{"id":"court_ctb_1683_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":1683,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2023-04-20","title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION In Re \\* Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) \\* HO WAN KW","summary_zh":"听证会笔录 —— Ho Wan Kwok 破产案（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo），CTB 22-50073 ECF #1683（2023-04-20立案）。记录了法官 Julie A. Manning 于 2023 年 4 月 11 日主持的听证会内容，涵盖批准「Lady May」游艇管理与船员协议、HK International 附随诉讼（Adv. Proc. 22-05003）反诉驳回动议及 Greenwich Land 附随诉讼（Adv. Proc. 23-05005）紧急禁令动议的审理。","summary_en":"Hearing Transcript — In re Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo / Guo Wengui), CTB 22-50073 ECF #1683 (filed 2023-04-20). Official transcript of the April 11, 2023 hearing before Judge Julie A. Manning regarding agreements for Lady May yacht management and crew, motions to dismiss counterclaims in Adv. Proc. No. 22-05003, and emergency injunctive relief in Adv. Proc. No. 23-05005.","body_en":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION In Re \\* Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) \\* HO WAN KWOK and GENEVER \\* HOLDINGS CORPORATION, \\* \\* Debtor. \\* HK INTERNATIONAL FUNDS Adv. Proc. No. 22-05003 INVESTMENTS (USA) LIMITED, \\* \\* Plaintiff, \\* \\* v. \\* \\* LUC A. DESPINS, \\* \\* Defendant. \\* \\* LUC A. DESPINS, Adv. Proc. No. 23-05005 \\* Plaintiff, \\* Bridgeport, Connecticut \\* April 11, 2023 v. \\* \\* GREENWICH LAND, LLC, et al., \\* \\* Defendants. \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* \\* TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION FOR ORDER AUTHORIZING AGREEMENTS RE LADY MAY; MOTION TO DISMISS ADVERSARY PROCEEDING AS TO COUNTERCLAIMS TWO, THREE, FOUR and FIVE; EMERGENCY EX PARTE MOTION FOR TRO AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; MOTION TO CONTINUE/RESCHEDULE HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE JULIE A. MANNING UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording, transcript produced by transcription service. **Fiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc. 4 Research Drive, Suite 402 Shelton, Connecticut 06484 (203)929-9992**\n\nAPPEARANCES: For the Debtor and STEPHEN KINDSETH, ESQ. Plaintiff, HK Zeisler & Zeisler, PC International and 10 Middle Street, 15th Floor Mei Guo: Bridgeport, CT 06604 For the Plaintiff, SAM DELLA FERA, JR., ESQ. HK International and Chiesa Shahinian & Mei Guo: Giantomasi, PC One Boland Drive West Orange, NJ 07052 For the Defendant, G. ALEXANDER BONGARTZ, ESQ. Luc A. Despins, Chapter 11 NICHOLAS BASSETT, ESQ. Trustee: Paul Hastings, LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166 For the Chapter 11 PATRICK R. LINSEY, ESQ. Trustee: Neubert Pepe & Monteith, PC 195 Church Street New Haven, CT 06510 Chapter 11 Trustee: LUC A. DESPINS, ESQ. Paul Hastings, LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166 For the U.S. Trustee: HOLLEY L. CLAIBORN, ESQ. Office of the United States Trustee The Giaimo Federal Building 150 Court Street, Room 302 New Haven, CT 06510 For Greenwich Land, LLC CHRISTOPHER J. MAJOR, ESQ. and Hing Chi Ngok: Meister Seelig & Fein LLP 125 Park Avenue New York, NY 10017\n\n2\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 3 of 106\n\nHo Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023 3 (Proceedings commenced at 3:00 p.m.) THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: No. 22-5003. I'm sorry. Case No. 22-50073, Ho Wan Kwok. Adversary No. 22-5003, HK International Funds Investment Limited vs. Despins. 23-5005, Despins vs. Greenwich Land, LLC. THE COURT: Okay. Good afternoon. If we could have appearances for the record, please, starting with the Chapter 11 Trustee. MR. DESPINS: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Luc Despins, Chapter 11 Trustee. THE COURT: Good afternoon. MR. BASSETT: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Nic Bassett from Paul Hastings on behalf of the Chapter 11 Trustee. THE COURT: Good afternoon. MR. LINSEY: Afternoon, Your Honor. Patrick Linsey, Connecticut counsel for the trustee. THE COURT: Good afternoon. MR. BONGARTZ: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Alex Bongartz of Paul Hastings, also for the Chapter 11 Trustee. THE COURT: Good afternoon. MS. CLAIBORN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Holley Claiborn for the U.S. Trustee. MR. DELLA FERA: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Sam Della Fera, Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomaso, for HK\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 4 of 106\n\nHo Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023 4 International Funds Investments USA Limited, LLC and Mei Guo. THE COURT: Good afternoon. MR. KINDSETH: Stephen Kindseth, Zeisler & Zeisler, also for HK International and Mei Guo. THE COURT: Good afternoon. MR. MAJOR: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Chris Major from Meister Seelig & Fein. We represent Greenwich Land, LLC and Hing Chi Ngok in the adversary proceeding, 23-05005. THE COURT: Good afternoon. MR. MAJOR: Good afternoon, Your Honor. THE COURT: Have I taken everyone's appearances? THE CLERK: Your Honor, the gentleman to the right with the glasses, I did not hear his name. I'm sorry. THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry. MR. BONGARTZ: That's okay. THE COURT: Counsel? MR. BONGARTZ: It's -- THE CLERK: You did say it, but I just didn't hear it. MR. BONGARTZ: No. It's okay. It's Alex Bongartz of Paul Hastings. THE CLERK: Okay. Thank you. THE COURT: From Paul Hastings. Okay?\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 5 of 106\n\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023
5 |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | THE CLERK:
Yes. |\n| 2 | THE COURT:
All right.
We have a few matters on |\n| 3 | the calendar, and it seems to me -- unless, Trustee Despins, |\n| 4 | you have a different view or anyone else has a different |\n| 5 | view -- that we should take up the motion for order |\n| 6 | authorizing agreements regarding the Lady May first. |\n| 7 | MR. DESPINS:
Sure, Your Honor. |\n| 8 | THE COURT:
It doesn't appear to be -- it -- I |\n| 9 | didn't see any opposition to it anyway. |\n| 10 | MR. DESPINS:
You're correct, Your Honor. |\n| 11 | Mr. Bongartz is going to handle that aspect, Your Honor. |\n| 12 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Thank you. |\n| 13 | Mr. Bongartz? |\n| 14 | MR. BONGARTZ:
Yes.
Good afternoon, Your Honor. |\n| 15 | Again, Alex Bongartz of Paul Hastings for the Chapter 11 |\n| 16 | Trustee.
We're here on the motion to authorize the trustee |\n| 17 | to enter into three yacht-related agreements.
They are, |\n| 18 | specifically, a yacht management agreement with YACHTZOO, a |\n| 19 | crew provision agreement with FDS 46 Crew Services |\n| 20 | (phonetic), and a dock space license agreement with BLD |\n| 21 | Waterfront.
I'll just refer them to as the Bridgeport |\n| 22 | Marina. |\n| 23 | Also, to be clear, in addition to requesting |\n| 24 | authority to enter into the agreements, we also, obviously |\n| 25 | are requesting authority to perform under these agreements |\n| | |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 6 of 106\n\nHo Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023 6 and in connection with them incur and pay reasonable operational expenses to the extent necessary to maintain and operate the Lady May. We can proceed in a different form, however Your Honor prefers. I could walk you through each of the three agreements and then address any questions you may have. I should note up front, as you already noted, there's no filed objection. And we've also -- have confirmation from the Committee that they are not objecting. But that said, we've had informal discussions with the U.S. Trustee. We understand that they'll have a handful of concerns. We have tried to resolve them as best as we can, and we have actually made modifications to the proposed order and some of the agreements. And I'm happy to walk Your Honor through exactly those changes. But my understanding is that not all of the trustee's issues have been resolved. And, accordingly, there's going to be some argument on those points. THE COURT: All right. Well, as far as the management agreement and the crew provision agreement and the dockage agreement, I don't have any questions with regard to the agreements, per se. MR. BONGARTZ: Okay. THE COURT: But you -- I think it might make some sense -- and, Attorney Claiborn, obviously I did see you\n\nHo Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023 7 stand up before, so I know that the United States Trustee's Office wishes to be heard on this issue. But it might make some sense for me to understand what the issues are that the U.S. Trustee's Office is concerned about in the proposed order. And you could start off by telling me what issues have been raised that have been resolved in -- MR. BONGARTZ: Okay. THE COURT: -- the proposed order. So do you want -- so I have the order, I believe, in front of me the proposed order that was attached to ECF 1637. So is that the order you are working off of with the United States Trustee's Office? MR. BONGARTZ: Correct. And we have reached agreement on specific language concerning what's defined as the vessel account that would be set up under the agreement. THE COURT: Okay. MR. BONGARTZ: And I have copies of a revised proposed order blacklined to show what that language is. May I approach the bench and hand you -- THE COURT: Yes, please. MR. BONGARTZ: Thank you. THE COURT: Thank you. (Counsel confer) MR. BONGARTZ: Okay. So this change actually -- Case 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 7 of 106\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 8 of 106\n\nHo Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023 8 as I noted, concerns the vessel account. And the U.S. Trustee had raised concerns about the funds in those accounts technically being -- at least under the original structure being estate funds and being held in a foreign bank with YACHTZOO having the ability to access the account and pay expenses.\n\n And we have reached out to YACHTZOO, and they have agreed to modify that structure such that instead of us funding the account and the monies in the account being -- continuing to be estate funds, YACHTZOO will issue at the beginning of each month an invoice based on the projected amount of services and expenses incurred and to be incurred. And at the end of the month, there'll be a reconciliation. If there's any surplus, it'll be returned to the estate or, if we so choose, applied against the next month's expenses. Or if there's a shortfall, obviously the estate will have to make up that shortfall.\n\n So the -- and in connection with that, we've also clarified that we're not funding future expenses or future fees. That had never been our intention. This was language that was in there from their form agreement. So it had always been our intention to just pay on a month-to-month basis the expenses that arise under that agreement.\n\n So I don't know if I -- Your Honor, if you want me to read the specific language into the record, I'm happy to\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 9 of 106\n\nHo Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023 9 take a break -- THE COURT: No. You don't need to do that, counsel. Thank you. MR. BONGARTZ: Okay. THE COURT: My only question is -- MR. BONGARTZ: Uh-huh. THE COURT: I'm just looking at this for the first time as well. MR. BONGARTZ: Of course. THE COURT: So some of these terms, the vessel budget, that's defined in the motion, correct? MR. BONGARTZ: I don't think that's a defined term. Vessel is a defined term. That is the Lady May. THE COURT: Okay. MR. BONGARTZ: And budget is simply the month's -- THE COURT: Okay. That's fine. MR. BONGARTZ: Okay. THE COURT: Oh, but the vessel account is a defined term. I see. MR. BONGARTZ: Correct. THE COURT: Okay. MR. BONGARTZ: The vessel account is the new account that will be set up. Typically, it is set up in the name of the owner, but this is actually -- this is part of, you know, modifying this. This will not be an estate\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 10 of\n\n| | 106 |\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023
10 |\n| 1 | account.
It will not be estate funds.
It's merely a -- an |\n| 2 | administrative account that YACHTZOO will set up to |\n| 3 | facilitate payments to the crew, for example salary, pay |\n| 4 | insurance premiums, et cetera.
But we won't have control |\n| 5 | over that account. |\n| 6 | THE COURT:
So and, again, I'm sorry.
Just |\n| 7 | looking at this, who has control over the vessel account? |\n| 8 | MR. BONGARTZ:
It's YACHTZOO. |\n| 9 | THE COURT:
And the account is located where? |\n| 10 | MR. BONGARTZ:
It's with an entity called |\n| 11 | Moneycorp.
That's a financial institution in Europe, based |\n| 12 | out of Europe.
And the account is specifically located, I'm |\n| 13 | told, in Gibraltar.
They have a branch there that |\n| 14 | apparently specializes in maritime-related banking and |\n| 15 | transfers.
So that's the reason for that location. |\n| 16 | THE COURT:
And I don't -- I could be wrong, but |\n| 17 | has anyone -- no one's filed an appearance on behalf of |\n| 18 | YACHTZOO in the case yet.
Only the marina and different |\n| 19 | parties in Connecticut, correct? |\n| 20 | MR. BONGARTZ:
I believe that is correct. |\n| 21 | THE COURT:
Counsel, what -- and, Attorney |\n| 22 | Claiborn, because YACHTZOO has not filed an appearance in |\n| 23 | this case, and I don't really have any -- you know, not that |\n| 24 | I need to, but what happens if they don't do what they're |\n| 25 | supposed to do in paragraph 3, right?
So what about if we |\n| | |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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11 |\n| 1 | say YACHTZOO has consented that it shall issue, right?
I |\n| 2 | mean, you've got to have -- I think we need to have |\n| 3 | something in here to -- |\n| 4 | MR. BONGARTZ:
That's perfectly fine.
They have |\n| 5 | confirmed by email to me that this language is acceptable to |\n| 6 | them. |\n| 7 | THE COURT:
All right. |\n| 8 | MR. BONGARTZ:
So that is perfectly fine, Your |\n| 9 | Honor. |\n| 10 | THE COURT:
Attorney Claiborn, do you have any |\n| 11 | problem with that? |\n| 12 | MS. CLAIBORN:
No, Your Honor.
It's my |\n| 13 | understanding that YACHTZOO is amenable to the changes we're |\n| 14 | proposing and that they are on board with the language |\n| 15 | specifically, so I don't think it's a problem to add their |\n| 16 | consent to that language. |\n| 17 | THE COURT:
And they're a signatory to the |\n| 18 | management agreement, YACHTZOO? |\n| 19 | MR. BONGARTZ:
Correct.
Yes. |\n| 20 | THE COURT:
What about the crew provision and |\n| 21 | dockage agreement?
Are they signatories to that agreement |\n| 22 | as well -- |\n| 23 | MR. BONGARTZ:
No. |\n| 24 | THE COURT:
-- those agreements? |\n| 25 | MR. BONGARTZ:
No.
Those are -- |\n| | |\n\nHo Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023 12 THE COURT: Okay. MR. BONGARTZ: -- agreements between the estate and other parties. THE COURT: Okay. Okay. That's what I thought, but I want to make sure. Okay? (Counsel confer) MR. BONGARTZ: I also want to point out, we had mentioned this in our motion, but the agreement itself is -- any dispute arising out of the agreement is subject to the exclusive bankruptcy court jurisdiction here in this court. So I can point out that section in a second. THE COURT: Well -- MR. BONGARTZ: It's Section 15.2. THE COURT: Of the management agreement? MR. BONGARTZ: Correct. THE COURT: Okay. Okay. All right. So I see the new paragraph 3. That's what's agreed to, but there are still other issues? MR. BONGARTZ: Yes, Your Honor. And I don't want to be presumptuous to assume exactly what issues remain outstanding for the U.S. Trustee, but my understanding, based on email correspondence, is that the issues concern Section 9.2, which is the cap on the trustee's ability to recover if the manager is liable for an incident arising out of the agreement, the cap there being 2 million Euros. Case 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 12 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023 13 I should note, though, that the standard cap that we're -- that YACHTZOO had informed us that is typically in these agreements is 500,000 Euros. We actually negotiated an increase of that amount to \\$2 million. We also, obviously, pushed to remove the cap altogether, but YACHTZOO was not able to accommodate that, because their own insurer would not allow an -- an uncapped liability. So that's issue -- as I understand it, issue number one. Issue number two concerns Section 9.5 which essentially is a carve out to any liability that may -- that we could assert against employees, agents, or manager of YACHTZOO. But I should note that this does not take away from our ability to hold the manager responsible, manager in this case, to be specific, YACHTZOO itself responsible. It just means that we cannot go after their employees, agents, or, lower case M manager. And then -- and this is the third item which I'm not sure if the U.S. Trustee is pursuing it, and then that is Section 5.3 which requires payments without setoff, counterclaim, et cetera. We believe that this is a standard provision under the -- and I'm not quite sure whether the changes we've made to the order regarding the monthly invoicing resolved the Case 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 13 of\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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14 |\n| 1 | U.S. Trustee's concern with respect to 5.3.
But, obviously, |\n| 2 | I will let Ms. Claiborn speak for herself on those three |\n| 3 | points.
Thank you. |\n| 4 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Thank you. |\n| 5 | MS. CLAIBORN:
Your Honor, Attorney Bongartz is |\n| 6 | correct.
Those are the three sections that need further |\n| 7 | discussion. |\n| 8 | THE COURT:
Tell me the first section again.
I |\n| 9 | didn't hear it clearly. |\n| 10 | MS. CLAIBORN:
9.2, 9.5, and 5.3. |\n| 11 | THE COURT:
I've got the other two.
Okay.
Go |\n| 12 | ahead.
Section 9 -- so, Attorney Claiborn, please let me |\n| 13 | know what is the U.S. Trustee's office with regard to -- |\n| 14 | issue with regard to Section 9.2. |\n| 15 | MS. CLAIBORN:
So 9.2 is a limitation on liability |\n| 16 | that caps the exposure of YACHTZOO at \\$2 million.
And the |\n| 17 | U.S. Trustee generally opposes limitation on liability |\n| 18 | clauses in professional contracts and agreements and |\n| 19 | consistent with that has a problem with this particular one. |\n| 20 | The scope of the services and the cost of |\n| 21 | YACHTZOO's involvement in this case is discussed in the |\n| 22 | motion, and the motion also talks about the fact that the |\n| 23 | general maintenance costs of running this yacht and keeping |\n| 24 | it in operating condition, you know, can span the cost of |\n| 25 | \\$100,000 to, I think, \\$300,000 per month.
So against that |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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15 |\n| 1 | backdrop, a limitation of liability that is only at \\$2 |\n| 2 | million is insufficient from the U.S. Trustee's point of |\n| 3 | view. |\n| 4 | The other issue is -- just is a practical one. |\n| 5 | The estate is exposed if it cannot recover from others the |\n| 6 | actual cost of whatever damage happens. |\n| 7 | THE COURT:
So this is 9.5 you're talking about? |\n| 8 | MS. CLAIBORN:
9.2 has the limitation of |\n| 9 | liability. |\n| 10 | THE COURT:
Right. |\n| 11 | MS. CLAIBORN:
9.5 and 5.3 are sort of companion |\n| 12 | concepts to that idea that we're limiting remedies.
5.3 |\n| 13 | limits remedies on the part of the trustee, and it waives |\n| 14 | the right to assert setoff, counterclaim, condition and |\n| 15 | qualification and response to payments.
So if there were a |\n| 16 | payment dispute or there was a conduct dispute, those sorts |\n| 17 | of remedies would not be available to the trustee. |\n| 18 | And then 9.5 speaks to protections that are |\n| 19 | afforded to employees or agents or managers of YACHTZOO and |\n| 20 | gives up rights to go against those. |\n| 21 | It does at the very end of 9.5 provide for the |\n| 22 | manager being responsible for those sorts of bad acts that |\n| 23 | are in the nature of gross negligence or willful misconduct. |\n| 24 | But Section 9.5 in generality gives up rights as against |\n| 25 | others and limits them only to certain types and only |\n| | |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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16 |\n| 1 | against YACHTZOO. |\n| 2 | So taken together, this grouping of limitations on |\n| 3 | the rights to recover in the event of problems and bad acts |\n| 4 | puts the estate in a place of being more exposed than the |\n| 5 | U.S. Trustee thinks ought is -- ought to be reasonable. |\n| 6 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Thank you. |\n| 7 | MR. BONGARTZ:
May I respond, ma'am? |\n| 8 | THE COURT:
Yes, counsel.
Go right ahead. |\n| 9 | MR. BONGARTZ:
Okay.
Yes.
To be honest, I mean, |\n| 10 | we certainly appreciate the comments we've -- that |\n| 11 | Ms. Claiborn has given us.
And we obviously wanted to |\n| 12 | negotiate and would want to negotiate the best contract |\n| 13 | possible.
And, in fact, we've raised these issues with |\n| 14 | YACHTZOO both before and after -- again, after Ms. Claiborn |\n| 15 | communicated with us.
And on balance, this is, you know, |\n| 16 | from our perspective, the best deal we could obtain. |\n| 17 | Obviously, at the end of the day, we submit it's |\n| 18 | the trustee's business judgment that should control on |\n| 19 | these.
And while it would have been nice to get, you know, |\n| 20 | improvements on these specific provisions, unfortunately |\n| 21 | that just wasn't possible. |\n| 22 | I should also note that we did actually -- in |\n| 23 | negotiating the agreement did get actually what we believe |\n| 24 | are substantial concessions, including with respect to these |\n| 25 | provisions.
I should just reiterate the point about the |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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17 |\n| 1 | increase in the liability cap to 2 million Euros. |\n| 2 | But there were also other provisions that we |\n| 3 | successfully improved from the perspective of the estate |\n| 4 | during our negotiations. |\n| 5 | We flagged a few of those in our motion, but, you |\n| 6 | know, they include exclusive bankruptcy court jurisdiction, |\n| 7 | the removal of the arbitration clause. |\n| 8 | We've also -- YACHTZOO also agreed at our request |\n| 9 | to remove a provision that would have required us to |\n| 10 | indemnify them from third-party claims.
That used to be in |\n| 11 | Section 9.4.
That was also removed. |\n| 12 | So I think, on balance, we submit that the |\n| 13 | contract should be -- entry into the contract as currently |\n| 14 | before the Court should be approved.
Thank you. |\n| 15 | THE COURT:
Thank you.
All right.
I want to |\n| 16 | look -- I'm looking at these provisions in the agreement at |\n| 17 | the moment that we just discussed.
I'll start with 9.2, |\n| 18 | because that's where you started. |\n| 19 | So with regard to 9.2 and the concern about the |\n| 20 | limitation on liability and the cap of 2 million Euro, I |\n| 21 | mean, this clause existed in -- did this clause exist in the |\n| 22 | management agreement that was in place prior to the trustee |\n| 23 | entering -- |\n| 24 | MR. BONGARTZ:
Yes.
We were informed that it did. |\n| 25 | THE COURT:
And do you know if there was a cap? |\n| | |\n\nHo Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023 18 MR. BONGARTZ: There was. We're told by YACHTZOO that the cap was 1 million Euros. THE COURT: So you've exceed the -- you've increased the cap? MR. BONGARTZ: Correct. THE COURT: And the Section 9.2 says that the manager shall have no liability whatsoever to the owner for any loss, damage, delay, or expense unless it is proved to have resulted directly or indirectly from or has been materially contributed to by the negligence or gross negligence or willful conduct. So it's not just gross negligence and willful misconduct. It's negligence as well. MR. BONGARTZ: Yes. That's -- yes, that's correct. Yes. THE COURT: And it's negligence or gross negligence or willful misconduct of the manager or its employees or agents or managers or subcontractors employed by the manager in connected with the -- in connection with this agreement. So I don't see that Section 9.2 is limited solely to the manager. MR. BONGARTZ: No. I believe what -- again, I don't want to be presumptuous to speak for Ms. Claiborn. But I believe in this particular instance she's referring to Section 9.5 which essentially, the way I read it, precludes Case 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 18 of\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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19 |\n| 1 | us from suing the employees.
But this does not mean that |\n| 2 | the manager can avoid liability for the actions of its |\n| 3 | employees.
So if the employee does something wrong -- |\n| 4 | THE COURT:
Right. |\n| 5 | MR. BONGARTZ:
-- and, obviously, the manager acts |\n| 6 | through its employees -- then we can pursue claims against |\n| 7 | the manager.
It just -- 9.5 just, you know, precludes us |\n| 8 | from going after the employee individually. |\n| 9 | THE COURT:
So, Attorney Claiborn, I'm looking at |\n| 10 | the sections that still remain in dispute, I would say, or |\n| 11 | at least not in agreement.
So I'm -- with regard to 9.2, |\n| 12 | the limitation on the liability, the dollar amount is 2 |\n| 13 | million Euro.
I see that.
And counsel is saying that the |\n| 14 | dollar amount prior to this was 1 million. |\n| 15 | So isn't that an improvement for the estate if the |\n| 16 | amount is increased by a million dollars? |\n| 17 | MS. CLAIBORN:
It definitely is an improvement. |\n| 18 | Our position is just that professionals should not be able |\n| 19 | to protect themselves by limiting their liability in advance |\n| 20 | of performing services. |\n| 21 | THE COURT:
Understood.
The trustee's counsel is |\n| 22 | saying, though, that they wouldn't enter into this agreement |\n| 23 | without that provision. |\n| 24 | MS. CLAIBORN:
That is the typical refrain that I |\n| 25 | hear from the other side of the aisle as to |\n| | |\n\nHo Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023 20 professionals' -- THE COURT: Well -- MS. CLAIBORN: -- positions on things. It's -- THE COURT: You may be right. MS. CLAIBORN: It's understandable. But that said, it's the point that the estate is exposing itself in a way that the U.S. Trustee would prefer and thinks it is not appropriate. THE COURT: Well, let's think that -- MS. CLAIBORN: So I'm raising that issue. THE COURT: What do we have for insurance with regard to the Lady May right now? MR. BONGARTZ: There is various insurance. I think there is a -- I know there's a P&I policy, a protection and indemnity policy which I believe has a cap of \\$100 million. There is a Holland machinery policy which protects the boat from property damage. I don't -- and I'm sorry. I don't know off the top of my head what the liability limit is for that. And then there's various other smaller policies for cyber -- covering cyber attacks. And for the crew there's also going to be a health insurance. THE COURT: The reason I ask the question is the -- if the manager does something wrong with regard to the boat, right, even just acts negligently, at least under Paragraph 9.2, if that negligence is proven to have resulted Case 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 20 of\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 21 of\n\n| | 106 |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023
21 |\n| 1 | directly or indirectly from or has been material |\n| 2 | contributed -- materially, excuse me, contributed to by the |\n| 3 | negligence or gross negligence or willful misconduct of the |\n| 4 | manager or its employees or agents or managers, then there's |\n| 5 | a possible recovery of 2 million Euro. |\n| 6 | Plus, what would the manager -- what would happen? |\n| 7 | I mean, let's just use a hypothetical, right?
They |\n| 8 | didn't -- the manager forgot to fuel the boat, and some |\n| 9 | reason -- they start the boat and it burns up the engine, |\n| 10 | right?
That would be -- you could argue that would be |\n| 11 | negligence.
They were negligent in taking care of the boat. |\n| 12 | That's what they're doing.
They're managing the |\n| 13 | boat, right?
Isn't that their -- that's the reason they're |\n| 14 | being retained? |\n| 15 | MR. BONGARTZ:
Through the crew, yes.
I mean, the |\n| 16 | manager is either -- their offices are in Europe, so they're |\n| 17 | not physically on the boat.
But they are responsible for -- |\n| 18 | THE COURT:
Well, and as it says -- |\n| 19 | MR. BONGARTZ:
Yeah. |\n| 20 | THE COURT:
-- the manager, its employees or |\n| 21 | agents or managers or subcontractors -- |\n| 22 | MR. BONGARTZ:
Correct. |\n| 23 | THE COURT:
-- employed by the manager in |\n| 24 | connection with this agreement, right? |\n| 25 | MR. BONGARTZ:
Correct. |\n| | |\n\nHo Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023 22 THE COURT: So you'd have a claim against the manager, and you might even have an insurance claim, right? MR. BONGARTZ: Depending -- I mean, I would have -- it all depends on the specifics. THE COURT: I'm just saying hypothetically. MR. BONGARTZ: But yes. Yes. THE COURT: Right? Hypothetically. And the estate now has negotiated a better bargain under Article -- or section 9.2 to have the cap be \\$2 million. So with regard to 9.2, I understand the United States Trustee's position that they don't -- that the office does not support what is -- can be interpreted as a limitation on liability. But I think under the circumstances of this case and under the circumstances that the cap has been increased, I think it's reasonable, and I think that the trustee's acting within his business judgment to agree to 9.2 in the management agreement. I think there's protection not only under this agreement but potentially other agreements that are to ensure or -- the boat, the yacht for the purposes of the estate. So I don't know that you made a formal written objection, Attorney Claiborn, but to the extent -- MS. CLAIBORN: Your Honor, we did not based -- and that was due, in part, to the fact that this was just filed Case 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 22 of\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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23 |\n| 1 | last week, and so -- |\n| 2 | THE COURT:
Right.
With regard to Section 9.2, |\n| 3 | while I agree that, you know, no section and no wording are |\n| 4 | perfect -- are often perfect in agreements, I think that |\n| 5 | this language has some broad implications, and I think it's |\n| 6 | protective of the estate in a reasonable manner under the |\n| 7 | circumstances of this case.
Okay? |\n| 8 | With regard to 9.5, 9.5 references 9.2.
So it |\n| 9 | says except to the extent the manager would be held liable |\n| 10 | under 9.2, the owner hereby undertakes and agrees that it |\n| 11 | will -- and agrees that it will undertake to obtain an order |\n| 12 | from the bankruptcy court to enjoin legal actions brought by |\n| 13 | third parties against the manager arising out of or caused |\n| 14 | or occasioned by the manager performing any of the services |\n| 15 | under the terms hereof. |\n| 16 | MR. BONGARTZ:
Your Honor, I -- |\n| 17 | THE COURT:
All that's saying is that you're going |\n| 18 | to try to get an order to stop people from doing that, |\n| 19 | right? |\n| 20 | MR. BONGARTZ:
That is correct, Your Honor.
I |\n| 21 | just would note -- |\n| 22 | THE COURT:
Oh, except I just read the wrong -- |\n| 23 | MR. BONGARTZ:
-- you're reading 9.4. |\n| 24 | THE COURT:
I just read the wrong provision. |\n| 25 | That's 9.4. |\n| | |\n\nHo Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023 24 MR. BONGARTZ: Yeah. Correct. THE COURT: So 9.5. I'm sorry. Yeah. So 9.5 is, to me anyway, saying you can't sue the individual employees or agent or manager. You have to serve -- you have to sue YACHTZOO -- MR. BONGARTZ: That's our understanding. THE COURT: -- and they're responsible for all of those people's -- all those parties' actions anyway under 9.2. MR. BONGARTZ: Correct. That's our understanding and reading of that provision as well. THE COURT: Okay. I think 9.5 is reasonable again under the circumstances of this case. THE COURT: All right. Let me look at the Section 5.3 setoff, counterclaims, and payment issue. Well, I mean, it does say -- it doesn't foreclose the ability for a setoff or a counterclaim or a condition or qualification free and clear of and without any deduction, because you could get the prior written consent of the manager to do that, correct? MR. BONGARTZ: That is correct. THE COURT: So I think that's fine too. I think that the trustee -- MR. BONGARTZ: Okay. THE COURT: -- can exercise his business judgment Case 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 24 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023 25 to have that provision in the agreement. The one thing, counsel, that I would add, though, in addition to what I just stated, that minor language about YACHTZOO -- MR. BONGARTZ: Yes. THE COURT: -- has consented that it shall issue, right -- MR. BONGARTZ: Correct. THE COURT: -- although I understand it says it in the management agreement, it might make sense in this order to state that YACHTZOO has agreed that the exclusive jurisdiction of the -- you know, this Court has exclusive jurisdiction over any -- you know, whatever the provision is that you already noted on the record. MR. BONGARTZ: That's fine. They have agreed to the insertion of Section 15.2. And I don't think it's a problem to also specifically note that in the order itself. THE COURT: I would do that. (Counsel confer) MR. BONGARTZ: That's fine, Your Honor. THE COURT: I think it'll make it easier -- it could make it easier for future issues. All right. Then is there anything further we need to address with regard to this order, the order authorizing the trustee to enter into and perform under certain post-petition agreements relating to the maintenance and Case 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 25 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023 26 operation of the Lady May? MS. CLAIBORN: There are two other contracts that are a part of this motion, and we do have some updates on one, and we need to have some discussion about the other. THE COURT: Okay. So this order does encompass the other two agreements? MS. CLAIBORN: Yes. MR. BONGARTZ: Correct. It covers all three. It's the defined term -- THE COURT: Three. Okay. MR. BONGARTZ: It's the defined term maintenance agreements -- THE COURT: Okay. MR. BONGARTZ: -- which is -- okay. THE COURT: So what about the crew provision agreement? That's the next agreement. MR. BONGARTZ: So -- THE COURT: What are the issues in that? MR. BONGARTZ: On the crew provision agreement, we actually did resolve all of the U.S. Trustee's concerns by making two modifications to the agreement itself. They are, first, changing the applicable law from Cyprus law to New York law. And that was acceptable to the crew employer. And then the second change is adding a clarification to the end of Section 5.3 to -- just as quick Case 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 26 of\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 27 of\n\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023
27 |\n|---|-------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | background, Section 5.3 deals with our obligation to obtain |\n| 2 | insurance coverage for the crew as well as P&I insurance, |\n| 3 | which we in the case of P&I insurance already have and in |\n| 4 | the case of crew insurance will obtain as soon as this |\n| 5 | agreement has been entered into.
And that under those |\n| 6 | insurance policies, the employer will be included as a |\n| 7 | co-insured. |\n\n And there had been some confusion about the word \"indemnified\" which some -- which the U.S. Trustee had concerns about that somehow the trustee was agreeing to indemnify the crew employer. That's actually not the case. It simply means that under the insurance, the employer will be indemnified.\n\n But in order to resolve and button this issue up entirely and prevent any argument that somehow the estate is releasing or discharging potential future claims against the crew employer, we've agreed and the employer has also agreed to add the following language at the end of Section 5.3, and that will read, \"Notwithstanding the foregoing, nothing herein shall release or discharge FDS\" which is the employer \"from any liability to LDS,\" that's the estate, \"that may arise out of this agreement.\" And I have a copy of the revised agreement\n\navailable as well if Your Honor --\n\nTHE COURT: I don't need the copy of the revised\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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28 |\n| 1 | agreement.
But I think what you could do, counsel, is if |\n| 2 | that's -- if the U.S. Trustee has -- does that resolve the |\n| 3 | U.S. Trustee's issues with regard to the crew provision |\n| 4 | agreement? |\n| 5 | MS. CLAIBORN:
That new language does, Your Honor. |\n| 6 | THE COURT:
So the crew provision agreement |\n| 7 | attached to the motion then is now going to be different |\n| 8 | from the crew provision agreement that the trustee is going |\n| 9 | to sign and enter into? |\n| 10 | MR. BONGARTZ:
That is correct.
And we were -- we |\n| 11 | can do it either way.
We can either file a revised proposed |\n| 12 | order attaching the updated form -- |\n| 13 | THE COURT:
I don't think you need to do that. I |\n| 14 | think you just say in the order the crew provision agreement |\n| 15 | as modified, you know, after the filing of the motion, |\n| 16 | right? |\n| 17 | MR. BONGARTZ:
Okay. |\n| 18 | THE COURT:
I think that's fine. |\n| 19 | MR. BONGARTZ:
Okay.
We will make that change. |\n| 20 | And -- |\n| 21 | THE COURT:
All right.
Then we -- moving on to |\n| 22 | the dockage agreement.
Is that right? |\n| 23 | MR. BONGARTZ:
That is correct.
I need to set the |\n| 24 | stage a little bit for this -- |\n| 25 | THE COURT:
Sure. |\n| | |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 29 of\n\n| | 106
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29 |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | MR. BONGARTZ:
-- for this agreement.
We're |\n| 2 | essentially entering into a month-to-month-based agreement |\n| 3 | with the Bridgeport Harbor Marina.
Specifically, we would |\n| 4 | be entering into it for the month of April and any |\n| 5 | reasonable extension. |\n| 6 | I want to be clear, our -- and this sort of now |\n| 7 | bleeds into a few housekeeping matters.
We are not |\n| 8 | intending to keep the Lady May indefinitely or even long or |\n| 9 | medium term in Bridgeport.
Obviously, we would seek relief |\n| 10 | from the Court before we move the Lady May.
But our |\n| 11 | intention is to move the Lady May to Rhode Island, |\n| 12 | specifically the free trade zone in Newport, to facilitate |\n| 13 | marketing and sale of the boat. |\n| 14 | And so what we're looking at here is definitely |\n| 15 | the month of April, which obviously has already started, |\n| 16 | potentially some portion or maybe the month of May.
But |\n| 17 | we're not looking at a horizon that would go beyond that. |\n| 18 | And in light of that -- and we do recognize that |\n| 19 | there are objections that the U.S. Trustee has raised.
But |\n| 20 | in light of that, the short-term nature of this agreement, |\n| 21 | we would ask that the -- this -- entry into this agreement |\n| 22 | also be approved. |\n| 23 | Now I want to just briefly preview -- and I'm not |\n| 24 | trying to take anything away from Ms. Claiborn, but I want |\n| 25 | to just briefly preview what we understand the three issues |\n| | |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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30 |\n| 1 | to be.
And they all are in the terms and conditions portion |\n| 2 | of the agreement.
It's the proverbial fine print, page -- |\n| 3 | and it's all on page 3 of those terms and conditions. |\n| 4 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Hold on one second.
I'm |\n| 5 | looking at a document that starts the terms and conditions |\n| 6 | on page 2. |\n| 7 | MR. BONGARTZ:
Correct. |\n| 8 | THE COURT:
And then -- |\n| 9 | MR. BONGARTZ:
And then on the very next page |\n| 10 | that's -- |\n| 11 | THE COURT:
So you want me to look at page 3? |\n| 12 | MR. BONGARTZ:
Correct, Your Honor. |\n| 13 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Go ahead. |\n| 14 | MR. BONGARTZ:
So I want to preface what I'm going |\n| 15 | to say next is that we have tried to modify these |\n| 16 | provisions.
We've reached out to Bridgeport Marina and to |\n| 17 | ask them if they were -- would modify them.
But they |\n| 18 | have -- we've gotten a very clear and hard no.
And so I |\n| 19 | want to just put that into context before I start my -- you |\n| 20 | know, the discussion of this -- these sections. |\n| 21 | So the first comment, we understand, is the |\n| 22 | section that starts with the vessel agent and owner hereby |\n| 23 | release and discharge marina, which we understand is a |\n| 24 | release of the marina for any claims of negligence.
That is |\n| 25 | in little one, like the fourth line down. |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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31 |\n| 1 | We, however, read this provision as not precluding |\n| 2 | claims against the marina arising from intentional conduct |\n| 3 | and gross negligence. |\n| 4 | Specifically, if you go into item number three, |\n| 5 | there is a parenthetical not rising to the level of gross |\n| 6 | negligence and intentional conduct, which is specifically |\n| 7 | carved out there.
So our position and our view of this |\n| 8 | agreement is that while there is a release of negligence |\n| 9 | claims, claims rising to the level of intentional conduct or |\n| 10 | gross negligence would not be released.
So that was issue |\n| 11 | number one. |\n| 12 | Issue number two is the indemnification provision |\n| 13 | which is the very next section.
Unfortunately, it doesn't |\n| 14 | have a section number, but it's the one that starts with |\n| 15 | vessel agent and owner shall indemnify and hold harmless |\n| 16 | marina. |\n| 17 | Again, it's -- from our perspective, it's the same |\n| 18 | distinction that I would like to draw here between, on the |\n| 19 | one hand, claims arising out of the marina's negligence for |\n| 20 | which there would be indemnification and -- on the one hand |\n| 21 | and on the other hand claims rising to the level of gross |\n| 22 | negligence and intentional conduct which, again, our reading |\n| 23 | is are excluded. |\n| 24 | And I want to -- yes, it's -- I'm sorry.
It took |\n| 25 | me a second to find the languages.
It's the last line of |\n| | |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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32 |\n| 1 | that section of the terms and condition at the end, again |\n| 2 | the parenthetical, not rising to the level of gross |\n| 3 | negligence, et cetera.
So that was the second issue. |\n| 4 | And the third issue is the responsibility for |\n| 5 | attorney's fees.
Obviously, you know, that's not something |\n| 6 | that, you know, we would ever offer up lightly.
But we |\n| 7 | pushed back as hard as we could on this, and the marina just |\n| 8 | simply said that this was just not acceptable to in any way |\n| 9 | modify their standard terms and conditions. |\n| 10 | But I should also note the attorney's fees is |\n| 11 | limited to enforcement of this agreement.
We obviously have |\n| 12 | every intention to pay and comply with this agreement. |\n| 13 | In fact, we've already made the Bridgeport Marina |\n| 14 | a co-insured under the insurance policies, both the P&I |\n| 15 | policy and the Holland machinery policy as they required us |\n| 16 | to do. |\n| 17 | So we don't believe on balance that there's a -- |\n| 18 | you know, obviously, there's always a risk.
So I can't give |\n| 19 | any assurances here.
But we don't believe there's a |\n| 20 | material risk that they would ever have to come to court or |\n| 21 | any other court to enforce this agreement. |\n| 22 | And in any event, I should also note that we |\n| 23 | specifically negotiated that this Court will have exclusive |\n| 24 | jurisdiction over any claim or dispute arising out of this |\n| 25 | agreement. |\n\nHo Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023 33 So to the extent that there is a -- ever a dispute over what any of the foregoing provisions that I just summarized mean and what their effect is, this Court would ultimately be the arbiter of that. So I know I said a lot, and I will pass the podium to Ms. Claiborn now to respond. Thank you. MS. CLAIBORN: Thank you. Your Honor, the boilerplate language that's on page 3 that Attorney Bongartz has just summarized for the Court is a common and regular appearing sort of language in maritime agreements and has been routinely held to be enforceable. So should something happen that is the fault of the marina, the marina is actually not going to be responsible, because this language gives up on that responsibility. The location of the language regarding gross negligence or intentional conduct is purposefully confusing, I think, and could be read to be limited to the concepts that follow immediately before it which are strict liability, breach of warranty, or other fault. It does not say in an easy to read and easy to understand way that such conduct that rises to the level of gross negligence or intentional conduct of any kind would be excluded from the protections that are given to the marina. So the U.S. Trustee again has concerns that should Case 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 33 of\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 1683 | Filed 04/20/23 | Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 | Page 34 of |\n|---------------|----------|----------------|---------------------------|------------|\n|---------------|----------|----------------|---------------------------|------------|\n\nHo Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023 34 something happen, and even if it's the fault of someone at the marina, that the estate is not only liable for it but the estate also has to pay for the attorney's fees in connection with the dispute that involves that. So I appreciate Attorney Bongartz reaching out to\n\n the marina to ask them to consider walking back some of these protections, but like I said, from what I've seen in the case law, these types of protections are routine, and they are held to be enforceable. And so based on that backdrop, I understand why the marina said no, but that doesn't make it an appropriate risk that the estate should bear.\n\n MR. BONGARTZ: I don't have much further to add except to note that if the marina -- if we don't enter into this agreement, which again is a short-term agreement, but if we don't enter this, the fate of the yacht is uncertain.\n\n I can't stand here right now and tell you that the marina would not unmoor the ship and just let it drift off to sea. I think that would be incredibly irresponsible on their part. But if we don't have a contract with them, I just don't know what they would do.\n\n And then the other aspect is, in some sense this is kind of the hand that we've been dealt, because that's where the boat was and currently is at the time of the -- of ownership having been determined to be in the -- with the\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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35 |\n| 1 | estate. |\n| 2 | We have, as I mentioned earlier, no intention of |\n| 3 | keeping the boat there long term.
This is simply a |\n| 4 | short-term arrangement that we have to accept, |\n| 5 | unfortunately. |\n| 6 | We would love to have improved these terms, but I |\n| 7 | unfortunately cannot.
I don't have the power to force the |\n| 8 | marina to change their standard terms and conditions. |\n| 9 | So under those circumstances, we submit that given |\n| 10 | the lack of alternatives and given that our objective is to |\n| 11 | move the boat as soon as possible, we would ask that the |\n| 12 | agreement be approved.
Thank you, Your Honor. |\n| 13 | THE COURT:
I have a question about the fees and |\n| 14 | expenses right now that are due to the marina.
What is due |\n| 15 | to the marina right now? |\n| 16 | MR. BONGARTZ:
We understand that they are -- they |\n| 17 | have been paid through the end of March.
So the only |\n| 18 | \"outstanding\" is -- they're not outstanding.
They're fees |\n| 19 | that are due for this month, the month of April.
They are |\n| 20 | \\$16,484.
And they have not yet been paid. |\n| 21 | THE COURT:
And that's all the marina will be |\n| 22 | billing the estate for in April, the marina itself? |\n| 23 | MR. BONGARTZ:
Correct.
Yes. |\n| 24 | THE COURT:
In accordance with the dockage |\n| 25 | agreement? |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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36 |\n| 1 | MR. BONGARTZ:
Just one second, Your Honor. |\n| 2 | THE COURT:
Yeah. |\n| 3 | (Counsel confer) |\n| 4 | MR. BONGARTZ:
I'm sorry.
There could be an |\n| 5 | adjustment based on the amount of electricity consumed, and |\n| 6 | there might be a reconciliation at the end of the month. |\n| 7 | But we're not talking a large amount of dollars here. |\n| 8 | THE COURT:
But that electricity would be -- have |\n| 9 | to be paid for regardless of who was in the party to the |\n| 10 | dockage agreement with the marina?
That's not something |\n| 11 | unique to this vessel? |\n| 12 | MR. BONGARTZ:
No, of course not.
No. |\n| 13 | THE COURT:
And so if you keep the Lady May at the |\n| 14 | marina through the end of May, which it sounds like you -- |\n| 15 | the intent is that may not happen.
It may be moved before |\n| 16 | the end of -- |\n| 17 | MR. BONGARTZ:
Well, we may be able to move it |\n| 18 | sooner than that.
I mean, we're exploring right now like |\n| 19 | how soon we can move it.
But it may be before the end of |\n| 20 | the month, obviously subject to this Court approving any |\n| 21 | transfer of the yacht. |\n| 22 | THE COURT:
So if you do not move the Lady May |\n| 23 | before the end of April, do you have to enter into another |\n| 24 | license agreement for the month of May? |\n| 25 | MR. BONGARTZ:
We would have to do it for every |\n| | |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 37 of\n\n| | 106 |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023
37 |\n| 1 | month.
And we had as a -- you know, as -- in order to avoid |\n| 2 | having to file such a motion, every month we would ask as |\n| 3 | part of the relief requested in the motion that also any |\n| 4 | reasonable extension be approved.
But I still reiterate my |\n| 5 | earlier point.
We have no intention of this being a |\n| 6 | long-term arrangement.
We want to move and ultimately sell |\n| 7 | the Lady May as soon as possible. |\n| 8 | THE COURT:
It does look like the electric -- |\n| 9 | well, the electricity estimate is part of the \\$16,484.25. |\n| 10 | But I understand that may change depending upon a true-up or |\n| 11 | whatever at the -- |\n| 12 | MR. BONGARTZ:
Yeah.
I think -- |\n| 13 | THE COURT:
-- of the month, right? |\n| 14 | MR. BONGARTZ:
Correct.
You're accurate.
It's |\n| 15 | estimated at \\$5,000, so it could be somewhat higher or |\n| 16 | somewhat lower -- |\n| 17 | THE COURT:
Right. |\n| 18 | MR. BONGARTZ:
-- based on actual usage. |\n| 19 | THE COURT:
All right.
Attorney Claiborn, is |\n| 20 | there anything else you'd like to add with regard to the |\n| 21 | dockage agreement? |\n| 22 | MS. CLAIBORN:
No, Your Honor. |\n| 23 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Thank you.
I understand the |\n| 24 | United States Trustee's Office concerns with regard to the |\n| 25 | dockage agreement.
However, given the specific facts and |\n| | |\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 38 of\n\n| | 106 |\n|----|------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023
38 |\n| 1 | circumstances of this case and the fact that the boat has -- |\n| 2 | the vessel's been there since July of last year and there |\n| 3 | haven't been any issues that the Court's been made aware of |\n| 4 | with regard to the dockage agreement with the marina and |\n| 5 | because it looks as though the language in the agreement |\n| 6 | does exclude a release of any injury or damage not rising to |\n| 7 | the level of gross negligence or an intentional conduct, |\n| 8 | that these provisions, including the indemnity provision and |\n| 9 | the payment of fees and expenses, while standard and |\n| 10 | enforceable, are within reason in order for the trustee to |\n| 11 | attempt to liquidate this asset of the estate. |\n| 12 | And so, therefore, unless there's -- there is |\n| 13 | no -- there are no changes that are going to be made to the |\n| 14 | dockage agreement that have been -- that has already been |\n| 15 | submitted and filed with the Court. |\n| 16 | MR. BONGARTZ:
That's correct. |\n| 17 | THE COURT:
So therefore I -- with regard to the |\n| 18 | United State's Trustee's objections, I don't see any need to |\n| 19 | change the proposed order other than in the manner that |\n| 20 | we've already stated on the record.
Okay? |\n| 21 | MR. BONGARTZ:
Thank you, Your Honor. |\n| 22 | THE COURT:
So the -- does anyone else wish to be |\n| 23 | heard on these agreements?
Okay.
Hearing nothing, then the |\n| 24 | motion is granted for the reasons and in the manner stated |\n| 25 | on the record, and a revised proposed order will be |\n| | |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 39 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023 39 submitted. How much time do you need, counsel? MR. BONGARTZ: We can do that tomorrow or -- THE COURT: Okay. MR. BONGARTZ: Yeah. That's not a problem. THE COURT: I'll give you to Friday just to be on the safe side. The clerk's office likes to be able to track when things are submitted, when they're supposed to be submitted by. So I will indicate, when I get to the right place, that the motion for order authorizing agreements regarding the Lady May is granted, and a revised proposed order will be submitted on or before April 14th. MR. BONGARTZ: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you. Now, it seems to me that we should be turning to the -- to Adversary 23-5005 where we have the motion for a preliminary injunction, TRO, and the defendant's motion to adjourn to April 11. I've seen -- it seems to me, Trustee Despins, and I could be wrong, but that you don't necessarily have a disagreement on the adjournment, but that you need to have an agreement, which I didn't see that there was an agreement, that the temporary restraining order would remain in place until the hearing on the adjourned preliminary injunction, correct?\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 40 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023 40 MR. DESPINS: May I, Your Honor? THE COURT: Yes, please. MR. DESPINS: For the record, Luc Despins, Chapter 11 Trustee. There is an agreement on continuing the TRO -- or the injunction in place. Where there's no agreement or at least it's not clear that there's an agreement is that we said as an additional condition they should agree, because we served them under subpoena. We served Mr. Major with a subpoena for his client to appear today. We understand that she didn't appear today, but that subpoena, the acceptance of the subpoena should carry over to the adjourned hearing date so we -- Your Honor, you're familiar with this. We've had also some issues of people not appearing, not accepting subpoenas and all that. So that's really the issue. I thought this would be resolved by now, but we made it very clear that the only thing we wanted is an agreement that his client would appear pursuant to the subpoena at the adjourned hearing. And that's the only thing that we would condition that and the continuation of the injunction in place. That's the only thing we're seeking. So I guess I'll let Mr. Major address that. THE COURT: Mr. Major? MR. MAJOR: Thank you, Your Honor. Chris Major\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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41 |\n| 1 | for Greenwich Land, LLC and Ms. Ngok. |\n| 2 | So first of all, with respect to the restraining |\n| 3 | order, it specifically states that it remains in place until |\n| 4 | further order of the Court.
So there's no need for an |\n| 5 | agreement or stipulation of the parties.
The defendants |\n| 6 | have not sought relief from that order or the -- |\n| 7 | THE COURT:
Well, you could make an argument -- |\n| 8 | you could make an argument that it expires today under the |\n| 9 | Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
So I want to -- I want |\n| 10 | a -- an affirmative consent for an extension or I have to |\n| 11 | make findings as to why I have to extend it. |\n| 12 | MR. MAJOR:
So, Your Honor, as we did indicate to |\n| 13 | the trustee's counsel, we are in agreement that the |\n| 14 | restraining order can remain in place post today provided |\n| 15 | that we're not prohibited from coming into the court, |\n| 16 | including if necessary on an emergency basis, to seek some |\n| 17 | relief from that order.
But we have no objection to the |\n| 18 | order continuing on the basis that we're seeking this |\n| 19 | adjournment.
And we certainly are not looking to put the |\n| 20 | Court through the paces of making findings at this juncture. |\n| 21 | THE COURT:
Well, I think what -- I think that's |\n| 22 | fine, because you have whatever rights you have under the |\n| 23 | Federal Rules of Civil Procedure -- |\n| 24 | MR. BONGARTZ:
Yes, Your Honor. |\n| 25 | THE COURT:
-- with regard to if you seek relief |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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42 |\n| 1 | from a temporary restraining order. |\n| 2 | So but you need -- you can affirmatively consent, |\n| 3 | which you just have, to the extension of the temporary |\n| 4 | restraining order until the adjourned hearing on the |\n| 5 | preliminary injunction unless you seek relief from that |\n| 6 | order.
And you could do that.
Whether or not you'd obtain |\n| 7 | that, I have no idea.
Obviously, it would have to be |\n| 8 | whatever you put before the Court seeking that type of |\n| 9 | relief.
Okay? |\n| 10 | MR. MAJOR:
Okay. |\n| 11 | THE COURT:
But what about the subpoena issue? |\n| 12 | MR. MAJOR:
So in terms of the subpoena, the way |\n| 13 | that that was pitched to us was that not only that we accept |\n| 14 | service of a subpoena which -- and we've never been |\n| 15 | authorized to accept service and haven't accepted service of |\n| 16 | the subpoena, but what -- the pitch was, was in exchange for |\n| 17 | the trustee taking no position on our adjournment request |\n| 18 | was that we accept service of the subpoena and agree that |\n| 19 | Ms. Ngok would, in fact, testify at a preliminary injunction |\n| 20 | hearing. |\n| 21 | And as our motion for adjournment that we filed |\n| 22 | over the -- I believe Friday evening over the weekend -- |\n| 23 | yeah, Friday evening -- we are not in a position to be |\n| 24 | prepared to substantively respond to the preliminary |\n| 25 | injunction motion.
And that includes, without limitation, |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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43 |\n| 1 | analyzing all the myriad of legal issues, procedural issues, |\n| 2 | factual issues. |\n| 3 | As Your Honor knows better than me, there's a lot |\n| 4 | of water under the bridge in this bankruptcy case.
And |\n| 5 | there is a lot that's even alleged in the various filings |\n| 6 | that the trustee has made in this specific adversary |\n| 7 | proceeding. |\n| 8 | So what I can't do is tell the trustee that we are |\n| 9 | waiving rights, various objections and things like that that |\n| 10 | we may have or -- and may wish to pursue with respect to our |\n| 11 | client having to testify. |\n| 12 | And so I will accept service on -- and I am |\n| 13 | authorized to accept service of a subpoena.
I'm certainly |\n| 14 | not going to put the Court through anything or make the |\n| 15 | trustee send a process server out.
We're in the case now, |\n| 16 | and we can take the service of the subpoena. |\n| 17 | But I can't waive any rights or objections we may |\n| 18 | have in responding to that subpoena, whether it be a motion |\n| 19 | to quash, whether it be objections, whether it be some |\n| 20 | negotiated resolution on scope or anything like that. |\n| 21 | But we're not yet in a position to know, despite |\n| 22 | having asked generally, why the trustee needs to call |\n| 23 | Ms. Ngok and what testimony the trustee may seek to elicit. |\n| 24 | So we're just not in a position to go that far |\n| 25 | down the road, but we will accept service of a subpoena for |\n| | |\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 1683 | Filed 04/20/23 | Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 | Page 44 of |\n|---------------|----------|----------------|---------------------------|------------|\n|---------------|----------|----------------|---------------------------|------------|\n\nHo Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023 44 the adjourned date. THE COURT: Okay. I appreciate that, that you will accept service. With regard to the statements, I -- and I understand that you need some time, although you're being given time through an adjournment, right, an agreed-upon adjournment? They're not opposing your adjournment request, so you'll have some time. But with regard to that you don't know what the trustee will be asking or seeking, I'm not sure that's accurate, at least from your client's point of view, given prior testimony that your client has given with regard to Greenwich Land and that she's the owner of Greenwich Land and the -- as you know, prior counsel was -- already appeared for Greenwich Land and Ms. Ngok. I know you've now come in, and you have to do whatever you have to do. And I understand that. However, your client has already given testimony, and that testimony, at least what I've seen, has been submitted to the Court and is part of the record of this adversary proceeding. So I think the issue is this. If you're saying\n\n you'll accept service of subpoena, but you want to reserve your right to file a motion to quash, then we'd have to, at the very least -- and I'm not suggesting that this is definitely what we're doing yet. But I'm making a\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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45 |\n| 1 | suggestion to you to think about is you'd have to accept |\n| 2 | service of the subpoena on X date.
You'd have to serve your |\n| 3 | motion to quash by Y date. |\n| 4 | Because you're not serving your motion to quash |\n| 5 | the morning of the hearing on the preliminary injunction. |\n| 6 | We're not going to do that, right? |\n| 7 | We're either going to have a hearing on whatever |\n| 8 | you're moving to quash or whatever you decide to do or not. |\n| 9 | We're not going to do that on the morning of the hearing, |\n| 10 | because -- and that's fine, because you're consenting to the |\n| 11 | extension of the temporary restraining order. |\n| 12 | And if you then come in and you seek to somehow |\n| 13 | get relief from that temporary restraining order, which |\n| 14 | you're absolutely entitled to do under applicable Federal |\n| 15 | Rules of Civil Procedure, then I would think that's your |\n| 16 | burden, and you'd need to have your client testify.
I don't |\n| 17 | know how else you couldn't have her testify since this is a |\n| 18 | temporary restraining order against Greenwich Land and your |\n| 19 | client -- and your individual client. |\n| 20 | So I hear that there's progress with regard to the |\n| 21 | subpoena, but I also think that there is a hurdle that |\n| 22 | you're not willing to go over at this point.
Maybe you'll |\n| 23 | have further discussions.
Maybe you won't.
I don't know. |\n| 24 | But if you're going to take the position that you |\n| 25 | have -- you accept service, but you're still going to |\n| | |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 46 of\n\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023
46 |\n|---|--------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | reserve all your rights to quash, whatever you want to do, |\n| 2 | that's fine, but we're going to set up a process for that so |\n| 3 | that it's not the hearing -- the morning of the hearing or |\n| 4 | the afternoon of the hearing and the preliminary injunction. |\n| 5 | I'm not going to -- I mean, subject to the argument that I'm |\n| 6 | going to get that that's not fine. |\n| 7 | You know I'm going to get that argument right now |\n| 8 | that it's not fine for you to -- I don't know if you're -- |\n\n if I'm going to get that argument. I'm making a presumption that maybe I shouldn't that, you know, great that you're going to accept service, but if you're not going to produce her to testify, then let's fight it out right now. Why waste any time, essentially, is what I think I'm going to be told.\n\n So I don't know what your response to that is, if any. But this has to proceed in some way, shape, or form. And at this point, your clients are defendants in an adversary proceeding. The time for your clients to file a response is running.\n\n There is a -- there was supposed to be a hearing and a preliminary injunction today. Because, as I said, the argument can be made that the temporary restraining order expires today. And the trustee is saying, okay, you'd like to adjourn the hearing. That's fine. But I need you to accept service and produce your client for testimony.\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 1683 | Filed 04/20/23 | Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 | Page 47 of |\n|---------------|----------|----------------|---------------------------|------------|\n|---------------|----------|----------------|---------------------------|------------|\n\n| | 106 |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023
47 |\n| 1 | I think you're saying I'll produce the -- I'll |\n| 2 | accept service, but I'm not necessarily producing the client |\n| 3 | for testimony.
So we need to address that issue somehow. |\n| 4 | Because we're not going to have another hearing about it. |\n| 5 | It's either it's going to happen or it's not going to |\n| 6 | happen. |\n| 7 | And it's fine whatever way you proceed.
I mean, |\n| 8 | you have to do whatever you think is appropriate for your |\n| 9 | client and your client -- but -- your clients.
But that's |\n| 10 | where we are right now. |\n| 11 | So, Trustee Despins, I've heard counsel say that |\n| 12 | he'll accept the subpoena, but I assume that is not enough |\n| 13 | from your perspective.
Is that correct? |\n| 14 | MR. DESPINS:
Actually -- |\n| 15 | THE COURT:
Maybe I'm wrong. |\n| 16 | MR. DESPINS:
No.
Actually, Your Honor, we're |\n| 17 | going to take the Court's lead on that, meaning as long as |\n| 18 | there's a process before the hearing so that that issue can |\n| 19 | be vetted out, we're okay with him just accepting service. |\n| 20 | So there won't be any games about was she properly served or |\n| 21 | not.
That's over. |\n| 22 | And then if he wants to -- her not to testify, |\n| 23 | then there'll be another hearing before the preliminary |\n| 24 | injunction hearing.
We're okay with that suggestion, Your |\n| 25 | Honor. |\n| | |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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48 |\n| 1 | THE COURT:
Okay. |\n| 2 | MR. DESPINS:
So but I think we need to -- we |\n| 3 | should really pick the dates and have the usual structure |\n| 4 | you have which is both sides have to produce their exhibits |\n| 5 | and their witness list by -- |\n| 6 | THE COURT:
Yes. |\n| 7 | MR. DESPINS:
-- seven business days, and then we |\n| 8 | have four business days to respond or to object.
We should |\n| 9 | build that in today if we -- |\n| 10 | THE COURT:
We are going to do that.
Thank you. |\n| 11 | So, Attorney Major, what time frame -- I looked at |\n| 12 | your motion, but I have to say I looked at it very briefly. |\n| 13 | So I didn't see in this -- I didn't see, but I could have |\n| 14 | missed, okay, what kind of -- you said two weeks.
But are |\n| 15 | you -- have you and the trustee discussed a date for an |\n| 16 | adjourned hearing? |\n| 17 | MR. MAJOR:
Your Honor, we discussed the two |\n| 18 | weeks.
And let me just tell the Court, if I may, what the |\n| 19 | genesis of the two weeks were. |\n| 20 | We were in an exigent circumstance, which is there |\n| 21 | was a hearing scheduled for today.
And we had a lot of work |\n| 22 | today to get prepared for that hearing.
And that's not just |\n| 23 | in terms of, you know, preparing exhibits and things like |\n| 24 | that but to figure out what's available to do and then what |\n| 25 | is advisable to do and then to consult with a client, which |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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49 |\n| 1 | as I said in our request for an adjournment is not a |\n| 2 | simplistic process.
And there's a language barrier, and |\n| 3 | there are health issues and so forth. |\n| 4 | So I needed to get the adjournment as quickly as |\n| 5 | possible.
And I wanted to make sure that I asked for a time |\n| 6 | that I thought that the Court would sign off on, that I |\n| 7 | thought the trustee may join if they were willing to. |\n| 8 | But also not knowing exactly how the existing |\n| 9 | restraining order could impact things going forward, I |\n| 10 | wanted to not ask for a date that was too far out that might |\n| 11 | make it harder for me to get a hearing date if it's |\n| 12 | determined that we do need to seek relief from that order |\n| 13 | before the PI hearing.
Which at this point I don't plan to |\n| 14 | do that, but circumstances change.
And, you know, the |\n| 15 | order -- it may be something we have to come into the court |\n| 16 | with. |\n| 17 | So there was no, from my perspective, hard and |\n| 18 | fast idea behind the two weeks except that, like I said, I |\n| 19 | wanted to try to get something that I could persuade the |\n| 20 | trustee to join or -- and, more importantly, that I could |\n| 21 | get the Court to go along with. |\n| 22 | I certainly don't have a problem with, you know, |\n| 23 | setting a specific date.
And the other reason I just said |\n| 24 | two weeks is I certainly wasn't aware of Your Honor's |\n| 25 | availability.
So I thought it would be too presumptuous to |\n| | |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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50 |\n| 1 | suggest a specific date on when you -- |\n| 2 | THE COURT:
No, that's fine.
That's fine. |\n| 3 | MR. MAJOR:
Okay. |\n| 4 | THE COURT:
I was just asking if you had talked |\n| 5 | about a specific date.
But now, given what you've stated -- |\n| 6 | and which is fine. |\n| 7 | And the trustee's statements about -- and I think |\n| 8 | it is the proper way to proceed -- is that we're going to |\n| 9 | set a date by which you're going to accept service of the |\n| 10 | subpoena.
And then we're going to set a date by which |\n| 11 | you're going to have to file any motions under the Federal |\n| 12 | Rules of Civil Procedure with regard to the subpoena. |\n| 13 | And then we're going to have a hearing date set on |\n| 14 | that, assuming you file something.
And then we're going to |\n| 15 | then have the preliminary injunction hearing date after |\n| 16 | that.
And in between those two hearings are going to be the |\n| 17 | dates by which a list of witnesses and exhibits need to be |\n| 18 | filed with the Court. |\n| 19 | So that is how we're going to proceed with regard |\n| 20 | to this matter.
Because we're not -- I'm not going to have |\n| 21 | parties come in the day of a preliminary injunction hearing |\n| 22 | and say -- and I'm not saying you -- I'm talking about |\n| 23 | anybody -- and say we're not going to testify, because you |\n| 24 | need to -- the subpoena needs to be quashed.
I mean, we |\n| 25 | need to deal with that in advance of the hearing. |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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51 |\n| 1 | So do you two want to confer for a few minutes |\n| 2 | about dates?
I can tell you right now that what I would |\n| 3 | offer to you all, and you'll have to all think about it, is |\n| 4 | that the subpoena -- |\n| 5 | And is it one or two subpoenas?
Are you also |\n| 6 | subpoenaing Greenwich Land? |\n| 7 | MR. DESPINS:
We probably will have to, Your |\n| 8 | Honor. |\n| 9 | THE COURT:
All right.
So the subpoenas -- you |\n| 10 | will accept service of the subpoenas based upon your |\n| 11 | agreement on the record, counsel, on or before Friday, April |\n| 12 | 14.
You will file any objections, motions to quash, |\n| 13 | whatever you feel is appropriate with regard to those |\n| 14 | subpoenas on or before April 28th. |\n| 15 | We'll have a hearing on the issue of the |\n| 16 | subpoenas, if there is any objection filed to the |\n| 17 | subpoenas -- and I'm just checking a time frame on a date, |\n| 18 | so just bear with me, please.
On May 3rd at 12:00 p.m.
And |\n| 19 | the preliminary injunction hearing will be held -- will |\n| 20 | begin 10:00 a.m. on May 17 and continue to May 18 if |\n| 21 | necessary.
Those are my proposed dates. |\n| 22 | Would the parties like some time to discuss those? |\n| 23 | I can take a short recess.
Whatever you prefer.
And the |\n| 24 | temporary restraining order will remain in place until at |\n| 25 | least May 17. |\n\nHo Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023 52 MR. DESPINS: From the trustee's point of view, these are fine, but we should add exhibit -- THE COURT: Oh, yes. I apologize. MR. DESPINS: -- and witness list -- THE COURT: The exhibit and witness lists will be filed on or before May 10. MR. MAJOR: Your Honor, may I be heard on that point? THE COURT: Yes. MR. MAJOR: I was told when this issue came up during our meet and confer process that Your Honor has followed that procedure of simultaneous exchange -- THE COURT: That is correct. MR. MAJOR: -- of witness lists, exhibits. I would just like to be heard on that. And I know you -- I've heard, obviously, what Your Honor has said on the record today. But given the way the burden works on this motion and given the fact that the trustee has already submitted a certification and has submitted exhibits and made, you know, statements and pleadings filed with the Court and as a result of that has already obtained orders on an ex parte basis, I think it's only fair, and I think it would also be the most efficient way to proceed is for the trustee -- and they don't necessarily have to file it, but if they would Case 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 52 of\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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53 |\n| 1 | serve on us first their witness list and their exhibit |\n| 2 | list -- since they own the burden here and have already told |\n| 3 | the Court they can satisfy the burden, that they make those |\n| 4 | disclosures to us and then we do it in a responsive way. |\n| 5 | So I'd ask the Court to consider that procedure |\n| 6 | for this particular proceeding given what's happened so far |\n| 7 | in it and given the way the burden works. |\n| 8 | THE COURT:
When you say given so far what's |\n| 9 | happened in it, what do you mean? |\n| 10 | MR. MAJOR:
Meaning that the trustee has already |\n| 11 | put in that certification that I mentioned and has obtained |\n| 12 | orders on an ex parte basis, I think it would be appropriate |\n| 13 | for the trustee to first disclose to us his exhibit list and |\n| 14 | his witness list and then we do so in a responsive manner. |\n| 15 | And then at that time the parties could file them with the |\n| 16 | Court. |\n| 17 | Like I said, I'm not insisting or asking the |\n| 18 | trustee to do that by filing it, but I'm just asking the |\n| 19 | Court if the Court would entertain that sequential method, |\n| 20 | and then we could work out the particulars. |\n| 21 | THE COURT:
When you say work out the particulars, |\n| 22 | what do you mean? |\n| 23 | MR. MAJOR:
Meaning, for example, this filing |\n| 24 | versus service issue.
I'm just trying to be accommodative |\n| 25 | to see if I can get the trustee to join me in this process. |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 54 of\n\n| | 106 |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023
54 |\n| 1 | THE COURT:
Trustee Despins, what -- |\n| 2 | MR. DESPINS:
Yeah.
Your Honor, the issue is not |\n| 3 | service versus filing.
The issue is that, you know, they |\n| 4 | have our full -- all our cards are on the table.
They are |\n| 5 | through these various pleadings we filed and there's |\n| 6 | certification.
If anything, it should be the opposite, |\n| 7 | meaning they should go first.
But we're not insisting on |\n| 8 | that. |\n| 9 | For one year now almost in the case we've always |\n| 10 | operated in the same -- you know, in this fashion of having |\n| 11 | disclosure at the same time.
There's no reason why it |\n| 12 | shouldn't be the case -- the same here.
In every |\n| 13 | litigation, somebody has a burden; somebody does not.
And |\n| 14 | we've always operated with disclosure at the same time. |\n| 15 | And here they have our full game plan.
It's in |\n| 16 | our pleadings.
So there's no prejudice to them in |\n| 17 | submitting their exhibits at the same time.
And we don't |\n| 18 | see any reason why we should change the approach. |\n| 19 | THE COURT:
Anything further, counsel? |\n| 20 | MR. MAJOR:
Yes, Your Honor.
I do think that it's |\n| 21 | not necessary to just follow the procedure because it's been |\n| 22 | done in other settings in the case.
I think that the -- |\n| 23 | this case -- |\n| 24 | THE COURT:
It's not just done in other settings. |\n| 25 | That's how I -- that's my pretrial process, which under the |\n| | |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 55 of\n\n| 106 |\n|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| Ho Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023
55 |\n| Federal Rules of Civil Procedure every judge has the right |\n| to decide how the pretrial process will work.
And I have |\n| found over many, many years that that process works very |\n| well.
You've asked them to consider it.
They're not |\n| considering it. |\n| I will note that at the time of the filing of the |\n| complaint, 50 exhibits were filed in support of the |\n| complaint.
So you already have -- and that -- those have |\n| been on the record of this adversary since March 27 of 2023. |\n| You already have 50 exhibits, which, you know, they're |\n| probably going to be their list of exhibits. |\n| You know who they want to call as a witness.
They |\n| want to call your client.
I don't know if they're going to |\n| call any other people, but I'm sure if you ask them they |\n| could tell you if they are. |\n| But I -- it's not an issue of burden.
It's an |\n| issue of how the Court manages the trial.
And that's in |\n| the -- there's -- the federal rules support that the Court |\n| make its determination of how to manage a trial. |\n| And as I said, I've done this in I don't know how |\n| many but very many cases over the last ten years, and never |\n| has anyone raised an issue with regard to the simultaneous |\n| filings of list of witnesses and exhibits. |\n| You have.
And I've heard your concern.
And I've |\n| listened to the trustee.
And I think in this circumstance I |\n| |\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 56 of\n\n| | 106 |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023
56 |\n| 1 | don't see any reason why I should deviate from the trial |\n| 2 | management of this adversary in the -- from the way I do in |\n| 3 | all other adversaries.
There's nothing -- and adversaries |\n| 4 | which include injunctive relief, by the way.
We've had |\n| 5 | plenty of them.
And I've never deviated from that case |\n| 6 | management process with regard to lists of witnesses of |\n| 7 | exhibits. |\n| 8 | I think it's important for the parties to see at |\n| 9 | the same time who's doing what in preparation for the trial. |\n| 10 | And maybe it results in some communications.
Maybe it |\n| 11 | doesn't.
But in many cases, it has resulted in |\n| 12 | communications where parties have either stipulated to facts |\n| 13 | and/or stipulated to the introduction of exhibits. |\n| 14 | So that's part of the reason that I proceed in |\n| 15 | that manner.
So I'm not going to -- I'm not persuaded that |\n| 16 | there's any reason in this adversary proceeding that I |\n| 17 | should deviate from that trial management process. |\n| 18 | MR. MAJOR:
Thank you, Your Honor. |\n| 19 | THE COURT:
Thank you. |\n| 20 | So those dates that I've set forth, counsel, do |\n| 21 | you have any questions about those dates? |\n| 22 | MR. MAJOR:
Your Honor, just if we could confirm |\n| 23 | the exchange of witnesses and exhibit lists.
I think |\n| 24 | it's -- |\n| 25 | THE COURT:
May 3rd. |\n| | |\n\nHo Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023 57 MR. MAJOR: Okay. THE COURT: And that will be -- I'm sorry. No. That's the hearing. Wait a minute. I apologize. I made a mistake. MR. DESPINS: I think you said May 10th. THE COURT: May 10th. May 10th. I apologize. MR. MAJOR: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: May 3rd would be the hearing on your objections -- MR. MAJOR: Right. THE COURT: -- to the subpoena. And that'll be at noon. So it'll be May 10th. And the way that we do -- we handle exhibits in this court is, you know, Plaintiff's 1 through whatever, Defendant's 1 through whatever. Or you can place a name on it. If you wanted to say Greenwich Land 1, whatever. I don't use letters. I use numbers. And they're all filed in PDF format, and they're all filed as separate PDFs. So if you have any issue with regard to that -- and sometimes people do if they haven't done it before. The clerk's office will help you and -- or someone at your office explain how to do that. Once you do it, it's -- you understand it. But if you've never done it before, and you need any assistance, you can contact the clerk's office, and Case 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 57 of\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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58 |\n| 1 | they'll help you with that.
Okay? |\n| 2 | MR. MAJOR:
Thank you, Your Honor. |\n| 3 | THE COURT:
All right.
So with regard to the |\n| 4 | matters in Adversary 23-5005, the defendant's motion to |\n| 5 | adjourn is granted in part for the reasons stated on the |\n| 6 | record.
And then we will then issue a scheduling order with |\n| 7 | regard to all of the issues leading up to the continued |\n| 8 | hearing on the preliminary injunction which will begin at 10 |\n| 9 | a.m. on May 17th. |\n| 10 | I would assume that scheduling order will issue in |\n| 11 | the next day or two.
We have some other things we have to |\n| 12 | address.
But I would assume -- I would be surprised if it |\n| 13 | didn't issue before Friday. |\n| 14 | MR. MAJOR:
Okay.
Thank you. |\n| 15 | THE COURT:
But we all -- the order -- the dates |\n| 16 | are so ordered on the record, but they will be memorialized |\n| 17 | in a scheduling order.
Okay? |\n| 18 | Then so ECF 19 is granted in part.
ECF 12 is |\n| 19 | continued to May 17 at 10:00 a.m. and will continue on to |\n| 20 | May 18th if necessary at 10:00 a.m. |\n| 21 | Just one moment, please. |\n| 22 | Attorney Major, did you have a question? |\n| 23 | MR. MAJOR:
Yes, Your Honor.
I actually just |\n| 24 | forgot to clarify one thing -- |\n| 25 | THE COURT:
Sure. |\n| | |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 59 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023 59 MR. MAJOR: -- or ask the Court to clarify one thing, which is the response date for -- to the extent we file a motion to quash or some other motion relative to the subpoenas, when the trustee would respond in writing. THE COURT: You have until April 28th to file your objection, and the hearing is then on May 3rd. So I will give the trustee until May 2nd. MR. MAJOR: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: But 5:00 p.m. on May 2nd if possible, Trustee -- MR. DESPINS: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay? So that I could actually read it before we have a hearing on the 3rd. Okay? Thank you. Thank you, counsel. Okay? So we'll make sure that that's part of the scheduling order as well. All right. Then the last matter on the calendar today is in Adversary 22-5003, the motion to dismiss the adversary proceeding, Counterclaims 2, 3, 4, and 5. MR. DELLA FERA: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Sam Della Fera, Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi, for the movants, HK International Foods Investments USA Limited, LLC, which I will refer to as HKI, and Ms. Mei Guo. THE COURT: Good afternoon. MR. DELLA FERA: Good afternoon, Your Honor. And as the Court noted, this is the motion of HKI and Ms. Guo to\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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60 |\n| 1 | dismiss certain counterclaims filed by the trustee.
In |\n| 2 | response to the complaint commencing this adversary |\n| 3 | proceeding, the trustee filed an answer and five |\n| 4 | counterclaims. |\n| 5 | This motion, when filed, sought to dismiss four of |\n| 6 | those counterclaims, namely Counterclaims 2, 3, 4, and 5. |\n| 7 | Since then, Your Honor, as I'm sure the Court will recall, |\n| 8 | Your Honor has entered summary judgment on Count 1 of the |\n| 9 | trustee's counterclaims, leaving the four counterclaims that |\n| 10 | are the subject of this motion. |\n| 11 | More recently, Your Honor, we were -- my office |\n| 12 | was advised by trustee's counsel that the -- for lack of a |\n| 13 | better term, I suppose, the trustee considered Count 4 of |\n| 14 | the counterclaims to be moot and advised our office, and I |\n| 15 | believe the Court as well, that the trustee would not be |\n| 16 | addressing that count but would be reserving its rights. |\n| 17 | I'm sure counsel for the trustee can elaborate on that. |\n| 18 | So that leaves for determination the motion to |\n| 19 | dismiss as to Counts 2, 3, and 5 of the counterclaims.
The |\n| 20 | motion has been extensively briefed by both sides, Your |\n| 21 | Honor.
I don't intend to regurgitate the arguments here. |\n| 22 | Suffice it to say that the motion is brought |\n| 23 | pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and |\n| 24 | 12(b)(6) as incorporated herein by Federal Rule of |\n| 25 | Bankruptcy Procedure 7012.
Both of those rules form the |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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61 |\n| 1 | bases for the motion to dismiss each of the three remaining |\n| 2 | counterclaims.
Namely, Your Honor, the lack of subject |\n| 3 | matter jurisdiction and a failure to state a claim upon |\n| 4 | which relief can be granted. |\n| 5 | The lack of subject matter jurisdiction is based |\n| 6 | on the trustee's lack of standing under both the Wagoner |\n| 7 | rule and its close cousin, the doctrine of in pari delicto. |\n| 8 | The trustee, as he has acknowledged in his filings, brings |\n| 9 | these claims essentially standing in the shoes of the |\n| 10 | debtor. |\n| 11 | The trustee is given that benefit by law, but in |\n| 12 | accepting that benefit, the trustee must accept the burden |\n| 13 | of acting as the successor of the debtor. |\n| 14 | And that burden, Your Honor, includes being |\n| 15 | subject to the application of the Wagoner rule and the |\n| 16 | doctrine of in pari delicto which are effectively the same |\n| 17 | and effectively prevent the trustee from bringing claims |\n| 18 | against HKI and Ms. Guo that the debtor himself could not |\n| 19 | bring because the debtor was a participant in the alleged |\n| 20 | wrongdoing. |\n| 21 | Taking the counts in reverse order, Your Honor, |\n| 22 | Count 5 alleges negligence against HKI and presumably |\n| 23 | Ms. Guo, although Your Honor would be hard pressed to find |\n| 24 | any reference to Ms. Guo, frankly, anywhere in the trustee's |\n| 25 | counterclaims but specifically in Count 5. |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 62 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023 62 The negligence is alleged to have arisen by HKI and Ms. Guo, causing the debtor to fail to return the Lady May as directed by the New York court and thereby causing the debtor to incur a contempt fine. Of course, again, it's worth noting that there's no allegation that Ms. Guo herself caused the debtor to violate the New York court order. But more importantly, Your Honor, in order to -- for this Court to find negligence, the Court, of course, needs to determine that there was a duty of care that was breached by either HKI and/or Ms. Guo. The trustee alleges no such duty. Nor can there be any such duty, Your Honor. The debtor was obligated to return the Lady May as directed by the New York court. The debtor failed to do that. As cited in our brief, under New York law, in pari delicto bars claims against a co-conspirator for negligence and, at the very least, the debtor here is a co-conspirator. After all, the debtor himself was bound to return the ship. His failure to do so is now attributably to the trustee. And in any event, negligence does not sound in a generalized duty not to interfere with the obligation of a third party whom, by the way, the trustee alleges is an independent third party, at least for purposes of Count 5. And so without a specific duty owed by either HKI or Ms. Guo to the debtor and, here, the trustee, there can\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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63 |\n| 1 | be no -- as a matter of law, no finding that there has |\n| 2 | been -- that there's liability on behalf of HKI or Ms. Guo |\n| 3 | for negligence. |\n| 4 | The trustee relies on some generalized duty of all |\n| 5 | persons not to harm other people.
That, frankly, does not |\n| 6 | exist.
And that's made clear, Your Honor, in the Hamilton |\n| 7 | case that's cited, the New York Court of Appeals case cited |\n| 8 | in our briefing. |\n| 9 | So with respect to Count 5, the negligence count, |\n| 10 | we submit that there is no duty as a matter of law of either |\n| 11 | HKI or Ms. Guo not to interfere with the application of the |\n| 12 | court's order -- the New York court's order.
And we -- also |\n| 13 | the in pari delicto doctrine and/or Wagoner rule prevents |\n| 14 | the trustee from asserting that claim in any event. |\n| 15 | With respect to Counts 2 and 3, similarly, the |\n| 16 | allegations essentially boil down to the debtor having |\n| 17 | entered into a scheme to hide assets from his creditors. |\n| 18 | The debtor obviously being an active participant in such a |\n| 19 | scheme, to the extent it existed, cannot -- could not bring |\n| 20 | a cause of action against HKI or Ms. Guo. |\n| 21 | And as a result, the trustee standing in the shoes |\n| 22 | of the debtor similarly cannot bring such a cause of action |\n| 23 | based on both in pari delicto and the application of the |\n| 24 | Wagoner rule. |\n| 25 | Moreover, Your Honor, with respect to Count 2 -- |\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 64 of\n\n| | 106 | |\n|---|-------------------------------------------------------------|----|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023 | 64 |\n| 1 | and Count 3, as the Court may recall, is a very short, | |\n| 2 | one-paragraph allegation essentially relying on the | |\n| 3 | allegations in Count 2, which -- both of which counts | |\n| 4 | essentially boil down to HKI is the alter ego of the debtor | |\n| 5 | and/or the debtor is the equitable owner of HKI. | |\n| 6 | Essentially, the same allegations. | |\n| 7 | With respect to both claims, Your Honor, HKI and | |\n| 8 | Ms. Guo assert that the trustee is bound by the stipulated | |\n| | | |\n\n order that this Court entered on April 29, 2022. That order expressly provided that there shall be no execution or attachment of the escrowed funds that were deposited by HKI in exchange for the -- or to ensure the return of the Lady May to these waters. The stipulated order was the result of negotiations among not only the debtor but PAX, the creditors' committee, other creditors that were represented by counsel.\n\n The trustee described that stipulated order as essentially the debtor agreeing with himself. But the trustee fails to acknowledge that that order resolved the motion of PAX for stay relief. That motion was negotiated among multiple parties, including the then representative of the general unsecured creditor body, namely the committee, and that that order expressly provides that if the Lady May is returned timely that the \\$37 million in escrow funds will -- would not be subject to execution or attachment.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 65 of\n\n| | 106 |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023
65 |\n| 1 | So in addition to the application of the in pari |\n| 2 | delicto and Wagoner doctrine and rule, we submit that as a |\n| 3 | matter of law the counts that suggest that the trustee |\n| 4 | should have access to the \\$37 million in escrow funds by way |\n| 5 | of being an -- the debtor being the alter ego of HKI or |\n| 6 | otherwise through some other equitable ownership of HKI |\n| 7 | fails as a matter of law. |\n| 8 | The trustee, no doubt, will argue as -- to Your |\n| 9 | Honor as he did in his papers that the in pari delicto |\n| 10 | doctrine and the Wagoner rule don't apply here.
And they |\n| 11 | note two exceptions to those doctrines.
But we submit, as |\n| 12 | we did in our papers, that those exceptions do not apply. |\n| 13 | Certainly, the doctrines do not shield insiders of |\n| 14 | an entity from claims brought by that entity that would |\n| 15 | otherwise be imputed to the entity.
In other words, if an |\n| 16 | insider has done wrong and that wrongdoing is otherwise |\n| 17 | attributable to -- or imputed to the plaintiff, the insider |\n| 18 | cannot use the in pari delicto or Wagoner rules to protect |\n| 19 | himself or herself. |\n| 20 | That is not the case here.
The wrongdoer here, |\n| 21 | Your Honor, is the debtor.
And by virtue of his being a |\n| 22 | successor to the debtor, the wrongdoer, for purposes of |\n| 23 | these claims anyway, is the trustee. |\n| 24 | Again, the issues have been briefed.
I'm happy to |\n| 25 | answer any questions that the Court may have.
But, |\n| | |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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66 |\n| 1 | otherwise, we would rely on our papers. |\n| 2 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Thank you. |\n| 3 | MR. DELLA FERA:
Thank you, Your Honor. |\n| 4 | THE COURT:
I don't have any questions at this |\n| 5 | time.
Thank you. |\n| 6 | MR. MAJOR:
Your Honor, pardon the interruption, |\n| 7 | but may I be excused? |\n| 8 | THE COURT:
Yes.
But before you're excused, the |\n| 9 | one thing I didn't do that you made me think about before we |\n| 10 | started talking about the motion to dismiss is that |\n| 11 | scheduling order will also have a date by which you have to |\n| 12 | respond to the preliminary injunction relief.
So it'll be |\n| 13 | that same date of the list of witnesses and exhibits where |\n| 14 | you'll have to file your reply or objection to the |\n| 15 | preliminary injunction.
Okay? |\n| 16 | MR. MAJOR:
Thank you, Your Honor. |\n| 17 | THE COURT:
All right.
Thank you. |\n| 18 | UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:
Your Honor, with the |\n| 19 | Court's indulgence, may I take one minute? |\n| 20 | THE COURT:
Yes.
Certainly. |\n| 21 | UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:
Thank you. |\n| 22 | MR. DESPINS:
Your Honor, there were some |\n| 23 | housekeeping matters -- really housekeeping matters.
I |\n| 24 | could cover those in two seconds. |\n| 25 | THE COURT:
Sure. |\n| | |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 67 of\n\n| | 106 |\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023
67 |\n| 1 | MR. DESPINS:
The first one is, remember, there |\n| 2 | was -- there were repairs that were not done to the ship, to |\n| 3 | the valves, sea valves.
And so we're in discussions with |\n| 4 | Mr. Moriarty about them consenting to use of the repair |\n| 5 | reserve to make those repairs.
That's floating out there, |\n| 6 | but we might be coming to Your Honor with a consent order |\n| 7 | soon, so I want to flag that. |\n| 8 | The second -- |\n| 9 | THE COURT:
There was a consent order filed |\n| 10 | yesterday too on -- with regard to the motion to intervene |\n| 11 | and one of the adversaries.
That's been taken care of -- |\n| 12 | MR. DESPINS:
That's been entered.
I saw that. |\n| 13 | THE COURT:
Yes. |\n| 14 | MR. DESPINS:
Yes. |\n| 15 | THE COURT:
Okay. |\n| 16 | MR. DESPINS:
The second one is that there -- |\n| 17 | we -- there's a motion to expand the scope of the retention |\n| 18 | of our expert, Dexter White (ph).
So that's coming.
We're |\n| 19 | not asking -- |\n| 20 | THE COURT:
Has it been filed? |\n| 21 | MR. DESPINS:
No. |\n| 22 | THE COURT:
Oh, okay. |\n| 23 | MR. DESPINS:
No.
He's been -- |\n| 24 | THE COURT:
Okay. |\n| 25 | MR. DESPINS:
-- retained, but we -- |\n| | |\n\nHo Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023 68 THE COURT: Okay. MR. DESPINS: -- need to expand his role -- THE COURT: I was going to say, I don't recall seeing that. Okay. MR. DESPINS: No. Yes. Then a motion to move the Lady May to Newport. That's coming. And then most importantly is the motion to approve the retention of a sales broker for the ship. I've been working on that extensively. It will -- you know, learning a lot about shipping. You know, the commissions that these people charge are more than a real estate broker. So if you think of a ship -- let's assume it's worth, in my dreams, \\$30 million. You know, if their commission is 6 percent, you can imagine how much that is. So we're getting three brokers to submit bids on that. But, obviously, we cannot hire a broker without Your Honor's authorization, so we're going to come back to Your Honor for that, because this is priority number one, to sell the ship. So that -- THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. MR. DESPINS: These are all the housekeeping matters I wanted to raise. THE COURT: All right. Thank you. MR. DESPINS: Thank you. Case 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 68 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023 69 MR. BASSETT: Good afternoon, Your Honor. For the record, Nic Basset from Paul Hastings on behalf of the Chapter 11 Trustee. Your Honor, before I begin addressing some of the arguments made by counsel, I'd like to start by mentioning Count 4 which counsel also mentioned. And as counsel said, we had sent the Court a note yesterday which we thought might be helpful just in terms of, as the Court was preparing for today, to inform Your Honor that we did not intend to have argument on Count 4 which is our fraudulent transfer claims. And just to be clear for the record, the reason the trustee has taken that position is because those claims, the relief sought was the return of the Lady May by -- via a fraudulent transfer claim to the estate. Since the Court has already granted summary judgment on Count 1 of the trustee's counterclaims which sought ownership of the Lady May, there's no longer a reason at this time to pursue the fraudulent transfer claims in Count 4. And, in fact, that -- Count 4 was expressly pled in the alternative for that reason. So the trustee reserves his rights to the extent -- and I believe a notice of appeal was just filed of the summary judgment decision. The trustee, of course, reserves his rights to pursue those fraudulent transfer Case 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 69 of\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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70 |\n| 1 | claims at a later date if necessary.
But as of right now, |\n| 2 | given the state of play, there's no effective relief that |\n| 3 | could be granted on those claims, and, therefore, we don't |\n| 4 | view them as being -- |\n| 5 | THE COURT:
So you're not going to withdraw |\n| 6 | Counterclaim 4.
You're going to keep it in place, depending |\n| 7 | upon what happens with the appeal.
And if the Counterclaim |\n| 8 | 1 is somehow defeated, then you're going to assert the |\n| 9 | causes of action under Counterclaim 4? |\n| 10 | MR. BASSETT:
That's right, Your Honor. |\n| 11 | THE COURT:
Okay. |\n| 12 | MR. BASSETT:
You know, and to give like a pretty |\n| 13 | simply different example, I mean if -- |\n| 14 | THE COURT:
No.
It's fine. |\n| 15 | MR. BASSETT:
Yeah.
Okay. |\n| 16 | THE COURT:
I just want to make sure you're not |\n| 17 | withdrawing it. |\n| 18 | MR. BASSETT:
Sure.
No.
That's -- |\n| 19 | THE COURT:
But you're not -- |\n| 20 | MR. BASSETT:
That's correct, Your Honor. |\n| 21 | THE COURT:
You're not pursuing them.
So the HKI |\n| 22 | parties' motion to dismiss the counterclaims right now, as |\n| 23 | of today, are -- the parties are only asking the Court to |\n| 24 | address Counterclaims 2, 3, and 5. |\n| 25 | MR. BASSETT:
That's correct.
And, in fact, I |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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71 |\n| 1 | don't know that the Court would even have jurisdiction over |\n| 2 | Count 4 given that there's no effective relief that can be |\n| 3 | granted and given the notice of appeal.
But that's correct, |\n| 4 | Your Honor. |\n| 5 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Go right ahead. |\n| 6 | MR. BASSETT:
So, Your Honor, I will -- I'll start |\n| 7 | by making the general observation that the -- if you look at |\n| 8 | the motion to dismiss Counts 2, 3, and 5, there's really no |\n| 9 | argument that the trustee has not sufficiently pled the |\n| 10 | substantive elements of his causes of action, if you will, |\n| 11 | in that there's really no allegation that the trustee has |\n| 12 | not sufficiently pled that HK USA is the debtor's alter ego, |\n| 13 | that the debtor beneficially owns HK, or that there was |\n| 14 | some, you know, conduct that harmed the trustee -- or, |\n| 15 | sorry, the debtor with respect to the negligence claim in |\n| 16 | Count 5 of the complaint. |\n| 17 | Instead, what we see are a bunch of what I would |\n| 18 | call sort of strawman legal arguments that the |\n| 19 | counter-defendants have raised in an effort to defeat the |\n| 20 | otherwise facially valid and well-pled claims that the |\n| 21 | trustee has brought.
And I would submit that each of those |\n| 22 | legal arguments lacks merit.
And I'll walk through them. |\n| 23 | I'll actually start in reverse order in terms of |\n| 24 | the order that counsel raised the arguments.
I'll start |\n| 25 | with the second and third counterclaims, the second being |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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72 |\n| 1 | the alter ego counterclaim.
Which, as the Court is aware, |\n| 2 | there's also the pending motion for summary judgment. |\n| 3 | Assuming that the count is not dismissed, we would have that |\n| 4 | argument on the 20th. |\n| 5 | And I don't know that the Court -- obviously, it's |\n| 6 | up to the Court.
I'm not sure if there needs to be a ruling |\n| 7 | on this before then or not.
But just mentioning that we do |\n| 8 | have the summary judgment motion out there. |\n| 9 | The second counterclaim is the alter ego |\n| 10 | counterclaim.
The third counterclaim is a counterclaim that |\n| 11 | seeks equitable ownership of HK USA based on, you know, |\n| 12 | similar concepts and similar principles. |\n| 13 | The first argument that the counter-defendants |\n| 14 | have raised is that -- I guess there's two arguments.
And |\n| 15 | I'll put the in pari delicto and the Wagoner rule sort of in |\n| 16 | one bucket, and I'll address those.
And then the other |\n| 17 | argument is that the stipulation that this Court entered |\n| 18 | with respect to the Lady May would bar the relief the |\n| 19 | trustee is seeking to the extent it relates to the 37 |\n| 20 | million, now \\$33 million, I believe, that is held in escrow. |\n| 21 | On the Wagoner rule and in pari delicto, I think |\n| 22 | it is absolutely the case that both of the exceptions, one |\n| 23 | being the insider exception and the other -- I don't even |\n| 24 | know if it's an exception, per se, but the fact that the |\n| 25 | trustee has pled the claim under Section 544, I think each |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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73 |\n| 1 | of those gets around the Wagoner rule on Counts 2 and 3, no |\n| 2 | question. |\n| 3 | But before getting to each of those exceptions, I |\n| 4 | think it's helpful to point out that in this case, under the |\n| 5 | circumstances, the principles that underlie and that |\n| 6 | motivate the in pari delicto doctrine and the Wagoner rule |\n| 7 | are simply not at all implicated.
In fact, I would submit |\n| 8 | that the opposite is true. |\n| 9 | One of the cases cited by the counter-defendants |\n| 10 | actually talks about what the motivating principle behind |\n| 11 | the in pari delicto doctrine is, and that's the Teras |\n| 12 | International Corp. v. Gimbel case that they cite.
And a |\n| 13 | portion of that decision, what the court says is that the in |\n| 14 | pari delicto doctrine, which is very similar to the Wagoner |\n| 15 | rule, is based on the policy that courts should not lend |\n| 16 | their good offices to mediating disputes among wrongdoers |\n| 17 | and that denying judicial relief to an admitted wrongdoer is |\n| 18 | an effective means of deterring illegality. |\n| 19 | So in other words, the motivating factor behind |\n| 20 | the rule is that, you know, courts don't want to give relief |\n| 21 | to a plaintiff in a situation where doing so would encourage |\n| 22 | illegality.
And by denying relief, they discourage the |\n| 23 | illegal conduct that allegedly occurred. |\n| 24 | So that makes sense in a situation where one |\n| 25 | wrongdoer who's the plaintiff in a later action might want |\n| | |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 74 of\n\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023
74 |\n|---|-------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | to obtain some monetary recovery from his co-conspirator or |\n| 2 | his co-wrongdoer.
And the court would say, no, we're not |\n| 3 | going to let you do that, because if we do let you do that |\n| 4 | then you're basically benefitting from the fruits of your |\n| 5 | wrong and the courts are intervening to help you recover |\n| 6 | something from that other party. |\n\n But here it's the exact opposite. Denying relief to the trustee or to the debtor if the trustee had never been appointed would have the exact opposite effect, because it would encourage the exact kind of illegality that the debtor has been engaged in with the assistance of HK USA and Mei Guo. Specifically, his entire purpose has been to keep his assets outside the reach of his creditors.\n\n And if the Court were to hold that the in pari delicto doctrine and the Wagoner rule apply to prevent the trustee from getting this estate access to those assets, then the debtor wins. It's exactly what he's always wanted. So it would actually encourage him to have done that and would vindicate his efforts to hide his assets from creditors.\n\n And in the future, any other debtor that wants to try to hide assets in shell companies, keep them away from creditors, presumably could do that. And it would -- he would find comfort that if he ever filed for bankruptcy, the trustee would not be able to recover those assets, because\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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75 |\n| 1 | the defendant would assert in pari delicto. |\n| 2 | So I would submit that in this particular |\n| 3 | instance, it would do a complete disservice to justice to |\n| 4 | allow either rule to apply.
But the Court need not issue a |\n| 5 | decision based on that, because there are two, as I said, |\n| 6 | very well-established exceptions that apply. |\n| 7 | The first, as counsel alluded to, is the insider |\n| 8 | exception.
And we've cited cases in our papers.
I think |\n| 9 | there is no doubt.
I mean, the cases that we cite say point |\n| 10 | blank the Wagoner rule does not apply to claims against |\n| 11 | insiders.
That's the PHS Group, Inc. case, 581 B.R. 16 |\n| 12 | (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2018). |\n| 13 | There's the TS Employment case, 597 B.R. 543 |\n| 14 | (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019): \"The Wagoner rule does not protect |\n| 15 | insiders.\" |\n| 16 | I don't think there's really any dispute at all |\n| 17 | about that general proposition.
Nor is there a dispute that |\n| 18 | under the Bankruptcy Code under Section 101(31) of the |\n| 19 | Bankruptcy Code both Mei Guo and HK USA are insiders of the |\n| 20 | debtor. |\n| 21 | The argument instead that we've received is, okay, |\n| 22 | be that as it may, even if they are insiders and even if |\n| 23 | there is this insider exception, the counter-defendants |\n| 24 | would read the cases to say, well, that exception only |\n| 25 | applies in a principal agent scenario where the defendant is |\n| | |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 76 of\n\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023 | 76 |\n|---|-------------------------------------------------------------|----|\n| 1 | the agent to a corporation and the agent's wrongdoing would | |\n| 2 | be imputed to the corporation, and it has to be the agent | |\n| 3 | who is the one who is primarily engaged in the wrongdoing, | |\n| 4 | and it can't be the debtor or it can't be the plaintiff. | It |\n| 5 | can't be the other way around. | |\n\n I think that's -- that argument is wrong both on the law and on the facts. On the law, I think there is no such limitation to the insider exception in the case law. The cases that were cited by counsel and in their papers just don't apply to an individual debtor situation and leave to one side whether the Wagoner rule even applies to individual debtors. But the cases that they cite clearly wouldn't apply here, because the debtor is not a corporation.\n\n But setting that aside, there's other cases that make clear that this is not a requirement. One of the cases that we cite to and discuss in our brief is the Butler case which is a 2015 case from the bankruptcy court in Massachusetts. That case was -- is a Chapter 7 case of an individual who was the sole shareholder and director of a corporation which was a dental practice. And as the sole shareholder and decision maker, the debtor authorized the payment of, I think, an allegedly exorbitant salary paid to his wife who was an employee of the corporation.\n\nAnd in response to that, the in pari delicto\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 77 of\n\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023
77 |\n|---|-------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | doctrine and the Wagoner rule were raised.
And the issue |\n| 2 | was whether the insider defense applied given that the |\n| 3 | recipient of the transfer, the defendant, was the debtor's |\n| 4 | wife and, therefore, was an insider. |\n\n And, notably, in that case there was zero allegation that the debtor's wife, who was merely an employee of this entity who just received a salary, was the one who, acting as an agent for the debtor, somehow caused him to engage in this wrongful conduct. In fact, the opposite was true. The court noted that the debtor was the one in control. The debtor was the one who decided to make the salary payment. But yet the insider exception applied, because the wife -- his wife who received the transfer is a statutory insider. So I think that case is instructive.\n\n The other thing I would note is if you look at some of the cases that go through the kind of analysis of control and whether the defendant, you know, had sufficient control over the debtor for purposes of applying the exception -- the TS Employment case is an example -- those deal with non-statutory insiders. So the analysis that is undertaken is in connection with determining whether the control, you know, language in Section 101(31) was triggered.\n\n And this is a situation where there's been no dispute. Nobody's argued that HK USA and Mei Guo are not\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 78 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023 78 statutory insiders. Briefly -- I don't want to spend too much time on all these points, Your Honor. But one of the cases that's worth pointing out that's cited by the counter-defendants in their papers is the Madoff case, Bankruptcy Court Southern District of New York 2011. Again, that's a case that very clearly recites the insider exception and says that the in pari delicto or Wagoner rule does not apply to claims against insiders. In that case, the court ultimately held that the insider exception did apply, and, therefore, the in pari delicto doctrine and Wagoner rule did not apply to claims by Bernie Madoff's investment advisory company, BLMIS, against certain officers, directors, and compliance managers who helped Madoff carry out his fraud. And I just -- I don't see how this case is any different. Even if the debtor is the principal architect of his shell game, which of course he is, all you have to do is replace Bernie Madoff with Kwok, and these officer, director, and compliance manager defendants with HK USA and Mei Guo, and you get to the same result. The last thing I would note -- and I won't address all the cases, but I'm happy to discuss more of them. But the last thing I would note on this insider exception is that to the extent that there is some requirement of the\n\n| | Case 22-50073 | Doc 1683 | Filed 04/20/23 | Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 | Page 79 of |\n|--|---------------|----------|----------------|---------------------------|------------|\n|--|---------------|----------|----------------|---------------------------|------------|\n\nHo Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023 79 insider exception that we demonstrate that the insider was complicit or did engage in some wrongful conduct, I don't think it's accurate that we haven't alleged that. In fact, I think we've done it in spades. I think if you look at the counterclaims and the overall backdrop for this entire case and the counterclaims themselves, Mei Guo and HK USA have been instrumental in helping the debtor carry out this shell game to hide assets from creditors. This is all over the counterclaims. Paragraph 27 of the counterclaim we have a reference to, you know, Mei Guo executing the instrument of transfer to transfer ownership of HK International to herself -- or to -- from -- purportedly from the debtor to her for consideration of \\$1. We have her at paragraph 30. She executed an LLC agreement for HK USA as the sole member of the company. We go on. Paragraphs 58, 61, we talk about Mei Guo's testimony in front of Justice Ostrager which he found had -- he found \"cannot be credited in any respect.\" She was instrumental in trying to uphold the facade of separateness between the debtor and HK USA to enable him to keep his assets out of -- outside the reach of his creditors. And, in fact, Justice Ostrager found in his contempt decision that the debtor's daughter introduced no\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 1683 | Filed 04/20/23 | Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 | Page 80 of |\n|---------------|----------|----------------|---------------------------|------------|\n|---------------|----------|----------------|---------------------------|------------|\n\n| | 106
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evidence that she exercised dominion and control of the Lady |\n| | |\n| 2 | May and provided no confirmation that she came into |\n| 3 | possession of the Lady May \"other than as a ruse to shield |\n| 4 | the Lady May from being levied upon by her father's |\n| 5 | creditors.\" |\n| 6 | So I -- and this is all in the counterclaims.
So |\n| 7 | I don't think it can be possibly disputed that, to the |\n| 8 | extent we are required to allege some improper conduct on |\n| 9 | the part of the insider defendants, that we've alleged that |\n| 10 | more than sufficiently. |\n| 11 | The second reason the in pari delicto and Wagoner |\n| 12 | rules do not apply here, Your Honor, is because of the |\n| 13 | Section 544 issue.
And, Your Honor, I'll walk through |\n| 14 | this -- the key points related to the Section 544 issue now. |\n| 15 | |\n| 16 | But one thing I would like to point out for the |\n| 17 | Court is that a lot of these same arguments came up in the |\n| 18 | PJR briefing, and just to the extent it's helpful for the |\n| 19 | Court to have a reference point, a lot of what I'm going to |\n| 20 | discuss can also be found at paragraphs -- I think it's |\n| 21 | roughly 23 to 25 of the reply that the trustee submitted on |\n| 22 | the PJR motion.
And that's at ECF 101.
But, again, I -- we |\n| 23 | don't need to incorporate that.
I'm just putting that out |\n| 24 | there for the Court's convenience. |\n| 25 | So the argument that the counter-defendants have |\n| | |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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81 |\n| 1 | made is that the -- I think they would concede that to the |\n| 2 | extent a claim has been brought under Section 544(a) of the |\n| 3 | Bankruptcy Code, it is by definition a claim that's being |\n| 4 | brought on behalf of creditors. |\n| 5 | So one thing that counsel said at the very |\n| 6 | beginning of his remarks was that we're bringing these |\n| 7 | claims, including our claims in Counts 2 and 3, in the shoes |\n| 8 | of the debtor.
Well, that's not the case at all to the |\n| 9 | extent we're bringing them under Section 544(a), which we |\n| 10 | are. |\n| 11 | And to the extent that -- I believe in their |\n| 12 | papers the counter-defendants cite a case or two that calls |\n| 13 | into question whether or not an alter ego claim can be |\n| 14 | brought under Section 544(a).
I'll cite a bunch of |\n| 15 | authority to the Court in a second that demonstrates that it |\n| 16 | can. |\n| 17 | But what I would like to start with noting is |\n| 18 | there's a distinction between Section 544(a) and Section |\n| 19 | 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Section 544(b), which is |\n| 20 | cited in -- which case was it -- the Harrison v. Soroof case |\n| 21 | that counter-defendants site, Section -- that was a case |\n| 22 | where specifically the plaintiff in that case had argued |\n| 23 | that his claim he was trying to bring arose under Section |\n| 24 | 544(b) and not, as the court noted, Section 544(a). |\n| 25 | And the difference is, of course, critical, |\n| | |\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 82 of\n\n| | 106 |\n|---|-------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023
82 |\n| 1 | because Section 544(a) says, \"The trustee shall have, as of |\n| 2 | the commencement of the case and without regard to any |\n| 3 | knowledge of the trustee or of any creditor, the rights and |\n| 4 | powers of,\" and then it goes on to say, \"or may avoid any |\n| 5 | transfer of property of the debtor or any obligation |\n| 6 | incurred by the debtor that is voidable by,\" and then |\n| 7 | there's a list of certain types of creditors, one of which |\n| 8 | in the second subsection is a judgment creditor. |\n| 9 | So the key language there is the rights and powers |\n| | |\n\n of, because this is not limited, as counter-defendants would suggest, to traditional avoidance actions. A trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the case, the rights and powers of a judgment creditor.\n\n And under Delaware law, the rights and powers of a judgment creditor -- and I don't think this is disputed -- include the ability to bring an alter ego claim. And as I mentioned, this is distinct from Section 544(b) which does not contain that same language concerning the rights and powers of creditors but rather speaks only to traditional avoidance actions.\n\n One of the cases cited by the counter-defendants is almost squarely on point and proves the trustee's argument. This is the Titan Real Estate case, In Re Flanagan, Bankruptcy Court Connecticut 2007. That was a case where the trustee was trying to bring an alter ego\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 83 of\n\n| | 106 | | | |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|--|--|--|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023
83 | | | |\n| 1 | claim, but it, as the court noted, specifically did not | | | |\n| 2 | choose to bring that claim under Section 544.
The court | | | |\n| 3 | said, \"Notably, Titan\" -- and this -- Titan was an assignee | | | |\n| 4 | actually of claims that I believe the trustee had.
The | | | |\n| 5 | court said, \"Notably, Titan declines at this time to assert | | | |\n| 6 | any of the trustee's 'hypothetical creditor' rights and | | | |\n| 7 | powers under Code Section 544, even though, as discussed | | | |\n| 8 | more fully infra, that statutory source provides the most | | | |\n| 9 | coherent basis for the core Titan claims.\" | | | |\n| 10 | And then if you go infra below in the opinion, the | | | |\n| 11 | court expands on what it meant.
And what the court said was | | | |\n| 12 | that -- and the court was saying that the trustee could have | | | |\n| 13 | brought his claim under 544(a). | | | |\n| 14 | And the court said, \"The essential question under | | | |\n| 15 | Section 544(a)(2),\" which is a judgment creditor's rights, | | | |\n| 16 | \"is whether the claim that a trustee is asserting is one | | | |\n| 17 | that an execution creditor would possess under applicable | | | |\n| 18 | law.
At least two of the Titan claims -- the alter ego | | | |\n| 19 | claim and the constructive trust claims -- are claims that | | | |\n\n an execution creditor may prosecute under Connecticut law,\" which was at issue in that case.\n\n The court went on to say, thus, the alter ego claim appears to have a more natural and effective foundation under Section 544(a)(2) than under Section 541(a)(1).\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 84 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023 84 And then the court said, and this is the key language, this is true primarily because the assertion of claims to recognize a constructive trust or to disregard a separate legal entity (sic), i.e. alter ego, on behalf of a hypothetical, unsatisfied judgment creditor would be limited by none of the equitable deficiencies -- such as the in pari delicto disability -- that they suffer in the hands of the debtor.\n\n So the court in that case gave a roadmap for how you would assert those claims in a way that obviously does not bind the trustee. And, oh, by the way, that's a way around what I was talking about at the outset which is that it makes no sense as a policy matter to imply the in pari delicto doctrine to these facts, because it would encourage debtors to simply hide all their assets in shell companies and then their response would be in pari delicto; you can't get them back. But under 544(a), you can.\n\n And in the Titan case, the only reason that the trustee couldn't have brought them, it turns out, is that a statute of limitations issue had lapsed after the claims were assigned to the trustee. Not the case here.\n\n As I'm sure Your Honor knows, the Titan court's analysis is consistent with what you wrote in your decision in the In Re Farrell case that was from February 12th of 2021. That case, which the Court will recall better than\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 85 of\n\n| | 106 |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023
85 |\n| 1 | I've gathered based on my reading of it, is that it involved |\n| 2 | a trustee who was seeking to execute against a jointly held |\n| 3 | bank account between the debtor and his son.
And what I |\n| 4 | believe Your Honor held was that the trustee had the |\n| 5 | authority to do that under Section 544(a) and applicable |\n| 6 | Connecticut law. |\n| 7 | And the opinion said, \"Whenever applicable |\n| 8 | non-bankruptcy law affords a right of action that would be |\n| 9 | generally available to judgment lien creditors, Section |\n| 10 | 544(a) should be construed to afford the estate |\n| 11 | representative standing to assert the claim.\" |\n| 12 | So that's exactly what we have here.
We have a |\n| 13 | claim that a judgment creditor could bring for alter ego or |\n| 14 | beneficial ownership.
Under applicable law, the trustee is |\n| 15 | now able to assert that claim under Section 544(a). |\n| 16 | There are numerous other cases, Your Honor, that |\n| 17 | have held this, that the trustee can assert an alter ego |\n| 18 | claim under Section 544(a).
Another one from this district |\n| 19 | is the David X. Manners Co. case.
That's Bankruptcy Court |\n| 20 | District of Connecticut November 27, 2018.
I won't discuss |\n| 21 | it in detail, but it stands for the proposition that an |\n| 22 | alter ego claim can be brought under Section 544(a). |\n| 23 | In Re Archdiocese of Milwaukee, Bankruptcy Court |\n| 24 | Eastern District of Wisconsin 2012.
That's 483 B.R. 693. |\n| 25 | Same thing. |\n| | |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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86 |\n| 1 | In Re Wolf, 595 B.R. 735 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2018). |\n| 2 | Same holding. |\n| 3 | In Re Howland, 516 B.R. 163 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. |\n| 4 | 2014).
Same thing. |\n| 5 | So, Your Honor, to recap that issue, I think it's |\n| 6 | clear as a policy matter in pari delicto and the Wagoner |\n| 7 | rule do not apply here.
The exceptions bear that out, |\n| 8 | because both also apply here.
Insider exception applies as |\n| 9 | does the fact that these claims are brought under Section |\n| 10 | 544(a). |\n| 11 | The next argument that the counter-defendants |\n| 12 | raise on Counts 2 and 3 is with respect to the Lady May |\n| 13 | stipulation.
The Lady May stipulation does not prevent any |\n| 14 | aspect of the relief that the trustee is seeking for several |\n| 15 | reasons.
The first thing I would note that the trustee is |\n| 16 | indisputably not a party to the stipulation and neither is |\n| 17 | he bound by it for reasons that I will discuss. |\n| 18 | But before I get to circumstances surrounding |\n| 19 | entry into the stipulation and why the trustee is not bound |\n| 20 | and all of that, there's a threshold issue that I think sort |\n| 21 | of obviates all of that which is that the stipulation on its |\n| 22 | face, even assuming it were binding on the trustee, is not |\n| 23 | even implicated by the relief that the trustee is seeking in |\n| 24 | Counts 2 and 3 of his counterclaims. |\n| 25 | And this is so because the operative paragraph of |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 87 of\n\n| | 106 |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023
87 |\n| 1 | the stipulation is paragraph 12, and paragraph 12 only |\n| 2 | prohibits the debtor -- again, I'm operating under the |\n| 3 | assumption that the debtor's obligations would extend to the |\n| 4 | trustee here -- but it only prohibits the debtor from taking |\n| 5 | certain affirmative acts. |\n| 6 | It says, specifically, PAX, the debtor, the |\n| 7 | committee, and the creditors, the two creditors who are |\n| 8 | parties to the agreement \"Shall not take any act,\" and then |\n| 9 | it goes on to say, \"to assert, create, perfect, or enforce |\n| 10 | any right, title, lien, or other interest in the escrow |\n| 11 | funds\" |\n| 12 | Here, I think it's important to focus on the |\n| 13 | relief that the trustee is actually seeking in Counts 2 and |\n| 14 | 3.
In Count 2, the trustee is seeking a ruling from the |\n| 15 | Court that HK USA is and always has been the debtor's alter |\n| 16 | ego, including at the time the debtor and HK USA entered |\n| 17 | into the stipulation. |\n| 18 | Now, because HK USA, as this theory goes, is the |\n| 19 | debtor's alter ego, then HK USA and all of its property are |\n| 20 | property of the estate by operation of law.
This includes |\n| 21 | the 37 million which is property of HK USA. |\n| 22 | This is not a case where the trustee is seeking to |\n| 23 | claw back the \\$37 million through an avoidance action or |\n| 24 | recover it as damages.
As it relates to Counts 2 and 3 -- |\n| 25 | or -- and I'm on Count 2 right now, the trustee is simply |\n| | |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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88 |\n| 1 | seeking to confirm that the \\$37 million, which is property |\n| 2 | of HK USA, is and always has been property of the estate |\n| 3 | from the moment it came into HK USA's hands, because HK USA |\n| 4 | is the debtor's alter ego. |\n| 5 | The third counterclaim is similar in that what the |\n| 6 | trustee is seeking a ruling of is that the debtor and now |\n| 7 | the estate beneficially owns the equity in HK USA.
In other |\n| 8 | words, yeah, the fact -- the idea that HK USA was owned by |\n| 9 | Mei Guo was a fiction and that, in fact, the debtor has |\n| 10 | always been the beneficial owner of HK USA.
That's asserted |\n| 11 | in the alternative to our alter ego claim. |\n| 12 | But there again, the trustee is not seeking any |\n| 13 | relief with respect to the \\$37 million in particular.
If |\n| 14 | the trustee prevails on that claim, then he becomes the |\n| 15 | owner of the equity in HK USA.
The \\$37 million doesn't go |\n| 16 | anywhere.
It remains property of HK USA.
But now the |\n| 17 | debtor owns HK USA itself. |\n| 18 | And I, in fact, have been on the other side of |\n| 19 | this recently in a different issue where there's a transfer |\n| 20 | of property under an agreement, but there's an agreement |\n| 21 | that purports to prohibit the transfer of property from one |\n| 22 | entity to another.
And instead of the property itself being |\n| 23 | transferred, the transfer occurs at the top level with an |\n| 24 | interest in the equity of the company that owns the |\n| 25 | property.
That doesn't work, because the agreement in |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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89 |\n| 1 | question only talks about the property itself and not the |\n| 2 | transaction at the next level up.
That's exactly the |\n| 3 | situation here. |\n| 4 | So even if -- like I said, I don't think paragraph |\n| 5 | 12 of the stipulation is implicated by these claims for the |\n| 6 | reasons I just discussed.
But even if it was, the |\n| 7 | stipulation itself is not binding on the trustee for at |\n| 8 | least two reasons. |\n| 9 | The first reason -- and this argument is discussed |\n| 10 | more in our summary judgment motion which will be address on |\n| 11 | the 20th.
That's ECF 186. |\n| 12 | But the trustee's position is that HK USA and the |\n| 13 | debtor are alter egos and always have been, including at the |\n| 14 | time the stipulation was entered into.
If that's true, then |\n| 15 | there was no distinction between them.
They were one and |\n| 16 | the same. |\n| 17 | And it is black letter law, black letter contract |\n| 18 | law, that one cannot enter into a contract with oneself.
So |\n| 19 | if HK USA and the debtor are the same, and they purported to |\n| 20 | enter into a stipulation or an agreement that bound one |\n| 21 | another to do things for the other, that's unenforceable as |\n| 22 | a matter of law.
We cited several cases in our SJ motion -- |\n| 23 | in our summary judgment motion on this point.
Since that's |\n| 24 | not part of the record here, I'll note the cases. |\n| 25 | Wilbanks vs. Simmons, 2013 WL 9542015.
It's |\n| | |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 90 of\n\n| | 106 |\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023
90 |\n| 1 | Western District of Texas 2013.
\"Where debtor and |\n| 2 | counter-party to agreement\" -- well, the case -- to |\n| 3 | summarize the point in the case, the court said the debtor |\n| 4 | and the counter-party to the agreement were alter egos and, |\n| 5 | therefore, the agreement was \"without legal effect.\" |\n| 6 | Another case is the Animazing Entertainment case. |\n| 7 | That's 88 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
\"It is well |\n| 8 | settled under contract formation law in New York that there |\n| 9 | must be two parties to a contract.
If one of the parties is |\n| 10 | wanting, then one of the formal constituents of a legal |\n| 11 | transaction is absent.\" |\n| 12 | Persky vs. Bank of America National Association, |\n| 13 | 261 N.Y. 212.
That's from 1933.
Same concept. |\n| 14 | Moore v. Denslow, 14 Conn. 235.
Same concept. |\n| 15 | Lavitman v. Uber Technologies, Inc., |\n| 16 | 2015 WL 728187.
That's a Massachusetts state court case |\n| 17 | from 2015.
Same concept.
One cannot contract with itself. |\n| 18 | Finally, the well-known treatise, Williston on |\n| 19 | Contracts, Section 3, Part 2, 4th Edition.
Same concept. |\n| 20 | So assuming, which we must for purposes of this |\n| 21 | analysis, that the trustee and HK USA are alter egos, then |\n| 22 | the stipulation is not enforceable as between them.
And |\n| 23 | that does not change simply because certain of the other |\n| 24 | parties -- that there are other parties to the stipulation. |\n| 25 | Because the issue before the Court, of course, is whether it |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 91 of\n\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023
91 |\n|---|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | is -- whether the stipulation is enforceable as against the |\n| 2 | debtor which they contend renders it applicable to the |\n| 3 | trustee.
The question is not whether it's enforceable as to |\n| 4 | the committee or PAX or anybody else. |\n\n The other reason which we spend time discussing in our papers as to why the stipulation is not binding on the trustee is because there is an exception in the case law. The general rule -- there are a lot of courts that say typically if a debtor enters into a contract or an agreement, it's binding on a subsequently appointed trustee. But almost all of those cases talk about exceptions to that general rule, including cases that are cited by the counter-defendants.\n\n For example, the Feldman case that they cite, it specifically notes that if there are special reasons for vacating the agreement or order in question, the result may be different. And in that case, the party, the court noted, did not claim that there was any fraud or bad faith by any party that led to the order in question.\n\n Similar statement in the Eastern Airlines case, In Re Ionosphere Clubs case that I believe also is cited by the counter-defendants. The Court noted that there was no allegation of improper conduct.\n\n Here, there is an abundance of allegations of improper conduct. I frankly don't think it is hyperbole at\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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92 |\n| 1 | this juncture to call the stipulation a borderline, if not |\n| 2 | full out, fraud on the Court, plain and simple. |\n| 3 | To recap the history of what happened, back in the |\n| 4 | spring of 2022, the debtor was desperate to avoid the Court |\n| 5 | lifting the automatic stay to allow PAX to pursue remedies |\n| 6 | before Justice Ostrager.
And HK USA and Mei Guo were |\n| 7 | instrumental in helping the debtor to achieve that |\n| 8 | objective. |\n| 9 | And, again, our allegation, which we are assuming |\n| 10 | for purposes of this discussion is true, is that HK USA was |\n| 11 | and always has been a sham, the alter ego of the debtor, not |\n| 12 | a separate entity, having no independent existence but |\n| 13 | rather a mere vehicle for the debtor to use to carry out his |\n| 14 | wishes. |\n| 15 | HK USA filed a statement attempting to moot the |\n| 16 | stay motion.
That's at paragraph 75 of our counterclaims. |\n| 17 | HK USA commenced this adversary proceeding to further the |\n| 18 | ruse that was being played on everyone.
That's at paragraph |\n| 19 | 76 of our counterclaims. |\n| 20 | And then, of course, on April 13th, there was the |\n| 21 | hearing on the motion to lift the stay.
This is discussed |\n| 22 | at paragraphs 79 to 81 of our counterclaims.
During that |\n| 23 | hearing, after the Court had made some comments, what is |\n| 24 | very interesting is that the debtor's counsel, then Brown |\n| 25 | Rudnick, proposed the \\$37 million bond that would be posted |\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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93 |\n| 1 | eventually pursuant to the stipulation.
A 15-minute recess |\n| 2 | was taken, and then all of a sudden HK USA had \\$37 million |\n| 3 | with which to post a bond. |\n| 4 | So if HK USA is the debtor's alter ego, the entire |\n| 5 | exercise was a fraud upon this Court and everybody involved, |\n| 6 | because it was the debtor simply using his mere |\n| 7 | instrumentality to take money that would be his in the |\n| 8 | possession of HK USA and pretending it was not, pretending |\n| 9 | that there was separateness, and pretending that HK USA was |\n| 10 | not really just doing his bidding. |\n| 11 | I don't think anyone would have entered into that |\n| 12 | agreement if the Court had already found that HK USA and the |\n| 13 | debtor were the alter -- were alter egos.
Nor do I think |\n| 14 | the Court would have approved it. |\n| 15 | So under these circumstances, I think -- if there |\n| 16 | was ever a case where an exception should apply to the |\n| 17 | general rule that an agreement by a debtor in possession is |\n| 18 | binding on a trustee, it's this case. |\n| 19 | I won't discuss it in detail, but I want to direct |\n| 20 | the Court to it, because I think it's very important and on |\n| 21 | point.
The Alma Energy case that we cite in our papers |\n| 22 | which I think counsel alluded to.
It's an Eastern District |\n| 23 | of Kentucky case from 2010.
It goes exactly through this |\n| 24 | type of analysis. |\n| 25 | It was a debtor whose sole member was also a |\n| | |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 94 of\n\n| | 106 |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023
94 |\n| 1 | claimant against the debtor.
And there was a settlement |\n| 2 | agreement reached.
And the court said, wait a minute, that |\n| 3 | sounds like self-dealing.
You had somebody who was |\n| 4 | controlling the debtor, and then you had a claimant, and |\n| 5 | then there was deal reached. |\n| 6 | And the court said we're going to look at this |\n| 7 | with heightened scrutiny.
It took note of the fact that the |\n| 8 | defendant was an insider.
Took note of the questionable |\n| 9 | circumstances related to the debtor's Chapter 11 case, |\n| 10 | including failure to make required disclosures, including |\n| 11 | the debtor's counsel having acted before another party |\n| 12 | before the court, including possible fraud.
And in light of |\n| 13 | all of that, the court ultimately held that in that |\n| | |\n\n situation, that agreement, that settlement agreement would not be binding on the trustee.\n\n The final thing I would note on the stipulation itself, Your Honor, it's common that a stipulation, especially, I would submit, in a case like this where the debtor was seriously having trouble managing his Chapter 11 process, to include language in a stipulation or an order saying expressly that it's binding on a trustee. We don't have that here.\n\n I think that's indicative of the intent, particularly given that the motion to appoint the trustee was pending at the time, as was a motion to dismiss the\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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95 |\n| 1 | case.
The stipulation actually alludes to the pending |\n| 2 | motion to dismiss but not to the motion to appoint a |\n| 3 | trustee.
And I think that's very telling. |\n| 4 | The other thing that's telling about the text of |\n| 5 | the stipulation is that the debtor under that stipulation |\n| 6 | has no right to inspect the yacht at all.
And the reason |\n| 7 | why that's important, I think, is because if it were the |\n| 8 | intent that the stipulation would be binding on a trustee, |\n| 9 | that just wouldn't work, because of course a trustee would |\n| 10 | have inspection rights. |\n| 11 | So I think there's -- I've gone through a lot, but |\n| 12 | I think the bottom line because of that is there are |\n| 13 | numerous reasons why the stipulation does not preclude the |\n| 14 | relief the trustee is seeking. |\n| 15 | The last point that I'll conclude on, Your Honor, |\n| 16 | is some brief remarks about the fifth counterclaim, which is |\n| 17 | the negligence claim.
This claim, I think it's important to |\n| 18 | note, assumes that the debtor and HK USA are separate. |\n| 19 | And the reason for that is because it's a claim |\n| 20 | that seeks to recover damages for negligence.
And if HK USA |\n| 21 | is the debtor's alter ego, then there's no reason -- then, |\n| 22 | you know, the debtor owns all of HK USA's property, and |\n| 23 | there's no reason or ability for the debtor to obtain a |\n| 24 | recovery from HK USA.
The trustee would already have all of |\n| 25 | its assets. |\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 96 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023 96 So it's asserted in the alternative in a world where they aren't alter egos and, therefore, in a world where HK USA is acting independently and, you know, furthering its own interests to keep the yacht away from the United States, that's important because that brings it outside the purview of the in pari delicto and Wagoner rule doctrines in that alternative scenario, because it's not the debtor who is the one who is engaging in this conduct. It's HK USA and Mei Guo doing it on their own. The main argument then that the counter-defendants rely on is they say that this claim isn't viable, because there's no duty here. And I think there's very clearly a duty here for a couple of reasons. A duty that one owes to another to not take action that will cause it harm in the context of negligence includes a situation where there is a relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant that would require the defendant to protect the plaintiff. Examples include a parent and child relationship. That's in the Hamilton case. I believe that was cited. And of course, here, Mei Guo is the debtor's daughter. And she was aware that the stipulation existed. And to the extent that she caused HK USA to keep the -- she was aware that Justice Ostrager's contempt order existed. And to the extent that she caused HK USA to keep the yacht\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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97 |\n| 1 | outside of US waters and, therefore, caused the debtor to |\n| 2 | incur hundreds of millions of dollars in fines, she had a |\n| 3 | duty to not do that. |\n| 4 | The other thing that counter-defendants haven't |\n| 5 | mentioned that's equally important is that a duty can be |\n| 6 | imposed by operation of law such as a statute or, for |\n| 7 | example, a court order. |\n| 8 | And here, that is critically important, because |\n| 9 | Justice Ostrager's contempt order specifically applied to HK |\n| 10 | USA.
This is in paragraphs 43 and 44 of our counterclaims |\n| 11 | which discusses Justice Ostrager's order and says -- and |\n| 12 | this was the October 2020 restraining order that was in |\n| 13 | place by Justice Ostrager at the time -- applied to HK USA |\n| 14 | because it was the registered owner of the Lady May.
The |\n| 15 | stipulation itself by its terms said that it applied to |\n| 16 | Mr. Kwok and/or the registered owners of the Lady May. |\n| 17 | The registered owner of the Lady May at the time |\n| 18 | was unquestionably HK USA.
Thus, the order itself by |\n| 19 | Justice Ostrager imposed this duty, placed HK USA on notice. |\n| 20 | And by defying that, knowing that the consequences would be |\n| 21 | for the debtor to incur hundreds of millions of dollars in |\n| 22 | contempt fines, HK USA is liable for negligence. |\n| 23 | I think that covers my remarks, Your Honor.
I |\n| 24 | wanted to be thorough.
I apologize for taking a lot of the |\n| 25 | Court's time.
I'm happy to answer any questions.
But |\n\nHo Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023 98 that's all I had for now. THE COURT: I don't think I have any questions at the moment. MR. BASSETT: Thank you. THE COURT: Thank you. Counsel, do you have any response? MR. DELLA FERA: For the record, Sam Della Fera, Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi, for the movants. Only that I just wanted to note that Justice Ostrager's order did not impose any duty, statutory or otherwise, on Mei Guo. Perhaps HKI or HK USA. It's been referred to by both monikers today. Certainly Ms. Guo had no duty. And to suggest that a parent's duty to a child flows the other, a child's duty to a parent, trustee offers no authority for that proposition, Your Honor. So we -- as I've argued, as you've heard counsel mention, we submit that there was no duty owed by this independent party for purposes of this counterclaim asserted. In the alternative, HKI, an independent third party, owes no duty to the debtor. To the extent any duty was imposed by Justice Ostrager's order, that does not flow to Ms. Guo. Nor does any duty flow from Ms. Guo as the debtor's daughter to the debtor vis-a-vis Justice Ostrager's order and the need to return the Lady May to the territorial Case 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 98 of\n\n| | Case 22-50073 | Doc 1683 | Filed 04/20/23 | 106 | Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 | Page 99 of | |\n|---|---------------|--------------------|----------------|------------------------------|---------------------------|------------|----|\n| | | | | Ho Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023 | | | 99 |\n| 1 | | waters of the U.S. | | Thank you, Your Honor. | | | |\n| 2 | | | THE COURT: | Thank you. | | | |\n\n Anything further, Attorney Bassett? MR. BASSETT: No, Your Honor. Thank you. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.\n\n As I think both counsel has noted during argument, the motion to dismiss the adversary proceeding does have an impact on the pending motion for summary judgment. And I have reviewed your briefs and listened to the argument today. I feel that I am substantially familiar with your arguments. I need to take a little time to look at them again given what you've said on there record today, take a look back at some of the cases that you've noted. I have looked at quite a few of those cases, I would say.\n\n And I am, I believe, you know, going to be in a position to rule shortly. I do think the parties briefed the issues well and made the arguments for their respective clients well. But I will be ruling on this in short order.\n\n Does anybody else have any other issues they want to raise with the motion to dismiss? Okay. Then the motion to dismiss, subject to some further review of what was raised in the arguments, most of which I -- as I said, I'm familiar with and I believe have been raised in the papers, then, you know, the ruling will be coming soon, unless something occurs that I'm not aware of at this point in\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 1683 | Filed 04/20/23 | Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 | Page 100 of |\n|---------------|----------|----------------|---------------------------|-------------|\n|---------------|----------|----------------|---------------------------|-------------|\n\nHo Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023 100 time. Okay? I believe that that concludes all of the matters in the Kwok cases and the adversary proceedings today. Does anyone -- is there something else that someone wants to discuss before we adjourn court today? Maybe. Oh, yes, there is, actually. It's not on the calendar today, but -- and I thank you for the reminder. We have hearings next week on a number of issues, including the issue about the debtor's assertion of his Fifth Amendment rights. And Brown Rudnick filed a motion to expedite I think yesterday, last night maybe. I mean, I can look at it right now very quickly. I don't know if the trustee's planning to respond to that. But they're looking to have -- Brown Rudnick as now criminal counsel is looking to have a hearing scheduled next week along with the hearing on the Fifth Amendment privilege issue seeking basically a stay to -- with regard to the motion to compel compliance and the Rule 2004 subpoena. So that was filed actually -- yes, it was filed last night. Oh, I'm not sure what time. I shouldn't say that. I can find out in a second. I'm inclined to put that matter on the calendar for next Tuesday as well, but if the trustee wants an opportunity to respond to that motion, I can give you some time, not a substantial amount of time, but I can give you\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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101 |\n| 1 | some time to respond.
I don't know if you -- it was filed |\n| 2 | at 5 -- at 6:00 last night.
Okay?
So 24 hours ago. |\n| 3 | MR. DESPINS:
Your Honor, would it be possible, |\n| 4 | because we already have a hearing on the 20th as well, to |\n| 5 | have that matter heard on the 20th?
Or -- |\n| 6 | THE COURT:
Let me take a look. |\n| 7 | MR. DESPINS:
All right. |\n| 8 | THE COURT:
Maybe I'm wrong about the 18th. |\n| 9 | There's some matters on the 18th, and there is a matter on |\n| 10 | the 20th.
So you're probably right, Trustee Despins.
Just |\n| 11 | with so many things in front of me and dates, I'm -- I may |\n| 12 | have misspoken.
So just give me a second. |\n| 13 | MR. DESPINS:
I know the feeling.
But I think |\n| 14 | that the 20th is the summary judgment motion on Count 2. |\n| 15 | (Counsel confer) |\n| 16 | THE COURT:
The 20th is the summary judgment |\n| 17 | motion on Count 2 at 9:30 a.m.
The motion that was filed by |\n| 18 | the debtor's criminal counsel -- appears that Brown Rudnick |\n| 19 | is representing the debtor in the proceedings in the |\n| 20 | Southern District of New York -- is seeking to stay the -- |\n| 21 | to compel compliance.
But I think that might -- let me look |\n| 22 | at the 18th.
Yeah, the motion to compel compliance is on -- |\n| 23 | that's the UBS compliance, though.
Just give me a minute. |\n| 24 | There's so many pleadings that were filed last night.
I |\n| 25 | need to look for a moment. |\n\nHo Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023 102 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yeah. That's on the 18th, Your Honor, the -- THE COURT: Right. UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yeah. THE COURT: That's the UBS I'm talking about. I'm also -- there's a number of things on the 18th. Just give me one moment, please. I'm just pulling up a document. So the motion to expedite hearing was also filed last night in connection with the motion to -- for a stay to compel the debtor to comply with the Rule 2004 examination subpoenas. The motion to expedite the hearing, which is 1651, it's the trustee's motion for order to show cause why the debtor should not be held in contempt of court for failure to comply with the January 20 order which is on for hearing on April 18, 2023. So that's separate and distinct from the summary judgment motion. The issue I'm raising is not related to the motion to dismiss and the summary judgment motion. It's motions that were filed last night by Mr. Kwok's criminal counsel with regard to the trustee's motion for order to show cause why the debtor should not be held in contempt of court. Now, we -- everyone recalls the trustee filed -- I'm sorry. The debtor filed a response to that motion Case 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 102 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023 103 asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege. But this motion that the debtor's criminal counsel filed last night seeking an expedited hearing for next Tuesday relates -- MR. DESPINS: Yes. THE COURT: -- in my opinion to the trustee's motion for order to show cause. MR. DESPINS: It probably does, Your Honor. So what we're thinking is to give us more time to respond, if we could move that to the 20th. THE COURT: Well, I -- you'd have to get the agreement of Brown Rudnick on that, I think. I mean, they're asking for this on -- I have no -- I don't -- I have no idea what's going on in the criminal proceedings, but they're asking for the hearing on their motion that they filed yesterday afternoon, last night, 24 hours ago, to be scheduled along with the trustee's motion to show cause why the debtor shouldn't be held in contempt. Okay? We already all know what happened. The debtor asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege before there was an indictment. Now there's an indictment. MR. DESPINS: Correct. But given that the two are connected -- THE COURT: Well, why don't you just tonight ask Brown Rudnick what their position is. If you -- MR. DESPINS: We will. Case 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 103 of\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 104 of\n\n| | 106 |\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Ho Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023
104 |\n| 1 | THE COURT:
-- both agree that it can be on the |\n| 2 | 20th, it can be on the 20th.
That's fine.
You know, we're |\n| 3 | already here, so it won't make really any difference. |\n| 4 | We might just -- and the 20th summary judgment |\n| 5 | motion I think starts at 9:30.
I think that's what it says. |\n| 6 | Let me triple check since it's difficult to keep all these |\n| 7 | things in order.
But we will do that. |\n| 8 | MR. DESPINS:
That's correct, Your Honor. |\n| 9 | THE COURT:
9:30. |\n| 10 | MR. DESPINS:
Yeah. |\n| 11 | THE COURT:
So if the parties agree to that, if |\n| 12 | the trustee and Brown Rudnick agree to continue the matter |\n| 13 | on the 18th regarding the order to show cause, regarding |\n| 14 | contempt for failure to comply by Mr. -- by the debtor to |\n| 15 | the 20th, that's fine. |\n| 16 | But there's still other matters on the 18th as |\n| 17 | well. |\n| 18 | MR. DESPINS:
Understood.
Understood, Your Honor. |\n| 19 | THE COURT:
Okay? |\n| 20 | MR. DESPINS:
So we will send an email to |\n| 21 | Courtroom Deputy -- |\n| 22 | THE COURT:
Yes, please. |\n| 23 | MR. DESPINS:
-- with an update tomorrow morning. |\n| 24 | THE COURT:
Yes.
Because I have not ruled on this |\n| 25 | motion to expedite yet, although it was brought to my |\n| | |\n\nHo Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023 105 attention before we came out today -- this afternoon on these hearings. All right? So and then if you have an agreement about continuing it, I'd like -- if you have an agreement that the expedited hearing can be held and continued to April 20, then I think you'd still need to file some response to the substantive motion probably by the 18th. Okay? MR. DESPINS: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. I think that will -- in order for the Court to be as -- understanding the parties' positions as much as possible prior to the hearing, that's what I would like to have happen. Okay? MR. DESPINS: And, Your Honor, may I ask whether it's possible for me to attend that hearing by Zoom? I will not be arguing. Mr. Bassett will be. But can I participate by Zoom? THE COURT: Yes. MR. DESPINS: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. I think that does conclude everything then on today's calendar, so court is adjourned. THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: All rise. Court is adjourned. (Proceedings concluded at 5:45 p.m.) Case 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 105 of\n\n| | Case 22-50073
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106 |\n| 1 | |\n| 2 | I, CHRISTINE FIORE, Certified Electronic |\n| 3 | Court Reporter and Transcriber, certify that the foregoing |\n| 4 | is a correct transcript from the official electronic sound |\n| 5 | recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter. |\n| 6 | |\n| 7 | |\n| 8 | April 18, 2023 |\n| 9 | Christine Fiore, CERT |\n| 10 | |\n| 11 | |\n| 12 | |\n| 13 | |\n| 14 | |\n| 15 | |\n| 16 | |\n| 17 | |\n| 18 | |\n| 19 | |\n| 20 | |\n| 21 | |\n| 22 | |\n| 23 | |\n| 24 | |\n| 25 | |\n| | |","body_zh":"美利坚合众国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院\n布里奇波特分院\n\n关于 * 案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n *\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）及GENEVER *\nHOLDINGS CORPORATION（Genever *\nHoldings公司）， *\n *\n债务人。 *\n *\nHK INTERNATIONAL FUNDS 对抗程序案号：22-05003\nINVESTMENTS (USA) LIMITED（HK *\nInternational Funds Investments *\n(USA) Limited）， *\n *\n原告， *\n *\n诉 *\n *\nLUC A. DESPINS（吕克·A·德斯平斯），*\n *\n被告。 *\n *\nLUC A. DESPINS（吕克·A·德斯平斯）， 对抗程序案号：23-05005\n *\n原告， * 康涅狄格州布里奇波特\n * 2023年4月11日\n诉 *\n *\nGREENWICH LAND, LLC（格林尼治土地有限责任公司）等，*\n *\n被告。 *\n *\n *\n *\n关于授权就Lady May号达成协议的命令之动议；关于驳回针对反诉第二、第三、第四及第五项的对抗程序之动议；关于临时限制令及初步禁令的紧急单方动议；关于延期／重新安排听证会的动议\n在尊敬的JULIE A. MANNING（朱莉·A·曼宁）美国联邦破产法官面前\n\n程序由电子录音记录，庭审记录由速记服务机构制作。\nFiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc.（Fiore庭审记录及速记服务公司）\n4 Research Drive, Suite 402\n康涅狄格州谢尔顿市，邮编06484\n(203)929-9992\n\n出庭人员：\n代表债务人及原告HK International和Mei Guo：\nSTEPHEN KINDSETH, ESQ.（斯蒂芬·金德塞斯律师）\nZeisler & Zeisler, PC（Zeisler & Zeisler专业公司）\n10 Middle Street, 15th Floor\n康涅狄格州布里奇波特市，邮编06604\n\n代表原告HK International和Mei Guo：\nSAM DELLA FERA, JR., ESQ.（小萨姆·德拉费拉律师）\nChiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi, PC（Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi专业公司）\nOne Boland Drive\n新泽西州西奥兰治市，邮编07052\n\n代表被告、Chapter 11受托人Luc A. Despins：\nG. ALEXANDER BONGARTZ, ESQ.（G. 亚历山大·邦加茨律师）\nNICHOLAS BASSETT, ESQ.（尼古拉斯·巴塞特律师）\nPaul Hastings, LLP（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所）\n200 Park Avenue\n纽约州纽约市，邮编10166\n\n代表Chapter 11受托人：\nPATRICK R. LINSEY, ESQ.（帕特里克·R·林赛律师）\nNeubert Pepe & Monteith, PC（Neubert Pepe & Monteith专业公司）\n195 Church Street\n康涅狄格州纽黑文市，邮编06510\n\nChapter 11受托人：\nLUC A. DESPINS, ESQ.（吕克·A·德斯平斯律师）\nPaul Hastings, LLP（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所）\n200 Park Avenue\n纽约州纽约市，邮编10166\n\n代表美国受托人：\nHOLLEY L. CLAIBORN, ESQ.（霍利·L·克莱伯恩律师）\nOffice of the United States Trustee（美国受托人办公室）\nThe Giaimo Federal Building（贾伊莫联邦大楼）\n150 Court Street, Room 302\n康涅狄格州纽黑文市，邮编06510\n\n代表Greenwich Land, LLC及Hing Chi Ngok：\nCHRISTOPHER J. MAJOR, ESQ.（克里斯托弗·J·梅杰律师）\nMeister Seelig & Fein LLP（Meister Seelig & Fein律师事务所）\n125 Park Avenue\n纽约州纽约市，邮编10017\n\n案号22-50073 文件1683 提交日期04/20/23 登记日期04/20/23 11:01:19 第3页，共106页\n\nHo Wan Kwok - 2023年4月11日\n3\n（程序于下午3:00开始）\n\n法庭书记员：22-5003号。抱歉。案号22-50073，Ho Wan Kwok。对抗程序案号22-5003，HK International Funds Investment Limited诉Despins。23-5005号，Despins诉Greenwich Land, LLC。\n\n法官：好的。下午好。请各位为记录起见报明身份，先从Chapter 11受托人开始。\n\nDESPINS先生：下午好，法官阁下。Luc Despins，Chapter 11受托人。\n\n法官：下午好。\n\nBASSETT先生：下午好，法官阁下。Nic Bassett，来自Paul Hastings，代表Chapter 11受托人。\n\n法官：下午好。\n\nLINSEY先生：下午好，法官阁下。Patrick Linsey，受托人的康涅狄格州律师。\n\n法官：下午好。\n\nBONGARTZ先生：下午好，法官阁下。Alex Bongartz，来自Paul Hastings，也代表Chapter 11受托人。\n\n法官：下午好。\n\nCLAIBORN女士：下午好，法官阁下。Holley Claiborn，代表美国受托人。\n\nDELLA FERA先生：下午好，法官阁下。Sam Della Fera，Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi律师事务所，代表HK International Funds Investments USA Limited, LLC及Mei Guo。\n\n案号22-50073 文件1683 提交日期04/20/23 登记日期04/20/23 11:01:19 第4页，共106页\n\nHo Wan Kwok - 2023年4月11日\n4\n\n法官：下午好。\n\nKINDSETH先生：Stephen Kindseth，Zeisler & Zeisler律师事务所，也代表HK International及Mei Guo。\n\n法官：下午好。\n\nMAJOR先生：下午好，法官阁下。Chris Major，来自Meister Seelig & Fein律师事务所。我们在对抗程序23-05005中代表Greenwich Land, LLC及Hing Chi Ngok。\n\n法官：下午好。\n\nMAJOR先生：下午好，法官阁下。\n\n法官：我是否已经听取了所有人的出庭身份说明？\n\n书记员：法官阁下，我没有听清右边那位戴眼镜先生的姓名。抱歉。\n\n法官：哦，抱歉。\n\nBONGARTZ先生：没关系。\n\n法官：律师？\n\nBONGARTZ先生：是——\n\n书记员：您确实说过，但我刚才没有听清。\n\nBONGARTZ先生：不，没关系。是Paul Hastings的Alex Bongartz。\n\n书记员：好的。谢谢。\n\n法官：来自Paul Hastings。好吗？\n\n案号22-50073 文件1683 提交日期04/20/23 登记日期04/20/23 11:01:19 第5页，共106页\n\nHo Wan Kwok - 2023年4月11日\n\n1 书记员：是。\n\n2 法官：好的。日程上有几项事项，而且我认为——除非Despins受托人，或者其他任何人有不同看法——我们应当首先处理关于授权就Lady May号达成协议的命令之动议。\n\n7 DESPINS先生：当然，法官阁下。\n\n8 法官：无论如何，看起来并未——我没有看到任何对此的异议。\n\n10 DESPINS先生：您说得对，法官阁下。\n\n11 Bongartz先生将处理该事项，法官阁下。\n\n12 法官：好的。谢谢。\n\n13 Bongartz先生？\n\n14 BONGARTZ先生：是。下午好，法官阁下。\n\n15 再次说明，我是Paul Hastings的Alex Bongartz，代表Chapter 11受托人。\n\n16 我们今日就授权受托人订立三份与游艇有关协议的动议出庭。\n\n17 具体而言，这些协议是：与YACHTZOO（YACHTZOO公司）订立的游艇管理协议，\n\n18 与FDS 46 Crew Services（FDS 46船员服务公司）（音译）订立的船员提供协议，\n\n20 以及与BLD Waterfront（BLD Waterfront公司）订立的泊位许可证协议。\n\n21 我将统称其为Bridgeport Marina（布里奇波特码头）。\n\n23 此外，为明确起见，除请求授权订立上述协议外，我们显然还请求授权根据这些协议履行义务，\n\n24 并在必要范围内，因维持和运营Lady May号而发生及支付合理的运营费用。\n\n我们可以按照法官阁下偏好的不同方式进行。我可以向您逐一说明这三份协议，然后回答您可能提出的任何问题。\n\n我应当先指出，正如您已提到的，并无已提交的异议。我们还已获得委员会确认，其不会提出异议。\n\n不过，我们已与美国受托人进行了非正式讨论。我们了解到，他们将有若干项关切。我们已尽力解决这些问题，实际上已对拟议命令及部分协议作出修改。\n\n我很乐意向法官阁下逐一说明这些具体修改。但据我了解，并非所有受托人的问题都已得到解决。因此，将就这些问题进行一些辩论。\n\n法官：好的。关于管理协议、船员提供协议及泊位协议，我对协议本身没有任何问题。\n\nBONGARTZ先生：好的。\n\n法官：但我认为，这或许有些道理——而且，Claiborn律师，我显然先前看到您起立，因此我知道美国受托人办公室希望就此问题陈述意见。\n\nHo Wan Kwok - 2023年4月11日\n7\n\n但或许有些道理的是，让我了解美国受托人办公室对拟议命令所关切的问题。\n\n您可以先告诉我，已在——\n\nBONGARTZ先生：好的。\n\n法官：——拟议命令中解决了哪些已提出的问题。因此，您是否愿意——我相信我面前的是作为ECF 1637附件所附的拟议命令。这是否是您与美国受托人办公室据以工作的命令？\n\nBONGARTZ先生：正确。我们已就协议项下拟设立的、定义为船舶账户的账户达成了关于具体措辞的协议。\n\n法官：好的。\n\nBONGARTZ先生：我有经修订的拟议命令副本，其中以修订标记显示了该措辞。是否可以走近法官席并将其交给您——\n\n法官：可以，请。\n\nBONGARTZ先生：谢谢。\n\n法官：谢谢。\n\n（律师交谈）\n\nBONGARTZ先生：好的。因此，这项变更实际上——\n\n案号22-50073 文件1683 提交日期04/20/23 登记日期04/20/23 11:01:19 第7页，共106页\n\n案号22-50073 文件1683 提交日期04/20/23 登记日期04/20/23 11:01:19 第8页，共106页\n\nHo Wan Kwok - 2023年4月11日\n8\n\n正如我所指出的，涉及船舶账户。美国受托人曾对该等账户中的资金在技术上属于——至少按原有结构属于破产财产资金、且存放于外国银行，而YACHTZOO能够访问该账户并支付费用表示关切。\n\n我们已联系YACHTZOO，他们同意修改该结构：不再由我们为该账户注资、且账户内资金继续属于破产财产资金，而是由YACHTZOO在每月月初，基于已发生及预计将发生的服务和费用金额开具发票。月末将进行核对。若有任何余额，其将退还给破产财产，或者，如我们选择，将抵扣下个月的费用。或者，若有不足，显然破产财产将须补足该不足部分。\n\n因此——并且就此而言，我们还澄清，我们并非为未来费用或未来收费预先注资。这从来都不是我们的意图。该措辞来自他们的格式协议。因此，我们的意图始终只是按月支付根据该协议产生的费用。\n\n因此，我不知道是否——法官阁下，如果您希望我将具体措辞宣读入记录，我很乐意暂停——\n\n案号22-50073 文件1683 提交日期04/20/23 登记日期04/20/23 11:01:19 第9页，共106页\n\nHo Wan Kwok - 2023年4月11日\n9\n\n法官：不需要这样做，律师。谢谢。\n\nBONGARTZ先生：好的。\n\n法官：我唯一的问题是——\n\nBONGARTZ先生：嗯哼。\n\n法官：我也是第一次看这个。\n\nBONGARTZ先生：当然。\n\n法官：因此，这些术语中的一些，例如船舶预算，在动议中有定义，对吗？\n\nBONGARTZ先生：我认为那不是一个定义术语。船舶是一个定义术语，即Lady May号。\n\n法官：好的。\n\nBONGARTZ先生：而预算仅指当月的——\n\n法官：好的。没问题。\n\nBONGARTZ先生：好的。\n\n法官：哦，不过船舶账户是一个定义术语。我明白了。\n\nBONGARTZ先生：正确。\n\n法官：好的。\n\nBONGARTZ先生：船舶账户是将设立的新账户。通常，该账户以所有人的名义设立，但这实际上——这也是修改的一部分。这不会是破产财产账户。\n\n案号22-50073 文件1683 提交日期04/20/23 登记日期04/20/23 11:01:19 第10页，共106页\n\nHo Wan Kwok - 2023年4月11日\n\n1 账户。它不会是破产财产资金。它仅仅是——一个由YACHTZOO设立的行政账户，\n\n2 以便于向船员付款，例如支付薪金、\n\n3 保险费等。但我们不会控制该账户。\n\n6 法官：那么，再次抱歉。我刚在看这个，谁控制船舶账户？\n\n8 BONGARTZ先生：是YACHTZOO。\n\n9 法官：该账户位于何处？\n\n10 BONGARTZ先生：该账户设于一家名为Moneycorp（Moneycorp）的实体。\n\n11 该实体是欧洲的一家金融机构，总部位于欧洲。\n\n12 据告知，该账户具体位于直布罗陀。\n\n13 他们在那里有一家分支机构，\n\n14 据称专门从事海事相关银行业务和转账。\n\n15 所以这就是设在该地的原因。\n\n16 法官：而且我不——我可能错了，但是，\n\n17 尚无人代表YACHTZOO在本案中提交出庭声明。\n\n18 目前仅有码头及康涅狄格州的不同当事人，对吗？\n\n20 BONGARTZ先生：我相信正确。\n\n21 法官：律师，那么——而且，Claiborn律师，因为YACHTZOO尚未在本案中提交出庭声明，\n\n22 并且我实际上没有任何——您知道，并非我必须有，但是，\n\n23 如果他们未按第3段规定行事，会怎么样？\n\n24 对吗？那么，如果我们——\n\n写明 YACHTZOO 已同意其将予以出具，对吗？我的意思是，你们必须——我认为我们需要在这里写明一些内容，以——\n\nBONGARTZ（邦加茨）先生：完全可以。他们已通过电子邮件向我确认，该措辞对他们而言可以接受。\n\n法官：好的。\n\nBONGARTZ先生：所以完全没有问题，法官阁下。\n\n法官：Claiborn（克莱伯恩）律师，您对此有任何异议吗？\n\nCLAIBORN女士：没有，法官阁下。据我了解，YACHTZOO 同意我们拟议的修改，并且明确同意该措辞，因此我认为将其同意加入该措辞没有问题。\n\n法官：而且，YACHTZOO 是该管理协议的签署方？\n\nBONGARTZ先生：正确。是的。\n\n法官：那船员条款和泊位协议呢？他们也是该等协议的签署方吗——\n\nBONGARTZ先生：不是。\n\n法官：——那些协议？\n\nBONGARTZ先生：不是。那些是——\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2023年4月11日 12\n\n法官：好的。\n\nBONGARTZ先生：——破产财产与其他当事人之间的协议。\n\n法官：好的。好的。我原本也是这么认为，但我想确认一下。好吗？\n\n（律师商议）\n\nBONGARTZ先生：我还想指出，我们在动议中提到过这一点，但该协议本身规定，因该协议而产生的任何争议均受本院破产法院专属管辖。我稍后可以指出该条款。\n\n法官：那么——\n\nBONGARTZ先生：这是第15.2条。\n\n法官：管理协议的条款？\n\nBONGARTZ先生：正确。\n\n法官：好的。好的。好。因此，我看到了新的第3段。这是已达成一致的内容，但仍有其他问题？\n\nBONGARTZ先生：是的，法官阁下。我不想贸然假定美国受托人（U.S. Trustee）尚未解决的具体问题究竟为何，但根据电子邮件往来，我的理解是，问题涉及第9.2条，即如管理方因协议引起的事件承担责任时，对受托人可追偿能力的上限，该上限为2 million Euros。\n\nCase 22-50073\nDoc 1683\nFiled 04/20/23\nEntered 04/20/23 11:01:19\n第12页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2023年4月11日 13\n\n不过，我应指出，YACHTZOO 告知我们，此类协议中通常的标准上限为500,000 Euros。我们实际谈判将该金额提高至$2 million。显然，我们还努力完全取消该上限，但 YACHTZOO 无法满足这一要求，因为其自身保险人不会允许无上限责任。因此，据我理解，这是第一个问题。\n\n第二个问题涉及第9.5条，该条实质上排除了我们可能对 YACHTZOO 的雇员、代理人或管理方提出的任何责任主张。但我应指出，这并不剥夺我们追究管理方责任的能力；具体而言，本案中的管理方为 YACHTZOO 本身。其仅意味着我们不能向其雇员、代理人或小写字母 m 的 manager 追偿。\n\n然后——这是第三项，我不确定美国受托人是否正在提出这一项——即第5.3条，该条要求付款时不得抵销、反诉等。我们认为，这是一项标准条款，而且我不太确定我们就月度开票对命令作出的修改是否已解决了美国受托人就第5.3条提出的关切。\n\nCase 22-50073\nDoc 1683\nFiled 04/20/23\nEntered 04/20/23 11:01:19\n第13页，共\n\nCase 22-50073\nDoc 1683\nFiled 04/20/23\nEntered 04/20/23 11:01:19\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2023年4月11日\n\n美国受托人就第5.3条提出的关切。不过，显然，我将请 Claiborn 女士就这三点自行发言。谢谢。\n\n法官：好的。谢谢。\n\nCLAIBORN女士：法官阁下，Bongartz 律师是正确的。这三条均需进一步讨论。\n\n法官：请再告诉我第一条。我没有听清楚。\n\nCLAIBORN女士：第9.2条、第9.5条和第5.3条。\n\n法官：另两条我记下了。好的。请继续。第9条——那么，Claiborn 律师，请告诉我美国受托人办公室就第9.2条所涉问题的立场。\n\nCLAIBORN女士：第9.2条是一项责任限制，将 YACHTZOO 的责任风险限制为$2 million。美国受托人通常反对专业服务合同和协议中的责任限制条款，与此一致，其对这一特定条款存在异议。\n\nYACHTZOO 在本案中所提供服务的范围及其参与本案的费用，已在该动议中讨论；该动议还谈到，运营该游艇并使其保持可运行状态的一般维护费用，每月可能为$100,000至我认为的$300,000。因此，在这一背景下，从美国受托人的角度看，仅为$2 million的责任限制是不充分的。\n\n另一个问题仅是一个实际问题。如果破产财产不能从其他人处追偿所发生任何损害的实际成本，其将面临风险。\n\n法官：那么您说的是第9.5条？\n\nCLAIBORN女士：第9.2条包含责任限制。\n\n法官：对。\n\nCLAIBORN女士：第9.5条和第5.3条是与限制救济这一理念相伴随的概念。第5.3条限制受托人的救济，并放弃针对付款主张抵销、反诉、条件、资格及回应的权利。因此，如存在付款争议或行为争议，该等救济将不向受托人提供。\n\n第9.5条则涉及赋予 YACHTZOO 雇员、代理人或管理方的保护，并放弃向其追究的权利。\n\n第9.5条在最后确实规定，对于构成重大过失或故意不当行为的该等不法行为，管理方应承担责任。\n\n但第9.5条总体上放弃了针对其他人的权利，并且仅将其限定为某些类型，并且仅针对\n\nCase 22-50073\nDoc 1683\nFiled 04/20/23\nEntered 04/20/23 11:01:19\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2023年4月11日\n\nYACHTZOO。\n\n因此，综合来看，这组对在发生问题和不法行为时追偿权利的限制，使破产财产处于比美国受托人认为应属合理的程度更易受风险影响的境地。\n\n法官：好的。谢谢。\n\nBONGARTZ先生：女士，我可以回应吗？\n\n法官：可以，律师。请讲。\n\nBONGARTZ先生：好的。是的。坦率地说，我们当然感谢 Claiborn 女士向我们提出的意见。显然，我们希望谈判并且会希望谈判出尽可能好的合同。事实上，在 Claiborn 女士与我们沟通之前和之后——再次，在她与我们沟通之后——我们都已向 YACHTZOO 提出这些问题。权衡之下，从我们的角度看，这是我们能够获得的最佳交易。\n\n显然，归根结底，我们主张，在这些问题上应以受托人的商业判断为准。尽管若能对这些具体条款作出改进会很好，但遗憾的是，这无法实现。\n\n我还应指出，我们在谈判该协议时确实取得了我们认为是实质性的让步，包括就这些条款取得的让步。我仅重申有关将责任上限提高至2 million Euros这一点。\n\n但在我们的谈判过程中，我们还成功地从破产财产的角度改进了其他条款。\n\n我们在动议中标明了其中若干条，但其中包括破产法院专属管辖权，以及删除仲裁条款。\n\n此外，YACHTZOO 还应我们的要求同意删除一项原会要求我们就第三方索赔向其提供赔偿的条款。该条款原载于第9.4条。该条款也已删除。\n\n因此，我们认为，权衡之下，应批准订立目前提交法庭审议的该合同。谢谢。\n\n法官：谢谢。好的。我想看一下我们刚刚讨论的该协议中的这些条款。我先从第9.2条开始，因为你们是从那里开始的。\n\n因此，关于第9.2条以及对责任限制和2 million Euro上限的关切，我是说，这一条款存在于受托人订立之前已生效的管理协议中吗——\n\nBONGARTZ先生：是的。我们获告知其存在。\n\n法官：您知道当时是否有上限吗？\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2023年4月11日 18\n\nBONGARTZ先生：有。YACHTZOO 告诉我们，上限为1 million Euros。\n\n法官：所以你们超过了——你们提高了上限？\n\nBONGARTZ先生：正确。\n\n法官：而第9.2条规定，除非证明直接或间接因管理方或其雇员、代理人、管理人员或受管理方雇用并与本协议有关的分包商的过失、重大过失或故意行为所致，或该等行为对其有实质性促成作用，否则管理方对所有者遭受的任何损失、损害、延误或费用不承担任何责任。因此，并非仅限于重大过失和故意不当行为，也包括过失。\n\nBONGARTZ先生：是的。那——是的，正确。是的。\n\n法官：而且，该过失、重大过失或故意不当行为，是指管理方或其雇员、代理人、管理人员，或管理方雇用且与——与本协议有关联的分包商的行为。因此，我不认为第9.2条仅限于管理方。\n\nBONGARTZ先生：不。我认为——再次，我不想贸然代 Claiborn 女士发言。但我认为，在这一具体情形中，她指的是第9.5条；依我理解，该条实质上禁止我们起诉雇员。\n\nCase 22-50073\nDoc 1683\nFiled 04/20/23\nEntered 04/20/23 11:01:19\n第18页，共\n\nCase 22-50073\nDoc 1683\nFiled 04/20/23\nEntered 04/20/23 11:01:19\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—2023年4月11日\n\n但这并不意味着管理方可以免于为其雇员的行为承担责任。因此，如果雇员有不当行为——\n\n法官：对。\n\nBONGARTZ先生：——而且，显然，管理方通过其雇员行事——那么我们可以向管理方主张权利。第9.5条只是——就是说——禁止我们单独追究该雇员。\n\n法官：那么，Claiborn 律师，我正在看仍有争议，或者至少尚未达成一致的条款。因此，我——关于第9.2条，即责任限制，其金额为2 million Euro。我看到了。律师表示，在此之前的金额为1 million。\n\n那么，如果金额增加了1 million dollars，这难道不是对破产财产的改善吗？\n\nCLAIBORN女士：这肯定是一项改善。我们的立场只是，专业人士不应能够在提供服务之前通过限制其责任来保护自己。\n\n法官：明白。不过，受托人的律师表示，若没有该条款，他们就不会订立这项协议。\n\nCLAIBORN女士：这是我经常从对方听到的典型说法，即关于\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— April 11, 2023 20 名专业人士对事项的——立场。法庭：嗯——克莱伯恩女士：——立场。这是——法庭：您可能是对的。克莱伯恩女士：这是可以理解的。但话虽如此，问题在于，破产财产正以一种美国受托人办公室希望避免并认为不适当的方式使自身暴露于风险之中。法庭：那么，我们想想这个——克莱伯恩女士：所以我提出这个问题。法庭：目前，就 Lady May（“Lady May”号游艇）而言，我们有哪些保险？邦加茨先生：有各种保险。我认为有一份——我知道有一份 P&I 保单，即保护与赔偿保单，我相信其限额为 $100 million。还有一份 Holland 机械保险保单，用于保障该船免受财产损失。我不——抱歉。我一时想不起其责任限额是多少。另有各种较小的网络保险保单——承保网络攻击。船员还将有健康保险。法庭：我提出这个问题的原因是——如果管理人就该船做错了什么，对吧，即使只是存在过失，至少根据第 9.2 段，如果证明该过失直接或间接导致了，或者实质性地——抱歉，实质性地由管理人或其雇员、代理人或管理人员的过失、重大过失或故意不当行为所促成，那么可能获得 2 million Euro 的赔偿。此外，管理人会怎样——会发生什么？我的意思是，我们就举一个假设，对吧？他们没有——管理人忘了给船加燃料，出于某种原因——他们启动该船，结果烧坏了发动机，对吧？那将是——您可以主张那构成过失。他们在照管该船时存在过失。这正是他们所做的。他们在管理该船，对吧？那不正是他们——被聘用的原因吗？邦加茨先生：通过船员，是的。我的意思是，管理人要么——他们的办公室在欧洲，因此他们不实际在船上。但他们负责——法庭：嗯，而且如其中所述——邦加茨先生：是的。法庭：——管理人、其雇员或代理人、管理人员或分包商——邦加茨先生：正确。法庭：——由管理人就本协议受雇，对吧？邦加茨先生：正确。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 1683 提交于 04/20/23 录入于 04/20/23 11:01:19 第 20 页，共\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 1683 提交于 04/20/23 录入于 04/20/23 11:01:19 第 21 页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— April 11, 2023\n\n法庭：所以，您将对管理人提出索赔，甚至可能提出保险索赔，对吧？邦加茨先生：视情况而定——我的意思是，我会——这完全取决于具体情况。法庭：我只是作出假设。邦加茨先生：但，是的。是的。法庭：对吧？假设而言。现在，破产财产根据第——或第 9.2 节谈成了一项更好的安排，将限额定为 $2 million。因此，就第 9.2 节而言，我理解美国受托人的立场，即他们不——即该办公室不支持任何可被解释为责任限制的内容。但我认为，在本案情况下，并鉴于限额已被提高，我认为这是合理的，而且我认为受托人同意管理协议中的第 9.2 节，是在其商业判断范围内行事。我认为，不仅本协议提供保护，而且可能还有其他协议为——为破产财产之目的确保该船、该游艇受到保障。因此，我不知道您是否提出了正式的书面异议，克莱伯恩律师，但在此范围内——克莱伯恩女士：法官阁下，我们没有提出，部分原因是这份文件刚于上周提交，因此——\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 1683 提交于 04/20/23 录入于 04/20/23 11:01:19 第 22 页，共\n\n案件 22-50073\n文件 1683\n提交于 04/20/23\n录入于 04/20/23 11:01:19\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— April 11, 2023\n\n法庭：对。就第 9.2 节而言，尽管我同意，您知道，协议中没有任何章节和任何措辞是完美的——通常都不完美，但我认为，该措辞具有一些广泛影响，并且我认为，在本案情况下，其以合理方式保护了破产财产。好的？就第 9.5 节而言，第 9.5 节援引第 9.2 节。因此，其中写道，除管理人根据第 9.2 节应承担责任的范围外，所有人特此承诺并同意，其将——并同意其将承诺从破产法院取得一项命令，禁止第三方就管理人履行本协议项下任何服务所引起、导致或促成的事项，对管理人提起法律诉讼。邦加茨先生：法官阁下，我——法庭：这只是说，您将尝试取得一项命令，阻止人们这么做，对吧？邦加茨先生：这是正确的，法官阁下。我只是想指出——法庭：哦，除非我刚才读错了——邦加茨先生：——您读的是第 9.4 节。法庭：我刚才读错了条款。那是第 9.4 节。\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— April 11, 2023 24 邦加茨先生：是的。正确。法庭：那么是第 9.5 节。抱歉。是的。因此，第 9.5 节，在我看来，无论如何，是说您不能起诉个人雇员、代理人或管理人员。您必须送达——您必须起诉 YACHTZOO（YACHTZOO 公司）——邦加茨先生：这是我们的理解。法庭：——而且无论如何，根据第 9.2 节，他们须为所有这些人的——所有这些当事人的行为负责。邦加茨先生：正确。这也是我们对该条款的理解和解读。法庭：好的。我再次认为，在本案情况下，第 9.5 节是合理的。法庭：好。让我看看第 5.3 节的抵销、反诉和付款问题。嗯，我的意思是，其中确实说——其并未排除抵销、反诉、条件或资格的可能性，即不附带任何扣减地、无任何扣减地，因为您可以取得管理人的事先书面同意来这样做，正确吗？邦加茨先生：这是正确的。法庭：所以我认为这也没有问题。我认为受托人——邦加茨先生：好的。法庭：——可以行使其商业判断，将该条款纳入协议。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 1683 提交于 04/20/23 录入于 04/20/23 11:01:19 第 24 页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— April 11, 2023 25 律师，不过，除我刚才所述之外，我还要补充的一点是，关于 YACHTZOO 的那一小段措辞——邦加茨先生：是的。法庭：——已同意其应签发，对吧——邦加茨先生：正确。法庭：——尽管我理解管理协议中已有此规定，但在这项命令中写明 YACHTZOO 已同意——您知道，本法庭对任何——您知道，您已在记录中提及的无论何种条款，享有专属管辖权，或许是有意义的。邦加茨先生：没问题。他们已同意加入第 15.2 节。我认为在命令本身中也特别注明这一点没有问题。法庭：我会这样做。（律师协商）邦加茨先生：没问题，法官阁下。法庭：我认为这会更容易——这可能会使今后的问题更容易处理。好的。那么，就该命令，即授权受托人订立并履行与 Lady May 的维护及运营有关的若干破产申请后协议的命令，我们是否还有任何需要处理的事项？\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 1683 提交于 04/20/23 录入于 04/20/23 11:01:19 第 25 页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— April 11, 2023 26 克莱伯恩女士：本动议还包括另外两份合同，我们对其中一份有一些更新情况，且我们需要就另一份进行一些讨论。法庭：好的。那么，这项命令是否涵盖另外两份协议？克莱伯恩女士：是。邦加茨先生：正确。它涵盖全部三份。这是定义术语——法庭：三份。好的。邦加茨先生：这是定义术语“维护协议”——法庭：好的。邦加茨先生：——即——好的。法庭：那么，船员供给协议如何？那是下一份协议。邦加茨先生：那么——法庭：其中有哪些问题？邦加茨先生：关于船员供给协议，我们实际上通过对协议本身作出两项修改，解决了美国受托人的所有关切。第一项是将适用法律从塞浦路斯法改为纽约州法。这一点为船员雇主所接受。第二项修改是在第 5.3 节末尾增加一项澄清，以便——简要说明一下背景，第 5.3 节涉及我们为船员取得保险保障以及 P&I 保险的义务；在 P&I 保险方面，我们已经取得该保险，在船员保险方面，我们将在订立本协议后立即取得该保险。并且，根据该等保险保单，雇主将被列为共同被保险人。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 1683 提交于 04/20/23 录入于 04/20/23 11:01:19 第 26 页，共\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 1683 提交于 04/20/23 录入于 04/20/23 11:01:19 第 27 页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— April 11, 2023\n\n对于“indemnified（获赔偿）”一词曾存在一些混淆；美国受托人对此有所关切，认为受托人似乎同意赔偿船员雇主。实际上并非如此。这仅仅意味着，根据保险，雇主将获得赔偿。\n\n但为了彻底解决并妥善处理这一问题，并防止有人主张破产财产以某种方式放弃或解除对船员雇主的潜在未来索赔，我们已同意，且雇主也同意，在第 5.3 节末尾加入以下措辞，其内容将为：“尽管有上述规定，本协议中的任何内容均不应解除或免除 FDS（即雇主）因本协议可能产生的对 LDS（即破产财产）的任何责任。”如果法官阁下——我也备有修订后协议的副本。\n\n法庭：我不需要修订后协议的副本。\n\n案件 22-50073\n文件 1683\n提交于 04/20/23\n录入于 04/20/23 11:01:19\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— April 11, 2023\n\n但我认为，律师，您可以这样做，如果该——如果美国受托人已经——这是否解决了美国受托人就船员供给协议提出的问题？克莱伯恩女士：该新增措辞确实解决了，法官阁下。法庭：那么，附于动议的船员供给协议，现在将不同于受托人将签署并订立的船员供给协议？邦加茨先生：正确。我们曾——我们可以采取任何一种方式。我们可以提交一份修订后的拟议命令，并附上更新后的文本——法庭：我认为您不需要这样做。我认为您只需在命令中写明，经动议提交后修改的船员供给协议，您知道，对吧？邦加茨先生：好的。法庭：我认为这没有问题。邦加茨先生：好的。我们将作出该修改。并且——法庭：好。那么我们——转到泊位协议。对吗？邦加茨先生：正确。我需要先为此作一点铺垫——法庭：当然。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 1683 提交于 04/20/23 录入于 04/20/23 11:01:19 第 29 页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- April 11, 2023\n\n1 邦加茨先生（MR. BONGARTZ）：\n——为达成该协议。我们\n2 实质上正在与 Bridgeport Harbor Marina（布里奇波特港码头）订立一份按月续订的协议，\n3 \n4 具体而言，我们将就4月以及任何\n5 合理的延长期订立该协议。\n6 我想明确的是，我们的——而这现在也涉及一些\n7 日常事务。我们并不\n8 打算将 Lady May（“Lady May”号游艇）无限期，甚至长期或\n9 中期停放在布里奇波特。显然，在我们移动 Lady May 之前，\n10 我们会向本院申请救济。但是，我们\n11 打算将 Lady May 移至罗得岛州，\n12 具体是纽波特的自由贸易区，以便\n13 推介和出售该船。\n14 因此，我们目前所考虑的期限肯定包括\n15 4月，而4月显然已经开始，\n16 也可能包括5月的一部分或整个月。但是，\n17 我们并不考虑超过该期限。\n18 鉴于此——并且我们承认\n19 美国受托人（U.S. Trustee）提出了异议。但是，\n20 鉴于该协议的短期性质，\n21 我们请求批准——批准订立该\n22 协议。\n23 现在，我想简要预述一下——我并非\n24 试图剥夺 Claiborn 女士（Ms. Claiborn）的任何发言内容，但我想\n25 简要预述我们所理解的三个问题。\n\nCase 22-50073\nDoc 1683\nFiled 04/20/23\nEntered 04/20/23 11:01:19\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- April 11, 2023\n\n1 这些问题是什么。它们都位于协议的条款和条件部分。\n2 这是通常所说的细则，页——\n3 均载于该等条款和条件的第3页。\n4 本院（THE COURT）：\n好的。稍等一下。我\n5 正在查看一份其条款和条件从第2页\n6 开始的文件。\n7 邦加茨先生：\n正确。\n8 本院：\n然后——\n9 邦加茨先生：\n然后在紧接着的下一页，\n10 即——\n11 本院：\n所以你是要我看第3页？\n12 邦加茨先生：\n正确，法官阁下。\n13 本院：\n好的。请继续。\n14 邦加茨先生：\n因此，我想先说明，我接下来\n15 要说的是，我们已尝试修改这些\n16 条款。我们已联系布里奇波特港码头，请求\n17 他们是否会——是否愿意修改这些条款。但是，他们\n18 已经——我们得到的是明确且坚决的拒绝。因此，在开始讨论\n19 这些——您知道，这些条款之前，我想先\n20 说明这一背景。\n21 因此，我们理解第一个意见所涉的是\n22 以“船舶代理人和船舶所有人特此解除并免除码头责任”开头的条款，\n23 我们理解该条款\n24 是就任何过失索赔免除码头责任的免责条款。该条款\n25 位于小项1，大约自上而下第四行。\n\nCase 22-50073\nDoc 1683\nFiled 04/20/23\nEntered 04/20/23 11:01:19\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- April 11, 2023\n\n1 但是，我们将该条款理解为并未排除\n2 因码头故意行为\n3 和重大过失而对码头提出的索赔。\n4 具体而言，如果您查看第3项，\n5 其中有一处括号说明，即“不构成重大\n6 过失和故意行为”，该等行为在此被明确\n7 排除。因此，我们对本协议的立场和理解\n8 是：虽然其中免除了过失\n9 索赔，但达到故意行为或\n10 重大过失程度的索赔并未被免除。因此，这是\n11 第一个问题。\n12 第二个问题是赔偿条款，\n13 即紧接着的下一条。遗憾的是，该条款没有\n14 条款编号，但它以“船舶代理人和所有人应赔偿并使\n15 码头免受损害”开头。\n16 \n17 再次说明，从我们的角度而言，我想在此作出同样的区分，\n18 即一方面，因码头过失产生的索赔，\n19 对于该等索赔应提供赔偿；而另一方面，\n20 \n21 达到重大过失和故意行为程度的索赔，\n22 我们再次理解，该等索赔\n23 被排除在外。\n24 我想——是的，抱歉。\n25 我花了一点时间才找到该措辞。它位于\n\nCase 22-50073\nDoc 1683\nFiled 04/20/23\nEntered 04/20/23 11:01:19\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- April 11, 2023\n\n1 条款和条件中该部分末尾的最后一行，\n2 再次是在括号中，即“不构成重大\n3 过失”等。因此，这是第二个问题。\n4 第三个问题是对\n5 律师费的责任。显然，您知道，这并非\n6 我们会轻易提出的条件。但是，我们\n7 已尽力对该条款提出异议，而码头只是\n8 表示，无论如何修改其标准条款和条件\n9 均不可接受。\n10 但我还应指出，律师费\n11 仅限于执行本协议。显然，我们\n12 完全打算付款并遵守本协议。\n13 事实上，我们已经根据其要求，将布里奇波特港码头列为\n14 保险单项下的共同被保险人，包括保赔险\n15 保险单和 Holland machinery 保险单。\n16 \n17 因此，综合来看，我们不认为存在——\n18 您知道，显然始终存在风险。因此，我无法\n19 在此作出任何保证。但是，我们不认为存在\n20 他们必须到本院或\n21 任何其他法院执行本协议的重大风险。\n22 无论如何，我还应指出，我们\n23 已特别协商约定，本院对因本\n24 协议产生的任何索赔或争议享有专属\n25 管辖权。\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- April 11, 2023 33 因此，如对我刚才概述的任何前述条款的含义及其效力发生任何争议，最终将由本院作出裁决。因此，我知道我说了很多，现在我将讲台交给 Claiborn 女士答复。谢谢。\n\nClaiborn 女士：\n谢谢。法官阁下，邦加茨律师刚刚向本院概述的第3页中的格式条款，是海事协议中常见且经常出现的一类措辞，并且一贯被认定为可执行。因此，如发生任何系码头过错所致的事件，码头实际上将不承担责任，因为该等措辞放弃了该项责任。我认为，关于重大过失或故意行为的措辞所在位置具有刻意的混淆性，并且可能被解读为仅限于紧接其前的概念，即严格责任、违反保证或其他过错。该措辞并未以易于阅读和易于理解的方式表明，任何达到重大过失或任何种类故意行为程度的行为，均被排除在给予码头的保护之外。因此，美国受托人再次担心，如发生任何事件，即使该事件系码头人员的过错所致，破产财产不仅须对此承担责任，而且破产财产还必须支付与涉及该事件的争议有关的律师费。因此，我感谢邦加茨律师联系码头，请其考虑撤回其中某些保护条款，但正如我所说，根据我所见的判例法，此类保护条款属惯常条款，并被认定为可执行。因此，基于该背景，我理解码头为何拒绝，但这并不意味着该风险适宜由破产财产承担。\n\nCase 22-50073\nDoc 1683\nFiled 04/20/23\nEntered 04/20/23 11:01:19\nPage 33 of\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 第34页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- April 11, 2023 34 邦加茨先生：\n除指出以下一点外，我没有太多补充：如果码头——如果我们不订立本协议，尽管这再次是一份短期协议，但如果我们不订立该协议，游艇的去向将不确定。\n\n我现在无法站在这里告诉您，码头不会解开船只的系泊，使其任由漂流至海上。我认为那将是他们极其不负责任的行为。但如果我们与他们没有合同，我确实不知道他们会做什么。\n\n此外，某种意义上，这是我们不得不接受的局面，因为在所有权已被认定归属于破产财产时，该船当时及目前就停放在那里。\n\nCase 22-50073\nDoc 1683\nFiled 04/20/23\nEntered 04/20/23 11:01:19\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- April 11, 2023\n\n1 破产财产。\n2 如我先前所述，我们无意\n3 长期将该船停放在那里。这仅仅是\n4 一项我们不得不接受的短期安排，\n5 遗憾的是。\n6 我们非常希望能改善这些条款，但遗憾的是，\n7 我做不到。我无权强迫\n8 码头改变其标准条款和条件。\n9 因此，在这种情况下，鉴于缺乏替代方案，\n10 并且鉴于我们的目标是尽快\n11 移动该船，我们请求\n12 批准该协议。谢谢，法官阁下。\n13 本院：\n我现在有一个关于应付给码头的\n14 费用和开支的问题。目前应付\n15 码头多少？\n16 邦加茨先生：\n我们了解到，他们——他们\n17 已获付款至3月底。因此，唯一的\n18 “未付”款项是——它们并非未付。这些是\n19 本月，即4月应付的费用。金额为\n20 $16,484。该款项尚未支付。\n21 本院：\n而这就是码头本身将在4月\n22 向破产财产收取的全部费用？\n23 邦加茨先生：\n正确。是的。\n24 本院：\n根据泊位\n25 协议？\n\nCase 22-50073\nDoc 1683\nFiled 04/20/23\nEntered 04/20/23 11:01:19\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- April 11, 2023\n\n1 邦加茨先生：\n请稍等一下，法官阁下。\n2 本院：\n好的。\n3 （律师商议）\n4 邦加茨先生：\n抱歉。根据\n5 耗电量可能会作出调整，\n6 并可能在月底进行结算。\n7 但这里所涉金额不会很大。\n8 本院：\n但无论谁是与码头订立\n9 泊位协议的一方，该电费都——都必须\n10 支付？这并非该船\n11 特有的费用？\n12 邦加茨先生：\n不，当然不是。不。\n13 本院：\n因此，如果你们将 Lady May 留在\n14 码头至5月底，听起来你们——\n15 意图可能并非如此。它可能会在\n16 月底之前被移走——\n17 邦加茨先生：\n我们可能能够更早将其移走。我的意思是，我们目前正在研究\n18 能多快移走它。但显然，它可能在\n19 本月底之前被移走，但须以本院批准\n20 游艇的任何转让为前提。\n21 本院：\n那么，如果你们未在4月底之前\n22 移走 Lady May，\n23 是否必须就5月另行订立一份\n24 许可协议？\n25 邦加茨先生：\n我们每个月都必须这样做。\n\nCase 22-50073\nDoc 1683\nFiled 04/20/23\nEntered 04/20/23 11:01:19\nPage 37 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- April 11, 2023\n\n一个月。\n\n而且，我们一直——您知道，为了避免必须提交此类动议——每个月都会请求，作为该动议所请求救济的一部分，批准任何合理的延期。但我仍重申我先前的观点。我们无意将此作为长期安排。我们希望尽快转移并最终出售 Lady May。\n\n法官：看来电力——嗯，电费估算已包含在 $16,484.25 中。但我理解，这可能会根据月底的最终结算或其他情况而变化——\n\nBONGARTZ 律师：是的。我认为——\n\n法官：——对吗？\n\nBONGARTZ 律师：正确。您说得准确。估算为 $5,000，因此可能略高，也可能略低——\n\n法官：对。\n\nBONGARTZ 律师：——取决于实际使用量。\n\n法官：好的。Claiborn 律师，关于停泊协议，您还有什么要补充的吗？\n\nCLAIBORN 女士：没有，法官阁下。\n\n法官：好的。谢谢。我理解美国受托人办公室对于停泊协议的担忧。然而，鉴于本案的具体事实和情况，以及该船——\n\n案号 22-50073 文档 1683 提交 04/20/23 录入 04/20/23 11:01:19 第 38 页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— 2023年4月11日\n\n情况，以及该船舶自去年7月起一直停泊在那里，并且法院未获悉该船舶与码头之间就停泊协议存在任何问题，又因为该协议中的措辞似乎确实排除了对未达到重大过失或故意行为程度的任何伤害或损害的责任免除，因此，这些条款，包括赔偿责任条款以及支付费用和开支的条款，虽属标准且可执行，但为使受托人能够尝试变现该遗产资产，均属合理。\n\n因此，除非对已经提交并归档于法院的停泊协议作出任何变更——\n\nBONGARTZ 律师：正确。\n\n法官：因此，就美国受托人的异议而言，除以我们已在记录中说明的方式外，我认为无需修改拟议命令。好吗？\n\nBONGARTZ 律师：谢谢您，法官阁下。\n\n法官：那么，是否还有其他人希望就这些协议发表意见？好的。既然无人发言，基于记录中所述的理由并以所述方式，该动议获准，并将提交经修订的拟议命令。\n\n案号 22-50073 文档 1683 提交 04/20/23 录入 04/20/23 11:01:19 第 39 页，共\n\n郭文贵 — 2023年4月11日 39\n\n你们需要多少时间，律师？\n\nBONGARTZ 律师：我们明天就可以完成，或者——\n\n法官：好的。\n\nBONGARTZ 律师：是的。这没有问题。\n\n法官：为稳妥起见，我给你们到星期五。书记官办公室希望能够追踪文件何时提交、应于何时提交。因此，我将在适当位置注明，准许关于授权就 Lady May 达成协议的命令动议，并应于4月14日或之前提交经修订的拟议命令。\n\nBONGARTZ 律师：谢谢您，法官阁下。\n\n法官：谢谢。现在，我认为我们应当转向对抗程序 23-5005，其中有关于初步禁令、临时限制令（TRO）的动议，以及被告要求延期至4月11日的动议。我看到——我认为，Despins 受托人（Luc Despins，吕克·德斯平斯），我可能错了，但你们未必对延期存在分歧；不过，你们需要达成协议，而我没有看到已有协议，即临时限制令将持续有效，直至延期后的初步禁令听证会，对吗？\n\n案号 22-50073 文档 1683 提交 04/20/23 录入 04/20/23 11:01:19 第 40 页，共\n\n郭文贵 — 2023年4月11日 40\n\nDESPINS 先生：法官阁下，我可以说几句吗？\n\n法官：可以，请讲。\n\nDESPINS 先生：为记录起见，我是第11章受托人 Luc Despins（吕克·德斯平斯）。对于继续维持 TRO——或者说禁令——有效，双方已有协议。没有协议，或者至少尚不明确是否有协议之处在于，我们表示，作为附加条件，他们应当同意，因为我们已依据传票向他们送达。我们已向 Major 先生送达传票，要求他的当事人今天到庭。我们理解她今天没有出庭，但该传票以及对该传票送达的接受，应延续至延期后的听证日期，因此我们——法官阁下，您熟悉这一点。我们还曾遇到有人不出庭、不接受传票送达等等的问题。因此，这才是真正的问题。我原以为此事到现在已经解决，但我们非常明确地表示，我们唯一希望的是达成协议，即他的当事人将依据传票在延期后的听证会上出庭。这是我们对该事项以及继续维持禁令有效所附加的唯一条件。这是我们唯一寻求的事项。因此，我想我让 Major 先生就此回应。\n\n法官：Major 先生？\n\nMAJOR 先生：谢谢您，法官阁下。我是代表 Greenwich Land, LLC（格林尼治地产有限责任公司）及 Ngok 女士（Ngok）的 Chris Major（克里斯·梅杰）。\n\n案号 22-50073\n文档 1683\n提交 04/20/23\n录入 04/20/23 11:01:19\n\n郭文贵 — 2023年4月11日\n\n首先，就限制令而言，其中明确规定，该限制令持续有效，直至法院另行作出命令。因此，无需双方达成协议或约定。被告并未请求解除该命令或——\n\n法官：嗯，您可以主张——您可以主张，根据《联邦民事诉讼规则》，它今天届满。因此，我希望——我希望得到对延期的明确同意，否则我必须就为何必须延长它作出认定。\n\nMAJOR 先生：因此，法官阁下，正如我们向受托人的律师所表明的，我们同意限制令在今天之后继续有效，前提是我们不被禁止向法院提出申请，包括在必要时以紧急方式申请，以寻求解除该命令的某些救济。但鉴于我们正在请求此次延期，我们不反对该命令继续有效。我们当然也不希望在此时让法院费力作出认定。\n\n法官：嗯，我认为——我认为这没有问题，因为根据《联邦民事诉讼规则》，你们拥有你们所拥有的一切权利——\n\nBONGARTZ 律师：是，法官阁下。\n\n法官：——就你们如请求解除临时限制令而言。\n\n案号 22-50073\n文档 1683\n提交 04/20/23\n录入 04/20/23 11:01:19\n\n郭文贵 — 2023年4月11日\n\n因此，但你们需要——你们可以明确同意，而你们刚才已经同意，将临时限制令延长至延期后的初步禁令听证会，除非你们请求解除该命令。你们可以这样做。至于你们是否会获得该救济，我不清楚。显然，这将取决于你们为寻求该类救济而向法院提交的材料。好吗？\n\nMAJOR 先生：好的。\n\n法官：但传票问题呢？\n\nMAJOR 先生：那么，就传票而言，向我们提出的方式是，我们不仅要接受传票送达——而我们从未获授权接受送达，也尚未接受该传票的送达——而且，提出的条件是，作为受托人对我们的延期请求不持立场的交换条件，我们接受传票送达，并同意 Ngok 女士事实上将在初步禁令听证会上作证。\n\n而且，如同我们在周末——我相信是周五晚上——提交的延期动议中所述——是的，周五晚上——我们目前尚无法准备好就初步禁令动议作出实质性回应。这包括但不限于——\n\n案号 22-50073\n文档 1683\n提交 04/20/23\n录入 04/20/23 11:01:19\n\n郭文贵 — 2023年4月11日\n\n分析所有众多的法律问题、程序问题和事实问题。\n\n正如法官阁下比我更清楚的那样，在这宗破产案件中已有许多既往事由。而且，即使在受托人于本具体对抗程序中提交的各项文件中，也有大量指称。\n\n因此，我不能向受托人表示，我们放弃我们可能拥有或可能希望行使的各种权利、异议及类似事项，涉及我们的当事人必须作证一事。\n\n因此，我将接受送达——而且我获授权接受传票送达。我当然不会让法院为此费力，也不会让受托人派出送达员。我们现在已进入本案，我们可以接受传票送达。\n\n但我不能放弃我们在回应该传票时可能拥有的任何权利或异议，无论是撤销传票的动议、异议，还是就范围达成某种协商解决方案，或诸如此类的事项。\n\n但是，尽管我们已作一般性询问，我们目前尚不清楚受托人为何需要传唤 Ngok 女士，以及受托人可能试图引出的证词为何。\n\n因此，我们目前无法走到那一步，但我们将接受针对——\n\n案号 22-50073 文档 1683 提交 04/20/23 录入 04/20/23 11:01:19 第 44 页，共\n\n郭文贵 — 2023年4月11日 44\n\n延期日期的传票送达。\n\n法官：好的。我感谢你们将接受送达。关于这些陈述，我——我理解你们需要一些时间，尽管你们正通过延期获得时间，对吗，是经双方同意的延期？他们并不反对你们的延期请求，因此你们将有一些时间。但是，关于你们不知道受托人将会要求或寻求什么，我不确定这是否准确，至少从你们当事人的角度而言，鉴于你们当事人此前就 Greenwich Land 作出的证词，以及她是 Greenwich Land 的所有人，并且——如你们所知，先前的律师已经代表 Greenwich Land 和 Ngok 女士出庭。我知道你现在加入了，你必须做你必须做的事情。我理解这一点。然而，你们当事人已经作出证词，而该证词，至少据我所见，已提交给法院，并且是本对抗程序记录的一部分。因此，我认为问题在于此。如果你们说你们将接受传票送达，但希望保留你们提出撤销传票动议的权利，那么至少我们将不得不——我并不是说这肯定是我们现在要做的事情。但我是在作出一项\n\n我建议你们考虑的是，你们必须在 X date 接受传票的送达。你们必须在 Y date 之前送达你们的撤销传票动议。因为你们不能在初步禁令听证会当天上午才送达你们的撤销动议。我们不会那么做，对吧？我们要么就你们拟撤销的事项、或者你们决定采取或不采取的任何行动举行听证会。我们不会在听证会当天上午处理此事，因为——这没有问题，因为你们同意延长临时限制令。\n\n而且，如果你们随后到庭并寻求以某种方式获得解除该临时限制令的救济，根据适用的《联邦民事诉讼规则》，你们绝对有权这样做，那么我认为这将是你们的举证责任，而你们需要让你们的当事人作证。我不知道在这种情况下你们还能如何不让她作证，因为这是针对 Greenwich Land（格林尼治地产）及你们的当事人——你们的个人当事人的临时限制令。\n\n因此，我听说传票方面已有进展，但我也认为，目前存在一个你们不愿跨越的障碍。也许你们会进一步讨论，也许不会。我不知道。\n\n但是，如果你们的立场是——你们接受送达，但仍将保留你们提出撤销申请的全部权利，或者无论你们想做什么，这都没有问题；但我们将为此设定一个程序，以便不在听证会当天上午或听证会当天下午以及初步禁令听证会时处理此事。\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 1683 提交日期 04/20/23 录入日期 04/20/23 11:01:19 第 46 页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵） - April 11, 2023\n\n我不会——我的意思是，除非我将听取认为这不可行的辩论。\n\n你们知道，我现在就会听到这样的辩论，即对你们而言，这样做不可行——我不知道你们是否会——我不知道我是否会听到这种辩论。我作出了一个也许不该作出的假定，即，你们愿意接受送达，这很好；但如果你们不打算让她出庭作证，那么我们现在就来争论这个问题。实质上，我认为别人会告诉我的是，何必浪费时间。\n\n因此，我不知道你们对此有何回应，如果有的话。但此事必须以某种方式、形式或途径继续进行。而目前，你们的当事人是对抗程序中的被告。你们的当事人提交答复的期限正在届满。\n\n原本——原本应当在今天举行听证会并审理初步禁令。因为，如我所说，可以主张临时限制令于今天届满。而受托人表示，好，你们希望延期举行听证会。这没有问题。但我需要你们接受送达，并让你们的当事人出庭作证。\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 1683 提交日期 04/20/23 录入日期 04/20/23 11:01:19 第 47 页，共\n\n郭文贵 - April 11, 2023\n\n我认为你们是在说，我会让——我会接受送达，但我不一定会让当事人出庭作证。因此，我们必须以某种方式处理该问题。因为我们不会再就此举行一次听证会。要么会发生，要么不会发生。\n\n无论你们以何种方式推进都可以。我的意思是，你们必须为你们的当事人以及你们的当事人——但是——你们的当事人，采取你们认为适当的做法。但这就是我们目前的情况。\n\n因此，Despins（德斯潘）受托人，我听到律师表示他将接受传票，但我假定，从你方的角度来看，这还不够。是这样吗？\n\nDESPINS先生：实际上——\n\n法庭：也许我错了。\n\nDESPINS先生：不。实际上，法官阁下，我们将遵循法庭对此的指引；也就是说，只要在听证会之前设有一个程序，使该问题能够得到审查，我们可以接受他仅接受送达。这样就不会再就她是否被适当送达进行任何争议。这个问题已经结束。\n\n然后，如果他希望——希望她不作证，那么将在初步禁令听证会之前另行举行听证会。我们同意该建议，法官阁下。\n\n案件 22-50073\n文书 1683\n提交日期 04/20/23\n录入日期 04/20/23 11:01:19\n\n郭文贵 - April 11, 2023\n\n法庭：好的。\n\nDESPINS先生：不过，我认为我们需要——我们确实应当确定日期，并采用您通常的程序结构，即双方均须在——之前提交其证据材料和证人名单。\n\n法庭：是。\n\nDESPINS先生：——七个工作日，而后我们有四个工作日作出回应或提出异议。如果我们——\n\n法庭：我们会这样做。谢谢。\n\n因此，Major（梅杰）律师，时间框架是什么——我看过你们的动议，但我必须说，我只是非常简略地看了一下。因此，我没有在其中看到——我没有看到，但也可能遗漏了，好吗——什么样的——你说两周。但是，你和受托人是否讨论过延期听证会的日期？\n\nMAJOR先生：法官阁下，我们讨论了两周。请允许我向法庭说明两周这一期限的由来。\n\n我们当时处于紧急情形，即原定今天举行听证会。为了准备该听证会，我们今天有很多工作要做。这不仅是准备证据材料及诸如此类的事项，还包括弄清可以采取哪些行动、建议采取哪些行动，以及与当事人磋商；正如我在延期申请中所述，这并不是一个简单的过程。\n\n案件 22-50073\n文书 1683\n提交日期 04/20/23\n录入日期 04/20/23 11:01:19\n\n郭文贵 - April 11, 2023\n\n如我在延期申请中所述，这并不是一个简单的过程。存在语言障碍，也有健康问题等等。\n\n因此，我需要尽快取得延期。我想确保我请求的期限，是我认为法庭会批准的期限，也是我认为受托人若愿意可能会同意的期限。\n\n但同时，由于并不确切知道现有的限制令将如何影响今后的事项，我不希望请求一个过于靠后的日期；如果后来认定我们确实需要在初步禁令听证会之前寻求解除该命令的救济，过于靠后的日期可能使我更难获得听证日期。目前我不计划这样做，但情况会发生变化。而且，您知道，该命令——这可能是我们必须就此向法庭提出的问题。\n\n因此，从我的角度来看，两周背后并没有一个固定不变的想法，只是如我所说，我希望争取一个能够说服受托人同意——或者，更重要的是，能够使法庭同意的期限。\n\n我当然不反对确定一个具体日期。我刚才之所以只说两周，另一个原因是我当然不了解法官阁下的时间安排。因此，我认为贸然建议一个具体日期会过于冒昧，即您何时——\n\n案件 22-50073\n文书 1683\n提交日期 04/20/23\n录入日期 04/20/23 11:01:19\n\n郭文贵 - April 11, 2023\n\n法庭：不，这没有问题。这没有问题。\n\nMAJOR先生：好的。\n\n法庭：我只是问你们是否讨论过一个具体日期。但现在，鉴于你所陈述的情况——这没有问题。\n\n并且，受托人的陈述——我认为这也是适当的推进方式——是，我们将确定一个日期，你们须在该日期之前接受传票送达。然后，我们将确定一个日期，你们须在该日期之前就传票根据《联邦民事诉讼规则》提交任何动议。\n\n然后，假定你们提交了某些文件，我们将就此设定听证日期。之后，我们将确定初步禁令听证会的日期。在这两次听证会之间，将设定必须向法庭提交证人名单和证据材料清单的日期。\n\n因此，这就是我们将如何处理此事。因为我们不会——我不会让当事人在初步禁令听证会当天到庭并说——我并不是指你们，我说的是任何人——并说我们不会作证，因为传票需要被撤销。我的意思是，我们需要在听证会之前处理该问题。\n\n案件 22-50073\n文书 1683\n提交日期 04/20/23\n录入日期 04/20/23 11:01:19\n\n郭文贵 - April 11, 2023\n\n那么，你们两位想花几分钟协商一下日期吗？我现在可以告诉各位，我将向你们提出的方案——你们都需要考虑——是，关于传票——\n\n这是一份传票还是两份传票？你们是否也向 Greenwich Land 发出传票？\n\nDESPINS先生：法官阁下，我们可能必须这样做。\n\n法庭：好的。那么，根据律师你在记录中作出的同意，你们将在 Friday, April 14 当日或之前接受传票送达。你们将在 April 28th 当日或之前，就该等传票提交任何异议、撤销动议，或你们认为适当的任何文件。\n\n如果就该等传票提交任何异议，我们将在 May 3rd at 12:00 p.m. 就传票问题举行听证会——我只是在核对某个日期的时间安排，请稍候。初步禁令听证会将于 May 17 at 10:00 a.m. 举行——开始举行；如有必要，将持续至 May 18。以上是我建议的日期。\n\n各方是否希望有一些时间讨论这些日期？我可以短暂休庭。由你们决定。而临时限制令将至少持续有效至 May 17。\n\n郭文贵 - April 11, 2023 52\n\nDESPINS先生：从受托人的角度来看，这些日期没有问题，但我们应当增加证据材料——\n\n法庭：哦，是的。抱歉。\n\nDESPINS先生：——和证人名单——\n\n法庭：证据材料和证人名单将在 May 10 当日或之前提交。\n\nMAJOR先生：法官阁下，我可以就该问题陈述意见吗？\n\n法庭：可以。\n\nMAJOR先生：在我们进行会面协商时，该问题提出后，我被告知法官阁下遵循双方同时交换——\n\n法庭：这是正确的。\n\nMAJOR先生：——证人名单和证据材料的程序。我只是想就此发表意见。我当然已经听到法官阁下今天在记录中所说的话。但是，鉴于本项动议中的举证责任安排，并且鉴于受托人已经提交了一份证明，并已向法庭提交了证据材料以及陈述和诉状，并因此已在单方基础上获得命令，我认为，最公平且也是最有效的推进方式是由受托人——他们不一定必须提交，但如果他们会\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 1683 提交日期 04/20/23 录入日期 04/20/23 11:01:19 第 52 页，共\n\n案件 22-50073\n文书 1683\n提交日期 04/20/23\n录入日期 04/20/23 11:01:19\n\n郭文贵 - April 11, 2023\n\n1 首先向我们送达其证人名单和证据材料\n2 清单——鉴于他们在此负有举证责任，且已向\n3 法院表示他们能够满足该举证责任，他们应当向我们作出该等\n4 披露，然后我们以回应方式进行披露。\n5 因此，鉴于迄今为止在本程序中发生的情况，\n6 以及举证责任的运作方式，我请求法院考虑\n7 对本次特定程序采用该程序。\n\n8 法官：\n当你说鉴于迄今为止\n9 在本程序中发生的情况，你是什么意思？\n\n10 MAJOR 律师：\n意思是，受托人已经提交了\n11 我提到的那份证明，并已获得了单方\n12 裁定。我认为，受托人应当先向我们披露其证据材料清单和\n13 其证人名单，\n14 然后我们以回应方式进行披露。\n15 届时，当事人可以向法院提交该等材料。\n16 \n17 如我所说，我并非坚持或要求\n18 受托人通过提交文件的方式这样做；我只是请求\n19 法院考虑是否会接受这种依次进行的方法，\n20 然后我们可以商定具体细节。\n\n21 法官：\n当你说商定具体细节时，\n22 你是什么意思？\n\n23 MAJOR 律师：\n例如，提交文件\n24 与送达的问题。我只是试图通融，\n25 看看能否让受托人与我共同参与这一程序。\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 1683 提交日期 04/20/23 录入日期 04/20/23 11:01:19 第 54 页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— 2023 年 4 月 11 日\n\n1 法官：\nDespins 受托人，什么——\n\n2 DESPINS 律师：\n是的。法官阁下，问题并非\n3 送达与提交文件之争。问题在于，你知道，他们\n4 已掌握我们的全部——我们所有的底牌都已摊在桌面上。他们通过\n5 我们提交的各项诉状以及\n6 证明文件已经掌握。如果有任何先后之分，也应当相反，\n7 即他们应当先行。但我们并不坚持\n8 这一点。\n9 迄今为止，在本案近一年的时间里，我们始终\n10 以同样的——你知道的——方式运作，即\n11 同时进行披露。没有理由\n12 不应当在本案中采取同样做法。在每一项\n13 诉讼中，一方负有举证责任；另一方不负有。并且\n14 我们始终同时进行披露。\n15 在这里，他们掌握了我们的完整诉讼策略。这些内容载于\n16 我们的诉状中。因此，他们\n17 同时提交其证据材料不会受到任何不利影响。我们也\n18 看不出有任何理由改变这种做法。\n\n19 法官：\n律师，还有补充吗？\n\n20 MAJOR 律师：\n有，法官阁下。我确实认为，\n21 没有必要仅仅因为该程序已在本案其他情形中采用，\n22 就遵循该程序。我认为，这——\n23 本案——\n\n24 法官：\n这不仅仅是在其他情形中采用。\n25 这就是我——这是我的审前程序，根据\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 1683 提交日期 04/20/23 录入日期 04/20/23 11:01:19 第 55 页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— 2023 年 4 月 11 日\n\n《联邦民事诉讼规则》，每位法官都有权决定审前程序\n如何进行。我发现，在许多许多年的实践中，该程序\n运作得非常好。你已经请求他们考虑该程序。他们\n不予考虑。\n我注意到，在提交\n起诉状时，为支持该起诉状已提交了 50 份证据材料。\n因此，你已经拥有——而且——这些材料自 2023 年 3 月 27 日起\n已载入本对抗程序的案卷。你已经拥有 50 份证据材料，\n而这些材料，你知道，很可能就是他们的证据材料清单。\n你知道他们希望传唤谁作为证人。他们\n希望传唤你的当事人。我不知道他们是否会\n传唤其他人员，但我确信，如果你询问他们，他们可以告知你是否会这样做。\n但我——这不是举证责任的问题。这是\n法院如何管理审判的问题。而且，联邦规则支持\n法院决定如何管理审判。\n如我所说，在过去十年中，我在不知多少、但非常多的案件中采用过这种做法，从未\n有人就证人及证据材料清单同时\n提交提出异议。\n你提出了异议。我已听取你的关切。\n我也已听取受托人的意见。我认为，在本情形下，我\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 1683 提交日期 04/20/23 录入日期 04/20/23 11:01:19 第 56 页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— 2023 年 4 月 11 日\n\n1 看不出有任何理由应当偏离我在本对抗程序中\n2 对审判管理的方式，即我在\n3 所有其他对抗程序中所采取的方式。没有任何——而且对抗程序\n4 包括禁令救济，顺便说一句。我们已有\n5 很多此类程序。我从未在有关证人及\n6 证据材料清单的案件管理程序上偏离\n7 该做法。\n8 我认为，当事人在同一时间了解\n9 谁在为审判准备何种事项是重要的。\n10 或许这会促成某些沟通，或许\n11 不会。但在许多案件中，这已促成\n12 当事人就事实达成约定，\n13 和/或就引入证据材料达成约定。\n14 因此，这也是我以\n15 该方式进行处理的部分原因。因此，我不会——我并未被说服，\n16 认为在本对抗程序中有任何理由\n17 使我应当偏离该审判管理程序。\n\n18 MAJOR 律师：\n谢谢，法官阁下。\n\n19 法官：\n谢谢。\n20 那么，律师，对于我所确定的那些日期，\n21 你有什么问题吗？\n\n22 MAJOR 律师：\n法官阁下，只是如果我们能够确认\n23 交换证人名单和证据材料清单的日期。我认为\n24 是——\n\n25 法官：\n5 月 3 日。\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— 2023 年 4 月 11 日 57 MAJOR 律师：好的。法官：那将是——抱歉。不对。那是听证会。等一下。我道歉。我弄错了。DESPINS 律师：我想您说的是 5 月 10 日。法官：5 月 10 日。5 月 10 日。我道歉。MAJOR 律师：谢谢，法官阁下。法官：5 月 3 日将是就你方对传票提出的异议举行听证会——MAJOR 律师：对。法官：——听证会将在中午举行。因此，将是 5 月 10 日。并且，我们在本法院处理证据材料的方式是，你知道，原告第 1 号至无论多少号，被告第 1 号至无论多少号。或者你可以在其上标注名称。如果你想写 Greenwich Land 1，诸如此类。我不用字母。我用数字。并且它们全部以 PDF 格式提交，且均作为单独的 PDF 提交。因此，如果你对该事项有任何问题——有时，如果此前未曾这样做过，人们确实会有问题。书记官办公室会帮助你，和/或你办公室中的某人会说明如何办理。一旦做过一次，你就会明白。但如果你以前从未这样做过，且需要任何协助，你可以联系书记官办公室，并且\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 1683\n提交日期 04/20/23\n录入日期 04/20/23 11:01:19\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— 2023 年 4 月 11 日\n\n1 他们会就此帮助你。好吗？\n\n2 MAJOR 律师：\n谢谢，法官阁下。\n\n3 法官：\n好的。那么，就对抗程序 23-5005 中的\n4 事项而言，被告延期动议基于案卷中陈述的\n5 理由予以部分准许。\n6 随后，我们将就所有导致继续审理\n7 初步禁令事项的议题发布一份排期命令，该继续审理将于\n8 5 月 17 日上午 10 时\n9 开始。\n10 我预计该排期命令将在\n11 未来一两天内发布。我们还需要处理一些其他事项。\n12 但我预计——如果该命令未在周五之前发布，我会感到意外。\n13 \n14 MAJOR 律师：\n好的。谢谢。\n\n15 法官：\n但我们全体——该命令——这些日期\n16 已在案卷中作出命令，但将载入\n17 排期命令中。好吗？\n18 那么，ECF 19 获部分准许。ECF 12 的审理\n19 延期至 5 月 17 日上午 10:00，并将在必要时于\n20 5 月 18 日上午 10:00 继续进行。\n21 请稍候。\n22 Major 律师，你有问题吗？\n\n23 MAJOR 律师：\n有，法官阁下。我实际上只是\n24 忘记澄清一件事——\n\n25 法官：\n当然。\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 1683 提交日期 04/20/23 录入日期 04/20/23 11:01:19 第 59 页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— 2023 年 4 月 11 日 59 MAJOR 律师：——或者请求法院澄清一件事，即如果我们就传票提交撤销动议或其他相关动议，受托人何时应以书面作出回应的期限。法官：你方须在 4 月 28 日前提交异议，听证会随后于 5 月 3 日举行。因此，我给予受托人至 5 月 2 日。MAJOR 律师：谢谢，法官阁下。法官：但如有可能，受托人，请在 5 月 2 日下午 5:00 前提交——DESPINS 律师：是，法官阁下。法官：好吗？这样我可以在 3 日举行听证会之前实际阅读该文件。好吗？谢谢。谢谢，各位律师。好吗？我们将确保这也成为排期命令的一部分。好的。那么，今天日程中的最后一项事项是在对抗程序 22-5003 中，即请求驳回对抗程序、反诉第 2、3、4 和 5 项的动议。DELLA FERA 律师：下午好，法官阁下。Sam Della Fera（萨姆·德拉费拉），Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi（基耶萨·沙希尼安和詹托马西律师事务所），代表动议人 HK International Foods Investments USA Limited, LLC（美国香港国际食品投资有限责任公司，下称“HKI”）和 Mei Guo 女士（郭梅）。法官：下午好。DELLA FERA 律师：下午好，法官阁下。如法院所注意到，这是 HKI 和郭女士提出的动议，请求\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 1683\n提交日期 04/20/23\n录入日期 04/20/23 11:01:19\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— 2023 年 4 月 11 日\n\n1 驳回受托人提出的若干反诉。\n为回应启动本对抗\n2 程序的起诉状，受托人提交了一份答辩书及五项\n3 反诉。\n4 \n5 本动议在提交时，请求驳回其中四项\n6 反诉，即反诉第 2、3、4 和 5 项。\n7 此后，法官阁下，我相信法院会记得，\n8 法官阁下已就受托人反诉的第 1 项罪名项作出简易判决，\n9 因此留下了作为本动议标的的四项反诉。\n10 \n11 最近，法官阁下，我们——我所在的律师事务所\n12 获受托人律师告知，受托人——\n13 姑且如此称呼——认为反诉第 4 项\n14 已无实际争议，并告知我方事务所以及我\n15 相信也告知了法院，受托人将不再\n16 处理该项，但将保留其权利。\n17 我相信受托人的律师可以就此作进一步说明。\n18 \n19 因此，尚待裁定的是就反诉第 2、3 和 5 项提出的\n20 驳回动议。双方已就该动议进行了广泛的书面陈述，\n21 法官阁下。我无意在此重复这些论点。\n22 只需指出，本动议是依据\n23 《联邦民事诉讼规则》第 12(b)(1) 条和\n24 第 12(b)(6) 条提出，并由《联邦破产程序规则》第 7012 条\n25 纳入适用。这两项规则构成了\n\n驳回其余三项反诉中的每一项的依据。即，法官阁下，缺乏事项管辖权，以及未能陈述一项可获救济的请求。\n\n缺乏事项管辖权是基于受托人根据 Wagoner 规则及其近亲——同等过错原则——不具备诉讼资格。\n\n受托人如其在提交的文件中所承认，实质上是以债务人的身份提出这些请求。\n\n法律赋予受托人该项利益，但在接受该项利益时，受托人必须承担当任债务人继承人的负担。\n\n而该负担，法官阁下，包括须适用 Wagoner 规则和同等过错原则；二者实际上相同，并且实际上阻止受托人针对 HKI 和 Guo 女士提出债务人本人无法提出的请求，因为债务人是所指控不当行为的参与者。\n\n法官阁下，按罪名项逆序来看，第 5 项指控称 HKI 以及推定的 Guo 女士存在过失，尽管坦率地说，法官阁下将很难在受托人的反诉中任何地方找到对 Guo 女士的提及，尤其是在第 5 项指控中。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 62 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）- April 11, 2023 62 该过失被指称为由 HKI 和 Guo 女士造成，致使债务人未能按照纽约法院的指示返还 Lady May，并从而导致债务人承担藐视法庭罚款。当然，再次值得指出的是，并无指控称 Guo 女士本人导致债务人违反纽约法院命令。但更重要的是，法官阁下，为使本院认定存在过失，本院当然需要确定 HKI 和/或 Guo 女士违反了注意义务。受托人并未指称存在任何该等义务。法官阁下，也不可能存在任何该等义务。债务人有义务按照纽约法院的指示返还 Lady May。债务人未能这样做。如我方书面意见所引用，根据纽约州法律，同等过错原则禁止针对共谋者提出过失请求，而且至少在本案中，债务人是一名共谋者。毕竟，债务人本人受约束必须返还该船舶。他未能如此做现在可归责于受托人。无论如何，过失并不基于一项普遍性的义务，即不得干扰第三方的义务；顺便说一句，至少就第 5 项指控而言，受托人指称该第三方是独立第三方。因而，在 HKI 或 Guo 女士均未对债务人以及本案中的受托人负有具体义务的情况下，不可能——\n\nCase 22-50073\nDoc 1683\nFiled 04/20/23\nEntered 04/20/23 11:01:19\n\nHo Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023\n\n在法律上认定 HKI 或 Guo 女士对过失承担责任。\n\n受托人援引的是所有人均不得伤害他人的某种普遍义务。坦率地说，该义务并不存在。法官阁下，我方书面意见所引用的 Hamilton 案以及纽约州上诉法院（New York Court of Appeals）的该案判决已明确说明这一点。\n\n因此，就第 5 项指控，即过失罪名项而言，我方主张，作为法律问题，HKI 或 Guo 女士均不负有不干扰法院命令——纽约法院命令——适用的义务。而且，无论如何，同等过错原则和/或 Wagoner 规则均阻止受托人主张该项请求。\n\n就第 2 项和第 3 项指控而言，同样地，相关指控实质上归结为债务人参与一项向其债权人隐匿资产的计划。债务人显然是该计划的积极参与者，在该计划存在的范围内，其不能——也无法——对 HKI 或 Guo 女士提起诉因。\n\n因此，受托人作为债务人的继承人，同样无法基于同等过错原则以及 Wagoner 规则的适用提出该等诉因。\n\n此外，法官阁下，就第 2 项指控而言——\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 64 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023 64\n\n以及第 3 项指控，如本院可能记得，该项是一项非常简短、仅一段的指控，实质上依赖于第 2 项指控中的主张；这两项指控实质上均归结为 HKI 是债务人的另一个自我，和/或债务人是 HKI 的衡平所有人。\n\n实质上是相同的主张。\n\n就两项请求而言，法官阁下，HKI 和 Guo 女士主张受托人受本院于 April 29, 2022 作出的经约定命令约束。该命令明确规定，不得对 HKI 为换取——或为确保将 Lady May 返还至本水域而存入的托管资金进行执行或扣押。该经约定命令是债务人、PAX、债权人委员会以及其他由律师代理的债权人共同谈判的结果。\n\n受托人将该经约定命令描述为实质上是债务人与其本人达成协议。但受托人没有承认，该命令解决了 PAX 提出的解除中止动议。该动议经包括当时无担保普通债权人群体代表即委员会在内的多方谈判，而该命令明确规定，如 Lady May 被及时返还，则 $37 million 托管资金将不受执行或扣押。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 65 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023\n\n因此，除同等过错原则和 Wagoner 原则及规则的适用外，我方主张，作为法律问题，表明受托人应因债务人是 HKI 的另一个自我，或者通过对 HKI 的其他某种衡平所有权而可取得 $37 million 托管资金的罪名项，在法律上不能成立。\n\n毫无疑问，受托人将如其在书面文件中所做的那样向法官阁下主张，同等过错原则和 Wagoner 规则不适用于本案。其指出该等原则有两个例外。但我方主张，如我方在书面文件中所述，该等例外并不适用。\n\n当然，该等原则并不保护实体内部人员免于该实体所提出、否则将归责于该实体的请求。换言之，如一名内部人员实施不当行为，而该不当行为本可归责于——或归属于原告，则该内部人员不得利用同等过错原则或 Wagoner 规则保护其本人。\n\n本案并非如此。法官阁下，本案中的不当行为人是债务人。并且由于受托人是债务人的继承人，就这些请求而言，不当行为人即为受托人。\n\n再次说明，相关问题均已在书面文件中论述完毕。我乐意回答本院可能提出的任何问题。但是——\n\nCase 22-50073\nDoc 1683\nFiled 04/20/23\nEntered 04/20/23 11:01:19\n\nHo Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023\n\n否则，我方将援引我方书面文件。\n\n法庭：好的。谢谢。\n\nDELLA FERA 先生：谢谢，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：目前我没有任何问题。谢谢。\n\nMAJOR 先生：法官阁下，请原谅打断一下，我可以先行离席吗？\n\n法庭：可以。但在你离席之前，有一件我没有做、而你在我们开始讨论驳回动议前使我想到的事情：该排期命令还将包含一个日期，届时你必须对初步禁令救济作出回应。因此，你须提交初步禁令答复或异议的日期，将与提交证人和证物清单的日期相同。好吗？\n\nMAJOR 先生：谢谢，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：好的。谢谢。\n\n身份不明的发言人：法官阁下，承蒙本院准许，我可以占用一分钟吗？\n\n法庭：可以。当然可以。\n\n身份不明的发言人：谢谢。\n\nDESPINS 先生：法官阁下，有一些事务性事项——确实是事务性事项。我可以在两秒钟内说明。\n\n法庭：当然。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 67 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023\n\nDESPINS 先生：第一项是，请记得，船上的阀门、海阀尚未维修。因此，我们正在与 Moriarty 先生商讨，由其同意使用维修准备金进行该等维修。此事仍在商讨中，但我们可能很快会向法官阁下提交一项同意命令，所以我想提示此事。\n\n第二项——\n\n法庭：昨天还就介入动议和其中一项对抗程序提交了一项同意命令。该事项已经处理完毕——\n\nDESPINS 先生：该命令已经录入。我看到了。\n\n法庭：是。\n\nDESPINS 先生：是。\n\n法庭：好的。\n\nDESPINS 先生：第二项是，有——我们——有一项动议，请求扩大对我方专家 Dexter White（读音不详）的聘任范围。该动议即将提交。我们并非请求——\n\n法庭：已经提交了吗？\n\nDESPINS 先生：没有。\n\n法庭：哦，好的。\n\nDESPINS 先生：没有。他已经被——\n\n法庭：好的。\n\nDESPINS 先生：——聘任，但我们——\n\nHo Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023 68\n\n法庭：好的。\n\nDESPINS 先生：——需要扩大他的职责范围——\n\n法庭：我正想说，我不记得见过那项动议。好的。\n\nDESPINS 先生：没有。是的。然后是一项将 Lady May 移往 Newport 的动议。该动议即将提交。然后，最重要的是一项批准聘任该船舶销售经纪人的动议。我一直在广泛处理此事。它将——你知道，我正在学到很多关于航运的事情。你知道，这些人收取的佣金比房地产经纪人还高。因此，如果你设想一艘船——假定在我的梦想中，它值 $30 million。你知道，如果其佣金为 6 percent，你可以想象那是多少钱。因此，我们正让三家经纪人就此提交报价。但显然，未经法官阁下授权，我们不能聘请经纪人，所以我们将就此再次向法官阁下提出请求，因为首要任务是出售该船舶。因此，那就是——\n\n法庭：好的。谢谢。\n\nDESPINS 先生：这些就是我想提出的全部事务性事项。\n\n法庭：好的。谢谢。\n\nDESPINS 先生：谢谢。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1683 Filed 04/20/23 Entered 04/20/23 11:01:19 Page 68 of\n\nHo Wan Kwok - April 11, 2023 69\n\nBASSETT 先生：下午好，法官阁下。为记录在案，我是 Paul Hastings（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所）的 Nic Basset，代表第 11 章受托人。法官阁下，在我开始回应律师提出的若干论点之前，我想先提及律师也提到的第 4 项指控。如律师所述，我们昨天向本院发送了一份说明，我们认为，在本院为今日作准备时，该说明可能有助于告知法官阁下：我们无意就第 4 项指控，即我方的欺诈性转让请求，进行辩论。为使记录明确，受托人采取该立场的理由是：就该等请求所寻求的救济，是通过欺诈性转让请求将 Lady May 返还至破产财产。鉴于本院已经就受托人反诉中寻求 Lady May 所有权的第 1 项指控作出简易判决，目前已无理由继续追究第 4 项指控中的欺诈性转让请求。事实上，正因如此，第 4 项指控明确地作为备选请求提出。因此，受托人保留其权利，在——而且我相信刚刚已就该简易判决裁定提交上诉通知——的范围内，受托人当然保留继续主张该等欺诈性转让\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 1683\n提交日期 04/20/23\n录入日期 04/20/23 11:01:19\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵） - April 11, 2023\n\n1 如有必要，可在日后主张这些请求权。但截至目前，鉴于当前的情况，对这些请求权无法给予任何有效救济，因此，我们并不认为它们是——\n2\n3\n4\n5 法庭：那么你们不会撤回反诉请求 4。你们将保留该项请求，视上诉的结果而定。如果反诉请求 1 以某种方式被否决，那么你们将主张反诉请求 4 所列的诉因？\n6\n7\n8\n9\n10 巴塞特先生：是的，法官阁下。\n11 法庭：好的。\n12 巴塞特先生：您知道，举一个相当简单的不同例子，我的意思是，如果——\n13\n14 法庭：不。没关系。\n15 巴塞特先生：是。好的。\n16 法庭：我只是想确认你们没有撤回它。\n17\n18 巴塞特先生：当然。没有。那是——\n19 法庭：但你们没有——\n20 巴塞特先生：没错，法官阁下。\n21 法庭：你们没有继续主张这些请求。因此，截至今天，HKI 各方要求驳回反诉请求的动议——各方仅请求法庭处理反诉请求 2、3 和 5。\n22\n23\n24\n25 巴塞特先生：没错。事实上，我——\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 1683\n提交日期 04/20/23\n录入日期 04/20/23 11:01:19\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵） - April 11, 2023\n\n1 我甚至不知道，在无法给予任何有效救济且已提交上诉通知的情况下，法庭是否对第 4 项罪名具有管辖权。但没错，法官阁下。\n2\n3\n4\n5 法庭：好的。请继续。\n6 巴塞特先生：那么，法官阁下，我将——我先作一个总体说明，即——如果您看一下要求驳回第 2、3 和 5 项罪名的动议，实际上并无任何论点主张受托人未充分陈述其诉因的实体要件；也就是说，并无任何指称认为受托人未充分陈述 HK USA 是债务人的另我、债务人实益拥有 HK，或者就起诉书第 5 项罪名中的过失请求而言，存在某些对受托人——抱歉，对债务人造成损害的行为。\n7\n8\n9\n10\n11\n12\n13\n14\n15\n16\n17 相反，我们看到的是反诉被告为击败受托人提出的、表面上有效且已充分陈述的请求而提出的一系列我称之为稻草人式的法律论点。我认为，这些法律论点均无依据。我将逐一说明。\n18\n19\n20\n21\n22\n23 就律师提出论点的顺序而言，我实际上将按相反顺序开始。我将从第二项和第三项反诉请求开始，第二项是——\n24\n25\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 1683\n提交日期 04/20/23\n录入日期 04/20/23 11:01:19\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵） - April 11, 2023\n\n1 另我反诉请求。如法庭所知，目前还有一项待决的简易判决动议。假设该项罪名未被驳回，我们将于 20 日就该问题进行辩论。\n2\n3\n4\n5 而且我不知道法庭——显然，这由法庭决定。我不确定在此之前是否需要就此作出裁定。但只是提及，我们确有一项简易判决动议待决。\n6\n7\n8\n9 第二项反诉请求是另我反诉请求。第三项反诉请求则是基于类似概念和类似原则，寻求确认对 HK USA 的衡平所有权的反诉请求。\n10\n11\n12\n13 反诉被告提出的第一个论点是——我想有两个论点。我会把不法行为人不得因其不法行为获利原则和 Wagoner 规则归为一类，并对此作出回应。另一项论点是，本法庭就 Lady May 作出的约定将禁止受托人所寻求的救济，只要该救济涉及目前存放于托管账户中的 37 million、我相信现为 $33 million。\n14\n15\n16\n17\n18\n19\n20\n21 在 Wagoner 规则和不法行为人不得因其不法行为获利原则方面，我认为绝对可以确定的是，这两项例外——其一是内部人例外，另一项——我甚至不知道其严格说来是否属于例外，但受托人已根据第 544 条陈述请求这一事实——我认为其中每一项都足以排除 Wagoner 规则对第 2 和第 3 项罪名的适用，毫无疑问。\n22\n23\n24\n25\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 1683\n提交日期 04/20/23\n录入日期 04/20/23 11:01:19\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵） - April 11, 2023\n\n1 在讨论这些例外之前，我认为有必要指出，在本案情形下，构成并推动不法行为人不得因其不法行为获利原则和 Wagoner 规则基础的原则根本未被涉及。事实上，我认为情况恰恰相反。\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\n9 反诉被告援引的其中一个案件实际上讨论了不法行为人不得因其不法行为获利原则背后的推动性原则，即其援引的 Teras International Corp. v. Gimbel 案。该裁决的一部分中，法庭指出，不法行为人不得因其不法行为获利原则与 Wagoner 规则非常相似，其基于的政策是，法院不应为不法行为人之间的争议提供斡旋，拒绝给予已承认不法行为人司法救济是遏制违法行为的有效手段。\n10\n11\n12\n13\n14\n15\n16\n17\n18\n19 换言之，该规则背后的推动因素是，法院不希望在给予原告救济会鼓励违法行为的情形下给予原告救济。通过拒绝救济，法院阻止据称已经发生的违法行为。\n20\n21\n22\n23\n24 因此，在后一诉讼中的原告作为一名不法行为人，可能希望从其共谋者或共同不法行为人处获得——\n25\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 1683 提交日期 04/20/23 录入日期 04/20/23 11:01:19 第 74 页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵） - April 11, 2023\n\n1 某种金钱赔偿的情形下，这一原则是合理的。法院会说，不，我们不会允许你这么做，因为如果允许你这么做，你基本上就是从你不法行为的收益中获益，而法院正在介入协助你从另一方收回某些东西。\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n但在这里，情况恰恰相反。如果拒绝给予受托人救济，或者如果受托人从未被任命而拒绝给予债务人救济，将产生完全相反的效果，因为这会鼓励债务人在 HK USA 和 Mei Guo（梅国）的协助下从事的恰恰这类违法行为。具体而言，他的全部目的就是使其资产处于债权人无法追及的范围之外。\n\n如果法庭裁定不法行为人不得因其不法行为获利原则和 Wagoner 规则适用，从而阻止受托人为该破产财产取得这些资产，那么债务人就会获胜。这正是他一直想要的结果。因此，这实际上会鼓励他如此行事，并会认可他向债权人隐藏资产的努力。\n\n而在未来，任何其他想尝试将资产藏在空壳公司中、使其远离债权人的债务人，推定都可以这么做。而且——他会感到安心，即如果他日后申请破产，受托人将无法追回这些资产，因为——\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 1683\n提交日期 04/20/23\n录入日期 04/20/23 11:01:19\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵） - April 11, 2023\n\n1 被告将主张不法行为人不得因其不法行为获利原则。\n2 因此，我认为，在这一特定情形下，允许任一规则适用将完全有悖于司法公正。但法庭无需据此作出裁决，因为正如我所说，有两项非常确立的例外适用。\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7 第一项，如律师所提及，是内部人例外。我们已在书面材料中援引相关案件。我认为毫无疑问。我的意思是，我们援引的案件直截了当地指出，Wagoner 规则不适用于针对内部人的请求。这是 PHS Group, Inc. 案，581 B.R. 16 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2018)。\n8\n9\n10\n11\n12\n13 还有 TS Employment 案，597 B.R. 543 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019)：“Wagoner 规则不保护内部人。”\n14\n15\n16 我认为，对于这一一般性命题确实毫无争议。同样也不存在争议的是，根据《破产法典》第 101(31) 条，Mei Guo 和 HK USA 均为债务人的内部人。\n17\n18\n19\n20\n21 我们收到的论点反而是，好吧，即便如此，即便他们是内部人，也即便存在这一内部人例外，反诉被告会将案件解读为，该例外仅适用于委托人与代理人关系的情形，在该情形中，被告是公司的代理人，而代理人的不法行为将归责于公司；并且必须是代理人主要从事不法行为，而不能是债务人或原告。——\n22\n23\n24\n25\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 1683 提交日期 04/20/23 录入日期 04/20/23 11:01:19 第 76 页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵） - April 11, 2023 76\n\n1 代理人是公司的代理人，且代理人的不法行为将归责于公司，并且必须是该代理人主要从事不法行为，而不能是债务人或原告。不能反过来。\n2\n3\n4\n5\n我认为，该论点无论在法律上还是事实上都是错误的。在法律上，我认为判例法对内部人例外没有此类限制。律师及其书面材料中援引的案件并不适用于个人债务人的情形，且暂且不论 Wagoner 规则是否甚至适用于个人债务人。但他们援引的案件显然不适用于本案，因为债务人不是公司。\n\n但是，撇开这一点不谈，其他案件明确表明，这不是一项要求。我们在书面陈述中援引并讨论的案件之一是 Butler 案，该案是马萨诸塞州破产法院于 2015 年作出的案件。该案是一个个人的第 7 章案件，该个人是一家牙科诊所公司的唯一股东和董事。作为唯一股东和决策者，债务人授权支付——我认为是——向其妻子支付的一笔据称过高的薪水，其妻子是该公司的雇员。\n\n作为对此的回应，不法行为人不得因其不法行为获利——\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 1683 提交日期 04/20/23 录入日期 04/20/23 11:01:19 第 77 页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵） - April 11, 2023\n\n1 原则和 Wagoner 规则被提出。争点是，鉴于转让受领人、即被告是债务人的妻子，因此属于内部人，内部人抗辩是否适用。\n2\n3\n4\n在该案中，尤其值得注意的是，完全没有任何指称认为债务人的妻子仅仅是该实体的一名雇员、仅仅领取薪水，却作为债务人的代理人以某种方式导致其从事该不法行为。事实上，情况恰恰相反。法院指出，债务人是控制者。债务人是决定支付薪水的人。然而，内部人例外仍然适用，因为妻子——接受该项转让的他的妻子——是法定内部人。因此，我认为该案具有指导意义。\n\n我还要指出的是，如果您查看一些就控制权以及为适用该例外而被告是否对债务人拥有足够控制权进行分析的案件——TS Employment 案即为一例——这些案件涉及非法律规定的内部人。因此，所进行的分析是为了确定第 101(31) 条中有关控制权的表述是否被触发。\n\n而本案中并无争议。没有人主张 HK USA 和 Mei Guo 不是——\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 1683\n提交日期 04/20/23\n录入日期 04/20/23 11:01:19\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵） - April 11, 2023\n\n1\n\n郭文贵（Ho Wan Kwok）— 2023年4月11日 78\n\n法定内部人。简言之——法官阁下，我不想在所有这些问题上花费太多时间。但有一个值得指出的案件，即反诉被告在其书面文件中援引的 Madoff 案，即 United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York（美国纽约南区联邦破产法院）2011 年的案件。再次说明，该案非常明确地阐述了内部人例外，并称同等过错（in pari delicto）规则或 Wagoner 规则不适用于针对内部人的主张。在该案中，法院最终裁定内部人例外适用，因此，同等过错原则和 Wagoner 规则不适用于 Bernie Madoff（伯尼·麦道夫）的投资咨询公司 BLMIS（伯尼·麦道夫投资咨询公司）针对某些协助 Madoff 实施欺诈的高级职员、董事和合规经理提出的主张。而且我只是——我看不出本案有任何不同。即使债务人是其空壳骗局的主要策划者，当然他确实是，您所要做的就是以 Kwok 替代 Bernie Madoff，以 HK USA（美国HK公司）和 Mei Guo（郭美）替代这些作为被告的高级职员、董事和合规经理，便会得出同样的结果。最后我想指出的是——我不会讨论所有案件，但我很乐意进一步讨论其中更多案件。但关于这一内部人例外，我最后想指出的是，在某种程度上，如内部人例外要求我们证明该内部人共谋或确实实施了某些不当行为，\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 1683 提交 04/20/23 录入 04/20/23 11:01:19 第79页，共\n\n郭文贵— 2023年4月11日 79\n\n内部人例外要求我们证明该内部人共谋或确实实施了某些不当行为，我认为说我们没有主张这一点并不准确。事实上，我认为我们已经作出了充分至极的主张。我认为，如果您查看反诉以及本案整体背景和反诉本身，郭美和美国HK公司在协助债务人实施这一隐匿资产以逃避债权人的空壳骗局中起到了关键作用。这在反诉中随处可见。在反诉第27段中，我们提及郭美签署转让文书，以 $1 的对价将 HK International（HK国际公司）的所有权据称从债务人转让给她本人。第30段提及她。她以公司唯一成员的身份签署了美国HK公司的有限责任公司协议。我们继续看。第58段、第61段，我们谈及郭美在 Ostrager 法官（奥斯特拉格法官）面前的证言，后者认定该证言——认定其“在任何方面均不足采信”。她在试图维持债务人与美国HK公司之间相互独立的假象方面起到了关键作用，以使他能够将其资产置于债权人可追索范围之外。事实上，Ostrager 法官在其藐视法庭裁定中认定，债务人的女儿没有提出任何\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 1683 提交 04/20/23 录入 04/20/23 11:01:19 第80页，共\n\n郭文贵— 2023年4月11日\n\n80\n\n证据证明她对 Lady May（“Lady May”号）行使支配和控制，也未证实她取得 Lady May 的占有，“除作为一种手段，使 Lady May 免于被其父亲的债权人扣押外”。\n\n因此，我——这一切都载于反诉中。因此，我认为，不可能对以下事实提出争议：即在我们被要求主张内部人被告存在某些不当行为的范围内，我们的主张已绰绰有余。\n\n同等过错和 Wagoner 规则在此不适用的第二个理由，法官阁下，是第544条问题。而且，法官阁下，我现在将说明与第544条问题有关的关键要点。\n\n但我想向法院指出的一点是，许多同样的论点已在 PJR 书面陈述中提出；如果法院有一个参考点会有所帮助，我将讨论的许多内容也可见于受托人就 PJR 动议提交的答复第23至25段左右。该文件载于 ECF 101。不过，再次说明，我——我们不需要援引该文件。我只是为法院的便利而提及这一点。\n\n因此，反诉被告提出的论点是——我认为他们会承认，在根据《破产法典》第544(a)条提出主张的范围内，该主张按定义即是代表债权人提出的主张。\n\n因此，律师在其陈述一开始所说的一点是，我们是站在债务人的立场提出这些主张，包括我们在第2和第3罪名项中的主张。嗯，在我们根据第544(a)条提出这些主张的范围内，情况完全不是这样，而我们确实是根据该条提出的。\n\n并且，在他们的书面文件中——我相信反诉被告援引了一两个案件，对能否根据第544(a)条提出另我（alter ego）主张提出质疑。我马上会向法院援引大量权威资料，证明可以这样做。\n\n但我首先想指出的是，《破产法典》第544(a)条与第544(b)条之间存在区别。第544(b)条，即反诉被告援引的 Harrison v. Soroof 案中所援引的条款——那是一个原告特别主张其拟提出的主张产生于第544(b)条而非如法院所指出的第544(a)条的案件。当然，两者的区别至关重要，\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 1683 提交 04/20/23 录入 04/20/23 11:01:19 第82页，共\n\n郭文贵— 2023年4月11日\n\n因为第544(a)条规定：“受托人自案件开始时起，不论受托人或任何债权人是否知情，均享有……的权利和权力”，随后其规定：“或可撤销债务人财产的任何转让，或债务人所承担的、可由……撤销的任何义务”，然后列举若干类型的债权人，其中第二项为判决债权人。\n\n因此，关键措辞是“……的权利和权力”，因为这并不如反诉被告所称的那样，仅限于传统的撤销权诉讼。受托人在案件开始时享有判决债权人的权利和权力。\n\n根据 Delaware（特拉华州）法律，判决债权人的权利和权力——我认为这并无争议——包括提出另我主张的能力。如我所述，这与第544(b)条不同，后者并不包含关于债权人权利和权力的同样措辞，而仅涉及传统的撤销权诉讼。\n\n反诉被告援引的案件之一几乎完全切中要害，并证明了受托人的论点。这是 Titan Real Estate（泰坦房地产）案，即 In Re Flanagan，United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut（美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院）2007 年的案件。该案中，受托人试图提出一项另我\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 1683 提交 04/20/23 录入 04/20/23 11:01:19 第83页，共\n\n郭文贵— 2023年4月11日\n\n主张，但如法院所指出，其明确选择不根据第544条提出该主张。法院称：“值得注意的是，Titan”——而且——Titan 实际上是我相信受托人所拥有主张的受让人。法院称：“值得注意的是，Titan 此时拒绝主张《法典》第544条项下受托人的任何‘假定债权人’权利和权力，尽管如下文更充分讨论的那样，该法定依据为 Titan 核心主张提供了最连贯的基础。”\n\n如果您继续查看该意见书的下文，法院对其含义作了进一步阐述。法院所说的是——法院是在说受托人本可以根据第544(a)条提出其主张。\n\n法院称：“第544(a)(2)条下的根本问题”，即判决债权人的权利，“是受托人所主张的请求权是否为执行债权人依适用法律所享有的请求权。Titan 至少两项主张——另我主张和推定信托主张——是执行债权人可根据 Connecticut（康涅狄格州）法律提起的主张”，而该州法律正是该案所涉法律。\n\n法院继而表示，因此，该另我主张似乎比根据第541(a)(1)条更自然、更有效地建立在第544(a)(2)条之上。\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 1683 提交 04/20/23 录入 04/20/23 11:01:19 第84页，共\n\n郭文贵— 2023年4月11日 84\n\n随后法院称，这是关键措辞：这主要是因为，代表一名假定的、未获清偿的判决债权人主张确认推定信托或不顾独立法人实体的请求权（原文如此），即另我主张，不受其在债务人手中所受任何衡平法缺陷——例如同等过错障碍——的限制。\n\n因此，该案法院提供了如何提出这些主张的路线图，而该方式显然不会约束受托人。哦，顺便说一句，这也回应了我开头所说的问题，即从政策角度而言，将同等过错原则适用于这些事实毫无意义，因为这会鼓励债务人干脆将其全部资产隐藏在空壳公司中，然后其回应便会是同等过错；你们无法将其追回。但根据第544(a)条，你们可以追回。\n\n而在 Titan 案中，结果表明，受托人唯一不能提出这些主张的原因是，在这些主张被转让给受托人后，诉讼时效届满。本案并非如此。\n\n如法官阁下必然知悉，Titan 法院的分析与您在 In Re Farrell 案中于 February 12th of 2021 作出的裁决一致。该案，我相信法院对其记忆会比我根据阅读所了解的更为清楚，涉及一名受托人寻求对债务人与其儿子共同持有的银行账户强制执行。\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 1683 提交 04/20/23 录入 04/20/23 11:01:19 第85页，共\n\n郭文贵— 2023年4月11日\n\n我相信法官阁下裁定，受托人有权根据第544(a)条和适用的康涅狄格州法律这样做。\n\n该意见书称：“只要适用的非破产法律赋予一种通常可供判决留置权债权人行使的诉权，第544(a)条就应被解释为赋予破产财产代表主张该请求权的诉讼资格。”\n\n因此，这正是我们这里的情形。我们拥有判决债权人可就另我或受益所有权提出的主张。根据适用法律，受托人现可根据第544(a)条主张该请求权。\n\n还有许多其他案件，法官阁下，已经裁定受托人可根据第544(a)条提出另我主张。本辖区的另一案件是 David X. Manners Co.（大卫·X·曼纳斯公司）案。该案为 United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut（美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院）November 27, 2018 的案件。我不会详细讨论，但该案确立了可根据第544(a)条提出另我主张这一原则。\n\nIn Re Archdiocese of Milwaukee，United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin（美国威斯康星东区联邦破产法院）2012 年。该案载于 483 B.R. 693。也是同样的结论。\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 1683 提交 04/20/23 录入 04/20/23 11:01:19\n\n郭文贵— 2023年4月11日\n\n1 In Re Wolf, 595 B.R. 735 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2018)。\n\n2 同样的裁定。\n\n3 In Re Howland, 516 B.R. 163 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2014)。同理。\n\n5 因此，法官阁下，为概述该问题，我认为，作为一项政策问题，in pari delicto 原则和 Wagoner 规则在此不适用。这些例外情况证明了这一点，因为两者在此也均适用。内部人例外适用，本案请求亦系根据第 544(a) 条提出。\n\n11 反诉被告就第 2 项和第 3 项罪名提出的下一项论点涉及 Lady May（Lady May）约定。Lady May 约定基于若干理由，并不妨碍受托人寻求的任何救济。我要首先指出的是，受托人无可争议地并非该约定的一方，且基于我将讨论的理由，他亦不受该约定约束。\n\n18 但在我讨论订立该约定的情形、为何受托人不受其约束以及所有这些问题之前，存在一个我认为在某种程度上使所有这些问题均无必要的门槛问题，即该约定从其表面来看，即使假定其对受托人具有约束力，也根本不涉及受托人在其反诉第 2 项和第 3 项中寻求的救济。\n\n25 这是因为该约定的核心段落是第 12 段，而第 12 段仅禁止债务人——再次说明，我是在假定债务人的义务在此会延伸至受托人的前提下——但其仅禁止债务人采取某些积极行为。\n\n案号 22-50073 文书 1683 提交 04/20/23 登记 04/20/23 11:01:19 第 87 页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—April 11, 2023\n\n1 其具体规定，PAX（PAX）、债务人、委员会以及债权人，即作为协议当事方的两名债权人，“不得采取任何行为”，随后规定，“以主张、设立、完善或执行对托管资金的任何权利、所有权、留置权或其他权益”。\n\n12 在此，我认为重要的是聚焦于受托人在第 2 项和第 3 项中实际寻求的救济。在第 2 项中，受托人请求法院裁定，HK USA（HK USA）是且始终是债务人的另一个自我，包括在债务人与 HK USA 订立该约定之时。\n\n18 现在，按照该理论，由于 HK USA 是债务人的另一个自我，因此 HK USA 及其所有财产依法均属破产财产。这包括属于 HK USA 财产的 37 million。\n\n22 本案并非受托人试图通过撤销诉讼追回 $37 million，或将其作为损害赔偿予以追偿的案件。就第 2 项和第 3 项而言——或者——我现在谈的是第 2 项，受托人只是\n\n案号 22-50073\n文书 1683\n提交 04/20/23\n登记 04/20/23 11:01:19\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—April 11, 2023\n\n1 寻求确认，属于 HK USA 财产的 $37 million，自其进入 HK USA 手中之时起即为且始终为破产财产，因为 HK USA 是债务人的另一个自我。\n\n5 第三项反诉请求类似，受托人所寻求的裁定是，债务人以及现今的破产财产实益拥有 HK USA 的股权。换言之，HK USA 由 Mei Guo（郭美）所有这一事实——这一观念——是虚构的，而实际上，债务人始终是 HK USA 的实益所有人。这是作为我们另一个自我主张的备选主张提出的。\n\n12 但同样，受托人并未特别就 $37 million 寻求任何救济。若受托人在该项主张中胜诉，那么他将成为 HK USA 股权的所有人。$37 million 不会去任何地方。它仍然是 HK USA 的财产。但现在债务人拥有 HK USA 本身。\n\n18 事实上，我最近曾在另一问题中站在相反的一方，其中根据一项协议发生财产转让，但有一项协议声称禁止将财产从一个实体转让给另一个实体。财产本身并未被转让，而是通过转让拥有该财产的公司的股权权益，在上层发生转让。这行不通，因为所涉协议只谈及财产本身，而未谈及上一级交易。这正是此处的情形。\n\n4 因此，即使——如我所说，基于我刚才讨论的理由，我认为该约定第 12 段并不涉及这些主张。但即使涉及，该约定本身基于至少两个理由也不对受托人具有约束力。\n\n9 第一个理由——而该论点在我们将于 20 日审理的简易判决动议中有更详细讨论。这是 ECF 186。\n\n12 但是，受托人的立场是，HK USA 与债务人是且始终是另一个自我，包括在订立该约定之时。若果真如此，则二者并无区别。他们是同一主体。\n\n17 而且，合同法的一项明确规则，明确的合同法规则是，任何人不得与自己订立合同。因此，如果 HK USA 和债务人是同一主体，而他们声称订立了一项约定或协议，约束彼此为对方采取行动，则该约定或协议依法不可执行。我们在 SJ 动议——即我们的简易判决动议——中援引了若干关于此点的案件。由于该动议不属于此处的记录，我将说明这些案件。\n\n25 Wilbanks v. Simmons, 2013 WL 9542015。这是 Western District of Texas（得克萨斯州西区）2013 年的案件。“债务人与协议相对方”——好吧，该案——概述该案要点，法院称债务人与协议相对方是另一个自我，因此该协议“无法律效力”。\n\n6 另一案件是 Animazing Entertainment（Animazing Entertainment）案。即 88 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)。“根据纽约的合同成立法，已有确定结论，合同必须有两方当事人。如果其中一方缺失，则法律交易的形式构成要件之一即不存在。”\n\n12 Persky v. Bank of America National Association, 261 N.Y. 212。这是 1933 年的案件。同一概念。\n\n14 Moore v. Denslow, 14 Conn. 235。同一概念。\n\n15 Lavitman v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 2015 WL 728187。这是 Massachusetts（马萨诸塞州）州法院 2015 年的案件。同一概念。任何人不得与自己订立合同。\n\n18 最后，广为人知的论著 Williston on Contracts, Section 3, Part 2, 4th Edition。同一概念。\n\n20 因此，为本分析之目的，假定受托人与 HK USA 是另一个自我，则该约定在二者之间不可执行。而且，仅因该约定存在其他某些当事方——即存在其他当事方——这一点并不会改变结论。因为法院面前的问题，当然，是它是否\n\n案号 22-50073 文书 1683 提交 04/20/23 登记 04/20/23 11:01:19 第 91 页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—April 11, 2023\n\n1 ——即该约定是否可以对债务人执行，而对方主张这使其适用于受托人。问题并不是该约定是否可以对委员会、PAX 或任何其他人执行。\n\n另一理由，即我们在书面文件中花费篇幅讨论该约定为何不对受托人具有约束力的理由，是判例法中存在一项例外。一般规则是——许多法院认为，通常债务人订立合同或协议后，该合同或协议对随后被任命的受托人具有约束力。但几乎所有这些案件都讨论了该一般规则的例外，包括反诉被告援引的案件。\n\n例如，他们援引的 Feldman（费尔德曼）案特别指出，若存在撤销所涉协议或命令的特殊理由，结果可能不同。在该案中，法院指出，当事方并未主张任何一方存在导致所涉命令作出的欺诈或恶意行为。\n\nEastern Airlines（东方航空）案、In Re Ionosphere Clubs 案中亦有类似表述，我相信反诉被告也援引了该案。法院指出，不存在不当行为的指控。\n\n在此，存在大量关于不当行为的指控。坦率地说，我认为在\n\n案号 22-50073\n文书 1683\n提交 04/20/23\n登记 04/20/23 11:01:19\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—April 11, 2023\n\n1 此阶段，将该约定称为濒临——即使并非完全构成——对法院的欺诈，完全是恰如其分的。\n\n3 概述所发生事件的经过，早在 2022 年春季，债务人急于避免法院解除自动中止，以允许 PAX 在 Ostrager（奥斯特拉格）法官面前寻求救济。HK USA 和 Mei Guo 对协助债务人实现该目标起到了关键作用。\n\n9 并且，再次说明，我们的指控——为本讨论之目的我们假定其为真——是，HK USA 是且始终是一个幌子，是债务人的另一个自我，并非独立实体，没有独立存在，而仅仅是债务人用以实现其意愿的工具。\n\n15 HK USA 提交了一份声明，试图使中止动议失去意义。这载于我们反诉第 75 段。HK USA 提起了本对抗程序，以进一步推进针对所有人实施的骗局。这载于我们反诉第 76 段。\n\n20 随后，当然，在 April 13th，就解除中止动议举行了听证会。该事项在我们反诉第 79 至 81 段中有所讨论。在该听证会上，法院作出若干评论后，颇为有趣的是，债务人的律师，即当时的 Brown Rudnick（Brown Rudnick），提出了随后将根据该约定提交的 $37 million 保证金。\n\n案号 22-50073\n文书 1683\n提交 04/20/23\n登记 04/20/23 11:01:19\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）—April 11, 2023\n\n1 休庭 15 分钟后，突然之间，HK USA 就有了 $37 million 用以提交保证金。\n\n4 因此，如果 HK USA 是债务人的另一个自我，则整个行为是对本法院及所有相关人员的欺诈，因为债务人只是利用其单纯工具，动用本应属于其、由 HK USA 持有的资金，并假装这些资金并非如此，假装存在独立性，并假装 HK USA 并非真的只是在遵照他的指示行事。\n\n11 我认为，若法院当时已经认定 HK USA 和债务人是另一个——是另一个自我，则没有人会订立该协议。我也不认为法院会批准该协议。\n\n15 因此，在这些情形下，我认为——如果曾有任何案件应适用“占有中的债务人所作协议对受托人具有约束力”这一一般规则的例外，那就是本案。\n\n19 我不会详细讨论，但我想提请法院注意该案，因为我认为它非常重要且切中要点。我们在书面文件中援引的 Alma Energy（阿尔玛能源）案，我认为律师也提到了该案。这是 Eastern District of Kentucky（肯塔基州东区）2010 年的案件。它恰好分析了这类问题。\n\n25 该案中的债务人，其唯一成员也是一名\n\n1 债务人的请求权人。\n并且已达成一项和解\n2 协议。\n法院表示，等一下，这\n3 听起来像是自我交易。\n有人\n4 控制着债务人，而后又有一名请求权人，并且\n5 随后达成了一项交易。\n6 法院表示，将对此\n7 进行更严格的审查。\n法院注意到，\n8 被告属于内部人。\n法院还注意到与\n9 债务人的第11章案件有关的可疑情形，\n10 包括未作出必要披露，包括\n11 债务人的律师此前曾在法院代理另一方，\n12 包括可能存在欺诈。\n鉴于\n13 上述全部情况，法院最终裁定，在该等\n\n情况下，该协议，即该和解协议，对受托人不具有约束力。\n\n阁下，我最后想就该项约定本身指出的是，在约定中载明一项明确规定其对受托人具有约束力的措辞是常见的，尤其是，我认为，在本案这种债务人在管理其第11章程序方面严重遇到困难的案件中更是如此。我们这里没有这样的措辞。\n\n我认为，这表明了当事人的意图，尤其是考虑到当时指定受托人的动议尚待裁决，同时还有一项驳回\n\n案件 22-50073\n文件 1683\n提交日期 04/20/23\n录入日期 04/20/23 11:01:19\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— 2023年4月11日\n\n1 案件的动议。\n该约定实际上提及了尚待裁决的\n2 驳回动议，但未提及指定\n3 受托人的动议。\n我认为这很能说明问题。\n4 该约定文本中另一个值得注意的事项是，\n5 根据该约定，债务人\n6 完全无权检查该游艇。\n我认为，\n7 这之所以重要，是因为如果\n8 当事人的意图是让该约定对受托人具有约束力，\n9 那就无法成立，因为受托人当然\n10 享有检查权。\n11 因此，我认为——我已经讲了很多，但\n12 我认为，归根结底，由于上述原因，\n13 存在诸多理由说明该约定并不排除\n14 受托人所寻求的救济。\n15 阁下，我最后要结束说明的一点\n16 是对第五项反诉请求的简要陈述，该请求是\n17 过失请求。\n我认为，重要的是要注意到，该请求\n18 以债务人与HK USA相互独立为前提。\n19 原因在于，这是一个\n20 寻求追偿过失损害赔偿的请求。\n如果HK USA\n21 是债务人的另一个自我，那么就没有理由——那么，\n22 如您所知，债务人拥有HK USA的全部财产，\n23 债务人也没有理由或可能\n24 从HK USA获得赔偿。\n受托人将已拥有\n25 其全部资产。\n案件 22-50073 文件 1683 提交日期 04/20/23 录入日期 04/20/23 11:01:19 第96页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— 2023年4月11日 96 因此，该请求是在备选情况下提出，即在双方并非另一个自我的情形下提出；因此，在HK USA独立行事并且，如您所知，为维护其自身利益而使该游艇留在美国境外的情形下提出。这一点很重要，因为在该备选情形下，这使其不受不法平等抗辩（in pari delicto）和Wagoner规则原则的适用范围约束，因为实施该行为的并非债务人，而是HK USA和Mei Guo（郭美）自行实施。反诉被告所依赖的主要论点是，他们称该请求不能成立，因为此处不存在义务。我认为，此处显然存在义务，原因有几个。在过失的语境中，一方对另一方负有不采取会对其造成损害的行为的义务，包括原告与被告之间存在一种关系，要求被告保护原告的情形。例如，父母与子女关系。这在Hamilton案中有所说明。我相信该案已被援引。当然，在本案中，郭美是债务人的女儿。她知道该约定的存在。而且，就她致使HK USA继续——她知道Ostrager法官的藐视法庭命令存在。而且，就她致使HK USA继续将该游艇留在\n\n案件 22-50073\n文件 1683\n提交日期 04/20/23\n录入日期 04/20/23 11:01:19\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— 2023年4月11日\n\n1 美国水域之外，并因此导致债务人\n2 遭受数亿美元罚款而言，她负有\n3 不这样做的义务。\n4 反诉被告未提及、但同样重要的\n5 另一点是，义务可以依法施加，例如通过\n6 法律，或者例如通过\n7 法院命令。\n8 在本案中，这一点至关重要，因为\n9 Ostrager法官的藐视法庭命令明确适用于HK\n10 USA。\n这在我们的反诉请求第43和44段中有所载明，\n11 该部分讨论Ostrager法官的命令，并称——\n12 这指的是当时Ostrager法官作出的\n13 2020年10月限制令——该命令适用于HK USA，\n14 因为其为Lady May的登记所有人。\n该\n15 约定本身依其条款规定，适用于\n16 Kwok先生和/或Lady May的登记所有人。\n17 当时Lady May的登记所有人\n18 毫无疑问是HK USA。\n因此，Ostrager法官的该项\n19 命令本身施加了这项义务，并使HK USA知悉该义务。\n20 HK USA藐视该命令，明知后果将是\n21 债务人遭受数亿美元\n22 藐视法庭罚款，故HK USA应就过失承担责任。\n23 阁下，我认为这涵盖了我的陈述。\n我\n24 希望做到充分全面。\n我为占用法院大量\n25 时间表示歉意。\n我乐意回答任何问题。\n不过\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— 2023年4月11日 98 我目前的陈述至此结束。\n\n法庭：我目前认为没有任何问题。\n\n巴塞特先生：谢谢。\n\n法庭：谢谢。律师，您是否有任何回应？\n\n德拉费拉先生：记录在案，我是Sam Della Fera（萨姆·德拉费拉），代表动议方的Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi（基耶萨、沙希尼安及贾恩托马西律师事务所）。我仅想指出，Ostrager法官的命令并未对郭美施加任何法定或其他义务。也许对HKI或HK USA施加了义务。今天双方均以这两个名称提及它。当然，郭女士不负有任何义务。至于认为父母对孩子的义务会反向成为子女对父母的义务，受托人未就该主张提供任何依据，阁下。因此，正如我所辩称以及您听取律师所述，我们主张，为本项反诉请求之目的，该独立方不负有任何义务。作为备选，HKI作为独立第三方，对债务人不负有任何义务。即使Ostrager法官的命令施加了任何义务，该义务也不及于郭女士。郭女士作为债务人的女儿，对债务人也不因Ostrager法官的命令以及将Lady May送回美国领海的必要性而负有任何义务。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 1683 提交日期 04/20/23 录入日期 04/20/23 11:01:19 第98页，共\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 1683 提交日期 04/20/23 106 录入日期 04/20/23 11:01:19 第99页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— 2023年4月11日 99\n1 美国水域。谢谢，阁下。\n2 法庭：谢谢。\n\n还有其他事项吗，巴塞特律师？\n\n巴塞特先生：没有，阁下。谢谢。\n\n法庭：好的。谢谢。\n\n如我认为双方律师在辩论中都已指出的，对对抗程序的驳回动议确实会对尚待裁决的简易判决动议产生影响。我已审阅你们的书面意见，并听取了今天的辩论。我认为我已基本熟悉你们的论点。鉴于你们今天在法庭记录中所述内容，我需要花一点时间再次审视这些论点，并重新审阅你们提到的一些案件。我可以说，我已经审阅了相当多的那些案件。\n\n我相信，我很快将能够作出裁定。我确实认为双方对争点进行了充分书面陈述，并为各自当事人作出了充分论辩。但我将很快就此作出裁定。\n\n对于驳回动议，是否还有任何人希望提出其他问题？好的。那么，驳回动议将取决于对辩论中所提出事项的进一步审阅，其中大部分事项，如我所说，我已熟悉，并且我相信已在书面材料中提出；随后，我将很快作出裁定，除非在目前这一时间点发生我尚不知悉的事情。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 1683 提交日期 04/20/23 录入日期 04/20/23 11:01:19 第100页，共\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— 2023年4月11日 100 好吗？我相信这结束了今天Kwok案件及对抗程序中的全部事项。今天休庭前，是否有人——是否还有人希望讨论其他事项？也许。哦，实际上有。今天的日程上没有该事项，但是——感谢您的提醒。我们下周将就若干事项举行听证，包括债务人主张其第五修正案权利的问题。Brown Rudnick（布朗·鲁德尼克律师事务所）我认为于昨日，也许是昨晚，提交了一项加速审理动议。我的意思是，我现在可以很快查看。我不知道受托人是否计划对该动议作出回应。但Brown Rudnick作为现任刑事辩护律师，正寻求在下周安排一次听证，与关于第五修正案特权问题的听证一并进行，实质上是就强制履行命令动议及Rule 2004传票寻求中止。因此，该动议实际上是——是昨晚提交的。哦，我不确定具体时间。我不应这样说。我很快就能查明。我倾向于也将该事项排期至下周二，但如果受托人希望有机会回应该动议，我可以给你们一些时间，不会是很长时间，但我可以给你们\n\n案件 22-50073\n文件 1683\n提交日期 04/20/23\n录入日期 04/20/23 11:01:19\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）— 2023年4月11日\n\n1 一些时间作出回应。\n我不知道你们是否——该动议\n2 于昨晚5点——6:00提交。\n好吗？\n所以是24小时前。\n3 德斯平斯先生：\n阁下，是否可以\n4 因为我们在20日也已有一次听证，\n5 将该事项安排在20日审理？\n或者——\n6 法庭：\n让我看一下。\n7 德斯平斯先生：\n好的。\n8 法庭：\n也许我对18日记错了。\n9 18日有一些事项，20日也有一项事项。\n10 所以你可能是对的，Despins受托人。\n只是\n11 我面前有太多事情和日期，我——我可能\n12 说错了。\n所以请给我一点时间。\n13 德斯平斯先生：\n我理解这种感觉。\n但我认为\n14 20日是就第2项罪名的简易判决动议举行听证。\n15 （律师协商）\n16 法庭：\n20日上午9:30是\n17 就第2项罪名的简易判决动议举行听证。\n债务人的\n18 刑事辩护律师提交的动议——看来Brown Rudnick\n19 在纽约南区（Southern District of New York）的程序中代理债务人——\n20 寻求中止该——\n21 强制履行程序。\n但我认为那可能——让我看一下\n22 18日。\n是的，强制履行动议安排在——\n23 不过那是UBS履行事项。\n请给我一点时间。\n24 昨晚提交了太多诉状。\n我\n25 需要查看片刻。\n\n郭文贵（Ho Wan Kwok）—2023年4月11日 102 身份不明的发言人：是的。那是在18日，法官阁下，那个——法院：对。身份不明的发言人：是的。法院：我说的就是瑞银集团（UBS）。此外——18日还有若干事项。请给我一点时间。我正在调取一份文件。因此，关于加速举行听证的动议也于昨晚提交，该动议与请求暂缓并强制债务人遵从《破产程序规则》第2004条审查传票的动议有关。该加速举行听证的动议，编号为1651，是受托人请求发布说明理由命令的动议，要求说明债务人为何不应因未遵从1月20日命令而被认定藐视法庭；该事项定于2023年4月18日举行听证。因此，这与简易判决动议是相互独立且不同的。我所提出的问题与驳回动议和简易判决动议无关。这些是郭先生的刑事辩护律师昨晚就受托人请求发布说明理由命令、要求说明债务人为何不应被认定藐视法庭的动议所提交的动议。现在，我们——大家都记得，受托人提交了——抱歉。债务人就该动议提交了一份答复。案号 22-50073 文件 1683 提交日期 04/20/23 登记日期 04/20/23 11:01:19 第102页，共\n\n郭文贵（Ho Wan Kwok）—2023年4月11日 103 其主张第五修正案特权。但债务人的刑事辩护律师昨晚提交的这项动议，请求于下周二加速举行听证，与——德斯平斯先生（Mr. Despins）：是的。法院：——依我之见，与受托人请求发布说明理由命令的动议有关。德斯平斯先生：很可能如此，法官阁下。因此，我们的想法是，为给我们更多时间作出答复，如果可以的话，我们可将其改至20日。法院：那么，我认为你们必须取得布朗·拉德尼克（Brown Rudnick）对此的同意。我的意思是，他们请求在——我并不——我不——我不知道刑事诉讼中发生了什么，但他们请求将其昨天下午、昨晚、24小时前提交的动议的听证，与受托人请求说明债务人为何不应被认定藐视法庭的动议一并安排。明白吗？我们都已经知道发生了什么。债务人在起诉书提出前主张了第五修正案特权。现在已有起诉书。德斯平斯先生：正确。但鉴于两者相互关联——法院：那么，为什么你今晚不问问布朗·拉德尼克他们的立场。如果你们——德斯平斯先生：我们会的。案号 22-50073 文件 1683 提交日期 04/20/23 登记日期 04/20/23 11:01:19 第103页，共\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 1683 提交日期 04/20/23 登记日期 04/20/23 11:01:19 第104页，共\n\n郭文贵（Ho Wan Kwok）—2023年4月11日\n\n法院：——双方都同意可以安排在20日，那就可以安排在20日。没问题。你知道，我们反正已经在这里，所以实际上不会有什么差别。我们或许只是——而且20日的简易判决动议，我想是在9:30开始。我想文件上是这么写的。让我再三核实一下，因为很难把这些事情都理顺。不过我们会这样办。德斯平斯先生：是的，法官阁下。法院：9:30。德斯平斯先生：是的。法院：因此，如果各方同意，如果受托人和布朗·拉德尼克同意将18日关于说明理由命令、关于因郭先生——因债务人未遵从命令而藐视法庭的事项延期至20日，那没有问题。但18日还有其他事项。德斯平斯先生：明白。明白，法官阁下。法院：明白吗？德斯平斯先生：那么，我们将向法庭书记员——法院：是的，请这样做。德斯平斯先生：——发送一封电子邮件，于明天上午提供最新情况。法院：是的。因为我尚未就这项加速举行听证的动议作出裁定，尽管在我们今天——今天下午就这些听证出庭之前，该动议已提请我注意。明白吗？那么，如果你们就延期达成协议，我希望——如果你们达成协议，可以举行加速听证并将其延期至4月20日，那么我认为你们仍须最迟于18日就实体动议提交某种答复。明白吗？德斯平斯先生：是的，法官阁下。法院：好。我认为，为使法院在听证前尽可能了解各方的立场，我希望如此办理。明白吗？德斯平斯先生：法官阁下，我能否请问，我是否可以通过 Zoom 参加该听证？我不会进行辩论。巴塞特先生（Mr. Bassett）会进行辩论。但我可以通过 Zoom 参与吗？法院：可以。德斯平斯先生：好的。谢谢您，法官阁下。法院：好。我想这就结束了今天日程上的所有事项，因此现在休庭。法庭书记员：全体起立。现在休庭。（程序于下午5:45结束。）案号 22-50073 文件 1683 提交日期 04/20/23 登记日期 04/20/23 11:01:19 第105页，共\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 1683\n提交日期 04/20/23\n登记日期 04/20/23 11:01:19\n\n郭文贵（Ho Wan Kwok）—2023年4月11日\n\n本人，CHRISTINE FIORE（克里斯廷·菲奥雷），认证电子法庭记录员兼誊写员，证明上述内容系从上述案件程序的官方电子录音中制作的准确誊本。\n\n2023年4月18日\nChristine Fiore（克里斯廷·菲奥雷），CERT","key_entities":["Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Despins","Guo","Je","Paul Hastings","CIPA","Luc Despins"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":12,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":19,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":101,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":186,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1637,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":30927,"status":"published","published_at":"2023-04-20 00:00:00","created_at":"2023-04-20","updated_at":"2026-08-23 22:36:51"}