{"id":"court_ctb_164_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":164,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"### **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_ In re : Chapter 11 : Ho Wan Kwok, : Case No. 22-50073 : Debtor.<sup>1</sup> : : \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_:\n\n## **THE OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF UNSECURED CREDITORS' LIMITED OBJECTION TO DEBTOR'S APPLICATION FOR ENTRY OF AN ORDER AUTHORIZING THE EMPLOYMENT AND RETENTION OF BROWN RUDNICK LLP AS COUNSEL FOR THE DEBTOR**\n\nThe Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the \"Committee\") of Debtor and Debtor in Possession, Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\"), herby submits this Limited Objection to the Debtor's Application for Entry of an Order Authorizing the Employment and Retention of Brown Rudnick LLP (\"Brown Rudnick\") as Counsel for the Debtor (Dkt. No. 86, the \"Brown Rudnick Application\").\n\nIn support of the Objection, the Committee respectfully represents as follows:\n\n### **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\n1. In objection to the Brown Rudnick Application, the Committee does not challenge Brown Rudnick's qualifications or its disinterestedness. Rather, the Committee objects to the grossly excessive \\$1 million retainer and requests that the Court disgorge sums that are in excess of \\$375,000 and order that they be returned to the estate. Not only is this retainer far in excess of the norm or what should be expected of an individual chapter 11 case of this size, it also substantially exceeds the amount that Brown Rudnick received for other debtor cases where there was an actual operating business. This is especially the case where the Debtor purports to have no income, minimal assets and substantial debts, and the primary focus will be on the alleged connections between the Debtor and his purported shell companies. Giving Debtor's counsel a massive war-chest to continue to flaunt creditors would be a disservice to the Debtor's creditors and an affront to the bankruptcy process.\n\n2. Further, the Committee challenges the hourly rates that Brown Rudnick is seeking to charge as being far in excess of the market rates in this District, and even far in excess of what Brown Rudnick has charged in other debtor cases, where it has offered blended rates substantial below what it seeks in this case.\n\n#### **RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY**\n\n3. On February 15, 2022 (the \"Petition Date\"), the Debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11, Title 11 of the United States Code (the \"Bankruptcy Code\"). Since that time, the Debtor has remained a debtor-in-possession pursuant to §§1107 and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code.\n\n4. No trustee or examiner has yet been appointed in the Debtor's bankruptcy case, although on March 19, 2022, the United States Trustee (\"UST\") filed a Motion for Order Directing Appointment of an Examiner, or in the alternative, Motion for Order Directing the Appointment of a Chapter 11 Trustee (the \"Examiner/Trustee Motion\"). The Examiner/Trustee Motion is scheduled for hearing on April 13, 2022, and according to the UST's Amended Proposed Order at n. 1 (ECF No. 116), the Debtor has agreed to the Court's directing the UST to appoint an examiner in this case.\n\n<sup>1</sup> The Debtor is known by the following names: Guo Wengui; Miles Guo; Miles Kwok; and Ho Wan Kwok.\n\n5. On March 21, 2022, the Committee was officially appointed by the United States Trustee and on March 28, 2022, selected Pullman & Comley, LLC (\"P&C\") as its counsel.<sup>2</sup>\n\n6. On March 16, 2022, the Debtor filed the Brown Rudnick Application, which seeks to appoint Brown Rudnick as counsel to the Debtor and current Debtor-In-Possession. The Brown Rudnick Application identifies various services to be provided to the Debtor. ECF. No. 86, ¶11. Brown Rudnick identifies the principal persons who will work on the matter, with hourly rates ranging from \\$765 to \\$1,685 – with four attorneys seeking hourly rates in excess of \\$1,185. Id. ¶13.\n\n7. Brown Rudnick received a retainer of \\$1,000,000, via two payments of \\$500,000 on February 14 and 15, 2022, respectively (the \"Retainer\"). *Id*. ¶17. Brown Rudnick asserts that it applied \\$51,835.20 of the Retainer for preparation and services in connection with the filing of the Petition and that the balance of the retainer is \\$948,164.80. *Id*. The source of the retainer was a loan from Lamp Capital, LLC to the Debtor, who then directed that the loan proceeds be remitted to Brown Rudnick. *Id*. Brown Rudnick asserts that the Retainer will be used to pay its approved professional fees, with its fees to be thereafter paid by the proposed debtor-inpossession financing, provided that Brown Rudnick \"maintain[s] a Retainer balance not to exceed \\$250,000.\" *Id*. ¶18.\n\n8. Brown Rudnick submitted a copy of the Engagement Agreement with its Disclosure of Attorney Compensation. ECF No. 54, Exhibit A; see also ECF No. 142, Ex. A. The Engagement Agreement was dated February 14, 2022, with Brown Rudnick agreeing to represent the Debtor as of February 14, 2022. The Engagement Agreement does not provide any restriction on the amount of the Retainer that Brown Rudnick must maintain during the pendency of the proceeding. The Engagement Agreement provides that \"any unused portion will be\n\n<sup>2</sup> The Committee filed an application for authority to employ P&C on April 5, 2022.\n\nreturned\" to the Debtor, *id.,* thus indicating that the loan proceeds are property of the Debtor and therefore property of his estate.\n\n9. The Declaration of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok in Support of the Chapter 11 Case and Certain Motions states that Debtor \"needs highly capable and experienced restructuring counsel to advise and help structure my exit from Chapter 11, potentially in the form of a confirmed plan of reorganization.\" ECF No. 107, ¶49.\n\n#### **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**\n\n10. This Court has jurisdiction over the Claims Agent Application and the contested matter initiated thereby pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.\n\n#### **COMMITTEE POSITION**\n\n### **I. THE RETAINER IS EXCESSIVE AND A PORTION OF IT SHOULD BE RETURNED TO THE ESTATE**\n\n11. 11 U.S.C. § 329(a) obligates an attorney representing a debtor to disclose the compensation paid or agreed to be paid within one year of the petition date, as well as the source of compensation.\n\n12. In the Brown Rudnick Application, the Affidavit of William R. Baldiga, and the Disclosure of Compensation of Attorney for Debtor (ECF Nos. 86, 142 and 54, respectively) Brown Rudnick disclosed that it received the Retainer of \\$1,000,000 via two payments of \\$500,000, with the first delivered on February 14, 2022 – the date of its engagement - and the second delivered on February 15, 2022 – the Petition Date. ECF No. 86, ¶17; ECF No. 54, ¶1. The Debtor obtained the funds for the Retainer via a loan from Lamp Capital, LLC (\"Lamp\"), a company allegedly owned by the Debtor's son. ECF No. 86, ¶17; ECF No. 54, ¶2. Lamp is listed as a creditor on the Debtor's Schedule F. ECF No. 78. The Debtor then directed the proceeds of the loan to be remitted directly to Brown Rudnick. ECF No. 86, ¶17. Any amounts in excess of the retainer would be paid from debtor-In-possession financing. ECF. No. 54, ¶3. Brown Rudnick also asserts that its \"approved professional fees will be paid first from the Retainer and then from any approved debtor-in-possession financing, provided that Brown Rudnick shall maintain at all times a Retainer balance not to exceed \\$250,000.\" ECF No. 86, ¶18. Finally, Brown Rudnick assets that it charged \\$51,835.20 against the Retainer for preparation and services in connection with the filing of the Petition.<sup>3</sup>\n\n13. 11 U.S.C. § 329(b) provides as follows with regard to attorney compensation:\n\n(b) If such compensation exceeds the reasonable value of any such services, the court may cancel any such agreement, or order the return of any such payment, to the extent excessive, to—\n\n(1) the estate, if the property transferred--\n\n- (A) would have been property of the estate; or\n- (B) was to be paid by or on behalf of the debtor under a plan\n- under chapter 11, 12, or 13 of this title; or\n- (2) the entity that made such payment.\n- 14. Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2017(a) provides as follows:\n\nOn motion by any party in interest or on the court's own initiative, the court after notice and a hearing may determine whether any payment of money or any transfer of property by the debtor, made directly *or indirectly and in contemplation of the filing of a petition under the Code* by or against the debtor or before entry of the order for relief in an involuntary case, to an attorney for services rendered or to be rendered is excessive.\n\nFed. R. Bankr. P. 2017(a) (emphasis added).\n\n15. Courts have authority to review and disgorge fees paid more than a year prior to\n\nfiling. *In re Glemaud*, 2013 WL 4498677 at \\*9 (Bankr. D. Conn 2013); *In re Laferriere*, 286\n\n<sup>3</sup> The Engagement Agreement was dated February 14, 2022 and Brown Rudnick agreed to represent the Debtor as of that date. The Debtor filed the petition the following day. It is difficult to understand how\n\nB.R. 520, 529-30 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2002). Similarly, Courts have the authority to determine that a retainer paid to a Debtor's counsel is excessive. \"All prepetition retainers for bankruptcy services, regardless by whom paid, are subject to review and disgorgement under § 329(b) and Bankruptcy Rule 2017, if they are excessive or unreasonable.\" *In re Printing Dimensions, Inc.*, 153 B.R. 715, 719–20 (Bankr. D. Md. 1993) (citing *In re Stoecker*, 114 B.R. 865, 971, 978 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990); *In re McDonald Bros. Constr., Inc.*, 114 B.R. 989, 995–96 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990)).\n\n16. \"Once a question of the reasonableness of counsel's fees is raised by a party in interest bringing a motion, the attorney bears the burden of proving his fee was reasonable.\" *In re Chez,* 441 B.R. 724, 730 (Bankr.D.Conn.2010) (citing *In re Wood,* 408 B.R. 841, 848 (Bankr.D.Kan.2009)). *See also Snyder v. Dewoskin* (*In re Mahendra*)*,* 131 F.3d 750, 757 (8th Cir.197), *cert. denied,* 523 U.S. 1107, 118S.Ct. 1678, 140 L.Ed.2d 815(1998) (footnote omitted). *See also In re Glemaud*, No. 11-31697, 2013 WL 4498677, at \\*4–5 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2013).\n\n17. The Committee submits that the \\$1,000,000 Retainer is excessive for this matter, and that the portion above \\$375,000.00 should be disgorged and transferred to the estate. When, as in this case, the retainer for bankruptcy counsel is a security retainer, as opposed to an advance payment, the retainer is property of the estate and subject to return to the estate to the extent it is excessive. *See In re D.L.I.C., Inc.*, 120 B.R. 348, 351 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990). Here, the \\$1,000,000 fee is excessive, especially when considering the types of retainers that Brown Rudnick has typically required for major businesses undergoing chapter 11 and the nature of the services that will be needed in this matter.\n\n<sup>\\$51,835.20</sup> in services were provided in twenty-four hours, especially when the Debtor only filed a bare bones filing of a petition without any first day motions or schedules.\n\n18. It does not appear that Brown Rudnick has required retainers of this size in other recent bankruptcies where it represented a chapter 11 debtor. For example, Brown Rudnick served as counsel to debtor HMH Media, Inc. f/k/a Herald Media Holdings, Inc. (\"HMH\"), which owned the Boston Herald, in its consolidated Chapter 11 bankruptcy case in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. Docket 17-12881-LSS. In their Application for Employment, Brown Rudnick only had a retainer of approximately \\$14,200 at the time of filing. Docket No. 17-12811-LSS, Dkt. No. 28, ¶18, attached as Exhibit A. If one were to include under the category of a retainer the amounts paid for services performed and expenses incurred in advance of the petition date (\\$269,100.00), the amount was less than \\$300,000. *Id*.\n\n19. Similarly, Brown Rudnick served as counsel to the chapter 11 debtor, Dean & Deluca New York, Inc., in its consolidated chapter 11 bankruptcy case in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. Docket. No. 20-10916 (MEW). In their Application for Employment, Brown Rudnick reported receiving a retainer of approximately \\$374,150.89 at the time of filing. Docket. No. 20-10916(MEW), Dkt. No. 26, ¶¶18-19, attached as Exhibit B. The Committee is using this amount as a baseline of an appropriate retainer for the Debtor in this much smaller case.\n\n20. In light of the anticipated services to be rendered, the Committee submits that the reduced retainer is appropriate and sufficient. This is not a business bankruptcy case of an operating debtor, where numerous first-day motions are typically filed and there are multiple interim hearings on traditional debtor-In-possession financing, and the like. This is an individual chapter 11 bankruptcy where the Debtor asserts that he has meager assets except for two causes\n\n7\n\nof action with unknown value,<sup>4</sup> has no income, and exorbitant debt in excess of \\$373 million. It is not clear exactly why a retainer of this size is warranted, especially when considering the services that would need to be rendered. The Brown Rudnick Application identifies the services to be rendered on behalf of the Debtor. Dkt. No. 86, ¶8d. These are typical services rendered to a debtor, including preparation of Schedules, SOFAs and monthly operating reports, conferring with professionals, preparation of pleadings, seeking approval of a disclosure statement and confirmation of a plan, and appearing in court. Nothing suggests why an excessive retainer is warranted or why a substantial portion should not be returned for the benefit of the estate.\n\n21. Of equal importance are concerns that the Debtor will not serve the best interests of the estate and creditors, and Debtor's counsel will use the war-chest of a retainer to frustrate and delay the Committee and other parties' efforts to uncover assets and maximize the value of the estate. An individual chapter 11 debtor in possession is a fiduciary for his or her creditors, *In re Sillerman*¸ 605 B.R. 631, 647 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019), and must \"marshal assets in a way that maximizes their value for the benefit, primarily of creditors ….\" *USHA SoHa Terrace, LLC v. RGS Holding, LLC* (*In re Futterman*), 584 B.R. 609. 618 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018). This fiduciary duty includes the \"duty to wisely manage the estate's legal claims,\" *Smart World Techs., LLC v. Juno Online Servs., Inc.* (*In re Smart World Techs., LLC*), 423 F.3d 166, 175 (2d Cir.2005).\n\n22. As such, Brown Rudnick is serving not only as counsel to the Debtor, but counsel to the Debtor as a debtor-in-possession. Inasmuch as chapter 11 debtors-in-possession \"have fiduciary responsibilities to unsecured creditors and other parties in interest requiring them to act in the capacity of a bankruptcy trustee,\" \"lawyers representing debtors-in-possession are also charged with special responsibilities of insuring that when the interest of the estate conflicts with\n\n<sup>4</sup> Debtor is seeking to retain counsel to prosecute these actions via the Motion for Entry of Authorizing (I) Employment and Payment of Professionals Utilized in the Ordinary Course, (II) Payment of Prepetition\n\nthe interest of the individual who signs his checks, that the interest of the estate prevails.\" *In re Harp*, 166 B.R. 740, 746 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1993).\n\n23. The Debtor has already acted in contravention of his duty to marshal and maximize the value of assets of the estate, as well as to wisely manage the estate's legal claims, by appealing Judge Ostrager's February 9, 2022 ruling that the Debtor has the beneficial interest in the Lady May and opposing that ruling as having binding effect in this case. Any responsible fiduciary would act on that ruling and finding as having preclusive effect, as it would significantly augment the estate, yet the Debtor, through Brown Rudnick, has argued the opposite before this Court in opposing the Motion of Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. for Entry of an Order Confirming the Inapplicability of the Automatic Stay or, in the Alternative, Relief from the Automatic Stay Pursuant to Section 362(d)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code (the \"PAX Motion\").\n\n24. Further, the Debtor is alleged to have frustrated creditors in prior lawsuits, including invoking the Fifth Amendment over questions concerning his assets and financial dealings. *See e.g. Examiner/Trustee Motion* ¶¶46, 49, 50.\n\n25. The foregoing demonstrates a concern over whether the Debtor, and thus his counsel, will be acting in the best interest of creditors and to benefit the debtor's estate. As observed by the court in *In re JLM, Inc.*, 210 B.R. 19 (B.A.P. 2d Cir. 1997):\n\n> Under no circumstances, however, may the lawyer for a bankruptcy estate pursue a course of action, unless he has determined in good faith and as an exercise of his professional judgment that the course complies with the Bankruptcy Code and serves the best interests of the estate.\n\n*Id.* at 26 (quoting *Everett v. Perez* (*In re Perez*), 30 F.3d 1209, 1219 (9th Cir.1994)).\n\nClaims and (III) Granting Related Relief. ECF No. 119.\n\n26. It is obvious that creditors and the estate would be best served if the Debtor responded to questions concerning his assets and financial dealings and disclosed his \"efforts to avoid and deceive his creditors by parking his substantial personal assets with a series of corporations, trusted confidants, and family members.\" Examiner/Trustee Motion, ¶40 (citing to February 2022 Contempt Decision).\n\n27. Although the Debtor has proposed the funding of an investigation of his assets with a DIP loan from what he asserts is his son's company, Golden Spring (New York) Ltd. (ECF No. 117), the loan is rigged to become unavailable if there is an appointment of a chapter 11 trustee, the Court grants the PAX Motion, or the Debtor's exclusive period is terminated. These conditions are paradigmatic features of DIP financing that \"leverage the Chapter 11 process by preventing motions by parties-in-interest from being decided on the merits.\" *In re Ames Dept. Stores, Inc.,* 115 B.R. 34, 37 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990). Until provisions such as these are removed, and given the finding of Judge Ostrager that the Debtor has engaged in a shell game with his assets, it hardly seems sensible to allow his bankruptcy counsel to hold onto a \\$1 million Retainer while creditors are left with the untested process that has been proposed for investigating the Debtor's assets.\n\n28. Finally, the Brown Rudnick Application proposes that Brown Rudnick's approved fees would first be paid from the Retainer and then from the DIP financing that has been proposed, provided that Brown Rudnick will \"maintain at all times a Retainer balance not to exceed \\$250,000.\" ECF No. 86, ¶18. It is patently unfair for Brown Rudnick to hold onto a \\$250,000 kitty for it own fees, after having been paid \\$750,000 from the Retainer if fees to that extent are allowed, and then revert to the DIP financing for payment of its fees. Instead, the\n\n10\n\namount of the Retainer should be shared with other estate professionals and if the DIP financing is approved, all estate professionals would be paid from that source.\n\n#### **II.**\n\n#### **THE HOURLY RATE IS EXCESSIVE**\n\n29. The Brown Rudnick Application further identifies the hourly rates that it seeks to charge, with four attorneys charging in excess of \\$1,000 per hour including three attorneys from \\$1,450 - \\$1,658 per hour. ECF No. 86, ¶8d. Brown Rudnick also seeks approval of expenses, including travels costs, although it \"will bill non-working travel time at half the otherwise applicable hourly rate.\" ECF No. 86, Declaration ¶13.\n\n30. \"The reasonable hourly rate in the lodestar method should be based on the prevailing market rates for attorneys with comparable skill and standing in the pertinent legal community.\" *In re Jackson*, 630 B.R. 700, 728 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2021) (citing *Kerin v. U.S. Postal Serv.*, 218 F.3d 185, 190 (2d Cir. 2000)).\n\n31. The hourly rates claimed by Brown Rudnick substantially exceed the prevailing market rates in the District of Connecticut. It's more than double, nearly triple, what is often seen in this district.\n\n32. The hourly rates claimed by Brown Rudnick are even excessive in comparison to its prior work as Debtor's counsel. For example, in *In re HMH Media, Inc*., Brown Rudnick offered a blended rate of \\$615 per hour. See Ex A, ¶16 (\"Brown Rudnick proposes to render its services on an hourly fee basis according to a blended hourly rate of \\$615 per hour for all attorney time\"). Similarly, in *In re Dean and Deluca New York, Inc.*, Brown Rudnick offered a blended rate of \\$850 per hour. *See Ex. B*, ¶14 (\"Brown Rudnick proposes to render its services on an hourly fee basis according to a blended hourly rate of \\$850 per hour for all attorney time\").\n\n33. The Committee also questions the amount charged for travel time. Even though Brown Rudnick offered to charge half of its hourly rate for travel time, the Debtor selected counsel who work out of Brown Rudnick's offices in Boston and New York even though it has offices in Connecticut. With the return of in-person hearings, and the likely appearance of multiple attorneys at such hearings that have been identified as working on the Debtor's case, this is an unnecessary and unwarranted charge.\n\n**WHEREFORE,** the Committee respectfully requests that the Brown Rudnick Application should not be approved by the Court unless a portion of the Retainer is refunded to the estate and the terms of the engagement are modified as proposed herein.\n\nDated: Bridgeport, Connecticut April 6, 2022\n\n# **OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF UNSECURED CREDITORS OF HO WAN KWOK**\n\nBy: */s/Irve J. Goldman*  Irve J. Goldman Jonathan A. Kaplan Pullman & Comley, LLC 850 Main Street, 8th Floor PO Box 7006 Bridgeport, CT 06601-7006 (203) 330-2213 igoldman@pullcom.com\n\nIts Attorneys (Application Pending)\n\nACTIVE/83201.1/JKAPLAN/10237433v4","body_zh":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION（美国康涅狄格区破产法院布里奇波特分院）\n\n关于：\n第 11 章\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵），\n案件编号：22-50073\n债务人。1\n\n无担保债权人官方委员会对债务人关于作出授权聘请及留任 BROWN RUDNICK LLP 作为债务人律师的命令的申请的有限异议\n\n债务人及占有中债务人 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（下称“债务人”）的无担保债权人官方委员会（下称“委员会”）特此对债务人关于作出授权聘请及留任 Brown Rudnick LLP（下称“Brown Rudnick”）作为债务人律师的申请（案卷编号 86，下称“Brown Rudnick 申请”）提出本有限异议。\n\n为支持本异议，委员会恭敬陈述如下：\n\n初步声明\n\n1. 在对 Brown Rudnick 申请提出异议时，委员会并不质疑 Brown Rudnick 的资质或其无利害关系性。相反，委员会异议针对的是数额严重过高的 100 万美元预付款，并请求法院追缴超过 375,000 美元的部分，裁定将其退还给破产财产。该预付款不仅远远超出了此等规模的个人第 11 章案件的常态或预期标准，而且也大幅超过了 Brown Rudnick 在具有实际运营业务的其他债务人案件中所收取的金额。在债务人声称自己无收入、资产极少且债务庞大，且主要焦点将集中在债务人与其所谓空壳公司之间被指控的关联上的情况下，尤其如此。给予债务人律师巨额诉讼资金以继续藐视债权人，将损害债务人债权人的利益，并对破产程序构成冒犯。\n\n2. 此外，委员会对 Brown Rudnick 寻求收取的每小时费率提出质疑，认为其远远超出了本地区的市场费率，甚至远远超出了 Brown Rudnick 在其他债务人案件中所收取的费率——在那些案件中，其提供的综合费率大幅低于其在本案中寻求的费率。\n\n相关程序历史\n\n3. 2022 年 2 月 15 日（下称“申请日”），债务人根据《美国法典》第 11 编（下称“《破产法典》”）第 11 章自愿提交了破产保护救济申请。自那时起，债务人一直根据《破产法典》第 1107 条和第 1108 条保持为占有中债务人。\n\n4. 尽管美国联邦破产受托人（下称“UST”）于 2022 年 3 月 19 日提交了《关于作出指示指定审查员的命令的动议，或在备选方案下，关于作出指示指定第 11 章受托人的命令的动议》（下称“审查员/受托人动议”），但债务人的破产案件中尚未指定受托人或审查员。审查员/受托人动议定于 2022 年 4 月 13 日举行听证会，且根据 UST 的拟定修改命令注 1（ECF 编号 116），债务人已同意法院指示 UST 在本案中指定审查员。\n\n1 债务人以下列姓名为人所知：Guo Wengui（郭文贵）；Miles Guo；Miles Kwok；以及 Ho Wan Kwok。\n\n5. 2022 年 3 月 21 日，委员会由美国联邦破产受托人正式指定，并于 2022 年 3 月 28 日选定 Pullman & Comley, LLC（下称“P&C”）作为其法律顾问。2\n\n6. 2022 年 3 月 16 日，债务人提交了 Brown Rudnick 申请，请求指定 Brown Rudnick 作为债务人及当前占有中债务人的律师。Brown Rudnick 申请列明了拟向债务人提供的各项服务。ECF 编号 86，第 11 段。Brown Rudnick 确定了将参与处理本案的主要人员，其小时费率从 765 美元到 1,685 美元不等——其中有四名律师寻求的小时费率超过 1,185 美元。同上，第 13 段。\n\n7. Brown Rudnick 分别于 2022 年 2 月 14 日和 15 日分两笔各 500,000 美元的款项收到了 1,000,000 美元的预付款（下称“预付款”）。同上，第 17 段。Brown Rudnick 声称其已将该预付款中的 51,835.20 美元用于与提交破产申请相关的准备工作及服务，预付款余额为 948,164.80 美元。同上。预付款的来源是 Lamp Capital, LLC 向债务人提供的一笔贷款，随后债务人指示将该笔贷款收益汇至 Brown Rudnick。同上。Brown Rudnick 主张，该预付款将用于支付其获批的专业服务费，其后续费用将由拟议的占有中债务人融资支付，前提是 Brown Rudnick“维持不超过 250,000 美元的预付款余额”。同上，第 18 段。\n\n8. Brown Rudnick 随其《律师报酬披露》一并提交了《聘用协议》的副本。ECF 编号 54，附件 A；亦参见 ECF 编号 142，附件 A。《聘用协议》日期为 2022 年 2 月 14 日，Brown Rudnick 同意自 2022 年 2 月 14 日起代表债务人。《聘用协议》并未对 Brown Rudnick 在诉讼程序未决期间必须维持的预付款金额做出任何限制。《聘用协议》规定“任何未使用的部分将退还”\n\n2 委员会于 2022 年 4 月 5 日提交了聘请 P&C 的授权申请。\n\n给债务人，同上，从而表明该贷款收益为债务人的财产，因此属于其破产财产。\n\n9. 《Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）先生支持第 11 章案件及若干动议的声明》指出，债务人“需要极具能力且经验丰富的重组律师来提供建议，并协助规划我退出第 11 章的方案，形式可能是一份获确认的重组计划。”ECF 编号 107，第 49 段。\n\n管辖权与审理地点\n\n10. 根据《美国法典》第 28 编第 157 条和第 1334 条，本法院对理赔代理人申请及由此引发的争议事项具有管辖权。根据《美国法典》第 28 编第 1408 条和第 1409 条，审理地点适当。\n\n委员会立场\n\nI. 预付款过高，且其中一部分应退还给破产财产\n\n11. 《美国法典》第 11 编第 329(a) 条规定，代表债务人的律师有义务披露在申请日前一年内已支付或同意支付的报酬，以及该报酬的来源。\n\n12. 在 Brown Rudnick 申请、William R. Baldiga 的宣誓书以及《债务人律师报酬披露》（分别为 ECF 编号 86、142 和 54）中，Brown Rudnick 披露其通过两笔各 500,000 美元的付款收到了 1,000,000 美元的预付款，第一笔于 2022 年 2 月 14 日（即其受聘之日）交付，第二笔于 2022 年 2 月 15 日（即申请日）交付。ECF 编号 86，第 17 段；ECF 编号 54，第 1 段。债务人用于预付款的资金来自 Lamp Capital, LLC（下称“Lamp”）的贷款，据称该公司由债务人的儿子拥有。ECF 编号 86，第 17 段；ECF 编号 54，第 2 段。Lamp 在债务人的附表 F 中被列为债权人。ECF 编号 78。债务人随后指示将贷款收益直接汇至 Brown Rudnick。ECF 编号 86，第 17 段。任何超出预付款的金额将从占有中债务人融资中支付。ECF 编号 54，第 3 段。Brown Rudnick 还主张，其“获批的专业服务费将首先从预付款中支付，然后从任何获批的占有中债务人融资中支付，前提是 Brown Rudnick 在任何时候均应维持不超过 250,000 美元的预付款余额”。ECF 编号 86，第 18 段。最后，Brown Rudnick 主张其针对与提交破产申请相关的准备工作及服务从预付款中扣除了 51,835.20 美元。3\n\n13. 《美国法典》第 11 编第 329(b) 条就律师报酬做出如下规定：\n\n(b) 若该等报酬超过任何该等服务的合理价值，法院可撤销任何该等协议，或在过高的限度内命令将任何该等款项退还给——\n\n(1) 破产财产，若所转移的财产——\n\n(A) 本应属于破产财产；或\n(B) 原定由债务人或代表债务人根据本编第 11、12 或 13 章下的计划支付；或\n(2) 支付该款项的实体。\n\n14. 《联邦破产程序规则》第 2017(a) 条规定如下：\n\n经任何利害关系方提出动议或由法院依职权，在发出通知并举行听证后，法院可判定：债务人直接或间接地、且考虑到根据《法典》由其或针对其提交破产申请而做出的、或在非自愿案件作出救济命令之前向律师就已提供或将提供的服务支付的任何款项或转移的任何财产是否过高。\n\n《联邦破产程序规则》第 2017(a) 条（强调为后加）。\n\n15. 法院有权对在提交申请前一年以上支付的费用进行审查并予以追缴。参见 In re Glemaud, 2013 WL 4498677, at *9 (Bankr. D. Conn 2013)；In re Laferriere, 286\n\n3 《聘用协议》日期为 2022 年 2 月 14 日，Brown Rudnick 同意自该日起代表债务人。债务人于次日提交了申请。很难理解如何在二十四小时内提供了 51,835.20 美元的服务，尤其是债务人当时仅提交了最基本的破产申请文件，而没有任何首日动议或附表。\n\nB.R. 520, 529-30 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2002)。同样，法院有权认定支付给债务人律师的预付款过高。“无论由谁支付，所有用于破产服务的申请前预付款，若属于过高或不合理的，均须根据第 329(b) 条和《破产规则》第 2017 条接受审查并予以追缴。”In re Printing Dimensions, Inc., 153 B.R. 715, 719–20 (Bankr. D. Md. 1993)（引用 In re Stoecker, 114 B.R. 865, 971, 978 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990)；In re McDonald Bros. Constr., Inc., 114 B.R. 989, 995–96 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990)）。\n\n16. “一旦利害关系方通过提出动议对律师费用的合理性提出质疑，律师即承担证明其费用具有合理性的举证责任。”In re Chez, 441 B.R. 724, 730 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2010)（引用 In re Wood, 408 B.R. 841, 848 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2009)）。亦参见 Snyder v. Dewoskin (In re Mahendra), 131 F.3d 750, 757 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1107, 118 S. Ct. 1678, 140 L. Ed. 2d 815 (1998)（脚注省略）。亦参见 In re Glemaud, No. 11-31697, 2013 WL 4498677, at *4–5 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2013)。\n\n17. 委员会认为，1,000,000 美元的预付款对本案而言是过高的，超过 375,000.00 美元的部分应当予以追缴并转入破产财产。当破产律师的预付款属于担保性预付款（security retainer）而非预先支付款（advance payment）时（正如本案的情形），该预付款属于破产财产，并在过高限度内须退还给破产财产。参见 In re D.L.I.C., Inc., 120 B.R. 348, 351 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990)。在本案中，该 1,000,000 美元的费用是过高的，尤其是考虑到 Brown Rudnick 通常对经历第 11 章程序的大型企业所要求的预付款类型，以及本案中所需服务的性质。\n\n18. 在 Brown Rudnick 近期代表第 11 章债务人的其他破产案件中，其似乎并未要求过如此数额的预付款。例如，Brown Rudnick 在美国特拉华区破产法院审理的债务人 HMH Media, Inc.（前称 Herald Media Holdings, Inc.，下称“HMH”，曾拥有《波士顿先驱报》）合并第 11 章破产案中担任其律师。案卷号 17-12881-LSS。在其《聘用申请》中，Brown Rudnick 在提交破产申请时的预付款仅约为 14,200 美元。案卷号 17-12811-LSS，案卷编号 28，第 18 段，作为附件 A 附后。若将申请日前已履行服务和发生费用的已支付金额（269,100.00 美元）计入预付款类别，总额也低于 300,000 美元。同上。\n\n19. 同样，Brown Rudnick 在 United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York（美国纽约南区破产法院）审理的 Dean & Deluca New York, Inc. 合并第 11 章破产案件中担任第 11 章债务人的法律顾问。Docket. No. 20-10916 (MEW)。在其聘用申请中，Brown Rudnick 报告称在申请提起时收到了约 $374,150.89 的预付聘金。Docket. No. 20-10916(MEW), Dkt. No. 26, ¶¶18-19，作为附件 B 附上。委员会正将该金额作为本案这一规模小得多的案件中债务人适当预付聘金的基线。\n\n20. 鉴于预期将提供的服务，委员会认为减少后的预付聘金是适当且充足的。本案并非经营性债务人的商业破产案件（此类案件通常会提交大量首日动议，并就传统的占有中债务人融资等事项举行多次中期听证会）。本案是一起个人第 11 章破产案件，债务人声称除两项价值未知的诉由外其资产微薄（脚注 4：债务人正寻求通过《关于作出准予（I）聘用及支付在日常业务过程中使用的专业人士、（II）支付申请前债权以及（III）准予相关救济的命令的动议》（ECF No. 119）聘请律师来提起这些诉讼），且无收入，并背负超过 $3.73 亿的巨额债务。目前尚不清楚为何需要如此数额的预付聘金，特别是在考虑到需要提供的服务的情况下。Brown Rudnick 申请指明了代表债务人所要提供的服务。Dkt. No. 86, ¶8d。这些是向债务人提供的典型服务，包括准备财产清单、财务状况说明书（SOFAs）和月度运营报告、与专业人士磋商、准备诉状、寻求披露声明的批准和重整计划的确认，以及出庭。没有任何理由表明为何需要过高的预付聘金，或者为何不应退还相当大的一部分以使破产财团受益。\n\n21. 同样重要的是，人们担心债务人不会为破产财团和债权人的最大利益服务，而且债务人的法律顾问将利用巨额预付聘金来挫败和拖延委员会及其他各方揭露资产并使破产财团价值最大化的努力。个人第 11 章占有中债务人是其债权人的受托人，In re Sillerman¸ 605 B.R. 631, 647 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019)，并且必须“以主要为债权人利益实现其价值最大化的方式整理资产……”。USHA SoHa Terrace, LLC v. RGS Holding, LLC (In re Futterman), 584 B.R. 609. 618 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018)。该信托义务包括“明智地管理破产财团法律主张的义务”，Smart World Techs., LLC v. Juno Online Servs., Inc. (In re Smart World Techs., LLC), 423 F.3d 166, 175 (2d Cir.2005)。\n\n22. 因此，Brown Rudnick 不仅担任债务人的法律顾问，而且担任作为占有中债务人的债务人的法律顾问。既然第 11 章占有中债务人“对无担保债权人和其他利害关系方负有信托责任，要求他们以破产受托人的身份行事”，那么“代表占有中债务人的律师也承担着特殊的责任，即确保当破产财团的利益与为其签署支票的个人的利益发生冲突时，破产财团的利益优先。”In re Harp, 166 B.R. 740, 746 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1993)。\n\n23. 债务人已经违反了其整理破产财团资产并实现其价值最大化、以及明智管理破产财团法律主张的义务，其对 Ostrager 法官 2022 年 2 月 9 日关于债务人对 Lady May 拥有实益权益的裁定提出上诉，并反对该裁定在本案中具有约束力。任何负责任的受托人都会将该裁定和认定视为具有既判效力并依此行事，因为这将显著增加破产财团的财产，然而债务人却通过 Brown Rudnick 在反对 Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.（太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金有限公司）关于作出确认自动中止不适用或备选地根据《破产法典》第 362(d)(2) 条免除自动中止的命令的动议（“PAX 动议”）时，向本法院提出了相反的主张。\n\n24. 此外，据称债务人在先前的诉讼中挫败了债权人，包括在涉及其资产和财务交易的问题上援引第五修正案特权。参见例如《审查员/受托人动议》¶¶46, 49, 50。\n\n25. 上述情况表明，人们对债务人及其法律顾问是否会为了债权人的最大利益和为了使债务人的破产财团受益而行事表示担忧。正如法院在 In re JLM, Inc., 210 B.R. 19 (B.A.P. 2d Cir. 1997) 中所指出的：\n\n无论在何种情况下，破产财团的律师都不得采取某种行动方案，除非其出于善意并运用其专业判断确定该方案符合《破产法典》并符合破产财团的最大利益。\n\n同上，第 26 页（援引 Everett v. Perez (In re Perez), 30 F.3d 1209, 1219 (9th Cir.1994)）。\n\n26. 显而易见的是，如果债务人回答有关其资产和财务交易的问题，并披露其“通过将大量个人资产存放在一系列公司、受信赖的亲信和家庭成员处来规避和欺骗其债权人的行为”，将最符合债权人和破产财团的利益。《审查员/受托人动议》，¶40（引自 2022 年 2 月藐视法庭裁决）。\n\n27. 尽管债务人提议通过其声称属于其儿子的公司 Golden Spring (New York) Ltd.（金泉（纽约）有限公司）提供的 DIP 贷款来为其资产调查提供资金（ECF No. 117），但该贷款被设定为在任命第 11 章受托人、法院准予 PAX 动议或债务人的排他期终止时即失效。这些条件是 DIP 融资的典型特征，“通过阻止利害关系方的动议根据实质理由作出裁决，来撬动和操纵第 11 章程序。”In re Ames Dept. Stores, Inc., 115 B.R. 34, 37 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990)。在删除此类条款之前，且鉴于 Ostrager 法官认定债务人对其资产进行了欺骗性的倒手转移，允许其破产法律顾问保留 $100 万的预付聘金，而让债权人面对提议用于调查债务人资产的未经检验的程序，这显然是不合常理的。\n\n28. 最后，Brown Rudnick 申请提议 Brown Rudnick 获批的费用将首先从预付聘金中支付，然后从提议的 DIP 融资中支付，条件是 Brown Rudnick 将“始终保持不超过 $250,000 的预付聘金余额”。ECF No. 86, ¶18。在如果达到该数额的费用获得准许的情况下从预付聘金中获得 $750,000 的支付后，Brown Rudnick 为其自身费用保留一个 $250,000 的专用款池，然后转向 DIP 融资来支付其费用，这显然是不公平的。相反，预付聘金的金额应当与其他破产财团专业人士共享，并且如果 DIP 融资获得批准，所有破产财团专业人士都应从该来源获得支付。\n\nII.\n费率过高\n\n29. Brown Rudnick 申请进一步指明了其寻求收取的费率，其中四名律师收费超过每小时 $1,000，包括三名律师收费在每小时 $1,450 至 $1,658 之间。ECF No. 86, ¶8d。Brown Rudnick 还寻求批准开支，包括差旅费用，尽管其“将按照原适用小时费率的一半收取非工作差旅时间的费用”。ECF No. 86, 声明 ¶13。\n\n30. “在基准折算法中，合理的费率应基于相关法律界具有相当技能和地位的律师的通行市场费率。”In re Jackson, 630 B.R. 700, 728 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2021)（援引 Kerin v. U.S. Postal Serv., 218 F.3d 185, 190 (2d Cir. 2000)）。\n\n31. Brown Rudnick 主张的费率大幅超过了 District of Connecticut（康涅狄格区）的通行市场费率。这比该区通常所见费率的两倍还多，接近三倍。\n\n32. 与其此前作为债务人法律顾问的工作相比，Brown Rudnick 主张的费率也是过高的。例如，在 In re HMH Media, Inc. 案中，Brown Rudnick 提供了每小时 $615 的综合费率。参见附件 A, ¶16（“Brown Rudnick 提议在小时收费的基础上提供服务，所有律师时间的综合费率为每小时 $615”）。同样，在 In re Dean and Deluca New York, Inc. 案中，Brown Rudnick 提供了每小时 $850 的综合费率。参见附件 B, ¶14（“Brown Rudnick 提议在小时收费的基础上提供服务，所有律师时间的综合费率为每小时 $850”）。\n\n33. 委员会亦对差旅时间收取的金额提出质疑。尽管 Brown Rudnick 提出按其小时费率的一半收取差旅时间费用，但债务人选定的律师却在 Brown Rudnick 的波士顿和纽约办事处工作，尽管其在康涅狄格州设有办事处。随着现场听证会的恢复，以及指明处理债务人案件的多名律师可能会出席此类听证会，这是一笔不必要且不合理的收费。\n\n综上所述，委员会谨请求法院不应批准 Brown Rudnick 申请，除非将部分预付聘金退还给破产财团，并按本文件提议修改聘用条款。\n\n日期：康涅狄格州布里奇波特 2022 年 4 月 6 日\nOFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF UNSECURED CREDITORS OF HO WAN KWOK（郭文贵无担保债权人官方委员会）\n\n签署人：/s/Irve J. Goldman\nIrve J. Goldman\nJonathan A. Kaplan\nPullman & Comley, LLC\n850 Main Street, 8th Floor\nPO Box 7006\nBridgeport, CT 06601-7006\n(203) 330-2213\nigoldman@pullcom.com\n\n其代理律师（聘用申请待决）\n\nACTIVE/83201.1/JKAPLAN/10237433v4","key_entities":["Je","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Guo","CIPA","Miles Guo"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":26,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":28,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":54,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":78,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":86,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":107,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":116,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":117,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":119,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":142,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":3600,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 13:42:42"}