{"id":"court_ctb_1680_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":1680,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION | -------------------------------------------","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| ------------------------------------------------------ | x      |                         |\n|--------------------------------------------------------|--------|-------------------------|\n| In re:                                                 | :<br>: | Chapter 11              |\n| HO WAN KWOK, et al.,                                   | :<br>: | Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |\n| Debtors.1                                              | :<br>: | Jointly Administered    |\n| ------------------------------------------------------ | :<br>x |                         |\n\n# **TRUSTEE'S OBJECTION TO DEBTOR'S MOTION FOR A LIMITED STAY OF ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION TO COMPEL COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 2004 SUBPOENA**\n\nLuc. A. Despins, in his capacity as the chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") appointed in the chapter 11 case (the \"Chapter 11 Case\") of How Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\"), respectfully submits this objection (the \"Objection\") to the *Debtor's Motion for a Limited Stay of Order Granting in Part Motion to Compel Compliance with Rule 2004 Subpoena* (the \"Motion for Limited Stay\") [Docket No. 1649]. The Trustee's Objection is as follows:\n\n# **Preliminary Statement**\n\n1. The Debtor was first served with a Rule 2004 subpoena on August 19, 2022 –\n\nexactly eight months ago. Taking advantage of his countless delays in complying with that\n\nsubpoena, the Debtor now seeks a stay of the January 20 Order,2 opportunistically arguing that\n\nsuch a stay is necessary to protect his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in\n\n<sup>1</sup> The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595) (the \"Debtor \") and Genever Holdings Corporation (the \"Genever BVI Debtor\"). The mailing address for the Trustee and the Genever BVI Debtor is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\n<sup>2</sup> *Order Granting in Part Motion to Compel Compliance with Rule 2004 Subpoenas* [ECF No. 1353] (entered Jan. 20, 2023). Capitalized terms not defined herein have the meanings given to them in the Objection.\n\nconnection with a parallel criminal proceeding. The Debtor makes this request through his new counsel, Brown Rudnick, which previously served as counsel to the Debtor while he was the debtor-in-possession in this case prior to the Trustee's appointment and also serves as his counsel in his criminal case. The Trustee is troubled by Brown Rudnick's involvement and the conflict issues it raises and reserves all rights. Regardless of which counsel is making the request, the Debtor cannot use his criminal prosecution to delay progress in this case to the detriment of his creditors. His request for a stay of the January 20 Order should be denied.\n\n2. None of the reasons the Debtor gives in support of his requested stay support the relief he seeks. Contrary to the Debtor's contentions, the government's seizure of his devices and records provides no basis to stay the January 20 Order because the Debtor may still have possession, custody, or control of copies of those records or of other responsive materials. Moreover, the Trustee understands that the government is in the process of producing a large amount of data to the Debtor pursuant to disclosure obligations in the criminal proceeding. Once the Debtor receives this information, the January 20 Order should compel him to produce it to the Trustee to the extent it is responsive to the Trustee's subpoena.\n\n3. To the extent the Debtor has access to documents that he could produce in response to the January 20 Order, he has failed to adequately explain why doing so would violate his Fifth Amendment rights, other than by arguing that he cannot concede his control over certain entities and individuals by producing documents in their possession. The Fifth Amendment, however, does not permit the Debtor to avoid complying with his statutory obligations under section 521 of the Bankruptcy Code. In any event, the January 20 Order concerns more than just documents possessed by others that are under the Debtor's \"control,\"\n\nincluding documents in the Debtor's possession related to potential assets of the estate, and the Debtor has failed to explain how producing such additional documents would be incriminating.\n\n4. Finally, the Trustee would be severely prejudiced by a stay of the January 20 Order. The Trustee has a fiduciary duty to creditors to expeditiously administer the Debtor's bankruptcy estate. A stay of the January 20 Order would hinder the Trustee's efforts in this regard and prejudice the Debtor's creditors. The cases the Debtor cites in support of a stay are largely non-bankruptcy cases that address requested stays of civil litigations against criminal defendants. A case involving a debtor in bankruptcy is markedly different, and, for this reason, the Debtor seems to acknowledge that he could never obtain a stay of the entire bankruptcy case pending the Debtor's criminal prosecution. The relief the Debtor seeks, however, is arguably even worse, as he proposes a world in which the Trustee will need to continue to administer this case without any cooperation from his most critical witness—the Debtor himself. Such a result would never be permitted in a civil litigation—i.e., where a plaintiff would continue to litigate against a criminal defendant, but that defendant need not participate in discovery or in the litigation more generally—and it should not be permitted here.\n\n5. The requested stay of the January 20 Order should be denied or, alternatively, should be limited to the extent necessary to require the Debtor to comply with such order in a manner that does not infringe on the Debtor's Fifth Amendment rights.\n\n#### **Argument**\n\n#### **A. Government's Seizure of Debtor's Devices Provides No Basis For Stay**\n\n6. The Debtor first contends that the Court should stay the January 20 Order because the government \"has seized what it views as all of the Debtor's records and devices,\" and\n\ntherefore, he \"does not have responsive documents in his possession\" to produce. Motion for Limited Stay at ¶ 26. This argument does not justify the requested stay.\n\n7. First, the Debtor's statements about the government's seizures are telling for what they do not say. For instance, the Debtor states that the government has seized what \"*it views*\" as all of the Debtor's records and devices, but the Debtor notably does not say that the government has *in fact* seized all of his records and devices. To the extent the Debtor still has access to responsive documents (including backup copies of devices the government seized, such as such as backup storage devices, cloud storage accounts, or email accounts containing the same information as the devices, or other documents altogether), they are subject to production.\n\n8. Second, the Debtor refers only to documents \"in his possession\" and says nothing of responsive documents in his custody or control. Any such documents possessed by others that are subject to the Debtor's custody or control are also subject to production to the Trustee.\n\n9. Third, as the Debtor acknowledges, any seizure is temporary. Even if it were true that the Debtor could not produce documents now because they have been seized by the government, that is not reason to stay the January 20 Order. Rather, the January 20 Order should remain in place to ensure that it compels the Debtor to immediately produce responsive documents if and when he has access to such documents in the future. These responsive documents may include, among others, those that the government produces to the Debtor in discovery in the criminal proceeding.\n\n### **B. Debtor Has Failed to Explain Why Compliance With January 20 Order Would Violate Fifth Amendment Privilege**\n\n10. The party invoking the protection of the Fifth Amendment bears the burden of demonstrating how and why it applies in a given situation. *See, e.g.*, *In re Schick*, 215 B.R. 4, 9 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997). To satisfy this burden, the party \"must provide enough information to\n\nenable the Court to conduct a factual inquiry to determine the incriminating potential of the documents sought and the act of production against the privilege asserted.\" *Id. at 9* (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Invocation of the Fifth Amendment may not be done in a blanket or conclusory manner. Rather, \"in order to effectively invoke the protections of the Fifth Amendment, a party must make a particularized objection to each discovery request.\" *In re Astor*, 62 A.D.3d 867, 869 (2009) (citation and internal quotations omitted).\n\n11. Importantly, the Fifth Amendment privilege \"does not . . . reach the content of voluntarily created documents because there is no compulsion to create them.\" *Schick* 215 B.R. at 8. \"This is particularly true where the contents of the documents relates to debtors, their property and their business transactions.\" *Id.*; *see also Butcher v. Bailey*, 753 F.2d 465, 469 (6th Cir. 1985) (\"Information relating to property of the estate is not so intimately personal as to evoke serious concern over privacy interests, particularly in bankruptcy where the trustee has a strong interest in knowing the nature and scope of the estate's holdings.\").\n\n### i. **Fifth Amendment Does Not Prevent Debtor From Complying With Statutory Obligations Under Bankruptcy Code**\n\n12. The Fifth Amendment privilege may not be invoked to resist compliance with a \"regulatory regime constructed to effect the State's public purposes unrelated to the enforcement of its criminal laws.\" *Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight*, 493 U.S. 549, 556 (1990). This limitation applies to a debtor's statutory obligations under section 521 of the Bankruptcy Code. As the Supreme Court noted long ago in *In re Harris*, when a bankrupt seeks to withhold documents under the Fifth Amendment, \"the question is not of testimony but of surrender – not of compelling the bankrupt to be a witness against himself in a criminal case,\n\npast or future, but of compelling him to yield possession of property that he no longer is entitled to keep.\" *In re Harris*, 221 U.S. 274, 279 (1911) (Holmes, J.). 3\n\n13. In *Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight,* 493 U.S. 549, 556 (1990), the Supreme Court rejected the act of production privilege claim of a mother who had been granted custody of an abused child but later declined to bring the child to a welfare examination ordered by the state. In conducting its analysis, the Supreme Court analogized the mother's situation in *Bouknight*, which required her to comply with a specific regulatory regime, to a debtor's statutory obligation to surrender financial documents to a bankruptcy trustee. 493 U.S. at 556 (citing *Harris*); *see also* 3 *Collier on Bankruptcy*, ¶ 344.03[4] (Rev. 16th ed.) (\"[I]t is doubtful that a debtor, as opposed to other witnesses, may successfully refuse to turn over the property, books and records that every debtor under the Code is required to surrender to the trustee on the basis that this 'act of production' might itself tend to incriminate.\").\n\n14. The cases the Debtor cites in support of his argument for a stay of the January 20 Order are inapposite. In fact, the Debtor cites to only one bankruptcy case, *In re Julmice*, 458 B.R. 657 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2011). There, the chapter 7 trustee filed an adversary complaint against individual and corporate defendants, none of which were the debtor in the main bankruptcy case. *See Julmice*, 458 B.R. at 659. Those defendants moved for a stay of the adversary proceeding after the two individual defendants (again, non-debtors) were criminally indicted. *Id.* at 661. The court granted a short stay of the adversary proceeding as to the movants, subject to extension upon application of the movants. *Id.* at 665. Those facts are\n\n<sup>3</sup> Although the Supreme Court's rejection of the privilege claim in *Harris* ultimately relied on a property rights theory of the Fifth Amendment that is no longer viable—that is, that the debtor could not claim the Fifth Amendment privilege as to books and records that were no longer his—as *Collier on Bankruptcy* has observed, the Supreme Court's decision in *Bouknight* has revived the applicability of *Harris* within the contemporary Fifth Amendment doctrine context. 3 *Collier on Bankruptcy*, ¶ 344.03 (Rev. 16th ed.).\n\ninapposite here, where the Debtor himself is moving to stay an order compelling disclosure in the main bankruptcy proceeding, for an indefinite period of time \"pending resolution of the parallel criminal proceedings.\" *See* Motion for Limited Stay at ¶ 25.\n\n## ii. **Documents Under \"Control\" of Others Are Not Only Documents at Issue**\n\n15. The Debtor contends that \"the only portion of the requests still at issue relate to those documents that the Trustee alleges are held by other entities or individuals, but within the Debtor's 'control.'\" Motion for Limited Stay at ¶ 27. This is not so. In addition to requiring the Debtor to produce documents from sources under his control, the January 20 Order also requires him to produce documents within his possession related to assets of the Debtor and others. *See*  Jan. 20 Order at 4 (compelling the Debtor to produce, among other things, (i) \"documents responsive to the Trustee's requests *as to both assets he acknowledges he owns and assets allegedly belonging to persons or entities other than the Debtor*, including without limitation his family members and associated entities\" and (ii) \"documents responsive to the Trustee's requests *that are within his custody, possession*, or control, *including without limitation* documents in the files of his current of former counsel and other agents and advisors[.]\") (emphasis added). The Debtor has provided no explanation as to why producing documents in his possession concerning potential assets (to the extent they exist) would be incriminating.\n\n### iii. **Even as to Documents Under \"Control\" of Others, Debtor Has Failed to Satisfy His Burden Under Fifth Amendment**\n\n16. Even if the Debtor's production of documents under the control of others could, in some instances, expose him to potential criminal liability, the Debtor cannot reasonably take the position that this is so for every person under the Debtor's control who may possess responsive documents. Unless the Debtor genuinely believes the scope of the criminal indictment extends\n\nto everyone the Debtor has ever known, there must be persons or entities involved in transactions unrelated to those at issue in the indictment for whom documents could be produced without any risk of potential incrimination.\n\n17. It is for this reason the law provides that one must invoke the Fifth Amendment in a *particularized manner for each document or category of documents*. *See Astor*, 62 A.D.3d at 869 (\"in order to effectively invoke the protections of the Fifth Amendment, a party must make a particularized objection\") (citation and internal quotations omitted)*.* As applied here, the Debtor must state with particularity those Associated Entities and Associated Individuals listed in the Trustee's subpoena for which he is refusing to produce documents on the basis that the Fifth Amendment allegedly prevents him from testifying as to whether he has control over those individuals or entities. Absent such specificity, the Debtor is not entitled to the Fifth Amendment's protections. *See e.g.*, *In re Connelly*, 59 B.R. 421, 445 (Bankr. N.D.Ill. 1986) (holding that the debtor, upon classifying the documents to be produced and those to be withheld, is required to indicate why the act of producing each class of documents withheld might be incriminating); *In re Crabtree*, 39 B.R. 702, 712 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984) (finding that a debtor's refusal to provide information based on a blanket assertion of his Fifth Amendment right does not satisfy the debtor's statutory obligations, and that the debtor must \"file a second statement […], addressing each question and asserting any privilege claimed on an item-by-item basis.\"); *In re Blan*, 239 B.R. 385, 392 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1999) (finding that debtor must substantiate his Fifth Amendment privilege that responding to the specific requests for information may tend to incriminate him).\n\n## iv. **Debtor Has Not Explained Why Compliance With January 20 Order's Declaration Requirement Would Implicate Fifth Amendment**\n\n18. The January 20 Order also requires the Debtor to provide a declaration detailing his search and collection process. *See* Jan. 20 Order at 4-5. The Debtor, however, has provided no basis for why simply describing where and how he looked for documents could tend to incriminate him. If the Debtor has not even searched for responsive documents, how could he possibly know that his production of documents in his possession would be incriminating? The Debtor must provide a description of his search and collection efforts to comply with the January 20 Order, and the Fifth Amendment does not excuse him from doing so.\n\n# **C. Trustee Would Be Severely Prejudiced by Stay of January 20 Order, And Stay Would Run Contrary to Public Interest**\n\n19. The Debtor argues that public interest would not be harmed by a stay of the January 20 Order, arguing that \"in light of the criminal case, the assets at issue in the bankruptcy case have been or will likely be seized and frozen.\" *See* Motion for Limited Stay at ¶ 44. However, not all relevant assets at issue have been seized and frozen. In fact, there may be assets not yet discovered. Regardless, the Trustee's purpose extends beyond ensuring that already frozen assets do not escape the potential reach of the Trustee. The Trustee has a fiduciary duty to creditors of the bankruptcy estate and needs to monetize assets as quickly as possible to fund this case and eventually make distributions to creditors.4\n\n20. Moreover, the Debtor fails to mention that his criminal case could take years to resolve. Staying the January 20 Order, for an indefinite period of time, potentially several years, would severely prejudice the Trustee's efforts in this bankruptcy proceeding and run contrary to\n\n<sup>4</sup> The Trustee's duty stands in contrast to that of the government in the Debtor's criminal prosecution. The government is interested in identifying and seizing assets involved in a crime, whereas the Trustee is interested in identifying potential estate assets regardless of their connection to any criminal activity.\n\npublic interest. *See In re MGL Corp.*, 262 B.R. 324, 330 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2001) (\"The public interest in the expeditious administration of bankruptcy cases is impaired by obstructing a trustee's efforts to collect, liquidate and distribute assets to creditors of the estate.\").\n\n21. Finally, the Debtor's importance to the Trustee's investigation and to this case more generally cannot be overstated. Requiring the Trustee to continue administering this case without the Debtor's involvement and participation, as the Debtor proposes, is untenable. No court would ever suggest that a plaintiff in a civil litigation should have to litigate its case against a criminal defendant under circumstances where that defendant will have no obligation to provide discovery or otherwise participate in the case. The result should be no different here.\n\n#### **D. Reservation of Rights Concerning Debtor's Retention of Brown Rudnick**\n\n22. Finally, the Trustee is concerned with the Debtor's retention of his current criminal counsel and former debtor-in-possession bankruptcy counsel, Brown Rudnick, to represent him in this case. As a former professional for the Debtor's estate, Brown Rudnick owed duties to the estate and creditors before the Trustee's appointment and now owes duties of cooperation to the Trustee, and the Trustee fears that these duties cannot be exercised free from potential conflict of interest. This concern is heightened by remarks Brown Rudnick recently made at the Debtor's bail hearing in the criminal case, where counsel stated, \"[c]oncerning the civil lawsuits and the bankruptcy litigation and Mr. Kwok's alleged disregard for the law, first of all, it's important to keep in mind that much of the civil litigation, including the civil litigation that ultimately led to the bankruptcy filing was prompted by the CCP itself. That is not just a conspiracy theory. That is a documented fact.\" *See United States v. Ho Wan Kwok*, 23 CR 118 Apr. 4, 2023 Hr'g Tr., at 29 (citing to a 2020 Wall Street Journal article that has nothing to do with the Debtor and nothing to do with the CCP's nonexistent influence over this bankruptcy\n\ncase). The Trustee does not see how counsel who is on record stating that the CCP is influencing and controlling this case can possibly fulfill its and the Debtor's duties to cooperate with the Trustee under the Bankruptcy Code.5 While the Trustee is not presently requesting any relief as to this issue, he reserves all rights to do so as this case progresses.\n\n WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the Trustee respectfully requests that the Debtor's Motion for Limited Stay be denied and for such other relief as is just and proper.\n\nDated: April 19, 2023 LUC A. DESPINS, New Haven, Connecticut CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE\n\nBy: */s/ Patrick R. Linsey*\n\nPatrick R. Linsey (ct29437) NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 781-2847 plinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n*and*\n\nNicholas A. Bassett (admitted *pro hac vice*) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C., 20036 (202) 551-1902 nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\nAvram E. Luft (admitted *pro hac vice*) Douglass Barron (admitted *pro hac vice*) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6079 aviluft@paulhastings.com douglassbarron@paulhastings.com\n\n*Counsel for the Chapter 11 Trustee*\n\n<sup>5</sup> These conflict issues are further exacerbated by the fact that William Baldiga, the debtor-in-possession's former lead attorney in this case, who is likely to be called as a witness to testify in this case, is also personally representing the Debtor in his criminal proceeding.","body_zh":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION（美国康涅狄格区破产法院布里奇波特分院）\n\n------------------------------------------------------　x\n\n关于：　:\n:　第 11 章\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，　:\n:　案号 22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人。1　:\n:　合并审理\n\nx\n受托人对债务人关于有限中止部分批准强令遵守第 2004 条传票动议之裁定的动议的异议\n\nLuc. A. Despins 以在 How Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（“债务人”）的第 11 章案件（“第 11 章案件”）中被任命的第 11 章受托人（“受托人”）身份，谨就债务人关于有限中止部分批准强令遵守第 2004 条传票动议之裁定的动议（“有限中止动议”）[Docket No. 1649] 提交本异议（“本异议”）。受托人的异议如下：\n初步陈述\n\n1. 债务人于 2022 年 8 月 19 日首次被送达第 2004 条传票——距今整整八个月。债务人利用自己在遵守该传票方面的无数次拖延，现在寻求中止 1 月 20 日裁定2，投机性地辩称此类中止对于在平行刑事诉讼中保护其《第五修正案》反自证其罪特权是必要的。\n\n1 这些第 11 章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵，亦称为郭文贵、Miles Guo 和 Miles Kwok，以及诸多其他化名）（税务识别号后四位：9595）（“债务人”）和 Genever Holdings Corporation（“Genever BVI 债务人”）。受托人和 Genever BVI 债务人的邮寄地址为 Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok（仅用于接收通知和通讯目的）。\n\n2 部分批准强令遵守第 2004 条传票动议的裁定 [ECF No. 1353]（2023 年 1 月 20 日录入）。本文中未定义的大写术语具有本异议中赋予它们的含义。\n\n债务人通过其新聘律师 Brown Rudnick 提出这一请求，该律所在受托人被任命之前债务人作为本案占有中债务人期间曾担任债务人的律师，并且也在其刑事案件中担任其律师。受托人对 Brown Rudnick 的介入及其引发的利益冲突问题感到不安，并保留所有权利。无论由哪位律师提出请求，债务人都不能利用其刑事起诉来拖延本案的进展并损害其债权人的利益。其关于中止 1 月 20 日裁定的请求应予驳回。\n\n2. 债务人为支持其所请求的中止而提供的任何理由均不支持其所寻求的救济。与债务人的主张相反，政府扣押其设备和记录并不构成中止 1 月 20 日裁定的依据，因为债务人可能仍然占有、保管或控制这些记录的副本或其他相应材料。此外，受托人获悉，政府正在根据刑事诉讼中的披露义务向债务人出示大量数据。一旦债务人收到这些信息，只要其属于对受托人传票的响应范围，1 月 20 日裁定就应强令其将其出示给受托人。\n\n3. 在债务人能够获取可用于响应 1 月 20 日裁定而出示的文件的前提下，其未能充分解释为何这样做会侵犯其《第五修正案》权利，而仅仅辩称其不能通过出示某些实体和个人所占有的文件来承认自己对这些实体和个人的控制权。然而，《第五修正案》不允许债务人借此逃避履行《破产法典》第 521 条规定的法定强制义务。无论如何，1 月 20 日裁定涉及的不仅仅是处于债务人“控制”下由他人占有的文件，\n\n还包括债务人所占有的与破产财产潜在资产相关的文档，而债务人未能解释出示此类额外文件将如何具有自证其罪性质。\n\n4. 最后，中止 1 月 20 日裁定将严重损害受托人的利益。受托人对债权人负有迅速管理债务人破产财产的信义义务。中止 1 月 20 日裁定将阻碍受托人在这方面的努力，并损害债务人债权人的利益。债务人引用于支持中止的判例大部分是非破产判例，这些判例针对的是针对刑事被告人的民事诉讼的中止请求。涉及破产债务人的案件有着显著不同，正因如此，债务人似乎也承认其绝不可能在债务人面临刑事起诉期间获得整个破产案件的中止。然而，债务人所寻求的救济可以说更为恶劣，因为他设想了这样一种局面：受托人需要在完全没有其最关键证人——即债务人本人——的任何合作的情况下继续管理本案。这种结果在民事诉讼中是绝不会被允许的——即原告继续对刑事被告人提起诉讼，但该被告人无需参与证据开示或更广泛的诉讼程序——在此处也不应被允许。\n\n5. 对 1 月 20 日裁定所请求的中止应予驳回；或者，在替代方案下，应将中止限制在以不侵犯债务人《第五修正案》权利的方式要求债务人遵守该裁定所必需的限度内。\n论证\nA. 政府扣押债务人的设备不构成中止的依据\n\n6. 债务人首先主张法院应中止 1 月 20 日裁定，因为政府“已扣押了其认为属于债务人的全部记录和设备”，并且\n\n因此，他“没有占有可供出示的相应文件”。有限中止动议第 26 段。该论点不能成为所请求中止的正当理由。\n\n7. 首先，债务人关于政府扣押的陈述耐人寻味之处在于其未言明之处。例如，债务人陈述政府扣押了“其认为”属于债务人的全部记录和设备，但债务人值得注意地并未说明政府实际上已扣押了其所有的记录和设备。在债务人仍然能够获取相应文件（包括政府扣押设备的备份副本，例如备份存储设备、云存储账户或包含与设备相同信息的电子邮件账户，或完全属于其他文件）的范围内，这些文件均应予以出示。\n\n8. 其次，债务人仅提及“其占有”的文件，对处于其保管或控制下的相应文件只字未提。由他人占有但处于债务人保管或控制下的任何此类文件，也均应向受托人出示。\n\n9. 第三，正如债务人所承认的，任何扣押都是暂时的。即使债务人现在确实因文件被政府扣押而无法出示文件，那也不是中止 1 月 20 日裁定的理由。相反，1 月 20 日裁定应当维持效力，以确保在债务人未来能够获取此类文件时强令其立即出示相应文件。这些相应文件可能包括（其中包括）政府在刑事诉讼证据开示中向债务人出示的文件。\nB. 债务人未能解释为何遵守 1 月 20 日裁定会侵犯《第五修正案》特权\n\n10. 援引《第五修正案》保护的一方承担证明其在特定情形下如何适用及为何适用的举证责任。参见例如 In re Schick, 215 B.R. 4, 9 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.（纽约南区破产法院） 1997)。为了履行这一举证责任，该方“必须提供足够的信息，\n\n以使法院能够进行事实审查，从而对照所主张的特权来确定所寻求文件以及出示行为的潜在自证其罪性质”。同上，第 9 页（引文及内部引号省略）。《第五修正案》的援引不得以一概而论或结论性的方式进行。相反，“为了有效援引《第五修正案》的保护，当事人必须对每一项证据开示请求提出具体化的异议”。In re Astor, 62 A.D.3d 867, 869 (2009)（引文及内部引号省略）。\n\n11. 重要的是，《第五修正案》特权“并不……及于自愿制作的文件的内容，因为制作这些文件并不存在强迫”。Schick, 215 B.R. at 8。“在文件内容涉及债务人、其财产及其商业交易的情况下尤其如此”。同上；亦参见 Butcher v. Bailey, 753 F.2d 465, 469 (6th Cir.（第六巡回区） 1985)（“涉及破产财产的信息并非具有极度私人性质，以至于引起对隐私利益的严重关切，特别是在破产程序中受托人在了解破产财产所持资产的性质和范围方面拥有强烈的利益”）。\ni. 《第五修正案》并不妨碍债务人履行《破产法典》规定的法定强制义务\n\n12. 不得援引《第五修正案》特权来抗拒遵守“为实现与执行刑法无关的国家公共目的而构建的监管体系”。Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight（巴尔的摩市社会服务局诉布奈特案）, 493 U.S. 549, 556 (1990)。这一限制适用于债务人根据《破产法典》第 521 条所承担的法定强制义务。正如最高法院很久以前在 In re Harris（哈里斯案）中所指出的，当破产人寻求根据《第五修正案》扣留文件时，“问题不在于作证而在于交出——不在于强迫破产人在过去或将来的刑事案件中自证其罪，\n\n而在于强迫其让出其不再有权保留的财产的占有”。In re Harris, 221 U.S. 274, 279 (1911) (Holmes, J.)。3\n\n13. 在 Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 556 (1990) 一案中，一名母亲获得了受虐儿童的监护权，但后来拒绝按照州政府的命令带该儿童接受福利体检，最高法院驳回了该母亲提出的出示行为特权主张。在进行分析时，最高法院将 Bouknight 案中该母亲被要求遵守特定监管体系的情形，类比为债务人向破产受托人交出财务文件的法定强制义务。493 U.S. at 556（引用 Harris）；亦参见 3 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 344.03[4] (Rev. 16th ed.)（“债务人（与其他证人不同）能否以这种‘出示行为’本身可能倾向于自证其罪为由，成功拒绝移交法典要求每位债务人必须向受托人交出的财产、账簿和记录，是存疑的”）。\n\n14. 债务人引用于支持其关于中止 1 月 20 日裁定的论点的判例是不适用的。事实上，债务人仅引用了一个破产判例，即 In re Julmice, 458 B.R. 657 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.（纽约东区破产法院） 2011)。在该案中，第 7 章受托人对个人和公司被告提起了对抗制诉状，其中没有一个是主破产案件中的债务人。参见 Julmice, 458 B.R. at 659。在该两名个人被告（同样是非债务人）受到刑事起诉后，这些被告提出了中止对抗制诉讼的动议。同上，第 661 页。法院批准了针对动议人的对抗制诉讼的短期中止，并可根据动议人的申请予以展期。同上，第 665 页。这些事实是\n\n3 尽管Supreme Court（最高法院）在Harris（哈里斯案）中对特权主张的驳回最终依赖于一种不再适用的《Fifth Amendment（第五修正案）》财产权理论——即债务人不能就已不再属于其所有的账簿和记录主张《第五修正案》特权——但正如Collier on Bankruptcy（《科利尔论破产》）所指出的，最高法院在Bouknight（鲍奈特案）中的裁决已在当代《第五修正案》法理背景下恢复了哈里斯案的适用性。见 3 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 344.03 (Rev. 16th ed.)。\n\n在本案中并不适用，因为在本案中是Debtor（债务人）本人提出动议，要求在主破产程序中无限期中止一项强制披露的裁定，“直至平行刑事诉讼程序解决”。参见《Motion for Limited Stay（有限中止动议）》第25段。\n\nii. 处于他人“控制”之下的文件并非唯一存在争议的文件\n\n15. 债务人主张“仍然存在争议的请求部分仅涉及Trustee（受托人）声称由其他实体或个人持有、但在债务人‘控制’之下的那些文件。”《有限中止动议》第27段。事实并非如此。除了要求债务人从其控制的来源提供文件外，《January 20 Order（1月20日裁定）》还要求其提供其占有的、与债务人及他人资产相关的文档。参见《1月20日裁定》第4页（除其他事项外，强制债务人提供：(i)“针对受托人就其承认拥有的资产以及据称属于除债务人以外的个人或实体的资产（包括但不限于其家庭成员及关联实体）的请求所作出的应答文件”，以及(ii)“针对受托人的请求所作出的、在其保管、占有或控制之下的应答文件，包括但不限于其现任或前任法律顾问以及其他代理人和顾问卷宗中的文件[。]”）（强调为后加）。债务人并未就为何提供其占有的关于潜在资产的文件（在其存在的范围内）会构成自证其罪给出任何解释。\n\niii. 即使对于处于他人“控制”之下的文件，债务人也未能履行其在《第五修正案》项下的举证责任\n\n16. 即使债务人提供处于他人控制之下的文件在某些情况下可能使其面临潜在的刑事责任，债务人也不能合理地主张，对于债务人控制下可能占有应答文件的每一个人来说情况都是如此。除非债务人真诚地认为刑事起诉书的范围延伸至\n\n债务人所认识的每一个人，否则必然存在参与了与起诉书中所涉交易无关的交易的个人或实体，对于这些个人或实体，完全可以在不存在任何潜在自证其罪风险的情况下提供文件。\n\n17. 正因如此，法律规定必须针对每份文件或每类文件以具体化的方式援引《第五修正案》。参见 Astor, 62 A.D.3d at 869（“为了有效援引《第五修正案》的保护，当事人必须提出具体化的异议”）（引文及内部引号省略）。适用于本案时，债务人必须具体说明受托人传票中所列出的哪些Associated Entities（关联实体）和Associated Individuals（关联个人），他是基于《第五修正案》据称阻止其就其是否对这些个人或实体拥有控制权作证为由而拒绝提供文件的。若缺乏这种具体性，债务人无权获得《第五修正案》的保护。参见例如 In re Connelly, 59 B.R. 421, 445 (Bankr. N.D.Ill. 1986)（裁定债务人在对要提供的文件和要扣留的文件进行分类后，必须说明为何提供所扣留的各类文件的行为可能构成自证其罪）；In re Crabtree, 39 B.R. 702, 712 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984)（认定债务人仅基于对其《第五修正案》权利的总括性主张而拒绝提供信息，并不符合债务人的法定义务，债务人必须“提交第二份声明[…]，针对每个问题进行回应，并逐项主张所要求的任何特权”）；In re Blan, 239 B.R. 385, 392 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1999)（认定债务人必须证实其《第五修正案》特权，即回应特定的信息请求可能会倾向于使其自证其罪）。\n\niv. 债务人未解释为何遵守《1月20日裁定》的声明书要求会牵涉《第五修正案》\n\n18. 《1月20日裁定》还要求债务人提供一份详细说明其检索和收集过程的声明书。参见《1月20日裁定》第4-5页。然而，债务人并未提供任何依据来解释为何仅仅描述其在何处以及如何查找文件会倾向于使其自证其罪。如果债务人甚至根本没有检索过应答文件，他又如何可能知道提供其占有的文件会构成自证其罪？债务人必须提供其检索和收集工作的描述以遵守《1月20日裁定》，而《第五修正案》并不能免除其履行该义务。\n\nC. 中止《1月20日裁定》将对受托人造成严重损害，且中止将违背公共利益\n\n19. 债务人辩称中止《1月20日裁定》不会损害公共利益，其理由是“鉴于刑事案件，破产案件中涉及的资产已经或可能将被扣押和冻结。”参见《有限中止动议》第44段。然而，并非所有涉及的相关资产均已被扣押和冻结。事实上，可能存在尚未发现的资产。无论如何，受托人的目的不仅限于确保已被冻结的资产不超出受托人的潜在管辖范围。受托人对破产财产的债权人负有信义义务，需要尽快将资产变现以资助本案并最终向债权人进行分配。4\n\n20. 此外，债务人未提及其实施的刑事案件可能需要数年时间才能解决。将《1月20日裁定》无限期中止（可能长达数年），将严重损害受托人在本破产程序中的工作，并违背\n\n4 受托人的职责与政府在债务人刑事检控中的职责形成对比。政府关注的是识别和扣押涉案犯罪资产，而受托人关注的是识别潜在的破产财产资产，无论其是否与任何犯罪活动有关联。\n\n公共利益。参见 In re MGL Corp., 262 B.R. 324, 330 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2001)（“破产案件迅速管理的公共利益因妨碍受托人收集、变现资产并向破产财产债权人分配资产的工作而受到损害。”）。\n\n21. 最后，债务人对受托人的调查以及对本案更普遍的重要性无论如何强调都不为过。如债务人所提议的那样，要求受托人在没有债务人介入和参与的情况下继续管理本案，是站不住脚的。没有任何法院会认为民事诉讼中的原告应当在刑事被告无需承担提供证据开示或以其他方式参与案件的义务的情况下与该被告进行诉讼。此处的结果亦不应有所不同。\n\nD. 关于债务人聘请Brown Rudnick律师事务所的权利保留\n\n22. 最后，受托人对债务人聘请其现任刑事辩护律师及前debtor-in-possession（占有债务人）破产法律顾问Brown Rudnick（布朗·鲁德尼克律师事务所）在本案中代表他表示关切。作为债务人破产财产的前专业人员，布朗·鲁德尼克律师事务所在受托人被任命之前对破产财产和债权人负有义务，现在对受托人负有配合义务，受托人担心这些义务的履行无法免于潜在的利益冲突。布朗·鲁德尼克律师事务所近期在债务人刑事案件的保释听证会上发表的言论加剧了这一担忧，当时该辩护律师陈述称：“[关]于民事诉讼和破产诉讼以及郭先生被指控的蔑视法律行为，首先，重要的是要记住，许多民事诉讼，包括最终导致提交破产申请的民事诉讼，都是由CCP（中国共产党）本身煽动的。这不仅仅是一个阴谋论。这是一个有文件记录的事实。”参见 United States v. Ho Wan Kwok（美国诉郭文贵案）, 23 CR 118 2023年4月4日听证会记录，第29页（引述了2020年的一篇《Wall Street Journal（华尔街日报）》文章，该文章与债务人毫无关系，且与中共对本破产案不存在的影响毫无关系\n\n）。受托人无法理解，已在记录中公开声称中共正在影响和控制本案的法律顾问，如何可能履行其自身以及债务人在《Bankruptcy Code（破产法典）》项下向受托人提供配合的义务。5 尽管受托人目前未就此问题请求任何救济，但他保留随着本案推进而采取相应行动的所有权利。\n\n 综上所述，基于前述理由，受托人谨请求驳回债务人的《有限中止动议》，并给予其他公正且适当的救济。\n\n日期：2023年4月19日 康涅狄格州纽黑文 LUC A. DESPINS，第11章受托人\n\n签署人：/s/ Patrick R. Linsey\n\nPatrick R. Linsey (ct29437) NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 781-2847 plinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n以及\n\nNicholas A. Bassett (admitted pro hac vice（特准出庭）) PAUL HASTINGS LLP（普衡律师事务所） 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C., 20036 (202) 551-1902 nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\nAvram E. Luft (admitted pro hac vice) Douglass Barron (admitted pro hac vice) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6079 aviluft@paulhastings.com douglassbarron@paulhastings.com\n\n第11章受托人之法律顾问\n\n5 鉴于在本案中有可能被传唤作证的占有债务人前首席律师William Baldiga（威廉·鲍迪加）亦亲自在债务人的刑事诉讼中代表债务人，这些利益冲突问题进一步加剧。","key_entities":["Je","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Despins","CCP","Paul Hastings","CIPA","Guo","Miles Guo"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":1353,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":3544,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 13:43:29"}