{"id":"court_ctb_167_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":167,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"| fUNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT | |---------------------------------|","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"| fUNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT |\n|---------------------------------|\n| DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT         |\n| BRIDGEPORT DIVISION             |\n\n| _______________________________________________   |                     |\n|---------------------------------------------------|---------------------|\n| In re                                             | : Chapter 11        |\n|                                                   | :                   |\n| Ho Wan Kwok,                                      | : Case No. 22-50073 |\n|                                                   | :                   |\n| Debtor.1                                          | :                   |\n|                                                   | :                   |\n| ________________________________________________: |                     |\n| Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund, L.P.,     | :                   |\n|                                                   | :                   |\n| Movant,                                           | :                   |\n|                                                   | :                   |\n| vs.                                               | :                   |\n|                                                   | :                   |\n|                                                   | :                   |\n| Ho Wan Kwok,                                      | :                   |\n|                                                   | :                   |\n| Respondent.                                       | :                   |\n| ________________________________________________: |                     |\n\n# **POSITION STATEMENT OF THE OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF UNSECURED CREDITORS IN LIMITED SUPPORT OF MOTON OF PACIFIC ALLIANCE ASIA OPPORTUNITY FUND L.P. FOR ENTRY OF AN ORDER CONFIRMING THE INAPPLICABILITY OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, RELIEF FROM THE AUTOMATIC STAY PURSUANT TO SECTION 362(d)(2) OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE**\n\nThe Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the \"Committee\") of Debtor and Debtor\n\nin Possession, Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\"), herby submits this Position Statement in limited support of the Motion of Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. for Entry of an Order Confirming the Inapplicability of the Automatic Stay or, in the Alternative, Relief from the Automatic Stay Pursuant to Section 362(d)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code (the \"PAX Motion\").\n\nIn support of the PAX Motion, the Committee respectfully represents as follows:\n\n<sup>1</sup> The Debtor is known by the following names: Guo Wengui; Miles Guo; Miles Kwok; and Ho Wan Kwok.\n\n### **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\n1. The Committee was appointed in this case by a Notice of Appointment of Creditors' Committee filed by United States Trustee on March 21, 2022 (ECF No. 108). The Committee thereafter promptly engaged in the process of selecting its counsel, which it was only able to complete on March 28, 2022. Thus, by the time the Committee was able to select its counsel, all of the papers in support of or in opposition to the PAX Motion either had already been filed with the Court or were filed on the same day that the Committee selected its counsel.<sup>2</sup>\n\n2. While the Committee recognizes that the Court has already received extensive briefing on the issues raised by the PAX Motion, the Committee, with due regard for avoiding duplication or repetition of arguments heretofore made by the principal parties<sup>3</sup> , wishes to articulate its position to the Court in advance of the April 13 hearing on the PAX Motion, as opposed to addressing the Court for the first time at the hearing.<sup>4</sup>\n\n<sup>2</sup> The PAX Motion was filed on March 1, 2022 (ECF No. 57), the Debtor's Objection to the PAX Motion was filed on March 15, 2022 (ECF No. 83), PAX's Reply to the Debtor's Objection was filed on March 18, 2022 (ECF No. 98) (the \"PAX Reply\"), and the Debtor's Supplemental Objection to the PAX Motion was filed on March 28, 2022 (ECF No. 141) (the \"Debtor Supp. Obj.\").\n\n<sup>3</sup> The Committee is aware that at the March 22, 2022 hearing on the PAX Motion, the Court stated that other than a response by the Debtor to ¶¶8, 9, 10 and 11 of the PAX Reply, which would be due on or before March 28, 2022, no more briefing would be allowed in connection with the PAX Motion. Inasmuch as the Committee was not even appointed at that time, the Committee believes that the Court's directive could only have been intended for the principal parties to the PAX Motion and not to any creditors' committee that might later be appointed.\n\n<sup>4</sup> In this regard, the Committee would ask to be recognized as a party in interest that has a right to be heard on the PAX Motion pursuant to section 1109(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. *See generally Metro North State Bank v. The Barrick Group, Inc.* (*In re The Barrick Group, Inc.*), 98 B.R. 133, 135 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1989) (unsecured creditors have a right to oppose and otherwise be heard on motion for relief from the automatic stay pursuant to section 1109(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, but in the absence of formal intervention, have no right to take discovery).\n\n#### **RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY**\n\n3. On February 15, 2022 (the \"Petition Date\"), the Debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11, Title 11 of the United States Code (the \"Bankruptcy Code\"). Since that time, the Debtor has remained a debtor-in-possession pursuant to §§1107 and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code.\n\n4. No trustee or examiner has yet been appointed in the Debtor's bankruptcy case, although on March 19, 2022, the United States Trustee (\"UST\") filed a Motion for Order Directing Appointment of an Examiner, or in the alternative, Motion for Order Directing the Appointment of a Chapter 11 Trustee (the \"Examiner/Trustee Motion\"). The Examiner/Trustee Motion is scheduled for hearing on April 13, 2022, and according to the UST's Amended Proposed Order at n. 1 (ECF No. 116), the Debtor has agreed to the Court's directing the UST to appoint an examiner in this case.\n\n5. On March 21, 2022, the Committee was officially appointed by the United States Trustee and on March 28, 2022, selected Pullman & Comley, LLC (\"P&C\") as its counsel.<sup>5</sup>\n\n6. Additional procedural history relevant to the PAX Motion is set forth in the papers of the principal parties and will not be reiterated here. The Committee wishes to advise the Court, however, of the status of removal proceedings initiated by the Debtor whereby, in a further act of forum shopping, he seeks to remove the New York Supreme Court action, *PAX v. Kwok*¸ Index No. 652077/2017 (the \"New York Action\"), to this Court.<sup>6</sup>\n\n<sup>5</sup> The Committee filed an application for authority to employ P&C on April 4, 2022.\n\n<sup>6</sup> It is obvious that, by the removal action, the Debtor desperately seeks to avoid having to confront Judge Ostrager to answer for the contemptuous actions he committed before the New York Supreme Court, not this Court, and would prefer that this Court, in effect, take over for Judge Ostrager in deciding the Debtor's fate for disregarding multiple court orders in the New York Action. While the Court should not abide this gambit, the Committee notes that this Court has the power to order the imprisonment of a\n\n7. On March 15, 2022, the Debtor filed with the New York Supreme Court a Notice of Removal of the New York Action to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (Doc. No. 1195), and on March 18, 2022, followed that up with the filing of a Notice of Removal in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Civil Action No. 22-cv-2258 (MKV).<sup>7</sup> The District Court immediately referred the removed action to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York on March 21, 2022, where it remains pending under Case No. 22-1073, styled as *PAX v. Kwok*.\n\n8. On March 23, 2022, the Debtor filed a Motion to Transfer Case with the Bankruptcy Court in the Southern District of New York (ECF No. 4), requesting that the removed action be transferred to the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, for referral to this Court. No motion for remand, 28 U.S.C. § 1452(b), or other response has yet been made by PAX to the removal of the New York Action or the motion to transfer venue to this Court.\n\n9. The Committee notes that once an action is removed, the Rules direct that \"[t]he parties shall proceed no further in that court [referring to the court from which the action was removed] unless and until the claim or cause of action is remanded. A remand is available on \"any equitable ground.\" 28 U.S.C. § 1452(b).\n\ndebtor's representative for civil contempt based on a disregard of court orders. *Matter of Kossoff PLLC*, Case No. 21-10699 (DSJ), 2021 WL 5492186 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2021). The Committee believes such action is necessary in order to facilitate the return of the Lady May to its proper jurisdiction and for its further administration before this Court.\n\n<sup>7</sup> These filings were actually in the reverse of what the Bankruptcy Rules require. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9027(a)(1), (c) (notice of removal to be filed in the federal district within which is located the state court where the removed action is pending, and \"[p]romptly after filing the notice of removal, the party filing\n\n### **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**\n\n10. This Court has jurisdiction over the PAX Motion and the contested matter initiated thereby pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409. The statutory predicates for the relief sought herein are 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a), (b)(4), (d)(1), 105(a), Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9014, and D. Conn. LBR 9014-1.\n\n### **COMMITTEE POSITION**\n\n## **I. WHETHER OR NOT THE AUTOMATIC STAY IS APPLICABLE, THE DEBTOR SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO USE THE BANKRUPTCY COURT AS A REFUGE FOR HIS WRONGDOING**\n\n11. While the Debtor lectures about the purposes of the automatic stay, which he himself invoked to avoid facing the consequences of Judge Ostrager's February 9, 2022 Decision and Order, and attempts to distinguish much of the case authority relied upon by PAX (Debtor Obj. at 8-14, 16-19, 24-29), he overlooks the one bedrock principle of bankruptcy law that is most applicable to the PAX Motion: Congress did not \"intend that the bankruptcy court could be a haven for wrongdoers.\" *Berry Estates, Inc. v. State of New York* (*In re Berry Estates*), 812 F.2d 67, 71 (2d Cir. 1987). *See also Yates v. The District of Columbia* (*In re Yates*), 274 Fed. Appx. 312, 317 (4th Cir. Apr. 21, 2008) (\"'fresh start' principle is limited by the concept that a discharge in bankruptcy is not intended to be a haven for wrongdoers\" ) (internal quotation and citation omitted); *Fezler v. Davis* (*In re Davis*), 194 F.3d 570, 573 (5th Cir. 1999) (\"bankruptcy courts are not to be used as 'a haven for wrongdoers'\") (quoting *In re DeFelice*, 77 B.R. 376, 378 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1987)).\n\nthe notice shall file a copy of it with the clerk of the court from which … the cause of action is removed\").\n\n12. Pursuant to this fundamental principle, the Committee submits that rather wade into the thicket of case authorities concerning the applicability of the § 362(b)(4) exception to private parties seeking remedies for contempt, the Court, for \"cause,\" 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1), should simply modify the automatic stay to allow further proceedings before Judge Ostrager to take place to consider appropriate contempt remedies, other than the payment or continued accrual of monetary fines. In the Committee's view, such proceedings are necessary to facilitate the return of the Lady May, inasmuch as there is little, if any, doubt the Debtor will not cause its return to the U.S. jurisdiction unless further compelled to do so, and imprisonment may be the recourse that finally makes the Debtor accept that he is not above the law. Thus, the Committee would urge the Court to find \"cause\" to permit contempt proceedings to proceed subject to the limitations expressed below. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1).\n\n13. Under section 362(d)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Court can and should limit stay relief and impose conditions to it that would: (i) prevent the assessment of any postpetition fines or monetary sanctions that could arguably constitute administrative claims to the detriment of general unsecured creditors, or require any such fines or monetary sanctions to be subordinated to general unsecured creditors; (ii) limit the stay relief to marshaling the Lady May back to the US jurisdiction for the benefit of creditors of the estate, but making clear that PAX is prohibited from obtaining a postpetition lien on the yacht for its own advantage; and (iii) subject to the Debtor agreeing to return the Lady May to the U.S. jurisdiction within a period of 20 days from April 13, 2022 and demonstrating his inability to have done so prior to that time and his good faith steps to cause its return to occur, condition the effectiveness of the Court's lift stay order on the passage of 20 days from April 13, 2022 without the Lady May having been returned to the U.S. jurisdiction. For all other matters and actions by PAX, the automatic stay would\n\nremain in effect. The Court has the power to fashion such relief and it is appropriate to do so under the circumstances of this case.\n\n**II.**\n\n# **UNDER THE ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE AND PRINCIPLES OF CLAIM AND ISSUE PRECLUSION, THE DEBTOR IS BARRED FROM RELITIGATING THE ISSUES OF HIS BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF THE LADY MAY**\n\n14. As relevant here, Judge Ostrager found that the Debtor \"has much more than a beneficial interest in the Lady May. Not only does Kwok control the yacht, it appears he provided the funds to purchase it and he is the person who principally enjoys the yacht\" (PAX Motion, Ex. 1, at 8). Judge Ostrager further found that \"[t]he evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates that Kwok holds a beneficial interest in and controls the Lady May\" (*Id.*, Ex. 1 at 9).\n\n15. As this Court recognized in *U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Conrad* (*In re Conrad*), 614 B.R.\n\n20 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2020), \"[t]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal courts from reviewing cases \"brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review of those judgments'.\" *Id.* at 26 (quoting *Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp*., 544 U.S. 280, 283-84, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005)). It applies under the following circumstances:\n\n> (1) the plaintiff must have lost in state court, (2) the plaintiff must complain of injuries caused by a state court judgment, (3) the plaintiff must invite district court review and rejection of the state court judgment, and (4) the state judgment must have been rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.\n\n*Id.* (citing *Green v. Mattingly*, 585 F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 2009)). All of these elements are satisfied here. The Debtor did lose in the New York Action, he is now complaining that Judge Ostrager erred and is inviting this Court to reconsider the issue of his control and beneficial\n\nownership of the Lady May, and the February 9, 2022 decision was rendered before the commencement of this case.\n\n16. The Debtor has suggested that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply because Judge Ostrager's February 9, 2022 decision is on appeal and that he lacked jurisdiction to determine the Debtor's interest in the Lady May (Debtor Supp. Obj. at 1-3). The Debtor is mistaken. District Courts in this Circuit have held that \"Rooker-Feldman applies despite pending state court appeals.\" *Campbell v. Bank of America, N.A.*, 19 CV 11 (VB), 2019 WL 4083078, at \\*4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2019). And the Second Circuit itself \"has strongly suggested\" that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does apply \"even when there is a pending state appeal of the challenged judgment.\" *Butcher v. Wendt*, 975 F.3d 236, 244 n. 5 (2d Cir. 2020).\n\n17. As for the Debtor's challenge to Judge Ostrager's jurisdiction, courts in this Circuit have held that \"'no exception to the *Rooker/Feldman* doctrine exists when there is a challenge to the state court's personal or subject matter jurisdiction'.\" *Gunn v. Ambac Assurance Corp.*, No. 11 Civ. 5497 (PAC)(JLC), 2012 WL 3188849, at \\*4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2012) (quoting *In re Salem*, 290 B.R. 479, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)). Thus, the Debtor cannot escape the controlling effect of Judge Ostrager's February 9, 2022 decision by claiming that the New York Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to render it.\n\n18. As for *res judicata*, the Committee agrees with PAX that it applies to preclude relitigation of the issues of the Debtor's beneficial ownership and control (PAX Reply at 8), irrespective of the Debtor's appeal of Judge Ostrager's February 9, 2020. *See Arnold v. Beth Abraham Health Services, Inc.*, 2009 WL 5171736, at \\*4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2009) (\"[u]nder New York law, the pendency of an appeal does not deprive a challenged judgment of preclusive effect\" (citing *DiSorbo v. Hoy*, 343 F.3d 172, 183 (2d Cir. 2003), which applied preclusive effect\n\nto a New York Supreme Court judgment notwithstanding an appeal pending before the Appellate Division, and *Petrella v. Siegel*, 843 F. 2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1988), which held that \"the determination of the [New York] state supreme court... is entitled to res judicata effect, even though the [party] may be appealing that determination.\"). *See also CVR Energy, Inc. v. Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz,* 2016 WL 1271686, at \\*4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2016) (collecting New York federal and state cases); *Plaza PH2001 LLC v. Plaza Residential Owner, L.P.*, 98 A.3d 89, 98, 947 N.Y.S.2d 498, 505 (1st Dept. Appellate Div. 2012) (\"the pending appeal did not alter the applicability of the doctrine of res judicata at that time\").\n\n19. The Committee further submits that the issues of the Debtor's beneficial ownership and control of the yacht are precluded from relitigation by the doctrine of collateral estoppel as issues that were conclusively decided in the New York Action. It is well settled that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies in bankruptcy proceedings. *Evans v. Ottimo*, 469 F.3d 278, 281 (2d Cir.2006) (citing *Grogan v. Garner*, 498 U.S. 279, 285–91, 111 S.Ct. 654, 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991)).\n\n20. When determining whether a state court judgment should be accorded collateral estoppel effect, \"the court must apply the preclusive law of the rendering state.\" *Options Unlimited, Inc. v. McCann* (*In re McCann*), 634 B.R. 207, 215 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2021). Under New York law, collateral estoppel will bar the relitigation of an issue \"when (1) the identical issue necessarily was decided in the prior action and is decisive of the present action, and (2) the party to be precluded from relitigating the issue had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action.\" *Ottimo*, 469 F.3d at 281.\n\n21. The issue of the Debtor's interest in the Lady May is identical to the issue of whether that interest constitutes property of the estate. *See e.g. Breeden v. Bennett* (*In re Bennett*\n\n*Funding Group, Inc.*), 367 B.R. 269, 289 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2007). In *Bennet Funding*, the bankruptcy court, in determining whether a criminal conviction should be accorded collateral estoppel effect on a trustee's claim of turnover, observed that in the context of turnover, \"courts routinely look to state law in order to determine whether the property in question is property of the estate.\" *Id.* (citing *In re Mid–Island Hospital*, 254 B.R. 71, 74 (E.D.N.Y.2000) as \"holding that whether a particular item is property of the estate in bankruptcy is governed by principles of state law\").\n\n22. Here, Judge Ostrager determined that the Debtor had a beneficial interest in and was in control of the yacht and thus, the determination of those issues is collateral estoppel on whether the Debtor's interest in the yacht is property of the estate and whether he controls the yacht. And there is no question that the Debtor had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of his interest in and control of the yacht in the New York State Action. Thus, collateral estoppel applies.\n\n23. As with *res judicata*, \"[t]he pendency of an appeal does not preclude application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.\" *Marini v. Adamo* (*In re Adamo*), 560 B.R. 642, 649 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2016) (citing authorities). *See also In re Southold Development Corp.*, 136 B.R. 40, 42 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (applying collateral estoppel to decision on contested issue of debtor's ownership interest in Robins Island even though decision was on appeal to the Second Circuit).\n\n## **III. REMOVAL SHOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON THE DEBTOR'S INABILITY TO RELITIGATE THE ISSUES RELATED TO THE LADY MAY IN THIS COURT**\n\n 24. \"A party seeking removal bears the burden of showing that federal jurisdiction is proper.\" *Montefiore Med. Ctr. v. Teamsters Loc*. 272, 642 F.3d 321, 327 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation\n\nomitted). Federal jurisdiction over a removed action is not proper when the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would apply to prevent the federal court from effectively vitiating a related state court ruling. *See Yonkers Electric Contracting Corp. v. Local Union No. 3, International Brotherhood Electrical Workers' AFL-CIO*, 220 F.Supp2d 254, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (remanding removed action to state court after concluding there was a lack of \"subject matter jurisdiction over this matter under the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine,\" and observing that if Judge Lefkowitz's [the state court judge's] decision is to be overturned, the Appellate Division will have to do it\").\n\n25. Thus, the Debtor's removal of the New York Action and attempt to transfer it to this Court has accomplished nothing but a temporary delay of the Debtor's day of reckoning and an unreasonable multiplication of these proceedings.\n\n**WHEREFORE**, the Committee respectfully submits that the PAX Motion should be granted, but only to provide a conditional lifting of the automatic stay that would: (i) preclude the assessment or accrual of any postpetition contempt fines or monetary sanctions; (ii) limit stay relief to marshaling the Lady May back to the US jurisdiction for the benefit of creditors of the estate, but making clear that PAX is prohibited from obtaining a postpetition lien on the yacht for its own advantage; and (iii) subject to the Debtor agreeing to return the Lady May to the U.S. jurisdiction within a period of 20 days from April 13, 2022 and demonstrating his inability to have done so prior to that time and his good faith steps to cause its return to occur, condition the effectiveness of the Court's lift stay order on the passage of 20 days from April 13, 2022 without the Lady May having been returned to the U.S. jurisdiction.\n\nDated: Bridgeport, Connecticut April 6, 2022\n\n## **OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF UNSECURED CREDITORS OF HO WAN KWOK**\n\nBy: */s/Irve J. Goldman*  Irve J. Goldman Jonathan A. Kaplan Pullman & Comley, LLC 850 Main Street, 8th Floor PO Box 7006 Bridgeport, CT 06601-7006 (203) 330-2213 igoldman@pullcom.com\n\nIts Attorneys (Application Pending)\n\n## **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_ In re : Chapter 11 : Ho Wan Kwok, : Case No. 22-50073 : Debtor.<sup>1</sup> : : April 6, 2022 \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_:\n\n## **CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE**\n\nI Irve J. Goldman, herby certify that on the 6th day of April, 2022, The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors' (the \"Committee\") *Position Statement in Limited Support of Motion of Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. for Entry of an Order Confirming the Inapplicability of the Automatic Stay or, in the Alternative, Relief from the Automatic Stay Pursuant to Section 362(d)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code* was filed via the Court's CM/ECF electronic filing system (\"CM/ECF\"), which sent notice to all parties receiving notification through CM/ECF.\n\n> */s/ Irve J. Goldman*  Irve J. Goldman\n\nThe last four digits of the Debtor's taxpayer identification number are 9595.","body_zh":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT（美国破产法院）\nDISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT（康涅狄格区）\nBRIDGEPORT DIVISION（布里奇波特分部）\n\n关于：第11章\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵），：案件编号 22-50073\n债务人。1\n\n________________________________________________:\nPacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund, L.P.（太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金有限合伙），：\n动议人，：\n诉：\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵），：\n被申请人。：\n________________________________________________:\n\n无担保债权人官方委员会有限支持 PACIFIC ALLIANCE ASIA OPPORTUNITY FUND L.P. 申请作出确认自动中止不适用或依《破产法典》第 362(d)(2) 条免除自动中止的命令之动议的立场陈述书\n\n债务人及自行管业债务人 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵，下称“债务人”）的 Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors（无担保债权人官方委员会，下称“委员会”），特此提交本立场陈述书，有限支持 Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.（太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金有限合伙）申请作出确认自动中止不适用或依《破产法典》第 362(d)(2) 条免除自动中止的命令之动议（下称“PAX 动议”）。\n\n为支持 PAX 动议，委员会谨陈述如下：\n\n1 债务人已知姓名如下：Guo Wengui（郭文贵）；Miles Guo；Miles Kwok；以及 Ho Wan Kwok。\n前言陈述\n\n1. 委员会系由 United States Trustee（美国受托人）于 2022 年 3 月 21 日提交的《债权人委员会指定通知》（ECF No. 108）在本案中指定设立。随后，委员会迅速展开了选任其法律顾问的程序，并直至 2022 年 3 月 28 日方告完成。因此，在委员会选定其法律顾问之时，支持或反对 PAX 动议的所有书面材料，要么已向法院提交，要么系在委员会选定法律顾问的同日提交。2\n\n2. 尽管委员会知悉法院已就 PAX 动议所提问题收到了广泛的书面陈述，但在充分考虑避免重复或赘述主要当事人3迄今所作论点的前提下，委员会仍希望在 4 月 13 日就 PAX 动议举行听证会之前向法院阐明其立场，而非在听证会上首次向法院陈述。4\n\n2 PAX 动议于 2022 年 3 月 1 日提交（ECF No. 57），债务人对 PAX 动议的异议于 2022 年 3 月 15 日提交（ECF No. 83），PAX 对债务人异议的答辩于 2022 年 3 月 18 日提交（ECF No. 98）（下称“PAX 答辩”），债务人对 PAX 动议的补充异议于 2022 年 3 月 28 日提交（ECF No. 141）（下称“债务人补充异议”）。\n\n3 委员会知悉，在 2022 年 3 月 22 日就 PAX 动议举行的听证会上，法院曾表示，除债务人对 PAX 答辩第 8、9、10 及 11 段作出的应于 2022 年 3 月 28 日或之前提交的回应外，不再允许就 PAX 动议提交进一步的书面陈述。鉴于委员会当时甚至尚未获指定成立，委员会认为，法院的该项指示仅能是针对 PAX 动议的主要当事人，而非针对其后可能指定的任何债权人委员会。\n\n4 在此方面，委员会请求被确认为利害关系人，有权根据《破产法典》第 1109(b) 条就 PAX 动议发表意见。通常参见 Metro North State Bank 诉 The Barrick Group, Inc. 案（In re The Barrick Group, Inc.），98 B.R. 133, 135（Bankr. D. Conn. 1989）（无担保债权人有权依《破产法典》第 1109(b) 条反对免除自动中止的动议并在其他方面发表意见，但在未正式参加诉讼的情况下，无权进行证据开示）。\n相关程序历史\n\n3. 2022 年 15 日（下称“申请日”），债务人根据《美国法典》第 11 编（下称“《破产法典》”）第 11 章提交了自愿救济申请。自那时起，债务人一直依《破产法典》第 1107 条及第 1108 条作为自行管业债务人。\n\n4. 债务人的破产案件中尚未指定任何受托人或调查员，但 United States Trustee（美国受托人，下称“UST”）已于 2022 年 3 月 19 日提交了《关于责令指定调查员的命令动议，或在备位上，关于责令指定第11章受托人的命令动议》（下称“调查员/受托人动议”）。调查员/受托人动议定于 2022 年 4 月 13 日举行听证，且根据 UST 的《修改后拟定命令》脚注 1（ECF No. 116），债务人已同意法院责令 UST 在本案中指定一名调查员。\n\n5. 2022 年 3 月 21 日，委员会由美国受托人正式指定成立，并于 2022 年 3 月 28 日选定 Pullman & Comley, LLC（下称“P&C”）作为其法律顾问。5\n\n6. 与 PAX 动议相关的其他程序历史已在主要当事人的书面文件中陈述，在此不再赘述。然而，委员会希望向法院报告由债务人发起的移送程序的现状，债务人借此在进一步的挑选法院行为中，试图将 New York Supreme Court（纽约州最高法院）的诉讼案件 PAX 诉 Kwok 案，案卷号 652077/2017（下称“纽约州诉讼”）移送至本法院。6\n\n5 委员会于 2022 年 4 月 4 日提交了聘请 P&C 的授权申请。\n\n6 显而易见的是，通过移送诉讼，债务人极力试图避免面对 Ostrager 法官以对其在纽约州最高法院而非本法院所犯下的蔑视法庭行为承担责任，并且债务人实际上更倾向于让本法院取代 Ostrager 法官，就其在纽约州诉讼中无视多项法院命令的行为来决定债务人的命运。虽然法院不应纵容此种策略，但委员会指出，本法院有权因债务人代表无视法院命令而以民事蔑视法庭为由下令将其羁押。Matter of Kossoff PLLC 案，案件编号 21-10699 (DSJ)，2021 WL 5492186（Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2021年11月22日）。委员会认为，此类行动对于促使 Lady May（梅号游艇）归还至其适当司法管辖区并由本法院作进一步处置而言是必要的。\n\n7. 2022 年 3 月 15 日，债务人向纽约州最高法院提交了将纽约州诉讼移送至 U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York（美国纽约南区联邦地区法院）的《案件移送通知》（文件编号 1195），并于 2022 年 3 月 18 日紧接着向美国纽约南区联邦地区法院提交了《案件移送通知》，民事诉讼编号 22-cv-2258 (MKV)。7 地区法院于 2022 年 3 月 21 日立即将该移送诉讼移交至 United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York（美国纽约南区破产法院），目前该案仍在审理中，案件编号为 22-1073，案名为 PAX 诉 Kwok。\n\n8. 2022 年 3 月 23 日，债务人向纽约南区破产法院提交了《案件移送管辖动议》（ECF No. 4），请求将该移送诉讼移送至 United States District Court for the District of Connecticut（美国康涅狄格区联邦地区法院），以便移交本法院。针对纽约州诉讼的移送或移送管辖至本法院的动议，PAX 尚未提出发回动议（28 U.S.C. § 1452(b)）或其他回应。\n\n9. 委员会指出，一旦诉讼被移送，相关规则规定“各方当事人在该法院[指原移送案由的法院]不得再进行任何诉讼程序，除非且直至该主张或诉由被发回”。可基于“任何衡平法理由”予以发回。28 U.S.C. § 1452(b)。\n\n债务人代表因无视法院命令而受民事蔑视法庭处罚。参见 Matter of Kossoff PLLC 案，案件编号 21-10699 (DSJ)，2021 WL 5492186（Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2021年11月22日）。委员会认为，此种措施对于促使 Lady May 号游艇返回其正当管辖范围并在本法院作进一步处置是必要的。\n\n7 这些提交实际上与《破产程序规则》的要求相反。参见 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9027(a)(1), (c)（移送通知应向待移送诉讼所在州法院所处的联邦区域提交，且“在提交移送通知后，提交通知的一方应迅速向移送……诉由的原审法院书记官提交其副本”）。\n管辖权与审判地\n\n10. 依据 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 及 1334，本法院对 PAX 动议及由此引发的争议事项享有管辖权。依据 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 及 1409，审判地正当。在此寻求救济的法定依据为 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a), (b)(4), (d)(1), 105(a)、Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9014 以及 D. Conn. LBR 9014-1。\n委员会立场\n一、不论自动中止是否适用，均不应允许债务人将破产法院用作其不法行为的避难所\n\n11. 尽管债务人大谈自动中止的目的（而他本人正是利用自动中止来规避承担 Ostrager 法官 2022 年 2 月 9 日《裁决与命令》的后果），并试图区分 PAX 所援引的大部分判例法源（债务人异议第 8-14、16-19、24-29 页），但他却忽视了最适用于 PAX 动议的破产法基石原则：国会并未“意图让破产法院成为不法分子的避难所”。Berry Estates, Inc. 诉 State of New York 案（In re Berry Estates），812 F.2d 67, 71（2d Cir. 1987）。另见 Yates 诉 The District of Columbia 案（In re Yates），274 Fed. Appx. 312, 317（4th Cir. 2008年4月21日）（“‘重新开始’原则受到破产免责并非旨在成为不法分子避难所这一概念的限制”）（引文及引证省略）；Fezler 诉 Davis 案（In re Davis），194 F.3d 570, 573（5th Cir. 1999）（“破产法院不得被用作‘不法分子的避难所’”）（援引 In re DeFelice 案，77 B.R. 376, 378（Bankr. D. Conn. 1987））。\n\n该通知应当向原诉由被移送出的法院书记官提交一份副本”）。\n\n12. 依据这一基本原则，委员会主张，法院与其深究关于第 362(b)(4) 条例外是否适用于寻求蔑视法庭救济的私方当事人的繁复判例，不如出于“正当理由”（11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1)），直接变更自动中止，以允许在 Ostrager 法官面前开展进一步程序，从而考虑适当的蔑视法庭救济手段（除支付或继续产生罚金之外）。在委员会看来，此类程序对于促使 Lady May 号返回是必要的，因为几乎毫无疑问，除非受到进一步强制，否则债务人绝不会促使其返回美国管辖范围，而羁押可能是最终使债务人承认自己不能凌驾于法律之上的手段。因此，委员会敦促法院认定存在“正当理由”，允许在下述限制条件下继续进行蔑视法庭程序。11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1)。\n\n13. 根据《破产法典》第 362(d)(1) 条，法院能够且应当限制中止救济并对其附加条件，具体包括：(i) 禁止评估可能构成有损普通无担保债权人利益的行政优先权主张的任何申请日后罚款或金钱制裁，或要求将任何此类罚款或金钱制裁置于普通无担保债权人之后受偿；(ii) 将中止救济限制在为破产财产债权人的利益将 Lady May 号追回至美国管辖范围，但明确禁止 PAX 为自身利益获取对该游艇的申请日后留置权；以及 (iii) 在债务人同意自 2022 年 4 月 13 日起 20 天内将 Lady May 号返回美国管辖范围，并证明其在此之前无法做到这一点以及为促使其返回已采取善意步骤的前提下，将法院解除中止命令的生效条件设定为自 2022 年 4 月 13 日起经过 20 天且 Lady May 号仍未返回美国管辖范围。对于 PAX 的所有其他事项和行动，自动中止将\n\n继续有效。法院有权拟定此类救济，且在本案具体情形下作出此类救济是适当的。\n\nII.\n根据鲁克-费尔德曼教义（Rooker-Feldman doctrine）以及请求权排除和争点排除原则，债务人被禁止就其对 Lady May 号的实质所有权和控制权争点重新提起诉讼\n\n14. 在与本案相关的方面，Ostrager 法官认定债务人「在 Lady May 号上拥有的远不止实质权益。Kwok（郭文贵）不仅控制着这艘游艇，而且似乎是他提供了购买游艇的资金，并且他才是该游艇的主要享用人」（PAX Motion，Ex. 1，at 8）。Ostrager 法官进一步认定，「证据清晰且令人信服地证明，Kwok 对 Lady May 号享有实质权益并对其进行控制」（同上，Ex. 1 at 9）。\n\n15. 正如本院在 U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Conrad (In re Conrad), 614 B.R. 20 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2020) 一案中所确认的，「鲁克-费尔德曼教义禁止联邦法院审理由『州法院败诉方提起的案件，该败诉方就地方法院诉讼程序开始前作出的州法院判决所造成的损害进行申诉，并请求地方法院对这些判决进行审查』」。同上，at 26（援引 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283-84, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005)）。该教义在以下情形下适用：\n\n(1) 原告必须在州法院败诉，(2) 原告必须就州法院判决造成的损害进行申诉，(3) 原告必须请求地方法院审查并撤销该州法院判决，以及 (4) 州法院判决必须在地方法院诉讼程序开始之前作出。\n\n同上（援引 Green v. Mattingly, 585 F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 2009)）。所有这些要件在此均已满足。债务人确实在 New York Action（纽约州诉讼）中败诉，他现在申诉 Ostrager 法官犯有错误，并请求本院重新审议他对 Lady May 号的控制权和实质所有权争点，且 2022年2月9日的裁决是在本案开始之前作出的。\n\n16. 债务人提出，鲁克-费尔德曼教义不适用，因为 Ostrager 法官 2022年2月9日的裁决正在上诉中，且他缺乏裁定债务人在 Lady May 号中权益的管辖权（Debtor Supp. Obj. at 1-3）。债务人的观点是错误的。本巡回区内的联邦地方法院（District Courts）已认定「尽管州法院上诉悬而未决，鲁克-费尔德曼教义依然适用」。Campbell v. Bank of America, N.A., 19 CV 11 (VB), 2019 WL 4083078, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2019)。并且 Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）本身「已明确示意」，鲁克-费尔德曼教义确实适用，「即使被质疑的判决正处于州法院上诉未决状态」。Butcher v. Wendt, 975 F.3d 236, 244 n. 5 (2d Cir. 2020)。\n\n17. 至于债务人对 Ostrager 法官管辖权的质疑，本巡回区内的法院已认定，「『当对州法院的对人管辖权或对事管辖权提出质疑时，鲁克-费尔德曼教义不存在任何例外』」。Gunn v. Ambac Assurance Corp., No. 11 Civ. 5497 (PAC)(JLC), 2012 WL 3188849, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2012)（援引 In re Salem, 290 B.R. 479, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)）。因此，债务人不能通过声称 New York Supreme Court（纽约州最高法院）无管辖权作出该裁决，来逃避 Ostrager 法官 2022年2月9日裁决的约束力。\n\n18. 至于既判力（res judicata），委员会赞同 PAX（太平洋同盟亚洲机遇基金）的意见，即无论债务人是否就 Ostrager 法官 2022年2月9日的裁决提起上诉，既判力均适用并排除就债务人的实质所有权和控制权争点重新提起诉讼（PAX Reply at 8）。参见 Arnold v. Beth Abraham Health Services, Inc., 2009 WL 5171736, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2009)（「根据纽约州法律，上诉未决并不剥夺受到质疑的判决的排除效力」（援引 DiSorbo v. Hoy, 343 F.3d 172, 183 (2d Cir. 2003)，该案在向 Appellate Division（上诉法庭）提起上诉悬而未决的情况下，依然对纽约州最高法院的判决适用了排除效力；以及 Petrella v. Siegel, 843 F. 2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1988)，该案认定「[纽约]州最高法院的裁定……享有既判力效力，即使[当事人]可能正就该裁定提起上诉」））。亦见 CVR Energy, Inc. v. Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, 2016 WL 1271686, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2016)（汇集纽约州联邦及州判例）；Plaza PH2001 LLC v. Plaza Residential Owner, L.P., 98 A.3d 89, 98, 947 N.Y.S.2d 498, 505 (1st Dept. Appellate Div. 2012)（「未决的上诉并未改变当时既判力教义的适用性」）。\n\n19. 委员会进一步主张，债务人对该游艇的实质所有权和控制权争点，作为在纽约州诉讼中已被确定性裁决的争点，依争点排除（collateral estoppel）教义被禁止重新提起诉讼。争点排除教义适用于破产程序是确立已久的原则。Evans v. Ottimo, 469 F.3d 278, 281 (2d Cir.2006)（援引 Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 285–91, 111 S.Ct. 654, 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991)）。\n\n20. 在确定是否应对州法院判决赋予争点排除效力时，「法院必须适用作出判决之州的排除效力法律」。Options Unlimited, Inc. v. McCann (In re McCann), 634 B.R. 207, 215 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2021)。根据纽约州法律，争点排除将在以下情形下禁止对某一争点重新提起诉讼：「(1) 同一争点必然在前案中已被裁决，且对本案具有决定性意义；以及 (2) 被禁止重新诉讼该争点的当事人在前案中获得了充分且公正的机会对该争点进行辩论。」Ottimo, 469 F.3d at 281。\n\n21. 债务人在 Lady May 号中的权益争点，与该权益是否构成破产财产（property of the estate）的争点是同一的。参见如 Breeden v. Bennett (In re Bennett Funding Group, Inc.), 367 B.R. 269, 289 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2007)。在 Bennett Funding 一案中，破产法院在确定刑事定罪是否应对受托人的移交（turnover）主张赋予争点排除效力时指出，在移交的情境下，「法院依惯例参照州法律来确定争议财产是否属于破产财产」。同上（援引 In re Mid–Island Hospital, 254 B.R. 71, 74 (E.D.N.Y.2000)，指出其「认定破产程序中的某项特定财产是否属于破产财产受州法律原则管辖」）。\n\n22. 在本案中，Ostrager 法官认定债务人在该游艇中享有实质权益并对其实施控制，因此，对这些争点的裁定，在债务人对游艇的权益是否属于破产财产以及他是否控制该游艇的问题上具有争点排除效力。而且毫无疑问的是，债务人在纽约州诉讼中已获得了充分且公正的机会对其在游艇中的权益和控制权争点进行辩论。因此，争点排除适用。\n\n23. 与既判力相同，「上诉未决并不妨碍争点排除教义的适用」。Marini v. Adamo (In re Adamo), 560 B.R. 642, 649 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2016)（援引相关权威先例）。亦见 In re Southold Development Corp., 136 B.R. 40, 42 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)（对关于债务人在 Robins Island 上的所有权权益这一争议争点的裁决适用争点排除，即使该裁决正向上诉至第二巡回法院）。\n\nIII. 移送管辖不应对债务人无法在本院重新就与 LADY MAY 号相关的争点提起诉讼产生任何影响\n\n24. 「寻求移送管辖（removal）的一方承担证明联邦管辖权适当的举证责任」。Montefiore Med. Ctr. v. Teamsters Loc. 272, 642 F.3d 321, 327 (2d Cir. 2011)（引用省略）。当鲁克-费尔德曼教义适用以阻止联邦法院实质上撤销相关的州法院裁决时，对被移送诉讼行使联邦管辖权是不适当的。参见 Yonkers Electric Contracting Corp. v. Local Union No. 3, International Brotherhood Electrical Workers' AFL-CIO, 220 F.Supp2d 254, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)（在得出结论认为「根据鲁克-费尔德曼教义对本案缺乏对事管辖权」，并指出「如果要推翻 Lefkowitz 法官[州法院法官]的裁决，必须由上诉法庭来进行」之后，将移送的诉讼发回州法院）。\n\n25. 因此，债务人对纽约州诉讼的移送管辖以及试图将其转移至本院的做法，除暂时推迟债务人的清算之日并使这些诉讼程序产生不合理的繁复之外，别无所成。\n\n据此，委员会谨请准许 PAX 的动议，但仅限于提供自动中止（automatic stay）的有条件解除，该解除将：(i) 禁止核定或产生任何申请破产后的藐视法庭罚金或金钱制裁；(ii) 将中止救济限制在为了破产财产债权人的利益将 Lady May 号收拢汇集并带回美国司法管辖区，但明确禁止 PAX 为了自身利益获取对该游艇的申请破产后留置权；以及 (iii) 以债务人同意在自 2022年4月13日起的 20 天期限内将 Lady May 号带回美国司法管辖区，并证明其在此之前无法做到这一点及其为促成其返还所采取的善意步骤为前提，将法院解除中止命令的生效条件设定为自 2022年4月13日起经过 20 天而 Lady May 号仍未被带回美国司法管辖区。\n\n日期：康涅狄格州布里奇波特 2022年4月6日\nOFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF UNSECURED CREDITORS OF HO WAN KWOK（郭文贵无担保债权人官方委员会）\n\n签署人：/s/Irve J. Goldman  Irve J. Goldman Jonathan A. Kaplan Pullman & Comley, LLC 850 Main Street, 8th Floor PO Box 7006 Bridgeport, CT 06601-7006 (203) 330-2213 igoldman@pullcom.com\n\n其代理律师（申请待决）\n\nUNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION（美国破产法院 康涅狄格区 布里奇波特分院）\n\n__________________________________________________\n关于事项：\n第 11 章\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵），\n案件编号：22-50073\n债务人。1\n2022年4月6日\n__________________________________________________:\n\n送达证明书\n\n我，Irve J. Goldman，特此证明，于 2022年4月6日，无担保债权人官方委员会（「委员会」）的《关于有限支持 Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.（太平洋同盟亚洲机遇基金有限合伙）请求作出确认自动中止不适用或依破产法第 362(d)(2) 条获得自动中止救济之命令的动议的立场陈述》已通过法院的 CM/ECF 电子归档系统（「CM/ECF」）提交归档，该系统已向通过 CM/ECF 接收通知的所有当事人发送了通知。\n\n/s/ Irve J. Goldman  Irve J. Goldman\n\n1 债务人纳税人识别号的后四位数字为 9595。","key_entities":["Kwok","Je","Ho Wan Kwok","CIPA","Guo","Miles Guo"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":4,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":57,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":83,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":98,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":108,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":116,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":141,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":3845,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 13:50:55"}