{"id":"court_ctb_1505_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":1505,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION | -------------------------------------------","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| -----------------------------------------------------------<br>x |             |                         |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|-------------------------|\n| In re:                                                           | :<br>:      | Chapter 11              |\n| HO WAN KWOK,<br>et al.,                                          | :<br>:<br>: | Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |\n| Debtor.1                                                         | :<br>:      | (Jointly Administered)  |\n| -----------------------------------------------------------<br>x |             |                         |\n\n# **TRUSTEE'S OBJECTION TO INDIVIDUAL DEBTOR'S MOTION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL OF ORDER HOLDING HIM IN CONTEMPT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ORDER**\n\nLuc A. Despins, in his capacity as the chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") appointed in the chapter 11 case of Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\"), files this objection (the \"Objection\") to the *Individual Debtor's Motion for Stay Pending Appeal of Order Holding Him in Contempt of Corporate Governance Order* [Docket No. 1492] (the \"Motion to Stay\").<sup>2</sup> In support of this Objection, the Trustee respectfully states as follows: **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\n1. For more than six months now, the Trustee has attempted to obtain the Debtor's cooperation to effectuate the transfer ownership of Ace Decade Holdings Limited (\"Ace Decade\") and its wholly owned subsidiary, Dawn State Limited (\"Dawn State\" and, together with Ace Decade, the \"Ace Decade Entities\") to the Trustee. Unable to secure the Debtor's\n\n<sup>1</sup> The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and the Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\n<sup>2</sup> Capitalized terms used but not defined in this Objection have the meanings set forth in the Motion to Stay.\n\ncooperation, as required by the Corporate Governance Order, to obtain full ownership and control of the Ace Decade Entities, the Trustee sought and obtained the Contempt Order, which gave the Debtor one last opportunity to come into compliance with the Corporate Governance Order by March 6, 2023 before sanctions would be triggered. In response to the Contempt Order, the Debtor has remained defiant—instead of finally complying with the Corporate Governance Order and transferring ownership of the Ace Decade Entities, the Debtor has appealed the Contempt Order and sought a stay pending appeal of such order.\n\n2. While the Debtor is, of course, free to appeal the Contempt Order, the Court should deny the Motion to Stay for what it is: the latest ploy to delay compliance with this Court's clear directives to effectuate the transfer of an undisputed estate asset, *i.e.*, Ace Decade, to the estate—all for the obvious purpose of impeding the Trustee's efforts to investigate and recover assets for the estate and imposing ever-increasing costs on the estate along the way.\n\n3. The Motion to Stay does not even come close to satisfying the standard for a stay pending appeal. To obtain a stay, the Debtor must establish (i) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (ii) that he will suffer irreparable injury if a stay is denied, (iii) that there will be no substantial injury to the party opposing a stay if one is issued, and (iv) that a stay would be in the public interest. The Debtor cannot satisfy any one of these factors, much less show that, on balance, they entitle him to a stay pending appeal.\n\n4. First, the Debtor's appeal of the Contempt Order has virtually no likelihood of success. The Court has already carefully considered and rejected the Debtor's argument that the Corporate Governance Order is somehow vague and ambiguous. This conclusion is not altered by the case law cited by the Debtor for the proposition that the violation of a court-issued injunction does not give rise to contempt sanctions if the injunction incorporates broad statutory\n\nlanguage of general character. *See* Motion to Stay at 10-13. This case law merely reflects one special subset of cases where the relevant language—*i.e.*, non-specified or generic statutory provisions—was not sufficiently clear and unambiguous to serve as the basis for contempt sanctions. Contrary to the Debtor's suggestion, there is no absolute rule that adopting statutory language into an order automatically precludes contempt sanctions for violation of such order.\n\n5. Here, the Court correctly concluded that paragraph 3 of the Corporate Governance Order (which adopts language from section 521(a)(3) and (4) of the Bankruptcy Code) leaves no ambiguity as to what is required by the Debtor—namely, effectuating the transfer of Ace Decade to the Trustee. But even if the Corporate Governance Order were somehow ambiguous (which it is not), it is undisputed that no ambiguity exists in the *Contempt Order* as to what actions the Debtor needed to take on or before March 6, 2023 to avoid sanctions.\n\n6. Similarly, the Court should reject the Debtor's argument that the Contempt Order will likely be reversed on appeal because the Debtor supposedly diligently attempted to comply with the Corporate Governance Order. For one, the Court's findings regarding the Debtor's noncompliance, including his bad faith conduct, are reviewed for clear error—a high bar under the circumstances. In any event, the Debtor's arguments as to his purported compliance with the Corporate Governance Order rely on numerous mischaracterizations of the record and the Court's findings in the Contempt Order. For example, contrary to the Debtor's assertion, the Court did not base its conclusion that the Debtor has control over Ms. Wang solely on two emails from late 2016 and mid-2017. Instead, the Court based its conclusion on the entire record before it, including the fact that the Debtor exclusively beneficially owned and controlled the Ace Decade Entities as of the appointment of the Trustee and that Ms. Wang currently is the Debtor's nominee shareholder of Ace Decade. Nor is there any support for the Debtor's convoluted\n\nargument (raised for the first time in the Motion to Stay) that the Debtor did not give explicit instructions in his letter to Ms. Wang to transfer the shares in Ace Decade because he was purportedly concerned about *violating* the Corporate Governance Order if he held himself out as owning or controlling Ace Decade. Nothing in the Debtor's letter to Ms. Wang, or the rest of the record, suggests that the Debtor was motivated by such concerns when he wrote the letter. Rather, as the Court correctly recognized, the Debtor's letter makes clear that he \"does not fully support executing the share transfer instrument\" to the Trustee. Contempt Order at 4. For these and the additional reasons discussed below, the Debtor has failed to show that his appeal is likely to succeed on the merits, and, accordingly, the Motion to Stay should be denied on this basis alone.\n\n7. Second, the Debtor cannot establish that he will suffer irreparable injury absent a stay. If the Debtor does not comply with the Contempt Order, he will face monetary sanctions, which, as a matter of black letter law (and as the Debtor acknowledges) cannot constitute irreparable harm. To support his assertion of irreparable harm, the Debtor speculates that the Trustee could, in the future, request additional sanctions, including incarceration, and that such future sanctions constitute irreparable harm. However, the possibility of future sanctions is not irreparable harm—and the Debtor cites no authority for this rather absurd proposition. At this time, no request for further sanctions has been made, and if such a request were to be made in the future, the Debtor will have every opportunity to oppose such request. Regardless, the ultimate arbiter of whether any additional sanctions should be imposed is this Court, not the Trustee.\n\n8. Third, further delaying the transfer of ownership of and control over Ace Decade to the Trustee will cause substantial harm to the Trustee and this estate. As the Court is well aware, Ace Decade and Dawn State are co-plaintiffs in the Debtor's pending litigation against\n\nUBS in the English courts (the \"UBS Litigation\"), the largest identified asset on the Debtor's schedules. In order for the Trustee to be able to steer the course of that litigation (including in as it relates to any potential settlement), the Trustee must have full corporate control over the Debtor's co-plaintiffs, *i.e.*, Ace Decade and Dawn State, which the Debtor advocates the Trustee does not have at this time (as discussed in paragraph 11 below).\n\n9. The Trustee's current lack of full control over these entities is materially harming the estate because they are refusing to cooperate with the Trustee. For example, Ace Decade has vigorously opposed the Trustee's efforts to gain access to the Debtor's privileged documents related to the UBS litigation in the possession of the Debtor's UK counsel, Harcus Parker Limited (\"UK Counsel\"). While, as detailed below, the English courts have ultimately rejected virtually all of Ace Decade's arguments (including its argument that any joint-privilege among the Debtor, Ace Decade, and/or Dawn State somehow precludes the Trustee from gaining access to the Debtor's privileged documents), Ace Decade's obstructionism has come at a price: months-long delay and substantial legal expense. Given Ace Decade's track record so far, the Trustee has every reason to believe that it will continue to obstruct the Trustee's efforts to obtain documents from UK Counsel and to control the UBS litigation for the benefit of this estate.\n\n10. Moreover, it is (to be charitable to the Debtor) unclear who, if not the Debtor (or someone under his control), has been directing and funding Ace Decade's quest to impede the Trustee's access to the Debtor's documents and take control of the UBS litigation. It is particularly troubling that much of Ace Decade's obstructionism occurred *after* November 17, 2022, *i.e.*, the date this Court entered the Partial Resolution Order, at which point the Debtor had agreed not to contest the finding that the Trustee now beneficially owns Ace Decade. Put\n\ndifferently, on what basis and at whose direction has Ace Decade been continuing to take actions directly contrary to the interests of its current beneficial owner, *i.e.*, the Trustee?\n\n11. Only a few days ago, the Debtor posted a video on his Gettr account (the \"March 1, 2023 Video\") thumbing his nose at the Trustee by saying the Trustee is not capable of settling the UBS Litigation because the Trustee does not have control over Ace Decade and Dawn State—which is exactly why the Stay Motion should not be granted:\n\n> I guess when Luc was asking UBS Switzerland for money UBS told him: \"You can kick Miles Guo out of the case\" \"but Ace Decade and Dawn State\" \"have nothing to do with Miles Guo\" \"How can you guarantee the dismissal of the case?\" In other words, if UBS decided to pay Luc How could Luc manage to close the case for good? He is not capable of doing so<sup>3</sup>\n\nThis statement demonstrates the Debtor's continued disregard for this Court's orders, both the uncontested Partial Resolution Order, which found that Ace Decade and Dawn State are now beneficially owned by the Trustee and the Corporate Governance Order, which requires him to transfer corporate control of Ace Decade and Dawn State to the Trustee.\n\n12. Fourth, the public interest strongly weighs in favor of not staying the Contempt Order. The Debtor has had plenty of opportunity to comply with the Corporate Governance Order, including during the six-week period between the entry of the Contempt Order (on January 24, 2023) and the deadline for the Debtor to purge himself of contempt (*i.e.*, March 7, 2023). Nor is this Court writing on a blank slate; the Debtor has repeatedly shown a willingness to disregard the Court's orders in this case, including orders compelling him to produce documents and orders instructing him to stop interfering with the bankruptcy process. The Court\n\n<sup>3</sup> The March 1, 2023 Video can be viewed at [http](http) The quoted excerpt of the March 1, 2023 Video is at time stamp 1:31 to 1:50.\n\nalso has the benefit of the experience of Judge Ostrager who has presided over five years of \"evasive and contemptuous acts\" by the Debtor, and has concluded that the Debtor has \"knowingly and intentionally violat[ed] Court orders.\"<sup>4</sup> There could not be a better description of why the public interest factor weighs heavily in favor of the Trustee here.\n\n## **BACKGROUND**\n\n13. On October 4, 2022, the Trustee filed the Contempt Motion [Docket No. 913]\n\nseeking entry of an order holding the Debtor in contempt for failing to comply with the\n\nCorporate Governance Order, namely the Debtor's failure to effectuate the transfer of his\n\nownership interest in Ace Decade to the Trustee.\n\n14. On October 25, 2022, the Debtor file his objection to the Contempt Motion\n\n[Docket No. 1026], and, on November 14, 2022, the Trustee filed his reply in further support of\n\nthe Contempt Motion [Docket No. 1092].\n\n15. On November 17, 2022, the Court entered the Partial Resolution Order, pursuant\n\nto which the Court made the following findings, among others:\n\n1. The Court hereby finds that (i) the Debtor exclusively beneficially owned and controlled Ace Decade Holdings Limited (\"Ace Decade\") on the February 15, 2022 petition date (the \"Petition Date\") and maintained such exclusive beneficial ownership and control up to and including immediately prior to the date of the Trustee's appointment, and (ii) Dawn State Limited (\"Dawn State\" and, together with Ace Decade, the \"Ace Decade Entities\") is Ace Decade's whollyowned subsidiary and is exclusively owned and controlled by Ace Decade. For the avoidance of doubt, Yanping \"Yvette\" Wang is not and has never been a beneficial owner of the shares in Ace Decade or Dawn State. The Debtor does not contest the findings in this paragraph and will not appeal such findings.\n\n2. The Debtor represents that he has never transferred or purported to transfer any ownership or control of Ace Decade to any other person\n\n<sup>4</sup> Decision & Order on Motion, *PAX v. Kwok*, 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. 2020), ECF No. 1181 (\"Final Contempt Order\") at 7, 10.\n\nor entity since the Petition Date. Accordingly, the Court further finds that, but for the Trustee's appointment and his rights under the Bankruptcy Code and the Corporate Governance Rights Order, the Debtor would still exclusively beneficially own and control Ace Decade as of the date of this order. The Debtor does not contest the findings in this paragraph and will not appeal such findings.\n\n16. The Partial Resolution Order did not resolve the entirety of the Trustee's Contempt Motion, including as it related to the Debtor's obligation, under the Corporate Governance Order, to cause the transfer of Ace Decade to the Trustee.\n\n17. The Court held an evidentiary hearing on the Contempt Motion on November 16,\n\n17, and 18, 2022, including as it relates to the unresolved portion of the Partial Resolution Order.\n\n18. On January 24, 2023, the Court entered the Contempt Order [Docket No. 1372]\n\nfinding the Debtor in civil contempt and imposing sanctions (in the form of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs that the Trustee has had to incur in pursuing compliance with the Corporate Governance Order as it relates to the Ace Decade Entities) in the event he fails to purge himself of contempt on before 5:00 p.m. on March 6, 2023.\n\n19. For additional background on the Debtor's non-compliance with the Corporate Governance Order, the Trustee refers to the factual findings set forth in the Contempt Order.\n\n## **ARGUMENT**\n\n20. For the Contempt Order to be stayed pending appeal, the Debtor must show he has satisfied the four-prong test set out by the Second Circuit in *Mohammed v. Reno*, 309 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2002): \"[1] the likelihood of success on the merits, [2] irreparable injury if a stay is denied, [3] substantial injury to the party opposing a stay if one is issued, and [4] the public\n\ninterest.\"<sup>5</sup> The Debtor fails establish any of these factors, much less show that they collectively weigh in his favor.\n\n## **I. Debtor Cannot Demonstrate a Likelihood Of Success On Merits**\n\n21. To satisfy the likelihood of success prong of the standard for a stay pending appeal, the movant must make \"a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits.\" *In re Cacioli*, 302 B.R. 429, 431 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2003) (citing *Hilton v. Braunskill*, 481 U.S. 770, 776, 107 S. Ct. 2113, 2119, 95 L. Ed. 2d 724 (1987) (noting the factors governing stays pending appeal as \"(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies)). 6 The Debtor falls far short of meeting this standard.\n\n# A. Corporate Governance Order Is Not Vague and Ambiguous as it Relates to Debtor's Obligation to Transfer Ace Decade to Trustee\n\n22. In the Contempt Order, the Court concluded that the Corporate Governance Order is clear and unambiguous and that there is no fair ground of doubt as to its meaning. There is no basis to conclude that an appellate court would disturb that ruling—let alone that the Debtor will likely succeed on the merits of his appeal. In fact, virtually all arguments raised by the Debtor in his Motion to Stay were previously raised in his objection to the Contempt Motion and *rejected* by this Court in the Contempt Order.\n\n<sup>5</sup> The \"degree to which a factor must be present varies with the strength of the other factors, meaning more of one [factor] excuses less of the other.\" *McCue v. City of New York (In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig.)*, 503 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original).\n\n<sup>6</sup> Some other courts in the Second Circuit have articulated slightly modified standards in analyzing motions for stay pending appeal. *See, e.g.*, *In re Country Squire Assoc. of Carle Place, L.P.*, 203 B.R. 182, 183 (2d Cir. BAP 1996) (\"(1) whether the movant will suffer irreparable injury absent a stay, (2) whether a party will suffer substantial injury if a stay is issued, (3) whether the movant has demonstrated 'a substantial possibility, although less than a likelihood, of success' on appeal, and (4) the public interests that may be affected.\"). Here, Debtor fails under both standards.\n\n23. In particular, this Court already considered and rejected the argument that paragraph 3 of the Corporate Governance Order is vague and unambiguous. In this regard, the Court concluded that: \"[t]here is no fair ground of doubt that paragraph 3 requires the Debtor's cooperation with the Trustee in locating the Debtor's nominee, Ms. Wang, and in effectuating turnover of her ownership interest in Ace Decade,\" Contempt Order at 9; \"[t]he Debtor is required by the clear terms of paragraph 3 to cooperate with the Trustee as necessary to realize this assertion of control and possession over the Ace Decade Entities for the benefit of the Estate,\" *Id.* at 10-11; and \"[t]here is no fair ground of doubt . . . that the Debtor is required to surrender to the Trustee the Ace Decade Entities, including the ownership interests in the Ace Decade Entities and corporate governance documents related to the Ace Decade Entities.\" *Id.* at 11.\n\n24. Similarly, the Court also considered and rejected the argument that paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Corporate Governance Order are somehow in tension such that obligations in the paragraph 3 are somehow ambiguous. There simply is no conflict. Indeed, as the Court explained, paragraph 2 and 3 complement each other: while paragraph 2 confirms the Trustee's *de jure* control over the Debtor's economic and governance rights with respect to all Debtor-Controlled Entities (as defined in the Corporate Governance Order), that control is not necessarily self-effectuating and, therefore, requires the Debtor to turn over *de facto* possession and control—which is exactly what paragraph 3 is intended to accomplish. Contempt Order at 12. Simply put, paragraph 2 sets forth the Trustee's legal rights as it relates to Debtor-Controlled Entities, while paragraph 3 imposes obligations on the Debtor to cooperate with the Trustee and surrender property of the estate in order for the Trustee to be able to realize those rights.\n\n25. In his Motion to Stay, the Debtor also argues that the violation of a court-issued injunction does not give rise to contempt sanctions if the injunction incorporates broad statutory language of general character. *See* Motion to Stay at 10-13. However, the cases cited by the Debtor in support of that proposition do not change anything about this Court's analysis in the Contempt Order. These cases merely affirm the general rule that non-specific, generic injunctions cannot form the basis for contempt sanctions. *See, e.g.*, *Louis W. Epstein Family Partnership v. Kmart Corp.*, 13 F. 3d 762, 771 (3d Cir. 1994) (\"Broad, non-specific language that merely enjoins a party to obey the law or comply with an agreement . . . does not give the restrained party fair notice of what conduct will risk contempt.\"). Contrary to the Debtor's suggestion, there is no absolute rule that adopting statutory language into an order automatically precludes contempt sanctions for violation of such order.\n\n26. Here, while the Corporate Governance Order tracks the statutory language of sections 521(a)(3) and 521 (a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, that language forms a proper basis of the contempt ruling. As the Second Circuit observed in *S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Clorox Co*., 241 F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir.2001), \"under Rule 65(d), an injunction must be more specific than a simple command that the defendant obey the law. . . . To comply with the specificity and clarity requirements, an injunction must 'be specific and definite enough to apprise those within its scope of the conduct that is being proscribed.'\" (internal citation omitted). To be clear, \"[c]ases like *S.C. Johnson* do not prohibit courts from ordering parties to obey the law, but rather require that such orders be specific and clear.\" *Ligon v. City of N.Y*., 925 F. Supp. 2d 478, 539 n. 455 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).\n\n27. The Corporate Governance Order is sufficiently specific to apprise the Debtor of what conduct would risk contempt. *See United States v. Miller*, 588 F.2d 1256, 1261 (9th Cir.\n\n1978) (\"the mere fact that the injunction is framed in language almost identical to the statutory mandate does not make the language vague\" so long as \"the statutory terms adequately describe the impermissible conduct\"). The Corporate Governance Order makes clear that the Debtor was required to surrender property of the estate and any documents related to property of the estate. In fact, the Corporate Governance Order provides even further context for the actions required by the Debtor, stating that such property includes \"without limitation, his shares in Genever (BVI) and all related corporate governance documents.\" Corporate Governance Order ¶ 3. It cannot legitimately be argued that the Debtor was unaware he would also have to transfer his interest in other corporate entities he owns, such as Ace Decade.\n\n28. Moreover, the Corporate Governance Order must be read in the context of this chapter 11 case. Courts recognize that \"[t]here may be circumstances when obey-the-law injunctions are justified by the facts of the case in which the injunction is sought.\" *Perez v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co*., 655 Fed. Appx. 404, 412 (6th Cir. 2016). Such provisions \"of that generality are often necessary to prevent further violations where a proclivity for unlawful conduct has been shown.\" *McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co*., 336 U.S. 187, 192 (1949); *see U.S. v. Philip Morris USA Inc.*, 566 F.3d 1095, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (stating injunction requiring defendant to \"avoid making false statements or committing racketeering acts: the manufacturing, marketing, promotion, health consequences, and sale of cigarettes, along with related issues that [d]efendants have reason to know are of concern to cigarette consumers\" is \"not a generalized injunction to obey the law . . . These injunctions may be broad, but breadth is warranted to prevent further violations where[, as here,] a proclivity for unlawful conduct has been shown.\") (quotations omitted).\n\n29. In this case, the Trustee's appointment arose out of the concern that the Debtor did not appropriately manage the estate and that a chapter 11 trustee ought to be appointed to investigate the assets of the Debtor. A similar concern, namely the Debtor's track record of hiding his assets from creditors in a maze of corporate entities, more than justified the breadth of the Corporate Governance Order so as to ensure that *all* of Kwok's property interests would be surrendered to the Trustee.\n\n30. For these reasons, it is irrelevant that the Corporate Governance Order does not specifically mention Ace Decade. Because it is undisputed that the Debtor was the beneficial owner of Ace Decade at the time of the Trustee's appointment, the Debtor was obligated to take the necessary steps to surrender that ownership interest to the Trustee. Similarly, there is no significance to the fact that Ms. Wang is not specifically named in the Corporate Governance Order. Putting aside that the Debtor didn't even disclose that she was the nominee shareholder until his deposition less than a week before the hearing on the Contempt Motion, the Debtor's obligation to turn over property of the estate to the Trustee cannot possibly turn on the identity of the nominee shareholder of Ace Decade or any other Debtor-Controlled Entity. It would be absurd to allow the Debtor to escape complying with the clear directives of this Court merely because those directives did not specify the names of unknown nominee shareholders that the Debtor selected for the very purpose of obscuring his ownership interests.\n\n31. In sum, while paragraph 3 of the Corporate Governance Order may be broad, it *is*  specific: it requires the Debtor to, among other things, \"surrender to the Trustee *all* property of the estate.\" Corporate Governance Order ¶ 3. The breadth of the Court's directive does *not* mean that it is ambiguous, such that the Debtor was not on fair notice of what conduct would result in the imposition contempt sanctions. But even if the Corporate Governance Order were\n\nsomehow ambiguous (which it is not), there is clearly no ambiguity (and the Debtor doesn't assert there is any) in the Contempt Order as to what actions the Debtor is required to take on or before March 6, 2023 to avoid the imposition of sanctions.\n\n#### B. Debtor Did Not Diligently Attempt to Comply\n\n32. The Court should also reject the Debtor's attempt to re-argue the Debtor's alleged compliance with the Corporate Governance Order. The Court has already considered and rejected all these arguments, finding that the Debtor did *not* comply with his obligations and, worse, acted in bad faith by feigning compliance. Contempt Order 14-15. The Debtor fails to demonstrate that an appellate court would reverse the Court's factual findings in that regard.\n\n33. As noted, the Debtor's arguments as to his purported compliance with the Corporate Governance Order rely on numerous mischaracterizations of the record and the Court's ruling in the Contempt Order. First, contrary to the Debtor's assertion, the Court did not base its conclusion that the Debtor has control over Ms. Wang solely on two emails from late 2016 and mid-2017. Instead, the Court's conclusion was based on the entire record before it, including the fact that the Debtor exclusively and beneficially owned and controlled the Ace Decade Entities as of the appointment of the Trustee and that Ms. Wang currently is the Debtor's nominee shareholder of Ace Decade. Contempt Order at 4.\n\n34. Second, neither the Debtor's executed share transfer instrument (which purported to transfer all shares in Ace Decade to the Trustee) nor the Debtor's executed written resolution as sole director of Ace Decade (which purported to authorize the transfer of Ace Decade shares to the Trustee) comply with the Corporate Governance Order because neither document has legal effect. The Debtor is *not* the nominee shareholder of Ace Decade, nor is he a director of Ace Decade. In each case, the relevant party who needs to execute these documents is Ms. Wang, a fact that the Debtor well understands. In short, these executed documents are worthless.\n\n35. Third, the Debtor's letter to Ms. Wang also does not constitute compliance with\n\nthe Corporate Governance Order. The Court has already set forth the numerous reasons as to\n\nwhy this letter was a mere subterfuge, including:\n\n- The Debtor failed to sufficiently establish that the letter was delivered to Ms. Wang, Contempt Order at 14;\n- The letter, if delivered at all, was dilatory, coming a month after the Contempt Motion was filed, *id.*;\n- The letter, if delivered at all, was not sent in a reasonable manner, including because the letter contains no address, there is no post-mark, there is no acknowledgment of receipt, and the Debtor does not even know which of his bodyguards allegedly personally delivered the letter, *id.* at 14-15;\n- Because of the lack an address, the letter also obscures the location of Ms. Wang from the Trustee, who has been unable to serve her with a subpoena, *id.* at 13; and\n- The language in the letter signals to its reader that the Debtor does not fully support executing the share transfer instrument, *id.* at 4.\n- 36. Fourth, there is no support for the Debtor's convoluted argument (raised for the\n\nfirst time in the Motion to Stay) that the Debtor did not give explicit instructions to Ms. Wang to\n\ntransfer the shares in Ace Decade because he was purportedly concerned about *violating* the\n\nCorporate Governance Order if he held himself out as owning or controlling Ace Decade.\n\nNothing in the Debtor's letter to Ms. Wang, or the rest of the record, suggests that the Debtor\n\nwas motivated by such concerns when he wrote the letter.\n\n37. Fifth, there is no inconsistency between, on the one hand, the Court commending the parties for reaching a consensual resolution on the Partial Resolution Order shortly before the hearing on the Contempt Motion and, on the other hand, the Court faulting the Debtor for sending a dilatory letter to Ms. Wang more than a month after the Motion for Contempt had been filed. Contrary to the Debtor's assertion, these two acts are not the \"same act.\" Motion to Stay\n\n¶ 33. The former represents an effort by the parties to narrow the issues and reach a consensual resolution. The latter represents an effort by the Debtor to feign compliance with the Corporate Governance Order, while, in reality, taking no steps to actually effectuate the transfer of Ace Decade to the Trustee, as required by the Corporate Governance Order (and, at the same time, obscuring the location of Ms. Wang to impede the Trustee's efforts to serve her with a subpoena). 7\n\n38. For all these reasons, the Debtor has failed to show that his appeal is likely to succeed on the merits.\n\n#### **II. Debtor Will Not Suffer Irreparable Injury Absent a Stay**\n\n39. The Debtor fails to articulate any *actual* irreparable injury he will allegedly suffer absent a stay. In fact, the Debtor acknowledges that the monetary sanctions under the Contempt Order do *not* constitute irreparable injury. Instead, he claims that he will, in future, suffer irreparable harm if and when additional sanctions are sought and imposed. However, there is no legal support (and the Debtor offers none) that the possibility of future sanctions constitutes irreparable harm. At this time, no request for further sanctions has been made, and if such a request were to be made in the future, the Debtor will have every opportunity to persuade the Court that no further sanctions should be issued.\n\n<sup>7</sup> The Debtor also makes a half-hearted attempt to suggest that this Court erred, as a legal matter, that a finding of bad faith shifts the \"burden of persuasion\" as to whether the Corporate Governance Order is unclear and ambiguous to the Debtor. Motion to Stay ¶ 34 n.2. However, the Court did not suggest that the \"burden of persuasion\" shifted. Instead, and consistent with *Taggart v. Lorenzen ex rel. Brown*, 139 S. Ct. 1795 (2019), the Court merely observed that \"if a reviewing court were to find the Corporate Governance Order is unclear, the burden of that uncertainty is not upon the Trustee, but upon the Debtor, on account of the Debtor's bad faith.\" Contempt Order at 13. The point here simply is that, in light of the Debtor's bad faith, the Debtor bears the risk that his action (or inaction) comply with the Corporate Governance Order or not.\n\n## **III. Trustee Will Suffer Substantial Injury If Stay is Granted**\n\n40. As noted, the Trustee has been attempting for six months now to obtain control over Ace Decade (and its wholly-owned subsidiary Dawn State). During this time, the Trustee had to incur substantial expense fending off Ace Decade's vigorous opposition to the Trustee's efforts to obtain access to the Debtor's privileged documents from UK Counsel. Clearly, in order for the Trustee to be able to direct the course of that litigation (including in as it relates to any potential settlement), and to avoid the delay and costs resulting from Ace Decade's obstructionism, the Trustee must have full corporate control over the Debtor's co-plaintiffs, *i.e.*, Ace Decade and Dawn State.\n\n41. These are no mere hypothetical concerns. To date, Ace Decade has opposed the\n\nTrustee's efforts in the English courts at every turn. Among other things:\n\n- On November 3, 2022, Ace Decade's counsel sent a letter to Trustee's counsel regarding the Trustee's application in the English courts for (a) recognition of this chapter 11 case as a foreign main proceeding and (b) access to the Debtor's privileged documents related to the UBS litigation in possession of the Debtor's UK Counsel, *i.e.*, Harcus Parker (the \"Recognition Application\"). The letter sought to cast doubt on the Trustee's ability to seek relief in the English courts including because of the Debtor's pending appeals of (i) the order denying the Debtor's motion to vacate the appointment of the Trustee and (ii) the order directing the Debtor to send a letter his UK counsel directing the release of UBS-related documents to the Trustee. The letter also asserted, without elaboration, that the Trustee's request to gain access to the Debtor's privileged documents was contrary to English law. As a result of Ace Decade's letter, the hearing on the Trustee's application was adjourned from November 7, 2022 to December 20, 2022.\n- On December 9, 2022, Ace Decade filed a witness statement attaching 600 pages of supposed \"evidence\" for its positions—evidence consisting primarily of court documents from this chapter 11 case—but offering no further elaboration on its legal theories as to why the pending appeals of unstayed orders of this Court would affect the Trustee's ability to seek recognition in the UK or why the Trustee's request for access to Debtor's privileged documents should be denied.\n- On December 17, 2022, *i.e.*, three days prior to the December 20, 2022 hearing on the Recognition Application, Ace Decade submitted its \"skeleton\" argument explaining, for the first time, its legal position in opposition to the Recognition Application. Among other things, Ace Decade argued that the Trustee was not entitled to access documents subject to the Debtor's privilege to the extent such privilege was jointly held by the Debtor, Ace Decade, and/or Dawn State.\n- At the December 20, 2022 hearing, Ace Decade's counsel argued in opposition to the Trustee's request to obtain access to the Debtor's privileged documents in possession of UK Counsel relating to the UBS litigation.\n- Following the hearing, Ace Decade continued to oppose the Trustee at virtually every turn. For example, after the English court had advised the parties that it would rule in favor of the Trustee, counsel for Ace Decade, rather than working cooperatively with counsel the Trustee in drafting the form of order (as is common practice in England), contacted the English court directly to express its opposition to the Trustee's proposed form of order and to request a follow-up hearing to determine certain ancillary matters, including Ace Decade's request for the reimbursement of more than £60,000 in legal fees.\n- 42. Ultimately, on January 24, 2023, the English court issued its order *granting* the\n\nTrustee's Recognition Application in all respects, including directing UK Counsel to provide the Trustee with access to all of the Debtor's documents relating to the UBS litigation, regardless of any claim by Ace Decade and/or Dawn State to joint privilege. The English court provided only for one narrow exception: Ace Decade and Dawn State were given the opportunity to identify, by March 31, 2023, documents as to which they claim sole privilege, with any dispute in that regard to be decided by the English court.\n\n43. The foregoing illustrates the real and substantial delay and costs resulting from Ace Decades obstructionism to date, which will likely continue unless the Trustee obtains effective corporate control over Ace Decade now. The balance of hardship thus clearly tips in favor of not granting the Motion to Stay.\n\n### **IV. Public Interest Weighs Against a Stay**\n\n44. The only public interest that the Debtor raises in support of his requested stay is that the public has a \"keen interest in fully understanding the types of orders for which contempt citations may issue, and whether those orders must be narrow and specific, or can be broad and general.\" Motion to Stay ¶ 41. That interest, however, would already be served by the appeal and does not require a stay pending appeal, unless the appeal were to be moot in the absence of a stay. But mootness is not a real concern here because if this Court were to impose monetary sanctions, an appellate court could still grant effective relief in the event of reversal of the Contempt Order, namely the return of moneys paid. In fact, the only scenario in which mootness could occur is if the Debtor purges himself of contempt by finally transferring ownership of Ace Decade to the Trustee—and, of course, if the Debtor purges himself of contempt in this manner, he will necessarily be acknowledging that the directives of the Corporate Governance Order and Contempt Order he is challenging are *not* unclear and overbroad.\n\n45. The real public interest at stake here is ensuring that debtors comply with the directives of bankruptcy courts to cooperate with a chapter 11 trustee by turning over property of the estate. The Debtor voluntarily filed for chapter 11 to avoid pending actions to collect debts of the Debtor. There is no public interest in allowing the Debtor to use this Court as a shield from his creditors, while working tirelessly to obfuscate his assets, so that he can continue to live the life of a billionaire. As Judge Ostrager noted \"[i]f billionaire litigants can simultaneously seek to use Court process[es] in New York and elsewhere in the United States while knowingly and intentionally violating Court orders, there is no rule of law.\" Final Contempt Order at 10. The public interest dictates allowing the Trustee to expediently do his work, in the UBS Litigation and elsewhere, so that creditors can be paid as soon as possible.\n\nDated: March 6, 2023 LUC A. DESPINS,\n\nNew Haven, Connecticut CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE\n\nBy: */s/ Patrick R. Linsey*\n\nDouglas S. Skalka, Esq. (ct00616) Patrick R. Linsey, Esq. (ct29437) NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 821-2000 dskalka@npmlaw.com plinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n*and*\n\nNicholas A. Bassett, Esq. *(pro hac vice*) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C., 20036 (202) 551-1700 nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n*and*\n\nG. Alexander Bongartz, Esq. *(pro hac vice*) Douglass Barron, Esq. (*pro hac vice*) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6000 alexbongartz@paulhastings.com douglassbarron@paulhastings.com\n\n*Counsel for the Chapter 11 Trustee*","body_zh":"美国康涅狄格联邦破产法院布里奇波特分院\n\nx\n\n关于：　：\n：　第11章\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），\n等人，　：\n：\n：　案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人。1　：\n：　（合并管理）\n\nx\n受托人对个别债务人就待上诉期间暂缓执行认定其藐视公司治理命令之命令所提动议的异议\n\nLuc A. Despins，以获任命担任 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（“债务人”）第11章案件受托人（“受托人”）的身份，就个别债务人就待上诉期间暂缓执行认定其藐视公司治理命令之命令所提动议 [Docket No. 1492]（“暂缓执行动议”）提出本异议（“本异议”）。2 为支持本异议，受托人谨陈述如下：初步陈述\n\n1. 六个多月以来，受托人一直试图取得债务人的配合，以促成将 Ace Decade Holdings Limited（“Ace Decade”）及其全资子公司 Dawn State Limited（“Dawn State”，与 Ace Decade 合称“Ace Decade 实体”）的所有权转让给受托人。由于未能获得债务人的\n\n1. 本第11章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（亦称 Guo Wengui、Miles Guo 及 Miles Kwok，以及众多其他别名）（税务识别号码后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（税务识别号码后四位：8202）及 Genever Holdings Corporation。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 及 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为：Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166，收件人：Luc A. Despins，作为 Ho Wan Kwok 遗产的受托人（仅用于通知及通信）。\n\n2. 本异议中使用但未定义的大写术语，具有暂缓执行动议中规定的含义。\n\n配合——而根据公司治理命令，为取得 Ace Decade 实体的完整所有权及控制权，该配合是必要的——受托人申请并获得了藐视法庭命令，该命令给予债务人最后一次机会，要求其在 2023年3月6日之前遵守公司治理命令，否则将触发制裁。作为对藐视法庭命令的回应，债务人仍然不服从——债务人非但未最终遵守公司治理命令并转让 Ace Decade 实体的所有权，反而对藐视法庭命令提出上诉，并申请在该命令上诉期间暂缓执行。\n\n2. 债务人当然可以自由地对藐视法庭命令提起上诉，但本院应当就暂缓执行动议的本质予以驳回：该动议是为拖延遵守本院关于将一项无争议的遗产资产，即 Ace Decade，转让给遗产的明确指令而采取的最新伎俩——其显而易见的目的，是阻碍受托人为遗产调查及追回资产的努力，并在此过程中给遗产施加不断增加的成本。\n\n3. 暂缓执行动议甚至远未满足待上诉期间暂缓执行的标准。为获得暂缓执行，债务人必须证明：(i) 在实体问题上具有获得成功的实质可能性；(ii) 如不准予暂缓执行，其将遭受不可弥补的损害；(iii) 如准予暂缓执行，反对暂缓执行的一方不会遭受实质损害；以及 (iv) 暂缓执行符合公共利益。债务人无法满足其中任何一项因素，更遑论证明综合衡量后这些因素使其有权获得待上诉期间暂缓执行。\n\n4. 首先，债务人对藐视法庭命令的上诉几乎没有成功的可能性。本院已仔细考虑并驳回债务人的论点，即公司治理命令在某种程度上含糊不清。这一结论不会因债务人为支持以下主张所援引的判例法而改变：如果禁令纳入具有一般性质的宽泛法定措辞，则违反法院签发的禁令不会引发藐视法庭制裁。见暂缓执行动议第10-13页。该等判例法仅反映了一类特殊案件，在该类案件中，相关措辞——即未具体指明或概括性的法定规定——不够清晰明确，不能作为藐视法庭制裁的依据。与债务人的暗示相反，并不存在一项绝对规则，即在命令中采用法定措辞会自动排除对违反该命令施加藐视法庭制裁。\n\n5. 本案中，本院正确认定，公司治理命令第3段（其采用《破产法典》第521(a)(3)及(4)节的措辞）对于债务人须履行何种义务并无任何含糊之处——即促成将 Ace Decade 转让给受托人。然而，即便公司治理命令在某种程度上存在歧义（事实并非如此），也无争议的是，藐视法庭命令对于债务人为避免制裁而须于 2023年3月6日或之前采取何种行动，并不存在任何歧义。\n\n6. 同样，本院应驳回债务人的论点，即因债务人据称已勤勉尝试遵守公司治理命令，藐视法庭命令很可能在上诉中被撤销。其一，本院关于债务人不遵守命令的认定，包括其恶意行为，适用明显错误标准审查——在此情形下，这是一个很高的门槛。无论如何，债务人关于其据称遵守公司治理命令的论点，依赖于对记录及本院在藐视法庭命令中认定的诸多歪曲。例如，与债务人的主张相反，本院并非仅基于 2016 年末及 2017 年中两封电子邮件，得出债务人对 Wang 女士具有控制权的结论。相反，本院的结论基于其面前的全部记录，包括在受托人获任命时债务人独占地实益拥有及控制 Ace Decade 实体这一事实，以及 Wang 女士目前是债务人在 Ace Decade 的名义股东。债务人提出的一项复杂论点（首次在暂缓执行动议中提出）同样毫无依据，即债务人在其致 Wang 女士的信中未明确指示其转让 Ace Decade 的股份，是因为其据称担心若其以拥有或控制 Ace Decade 的身份示人，将违反公司治理命令。债务人致 Wang 女士的信或其余记录中，没有任何内容表明债务人在撰写该信时受到此类担忧的驱使。相反，正如本院正确指出，债务人的信明确表明其“并不完全支持向”受托人“签署股份转让文书”。藐视法庭命令第4页。基于这些理由及下文讨论的其他理由，债务人未能证明其上诉在实体问题上可能成功，因此，仅基于此理由即应驳回暂缓执行动议。\n\n7. 其次，债务人无法证明，如无暂缓执行，其将遭受不可弥补的损害。如债务人不遵守藐视法庭命令，其将面临金钱制裁；根据明确的法律规则（且债务人亦承认），该等制裁不能构成不可弥补的损害。为支持其关于不可弥补损害的主张，债务人推测，受托人日后可能请求追加制裁，包括监禁，而此类未来制裁构成不可弥补的损害。然而，未来制裁的可能性并非不可弥补的损害——债务人亦未援引任何权威依据支持这一颇为荒谬的主张。目前尚未提出进一步制裁的请求；如将来提出此类请求，债务人将有充分机会反对此类请求。无论如何，是否应施加任何追加制裁的最终裁决者是本院，而非受托人。\n\n8. 第三，进一步拖延将 Ace Decade 的所有权及控制权转让给受托人，将对受托人及本遗产造成实质损害。正如本院充分知悉，Ace Decade 及 Dawn State 是债务人在英国法院针对 UBS 提起的未决诉讼（“UBS 诉讼”）的共同原告，该诉讼是债务人资产负债表中已识别的最大资产。为使受托人能够掌控该诉讼的进程（包括与任何潜在和解有关的事项），受托人必须对债务人的共同原告，即 Ace Decade 及 Dawn State，拥有完整的公司控制权；而债务人主张受托人目前并不拥有该等控制权（如下文第11段所述）。\n\n9. 受托人目前未能完全控制该等实体，正对遗产造成实质损害，因为它们拒绝与受托人合作。例如，Ace Decade 强烈反对受托人努力获取债务人英国律师 Harcus Parker Limited（“英国律师”）所持有的、与 UBS 诉讼有关的债务人享有特权的文件。尽管如下文详述，英国法院最终驳回了 Ace Decade 几乎所有的论点（包括其主张债务人、Ace Decade 及/或 Dawn State 之间的任何共同特权在某种程度上阻止受托人获取债务人的享有特权的文件），但 Ace Decade 的阻挠行为付出了代价：长达数月的延误及巨额法律费用。鉴于 Ace Decade 迄今的表现，受托人完全有理由相信，其将继续阻碍受托人从英国律师处取得文件以及为本遗产利益控制 UBS 诉讼的努力。\n\n10. 此外，（为对债务人作宽厚解释）尚不清楚，除债务人（或受其控制之人）以外，究竟是谁在指挥及资助 Ace Decade 阻碍受托人获取债务人文件并接管 UBS 诉讼的行动。尤其令人不安的是，Ace Decade 的大量阻挠行为发生在 2022年11月17日之后，即本院作出部分解决命令之日；彼时债务人已同意不再对受托人现已实益拥有 Ace Decade 的认定提出异议。换言之，Ace Decade 基于何种依据并依谁的指示，继续采取与其现任实益所有人，即受托人，利益直接相悖的行动？\n\n11. 就在数日前，债务人在其 Gettr 账户上发布了一段视频（“2023年3月1日视频”），其以受托人无法和解 UBS 诉讼为由嘲弄受托人，称受托人不具备对 Ace Decade 及 Dawn State 的控制权——这正是为何不应准予暂缓执行动议：\n\n> 我猜当 Luc 向 UBS Switzerland 要钱时，UBS 告诉他：“你可以把 Miles Guo 从案件中踢出去”，“但 Ace Decade 和 Dawn State”“与 Miles Guo 无关”，“你如何保证撤销该案？”换言之，如果 UBS 决定向 Luc 付款，Luc 如何能够永久结案？他无能力这样做3\n\n该陈述表明债务人继续无视本院的命令，包括无人提出异议的部分解决命令——该命令认定 Ace Decade 及 Dawn State 现由受托人实益拥有——以及要求其将 Ace Decade 及 Dawn State 的公司控制权转让给受托人的公司治理命令。\n\n12. 第四，公共利益强烈支持不暂缓执行藐视法庭命令。债务人已有充分机会遵守公司治理命令，包括在藐视法庭命令作出之日（2023年1月24日）与债务人清除其藐视法庭状态的截止日期（即 2023年3月7日）之间的六周期间。本院也并非在一张白纸上书写；债务人已多次表现出愿意无视本案中本院命令的态度，包括强制其提交文件的命令及指示其停止干扰破产程序的命令。本院\n\n3 2023年3月1日视频可在[http]观看。所引2023年3月1日视频片段位于时间戳1:31至1:50。\n\n还享有奥斯特拉格法官（Judge Ostrager）五年来主持审理债务人“规避且蔑视法庭的行为”的经验之益，且其已认定债务人“明知且故意违反法院命令。”4 没有比这更好的理由说明，为何公共利益因素在此强烈支持受托人。\n\n背景\n\n13. 2022年10月4日，受托人提交了藐视法庭动议[案卷编号913]，请求作出裁定，认定债务人因未遵守公司治理命令而构成藐视法庭，具体而言，即债务人未能将其在Ace Decade的所有权权益转让给受托人。\n\n14. 2022年10月25日，债务人提交了其对藐视法庭动议的异议[案卷编号1026]；2022年11月14日，受托人提交了进一步支持藐视法庭动议的答复[案卷编号1092]。\n\n15. 2022年11月17日，法院作出部分解决命令，据此，法院作出如下认定，其中包括：\n\n1. 法院特此认定：(i) 于2022年2月15日申请日（“申请日”），债务人独占实益拥有并控制Ace Decade Holdings Limited（“Ace Decade”），并一直维持该等独占实益所有权和控制权直至并包括紧接受托人获任命之前；及(ii) Dawn State Limited（“Dawn State”，与Ace Decade合称“Ace Decade实体”）为Ace Decade全资拥有的子公司，并由Ace Decade独占拥有和控制。为免生疑，Yanping “Yvette” Wang从未且现在也不是Ace Decade或Dawn State股份的实益所有人。债务人不对本段认定提出异议，且不会就该等认定提起上诉。\n\n2. 债务人陈述，自申请日以来，其从未向任何其他个人或实体转让或声称转让Ace Decade的任何所有权或控制权。\n\n4 关于动议的裁决及命令，PAX v. Kwok, 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. 2020), ECF No. 1181（“最终藐视法庭命令”）第7、10页。\n\n因此，法院进一步认定，若非受托人的任命及其根据《破产法》和公司治理权利命令所享有的权利，截至本命令作出之日，债务人仍将独占实益拥有并控制Ace Decade。债务人不对本段认定提出异议，且不会就该等认定提起上诉。\n\n16. 部分解决命令并未解决受托人藐视法庭动议的全部事项，包括与债务人根据公司治理命令负有促成将Ace Decade转让给受托人的义务有关的事项。\n\n17. 法院于2022年11月16日、17日和18日就藐视法庭动议举行了证据听证会，包括与部分解决命令尚未解决部分有关的事项。\n\n18. 2023年1月24日，法院作出藐视法庭命令[案卷编号1372]，认定债务人民事藐视法庭，并规定，如其未能在2023年3月6日下午5:00前消除其藐视法庭状态，则对其施加制裁（形式为受托人为促使遵守与Ace Decade实体有关的公司治理命令而不得不支出的合理律师费和费用）。\n\n19. 关于债务人未遵守公司治理命令的更多背景情况，受托人援引藐视法庭命令中载明的事实认定。\n\n论证\n\n20. 为使藐视法庭命令在上诉期间暂停执行，债务人必须证明其满足第二巡回上诉法院在Mohammed v. Reno, 309 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2002)中确立的四要件检验：“[1] 就实体问题取得成功的可能性，[2] 如不准予暂停执行将遭受不可弥补的损害，[3] 如准予暂停执行，反对暂停执行的一方将遭受重大损害，以及[4] 公共利益。”5 债务人未能证明任何一项因素，更遑论证明这些因素整体上对其有利。\n\n一、债务人无法证明其就实体问题取得成功的可能性\n\n21. 为满足上诉期间暂停执行标准中关于成功可能性的要件，动议提出人必须“有力证明其很可能在实体问题上胜诉。”In re Cacioli, 302 B.R. 429, 431 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2003)（引自Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776, 107 S. Ct. 2113, 2119, 95 L. Ed. 2d 724 (1987)（指出上诉期间暂停执行的决定因素为：“(1) 申请暂停执行者是否有力证明其很可能在实体问题上胜诉；(2) 如不暂停执行，申请人是否将遭受不可弥补的损害；(3) 作出暂停执行是否将对程序中其他利害关系方造成重大损害；以及(4) 公共利益所在。”））。6 债务人远未达到该标准。\n\nA. 就债务人将Ace Decade转让给受托人的义务而言，公司治理命令并不模糊或含混\n\n22. 在藐视法庭命令中，法院认定公司治理命令清楚明确，其含义不存在任何合理疑义。没有依据认为上诉法院会推翻该裁定——更不用说债务人很可能在其上诉的实体问题上胜诉。事实上，债务人在其暂停执行动议中提出的几乎所有论点，均已在其对藐视法庭动议的异议中提出，并被本院在藐视法庭命令中驳回。\n\n5 “一项因素须达到何种程度，会随着其他因素的强弱而变化，这意味着一项[因素]更强，可以弥补另一项因素较弱。”McCue v. City of New York (In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig.), 503 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2007)（引文及内部引号省略）（原文改动）。\n\n6 第二巡回上诉法院辖区内的一些其他法院在分析上诉期间暂停执行动议时，阐述了略有修改的标准。参见，例如，In re Country Squire Assoc. of Carle Place, L.P., 203 B.R. 182, 183 (2d Cir. BAP 1996)（“(1) 如不暂停执行，动议提出人是否将遭受不可弥补的损害，(2) 如准予暂停执行，一方是否将遭受重大损害，(3) 动议提出人是否证明在上诉中‘存在实质性可能性，尽管未达到胜诉可能性’，以及(4) 可能受影响的公共利益。”）。在此，债务人在两种标准下均不成立。\n\n23. 具体而言，本院已审议并驳回以下论点：公司治理命令第3段模糊且含混。就此，法院认定：“毫无合理疑义，第3段要求债务人与受托人合作，以查找债务人的被提名人Wang女士，并促成移交其在Ace Decade中的所有权权益”，藐视法庭命令第9页；“第3段的明确条款要求债务人在必要范围内与受托人合作，以便为破产财团的利益实现对Ace Decade实体的该项控制权和占有权主张”，同上，第10-11页；以及“毫无合理疑义……债务人必须向受托人交出Ace Decade实体，包括Ace Decade实体中的所有权权益以及与Ace Decade实体有关的公司治理文件。”同上，第11页。\n\n24. 同样，法院还审议并驳回了如下论点：公司治理命令第2段和第3段之间存在某种冲突，以致第3段中的义务存在某种含混。根本不存在冲突。实际上，如法院所解释，第2段和第3段相互补充：第2段确认受托人对债务人控制实体（定义见公司治理命令）中债务人经济权利和治理权利的法律上控制权；但该等控制权未必能够自行实现，因此要求债务人交出事实上的占有和控制权——而这正是第3段旨在实现的目的。藐视法庭命令第12页。简言之，第2段规定了受托人有关债务人控制实体的法律权利，而第3段则要求债务人与受托人合作并交出破产财团财产，以便受托人能够实现该等权利。\n\n25. 债务人在其暂停执行动议中还主张，如法院作出的禁令纳入了具有普遍性质的宽泛法定语言，违反该禁令不会导致藐视法庭制裁。参见暂停执行动议第10-13页。然而，债务人为支持该主张所援引的案件，并未改变本院在藐视法庭命令中的任何分析。该等案件仅确认一项普遍规则，即不具体、笼统的禁令不能构成藐视法庭制裁的依据。参见，例如，Louis W. Epstein Family Partnership v. Kmart Corp., 13 F. 3d 762, 771 (3d Cir. 1994)（“仅仅禁止一方遵守法律或遵守协议的宽泛、非具体语言……并未向受约束一方公平告知何种行为将导致藐视法庭风险。”）。与债务人的暗示相反，并不存在一项绝对规则，即在命令中采纳法定语言会自动排除对违反该命令施加藐视法庭制裁。\n\n26. 在此，尽管公司治理命令沿用了《破产法》第521(a)(3)和521(a)(4)条的法定语言，该语言仍构成藐视法庭裁定的适当依据。如第二巡回上诉法院在S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Clorox Co., 241 F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir.2001)中所指出，“根据Rule 65(d)，禁令必须比要求被告遵守法律的简单命令更为具体。……为满足具体性和明确性要求，禁令必须‘足够具体和明确，以告知其适用范围内的人员被禁止的行为。’”（内部引文省略）。明确而言，“S.C. Johnson等案件并不禁止法院命令当事人遵守法律，而是要求此类命令具体且明确。”Ligon v. City of N.Y., 925 F. Supp. 2d 478, 539 n. 455 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)。\n\n27. 公司治理命令具有充分具体性，足以告知债务人何种行为将导致藐视法庭风险。参见United States v. Miller, 588 F.2d 1256, 1261 (9th Cir. 1978)（只要“法定术语充分描述了不允许的行为”，“禁令的措辞几乎与法定要求完全相同这一事实，并不使该措辞变得模糊”）。公司治理命令明确规定，债务人必须交出破产财团财产及与破产财团财产有关的任何文件。事实上，公司治理命令就债务人所需采取的行动提供了更进一步的背景，载明该等财产包括“但不限于，其在Genever (BVI)中的股份及所有相关公司治理文件。”公司治理命令第3段。不能合法地认为，债务人不知道其还须转让其在其他由其拥有的公司实体中的权益，例如Ace Decade。\n\n28. 此外，公司治理命令（Corporate Governance Order）必须结合本第11章案件的背景加以理解。各法院承认，“在某些情形下，在申请禁令的案件中，案件事实可能足以证明发布要求遵守法律的禁令具有正当性。”Perez v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 655 Fed. Appx. 404, 412 (6th Cir. 2016)。此类具有该等概括性的规定，“在已显示出实施违法行为倾向的情况下，往往有必要藉此防止进一步违法。”McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 192 (1949)；参见 U.S. v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 2009)（指出，要求被告“避免作出虚假陈述或实施敲诈勒索行为：有关香烟的制造、营销、推广、健康后果和销售，以及[被]告有理由知道香烟消费者所关切的相关问题”的禁令，“并非一项概括性地要求遵守法律的禁令……这些禁令可能范围广泛，但在如本案般已显示出实施违法行为倾向的情况下，为防止进一步违法，该等广度具有正当性。”）（引文略）。\n\n29. 在本案中，指定受托人源于以下关切：债务人未适当管理破产财产，且应指定一名第11章受托人对债务人的资产进行调查。类似的关切，即债务人长期通过错综复杂的公司实体隐匿其资产以躲避债权人，完全足以证明公司治理命令的广泛范围具有正当性，从而确保郭文贵（Ho Wan Kwok）的全部财产权利均移交给受托人。\n\n30. 基于上述理由，公司治理命令未明确提及 Ace Decade（艾斯十年）并无意义。由于无争议的是，在指定受托人时，债务人是 Ace Decade 的实益所有人，债务人有义务采取必要步骤，将该所有权权益移交给受托人。同样，王女士（Ms. Wang）未在公司治理命令中被明确点名这一事实也无关紧要。姑且不论债务人直至藐视法庭动议（Contempt Motion）听证会前不足一周、在其证言录取中，才披露她是名义股东，债务人将破产财产移交给受托人的义务，不可能取决于 Ace Decade 或任何其他债务人控制实体的名义股东身份。仅因本院的明确指令未列明债务人为专门掩盖其所有权权益而选择的未知名义股东姓名，就允许债务人逃避遵守该等指令，将是荒谬的。\n\n31. 总而言之，尽管公司治理命令第3段的范围可能广泛，但其内容是具体的：除其他事项外，其要求债务人“将破产财产的全部财产移交给受托人。”Corporate Governance Order ¶ 3。本院指令范围广泛，并不意味着其含糊不清，以至于债务人未获得合理通知，不知何种行为会导致施加藐视法庭制裁。但即使公司治理命令不知何故存在歧义（事实并非如此），藐视法庭命令（Contempt Order）对于债务人为避免制裁而须在2023年3月6日或之前采取何种行动显然不存在任何歧义（且债务人并未主张存在任何歧义）。\n\nB. 债务人未勤勉尝试遵守\n\n32. 本院还应驳回债务人试图重新争辩其据称遵守公司治理命令的主张。本院已审议并驳回所有这些论点，认定债务人未履行其义务，更糟的是，其通过假装遵守而恶意行事。Contempt Order 14-15。债务人未能证明上诉法院会就此推翻本院的事实认定。\n\n33. 如前所述，债务人关于其据称遵守公司治理命令的论点，依赖于对案卷记录及本院在藐视法庭命令中裁决的多项歪曲。第一，与债务人的主张相反，本院并非仅依据2016年末和2017年中两封电子邮件，得出债务人控制王女士的结论。相反，本院的结论基于其面前的全部记录，包括在指定受托人时债务人排他性地、实益地拥有并控制 Ace Decade 实体，以及王女士目前是债务人关于 Ace Decade 的名义股东这一事实。Contempt Order at 4。\n\n34. 第二，债务人已签署的股份转让文书（声称将 Ace Decade 的全部股份转让给受托人），以及债务人以 Ace Decade 唯一董事身份签署的书面决议（声称授权将 Ace Decade 股份转让给受托人），均不符合公司治理命令，因为两份文件均不具法律效力。债务人不是 Ace Decade 的名义股东，也不是 Ace Decade 的董事。在每种情形下，需要签署这些文件的相关方均为王女士，债务人对此十分清楚。简言之，这些已签署文件毫无价值。\n\n35. 第三，债务人致王女士的信函亦不构成对公司治理命令的遵守。本院已列明该信函仅是幌子的诸多理由，包括：\n\n— 债务人未能充分证明该信函已送达王女士，Contempt Order at 14；\n\n— 即使该信函确已送达，其亦属拖延之举，因为其是在提交藐视法庭动议一个月后才发出，id.；\n\n— 即使该信函确已送达，其发送方式亦不合理，包括该信函未载明地址、没有邮戳、没有收悉确认，以及债务人甚至不知道其哪名保镖据称亲自递送了该信函，id. at 14-15；\n\n— 由于缺少地址，该信函还对王女士所在地予以隐瞒，致使受托人无法向其送达传票，id. at 13；以及\n\n— 该信函中的措辞向其读者表明，债务人并不完全支持签署股份转让文书，id. at 4。\n\n36. 第四，对于债务人提出的复杂论点——该论点首次在暂缓执行动议（Motion to Stay）中提出，即债务人未向王女士明确指示转让 Ace Decade 股份，是因为其据称担心若表示自己拥有或控制 Ace Decade，便会违反公司治理命令——没有任何支持。债务人致王女士的信函或其余案卷记录中，均无任何内容表明债务人在撰写该信函时是出于此类担忧。\n\n37. 第五，一方面，本院称许各方在藐视法庭动议听证会前不久就部分解决命令（Partial Resolution Order）达成协商一致的解决方案；另一方面，本院指责债务人在提交藐视法庭动议一个多月后才向王女士发出拖延性的信函，二者之间并不矛盾。与债务人的主张相反，这两项行为并非“同一行为”。Motion to Stay ¶ 33。前者体现了各方缩小争议范围并达成协商一致解决方案的努力。后者体现了债务人试图假装遵守公司治理命令，而实际上未采取任何步骤实际完成将 Ace Decade 转让给受托人——这是公司治理命令所要求的——同时还隐瞒王女士的所在地，以阻碍受托人向其送达传票的努力。7\n\n38. 基于上述全部理由，债务人未能证明其上诉在实体上很可能成功。\n\nII. 如不准予暂缓执行，债务人不会遭受不可弥补的损害\n\n39. 债务人未能说明如不准予暂缓执行，其据称将遭受何种实际的不可弥补损害。事实上，债务人承认，藐视法庭命令规定的金钱制裁并不构成不可弥补的损害。相反，其声称，若日后寻求并施加额外制裁，其将在届时遭受不可弥补的损害。然而，没有任何法律依据支持（且债务人亦未提供任何依据）未来可能实施制裁构成不可弥补损害。目前尚未提出进一步制裁的请求；如将来提出此类请求，债务人将有充分机会说服本院不应施加进一步制裁。\n\n7 债务人还勉强试图主张，本院在法律上错误地认定，恶意认定会将关于公司治理命令是否不明确和含糊的“说服责任”转移给债务人。Motion to Stay ¶ 34 n.2。然而，本院并未表示“说服责任”发生转移。相反，且与 Taggart v. Lorenzen ex rel. Brown, 139 S. Ct. 1795 (2019) 一致，本院仅指出，“如审查法院认定公司治理命令不明确，不确定性的负担不应由受托人承担，而应因债务人的恶意由债务人承担。”Contempt Order at 13。此处的要点仅在于，鉴于债务人的恶意，债务人须承担其作为（或不作为）是否遵守公司治理命令的风险。\n\nIII. 如准予暂缓执行，受托人将遭受重大损害\n\n40. 如前所述，受托人现已尝试六个月取得对 Ace Decade（及其全资子公司 Dawn State（曙光州））的控制权。在此期间，受托人不得不承担大量费用，以应对 Ace Decade 强烈反对受托人从英国律师（UK Counsel）取得债务人享有特权的文件的努力。显然，为使受托人能够主导该诉讼的进程（包括与任何潜在和解有关的事项），并避免 Ace Decade 的阻挠造成的延误和费用，受托人必须对债务人的共同原告，即 Ace Decade 和 Dawn State，拥有完全的公司控制权。\n\n41. 这些并非仅仅是假设性的担忧。截至目前，Ace Decade 在英格兰法院的每一步程序中均反对受托人的努力。除其他事项外：\n\n2022年11月3日，Ace Decade（艾斯十年）的律师就受托人向英国法院提出的申请致函受托人的律师，该申请旨在：(a) 承认本第11章案件为外国主要程序；以及 (b) 获得债务人英国律师Harcus Parker（哈克斯·帕克）所持有的、与UBS诉讼有关的债务人受特权保护文件（以下简称“承认申请”）。该函试图对受托人向英国法院寻求救济的能力提出质疑，其中包括因债务人尚未审结的上诉，即：(i) 驳回债务人撤销指定受托人之动议的命令；以及 (ii) 命令债务人致函其英国律师，指示其向受托人交付与UBS有关文件的命令。该函还未作阐述地声称，受托人要求获得债务人受特权保护文件的请求违反英国法律。由于Ace Decade的该函，受托人申请的听证会从2022年11月7日延期至2022年12月20日。\n\n2022年12月9日，Ace Decade提交了一份证人陈述，附有600页据称支持其立场的“证据”——该等证据主要由本第11章案件中的法院文件构成——但未进一步阐述其法律理论，即为何对本院未获中止执行的命令提出的尚未审结上诉会影响受托人在英国寻求承认的能力，或者为何应当驳回受托人获取债务人受特权保护文件的请求。\n\n2022年12月17日，即承认申请于2022年12月20日举行听证会前三日，Ace Decade提交了其“书面论点提纲”，首次说明其反对承认申请的法律立场。其中，Ace Decade主张，如该等特权由债务人、Ace Decade和/或Dawn State（晨曦州）共同享有，则受托人无权获得受债务人特权保护的文件。\n\n在2022年12月20日的听证会上，Ace Decade的律师反对受托人请求获得英国律师所持有的、与UBS诉讼有关的债务人受特权保护文件。\n\n听证会后，Ace Decade几乎在每一步都继续反对受托人。例如，在英国法院告知各方其将作出有利于受托人的裁决后，Ace Decade的律师没有与受托人的律师合作起草命令文本（此为英国惯常做法），而是直接联系英国法院，表示其反对受托人拟议的命令文本，并请求举行后续听证会以确定若干附带事项，包括Ace Decade要求偿还超过£60,000律师费的请求。\n\n42. 最终，于2023年1月24日，英国法院作出命令，在各方面准许受托人的承认申请，包括命令英国律师向受托人提供查阅所有与UBS诉讼有关的债务人文件的权限，而不论Ace Decade和/或Dawn State是否主张共同特权。英国法院仅规定一项狭窄例外：给予Ace Decade和Dawn State机会，于2023年3月31日前指明其主张享有独有特权的文件，任何有关争议由英国法院裁决。\n\n43. 上述情况表明，迄今为止Ace Decade的阻挠行为已造成实际且重大的延误和费用；除非受托人现时取得对Ace Decade的有效公司控制权，否则该等情况很可能持续。因此，困难衡量显然倾向于不准许中止执行动议。\n\nIV. 公共利益不支持中止执行\n\n44. 债务人为支持其请求中止执行而提出的唯一公共利益是，公众“非常关切充分了解可据以发出藐视法庭传票的命令类型，以及该等命令是否必须狭窄且具体，抑或可以宽泛且概括。”中止执行动议第41段。然而，该利益已经可通过上诉得到保障，并不要求在上诉期间中止执行，除非在没有中止执行的情况下上诉将失去实际意义。但在本案中，失去实际意义并非真正关切，因为如本院施加金钱制裁，若藐视法庭命令被撤销，上诉法院仍可给予有效救济，即返还已支付的款项。事实上，唯一可能发生失去实际意义的情形，是债务人最终将Ace Decade的所有权转让给受托人，从而消除其藐视法庭状态——当然，如债务人以此方式消除其藐视法庭状态，其必然承认其所质疑的公司治理命令和藐视法庭命令中的指令并非不明确且过于宽泛。\n\n45. 本案真正涉及的公共利益，是确保债务人遵守破产法院的指令，通过交付破产财产而与第11章受托人合作。债务人自愿申请第11章破产程序，以避免正在进行的追收债务人债务的诉讼。公共利益并不支持允许债务人将本院作为抵御其债权人的盾牌，同时不遗余力地隐匿其资产，以便其能够继续过着亿万富翁的生活。Ostrager法官指出：“[如]亿万富翁诉讼当事人能够同时寻求利用纽约及美国其他地区的法院程序，却明知且故意违反法院命令，则法治将不复存在。”最终藐视法庭命令第10页。公共利益要求允许受托人迅速开展其在UBS诉讼及其他事项中的工作，以便尽快向债权人支付款项。\n\n日期：2023年3月6日　LUC A. DESPINS（卢克·A·德斯平斯），\n\n康涅狄格州纽黑文　第11章受托人\n\n签署人：/s/ Patrick R. Linsey（帕特里克·R·林赛）\n\nDouglas S. Skalka, Esq.（道格拉斯·S·斯卡尔卡，律师）（ct00616） Patrick R. Linsey, Esq.（帕特里克·R·林赛，律师）（ct29437） NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C.（纽伯特、佩佩及蒙蒂思律师事务所） 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 821-2000 dskalka@npmlaw.com plinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n以及\n\nNicholas A. Bassett, Esq.（尼古拉斯·A·巴西特，律师）（pro hac vice） PAUL HASTINGS LLP（普衡律师事务所） 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C., 20036 (202) 551-1700 nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n以及\n\nG. Alexander Bongartz, Esq.（G·亚历山大·邦加茨，律师）（pro hac vice） Douglass Barron, Esq.（道格拉斯·巴伦，律师）（pro hac vice） PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6000 alexbongartz@paulhastings.com douglassbarron@paulhastings.com\n\n第11章受托人律师","key_entities":["Je","Guo","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Miles Guo","Despins","GETTR","Paul Hastings"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":1181,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":6651,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 19:35:08"}