{"id":"court_ctb_1492_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":1492,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION HO WAN KWOK, *et al.* : Case No. 22-50073 (JA","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\nHO WAN KWOK, *et al.* : Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\nIn re : Chapter 11\n\n : Debtors. : \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_:\n\n\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_ :\n\n:\n\n## **INDIVIDUAL DEBTOR'S MOTION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL OF ORDER HOLDING HIM IN CONTEMPT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ORDER**\n\nPursuant to Fed. R. Bank. P. 8007(a), the individual debtor, Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Individual Debtor\"), by and through his undersigned counsel, Zeisler & Zeisler, P. C., respectfully moves for a stay (the \"Motion to Stay\") pending appeal of this Court's January 24, 2023, Order Granting Motion to Hold Debtor in Contempt of Corporate Governance Order (Doc. No. 1372, the \"Contempt Order\"). The Individual Debtor filed a notice of appeal of the Contempt Order on February 7, 2023. The Individual Debtor seeks a stay of the Contempt Order's enforcement pending appeal so that the monetary sanctions imposed against him in the Contempt Order will not accrue and the threat of further punishment, including imprisonment which the Trustee desperately desires, will not hang over his head while he pursues appellate review. In support of his Motion to Stay, the Individual Debtor respectfully states as follows.\n\n#### **I. INTRODUCTION**\n\n1. The Individual Debtor has a substantial possibility of success on his appeal. The order underlying the contempt finding is not clear and unambiguous as it must be to hold the Individual Debtor in contempt for its violation. In particular, the portion of the order at issue in the contempt proceeding does not identify in any way, let alone a particularized way, what the Individual Debtor is required to do and to refrain from doing, but instead does nothing more than\n\nincorporate a provision of the Bankruptcy Code and direct the Individual Debtor to \"obey the law.\" The law is clear and settled that a statute cannot properly be made the basis of contempt proceedings merely by incorporating a reference to its terms into a court order. Thus, the Individual Debtor cannot be in contempt for his purported failure to comply with underlying order and the Motion for Stay should be granted. In addition, as detailed below, the Court made findings that are not supported by the evidence.\n\n2. A stay pending appeal should also enter because a stay is supported by the other factors that the Second Circuit balances when considering whether to grant such a stay. As demonstrated herein, (a) absent a stay, the Individual Debtor will be forced to face sanctions, with the probability that they will increase while his appeal is pending, or comply with the Contempt Order and moot his appeal even though the Individual Debtor is not in contempt; the balance of hardships therefore tips decidedly in the Individual Debtor's favor, (b) the Trustee will not suffer substantial injury if a stay is issued, and (c) the public interest supports a stay.\n\n#### **II. BACKGROUND**\n\n3. On February 15, 2022 (the \"Petition Date\"), the Individual Debtor filed his voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, thereby commencing the above-captioned bankruptcy case.\n\n4. On July 7, 2022, the UST filed a notice appointing Luc A. Despins (the \"Trustee\") as Chapter 11 trustee (Doc. No. 514), and an Application for Order Approving Appointment of Chapter 11 Trustee (Doc. No. 515) seeking Court approval of the appointment of the Trustee. On July 8, 2022, the Court entered its Order Granting Appointment Of Chapter 11 Trustee (Doc. No. 523), granting the appointment of the Trustee as Chapter 11 trustee in this case.\n\n2\n\n5. On July 23, 2022, the Trustee filed his Motion Of Chapter 11 Trustee For Entry Of Order, Pursuant To Bankruptcy Code Sections 363, 541, 1108, And 1505, (A) Confirming That Chapter 11 Trustee Holds All Of The Debtor's Economic And Corporate Governance Rights In Debtor-Controlled Entities, (B) Authorizing Chapter 11 Trustee To Act In Any Foreign Country On Behalf Of Estate, And (C) Granting Related Relief (Doc. No. 598).\n\n6. On August 10, 2022, this Court entered its Order, Pursuant To Bankruptcy Code Sections 363, 521, 541, 1108, And 1505, (A) Confirming That Chapter 11 Trustee Holds All Of The Debtor's Economic And Corporate Governance Rights In Debtor-Controlled Entities, (B) Authorizing Chapter 11 Trustee To Act In Any Foreign Country On Behalf Of Estate, And (C) Granting Related Relief (Doc. No. 717, the \"Corporate Governance Order\"). Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Corporate Governance Order provide in pertinent part:\n\n> 2. Effective as of entry of the order, dated July 8, 2022, granting the appointment of Luc A. Despins as the Trustee in the Chapter 11 Case [ECF No. 523], the Trustee holds all of the Debtor's economic and governance rights, for the benefit of the Estate, with respect to all Debtor-Controlled Entities, including, without limitation, Genever (BVI). For the avoidance of doubt, the foregoing rights include the Trustee's asserted authority to replace any existing officer, director, manager, or similar person of the Debtor-Controlled Entities. As part of the foregoing, to the extent necessary, the Trustee is authorized to act, in his capacity as the chapter 11 trustee in this Chapter 11 Case, as any such officer, director, manager, or similar person who has been removed.\n\n> 3. In accordance with sections 521(a)(3) and 521(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Debtor is hereby directed to, respectively, (a) cooperate with the Trustee as necessary to enable the Trustee to perform his duties, including, without limitation, the Trustee's investigation into the assets of the Debtor, and (b) surrender to the Trustee all property of the estate and any recorded information, including, without limitation, books, documents, records, and papers relating to property of the estate (including, without limitation, his shares in Genever (BVI) and all related corporate governance documents). . . .\n\n7. Paragraph 3(a) of the Corporate Governance Order expressly directs the Individual Debtor to execute a share transfer instrument and director's resolutions for Genever BVI in the forms attached as Exhibit A to the Corporate Governance Order. The Individual Debtor thereafter executed the share transfer and director's resolutions for Genever BVI and they were provided to the Trustee.\n\n8. On August 31, 2022, the Trustee sent counsel for the Individual Debtor a letter requesting that the Individual Debtor (a) execute, and cause any nominee shareholder to execute, a share transfer instrument to transfer all of the Individual Debtor's shares in Ace Decade Holdings Limited (\"Ace Decade\") (including all shares beneficially owned by the Individual Debtor through any nominee shareholder) to the Trustee, and (b) execute and/or cause the director(s) of Ace Decade to execute a resolution approving such transfer of the shares in Ace Decade to the Trustee. The Trustee's August 31, 2022, letter provides that the share transfer instrument and related director's resolution shall be in the same form as the corresponding documents related to the shares of Genever (BVI), which were attached as Exhibit A to the Corporate Governance Order.\n\n9. On October 4, 2022, the Trustee filed his Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee For Entry Of Order Holding Debtor In Civil Contempt For Failure To Comply With Corporate Governance Rights Order (Doc. No. 913, the \"Motion for Contempt\"). The gravamen of the Motion for Contempt was the Individual Debtor's purported failure to cooperate with the Trustee in connection with the Trustee exercising corporate control over Ace Decade.\n\n10. On October 25, 2022, the Individual Debtor filed his Objection to the Motion for Contempt (Doc. No. 1026). In his Objection to the Motion for Contempt, the Individual Debtor argued, among other things, that paragraph 3 could not be the basis for a contempt finding. *See*  Objection ¶14, at 9 (\"The very broad relief provided for in paragraph 3 of the Corporate Governance Order, which does nothing more than refer to and restate Bankruptcy Code section 521(a)(3) and (4), cannot be the basis for a contempt finding with respect to the action requested by the Trustee.\").\n\n11. On November 10 and 11, 2022, the Individual Debtor attempted to comply with the Trustee's August 31, 2022, demand by (a) providing the Trustee with a fully executed (i) Share Transfer Instrument transferring all shares of Ace Decade in the Individual Debtor's name to the Trustee and (ii) Written Resolutions of the Sole Director of the Company [Ace Decade], *inter alia*, approving and effectuating the share transfer pursuant to the Share Transfer Instrument, and (b) sending a letter (the \"Wang Letter\") with a form of Share Transfer Instrument and Written Resolutions of the Sole Director of the Company [Ace Decade] to Ms. Yanping (Yvette) Wang in her capacity as sole director of Ace Decade. The Share Transfer Instrument and Written Resolutions of the Sole Director of the Company executed by the Individual Debtor and in the form sent to Ms. Wang as attachments to the Wang Letter were in the form demanded by the Trustee in the Trustee's August 31, 2022, letter.[1](#page-4-0)\n\n12. The Court held a hearing on the Motion for Contempt on November 16, 17 and 18, 2022.\n\n13. In line with this Court's prior directives to the parties to work together to resolve disputes by agreement, in the days leading up to the hearing counsel for the parties engaged in discussions in an effort to find common ground and at least narrow the issues to be presented to the Court for decision. The discussions between counsel resulted in the filing of a proposed order\n\n<span id=\"page-4-0\"></span><sup>1</sup> The Wang Letter with the form of Share Transfer Instrument and Written Resolutions of the Sole Director of the Company as well as the Share Transfer Instrument and Written Resolutions of the Sole Director of the Company executed by the Individual Debtor and provided to the Trustee in advance of the November 16 hearing were introduced into evidence during the hearing on the Motion for Contempt without objection as [Individual] Debtor's exhibits, B, C and D respectively.\n\nthat would, if granted, narrow the issues for the Court's consideration during the hearing on the Motion for Contempt. The parties' proposed order was subsequently revised following discussion with the Court and on November 17, 2022, the Court entered an Order Regarding Partial Resolution of Trustee's Contempt Motion (Doc. No. 1110, the \"Partial Resolution Order\"). Pursuant to the Partial Resolution Order the Court found that certain facts related to the Individual Debtor's beneficial ownership and control of Ace Decade had been established and the Debtor did not contest and agreed that he would not appeal those findings. *See* Partial Resolution Order, at ¶1.\n\n14. On January 24, 2023, the Court entered the Contempt Order, finally deciding the discrete issues related to the Individual Debtor's obligations vis-à-vis Ace Decade under the Corporate Governance Order and holding the Individual Debtor in contempt for failing to comply with the Corporate Governance Order. In the Contempt Order, the Court found, among other things, that Ms. Yvette Wang is the nominee owner of Ace Decade, that the Debtor has control over Ms. Wang, and that the language of the Wang Letter does not fully support executing the share transfer instrument. *See generally*, Contempt Order, at 3-5.\n\n15. The Contempt Order focuses on paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Corporate Governance Order. The Court concluded that those paragraphs of the Corporate Governance Order are clear and unambiguous, and required the Individual Debtor \"to cooperate with the Trustee regarding the Trustee's control of the Ace Decade Entities and also required the surrender of the Ace Decade Entities, ownership interests in the Ace Decade Entities, and corporate governance documents relating to the Ace Decade Entities.\" *Id.*, at 6-7. The Court held that \"there is no fair ground of doubt that paragraph 2 of the Corporate Governance Order allows the Trustee to act of his own accord to assert control over corporate entities, including the Ace Decade Entities,\" but does not require the Trustee to do so, *id.*, at 7, and speculated that \"recourse to self-help may be in contravention of applicable non-bankruptcy law or existing corporate governance documents and could create legal problems for the Trustee.\" *Id.*, at 8. The Court then held that the Debtor violated paragraph 3 of the Corporate Governance Order by failing to cooperate with the Trustee by locating Ms. Wang and compelling turnover of her ownership interest in Ace Decade. *Id.*, at 9-12.\n\n16. The Contempt Order requires the Individual Debtor to purge himself of his contempt by 5:00 p.m. on March 6, 2023. *Id.*, at 15. The Contempt Order further provides that any failure to purge the contempt will result in the Individual Debtor being sanctioned the reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred by the Trustee in bringing the Contempt Motion, and threatens the possibility of further sanctions upon motion in order to secure compliance with the Corporate Governance Order. *See Id*.\n\n#### **III. ARGUMENT**\n\n17. Fed. R. Bank. P. 8007(a)(1)(A) provides that \"[o]rdinarily a party must move first in the bankruptcy court for … a stay of a judgment, order, or decree of the bankruptcy court pending appeal ….\"\n\n18. The Second Circuit has articulated the following four-prong test in determining whether to issue a stay of an order pending appeal: (a) whether there is a probability or possibility of success, or substantial probability or possibility of success, or serious legal questions going to the merits; (b) irreparable injury, balance of hardships tipping in favor of, or some injury to the movant if a stay is denied; (c) substantial injury to the party opposing a stay if one is issued; and (d) the public interest. *Mohammed v. Reno*, 309 F.3d 95, 100-01 (2d Cir. 2002); *see also United States v. Grote,* 961 F.3d 105, 122-23 (2d Cir. 2020) (standard is (1) whether a movant will suffer irreparable injury absent a stay, (2) whether a party will suffer substantial injury if a stay is issued,\n\n(3) whether the movant has demonstrated a substantial possibility, although less than a likelihood, of success on appeal, and (4) the public interest that may be affected); *Hirschfeld v. Bd. Of Elections of N.Y.*, 984 F.2d 35, 39 (2d Cir. 1993) (same).\n\n19. The \"degree to which a factor must be present varies with the strength of the other factors, meaning more of one excuses less of the other.\" *McCue v. City of New York (In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig.)*, 503 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); *see also Mohammed*, 309 F.3d at 100-01 (\"[W]e see considerable merit in the approach expressed by the District of Columbia Circuit: 'The necessary 'level' or 'degree' of possibility of success will vary according to the court's assessment of the other [stay] factors.' Applying that test, that Circuit has granted a stay pending appeal where the likelihood of success is not high but the balance of hardships favors the applicant, and has stated that a stay may be granted where the probability of success is 'high' and 'some injury' has been shown. As the Sixth Circuit has explained, 'The probability of success that must be demonstrated is inversely proportional to the amount of injury plaintiff[ ] will suffer absent the stay. Simply stated, more of one excuses less of the other.'\" (citations omitted)); *In re Taub*, 470 B.R. 273, 278 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2012) (\"The requisite showing of substantial possibility of success is inversely proportional to the amount of injury [the movant] will suffer absent the stay.\").\n\n## **a. The Individual Debtor has a Substantial Possibility of Success on Appeal or, at the Very Least, there are Serious Legal Questions Going to the Merits**\n\n20. It is axiomatic that a \"bankruptcy court's contempt power, like that of a district court, is 'narrowly circumscribed.'\" *PHH Mortg. Corp v. Sensenich (In re Gravel)*, 6 F.4th 503, 511 (2d Cir. 2021). *See also Perez v. Danbury Hosp*., 347 F.3d 419, 423 (2d Cir. 2003) (\"[O]ur review of a contempt order is more exacting than under the ordinary abuse-of-discretion standard because a district court's contempt power is narrowly circumscribed.\"). This is because \"[t]he\n\njudicial contempt power is a potent weapon.\" *Int'l Longshoreman's Ass'n v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n*, 389 U.S. 64, 76 (1967). *See also Taggart v. Lorenzen*, 139 S. Ct. 1795, 1802 (2019) (\"[C]ivil contempt is a severe remedy ….\"); *In re Attorney General of U.S.*, 596 F.2d 58, 65 (2d Cir. 1979) (\"[T]he court must not lightly invoke its contempt power.\"); *United States v. Wendy*, 575 F.2d 1025, 1030 (2d Cir. 1978) (recognizing that the \"exercise of the contempt power is awesome in its implications.\"). Accordingly, \"civil contempt 'should not be resorted to where there is a *fair ground of doubt* as to the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct.'\" *Taggart*, 389 S. Ct. 1801 (quoting *California Artificial Stone Paving Co. v. Molitor*, 113 U.S. 609, 618 (1885) (emphasis in original)).\n\n21. \"A contempt order is warranted only where the moving party establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged contemnor violated the district court's edict. More specifically, a movant must establish that (1) the order the contemnor failed to comply with is clear and unambiguous, (2) the proof of noncompliance is clear and convincing, and (3) the contemnor has not diligently attempted to comply in a reasonable manner.\" *King*, 65 F.3d at 1058 (citation omitted). *See also Vineyard Vines, LLC v. MacBeth Collection, LLC*, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205502, \\*39 (D. Conn., Dec. 5, 2018) (\"'[T]he moving party …bears the burden of establishing [these] three factors[.]\") (quoting *Latino Officers Ass'n City of New York, Inc. v. City of New York*, 558 F.3d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 2009)).\n\n## **i. The Corporate Governance Order is Vague and Ambiguous with Respect to the Demand That was Made by the Trustee**\n\n22. When the judicial contempt power \"is founded upon a decree too vague to be understood, it can be a deadly one.\" *Int'l Longshoreman's Ass'n*, 389 U.S. at 76. Accordingly, civil contempt usually is not appropriate unless \"those who must obey [orders] will know what the court intends to require and what it means to forbid.\" *Id*. *See also Taggart*, 139 S. Ct. at 1802 (\"[P]rinciples of 'basic fairness require that those enjoined receive explicit notice' of 'what conduct is outlawed' before being held in contempt.\" (*quoting Schmidt v. Lessard*, 414 U.S. 473, 476 (1974)).\n\n23. \"A clear and unambiguous order is one that leaves no uncertainty in the minds of those to whom it is addressed, who must be able to ascertain from the four corners of the order precisely what acts are forbidden.\" *King*, 65 F.3d at 1058 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). *See also Federated Dep.'t Stores, Inc. v. Wongco (In re R.H. Macy & Co.)*, 236 B.R. 583, 592 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) (\"A finding of civil contempt requires a showing that there exists an enforceable order that is clear and specific which unambiguously commands such party to perform or refrain from performing in accordance with the order.\"); *Gucci Am. v. Bank of China*, 768 F.3d 122, 143 (2d Cir. 2014) (\"[U]nless the parties can 'ascertain from the four corners of the order precisely what acts are forbidden,' the order cannot form the basis for contempt.\" (*quoting King*, 65 F.3d at 1058)); *Liberty Propane L.P. v. Feheley*, 522 Fed. Appx. 38, 39 (2d Cir. 2013) (vacating contempt order for failure to produce specific documents where underlying orders regarding production did not expressly require production of those specific documents); *Red Ball Interior Demolition Corp. v. Palmadessa*, 947 F. Supp. 116, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding contempt inappropriate where order operated by reference to motion, and thus did not expressly set forth its requirements within the four corners of the order). \"Furthermore, 'the longstanding, salutary rule in contempt cases is that ambiguities and omissions in orders redound to the benefit of the person charged with contempt.'\" *[Drywall Tapers, Local 1974 v. Local 530,](http) [Operative](http)  Plasterers Int'l Ass'n*[, 889 F.2d 389, 395 \\(2d Cir. 1989\\)](http) (quoting *[Ford v. Kammerer](http)*, [450 F.2d 279,](http)  [280 \\(3d Cir. 1971\\)\\)](http).\n\n24. Of particular relevance here, a statute cannot properly be made the basis of\n\ncontempt proceedings merely by incorporating a reference to its broad terms into a court order.\n\nA federal court has broad power to restrain acts which are of the same type or class as unlawful acts which the court has found to have been committed or whose commission in the future, unless enjoined, may fairly be anticipated from the defendant's conduct in the past. But the mere fact that a court has found that a defendant has committed an act in violation of a statute does not justify an injunction broadly to obey the statute and thus subject the defendant to contempt proceedings if he shall at any time in the future commit some new violation unlike and unrelated to that with which he was originally charged. This Court will strike from an injunction decree restraints upon the commission of unlawful acts which are thus disassociated from those which a defendant has committed.\n\n*NLRB v. Express Pub. Co.*, 312 U.S. 426, 435-36 (1941). *See also McComb v. [Jacksonville Paper](http)  Co*[., 336 U.S. 187, 195-96 \\(1949\\) \\(Frankfurter,](http) J. and Jackson, J., dissenting) (\"[T]his Court has indicated again and again that a statute cannot properly be made the basis of contempt proceedings merely by incorporating a reference to its broad terms into a court order.\"); *New York, N.H. & H.R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Com*., 200 U.S. 361, 404 (1906) (\"In other words, the proposition is that by the effect of a judgment against a carrier concerning a specific violation of the act, the carrier ceases to be under the protection of the law of the land and must thereafter conduct all its business under the jeopardy of punishment for contempt for violating a general injunction. To state the proposition is, we think, to answer it. … The requirement of the act to regulate commerce that a court shall enforce an observance of the statute against a carrier who has been adjudged to have violated its provisions, in no way gives countenance to the assumption that Congress intended that a court should issue an injunction of such a general character as would be violative of the most elementary principles of justice. … To accede to the doctrine relied upon would compel us, under the guise of protecting freedom of commerce, to announce a rule which would be destructive of the fundamental liberties of the citizen.\"); *Perez v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co*., 655 Fed. Appx. 404, 410- 11 (6th Cir. 2016) (\"The prohibition on overbroad or vague injunctions is deeply rooted in equity. The Supreme Court has warned against 'sweeping injunction[s] to obey the law' and has cautioned courts about their 'duty to avoid' such orders. *[Swift & Co. v.](http) United States*, 196 U.S. 375, 401, 25 S. Ct. 276, 49 L. Ed. 518 (1905). The warning followed from the Supreme Court's emphasis that 'defendants ought to be informed, as accurately as the case permits, what they are forbidden to do.' *Id.* … Most importantly, a broad injunction requiring a party to obey the law would require 'that courts … give effect in contempt proceedings to an order of such breadth.' *Id.* 'The judicial contempt power is a potent weapon. When it is founded upon a decree too vague to be understood, it can be a deadly one.' *[Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1291 v. Philadelphia Marine Trade](http)  Ass'n*[, 389 U.S. 64, 76, 88 S.](http) Ct. 201, 19 L. Ed. 2d 236 (1967).\"); *S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Clorox Co*., 241 F.3d 232, 240-41 (2d Cir. 2001) (\"Under Rule 65(d), an injunction must be more specific than a simple command that the defendant obey the law. To comply with the specificity and clarity requirements, an injunction must be specific and definite enough to apprise those within its scope of the conduct that is being proscribed. This rule against broad, vague injunctions is designed to prevent uncertainty and confusion on the part of those to whom the injunction is directed, and to be sure that the appellate court knows precisely what it is reviewing.\" (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)); *Hughey v. JMS Dev. Corp*., 78 F.3d 1523, 1531 (11th Cir. 1996) (\"[A]ppellate courts will not countenance injunctions that merely require someone to 'obey the law.' Broad, non-specific language that merely enjoins a party to obey the law or comply with an agreement … does not give the restrained party fair notice of what conduct will risk contempt. Because of the possibility of contempt, an injunction must be tailored to remedy the specific harms shown rather than to enjoin all possible breaches of the law.\" (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)); *Louis W. Epstein Family Partnership v. Kmart Corp*., 13 F.3d 762, 771 (3d Cir. 1994) (\"Broad, non-specific language that merely enjoins a party to obey the law or comply with an agreement … does not give the restrained party fair notice of what conduct will risk contempt.\"); *SEC v. Sky Way Global, LLC*, 710 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1292 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (\"[A]n abundance of precedent rejects an injunction framed entirely in the broad terms of the statutory language.\"); *Cuviello v. City of Oakland*, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26067, [\\*9] (N.D. Cal. March 19, 2009) (\"[C]ontempt may be issued against a party only if it is violation of a specific and definite order. That there must first be a specific and definite order is dictated by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d), which provides that 'every order granting an injunction must … state its terms specifically' as well as 'describe in reasonable detail … the act or acts restrained or required.' Notably, courts have held that not only vague injunctions but also injunctions that simply require a defendant to 'obey the law' fail to comply with Rule 65(d).\").\n\n25. Paragraph 3 does not, as the Court states, \"require[] the [Individual] Debtor's cooperation with the Trustee in locating the [Individual] Debtor's nominee, Ms. Wang, and in effectuating turnover of her ownership interest in Ace Decade.\" Contempt Order, at 9. *See also*, *id.,* at 11 (\"The Debtor is required by the clear terms of paragraph 3 to cooperate with the Trustee as necessary to realize the assertion of control and possession over the Ace Decade Entities for the benefit of the Estate, . . .\"). Indeed, paragraph 3 says nothing whatsoever about Ms. Wang or Ace Decade, but broadly and generally requires the Debtor to cooperate with the Trustee in accordance with section 521(a)(3) and 521(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code. The Individual Debtor cannot be held in contempt for purportedly failing to comply with such a broad and general directive.\n\n26. The Trustee, whose counsel drafted the Corporate Governance Order, knows how to draft an order with the necessary specificity to put the Individual Debtor on notice of what is required of him. Indeed, in paragraph 3(a) of the Corporate Governance Order the Trustee detailed what the Individual Debtor was required to do to facilitate the transfer of Genever BVI, an\n\nIndividual Debtor-Controlled Entity, as that term is defined in the Corporate Governance Order, to the Trustee, and attached to the Corporate Governance Order the documents that the Trustee was requiring the Individual Debtor to complete and execute to facilitate the Genever BVI transfer. The Trustee could have included that same, or any, level of detail with respect to Ace Decade, an entity that he knew at that time he would seek to exercise control over, but chose not to and as a result the Individual Debtor cannot be held in contempt for purportedly violating the exceedingly general requirement to cooperate with the Trustee, an obligation that exists independent of the Corporate Governance Order within section 521 of the Bankruptcy Code and for which other remedies are available for failure to comply. *See* Contempt Order, at 10 (\"Given the close resemblance of the text of the Bankruptcy Code and the explicit cite to section 521 in the Corporate Governance Order, it is clear and unambiguous that paragraph 3 should be read similarly broadly.\").\n\n27. Moreover, the Court's holding with respect to paragraph 2 of the Corporate Governance Order underscores its lack of clarity. The Individual Debtor argued in opposition to the Motion for Contempt that pursuant to paragraph 2 of the Corporate Governance Order the Trustee became the holder of all of the Individual Debtor's governance and economic rights in any Debtor-Controlled Entities, upon his appointment, and the Court agreed. *See* Contempt order, at 7 (\"The Court agrees with the Debtor that there is no fair ground of doubt that paragraph 2 of the Corporate Governance Order allows the Trustee to act of his own accord to assert control over corporate entities, including the Ace Decade Entities.\"). *See also*, *Id.*, at 10 (\"Therefore, the Trustee holds the Debtor's economic and governance rights with respect to the Ace Decades Entities in furtherance of his duties to the Estate.\"). Yet, the Court then held that the Debtor was supposed to understand based on the incorporation of Bankruptcy Code section 521 into paragraph 3 of the Corporate Governance Order, and on pain of contempt, that the specific authority granted in paragraph 2 of the Corporate Governance Order was elective and merely provided the Trustee one method among several for asserting control over Ace Decade. To reiterate the controlling law in the Second Circuit, the issue on contempt is whether an order \"leaves no uncertainty in the minds of those to whom it is addressed, who must be able to ascertain from the four corners of the order precisely what acts are forbidden.\" *King*, 65 F.3d at 1058. The Corporate Governance Order, or at least those sections at issue, utterly fail to meet this strict standard.\n\n28. Holding the Individual Debtor in contempt based on his purported violation of paragraph 3 of the Corporate Governance Order constitutes clear error.\n\n#### **ii. The Individual Debtor Diligently Attempted to Comply**\n\n29. The Court found that the Individual Debtor has control over Ms. Wang. The Court based this finding on Trustee's Exhibits 29 and 30. Exhibit 29 is an e-mail string from late 2016 and Exhibit 30 is an e-mail string from mid-2017. In those e-mails, Ms. Wang indicated that in some fashion she took direction from the Debtor. The Trustee presented no evidence that the Individual Debtor has any control over Ms. Wang today.\n\n30. While the Trustee presented no evidence that the Individual Debtor has any ability to control Ms. Wang today, and although the Corporate Governance Order does not expressly require the Individual Debtor to take any action vis-à-vis Ace Decade, as noted above, in an effort to cooperate with the Trustee the Individual Debtor (a) provided the Trustee with a fully executed (i) Share Transfer Instrument transferring all shares of Ace Decade in the Individual Debtor's name to the Trustee, and (ii) Written Resolutions of the Sole Director of the Company [Ace Decade], *inter alia*, approving and effectuating the share transfer pursuant to the Share Transfer Instrument, and (b) sent the Wang Letter attaching forms of the same documents to Ms. Wang in her capacity as sole director of Ace Decade. The Court criticizes the Individual Debtor for the wording of the Wang Letter, but the Individual Debtor had to word the letter in such a way so as to not represent to Ms. Wang that he owned or controlled Ace Decade because, as memorialized by the Corporate Governance Order, he did not as the Trustee had succeeded to his corporate rights. Thus, the Individual Debtor had to walk a fine line between requesting that Ms. Wang take certain actions while not violating the Corporate Governance Order by holding himself out as owning or controlling ACE Decade. In addition, at the November 18 hearing the Individual Debtor through counsel made clear that he would send a different letter if the Trustee or the Court specified what should be in such a letter. *See* November 18, 2022, Transcript of Motion to Seal; Motion for Entry of Order Holding Debtor in Civil Contempt for Failure to Comply with Corporate Governance Rights Order and Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee for Entry of Order Compelling Individual Debtor, Mei Gui (sic), HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited LLC, Hing Chi Ngok, Greenwich Land LLC, Lamp Capital LLC and Cold (sic) Spring (New York) LTR (sic) to Comply with Rule 2004 Subpoenas Before the Honorable Julie A. Manning United States Bankruptcy Judge (\"Nov. 18 Tran.\"), at 90:9-11.\n\n31. The efforts undertaken by the Individual Debtor to cooperate with the Trustee by executing certain corporate documents, requesting Ms. Wang do the same, and negotiating an order to streamline the Contempt Hearing were not undertaken in bad faith. Indeed, it appears that the primary basis for the Court's conclusion that the Debtor acted in bad faith is the timing of his efforts to cooperate with the Trustee. Contempt Order, at 13. The Debtor should not be punished for making an effort to comply with the incredibly broad mandate of paragraph 3 of the Corporate Governance Order before the hearing on the Motion for Contempt, and then agreeing to streamline\n\nthe hearing by resolving a substantial issue pre-hearing when the Trustee refused to accept his compliance.\n\n32. Parties often resolve contested issues and even full cases shortly before a hearing or trial. Indeed, this Court has encouraged the parties to work together to find negotiated solutions to various issues since the Trustee was appointed, and was complementary of the parties for working out the Partial Resolution Order:\n\n- 25. THE COURT: Okay. Hearing nothing, I have\n- 1. reviewed the order. I have to say that I see that it is\n- 2 progress without question, and that the parties are working\n- 3 together to try to resolve many of the issues that are the\n- 4 subject of the contempt motion.\n\nNovember 16, 2022, Transcript of Motion for Joint Administration with 22-50073; Motion for Order (I) Setting Bar Dates of Filing Proofs of Claim; (ii) Approving Form of Notice of Bar Dates and (iii) Granting Related Relief; Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee for Entry of Order Holding Debtor in Civil Contempt for Failure to Comply with Corporate Governance Rights [Order]; Application to Employee Neubert, Pepe & Monteith and Motion for Joint Administration with 22-50592 Before the Honorable Julie A. Manning United States Bankruptcy Judge, at 43:25-44:4.\n\n33. The Individual Debtor is at a loss to understand how the same act could be viewed by the Court as laudatory and undertaken in bad faith.\n\n34. The Individual Debtor has not acted in bad faith and there is simply no basis to shift the burden to him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the Corporate Governance Order is unclear and ambiguous, even if such burden shifting was permissible, a proposition that is not fully supported by *Taggart v. Lorenzen.[2](#page-16-0)* Nevertheless, even if the burden of persuasion was shifted to the Individual Debtor he has satisfied that burden.\n\n<span id=\"page-16-0\"></span><sup>2</sup> *Taggart* does not expressly shift the burden of persuasion in contempt proceedings to the alleged contemnor when the contemnor has proceeded in bad faith, instead noting that the contemnor bears\n\n35. The Individual Debtor's possibility of success is substantial and as a result the remaining factors do not have to weigh heavily in his favor to obtain a stay, *see McCue*, 503 F.3d 167, at 170 (\"[The] degree to which a factor must be present varies with the strength of the other factors, meaning more of one excuses less of the other.\"), but they do.\n\n## **b. The Individual Debtor Will Likely Suffer Irreparable Injury Absent a Stay and the Balance of Hardships Tip in Favor of the Individual Debtor**\n\n36. Absent a stay, the Individual Debtor will likely suffer irreparable injury, or at the very least, the balance of hardships tips in his favor.\n\n37. The Individual Debtor is not suggesting that the imposition of monetary sanctions alone constitutes irreparable harm, but the Court has made clear that further sanctions could issue, and the Trustee has made clear to the Individual Debtor that the Trustee will seek the Individual Debtor's incarceration which would deprive the Individual Debtor of his liberty and constitute quintessential irreparable harm. *See* Nov. 18, Tran., at 103:10-15; *Hardy v. Fischer*, 701 F. Supp. 2d 614, 619 (SDNY 2010) (\"Alleged violations of constitutional rights are commonly considered irreparable injuries for purposes of a preliminary injunction.\") (citations omitted); *Cobb v. Green*, 574 F. Supp. 256, (W.D. Mich. 1983) (court finds irreparable harm where finding of contempt for failure to pay child support could lead to incarceration and notes that \"[t]here is no adequate remedy at law for a deprivation of one's physical liberty\").\n\nthe risk that his acts and actions will be within the scope of the order at issue and subject him to contempt. *Taggart*, 139 S. Ct. 1795, at 1802 (\"Thus, in *McComb*, we explained that a party's 'record of continuing and persistent violations' and 'persistent contumacy' justified placing 'the burden of any uncertainty in the decree . . . on [the] shoulders' of the party who violated the court order.\") (ellipsis and brackets in original, *quoting McComb*, 336 U.S. 187, at 192-93)). *McComb* likewise does not hold that the burden of persuasion shifts to a contemnor who has purportedly acted in bad faith. *McComb*, at 336 U.S. at 192. Indeed, the most logical reading of *Taggart's* reference to the contemnor bearing the burden of uncertainty is to a shift in the general rule that \"ambiguities and omissions in orders redound to the benefit of the person charged with contempt,\" *[Drywall Tapers, Local 1974](http)*[,](http) [450 F.2d 279, at 280,](http) not a shift in the burden of persuasion.\n\n38. The Individual Debtor is thus faced with the choice of purging himself of what he believes is a wrongful contempt finding by this Court, having the contempt finding stand, and likely mooting his appeal, *see Legacy Healthcare, LLC v. New York (In re Legacy Healthcare, LLC)*, 09-CV-1102A; 09-CV-1103A, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98329, \\* (W.D.N.Y., Sept. 20, 2010) (staying order pending appeal to avoid mooting appeal and causing irreparable harm), or facing ever increasing sanctions as his appeal remains pending and the Trustee inevitably moves for further contempt sanctions. Under these circumstances the Individual Debtor will suffer irreparable harm absent a stay pending appeal and the balance of the hardships thus tip decidedly in the Individual Debtor's favor.\n\n#### **c. The Trustee Will Not Suffer Substantial Injury Upon a Stay**\n\n39. The granting of the Motion for Stay will not result in any prejudice to the Trustee. The Court has already provided the Trustee with all of the corporate authority he needs to effectuate a transfer of Ace Decade and the Trustee is fully aware of the process to facilitate the transfer of a BVI entity to his name because he has already transferred Genever BVI to his name. Moreover, the Trustee has retained BVI counsel to represent him in this case.\n\n40. There may be some delay in the transfer of Ace Decade, but that delay could have been avoided if the Trustee had simply exercised the rights this Court granted him at his request shortly after his appointment. Regardless \"[a] mere assertion of delay does not constitute substantial harm.\" *United States v. Philip Morris, Inc*., 314 F.3d 612, 622 (D.C. Cir. 2003).\n\n#### **d. The Public Interest Supports a Stay**\n\n41. The public interest militates in favor of a stay. \"The judicial contempt power is a potent weapon,\" *Int'l Longshoreman's Ass'n.* 389 U.S. 64, at 76, that should not be lightly invoked. *In re Attorney General of U.S.*, 596 F.2d 58, at 65. The public has a keen interest in fully understanding the types of orders for which contempt citations may issue, and whether those orders must be narrow and specific, or can be broad and general such as the Corporate Governance Order.\n\n42. Denying the Individual Debtor's Motion has the potential to moot the Individual Debtor's appeal and thereby deny the public further review of the Contempt Order and a decision as to whether the Corporate Governance Order, and in particular paragraph 3, is too broad and general to support a finding of contempt. Such a decision will enlighten other bankruptcy case participants as to the necessity of narrowly tailored orders, and whether the cooperation requirements of Bankruptcy Code section 521(a) can be incorporated into an order and thereafter form the basis for a finding of contempt. *See McComb*, 336 U.S. 187, at 195-96 (Frankfurter, J. dissenting) (\"[T]his court has indicated again and again that a statute cannot properly be made the basis of contempt proceedings merely by incorporating a reference to its broad terms into a court order.\") (citations omitted)\n\n43. Accordingly, the Individual Debtor respectfully submits that it is in the public's interest for this Court to stay the Contempt Order to allow the Individual Debtor to obtain meaningful appellate review.\n\n### **IV. CONCLUSION**\n\n44. For the reasons set forth above, this Court should (a) issue a stay of the Contempt Order pending the Individual Debtor's appeal thereof and (b) grant the Individual Debtor such other and further relief as justice requires.\n\nDated at Bridgeport, Connecticut on this 1st day of March, 2023.\n\nTHE INDIVIDUAL DEBTOR, HO WAN KWOK\n\nBy: */s/ James M. Moriarty*\n\nEric Henzy (ct12849) James M. Moriarty (ct21876) John L. Cesaroni (ct29309) 10 Middle Street, 15th Floor Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604 Telephone: (203) 368-4234 Facsimile: (203) 368-548 Email: [ehenzy@zeislaw.com](mailto:ehenzy@zeislaw.com) [Jmoriarty@zeislaw.com](mailto:Jmoriarty@zeislaw.com) [jcesaroni@zeislaw.com](mailto:jcesaroni@zeislaw.com)\n\n#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI hereby certify that on this 1st day of March, 2023, a copy of foregoing was filed electronically. Notice of this filing will be sent by e-mail to all parties by operation of the Court's electronic filing system or by mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing as indicated on the Notice of Electronic Filing. Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF System.\n\n By: */s/ James M. Moriarty*  James M. Moriarty (ct21876)","body_zh":"美国联邦康涅狄格州破产法院布里奇波特分部（UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION）\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等：案号 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n关于：第 11 章\n\n债务人。\n\n个体债务人就认定其藐视公司治理命令之裁定在上诉期间请求暂缓执行的动议\n\n依据 Fed. R. Bank. P. 8007(a)，个体债务人 Ho Wan Kwok（以下简称“个体债务人”）通过其下署律师 Zeisler & Zeisler, P. C.，谨此请求在其就本院于 January 24, 2023 作出的《准许认定债务人藐视公司治理命令动议的裁定》（Doc. No. 1372，以下简称“藐视法庭裁定”）提起上诉期间暂缓执行（以下简称“暂缓执行动议”）。个体债务人于 February 7, 2023 就藐视法庭裁定提交了上诉通知。个体债务人请求在上诉期间暂缓执行藐视法庭裁定，以使该裁定对其施加的金钱制裁不再累积，并使包括受托人迫切希望施加的监禁在内的进一步惩罚威胁，不会在其寻求上诉审查期间悬于其头顶。为支持其暂缓执行动议，个体债务人谨陈述如下。\n\n一、引言\n\n1. 个体债务人在其上诉中有较大可能胜诉。作为藐视法庭认定依据的命令，并未达到认定个体债务人因违反该命令而构成藐视法庭所必需的清晰明确程度。具体而言，在藐视法庭程序中所涉命令部分，并未以任何方式，更遑论以具体明确的方式，说明个体债务人必须实施及必须避免实施何种行为，而仅仅是纳入《破产法典》的一项规定，并指示个体债务人“遵守法律”。法律明确且既定：仅通过在法院命令中援引法条文本，不得适当地将该法条作为藐视法庭程序的依据。因此，个体债务人不可能因其所谓未遵守基础命令而构成藐视法庭，且应当准许暂缓执行动议。此外，如下文详述，法院作出了缺乏证据支持的认定。\n\n2. 亦应在上诉期间准予暂缓执行，因为在考虑是否准予此类暂缓执行时，第二巡回法院所权衡的其他因素亦支持暂缓执行。如本文所示，(a) 如不予暂缓执行，个体债务人将被迫面对制裁，且在其上诉待决期间制裁可能增加，或者遵守藐视法庭裁定并使其上诉失去意义，尽管个体债务人并未构成藐视法庭；因此，困难衡量明显有利于个体债务人，(b) 如作出暂缓执行，受托人不会遭受实质性损害，以及 (c) 公共利益支持暂缓执行。\n\n二、背景\n\n3. 于 February 15, 2022（以下简称“申请日”），个体债务人根据《破产法典》第 11 章提交了其自愿救济申请，由此启动上述破产案件。\n\n4. 于 July 7, 2022，UST 提交通知，任命 Luc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯平斯，以下简称“受托人”）为第 11 章受托人（Doc. No. 514），并提交《请求批准任命第 11 章受托人的命令申请》（Doc. No. 515），请求法院批准任命该受托人。于 July 8, 2022，法院作出《准许任命第 11 章受托人的裁定》（Doc. No. 523），准许任命受托人为本案的第 11 章受托人。\n\n5. 于 July 23, 2022，受托人提交其《第 11 章受托人请求依据《破产法典》第 363、541、1108 及 1505 条作出命令的动议：(A) 确认第 11 章受托人持有债务人控制实体中债务人的全部经济及公司治理权利；(B) 授权第 11 章受托人代表破产财团在任何外国采取行动；及 (C) 准予相关救济》（Doc. No. 598）。\n\n6. 于 August 10, 2022，本院作出其《依据《破产法典》第 363、521、541、1108 及 1505 条作出的命令：(A) 确认第 11 章受托人持有债务人控制实体中债务人的全部经济及公司治理权利；(B) 授权第 11 章受托人代表破产财团在任何外国采取行动；及 (C) 准予相关救济》（Doc. No. 717，以下简称“公司治理命令”）。公司治理命令第 2 及第 3 段相关内容规定：\n\n2. 自于 July 8, 2022 作出的准许任命 Luc A. Despins 为本第 11 章案件受托人的命令[ECF No. 523]录入之日起生效，受托人为破产财团利益，就所有债务人控制实体，包括但不限于 Genever (BVI)，持有债务人的全部经济及治理权利。为免生疑义，前述权利包括受托人所主张的替换债务人控制实体任何现有高级职员、董事、经理或类似人员的权力。作为前述事项的一部分，在必要范围内，受托人获授权以其在本第 11 章案件中第 11 章受托人的身份，担任任何被免职的该等高级职员、董事、经理或类似人员。\n\n3. 依照《破产法典》第 521(a)(3) 及 521(a)(4) 条，特此命令债务人分别：(a) 在必要范围内与受托人合作，以使受托人能够履行其职责，包括但不限于受托人对债务人资产的调查，以及 (b) 向受托人交付破产财团的全部财产及任何已记录的信息，包括但不限于与破产财团财产有关的账簿、文件、记录及文书（包括但不限于其在 Genever (BVI) 中的股份及所有相关公司治理文件）。……\n\n7. 公司治理命令第 3(a) 段明确指示个体债务人按照作为公司治理命令附件 A 所附格式，签署 Genever BVI 的股份转让文书及董事决议。此后，个体债务人签署了 Genever BVI 的股份转让文书及董事决议，并将其提供给受托人。\n\n8. 于 August 31, 2022，受托人向个体债务人的律师发送信函，要求个体债务人：(a) 签署并促使任何名义股东签署股份转让文书，将个体债务人在 Ace Decade Holdings Limited（以下简称“Ace Decade”）的全部股份（包括个体债务人通过任何名义股东实益拥有的全部股份）转让给受托人；以及 (b) 签署及/或促使 Ace Decade 的董事签署决议，批准将 Ace Decade 的该等股份转让给受托人。受托人于 August 31, 2022 发出的信函规定，股份转让文书及相关董事决议应采用与作为公司治理命令附件 A 所附的、有关 Genever (BVI) 股份的相应文件相同的格式。\n\n9. 于 October 4, 2022，受托人提交其《第 11 章受托人请求作出认定债务人因未遵守公司治理权利命令而构成民事藐视法庭之裁定的动议》（Doc. No. 913，以下简称“藐视法庭动议”）。藐视法庭动议的核心是个体债务人所谓未能就受托人对 Ace Decade 行使公司控制权与受托人合作。\n\n10. 于 October 25, 2022，个体债务人提交其对藐视法庭动议的异议（Doc. No. 1026）。个体债务人在其对藐视法庭动议的异议中主张，除其他事项外，第 3 段不能作为藐视法庭认定的依据。参见异议第 14 段，第 9 页（“公司治理命令第 3 段规定的极为宽泛的救济，仅仅援引并重述《破产法典》第 521(a)(3) 及 (4) 条，不能成为就受托人请求采取的行动作出藐视法庭认定的依据。”）。\n\n11. 于 November 10 及 11, 2022，个体债务人尝试通过以下方式遵守受托人于 August 31, 2022 提出的要求：(a) 向受托人提供已完整签署的：(i) 将以个体债务人名义持有的 Ace Decade 全部股份转让给受托人的《股份转让文书》；以及 (ii) 《公司[Ace Decade]唯一董事书面决议》，其中除其他事项外，批准并依照股份转让文书实施该股份转让；以及 (b) 向 Yanping (Yvette) Wang 女士以其 Ace Decade 唯一董事的身份发送一封信函（以下简称“Wang 信函”），其中附有《股份转让文书》及《公司[Ace Decade]唯一董事书面决议》的格式文本。由个体债务人签署的《股份转让文书》及《公司唯一董事书面决议》，以及作为 Wang 信函附件发送给 Wang 女士的该等文件格式，均采用受托人于 August 31, 2022 的信函所要求的格式。[1]\n\n12. 法院于 November 16、17 及 18, 2022 就藐视法庭动议举行了听证会。\n\n13. 根据本院此前指示各方通过协议共同解决争议的指示，在听证会前数日，各方律师进行了讨论，以求找到共同点，并至少缩小提交法院裁决的问题范围。律师之间的讨论促成提交一项拟议命令；如获准许，该命令将缩小法院在藐视法庭动议听证会上需审议的问题范围。\n\n1 Wang 信函及其所附《股份转让文书》格式文本和《公司唯一董事书面决议》格式文本，以及个体债务人签署并于 November 16 听证会前提供给受托人的《股份转让文书》及《公司唯一董事书面决议》，均在藐视法庭动议听证会上作为[个体]债务人的证据 B、C 及 D，分别无异议地被接纳为证据。\n\n各方拟议命令随后在与法院讨论后经修订，并于 November 17, 2022，法院作出《关于部分解决受托人藐视法庭动议的命令》（Doc. No. 1110，以下简称“部分解决命令”）。根据部分解决命令，法院认定与个体债务人对 Ace Decade 的实益所有权及控制权有关的某些事实已经确定，且债务人未提出异议，并同意其不会对该等认定提起上诉。参见部分解决命令，第 1 段。\n\n14. 于 January 24, 2023，法院作出藐视法庭裁定，最终裁决了与个体债务人根据公司治理命令就 Ace Decade 所承担义务有关的具体问题，并认定个体债务人因未遵守公司治理命令而构成藐视法庭。藐视法庭裁定中，法院除其他事项外认定，Yvette Wang 女士是 Ace Decade 的名义所有人，债务人对 Wang 女士具有控制权，且 Wang 信函的措辞并不完全支持签署股份转让文书。总体参见藐视法庭裁定，第 3-5 页。\n\n15. 藐视法庭命令聚焦于公司治理命令第2段和第3段。本院认定，公司治理命令的上述段落清晰明确，并要求个人债务人“就受托人对 Ace Decade Entities（Ace Decade实体）的控制与受托人合作，同时要求交出 Ace Decade Entities、对 Ace Decade Entities 的所有权权益，以及与 Ace Decade Entities 有关的公司治理文件。”同上，第6-7页。本院认为，“毫无公平合理的疑问，公司治理命令第2段允许受托人自行采取行动，对包括 Ace Decade Entities 在内的法人实体主张控制权”，但并未要求受托人如此行事，同上，第7页，并推测“采取自助措施可能违反适用的非破产法或现有公司治理文件，并可能给受托人带来法律问题。”同上，第8页。本院随后认定，债务人未能通过找到 Wang 女士（王女士）并促使其移交其在 Ace Decade 中的所有权权益而与受托人合作，因而违反了公司治理命令第3段。同上，第9-12页。\n\n16. 藐视法庭命令要求个人债务人在 March 6, 2023 5:00 p.m. 前消除其藐视法庭行为。同上，第15页。藐视法庭命令进一步规定，任何未能消除藐视法庭行为的情形，均将导致个人债务人被裁定承担受托人为提出藐视法庭动议所发生的合理律师费和费用，并威胁称，为确保遵守公司治理命令，可经动议施加进一步制裁。见同上。\n\nIII. 论证\n\n17. Fed. R. Bank. P. 8007(a)(1)(A) 规定：“通常，当事人必须首先向破产法院提出动议，以便……在上诉期间中止执行破产法院的判决、命令或裁定……。”\n\n18. 第二巡回区已阐明，在决定是否于上诉期间中止执行一项命令时，应适用以下四要件测试：(a) 是否存在成功的概率或可能性、实质性成功的概率或可能性，或涉及实体问题的重大法律问题；(b) 如不予中止执行，是否会对动议人造成不可弥补的损害、困难衡量是否倾向于动议人，或是否会对动议人造成某种损害；(c) 如准予中止执行，是否会对反对中止执行的一方造成实质性损害；以及 (d) 公共利益。Mohammed v. Reno, 309 F.3d 95, 100-01 (2d Cir. 2002)；另见 United States v. Grote, 961 F.3d 105, 122-23 (2d Cir. 2020)（标准为：(1) 如无中止执行，动议人是否将遭受不可弥补的损害，(2) 如准予中止执行，一方是否将遭受实质性损害，\n\n(3) 动议人是否已证明其在上诉中具有实质性成功可能性，尽管该可能性低于成功的盖然性，以及 (4) 可能受影响的公共利益）；Hirschfeld v. Bd. Of Elections of N.Y., 984 F.2d 35, 39 (2d Cir. 1993)（同上）。\n\n19. “某一要件须达到的程度，随其他要件的强度而变化，即一项要件越强，对其他要件的要求便越低。”McCue v. City of New York（纽约市）(In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig.), 503 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2007)（省略引文及内部引号）；另见 Mohammed, 309 F.3d at 100-01（“[W]e see considerable merit in the approach expressed by the District of Columbia Circuit: ‘The necessary ‘level’ or ‘degree’ of possibility of success will vary according to the court’s assessment of the other [stay] factors.’ Applying that test, that Circuit has granted a stay pending appeal where the likelihood of success is not high but the balance of hardships favors the applicant, and has stated that a stay may be granted where the probability of success is ‘high’ and ‘some injury’ has been shown. As the Sixth Circuit has explained, ‘The probability of success that must be demonstrated is inversely proportional to the amount of injury plaintiff[ ] will suffer absent the stay. Simply stated, more of one excuses less of the other.’”（省略引文））；In re Taub, 470 B.R. 273, 278 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2012)（“所要求证明的实质性成功可能性与[动议人]在未获中止执行时将遭受的损害程度成反比。”）。\n\na. 个人债务人在上诉中具有实质性成功可能性，或者至少存在涉及实体问题的重大法律问题\n\n20. 不言而喻，“破产法院的藐视法庭权力，与地区法院的该等权力一样，‘受到严格限制。’”PHH Mortg. Corp v. Sensenich (In re Gravel), 6 F.4th 503, 511 (2d Cir. 2021)。另见 Perez v. Danbury Hosp.（丹伯里医院）, 347 F.3d 419, 423 (2d Cir. 2003)（“[O]ur review of a contempt order is more exacting than under the ordinary abuse-of-discretion standard because a district court’s contempt power is narrowly circumscribed.”）。这是因为“司法藐视法庭权力是一种强有力的武器。”Int’l Longshoreman’s Ass’n（国际码头工人协会）v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass’n（费城海运贸易协会）, 389 U.S. 64, 76 (1967)。另见 Taggart v. Lorenzen, 139 S. Ct. 1795, 1802 (2019)（“[C]ivil contempt is a severe remedy ….”）；In re Attorney General of U.S.（美国总检察长）, 596 F.2d 58, 65 (2d Cir. 1979)（“[T]he court must not lightly invoke its contempt power.”）；United States v. Wendy, 575 F.2d 1025, 1030 (2d Cir. 1978)（承认“行使藐视法庭权力在其影响方面是令人敬畏的。”）。因此，“如果对于被告行为的不当性存在公平合理的疑问，则不应采取民事藐视法庭这一救济。”Taggart, 389 S. Ct. 1801（引自 California Artificial Stone Paving Co. v. Molitor, 113 U.S. 609, 618 (1885)（原文强调））。\n\n21. “仅在动议方以清楚且令人信服的证据证明被指称的藐视法庭者违反了地区法院的命令时，方可作出藐视法庭命令。更具体地说，动议人必须证明：(1) 藐视法庭者未遵守的命令清晰明确；(2) 不遵守的证据清楚且令人信服；以及 (3) 藐视法庭者未以合理方式勤勉尝试遵守。”King, 65 F.3d at 1058（省略引文）。另见 Vineyard Vines, LLC v. MacBeth Collection, LLC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205502, \\*39 (D. Conn., Dec. 5, 2018)（“‘[T]he moving party … bears the burden of establishing [these] three factors[.]’”）（引自 Latino Officers Ass’n City of New York, Inc. v. City of New York, 558 F.3d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 2009)）。\n\ni. 就受托人提出的要求而言，公司治理命令含糊且不明确\n\n22. 当司法藐视法庭权力“建立在一项过于含糊、无法理解的裁定之上时，它可能是致命的。”Int’l Longshoreman’s Ass’n, 389 U.S. at 76。因此，除非“必须服从[命令]的人知道法院意图要求什么，以及意图禁止什么”，否则民事藐视法庭通常并不适当。同上。另见 Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1802（“[P]rinciples of ‘basic fairness require that those enjoined receive explicit notice’ of ‘what conduct is outlawed’ before being held in contempt.”（引自 Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473, 476 (1974)））。\n\n23. “清晰明确的命令，是指不会使受命令约束者产生任何不确定性的命令；该等人员必须能够仅从命令文本本身准确确定哪些行为被禁止。”King, 65 F.3d at 1058（省略内部引文及引号）。另见 Federated Dep.’t Stores, Inc. v. Wongco (In re R.H. Macy & Co.), 236 B.R. 583, 592 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999)（“认定民事藐视法庭，须证明存在一项可执行、清晰且具体的命令，该命令明确要求该方依照命令作为或不作为。”）；Gucci Am. v. Bank of China（中国银行）, 768 F.3d 122, 143 (2d Cir. 2014)（“[U]nless the parties can ‘ascertain from the four corners of the order precisely what acts are forbidden,’ the order cannot form the basis for contempt.”（引自 King, 65 F.3d at 1058））；Liberty Propane L.P. v. Feheley, 522 Fed. Appx. 38, 39 (2d Cir. 2013)（因关于提交文件的基础命令未明确要求提交该等特定文件，撤销因未提交特定文件而作出的藐视法庭命令）；Red Ball Interior Demolition Corp. v. Palmadessa, 947 F. Supp. 116, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)（认定藐视法庭并不适当，因该命令通过援引动议而发生效力，故未在命令文本本身明确载明其要求）。“此外，‘藐视法庭案件中长期存在且有益的规则是，命令中的含糊之处和遗漏应有利于被指控藐视法庭的人。’”[Drywall Tapers, Local 1974 v. Local 530,] [Operative] Plasterers Int’l Ass’n[, 889 F.2d 389, 395 \\(2d Cir. 1989\\)]（引自 [Ford v. Kammerer], [450 F.2d 279,] [280 \\(3d Cir. 1971\\)]）。\n\n24. 与本案特别相关的是，仅通过在法院命令中援引某项法规的宽泛条款，不能恰当地使该法规成为藐视法庭程序的依据。\n\n联邦法院拥有广泛权力，可以禁止与法院已认定实施的违法行为属于同一类型或类别的行为，或者根据被告过去的行为，可以公平预见其将来会实施、除非被禁止的行为。但是，法院认定被告实施了违反某项法规的行为这一事实本身，并不能证明有理由作出一项宽泛的禁令，要求遵守该法规，从而使被告在将来任何时候实施某项与其最初被指控行为不同且无关的新违法行为时，受到藐视法庭程序的约束。本院将从禁令裁定中删除对实施此类违法行为的限制，因为该等违法行为与被告已经实施的行为并无关联。\n\nNLRB v. Express Pub. Co., 312 U.S. 426, 435-36 (1941)。另见 McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co.（杰克逊维尔纸业公司）, 336 U.S. 187, 195-96 \\(1949\\) \\(Frankfurter, J. and Jackson, J., dissenting)（“本院一再指出，仅仅通过在法院命令中援引某项法规的宽泛条款，不能适当地使该法规成为藐视法庭程序的依据。”）；New York, N.H. & H.R. Co.（纽约、纽黑文和哈特福德铁路公司）v. Interstate Commerce Com., 200 U.S. 361, 404 (1906)（“换言之，该主张认为，由于针对某承运人就其具体违反该法的行为作出了判决，该承运人即不再受国家法律保护，此后必须在因违反一项一般禁令而可能受到藐视法庭处罚的风险下开展其全部业务。我们认为，只要陈述该主张，即已对其作出回答。……《规制商业法》要求法院强制一家已被裁定违反其规定的承运人遵守该法规，绝不支持如下假设：国会意图让法院发布一种如此一般性的禁令，以致违反最基本的正义原则。……若接受所依据的理论，将迫使我们以保护商业自由为名，宣布一项会破坏公民基本自由的规则。”）；Perez v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co.（俄亥俄贝尔电话公司）, 655 Fed. Appx. 404, 410- 11 (6th Cir. 2016)（“禁止过于宽泛或含糊的禁令，深深植根于衡平法。本院已警告不要发布‘要求遵守法律的全面禁令’，并告诫法院有‘义务避免’此类命令。Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 401, 25 S. Ct. 276, 49 L. Ed. 518 (1905)。该警告源于最高法院所强调的：‘应当尽可能准确地告知被告，其被禁止实施何种行为。’Id.……最重要的是，要求一方遵守法律的宽泛禁令将要求‘法院……在藐视法庭程序中使如此宽泛的命令发生效力。’Id.‘司法藐视法庭权力是一种强有力的武器。当其建立在一项过于含糊、无法理解的判令之上时，它可能成为致命的武器。’Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1291 v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n（费城海事贸易协会）, 389 U.S. 64, 76, 88 S. Ct. 201, 19 L. Ed. 2d 236 (1967).”）；S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc.（庄臣父子公司）v. Clorox Co.（高乐氏公司）, 241 F.3d 232, 240-41 (2d Cir. 2001)（“根据 Rule 65(d)，禁令必须比要求被告遵守法律的简单命令更为具体。为符合具体性和明确性要求，禁令必须足够具体和确定，以使其适用范围内的人知悉被禁止的行为。本项禁止宽泛、含糊禁令的规则，旨在防止禁令所针对的人产生不确定性和混淆，并确保上诉法院准确知悉其正在审查的内容。”（省略内部引文和引号））；Hughey v. JMS Dev. Corp.（JMS开发公司）, 78 F.3d 1523, 1531 (11th Cir. 1996)（“上诉法院不会容许仅要求某人‘遵守法律’的禁令。仅仅禁止一方遵守法律或履行协议的宽泛、非具体语言……并未使受约束方得到公平通知，知悉何种行为将招致藐视法庭。鉴于可能发生藐视法庭，禁令必须限于救济所证明的具体损害，而非禁止一切可能违反法律的行为。”（省略内部引文和引号））；Louis W. Epstein Family Partnership v. Kmart Corp.（凯马特公司）, 13 F.3d 762, 771 (3d Cir. 1994)（“仅仅禁止一方遵守法律或履行协议的宽泛、非具体语言……并未使受约束方得到公平通知，知悉何种行为将招致藐视法庭。”）；SEC v. Sky Way Global, LLC（天路环球有限责任公司）, 710 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1292 (M.D. Fla. 2010)（“大量先例否定了完全以法规语言的宽泛术语表述的禁令。”）；Cuviello v. City of Oakland（奥克兰市）, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26067, [\\*9] (N.D. Cal. March 19, 2009)（“只有在当事人违反具体且确定的命令时，方可对其作出藐视法庭裁定。必须首先存在具体且确定的命令，这由 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d) 所规定；该规则规定，‘每一项准予禁令的命令必须……具体载明其条款’，并且‘以合理的详细程度……描述被禁止或被要求实施的行为。’值得注意的是，法院认为，不仅含糊的禁令，而且仅仅要求被告‘遵守法律’的禁令，均不符合 Rule 65(d)。”）。\n\n25. 第3段并未如法院所述，“要求[个人]债务人与受托人合作，以查找[个人]债务人的代持人王女士，并促成其对 Ace Decade（艾斯十年公司）所有权权益的移交。”Contempt Order, at 9。另见 id., at 11（“根据第3段的明确条款，债务人必须在为使受托人能够为财产利益主张对 Ace Decade Entities（艾斯十年实体）的控制和占有而有必要的范围内与受托人合作，. . .”）。事实上，第3段完全没有提及王女士或 Ace Decade，而是宽泛且一般性地要求债务人依照 Bankruptcy Code 第521(a)(3)条和第521(a)(4)条与受托人合作。个人债务人不能因据称未遵守此类宽泛且一般性的指令而被认定藐视法庭。\n\n26. 受托人，其律师起草了 Corporate Governance Order（公司治理命令），知道如何起草具有必要具体性的命令，以告知个人债务人其被要求履行的事项。事实上，在公司治理命令第3(a)段中，受托人详细列明了个人债务人为便利将 Genever BVI（杰尼维尔英属维尔京群岛公司）——该术语在公司治理命令中被定义为个人债务人控制实体——转让给受托人所必须采取的行动，并将受托人要求个人债务人为便利 Genever BVI 转让而完成和签署的文件附于公司治理命令。受托人本可以就 Ace Decade——其当时明知将寻求对其行使控制权的实体——纳入同等程度或任何程度的细节，但其选择不这样做；因此，个人债务人不能因据称违反与受托人合作这一极其一般性的要求而被认定藐视法庭，该义务独立于公司治理命令而存在于 Bankruptcy Code 第521条之中，且对于未予遵守还可获得其他救济。见 Contempt Order, at 10（“鉴于 Bankruptcy Code 的文本与公司治理命令中对第521条的明确引用高度相似，显然且毫不含糊，第3段应被同样宽泛地解读。”）。\n\n27. 此外，法院关于公司治理命令第2段的裁定凸显了其缺乏明确性。个人债务人在反对 Motion for Contempt（藐视法庭动议）时主张，根据公司治理命令第2段，受托人自其被任命之时起即成为个人债务人于任何债务人控制实体中全部治理及经济权利的持有人，法院对此表示同意。见 Contempt order, at 7（“法院同意债务人的意见，即毫无公平的疑义表明，公司治理命令第2段允许受托人自行采取行动，对包括 Ace Decade Entities 在内的公司实体主张控制权。”）。另见 Id., at 10（“因此，受托人为推进其对财产的职责，持有债务人就 Ace Decades Entities 所享有的经济和治理权利。”）。然而，法院随后裁定，债务人应当理解，基于 Bankruptcy Code 第521条被纳入公司治理命令第3段，并在藐视法庭处罚的压力下，公司治理命令第2段所授予的具体授权是可选择的，并且仅为受托人对 Ace Decade 主张控制权的若干方法之一。重申 Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）的控制性法律，藐视法庭问题在于，一项命令是否“不给其所针对者的心中留下任何不确定性；他们必须能够仅从命令文本本身准确确定哪些行为被禁止。”King, 65 F.3d at 1058。公司治理命令，或者至少其中有争议的部分，完全未达到这一严格标准。\n\n28. 基于个人债务人据称违反公司治理命令第3段而认定其藐视法庭，构成明显错误。\n\nii. 个人债务人勤勉地尝试遵守\n\n29. 法院认定个人债务人对王女士具有控制权。法院以受托人证据29和30为依据作出此项认定。证据29为2016年末的一组电子邮件，证据30为2017年年中的一组电子邮件。在这些电子邮件中，王女士表示，她以某种方式接受债务人的指示。受托人没有提供任何证据证明个人债务人如今对王女士具有任何控制权。\n\n30. 虽然受托人没有提供任何证据证明个人债务人如今具有控制王女士的任何能力，并且如上所述，公司治理命令也未明确要求个人债务人就 Ace Decade 采取任何行动，但为努力与受托人合作，个人债务人(a)向受托人提供了已完整签署的(i) Share Transfer Instrument（股份转让文书），将登记在个人债务人名下的 Ace Decade 全部股份转让给受托人；以及(ii) Written Resolutions of the Sole Director of the Company [Ace Decade]（公司[Ace Decade]唯一董事的书面决议），其中包括批准并依照股份转让文书实施该股份转让；并且(b)以王女士作为 Ace Decade 唯一董事的身份，向其发送了附有同类文件表格的 Wang Letter（王函）。法院批评王函的措辞，但个人债务人必须以此方式措辞，以免向王女士表示其拥有或控制 Ace Decade，因为正如公司治理命令所记录的那样，其并不拥有或控制该公司，因为受托人已承继其公司权利。因此，个人债务人必须在请求王女士采取某些行动与不通过宣称自己拥有或控制 ACE Decade 而违反公司治理命令之间谨慎周旋。此外，在 November 18 听证会上，个人债务人通过律师明确表示，如受托人或法院具体说明此类信函应包含何种内容，其将发送另一封不同的信函。见 November 18, 2022, Transcript of Motion to Seal; Motion for Entry of Order Holding Debtor in Civil Contempt for Failure to Comply with Corporate Governance Rights Order and Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee for Entry of Order Compelling Individual Debtor, Mei Gui (sic), HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited LLC, Hing Chi Ngok, Greenwich Land LLC, Lamp Capital LLC and Cold (sic) Spring (New York) LTR (sic) to Comply with Rule 2004 Subpoenas Before the Honorable Julie A. Manning United States Bankruptcy Judge (\"Nov. 18 Tran.\"), at 90:9-11。\n\n31. 个人债务人为配合受托人而采取的措施，包括签署某些公司文件、要求王女士作出同样签署，以及协商一项命令以简化藐视法庭听证会，并非出于恶意。事实上，法院认定债务人出于恶意的主要依据似乎是其努力配合受托人的时间安排。藐视法庭命令，第13页。债务人不应因在藐视法庭动议听证会之前努力遵守《公司治理命令》第3段极其宽泛的要求，且在受托人拒绝接受其履行行为时，通过在听证会前解决一项重大问题而同意简化听证会，而受到惩罚。\n\n32. 当事人经常在听证会或审判前不久解决存在争议的问题，甚至解决整个案件。事实上，自受托人被任命以来，本院一直鼓励各方共同努力，就各种问题寻求协商解决方案，并称赞各方就《部分解决命令》达成一致：\n\n25. 法院：好的。既然没有听到异议，我已经审阅了该命令。我必须说，我认为这毫无疑问是进展，而且各方正在共同努力，试图解决作为藐视法庭动议标的的许多问题。\n\n2022年11月16日，关于与22-50073号案合并管理的动议；关于命令（I）确定提交债权证明的截止日期；（ii）批准截止日期通知的格式；及（iii）给予相关救济的动议；第11章受托人请求作出命令，因债务人未遵守公司治理权利[命令]而认定其构成民事藐视法庭的动议；聘请Employee Neubert, Pepe & Monteith的申请；以及关于与22-50592号案合并管理的动议，于美利坚合众国破产法官Julie A. Manning（朱莉·A·曼宁）阁下庭前记录，第43:25—44:4页。\n\n33. 个人债务人无法理解，同一行为何以会被本院视为值得称赞，同时又被视为出于恶意。\n\n34. 个人债务人并未出于恶意行事，也完全没有理由将举证责任转移给他，要求其以明确且令人信服的证据证明《公司治理命令》不清楚且含糊不明；即使此种举证责任转移是允许的，而Taggart v. Lorenzen[2]并未完全支持该命题。然而，即使说服责任被转移给个人债务人，他也已经满足该责任。\n\n2 Taggart并未明确规定，在被指称藐视法庭者出于恶意行事时，将藐视法庭程序中的说服责任转移给该被指称藐视法庭者；相反，其指出，被指称藐视法庭者承担其作为及行为将落入相关命令范围并使其受到藐视法庭制裁的风险。Taggart, 139 S. Ct. 1795, at 1802（“因此，在McComb案中，我们解释道，当事人‘持续和反复违反’以及‘持续抗命’的记录，足以证明应将‘判令中的任何不确定性……’的负担当由违反法院命令一方‘承担’。”）（原文中的省略号和方括号，引自McComb, 336 U.S. 187, at 192-93）。McComb同样未裁定，说服责任应转移给被指称出于恶意行事的藐视法庭者。McComb, at 336 U.S. at 192。事实上，对Taggart关于藐视法庭者承担不确定性负担之表述最合乎逻辑的理解，是对“命令中的含糊之处和遗漏应有利于被控藐视法庭之人”这一一般规则的改变，[Drywall Tapers, Local 1974][,] [450 F.2d 279, at 280,]，而非说服责任的转移。\n\n35. 个人债务人胜诉的可能性很大，因此，为取得暂缓，其他因素无需明显偏向其一方，见McCue, 503 F.3d 167, at 170（“某一因素须具备到何种程度，取决于其他因素的强度，这意味着其中一项更强，可以弥补另一项较弱。”），但其他因素确实偏向其一方。\n\nb. 如不暂缓，个人债务人很可能遭受不可弥补的损害，且困难衡量偏向个人债务人\n\n36. 如不暂缓，个人债务人很可能遭受不可弥补的损害；或者至少，困难衡量偏向其一方。\n\n37. 个人债务人并非主张仅施加金钱制裁即构成不可弥补的损害，但本院已明确表示可能施加进一步制裁，且受托人已向个人债务人明确表示，受托人将寻求对个人债务人予以监禁；这将剥夺个人债务人的人身自由，并构成典型的不可弥补损害。见Nov. 18, Tran., at 103:10-15；Hardy v. Fischer, 701 F. Supp. 2d 614, 619 (SDNY 2010)（“为初步禁令之目的，被指称侵犯宪法权利通常被视为不可弥补的损害。”）（引文略）；Cobb v. Green, 574 F. Supp. 256, (W.D. Mich. 1983)（法院认定，因未支付子女抚养费而被认定藐视法庭可能导致监禁时存在不可弥补的损害，并指出“对于剥夺一个人的人身自由，不存在充分的法律救济”）。\n\n38. 因此，个人债务人面临如下选择：消除其认为本院作出的错误藐视法庭认定；允许该藐视法庭认定继续有效，从而很可能使其上诉失去意义，见Legacy Healthcare, LLC v. New York (In re Legacy Healthcare, LLC), 09-CV-1102A; 09-CV-1103A, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98329, \\* (W.D.N.Y., Sept. 20, 2010)（在上诉期间暂缓命令，以避免使上诉失去意义并造成不可弥补的损害）；或者在其上诉尚待裁决且受托人不可避免地申请进一步藐视法庭制裁时，面对不断加重的制裁。在此情况下，如在上诉期间不予暂缓，个人债务人将遭受不可弥补的损害，因此困难衡量显然偏向个人债务人一方。\n\nc. 暂缓不会使受托人遭受重大损害\n\n39. 准予暂缓动议不会对受托人造成任何不利影响。本院已经向受托人提供了完成Ace Decade转让所需的一切公司权限；受托人完全了解如何促成英属维尔京群岛实体转让至其名下，因为他已经将Genever BVI转让至其名下。此外，受托人已聘请英属维尔京群岛律师在本案中代表其行事。\n\n40. Ace Decade的转让可能会有一定延迟，但如果受托人在被任命后不久即行使本院应其请求授予的权利，本可避免该延迟。无论如何，“仅仅主张存在延迟并不构成重大损害。”United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 314 F.3d 612, 622 (D.C. Cir. 2003)。\n\nd. 公共利益支持暂缓\n\n41. 公共利益要求准予暂缓。“司法藐视法庭权是一项强有力的武器，”Int'l Longshoreman's Ass'n. 389 U.S. 64, at 76，不应轻易行使。In re Attorney General of U.S., 596 F.2d 58, at 65。公众对于充分理解可据以作出藐视法庭认定的命令类型，以及此类命令是否必须狭窄且具体，抑或可以如《公司治理命令》般宽泛和概括，具有重大利益。\n\n42. 驳回个人债务人的动议可能使个人债务人的上诉失去意义，从而剥夺公众对《藐视法庭命令》的进一步审查，以及对《公司治理命令》、尤其是第3段是否过于宽泛和概括而不足以支持藐视法庭认定作出裁决的机会。该裁决将使其他破产案件参与者了解命令必须经过狭窄定制的必要性，以及《破产法典》第521(a)条的合作要求是否可被纳入一项命令，并随后构成藐视法庭认定的依据。见McComb, 336 U.S. 187, at 195-96（Frankfurter法官异议意见）（“本院曾一再指出，仅通过在法院命令中援引法规的宽泛条款，不能适当地使该法规成为藐视法庭程序的依据。”）（引文略）\n\n43. 因此，个人债务人谨此主张，允许个人债务人获得有实质意义的上诉审查而由本院暂缓《藐视法庭命令》，符合公众利益。\n\nIV. 结论\n\n44. 基于上述理由，本院应当：（a）在个人债务人就该命令提出上诉期间，暂缓《藐视法庭命令》；以及（b）给予个人债务人为实现公平正义所需的其他及进一步救济。\n\n2023年3月1日，订于康涅狄格州布里奇波特。\n\n个人债务人，HO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）\n\n签署人：/s/ James M. Moriarty\n\nEric Henzy（ct12849） James M. Moriarty（ct21876） John L. Cesaroni（ct29309） 10 Middle Street, 15th Floor Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604 电话：(203) 368-4234 传真：(203) 368-548 电子邮箱：[ehenzy@zeislaw.com] [Jmoriarty@zeislaw.com] [jcesaroni@zeislaw.com]\n\n送达证明\n\n本人特此证明，于2023年3月1日，前述文件副本已以电子方式提交。根据法院电子提交系统的运行，该提交的通知将通过电子邮件发送给所有当事人；对于无法接受电子提交者，则依《电子提交通知》所示通过邮件送达。当事人可通过法院CM/ECF系统查阅该提交文件。\n\n签署人：/s/ James M. Moriarty  James M. Moriarty（ct21876）","key_entities":["Je","Guo","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Despins","CIPA"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":523,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":6967,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 19:46:38"}