{"id":"court_ctb_1670_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":1670,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION | -------------------------------------------","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"## **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| ----------------------------------------------------------- | x      |                         |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------|--------|-------------------------|\n| In re:                                                      | :<br>: | Chapter 11              |\n| HO WAN KWOK et al.,                                         | :<br>: | Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |\n| Debtors.1                                                   | :<br>: | Jointly Administered    |\n| ----------------------------------------------------------- | :<br>x |                         |\n\n# **CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE'S RESPONSE TO DEBTOR'S OBJECTION TO TRUSTEE'S MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY DEBTOR SHOULD NOT BE HELD IN CONTEMPT**\n\nLuc A. Despins, in his capacity as the chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") appointed in the chapter 11 case (the \"Chapter 11 Case\") of Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\"), respectfully submits this response (the \"Response\") to the *Individual Debtor's Objection to The Chapter 11 Trustee's Motion For Order to Show Cause Why Debtor Should Not Be Held in Contempt* (the \"Objection\")\n\n[Docket No. 1650]. The Trustee's Response is as follows:\n\n# **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\n1. The Debtor contends that because compliance with the January 20 Order<sup>2</sup> would violate his Fifth Amendment rights he should not be held in contempt of Court. His principal basis for this contention is that, by producing documents to the Trustee, he would allegedly reveal his \"control\" over certain entities and individuals, and this same issue of \"control,\" he says, permeates\n\n<sup>1</sup> The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\n<sup>2</sup> *See Order Granting in Part Motion to Compel Compliance with Rule 2004 Subpoenas* [ECF No. 1353] (entered Jan. 20, 2023). Capitalized terms not defined herein have the meanings given to them in the Objection.\n\nthe criminal indictment against him. But the Debtor cannot use the allegations of the criminal indictment to absolve himself of his past contempt because he initially asserted the Fifth Amendment in response to the January 20 Order more than a month before the criminal charges were announced. Moreover, to the extent the Debtor is using the indictment as a basis to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege on a prospective basis, this argument is flawed in the context of this bankruptcy case, which the Debtor commenced voluntarily to avoid the payment of his debts to creditors. The Debtor cannot reap the benefits of the chapter 11 process while shielding himself from his statutory obligation under the Bankruptcy Code to turn over documents to the Trustee.\n\n2. The other arguments the Debtor raises also fail. The Debtor, not the Trustee, bears the burden as to his invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege, and he cannot (despite his protestations to the contrary) assert that privilege in a blanket manner. The Debtor must instead explain why each act the January 20 Order requires of him would be both testimonial in nature and incriminating; otherwise, he is not entitled to the privilege. In his objection, the Debtor relies almost exclusively on the \"control\" issue and fails to explain why producing documents presently in his possession concerning assets of the estate would implicate his Fifth Amendment rights.\n\n3. Because the Debtor's explanations for his failure to comply with the January 20 Order are insufficient, this Court should overrule his objection and find him in contempt of Court.\n\n#### **DISCUSSION**\n\n4. The party invoking the protection of the Fifth Amendment bears the burden of demonstrating how and why it applies in a given situation. *See, e.g., In re Schick,* 215 B.R. 4, 9 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997). To satisfy this burden, the party \"must provide enough information to enable the Court to conduct a factual inquiry to determine the incriminating potential of the documents sought and the act of production against the privilege asserted.\" *Id.* at 9 (citation and\n\ninternal quotation marks omitted). Invocation of the Fifth Amendment may not be done in a blanket or conclusory manner. Rather, \"in order to effectively invoke the protections of the Fifth Amendment, a party must make a particularized objection to each discovery request.\" *In re Astor,*  62 A.D.3d 867, 869 (2009) (citation and internal quotations omitted).\n\n5. Importantly, the Fifth Amendment privilege \"does not . . . reach the content of voluntarily created documents because there is no compulsion to create them.\" *Schick* 215 B.R. at 8. \"This is particularly true where the contents of the documents relates to debtors, their property and their business transactions.\" *Id*.; *see also Butcher v. Bailey*, 753 F.2d 465, 469 (6th Cir. 1985) (\"Information relating to property of the estate is not so intimately personal as to evoke serious concern over privacy interests, particularly in bankruptcy where the trustee has a strong interest in knowing the nature and scope of the estate's holdings.\")\n\n6. In addition, the Fifth Amendment privilege may not be invoked to resist compliance with a \"regulatory regime constructed to effect . . . public purposes unrelated to the enforcement of its criminal laws[,]\" 3 such as the Bankruptcy Code. *See In re Harris*, 221 U.S. 274, 279 (1911) (Holmes, J.) (debtor may not invoke Fifth Amendment privilege to avoid statutory obligations to turn over documents to trustee).\n\n7. Here, contrary to what the law requires, the Debtor seeks to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege in a blanket manner to avoid complying with his obligations under the Bankruptcy Code. The Debtor has not satisfied his burden of supporting his assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege in this manner and, therefore, he is in contempt of Court.\n\n<sup>3</sup> *Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight,* 493 U.S. 549, 556 (1990).\n\n#### **A. Allegations of Criminal Indictment Cannot Absolve Debtor of Past Contempt**\n\n8. The Debtor cannot use the allegations in the criminal indictment to absolve himself of contempt because he failed to comply with the January 20 Order well before the criminal indictment was filed. The United States announced its indictment on March 15, 2023; however, the Debtor's deadline under the January 20 Order to produce documents and provide a declaration detailing his search and collection process was February 7, 2023, nearly a month earlier. The Debtor could not have known of the indictment's specific allegations on February 7; accordingly, those allegations could not have provided a basis for the Debtor's invocation of the Fifth Amendment at that time. The Debtor is, therefore, in contempt of Court.\n\n#### **B. Act of Production Doctrine Does Not Shield Debtor From Producing Documents**\n\n9. Although the Debtor provides no excuse for his *past* failure to comply with the January 20 Order, he now argues primarily that, because the criminal indictment alleges that he controls certain individuals and entities, he cannot produce documents from those individuals and entities on a go-forward basis without conceding he has control over them, which would tend to incriminate him. This forward-looking argument fits more naturally within the Debtor's contemporaneously-filed Stay Motion, 4 and, therefore, the Trustee will reserve his right to fully address such argument in his forthcoming response to that motion. For present purpose, a few points are worth making.\n\n10. First, as noted above, the ability of a debtor in bankruptcy to assert the act of production doctrine as a means to avoid statutory obligations to turn over documents to a trustee is questionable at best. As the Supreme Court noted long ago in *In re Harris*, when a bankrupt\n\n<sup>4</sup> *See Motion For a Limited Stay of Order Granting in Part Motion to Compel Compliance with Rule 2004 Subpoena* [ECF No. 1649] (the \"Stay Motion\").\n\nseeks to withhold documents under the Fifth Amendment privilege, \"the question is not of testimony but of surrender – not of compelling the bankrupt to be a witness against himself in a criminal case, past or future, but of compelling him to yield possession of property that he no longer is entitled to keep.\" 221 U.S. at 279. In *Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight,* 493 U.S. 549, 556 (1990), the Supreme Court, rejected the act of production privilege claim of a mother who had been granted custody of an abused child but later declined to bring the child to a welfare examination ordered by the state. There, the Supreme Court expressly analogized the mother's situation in *Bouknight* to a debtor's obligation to surrender financial documents to a bankruptcy trustee. 493 U.S. at 556 (citing *Harris*). *See also Fisher v. United States*, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976) (citing *Harris* with approval for the proposition that there is no cognizable testimonial aspect to the act of production when the \"existence and location of the papers are a foregone conclusion and the [witness] adds little or nothing to the sum total of the [requesting party's] information by conceding that he in fact has the papers.\"); 3 *Collier on Bankruptcy*, ¶ 344.03[4] (Rev. 16th ed.) (\"it is doubtful that a debtor, as opposed to other witnesses, may successfully refuse to turn over the property, books and records that every debtor under the Code is required to surrender to the trustee on the basis that this 'act of production' might itself tend to incriminate.\").<sup>5</sup>\n\n11. Second, to the extent the Fifth Amendment permits the Debtor to avoid searching for and producing any documents in the possession or custody of certain individuals or entities because doing so would expose his \"control\" over such individuals and entities, he must clearly\n\n<sup>5</sup> The Supreme Court's rejection of the privilege claim in *Harris* relied on a property rights theory of the Fifth Amendment that is no longer viable, that is, that the debtor could not claim the Fifth Amendment privilege as to books and records that were no longer his; however, the Supreme Court's decisions in *Bouknight* and *Fisher* have revived the applicability of *Harris* within the contemporary Fifth Amendment doctrine context.\n\nmake this Fifth Amendment assertion under oath in a particularized manner. *See Astor,* 62 A.D.3d at 869 (\"in order to effectively invoke the protections of the Fifth Amendment, a party must make a particularized objection\") (citation and internal quotations omitted). Specifically, the Debtor must state that he is refusing to produce documents related to each \"Associated Individual\" and \"Associated Entity\" listed in the Trustee's subpoena on the basis that the Fifth Amendment prevents him from testifying as to whether he has control over such individuals and entities. The Trustee is entitled to this level of specificity for purposes of building an evidentiary record in this case, and the Debtor cannot carry his burden with anything less.\n\n12. Third, the Debtor fails to acknowledge that, even if he has a valid basis for invoking the Fifth Amendment based on the notion that by producing certain documents he would concede his control over certain individua ls and entities, this would not cover the entirety of his obligations under the January 20 Order. In addition to requiring the Debtor to produce documents from sources under his control, the January 20 Order also required him to produce documents in his own custody or possession related to potential property of the estate. *See* Jan. 20 Order at 2-4. The Debtor has provided no justification as to why producing such documents would either (a) be testimonial in nature, or (b) tend to incriminate him. The criminal indictment involves certain securities and investment frauds, while this case involves the Trustee's attempt to identify assets of the estate. It is not at all clear how every document relevant to the latter could somehow impact the former, and it is the Debtor's burden<sup>6</sup> to substantiate his Fifth Amendment privilege (not the Trustee's to refute it). *See e.g.*, *In re Connelly*, 59 B.R. 421, 445 (Bankr. N.D.Ill. 1986) (holding that the debtor, upon classifying the documents to be produced and those to be withheld, is required to indicate why the act of producing each class of documents withheld might be incriminating);\n\n<sup>6</sup> *In re Schick,* 215 B.R. at 9 (debtor's burden to substantiate Fifth Amendment privilege).\n\n*In re Crabtree*, 39 B.R. 702, 712 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984) (finding that a debtor's refusal to provide information based on a blanket assertion of his Fifth Amendment right does not satisfy the debtor's statutory obligations, and that the debtor must \"file a second statement […], addressing each question and asserting any privilege claimed on an item-by-item basis.\"); *In re Blan*, 239 B.R. 385, 392 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1999) (finding that debtor must substantiate his Fifth Amendment privilege that responding to the specific requests for information may tend to incriminate him).\n\n13. Fourth, to the extent the Debtor is arguing that he cannot comply with the January 20 Order because the government has seized all of his documents, that argument, without more, is insufficient to avoid a finding of contempt. The Debtor previously represented to his counsel, the Trustee, and to this Court that he had no responsive text messages on his cell phones, *no computer*, *no servers*, and *no hard copy documents in his house*. 7 The government has now stated that it seized *approximately 30 phones* and *approximately 25 computers, plus dozens of external storage devices*, from the Debtor's residences.<sup>8</sup> The seizure of these devices not only exposes the untruthfulness of the Debtor's prior assertions, it also demonstrates that the government *already has in its possession* all the contents of such devices. Accordingly, to the extent the Debtor has himself retained copies of these devices or their contents (such as backup storage devices, cloud storage accounts, or email accounts containing the same information as the devices), he can search for and produce documents to the Trustee without any fear of prejudicing his rights in his criminal\n\n<sup>7</sup> *See, e.g.,* Nov. 30, 2022 Hr'g Tr. at 52:18-53:2 (Moriarty, J.) (\"The debtor represented that he doesn't use a computer. [. . .] The debtor doesn't have a server. [. . .] The debtor does not have an office. The debtor does not maintain hard copy documents in his house.\"); *id.* at 58:2 (\"The debtor doesn't use email.\").\n\n<sup>8</sup> *See Letter Response in Opp. to Mot. of Yvette Wang for Bond,* No. 1:23-cr-118-AT [ECF No. 10], at 3.\n\ncase—i.e., if the government already has the documents, then there cannot be any harm to the Debtor in also providing them to the Trustee.\n\n#### **C. Fifth Amendment Does Not Prevent Debtor From Providing Required Declaration**\n\n14. The January 20 Order also requires the Debtor to provide a declaration detailing his search and collection process. *See* Jan. 20 Order at 4-5. The Debtor, however, has provided no basis for why simply describing where and how he looked for documents could tend to incriminate him. If the Debtor has not even searched for responsive documents, how could he possibly know that his production of documents in his possession would be incriminating? The Debtor must provide a description of his search and collection efforts to comply with the January 20 Order.\n\n[*Remainder of Page Intentionally Left Blank.*]\n\nWHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the Trustee respectfully requests that the Court reject the Debtor's arguments and hold him in contempt of Court for his past and ongoing violations of the January 20 Order.\n\nNew Haven, Connecticut\n\n#### Dated: April 14, 2023 LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE\n\nBy: */s/ Patrick R. Linsey*\n\nDouglas S. Skalka (ct00616) Patrick R. Linsey (ct29437) NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 781-2847 dskalka@npmlaw.com plinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n*and*\n\nNicholas A. Bassett (admitted *pro hac vice*) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C., 20036 (202) 551-1902 nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n*and*\n\nAvram E. Luft (admitted *pro hac vice*) G. Alexander Bongartz (admitted *pro hac vice*) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6079 aviluft@paulhastings.com alexbongartz@paulhastings.com\n\n*Counsel for the Chapter 11 Trustee*\n\n## **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| -----------------------------------------------------------<br>x |             |                         |  |  |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|-------------------------|--|--|\n| In re:                                                           | :<br>:      | Chapter 11              |  |  |\n| HO WAN KWOK et al.,                                              | :<br>:<br>: | Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |  |  |\n| Debtors.1                                                        | :<br>:      | Jointly Administered    |  |  |\n| -----------------------------------------------------------      | x           |                         |  |  |\n\n### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nThe undersigned hereby certifies that on April 14, 2023, the foregoing Response was electronically filed. Notice of this filing was sent by e-mail to all parties to the above-captioned chapter 11 case by operation of the Court's electronic filing (\"CM/ECF\") system or by mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing as indicated on the Notice of Electronic Filing. Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF system.\n\n| Dated: | April 14, 2023         |                                      |\n|--------|------------------------|--------------------------------------|\n|        | New Haven, Connecticut | By:<br>/s/ Patrick R. Linsey         |\n|        |                        | Douglas S. Skalka (ct00616)          |\n|        |                        | Patrick R. Linsey (ct29437)          |\n|        |                        | NEUBERT,<br>PEPE &<br>MONTEITH, P.C. |\n|        |                        | 195 Church Street, 13th Floor        |\n|        |                        | New Haven, Connecticut 06510         |\n|        |                        | (203) 781-2847                       |\n|        |                        | dskalka@npmlaw.com                   |\n|        |                        | plinsey@npmlaw.com                   |\n|        |                        |                                      |\n|        |                        |                                      |\n\n*Counsel for the Chapter 11 Trustee*\n\n<sup>1</sup> The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).","body_zh":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION（美国康涅狄格区联邦破产法院布里奇波特分院）\n\n----------------------------------------------------------- x\n\n关于： :\n: 第 11 章\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等， :\n: 案号 22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人。1 :\n: 联合审理\n\nx\n第 11 章受托人对债务人就受托人申请责令债务人说明不应被裁定蔑视法庭理由之动议所提异议的回应\n\nLuc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯平斯）作为在 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（下称“债务人”）的第 11 章案件（下称“第 11 章案件”）中获任命的第 11 章受托人（下称“受托人”），谨就《个人债务人对第 11 章受托人申请责令债务人说明不应被裁定蔑视法庭理由之动议的异议》（下称“异议”）[Docket No. 1650] 提交本回应（下称“回应”）。受托人的回应如下：\n\n引言\n\n1. 债务人主张，由于遵守1月20日裁定2会侵犯其《第五修正案》权利，因此他不应被裁定蔑视法庭。其提出该主张的主要依据是，通过向受托人提供文件，据称会揭示他对某些实体和个人的“控制”，而他说，这一相同的“控制”问题贯穿于\n\n1 在这些第 11 章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵，亦称 Guo Wengui、Miles Guo 和 Miles Kwok，以及其他众多化名）（纳税人识别号后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（纳税人识别号后四位：8202）以及 Genever Holdings Corporation。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 和 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为 Paul Hastings LLP（普衡律师事务所）, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 转交 Luc A. Despins（作为 Ho Wan Kwok 破产财团的受托人）（仅用于送达通知和通信目的）。\n\n2 参见《关于部分准许强制遵守第 2004 条传票之动议的裁定》[ECF No. 1353]（2023年1月20日登载）。本文中未作定义的大写术语具有“异议”中所赋予它们的含义。\n\n针对他的刑事起诉书。但债务人不能利用刑事起诉书中的指控来免除其过去的蔑视法庭行为，因为他在刑事指控公布前一个多月就已针对1月20日裁定援引了《第五修正案》。此外，在债务人将起诉书作为前瞻性援引《第五修正案》特权之依据的范围内，该论点在本破产案件的背景下是有缺陷的，而本破产案件是债务人为了避免向债权人偿还债务而自愿发起的。债务人不能在享受第 11 章程序利益的同时，逃避其根据《破产法典》向受托人移交文件的法定规定义务。\n\n2. 债务人提出的其他论点也均不成立。就援引《第五修正案》特权而言，举证责任在债务人，而不在受托人，且债务人不能（尽管他提出了相反抗辩）以一概而论的方式主张该特权。相反，债务人必须解释为何1月20日裁定要求其作出的每一项行为既具有证言性质又具有自证其罪的可能；否则，他无权享有该特权。在其异议中，债务人几乎完全依赖“控制”问题，未能解释为何提供目前由其占有的、涉及破产财团资产的文件会涉及其《第五修正案》权利。\n\n3. 由于债务人对其未能遵守1月20日裁定的解释是不充分的，本法院应驳回其异议并裁定其蔑视法庭。\n\n讨论\n\n4. 援引《第五修正案》保护的一方承担证明其在特定情形下如何以及为何适用的举证责任。参见例如 In re Schick, 215 B.R. 4, 9 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997)（纽约南区联邦破产法院1997年）。为履行该举证责任，该当事方“必须提供足够的信息，使法院能够进行事实调查，以对照所主张的特权来确定所寻求的文件以及提供文件的行为是否具有自证其罪的潜在可能性。”同上，第 9 页（引文及\n\n内部引号省略）。援引《第五修正案》不得以一概而论或结论性的方式进行。相反，“为了有效援引《第五修正案》的保护，当事方必须对每一项证据开示请求提出具体化的异议。”In re Astor, 62 A.D.3d 867, 869 (2009)（引文及内部引号省略）。\n\n5. 重要的是，《第五修正案》特权“并不仅因文件内容而及于自愿制作的文件，因为制作这些文件并未受到强迫。”Schick, 215 B.R. 8 页。“当文件的内容涉及债务人、其财产及其商业交易时尤为如此。”同上；亦见 Butcher v. Bailey, 753 F.2d 465, 469 (6th Cir. 1985)（第六巡回上诉法院1985年）（“与破产财团财产相关的信息并不具有极度隐私的性质，以至于会引发对隐私利益的严重关切，特别是在破产案件中，受托人在了解破产财团持有资产的性质和范围方面拥有强烈的利益。”）\n\n6. 此外，不得援引《第五修正案》特权来抗拒遵守“旨在实现……与其刑事法律执行无关的公共目的而构建的监管制度[，]”3 例如《破产法典》。参见 In re Harris, 221 U.S. 274, 279 (1911) (Holmes, J.)（霍姆斯法官）（债务人不得援引《第五修正案》特权来规避向受托人移交文件的法定规定义务）。\n\n7. 在本案中，与法律要求相反，债务人试图以一概而论的方式援引其《第五修正案》特权，以规避其在《破产法典》下的义务。债务人未能履行其以此种方式支持其主张《第五修正案》特权的举证责任，因此，其构成了蔑视法庭。\n\n3 Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight（巴尔的摩市社会服务部诉鲍奈特案）, 493 U.S. 549, 556 (1990).\n\nA. 刑事起诉书的指控不能免除债务人过去的蔑视法庭行为\n\n8. 债务人不能利用刑事起诉书中的指控来免除自己的蔑视法庭行为，因为他在刑事起诉书提交之前很久就已经未能遵守1月20日裁定。美国联邦政府于2023年3月15日宣布了起诉书；然而，根据1月20日裁定，债务人提供文件并提供详述其检索和收集过程的声明书的截止日期是2023年2月7日，比前者早了将近一个月。债务人在2月7日不可能知晓起诉书的具体指控；因此，这些指控在当时不可能构成债务人援引《第五修正案》的依据。因此，债务人构成了蔑视法庭。\n\nB. 提供行为原则并不包庇债务人使其免于提供文件\n\n9. 尽管债务人未就其过去未能遵守1月20日裁定的行为提供任何借口，但他现在主要辩称，由于刑事起诉书指控他控制了某些个人和实体，因此他在今后的阶段无法在不承认自己对他们拥有控制权的情况下提供来自这些个人和实体所有的文件，而承认控制权将倾向于使他自证其罪。这种前瞻性的论点更适合置于债务人同期提交的暂缓执行动议4中，因此，受托人将保留其在即将针对该动议作出的回应中充分反驳该论点的权利。就目前而言，有几点值得阐明。\n\n10. 首先，如上所述，破产债务人主张提供行为原则作为规避向受托人移交文件之法定规定义务的手段，这种能力充其量是存疑的。正如最高法院很久以前在 In re Harris 案中所指出的，当破产人\n\n4 参见《关于对部分准许强制遵守第 2004 条传票之动议的裁定进行有限暂缓执行的动议》[ECF No. 1649]（下称“暂缓执行动议”）。\n\n试图根据《第五修正案》特权扣留文件时，“问题不在于作证，而在于交出——不是强迫破产人在过去或未来的刑事案件中成为不利于自己的证人，而是强迫其放弃占有其不再有权保留的财产。”221 U.S. 279 页。在 Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 556 (1990) 案中，最高法院驳回了一位母亲的提供行为特权主张，该母亲获得了受虐待儿童的监护权，但后来拒绝将儿童带去接受州政府命令进行的福利检查。在那里，最高法院明确将 Bouknight 案中母亲的处境比作债务人向破产受托人交出财务文件的义务。493 U.S. 556 页（引用 Harris 案）。亦见 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976)（赞同地引用 Harris 案，以支持当“文件的存在和存放地点已成定论，且[证人]通过承认其确实持有这些文件对[请求方]的信息总量几乎没有增加任何内容”时，提供行为不存在可认定的证言层面的命题）；3 Collier on Bankruptcy（《科利尔论破产法》第 3 卷）, ¶ 344.03[4] (Rev. 16th ed.)（“与其他人证不同，法典下的每位债务人都被要求向受托人交出财产、账簿和记录，债务人能否以这种‘提供行为’本身可能倾向于自证其罪为由成功拒绝交出，这是存疑的。”）5\n\n11. 其次，在《第五修正案》允许债务人免于检索和提供某些个人或实体所占有或保管的任何文件（因为这样做会暴露其对这些个人和实体的“控制”）的范围内，他必须以具体化的方式宣誓明确\n\n5 最高法院在 Harris 案中驳回特权主张依赖于当时关于《第五修正案》的财产权理论，即债务人不能对不再属于他的账簿和记录主张《第五修正案》特权，该理论现已不再适用；然而，最高法院在 Bouknight 案和 Fisher 案中的裁决使 Harris 案在当代《第五修正案》法理背景下的适用性得以复活。\n\n提出此项《第五修正案》主张。参见 Astor, 62 A.D.3d 869 页（“为了有效援引《第五修正案》的保护，当事方必须提出具体化的异议”）（引文及内部引号省略）。具体而言，债务人必须声明，他是以《第五修正案》阻止其就其是否对这些个人和实体拥有控制权作证为由，拒绝提供与受托人传票中所列的每个“关联个人”和“关联实体”相关的文件。为了在本案中建立证据记录，受托人有权要求达到这种具体程度，而债务人若未达到此标准则无法履行其举证责任。\n\n12. 第三，债务人未认识到，即便他有正当理由以出示某些文件即意味着承认对某些个人和实体的控制权为由援引《第五修正案》，这也无法涵盖其在1月20日命令下的全部义务。除要求债务人出示来自其控制之来源的文件外，1月20日命令还要求他出示其自身保管或占有的、与破产财团潜在财产相关的文档。参见1月20日命令第2-4页。债务人未就为何出示此类文件会（a）具有证言性质，或（b）可能使其自证其罪提供任何正当理由。刑事起诉书涉及某些证券和投资欺诈，而本案涉及受托人试图查明破产财团资产的努力。目前完全不清楚与后者相关的每一份文件究竟如何会对前者产生影响，且证实其《第五修正案》特权的举证责任在于债务人6（而非由受托人予以反驳）。参见例如 In re Connelly, 59 B.R. 421, 445 (Bankr. N.D.Ill. 1986)（裁定债务人在对待出示文件和待扣留文件进行分类后，须说明为何出示每一类被扣留文件的行为可能使其自证其罪）；\n\n6 In re Schick, 215 B.R. at 9（债务人负有证实其《第五修正案》特权的举证责任）。\n\nIn re Crabtree, 39 B.R. 702, 712 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984)（认定债务人基于对其《第五修正案》权利的一揽子主张而拒绝提供信息的行为不符合债务人的法定義务，且债务人必须“提交第二份声明[…]，逐项针对每个问题并逐项主张任何所主张的特权”）；In re Blan, 239 B.R. 385, 392 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1999)（认定债务人必须证实其《第五修正案》特权，即回应具体的信息请求可能会使其自证其罪）。\n\n13. 第四，就债务人主张其因政府已扣押其所有文件而无法遵守1月20日命令而言，在没有更多证据的情况下，该主张不足以避免被裁定藐视法庭。债务人此前曾向其律师、受托人以及本法院表示，其手机上没有应答性短信，没有电脑，没有服务器，家中也没有纸质文件。7 政府现已声明，其从债务人的住所中扣押了大约30部手机和大约25台电脑，外加数十个外部存储设备。8 扣押这些设备不仅揭露了债务人此前主张的不实，还表明政府已经占有了此类设备的所有内容。因此，就债务人自身保留了这些设备或其内容的副本（例如备用存储设备、云存储账户或包含与设备相同信息的电子邮件账户）而言，他可以为受托人检索并出示文件，而无需担心损害其在刑事\n\n7 参见例如2022年11月30日庭审记录第52:18-53:2行（Moriarty，法官）（“债务人表示其不使用电脑。[. . .] 债务人没有服务器。[. . .] 债务人没有办公室。债务人不在家中保留纸质文件。”）；同上，第58:2行（“债务人不使用电子邮件。”）。\n\n8 参见对Yvette Wang（王雁平）保释动议的答辩信，案号 1:23-cr-118-AT [ECF No. 10]，第3页。\n\n案件中的权利——即，如果政府已经掌握了这些文件，那么债务人将这些文件同样提供给受托人就不会受到任何损害。\n\nC. 《第五修正案》并不阻止债务人提供所要求的声明书\n\n14. 1月20日命令还要求债务人提供一份详细说明其检索和收集过程的声明书。参见1月20日命令第4-5页。然而，债务人并未就为何仅仅描述其在何处以及如何查找文件可能使其自证其罪提供任何依据。如果债务人甚至都没有检索应答性文件，他怎么可能知道出示其占有的文件会使其自证其罪？债务人必须提供对其检索和收集工作的描述，以遵守1月20日命令。\n\n[本页其余部分有意留白。]\n\n据此，基于前述理由，受托人谨请法院驳回债务人的主张，并因其过去和持续违反1月20日命令的行为判定其藐视法庭。\n\n康涅狄格州纽黑文\n日期：2023年4月14日 LUC A. DESPINS，第11章破产受托人\n\n签署人：/s/ Patrick R. Linsey\n\nDouglas S. Skalka (ct00616) Patrick R. Linsey (ct29437) NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 781-2847 dskalka@npmlaw.com plinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n以及\n\nNicholas A. Bassett（特别获准代理本案） PAUL HASTINGS LLP（普衡律师事务所） 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C., 20036 (202) 551-1902 nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n以及\n\nAvram E. Luft（特别获准代理本案） G. Alexander Bongartz（特别获准代理本案） PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6079 aviluft@paulhastings.com alexbongartz@paulhastings.com\n\n第11章破产受托人之代理律师\n\n美国破产法院 康涅狄格区 布里奇波特分院\n\nx\n\n案由： :\n: 第11章\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等， :\n:\n: 案号 22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人。1 :\n: 联合审理\n----------------------------------------------------------- x\n\n送达证书\n\n下述署名人特此证明，于2023年4月14日，前述答辩书已通过电子方式提交。本提交通知已通过法院电子归档（“CM/ECF”）系统的运行向上述标题项下第11章案件的所有当事人发送电子邮件，或按照电子归档通知上的指示向任何无法接受电子归档的人士邮寄送达。各方当事人均可通过法院的CM/ECF系统查阅本次提交的文件。\n\n日期：2023年4月14日\n\n康涅狄格州纽黑文 签署人：\n/s/ Patrick R. Linsey\nDouglas S. Skalka (ct00616)\nPatrick R. Linsey (ct29437)\nNEUBERT,\nPEPE &\nMONTEITH, P.C.\n195 Church Street, 13th Floor\nNew Haven, Connecticut 06510\n(203) 781-2847\ndskalka@npmlaw.com\nplinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n第11章破产受托人之代理律师\n\n1 这些第11章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（亦称郭文贵、Miles Guo 和 Miles Kwok，以及其他众多化名）（纳税人识别号后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（纳税人识别号后四位：8202）及 Genever Holdings Corporation。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 及 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为 Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 转交 Ho Wan Kwok 破产财团受托人 Luc A. Despins（仅用于接收通知和联络之目的）。","key_entities":["Je","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Guo","Despins","Paul Hastings","Miles Guo","CIPA"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":10,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1353,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1649,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":2982,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 13:33:02"}