{"id":"court_ctb_1602_2","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":1602,"sub_number":2,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2023-03-27","title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT )","summary_zh":"裁定HK方藐视法庭及制裁裁定书 —— Ho Wan Kwok 破产案（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo），CTB 22-50073 ECF #1602-2（2023-03-27立案）。破产法院法官 Julie A. Manning 裁定郭美及 HK USA 因未遵守 Rule 2004 传票和文件提供命令而构成民事藐视法庭，并裁定郭美、HK USA 及其代理律师 Lee Vartan 与 CSG 律所连带承担受托人为此支出的合理律师费和诉讼成本。","summary_en":"Order Holding HK Parties in Contempt and Imposing Sanctions —— In re Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo / Guo Wengui), CTB 22-50073 ECF #1602-2 (Filed 2023-03-27). Bankruptcy Judge Julie A. Manning found Mei Guo and HK USA in civil contempt for failure to comply with Rule 2004 document production orders, and held them jointly and severally liable with their attorneys Lee Vartan and CSG for the Trustee's reasonable attorneys' fees and costs.","body_en":"# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\n)\n\n)\n\n)\n\nDebtors.1\n\nIn re: ) Chapter 11 ) Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) HO WAN KWOK, *et al.*, ) (Jointly Administered)\n\n) Re: ECF Nos. 1353 and 1455\n\n### **ORDER HOLDING HK PARTIES IN CONTEMPT OF COURT AND SANCTIONING HK PARTIES, ATTORNEY VARTAN AND CHIESA SHAHINIAN & GIANTOMASI PC**\n\n### **I. INTRODUCTION**\n\n Before the Court is the Order Granting in Part Motion for Order to Appear and Show Cause Why the Court Should Not Hold the HK Parties in Contempt of Court (the \"Show Cause Order\"). (ECF No. 1455.) On March 7, 2023, a hearing was held on the Show Cause Order (the \"Show Cause Hearing\"). For the reasons stated on the record during the Show Cause Hearing and those stated below, the Court finds Ms. Mei Guo and HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC (\"HK USA,\" and together with Ms. Guo, the \"HK Parties\") in civil contempt of Court pursuant to the Court's inherent contempt powers and also pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(1) and 37(b)(2)(A)(vii). Additionally, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C), the Court sanctions the HK Parties and Attorney Vartan and Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC (\"CSG\"), as the attorneys advising the HK Parties.\n\n<sup>1</sup> The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and the Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\n### **II. BACKGROUND**\n\nOn July 28, 2022, Luc A. Despins, in his capacity as Chapter 11 trustee for the estate of Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\"), (the \"Trustee\") filed a motion seeking to conduct a Rule 2004 examination of, *inter alia*, Ms. Guo and HK USA (the \"Rule 2004 Motion\"). (ECF No. 638.) On August 16, 2022, *almost seven months ago*, the Court entered an order granting the Rule 2004 Motion (the \"Rule 2004 Order\") and, *inter alia*, approved the proposed subpoenas to be served on Ms. Guo and HK USA (the \"Subpoenas\"). (ECF No. 758.) The Subpoenas were served on Ms. Guo and HK USA between August 19 and 23, 2022. (ECF No. 1046.)\n\nOn October 28, 2022, the Trustee filed a Motion to Compel Compliance of, *inter alia*, the HK Parties with the Subpoenas (the \"Motion to Compel\"). (ECF No. 1046.) On November 14, 2022, the HK Parties and the Debtor filed a joint objection to the Motion to Compel (the \"Objection to the Motion to Compel\"). (ECF No. 1090.) On November 30, 2022, a hearing was held on the Motion to Compel. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Motion to Compel was taken under advisement.2\n\nOn January 20, 2022, the Court entered the Order Granting in Part Motion to Compel Compliance with Rule 2004 Subpoenas (the \"Order Compelling Production\"). (ECF No. 1353.) In pertinent part, the Order Compelling Production provides:\n\n**ORDERED:** The Objection is **OVERRULED** as it relates to discovery requests directed to Mei Guo and HK (USA) except as such requests concern specifically the Lady May, which is subject to a pending adversary proceeding – *HK Int'l Funds Invs. (USA) Ltd., LLC v. Despins ex rel. Kwok*, Adv. P. No. 22-05003 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022)\n\n<sup>2</sup> Between November 16, 2022, and January 13, 2023, the Court was engaged with matters in an adversary proceeding related to these cases styled *Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund v. Kwok (In re Kwok)*, Adv. P. 22-05032 (JAM), in which a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction were sought, a four-day trial was held, and hundreds of exhibits as well as several witnesses were introduced at trial. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(3), the Court was required to address these matters \"at the earliest possible time, taking precedence over all other matters except hearings on older matters of the same character.\" It did so.\n\n(the \"Adversary Proceeding\") – or as such requests are for documents dated earlier than June 1, 2014, to which extent the Objection is **SUSTAINED**. The Court issues this Order without prejudice to the Trustee to seek discovery from Ms. Guo or HK USA regarding the Lady May in the Adversary Proceeding in accordance with the Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 *et*\n\n26\n\n*al.* and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7026 *et al.* and without prejudice to the Trustee to seek discovery of documents dated earlier than June 1, 2014, as the investigation proceeds upon cause shown. Furthermore, should either Mei Guo or HK (USA) no longer be a party to a pending proceeding involving the Trustee and relating to the Lady May, the Trustee may seek discovery regarding the Lady May in the Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases from such party upon cause shown. Mei Guo and HK (USA) shall, by 5:00 p.m. on\n\n(i) documents responsive to the Trustee's requests, except as to the documents that concern the Lady May, dated June 1, 2014, or later, unless a particular request specifies a different time period and such time period does not begin before June 1, 2014;\n\nJanuary 31, 2023, search for and produce to the Trustee:\n\n(ii) documents responsive to the Trustee's requests, except as the documents concern the Lady May, as to both assets the Debtor acknowledges he owns and assets that allegedly belong to persons or entities other than the Debtor, including without limitation his family members, including Mei Guo herself, and associated entities, including HK (USA) itself; and\n\n(iii) documents responsive to the Trustee's requests that are within their custody, possession, or control, except as to [sic] the documents concern the Lady May, including without limitation documents in the files of their current or former counsel and other agents and advisors, unless such documents have already been produced by their current or former counsel and other agents and advisors but without consideration of any potential future production by their current or former counsel and other agents and advisors.\n\n(*Id.* at 5–6.) The Order Compelling Production set a compliance deadline of January 31, 2023.\n\nOn January 24, 2023, the Court entered an order directing the parties in these Chapter 11\n\ncases – including the HK Parties and the Trustee – to mediation (the \"Mediation Order\"). (ECF\n\nNo. 1373.) The Mediation Order provides that the following would be stayed during mediation:\n\n**ORDERED:** The Court will hold the hearings presently scheduled to be held on January 24, 26, and 31, 2023. Following those hearings, during the Mediation, absent compelling cause, all hearings in these Jointly Administered Chapter 11 cases and related adversary proceedings, are stayed, including without limitation all hearings in *HK Int'l Funds Invs. (USA) Ltd. v. Despins ex rel. Kwok*, Adv. P. No. 22-05003 (JAM) and *Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. v. Kwok*, Adv. P. No. 22-05032 (JAM). The Parties are ordered and directed to negotiate in good faith and encouraged to refrain from legal\n\nprocess which can be deferred, addressed by consensus, or duly considered by the Mediator; and it is further\n\n(*Id.* at 6.) The Court elected not to stay pending discovery or compliance with the Order Compelling Production and no party filed any pleadings asking the Court to do so.\n\nDuring the mediation, on February 10, 2023, the Trustee filed a Motion for Order to\n\nShow Cause why, *inter alia*, Ms. Guo and HK USA should not be held in contempt of court (the\n\n\"Motion for Show Cause Order\"). (ECF No. 1453.) In support of the Motion for Show Cause\n\nOrder, the Trustee filed a declaration of Attorney Bassett (the \"Bassett Declaration\"). That same\n\ndate – ten days after the production deadline set by the Order Compelling Production and almost\n\nsix months after the Subpoenas were served – the HK Parties filed a Cross-Motion for an\n\nExtension of Time to Comply with Order Compelling Production (the \"Motion for Extension of\n\nTime,\" and, together with the Motion for Show Cause Order, the \"Cross-Motions\"). (ECF No.\n\n1454.) In pertinent part, the Motion for Extension of Time represented to the Court that:\n\nAccordingly, Ms. Guo and HK USA advised the Trustee that they require an additional thirty (30) days from today to complete their search, review and production. *Counsel made clear that Ms. Guo and HK USA would begin producing documents as early as next week, and would continue to produce documents on a rolling basis*, but were placing a realistic timeline on their practical and logistical ability to fully comply with the January 20 Order.\n\n(*Id.* at ¶ 13) (emphasis added). The Motion for Extension of Time sought an extension of time \"through and including March 13, 2023.\" (*Id.* at ¶ 15)\n\n On February 13, 2023, the Court issued the Show Cause Order. (ECF 1455.) In pertinent part, the Show Cause Order found that \"[b]oth the Bassett Declaration and the Motion for Extension of Time establish that the HK Parties did not meet the production deadline ordered in the Order Compelling Production.\" (*Id.*) Nevertheless, the Show Cause Order essentially split the difference between the Cross-Motions: The Show Cause Order did not grant the Motion for\n\n### Case 22-50073 Doc 1602-2 Filed 03/27/23 Entered 03/27/23 11:18:17 Page 5 of 26\n\nExtension of Time. Instead, it scheduled the Show Cause Hearing. Nevertheless, it gave the HK Parties until \"on or before 5:00 p.m. on March 6, 2023,\" – one less week than the HK Parties had requested – to \"file a sworn declaration on the docket of this case detailing full compliance with the Order Compelling Production or, failing that, describing in detail the efforts taken to comply . . ..\" (*Id.*) Moreover, it set a hearing on the Motion for Extension of Time at the same time of the Show Cause Hearing. (*Id.*) The Court anticipated that the same evidence, which could potentially establish a diligent attempt at compliance, could also potentially establish cause for granting an extension of time. The Court believed this course of action wise because \"[b]ased upon the representations of counsel for the HK Parties in the Motion for Extension of Time, the Court expects that the HK Parties will be producing documents to the Trustee on a rolling basis during the ongoing mediation.\" (*Id.*)\n\n On March 6, 2023, the Trustee timely filed an objection to the Motion for Extension of Time (the \"Objection to Extension of Time\"). (ECF No. 1510.) In the Objection to Extension of Time, the Trustee alleged that no documents had been produced to the Trustee by either Ms. Guo or HK USA between the date the Show Cause Order issued and March 6, 2023, and that counsel for Ms. Guo and HK USA had ceased engaging with the Trustee and his counsel. (*Id.*) At 8:14:58 p.m., more than three hours after compliance was due, counsel for the HK Parties—not the HK Parties—filed an untimely sworn declaration alleging that the HK Parties had fully complied with the Order Compelling Production (the \"Vartan Declaration\"). (ECF No. 1512.)\n\n On March 7, 2023, the HK Parties filed a reply to the Objection to Extension of Time (the \"HK Parties Reply\"). (ECF No. 1516.) The HK Parties Reply asserted that they had both fully complied to the best of their knowledge and that they would continue to comply, going forward, if and when they uncovered further responsive documents. That same date, the Trustee filed a timely response to the Vartan Declaration (the \"Trustee Reply\") – despite the untimely filing of the Vartan Declaration. (ECF No. 1517.) The Trustee Reply asserted that (a) there were severe deficiencies in the Vartan Declaration's described process and contemptible omissions and (b) the Vartan Declaration was improperly a declaration of counsel rather than of the HK Parties themselves.\n\n Also on March 7, 2023, the Court held the Show Cause Hearing. Attorney Vartan did not appear at the Show Cause Hearing, although another CSG attorney appeared. Attorney Vartan appeared the next day at a Status Conference held in a related adversary proceeding styled *HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC v. Despins ex rel. Kwok (In re Kwok)*, Adv. P. No. 22-05003 (JAM) (the \"Adversary Proceeding\"), at which Status Conference the present matter was further discussed. On March 9, 2023, the Court ordered the Trustee to file the deposition testimony of Ms. Guo (the \"Deposition\"), which was taken in relation to the Adversary Proceeding. (ECF No. 1527.) That same day, the Trustee filed the Deposition. (ECF No. 1529.)\n\nThis matter is ripe for decision.\n\n#### **III. JURISDICTION**\n\nThe United States District Court for the District of Connecticut has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). This Court has authority to hear and determine this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) and the Order of Reference of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut dated September 21, 1984. The instant proceedings are statutorily core proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2). There is no constitutional issue precluding the exercise of jurisdiction in the instant case. *Cf*. *Stern v. Marshall*, 564 U.S. 462, 487–99 (2011).\n\nVenue in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.\n\n# **IV. DISCUSSION3**\n\n### **a. Contempt Standard**\n\nThis Court has the inherent power to hold parties in contempt of court under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9020. *Taggart v. Lorenzen ex rel. Brown*, 139 S. Ct. 1795, 1801 (2019); *Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.*, 501 U.S. 32, 44–45 (1991); *PHH Mortg. Corp. v. Sensenich ex rel. Gravel (In re Gravel)*, 6 F.4th 503, 512 (2d Cir. 2021); *Mar. Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.)*, 920 F.2d 183, 187 (2d. Cir. 1990). Contempt may be sought to \"'coerce the defendant into compliance'\" with a court order or to \"'compensate the complainant for losses'\" resulting from noncompliance with a court order. *Taggart*, 139 S. Ct. at 1801 (citing *United States v. United Mine Workers*, 330 U.S. 258, 303–04 (1947)). A finding of civil contempt requires \"(1) the order the contemnor failed to comply with is clear and unambiguous, (2) the proof of noncompliance is clear and convincing, and (3) the contemnor has not diligently attempted to comply in a reasonable manner.\" *King v. Allied Vision, Ltd.*, 65 F.3d 1051, 1058 (2d Cir. 1995); *see Gravel*, 6 F.4th at 512 (adding that the contemnor must have notice of the order).\n\nContempt \"'should not be resorted to where there is [a] *fair ground of doubt* as to the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct.'\" *Taggart*, 139 S. Ct. at 1801 (citing *Cal. Artificial Stone Paving Co. v. Molitor*, 113 U.S. 609 (1885)). This standard is generally objective – a \"party's subjective belief that she was complying with an order ordinarily will not insulate her from civil contempt if that belief was objectively unreasonable.\" *Taggart*, 139 S. Ct. at 1802\n\n<sup>3</sup> The following constitutes the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Court pursuant to Rule 7052 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, which is made applicable to contested matters by Rule 9014(c).\n\n(citing *McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co.*, 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1949) (\"The absence of wilfulness [sic] does not relieve from civil contempt.\")).4\n\n# **b. Ms. Mei Guo and HK International Funds Investments (USA) Ltd., LLC are in Contempt of Court For Failure to Comply with the Order Compelling Production**\n\n# **i. Ms. Mei Guo and HK International Funds Investments (USA) Ltd., LLC Had Notice of the Order Compelling Production**\n\nThe Court concludes that both of the HK Parties had notice of the Order Compelling Production. Both of them are represented by counsel in this case who receive service of the Court's orders by notices of electronic filing. Moreover, the HK Parties filed the Objection to Motion to Compel jointly with the Debtor. Finally, the HK Parties did not in any way contest they received notice in the Motion for Extension of Time, in any of their subsequent pleadings, or during the Show Cause Hearing.\n\n# **ii. The Order Compelling Production Is Clear and Unambiguous**\n\nOn March 8, 2023, during a Status Conference in the Adversary Proceeding, Attorney Vartan asserted that he did not know what the term \"advisors\" in the Order Compelling Production meant. At no other time has any argument been advanced suggesting that the Order Compelling Production is unclear. The Court finds Attorney Vartan's purported lack of understanding of subparagraph (iii) objectively unreasonable. *Taggart*, 139 S. Ct. at 1802 (\"[A] party's subjective belief that she was complying with an order ordinarily will not insulate her from civil contempt if that belief was objectively unreasonable.\"). Therefore, as discussed\n\n<sup>4</sup> Nevertheless, a party's bad faith may justify \"placing 'the burden of any uncertainty in the decree . . . on [the] shoulders' of the party who violated the court order,\" and \"a party's good faith, even where it does not bar civil contempt, may help to determine an appropriate sanction.\" *Taggart*, 139 S. Ct. at 1802 (citing *McComb*, 336 U.S. at 192–93 and *Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A.*, 481 U.S. 787, 801 (1987)).\n\nbelow, the Court finds there is no fair ground of doubt as to what the term \"advisors\" in\n\nsubparagraph (iii) means and, resultingly, what subparagraph (iii) requires.\n\nThe relevant section of the Order Compelling Production reads:\n\nMei Guo and HK (USA) shall, by 5:00 p.m. on January 31, 2023, search for and produce to the Trustee: . . .\n\n(iii) documents responsive to the Trustee's requests that are within their custody, possession, or control, except as to [sic]5 the documents concern the Lady May, including without limitation documents in the files of their current or former counsel and other agents and advisors, unless such documents have already been produced by their current or former counsel and other agents and advisors but without consideration of any potential future production by their current or former counsel and other agents and advisors.\n\nSubparagraph (iii) is clear and unambiguous – unless a former or current counsel or other agent or advisor has already produced a particular responsive document, the HK Parties were ordered to produce the documents. Furthermore, the HK Parties were ordered to produce documents not just in their personal custody or possession but also documents in their control, such as documents held by current or former counsel and other agents and advisors. For an abundance of clarity and in response to the arguments of the parties prior to the entry of the Order Compelling Production, subparagraph (iii) specifies that neither of the HK Parties were required to make duplicative production of documents, but must produce any documents not yet produced by current or former counsel and other agents and advisors.\n\nFor example, Ms. Guo testified that she manages and operates Pangu Plaza in Beijing. She also testified that, in addition to HK USA, she owns and controls other entities with assets – most of which were unknown to her at the time of the Deposition, including until recently an\n\n<sup>5</sup> The Court acknowledges its typographical error in the clause \"except as to [sic] the documents concern the Lady May . . ..\" The Court concludes, however, that this error could not create any reasonable confusion as to the meaning of subparagraph (iii).\n\nairplane which was sold in the summer of 2022 (during the pendency of her father's Chapter 11 bankruptcy case). (Deposition at 17:19–18:15, 30:3–31:10, 56:18–72:14.) If Ms. Guo's testimony is true, one could reasonably expect that she has in her possession extensive financial and corporate documents. At the very least, even if she is not in possession of extensive financial and corporate documents, it is virtually impossible to believe that her attorneys, accountants, advisors, financial advisors, employees, contractors, etc. are not in possession of such documents. Indeed, Ms. Guo testified about managers of Pangu Plaza who operate at her direction. (Deposition at 53:13–54:3.) These mangers and her attorneys, accountants, advisors, financial advisors, employees, contractors, etc. are under her control. Under the clear and unambiguous terms of the Order Compelling Production, Ms. Guo would have to produce the documents in the possession of these managers who are among \"current or former counsel and other agents and advisors,\" in order to avoid being in contempt of court unless the \"current or former counsel and other agents and advisors\" had already produced such documents.\n\nFurthermore, it is clear from the Objection to the Motion to Compel and the hearing on the Motion to Compel that at least Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. (\"Z&Z\") – the HK Parties only counsel at the time the Motion to Compel was argued – understood the portion of relief sought regarding documents in possession of current or former counsel and other agents and advisors. Attorney Vartan could have asked Z&Z, to whom he undoubtedly spoke when entering this case, or he could have read the transcript of the hearing on the Motion to Compel if he seriously – albeit unreasonably – did not understand subparagraph (iii).6\n\n<sup>6</sup> To be clear, Attorney Vartan and CSG represented HK USA in the New York Supreme Court action that precipitated these bankruptcy cases. *See Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund, L.P. v. Kwok Ho Wan*, Index No. 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 7, 2022), NYSCEF Doc. No. 1179.\n\nFinally, attached to the Bassett Declaration is an email from Attorney Avram E. Luft,\n\ncounsel to the Trustee, telling Attorney Vartan that the HK Parties would need to produce\n\ndocuments in the possession of, *inter alia*, Golden Spring (New York) Ltd as an agent, advisor,\n\nor attorney of the HK Parties. This suggests to the Court that before communications between\n\nAttorney Vartan and counsel to the Trustee broke down, there were discussions about the\n\nproduction of documents in the possession of current or former counsel and other agents and\n\nadvisors.\n\nAlthough no argument was made as to the remainder of the relevant ordered paragraph,\n\nincluding subparagraphs (i) and (ii), the Court concludes that they also are clear and\n\nunambiguous. The relevant section of the Order Compelling Production reads:\n\n**ORDERED:** The Objection is **OVERRULED** as it relates to discovery requests directed to Mei Guo and HK (USA) except as such requests concern specifically the Lady May, which is subject to a pending adversary proceeding – *HK Int'l Funds Invs. (USA) Ltd., LLC v. Despins ex rel. Kwok*, Adv. P. No. 22-05003 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022) (the \"Adversary Proceeding\") – or as such requests are for documents dated earlier than June 1, 2014, to which extent the Objection is **SUSTAINED**. The Court issues this Order without prejudice to the Trustee to seek discovery from Ms. Guo or HK USA regarding the Lady May in the Adversary Proceeding in accordance with the Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 *et al*. and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7026 *et al.* and without prejudice to the Trustee to seek discovery of documents dated earlier than June 1, 2014, as the investigation proceeds upon cause shown. Furthermore, should either Mei Guo or HK (USA) no longer be a party to a pending proceeding involving the Trustee and relating to the Lady May, the Trustee may seek discovery regarding the Lady May in the Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases from such party upon cause shown. Mei Guo and HK (USA) shall, by 5:00 p.m. on January 31, 2023, search for and produce to the Trustee:\n\n(i) documents responsive to the Trustee's requests, except as to the documents that concern the Lady May, dated June 1, 2014, or later, unless a particular request specifies a different time period and such time period does not begin before June 1, 2014;\n\n(ii) documents responsive to the Trustee's requests, except as the documents concern the Lady May, as to both assets the Debtor acknowledges he owns and assets that allegedly belong to persons or entities other than the Debtor, including without limitation his family members, including Mei Guo herself, and associated entities, including HK (USA) itself; and\n\nIn the Order Compelling Production, the Court sustained the Objection to the Motion to Compel in two respects. The body of the relevant ordered paragraph is largely spent explaining them.\n\nFirst, pursuant to the pending proceeding doctrine, the Order Compelling Production required the Trustee to only pursue discovery relating to the Lady May from either Ms. Guo or HK USA in the Adversary Proceeding, so long as that proceeding remained pending against Ms. Guo or HK USA. However, the Trustee was also authorized to seek discovery in the Chapter 11 cases from whichsoever of the HK Parties was no longer party to the Adversary Proceeding, should one or both of them cease to be a party to the Adversary Proceeding. The Court was cognizant that Ms. Guo might move to dismiss the counterclaims against her in the Adversary Proceeding, in which she is not a plaintiff – only a counterclaim defendant. The Court wanted to be clear that if the counterclaims against Ms. Guo were dismissed, the Court's analysis under the pending proceeding doctrine might be altered.\n\nSecondly, Z&Z had argued that discovery requests should date back to the Debtor's flight to America from Hong Kong. There was disagreement between the Trustee, on the one hand, and the Debtor and the HK Parties, on the other hand, as to when that occurred. The Court, hence, settled on the June 1, 2014, date as it seemed the parties were agreed that the Debtor fled China in the second half of 2014 or early 2015. The Court found the Trustee's argument about the statute of limitations applicable to fraudulent transfer actions underdeveloped during the hearing. The Court left open that the Trustee could make that argument again at a later date as his investigation developed.\n\nWhile perhaps the above discussed language is technical, it is important to note that this language is not the operative language commanding production. The last sentence fragment of\n\nthe main paragraph begins the command to Ms. Guo and HK (USA). It provides that \"Mei Guo and HK (USA) shall, by 5:00 p.m. on January 31, 2023, search for and produce to the Trustee: . . ..\" Notably, this language is where the HK Parties begin their cite to the Order Compelling Production in their Motion for Extension of Time and the Vartan Declaration. There is no fair ground of doubt as to the meaning of this sentence fragment (which is completed by the subparagraphs).\n\nSubparagraph (i) reads\n\n(i) documents responsive to the Trustee's requests, except as to the documents that concern the Lady May, dated June 1, 2014, or later, unless a particular request specifies a different time period and such time period does not begin before June 1, 2014;\n\nThere is no fair ground of doubt as to the meaning of subparagraph (i). Moreover, this\n\nsubparagraph is again directly responsive to arguments raised by Z&Z and the Trustee during the\n\nhearing on the Motion to Compel.\n\nSubparagraph (ii) reads\n\n(ii) documents responsive to the Trustee's requests, except as the documents concern the Lady May, as to both assets the Debtor acknowledges he owns and assets that allegedly belong to persons or entities other than the Debtor, including without limitation his family members, including Mei Guo herself, and associated entities, including HK (USA) itself; and\n\nThere is no fair ground of doubt as to the meaning of subparagraph (ii). Moreover, yet again this language is directly reflective of an issue that was litigated during the hearing on the Motion to Compel. The Court's language reflects a position the Trustee asserted, which position the HK Parties understood enough to cogently object to it.\n\nTherefore, the Court concludes that the Order Compelling Production is clear and\n\nunambiguous.\n\n### **iii. Ms. Mei Guo and HK International Funds Investments (USA) Ltd., LLC Did Not Comply with the Order Compelling Production**\n\nAs the Court stated in the Show Cause Order, as of February 13th, \"[b]oth the Bassett Declaration and the Motion for Extension of Time establish that the HK Parties did not meet the production deadline ordered in the Order Compelling Production.\" The Trustee's assertion that nothing further was produced between the entry of the Show Cause Order and 5:00 p.m. on March 6, 2023, is not controverted. Similarly, the Trustee's assertion that, at approximately 8:30 p.m. on March 6, 2023, the HK Parties collectively produced eleven (11) further documents to the Trustee is uncontested. The Court concludes, for the reasons stated below, that the Trustee has established by clear and convincing evidence that neither of the HK Parties has complied with the Order Compelling Production.\n\nThe Court notes before considering the Vartan Declaration, it is under no obligation to do so. In violation of the Show Cause Order, the Vartan Declaration was filed over three hours late. The Show Cause Order gave the HK Parties maximal time to file their declarations before the Show Cause Hearing and set a short time – less than 24 hours – for the Trustee to reply to any declarations. Nevertheless, in the interest of justice, the Court does consider the Vartan Declaration for what it is worth.\n\nIn the Trustee Reply and during the Show Cause Hearing, the Trustee raised nine responses to the Declaration in support of finding the HK Parties in contempt. The Court is convinced that the Trustee has established that the submission of eleven (11) documents at approximately 8:30 p.m. on March 6, 2023, did not bring either of the HK Parties into compliance with the Order Compelling Production. The HK Parties failed to raise any convincing counterarguments in their papers or during the Show Cause Hearing. The Court will address the Trustee's nine responses in turn.\n\nFirst, the Trustee noted that the Vartan Declaration is not a declaration of Ms. Guo and/or HK USA. Therefore, the Trustee argued that the assertions about Ms. Guo's experiences in China and subsequent behavior towards electronic media are only representations of counsel – not sworn statements of Ms. Guo under penalty of perjury. Counsel to the HK Parties represented in response that Attorney Vartan is intimately aware of Ms. Guo's experience and behavior, having been her long-standing counsel. Additional CSG counsel further represented that it was their belief that the Show Cause Order did not specify that the HK Parties themselves had to file sworn declarations. The Court is troubled by this counterargument and will not weigh as heavily the representations of Attorney Vartan and additional CSG counsel as it would statements of Ms. Guo under penalty of perjury.\n\nSecond, the Trustee noted that the Vartan Declaration states nothing about HK USA's attempt to comply. The HK Parties argue this was unnecessary because Ms. Guo is the principal of HK USA, is the sole member of HK USA, and effectively everything that is HK USA's is Ms. Guo's. March 7 Hr. 2:13:44–2:14:08 p.m.; March 8 Hr. 1:39:23–1:40:06 p.m. Unless and until the Court finds that HK USA is the alter ego of Ms. Guo, this argument fails. Counsel for the HK Parties was quick to clarify that they did not intend to argue that Ms. Guo and HK USA were alter egos. The Court is, therefore, unconvinced by this argument and concludes that the Trustee is correct that the Vartan Declaration fails to detail HK USA's efforts to comply with the Order Compelling Production. Resultingly, the Court concludes that HK USA has not complied with the Order Compelling Production.\n\nThird, the Trustee argued that the Vartan Declaration does not make clear what electronic documents/devices are in Ms. Guo's custody, possession, and control. As an example of why this is relevant to the issue of whether the Vartan Declaration demonstrates compliance, the\n\nTrustee pointed out that in the Deposition, Ms. Guo testified she gets a new phone every month. (Deposition at 148:4–5.) The Vartan Declaration contains no discussion of efforts to capture, preserve, and prepare the contents of each phone. The HK Parties advanced no counterargument on this point. The Court concludes that the Trustee has established that Ms. Guo has not complied with the Order Compelling Production regarding production of electronic records.\n\nFourth, the Trustee argued that the Vartan Declaration only discusses present email accounts and seemed to take Ms. Guo's alleged representations – which were not put to the Court under oath as discussed above – at face value. This credulity is despite – as the Trustee and Attorney Vartan both represent – CSG only gaining access to the email accounts as of February 20, 2023. March 8 Hr. at 1:35:32–1:35:47 p.m. Two of the email accounts CSG accessed were accounts strictly designed for communication with CSG attorneys and Z&Z attorneys, respectively, and hence purportedly subject to attorney-client privilege. The Trustee represents that documents were only produced from a third email account CSG attorneys accessed. The Court finds, on this record, that the Trustee has established Ms. Guo has not complied with the Order Compelling Production regarding production of electronic records.\n\nFifth, the Trustee argues that the search terms used by the HK Parties were either poorly chosen or designed to avoid discovery. In particular, the Trustee argues that the search terms listed only include persons and entities by their full names – including persons Ms. Guo knows as her family or close associates and entities with which Ms. Guo is purportedly similarly familiar. There are no names of endearment or names denoting familiarity listed among the search terms. The HK Parties argued that they scrupulously looked and searched for information regarding all the related parties, about whom the Subpoenas sought information. The Court disagrees with the HK Parties and agrees with the Trustee's argument. Therefore, the Court\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 1602-2 Filed 03/27/23 Entered 03/27/23 11:18:17 Page 17 of 26\n\nconcludes that the Trustee has established that Ms. Guo has not complied with the Order Compelling Production regarding production of electronic records.\n\nSixth, the Trustee objects that with respect to WhatsApp and Telegram, the Vartan Declaration states that Ms. Guo's conversations with family are atypical – with no clarification as to what atypical means. Relatedly, the Trustee objects that the Vartan Declaration states nothing about Ms. Guo's communications with persons other than her family members via WhatsApp and Telegram, such as current or former counsel and other agents and advisors. This again relates to the Trustee's first objection. The Vartan Declaration's representations about Ms. Guo's behavior with electronic devices is not convincing. Moreover, what is stated is, as the Trustee observes, less than fully forthcoming. The HK Parties raise no counterargument on this point. Therefore, the Court concludes that the Trustee has established that Ms. Guo has not complied with the Order Compelling Production regarding production of electronic records.\n\nSeventh, the Trustee objects that the Vartan Declaration does not discuss in any detail the nature and sorts of hard copy documents that Ms. Guo keeps or the efforts that Ms. Guo and CSG attorneys took to search her hard copy documents for responsive documents. Instead, the Vartan Declaration simply states that they conducted this investigation. The HK Parties raise no counterarguments in this regard. The Court agrees with the Trustee. Therefore, the Court concludes that the Trustee has established that Ms. Guo has not complied with the Order Compelling Production regarding production of physical records.\n\nEighth, the Trustee argues that the Vartan Declaration's representations about Ms. Guo's bank accounts and her access to them is not credible. The Court notes that this argument implicates the Trustee's first objection, namely, the Vartan Declaration speaks to Ms. Guo's relations to her bank accounts, but it is not her sworn statement. The Vartan Declaration states\n\nthat Ms. Guo's Bank of China account is her only extant account, which account she purportedly refuses to access in order to provide information about it to the Trustee. The Trustee points out that while Ms. Guo may not feel safe in a physical Bank of China location – although again this is not her sworn statement – she could either set up online access to her account or send a designated representative to a physical Bank of China location to access the account information. The HK Parties raise no response to this objection. The Court agrees with the Trustee. Therefore, the Court concludes that the Trustee has established that Ms. Guo has not complied with the Order Compelling Production regarding production of information relating to her banking activity.\n\nNinth and finally, the Trustee objects that the Vartan Declaration is utterly silent about Ms. Guo's efforts – if any – to search for and produce documents under her control but in the possession of her current or former counsel and other agents and advisors. Other than Attorney Vartan's remark that he does not understand the word \"advisor,\" the HK Parties did not respond to this argument. In the Deposition, Ms. Guo testified that she has significant management and/or ownership positions in several companies in her family's business empire. If this is true, she almost assuredly has control over many documents in the possession of current or former attorneys and other agents and advisors. The HK Parties cannot have it both ways. Ms. Guo cannot both own, operate, and manage in her own right substantial business interests and have no control over documents in the possession of the various entities she supposedly own, operates, and manages. Therefore, the Court concludes that the Trustee has established that Ms. Guo has not complied with the Order Compelling Production regarding production of information under her control but in the possession – physical, digital, or otherwise – of her current or former counsel and other agents and advisors.\n\nFor all the reasons stated above and on the record, the Court concludes both Ms. Guo and HK USA did not comply with the Order Compelling Production.\n\n# **iv. Ms. Mei Guo and HK International Funds Investments (USA) Ltd., LLC Did Not Diligently Attempt to Comply with the Order Compelling Production**\n\nIn addition to the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that neither of the HK Parties diligently attempted to comply for the following reasons. The Subpoenas were served in August 2022. The Order Compelling Production was issued on January 20, 2023. The HK Parties had roughly four months to prepare for production before the entry of the Order Compelling Production. They did not produce and, as noted above, they *still* have not produced. As the Honorable Sonia Sotomayor, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, observed when she was a judge in the United States District Court for the Southern District Court of New York: \"neither [counsel] nor [a party has] a unilateral right to decide whether or when to comply with discovery demands.\" *535 Broadway Assocs. v. Com. Corp. of Am.*, 159 B.R. 403, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (sanctioning plaintiff in an adversary proceeding with dismissal for plaintiff's and plaintiff's counsel's actions regarding, *inter alia*, discovery).\n\nThis principle is relevant here. In the Motion for Extension of Time, the HK Parties represented to the Court and to their brother and sister counsel that they would be producing documents to the Trustee on a rolling basis. Explicitly relying on that representation and informing the HK Parties that the Court expected them to act in accordance with that representation, in entering the Show Cause Order, the Court effectively granted the HK Parties until 5:00 p.m. on March 6, 2023, to comply with the Order Compelling Production – an extension of over a month from the deadline set by the Order Compelling Production and almost seven months since the Subpoenas were served. Moreover, the Court preserved the possibility,\n\nupon cause shown, for the HK Parties to obtain a further extension of time to March 13, 2023. Nevertheless, instead of using the time the Court afforded them, the HK Parties chose to persist in noncompliance. The HK Parties used the time the Court provided to stall, delay, and frustrate the Trustee's ongoing investigation and related discovery efforts. The HK Parties' false representations about production on a \"rolling basis,\" and the late and noncompliant Vartan Declaration, are not a diligent attempt to comply. Instead, these actions are a transparent and egregious attempt to avoid compliance after ample consideration has been given to the HK Parties both in the Order Compelling Production and the Show Cause Order. *See, e.g.*, *Malatuea v. Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd.*, 987 F.2d 1536, 1542 (11th Cir. 1993) (affirming district court sanction where there was no clear error with finding that \"appellants willfully violated court orders and abused the discovery process\" and \"[t]he sanctions imposed for this egregious conduct were well within the judge's discretion\").\n\n### **c. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37**\n\nA party may be sanctioned for failure to make disclosures or cooperate in discovery pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 and D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 37, made applicable in this case by D. Conn. Bankr. L.R. 1001-1(a)(1) and 2004-1(a). Rule 37(b)(2) states\n\n(A) *For Not Obeying a Discovery Order.* If a party or a party's officer, director, or managing agent--or a witness designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a)(4)--fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including an order under Rule 26(f), 35, or 37(a), the court where the action is pending may issue further just orders. They may include the following:\n\n(i) directing that the matters embraced in the order or other designated facts be taken as established for purposes of the action, as the prevailing party claims;\n\n(ii) prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses, or from introducing designated matters in evidence;\n\n(iii) striking pleadings in whole or in part;\n\n26\n\n(iv) staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed;\n\n(v) dismissing the action or proceeding in whole or in part;\n\n(vi) rendering a default judgment against the disobedient party; or\n\n(vii) treating as contempt of court the failure to obey any order except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination.\n\n(B) *For Not Producing a Person for Examination.* If a party fails to comply with an order under Rule 35(a) requiring it to produce another person for examination, the court may issue any of the orders listed in Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vi), unless the disobedient party shows that it cannot produce the other person.\n\n(C) *Payment of Expenses.* Instead of or in addition to the orders above, the court must order the disobedient party, the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.\n\nFed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2). Upon a finding of non-compliance with an order compelling\n\nproduction, a court may sanction a party under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)–(C). Additionally, a\n\ncourt may sanction a party's attorney, but only under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C). *See Apex Oil*\n\n*Co. v. Belcher Co. of N.Y., Inc.*, 855 F.2d 1009, 1013, 1014–15 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding Fed. R.\n\nCiv. P. 37(b)(2)(C) sanctions available for attorneys but not Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)–(B)\n\nsanctions). As the Second Circuit has stated,\n\nDisciplinary sanctions under Rule 37 are intended to serve three purposes. First, they ensure that a party will not benefit from its own failure to comply. Second, they are specific deterrents and seek to obtain compliance with the particular order issued. Third, they are intended to serve a general deterrent effect on the case at hand and on other litigation, provided that the party against whom they are imposed was in some sense at fault.\n\n*Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publ'g, Ltd.*, 843 F.2d 67, 71 (2d Cir. 1988).\n\n# **d. Rules 37(b)(1) and 37(b)(2)(A)(vii) Provide Additional Statutory Contempt Authority**\n\nThe Order Compelling Production is not an order to submit to a physical or mental\n\nexamination. Accordingly, contempt – and attendant sanctions – is available. Therefore, in\n\naddition to holding the HK Parties in contempt pursuant to the Court's inherent power to do so, the Court holds the HK Parties in contempt pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(vii) for the reasons discussed above. The Court further notes that Rule 37(b)(1) provides a further statutory basis underlying the contempt findings above, because the Court is also the court where the discovery was originally sought – not just the court where the Motion to Compel and Motion for Show Cause Order were filed. *See In re Chase & Sanborn Corp.*, 872 F.2d 397 (11th Cir. 1989), *rev'd on other grounds by Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg*, 492 U.S. 33 (1989) (holding that a bankruptcy court may impose sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b) so long as (1) evidence in the record supports sanctions for failing to obey a discovery order and (2) the bankruptcy court articulates whether the sanction was intended to be compensatory or coercive).\n\n# **e. Rule 37(b)(2)(C) Sanctions Are Appropriate Against Ms. Mei Guo, HK International Funds Investments (USA) Ltd., LLC, Attorney Vartan, and Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC**\n\n\"Counsel have an obligation, as officers of the court, to assist in the discovery process by making diligent, good-faith responses to legitimate discovery requests.\" *McLeod, Alexander, Powel & Apffel, P.C. v. Quarles*, 894 F.2d 1482, 1486 (5th Cir. 1990). For this reason, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(C) provides\n\n(C) *Payment of Expenses.* Instead of or in addition to the orders above, the court must order the disobedient party, the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.\n\n*See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper*, 447 U.S. 752, 763–64 (1980); *Apex Oil*, 855 F.2d at 1013,\n\n1014–15. The Court notes that Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C) describes mandatory sanctions,\n\nshould the conditions described arise. As discussed above, the failure to comply was not\n\n\"substantially justified.\" For the most part, the HK Parties did not have any explanation at all.\n\nPresently, there are no circumstances that would make an award of expenses unjust. Therefore,\n\n### Case 22-50073 Doc 1602-2 Filed 03/27/23 Entered 03/27/23 11:18:17 Page 23 of 26\n\nthe question before the Court is who must be ordered to pay reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure of the disobedient parties—Ms. Guo, HK USA, and/or Attorney Vartan and CSG.\n\n For the reasons set forth above, the Court has concluded that the HK Parties are both in contempt of Court. Therefore, for those same reasons, the Court also finds that Rule 37(b)(2)(C) sanctions are appropriate to enter against each of the HK Parties.\n\n Furthermore, Attorney Vartan and CSG, at best, materially misrepresented to the Court that it would proceed with production in its Motion for an Extension of Time. At worst, Attorney Vartan and CSG knowingly made false statements to the Court. Regardless, the actions of Attorney Vartan and CSG are not acceptable in any way. The Court relied on Attorney Vartan's and CSG's representations in crafting the Show Cause Order, which gave the HK Parties several additional weeks to comply. Moreover, it is clear from the Deposition – both in Attorney Vartan's conduct during the Deposition and the discussion of the failure to produce documents in the Adversary Proceeding prior to the Deposition – that this is part of a pattern of unacceptable, obstructionist behavior of Attorney Vartan and CSG. (Deposition at 166:12–20, 167:6–20 (discussing NDAs related to the Lady May and the failure of the HK Parties and CSG to produce them).) Therefore, on the basis of these findings, the Court also sanctions Attorney Vartan and CSG under Rule 37(b)(2)(C). *Cf. Martin v. Brown,* 63 F.3d 1252 (3d Cir. 1995).\n\nThe Second Circuit has affirmed the imposition of a sanction of attorneys' fees and costs on a law firm or individual lawyer that served as counsel to a party jointly and severally with the party under Rule 37. *See, e.g., Thomas E. Hoar, Inc. v. Sara Lee Corp.*, 900 F.2d 522 (2d. Cir. 1990); *Friedman v. Shree PLC*, Civil No. 3:14CV00378 (AWT) (D. Conn. Sept. 15, 2017), ECF\n\nNo. 311, *aff'd by* Civil No. 3:14CV00378 (AWT) (D. Conn. Oct. 17, 2019), ECF No. 368, *aff'd by Friedman v. Radjuko*, 854 F. App'x 390 (2d Cir. 2021).\n\nThe Court hopes it is impressed upon Attorney Vartan and CSG that the Court is a court of law, and as lawyers appearing before this Court, they need to act appropriately and in accordance with their obligations as officers of the Court. In the Motion for Extension of Time, Attorney Vartan represented to the Court that the HK Parties would produce documents to the Trustee on a rolling basis. No documents were produced to the Trustee, let alone on a rolling basis, until eleven (11) documents were produced at approximately 8:30 p.m. on March 6, 2023. Nevertheless, Attorney Vartan argued before the Court that he had made no false representations. The Court thereafter warned Attorney Vartan that Rule 11 sanctions could enter against him for his misconduct. While the Court declines to do so at this time, it hopes that Attorney Vartan takes this admonition to heart.\n\n### **f. Standard For Sanction of Attorneys' Fees and Costs**\n\nSanctions of attorneys' fees and costs must be \"compensatory rather than punitive in nature.\" *Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger*, 581 U.S. 101, 108 (2017). Hence, the\n\nSupreme Court has held that\n\nA fee award is so calibrated if it covers the legal bills that the litigation abuse occasioned. But if an award extends further than that—to fees that would have been incurred without the misconduct—then it crosses the boundary from compensation to punishment. Hence the need for a court, when using its inherent sanctioning authority (and civil procedures), to establish a causal link—between the litigant's misbehavior and legal fees paid by the opposing party.\n\n*Id.* It does not matter that the Objection to Motion to Compel was partially sustained. *Liebowitz v. Bandshell Artist Mgmt.*, 6 F.4th 267, 288 (2d. Cir. 2021) (sanctions of attorneys' fees and costs discussed in different context). Therefore, the Court sanctions the HK Parties, Attorney Vartan, and CSG reasonable attorneys' fees and costs related to the preparation and prosecution of the\n\nMotion to Compel and the continued efforts by the Trustee to bring the HK Parties into compliance, including any ongoing efforts. The fees and costs of the Trustee were incurred because the HK Parties failed to comply with the Subpoenas and persisted in non-compliance with the assistance of counsel, even after the Order to Compel Production and the Show Cause Order entered. They persist in non-compliance to this day.\n\n#### **V. CONCLUSION**\n\nFor the reasons stated above and on the record, pursuant to the failure to comply with the Order Compelling Production and the Order to Show Cause, both under the Court's inherent contempt power and pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(1) and 37(b)(2)(A)(vii), the Court finds Ms. Mei Guo and HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC in contempt of court and sanctions them appropriately as set forth below. Furthermore, for the reasons stated above and on the record, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C), the Court sanctions Ms. Mei Guo, HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC, Attorney Vartan, and CSG for attorneys' fees and costs incurred on account of their noncompliance. Accordingly, it is hereby\n\n**ORDERED:** Ms. Mei Guo and HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC (\"HK USA\") shall at or before 11:59 p.m. on March 13, 2023 – the date they sought in the Motion for Extension of Time – purge themselves of contempt through complete compliance with the Order Compelling Production and the Show Cause Order; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** Should Ms. Guo and HK USA fail to purge their contempt at or before 11:59 p.m. on March 13, 2023, the Trustee may move for any sanction against Ms. Guo and HK USA, including without limitation those listed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A); and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C), Ms. Guo, HK USA, Attorney Vartan, and Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC (\"CSG\") are jointly and severally liable and\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 1602-2 Filed 03/27/23 Entered 03/27/23 11:18:17 Page 26 of 26\n\nsanctioned, as compensatory damages, reasonable attorney's fees and costs associated with the Trustee's efforts to secure compliance with the Court-authorized Subpoenas from the preparation and prosecution Motion to Compel through and including the reasonable attorneys' fees and costs spent in relation to ongoing efforts to secure compliance, which reasonable attorneys' fees and costs shall be payable to the Chapter 11 estate of Ho Wan Kwok and be determined by the Court upon the fee application(s) of the Trustee, which application(s) are to be submitted on or before March 24, 2023.\n\nDated at Bridgeport, Connecticut this 10th day of March, 2023.","body_zh":"美国康涅狄格联邦破产法院\n\n)\n\n)\n\n)\n\n债务人。1\n\n关于： ) 第11章 ) 案号 22-50073 (JAM) HO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等， ) （合并管理）\n\n) 关于：ECF Nos. 1353 and 1455\n关于认定 HK PARTIES（HK 各方）藐视法庭并对 HK 各方、律师 VARTAN（瓦尔坦）以及 CHIESA SHAHINIAN & GIANTOMASI PC（Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi 专业公司）实施制裁的命令\nI. 引言\n\n本院现审理的是《关于部分准许要求出庭并说明本院为何不应认定 HK 各方藐视法庭的动议的命令》（以下简称“说明理由命令”）。(ECF No. 1455.) 于 March 7, 2023，就说明理由命令举行了听证会（以下简称“说明理由听证会”）。基于本院在说明理由听证会上记录在案的理由以及下文所述理由，本院依据其固有的藐视法庭权力，并依据 Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(1) 和 37(b)(2)(A)(vii)，认定 Mei Guo（郭梅）女士及 HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC（HK International Funds Investments（USA）有限责任公司）（以下简称“HK USA”，并与 Guo 女士合称“HK 各方”）构成民事藐视法庭。此外，依据 Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C)，本院对 HK 各方以及作为向 HK 各方提供法律意见的律师 Vartan（瓦尔坦）和 Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC（CSG）实施制裁。\n\n1 本第11章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（亦称 Guo Wengui、Miles Guo 和 Miles Kwok，以及众多其他别名）（税务识别号码后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（Genever Holdings 有限责任公司）（税务识别号码后四位：8202）以及 Genever Holdings Corporation（Genever Holdings 公司）。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 和 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为 Paul Hastings LLP（Paul Hastings 律师事务所）, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166，c/o Luc A. Despins（Luc A. Despins），作为 Ho Wan Kwok 遗产的受托人（仅为通知和通信之目的）。\nII. 背景\n\n于 July 28, 2022，Luc A. Despins 以 Ho Wan Kwok（以下简称“债务人”）遗产第11章受托人（以下简称“受托人”）的身份，提交了一项动议，请求对包括 Guo 女士和 HK USA 在内的人员进行 Rule 2004 审查（以下简称“Rule 2004 动议”）。(ECF No. 638.) 于 August 16, 2022，即约七个月前，本院作出命令，准许 Rule 2004 动议（以下简称“Rule 2004 命令”），并且除其他事项外，批准了拟向 Guo 女士和 HK USA 送达的传票（以下简称“传票”）。(ECF No. 758.) 传票于 August 19 至 23, 2022 期间向 Guo 女士和 HK USA 送达。(ECF No. 1046.)\n\n于 October 28, 2022，受托人提交了一项动议，请求强制包括 HK 各方在内的人员遵守传票（以下简称“强制履行动议”）。(ECF No. 1046.) 于 November 14, 2022，HK 各方和债务人共同提交了对强制履行动议的异议（以下简称“对强制履行动议的异议”）。(ECF No. 1090.) 于 November 30, 2022，就强制履行动议举行了听证会。听证会结束时，强制履行动议留待裁定。2\n\n于 January 20, 2022，本院作出《关于部分准许强制遵守 Rule 2004 传票动议的命令》（以下简称“强制提交命令”）。(ECF No. 1353.) 强制提交命令的相关部分规定：\n\n兹命令：就针对 Mei Guo 和 HK (USA) 的证据开示请求而言，异议予以驳回，但该等请求具体涉及 Lady May（“梅女士”号）者除外，该船舶目前为未决对抗程序的标的——HK Int'l Funds Invs. (USA) Ltd., LLC v. Despins ex rel. Kwok, Adv. P. No. 22-05003 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022)\n\n2 在 November 16, 2022 至 January 13, 2023 期间，本院正处理与本案相关、题为 Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund v. Kwok (In re Kwok), Adv. P. 22-05032 (JAM) 的对抗程序事项；在该程序中，当事人请求临时限制令和初步禁令，举行了为期四日的审判，并在审判中提出数百份证据以及数名证人。依据 Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(3)，本院必须“在尽可能最早的时间处理这些事项，并优先于所有其他事项，除非是同类性质的较早事项听证会。”本院已如此处理。\n\n（以下简称“对抗程序”）——或者请求获取日期早于 June 1, 2014 的文件的范围内，异议予以支持。本院作出本命令，不妨碍受托人依据 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 et al. 和 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7026 et al. 在对抗程序中就 Lady May 向 Guo 女士或 HK USA 请求证据开示；亦不妨碍受托人在有理由证明的情况下，随着调查推进请求获取日期早于 June 1, 2014 的文件。此外，如 Mei Guo 或 HK (USA) 任何一方不再是受托人参与且涉及 Lady May 的未决程序当事人，受托人可在有理由证明的情况下，在第11章破产案件中向该方请求有关 Lady May 的证据开示。Mei Guo 和 HK (USA) 应于 January 31, 2023 下午 5:00 前，\n\n(i) 检索并向受托人提交响应受托人请求的文件，但不包括涉及 Lady May、日期为 June 1, 2014 或之后的文件，除非某项具体请求规定了不同的期间且该期间不早于 June 1, 2014 开始；\n\n(ii) 检索并向受托人提交响应受托人请求的文件，但不包括涉及 Lady May 的文件，涉及债务人承认其拥有的资产，以及据称属于债务人以外个人或实体的资产，包括但不限于其家庭成员（包括 Mei Guo 本人）以及关联实体（包括 HK (USA) 本身）的资产；以及\n\n(iii) 检索并向受托人提交其保管、占有或控制的、响应受托人请求的文件，但不包括 [sic] 涉及 Lady May 的文件，包括但不限于其现任或前任律师及其他代理人和顾问档案中的文件，除非该等文件已由其现任或前任律师及其他代理人和顾问提交，但不考虑其现任或前任律师及其他代理人和顾问未来可能提交的任何文件。\n\n(Id. at 5–6.) 强制提交命令规定的履行期限为 January 31, 2023。\n\n于 January 24, 2023，本院作出命令，指示本第11章案件各方——包括 HK 各方和受托人——进行调解（以下简称“调解命令”）。(ECF No. 1373.) 调解命令规定，在调解期间，下列事项将予中止：\n\n兹命令：本院将举行目前安排于 January 24、26 和 31, 2023 举行的听证会。在该等听证会后，于调解期间，除非有令人信服的理由，所有本合并管理第11章案件及相关对抗程序中的听证会均予中止，包括但不限于 HK Int'l Funds Invs. (USA) Ltd. v. Despins ex rel. Kwok, Adv. P. No. 22-05003 (JAM) 和 Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. v. Kwok, Adv. P. No. 22-05032 (JAM) 中的所有听证会。命令并指示各方本着诚信进行谈判，并鼓励其避免采取可以延期、通过协商解决或由调解员适当审议的法律\n\n程序；并进一步命令\n\n(Id. at 6.) 本院决定不暂停未决的证据开示或对强制提交命令的履行，且未有任何一方提交书状请求本院如此处理。\n\n在调解期间，于 February 10, 2023，受托人提交了一项动议，请求作出命令，说明为何包括 Guo 女士和 HK USA 在内的人员不应被认定为藐视法庭（以下简称“说明理由命令动议”）。(ECF No. 1453.) 为支持说明理由命令动议，受托人提交了律师 Bassett（Bassett）的声明（以下简称“Bassett 声明”）。同日——即强制提交命令规定的提交期限届满后十日，以及传票送达近六个月后——HK 各方提交了一项交叉动议，请求延长遵守强制提交命令的期限（以下简称“延长期限动议”，并与说明理由命令动议合称“交叉动议”）。(ECF No. 1454.) 延长期限动议的相关部分向本院陈述：\n\n因此，Guo 女士和 HK USA 已告知受托人，其需要自今日起额外三十（30）日以完成检索、审阅和提交。*律师明确表示，Guo 女士和 HK USA 将最早于下周开始提交文件，并将持续滚动提交文件*，但其就完全遵守 January 20 命令的实际和后勤能力设定了现实的时间表。\n\n(Id. at ¶ 13)（原文强调）。延长期限动议请求将期限延长“至并包括 March 13, 2023”。(Id. at ¶ 15)\n\n于 February 13, 2023，本院作出说明理由命令。(ECF 1455.) 说明理由命令的相关部分认定，“[b]oth the Bassett Declaration and the Motion for Extension of Time establish that the HK Parties did not meet the production deadline ordered in the Order Compelling Production.” (Id.) 然而，说明理由命令实质上在交叉动议之间作出折中：说明理由命令未准许延长期限动议。相反，其安排举行说明理由听证会。尽管如此，其给予 HK 各方直至“on or before 5:00 p.m. on March 6, 2023”——比 HK 各方请求的期限少一周——以“在本案案卷中提交经宣誓的声明，详述对强制提交命令的完全遵守情况；或者，如未能完全遵守，则详细说明为遵守该命令所作出的努力……”。(Id.) 此外，其将延长期限动议的听证会安排在与说明理由听证会相同的时间举行。(Id.) 本院预期，同一证据既可能证明为遵守命令所作出的勤勉努力，也可能证明有理由准许延长期限。本院认为该处理方式明智，因为“[b]ased upon the representations of counsel for the HK Parties in the Motion for Extension of Time, the Court expects that the HK Parties will be producing documents to the Trustee on a rolling basis during the ongoing mediation.” (Id.)\n\n于 March 6, 2023，受托人及时提交了对延长期限动议的异议（以下简称“延长期限异议”）。(ECF No. 1510.) 受托人在延长期限异议中主张，自说明理由命令作出之日至 March 6, 2023，Guo 女士或 HK USA 均未向受托人提交任何文件，且 Guo 女士和 HK USA 的律师已停止与受托人及其律师进行沟通。(Id.) 在履行期限届满超过三小时后的晚上 8:14:58，HK 各方的律师——而非 HK 各方本人——提交了一份逾期的经宣誓声明，主张 HK 各方已完全遵守强制提交命令（以下简称“Vartan 声明”）。(ECF No. 1512.)\n\n于 March 7, 2023，HK 各方提交了对延长期限异议的答复（以下简称“HK 各方答复”）。(ECF No. 1516.) HK 各方答复主张，其已尽其所知完全遵守命令，并将在今后发现更多响应性文件时继续遵守。同日，尽管 Vartan 声明逾期提交，受托人仍及时提交了对 Vartan 声明的答复（以下简称“受托人答复”）。(ECF No. 1517.) 受托人答复主张：(a) Vartan 声明所述程序存在严重缺陷和构成藐视法庭的遗漏；以及 (b) Vartan 声明不当系由律师而非 HK 各方本人作出的声明。\n\n同样于 March 7, 2023，本院举行了说明理由听证会。Vartan 律师未出席说明理由听证会，尽管另一名 CSG 律师出席。Vartan 律师于次日出席了一场在相关对抗程序 HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC（HK 国际基金投资（美国）有限责任公司）v. Despins ex rel. Kwok（代表郭文贵的 Despins）（In re Kwok），Adv. P. No. 22-05003 (JAM)（“对抗程序”）中举行的状态会议，并在该状态会议上进一步讨论了本案。March 9, 2023，本院命令受托人提交与该对抗程序有关而取得的 Guo 女士（“证言记录”）的证言。（ECF No. 1527。）同日，受托人提交了证言记录。（ECF No. 1529。）\n\n本案已具备裁决条件。\n\nIII. 管辖权\n\nUnited States District Court for the District of Connecticut（康涅狄格州联邦地区法院）依据 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) 对本案具有管辖权。本院依据 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) 及康涅狄格州联邦地区法院日期为 September 21, 1984 的移送命令，有权审理并裁决本案。本程序依法属于核心程序。28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)。本案不存在妨碍行使管辖权的宪法问题。参见 Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 487–99 (2011)。\n\n依据 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409，本区为适当审判地。\n\nIV. 讨论3\n\na. 藐视法庭标准\n\n本院依据 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) 和 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9020，拥有以藐视法庭追究当事人的固有权力。Taggart v. Lorenzen ex rel. Brown, 139 S. Ct. 1795, 1801 (2019); Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44–45 (1991); PHH Mortg. Corp. v. Sensenich ex rel. Gravel (In re Gravel), 6 F.4th 503, 512 (2d Cir. 2021); Mar. Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 920 F.2d 183, 187 (2d. Cir. 1990)。可为“强制被告遵守”法院命令，或为“补偿申诉人因未遵守法院命令所遭受的损失”而申请藐视法庭。Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1801（引用 United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 303–04 (1947)）。认定民事藐视法庭须满足：“(1) 被藐视人未遵守的命令明确且毫不含糊，(2) 不遵守的证据清楚且令人信服，以及 (3) 被藐视人未以合理方式勤勉地尝试遵守。”King v. Allied Vision, Ltd., 65 F.3d 1051, 1058 (2d Cir. 1995); 参见 Gravel, 6 F.4th at 512（补充要求被藐视人知悉该命令）。\n\n如对被告行为的违法性存在“合理怀疑依据”，则“不应诉诸”藐视法庭。Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1801（引用 Cal. Artificial Stone Paving Co. v. Molitor, 113 U.S. 609 (1885)）。该标准通常是客观的——“当事人主观上相信其正在遵守命令，如该信念在客观上不合理，通常不会使其免于民事藐视法庭。”Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1802\n\n3 以下内容构成本院依据 Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure（联邦破产程序规则）Rule 7052 作出的事实认定和法律结论，该规则依 Rule 9014(c) 适用于有争议事项。\n\n（引用 McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1949)（“不存在故意[原文如此]并不能免除民事藐视法庭责任。”））。4\n\nb. Mei Guo 女士和 HK International Funds Investments (USA) Ltd., LLC 因未遵守强制提交命令而构成藐视法庭\n\ni. Mei Guo 女士和 HK International Funds Investments (USA) Ltd., LLC 已知悉强制提交命令\n\n本院认定，两名 HK 当事人均已知悉强制提交命令。两者在本案中均有律师代理，其律师通过电子提交通知收到本院命令的送达。此外，HK 当事人与债务人共同提交了对强制提交动议的异议。最后，HK 当事人无论是在延期动议、其后的任何诉状中，还是在说明理由听证会上，均未以任何方式对其收到通知提出异议。\n\nii. 强制提交命令明确且毫不含糊\n\nMarch 8, 2023，在对抗程序的一次状态会议期间，Vartan 律师主张其不知道强制提交命令中“顾问”一词的含义。除此之外，未曾提出任何主张认为强制提交命令不明确。本院认定，Vartan 律师所谓对第 (iii) 项缺乏理解，在客观上不合理。Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1802（“当事人主观上相信其正在遵守命令，如该信念在客观上不合理，通常不会使其免于民事藐视法庭。”）。因此，如下文所述，\n\n4 尽管如此，当事人的恶意可能证明有理由“将判决中任何不确定性的负担……置于违反法院命令的当事人肩上”，而“当事人的善意，即使并不阻却民事藐视法庭，也可能有助于确定适当的制裁”。Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1802（引用 McComb, 336 U.S. at 192–93 和 Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 801 (1987)）。\n\n本院认定，对于第 (iii) 项中“顾问”一词的含义，以及由此第 (iii) 项所要求的内容，不存在合理怀疑依据。\n\n强制提交命令的相关部分如下：\n\nMei Guo 和 HK (USA) 应于 January 31, 2023 下午 5:00 前，搜索并向受托人提交：……\n\n(iii) 对受托人请求作出回应的、处于其保管、占有或控制之下的文件，但就与 Lady May 有关的文件除外[原文如此]5，包括但不限于其现任或前任律师及其他代理人和顾问档案中的文件，除非此类文件已由其现任或前任律师及其他代理人和顾问提交，但不考虑其现任或前任律师及其他代理人和顾问未来可能作出的任何提交。\n\n第 (iii) 项明确且毫不含糊——除非前任或现任律师或其他代理人或顾问已提交某一特定的回应性文件，否则 HK 当事人被命令提交该等文件。此外，HK 当事人被命令提交的文件不仅包括由其个人保管或占有的文件，也包括由其控制的文件，例如由现任或前任律师及其他代理人和顾问持有的文件。为充分明确起见，并回应各方在强制提交命令作出前提出的主张，第 (iii) 项明确规定，HK 当事人均无须重复提交文件，但必须提交任何尚未由现任或前任律师及其他代理人和顾问提交的文件。\n\n例如，Guo 女士证称，其管理并经营北京的盘古广场。她还证称，除 HK USA 外，她还拥有并控制其他持有资产的实体——其中大部分在证言记录作出时对她而言并不知晓，其中包括一架直到最近仍持有、并于 summer of 2022 出售的飞机（在其父亲的 Chapter 11 破产案件审理期间）。（Deposition at 17:19–18:15, 30:3–31:10, 56:18–72:14。）如果 Guo 女士的证言属实，可以合理预期她持有大量财务和公司文件。至少，即使她并未占有大量财务和公司文件，也几乎不可能相信其律师、会计师、顾问、财务顾问、雇员、承包商等并未占有此类文件。事实上，Guo 女士证称，盘古广场的管理人员依其指示运营。（Deposition at 53:13–54:3。）这些管理人员及其律师、会计师、顾问、财务顾问、雇员、承包商等均受其控制。根据强制提交命令明确且毫不含糊的条款，为避免构成藐视法庭，Guo 女士必须提交由这些属于“现任或前任律师及其他代理人和顾问”的管理人员占有的文件，除非“现任或前任律师及其他代理人和顾问”已提交该等文件。\n\n此外，从对强制提交动议的异议以及对强制提交动议的听证会可清楚看出，至少 Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（“Z&Z”）——在审理强制提交动议时 HK 当事人唯一的律师——理解了所请求救济中有关现任或前任律师及其他代理人和顾问所占有文件的部分。Vartan 律师本可询问 Z&Z——其在进入本案时无疑曾与之交谈——或者，如果他确实——尽管不合理地——不理解第 (iii) 项，他本可阅读强制提交动议听证会的记录。6\n\n6 为明确起见，Vartan 律师和 CSG 在引发这些破产案件的 New York Supreme Court（纽约州最高法院）诉讼中代理 HK USA。参见 Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund, L.P. v. Kwok Ho Wan, Index No. 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 7, 2022), NYSCEF Doc. No. 1179。\n\n最后，Bassett 声明所附有一封来自受托人律师 Avram E. Luft 律师的电子邮件，其中告知 Vartan 律师，HK 当事人须提交由 Golden Spring (New York) Ltd 等作为 HK 当事人代理人、顾问或律师者所占有的文件。这向本院表明，在 Vartan 律师与受托人律师之间的沟通破裂之前，双方曾讨论由现任或前任律师及其他代理人和顾问所占有文件的提交。\n\n尽管对于相关命令段落的其余部分，包括第 (i) 和第 (ii) 项，未提出任何主张，本院认定它们同样明确且毫不含糊。强制提交命令的相关部分如下：\n\n命令：对于针对 Mei Guo 和 HK (USA) 的证据开示请求，异议予以驳回，但此类请求明确涉及作为待决对抗程序标的的 Lady May——HK Int'l Funds Invs. (USA) Ltd., LLC v. Despins ex rel. Kwok, Adv. P. No. 22-05003 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022)（“对抗程序”）——的除外；或者，此类请求要求提交日期早于 June 1, 2014 的文件的，在该范围内异议予以支持。本院作出本命令，不妨碍受托人依照 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 et al. 和 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7026 et al.，在对抗程序中就 Lady May 向 Guo 女士或 HK USA 寻求证据开示；亦不妨碍受托人在调查进行中说明理由后，就日期早于 June 1, 2014 的文件寻求证据开示。此外，如 Mei Guo 或 HK (USA) 任一方不再是涉及受托人并与 Lady May 有关的待决程序中的当事人，受托人可在说明理由后，于 Chapter 11 破产案件中向该当事人就 Lady May 寻求证据开示。Mei Guo 和 HK (USA) 应于 January 31, 2023 下午 5:00 前，搜索并向受托人提交：\n\n(i) 对受托人请求作出回应的文件，但与 Lady May 有关且日期为 June 1, 2014 或之后的文件除外，除非某一特定请求规定了不同的期间，且该期间不早于 June 1, 2014 开始；\n\n(ii) 回应受托人请求的文件，但涉及 Lady May（“五月夫人”号）的文件除外，且涉及债务人承认其拥有的资产以及据称属于债务人以外的个人或实体的资产，包括但不限于其家庭成员（包括 Mei Guo（郭美）本人）以及关联实体（包括 HK (USA)（HK（美国））本身）；以及\n\n在《强制提交命令》中，法院在两个方面支持了对强制提交动议的异议。相关命令段落的正文在很大程度上用于解释这两个方面。\n\n第一，根据在审程序原则，《强制提交命令》要求受托人仅可在对抗程序中向郭女士或 HK USA 就 Lady May 寻求证据开示，只要该程序仍针对郭女士或 HK USA 处于待决状态。然而，如香港各方中的一方或双方不再是对抗程序的当事方，受托人亦获授权可在第11章案件中向不再是对抗程序当事方的任何香港当事方寻求证据开示。法院知悉，郭女士可能会在对抗程序中提出动议，要求驳回针对她的反诉；在该程序中，她并非原告，而仅是反诉被告。法院希望明确，如针对郭女士的反诉被驳回，法院根据在审程序原则所作的分析可能会改变。\n\n第二，Z&Z 曾主张，证据开示请求应追溯至债务人从香港逃往美国之时。受托人与债务人及香港各方之间对于该事件何时发生存在分歧。因此，法院确定以 June 1, 2014 为日期，因为各方似乎一致认为，债务人于 2014 年下半年或 2015 年初逃离中国。法院认为，受托人关于适用于欺诈性转让诉讼的诉讼时效的论点在听证期间阐述不足。法院保留受托人在其调查进展后于日后再次提出该论点的可能性。\n\n尽管上述讨论的措辞或许具有技术性，但必须指出，该等措辞并非命令提交文件的操作性措辞。主段落最后的句子片段开始了对郭女士和 HK (USA) 的命令。其规定：“Mei Guo and HK (USA) shall, by 5:00 p.m. on January 31, 2023, search for and produce to the Trustee: . . ..”值得注意的是，香港各方在其《期限延长动议》和 Vartan 声明中援引《强制提交命令》时，即从该措辞开始。对于该句子片段（由下列分段完成）的含义，不存在合理疑义。\n\n分段 (i) 载明：\n\n(i) 回应受托人请求的文件，但涉及 Lady May 的文件除外，其日期为 June 1, 2014 或之后，除非特定请求规定了不同的期间，且该期间不得早于 June 1, 2014 开始；\n\n对于分段 (i) 的含义，不存在合理疑义。此外，该分段再次直接回应了 Z&Z 和受托人在强制提交动议听证期间提出的论点。\n\n分段 (ii) 载明：\n\n(ii) 回应受托人请求的文件，但涉及 Lady May 的文件除外，且涉及债务人承认其拥有的资产以及据称属于债务人以外的个人或实体的资产，包括但不限于其家庭成员（包括 Mei Guo 本人）以及关联实体（包括 HK (USA) 本身）；以及\n\n对于分段 (ii) 的含义，不存在合理疑义。此外，该措辞再次直接反映了在强制提交动议听证期间审理的一个争议。法院的措辞反映了受托人所主张的立场，香港各方对该立场的理解足以使其能够有条理地提出异议。\n\n因此，法院认定，《强制提交命令》清晰且明确。\n\niii. Mei Guo（郭美）和 HK International Funds Investments (USA) Ltd., LLC（香港国际基金投资（美国）有限公司）未遵守《强制提交命令》\n\n如法院在《说明理由命令》中所述，截至 February 13th，“Bassett 声明和《期限延长动议》均表明，香港各方未能满足《强制提交命令》所命令的提交期限。”受托人关于在《说明理由命令》作出与 March 6, 2023 5:00 p.m. 之间未进一步提交任何文件的主张，未受到反驳。同样，受托人关于香港各方于 March 6, 2023 约 8:30 p.m. 共同向受托人进一步提交十一（11）份文件的主张，亦无争议。基于下述理由，法院认定，受托人已以明确且令人信服的证据证明，香港各方均未遵守《强制提交命令》。\n\n法院在审议 Vartan 声明之前指出，法院并无义务审议该声明。Vartan 声明违反《说明理由命令》，迟延提交逾三小时。《说明理由命令》给予香港各方在说明理由听证会前提交其声明的最长时间，并为受托人回复任何声明设定了很短的期限——不足 24 小时。尽管如此，为了司法公正，法院仍按其应有的证明力审议 Vartan 声明。\n\n在受托人回复文件及说明理由听证会期间，受托人提出九项回应，以支持认定香港各方构成藐视法庭。法院确信，香港各方于 March 6, 2023 约 8:30 p.m. 提交十一（11）份文件，并未使任何香港当事方遵守《强制提交命令》。香港各方在其书面文件中或在说明理由听证会期间均未提出任何有说服力的反驳论点。法院将逐一处理受托人的九项回应。\n\n第一，受托人指出，Vartan 声明并非郭女士和／或 HK USA 的声明。因此，受托人主张，关于郭女士在中国的经历以及其后对电子媒介的行为的陈述，仅是律师的陈述，而非郭女士在伪证处罚约束下作出的宣誓陈述。香港各方的律师回应称，Vartan 律师因长期担任郭女士的律师，十分了解郭女士的经历和行为。其他 CSG 律师进一步称，他们认为《说明理由命令》并未规定香港各方本身必须提交宣誓声明。法院对此反驳论点感到不安，不会像衡量郭女士在伪证处罚约束下所作陈述那样重视 Vartan 律师和其他 CSG 律师的陈述。\n\n第二，受托人指出，Vartan 声明对 HK USA 为遵守命令所作的尝试只字未提。香港各方主张，这是不必要的，因为郭女士是 HK USA 的负责人，是 HK USA 的唯一成员，且实际上 HK USA 的一切均属于郭女士。March 7 Hr. 2:13:44–2:14:08 p.m.; March 8 Hr. 1:39:23–1:40:06 p.m. 除非且直至法院认定 HK USA 是郭女士的另一个自我，该论点不能成立。香港各方的律师迅速澄清，他们并无意主张郭女士和 HK USA 互为另一个自我。因此，法院不接受该论点，并认定受托人正确地指出，Vartan 声明未详细说明 HK USA 为遵守《强制提交命令》所作的努力。因此，法院认定，HK USA 未遵守《强制提交命令》。\n\n第三，受托人主张，Vartan 声明未明确说明哪些电子文件／设备处于郭女士的保管、占有和控制范围内。作为此事项与 Vartan 声明是否证明遵守命令有关的一个例子，受托人指出，郭女士在证言笔录中作证称，她每月都会更换一部新手机。（Deposition at 148:4–5.）Vartan 声明未讨论为获取、保存和准备每部手机内容所作的努力。香港各方未就此提出反驳论点。法院认定，受托人已证明，郭女士未就电子记录的提交遵守《强制提交命令》。\n\n第四，受托人主张，Vartan 声明仅讨论目前的电子邮件账户，并且似乎不加审查地接受郭女士据称作出的陈述——如上所述，该等陈述并未在宣誓后提交法院。尽管受托人和 Vartan 律师均称，CSG 直至 February 20, 2023 才获得对电子邮件账户的访问权限，仍作此轻信。March 8 Hr. at 1:35:32–1:35:47 p.m. CSG 访问的其中两个电子邮件账户，分别专门用于与 CSG 律师和 Z&Z 律师通信，因此据称受律师—当事人保密特权保护。受托人称，仅从 CSG 律师访问的第三个电子邮件账户中提交了文件。根据该记录，法院认定，受托人已证明郭女士未就电子记录的提交遵守《强制提交命令》。\n\n第五，受托人主张，香港各方使用的检索词要么选择不当，要么旨在规避证据开示。特别是，受托人主张，所列检索词仅包括个人和实体的全名——其中包括郭女士作为其家人或密切关联人所知的个人，以及郭女士据称同样熟悉的实体。检索词中未列出任何爱称或表示熟悉关系的称呼。香港各方主张，他们一丝不苟地查阅并检索了所有相关当事方的信息，而传票正是就该等当事方寻求信息。法院不同意香港各方，并同意受托人的论点。因此，法院\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 1602-2 于 03/27/23 提交 于 03/27/23 11:18:17 登记 第 17 页，共 26 页\n\n认定，受托人已证明郭女士未就电子记录的提交遵守《强制提交命令》。\n\n第六，受托人反对称，就 WhatsApp 和 Telegram 而言，Vartan 声明称郭女士与家人的对话并不典型，却未澄清“不典型”的含义。相关地，受托人反对称，Vartan 声明未提及郭女士通过 WhatsApp 和 Telegram 与其家人以外人士（例如现任或前任律师以及其他代理人和顾问）的通信。这再次涉及受托人的第一项异议。Vartan 声明关于郭女士使用电子设备行为的陈述并无说服力。此外，如受托人所指出，所述内容并非完全坦诚。香港各方未就此提出反驳论点。因此，法院认定，受托人已证明郭女士未就电子记录的提交遵守《强制提交命令》。\n\n第七，受托人反对称，Vartan 声明未详细讨论郭女士保存的纸质文件的性质和种类，亦未讨论郭女士和 CSG 律师为在其纸质文件中检索符合请求范围的文件所作的努力。相反，Vartan 声明仅称他们进行了该项调查。香港各方未就此提出反驳论点。法院同意受托人的意见。因此，法院认定，受托人已证明郭女士未就实物记录的提交遵守《强制提交命令》。\n\n第八，受托人主张，Vartan Declaration（瓦尔坦声明）中关于郭女士的银行账户及其对该等账户的访问权限的陈述不可信。本院注意到，该主张涉及受托人的第一项异议，即，Vartan Declaration涉及郭女士与其银行账户的关系，但并非其宣誓陈述。Vartan Declaration称，郭女士在Bank of China（中国银行）的账户是其唯一现存账户，而她据称拒绝访问该账户，以便向受托人提供有关该账户的信息。受托人指出，尽管郭女士在中国银行实体网点可能不感到安全——但再次强调，这并非其宣誓陈述——她可以为其账户设置在线访问权限，或派遣指定代表前往中国银行实体网点获取账户信息。HK各方未对该异议作出回应。本院同意受托人的意见。因此，本院认定，受托人已证明郭女士未遵守强制提交命令中关于提交与其银行活动有关的信息的要求。\n\n第九，也是最后，受托人异议称，Vartan Declaration对于郭女士为搜寻和提交其控制之下、但由其现任或前任律师及其他代理人和顾问持有的文件所作的努力——如有——完全未作说明。除Vartan律师表示其不理解“advisor”一词外，HK各方未对该论点作出回应。在证言笔录中，郭女士作证称，其在其家族商业帝国的数家公司中担任重要的管理和／或所有权职位。如果这属实，她几乎必然控制着许多由现任或前任律师及其他代理人和顾问持有的文件。HK各方不能两面兼得。郭女士不能一方面以自身名义拥有、经营和管理重大商业权益，另一方面又对据称由其拥有、经营和管理的各实体所持有的文件毫无控制权。因此，本院认定，受托人已证明郭女士未遵守强制提交命令中关于提交由其控制、但由其现任或前任律师及其他代理人和顾问以实体、电子或其他形式持有的信息的要求。\n\n基于上述及庭审记录中所述的全部理由，本院认定，郭女士和HK USA均未遵守强制提交命令。\n\niv. Ms. Mei Guo（郭美）和HK International Funds Investments (USA) Ltd., LLC（HK国际基金投资（美国）有限公司）未勤勉尝试遵守强制提交命令\n\n除上述理由外，本院认定，HK各方均未勤勉尝试遵守，理由如下。传票于August 2022送达。强制提交命令于January 20, 2023作出。HK各方在强制提交命令录入前约有四个月时间为提交作准备。其未予提交，并且如上所述，其至今仍未提交。正如美国联邦最高法院（Supreme Court of the United States）大法官Sonia Sotomayor（索尼娅·索托马约尔）在其担任美国纽约南区联邦地区法院（United States District Court for the Southern District Court of New York）法官时所指出：“无论[律师]还是[当事人]，均无单方权利决定是否或何时遵守证据开示要求。”*535 Broadway Assocs. v. Com. Corp. of Am.*, 159 B.R. 403, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)（因原告及原告律师就包括证据开示在内的事项所采取的行为，在对抗程序中对原告施以驳回制裁）。\n\n该原则与本案相关。在延期动议中，HK各方向本院及其同行律师表示，其将以陆续方式向受托人提交文件。本院在作出责令说明理由命令时，明确依赖该陈述，并告知HK各方本院期望其依照该陈述行事，实际上给予HK各方至March 6, 2023 5:00 p.m.遵守强制提交命令的期限——较强制提交命令设定的期限延长一个多月，且距传票送达已近七个月。此外，本院保留了在有正当理由的情况下允许HK各方进一步延期至March 13, 2023的可能性。然而，HK各方没有利用本院给予其的时间，而是选择持续不遵守。HK各方利用本院给予的时间拖延、延迟并阻挠受托人正在进行的调查及相关证据开示工作。HK各方关于以“陆续”方式提交的虚假陈述，以及迟交且不符合要求的Vartan Declaration，并非勤勉尝试遵守。相反，在本院已通过强制提交命令和责令说明理由命令给予HK各方充分考虑后，这些行为是企图规避遵守义务的明显且恶劣的行为。参见，例如，Malatuea v. Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd., 987 F.2d 1536, 1542 (11th Cir. 1993)（确认地区法院的制裁；该法院认定“上诉人故意违反法院命令并滥用证据开示程序”以及“针对该等恶劣行为施加的制裁完全处于法官自由裁量权范围内”，并无明显错误）。\n\nc. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37（《联邦民事诉讼规则》第37条）\n\n当事人未作出披露或未配合证据开示的，可依据Fed. R. Civ. P. 37和D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 37受到制裁；该等规则经D. Conn. Bankr. L.R. 1001-1(a)(1)和2004-1(a)适用于本案。Rule 37(b)(2)规定：\n\n(A) 未遵守证据开示命令。如当事人、当事人的高级职员、董事或管理代理人，或根据Rule 30(b)(6)或31(a)(4)指定的证人，未遵守提供或准许证据开示的命令，包括根据Rule 26(f)、35或37(a)作出的命令，诉讼未决法院可作出进一步公正的命令。该等命令可包括下列事项：\n\n(i) 指示将该命令所涵盖的事项或其他指定事实，按照胜诉方所主张的内容，视为已为本案目的而确立；\n\n(ii) 禁止不服从命令的当事人支持或反对指定的请求或抗辩，或禁止其将指定事项作为证据提出；\n\n(iii) 全部或部分删除诉状；\n\n(iv) 在该命令得到遵守之前中止进一步程序；\n\n(v) 全部或部分驳回诉讼或程序；\n\n(vi) 对不服从命令的当事人作出缺席判决；或\n\n(vii) 将未遵守除接受身体或精神检查命令以外的任何命令的行为，视为藐视法庭。\n\n(B) 未提交人员接受检查。如当事人未遵守根据Rule 35(a)作出的、要求其提交另一人员接受检查的命令，法院可作出Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vi)所列的任何命令，除非不服从命令的当事人证明其无法提交该另一人员。\n\n(C) 支付费用。法院除作出或代替作出上述命令外，必须命令不服从命令的当事人、向该当事人提供建议的律师，或二者共同支付因该不遵守行为所致的合理费用，包括律师费，除非该不遵守行为具有实质正当理由，或其他情形使裁定费用不公正。\n\nFed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)。一旦认定未遵守强制提交命令，法院可根据Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)–(C)对当事人施以制裁。此外，法院可对当事人的律师施以制裁，但仅可依据Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C)。参见Apex Oil Co. v. Belcher Co. of N.Y., Inc., 855 F.2d 1009, 1013, 1014–15 (2d Cir. 1988)（认定Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C)项下制裁可适用于律师，但Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)–(B)项下制裁不可适用）。正如第二巡回法院所述：\n\nRule 37项下的纪律制裁旨在实现三个目的。第一，其确保当事人不会因其自身未遵守行为而获益。第二，其属于具体威慑，旨在促使遵守所作出的特定命令。第三，其旨在对本案及其他诉讼产生一般威慑作用，前提是被施加制裁的当事人在某种意义上存在过错。\n\nUpdate Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publ'g, Ltd., 843 F.2d 67, 71 (2d Cir. 1988)。\n\nd. Rules 37(b)(1) and 37(b)(2)(A)(vii)提供额外的法定藐视法庭权限\n\n强制提交命令并非要求接受身体或精神检查的命令。因此，可以适用藐视法庭——及其附随制裁。故此，除根据本院固有权力认定HK各方藐视法庭外，本院还基于上述讨论的理由，根据Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(vii)认定HK各方藐视法庭。本院进一步注意到，Rule 37(b)(1)为上述藐视法庭认定提供了进一步的法定依据，因为本院也是最初寻求证据开示的法院——而不仅是提交强制动议和责令说明理由命令动议的法院。参见In re Chase & Sanborn Corp., 872 F.2d 397 (11th Cir. 1989), rev'd on other grounds by Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989)（认定破产法院可根据Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)施以制裁，只要：(1)记录中的证据支持因未遵守证据开示命令而施以制裁；且(2)破产法院阐明该制裁意在补偿还是强制）。\n\ne. Rule 37(b)(2)(C)项下制裁适宜针对Ms. Mei Guo（郭美）、HK International Funds Investments (USA) Ltd., LLC（HK国际基金投资（美国）有限公司）、Attorney Vartan（瓦尔坦律师）及Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC（奇耶萨·沙希尼安与贾恩托马西律师事务所）作出\n\n“作为法院官员，律师有义务通过对合法证据开示请求作出勤勉、善意的回应，协助证据开示程序。”McLeod, Alexander, Powel & Apffel, P.C. v. Quarles, 894 F.2d 1482, 1486 (5th Cir. 1990)。因此，Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(C)规定：\n\n(C) 支付费用。法院除作出或代替作出上述命令外，必须命令不服从命令的当事人、向该当事人提供建议的律师，或二者共同支付因该不遵守行为所致的合理费用，包括律师费，除非该不遵守行为具有实质正当理由，或其他情形使裁定费用不公正。\n\n参见Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 763–64 (1980); Apex Oil, 855 F.2d at 1013, 1014–15。本院注意到，Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C)规定，在所述条件出现时，制裁具有强制性。如上所述，未遵守行为并无“实质正当理由”。在大多数情况下，HK各方根本没有任何解释。目前不存在会使裁定费用不公正的情形。因此，\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1602-2 Filed 03/27/23 Entered 03/27/23 11:18:17 Page 23 of 26\n\n本院面临的问题是，必须命令谁支付因不服从命令的当事人——郭女士、HK USA和／或Vartan律师及CSG——未遵守行为所致的合理费用，包括律师费。\n\n基于上述理由，本院已认定HK各方均藐视法庭。因此，基于相同理由，本院还认定，适宜对HK各方中的每一方作出Rule 37(b)(2)(C)项下制裁。\n\n此外，Attorney Vartan（瓦尔坦律师）和 CSG（Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC）充其量是在其延期动议中向法院作出了将继续提交材料的重大不实陈述；往坏处说，Attorney Vartan 和 CSG 明知故犯，向法院作出了虚假陈述。无论如何，Attorney Vartan 和 CSG 的行为在任何方面均不可接受。法院在拟定说明理由命令时依赖了 Attorney Vartan 和 CSG 的陈述，该命令给予 HK Parties（HK 各方）额外数周以履行义务。此外，从证言录取中——无论是 Attorney Vartan 在证言录取期间的行为，还是对证言录取前对抗程序中未能提交文件的讨论——均清楚表明，这是 Attorney Vartan 和 CSG 不可接受的、阻挠性行为模式的一部分。（证言录取记录第 166:12–20、167:6–20 页（讨论与 Lady May 有关的保密协议，以及 HK 各方和 CSG 未能提交该等协议）。）因此，基于上述认定，法院还根据 Rule 37(b)(2)(C) 对 Attorney Vartan 和 CSG 予以制裁。Cf. Martin v. Brown, 63 F.3d 1252 (3d Cir. 1995).\n\n第二巡回上诉法院已确认，根据 Rule 37，对担任一方当事人律师的律师事务所或个人律师，与该当事人承担连带责任的律师费和费用制裁。参见，例如，Thomas E. Hoar, Inc. v. Sara Lee Corp., 900 F.2d 522 (2d. Cir. 1990); Friedman v. Shree PLC, Civil No. 3:14CV00378 (AWT) (D. Conn. Sept. 15, 2017), ECF No. 311, aff'd by Civil No. 3:14CV00378 (AWT) (D. Conn. Oct. 17, 2019), ECF No. 368, aff'd by Friedman v. Radjuko, 854 F. App'x 390 (2d Cir. 2021).\n\n法院希望 Attorney Vartan 和 CSG 能够认识到，法院是法律法院，且作为出庭于本院的律师，其必须适当行事，并依照其作为法院官员的义务行事。在延期动议中，Attorney Vartan 向法院陈述，HK 各方将以滚动方式向 Trustee（受托人）提交文件。直至 2023 年 3 月 6 日晚上约 8:30，才向受托人提交了十一（11）份文件，更遑论以滚动方式提交。然而，Attorney Vartan 在法院面前辩称其未作出任何虚假陈述。此后，法院警告 Attorney Vartan，其不当行为可能导致对其作出 Rule 11 制裁。虽然法院目前拒绝这样做，但希望 Attorney Vartan 能认真对待这一告诫。\n\nf. 律师费和费用制裁标准\n\n律师费和费用制裁必须“在性质上是补偿性的，而非惩罚性的。”Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 581 U.S. 101, 108 (2017)。因此，Supreme Court（美国最高法院）认定：\n\n如果一项费用裁定涵盖由诉讼滥用行为所导致的法律账单，则该裁定即经过如此校准。但是，如果一项裁定延伸至更远范围——即延伸至即使不存在该不当行为本也会发生的费用——则其便越过了从补偿到惩罚的界限。因此，当法院运用其固有制裁权（以及民事程序）时，必须确立因果联系——即诉讼当事人的不当行为与对方当事人支付的法律费用之间的因果联系。\n\nId. 对强制提交动议的异议被部分支持这一事实并不重要。Liebowitz v. Bandshell Artist Mgmt., 6 F.4th 267, 288 (2d. Cir. 2021)（在不同语境下讨论律师费和费用制裁）。因此，法院对 HK 各方、Attorney Vartan 和 CSG 作出制裁，责令其支付与准备和推进强制提交动议，以及受托人为促使 HK 各方履行义务所作持续努力（包括任何正在进行的努力）有关的合理律师费和费用。受托人的费用和成本，是因 HK 各方未遵守传票，并在律师协助下持续不履行义务而产生，即使在强制提交命令和说明理由命令作出后仍然如此。其至今仍持续不履行义务。\n\nV. 结论\n\n基于上述理由及庭审记录，鉴于未遵守强制提交命令和说明理由命令，法院依据其固有的藐视法庭权力以及 Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(1) 和 37(b)(2)(A)(vii)，认定 Ms. Mei Guo（郭梅女士）和 HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC（HK International Funds Investments（USA）有限公司）藐视法庭，并按如下所述对其作出适当制裁。此外，基于上述理由及庭审记录，法院根据 Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C)，就 Ms. Mei Guo、HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC、Attorney Vartan 和 CSG 未履行义务所产生的律师费和费用，对其作出制裁。因此，现命令：\n\n命令：Ms. Mei Guo 和 HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC（“HK USA”）应于 2023 年 3 月 13 日晚上 11:59 前——即其在延期动议中请求的日期——通过完全遵守强制提交命令和说明理由命令，消除其藐视法庭状态；并进一步\n\n命令：如 Ms. Guo 和 HK USA 未能于 2023 年 3 月 13 日晚上 11:59 前消除其藐视法庭状态，受托人可就 Ms. Guo 和 HK USA 提出任何制裁动议，包括但不限于 Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A) 所列制裁；并进一步\n\n命令：根据 Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C)，Ms. Guo、HK USA、Attorney Vartan 和 Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC（“CSG”）承担连带责任，并\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1602-2 Filed 03/27/23 Entered 03/27/23 11:18:17 Page 26 of 26\n\n被制裁，作为补偿性损害赔偿，支付与受托人为取得对经法院授权传票的遵守所作努力有关的合理律师费和费用，该等费用自准备和推进强制提交动议起，直至并包括为取得遵守所作持续努力而支出的合理律师费和费用；该等合理律师费和费用应支付给 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）的 Chapter 11 财产，并由法院根据受托人应于 2023 年 3 月 24 日或之前提交的费用申请确定。\n\n于 2023 年 3 月 10 日在 Connecticut（康涅狄格州）Bridgeport（布里奇波特）签署。","key_entities":["Guo","Je","Kwok","Despins","Ho Wan Kwok","CIPA","Miles Guo","Paul Hastings"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":311,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":368,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":638,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":758,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1046,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1090,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1353,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1373,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1453,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1454,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1455,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1510,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1512,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1516,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1517,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1527,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1529,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":8802,"status":"published","published_at":"2023-03-27 00:00:00","created_at":"2023-03-27","updated_at":"2026-08-23 20:37:44"}