{"id":"court_ctb_1443_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":1443,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2023-02-07","title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION In re:","summary_zh":"上诉通知书 —— Ho Wan Kwok 破产案（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo），CTB 22-50073 ECF #1443（2023-02-07立案）。债务人 Ho Wan Kwok 就破产法院于 2023 年 1 月 24 日作出的民事藐视法庭裁定（ECF #1372）向康涅狄格区联邦地区法院提起上诉；该裁定认定其未能完全遵守关于移交实体控制权及公司治理权的法院命令。","summary_en":"Notice of Appeal — In re Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo / Guo Wengui), CTB 22-50073, ECF No. 1443 (filed Feb 7, 2023). Debtor Ho Wan Kwok appealed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut from the Bankruptcy Court's January 24, 2023 order (ECF No. 1372) that found him in civil contempt for non-compliance with the Corporate Governance Order.","body_en":"# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\nIn re:\n\nHO WAN KWOK,\n\nDebtor.\n\nChapter 11\n\nCase No: 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n# **NOTICE OF APPEAL**\n\n**PLEASE TAKE NOTICE** that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), the Debtor, Ho Wan Kwok, hereby appeals to the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut from the January 24, 2023, *Order Granting Motion to Hold Debtor in Contempt of Corporate Governance Order,* (ECF No. 1372) (the \"Order\"), entered by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut (Hon. Julie A. Manning) finding the Debtor in civil contempt for failing to fully comply with the Court's August 10, 2022, Order granting the July 23, 2022, Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee for Entry of Order, Pursuant to Bankruptcy Code Sections 363, 541, 1108, and 1505, (A) Confirming that Chapter 11 Trustee Holds all of Debtor's Economic and Corporate Governance Rights in Debtor-Controlled Entities, (B) Authorizing Chapter 11 Trustee to Act in Any Foreign Country on Behalf of Estate, and (C) Granting Related Relief (ECF No. 598). A copy of the Order is attached hereto as Exhibit A. The names of all parties to the Order and the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of their respective counsel are as follows:\n\n| PARTY                       | ATTORNEYS                     |\n|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|\n| Ho Wan Kwok –<br>The Debtor | ZEISLER & ZEISLER, P.C.       |\n|                             | Eric Henzy                    |\n|                             | Stephen M. Kindseth           |\n|                             | Aaron A. Romney               |\n|                             | James M. Moriarty             |\n|                             | John L. Cesaroni              |\n|                             | 10 Middle Street, 15th Floor  |\n|                             | Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604 |\n|                             | Tel: (203) 368-4234           |\n|                             | ehenzy@zeislaw.com            |\n|                             | skindseth@zeislaw.com         |\n|                             | aromney@zeislaw.com           |\n|                             | jmoriarty@zeislaw.com         |\n|                             | jcesaroni@zeislaw.com         |\n|                             |                               |\n|                             | LAWALL & MITCHELL, LLC        |\n|                             | Aaron A Mitchell              |\n|                             | 55 Madison Ave, Suite 400     |\n|                             | Morristown, NJ 07960          |\n|                             | Tel: (973)-285-3280           |\n|                             | aaron@lmesq.com               |\n\n| Luc A. Despins-Chapter 11 Trustee | NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C.   |\n|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|\n|                                   | Douglas Skalka                   |\n|                                   | James C. Graham                  |\n|                                   | Patrick R. Linsey                |\n|                                   | Lucas B. Rocklin                 |\n|                                   | 195 Church Street, 13th Floor    |\n|                                   | New Haven, Connecticut 06510     |\n|                                   | (203) 781-2847                   |\n|                                   | dskalka@npmlaw.com               |\n|                                   | jgraham@npmlaw.com               |\n|                                   | plinsey@npmlaw.com               |\n|                                   | rocklin@npmlaw.com               |\n|                                   |                                  |\n|                                   | PAUL HASTINGS LLP                |\n|                                   | Nicholas A. Bassett              |\n|                                   | 2050 M Street NW                 |\n|                                   | Washington, D.C., 20036          |\n|                                   | (202) 551-1902                   |\n|                                   | nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com |\n|                                   | -and                             |\n|                                   | Luc A. Despins                   |\n|                                   | Avram E. Luft                    |\n|                                   | Douglass Barron                  |\n|                                   | G. Alexander Bongartz            |\n|                                   | 200 Park Avenue                  |\n|                                   | New York, New York 10166         |\n|                                   | (212) 318-6079                   |\n|                                   | lucdespins@pauhastings.com       |\n|                                   | aviluft@paulhastings.com         |\n|                                   | douglassbarron@paulhastings.com  |\n|                                   | alexbongartz@paulhastings.com    |\n\nDated: Bridgeport, Connecticut, February 7, 2023\n\n## **THE DEBTOR, HO WAN KWOK**\n\n*/s/ Eric Henzy* Eric Henzy (ct12849) Stephen M. Kindseth (ct14640) Aaron A. Romney (ct28144) James M. Moriarty (ct21876) John L. Cesaroni (ct29309) 10 Middle Street, 15th Floor Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604 Telephone: (203) 368-4234 Facsimile: (203) 368-5487 Email: [ehenzy@zeislaw.com](mailto:ehenzy@zeislaw.com) [skindseth@zeislaw.com](mailto:skindseth@zeislaw.com) [aromney@zeislaw.com](mailto:aromney@zeislaw.com) [jmoriarty@zeislaw.com](mailto:jmoriarty@zeislaw.com) [jcesaroni@zeislaw.com](mailto:jcesaroni@zeislaw.com)\n\n#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI hereby certify that on this 7 th day of February 2023, a copy of foregoing Notice of Appeal was filed electronically. Notice of this filing will be sent by e-mail to all parties by operation of the Court's electronic filing system or by mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing as indicated on the Notice of Electronic Filing. Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF System.\n\n.\n\n/s/ Eric Henzy\n\n# **Exhibit A**\n\n## **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\n)\n\n)\n\n)\n\nIn re: ) Chapter 11 ) Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) HO WAN KWOK, *et al.*, ) (Jointly Administered)\n\nDebtors. ) Re: ECF Nos. 717 and 913\n\n## **ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO HOLD DEBTOR IN CONTEMPT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ORDER**\n\n#### **I. INTRODUCTION**\n\nBefore the Court is the motion of Luc A. Despins, in his capacity as the Chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") for the estate (the \"Estate\") of Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\"), to hold the Debtor in civil contempt. (ECF No. 913, the \"Contempt Motion.\") The Contempt Motion asserts that the Debtor has not complied with the Court's order regarding the transfer of economic and corporate governance rights from the Debtor to the Trustee. (ECF No. 717, the \"Corporate Governance Order.\") For the reasons stated below, the Court finds the Debtor in civil contempt and will sanction him reasonable attorneys' fees and costs in the event he fails to purge himself of contempt.\n\n#### **II. BACKGROUND**\n\nOn February 15, 2022, the Debtor filed his voluntary Chapter 11 petition, commencing this case. (ECF No. 1.) His individual case is jointly administered with two affiliated corporate cases. (ECF Nos. 970 and 1141.) On June 15, 2022, after developments the Court has discussed in a prior opinion, the Court ordered the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee. *In re Kwok*, 640 B.R. 514 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022). (ECF No. 465.) On July 8, 2022, the Court appointed Mr. Despins as the Chapter 11 Trustee. (ECF No. 523.)\n\nOn July 23, 2022, the Trustee filed a motion to confirm that he held the Debtor's economic and corporate governance rights. (ECF No. 598, the \"Corporate Governance Motion.\") On July 29, 2022, the Debtor filed an objection to the Corporate Governance Motion, which he supplemented with a further objection on August 4, 2022. (ECF Nos. 643 and 678.) Also on August 4, 2022, the Trustee filed a reply in support of the Corporate Governance Motion. (ECF No. 679.) That same date, a hearing was held on the Corporate Governance Motion. The Court granted the Corporate Governance Motion during the hearing and entered the Corporate Governance Order on August 10, 2022. (ECF No. 717.)\n\nOn October 4, 2022, the Trustee filed the Contempt Motion asserting that the Debtor had failed to comply with the Corporate Governance Order and requesting that he be held in civil contempt of court. (ECF No. 913.) On October 25, 2022, the Debtor filed his objection to the Contempt Motion. (ECF No. 1026, the \"Objection.\") On November 14, 2022, the Trustee filed his reply. (ECF No. 1092, the \"Reply.\") The instant matter is fully briefed.\n\nAn evidentiary hearing (the \"Hearing\") on the Contempt Motion was held on November 16, 17, and 18, 2022. On November 17, 2022, the Court entered an order partially resolving the Contempt Motion (ECF No. 1110, the \"Partial Resolution Order\"), which Order the Debtor insisted the Court enter prior to continuing with the evidentiary hearing. During the Hearing, no testimony was heard but evidence, including excerpts from deposition testimony, was admitted.\n\n#### **III. JURISDICTION**\n\nThe United States District Court for the District of Connecticut has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). This Court has authority to hear and determine this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) and the Order of Reference of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut dated September 21, 1984. The instant proceedings are\n\nstatutorily core proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (E). This Court explicitly retained jurisdiction over all matters all matters arising from or related to the implementation, interpretation, and enforcement of the Corporate Governance Order. There is no constitutional issue precluding the exercise of jurisdiction in the instant case. *Cf*. *Stern v. Marshall*, 564 U.S. 462, 487–99 (2011).\n\nVenue in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.\n\n#### **IV. FINDINGS OF FACT**\n\nThe Court has already made the findings of fact contained in paragraphs 1 and 2 below, as set forth in the Partial Resolution Order:\n\n1. The Debtor exclusively beneficially owned and controlled Ace Decade Holdings Limited (\"Ace Decade\") on the February 15, 2022 petition date (the \"Petition Date\") and maintained such exclusive beneficial ownership and control up to and including immediately prior to the date of the Trustee's appointment, and (ii) Dawn State Limited (\"Dawn State\" and, together with Ace Decade, the \"Ace Decade Entities\") is Ace Decade's wholly-owned subsidiary and is exclusively owned and controlled by Ace Decade. For the avoidance of doubt, Yanping \"Yvette\" Wang (hereinafter, Ms. Wang) is not and has never been a beneficial owner of the shares in Ace Decade or Dawn State. (Trustee 6–7, 10, 15.)<sup>1</sup>\n\n2. But for the Trustee's appointment and his rights under the Bankruptcy Code and the Corporate Governance Order, the Debtor would still exclusively beneficially own and control Ace Decade. (Trustee 6–7, 10, 15.)\n\n<sup>1</sup> Exhibits submitted during the Hearing by the Trustee will be styled Trustee [No.] and exhibits submitted by the Individual Debtor will be styled Kwok [Letter].\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 1443 Filed 02/07/23 Entered 02/07/23 09:45:02 Page 10 of 22 Case 22-50073 Doc 1372 Filed 01/24/23 Entered 01/24/23 13:01:58 Page 4 of 16\n\nFrom the evidence on the record and introduced during the Hearing, the Court makes the following additional findings of fact:\n\n3. Ms. Yvette Wang is the nominee owner of Ace Decade for the benefit of the Debtor. (Trustee 27.)\n\n4. The Debtor has control over Ms. Wang. The Debtor has employed Yvette Wang for several years, and has directed her to take actions on his behalf, including directing her to act on his behalf to purchase properties such as the Sherry-Netherland apartment. (Trustee 29 and 30.)\n\n5. The Debtor did not sufficiently establish that the letter (the \"Letter,\" Kwok B) and the purportedly attached share transfer instrument and share transfer resolution were delivered to Ms. Wang directing her to transfer the corporate and economic rights of Ace Decade to the Trustee. The Debtor represented he does not believe he has any ability to take the actions he directs Ms. Wang to take in the Letter. (Trustee 27, at 87:3–13.) The Debtor represents he sent the Letter to Ms. Wang via personal delivery (Kwok B), and asserts this personal delivery was completed through his personal bodyguards. However, the Debtor does not remember which bodyguard he directed to deliver the Letter, and \"can never remember the names\" of his security guards. (Trustee 27, at 88:3–13.) Beyond the Debtor's deposition testimony and the description \"via personal delivery\" on the Letter, there is no evidence to support the Letter was actually delivered. The Letter does not contain an address. (Kwok B.) There is no receipt nor sworn affidavit regarding service or delivery of the Letter from the unidentified bodyguard. (*Id.)*\n\n6. Even if the Letter was delivered, the language in it signals to its reader that the Debtor does not fully support executing the share transfer instrument. Instead, the Letter states \"The Trustee believes that I control Ace Decade and that I utilize that perceived control to direct you to execute the Share Transfer Instrument and Share Transfer Resolution.\" [emphasis added].\n\nThe Letter further states, \". . . in compliance with the Trustee's demands and to the extent that I may have any authority over Ace Decade, I hereby direct you to execute the attached Share Transfer Instrument and Share Transfer Resolution.\" (Kwok B.)\n\n7. The Debtor represents he has had no communications of any kind with Yvette Wang about the contempt motion. (Trustee 27, at 84:5–85:5.)\n\n8. The Trustee has been unable to service Yvette Wang with a subpoena. (Trustee 32– 33).\n\n#### **V. DISCUSSION**\n\n#### **a. Legal Standard**\n\nThis Court has the power to hold parties in contempt of court under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9020. *Taggart v. Lorenzen ex rel. Brown*, 139 S. Ct. 1795, 1801 (2019); *PHH Mortg. Corp. v. Sensenich ex rel. Gravel (In re Gravel)*, 6 F.4th 503, 512 (2d Cir. 2021); *Mar. Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chauteaugay Corp.)*, 920 F.2d 183, 187 (2d. Cir. 1990). Contempt may be sought to \"'coerce the defendant into compliance'\" with a court order or to \"'compensate the complainant for losses'\" resulting from noncompliance with a court order. *Taggart*, 139 S. Ct. at 1801 (citing *United States v. United Mine Workers*, 330 U.S. 258, 303–04 (1947)). A finding of civil contempt requires \"(1) the order the contemnor failed to comply with is clear and unambiguous, (2) the proof of noncompliance is clear and convincing, and (3) the contemnor has not diligently attempted to comply in a reasonable manner.\" *King v. Allied Vision, Ltd.*, 65 F.3d 1051, 1058 (2d Cir. 1995); *see Gravel*, 6 F.4th at 512 (adding that the contemnor must have notice of the order). \"A long recognized defense to a civil contempt citation is the cited individual's inability to comply with the court's order.\" *United States v. Wendy*, 575 F.2d 1025, 1030 (2d Cir. 1978).\n\nContempt \"'should not be resorted to where there is [a] *fair ground of doubt* as to the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct.'\" *Taggart*, 139 S. Ct. at 1801 (citing *Cal. Artificial Stone Paving Co. v. Molitor*, 113 U.S. 609 (1885)). This standard is generally objective – a \"party's subjective belief that she was complying with an order ordinarily will not insulate her from civil contempt if that belief was objectively unreasonable.\" *Taggart*, 139 S. Ct. at 1802 (citing *McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co.*, 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1949) (\"The absence of wilfulness [sic] does not relieve from civil contempt.\")). Nevertheless, a party's bad faith may justify \"placing 'the burden of any uncertainty in the decree . . . on [the] shoulders' of the party who violated the court order,\" and \"a party's good faith, even where it does not bar civil contempt, may help to determine an appropriate sanction.\" *Taggart*, 139 S. Ct. at 1802 (citing *McComb*, 336 U.S. at 192–93 and *Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A.*, 481 U.S. 787, 801 (1987)).\n\n## **b. Conclusions of Law**\n\n#### **1. The Debtor Had Notice of the Corporate Governance Order**\n\nThe Court concludes that the Individual Debtor had notice of the Corporate Governance Order. *See Gravel*, 6 F.4th at 512. As outlined above, he litigated its entry. Furthermore, he did not contest notice in his Objection or during the Hearing.\n\n## **2. The Corporate Governance Order Clearly and Unambiguously Directs the Debtor to Cooperate with the Trustee**\n\nThe Court concludes that the Corporate Governance Order is clear and unambiguous, s*ee King*, 65 F.3d at 1058, and that there is no fair ground of doubt as to its meaning, *see Taggart*, 139 S. Ct. at 1801. Under the Corporate Governance Order, the Debtor is required to cooperate with the Trustee regarding the Trustee's control of the Ace Decade Entities and also required to\n\nsurrender the Ace Decade Entities, ownership interests in the Ace Decade Entities, and corporate governance documents relating to the Ace Decade Entities.\n\nThe Trustee argues that paragraph 2 of the Corporate Governance order needs to be read in concert with paragraph 3 and the underlying provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. In this context, the Trustee argues that the Debtor was clearly and unambiguously directed to cooperate with the Trustee and turn over assets of the Estate and related records to the Trustee. The Debtor argues that the Trustee obtained control over the Ace Decade Entities via operation of law under paragraph 2 of the Corporate Governance Order and, therefore, the Debtor need not do anything to comply with the Corporate Governance Order. The Debtor further argues that the Trustee can assert control over the Ace Decade Entities and the present dispute is manufactured and unnecessary.\n\nThe Court agrees with the Debtor that there is no fair ground of doubt that paragraph 2 of the Corporate Governance Order allows the Trustee to act of his own accord to assert control over corporate entities, including the Ace Decade Entities. Paragraph 2 provides in pertinent part:\n\nFor the avoidance of doubt, the foregoing rights include the Trustee's asserted authority to replace any existing officer, director, manager, or similar person of the Debtor-Controlled Entities. As part of the foregoing, to the extent necessary, the Trustee is authorized to act, in his capacity as the chapter 11 trustee in this Chapter 11 Case, as any such officer, director, manager, or similar person who has been removed.\n\nParagraph 2 does allow the Trustee to issue new shares or membership interests and appoint new directors in the Debtor's corporate entities. However, paragraph 2 does not require the Trustee to do so. Even if the Trustee did issue new shares or membership interests or appoint new directors in the Ace Decade Entities, without the corporate documents and access to any\n\ncorporate accounts, it is unclear how the Trustee would operate the Ace Decade Entities. The Trustee's desire for an orderly and complete transition is reasonable.\n\nMoreover, recourse to self-help may be in contravention of applicable non-bankruptcy law or existing governance documents and could create legal problems for the Trustee. The Debtor raised this exact issue during the August 4th hearing on the Corporate Governance Motion and noted that paragraph 2 would \"give [the Trustee] authority that may not be provided for under applicable non-bankruptcy law and the governing documents of particular entities.\" (ECF No. 746, at 63:15–18.) The Trustee assured the Court that his intent was to act where he had authority under applicable non-bankruptcy law and the governing documents. (*Id.* at 64:14–15.) The Trustee stated\n\nThe reason we asked for blanket authority is because we will not exercise that right unless we believe through due diligence we have the power to do it. And if we're doubtful, we'll come back to the Court. But we cannot be in a position where there's a satellite litigation open whether – what state law provides, what foreign law provides, because that's a – that's going to be another case basically.\n\n(*Id.* at 64:19–65:1.) The Debtor then insisted that his intent was not to enter into litigation about corporate governance, but that he was concerned about the Trustee acting contrary to applicable non-bankruptcy law and the governing documents of particular entities. (*Id.* at 65:2–8.) In response to the Debtor's concern, the Court inserted the word \"asserted\" into paragraph 2 of the Corporate Governance Order to address this issue. (*Id.* at 65:11–21.) At that point, the Debtor did not press his objection to paragraph 2. (*Id.* at 65:23–24.) The Court finds the Trustee's desire to avoid \"satellite litigation\" about corporate governance is reasonable. However, despite paragraph 2 of the Corporate Governance Order and the Debtor's stated intent not to engage in satellite litigation, the Trustee has had to engage in litigation against the Debtor and the Ace Decade Entities in the High Court of England and Wales, Chancery Division, regarding\n\nrecognition of these bankruptcy cases in the United Kingdom. *See* Despins v Kwok (Re Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006) [2023] EWHC 74 (Ch) (20 January 2023). Ace Decade argued against the Trustee's application seeking recognition under the Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006 (the \"CBIR\") of the Debtor's Chapter 11 case in that court.\n\nThe Court also disagrees with the Debtor that the Trustee's rights in paragraph 2 end the analysis. Simply because the Trustee has recourse to self-help under paragraph 2 of Corporate Governance Order, does not mean that the Trustee has no other recourse under its terms.\n\nWith respect to paragraph 3 of the Corporate Governance Order, the Court concludes that it clearly and unambiguously directs the Debtor to cooperate with the Trustee. There is no fair ground of doubt that paragraph 3 requires the Debtor's cooperation with the Trustee in locating the Debtor's nominee, Ms. Wang, and in effectuating turnover of her ownership interest in Ace Decade.\n\nParagraph 3 clearly and unambiguously states, in pertinent part:\n\nIn accordance with [section] 521(a)(3) . . . of the Bankruptcy Code, the Debtor is hereby directed to . . . (a) cooperate with the Trustee as necessary to enable the Trustee to perform his duties, including, without limitation, the Trustee's investigation into the assets of the Debtor . . ..\"\n\nSection 521 of the Bankruptcy Code is entitled \"Debtor's duties.\" Section 521(a)(3)'s language is almost identical to the language of the Corporate Governance Order: \"The debtor shall . . . if a trustee is serving in the case . . . cooperate with the trustee as necessary to enable the trustee to perform the trustee's duties under this title.\" The duty to cooperate under section 521(a)(3) is interpreted broadly. *In re Cambridge Analytica LLC*, 596 B.R. 1, 8 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019) (\"Section 521(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code similarly requires a debtor to 'cooperate with the trustee as necessary to enable the trustee to perform the trustee's duties.' ''Cooperate' is a broad term, indeed, and must be construed that whenever the trustee calls upon the debtor for assistance in the performance of his duties, the debtor is required to respond, at least if the request is not unreasonable.' 'Indeed, '[i]t is well settled that a trustee should not be required to drag information from a reluctant and uncooperative debtor. Because of the extraordinary relief offered under the Bankruptcy Code delay and avoidance tactics are inconsistent with, and offensive to, its purpose and spirit.'\") (internal citations omitted); *see Beach v. Morris (In re Beach)*, 281 B.R. 917, 921 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2002) (\"In addition to imposing affirmative duties on the Debtors, these provisions impress the policy that a debtor who voluntarily submits him or herself to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to obtain the benefit of a discharge of debts, must fulfill certain duties to insure that estate assets are administered in accordance with applicable law.\"); *see also* 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 521.15[5] (16th ed. 2022) (\"The debtor's cooperation may involve informing the trustee of and assisting in locating property of the estate in the possession of third parties, executing documents necessary to convey property and assisting in the collection of accounts receivable.\"). Given the close resemblance of the text of the Bankruptcy Code and the explicit cite to section 521 in the Corporate Governance Order, it is clear and unambiguous that paragraph 3 should be read similarly broadly.\n\nAs set forth above and in the uncontested Partial Resolution Order, the Debtor has been found to have exclusively beneficially owned and controlled Ace Decade and, through it, Dawn State, as of the petition date and as of the appointment of the Trustee. Pursuant to paragraph 2 of the Corporate Governance Order, the Trustee \"holds all of the Debtor's economic and governance rights, for the benefit of the Estate, with respect to all Debtor-Controlled Entities.\" Therefore, the Trustee holds the Debtor's economic and governance rights with respect to the Ace Decade Entities in furtherance of his duties to the Estate. The Debtor no longer contests this fact. The Debtor is required by the clear terms of paragraph 3 to cooperate with the Trustee as\n\nnecessary to realize this assertion of control and possession over the Ace Decade Entities for the benefit of the Estate, whether that furthers the Trustee's investigation of assets or some other duty to the Estate. *See Star Direct Telecom, Inc. v. Glob. Crossing Bandwidth, Inc.*, 272 F.R.D. 350, 356 (W.D.N.Y. 2011) (\"First, Global Crossing offers no authority, nor is this Court aware of any, to support its argument that the clause \"including, without limitation\" should be read as a limiting clause.\"); *Shugrue v. Cont'l Airlines*, 977 F. Supp. 280, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (\"Even assuming there is some ambiguity as to what was actually attached to the first page of Schedule C, the language on that first page—'[a]ll of Eastern[ ]'s computer programs and software, including without limitation'—makes it clear that the attached list was not an exclusive list.\").\n\nThe Court further holds that there is no fair ground of doubt under paragraph 3 of the Corporate Governance Order that the Debtor is required to surrender to the Trustee the Ace Decade Entities, including the ownership interests in the Ace Decade Entities and corporate governance documents relating to the Ace Decade Entities. Paragraph 3 clearly and unambiguously states, in pertinent part and in language closely mirroring § 521(a)(4):\n\nIn accordance with [section] . . . 521(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Debtor is hereby directed to . . . (b) surrender to the Trustee all property of the estate and any recorded information, including, without limitation, books, documents, records, and papers relating to property of the estate (including, without limitation, his shares in Genever (BVI) and all related corporate governance documents).\n\nSection 521(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, and the Corporate Governance Order based on its language, reaches all equitable interests a debtor may have, such as beneficial ownership in corporate entities. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). The Debtor is required under section 521(a)(4) and the Corporate Governance Order to promptly surrender assets and documents relating to assets upon request. *See Beach*, 281 B.R. at 921; 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 521.16.\n\nBecause the Debtor exclusively beneficially owned and controlled the Ace Decade Entities as of the petition date and as of the appointment of the Trustee, under paragraph 2 of the Corporate Governance Order, the Trustee controls the Ace Decade Entities for the benefit of the Estate. As noted above, the Debtor does not contest this fact. The Debtor is required by the clear terms of paragraph 3 to surrender the Ace Decade Entities to the Trustee, which includes all recorded information relating the Ace Decade Entities, such as shares and corporate governance documents. *See Star Direct*, 272 F.R.D. at 356; *Shugrue*, 977 F. Supp. at 285.\n\nThe Debtor argued in the alternative that the Corporate Governance Order was unclear and ambiguous because paragraphs 2 and 3 of the corporate governance order were in conflict with each other, trapping the Debtor in a \"Catch-22.\" The Debtor argues that paragraph 2 strips him of the economic and corporate governance rights required to comply with paragraph 3.\n\nThe Court holds, however, that paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Corporate Governance Order are not in conflict. While the Trustee came into *de jure* control of the Estate and the Debtor's economic and corporate governance rights by operation of law, the Bankruptcy Code – and the clear and unambiguous Corporate Governance Order – require turnover of *de facto* possession and control pursuant to the Trustee's rights under the Corporate Governance Order. Courts routinely provide remedies that bring parties' *de facto* rights in line with their *de jure* rights. There is nothing in this case to create a fair ground of doubt as to what conduct the Corporate Governance Order is requiring.\n\nThe Court further finds the Debtor's argument regarding a conflict between paragraphs 2 and 3 would render 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(a)(3)–(4) useless and cannot be correct as a matter of law. The Debtor is directed by the Bankruptcy Code and the Corporate Governance Order to cooperate with the Trustee and surrender assets of the Estate and related records, even if by\n\noperation of law control has already passed to the Trustee. Complying would not have frustrated the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and the Corporate Governance Order, but rather would have furthered them.\n\nAlthough the Court finds the Corporate Governance Order clearly required the Debtor to cooperate with the Trustee, if a reviewing court were to find the Corporate Governance Order is unclear, the burden of that uncertainty is not upon the Trustee, but upon the Debtor, on account of the Debtor's bad faith. *See Taggart*, 139 S. Ct. at 1802. As detailed above, the Court is not persuaded by the Debtor's interpretation of the Order, and, since the burden has been shifted by the Debtor's bad faith, it is sufficient for the Court to find this element in the Trustee's favor.\n\nThe Court finds the Debtor has acted in bad faith for several reasons. Until the hearing, the Debtor's primary argument in his Objection and in his deposition testimony was that he did not own Ace Decade, beneficially or otherwise, as of the petition date and as of the Trustee's appointment. However, during the Hearing he abandoned this argument, sought the entry of the Partial Resolution Order prior to continuing the Hearing, and agreed not to appeal the Partial Resolution Order. Nevertheless, the Partial Resolution Order is not a consent order. The Debtor would not consent to findings in the Partial Resolution Order, which is in tension with his abandonment of his Objection file prior to the Hearing and his agreement not to appeal the order.\n\nFurthermore, the Debtor's only alleged attempt to comply with the Corporate Governance Order came on November 10, 2022, several months after it entered, one month after the Contempt Motion was filed, and less than one week before the Hearing was scheduled to begin. In addition, the Debtor's alleged attempt to comply with the Corporate Governance Order obscured the location of his nominee – Ms. Wang – from the Trustee, who has been unable to serve her with a subpoena. During the Hearing, the Debtor highlighted the Trustee's lack of\n\ncommunication with Ms. Wang despite only informing him she was the nominee owner of Ace Decade shortly before the Hearing. Finally, the Debtor has not sufficiently shown that the Letter was sent to Ms. Wang. The Letter contains no address for Ms. Wang and the Debtor could not remember which of his bodyguards purportedly personally delivered the Letter to Ms. Wang.\n\n#### **3. The Debtor Has Not Complied with Corporate Governance Order**\n\nThe Court concludes, by clear and convincing evidence, that the Debtor has not complied with the Corporate Governance Order. *See King*, 65 F.3d at 1058. The Debtor has not surrendered the Ace Decade Entities, ownership interests in them, or their corporate governance documents to the Trustee. If he had, the Motion would be moot. The Debtor's only purported compliance was the Letter allegedly sent to Ms. Wang, which he failed to sufficiently establish was sent. The Debtor has not cooperated with the Trustee's attempt to locate Ms. Wang and effectuate a surrender. The Debtor only belatedly disclosed that Ms. Wang was the nominee owner of Ace Decade Entities. The Letter, which was produced to the Trustee and during the Hearing, lacks an address for Ms. Wang. The Debtor did not produce the bodyguard who purportedly knew how to find Ms. Wang or otherwise tell the Trustee how to locate Ms. Wang.\n\n#### **4. The Debtor Has Not Diligently Attempted to Comply**\n\nThe Court further concludes that the Debtor has not diligently attempted to comply with the Corporate Governance Order in a reasonable manner. *See id.* As noted immediately above, the only alleged attempt to either cooperate or effectuate a turnover was the Letter. No evidence was introduced to establish that the Letter was sent to Ms. Wang. Nevertheless, assuming the Letter was sent, it was dilatory – not diligent – coming a month after the Contempt Motion was filed and several months after the Corporate Governance Order was entered. Furthermore, again assuming the Letter was sent, it was not sent in a reasonable manner. There is no address on the\n\nLetter. There is no post-mark. There is no acknowledgment of receipt. The Debtor does not even know which of his bodyguards allegedly personally delivered the Letter.\n\n#### **5. The Debtor Could Have Complied**\n\nFinally, the Court concludes that it is not impossible for the Debtor to comply with the Corporate Governance Order. *See Wendy*, 575 F.2d at 1030. The Debtor abandoned his argument that he did not beneficially own or control Ace Decade and, through it, Dawn State, as of the petition date and the appointment of the Trustee. Therefore, it was not impossible for the Debtor to cooperate or to surrender the Ace Decade Entities to the Trustee for the reasons stated above.\n\nThe Trustee introduced into evidence email exchanges showing that Ms. Wang, the nominee owner of Ace Decade, acted under the direction of the Debtor in other transactions, including the New York litigation involving Ace Decade and also matters involving the Sherry Netherland Apartment. (Trustee 29 and 30.) On the basis of this evidence, the Court determines that the Debtor could cause her to turnover her ownership interest over to the Trustee. As of yet, he has not.\n\n#### **VI. CONCLUSION & ORDER**\n\nFor the reasons stated above, the Court finds the Debtor in civil contempt of court. It is hereby\n\n**ORDERED:** The Debtor has until at or before 5:00 p.m. (17:00) on March 6, 2023, to purge himself of contempt; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** If the Debtor does not purge himself of contempt at or before 5:00 p.m. (17:00) on March 6, 2023, he will be sanctioned reasonable attorneys' fees and costs that the Trustee has had to incur in pursuing compliance with the Corporate Governance Order as it\n\nrelates to the Ace Decade Entities, which reasonable fees will be determined by the Court, and will be paid to the Estate; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** The Court may, upon notice, issue further sanctions to secure compliance with the Corporate Governance Order, should the Debtor persist in contempt.\n\nDated at Bridgeport, Connecticut this 24th day of January, 2023.","body_zh":"美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院布里奇波特分院\n\n关于：\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），\n\n债务人。\n\n第11章\n\n案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n上诉通知\n\n特此通知，根据 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)，债务人 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）现就美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院（United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut）（尊敬的 Julie A. Manning 法官）作出的、日期为 January 24, 2023 的《准许要求认定债务人藐视公司治理命令之动议的命令》(ECF No. 1372)（以下简称“该命令”），向美国康涅狄格州联邦地区法院（United States District Court for the District of Connecticut）提起上诉；该命令认定债务人因未能完全遵守本院日期为 August 10, 2022 的命令而构成民事藐视，该命令准许了第11章受托人于 July 23, 2022 提交的动议，即请求依据《破产法典》第 363、541、1108 和 1505 条作出命令，以：(A) 确认第11章受托人持有债务人对由债务人控制实体享有的全部经济权利和公司治理权利；(B) 授权第11章受托人代表破产财产在任何外国采取行动；以及 (C) 准予相关救济 (ECF No. 598)。该命令副本作为附件 A 随附于此。该命令的所有当事人，以及其各自律师的姓名、地址和电话号码如下：\n\n当事人　律师\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—\n债务人　ZEISLER & ZEISLER, P.C.（泽斯勒与泽斯勒专业公司）\nEric Henzy（埃里克·亨齐）\nStephen M. Kindseth（斯蒂芬·M·金德塞思）\nAaron A. Romney（亚伦·A·罗姆尼）\nJames M. Moriarty（詹姆斯·M·莫里亚蒂）\nJohn L. Cesaroni（约翰·L·切萨罗尼）\n10 Middle Street, 15th Floor\nBridgeport, Connecticut 06604\n电话：(203) 368-4234\nehenzy@zeislaw.com\nskindseth@zeislaw.com\naromney@zeislaw.com\njmoriarty@zeislaw.com\njcesaroni@zeislaw.com\n\nLAWALL & MITCHELL, LLC（劳沃尔与米切尔有限责任公司）\nAaron A Mitchell（亚伦·A·米切尔）\n55 Madison Ave, Suite 400\nMorristown, NJ 07960\n电话：(973)-285-3280\naaron@lmesq.com\n\nLuc A. Despins（吕克·A·德斯平斯）—第11章受托人　NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C.（纽伯特、佩佩与蒙蒂斯专业公司）\n\nDouglas Skalka（道格拉斯·斯卡尔卡）\nJames C. Graham（詹姆斯·C·格雷厄姆）\nPatrick R. Linsey（帕特里克·R·林赛）\nLucas B. Rocklin（卢卡斯·B·罗克林）\n195 Church Street, 13th Floor\nNew Haven, Connecticut 06510\n(203) 781-2847\ndskalka@npmlaw.com\njgraham@npmlaw.com\nplinsey@npmlaw.com\nrocklin@npmlaw.com\n\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所）\nNicholas A. Bassett（尼古拉斯·A·巴塞特）\n2050 M Street NW\nWashington, D.C., 20036\n(202) 551-1902\nnicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n以及\nLuc A. Despins（吕克·A·德斯平斯）\nAvram E. Luft（阿夫拉姆·E·卢夫特）\nDouglass Barron（道格拉斯·巴伦）\nG. Alexander Bongartz（G·亚历山大·邦加茨）\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, New York 10166\n(212) 318-6079\nlucdespins@pauhastings.com\naviluft@paulhastings.com\ndouglassbarron@paulhastings.com\nalexbongartz@paulhastings.com\n\n日期：Bridgeport, Connecticut，February 7, 2023\n债务人，HO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）\n\n/s/ Eric Henzy Eric Henzy（埃里克·亨齐）(ct12849) Stephen M. Kindseth（斯蒂芬·M·金德塞思）(ct14640) Aaron A. Romney（亚伦·A·罗姆尼）(ct28144) James M. Moriarty（詹姆斯·M·莫里亚蒂）(ct21876) John L. Cesaroni（约翰·L·切萨罗尼）(ct29309) 10 Middle Street, 15th Floor Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604 电话：(203) 368-4234 传真：(203) 368-5487 电子邮件：[ehenzy@zeislaw.com] [skindseth@zeislaw.com] [aromney@zeislaw.com] [jmoriarty@zeislaw.com] [jcesaroni@zeislaw.com]\n\n送达证明\n\n本人特此证明，于 February 2023 的第 7 日，上述上诉通知副本已以电子方式提交。该提交通知将通过本院电子提交系统的运行以电子邮件发送给所有当事人，或按《电子提交通知》所示，以邮件发送给无法接受电子提交的任何人。当事人可通过本院的 CM/ECF 系统查阅该提交文件。\n\n。\n\n/s/ Eric Henzy\n附件 A\n美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院\n\n)\n\n)\n\n)\n\n关于： ) 第11章 ) 案号 22-50073 (JAM) HO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等， ) （合并管理）\n\n债务人。 ) 关于：ECF Nos. 717 和 913\n准许要求认定债务人藐视公司治理命令之动议的命令\n一、引言\n\n本院审理的是 Luc A. Despins（吕克·A·德斯平斯）以 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（以下简称“债务人”）破产财产（以下简称“破产财产”）的第11章受托人（以下简称“受托人”）身份提出的动议，请求认定债务人构成民事藐视。(ECF No. 913，以下简称“藐视动议”。) 藐视动议主张，债务人未遵守本院关于将经济权利和公司治理权利自债务人移转给受托人的命令。(ECF No. 717，以下简称“公司治理命令”。) 基于下述理由，本院认定债务人构成民事藐视；如其未能消除其藐视状态，本院将对其处以合理的律师费和费用制裁。\n二、背景\n\n于 February 15, 2022，债务人提交其自愿第11章申请，启动本案。(ECF No. 1.) 其个人案件与两个关联公司案件合并管理。(ECF Nos. 970 and 1141.) 于 June 15, 2022，在本院已于先前意见中讨论的事态发展之后，本院命令任命一名第11章受托人。In re Kwok, 640 B.R. 514 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022). (ECF No. 465.) 于 July 8, 2022，本院任命 Despins 先生为第11章受托人。(ECF No. 523.)\n\n于 July 23, 2022，受托人提交动议，请求确认其持有债务人的经济权利和公司治理权利。(ECF No. 598，以下简称“公司治理动议”。) 于 July 29, 2022，债务人就公司治理动议提出异议，并于 August 4, 2022 通过进一步异议对其进行了补充。(ECF Nos. 643 and 678.) 同于 August 4, 2022，受托人提交支持公司治理动议的答复。(ECF No. 679.) 同日，就公司治理动议举行听证。本院在听证期间准许公司治理动议，并于 August 10, 2022 作出公司治理命令。(ECF No. 717.)\n\n于 October 4, 2022，受托人提交藐视动议，主张债务人未遵守公司治理命令，并请求认定其构成民事藐视法庭。(ECF No. 913.) 于 October 25, 2022，债务人就藐视动议提交其异议。(ECF No. 1026，以下简称“异议”。) 于 November 14, 2022，受托人提交其答复。(ECF No. 1092，以下简称“答复”。) 本事项已获得充分书面陈述。\n\n于 November 16、17 和 18, 2022，就藐视动议举行了证据听证会（以下简称“听证会”）。于 November 17, 2022，本院作出一项部分解决藐视动议的命令 (ECF No. 1110，以下简称“部分解决命令”)；债务人坚持要求本院在继续进行证据听证会前作出该命令。在听证会期间，未听取任何证人证言，但接纳了包括证言笔录摘录在内的证据。\n三、管辖权\n\n美国康涅狄格州联邦地区法院（United States District Court for the District of Connecticut）根据 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) 对本事项具有管辖权。本院根据 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) 以及美国康涅狄格州联邦地区法院日期为 September 21, 1984 的移送命令，有权审理并裁决本事项。本程序属于\n\n法定核心程序。28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (E)。本院明确保留对因实施、解释和执行公司治理命令而产生或与之有关的一切事项的一切管辖权。本案不存在任何妨碍行使管辖权的宪法问题。参见 Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 487–99 (2011)。\n\n根据 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409，本地区为适当审判地。\n四、事实认定\n\n本院已作出下文第 1 和第 2 段所载的事实认定，具体如部分解决命令所述：\n\n1. 于 February 15, 2022 申请日期（以下简称“申请日”），债务人独家实益拥有并控制 Ace Decade Holdings Limited（以下简称“Ace Decade”），且直至并包括受托人获任命日期之前的紧接期间，持续享有该等独家实益所有权和控制权；并且 (ii) Dawn State Limited（以下简称“Dawn State”，与 Ace Decade 合称“Ace Decade 实体”）是 Ace Decade 的全资子公司，且由 Ace Decade 独家拥有和控制。为避免疑义，Yanping “Yvette” Wang（王燕平，以下简称“王女士”）不是且从未是 Ace Decade 或 Dawn State 股份的实益所有人。(Trustee 6–7, 10, 15.)1\n\n2. 若非受托人的任命及其根据《破产法典》和公司治理命令享有的权利，债务人仍将独家实益拥有并控制 Ace Decade。(Trustee 6–7, 10, 15.)\n\n1 受托人在听证会期间提交的证物将标为 Trustee [编号]，个人债务人提交的证物将标为 Kwok [字母]。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1443 Filed 02/07/23 Entered 02/07/23 09:45:02 Page 10 of 22 Case 22-50073 Doc 1372 Filed 01/24/23 Entered 01/24/23 13:01:58 Page 4 of 16\n\n根据记录在案及在听证会期间提交的证据，本院作出以下补充事实认定：\n\n3. Yvette Wang（王燕平）系为债务人利益持有 Ace Decade 的名义所有人。(Trustee 27.)\n\n4. 债务人控制王女士。债务人已雇用 Yvette Wang 数年，并指示其代表自己采取行动，包括指示其代表自己购买诸如 Sherry-Netherland apartment（雪莉-荷兰人公寓）等房产。(Trustee 29 and 30.)\n\n5. 债务人未能充分证明，该信函（以下简称“该信函”，Kwok B）以及据称随附的股份转让文书和股份转让决议，已被送达王女士，并指示其将 Ace Decade 的公司权利和经济权利转让给受托人。债务人表示，其认为自己不具备采取其在该信函中指示王女士采取之行动的任何能力。(Trustee 27, at 87:3–13.) 债务人表示，其通过亲自递送方式向王女士发送了该信函 (Kwok B)，并主张该亲自递送由其私人保镖完成。然而，债务人不记得其指示哪一名保镖递送该信函，并且“从来记不住”其安保人员的姓名。(Trustee 27, at 88:3–13.) 除债务人的证言笔录和该信函上“通过亲自递送”的说明外，没有证据支持该信函确已送达。该信函不包含地址。(Kwok B.) 没有来自身份不明保镖关于该信函送达或递送的收据或宣誓书。(同上。)\n\n6. 即使该信函已被递送，其中的语言也向读者表明，债务人并不完全支持签署股份转让文书。相反，该信函称：“受托人认为我控制 Ace Decade，并且我利用该被认为的控制权指示你签署股份转让文书和股份转让决议。”[强调添加]。\n\n该信函进一步称：“……为遵守受托人的要求，并在我可能对 Ace Decade 拥有任何权限的范围内，我特此指示你签署所附的股份转让文书和股份转让决议。”(Kwok B.)\n\n7. 债务人表示，其未曾就藐视动议与 Yvette Wang 进行任何形式的沟通。(Trustee 27, at 84:5–85:5.)\n\n8. 受托人一直未能向 Yvette Wang 送达传票。(Trustee 32– 33).\n五、讨论\na. 法律标准\n\n本院依据 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) 和 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9020 有权认定当事人藐视法庭。Taggart v. Lorenzen ex rel. Brown, 139 S. Ct. 1795, 1801 (2019); PHH Mortg. Corp. v. Sensenich ex rel. Gravel (In re Gravel), 6 F.4th 503, 512 (2d Cir. 2021); Mar. Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chauteaugay Corp.), 920 F.2d 183, 187 (2d. Cir. 1990)。可为“迫使被告遵守”法院命令，或为“赔偿申诉人因未遵守法院命令而遭受的损失”，而请求藐视法庭救济。Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1801 (citing United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 303–04 (1947))。认定民事藐视法庭须满足：“(1) 被认定藐视法庭者未遵守的命令明确且无歧义，(2) 不遵守的证据明确且令人信服，且 (3) 被认定藐视法庭者未以合理方式勤勉地尝试遵守。”King v. Allied Vision, Ltd., 65 F.3d 1051, 1058 (2d Cir. 1995); see Gravel, 6 F.4th at 512（补充指出，被认定藐视法庭者必须知悉该命令）。“对于民事藐视法庭指控，长期以来公认的一项抗辩是，被指控的个人无能力遵守法院命令。”United States v. Wendy, 575 F.2d 1025, 1030 (2d Cir. 1978)。\n\n在“对被告行为的不当性存在合理疑问余地”的情况下，“不应诉诸”藐视法庭。Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1801 (citing Cal. Artificial Stone Paving Co. v. Molitor, 113 U.S. 609 (1885))。该标准通常是客观的——“一方当事人主观上相信其正在遵守命令，如该信念在客观上不合理，通常不能使其免于承担民事藐视法庭责任。”Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1802 (citing McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1949) (“缺乏故意 [sic] 并不免除民事藐视法庭责任。”))。然而，一方当事人的恶意可证明“将‘判令中的任何不确定性……的负担’置于违反法院命令的一方‘肩上’”具有正当性；而“一方当事人的善意，即使不足以排除民事藐视法庭责任，也可能有助于确定适当的制裁。”Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1802 (citing McComb, 336 U.S. at 192–93 and Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 801 (1987))。\n\nb. 法律结论\n\n1. 债务人已知悉公司治理命令\n\n本院认定，个人债务人已知悉公司治理命令。See Gravel, 6 F.4th at 512。如上所述，他曾就该命令的作出进行诉讼。此外，他在其异议书中或在听证期间均未对其已知悉该命令提出争议。\n\n2. 公司治理命令明确且无歧义地指示债务人与受托人合作\n\n本院认定，公司治理命令明确且无歧义，see King, 65 F.3d at 1058，且对其含义不存在合理疑问余地，see Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1801。根据公司治理命令，债务人必须就受托人对 Ace Decade Entities（Ace Decade实体）的控制与受托人合作，并且还必须\n\n交出 Ace Decade Entities、其在 Ace Decade Entities 中的所有权权益，以及与 Ace Decade Entities 有关的公司治理文件。\n\n受托人主张，公司治理命令第2段须与第3段及《破产法》的相关规定一并解读。在此背景下，受托人主张，债务人被明确且无歧义地指示与受托人合作，并向受托人移交破产财产的资产及相关记录。债务人主张，受托人根据公司治理命令第2段通过法律的实施取得了对 Ace Decade Entities 的控制，因此债务人无需采取任何行动以遵守公司治理命令。债务人进一步主张，受托人可以对 Ace Decade Entities 主张控制权，而当前争议系人为制造且无必要。\n\n本院同意债务人的意见，即对于公司治理命令第2段允许受托人自行采取行动以对包括 Ace Decade Entities 在内的公司实体主张控制权，不存在合理疑问余地。第2段相关部分规定：\n\n为免生疑，上述权利包括受托人所主张的权力，即替换债务人控制实体中任何现有的高级职员、董事、经理或类似人员。作为上述事项的一部分，在必要范围内，受托人获授权以其在本 Chapter 11 Case 中担任第11章受托人的身份，担任任何已被撤职的该等高级职员、董事、经理或类似人员。\n\n第2段确实允许受托人在债务人的公司实体中发行新股或成员权益，并任命新董事。然而，第2段并不要求受托人这样做。即使受托人在 Ace Decade Entities 中发行了新股或成员权益，或者任命了新董事，如无公司文件以及对任何\n\n公司账户的访问权限，受托人将如何经营 Ace Decade Entities 尚不明确。受托人希望实现有序而完整的交接，是合理的。\n\n此外，采取自行救济可能违反适用的非破产法或现有治理文件，并可能给受托人带来法律问题。债务人在就公司治理动议举行的 August 4th 听证会上提出了这一确切问题，并指出第2段将“赋予[受托人]适用非破产法和特定实体治理文件可能未规定的权力。”(ECF No. 746, at 63:15–18.) 受托人向本院保证，其意图是在其根据适用非破产法和治理文件享有权力的情况下行事。(Id. at 64:14–15.) 受托人陈述：\n\n我们请求全面授权的原因是，除非我们经尽职调查后认为自己有权这样做，否则我们不会行使该项权利。如果我们存有疑问，我们会回到法院。但我们不能处于这样一种境地，即围绕——州法规定什么、外国法规定什么——开展附带诉讼，因为那——那基本上将成为另一个案件。\n\n(Id. at 64:19–65:1.) 债务人随后坚持称，其意图并非就公司治理提起诉讼，而是担心受托人的行为违反适用非破产法和特定实体的治理文件。(Id. at 65:2–8.) 为回应债务人的担忧，本院在公司治理命令第2段中加入“所主张的”一词以处理该问题。(Id. at 65:11–21.) 此后，债务人未再坚持其对第2段的异议。(Id. at 65:23–24.) 本院认定，受托人希望避免有关公司治理的“附带诉讼”，是合理的。然而，尽管有公司治理命令第2段以及债务人所称不参与附带诉讼的意图，受托人仍不得不在 England and Wales High Court, Chancery Division（英格兰和威尔士高等法院衡平法庭）就\n\n承认这些破产案件在 United Kingdom（英国）的效力，对债务人和 Ace Decade Entities 提起诉讼。See Despins v Kwok (Re Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006) [2023] EWHC 74 (Ch) (20 January 2023)。Ace Decade 反对受托人在该法院根据 Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006（“CBIR”）申请承认债务人 Chapter 11 case 的请求。\n\n本院亦不同意债务人的观点，即受托人在第2段中的权利终结了该分析。仅因受托人可根据公司治理命令第2段采取自行救济，并不意味着受托人根据该命令条款没有其他救济途径。\n\n就公司治理命令第3段而言，本院认定，该段明确且无歧义地指示债务人与受托人合作。对于第3段要求债务人与受托人合作，以查找债务人的被提名人 Wang 女士，并促成其在 Ace Decade 中的所有权权益的移交，不存在合理疑问余地。\n\n第3段在相关部分中明确且无歧义地规定：\n\n根据《破产法》第 521(a)(3) 条……，现指示债务人……(a) 在必要范围内与受托人合作，使受托人能够履行其职责，包括但不限于受托人对债务人资产的调查……。”\n\n《破产法》第 521 条的标题为“债务人的义务”。第 521(a)(3) 条的措辞与公司治理命令的措辞几乎完全相同：“债务人应当……如案件中有受托人任职……在必要范围内与受托人合作，使受托人能够履行其根据本法典所负职责。”第 521(a)(3) 条规定的合作义务被作广泛解释。In re Cambridge Analytica LLC, 596 B.R. 1, 8 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019)（“《破产法》第 521(a)(3) 条同样要求债务人‘在必要范围内与受托人合作，使受托人能够履行受托人的职责。’‘合作’确实是一个宽泛术语，必须被解释为：每当受托人为履行其职责而要求债务人提供协助时，债务人均须作出回应，至少在该请求并非不合理的情况下如此。‘事实上，‘已有充分确立的判例表明，不应要求受托人从不情愿且不合作的债务人处强行获取信息。鉴于《破产法》所提供的非常救济，拖延和规避策略与其宗旨和精神不一致，并且违背其宗旨和精神。’”）（内部引注省略）；see Beach v. Morris (In re Beach), 281 B.R. 917, 921 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2002)（“除对债务人施加积极义务外，这些规定还体现了一项政策：自愿接受破产法院管辖以取得债务免除利益的债务人，必须履行某些义务，以确保破产财产资产依照适用法律得到管理。”）；see also 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 521.15[5] (16th ed. 2022)（“债务人的合作可能包括告知受托人由第三方占有的破产财产，并协助查找该等财产，签署转让财产所需文件，以及协助收回应收账款。”）。鉴于《破产法》文本与公司治理命令文本之间的密切相似性，以及公司治理命令明确引用第 521 条，第3段应被同样作广泛解读，这一点明确且无歧义。\n\n如上所述及在无争议的部分解决命令中所载，已认定债务人于申请日及受托人获任命时，系 Ace Decade 及通过 Ace Decade 控制的 Dawn State（黎明州）的唯一实益所有人及控制人。根据公司治理命令第2段，受托人“为破产财产的利益，就所有债务人控制实体持有债务人的全部经济权利和治理权利。”因此，受托人为履行其对破产财产所负职责，就 Ace Decade Entities 持有债务人的经济权利和治理权利。债务人不再对该事实提出争议。根据第3段的明确条款，债务人必须与受托人合作，以\n\n为使破产财产受益而对 Ace Decade Entities（Ace Decade 实体）实现该等控制和占有是必要的，无论这是否有助于受托人对资产进行调查，或履行其对破产财产的其他职责。参见 Star Direct Telecom, Inc. v. Glob. Crossing Bandwidth, Inc., 272 F.R.D. 350, 356 (W.D.N.Y. 2011)（“首先，Global Crossing 未提出任何依据，本院也未获悉有任何依据，支持其关于‘including, without limitation’这一短语应被解读为限制性条款的主张。”）；Shugrue v. Cont'l Airlines, 977 F. Supp. 280, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)（“即使假定对于实际附于附件 C 首页的内容存在某种歧义，该首页中的措辞——‘Eastern[ ] 的所有计算机程序和软件，包括但不限于’——也清楚表明，所附清单并非排他性清单。”）。\n\n本院进一步认定，根据公司治理命令（Corporate Governance Order）第 3 段，债务人须向受托人交付 Ace Decade 实体，包括其在 Ace Decade 实体中的所有权权益以及与 Ace Decade 实体有关的公司治理文件，对此不存在任何公平合理的疑义。第 3 段以明确无歧义的措辞作出如下相关规定，其措辞与 § 521(a)(4) 高度一致：\n\n根据《破产法典》第 . . . 521(a)(4) 条，现命令债务人 . . . （b）向受托人交付破产财产的全部财产及任何已记录信息，包括但不限于与破产财产有关的账簿、文件、记录和文书（包括但不限于其在 Genever (BVI) 持有的股份及所有相关公司治理文件）。\n\n《破产法典》第 521(a)(4) 条，以及基于该条文措辞作出的公司治理命令，涵盖债务人可能拥有的所有衡平法权益，例如在公司实体中的受益所有权。11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)。债务人依第 521(a)(4) 条及公司治理命令，须在被要求时迅速交付资产及与资产有关的文件。参见 Beach, 281 B.R. at 921; 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 521.16。\n\n由于债务人在申请日及受托人获任命之时，均对 Ace Decade 实体享有排他的受益所有权和控制权，根据公司治理命令第 2 段，受托人为破产财产的利益控制 Ace Decade 实体。如上所述，债务人并不争议该事实。根据第 3 段的明确条款，债务人须向受托人交付 Ace Decade 实体，其中包括与 Ace Decade 实体有关的全部已记录信息，例如股份及公司治理文件。参见 Star Direct, 272 F.R.D. at 356; Shugrue, 977 F. Supp. at 285。\n\n债务人备选主张，公司治理命令不明确且含糊不清，因为公司治理命令第 2 段与第 3 段彼此冲突，使债务人陷入“Catch-22”困境。债务人主张，第 2 段剥夺了其为遵守第 3 段所必需的经济权利和公司治理权利。\n\n然而，本院认定，公司治理命令第 2 段与第 3 段并不冲突。尽管受托人依法取得了对破产财产及债务人经济权利和公司治理权利的法律上控制权，《破产法典》——以及明确无歧义的公司治理命令——要求依据受托人在公司治理命令下的权利，移交事实上的占有和控制。法院通常会提供救济，使当事人的事实权利与其法律权利相一致。本案不存在任何使人对公司治理命令所要求行为产生公平合理疑义的情况。\n\n本院进一步认定，债务人关于第 2 段与第 3 段冲突的主张，将使 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(a)(3)–(4) 失去作用，且在法律上不可能正确。《破产法典》和公司治理命令命令债务人与受托人合作，并交付破产财产的资产及相关记录，即使控制权已依法转移给受托人。遵从该等规定不会妨碍《破产法典》和公司治理命令的条款，反而会促进其实现。\n\n尽管本院认定公司治理命令明确要求债务人与受托人合作，但即使复审法院认定公司治理命令不明确，该等不确定性的负担也不应由受托人承担，而应由债务人承担，原因在于债务人的恶意。参见 Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1802。如上所述，本院不接受债务人对该命令的解释；且由于债务人的恶意已导致举证负担转移，本院认定该要件对受托人有利即已足够。\n\n本院基于若干理由认定债务人存在恶意。在听证会之前，债务人在其异议及证言笔录中的主要主张是，在申请日及受托人获任命之时，其并未以受益所有人或其他身份拥有 Ace Decade。然而，在听证会期间，他放弃了该主张，在继续举行听证会之前寻求作出部分解决命令（Partial Resolution Order），并同意不对部分解决命令提出上诉。尽管如此，部分解决命令并非同意命令。债务人不同意部分解决命令中的认定，这与其在听证会前放弃其已提交的异议以及同意不对该命令提出上诉相矛盾。\n\n此外，债务人唯一声称为遵守公司治理命令所作的尝试发生于 November 10, 2022，即该命令作出数月之后、藐视法庭动议（Contempt Motion）提出一个月之后，以及原定听证会开始不足一周之前。此外，债务人声称为遵守公司治理命令所作的尝试，向受托人隐瞒了其名义持有人——Ms. Wang（王女士）——的所在地；受托人一直未能向其送达传票。在听证会期间，债务人强调受托人与王女士之间缺乏沟通，尽管他直到听证会前不久才告知受托人她是 Ace Decade 的名义所有人。最后，债务人未能充分证明该函件（Letter）已寄送给王女士。该函件未载有王女士的地址，且债务人无法记起其哪一名保镖据称亲自将该函件递送给王女士。\n\n3. 债务人未遵守公司治理命令\n\n本院依据清楚且令人信服的证据认定，债务人未遵守公司治理命令。参见 King, 65 F.3d at 1058。债务人未向受托人交付 Ace Decade 实体、其在该等实体中的所有权权益或其公司治理文件。若其已交付，该动议将失去争议意义。债务人唯一声称的遵守行为，是据称寄给王女士的函件；其未能充分证明该函件已被寄送。债务人未配合受托人寻找王女士并完成交付的尝试。债务人仅在迟延后披露王女士是 Ace Decade 实体的名义所有人。向受托人及在听证会期间出示的函件未载有王女士的地址。债务人未让据称知道如何找到王女士的保镖出庭，亦未以其他方式告知受托人如何找到王女士。\n\n4. 债务人未作出勤勉的遵守尝试\n\n本院进一步认定，债务人未以合理方式勤勉尝试遵守公司治理命令。参见同上。如紧接上文所述，唯一声称为合作或完成移交所作的尝试是该函件。未提交任何证据证明该函件已寄给王女士。然而，即使假定该函件已寄送，其在藐视法庭动议提出一个月后及公司治理命令作出数月后才发出，属于拖延，而非勤勉。此外，同样即使假定该函件已寄送，其寄送方式亦不合理。该函件上没有地址。没有邮戳。没有收讫确认。债务人甚至不知道其哪一名保镖据称亲自递送了该函件。\n\n5. 债务人本可遵守\n\n最后，本院认定，债务人遵守公司治理命令并非不可能。参见 Wendy, 575 F.2d at 1030。债务人放弃了其关于在申请日及受托人获任命之时，其并未对 Ace Decade 及通过该实体对 Dawn State 享有受益所有权或控制权的主张。因此，基于上述理由，债务人与受托人合作或向受托人交付 Ace Decade 实体并非不可能。\n\n受托人提交了作为证据的电子邮件往来，显示 Ace Decade 的名义所有人王女士在其他交易中依债务人的指示行事，包括涉及 Ace Decade 的纽约诉讼，以及涉及 Sherry Netherland Apartment（Sherry Netherland 公寓）的事项。（Trustee 29 and 30。）基于该等证据，本院认定债务人能够促使其将其所有权权益移交给受托人。截至目前，他尚未这样做。\n\nVI. 结论及命令\n\n基于上述理由，本院认定债务人构成民事藐视法庭。现命令如下：\n\n命令：债务人须于 March 6, 2023 下午 5:00（17:00）或之前消除其藐视法庭状态；并进一步\n\n命令：如债务人未于 March 6, 2023 下午 5:00（17:00）或之前消除其藐视法庭状态，则将被判处支付受托人为促使其遵守与 Ace Decade 实体有关的公司治理命令而不得不支出的合理律师费及费用；该等合理费用将由本院确定，并支付给破产财产；并进一步\n\n命令：如债务人继续藐视法庭，本院可在通知后施加进一步制裁，以确保其遵守公司治理命令。\n\n于 2023 年 January 24th 日在 Connecticut（康涅狄格州）Bridgeport（布里奇波特）作出。","key_entities":["Kwok","Je","Guo","Ho Wan Kwok","Despins","Paul Hastings"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":1,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":465,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":523,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":598,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":679,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":717,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":746,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":913,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1026,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1092,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1110,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1372,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":5526,"status":"published","published_at":"2023-02-07 00:00:00","created_at":"2023-02-07","updated_at":"2026-08-23 19:03:06"}