which prohibits the lower federal courts from reviewing appeals of state-court decisions — applies only to an exceedingly narrow set of cases.\").\n\nalmost certain to be a dispute over whether and the extent to which the vessel is property of the estate under Section 541; [8](#page-3-0) or (ii) to ancillary proceedings (*e.g.*, contempt/enforcement proceedings) separate from the underlying liability judgment. [9](#page-3-1) Further, as discussed below, the precise issue in this case and the issue before the NY State Court are different, rendering Rooker-Feldman inapplicable.[10](#page-3-2)\n\n5. *Res judicata* does not apply either. *Res judicata* requires both that the rendering court be a court of \"competent jurisdiction\" and that \"the litigants were the same parties.\"[11](#page-3-3) The February 9 Contempt Order could not have *res judicata* effect regarding: (i) the ultimate ownership of the Lady May, which the NY State Court lacked jurisdiction to resolve; or (ii) the asserted competing interests of third parties *(e.g.*, HK International) who were not party to that litigation.[12](#page-3-4)\n\n6. *Res judicata* also does not apply because the precise question decided by the NY State Court (*i.e.*, whether the Debtor held a sufficient beneficial interest to support a levy), and the question to be decided by this Court (*e.g.*, the extent to which the Lady May is property of the\n\n<span id=\"page-3-0\"></span><sup>8</sup> See [Nicholson](http)#co_pp_sp_506_1275) v. Shafe*,* 558 F.3d 1266, 1275-76 (11th Cir. 2009) (\"[B]ecause an appeal remained pending in the state court action at the time the Appellants filed the instant [federal] case, the state court proceedings had not ended for purposes of Rooker–Feldman....\"); [Guttman](http)#co_pp_sp_506_1032) v. G.T.S. Khalsa*,* 446 F.3d 1027, 1032 (10th Cir. [2006\\)](http)#co_pp_sp_506_1032) (\"In this case, [plaintiff] filed his federal suit while his petition for certiorari to the New Mexico Supreme Court was pending. His state suit was not final. As such, the Rooker–Feldman doctrine does not bar his federal suit....\"); [Dornheim](http)#co_pp_sp_506_923) v. Sholes*,* 430 F.3d 919, 923–24 (8th Cir. 2005) (\"At the time that the [plaintiffs] commenced this federal action, the state court adjudication was not complete\" because state appellate proceedings took place after filing of federal action); [Federación](http)#co_pp_sp_506_27) de Maestros de P.R. v. Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo de P.R.*,* 410 F.3d 17, 27 & n. [13 \\(1st Cir.](http)#co_pp_sp_506_27) 2005).\n\n<span id=\"page-3-1\"></span><sup>9</sup> VanderKodde, 951 F.3d at 402 (\"First, Rooker-Feldman applies only when a state court renders a *judgment*  when the court investigates, declares, and enforces liabilities based on application of law to fact.\") (emphasis in original) (citations and quotations omitted).\n\n<span id=\"page-3-2\"></span><sup>10</sup> See Philadelphia. Entm't & Dev. Partners LP v. Commonwealth of Pa. Dept. of Rev. (In re Phila. Entm't & Dev. Partners LP), 879 F.3d 492, 501-02 (3d Cir. 2018) (\"[A] federal court can address the same issue and reach a conclusion contrary to a judgment by the first court, as long as the federal court does not reconsider the legal conclusion reached by the state court.\").\n\n<span id=\"page-3-3\"></span><sup>11</sup> Brown Media Corp. v. K & L Gates, LLP, 854 F.3d 150, 157 (2d Cir. 2017).\n\n<span id=\"page-3-4\"></span><sup>12</sup> See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 884 (2008) (\"It is a principle of general application in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment *in personam* in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process.\") (quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U. S. 32, 40 (1940)).\n\nDebtor's estate), are different. \"Whether property is property of the estate is a question *only a Bankruptcy Court can make with full authority*.\"[13](#page-4-0) A Section 541 property of the estate determination: (i) is a separate and distinct cause of action under the Bankruptcy Code; (ii) did not arise until after the bankruptcy petition was filed; (iii) was not previously litigated; (iv) could not have been raised in any prior proceeding; and (v) is subject to this Court's *exclusive* jurisdiction.[14](#page-4-1) Even where there may be overlapping facts,[15](#page-4-2) *res judicata* does not foreclose a Section 541 determination because of the separate and distinct nature of the action and the fact that it was not (nor could it have been) litigated before the bankruptcy case.[16](#page-4-3)\n\n7. Collateral estoppel is not applicable either for substantially the same reasons neither the actual ownership of the Lady May, nor the relative rights of the parties with asserted competing interests in the Lady May, nor a Section 541 determination of the estate's interest in the Lady May, has ever been previously adjudicated.[17](#page-4-4)\n\n8. Accordingly, the February 9 Contempt Order does not bind this Court, does not preclude proper findings as to the extent to which the Lady May is property of the Debtor's estate,\n\n<span id=\"page-4-0\"></span><sup>13</sup> In re DeFlora Lake Dev. Assocs., Inc., 571 B.R. 587, 593 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017) (emphasis added).\n\n<span id=\"page-4-1\"></span><sup>14</sup> Id. at 598 (\"[A] determination of property of the estate could not have been made by the District Court or the Second Circuit prior to Debtor's filing for bankruptcy. Such a determination is not only a separate cause of action under Bankruptcy Code § 541 and § 543, it is also a determination within the exclusive province of the Bankruptcy Court. The District Court could not have made a determination on what constituted property of the bankruptcy estate before the bankruptcy case was even filed.\") (citations omitted).\n\n<span id=\"page-4-2\"></span><sup>15</sup> It bears observing that the NY State Court's determination respecting the Lady May was based, in part, on an adverse inference drawn respecting the Debtor's invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights, which adverse inference does not carry over to this proceeding. See Klein v. Harris, 667 F.2d 274, 288 (2d Cir. 1981) (inferences respecting waiver/invocation of Fifth Amendment rights may be made only \"in the context of the same judicial proceeding.\").\n\n<span id=\"page-4-3\"></span><sup>16</sup> DeFlora, 571 B.R. at 597 (\"Even though the adversary proceeding before this Court may involve some overlapping facts that were alleged in the parties' breach of contract claims in the District Court, the causes of action are not the same and this proceeding for turnover of property of the estate and for a determination of Hyde Park's bankruptcy claims could not have been raised in the District Court.\").\n\n<span id=\"page-4-4\"></span><sup>17</sup> See Napoli v. New York Post, 107 N.Y.S.3d 279, 281 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019) (holding that collateral estoppel does not apply where claim decided in first proceeding was different from claim in second proceeding).\n\nand does not implicate Rooker-Feldman, *res judicata*, collateral estoppel, or any other similar legal or equitable considerations.\n\nDated: March 28, 2022\n\n## **BROWN RUDNICK LLP**\n\nBy: */s/ William R. Baldiga* Dylan P. Kletter, Esq. 185 Asylum Street Hartford, Connecticut 06103 Telephone: (860) 509-6500 Facsimile: (860) 509-6501 Email: dkletter@brownrudnick.com\n\n-and-\n\nWilliam R. Baldiga, Esq. Robert J. Stark, Esq. Jeffrey L. Jonas, Esq. Bennett S. Silverberg, Esq. Seven Times Square New York, New York 10036 Telephone: (212) 209-4800 Facsimile: (212) 209-4801 Email: wbaldiga@brownrudnick.com rstark@brownrudnick.com jjonas@brownrudnick.com bsilverberg@brownrudnick.com\n\n*Proposed Counsel for Ho Wan Kwok, Debtor*","body_zh":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION（美国康涅狄格州破产法院布里奇波特分院）\n\n关于：\n第 11 章\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵），\n案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人。\n参考案卷号：57, 83, 98\n\n债务人对 PACIFIC ALLIANCE ASIA OPPORTUNITY FUND L.P. 申请作出确认自动中止不适用或依据《破产法典》第 362(d)(2) 条免除自动中止命令的动议之异议的补充文件\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵，下称“债务人”）通过其下述拟聘律师，根据本法院在 2022 年 3 月 22 日就 PAX 动议举行的初步听证会上的指示，[1] 特此提交本补充文件，对其就 PAX 动议提出的异议 [案卷号 83] 进行补充，并对 PAX 就 PAX 动议提出的答辩意见 [案卷号 98] 中的第 8 至 11 段作出回应。[2]\n\n1. 2 月 9 日蔑视法庭裁定对本法院不具有约束力，亦不妨碍就破产财产对 Lady May 号游艇享有多大程度的权益作出适当认定。\n\n(i) 关于 2 月 9 日蔑视法庭裁定，PAX 仅请求判定债务人根据 CPLR（纽约州《民事诉讼法与规则》）§ 5225 对 Lady May 号享有足以支持扣押的实益权益——而非判定该游艇的实际所有权归属。\n\n1 2022 年 3 月 1 日提交的《Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. 申请作出确认自动中止不适用或依据〈破产法典〉第 362(d)(2) 条免除自动中止命令的动议》[案卷号 57]（下称“PAX 动议”）。\n\n2 根据本法院的指示，本补充文件仅针对 PAX 答辩意见第 8 至 11 段中提出的论点和主张作出回应。如果 PAX 或任何其他利害关系方就 PAX 动议或本案中的任何其他事项提出额外的既判力（res judicata）、附带禁反言（collateral estoppel）、Rooker-Feldman 理论或其他论点，债务人保留一切回应的权利，包括就此提出任何适用的法律或衡平法论点的权利。\n\n- (ii) 纽约州法院仅审理并裁决了 PAX 请求其审理的明确问题，并未超出此范围。\n- (iii) 无论如何，纽约州法院不可能对 Lady May 号的所有权作出裁决，因为根据联邦法律，该法院对判定该游艇的所有权不具有管辖权。\n- (iv) Rooker-Feldman 理论不能适用，因为纽约州法院的认定并非终局性的；相反，它们正处于上诉阶段。\n- (v) 此外，Rooker-Feldman 理论不适用于附随程序（例如导致作出 2 月 9 日蔑视法庭裁定的程序），而仅适用于涉及责任的实体终审判决。\n- (vi) 既判力不适用，因为主张拥有 Lady May 号所有权的现法定产权所有人（HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC，下称“HK International”）并非纽约州法院诉讼的当事人，而对 HK International 的权益以及破产财产对 Lady May 号的权益作出的任何决定，必然要求 HK International 作为诉讼当事人；因此，纽约州法院诉讼与本案之间不存在当事人同一性。\n- (vii) 既判力亦不适用，因为两案中待决的具体问题不同：前案审理的是债务人对 Lady May 号是否享有足以支持扣押的实益权益；而本案审理的是对 Lady May 号的任何权益在多大程度上属于破产财产；因此，纽约州法院诉讼与本案之间不存在争点同一性。\n- (viii) 基于实质相同的理由，附带禁反言同样不适用。\n- 2. 2 月 9 日蔑视法庭裁定仅针对一项狭隘的问题作出了裁决，即债务人是否根据 CPLR § 5225 对 Lady May 号享有充分的实益权益或对其具有充分的控制权，从而使 PAX 本可以对该权益进行扣押。这正是 PAX 请求纽约州法院裁决的明确问题，[3] 且该法院也确实作出了该项裁决。[4]\n\n3. PAX 承认 HK International 拥有 Lady May 号的法定产权。[5] 2 月 9 日蔑视法庭裁定并未解决谁实际拥有 Lady May 号这一根本问题，也未解决债务人对该游艇享有的实益权益相对于现法定产权所有人 HK International 或任何其他方所主张的相冲突权益的范围。该裁定也不可能解决该问题。纽约州法院对确定 Lady May 号的产权和所有权不具有管辖权，因为此类事项属于联邦法院专属的海事/海商管辖权范围。[6]\n\n4. Rooker-Feldman 理论作为一种“极其狭隘”、仅在极罕见情况下才适用的理论，[7] 在此根本不能适用。Rooker-Feldman 理论的“有限范围”在下列情形中不适用：(i) 如本案这样，该裁定正在上诉中，且几乎必然会就该游艇是否属于以及在多大程度上属于《破产法典》第 541 条规定的破产财产产生争议；[8] 或 (ii) 适用于独立于基础责任判决之外的附随程序（例如蔑视法庭/执行程序）。[9] 此外，如下文所述，本案中的具体争点与纽约州法院审理的争点不同，这也使得 Rooker-Feldman 理论无法适用。[10]\n\n5. 既判力同样不适用。既判力既要求作出裁决的法院是“有管辖权的法院”，又要求“诉讼当事人为同一主体”。[11] 2 月 9 日蔑视法庭裁定无法就以下事项产生既判力效力：(i) 纽约州法院无权解决的 Lady May 号的最终所有权归属；或 (ii) 未参与该诉讼的第三方（例如 HK International）所主张的相冲突权益。[12]\n\n6. 既判力亦不适用，因为纽约州法院裁决的具体问题（即债务人是否享有足以支持扣押的充分实益权益）与本法院待决的问题（例如 Lady May 号在多大程度上属于债务人的\n\n3 参见 2022 年 2 月 1 日在 PAX 诉 Kwok 等人案（纽约州最高法院，索引号 652077/2017）中提交的《Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. 申请对被告 Kwok 作出民事蔑视法庭最终命令动议的听证前辩护状》，ECF 编号 1172（下称“PAX 听证前辩护状”），第 8 页（“PAX 持续受到的‘损害’程度取决于 PAX 能否证明其最终可以通过扣押 Lady May 号来清偿其对 Kwok 享有的超过 1.16 亿美元的判决债权。根据 CPLR § 5225，在债务人享有必要‘权益’的情况下，对诸如 Lady May 号等‘金钱或其他动产’所享有的权益是可供扣押的。为满足这一要求，‘判决债务人无须对该财产拥有法定产权；享有实益权益即已足够。’”）（原文强调）（引注省略）。\n\n4 Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. 诉 Kwok，案号 652077/2017, 2022 WL 406636，第 *5 页（N.Y. Sup. Ct.（纽约州最高法院）2022 年 2 月 9 日）（“证据清楚且有说服力地表明，Kwok 对 Lady May 号享有实益权益并对其拥有控制权。”）。\n\n5 PAX 听证前辩护状，第 9 页（“首先，Kwok 主张其从未拥有 HK International 或 HK USA 的法定产权。PAX 对此不持异议，但这并非相关事实。”）。\n\n6 参见 28 U.S.C. § 1333（“地方法院对下列事项享有专属原审管辖权，排斥州法院管辖：(1) 具有海事或海商管辖权的任何民事案件，但在所有案件中均保留起诉人依法享有的所有其他救济途径……”）；Ward 诉 Peck，59 U.S. 267, 267 (1855)（“在本国……对所有权确权诉讼或财产诉因的古老管辖权一直由 [海事法院] 保留。”）；Matsuda 诉 Wada，128 F. Supp. 2d 659, 669 (D. Haw. 2000)（“联邦法院的海事管辖权延伸至涉及船舶的所有权确权诉讼和占有权之诉，这一点已确立无疑。”）；Kawa Leasing, Ltd. 诉 Yacht Sequoia，544 F.Supp. 1050, 1064-65 (D. Md. 1982)（确权之诉属于海事诉讼，受联邦法院海事管辖权管辖）。\n\n7 参见 VanderKodde 诉 Elliott，951 F.3d 397, 400-01 (6th Cir. 2020)（“在 Exxon Mobil Corp. 诉 Saudi Basic Industries Corp. 案中，最高法院明确指出，禁止联邦下级法院审查对州法院裁决之上诉的 Rooker-Feldman 理论，仅适用于极小范围的案件。”）。\n\n破产财产）是不同的。“某项财产是否属于破产财产，是一个唯有破产法院才有完全权力认定的问题。”[13] 根据《破产法典》第 541 条对破产财产的认定：(i) 是《破产法典》项下单独且相区别的诉因；(ii) 直至破产申请提交后才产生；(iii) 先前未曾经过审理；(iv) 不可能在任何在先程序中提出；且 (v) 属于本法院的专属管辖范围。[14] 即使可能存在事实重合，[15] 由于该诉因的独立与区别性质，以及在破产案之前未曾（亦不可能）经过审理的事实，既判力并不能排除依据第 541 条进行认定。[16]\n\n7. 基于实质相同的理由，附带禁反言同样不适用——无论是 Lady May 号的实际所有权归属、主张对 Lady May 号享有相冲突权益的各当事方的相对权利，还是依据第 541 条对破产财产在 Lady May 号中所享权益的认定，先前均未曾被审判决断。[17]\n\n8. 因此，2 月 9 日蔑视法庭裁定对本法院不具有约束力，不妨碍就 Lady May 号在多大程度上属于债务人破产财产作出适当认定，\n\n8 参见 Nicholson 诉 Shafe，558 F.3d 1266, 1275-76 (11th Cir. 2009)（“由于在上诉人提起本案 [联邦] 诉讼时州法院诉讼中的上诉仍在进行中，因此就 Rooker-Feldman 而言，州法院程序尚未终结……”）；Guttman 诉 G.T.S. Khalsa，446 F.3d 1027, 1032 (10th Cir. 2006)（“在本案中，[原告] 是在向新墨西哥州最高法院申请调卷令（certiorari）尚在审理期间提起联邦诉讼的。其州法院诉讼并未终结。因此，Rooker-Feldman 理论并不禁止其提起联邦诉讼……”）；Dornheim 诉 Sholes，430 F.3d 919, 923–24 (8th Cir. 2005)（“在 [原告] 提起本联邦诉讼时，州法院的审理裁决尚未完成”，因为州上诉程序发生在提起联邦诉讼之后）；Federación de Maestros de P.R. 诉 Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo de P.R.，410 F.3d 17, 27 及附注 13 (1st Cir. 2005)。\n\n9 VanderKodde，951 F.3d，第 402 页（“首先，Rooker-Feldman 仅在州法院作出判决——即法院根据法律适用事实调查、宣布和执行责任时适用。”）（原文强调）（引注及引文省略）。\n\n10 参见 Philadelphia. Entm't & Dev. Partners LP 诉 Commonwealth of Pa. Dept. of Rev. (In re Phila. Entm't & Dev. Partners LP)，879 F.3d 492, 501-02 (3d Cir. 2018)（“只要联邦法院不重新审查州法院得出的法律结论，联邦法院就可以审理同一争点并得出与第一家法院判决相反的结论。”）。\n\n11 Brown Media Corp. 诉 K & L Gates, LLP，854 F.3d 150, 157 (2d Cir. 2017)。\n\n12 参见 Taylor 诉 Sturgell，553 U.S. 880, 884 (2008)（“英美法系中普遍适用的原则是，任何人在未被指定为诉讼当事人或未通过送达传票被列为诉讼当事人的诉讼中，不受对人判决（judgment in personam）的约束。”）（援引 Hansberry 诉 Lee，311 U. S. 32, 40 (1940)）。\n\n13 In re DeFlora Lake Dev. Assocs., Inc.，571 B.R. 587, 593 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.（纽约南区破产法院）2017)（强调为后加）。\n\n14 同上，第 598 页（“在债务人申请破产之前，District Court（地区法院）或 Second Circuit（第二巡回法院）不可能对破产财产作出认定。这种认定不仅是《破产法典》第 541 条和第 543 条项下的独立诉由，而且也是 Bankruptcy Court（破产法院）专属管辖范围内的事项。在破产案件甚至尚未立案之前，地区法院不可能就何者构成破产财产作出认定。”）（引用省略）。\n\n15 值得注意的是，NY State Court（纽约州法院）关于 Lady May（梅号游艇）的认定部分基于对债务人援引其第五修正案权利所作出的不利推定，而该不利推定并不延续至本诉讼程序。参见 Klein 诉 Harris 案，667 F.2d 274, 288 (2d Cir. 1981)（关于放弃/援引第五修正案权利的推定只能在“同一司法程序的背景下”作出）。\n\n16 DeFlora 案，571 B.R. 第 597 页（“尽管本法院审理的对席诉讼可能涉及各方在地区法院的违约主张中所主张的部分重叠事实，但诉由并不相同，且本起要求移交破产财产以及对 Hyde Park 的破产债权作出认定的诉讼程序不可能在地区法院提起。”）。\n\n17 参见 Napoli 诉 New York Post 案，107 N.Y.S.3d 279, 281 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019)（裁定当第一个程序中判定的主张与第二个程序中的主张不同时，不适用争点排除效）。\n\n并且不涉及 Rooker-Feldman 教义、既判力、争点排除效或任何其他类似法律或衡平法考量。\n\n日期：March 28, 2022\nBROWN RUDNICK LLP（博锐律师事务所）\n\n签署人：/s/ William R. Baldiga Dylan P. Kletter, Esq.\n185 Asylum Street\nHartford, Connecticut 06103\n电话：(860) 509-6500\n传真：(860) 509-6501\n电子邮箱：dkletter@brownrudnick.com\n\n-以及-\n\nWilliam R. Baldiga, Esq.\nRobert J. Stark, Esq.\nJeffrey L. Jonas, Esq.\nBennett S. Silverberg, Esq.\nSeven Times Square\nNew York, New York 10036\n电话：(212) 209-4800\n传真：(212) 209-4801\n电子邮箱：wbaldiga@brownrudnick.com\nrstark@brownrudnick.com\njjonas@brownrudnick.com\nbsilverberg@brownrudnick.com\n\n债务人 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）之拟任代理律师","key_entities":["Kwok","Je","Ho Wan Kwok"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":57,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":83,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":98,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1172,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":2342,"status":"published","published_at":"2022-03-01 00:00:00","created_at":"2022-03-01","updated_at":"2026-08-23 13:16:34"}