{"id":"court_ctb_1650_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":1650,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION :","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n:\n\n:\n\n:\n\nIn re : Chapter 11 HO WON KWOK, *et al., 1*\n\n\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_:\n\n\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\n\n: Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\nDebtors. : (Jointly Administered)\n\n# **INDIVIDUAL DEBTOR'S OBJECTION TO THE CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE'S MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY DEBTOR SHOULD NOT BE HELD IN CONTEMPT**\n\nHo Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\"),<sup>2</sup> by and through his undersigned counsel, hereby objects to the Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee For Order to Show Cause Why Debtor … Should not be Held in Contempt of Court for Failure to Comply with Order Compelling Compliance with Rule 2004 Subpoenas and Sanctioned for Such Conduct (Doc. No. 1453, the \"Motion\"). Because of his criminal indictment, the Debtor does not have a present ability to comply with this Court's Order Granting in Part Motion to Compel Compliance with Rule 2004 Subpoenas (the \"January 20 Order\") without waving his Fifth Amendment privilege, assuming he ever had the ability to comply. If this Court were to hold the Debtor in contempt, it would be compelling the Debtor to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege, but the Fifth Amendment prohibits this Court from\n\n<sup>1</sup> The debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and the Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\n<sup>2</sup> As used herein the term \"Debtor\" refers only to the individual debtor Ho Wan Kwok.\n\ncompelling the Debtor to be a witness against himself. In support of his objection, the Debtor respectfully states:\n\n### **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\n1. By the Motion, the Trustee seeks to have this Court hold the Debtor in contempt for failing to comply with the January 20 Order. In the January 20 Order, this Court ordered the Debtor to produce certain documents to the Trustee on or before January 31, 2023, and to file a sworn declaration on or before February 7, 2023, describing the document collection, search and review actions taken by him and his counsel in response to the Rule 2004 Subpoena (as defined below). The Debtor invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in response to the January 20 Order. The gravamen of the Motion is that the Debtor's invocation of his rights under the Fifth Amendment on January 31 and February 7, in response to the January 20 Order, was not proper.\n\n2. There has been a massive intervening event since the entry of the January 20 Order. As stated in the Debtor's Motion for a Limited Stay of Order Granting in Part Motion to Compel Compliance with Rule 2004 Subpoena (the \"Stay Motion\"), filed of even date herewith, the \"Debtor is charged with grievous and consequential federal crimes. The government has alleged that the Debtor has engaged in a years-long conspiracy to defraud investors that has resulted in losses amounting to \\$1 billion. The gravamen of the government's allegations is that, as 'The Principal,' the Debtor directed and controlled entities to perpetuate a pervasive fraud. The Debtor must be afforded a full and fair opportunity to defend against these grave charges.\" Stay Motion, ¶ 2.\n\n3. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part that no person \"shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ….\" As discussed further below and in the Stay Motion, present compliance with the January 20 Order would require the Debtor to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege. Given the extremely broad and non-specific allegations made by the government in the criminal action described herein, the nature and the early stage of the criminal proceedings, the extremely broad requests made in the Rule 2004 Subpoena, the known substantial overlap between the allegations made by the government and the requests made in the Rule 2004 Subpoena, and the unknown possible further overlap between the allegations made by the government and the requests made in the Rule 2004 Subpoena, this Court should not enter an order that would compel the Debtor to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege or, at the very least, the Court should defer consideration of entry of such an order until the criminal proceedings are concluded.\n\n### **BACKGROUND**\n\n4. On February 15, 2022, the Debtor filed his voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. On July 8, 2022, the Court entered its Order Granting Appointment Of Chapter 11 Trustee (Doc. No. 523), granting the appointment of the Trustee as Chapter 11 trustee in this case.\n\n5. On July 28, 2022, the Trustee filed his i) Motion for 2004 Examination of the Debtor (Doc. No. 636, the \"Debtor 2004 Motion\"), ii) Omnibus Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee For Entry of Order Under Bankruptcy Rule 2004 and Local Rule 2004-1 Authorizing Discovery with Respect to Various Legal and Financial Advisors to the Debtor (Doc. No. 637), and iii) Omnibus Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee For Entry of Order Under Bankruptcy Rule 2004 and Local Rule 2004-1 Authorizing Discovery with Respect to Various Entities and Individuals Affiliated with the Debtor (Doc. No. 638) (collectively the \"July Rule 2004 Exam Motions\"). In terms of the type of information the Trustee is seeking pursuant to the Rule 2004 Subpoena (defined below), in the\n\nDebtor 2004 Motion the Trustee alleged, among other things, that \"[r]eports suggest that the Debtor … has a financial interest in myriad for-profit and not-for-profit entities,\" that the \"Debtor has an extensive network of shell companies he uses to pursue business interests and store his wealth,\" and that the \"Debtor … reportedly owns or controls 'more than 60 commercial, nonprofit and online groups' collectively referred to as the whistleblower movement.\" Debtor 2004 Motion, ¶¶ 12, 13 and 28. In the Debtor 2004 Motion, the Trustee made specific reference to, among other entities and individuals, GTV, GClubs, GMusic, the Rule of Law Society, the Rule of Law Foundation, Saraca Media Group, Inc., and the Debtor's family members.\n\n6. On August 5, 2022, the Debtor filed the Debtor's Limited Objection to Rule 2004 Motions (Doc. No. 703) to preserve certain rights, including the right to assert objections to the requests for the production of documents that would be served with the subpoena attached to the July Rule 2004 Exam Motions after the subpoena was actually served. By orders dated August 16, 2022, this Court granted the July Rule 2004 Exam Motions.\n\n7. The Debtor was served with a Rule 2004 subpoena (the \"Rule 2004 Subpoena\") through his counsel on August 19, 2022. The Rule 2004 Subpoena contains thirty requests for the production of documents, of which twenty include demands for documents relating to \"Associated Individuals\" and/or \"Associated Entities.\"\n\n8. An Associated Individual is defined in the Rule 2004 Subpoena, in relevant part, as \"individually and collectively, all individuals that (1) hold, control, have custody over, or discretion over assets owned, controlled, or enjoyed by the Debtor or the Debtor's Family; or (2) have been employees, directors, or otherwise affiliated with one or more Associated Entities, together with the respective employees, agents, counsel, advisors, or anyone acting on behalf of\n\n4\n\nany of the foregoing.\" The definition of Associated Individuals includes twenty-seven individuals, including Yanping Wang (\"Ms. Wang\") and Je Kin Ming (\"Mr. Je\").\n\n9. An Associated Entity is defined in the Rule 2004 Subpoena, in relevant part, as \"individually and collectively, all organizations or Entities of any type that (1) have been owned, controlled, or invested in by the Debtor or the Debtor's Family; or (2) have an interest, whether directly or indirectly, in any assets owned, controlled, or enjoyed by the Debtor or the Debtor's Family, together with the respective employees, agents, counsel, advisors, or anyone acting on behalf of any of the foregoing.\" The definition of Associated Entity includes seventy-seven entities, including: GTV Media Group, Inc., G|Club Operations, LLC, G|MUSIC , Himalaya Exchange, Saraca Media Group, Inc., Rule of Law Foundation III, Inc., Rule of Law Foundation IV, Inc., Rule of Law Fund, Rule of Law Society, Rule of Law Society IV, Inc., and related entities.\n\n10. The Debtor served timely objections to the document requests attached to the subpoena, asserting objections to certain of the enumerated Instructions and Definitions included with the requests for production, as well as objections to certain of the requests for production. The Debtor objected to the production of certain categories of documents, primarily documents related to the assets of his \"family,\" which the Trustee defined to include \"the Debtor, the Debtor's Son, the Debtor's Daughter, and the Debtor's Purported Wife, and any other familial relation to the Debtor.\" The Debtor agreed to produce, and through his professionals and former professionals did produce, certain documents requested by the Trustee in the requests for production.\n\n11. On October 28, 2022, the Trustee filed his Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee for Entry of Order Compelling Individual Debtor, [and Others] to Comply with Rule 2004 Subpoenas (Doc. No. 1046 the \"Motion to Compel\"). On November 14, 2022 the Debtor filed his Joint Objection of the [Individual] Debtor, Mei Guo, and HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC to Chapter 11 Trustee's Motion to Compel Compliance with Rule 2004 Subpoenas (Doc. No.\n\n1090). This Court held a hearing on the Motion to Compel on November 30, 2022, and entered the January 20 Order on January 20, 2023.\n\n12. On February 1, 2023, the Debtor through counsel informed the Trustee through counsel that the Debtor was asserting his rights under the Fifth Amendment, including any rights under the Act of Production Doctrine, in response to the January 20 Order. On February 7, 2023, the Debtor filed a sworn declaration stating:\n\n> I am the Debtor in the above-captioned Chapter 11 case and am in receipt of the Court's order on the Trustee' s Motion to Compel, dated January 20, 2023, Doc. No . 1353. I hereby invoke my rights under the 5th Amendment to the United States Constitution, including under the act of production doctrine, with respect to the Subpoena dated August 17, 2022, in its entirety, including all requests for documents and information set forth therein.\n\nFebruary 7, 2023, Declaration of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok Concerning Invocation of Fifth Amendment Privilege in Regard to Rule 2004 Discovery (Exhibit A to Doc. No. 1444).\n\n13. The Trustee filed the Motion on February 10, 2023.\n\n14. On February 13, 2023, this Court issued its Order Granting in Part Motion for Order to Appear and Show Cause Why the Court Should not Hold the HK Parties in Contempt of Court (Doc. No. 1455, the \"February 13 Order\"). The February 13 Order stated that the Court would set a briefing schedule on the Debtor's assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege at the conclusion of mediation that the Court had ordered. *Id.*, at 2. Following the completion of such mediation, on March 7, 2023, this Court held a status conference on a number of matters. During the status conference the Court ordered the Debtor to respond to the Order to Show Cause by March 28, 2023. The Debtor's time to respond to the Order to Show Cause was subsequently extended to April 10, 2023.\n\n15. On March 15, 2023, a twelve-count indictment was unsealed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York charging the Debtor, King Ming Je and *others known and unknown* with various federal crimes. *United States v. Ho Wan Kwok et al.*, Southern District of New York Case Number S1 23 Cr. 118 (AT), Doc. No. 2. The Debtor was arrested by federal law enforcement authorities on March 15, 2023, and remains in federal custody. The government has stated that through the execution of search warrants it recovered from premises that it asserts are the Debtor's premises cellphones, computers or laptops, and external media storage devices. *Id*., Doc. No. 26.\n\n16. On March 29, 2023, the government filed a *Superseding Indictment*. The Superseding Indictment names Ms. Wang as a co-defendant. The government alleges that the Debtor, Mr. Je, Ms. Wang and *others known and unknown* \"conspired to defraud thousands of victims of more than approximately \\$1 billion.\" *Id*., Doc. No. 19, ¶ 1. The government further alleges that the Debtor, Mr. Je, Ms. Wang and \"their co-conspirators operated through a series of complex fraudulent and fictious businesses and investment opportunities that connected dozens of interrelated entities, which allowed the defendants and their co-conspirators to solicit, launder, and misappropriate victim funds.\" *Id*. The government further alleges that the Debtor and Mr. Je \"transferred, and directed the transfer of, money into and through more than approximately 500 accounts held in the name of at least 80 different entities or individuals.\" Id. ¶ 3. The government names some of such entities or individuals, including GTV, GClubs, GMusic, the Rule of Law Society, the Rule of Law Foundation, Saraca Media Group, Inc., and the Debtor's family members (entities and individuals listed in the Rule 2004 Subpoena), but the great majority of such \"dozens of interrelated entities\", \"80 different entities or individuals\" and \"approximately 500 accounts\" are not named or identified.\n\n17. Significantly, the government alleges that the Debtor and his alleged coconspirators \"operated the scheme for years\" by \"continually adapting the scheme's means and methods to evade the enforcement of investor-protection, anti-money laundering, and bankruptcy laws in the United States\" and that the Debtor \"was the leader of, and directed, the scheme.\" *Id*., ¶¶ 5-6.\n\n18. Throughout the Superseding Indictment, the government alleges that the Debtor controlled various entities and individuals, some named and many not named. For example, the government alleges that the Debtor \"functionally owned and controlled\" GTV Media Group, Inc., \"although [Debtor] held no formal position or title\" in that entity. *Id*., ¶ 10. Furthermore, the government alleges that G|Clubs \"was functionally owned and controlled by [the Debtor] although [the Debtor] held no formal position or title\" at G|Clubs. *Id.,* at ¶ 11. The government also alleges that \"[e]ntities functionally owned and controlled by [the Debtor], such as G|Clubs and G|Fashion, had purported business relationships with the Himalaya Exchange . . .\" and that the Debtor \"claimed to be the designer of its purported cryptocurrency, although [the Debtor] held no formal position or title at the Himalaya Exchange.\" *Id.,* at ¶12. Importantly, the government alleges that the Debtor \"directed\" that \"\\$100 million raised from investors\" be transferred into a hedge fund. *Id.,* ¶13h. The government further alleges that this transfer was made by Ms. Wang (at the Debtor's direction). *Id.,* ¶ 32b. While in the Superseding Indictment the government refers to certain individuals and entities by name, the government refers repeatedly to \"others known and unknown\" that conspired with the Debtor in the alleged fraud, *id*., ¶¶ 1, 13, 15-17, 22, 26-32, and unnamed co-conspirators. *Id*., ¶¶ 1-3, 5, 13h and 14.\n\n#### **ARGUMENT**\n\n19. A \"bankruptcy court's contempt power, like that of a district court, is 'narrowly circumscribed.'\" *PHH Mortg. Corp v. Sensenich (In re Gravel)*, 6 F.4th 503, 511 (2d. Cir. 2021). *See also Perez v. Danbury Hosp*., 347 F.3d 419, 423 (2d. Cir. 2003) (\"[O]ur review of a contempt order is more exacting than under the ordinary abuse-of-discretion standard because a district court's contempt power is narrowly circumscribed.\"). This is because \"[t]he judicial contempt power is a potent weapon.\" *Int'l Longshoreman's Ass'n v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n*, 389 U.S. 64, 76 (1967). *See also Taggart v. Lorenzen*, 139 S.Ct. 1795, 1802 (2019) (\"[C]ivil contempt is a severe remedy ….\"); *In re Attorney General of U.S.*, 596 F.2d 58, 65 (2d. Cir. 1979) (\"[T]he court must not lightly invoke its contempt power.\"); *United States v. Wendy*, 575 F.2d 1025, 1030 (2d. Cir. 1978) (recognizing that the \"exercise of the contempt power is awesome in its implications.\"); *Vineyard Vines, LLC v. MacBeth Collection, LLC*, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205502, [\\*38] (D. Conn. Dec. 5, 2018) (\"The standard is strict, and 'the power of a district court to impose contempt liability is carefully limited.'\" (quoting *CBS Broad, Inc. v. FilmOn.com, Inc.*, 814 F.3d 91, 98 (2d. Cir. 2016)). Accordingly, \"civil contempt 'should not be resorted to where there is a *fair ground of doubt* as to the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct.'\" *Taggart*, 389 S. Ct. 1801 (quoting *California Artificial Stone Paving Co. v. Molitor*, 113 U.S. 609, 618 (1885)) (emphasis in original). *See also PHH Mortg. Corp.*, 6 F.4th at 512 (\"Under Taggart, a bankruptcy court may hold a creditor in contempt for violating the court's injunction only 'if there is *no fair ground of doubt* as to whether the order barred the creditor's conduct. The 'fair ground of doubt' standard has long been used in this Circuit to determine when a party may be held in contempt in the district court.\"); *King v. Allied Vision, Ltd.*, 65 F.3d 1051, 1058 (2d. Cir. 1995) (\"[C]ourts should not resort [to a contempt order] 'where there is a fair ground of doubt as to the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct.'\" (quoting *California Artificial Stone Paving Co.*, 113 U.S. at 618)).\n\n20. \"A long recognized defense to a civil contempt citation is the cited individual's inability to comply with the court's order.\" *United States v. Wendy*, 575 F.2d at 1030. Technical ability to comply does not support contempt where there is no practical ability to comply. *Id.* The relevant time to determine an alleged contemnor's ability to comply is the time of the hearing on a contempt motion:\n\nIn a civil contempt proceeding such as this, of course, a defendant may assert a *present* inability to comply with the order in question. While the court is bound by the enforcement order, it will not be blind to evidence that compliance is now factually impossible. Where compliance is impossible, neither the moving party nor the court has any reason to proceed with the civil contempt action.\n\n*United States v. Rylander*, 460 U.S. 752, 757 (1983). *See also Maggio v. Zeitz*, 333 U.S. 56, 73 n.6 (1948) (\"[W]hile a bankrupt's denial of present possession, standing alone, may not be sufficient to establish his inability to produce the property or its proceeds, if the Court is satisfied, from all of the evidence before it, that the bankrupt has not the present ability to comply, the commitment order should not issue.\"). Here, as of the hearing on the Motion, whether the Court may hold the Debtor in contempt based on his non-compliance with the January 20 Order will turn on whether the Debtor is presently properly invoking his Fifth Amendment rights. Notwithstanding the criminal indictment, the Trustee would nevertheless argue that there is no \"fair ground of doubt\" that the Debtor's present invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights is improper.\n\n21. The Fifth Amendment \"must be accorded a liberal construction in favor of the right it was intended to secure.\" *Hoffman v. United States*, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951). *See also Estate of Fisher v. Comm'r*, 905 F.2d 645, 648 (2d. Cir. 1990) (\"The guarantee must be broadly construed to serve the right it was intended to protect.\"). Thus, the Fifth Amendment privilege extends to \"answers that would in themselves support a conviction under a federal criminal statute but\n\nlikewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a federal crime.\" *Estate of Fisher*, 905 F.2d at 648. *See also United States v. Hubbell*, 530 U.S. 27, 38 (2000) (\"Entirely apart from the contents of the 13,120 pages of materials that respondent produced in this case, it is undeniable that providing a catalog of existing documents fitting within any of the 11 broadly worded subpoena categories could provide a prosecutor with a 'lead to incriminating evidence,' or 'a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute.'\").\n\n22. The privilege applies where the declarant has reasonable cause to fear the consequences of an answer, and the court determines whether the apprehension is reasonable. \"To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.\" *Hoffman*, 341 U.S. at 486-87.\n\n23. Importantly, the disclosure need not be an element of the crime to preclude disclosure—it merely must tend to incriminate the witness. *Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc.*, 676 F.3d 83, 98 (2d. Cir. 2011) (\"Even where it would not be direct evidence of wrongdoing with respect to the scheme charged in the criminal case, such testimony may be admissible as Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) evidence in any criminal trial.\" (citation and quotation marks omitted)); *Estate of Fisher*, 905 F.2d at 649 (courts look \"only to whether the question would tend to incriminate the witness.\"); *United States v. St. Pierre*, 132 F.2d 837, 838 (2d Cir.1942) (emphasis added). Moreover, \"[c]ompelled testimony that may 'lead to incriminating evidence' is privileged even if the information itself is not inculpatory.\" *Hubbell.* 530 U.S. at 38.\n\n24. The production of documents implicates Fifth Amendment concerns. An individual may assert his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination to avoid producing documents if the act of producing the documents would tend to incriminate him. *Fisher v. U.S.*, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976). The doctrine operates to prevent an individual from being compelled to furnish evidence against themselves by the very act of producing documents. In brief, \"[t]he act of producing evidence in response to a subpoena … has communicative aspects of its own, wholly aside from the contents of the papers produced. Compliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes the existence of the papers demanded and their possession or control by the person subpoenaed. It would also indicate the person's belief that the papers are those described in the subpoena.\" *Id.* (citations and quotations omitted). *See also Hubbell*, 530 U.S. at 36 (\"We have held that \"the act of production' itself may implicitly communicate 'statements of fact.' By 'producing documents in compliance with a subpoena, the witness would admit that the papers existed, were in his possession or control, and were authentic.\"); *United States v. Doe*, 465 U.S. 605, 613 (1984) (same); *In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated October 29, 1992*, 1 F.3d 87, 93 (2d. Cir. 1993) (act of producing may require incriminating testimony \"(1) if the existence and location of the subpoenaed papers are unknown to the government; or (2) where production would 'implicitly authenticate' the documents.\" (internal quotation marks omitted)).\n\n25. The act of production doctrine is not limited solely to documents actually produced by the individual claiming the protections of the Fifth Amendment. Documents delivered to professionals, attorneys and accountants, are also subject to the act of production doctrine such that the attorney or accountant may not be compelled to produce the documents. *In re Hyde*, 253 B.R. 539, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that act of production doctrine applied to preclude compelled production of documents provided to debtor's attorneys and forensic accountants\n\nretained by the attorneys because, \"production of the Finax books and records sought from Hyde's attorney's accountant could well implicitly authenticate them.\").\n\n26. Likewise, there is no prohibition on blanket assertions of the act of production doctrine in response to broad subpoenas such as that served on the Debtor in this case. *See SEC v. Forster*, 147 F.Supp.3d 223, (S.D.N.Y 2015) (rejecting SEC's argument that blanket assertion of Fifth Amendment privilege in response to document requests was improper and stating that \"First, a document-by-document analysis by Forster would not be useful to determining whether Forster has validly asserted the act-of-production privilege, and the SEC has not explained how such a proffer would even work. … Second, the SEC has not 'demonstrated with reasonable particularity that it knows of the existence and location;' of the many documents it seeks from Forster. … To comply, Forster would implicitly state what documents exist, are in his possession, and are authentic.\"). Indeed, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the act of production doctrine is applicable to protect against exceedingly broad subpoenas:\n\nGiven the breadth of the description of the 11 categories of documents called for by the subpoena, the collection and production of the materials demanded was tantamount to answering a series of interrogatories asking a witness to disclose the existence and location of particular documents fitting certain broad descriptions. The assembly of literally hundreds of pages of material in response to a request for \"any and all documents reflecting, referring, or relating to any direct or indirect sources of money or other things of value received by or provided to\" an individual or members of his family during a 3-year period, Appendix, infra, at 19, is the functional equivalent of the preparation of an answer to either a detailed written interrogatory or a series of oral questions at a discovery deposition.\n\n*Hubbell*, 530 U.S. 27, at 41-43 (\"It was unquestionably necessary for respondent to make extensive use of 'the contents of his own mind' in identifying the hundreds of documents responsive to the requests in the subpoena.\").\n\n27. Here, as set forth above, compliance with the January 20 Order requires the Debtor to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege. The requests in the Rule 2004 Subpoena and the allegations of the Superseding Indictment are incredibly broad and have substantial overlap in terms of the entities and individuals named and the underlying allegations made. Compliance with this Court's directive necessarily requires the Debtor to communicate—beyond the mere act of producing the documents—whether, among other things, he believes the various entities and individuals are under the Debtor's \"control.\" Several of the entities listed in the Rule 2004 Subpoena, and at least two individuals, are specifically named in the Superseding Indictment as individuals or entities over whom the Debtor had \"control.\" In addition, as noted above, the Superseding Indictment includes repeated references to \"unknown\" persons involved in the alleged fraud and unnamed co-conspirators, so there is no way for the Debtor to know whether they are the same persons named and unnamed in the Rule 2004 Subpoena. Accordingly, the Debtor has a reasonable apprehension of incrimination with respect to all persons and entities covered by the Rule 2004 Subpoena, whether expressly named or not, and invokes his Fifth Amendment privilege as to all such persons and entities.\n\n28. Importantly, the government has alleged a years-long and pervasive \"fraud.\" The government may yet supersede its indictment again. As such, and given the substantial overlap in the underlying allegations made by the government and the Trustee, the Debtor has a reasonable apprehension of incrimination with respect to all matters described in the Rule 2004 Subpoena, and invokes his Fifth Amendment privilege as to all such matters.\n\n29. In addition to directly admitting an element of the government's criminal case, i.e., the Debtor's alleged control over various named and unnamed person and entities, compliance with the both the production and the declaration requirements of the January 20 Order necessarily would require the Debtor to concede the existence and identify the location of documents relevant to the Superseding Indictment, concede his possession or control over any such documents, and implicitly authenticate any such documents. Compliance with the declaration requirement essentially would require the Debtor to potentially provide a roadmap of the existence and location of evidence to the government in the criminal case, which the Debtor cannot be compelled to do over his Fifth Amendment invocation. *Hubbell*, 530 U.S. at 43 (\"In sum, we have no doubt that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination protects the target of a grand jury investigation, [or in this case an individual already indicted by a grand jury], from being compelled to answer questions designed to elicit information about the existence of sources of potentially incriminating evidence. That constitutional privilege has the same application to the testimonial aspect of a response to a subpoena seeking discovery of those sources.\")\n\n30. Compliance with the January 20 Order would furnish a \"link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute.\" *Hubbell*, 530 U.S. at 42. The government has a burden of proving its allegations in the criminal case beyond a reasonable doubt—without the assistance of the Debtor. This Court should not enter an order in this case that would interfere with the Debtor's assertion of his Constitutional rights in the criminal case. The proper assertion of the Debtor's Fifth Amendment rights in connection with the criminal case should be for the District Court in the criminal case to determine.\n\n**WHEREFORE,** the Debtor respectfully requests that the Court deny the Motion and grant the Debtor such other relief as is just.\n\nDated at Bridgeport, Connecticut, on this 10th day April, 2023.\n\n# **HO WAN KWOK**\n\n*/s/ Eric Henzy* Eric Henzy (ct12849) James M. Moriarty (ct21876) Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. 10 Middle Street, 15th Floor Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604 Telephone: (203) 368-4234 Facsimile: (203) 368-5487 Email: ehenzy@zeislaw.com jmoriarty@zeislaw.com His Attorneys\n\n### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI hereby certify that on this 10th day of April, 2023, a copy of foregoing was filed electronically. Notice of this filing will be sent by e-mail to all parties by operation of the Court's electronic filing system or by mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing as indicated on the Notice ofElectronic Filing. Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF System.\n\n> */s/ Eric Henzy* Eric Henzy (ct12849)","body_zh":"美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院布里奇波特分院\n\n关于：                                               第11章\nHO WON KWOK（郭文贵）等人，1\n\n__________________________________________________：\n\n__________________________________________________\n\n：案号 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n债务人。                                             ：（联合管理）\n个人债务人对第11章受托人要求说明为何不应认定债务人藐视法庭的动议提出的异议\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵，下称“债务人”）2 通过其下方签署的代理律师，特此对第11章受托人提出的要求说明为何债务人……不应因未遵守要求遵从规则2004传票的命令而被认定藐视法庭并因此行为受到制裁的动议（文件编号1453，下称“该动议”）提出异议。鉴于其刑事起诉书，债务人目前无法在不放弃其《美国宪法第五修正案》特权的情况下遵守本院《关于部分准许要求遵从规则2004传票的动议的命令》（下称“1月20日命令”），即使其曾经具备遵守的能力亦然。若本院认定债务人藐视法庭，即将迫使债务人放弃其《第五修正案》特权，但《第五修正案》禁止本院迫使债务人成为不利于其本人的证人。为支持其异议，债务人谨陈述如下：\n\n1 本第11章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵，亦称 Guo Wengui、Miles Guo 和 Miles Kwok，以及其他别名）（税务识别号后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（杰尼弗控股有限责任公司）（税务识别号后四位：8202）以及 Genever Holdings Corporation（杰尼弗控股公司）。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 和 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为 Paul Hastings LLP（普衡律师事务所），200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166，c/o Luc A. Despins（吕克·A·德斯平斯），作为 Ho Wan Kwok 遗产的受托人（仅为通知和通信之目的）。\n\n2 本文所称“债务人”仅指个人债务人 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）。\n\n初步陈述\n\n1. 受托人通过该动议请求本院因债务人未遵守1月20日命令而认定其藐视法庭。本院在1月20日命令中命令债务人最迟于2023年1月31日向受托人提交某些文件，并最迟于2023年2月7日提交一份经宣誓的声明，说明其本人及其代理律师为回应规则2004传票（定义见下文）所采取的文件收集、检索和审查行动。债务人为回应1月20日命令而援引其《第五修正案》反对自证其罪特权。该动议的核心主张是，债务人为回应1月20日命令，于1月31日和2月7日援引其《第五修正案》权利并不适当。\n\n2. 自1月20日命令作出以来，发生了一项重大的介入事件。如债务人于同日提交的《关于有限中止部分准许要求遵从规则2004传票的动议的命令的动议》（下称“中止动议”）所述，“债务人被控犯有严重且后果重大的联邦罪行。政府指称，债务人参与了一项长达数年的诈骗投资者阴谋，造成的损失高达 $1 billion。政府指控的核心是，债务人作为‘The Principal’，指挥并控制实体实施了广泛的欺诈。必须给予债务人充分且公平的机会，以对这些严重指控进行辩护。”中止动议，第2段。\n\n3. 《美国宪法第五修正案》部分规定，任何人“不得在任何刑事案件中被强迫成为不利于其本人的证人……”。如下文及中止动议进一步所述，目前遵守1月20日命令将要求债务人放弃其《第五修正案》特权。鉴于政府在本文所述刑事诉讼中提出的指控极其宽泛且不具体，刑事程序的性质及其尚处于早期阶段，规则2004传票中提出的请求极其宽泛，政府提出的指控与规则2004传票中提出的请求之间存在已知的实质性重叠，以及政府提出的指控与规则2004传票中提出的请求之间可能存在的进一步重叠尚属未知，本院不应作出将迫使债务人放弃其《第五修正案》特权的命令；或者，至少本院应推迟考虑作出该等命令，直至刑事程序终结。\n\n背景\n\n4. 2022年2月15日，债务人根据《破产法》第11章提交了自愿救济申请。2022年7月8日，法院作出《关于准许任命第11章受托人的命令》（文件编号523），准许任命受托人为本案的第11章受托人。\n\n5. 2022年7月28日，受托人提交了：i）《债务人规则2004审查动议》（文件编号636，下称“债务人2004动议”）；ii）《第11章受托人根据破产规则2004和地方法则2004-1请求作出命令，授权就债务人的各类法律和财务顾问进行证据开示的综合动议》（文件编号637）；以及 iii）《第11章受托人根据破产规则2004和地方法则2004-1请求作出命令，授权就与债务人有关联的各类实体和个人进行证据开示的综合动议》（文件编号638）（统称“7月规则2004审查动议”）。就受托人依据规则2004传票（定义见下文）寻求的信息类型而言，受托人在债务人2004动议中尤其主张，“[r]eports suggest that the Debtor … has a financial interest in myriad for-profit and not-for-profit entities”，债务人“拥有一个广泛的空壳公司网络，其利用该网络追求商业利益并储存财富”，且债务人“据称拥有或控制‘more than 60 commercial, nonprofit and online groups’，统称为吹哨人运动。”债务人2004动议，第12、13和28段。在债务人2004动议中，受托人尤其具体提及了 GTV、GClubs、GMusic、Rule of Law Society（法治协会）、Rule of Law Foundation（法治基金会）、Saraca Media Group, Inc.（萨拉卡媒体集团股份有限公司）以及债务人的家庭成员等实体和个人。\n\n6. 2022年8月5日，债务人提交了《债务人对规则2004动议的有限异议》（文件编号703），以保留某些权利，包括在实际送达附于7月规则2004审查动议的传票后，就传票附带的文件提交请求提出异议的权利。本院于2022年8月16日作出的命令准许了7月规则2004审查动议。\n\n7. 2022年8月19日，债务人通过其代理律师获送达一份规则2004传票（下称“规则2004传票”）。规则2004传票包含三十项文件提交请求，其中二十项包括要求提交与“关联个人”和/或“关联实体”有关的文件。\n\n8. 规则2004传票在相关部分将关联个人定义为：“单独及共同而言，所有下列个人：（1）持有、控制、保管或对债务人或债务人家庭拥有、控制或享有的资产具有处置权；或（2）曾为一个或多个关联实体的雇员、董事或以其他方式与其有关联，连同前述各方各自的雇员、代理人、律师、顾问，或代表前述任何一方行事的任何人。”关联个人的定义包括二十七名个人，其中包括 Yanping Wang（王艳萍女士，下称“王女士”）和 Je Kin Ming（谢建明先生，下称“谢先生”）。\n\n9. 规则2004传票在相关部分将关联实体定义为：“单独及共同而言，所有下列任何类型的组织或实体：（1）曾由债务人或债务人家庭拥有、控制或投资；或（2）直接或间接地对债务人或债务人家庭拥有、控制或享有的任何资产具有权益，连同前述各方各自的雇员、代理人、律师、顾问，或代表前述任何一方行事的任何人。”关联实体的定义包括七十七个实体，其中包括：GTV Media Group, Inc.（GTV媒体集团股份有限公司）、G|Club Operations, LLC、G|MUSIC、Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）、Saraca Media Group, Inc.（萨拉卡媒体集团股份有限公司）、Rule of Law Foundation III, Inc.（法治基金会III股份有限公司）、Rule of Law Foundation IV, Inc.（法治基金会IV股份有限公司）、Rule of Law Fund（法治基金）、Rule of Law Society（法治协会）、Rule of Law Society IV, Inc.（法治协会IV股份有限公司）及关联实体。\n\n10. 债务人及时对附于传票的文件请求提出异议，就随文件提交请求一并列明的某些指示和定义提出异议，并就某些文件提交请求提出异议。债务人反对提交某些类别的文件，主要是与其“家庭”资产有关的文件；受托人将该“家庭”定义为包括“债务人、债务人的儿子、债务人的女儿、债务人声称的妻子，以及与债务人具有任何其他家庭关系的人”。债务人同意提交，并通过其专业人士和前专业人士确已提交，受托人在文件提交请求中要求的某些文件。\n\n11. 2022年10月28日，受托人提交了《第11章受托人请求作出命令，强制个人债务人[及其他人]遵守规则2004传票的动议》（文件编号1046，下称“强制动议”）。2022年11月14日，债务人提交了《[个人]债务人、Mei Guo（郭梅）和 HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC（香港国际基金投资〈美国〉有限责任公司）对第11章受托人要求遵守规则2004传票的强制动议的联合异议》（文件编号1090）。本院于2022年11月30日就强制动议举行听证，并于2023年1月20日作出1月20日命令。\n\n12. 2023年2月1日，债务人通过其代理律师告知受托人的代理律师，债务人就1月20日命令主张其《第五修正案》权利，包括《提交行为理论》下的任何权利。2023年2月7日，债务人提交了一份经宣誓的声明，内容如下：\n\n本人系上述第11章案件中的债务人，并已收到法院就受托人强制动议作出的、日期为2023年1月20日的命令，文件编号1353。本人特此就日期为2022年8月17日的传票整体，包括其中载列的所有文件和信息请求，援引本人根据《美国宪法第五修正案》享有的权利，包括提交行为理论下的权利。\n\n2023年2月7日，Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）先生关于就规则2004证据开示援引《第五修正案》特权的声明（文件编号1444的附件A）。\n\n13. 受托人于2023年2月10日提交了该动议。\n\n14. 2023年2月13日，本院作出《关于部分准许要求出庭并说明为何法院不应认定 HK Parties（香港各方）藐视法庭的动议的命令》（文件编号1455，下称“2月13日命令”）。2月13日命令规定，法院将在其命令进行的调解结束后，就债务人援引其《第五修正案》特权设定书面陈述时间表。同上，第2页。该调解完成后，2023年3月7日，本院就若干事项举行了一次状态会议。在该状态会议期间，法院命令债务人于2023年3月28日前对说明理由命令作出回应。债务人对说明理由命令作出回应的期限随后延长至2023年4月10日。\n\n15. 2023年3月15日，美国政府在 United States District Court for the Southern District of New York（纽约南区联邦地区法院）公开了一份包含十二项罪名的起诉书，指控债务人 King Ming Je（介明杰）以及其他已知和未知人员犯有多项联邦罪行。United States v. Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵） et al., Southern District of New York Case Number S1 23 Cr. 118 (AT), Doc. No. 2。债务人于2023年3月15日被联邦执法机关逮捕，并一直处于联邦羁押之中。政府表示，其通过执行搜查令，从其主张属于债务人场所的地点收缴了手机、计算机或笔记本电脑以及外部媒体存储设备。同上，Doc. No. 26。\n\n16. 2023年3月29日，政府提交了一份替代起诉书。该替代起诉书将 Ms. Wang（王女士）列为共同被告。政府主张，债务人、Mr. Je（介先生）、王女士以及其他已知和未知人员“共谋诈骗数千名受害人，金额超过约 \\$1 billion。”同上，Doc. No. 19，第1段。政府进一步主张，债务人、介先生、王女士及“其共谋者通过一系列复杂的欺诈性和虚构性企业及投资机会开展活动，这些活动连接了数十个相互关联的实体，使被告及其共谋者能够招揽、洗钱并侵占受害人资金。”同上。政府进一步主张，债务人和介先生“将资金转入并指示将资金转入和经由以至少80个不同实体或个人名义持有的约500多个账户。”同上，第3段。政府列举了部分此类实体或个人，包括 GTV、GClubs、GMusic、Rule of Law Society（法治协会）、Rule of Law Foundation（法治基金会）、Saraca Media Group, Inc.（萨拉卡媒体集团公司）以及债务人的家庭成员（Rule 2004 Subpoena（《破产程序规则》第2004条传票）中列出的实体和个人），但此类“数十个相互关联的实体”、“80个不同实体或个人”及“约500个账户”中的绝大多数未被指名或识别。\n\n17. 值得注意的是，政府主张，债务人及其被指控的共谋者通过“不断调整该计划的手段和方法，以规避美国投资者保护、反洗钱和破产法律的执行”，从而“多年实施该计划”；并且债务人“是该计划的领导者，并指挥该计划。”同上，第5-6段。\n\n18. 在整份替代起诉书中，政府主张债务人控制了多个实体和个人，其中部分被指名，许多未被指名。例如，政府主张，债务人“实际上拥有并控制”GTV Media Group, Inc.（GTV媒体集团公司），尽管债务人在该实体中“未担任任何正式职务或拥有任何正式头衔”。同上，第10段。此外，政府主张，G|Clubs“实际上由[债务人]拥有和控制，尽管[债务人]在G|Clubs未担任任何正式职务或拥有任何正式头衔。”同上，第11段。政府还主张，“由[债务人]实际拥有和控制的实体，例如G|Clubs和G|Fashion，与Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）存在声称的商业关系……”并且债务人“声称是其所称加密货币的设计者，尽管[债务人]在Himalaya Exchange未担任任何正式职务或拥有任何正式头衔。”同上，第12段。重要的是，政府主张，债务人“指示”将“从投资者处筹集的 \\$100 million”转入一家对冲基金。同上，第13h段。政府进一步主张，该笔转账由王女士（根据债务人的指示）作出。同上，第32b段。尽管政府在替代起诉书中以姓名指称某些个人和实体，但政府反复提及与债务人共谋实施所指控欺诈的“其他已知和未知人员”，同上，第1、13、15-17、22、26-32段，以及未具名的共谋者。同上，第1-3、5、13h和14段。\n\n论证\n\n19. “与地区法院的权力一样，破产法院的藐视法庭权力也‘受到严格限制。’”PHH Mortg. Corp v. Sensenich (In re Gravel), 6 F.4th 503, 511 (2d. Cir. 2021)。另见 Perez v. Danbury Hosp., 347 F.3d 419, 423 (2d. Cir. 2003)（“[O]我们的藐视法庭命令审查，比通常的裁量权滥用标准更为严格，因为地区法院的藐视法庭权力受到严格限制。”）。这是因为“[t]司法藐视法庭权力是一种强有力的武器。”Int'l Longshoreman's Ass'n v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n, 389 U.S. 64, 76 (1967)。另见 Taggart v. Lorenzen, 139 S.Ct. 1795, 1802 (2019)（“[C]民事藐视法庭是一项严厉的救济措施……”）；In re Attorney General of U.S., 596 F.2d 58, 65 (2d. Cir. 1979)（“[T]法院不得轻率行使其藐视法庭权力。”）；United States v. Wendy, 575 F.2d 1025, 1030 (2d. Cir. 1978)（承认“行使藐视法庭权力的后果极为重大。”）；Vineyard Vines, LLC v. MacBeth Collection, LLC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205502, [*38] (D. Conn. Dec. 5, 2018)（“该标准严格，且‘地区法院施加藐视法庭责任的权力受到谨慎限制。’”（引自 CBS Broad, Inc. v. FilmOn.com, Inc., 814 F.3d 91, 98 (2d. Cir. 2016)））。因此，“在对被告行为是否不当存在合理疑问的情况下，‘不应诉诸民事藐视法庭。’”Taggart, 389 S. Ct. 1801（引自 California Artificial Stone Paving Co. v. Molitor, 113 U.S. 609, 618 (1885)）（原文强调）。另见 PHH Mortg. Corp., 6 F.4th at 512（“根据Taggart，破产法院只有在‘对该命令是否禁止债权人行为不存在合理疑问’时，方可因债权人违反法院禁令而认定其藐视法庭。‘合理疑问’标准长期以来一直用于本巡回区，以确定当事人何时可在地区法院被认定为藐视法庭。”）；King v. Allied Vision, Ltd., 65 F.3d 1051, 1058 (2d. Cir. 1995)（“在对被告行为是否不当存在合理疑问的情况下，‘[c]法院不应诉诸[藐视法庭命令]。’”（引自 California Artificial Stone Paving Co., 113 U.S. at 618））。\n\n20. “对民事藐视法庭指控的一项长期认可的抗辩是，被指控的个人无法遵守法院命令。”United States v. Wendy, 575 F.2d at 1030。在不存在实际遵守能力时，技术上的遵守能力不足以支持藐视法庭认定。同上。确定被指控藐视法庭者遵守能力的相关时间，是就藐视法庭动议举行听证会的时间：\n\n在诸如此类的民事藐视法庭程序中，当然，被告可以主张其目前无法遵守所涉命令。尽管法院受执行命令的约束，但不会对证明目前事实上不可能遵守的证据视而不见。在无法遵守的情况下，动议方和法院均无理由继续进行民事藐视法庭程序。\n\nUnited States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 757 (1983)。另见 Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 73 n.6 (1948)（“[W]尽管破产人仅仅否认目前占有，可能不足以证明其无法交出财产或其收益，但如果法院根据其面前的全部证据确信，破产人目前没有遵守能力，则不应签发拘押命令。”）。在本案中，截至就该动议举行听证会之时，法院能否基于债务人未遵守1月20日命令而认定其藐视法庭，将取决于债务人目前是否适当援引其第五修正案权利。尽管存在刑事起诉书，受托人仍会主张，对于债务人目前援引其第五修正案权利不当这一点，不存在“合理疑问”。\n\n21. 第五修正案“必须作有利于其旨在保障之权利的宽泛解释。”Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951)。另见 Estate of Fisher v. Comm'r, 905 F.2d 645, 648 (2d. Cir. 1990)（“该保障必须作宽泛解释，以实现其旨在保护的权利。”）。因此，第五修正案特权延及“本身将支持根据联邦刑事法规作出有罪判决的回答，也同样涵盖将为起诉主张该特权者犯有联邦罪行所需证据链提供一环的回答。”Estate of Fisher, 905 F.2d at 648。另见 United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 38 (2000)（“完全不考虑被申请人在本案中提交的13,120页材料的内容，不可否认的是，提供符合11个措辞宽泛的传票类别中任一类别的现有文件目录，可能为检察官提供‘导致不利证据的线索’，或‘起诉所需证据链中的一环。’”）。\n\n22. 在陈述人有合理理由担心回答的后果时，该特权适用；法院确定该担忧是否合理。“为了维持该特权，只需从问题的含义以及提出问题的情境中显见，对该问题作出回应性回答，或解释为何无法回答，可能具有危险性，因为可能导致有害披露。”Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486-87。\n\n23. 重要的是，为排除披露，该披露无需构成犯罪的要件——其仅须倾向于使证人自证其罪。Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 98 (2d. Cir. 2011)（“即使该证言并非与刑事案件中所指控计划相关的不法行为的直接证据，此类证言也可在任何刑事审判中作为 Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) 证据被采纳。”（省略引文和引号））；Estate of Fisher, 905 F.2d at 649（法院“仅考察该问题是否会倾向于使证人自证其罪。”）；United States v. St. Pierre, 132 F.2d 837, 838 (2d Cir.1942)（强调为原文所加）。此外，“可能‘导致不利证据’的被强制作出的证言，即使该信息本身并不具有罪责指向性，也受特权保护。”Hubbell. 530 U.S. at 38。\n\n24. 提交文件涉及第五修正案方面的关切。如果提交文件这一行为会倾向于使个人自证其罪，该个人可援引其第五修正案反对自证其罪权，以避免提交文件。Fisher v. U.S., 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976)。该原则旨在防止个人因提交文件这一行为本身而被迫提供不利于其自身的证据。简言之，“[t]为回应传票而提交证据这一行为……本身具有交际性方面，完全独立于所提交文件的内容。遵守传票默示承认被要求的文件存在，且被传唤人占有或控制该等文件。该行为还会表明该人相信文件就是传票中所描述的文件。”同上（省略引文和引语）。另见 Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 36（“我们认定，‘提交行为’本身可能默示传达‘事实陈述’。通过‘遵守传票提交文件’，证人将承认该等文件存在、处于其占有或控制之下，并且真实。”）；United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 613 (1984)（同上）；In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated October 29, 1992, 1 F.3d 87, 93 (2d. Cir. 1993)（提交行为可能要求作出使人自证其罪的证言，“(1) 如果政府不知道被传唤文件的存在和位置；或者(2) 在提交将‘默示认证’文件的情况下。”（省略内部引号））。\n\n25. 提交行为原则并不限于由主张第五修正案保护的个人实际提交的文件。交付给专业人士、律师和会计师的文件，同样受提交行为原则约束，因此不得强制律师或会计师提交该等文件。In re Hyde, 253 B.R. 539, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)（认定提交行为原则适用于排除强制提交由债务人提供给其律师及由律师聘请的法务会计师的文件，因为“从Hyde律师的会计师处寻求提交Finax账簿和记录，完全可能构成对其真实性的默示认证。”）。\n\n26. 同样，对于如本案中向债务人送达的广泛传票，并不禁止概括性主张提交行为原则。见SEC v. Forster, 147 F.Supp.3d 223, (S.D.N.Y 2015)（驳回SEC关于针对文件请求概括性主张第五修正案特权不当的论点，并指出：“第一，Forster逐份分析文件，对于确定Forster是否有效主张提交行为特权并无帮助，而且SEC并未说明此类陈述如何能够运作。……第二，SEC并未‘以合理的具体性证明其知悉’其向Forster寻求的大量文件的存在及所在地。……为遵守要求，Forster将默示说明哪些文件存在、由其持有并且真实。”）。事实上，最高法院已明确指出，提交行为原则适用于防范极其宽泛的传票：\n\n鉴于传票所要求的11类文件描述范围之广，收集并提交所要求的材料，无异于回答一系列要求证人披露符合某些宽泛描述的特定文件之存在及所在地的书面质询。为回应要求提供“反映、提及或涉及在3年期间内由某个人或其家庭成员收到或提供给其的任何及所有直接或间接资金来源或其他有价值物品”的任何及所有文件这一请求，汇集数百页材料，Appendix, infra, at 19，在功能上等同于准备对一项详细的书面质询或一系列证据开示询问中的口头问题作出答复。\n\nHubbell, 530 U.S. 27, at 41-43（“毫无疑问，被申请人必须广泛运用‘其自身思维的内容’，以识别符合传票请求的数百份文件。”）。\n\n27. 如上所述，遵守January 20命令要求债务人放弃其第五修正案特权。Rule 2004传票中的请求与替代起诉书中的指控极其宽泛，就所列实体和个人以及所作出的基础指控而言存在大量重叠。遵守本院的指示，必然要求债务人作出沟通——超出仅仅提交文件的行为——包括但不限于说明其是否认为各个实体和个人处于债务人的“控制”之下。Rule 2004传票中列出的数个实体，以及至少两名个人，均在替代起诉书中被明确列为债务人对其拥有“控制”的个人或实体。此外，如上所述，替代起诉书多次提及参与所指控欺诈的“未知”人员及未具名共谋者，因此债务人无法知悉其是否与Rule 2004传票中具名及未具名的人员相同。因此，债务人对于Rule 2004传票涵盖的所有人员和实体——无论是否明确具名——均有合理的自证其罪忧虑，并就所有该等人员和实体主张其第五修正案特权。\n\n28. 重要的是，政府指控存在持续多年且普遍的“欺诈”。政府仍可能再次以替代起诉书取代其起诉书。因此，鉴于政府与受托人所作基础指控之间存在大量重叠，债务人对于Rule 2004传票所述的所有事项均有合理的自证其罪忧虑，并就所有该等事项主张其第五修正案特权。\n\n29. 除直接承认政府刑事案件的一个要件，即债务人被指控对各具名和未具名个人及实体拥有控制权外，遵守January 20命令的提交及声明要求，必然要求债务人承认与替代起诉书相关文件的存在并确定其所在地，承认其对任何该等文件的持有或控制权，并默示认证任何该等文件。遵守声明要求实质上将要求债务人可能向政府提供刑事案件中证据存在及所在地的路线图，而债务人不能在其援引第五修正案的情况下被强制这样做。Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 43（“总之，我们毫不怀疑，禁止自证其罪的宪法特权保护大陪审团调查的对象，[或本案中已被大陪审团起诉的个人]，免于被强制回答旨在引出有关潜在不利证据来源存在情况的问题。该宪法特权同样适用于对寻求发现该等来源的传票作出回应时所具有证言性质的方面。”）\n\n30. 遵守January 20命令将提供“起诉所需证据链中的一环”。Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 42。政府负有在刑事案件中排除合理怀疑地证明其指控的责任——不得依赖债务人的协助。本院不应在本案中作出会干扰债务人在刑事案件中主张其宪法权利的命令。债务人就刑事案件适当主张其第五修正案权利，应由该刑事案件的地区法院裁定。\n\n鉴此，债务人谨请求本院驳回该动议，并给予债务人其他公正适当的救济。\n\n签于Connecticut（康涅狄格州）Bridgeport（布里奇波特），2023年April 10日。\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）\n\n/s/ Eric Henzy\nEric Henzy (ct12849)\nJames M. Moriarty (ct21876)\nZeisler & Zeisler, P.C.\n10 Middle Street, 15th Floor\nBridgeport, Connecticut 06604\nTelephone: (203) 368-4234\nFacsimile: (203) 368-5487\nEmail: ehenzy@zeislaw.com\njmoriarty@zeislaw.com\n其代理律师\n\n送达证明\n\n本人特此证明，于2023年April 10日，上述文件副本已通过电子方式提交。本次提交的通知将依本院电子提交系统的运行，通过电子邮件发送给所有当事人；对于如电子提交通知所示无法接受电子提交的任何人士，则通过邮寄方式送达。当事人可通过本院CM/ECF系统查阅本次提交。\n\n/s/ Eric Henzy\nEric Henzy (ct12849)","key_entities":["Je","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","GTV","Guo","Himalaya","Saraca","Himalaya Exchange","Miles Guo","Despins","Yanping Wang","Paul Hastings","CIPA"],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":4934,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 18:41:04"}