{"id":"court_ctb_1724_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":1724,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2023-04-28","title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION | -------------------------------------------","summary_zh":"受托人申请批准和解协议的动议 —— Ho Wan Kwok 破产案（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo），CTB 22-50073 ECF #1724（2023-04-28立案）。第 11 章受托人 Luc A. Despins 依据《联邦破产诉讼规则》第 9019 条提出动议，请求法院批准与 Clark Hill PLC 律所及 Thomas K. Ragland 达成的和解协议，以了结债务人此前因网络黑客攻击及法律执业疏忽提起的索赔诉讼。","summary_en":"Trustee's Motion to Approve Settlement Agreement — In re Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo / Guo Wengui), CTB 22-50073 ECF #1724 (filed Apr 28, 2023). Chapter 11 Trustee Luc A. Despins moved pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 for entry of an order approving a settlement agreement with law firm Clark Hill PLC and Thomas K. Ragland to resolve the Debtor's legal malpractice and cyberattack-related litigation.","body_en":"#### **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| ----------------------------------------------------------- | x | |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|-------------------------|\n| In re: | :
: | Chapter 11 |\n| 1
HO WAN KWOK,
et al., | :
:
: | Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |\n| Debtors. | :
: | (Jointly Administered) |\n| ----------------------------------------------------------- | x | |\n\n#### **MOTION OF CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR ENTRY OF ORDER, PURSUANT TO BANKRUPTCY RULE 9019, APPROVING SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WITH CLARK HILL PLC**\n\nLuc A. Despins, in his capacity as the Chapter 11 Trustee (the \"Trustee\") appointed in the above-captioned chapter 11 case (the \"Chapter 11 Case\") of Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\" or \"Plaintiff\"), respectfully submits this motion (the \"Motion\"), pursuant to Rule 9019(a) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the \"Bankruptcy Rules\") and Rule 9019-1(a) of the Local Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure for the United States Bankruptcy Court District of Connecticut (the \"Local Rules\"), for entry of an order, substantially in the form attached hereto as **Exhibit 1** (the \"Proposed Order\"), approving the settlement agreement (the \"Settlement Agreement\"), attached as Exhibit A to the Proposed Order, between the Trustee, Thomas K. Ragland, and Clark Hill PLC (collectively, the \"Parties\"). In support of this Motion, the Trustee respectfully represents as follows:\n\n1 The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and the Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\n#### **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**\n\n1. This Court has jurisdiction to consider the Motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334 and the *Standing Order of Reference* from the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. This is a core proceeding within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b).\n\n2. Venue in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.\n\n3. The bases for the relief requested herein are Bankruptcy Rule 9019(a) and Local Rule 9019-1(a).\n\n#### **BACKGROUND**\n\n#### **I. Clark Hill Litigation**\n\n4. On September 19, 2019, the Debtor filed a complaint (the \"Complaint\") against his former counsel Clark Hill PLC (\"Clark Hill\") and Thomas K. Ragland, a Member of Clark Hill (together with Clark Hill, the \"Defendants\") in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia alleging malpractice and seeking damages arising from a cyber incident involving Clark Hill's computer server resulting in the alleged public dissemination of the Debtor's asylum application information on the internet (the \"Action\").2\n\n5. The Debtor alleged that in August 2017, when he engaged Clark Hill as his immigration counsel to assist him in applying for and obtaining political asylum in the United States, he warned Clark Hill of the potential risk of cyberattacks by the Chinese Communist Party (the \"CCP\") in connection with his status as a \"prominent Chinese political dissident.\"3 The Debtor alleged that the Defendants stated that they would take special precautions to prevent such an attack, but allegedly failed to do so, resulting in the Debtor's asylum application\n\n2 The Debtor retained Ari Casper from The Casper Firm, LLC (\"Attorney Casper\") to represent him in the Action, and the Defendants retained Jenner & Block LLP (\"Jenner & Block\") as defense counsel.\n\n3 Notice of Removal, Ex. 1, Compl. ¶ 31, *Wengui v. Clark Hill PLC*, No. 1:19-cv-03195-JEB (D. D.C. Oct. 24, 2019) [Docket No. 1], attached hereto as **Exhibit 2**.\n\ncontaining personal information allegedly being publicly disseminated as a result of a cyberattack on Clark Hill's computer systems (the \"Cyberattack\").\n\n6. The Debtor alleged that, in connection with the Cyberattack and Clark Hill's subsequent withdrawal as his counsel, the Debtor sustained \"damages, injuries, and wrongs . . . as the direct and proximate result and consequence of [D]efendants' multiple serious breaches of their duties to [P]laintiff arising from the firm's legal representation of [P]laintiff.\"4 Specifically, the Complaint brought the following claims for relief against the Defendants: (I) breach of fiduciary duties; (II) breach of contract representation; (III) legal malpractice; and (IV) punitive damages;5 and sought compensatory and punitive damages relating to (i) reputational damages, (ii) risk to the Debtor's safety, (iii) delays to his asylum application, and (iv) lost business opportunities.\n\n7. On October 24, 2019, the Action was removed to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (the \"District Court\").\n\n8. On November 25, 2019, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss (the \"Motion to Dismiss\"), seeking to dismiss all counts of the Complaint with prejudice. 6 On February 20, 2020, the District Court issued its order granting in part and denying in part the Motion to Dismiss (\"MTD Order\").7 The MTD Order dismissed without prejudice count IV for punitive damages entirely, and dismissed the Debtor's claims in regards to counts I-III to the extent they rely on the theory that Defendants' withdrawal as counsel constituted a legally remediable\n\n4 *Id.* ¶ 1.\n\n5 *Id.* ¶¶ 62-65; 89-93.\n\n6 *See* Mot. to Dismiss, *Wengui v. Clark Hill PLC*, No. 1:19-cv-03195-JEB (D. D.C. Nov. 25, 2019) [Docket No. 12], attached hereto as **Exhibit 3**.\n\n7 *See* MTD Order, *Wengui v. Clark Hill PLC*, No. 1:19-cv-03195-JEB (D. D.C. Feb. 20, 2020) [Docket No. 17]. attached hereto as **Exhibit 4**.\n\nwrong. The dismissal reduced the scope and relief of the Action, as the Debtor's allegations that the Defendants had \"breached their contractual, common law, and professional duties\" by \"improperly and wrongfully terminating their representation of [the Debtor]\" for \"no good, sufficient, or valid cause\" could, but for dismissal, have constituted a meaningful basis for the damages sought by the Debtor in the Complaint.8 The District Court allowed the Debtor's claims and attendant damages surrounding the mishandling of the Debtor's confidential information to go forward.9\n\n9. On March 19, 2020, Defendants filed their answer to the Complaint (the \"Answer\"), 10 after which discovery commenced in the Action.\n\n10. On July 26, 2021, the Debtor stated that he was no longer seeking any economic damages in the Action and advised that the only damages he sought were for emotional distress and \"reputational\" harm insofar as they caused the Debtor distress.11 Economic damages had previously constituted a significant basis of the damages sought by the Debtor—as the Debtor asserted in the Complaint that he suffered damages to his business reputation and lost substantial income and business opportunities. 12 With those claims dismissed, the Complaint now only sought damages arising from the alleged emotional distress purportedly caused by the Defendants' alleged mishandling of the Debtor's confidential information.\n\n12 *See* Ex. 2 ¶ 56.\n\n8 Ex. 2 ¶ 87.\n\n9 *See* Mem. Op. at 2, *Wengui v. Clark Hill PLC*, No. 1:19-cv-03195-JEB (D. D.C. Feb. 20, 2020) [Docket No. 18], attached hereto as **Exhibit 5**.\n\n10 Answer, *Wengui v. Clark Hill PLC*, No. 1:19-cv-03195-JEB (D. D.C. Mar. 19, 2020) [Docket No. 20], attached hereto as **Exhibit 6**.\n\n11 *See* Summary Judgment Mot., Defs.' Local Rule 7(h) Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of Summ. J. ¶ 246, *Wengui v. Clark Hill PLC*, No. 1:19-cv-03195-JEB (D. D.C. Feb. 15, 2022) [Docket No. 86] (filed under seal), attached hereto as **Exhibit 7**.\n\n11. On July 28, 2021, Clark Hill took the Debtor's deposition. During his deposition, the Debtor refused, on Fifth Amendment grounds, to answer approximately 28 questions on a variety of issues, including those relating to the Debtor's purported relationship with ACA Capital Group Limited13 and relating to the Debtor's wealth and assets. 14\n\n12. On September 14, 2021, Clark Hill filed a motion to compel the Debtor to answer questions for which he asserted the Fifth Amendment at his deposition, or in the alternative, to permit a negative inference from the Debtor's refusal to answer. 15\n\n13. In response, the Debtor's investigations counsel submitted an *ex parte, in camera* declaration outlining his reasons for advising the Debtor to invoke the privilege.16 The District Court subsequently held an *ex parte* telephonic hearing with the Debtor's investigations counsel where it asked for further explanation for why Defendants' questions, including those connected to the Debtor's financial connections, wealth and assets, would require answers that would violate the Debtor's Fifth Amendment rights. Based on that declaration and hearing, the District Court denied17 Defendants' motion to compel, concluding that the Debtor successfully established the possibility that his answers would be incriminating and thus the Fifth Amendment privilege attached. 18 The District Court declined to decide on the Defendants'\n\n13 The Debtor had previously claimed that the Cyberattack had cost him a multi-million dollar contract with ACA Capital Group Limited.\n\n14 *See* Defs.' Mot. to Compel Dep. Test. or, in the Alternative, for a Negative Inference, ¶ 1, *Wengui v. Clark Hill PLC*, No. 1:19-cv-03195-JEB (D. D.C. Sept. 14, 2021) [Docket No. 67], attached hereto as **Exhibit 8**; Mem. in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. to Compel Dep. Test. or in the Alternative, for a Negative Inference, at 1 [Docket No. 67-1], attached hereto as **Exhibit 8**; Mem. Op. at 1-2, *Wengui v. Clark Hill PLC*, No. 1:19-cv-03195-JEB (D. D.C. Oct. 25, 2021) [Docket No. 78], attached hereto as **Exhibit 9**.\n\n15 *See* Ex. 8.\n\n16 *See* Ex. 9, at 2.\n\n17 Order, *Wengui v. Clark Hill PLC*, No. 1:19-cv-03195-JEB (D. D.C. Oct. 25, 2021) [Docket No. 77], attached hereto as **Exhibit 10**.\n\n18 *See* Ex. 9 at 5.\n\nalternative request for an order for jury instructions ordering that a negative inference be drawn against the Debtor, as the District Court felt that would be premature to do so prior to having heard the parties' arguments and evidence, but the District Court nonetheless noted that that \"[a]n adverse inference [against the Debtor] is likely warranted here.\"19\n\n14. On October 14, 2021, the Debtor moved to revise the District Court's order and reinstate the Debtor's claims related to the Defendants' withdrawal from the representation following the Cyberattack. The District Court denied the Debtor's motion on November 9, 2021 citing his delay in bringing the motion (twenty months after the District Court's ruling on Defendants' motion to dismiss), and the prejudice to Defendants as discovery had closed. The District Court held that prejudice to Defendants was \"particularly true here where [the Debtor], after initially pursuing economic damages, has dropped that request in part apparently because he was obliged to assert Fifth Amendment in response to questions about his business.\"20\n\n15. On February 15, 2022, the Defendants moved for summary judgment [Docket No. 86] (the \"Summary Judgment Motion\"). 21\n\n16. The Summary Judgment Motion asserts that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact as to the elements of damages, causation, and breach of duty in connection with the Debtor's claims. Clark Hill contends that the Debtor cannot establish that the theft of his data is a legal cause of his emotional distress because, among other reasons: (i) he has already placed the relevant portions of the stolen information in the public domain; (ii) the majority of his symptoms relating to his emotional distress were occurring years before the Cyberattack; and\n\n19 Ex. 9 at 8\n\n20 Order, *Wengui v. Clark Hill PLC*, No. 1:19-cv-03195-JEB (D. D.C. Nov. 9, 2021) [Docket No. 82], attached hereto as **Exhibit 12**.\n\n21 Ex 7.\n\n(iii) the Debtor has filed thirteen other lawsuits alleging emotional distress, and thus, Clark Hill's acts cannot be the reasonable cause of any such alleged damages. Clark Hill further argues that the Debtor cannot show that Clark Hill was negligent in its cybersecurity or that it breached its duty of care to the Debtor. Finally, Clark Hill alleges that District of Columbia law does not allow recovery of emotional distress damages for breach of contract or for negligence from professionals as is sought by the Debtor in the Action, which, if such position is correct, eliminates all damages from the case.\n\n17. The Defendants additionally filed a motion *in limine* to exclude three of the expert witnesses whose testimony the Debtor had proffered to satisfy his burden of proving (i) Clark Hill owed a duty of care that it breached; and (ii) the alleged breach legally caused the Debtor emotional distress [Docket No. 85] (the \"Motion *In Limine*\"). 22\n\n18. The Motion *In Limine* seeks to exclude the testimony of the Debtor's cybersecurity expert, Dr. Shane D. Shook, for allegedly failing to employ reliable methodology in forming his opinions, and for failing to establish a standard of care; the Debtor's forensic psychiatrist, Dr. Eric Goldsmith (who the Debtor proffered to demonstrate his emotional distress and its cause), for allegedly failing to describe any methodology beyond using nebulous or abstract terms, and for failing to apply his methodology properly; and the opinions of law professor W. Bradley Wendel—who the Debtor offered to demonstrate that Clark Hill's conduct failed to comply with certain rules of professional conduct—as his proffered testimony allegedly was unreliable and unhelpful to the jury, and as they asserted he lacked the requisite experience to inform his opinions and applied no methodology in coming to his conclusions.\n\n22 Mot. in Lim., *Wengui v. Clark Hill PLC*, No. 1:19-cv-03195-JEB (D. D.C. Feb. 15, 2022) [Docket No. 85] (filed under seal), attached hereto as **Exhibit 11**.\n\n19. Neither the Debtor nor the Trustee has responded to the Summary Judgment Motion or the Motion *In Limine* given the automatic stay, which was triggered by the Debtor's chapter 11 filing on February 15, 2022.\n\n#### **II. Debtor Seeks Chapter 11 Relief**\n\n20. On February 15, 2022 (the \"Petition Date\"), the Debtor filed with the Court a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of title 11 of the United States Code (the \"Bankruptcy Code\"), which relief includes the automatic stay of all judicial proceedings against the Debtor, *see* Bankruptcy Code 362(a)(1), including the Action.\n\n21. On June 15, 2022, the Court entered a memorandum of decision and order [Docket No. 465] (the \"Trustee Order\") directing the United States Trustee to appoint a chapter 11 trustee in the Individual Debtor's chapter 11 case. Pursuant to the Trustee Order, the United States Trustee selected Luc A. Despins as the Trustee. On July 8, 2022, the Court entered an order granting the appointment of the Trustee as the chapter 11 trustee in the Individual Debtor's chapter 11 case [Docket No. 523].\n\n22. The Debtor listed litigation claims, with unknown value, including the Action, as property of his estate.23 In his Statement of Financial Affairs, the Debtor listed the Action as an active litigation in which he was a plaintiff. (*See* Docket No. 77 at 22).24\n\n23. Upon his appointment, the Trustee stepped into the Debtor's shoes with respect to the Action. Moreover, on August 10, 2022, the Court granted the Corporate Governance Rights Order [Docket No. 717], which specifically confirms the Trustee's ownership of and authority\n\n23 *See* Decl. of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok in Supp. of the Chapter 11 Case & Certain Mot. ¶ 32(b) (listing Clark Hill Claims under the \"My Assets\" section) [Docket No. 107].\n\n24 Listing *Guo Wengui (a/k/a Miles Kwok) v. Clark Hill PLC and Thomas Ragland* as a lawsuit to which the Debtor was a party.\n\nover, the Debtor's economic rights and directs the Debtor to \"surrender to the Trustee **all property of the estate** . . . .\" (Corporate Governance Rights Order ¶ 3) (emphasis added).\n\n24. On July 28, 2022, the Trustee filed a motion for Rule 2004 discovery as to various legal and financial advisors to the Debtor, including Clark Hill [Docket No. 637] (the \"Professionals 2004 Motion\"). On August 16, 2022, the Court granted the Trustee's Professionals 2004 Motion [Docket No. 756]. Pursuant to the Court's order, on August 19, 2022, Clark Hill was served with a Rule 2004 Subpoena and document requests attached thereto (the \"Subpoena\"),25 which sought information necessary for the Trustee to both evaluate and exercise control over the Action, which is property of the estate. (*See* Subpoena, Request for Production of Documents). 26\n\n25. Pursuant to the Subpoena, the Trustee received and reviewed pleadings, depositions, expert reports, and other documents from the Action, including the Summary Judgment Motion and the Motion *In Limine* (collectively, the \"Case Documents\"). The Trustee's counsel also spoke repeatedly and extensively with both Jenner & Block (counsel to Clark Hill) as well as Attorney Casper (counsel to the Debtor) regarding the Parties' positions, the merits of the case, the impact of the dismissal and/or withdrawal of certain damages or bases for the claims (including the lack of economic damages), and the potential settlement value of the Action.\n\n25 The Subpoena is attached to Docket No. 1105 as Ex. B.\n\n26 On November 2, 2022, the Debtor filed a motion for protective order (the \"Asylum Application Protective Order\") precluding the disclosure of the Debtor's asylum application (the \"Asylum Application\") to the Trustee (*See* Docket No. 637). On November 16, 2022, the Trustee filed his response to the Asylum Application Protective Order. (*See* Docket No. 1105). On December 9, 2022, the Court issued its order granting in part the Asylum Application Protective Order (the \"Asylum Application Order\"), which ordered Jenner & Block to produce the Summary Judgment Motion to the Trustee and his counsel. (*See* Docket No. 1217). On December 13, 2022, the Debtor filed a motion (the \"Motion for Appeal\") seeking leave to appeal the Asylum Application Order to the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (the \"Connecticut District Court\"). On January 11, 2023, the Connecticut District Court denied the Motion for Appeal.\n\n26. On January 24, 2023, the Court issued an *Order Granting Motion to Hold Debtor in Contempt of Corporate Governance Order* [Docket No. 1372] (the \"Contempt Order\"). The Court found in the contempt order that Debtor has acted in bad faith as a result of his lack of cooperation with the Trustee and with court orders.\n\n27. On March 15, 2023, the Debtor was arrested by federal law enforcement in connection with an indictment of the Debtor alleging various federal crimes.\n\n#### **THE SETTLEMENT**\n\n28. Both Parties have undertaken independent and considered review of the merits of the Action. The Defendants have been litigating these issues continuously since the inception of the Action, while the Trustee has reviewed the Case Documents and pleadings in the matter and considered what claims and damages remained to provide benefit for the Debtor's estate, and what evidence exists to support such claims.\n\n29. Based on their analysis of the relevant merits of their positions and the costs and risk attendant to the Action, the Parties engaged in extensive, good faith, arm's length negotiations over a prolonged period of time. After numerous rounds of proposals and counterproposals regarding the value of the claim over a period of several months, the Parties have entered into the Settlement Agreement, attached as Exhibit 1 to the Proposed Order, in order to resolve the Action. The salient provisions of the Settlement Agreement are as follows: 27\n\n- a. Clark Hill will pay the Debtor's estate a total of \\$499,000 in connection with the relief sought in the Complaint (the \"Settlement Payment\");\n- b. The Trustee agrees to dismissal of the Action with prejudice; and\n- c. Subject to the Trustee's receipt of the Settlement Payment and the Bankruptcy Court's approval of the Settlement Agreement, the Parties agree to mutually\n\n27 To the extent there are any inconsistencies between the summary description of the Settlement Agreement and the terms and conditions of the Settlement Agreement attached hereto, the terms of the Settlement Agreement shall control.\n\nrelease all claims against each other as set forth in more detail in the Settlement Agreement § 5.\n\n#### **RELIEF REQUESTED**\n\n30. By this Motion, the Trustee seeks entry of an order pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019(a) approving the Settlement Agreement in its entirety, and (b) authorizing the Parties to enter into and implement the Settlement Agreement in accordance with the terms thereof.\n\n#### **BASIS FOR THE RELIEF REQUESTED**\n\n#### **I. Standards for Approving the Settlement**\n\n31. The Court may authorize the Trustee to enter into the Settlement Agreement pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019. Compromises and settlements are \"a normal part of the process of, reorganization.\" *Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson,* 390 U.S. 414, 424 (1968) (quoting *Case v. L.A. Lumber Prods. Co.,* 308 U.S. 106, 130 (1939)). To approve a compromise and settlement under Bankruptcy Rule 9019, a bankruptcy court should find that the compromise and settlement is fair and equitable, reasonable, and in the best interests of the debtor's estate. *See, e.g.*, *Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co. of Chi. (In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.),* 156 B.R. 414, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1993.), *aff'd*, 17 F.3d 600 (2d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted); *In re Enron Corp.,* No. 02 Civ. 8489(AKH), 2003 WL 230838, at \\*2 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2003).\n\n32. The decision to approve a particular settlement lies within the sound discretion of the bankruptcy court. *See Nellis v. Shugrue*, 165 B.R. 115, 122-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).\n\n33. In exercising its discretion, the bankruptcy court must make an independent determination that the settlement is fair and reasonable. *Id.* at 122. The court may consider the opinions of the debtor in possession, or trustee, and its counsel that the settlement is fair and reasonable. *Id.*; *see also In re Purofied Down Prods. Corp.*, 150 B.R. 519, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 1724 Filed 04/28/23 Entered 04/28/23 16:10:54 Page 12 of 332\n\nThis discretion should be exercised by the bankruptcy court \"in light of the general public policy favoring settlements.\" *In re Hibbard Brown & Co.*, 217 B.R. 41, 46 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998); *Shugrue*, 165 B.R. at 123 (\"[T]he general rule [is] that settlements are favored and, in fact, encouraged by the approval process outlined above[.]\").\n\n34. Importantly, the \"settlement need not be the best that the debtor could have obtained.\" *In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp.*, 327 B.R. 143, 159 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing *In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co.*, 596 F.2d 1102, 1114 (3d Cir. 1979)). Instead, the court needs only \"canvass the issues and see whether the settlement falls below the lowest point in the range of reasonableness.\" *Id.* (citing *In re W.T. Grant Co.*, 699 F.2d 599, 608 (2d Cir. 1983)); see also *Purofied Down Prods.*, 150 B.R. at 522 (\"[T]he court need not conduct a 'mini-trial' to determine the merits of the underlying [dispute][.]\").\n\n35. In deciding whether a particular settlement falls within the \"range of\n\nreasonableness,\" courts consider the following factors:\n\n(1) the balance between the litigation's possibility of success and the settlement's future benefits; (2) the likelihood of complex and protracted litigation, \"with its attendant expense, inconvenience, and delay\" . . .; (3) the \"paramount interests of the creditors,\" including each affected class's relative benefits \"and the degree to which creditors either do not object to or affirmatively support the proposed settlement\"; (4) whether other parties in interest support the settlement; (5) the \"competency and experience of counsel\" supporting, and \"[t]he experience and knowledge of the bankruptcy court judge\" reviewing, the settlement; (6) \"the nature and breadth of releases to be obtained by officers and directors\"; and (7) \"the extent to which the settlement is the product of arm's length bargaining.\"\n\n*Motorola, Inc. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors* (*In re Iridium Operating LLC*), 478 F.3d 452, 462 (2d Cir. 2007) (\"*Iridium*\").\n\n### **II. Basis for Approving the Settlement**\n\n36. The Trustee submits that the Settlement Agreement is fair and reasonable under\n\nthe circumstances and in light of the applicable *Iridium* factors.\n\n#### 37. Balance Between the Litigation's Possibility of Success and the Settlement's\n\nFuture Benefits: The Settlement Agreement strikes a fair balance between the litigation's possibility of success and the settlement's future benefits, particularly given that many aspects of the Debtor's Complaint have already been dismissed or limited. Such dismissals and limitations include: (i) the MTD Order, dismissing any punitive damages and any damages linked to Clark Hill's withdrawal as the counsel to the Debtor, and (ii) the Debtor ceasing to seek any economic damages, both of which limit the Debtor's remaining claims to emotional distress damages. The Debtor's ability to obtain such damages are uncertain and have been vigorously opposed by Defendants legally and factually in their pending Summary Judgment Motion. Most significant here, the Debtor seeks putative emotional distress damages, which Defendants argue cannot be recovered as a matter of District of Columbia law for breach of contract or negligent breach of duty by a lawyer retained to perform legal duties. *See Hedgepeth v. Whitman Walker Clinic*, 22 A.3d 789, 810-11 (D.C. 2011) (determining that emotional damages claims are inappropriate in lawyer-client relationships where \"the object of the engagement is to obtain a financial, commercial or legal objection\"). Moreover, emotional distress damages are inherently reliant on the credibility of the Debtor, who was recently indicted and who has asserted the Fifth Amendment to every substantive question asked of him at his most recent deposition. Furthermore, Clark Hill has alleged credible evidence to support their position that the Debtor disclosed much of the information in his Asylum Application to the public himself in his prior social media postings, which could further undermine the Debtor's purported emotional distress as a result of the Cyberattack.\n\n38. The Likelihood of Complex and Protracted Litigation: Absent Court authorization to enter into and implement the Settlement Agreement, the Trustee would be required to spend\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 1724 Filed 04/28/23 Entered 04/28/23 16:10:54 Page 14 of 332\n\nsignificant estate resources to respond to the Summary Judgment Motion and the Motion *In Limine*, each of which would require extensive legal research and factual investigations. To date, the Defendants have aggressively defended the claims against them. Then, if successful, the Trustee would need to engage in an expensive and time-consuming trial, the result of which would be far from certain both as to the liability and the extent of any damages.\n\n39. The Interest and Support of the Creditors and Parties-in-Interest: Creditors have been clear with the Trustee that they are eager to see recoveries in a timely manner and for the Trustee to move ahead expeditiously with his investigation. Continued litigation would be time consuming for the Trustee and costly to the Debtor's estate. The Settlement Agreement, with its recovery for the estate and its creditors, is in the best interest of the estate, as it will provide a meaningful realization on the Action, while eliminating the costs, risks and time associated with litigating the Action.\n\n40. Competency of Counsel and Experience of the Bankruptcy Judge: This Court is deeply knowledgeable about the Debtor's bankruptcy and the unique issues presented in it. As to the Parties, both are themselves sophisticated parties and are represented by sophisticated and experienced counsel.\n\n41. Arm's Length Bargaining: The Settlement Agreement is the product of extensive, arm's length and good faith negotiations between the Parties, which took place over the course of months of protracted discussions regarding the details of the case and the potential value it represents.\n\n42. The Settlement Agreement falls within the range of reasonableness, provides significant benefit to, and is fair and equitable to, the Debtor's estate and creditors. Moreover, the Settlement Agreement resolves the Action, thereby eliminating any additional litigation risk\n\nand cost. Accordingly, the Trustee believes the Settlement Agreement satisfies Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and should be approved.\n\n#### **NOTICE**\n\n43. Notice of this Motion has been given to (i) the United States Trustee, (ii) the Parties, (iii) the Debtor, (iv) the Committee, and (v) by electronic filing utilizing the Court's electronic filing (\"CM/ECF\") system, to all appearing parties who utilize the CM/ECF system. The Trustee submits that, under the circumstances, no other or further notice is required.\n\n#### **NO PREVIOUS REQUEST**\n\n44. No previous request for the relief sought herein has been made by the Trustee to this or any other court.\n\n**WHEREFORE**, the Trustee respectfully requests that the Court approve the Settlement\n\nAgreement and grant such other and further relief as is just.\n\n| Dated: | April
28, 2023 | LUC A. DESPINS, |\n|--------|------------------------|--------------------|\n| | New Haven, Connecticut | CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE |\n\nBy: */s/ Douglas S. Skalka*\n\nDouglas S. Skalka (ct00616) Patrick R. Linsey (ct29437) NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 781-2847 dskalka@npmlaw.com plinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n*and*\n\nNicholas A. Bassett (admitted *pro hac vice*) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C., 20036 (202) 551-1902 nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n*and*\n\nAvram E. Luft (admitted *pro hac vice*) Douglass Barron (admitted *pro hac vice*) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6079 aviluft@paulhastings.com douglassbarron@paulhastings.com\n\n*Counsel for the Chapter 11 Trustee*\n\n### **EXHIBIT 1**\n\n#### **PROPOSED ORDER**\n\n#### **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| ----------------------------------------------------------- | x | |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------|--------|-------------------------|\n| In re: | :
: | Chapter 11 |\n| 1
HO WAN KWOK,
et al., | :
: | Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |\n| Debtors. | :
: | (Jointly Administered) |\n| ----------------------------------------------------------- | :
x | |\n\n#### **ORDER PURSUANT TO BANKRUPTCY RULE 9019 APPROVING SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WITH CLARK HILL PLC**\n\nUpon the Motion, dated April 28, 2023 (the \"Motion\"),2 of Luc A. Despins, in his capacity as the Chapter 11 Trustee (the \"Trustee\") appointed in the above-captioned chapter 11 case (the \"Chapter 11 Case\") of Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\"), for entry of an order, approving a settlement agreement between the Trustee and Clark Hill PLC (\"Clark Hill\"), as more fully described in the Motion; and the Court having jurisdiction to consider the Motion and the relief requested therein in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334; and the Trustee having stepped into the Debtor's shoes with respect to the Action; and the Court having granted the Corporate Governance Rights Order, which specifically confirms the Trustee's ownership of and authority over the Debtor's economic rights; and the Trustee having the sole and exclusive right to bring and control claims belonging to the Debtor's estate, including all claims asserted in the Action;\n\n1 The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and the Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\n2 Capitalized terms used herein and not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed to such terms in the Motion.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 1724 Filed 04/28/23 Entered 04/28/23 16:10:54 Page 19 of 332\n\nand the Court having found and determined that (i) the relief sought in the Motion is in the best interests of the Trustee, the Debtor's estates, creditors, and all parties in interest, (ii) the settlement reflected in the Settlement Agreement is fair and equitable and reasonable under the circumstances, and (iii) that the legal and factual bases set forth in the Motion establish just cause for the relief granted herein; and after due deliberation and sufficient cause appearing therefor, it is **ORDERED THAT**:\n\n1. The Motion is GRANTED.\n\n2. All objections to the Motion, if any, that have not been withdrawn, waived or settled, and all reservations of rights included therein, are overruled.\n\n3. The settlement agreement, attached hereto as **Exhibit A** (the \"Settlement Agreement\"), is approved pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019.\n\n4. The Trustee is authorized, pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019, to execute, deliver, implement, and fully perform any and all obligations, instruments, documents and papers and to take any and all actions reasonably necessary or appropriate to consummate the settlement reflected in the Settlement Agreement and to perform any and all obligations contemplated therein immediately upon entry of this Order.\n\n5. This Order shall be effective and enforceable immediately upon entry pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 6004(h), and the Trustee shall have unfettered use of the Settlement Payment when received.\n\n6. This Court shall retain jurisdiction to hear and determine all matters arising from or related to this Order and to the Settlement Agreement.\n\n#### **EXHIBIT A**\n\n#### **SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT**\n\n#### **SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND MUTUAL RELEASE**\n\nThis Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release (\"**Agreement**\"), dated and effective as of April 28, 2023, is made between (a) Luc A. Despins, not individually, but solely in his capacity as the chapter 11 trustee (the \"**Trustee**\") for the estate of Guo Wengui a/k/a Miles Kwok a/k/a Ho Wan Kwok (\"**Kwok**\" or \"**Debtor**\"), and (b) Clark Hill PLC and Thomas K. Ragland (collectively, \"**Clark Hill**\"), on the other hand. The Trustee and Clark Hill are each sometimes individually referred to herein as a \"**Party**\" and collectively as \"**Parties**.\" The Agreement shall become effective on the first day upon which it is executed by all Parties (\"**Effective Date**\").\n\n#### **RECITALS**\n\nA. WHEREAS, on February 15, 2022 (\"**Petition Date**\"), Kwok filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of title 11 of the U.S. Code (the \"**Bankruptcy Code**\") in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut (the \"**Bankruptcy Court**\") administered as *In re: Ho Wan Kwok*, No. 22-50073 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn.);\n\nB. WHEREAS, the Trustee is the duly appointed chapter 11 trustee for the Debtor's estate;\n\nC. WHEREAS, prior to the Petition Date, Clark Hill provided legal services to Kwok;\n\nD. WHEREAS, on or about September 19, 2019, Kwok filed a lawsuit against Clark Hill in Washington D.C. court, and, on October 24, 2019, the lawsuit was removed to United States District Court for the District of Columbia in an action captioned *Wengui v. Clark Hill PLC et al* (Case No. 1:2019-cv-03195) (hereinafter, the \"**Lawsuit**\"). The Lawsuit alleges claims arising out of Clark Hill's prior representation of Kwok, including: (1) breach of fiduciary duty, (2) breach of contract, (3) legal malpractice, and (4) punitive damage;\n\nE. WHEREAS, on or about November 25, 2019, Clark Hill filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which was fully briefed on January 14, 2020;\n\nF. WHEREAS, on or about February 20, 2020, Clark Hill's Motion to Dismiss was granted in part (dismissing Kwok's claims for punitive damages or claims for any injury resulting from Clark Hill's withdrawal of representation) and denied in part;\n\nG. WHEREAS, discovery occurred in the Lawsuit from February 2020 until December 2021;\n\nH. WHEREAS, on February 15, 2022, Clark Hill filed (1) a Rule 56 Motion for Summary Judgment and (2) Rule 702 Motion *in Limine* to Exclude Portions of Plaintiff's Proffered Expert Testimony under seal;\n\nI. WHEREAS, Clark Hill disputes and denies the claims that have been brought against them, and intends to defend vigorously and raise defenses at every stage;\n\nJ. WHEREAS, the claims asserted in the Lawsuit are now property of the Debtor's bankruptcy estate;\n\nK. WHEREAS, Clark Hill has produced to the Trustee pleadings and discovery from the Lawsuit;\n\nL. WHEREAS, the Parties recognize the significant cost and risk associated with the continuation of ligation; and\n\nM. WHEREAS, the Parties have engaged in extensive arm's-length good faith negotiations and have each separately concluded that the execution and performance by them of this Agreement will avoid protracted and expensive litigation, while according them each a substantial and valuable benefit if the settlement embodied herein is consummated:\n\n**NOW, THEREFORE**, for good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the Parties agree as follows:\n\n#### **AGREEMENT**\n\n**1. Recitals.** The recitals set forth above constitute an integral part of this Agreement and are incorporated into this Agreement, evidencing the intent of the Parties in executing this Agreement, and describing the circumstances surrounding its execution. Accordingly, this Agreement shall be construed in the light thereof.\n\n**2. Definitions.** In addition to the defined terms above and hereafter, the following capitalized terms used in this Agreement shall have the meanings specified below:\n\n(a) \"**Claims**\" means any and all manner of claims, counterclaims, complaints, disputes, demands, rights, actions, potential actions, causes of action, liabilities, duties, obligations, damages, losses, diminutions in value, obligations, judgments, decrees, request for attorneys' fees or costs, matters, issues, suits, proceedings, and controversies of any kind or nature whatsoever, including without limitation all claims related to any legal\n\n- 2 -\n\nservices by Clark Hill provided to Kwok, all claims for professional malpractice, all claims for breach of contract, all claims for breach of fiduciary duty, all claims for indemnification or contribution, and all other obligations or claims of any and all kinds of torts, fraud, negligence, errors and omissions, bad faith, defamation, accounts, expenses, attorney fees, economic losses, bodily injury or injury to property, reputation, Kwok's asylum application, privacy, breach of security, humiliation, mental anguish, emotional distress, and actual, compensatory, incidental, consequential, or indirect damages, lost profits, punitive or exemplary damages, whether known or unknown, asserted or unasserted, contingent or absolute, liquidated or not liquidated, accrued or unaccrued, suspected or unsuspected, disclosed or undisclosed, claimed or unclaimed, apparent or not apparent, foreseen or unforeseen, matured or not matured, secured or unsecured, which now exist, or heretofore or previously existed, or may hereafter exist, whether or not any such matter or claim was asserted or could have been asserted on or before the Effective Date including, but not limited to, any claims arising under federal, state or foreign law, common law, bankruptcy law, statute, equity, rule or regulation, or agreement, whether individual, class, direct, derivative, representative, on behalf of others, legal, equitable, regulatory, governmental or of any other type or in any other capacity.\n\n(b) **\"Estate Releasees**\" means, (i) the Debtor's estate; (ii) the Trustee; and (iii) any and all of the Trustee's attorneys, accountants, advisors, representatives or agents, in their respective capacities as such.\n\n(c) **\"Clark Hill Releasees**\" means, (i) in any capacity, Clark Hill; and (ii) with respect to any Claims arising from or related to the Lawsuit, any and all of Clark Hill's past or present, direct or indirect, parent entities, subsidiaries, divisions, member firms, affiliates, predecessors and successors of each and all such entities, and each and all of their respective past or present partners, members, directors, principals, officers, board members, executives, shareholders, employees, subsidiaries, affiliates, divisions, predecessors, successors, assigns, heirs, attorneys, stockholders, boards, accountants, auditors, advisors, trustees, administrators, fiduciaries, consultants, representatives, insurers, co-insurers, reinsurers and agents, in their respective capacities as such.\n\n(d) \"**Settlement**\" means the settlement contemplated by this Agreement.\n\n(e) \"**Settlement Motion\"** means a motion made by the Trustee pursuant to Rule 9019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure for entry of a Settlement Order.\n\n(f) \"**Settlement Order\"** means an order entered by the Bankruptcy Court approving the Settlement and the Trustee's entry into this Agreement.\n\n#### **3. Consideration**.\n\nIn consideration for the releases and other terms set forth in this Agreement, Clark Hill shall pay Debtor's estate a total of four-hundred-and-ninety-nine thousand (499,000) USD (the \"**Settlement Payment**\"). The Settlement Payment shall be made to the Trustee by wire transfer pursuant to instructions to be provided by the Trustee within 15 days after the date on which the Settlement Order is entered by the Bankruptcy Court; provided, however, that if a notice of appeal of the Settlement Order is filed, the Settlement Payment shall be made to the Trustee by wire transfer pursuant to instructions to be provided by the Trustee no later than 15 days after the date that the Settlement Order is no longer subject to appeal or *certiorari* proceedings and no such proceedings are pending.\n\n#### **4. Court Approval.**\n\nPromptly following execution of this Agreement, the Trustee shall submit to the Bankruptcy Court the Settlement Motion requesting entry of a Settlement Order, in a form that is mutually agreeable to the Parties, which shall include findings that the Claims being released are owned by the Debtor's estate and that the Trustee has the sole ability to assert these Claims, and further providing that the Bankruptcy Court retains jurisdiction to enforce the Agreement and Settlement Order and to address any violations thereof. The Trustee will use good faith efforts to secure approval of the Settlement Order. If this agreement is not approved by the Bankruptcy Court, Clark Hill is not required to make the Settlement Payment.\n\n#### **5. Releases.**\n\n(a) **Debtor Releases.** Subject to the Trustee's receipt of the Settlement Payment and the Bankruptcy Court's approval of this Agreement, the Trustee, the Debtor's estate and the Estate Releasees hereby unconditionally, absolutely and irrevocably release and discharge the Clark Hill Releasees of all Claims which they now have or ever had against the Clark Hill Releasees upon or by reason of any manner, cause or thing whatsoever\n\non or at any time prior to the date of this Agreement, including but not limited to Claims concerning, arising out of, or relating to the facts, circumstances, events, transactions or transfers alleged or which could have been alleged in the Lawsuit or arising out of the subject matter of the Lawsuit, it being the intention of the Trustee to reserve nothing whatsoever hereunder and to assure the Clark Hill Releasees peace and freedom from each and every of the released Claims of whatever character and description and including any Claims that may be asserted derivatively by any creditor; provided, however, that nothing in this paragraph shall be deemed or construed to be a release, waiver or discharge of the terms and conditions of this Agreement. The Trustee acknowledges that he may discover facts after the Effective Date different from, or in addition to, those which the Trustee now knows or believes to be true. The Trustee agrees that the releases contained in this paragraph shall be and remain effective in all respects notwithstanding the future discovery of such different or additional facts.\n\n(b) **Clark Hill Releases**. Subject to the Trustee's receipt of the Settlement Payment and the Bankruptcy Court's approval of this Agreement, the Clark Hill Releasees hereby unconditionally, absolutely, and irrevocably release and discharge the Estate Releasees of all Claims which they now have or ever had against any of the Estate Releasees based upon or by reason of any manner, cause or thing whatsoever on or at any time prior to the date of this Agreement, it being the intention of the Clark Hill Releasees to reserve nothing whatsoever hereunder and to assure the Estate Releasees, and each of them, their peace and freedom from each and every of the released claims of whatever character and description; provided, however, nothing in this paragraph shall be deemed or construed to be a release, waiver or discharge of the terms and conditions of this Agreement. Clark Hill Releasees acknowledge that they may discover facts after the Effective Date different from, or in addition to, those which they now know or believe to be true. Clark Hill agrees that the releases contained in this paragraph shall be and remain effective in all respects notwithstanding the future discovery of such different or additional facts.\n\n(c) The Trustee represents and warrants that he is not aware of any claims they may have against any of Clark Hill Releasees other than the Claims asserted in the Lawsuit.\n\n- 5 -\n\n(d) Clark Hill represents and warrants that they are not aware of any claims they may have against the Trustee or Debtor's estate other than Claims related to the Lawsuit.\n\n#### **6. Dismissal of the Trustee Action.**\n\nWithin five (5) days following the Trustee's receipt of the Settlement Payment, the Trustee and Clark Hill shall file in the Lawsuit a notice of dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(ii) dismissing the Lawsuit with prejudice, and shall take such other and further actions as may be reasonably necessary to cause the Lawsuit to be dismissed with prejudice.\n\n#### **7. General Representations and Warranties.**\n\n(a) **Authority.** Each of the undersigned covenants warrants that they have the power and authority to enter into and execute this Agreement and all releases, representations and warranties contained in this Agreement, on behalf of the Party on whose behalf this Agreement is so executed, subject in the case of the Trustee to Bankruptcy Court approval of this Agreement.\n\n(b) **Advice of Counsel.** Each of the Parties acknowledges and warrants that they have consulted with its attorneys regarding the terms of this Agreement, and that the terms of the Agreement have been completely read and are fully understood and voluntarily accepted for the purpose of making a full and final compromise, settlement and waiver of any and all claims as set forth herein.\n\n(c) **Due Diligence.** Each of the Parties has investigated the matters set forth in this Agreement, and all other matters pertaining to this Agreement. Each of the Parties represents and warrants that they have not relied upon any promises, agreements, representations, statements or warranties in entering into this Agreement that are not otherwise expressly provided for in this Agreement.\n\n(d) **No Assignment.** The Trustee warrants and represents that, as of the Effective Date, he has not transferred or assigned, and will not transfer or assign, all or any part of the Claims released in this Agreement**.**\n\n(e) **No Admission of Liability**. Nothing contained in this Agreement shall be deemed as an admission of any liability or lack of merit in any claim, by any party of any matter, claim or defense previously in dispute.\n\n(f) **Costs.** The Parties shall bear their respective costs, fees, and expenses in connection with this Agreement and all other matters relating to or arising from the Debtor's bankruptcy case and the Lawsuit. The Parties each waive any rights that any of them may have against the other to seek or recover any costs, fees, or expenses, including without limitation attorneys' fees related to or in connection with the Claims, this Agreement or the Lawsuit.\n\n(g) **Integration.** This Agreement represents the full and complete agreement between the Parties. Any representations, warranties, promises, or conditions, whether written or oral, not specifically incorporated into this Agreement, or in any other agreements, instruments, certificates, or documents delivered as required or contemplated under this Agreement, shall not be binding upon the Parties. All other discussions, negotiations, and writings have been and are merged into this Agreement.\n\n(h) **Governing Law and Consent to Jurisdiction**. This Agreement and all other documents required or contemplated hereby shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the state of New York applicable to contracts made and to be performed wholly within the laws of the state of New York but irrespective of its choice-of-law rules. As specific inducement for the Parties to enter into this Agreement, each of the Parties hereby consents to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court for resolution of any disputes arising under or related to this Agreement, and waives any objection it may have to the laying of venue in any such court and any claim that such suit has been brought in an inconvenient forum.\n\n#### (i) **Notice to Parties.**\n\nAll notices given pursuant to this Agreement shall be delivered by hand delivery; overnight delivery by reputable overnight delivery service; or email with a copy by U.S. Mail, at the following addresses (or, if applicable, the most current address available for such Party):\n\nSuch notice must be sent to the following persons:\n\nIf to Trustee: Paul Hastings LLP Attn: Avram E. Luft 200 Park Ave New York, NY 10166 + 212 318 6079\n\n#### aviluft@paulhastings.com\n\nIf to Clark Hill: Jenner & Block LLP Attn: John Storino 353 N Clark Street Chicago, IL 60654 + 1 312 840 8683 JStorino@jenner.com\n\n#### **8. Further Necessary Actions.**\n\nEach Party agrees, without further consideration, to sign or cause to be signed, and to deliver to the other Party or its counsel any other documents and to take any other action as may be necessary to fulfill their respective obligations under this Agreement. The Trustee served Clark Hill with a subpoena pursuant to the Trustee's Rule 2004 investigation in the Bankruptcy Case. The Trustee acknowledges that Clark Hill produced documents responsive to the subpoena and the Trustee agrees to not seek further discovery from Clark Hill in the Bankruptcy Case.\n\n#### **9. Proper Construction.**\n\n(a) The language of all parts of this Agreement shall in all cases be construed as a whole according to its fair meaning, and not strictly for or against any Party.\n\n(b) As used in this Agreement, the term \"or\" shall be deemed to include the term \"and/or\" and the singular or plural number shall be deemed to include the other whenever the context so indicates or requires.\n\n(c) The section headings used in this Agreement are intended solely for convenience of reference and shall not in any manner amplify, limit, modify, or otherwise be used in the interpretation of any of the provisions hereof.\n\n(d) If a deadline under this Agreement falls on a weekend or court holiday, the deadline shall be extended to the next weekday that is not a court holiday.\n\n#### **10. Survival of Representations and Warranties.**\n\nAll representations and warranties set forth in this Agreement shall be deemed continuing and shall survive the consummation of this Agreement.\n\n#### **11. Waiver or Modification.**\n\n(a) No waiver shall be binding unless executed in writing by the Party making the waiver. No waiver of any of the provisions of this Agreement shall be\n\n- 8 -\n\ndeemed, or shall constitute, a waiver of any other provision, whether or not similar, nor shall any waiver constitute a continuing waiver.\n\n(b) Neither this Agreement nor any term or provision may be changed, waived, discharged, or terminated except by an instrument in writing duly signed by both Parties. No supplement, modification, or amendment to this Agreement shall be binding unless in writing and executed by both Parties. This Agreement cannot be modified by oral or implied promises or representations.\n\n#### **12. Execution in Counterparts.**\n\nThis Agreement may be executed in counterparts, and the sum of each counterpart will constitute a single agreement. Copies of the signatures of each Party's duly authorized signatory provided to the other Party via electronic means, including email and facsimile, shall be treated as original signatures. A signature on a copy of this Agreement sent by facsimile or by email shall be accepted as binding on the Parties.\n\n| By: | |\n|------|--|\n| Its: | |\n\n### **EXHIBIT 2**\n\n#### **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**\n\n| GUO WENGUI a/k/a MILES KWOK a/k/a
HO WAN KWOK, | )
)
) |\n|---------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| Plaintiff, | )
) |\n| v. | )
Case No. _______________
) |\n| CLARK HILL PLC and THOMAS K.
RAGLAND, | )
Removed from the Superior Court of the
)
District of Columbia
) |\n| Defendants. | )
Superior Court of the District of Columbia
)
Case No. 2019 CA 001614M
) |\n\n#### **NOTICE OF REMOVAL**\n\nPursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(b) and 1446, Defendants Clark Hill PLC and Thomas K. Ragland (collectively, the \"Defendants\") hereby remove this action from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The Defendants' Notice of Removal is based on the following:\n\n1. On September 19, 2019, the Plaintiff Guo Wengui (\"Plaintiff\") filed a complaint against Defendants in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, Case No. 2019 CA 006164M (the \"Complaint\"). A true and correct copy of the Complaint and a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served on Defendants are attached as Exhibit 1.\n\n2. Clark Hill PLC accepted service of the Complaint on behalf of itself and Defendant Ragland on September 26, 2019. This Notice of Removal is timely because it was filed within 30 days of service of the summons and complaint. *See* 28 U.S.C. §1446(b).\n\n3. This court has original jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.\n\n§1332(a)(2) because the defendants are citizens of various States and the plaintiff is a citizen of a foreign state, and the amount in controversy exceeds \\$75,000, exclusive of interests or costs.\n\n4. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he is a \"native\" of the People's Republic of China and is seeking asylum in the United States. (Complaint ¶ 10). Accordingly, for diversity purposes Plaintiff is a citizen of the People's Republic of China.\n\n5. Defendant Clark Hill PLC is a professional limited liability company organized under the laws of the State of Michigan, and with its principal place of business in Detroit, Michigan. (*See*, *e.g*., Complaint ¶ 11; Exhibit 2). Defendant Clark Hill PLC is comprised of approximately 298 members, who are either individual attorneys working in Clark Hill PLC's various offices, or professional corporations incorporated by individual attorneys through which they hold their memberships in Clark Hill PLC. (Exhibit 2). For the purpose of diversity of citizenship, the citizenship of a professional limited liability company is determined by the citizenship of its members. *See, e.g. Cunningham & Assocs., PLC v. ARAG, LLC*, 842 F. Supp. 2d 25, 27 n.2 (D.D.C. 2012).\n\n6. None of Clark Hill PLC's individual members are domiciled in or citizens of the District of Columbia, and none of the professional corporations through which individuals hold memberships are incorporated under the laws of the District of Columbia. (Exhibit 2). Accordingly, for diversity purposes Clark Hill PLC is not a citizen of the District of Columbia.\n\n7. All of Clark Hill PLC's individual members are citizens of the United States, and they all reside and are domiciled in a State. None of Clark Hill PLC's members reside or are domiciled outside of the United States. (Exhibit 2). Accordingly, for diversity purposes, Clark Hill PLC is not a citizen of a foreign state.\n\n8. Defendant Thomas Ragland is domiciled in the Commonwealth of Virginia. (Exhibit 3). Accordingly, for diversity purposes, Thomas Ragland is a citizen of the Commonwealth of Virginia.\n\n9. Defendants believe in good faith that the amount in controversy exceeds \\$75,000. Plaintiff's Complaint seeks compensatory damages of \\$50 million, and also seeks punitive damages. (Complaint ¶ 1). Accordingly, the amount in controversy exceeds \\$75,000 and this action may have been brought in this court.\n\n10. As required by 28 U.S.C. §1446(d), written notice of the filing of this Notice of Removal will be provided to Plaintiff, together with all supporting papers. In addition, as is also required by 28 U.S.C. §1446(d), a copy of this Notice of Removal and all supporting papers are being filed with the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.\n\n11. By filing this Notice of Removal, Defendants do not waive any objections they may have to this action, and reserve the right to timely assert all defenses and objections.\n\n12. Defendants reserve their right to amend or supplement this Notice of Removal.\n\n13. Defendants demand a trial by jury.\n\nWHEREFORE, Defendants Clark Hill PLC and Thomas K. Ragland remove this action from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.\n\nDated: October 24, 2019 Respectfully submitted,\n\n CLARK HILL PLC and THOMAS K. RAGLAND\n\n By: */s/ Jessica Ring Amunson* One of their attorneys\n\nJessica Ring Amunson (#497223) JENNER & BLOCK, LLP 1099 New York Avenue NW\n\nSuite 900 Washington, DC 20001-4412 Tel: (202) 639-6000 JAmunson@jenner.com\n\n#### **Certificate of Service**\n\nI, Jessica Ring Amunson, an attorney, hereby certifies that I served the foregoing Notice of Removal on the following by electronic mail and overnight delivery on this, the 24th day of October, 2019:\n\n Ari S. Casper Ralph S. Tyler The Casper Firm 400 E. Pratt Street, Suite 903 Baltimore, MD 21202\n\n*/s/ Jessica Ring Amunson*\n\n# Exhibit 1\n\n**D.C. Superior Court 09/20/2019 09:16AM Clerk of the Court D.C. Superior Court 09/18/2019 18:47PM Clerk of the Court**\n\n#### IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE DlSTRICT OF COLUMBIA\n\n(Civil Division)\n\n| | | ) |\n|-----------------------|--------------------------------------|--------|\n| a/k/a HO WAN KWOK | GUO WENGUI a/k/a MILES KWOK | )
) |\n| 162 E, 64th Street | | ) |\n| New York, NY 10065 | | |\n| | | )
) |\n| Plaintiff, | | ) |\n| | | ) |\n| | | ) |\n| V | | ) |\n| CLARK HJ LL PLC | | ) |\n| 500 Woodward Avenue | | ) |\n| Suite 3500 | | ) |\n| Detroit, MI 48226, | | ) |\n| | | ) |\n| and | | ) |\n| | | ) |\n| | THOMAS K. IU\\GLAND | ) |\n| Clark Hill PLC | | ) |\n| | 1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW | ) |\n| Suite 1300 | | ) |\n| Washington, DC 20004, | | ) |\n| | | ) |\n| | Defendants. | ) |\n| | | ) |\n| SERVE: | | ) |\n| | | ) |\n| | John J. Hern, Jr. | ) |\n| | 500 \\Voodward Avenue | ) |\n| | Suite 3500 | ) |\n| | Detroit, MI 48226 | ) |\n| | | ) |\n| | Thomas K Ragland | ) |\n| | l 001 Pennsylvania A venue, NW | ) |\n| | Suite 1300 | ) |\n| | ____________
Washington, DC 20004 | ) |\n| | | ) |\n\n## Case No. **2019 CA 006164 M**\n\n#### **COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL**\n\n#### **INTRODUCTION**\n\n1. In this case, plaintiff Guo Wengui, a/k/a Miles Kwok a/k/a Ho Wan Kwok, (\"plaintiff') seeks compensatory monetary damages of \\$50 million or more, jointly and severally, and punitive damages, also jointly and severally, against the defendant law firm Clark Hill PLC (\"Clark Hill\" or the \"firm\") and one of the firm's members, defendant Thomas K. Ragland, Esq. (\"Mr. Ragland\"), for damages, injuries, and wrongs which plaintiff has sustained as the direct and proximate result and consequence of defendants' multiple serious breaches of their duties to plaintiff arising from the firm's legal representation of plaintiff. In addition to compensatory damages, plaintiff seeks punitive damages. Punitive damages are warranted here because the wrongful conduct of Clark Hill and Mr. Ragland was reckless, oppressive, intentional, deliberate, and willfully disregarded plaintiffs rights. (Clark Hill and Mr. Ragland are referred to herein collectively as \"defendants\" or the \"firm.\")\n\n2. Plaintiff was a client of Mr. Ragland and the Clark Hill law firm. In the course of that representation, Mr. Ragland and the Clark Hill law firm breached a lawyer's/law firm's fundamental obligation to protect from improper unauthorized disclosure plaintiffs (a client's) confidential information. The firm, specifically including Mr. Ragland, was reckless in its handling of plaintiffs confidential information and, as a direct result of that recklessness, plaintiffs confidential information was disclosed and widely disseminated, all to the great harm, detriment, and oppression of plaintiff. Having failed to protect plaintiffs confidential information, the firm then proceeded to compound that breach by wrongfully, improperly, and without good cause terminating its representation of plaintiff. This action, too, was reckless and in willful disregard of plaintiffs rights and in willful disregard of the firm's duties and obligations to plaintiff\n\nas a client of the firm. The firm intentionally undertook a matter beyond its competence and capability and then intentionally, deliberately, and willfully, wrongly placed its interests above the firm's duties to its client. Plaintiff was damaged as a result of the firm's breaches of the duties which the firm and its lawyer (Mr. Ragland) owed to plaintiff as a client. The firm's actions were oppressive and were taken in willful disregard of plaintiffs rights.\n\n3. Plaintiff reasonably relied on the firm's assurances - both implicit and explicit that the firm understood its ethical and legal obligations, including its fundamental obligation to protect plaintiffs confidential information, *and* that the firm actually had the capability to fulfill its obligations. In fact, however, Mr. Ragland failed to honor his assurances and, as a result, he recklessly exposed plaintiffs confidential information. Contrary to Mr. Ragland' s representations, the firm did not have adequate and appropriate electronic security measures in place to protect plaintiffs information and Mr. Ragland failed to take appropriate actions to protect plaintiffs confidential information. The direct consequence of the firm's and Mr. Ragland's failures in this regard was that plaintiffs sensitive confidential information, which plaintiff disclosed to the firm in confidence and which the firm assured plaintiff would be protected, was disclosed broadly and disseminated over the internet on social media platforms. The firm's breaches of duty to plaintiff caused these unauthorized disclosures. These disclosures have harmed and damaged plaintiff and those harms and damages are continuous and ongoing. The firm's conduct here goes far beyond negligence and was conduct which was outrageous in its recklessness and in its willful disregard of plaintiffs rights.\n\n4. The firm's representation of plaintiff involved preparing and filing plaintiffs application for asylum in the United States. Plaintiff sought asylum in the United States after\n\nfleeing from his native China to avoid further politically motivated harsh persecution, including fear of being tortured, incarcerated under extreme conditions, and potentially being murdered.\n\n5. The information which plaintiff disclosed to the firm and which, because of the firm's failures and breaches, was disclosed subsequently to the world, including to persons and interests in China committed to silencing, smearing, and potentially physically harming plaintiff, included information detailing plaintiffs political activities in China as well as other sensitive matters. This sensitive information, the public disclosure of which jeopardizes the life, safety, and welfare of plaintiff and others, lost its confidential status when it was displayed and published on social media platforms, and this occurred because of defendants' failures to properly protect the information from improper disclosure. Agents and officials of the Chinese government are believed to be among the parties who gained access to plaintiffs confidential information, which, again, they were able to obtain because of defendants' manifest failures and breaches of duty, including defendants' improper and unlawful actions and inactions in not taking necessary actions to protect plaintiffs confidential information from disclosure.\n\n6. As plaintiffs counsel, Clark Hill owed plaintiff an undivided duty to act in his best interests. Here, the firm, in its representation of plaintiff and then in improperly terminating that representation, violated that obligation. The firm knew from the outset of considering whether to undertake the representation of plaintiff that agents and officials of the Chinese government have been and are hostile to plaintiff and pose a genuine threat to plaintiffs life, liberty, and security. These Chinese agents and officials and the persons and interests on whose behalf they have acted in the past and were ( and are) expected to act in the future pose, as defendants knew before and when they agreed to represent plaintiff, a direct threat to plaintiff. Notwithstanding defendants' knowledge of the powerful interests hostile to plaintiff, knowledge which defendants had prior to\n\nagreeing to represent plaintiff, defendants failed to protect plaintiffs confidential information from disclosure from these persons and interests with a known agenda deeply hostile and antagonistic to plaintiff. Defendants' conduct prejudiced plaintiff, caused him severe personal and financial damage, all of which could have, and should have, been avoided.\n\n7. Defendants then compounded their breaches to plaintiff when they wrongfully, unlawfully, improperly, without valid cause, and without any meaningful consultation with plaintiff unilaterally terminated their representation of him. When this matter got \"hot,\" defendants did not stand with their client; rather, they \"ducked and ran.\" Defendants abandoned their client (plaintiff), and they put their perceived interests above their obligation to act in the interests of their client (plaintiff). Defendants violated their legal and ethical duty of undivided loyalty to their client. Defendants' conduct was oppressive, intentional, and willfully disregarded plaintiffs rights.\n\n8. Plaintiff brings this action because defendants must be - and in this action will be - held accountable for their gross and intentional misconduct. Defendants are liable for both compensatory and punitive damages. Defendants' egregious failures to protect plaintiffs information from being exposed to potential \"hackers,\" including failing to have in place and/or to maintain necessary and effective electronic security measures sufficient to protect plaintiffs sensitive and confidential information, violated the rules of professional conduct; constituted a serious breach of the firm's fiduciary duty to plaintiff as a client of the firm; violated the firm's contractual obligations to plaintiff; and violated the firm's obligation to provide plaintiff competent legal representation.\n\n9. The wide-spread and deeply harmful publication and dissemination of plaintiffs sensitive personal information on social media was the direct, proximate, and inevitable ( albeit\n\nentirely avoidable) result and consequence of the firm's breaches of its duties and obligations to plaintiff. The firm then intentionally, deliberately, and oppressively made matters worse when it terminated its representation of plaintiff, advancing a plainly pretextual, if not risible, \"justification\" for the firm's improper action. Defendants acted in willful disregard for the rights of plaintiff, and defendants' conduct was reckless and taken without regard to the safety or protection of the plaintiff, the firm's client, and in willful disregard of the firm's duties and obligations to plaintiff as a client. Because plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer serious harm and injury as a result of defendants' actions and inactions, plaintiff seeks monetary damages to compensate him for the grievous harms which defendants have caused him. In addition, plaintiff seeks punitive damages because of the recklessness, wantonness, and oppressiveness of defendants' conduct.\n\n#### **PARTIES**\n\n10. Plaintiff, a native of China, currently resides in New York, NY. Plaintiff has a pending application for asylum in the United States. Plaintiff is a highly successful businessman and a political activist and well-known Chinese dissident. Plaintiff has fought vigorously for many years for the rule of law, human rights, and democracy in China. In early 2015, plaintiff was forced to escape from China as he justifiably feared being unlawfully arrested, detained, interrogated, tortured, and/or killed by the Chinese government and/or the Chinese Communist Party (the **\"CCP\")** because of his political activities and outspoken advocacy. (References herein to the **\"CCP\"** are inclusive of both the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party.)\n\n11. Defendant Clark Hill PLC (\"Clark Hill\") is a major law firm of approximately 650 attorneys and professionals, in 25 offices, and operates as a professional services limited liability company, organized and existing under the laws of the State of Michigan. Clark Hill does business\n\non a regular, constant, and substantial basis in the District of Columbia, specifically including having an office at 1001 Pennsylvania A venue NW, Suite 1300, Washington, DC 20004, and Clark Hill's lawyers appear regularly before courts, agencies, and Congress in the District of Columbia.\n\n12. Defendant Thomas K. Ragland, Esq. (\"Mr. Ragland\") is an attorney licensed to practice law in the District of Columbia and is a member (partner or principal) of the Clark Hill law firm in the firm's District of Columbia office. Mr. Ragland does business on a regular, constant, and substantial basis in the District of Columbia, including maintaining his office for the practice of law at the Clark Hill office at 1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Suite 1300, Washington, DC 20004, and appearing before agencies and tribunals in the District of Columbia. (As noted previously, Clark Hill PLC and Mr. Ragland are referred to collectively herein as \"defendants\" or the \"firm.\")\n\n#### **JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND CONVENIENCE**\n\n13. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to D.C. Code § 11-921. This Court has personal jurisdiction over defendants as they both regularly and constantly conduct business in the District of Columbia. Defendants' actions and inactions giving rise to the matters alleged in this complaint took place in the District of Columbia, including meetings with plaintiff and/or his agents and authorized representative, Dr. Lianchao Han (\"Dr. Han\").\n\n14. Venue is proper in this Court and this Court is a convenient forum for this action. This case relates directly to actions and inactions of defendants in connection with their law office and law practice in the District of Columbia; defendants are very much present and engaged in doing business on a daily basis in the District of Columbia; and a substantial part of the events, actions, and inactions giving rise to plaintiffs claims in this complaint occurred in the District of Columbia. By way of illustration, meetings between the firm and plaintiffs authorized\n\nrepresentative, Dr. Han, during which the firm and plaintiff formed an attorney-client relationship, regularly exchanged information relating to plaintiffs asylum application, Mr. Ragland's preparation of that application, the firm's withdrawal from the representation, and other actions and inactions arising out of that relationship occurred in the District of Columbia at the firm's office in the District. Mr. Ragland was the firm's principal lawyer representing plaintiff and most of the work which Mr. Ragland did on behalf of plaintiff was done in the District of Columbia.\n\n#### **STATEMENT OF FACTS**\n\n#### **I. Plaintiff is a political activist and target of the Chinese government and the CCP.**\n\n15. For years, plaintiff has been a forceful, visible, and well-known advocate for the rule oflaw, human rights, and democracy in China. In connection with his political activities and advocacy, plaintiff has, for example, exposed systemic corruption in the CCP, as well as by senior officials of the Chinese government and family members of those officials. Plaintiff has also disclosed the widespread abuse of human rights in China, including the use of torture. Plaintiff has opposed Chinese governmental and party suppression of democratic movements in China. Plaintiff has also been involved in exposing the degree, extent, and effectiveness of China's covert cultural, political, economic, and intelligence operations in the United States and elsewhere in the West.\n\n16. Plaintiff has been effective in influencing international opinion with respect to China and the CCP. From the perspective of the CCP, plaintiffs activities and advocacy have affected adversely China's and the CCP's stature in the world community and, in response, the Chinese government has attempted to silence plaintiff. The Chinese government/CCP has employed various tactics, including coercion and offering bribes to attempt to silence plaintiff. Upon information and belief, the Chinese government/CCP has used its overseas intelligence\n\nnetworks to seek to discredit, silence, and threaten plaintiffs personal safety or, at the very least, to cause plaintiff to have good reason to fear for his personal safety as well as fearing for the safety of family members and friends.\n\n17. Upon information and belief, the CCP believes plaintiff presently holds not publicly known proof of various types of improper conduct on the part of the CCP and those associated with it and acting on its behalf, including information relating to corruption, murder, hiding of illegally-gained money, and China's spy network. For these and other reasons, the Chinese government and the CCP are highly motivated, to understate the matter, and engaged aggressively in seeking to silence plaintiff. The Chinese government and the CCP are equally motivated and engaged in seeking to learn what plaintiff knows about improper activities undertaken by or on behalf of the Chinese government and the CCP. And, perhaps most critically, the Chinese government and the CCP have the capabilities - the \"operational reach\" - to carry out aggressive hostile actions against plaintiff.\n\n18. In or about January 2015, for example, the CCP, through Bruno Wu Zheng, called plaintiff to request that plaintiff cooperate with the CCP and stop disclosing information regarding corruption on the part of senior CCP officials. Plaintiff refused. After several failed bribery attempts and threats, Bruno Wu Zheng directed the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (\"CCDI\") and the Special Task Force to request (truly demand) that plaintiff cooperate with China and return any evidence he had of corruption among senior leaders. Plaintiff was asked to hand over his evidence to the CCP and to stop acting against the CCP. In return, Bruno Wu Zheng promised plaintiff, *inter alia,* that ( 1) none of plaintiffs assets or properties would be seized by the CCP; (2) all privileges would be returned to plaintiff and his family; (3) plaintiffs family members would not be arrested; and ( 4) plaintiff would not be physically threatened or killed.\n\nPlaintiff refused this proposal. Plaintiff anticipated that this refusal would trigger the risk of serious persecution of plaintiff and his family.\n\n19. Plaintiffs political activities and his refusal to cease those activities, when coupled with the **CCP'** s powerful interest in bringing those activities to a halt, including using brute force, made it dangerous for plaintiff to remain in China. Consequently, on or about January 2015, plaintiff fled from China. He rightly feared being arrested, detained, interrogated, tortured, and/or killed by the Chinese government and/or the CCP. At or around this same time, the CCP seized substantial sums of plaintiffs family's assets and questioned and arrested 18 of plaintiffs family members. The CCP also arrested or detained a number of plaintiffs colleagues and employees and prohibited others from leaving China.\n\n20. In May 2017, by which time plaintiff was residing in the United States, the CCP sent Liu Yanping and three other agents to New York City to speak with plaintiff in yet another effort to seek to silence him. Liu Yan ping was then Secretary of the CCD I. Plaintiff refused this threat as he had refused previous threats. Instead of giving in to this latest threat, plaintiff disclosed a broad network of CCP spies operating in the United States. Upon information and belief, the United States government revoked the visas of these four officials, including Liu Yanping, because of their actions in the United States.\n\n21. The CCP also took another highly aggressive action to seek to silence plaintiff by issuing two International Criminal Police Organization (\"INTERPOL\") \"red [arrest] notices.\" Plaintiff disputes the legitimacy of these notices.\n\n22. In or around October 2017, just prior to China's 19th National Congress, an event of great importance to the CCP, plaintiffs Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook accounts were abruptly and suspiciously suspended, all without explanation.\n\n23. Upon information and belief, beginning in 2017, the Chinese government and/or the CCP sent agents and officials to the United States to organize demonstrations aimed directly against plaintiff outside the building in New York City where plaintiff resides. Persons attending these CCP-staged demonstrations, literally on plaintiffs front steps, were provided with preprinted signs defaming plaintiff in vile language, calling him a rapist and a liar, and urging plaintiff to leave the United States.\n\n24. The CCP separately orchestrated a malicious negative propaganda campaign against plaintiff. The CCP formed a team of people, the \"50-cent troll army,\" to manipulate public opinion on social media for the benefit of the CCP. The commentators created favorable comments or articles on popular Chinese social media networks intended to derail discussions that are unfavorable to the CCP and promote narratives that serve the government's interests, together with disparaging comments and misinformation about political opponents and critics of the Chinese government, such as plaintiff.\n\n25. Merely supporting plaintiff became a crime in China. One of plaintiffs supporters, Dong Qi, reportedly was arrested and sent to jail for wearing a T-shirt with plaintiffs slogan - \"Everything is just beginning\" - on it. Upon information and belief, plaintiffs followers have been questioned, restrained, and intimidated.\n\n26. Upon information and belief, the CCP perceives plaintiff as a dangerous challenge to the stability, legitimacy, and credibility of the Chinese regime and the CCP.\n\n27. Plaintiffs political actions and advocacy are known to and widely supported by many people in China and, indeed, around the world. The domestic Chinese and international support which plaintiff has and the related strong support for his political and advocacy activities are additional sources of anger, aggravation, deep displeasure, and frustration to the CCP.\n\n#### **II. Plaintiff retains the Clark Hill law firm to represent him in preparing and submitting an application for asylum in the United States.**\n\n28. Paragraphs 15-27 *supra,* describing plaintiffs political activities and advocacy and resulting persecution and justifiable fear of further retaliation after fleeing from China, provide background and context for plaintiffs seeking legal representation to assist him and advocate on his behalf in applying for and obtaining political asylum in the United States. Plaintiff retained Mr. Ragland and the Clark Hill law firm to represent him in this regard. Mr. Ragland holds himself out as a leading immigration lawyer. Mr. Ragland and the firm represented to plaintiff that Mr. Ragland and the firm were qualified, capable, and competent to represent plaintiff and to protect his interests fully and professionally. Plaintiff relied upon these representations; however, they turned out to be false.\n\n29. Clark Hill receives and expects to receive (as any large law firm would) a large amount of confidential client information, including financial records, trade secrets, sensitive personal communications and disclosures, and sensitive personally identifiable information *(e.g.,* addresses, contact information, social security numbers, and health information). Receiving such information is a daily occurrence at Clark Hill ( again, as it is at any law firm of comparable size). Clients, specifically including the present plaintiff, disclose confidential information to Clark Hill reasonably and justifiably relying on the firm's professional ethical and legal obligations to protect and preserve the confidentiality of their information, while strictly limiting disclosure of such information to that information which the client authorizes the firm to disclose.\n\n30. Clark Hill has clear and undeniable ethical and legal obligations to preserve a client's (plaintiffs) confidential information. These obligations to preserve confidentiality include information provided to the firm electronically and/or stored electronically on the firm's computer network. At all relevant times, Clark Hill and Mr. Ragland communicated to plaintiff, both\n\nimplicitly and explicitly, that the firm understood its obligations to preserve plaintiffs confidential information and, of equal importance, that the firm could and would do so *(i.e.,* that the firm had the requisite professional and technical knowledge, capability, and competence to protect plaintiffs information).\n\n31. On or about August 2017, plaintiff met with defendants in connection with plaintiffs potentially retaining the firm to represent him in preparing and filing his planned asylum application. During that meeting, plaintiff explained his standing and visibility as a prominent Chinese political dissident who is perceived as hostile to the CCP and related interests in China. Plaintiff also explained the risks associated with and attendant to plaintiffs position as a prominent visible critic of the Chinese regime. Plaintiff warned of the persistent and relentless cyberattacks that he and his associates had endured. At that meeting and subsequently, plaintiff disclosed to the firm confidential information about plaintiffs political and advocacy activities and equally sensitive confidential information regarding plaintiffs knowledge of wrongful actions and activities of the CCP. The firm knew from the very outset that plaintiffs asylum application was not \"routine\" and that in connection with that application plaintiff would necessarily be disclosing highly sensitive confidential information to Mr. Ragland and to the Clark Hill law firm.\n\n32. In meetings with the firm, plaintiff explained that any law firm preparing his asylum application had to expect to be subjected to sophisticated cyberattacks. Having been so informed, with \"eyes wide open,\" and with a full awareness and understanding of the cyber security and other potential risks involved, defendants agreed to move forward and agreed to undertake the representation of plaintiff.\n\n33. In agreeing to undertake the representation of plaintiff, Mr. Ragland and the firm agreed to take special precautions to prevent improper disclosure of plaintiffs sensitive\n\nconfidential information. Such precautions would include not placing any of plaintiffs information on the firm's computer server as doing so would, as Mr. Ragland and the firm understood, make the information an easy target for a \"hacker\" interested in obtaining the information. The firm also committed and agreed to have in place at all times the requisite security measures to protect plaintiffs confidential information and to otherwise provide plaintiff ethical and competent legal representation. Had the firm not made these commitments and agreements, plaintiff would not have retained the firm.\n\n34. On or about August 28, 2017, plaintiff, through his authorized representative, Dr. Han, and defendants executed a letter of agreement (the \"retention agreement\") for legal services pertaining to plaintiffs asylum application. That agreement created and formalized contractual, common law, and professional ethical and legal duties and obligations of defendants (as legal counsel) to plaintiff (as client), including the duties and obligations of undivided loyalty and the duties and obligations to maintain adequate and necessary security measures sufficient to safeguard plaintiffs sensitive personal and confidential information and documents.\n\n35. Whatever the firm's security protection obligations are or should be with respect to maintaining reasonable security measures to safeguard an \"ordinary\" client's sensitive personal information and confidential documents, the firm here was on full notice (\"high alert\") that the representation of plaintiff was in no sense an \"ordinary\" representation with \"ordinary\" risks of unauthorized disclosure. That is, the firm knew from the very outset, and prior to the firm's agreeing to undertake the representation of the plaintiff, that special care and attention to security measures were necessary, required, expected, and agreed-to by the firm. In agreeing to represent plaintiff, the firm agreed to take the necessary steps and actions to protect plaintiffs confidential\n\ninformation recognizing that meant the firm would take \"more than ordinary\" protective efforts. Had the firm not so committed and agreed, plaintiff would not have retained the firm.\n\n36. In accordance with the retention agreement, plaintiff paid defendants a retainer fee of \\$10,000, and the firm subsequently billed plaintiff ( or his authorized representative) for its fees and the firm's fees were paid.\n\n37. The firm's retention agreement and its related standard terms of engagement state, among other things, that plaintiff, as a client, has the right to \"expect competent representation by an attorney\" of the firm; that the firm \"will at all times act on your behalf to the best of our ability\"; and that the firm's lawyers \"are subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct governing attorneys in Washington, DC.\" 1*See also* CLARK HILL, *About Us,* https:!/,.,v,vYv.darkhilLcom/pages/ahout (last visited Aug. 29, 2019) (\"Ethical [b]ehavior is [n]on-[n]egotiable. We believe in doing the right thing every time. We uphold our professional responsibilities and are accountable for our actions.\").\n\n38. Plaintiff delivered sensitive personal information and confidential documents to defendants so they, as counsel, could complete plaintiffs asylum application. That application was prepared in the District of Columbia by Mr. Ragland in consultation with Dr. Han, plaintiffs authorized representative in the District of Columbia. The application was filed with the United States Department of Homeland Security in Washington, D.C. on September 5, 2017. As necessary and as appropriate and subject to appropriate protections *(e.g.,* under seal or *in camera),* plaintiff will identify the confidential information he disclosed to the firm.\n\n1 Plaintiff certainly does not concede and expressly disputes that the retainer agreement's identification of certain rights is exclusive, and that plaintiff did not and does not have other rights.\n\n#### **III. Defendants' failure to adequately protect plaintifrs confidential information led to the information being disclosed and disseminated widely and harmfully.**\n\n3 9. Notwithstanding ( 1) the firm's obligation to protect the confidentiality of plaintiff s information, (2) the firm's advance knowledge of the circumstances of plaintiffs case and the increased need for protection of plaintiffs information, and (3) defendants' agreement, by undertaking the representation of plaintiff and otherwise, that it would and could protect plaintiffs confidential information, the firm failed to do so. Discovery is needed to determine the specific details of the firm's failures; however, it is beyond dispute that the firm failed as plaintiffs information was disclosed. Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Ragland used the firm's server to store and transmit plaintiffs sensitive information, and used his firm email account to transmit plaintiffs confidential information to third parties, including to third parties not approved by plaintiff. If, as plaintiff believes and here alleges, that Mr. Ragland used his firm email account to transmit plaintiffs confidential information to third parties, that reckless and wanton conduct \"opened the door wide\" to the firm's server to potential \"hackers\" and thoroughly compromised the confidentiality of plaintiffs information.\n\n40. The combination of Mr. Ragland's reckless conduct and the firm's inadequate cybersecurity measures and infrastructure was fatal. As a result, plaintiffs sensitive confidential information was not protected, but was disclosed to the world at large, and thus made available to the CCP and others with hostile intent to plaintiff and with the capacity to carry out that hostile intent.\n\n41. The firm has indicated that on or about September 12, 2017, the firm's computer system was \"hacked\" by a third party. This third party, apparently without great difficulty, circumvented the firm's demonstrably inadequate (essentially porous) security and monitoring programs. After doing so, the third party \"hacker\" was able to locate and exfiltrate ( obtain)\n\nplaintiffs asylum application and affidavit and, perhaps, other information and materials relating to plaintiff. On September 12, 2017, Mr. Ragland wrote to Dr. Han, plaintiffs representative, that \"his computer is down - apparently it was attacked.\"\n\n42. The firm's security measures, whatever they were, failed to \"safeguard\" plaintiffs sensitive personal information and confidential documents. The firm's security measures were inadequate, unreasonable, and fell woefully far short of defendants' promises, assurances, obligations, and commitments to provide adequate security measures, given the circumstances of this case, in violation of defendants' contractual, common law, and professional duties to plaintiff.\n\n43. Because of defendants' failures, documents obtained by the third party included plaintiffs and plaintiffs spouse's sensitive personal information - *e.g.,* plaintiffs passport identification number; plaintiffs I-94 admission-number; plaintiffs spouse's passport identification number; and plaintiffs spouse's I-94 admission-number. Beginning on or about September 23, 2017, sensitive personal information and confidential documents obtained from defendants' computer system relating to plaintiff began to appear on Twitter. The published material included the following:\n\n- a. A copy of plaintiffs application for political asylum;\n- b. Plaintiffs passport identification number;\n- c. Plaintiffs I-94 admission-number;\n- d. Plaintiffs spouse's passport identification number; and\n- e. Plaintiffs spouse's I-94 admission-number.\n\n44. The information published and disseminated on social media included sensitive personal information and confidential portions of plaintiffs asylum application and affidavit. Plaintiff provided this and other highly sensitive information, including the entire contents of\n\nplaintiffs asylum application, to defendants in connection with their representation of plaintiff. Plaintiff did not consent to nor did he authorize the disclosure of any of the information to any persons other than to those in the United States government with a direct \"need to know\" in connection with the review of plaintiffs asylum application. By law, asylum applications are strictly confidential. By virtue of the wrongful conduct of Mr. Ragland and the firm, plaintiffs asylum application became entirely public and was published on social media sites.\n\n45. Defendants cannot properly, let alone reasonably, defend their undeniable failure to protect plaintiffs information on grounds of\"impossibility\" or some variation of that theme. If defendants lacked the will, the resources, or the technical capability or sophistication to protect plaintiffs information from being disclosed, defendants were duty-bound to disclose this limitation (whatever its cause and despite such disclosure being against the defendants' economic interest in gaining plaintiff as a client) to plaintiff *prior* to the firm's undertaking the representation of plaintiff, and thus afford plaintiff the opportunity not to retain the firm to represent him. The firm denied plaintiff this opportunity. The legal and ethical obligations of lawyers (here, Mr. Ragland) include the obligation to decline a representation when the matter is beyond the competence, capacity, or ability of the lawyer. Mr. Ragland and the Clark Hill law firm breached that duty and obligation because they undertook the representation of plaintiff when they lacked the competence and ability to do so professionally, properly, and without harming their client (plaintiff).\n\n46. Since the \"hacking,\" defendants have largely \"stonewalled\" and refused to provide plaintiff any meaningful information about what occurred. For example, defendants have refused to advise plaintiff of the scale of the attack, including whether materials of clients other than plaintiff were obtained and, if so, whether the firm withdrew from those representations, and\n\nwhether there is any discernible pattern in the materials seized; and defendants have likewise refused to advise plaintiff of how defendants first learned of the attack and what counter-measures, if any, defendants took.\n\n47. On or about May 14, 2019, Daniel S. Steinberg, Esq., as counsel for plaintiff, wrote to the firm's General Counsel, Edward J. Hood, Esq., to inquire regarding the cyberattack. Mr. Steinberg requested answers to several specific relevant questions:\n\n- a. Have you been able to identify the source of the attack and the mechanism by which access was gained to your firm's information systems?\n- b. What records were obtained by the hacker, and were they obtained by unauthorized access to an email server or by direct access to a storage location?\n- c. How did the attacker circumvent the firm's security measures, or did the attack entail malicious software that gained control of the firm's computer system until [plaintiffs] information was transferred?\n\n48. On or about May 23, 2019, Mr. Hood, claiming, without explaining, that the investigation which was conducted of the \"hacking\" is privileged, provided only a limited response. Mr. Hood failed to answer the direct question of \"how did the attacker circumvent the firm's security measures.\" Presumably, the investigative report, which, to date, the firm has steadfastly hidden from plaintiff as the victim of the attack, includes at least a preliminary answer to this question.\n\n#### **IV. The firm's improper withdrawal as plaintifrs counsel.**\n\n49. A week following the \"hacking\" of defendants' plainly inadequate system, on or about September 19, 2017, Mr. Hood, in his capacity as General Counsel of the Clark Hill law firm, wrote to plaintiff to inform him that defendants were terminating their representation of plaintiff:\n\nI regret to inform you that, after careful consideration, the Firm has concluded it must withdraw as your legal counsel.\n\n#### \\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\n\nThe cyberattack has presented several ethical complications with continuing to represent you. A primary concern is that the cyberattack will require Mr. Ragland - and possibly other members of the Firm - to be a witness in your asylum proceeding. Under our Rules of Professional Conduct, a lawyer may not serve as an advocate in a proceeding where the lawyer is likely to be a material witness. Here, the cyberattack has placed Mr. Ragland in an untenable position of being a witness in your asylum case while simultaneously serving as your attorney. At this point, Mr. Ragland must confine his role to that of witness, rather than legal advocate. (Emphasis added.)\n\n50. The firm's stated \"reason\" for its extreme unilateral action that \"it must withdraw\"\n\nwas that Mr. Ragland and perhaps others at the firm might be a witness in plaintiffs asylum proceeding. This \"reason\" is without credibility or merit.\n\n51. For example, no hearing was pending when the firm unilaterally withdrew from\n\nand abandoned plaintiff (and none is pending as of this filing); plaintiff had not asked that Mr. Ragland be a witness were there a hearing; as the client, it would be plaintiffs decision, not Mr. Ragland's or the firm's decision, as to whether the value or necessity of Mr. Ragland's testimony at any hearing outweighed the firm's continuing as counsel (particularly in light of Mr. Ragland's claimed preeminence in immigration and asylum matters); the substance of Mr. Ragland's testimony at any hearing, were he to testify, would relate to uncontested matters, *i.e.,* that the firm's server had been \"hacked\" and plaintiffs information had been obtained; the firm never asked plaintiffs opinion on the matter; and the firm never so much as hinted, let alone explained, why Mr. Ragland's testimony was, supposedly, so \"essential\" at a then-non-existent hearing as to warrant the firm's unilaterally, precipitously, and without regard to the best interests of plaintiff terminating its attorney-client relationship with plaintiff when it did.\n\n52. The firm simply wanted \"out\" despite its clear contrary ethical obligations, including the duty of undivided loyalty to its client (plaintiff). To accomplish its improper \"fire the client\" escape mission, the firm manufactured a plainly bogus \"reason\" to seek to justify its action. Here, the firm's client had done nothing wrong and certainly had done nothing to warrant such brutal, unjustifiable, and unethical treatment. Determining the firm's actual reason(s), as distinguished from its manufactured one, for its wrongful termination of its representation of plaintiff, including whether the firm yielded to pressure whether from the \"hacker\" or otherwise, will be an important area for discovery.\n\n53. Clark Hill has advised that it conducted ( or had conducted on its behalf) an investigation of the cyberattack at issue in this case. That investigation and any investigative report may address the topic of the firm's improper withdrawal from representing plaintiff. To date, the firm has failed to provide plaintiff any investigative report produced as a result of the internal investigation of this matter despite the fact that the plaintiffs information was obtained, and perhaps the only successful target of the attack, and the firm terminated its representation of plaintiff because of that attack. Plaintiff will seek this report in discovery. Accordingly, defendants are hereby on notice to preserve the report and all related drafts, investigative notes, transcripts, exhibits, and materials.\n\n54. If defendants were unwilling or unable to protect plaintiffs sensitive confidential information, or lacked the competence or the capability to keep plaintiffs information off the firm's server, or to secure properly its computer system and network to protect plaintiffs information, defendants were duty-bound to disclose this critical limitation to the plaintiff at the outset and prior to committing to represent plaintiff to give the plaintiff an opportunity to make an informed judgment as to whether to retain the firm given its limitations. The firm made no such\n\ndisclosure and thereby denied plaintiff the opportunity to make an informed decision on retaining the firm. Had the firm been forthright and candid about its limitations and lack of adequate security measures and protections, plaintiff would not have retained the firm as his counsel.\n\n#### **V. Defendants' breaches of duty have damaged plaintiff.**\n\n55. As a direct and proximate cause of defendants' multiple breaches of their duties and legal obligations to plaintiff, plaintiffs sensitive personal information and confidential documents were disclosed to third-parties, to the world at large, and to persons and institutions in China, including the Chinese government and CCP, to the great and severe injury, harm, and detriment of plaintiff.\n\n56. As a direct consequence of defendants' wrongful and unlawful conduct, plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer damages to his personal and professional reputation; he has lost substantial business opportunities; plaintiffs personal safety and security have been put at risk; his efforts to obtain political asylum have been delayed; his family has been arrested and threatened; plaintiffs employees in China have been harassed; plaintiff has incurred costs and expenses; and plaintiff has been denied the benefit of defendants' claimed immigration law expertise in connection with pursuing plaintiffs asylum application. Defendants' breaches of their legal duties and obligations caused these and potentially other harms and damages to plaintiff. These harms are continuous and ongoing, and there is a substantial risk, if not likelihood, of additional harm and damage in the future.\n\n57. As a direct and proximate cause of defendants' multiple breaches of their duties and legal obligations, the details and contents of plaintiffs asylum application and other materials have been disclosed widely on social media platforms and placed in the hands of third-parties hostile to plaintiff. There are powerful people and interests in China and elsewhere hostile to\n\nplaintiff because of his political activities who now have - solely because of defendants' failures and breaches of duty - detailed information about plaintiff which they would not otherwise have. There is good cause to believe that these persons have used and will continue to use plaintiffs confidential information for purposes harmful to plaintiff.\n\n58. The severe harm defendants have caused extends to limiting plaintiffs freedom and liberty to travel and jeopardizes his personal safety. Defendants' breaches of legal duties and obligations caused these harms and damages to plaintiff. These harms are continuous and ongoing, and there is a substantial risk, if not likelihood, of additional harm and damage in the future.\n\n59. The defendants' failure to safeguard plaintiffs sensitive personal information and confidential documents was the direct and proximate cause of the dissemination of plaintiffs sensitive personal information and confidential documents on social media, the publication of which has caused great harm to plaintiff by tarnishing his reputation and undermining his credibility and the credibility of his work in advancing the causes of bringing the rule of law, democracy, and justice to China. Defendants' breaches of legal duties and obligations caused these harms and damages to plaintiff. These harms are continuous and ongoing, and there is a substantial risk, if not likelihood, of additional harm and damage in the future.\n\n60. Defendants' improper and unjustified termination of its attorney-client relationship and attendant obligations has harmed and damaged plaintiff Defendants' improper action in abandoning their client (plaintiff) denied plaintiff the benefit of counsel at a time when he needed counsel (because his confidential information had just been splayed all over social media); sent the message to the public that plaintiff was somehow untrustworthy or acted improperly in connection with the representation; denied plaintiff defendants' claimed expertise in immigration law; and has caused and/or will cause undue delay and complications in action on plaintiffs\n\nasylum application. These harms are continuous and ongoing, and there is a substantial risk, if not likelihood, of additional harm and damage in the future.\n\n61. At trial, the jury will determine plaintiffs compensatory damages proximately caused by defendants. Plaintiff alleges that those damages are no less than \\$50 million and seeks a judgment in at least that amount.\n\n#### **PUNITIVE DAMAGES**\n\n62. At trial, the jury will also be asked to award significant punitive damages in an amount the jury determines to be appropriate. Punitive damages are warranted here because defendants' actions, inactions, and breaches of duties and obligations were reckless, wanton, intentional, and taken in willful disregard of plaintiffs rights and of defendants' obligations and duties to protect plaintiffs rights.\n\n63. Defendants were reckless in their handling of plaintiffs confidential information. Defendants' recklessness included failing to protect that information, putting it on the firm's computer server, either directly or indirectly by transmitting the information to third parties via the firm's email account, or otherwise. These actions were intentional, deliberate, and willfully disregarded plaintiffs rights and defendants' obligations and duties to protect plaintiffs rights.\n\n64. Defendants knew and understood the importance of protecting plaintiffs sensitive and confidential information, and that the dissemination of such information would jeopardize the personal and professional interests of plaintiff, plaintiffs family, including putting plaintiff and his family at grave risk of harm. Defendants specifically knew and understood that the CCP would attempt to obtain plaintiffs sensitive and confidential information and use that information to harm plaintiff and his family. Nevertheless, defendants ignored these very real and present risks, and their conduct was accompanied by fraud, ill will, recklessness, wantonness, oppressiveness, willful\n\ndisregard of the plaintiffs rights, his safety, his family's safety, and with other circumstances tending to aggravate plaintiffs injuries.\n\n65. Defendants' compounded their recklessness by abandoning plaintiff as their client, choosing self-interest over protecting their client. Defendants' unilateral withdrawal as plaintiffs counsel was intentional, deliberate, reckless, and unwarranted conduct, and conduct in willful disregard of plaintiffs rights and of defendants' obligations and duties to protect plaintiffs rights.\n\n#### **CLAIMS FOR RELIEF**\n\n#### **COUNT** I - **Breach of Fiduciary Duties**\n\nforth. 66. Plaintiff adopts and incorporates by reference ~~ 1-65 as if each were here fully set\n\n67. Defendants formed an attorney-client relationship with plaintiff. As a consequence, defendants owed plaintiff all the fiduciary duties and obligations which a lawyer owes to a client. Rather than honor those duties and obligations, defendants breached them.\n\n68. At all relevant times, the fiduciary duties defendants owed to plaintiff included, but were not limited to, the duty not to undertake a matter beyond the professional and technical competence, capability, and capacity of defendants; the duty to maintain reasonable and adequate, in this case meaning heightened, security measures to safeguard plaintiffs sensitive personal information and confidential records; the duty not to expose plaintiffs confidential information to the risk of disclosure by allowing the information to appear on the firm's computer server; the duty to exercise at all times the utmost good faith and undivided loyalty toward plaintiff; the duty to provide competent professional legal representation; and the duty not to withdraw from representing plaintiff, effectively abandoning him, absent valid and appropriate cause.\n\n69. Defendants breached their fiduciary duties to plaintiff. These breaches include defendants' failing to maintain reasonable security measures to safeguard plaintiffs sensitive personal information and confidential records by failing to maintain reasonable security measures, including placing information on the firm's computer server and/or allowing access to the firm's server, thus allowing unauthorized third-parties to gain access to electronic files and communications containing plaintiffs sensitive personal information and confidential documents.\n\n70. Defendants further breached their fiduciary duties and obligations to plaintiff by improperly and without valid cause withdrawing from representing plaintiff, whether in response to a \"ransom\" demand or otherwise. Defendants acted to advance their interests and contrary to the interests of the firm's client (plaintiff) to whom the firm owed its primary duty of undivided loyalty.\n\n71. Defendants had no valid or legally or ethically sufficient cause for terminating their representation of plaintiff. Plaintiff had satisfied his obligations as a client; defendants breached their obligations as counsel. The firm's stated reason for terminating its attorney-client relationship with plaintiff (that Mr. Ragland might be a witness in some unknown as-of-yet not scheduled hearing) was a transparent sham proffered to justify the defendants' improper unilateral decision to terminate the attorney-client relationship.\n\n72. If defendants released plaintiffs sensitive personal information and confidential documents to regain control of their computer system, or engaged in any similar conduct ( a topic plaintiff will pursue in discovery), defendants breached their primary duty of undivided loyalty to plaintiff as the firm's client by placing the interests of the firm above the interests of plaintiff.\n\n73. Plaintiff has been harmed and damaged as a result of defendants' breaches of duty to plaintiff. The amount of plaintiffs damages will be determined at trial.\n\n74. In addition to compensatory damages, defendants are liable for punitive damages because defendants' actions willfully disregarded the rights of plaintiff, were intentional, deliberate, and reckless. The amount of punitive damages will be determined at trial.\n\n#### **COUNT** II - **Breach of Contract of Representation**\n\n7 5. Plaintiff adopts and incorporates by reference ~~ 1-7 4 as if each were here fully set forth.\n\n76. Plaintiff entered into a written contract with plaintiff for the firm to represent the plaintiff. Defendants breached their contractual obligations to plaintiff by undertaking a matter beyond defendants' professional or technical competence, capability, and competence; by failing to provide plaintiff competent representation; by neglecting to undertake reasonable security measures to safeguard plaintiffs sensitive personal information and confidential documents; and by improperly and wrongfully terminating the firm's representation of plaintiff.\n\n77. Defendants further breached the retention agreement and the associated terms of engagement if they delivered a \"ransom\" to unknown third parties that included ceasing to represent plaintiff and/or providing plaintiffs sensitive personal information and confidential documents (plaintiff will pursue this topic in discovery). If defendants did so, they failed to provide competent representation and failed to act to the best of their ability and for the benefit of their client.\n\n78. The firm wrongfully placed its interests above the interests of its client (plaintiff) in violation of the firm's contractual and ethical obligations. Defendants had no good or sufficient cause for terminating their representation of plaintiff. Plaintiff had satisfied his obligations as a client; defendants breached their obligations as counsel. The firm's stated reason for terminating its attorney-client relationship with plaintiff (that Mr. Ragland might be a witness in some\n\nunknown as-of-yet not scheduled hearing) was a sham proffered to justify the defendants' improper unilateral decision to terminate the attorney-client contractual relationship.\n\n79. Plaintiff has been harmed and damaged as a result of defendants' breaches of their contractual duties and obligations to plaintiff. The amount of plaintiffs damages will be determined at trial.\n\n#### **COUNT III - Legal Malpractice**\n\n80. Plaintiff adopts and incorporates by reference ~~ 1-79 as if each were here fully set forth.\n\n81. At all relevant times, an attorney-client relationship existed between plaintiff and defendants. Defendants owed plaintiff contractual, common law, and professional duties to use the required degree of professional care and skill to represent plaintiff competently and professionally and consistent with the applicable standard of care. As detailed in this complaint, the firm did not represent plaintiff with the required degree of professional care and skill. Defendants breached their duties to plaintiff.\n\n82. The standard of care governing a lawyer's representation of a client is defined by a combination of contractual, common law, and professional ( ethical) duties and obligations. In this case, the firm breached the standard of care to represent plaintiff competently and professionally as the firm's representation of plaintiff and its termination of that representation fell far short of the required standard of care.\n\n83. Defendants breached their contractual, common law, and professional and ethical duties and obligations to plaintiff by undertaking a matter beyond defendants' professional or technical competence and capability; by failing to use the required degree of professional care and skill in representing plaintiff, resulting in the global exposure and dissemination of plaintiffs\n\nsensitive personal information and confidential documents; and by wrongfully and without valid cause terminating their representation of plaintiff.\n\n84. Defendants failed to take competent and reasonable measures to safeguard plaintiffs sensitive personal information and confidential documents by, *inter alia,* failing to maintain reasonable security measures to secure plaintiffs files and communications; failing to maintain reasonable security measures to secure email accounts and information systems, including the data contained within them, from unauthorized access by third parties; and failing to maintain reasonable security measures to prevent email accounts from being accessed by unauthorized third parties.\n\n85. Had Mr. Ragland done as he promised-not exposed plaintiffs sensitive confidential information-and had defendants maintained reasonable security measures to secure their computer system from unauthorized access, as required and promised to plaintiff, the cyber adversary would not have been able to gain access to plaintiffs sensitive personal information and confidential documents. If defendants lacked the will, the competence, or the capability to properly secure the firm's computer system and network and thereby protect plaintiffs information from unauthorized disclosure, defendants were duty-bound to disclose this limitation to the plaintiff at the outset, prior to undertaking the representation, to give the plaintiff an opportunity to make an informed judgment as to whether to retain the firm given its limitations. The firm made no such disclosure and thereby denied plaintiff the opportunity to make an informed decision on retaining the firm.\n\n86. Defendants further breached their contractual, common law, and professional duties to plaintiff if they delivered a \"ransom\" to unknown third parties that included ceasing to\n\nrepresent plaintiff and providing plaintiffs sensitive personal information and confidential documents.\n\n87. Defendants further breached their contractual, common law, and professional duties to plaintiff by improperly and wrongfully terminating their representation of plaintiff and by the manner in which defendants did so. Defendants had no good, sufficient, or valid cause for terminating their representation of plaintiff. Plaintiff had satisfied his obligations as a client; defendants breached their obligations as counsel. The firm's stated reason for terminating its attorney-client relationship with plaintiff (that Mr. Ragland might be a witness in some unknown as-of-yet not scheduled hearing) was a transparent sham proffered to justify the defendants' improper unilateral decision to terminate the attorney-client relationship.\n\n88. Plaintiff has been harmed and damaged as a result of defendants' breach of their duties and obligations of care and competence to plaintiff. The amount of plaintiffs damages will be determined at trial.\n\n#### **COUNT IV - Punitive Damages**\n\n89. Plaintiff adopts and incorporates by reference ~~ 1-88 as if each were here fully set forth.\n\n90. Because defendants' actions, inactions, failures, breaches of duties and obligations, and violations of plaintiffs rights were intentional, deliberate, outrageous, and in willful disregard of defendants' duties and obligations and in willful disregard of plaintiffs rights, defendants are liable to plaintiff for punitive damages, in addition to compensatory damages.\n\n91. Defendants' conduct at issue in this case is so far beyond the pale as to warrant punitive damages. Defendant's intentional, deliberate, wrongful conduct involves the failure to protect plaintiffs confidential information from deeply harmful public disclosure despite\n\ndefendants' specific knowledge of the acute need to do so followed by defendants' then immediately \"running away\" from its client (plaintiff) after the disclosure occurred, which occurred because of defendants' failures.\n\n92. Defendants' intentional and deliberate failures made plaintiffs information accessible to \"hackers\" and then defendants' intentionally, deliberately, wrongfully, and without regard to their duties and obligation and in willful disregard for the rights of plaintiff abandoned plaintiff as their client.\n\n93. The jury will determine the appropriate amount of punitive damages.\n\n#### **PRAYERS FOR RELIEF**\n\nAt trial or afterwards, plaintiff will seek a compensatory monetary judgment against defendants, jointly and severally, in an amount in excess of \\$50 million, plus interest at the legal rate, the costs and disbursements of this action, and such other relief as is just and proper.\n\nIn addition, plaintiff shall seek a judgment against defendants, jointly and severally, for significant punitive damages in an amount to be determined by the jury.\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\n*Isl Ari* S. *Casper*\n\nAri S. Casper (#471013) Ralph S. Tyler (#357087) The Casper Firm, LLC 400 E. Pratt Street, Suite 903 Baltimore, MD 21202 ( 410) 989-5097 - Phone (410) 630-7776 - Facsimile acaspen1vcas pcrfirrn. com rtvl e r(tL1.casperfi rm. com Attorneys for Plaintiff\n\n### **DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL**\n\nPlaintiff demands a trial by jury on all issues.\n\n*Isl Ari* S. *Casper*\n\nAri S. Casper\n\n|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|\n| | | | | | |\n| | | | | | |\n| | | | | | |\n| | | | | | |\n| | | | | | |\n| | | | | | |\n| | | | | | |\n| | | | | | |\n| | | | | | |\n| | | | | | |\n| | | | | | |\n| | | | | | |\n| | | | | | |\n| | | | | | |\n| | | | | | |\n| | | | | | |\n| | | | | | |\n| | | | | | |\n| | | | | | |\n| | | | | | |\n| | | | | | |\n\n| Award (Collection Cases Only) | | | | |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|--|\n| OPERTY TORTS | | | | |\n| 01 Automobile
02 Conversion
07 Shoplifting, D.C. Code § 27-102 (a) | 03 Destruction of Private Property ____ 05 Trespass
04 Property Damage | | | |\n| CRSONAL TORTS | | | | |\n| 01 Abuse of Process
02 Alienation of Affection
03 Assault and Battery
04 Automobile- Personal Injury
05 Deceit (Misrepresentation)
06 False Accusation
07 False Arrest
08 Fraud | 10 Invasion of Privacy
11 Libel and Slander
12 Malicious Interference
13 Malicious Prosecution
x 14 Malpractice Legal
15 Malpractice Medical (Including Wrongful Death)
16 Negligence- (Not Automobile,
Not Malpractice) | 17 Personal Injury- (Not Autor
Not Malpractice)
18Wrongful Death (Not Malp
19 Wrongful Eviction
20 Friendly Suit
21 Asbestos
22 Toxic/Mass Torts
23 Tobacco
74 Tead Paint | | |\n\n| C. OTHERS
01 Accounting
02 Att. Before Judgment
05 Ejectment
09 Special Writ/Warrants
(DC Code § 11-941)
10 Traffic Adjudication
11 Writ of Replevin
12 Enforce Mechanics Lien
16 Declaratory Judgment | 17 Merit Personnel Act (OEA)
(D.C. Code Title 1, Chapter 6)
18 Product Liability
24 Application to Confirm, Modify,
Vacate Arbitration Award (DC Code § 16-4401)
29 Merit Personnel Act (OHR)
31 Housing Code Regulations
32 Qui Tam
33 Whistleblower | | | |\n|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|--|\n| TI.
03 Change of Name
06 Foreign Judgment/Domestic
08 Foreign Judgment/International
13 Correction of Birth Certificate
14 Correction of Marriage
Certificate
26 Petition for Civil Asset Forfeiture (Vehicle)
27 Petition for Civil Asset Forfeiture (Currency)
28 Petition for Civil Asset Forfeiture (Other) | 15 Libel of Information
19 Enter Administrative Order as
Judgment [ D.C. Code &
2-1802.03 (h) or 32-151 9 (a)]
20 Master Meter (D.C. Code §
42-3301, et seq.) | 21 Petition for Subpoena
Rule 28-1 (b)
22 Release Mechanics Lien
23 Rule 27(a)(1)
(Perpetuate Testimony)
24 Petition for Structured Settlement
25 Petition for Liquidation | | |\n| D. REAL PROPERTY
09 Real Property-Real Estate
08 Quiet Title
25 Liens: Tax / Water Consent Granted
12 Specific Performance
30 Liens: Tax / Water Consent Denied
04 Condemnation (Eminent Domain)
10 Mortgage Foreclosure/Judicial Sale
_ 31 Tax Lien Bid Off Certificate Consent Granted
11 Petition for Civil Asset Forfeiture (RP) | | | | |\n\n\n\n| Ari S. Casper
Name of Plaintiff's Attorney | |\n|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 400 E. Pratt Street, Suite 903 | િક |\n| Address
Baltimore, MD 21202 | entry Clerk
09/26/2019 |\n| 410=989=5097 | Date |\n| Telephone
如果都是 老公安 注 (2000) 270-320-3272 | Italifor sameler an Child R. B. R. 2007 use was was with has date for as 1 222870.000 3 |\n\n\n\n| Ari S. Casper | |\n|--------------------------------|--------------------|\n| Name of Plaintiff's Attorney | |\n| 400 E. Pratt Street, Suite 903 | 137 |\n| Address | |\n| Baltimore, MD 21202 | |\n| 410=989=5097 | 09/26/2019
Date |\n| I elephone | |\n\n# Exhibit 2\n\n| GUO WENGUI a/k/a MILES KWOK a/k/a
HO WAN KWOK, | | |\n|---------------------------------------------------|-----|--|\n| Plaintiff, | | |\n| V. | No. | |\n| CLARK HILL PLC and THOMAS K.
RAGLAND, | | |\n| Defendants | | |\n\n# Exhibit 3\n\n| GUO WENGUI a/k/a MILES KWOK a/k/a
HO WAN KWOK, | |\n|---------------------------------------------------|-----|\n| Plaintiff, | |\n| V. | No. |\n| CLARK HILL PLC and THOMAS K.
RAGLAND, | |\n| | |\n\n| JS-44 (Rev. 6/17 DC) | | | | | | | | | |\n|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|\n| I. (a) PLAINTIFFS | | | DEFENDANTS | | | | | | |\n| GUO WENGUI a/k/a MILES KWOK a/k/a
HO WAN KWOK | | | CLARK HILL PLC and THOMAS K. RAGLAND | | | | | | |\n| New York County, NY
(b) COUNTY OF RESIDENCE OF FIRST LISTED PLAINTIFF _____________________
(EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES) | | | Wayne County, MI
COUNTY OF RESIDENCE OF FIRST LISTED DEFENDANT _____________________
(IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY)
NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF THE TRACT OF LAND INVOLVED | | | | | | |\n| (c) ATTORNEYS (FIRM NAME, ADDRESS, AND TELEPHONE NUMBER) | | | ATTORNEYS (IF KNOWN) | | | | | | |\n| Ari S. Casper, Ralph S. Tyler, The Casper Firm, 400 E.
Pratt Street, Suite 903, Baltimore, MD 21202 | | | Jessica Ring Amunson (#497223), Jenner & Block LLP, 1099
New York Avenue NW, Suite 900, Washington, DC
20001-4412, (202) 639-6000 | | | | | | |\n| II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION
(PLACE AN x IN ONE BOX ONLY) | | | | | | | III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES (PLACE AN x IN ONE BOX FOR
PLAINTIFF AND ONE BOX FOR DEFENDANT) FOR DIVERSITY CASES ONLY! | PTF | DFT |\n| o
o
1 U.S. Government
Plaintiff | 3 Federal Question
(U.S. Government Not a Party) | PTF
DFT
o
o
1
1
Citizen of this State | | | Incorporated or Principal Place
of Business in This State | o
4 | o
4 | | |\n| o
o
2 U.S. Government
Defendant | 4 Diversity
(Indicate Citizenship of | | Citizen of Another State | o
2 | o
2 | | Incorporated and Principal Place
of Business in Another State | o
5 | o
5 |\n| | Parties in item III) | | Citizen or Subject of a
Foreign Country | o
3 | o
3 | Foreign Nation | | o
6 | o
6 |\n| | IV. CASE ASSIGNMENT AND NATURE OF SUIT
(Place an X in one category, A-N, that best represents your Cause of Action and one in a corresponding Nature of Suit) | | | | | | | | |\n| o
o
A. Antitrust | B. Personal Injury/
Malpractice | o
o
C. Administrative Agency
D. Temporary Restraining
Review
Order/Preliminary | | | | | | | |\n| 410 Antitrust | 310 Airplane
315 Airplane Product Liability
320 Assault, Libel & Slander
330 Federal Employers Liability
340 Marine
345 Marine Product Liability
350 Motor Vehicle
355 Motor Vehicle Product Liability
360 Other Personal Injury
362 Medical Malpractice
365 Product Liability
367 Health Care/Pharmaceutical
Personal Injury Product Liability
368 Asbestos Product Liability | | 151 Medicare Act
Social Security
861 HIA (1395ff)
862 Black Lung (923)
863 DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
864 SSID Title XVI
865 RSI (405(g))
Other Statutes
891 Agricultural Acts
893 Environmental Matters
890 Other Statutory Actions (If
Administrative Agency is
Involved) | | | Injunction
Any nature of suit from any category
may be selected for this category of
case assignment.
*(If Antitrust, then A governs)* | | | |\n| o
E. General Civil (Other) | OR | | o | F. Pro Se General Civil | | | | | |\n| Real Property
Bankruptcy
210 Land Condemnation
422 Appeal 27 USC 158
220 Foreclosure
423 Withdrawal 28 USC 157
230 Rent, Lease & Ejectment
Prisoner Petitions
240 Torts to Land
535 Death Penalty
245 Tort Product Liability
540 Mandamus & Other
290 All Other Real Property
550 Civil Rights
555 Prison Conditions
Personal Property
370 Other Fraud
560 Civil Detainee – Conditions
371 Truth in Lending
of Confinement
380 Other Personal Property
Property Rights
Damage
820 Copyrights
385 Property Damage
830 Patent
Product Liability
835 Patent – Abbreviated New
Drug Application
840 Trademark | | | Federal Tax Suits
870 Taxes (US plaintiff or
defendant)
871 IRS-Third Party 26 USC
7609
Forfeiture/Penalty
625 Drug Related Seizure of
Property 21 USC 881
690 Other
Other Statutes
375 False Claims Act
376 Qui Tam (31 USC
3729(a))
400 State Reapportionment
430 Banks & Banking
450 Commerce/ICC
Rates/etc.
460 Deportation | | | 462 Naturalization
Application
465 Other Immigration
Actions
470 Racketeer Influenced
& Corrupt Organization
480 Consumer Credit
490 Cable/Satellite TV
850 Securities/Commodities/
Exchange
896 Arbitration
899 Administrative Procedure
Act/Review or Appeal of
Agency Decision
950 Constitutionality of State
Statutes
890 Other Statutory Actions
(if not administrative agency
review or Privacy Act) | | | |\n\n|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|\n| o
G. Habeas Corpus/
2255 | 332
o
H. Employment
Discrimination | o
I. FOIA/Privacy Act | o
J. Student Loan | |\n| 530 Habeas Corpus – General
510 Motion/Vacate Sentence
463 Habeas Corpus – Alien
Detainee | 442 Civil Rights – Employment
(criteria: race, gender/sex,
national origin,
discrimination, disability, age,
religion, retaliation) | 895 Freedom of Information Act
890 Other Statutory Actions
(if Privacy Act) | 152 Recovery of Defaulted
Student Loan
(excluding veterans) | |\n| | *(If pro se, select this deck)* | *(If pro se, select this deck)* | | |\n| o
K. Labor/ERISA
(non-employment)
710 Fair Labor Standards Act
720 Labor/Mgmt. Relations
740 Labor Railway Act
751 Family and Medical
Leave Act
790 Other Labor Litigation
791 Empl. Ret. Inc. Security Act | o
L. Other Civil Rights
(non-employment)
441 Voting (if not Voting Rights
Act)
443 Housing/Accommodations
440 Other Civil Rights
445 Americans w/Disabilities –
Employment
446 Americans w/Disabilities –
Other
448 Education | o
M. Contract
110 Insurance
120 Marine
130 Miller Act
140 Negotiable Instrument
150 Recovery of Overpayment
& Enforcement of
Judgment
153 Recovery of Overpayment
of Veteran's Benefits
160 Stockholder's Suits
190 Other Contracts
195 Contract Product Liability
196 Franchise | o
N. Three-Judge
Court
441 Civil Rights – Voting
(if Voting Rights Act) | |\n| V. ORIGIN | | | | |\n| o
o
o
o4 Reinstated
o5
o
o7 Appeal to
o8
1 Original
2 Removed
3 Remanded
Transferred
6 Multi-district
Multi-district
Proceeding
from State
from Appellate
or Reopened
from another
Litigation
District Judge
Litigation –
Court
Court
district (specify)
from Mag.
Direct File
Judge | | | | |\n| VI. CAUSE OF ACTION (CITE THE U.S. CIVIL STATUTE UNDER WHICH YOU ARE FILING AND WRITE A BRIEF STATEMENT OF CAUSE.)
Diversity of Citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and Removal of Civil Actions, 28 U.S.C. § 1441 | | | | |\n| 50,000,000
VII. REQUESTED IN
CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS
DEMAND \\$
Check YES only if demanded in complaint
✘
ACTION UNDER F.R.C.P. 23
YES
NO
COMPLAINT
JURY DEMAND: | | | | |\n| VIII. RELATED CASE(S)
IF ANY | (See instruction)
YES | ✘
NO | If yes, please complete related case form | |\n| 10/24/2019
DATE: _________________________ | | /s/ Jessica Ring Amunson
SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD _________________________________________________________ | | |\n\n#### **INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING CIVIL COVER SHEET JS-44 Authority for Civil Cover Sheet**\n\nThe JS-44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replaces nor supplements the filings and services of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. Consequently, a civil cover sheet is submitted to the Clerk of Court for each civil complaint filed. Listed below are tips for completing the civil cover sheet. These tips coincide with the Roman Numerals on the cover sheet.\n\n- **I.** COUNTY OF RESIDENCE OF FIRST LISTED PLAINTIFF/DEFENDANT (b) County of residence: Use 11001 to indicate plaintiff if resident of Washington, DC, 88888 if plaintiff is resident of United States but not Washington, DC, and 99999 if plaintiff is outside the United States.\n- **III.** CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES: This section is completed only if diversity of citizenship was selected as the Basis of Jurisdiction under Section II.\n- **IV.** CASE ASSIGNMENT AND NATURE OF SUIT: The assignment of a judge to your case will depend on the category you select that best represents the primary cause of action found in your complaint. You may select only one category. You must also select one corresponding nature of suit found under the category of the case.\n- **VI.** CAUSE OF ACTION: Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing and write a brief statement of the primary cause.\n- **VIII.** RELATED CASE(S), IF ANY: If you indicated that there is a related case, you must complete a related case form, which may be obtained from the Clerk's Office.\n\nBecause of the need for accurate and complete information, you should ensure the accuracy of the information provided prior to signing the form.\n\n## **EXHIBIT 3**\n\n#### **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**\n\n| GUO WENGUI a/k/a MILES KWOK a/k/a | ) |\n|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------|\n| HO WAN KWOK, | ) |\n| 162 E 64th Street | ) |\n| New York, NY 10065 | ) |\n| Plaintiff, | )
)
) |\n| v. | ) |\n| | )
Case No. 1:19-cv-3195-JEB |\n| CLARK HILL PLC | ) |\n| 500 Woodward Avenue | )
Hon. James Boasberg |\n| Suite 3500 | ) |\n| Detroit, MI 48226 | ) |\n| | ) |\n| and | ) |\n| | ) |\n| THOMAS K. RAGLAND, | ) |\n| c/o Clark Hill PLC | ) |\n| 1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW | ) |\n| Suite 1300 | ) |\n| Washington, DC 20004, | ) |\n| | ) |\n| Defendants. | ) |\n\n#### **DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)**\n\nDefendants Clark Hill PLC and Thomas Ragland respectfully move this Court, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for an order dismissing Plaintiff Guo Wengui's Complaint (Dkt. 1-1) with prejudice. Defendants are filing herewith a memorandum containing the specific points of law and authorities that support the motion and a proposed order.\n\nDated: November 25, 2019 Respectfully submitted,\n\n CLARK HILL PLC and THOMAS K. RAGLAND\n\n By: */s/ John R. Storino* One of their attorneys John R. Storino *(via pro hac vice)* JENNER & BLOCK, LLP 353 N. Clark Street Chicago, IL 60654-3456 Tel: (312) 222-9350 JStorino@jenner.com\n\nKali N. Bracey (#458965) JENNER & BLOCK, LLP 1099 New York Avenue NW Suite 900 Washington, DC 20001-4412 Tel: (202) 639-6000 KBracey@jenner.com\n\n#### **Certificate of Service**\n\nI, John R. Storino, an attorney, hereby certifies that I served the foregoing Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), along with the attached Memorandum in Support and Proposed Order on the following by electronic service on this, the 25th day of November, 2019:\n\n Ari S. Casper Ralph S. Tyler The Casper Firm 400 E. Pratt Street, Suite 903 Baltimore, MD 21202\n\n*/s/ John R. Storino*\n\n#### **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**\n\n| GUO WENGUI a/k/a MILES KWOK a/k/a | ) |\n|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------|\n| HO WAN KWOK, | ) |\n| 162 E 64th Street | ) |\n| New York, NY 10065 | ) |\n| Plaintiff, | )
) |\n| v. | )
) |\n| | )
Case No. 1:19-cv-3195-JEB |\n| CLARK HILL PLC | ) |\n| 500 Woodward Avenue | )
Hon. James Boasberg |\n| Suite 3500 | ) |\n| Detroit, MI 48226 | ) |\n| | ) |\n| and | ) |\n| | ) |\n| THOMAS K. RAGLAND, | ) |\n| c/o Clark Hill PLC | ) |\n| 1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW | ) |\n| Suite 1300 | ) |\n| Washington, DC 20004, | ) |\n| | ) |\n| Defendants. | |\n\n#### **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS**\n\n## **TABLE OF CONTENTS**\n\n| | | FACTUAL BACKGROUND 2 | | | | | |\n|------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|\n| | | LEGAL STANDARD 5 | | | | | |\n| | | ARGUMENT 6 | | | | | |\n| I. | | Plaintiff's Legal Malpractice Claim Fails Because He Can Not Allege That
Defendants Breached A Duty To Plaintiff. 6 | | | | | |\n| | A. | Defendants' Withdrawal From The Representation Did Not Breach A
Duty6 | | | | | |\n| | | 1.
Withdrawal was necessary under Rule of Professional Conduct 3.7. 7 | | | | | |\n| | | 2.
Withdrawal was necessary under Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7. 8 | | | | | |\n| | B. | The Mere Fact A Cyber Incident Occurred Is Not Sufficient To Allege
That Defendants Breached The Duty To Safeguard Confidential
Information. 10 | | | | | |\n| II. | The Court Should Dismiss Plaintiff's Claim For Breach Of Fiduciary Duty. 12 | | | | | | |\n| III. | The Court Should Dismiss Plaintiff's Claim For Breach Of Contract. 13 | | | | | | |\n| IV. | All Three of Plaintiff's Claims Should be Dismissed Because Plaintiff Does Not
Allege (and Cannot Allege) That Defendants' Actions Caused Actual Damages. 15 | | | | | | |\n| | A. | All Plaintiff's Claimed Damages From The Cyber Incident Are Either
Speculative Or Predated The Incident. 15 | | | | | |\n| | B. | Plaintiff Also Does Not Properly Allege That Defendants' Withdrawal
Caused Damages Because His Allegations Are Refuted by His Own
Complaint. 19 | | | | | |\n| V. | | The Court Should Dismiss Plaintiff's Claim For Punitive Damages With
Prejudice Because Plaintiff Does Not Meet The High Standard. 21 | | | | | |\n| | | CONCLUSION 23 | | | | | |\n\n## **TABLE OF AUTHORITIES\\***\n\n#### **Page(s)**\n\n#### **CASES**\n\n| Anderson-Bey v. D.C., 466 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 2006) 6 |\n|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) 5, 10, 11 |\n| Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2019) 15 |\n| Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 798 F.3d 1119 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 3 |\n| Bolton v. Crowley, Hoge & Fein, P.C., 110 A.3d 575 (D.C. 2015) 13 |\n| Boynton v. Lopez, 473 A.2d 375 (D.C. 1984) 22 |\n| Caston v. Butler, 718 F. Supp. 2d 87 (D.D.C. 2010) 22 |\n| *Chase v. Gilbert, 499 A.2d 1203 (D.C. 1985) 6, 19, 21 |\n| Dalo v. Kivitz, 596 A.2d 35 (D.C. 1991) 22 |\n| Embassy of Fed. Republic of Nigeria v. Ugwuonye, 297 F.R.D. 4 (D.D.C. 2013) 22, 23 |\n| Farah v. Esquire Magazine, 736 F.3d 528 (D.C. Cir. 2013) passim |\n| Hammerman v. Peacock, 607 F. Supp. 911 (D.D.C. 1985) 22 |\n| In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., No. CV 03-1650 (TFH), 2004
WL 7081446 passim |\n| Marte v. Ltd. Brands, No. CIV.A. 13-139 FSH, 2014 WL 1092503 (D.N.J. Mar.
18, 2014) 22 |\n| Morrison v. MacNamara, 407 A.2d 555 (D.C. 1979) 11 |\n| Mount v. Baron, 154 F. Supp. 2d 3 (D.D.C. 2001) 6, 15, 19, 21 |\n| N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge
& Rice, PLLC, 887 F. Supp. 2d 78 (D.D.C. 2012) 13 |\n| Nurriddin v. Bolden, 818 F.3d 751 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 5 |\n| O'Neil v. Bergan, 452 A.2d 337 (D.C. 1982) 13 |\n\n\\* Authorities upon which Defendants chiefly rely are marked with an asterisk.\n\n| Owens v. BNP Paribas, S.A., 897 F.3d 266 (D.C. Cir. 2018) 5 | |\n|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|\n| Park v. Reizes, No. 06-CV-0843 GTS/GJD, 2009 WL 4893142, at *5 (N.D.N.Y.
Dec. 15, 2009) 7 | |\n| *Pietrangelo v. Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr, LLP, 68 A.3d 697 (D.C.
2013) 5, 6, 19, 21 | |\n| *Randolph v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 973 A.2d 702 (D.C. 2009) 2, 12, 15, 16 | |\n| Rodriguez v. Lab. Corp. of AmericaHoldings, 13 F. Supp. 3d 121 (D.D.C. 2014) 14 | |\n| Rollins v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 703 F.3d 122 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 5 | |\n| Sackin v. TransPerfect Glob., Inc., 278 F. Supp. 3d 739 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) 12 | |\n| Scott v. Burgin, 97 A.3d 564 (D.C. 2014)18 | |\n| Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007) 2 | |\n| U.S. Telesis, Inc. v. Ende, 64 F. Supp. 3d 65, 68 (D.D.C. 2014), aff'd, No. 14-
7146, 2015 WL 653325 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 5, 2015) 13, 19, 21 | |\n| Williams v. Patterson, 681 A.2d 1147 (D.C. 1996) 19 | |\n| OTHER AUTHORITIES | |\n| Affirmative Asylum Interview Scheduling, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Service, http (last visited
November 10, 2019) 20 | |\n| Types of Asylum Decisions, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services,
http>decisions (last visited November 10, 2019) 7 | |\n| Form I-94, Arrival/Departure Record, Information for Completing USCIS Forms,
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, http>94information (last visited Nov. 12, 2019) 17 | |\n| Immigration Court Backlog Tool,
http visited
November 10, 2019) 20 | |\n| *D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 1.16(a) 6, 8 | |\n| *D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 3.7(a) 7 | |\n| *D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 1.7(b)(4) 8 | |\n\n| | | | D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 1.7, cmt. 11 9 | |\n|--|--|--|--------------------------------------|--|\n|--|--|--|--------------------------------------|--|\n\nPlaintiff Guo Wengui's Complaint against his former asylum lawyer (Thomas Ragland) and Mr. Ragland's law firm (Clark Hill PLC) (collectively, \"Defendants\") for legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract should be dismissed with prejudice because plaintiff fails to adequately plead numerous elements of his claim and, more importantly, cannot do so as a matter of law. Indeed, in his thirty-page Complaint, Plaintiff has pled himself out of court because his own allegations demonstrate that he lacks any viable claims. As outlined in his Complaint, Plaintiff has spent much of the last decade publicly criticizing the Chinese government. This public criticism has led the Chinese government to embark on alleged retribution, which has been ongoing for years. Plaintiff eventually applied for asylum in the United States—yet continued his public campaign against the Chinese government, and publicly disclosed his applying for asylum.\n\nThis publicity—generated by Plaintiff—was quickly followed by a cyberattack by the Chinese government directed at Clark Hill, to obtain information relating to Plaintiff. Plaintiff now attempts to manufacture three causes of action and a request for punitive damages from this turn of events—which began with Plaintiff's own publicity about the filing of his asylum petition. All three of his causes of action rest on the assertion that Defendants breached various duties to Plaintiff because of (1) the cyber incident itself, and (2) Defendants' subsequently withdrawing from the representation after the incident. However, neither action supports a claim. Specifically, Plaintiff offers no factual allegations regarding how Defendants allegedly breached their duties to safeguard Plaintiff's information. Additionally, not only does the firm's withdrawing from the asylum matter not constitute legal malpractice, withdrawal was appropriate—and in fact, required—because Defendants immediately became witnesses to China's alleged persecution of Plaintiff in the asylum case when the law firm was attacked.\n\nFurthermore, under controlling law, Plaintiff has not pleaded how either of these actions caused him any actual damages, a necessary element to sustain his claims. *See Randolph v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co.*, 973 A.2d 702, 708 (D.C. 2009) (affirming dismissal of claim based on negligent conduct arising from a data incident for failure to plead \"actual harm\"). Plaintiff has alleged no harm to his asylum proceedings resulting from the withdrawal—nor could he, as his application remains pending. In an insufficient effort to plead some damages, Plaintiff relies on vague and general allegations that are undermined by his complaint; for example, he complains that he has lost unspecified \"business opportunities,\" and suffered unspecified limitations on his travel. Complaint ¶¶ 56, 58. By his own account, however, Plaintiff's alleged damages from the cyber incident recites the same harassment and oppression that he has been suffering long before he retained Defendants (as demonstrated by his seeking asylum in the United States). Because Defendants' actions cannot have caused these harms, the Court should dismiss Plaintiff's complaint with prejudice.\n\n#### **FACTUAL BACKGROUND**\n\nPlaintiff is a well-known Chinese dissident. Complaint ¶ 10. He acknowledges that his methods of criticizing the Chinese government involves \"exposing\" various secrets held by the Chinese government and Chinese officials. *Id.* ¶ 15. As a result of these public activities, the Chinese government has allegedly targeted Plaintiff (and his family and businesses) with threats, harassment, and misinformation campaigns going back at least five years. *Id.* ¶¶ 10, 16-27. Plaintiff retained Defendants to represent him in his application for asylum in the United States, so he could escape this persecution. *Id.* ¶ 28. A true and correct copy of the engagement letter memorializing Defendants' representation of Plaintiff, which Plaintiff incorporated into his Complaint (*see* Complaint ¶¶ 37, 76) is attached as Exhibit A. *See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.*, 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007) (for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts must consider\n\n\"documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice\"); *Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham*, 798 F.3d 1119, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (\"The prototypical incorporation by reference occurs where a complaint claims breach of contract, and either party attaches to its pleading an authentic copy of the contract itself.\").\n\nPlaintiff's public criticism of the Chinese government could only earn such ire from the Chinese government if he had an audience—which he does. Plaintiff airs his criticisms on social media posts, interviews, and videos. *See* Chun Han Wong and Felicia Schwartz, *China Wants Fugitive Guo Wengui Back—but He's Applied for U.S. Asylum*, Wall St. J. (Sept. 7, 2017), (attached as Exhibit B); *see also Farah v. Esquire Magazine*, 736 F.3d 528, 534 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (\"Judicial notice is properly taken of publicly available historical articles[.]\"); *In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig.*, No. CV 03-1650 (TFH), 2004 WL 7081446, at \\*1 n.1, n.3 (D.D.C. May 18, 2004) (the Court may take judicial notice of matters of public record and newspaper articles). Plaintiff's YouTube page has nearly 800 videos, and he adds new ones nearly every day. *See* http (last visited November 10, 2019). The Complaint acknowledges all this publicity—Plaintiff notes that \"the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] believes plaintiff presently holds not publicly known proof of various types of improper conduct on the part of the CCP[.]\" Complaint ¶ 17. The CCP believes this because Plaintiff himself has said it—repeatedly.\n\nIn one of his videos, on September 7, 2017, Plaintiff announced that he had applied for asylum in the United States. Exhibit B (noting that Plaintiff announced asylum application in \"live video broadcast\"); *see also* http at 15:25 (September 2, 2017 video announcing that in five days, Plaintiff will make \"an important\n\nannouncement\" relating to his \"legal team\" and his \"visa\"); http watch?v=xW5TzUkUjrw (video of September 7, 2017).\n\nLess than a week later, on or about September 12, 2017, Clark Hill PLC was cyberattacked by actors sponsored by the Chinese government. *See* Complaint ¶ 41. Plaintiff himself contends that China had directed the cyber incident to obtain Plaintiff's asylum information. Philip Wen, *China denies links to alleged cyber attacks in United States targeting exiled tycoon Guo*, Reuters (Oct. 8, 2017) (attached as Exhibit C); *see also Farah*, 736 F.3d at 534 (regarding judicial notice); *In re Lorazepam*, 2004 WL 7081446, at \\*1 n.1, n.3 (same). After the incident, the Defendants timely notified the Plaintiff, orally and in a letter to Plaintiff—which Plaintiff also incorporated into his Complaint. *See* Complaint ¶ 49. In the letter, Defendants confirmed that the cyber incident was \"related to [Defendants'] representation of [Plaintiff].\" A true and correct copy of the Withdrawal Letter is attached as Exhibit D.\n\nDefendants informed Plaintiff that they were withdrawing as Plaintiff's counsel, because the cyber incident had placed the Defendants in the position of being potential witnesses to China's efforts to target Plaintiff, and therefore to his asylum proceedings. Complaint ¶ 49; Exhibit D. Defendants assured Plaintiff that they would assist him in transitioning his asylum request to successor counsel (which has occurred). Exhibit D. Because the asylum petition had just been filed and it would take months (if not years) for the government to contact the Plaintiff regarding his application, Plaintiff did not suffer any prejudice or delay in his asylum proceeding. *See* Complaint ¶ 38, 49. Plaintiff's asylum request remains pending. *Id.* ¶ 51. Despite these undisputed facts, Plaintiff now seeks damages from Defendants, including punitive damages, for legal malpractice, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty.\n\n#### **LEGAL STANDARD**\n\nTo survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain sufficient facts \"to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.\" *Rollins v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc.*, 703 F.3d 122, 129 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The facts in the complaint must allow the Court \"to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.\" *Id.* at 130 (quoting *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678). The Court \"need not accept inferences unsupported by facts or legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.\" *Owens v. BNP Paribas, S.A.*, 897 F.3d 266, 272 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (quoting *City of Harper Woods Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Olver*, 589 F.3d 1292, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). \"Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.\" *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678. A plaintiff who alleges facts that render success on the merits impossible pleads himself out of court. *Nurriddin v. Bolden*, 818 F.3d 751, 757 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Similarly, failure to adequately plead an element of a claim requires dismissal. *See id.* (dismissing cause of action when plaintiff's allegations did not \"give rise to an inference\" that all elements of the claim were present).\n\nFor the purposes of this Motion only, Defendants accept as true all well plead allegations in the Complaint. *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678*.* However, if it ever becomes necessary, the Defendants will demonstrate that many of the material assertions in the Complaint are inaccurate.\n\nThe law of the District of Columbia governs Plaintiff's claims. *See Pietrangelo v. Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr, LLP*, 68 A.3d 697, 714 (D.C. 2013) (District of Columbia law applied to claims of alleged misconduct by attorneys located in the District of Columbia, the engagement letter came from the law firm's District of Columbia office, and the relationship centered around the District of Columbia). The Complaint acknowledges that the substantial part of the Defendants' work to represent Plaintiff occurred in the District of Columbia. Complaint\n\n¶ 14. Plaintiff does not allege that any other state has a connection to the dispute. *Cf. Anderson-Bey v. D.C.*, 466 F. Supp. 2d 51, 67 (D.D.C. 2006) (the purpose of a choice of law analysis is to assess whether another jurisdiction has a competing interest that its laws should govern).\n\n#### **ARGUMENT**\n\n#### **I. Plaintiff's Legal Malpractice Claim Fails Because He Can Not Allege That Defendants Breached A Duty To Plaintiff.**\n\nTo state a claim for legal malpractice, a plaintiff must allege (1) an attorney-client relationship existed, (2) the attorney breached a duty to the client, (3) that breach caused the client injury, and (4) actual damages. *See Chase v. Gilbert*, 499 A.2d 1203, 1211 (D.C. 1985); *Mount v. Baron*, 154 F. Supp. 2d 3, 8 (D.D.C. 2001). As a matter of law, Plaintiff cannot allege Defendants breached any of their duties to the Plaintiff. Moreover, as demonstrated in Section IV below, Plaintiff cannot allege that the Defendants' actions caused Plaintiff any actual harm as required to sustain a legal malpractice claim.\n\n#### **A. Defendants' Withdrawal From The Representation Did Not Breach A Duty.**\n\nPlaintiff cannot show that Defendants breached any duty by withdrawing from the representation after the cyber incident. Defendants' withdrawal was entirely proper under the District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct. *Cf. Pietrangelo*, 68 A.3d at 710 (plaintiff could not state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against attorney based on disclosing confidential information when attorneys did not violate rules of professional conduct). An attorney must withdraw from representing a client if the attorney's ongoing representation would violate the Rules of Professional Conduct. D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 1.16(a). Once the cyber incident occurred, Defendants' ongoing representation would have violated multiple Rules, and therefore, they were required to withdraw from the representation.\n\n#### **1. Withdrawal was necessary under Rule of Professional Conduct 3.7.**\n\nThe cyber incident put Defendants in the position of becoming witnesses in Plaintiff's asylum proceedings. An attorney \"shall not\" act as an advocate for a client when the attorney is \"likely to be a necessary witness\" in the proceeding. D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 3.7(a). The cyber incident meant that Defendants were now direct witnesses to Plaintiff's own persecution by China. Given that China's prior persecution of Plaintiff formed the basis of Plaintiff's asylum claim, Defendants now found themselves as the only witnesses to a particular aspect of China's targeting of Plaintiff. Because the facts surrounding the cyber incident support Plaintiff's asylum claim, Defendants became a necessary witness, and withdrawal was proper under the Rules of Professional Conduct.\n\nThis need for withdrawal was explained to Plaintiff in the withdrawal letter. Exhibit D. Plaintiff's response is that this stated reason is a \"sham.\" Complaint ¶ 71. But Plaintiff's response attempts to force Defendants to sidestep their ethical obligations. For example, Plaintiff complains—two years after Defendants' withdrawal—that he had not asked Defendants to be witnesses, and that the matters relating to the cyber incident are uncontested, and thus fall into one of the limited exceptions to Rule 3.7(a). *Id.* ¶ 51. That is all pure speculation. Plaintiff may be required to undergo an asylum hearing or submit new evidence, and Plaintiff cannot predict what evidence he would want or need to submit in the future. *See Types of Asylum Decisions*, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, http (last visited November 10, 2019) (noting that some asylum decisions require a court hearing or new evidence); *see also Farah*, 736 F.3d at 534 (regarding judicial notice); *In re Lorazepam*, 2004 WL 7081446, at \\*1 n.1, n.3 (same). Plaintiff cannot speak for the U.S. government, and has no basis to state with certainty what matters will be uncontested or what witnesses it will call. *Cf. Park v. Reizes*, No. 06-CV-0843 GTS/GJD, 2009 WL 4893142,\n\nat \\*5 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2009) (withdrawal was required because opposing party intended to call lawyer as witness). Similarly, it is the lawyer's obligation to assess whether continuing a representation will violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, *see* D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 1.16(a) therefore, it is the lawyer who must assess whether he or she is \"likely\" to be a witness.\n\nNotwithstanding Plaintiff's currently-stated desire not to call Defendants as witnesses, circumstances may change as asylum proceedings progress. Defendants' continued representation of Plaintiff would deprive him of the ability to make this decision if, as Plaintiff's asylum proceedings proceed, Plaintiff later decides that Defendants' testimony would be beneficial. Defendants' failure to withdraw would violate their duty to Plaintiff by depriving him of the ability to make that decision and to benefit from that testimony. As a result, withdrawal was not only appropriate, but required.\n\n#### **2. Withdrawal was necessary under Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7.**\n\nWithdrawal was also required under Rule 1.7(b)(4), which requires withdrawal if the lawyer's ability to represent a client \"reasonably may be adversely affected by the lawyer's responsibilities to or interests in a third party or the lawyer's own financial, business, property, or personal interests.\" D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 1.7(b)(4). When the cyber incident occurred, Defendants immediately had its own interests in investigating and mitigating the incident—which conflicted with their representation of Plaintiff. Plaintiff's own allegations demonstrate this: Plaintiff complains that Defendants have not provided Plaintiff with sensitive information regarding the cyber incident, such as whether other client files have been compromised and the manner in which Defendants learned of the incident. Complaint ¶ 46.\n\nMoreover, the Rules contemplate the same type of \"prior work\" conflict when a client raises questions about a lawyer's earlier conduct in an ongoing matter. The comments to the Rules explain that \"if the probity of a lawyer's own conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may\n\nbe difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client detached advice.\" D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 1.7, cmt. 11. That was the situation here—after the cyber incident, Plaintiff's questioning Defendants' conduct would have compromised Defendants' ability to provide objective advice on the same matter going forward. Withdrawal was necessary to avoid this risk.\n\nNot only was the Defendant's withdrawal proper under the Rules of Professional Conduct, but it was expressly allowed and contemplated by the parties in the engagement letter. The engagement letter, which sets forth the scope of the representation and which Plaintiff incorporated into his complaint, expressly allowed Defendants to withdraw if Defendants \"perceive that any conflicts arise that would compromise [Defendants'] ability to represent [Plaintiff].\" Exhibit A at 3; *see* Exhibit A at 8. In other words, Defendants had the right, in their sole discretion, to withdraw if they perceived any conflict. As demonstrated above, Defendants were merely satisfying their professional obligations by withdrawing and ensuring Plaintiff received uncompromised representation going forward. Plaintiff cannot now raise this issue as part of his cause of action because he contractually agreed to allow Defendants to withdraw if they \"perceived\" any conflicts affecting Plaintiff's representation. Defendants have demonstrated such conflicts existed, or at the very least, Defendants perceived that such conflicts actually existed. Simply put, withdrawing from a representation does not constitute legal malpractice when it is done in an orderly fashion and the client has time to find replacement counsel. *Cf.* Complaint ¶ 51 (Plaintiff's asylum application has been pending since it was filed). That is exactly what occurred here.\n\nBecause the Rules of Professional Conduct mandated that Defendants withdraw from representing Plaintiff, and because withdrawal was consistent with the engagement letter, Plaintiff has not properly alleged that Defendants breached a duty by withdrawing from the representation.\n\n#### **B. The Mere Fact A Cyber Incident Occurred Is Not Sufficient To Allege That Defendants Breached The Duty To Safeguard Confidential Information.**\n\nPlaintiff also does not sufficiently allege that Defendants breached their duty of confidentiality to Plaintiff. Plaintiff's allegations assume that the mere fact of a cyber incident perpetuated by a foreign government, against an individual that it frequently and relentlessly targeted—is by itself enough to allege that Defendants' information security system must have been so deficient as to breach a duty to Plaintiff. This reasoning has two fatal flaws.\n\nFirst, Plaintiff ignores his own role in the incident. Not only is Plaintiff a persistent and frequent critic of China—which has taken retaliatory actions against Plaintiff in the past—he personally announced the fact that he had applied for asylum in a video that he posted on the Internet. Plaintiff himself drew attention to his asylum application and sought publicity regarding the asylum proceedings. Plaintiff's actions alerted China to his asylum application. This provocation shows that this cyber incident is different from the stereotypical hacker, who attacks multiple targets to obtain millions of consumers' private information to facilitate identity theft. This hack, on the other hand, was perpetuated by a foreign government intent on targeting only Plaintiff (a very public individual). *See* Complaint ¶¶ 15-27.\n\nPlaintiff simply assumes that because there was a cyber incident, Defendants must have put up \"porous\" and \"unreasonable\" security measures. *Id.* ¶¶ 41-42. Such speculative and vague allegations are insufficient to maintain a cause of action. *See Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678. To the contrary, this was an incident carried out or perpetuated by an aggressive foreign government that has sophisticated capabilities and experience in cyber warfare. Jack Stubbs et al., *China hacked eight major computer services firms in years-long attack*, Reuters (June 26, 2019) (Exhibit E); Kevin Collier, *Chinese spies stole NSA hacking tools, report finds*, CNN (June 15, 2019) (Exhibit F). Indeed, after Plaintiff's yacht was allegedly hacked by China, also in September 2017, Plaintiff\n\npublicly stated that China \"can obtain private correspondence and information from each and every American citizen if it wishes, and can do that very easily almost without any cost.\" Bill Gertz, *Beijing Suspected in Hacking Yacht Owned by Chinese Billionaire*, Wash. Free Beacon (Sep. 8, 2017) (Exhibit G); *see* Exhibit C at 3 (noting that an organization scheduled to host a public appearance for Plaintiff announced it was the victim of a Shanghai-based cyber incident). Plaintiff must allege more than the simple fact that a cyber incident occurred to support a claim that Defendants' breached their duty.\n\nSecond, perhaps recognizing that he cannot adequately plead a breach of any duty by Defendants, Plaintiff engages in rampant and inaccurate speculation in a failing effort to maintain a cause of action. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that Defendants breached their duty \"*if* they delivered a 'ransom'\" of Plaintiff's information to third parties, in order to negotiate with the hackers. Complaint ¶¶ 77, 86 (emphasis added). But Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants actually ransomed Plaintiff's information because that did not occur. Similarly, Plaintiff hypothesizes that the cyber attackers hacked Defendants' information system \"*apparently* without great difficulty.\" *Id.* ¶ 41 (emphasis added). These allegations attempt to disguise speculation as plausibility and are insufficient as a matter of law. *See Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678.\n\nIn fact, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants breached a duty because their security measures failed, \"whatever they were.\" Complaint ¶ 42. This amounts to circular, after-the-fact logic: Defendants were attacked, therefore the security measures *must* have been so insufficient that Defendants breached their duty, no matter what security measures Defendants took. The mere fact of a cyber incident does not mean Defendants breached a duty; a relentless foreign government is always a cyber risk when focused on one individual's information even though Defendants took reasonable care. *See Morrison v. MacNamara*, 407 A.2d 555, 561 (D.C. 1979) (noting that the\n\nstandard of care in legal malpractice cases is \"that degree of reasonable care and skill expected of lawyers acting under similar circumstances\").\n\nCourts allow complaints based on data incidents to survive when they allege facts—not conclusory allegations—indicating that defendants did not take reasonable care. *See Sackin v. TransPerfect Glob., Inc.*, 278 F. Supp. 3d 739, 748 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (denying motion to dismiss when complaint alleged that defendant \"failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the wrongful dissemination of Plaintiffs' [personally identifiable information]—including erecting a digital firewall, conducting data security training and adopting retention and destruction policies\"). But here, Plaintiff does not attempt to explain how Defendants failed to act with reasonable care—he simply assumes that they did. By this logic, even the best possible security measures would be so deficient as to be unreasonable if a sophisticated and determined foreign government was able to overcome them. These allegations improperly focus solely on the outcome, not whether Defendants breached a duty.\n\nFor the same reason, Plaintiff's theory that Defendants breached a duty simply by taking on the representation also fails—Plaintiff does not explain how Defendants breached a duty by doing so. The mere fact of the cyber incident is insufficient to support an allegation that the matter was beyond Defendants' competence. *See* Complaint ¶ 45.\n\nIn sum, Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants breached a professional duty to Plaintiff, through either their withdrawal from the representation or from the cyber incident. This Court should dismiss Plaintiff's malpractice claim with prejudice.\n\n#### **II. The Court Should Dismiss Plaintiff's Claim For Breach Of Fiduciary Duty.**\n\nPlaintiff's breach of fiduciary duty claim must be dismissed for the same reasons as the malpractice claim—Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege that Defendants breached a duty. *See Randolph*, 973 A.2d at 709 (finding that a breach of fiduciary duty claim must be dismissed \"[f]or\n\nmuch the same reason\" as a dismissed negligence claim, when the fiduciary duty claim arose from the same facts and circumstances as the negligence claim). \"In a professional malpractice case, additional claims which are based on the underlying malpractice claim cannot survive if the professional malpractice claim fails.\" *U.S. Telesis, Inc. v. Ende*, 64 F. Supp. 3d 65, 68 (D.D.C. 2014), *aff'd*, No. 14-7146, 2015 WL 653325 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 5, 2015) (quoting *Mawalla v, Hoffman*, 569 F. Supp. 2d 253, 257 (D.D.C. 2008)); *see Bolton v. Crowley, Hoge & Fein, P.C.*, 110 A.3d 575, 582 (D.C. 2015) (\"[O]ur disposition of the claim of legal malpractice applies with equal force to the claim of breach of fiduciary duty.\" (quoting *Mills v. Cooter*, 647 A.2d 1118, 1120 n.6 (D.C. 1994))).\n\nMoreover, the breach of fiduciary duty claim must be dismissed because the fiduciary duty claim and the legal malpractice claim are duplicative. \"[W]hen the basis for a claim of fiduciary breach arises from the same facts and seeks the same relief as a negligence claim, such a claim becomes redundant and therefore it should be dismissed.\" *Bolton*, 110 A.3d at 582; *N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice, PLLC*, 887 F. Supp. 2d 78, 83-84 (D.D.C. 2012) (collecting cases). Here, the same facts underlie both the legal malpractice claim and the breach of fiduciary duty claim—both are based on Defendants' alleged failure to protect against the cyber incident and the withdrawal from representing Plaintiff, and allege the exact same damages. *See* Complaint ¶¶ 68-74, 83-88. The Court should dismiss Plaintiff's breach of fiduciary duty claim with prejudice.\n\n#### **III. The Court Should Dismiss Plaintiff's Claim For Breach Of Contract.**\n\nPlaintiff's breach of contract claim is also duplicative of the legal malpractice claim. *See N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found.*, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 83-84 (explaining that breach of contract claims, like breach of fiduciary duty claims, must be dismissed as duplicative \"when arising from the same circumstances and seeking the same relief as a malpractice claim\"); *O'Neil*\n\n*v. Bergan*, 452 A.2d 337, 343 (D.C. 1982). The Court should dismiss the breach of contract claim for this reason alone.\n\nEven if the Court were to examine the elements of a breach of contract claim, it must dismiss the claim because Plaintiff fails to adequately plead the cause of action. A claim for breach of contract under District of Columbia law requires \"(1) a valid contract between the parties; (2) an obligation or duty arising out of the contract; (3) a breach of that duty; and (4) damages caused by breach.\" *Rodriguez v. Lab. Corp. of AmericaHoldings*, 13 F. Supp. 3d 121, 134 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting *Tsintolas Realty Co. v. Mendez*, 984 A.2d 181, 187 (D.C. 2009)). Here, Plaintiff acknowledges that the parties entered into a written agreement—the engagement letter. *See* Complaint ¶ 76 (\"[Defendants] entered into a written contract with plaintiff for the firm to represent the plaintiff.\"); ¶ 34 (alleging that the engagement letter \"created and formalized contractual\" duties); Exhibit A. By its terms, the engagement letter \"sets forth the respective obligations and expectations\" of the parties, and could be modified only in writing. Exhibit A at 1, 5. Accordingly, the engagement letter was the contract.\n\nPlaintiff does not allege how Defendants breached the engagement letter, and without such an allegation, the claim must be dismissed. Perhaps recognizing this deficiency, Plaintiff attempts to allege that Defendants had a separate agreement to safeguard Plaintiff's information above and beyond the express requirements of the contract. Complaint ¶ 33. But Plaintiff alleges no facts about the formation of this additional \"agreement\" because it did not exist. Nor could he—the engagement letter expressly states that the contract between the parties can be modified only in writing. Plaintiff has not alleged that this purported separate agreement was in writing. For all of these reasons, the Court must also dismiss Plaintiff's breach of contract claim with prejudice.\n\n#### **IV. All Three of Plaintiff's Claims Should be Dismissed Because Plaintiff Does Not Allege (and Cannot Allege) That Defendants' Actions Caused Actual Damages.**\n\nAs an initial matter, Plaintiff claims damages of \\$50 million, but does not explain (in any way, shape, or form) how he arrived at that figure. Furthermore, Plaintiff has not alleged the actual damages necessary to sustain any of his tort claims. He complains of persecution at the hands of the Chinese government—but this persecution began long before the cyber incident. Plaintiff has not explained how the persecution has increased or worsened, or how the cyber incident caused any *new* tangible harm. Nor could he. This fatally dooms his complaint.\n\nTo sustain a tort claim for legal malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must show *actual* injury caused by the defendant. *Randolph*, 973 A.2d at 708-09 (regarding claims based on negligence); *Mount*, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 8 (legal malpractice requires \"actual loss or damage resulting from [the attorney's] negligence\" (quoting *Shapiro, Lifschitz & Schram v. R.E. Hazard, Jr.*, 24 F. Supp. 2d 66, 75 (D.D.C. 1998))). This same standard applies to breach of contract claims. *See Attias v. CareFirst, Inc.*, 365 F. Supp. 3d 1, 9-10, 12 (D.D.C. 2019).\n\n#### **A. All Plaintiff's Claimed Damages From The Cyber Incident Are Either Speculative Or Predated The Incident.**\n\nPlaintiff alleges two types of speculative damages from the cyber incident: his fears of future harm resulting from the data incident, and the array of general and vague damages purportedly inflicted by the Chinese government, which has been ongoing for years. *See* Complaint ¶ 10. Neither of these can support his claims.\n\nThe District of Columbia Court of Appeals has squarely addressed the injury necessary to support a tort claim stemming from a data incident, and based on this controlling case law, Plaintiff's allegations are insufficient. In *Randolph v. ING Life Insurance and Annuity Co.*, burglars stole a laptop computer from an ING Agent's home containing—without any encryption or password protection—personal information of participants in a deferred compensation plan that\n\nING oversaw. 973 A.2d at 704-05. This personal information included addresses and Social Security numbers. *Id.* at 704, 706. The plaintiffs sued ING, alleging a number of tort claims, including negligence, gross negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty, alleging that they suffered (1) the risk of their identities being stolen, (2) the cost of credit monitoring and other security measures, and (3) the physical danger posed to some plaintiffs (who were police officers) by \"those who may harbor ill-will toward police.\" *Id.* at 708-09.\n\nThe district court dismissed the complaint, and the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of the complaint in its entirety. The court held that all three of the types of harm alleged amounted to a risk of future harm, and therefore did not sustain the plaintiffs' claims. *Id.* In doing so, the court explained that \"[s]peculative harm, or the threat of future harm—not yet realized does not suffice to create a cause of action for negligence.\" *Id.* at 708 (quoting *In re Estate of Curseen v. Buchanan Ingersoll, P.C.*, 890 A.2d 191, 194 (D.C. 2006)).\n\nIt is the same here. Plaintiff's claims are far more speculative than those in dismissed in *Randolph* for three reasons. First, the only damages that Plaintiff attempts to link to the cyber incident are unspecified lost business opportunities, unspecified \"costs and expenses,\" and unspecified \"damages to his personal and professional reputation.\" Complaint ¶ 56. These allegations are so general, Plaintiff does not even identify his \"business\" or explain how it (a nonparty) was harmed. He complains that his asylum application has surfaced on the Internet, but cannot explain how this has actually harmed him. Plaintiff's criticisms of China were well-known and widespread for years *before* the incident. *See id.* ¶ 10. Plaintiff has not explained how his asylum application contained any information or criticisms of China that Plaintiff himself had not already placed in the public sphere—indeed, asylum applications are necessarily based on recounting *past* persecution by the applicant's home country.\n\nPlaintiff states only that the information has \"lost its confidential status,\" and that there is unspecified \"cause to believe\" that others *might* have used this information to harm him. *Id.* ¶¶ 9, 57. This is precisely the kind of speculative damages rejected by *Randolph*. There, the fear of future harm generated by compromised Social Security numbers and addresses did not sufficiently allege actual damages. Similarly, Plaintiff complains only that information was hacked—he does *not* allege facts as to how this alleged disclosure has or will harm him. Indeed, it is unlikely that Plaintiff could ever show that any of the information he alleges was stolen could damage him at all—for example, an I-94 number, which Plaintiff alleges was in the information, is simply a number issued to any visitor to the United States. *See* Complaint ¶ 43; *Form I-94, Arrival/Departure Record, Information for Completing USCIS Forms*, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, http (last visited Nov. 12, 2019). Nor has Plaintiff alleged any damage from the publication of his passport number (again part of the information, *see* Complaint ¶ 43)—which would be unlikely, given that anyone attempting to travel under Plaintiff's name would face the well-publicized Interpol arrest notices. This contrasts with the information lost in *Randolph* (social security numbers), which could facilitate identity theft, and yet still was insufficient to state a claim.\n\nSecond, Plaintiff recites the litany of harm he has suffered at the hands of the Chinese government—but by his own admission, these harms have been ongoing for years before he hired Defendants. *See* Complaint ¶¶ 23-24. For example, as early as January 2015, Plaintiff alleges that he \"rightly feared being arrested, detained, interrogated, tortured, and/or killed by the Chinese government and/or the CCP.\" *Id.* ¶ 19. Yet, after the cyber-incident, he complains that his personal safety is at risk—just as it was before. *Id.* ¶ 56. Prior to the incident, Plaintiff alleges that the Chinese government often arrested and detained his colleagues and his employees were arrested\n\nand detained, and that he feared for the safety of his family and friends. *Id.* ¶¶ 16, 19. After the cyber-incident, he alleges that the Chinese government continues to detain his employees and harass his family—with no explanation how this has increased or worsened after the incident, or, more importantly, that the cyber incident caused any increase or worsening of such harm. *See id.* ¶ 56. Plaintiff complains that he has limited freedom to travel as a result of the incident, *id.* ¶ 58 but he acknowledges that the Chinese government issued an Interpol \"red notice\" limiting his ability to travel—before the cyber incident. *Id.* ¶ 21; *China says Interpol seeks arrest of tycoon Guo Wengui*, BBC News (Apr. 20, 2017) (Exhibit H) (Interpol red notice was issued in April 2017); *see also Farah*, 736 F.3d at 534 (regarding judicial notice); *In re Lorazepam*, 2004 WL 7081446, at \\*1 n.1, n.3 (same). More specifically, Plaintiff does not explain how the cyber incident limited his freedom to travel beyond the restrictions that already existed, or how to quantify any such limitation after the incident. As a result, Plaintiff does not allege any actual injury that began (or even worsened) after the cyber-incident. Without pleading facts to support damages caused by Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim.\n\nThird, Plaintiff cannot sustain a claim based on damages to his businesses, or on behalf of his employees, even if he had alleged what those damages were. A legal malpractice claim based on damages to a third party requires that the third party be the intended beneficiary of the legal services. *See Scott v. Burgin*, 97 A.3d 564, 566 (D.C. 2014). That is not the case here—Plaintiff has not pleaded any facts that Defendants provided legal services to his businesses. *See* Exhibit A.\n\nIn sum, even if the Court were to determine that these ongoing damages inflicted by China represented \"actual harm,\" Plaintiff does not allege that any of these harms were caused by the cyber incident. As explained above, by his own words, Plaintiff acknowledges that he has been suffering harm at the hands of the Chinese government for years—due to his own outspoken and\n\nfrequent advocacy. Indeed, that is why Plaintiff filed his asylum application in the first place. That all of Plaintiff's non-speculative harms have been ongoing since at least 2015 demonstrates that Plaintiff has not alleged, and cannot allege, that the cyber incident at Defendants' offices itself caused any actual harm. *Cf. Williams v. Patterson*, 681 A.2d 1147, 1150 (D.C. 1996) (\"The law is settled that where an accident does not cause a diseased condition, but only aggravates and increases the severity of a condition existing at the time of the accident, such party could only recover for such increased or augmented sufferings as were the natural and proximate result of the negligent act.\" (quoting *Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Morgan*, 35 App. D.C. 195, 200 (1910))).\n\n#### **B. Plaintiff Also Does Not Properly Allege That Defendants' Withdrawal Caused Damages Because His Allegations Are Refuted by His Own Complaint.**\n\nPlaintiff complains of three types of damages he has suffered due to Defendants' withdrawal as his attorneys in the asylum case, but none of them show the actual harm needed to support his claims. A claim for legal malpractice requires that the \"attorney's negligence caused a legally cognizable injury,\" and \"more is required than speculation.\" *Chase*, 499 A.2d at 1212; *see Pietrangelo*, 68 A.3d at 713 (\"Pietrangelo does not allege sufficient facts showing causation or resulting non-speculative harm from WilmerHale's breach of its professional duty.\"); *U.S. Telesis*, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 68 (\"UST has not sufficiently pleaded that defendants' conduct caused it to lose its damage claims in the underlying case.\"); *Mount*, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 9-10 (dismissing complaint where \"there is no basis to conclude from the complaint that the jury's verdict would have been any different had other law firms (and claims) been included\").\n\nPlaintiff first speculates that Defendants' withdrawal from representing him delayed his asylum proceedings. Complaint ¶ 56. Plaintiff pleads such vague and speculative damages because he concedes his asylum petition is still pending. But he offers no reason to infer that the\n\nattorney representing an asylum seeker has any bearing on the speed with which the U.S. government schedules asylum proceedings. By the time Defendants withdrew, the asylum application was filed, at which point Plaintiff had to wait for the government to act by scheduling an initial asylum interview. Initial asylum interviews are known to take years to schedule. *See Affirmative Asylum Interview Scheduling*, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service, http (last visited November 10, 2019) (noting that asylum interview scheduling was changed in January 2018 to a last-in-first-out basis, meaning that older filings like Plaintiff's will be addressed only after more recent filings); *see also Immigration Court Backlog Tool*, http (last visited November 10, 2019) (showing average wait time of 761 days and over 100,000 pending cases for hearing location in New York City); *see also Farah*, 736 F.3d at 534 (regarding judicial notice); *In re Lorazepam*, 2004 WL 7081446, at \\*1 n.1, n.3 (same). Therefore, the change in counsel shortly after filing the application did not cause any delay.\n\nSecond, Plaintiff complains that he has been denied the benefit of Defendants' immigration law expertise. Complaint ¶ 56. But Plaintiff does not allege that he has been unable to obtain qualified successor counsel. Nor does he allege that Defendants are the only lawyers who could successfully handle his asylum application. Plaintiff acknowledges that his asylum application is still pending—meaning that successor counsel has had over two years to prepare for the interview and potential hearing. This is not a case of counsel causing prejudice by abandoning a client on the eve of trial.\n\nThird, Plaintiff alleges that he suffered reputational harm because the withdrawal somehow indicates that Plaintiff is \"untrustworthy.\" *Id.* ¶ 60. This is again purely speculative, and not the\n\ntype of \"actual harm\" required by the law. Plaintiff has not plead who (if anyone) was aware of Defendants' withdrawal in this matter or how it changed their opinion of Plaintiff.\n\nPlaintiff speculates that the outcome of his asylum proceedings will be worse than if Defendants had not withdrawn. *See id.* ¶ 60. But speculation about the outcome of legal proceedings is precisely the kind of allegation that cannot sustain a legal malpractice claim. *See Pietrangelo*, 68 A.3d at 710 (dismissing causes of action that were based on abstract allegations that if the attorneys in the underlying action had acted differently, the court would have ruled in the plaintiff's favor); *Chase*, 499 A.2d at 1212 (affirming dismissal of legal malpractice counterclaim because counter-plaintiff's claim that outcome of underlying proceedings would have been different was speculative). Plaintiff does not identify any adverse action in his asylum proceedings, much less one that was caused by Defendants' actions. Obviously, if Plaintiff is ultimately granted asylum, he will have suffered no damages from the withdrawal as a matter of law. *See U.S. Telesis*, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 68; *Mount*, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 9-10.\n\nMoreover, Plaintiff similarly has not adequately alleged that the withdrawal *caused* cognizable injuries to Plaintiff. To sufficiently allege causation, Plaintiff must allege that Defendants' negligence caused him to lose a meritorious claim. *See U.S. Telesis*, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 68. By Plaintiff's own admission, his asylum claim remains pending, so he cannot allege any negative effect on his ability to obtain asylum.\n\nBecause Plaintiff cannot allege that the withdrawal caused him any harm, the claims based on the withdrawal must be dismissed with prejudice as a matter of law.\n\n#### **V. The Court Should Dismiss Plaintiff's Claim For Punitive Damages With Prejudice Because Plaintiff Does Not Meet The High Standard.**\n\nPlaintiff alleges that Defendants acted \"intentional[ly],\" \"reckless[ly],\" and committed \"fraud,\" but alleges no facts—none whatsoever—to support these conclusory allegations.\n\nComplaint ¶¶ 62-64. These bare conclusions are wholly insufficient to meet the Rule 12(b)(6) pleading standard, and the court should dismiss the claim for punitive damages with prejudice. *See Caston v. Butler*, 718 F. Supp. 2d 87, 89 (D.D.C. 2010) (\"conclusory claims\" of \"outrageous or reckless conduct do not provide a basis for [a punitive damages] award\"). In essence, Plaintiff is asking the court to assume \"reckless\" conduct occurred without providing any basis for such conclusions. This flips the pleading standard on its head.\n\nMoreover, Plaintiff's allegations do not state a claim for punitive damages. To recover punitive damages against an attorney, a defendant must act with actual malice or willful disregard of the plaintiff's rights. *Embassy of Fed. Republic of Nigeria v. Ugwuonye*, 297 F.R.D. 4, 13 (D.D.C. 2013); *Dalo v. Kivitz*, 596 A.2d 35, 40 (D.C. 1991) (\"[P]unitive damages are appropriately reserved only for tortious acts which are replete with malice.\" (quoting *Zanville v. Garza*, 561 A.2d 1000, 1002 (D.C. 1989))). \"[F]or punitive damages, actions do not become more egregious simply because of the professional obligations of the person committing them.\" *Boynton v. Lopez*, 473 A.2d 375, 378 (D.C. 1984). The Court can dismiss a claim for punitive damages under Rule 12(b)(6) when the Plaintiff does not allege facts that allow the Court to \"infer the level of callousness necessary for punitive damages.\" *Marte v. Ltd. Brands*, No. CIV.A. 13-139 FSH, 2014 WL 1092503, at \\*5 (D.N.J. Mar. 18, 2014); *see Hammerman v. Peacock*, 607 F. Supp. 911, 919 (D.D.C. 1985) (dismissing claim for punitive damages for common law tort and contract claims, and explaining that \"punitive damages are awardable only where the defendant's conduct was particularly outrageous, demonstrating reckless disregard for the rights of others, and mere inadvertence or even gross negligence is insufficient\").\n\nThis high standard is not even close to being met here; Plaintiff has not alleged any facts indicating that Defendants acted with malice or willfully disregarded the Plaintiff's rights, and, as\n\ndemonstrated above, he cannot do so. Courts have rejected punitive damages requests with far more egregious conduct. For example, in *Embassy of Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Ugwuonye*, a client sought punitive damages against its former attorney who had stolen the client's tax refund and deposited it in his law firm's account, while continuing to tell the client that the tax refund was forthcoming, and never returned the refund. 297 F.R.D. at 7. The Court declined to award punitive damages because the client had not shown that the attorney acted with the required malice. *Id.* at 14. Defendants' alleged behavior is nowhere near as egregious (indeed, it was all ethical and in the client's best interest), and thus Plaintiff has not adequately alleged facts to support a claim for punitive damages.\n\n#### **CONCLUSION**\n\nPlaintiff does not sufficiently allege that Defendant's actions or inactions caused him any actual harm—the only harms he allegedly suffered are ones that have been ongoing for years before the cyber incident. Any \"new\" harm is totally speculative. Plaintiff also does not allege that Defendants breached any duty they owed to him—he simply blames them for acting in an ethical manner and for a data incident, precipitated by his own publicity, which has caused him no harm. All three of his alleged causes of action are duplicative of one another. Finally, he offers no facts that support his claim for punitive damages. The Court should dismiss the entire Complaint with prejudice.\n\nDated: November 25, 2019 Respectfully submitted,\n\n CLARK HILL PLC and THOMAS K. RAGLAND\n\n By: */s/ John R. Storino* One of their attorneys John R. Storino *(via pro hac vice)* JENNER & BLOCK, LLP 353 N. Clark Street Chicago, IL 60654-3456 Tel: (312) 222-9350 JStorino@jenner.com\n\nKali N. Bracey (#458965) JENNER & BLOCK, LLP 1099 New York Avenue NW Suite 900 Washington, DC 20001-4412 Tel: (202) 639-6000 KBracey@jenner.com\n\n#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI, John R. Storino, an attorney, hereby certifies that I served the foregoing Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on the following by electronic on this, the 25th day of November, 2019:\n\n Ari S. Casper Ralph S. Tyler The Casper Firm 400 E. Pratt Street, Suite 903 Baltimore, MD 21202\n\n*/s/ John R. Storino*\n\n## Exhibit A\n\n| Thomas Ragland (Member) | \\$510 |\n|---------------------------------|-------|\n| Patrick Taurel (Associate) | \\$310 |\n| Jennifer Cook (Senior Attorney) | \\$285 |\n| Senior Paralegals | \\$235 |\n| Lauren Barger (Paralegal) | \\$170 |\n| Legal Secretaries | \\$100 |\n\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n\n# Exhibit B\n\n#### YOU HAVE BEEN SELECTED\n\nWSJ wants to hear from you. Take part in this short survey to help shape The Journal. [Take Survey](http)\n\nThis copy is for your personal, non-commercial use only. To order presentation-ready copies for distribution to your colleagues, clients or customers visit http\n\nhttp\n\n#### [WORLD](http)\n\n# China Wants Fugitive Guo Wengui Back—but He's Applied for U.S. Asylum\n\nRich businessman lobs graft allegations at China's elite from his New York perch as Beijing seeks his extradition and trial\n\n\n\nBusinessman Guo Wengui in New York in April. PHOTO: BRENDAN MCDERMIDREUTERS\n\nUpdated Sept. 7, 2017 849 pm ET *By Chun Han Wong and Felicia Schwartz*\n\nBEIJING—An exiled Chinese businessman who has alleged corruption among China's political and corporate elites said he is seeking asylum in the U.S., as [Beijing tries to discredit him](http) and try him on criminal charges.\n\n\"My home country wants to harm me, by any means necessary,\" Mr. Guo said in the video, filmed in his New York residence. A pending asylum application would allow him to remain in the U.S., potentially for years as the process unfolds. If approved, Chinese authorities \"will not be able to take me back, no matter what method they use,\" he said.\n\nIn recent months, [Mr. Guo has riveted many Chinese with salacious tales](http) of allegedly corrupt ties between China's business elite and senior Communist Party officials. His disclosures, aired on social media and video interviews, have the potential to roil behind-the-scenes jostling among senior leaders seeking promotions at the party's twice-a-decade leadership shuffle in October.\n\nThe U.S. State Department, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and China's Foreign Ministry didn't immediately respond to requests for comment. Reached via the WhatsApp messaging service, Mr. Guo referred to his online remarks and didn't respond to additional queries.\n\nThough Mr. Guo has provided scant evidence to substantiate his allegations, many Chinese are [paying attention. Beijing has responded by declaring him a criminal suspect and requesting an](http) Interpol arrest notice that was issued in April.\n\nA decision to grant Mr. Guo asylum could lead to diplomatic complications for the Trump administration, which is seeking China's cooperation in pressuring North Korea as Pyongyang ramps up its testing of missiles and nuclear technology. Beijing has indicated it wants Mr. Guo returned to China as a wanted exile, and his pending request will likely be an additional irritant between Beijing and Washington.\n\nThe U.S. and China don't have an extradition agreement.\n\nMr. Guo, who also uses the name Miles Kwok, filed his asylum application on Wednesday, said Thomas Ragland, the businessman's Washington-based immigration lawyer on the matter.\n\nMr. Guo is living in the U.S. on a tourist visa that expires within weeks, Mr. Ragland said. \"In addition to the asylum claim, we may apply to extend that visa or to change to a different visa status,\" he said, adding that a visa would allow Mr. Guo more freedom to work in the U.S. and travel abroad, compared with a basic entitlement to remain in the country granted by an asylum application.\n\nApplicants can wait for months or even years to undergo the interview, and are permitted remain in the U.S. as they go through the process. In most cases, decisions about asylum are made by immigration officials about two weeks after the interview, although decisions can be delayed if applicants are still undergoing security screening or if the case is referred to more senior officials. 332\n\nThose denied asylum requests aren't allowed to appeal them, but can reapply, according to USCIS.\n\nMr. Guo has said he left China in late 2014 after receiving a tip about the imminent arrest of one of his \"benefactors,\" a then vice minister of state security who was later detained for alleged corruption.\n\nHe then laid low before surfacing early this year with a series of video interviews and Twitter posts claiming he had detailed evidence of wrongdoing by senior party officials, their relatives and associates, and prominent Chinese businessmen.\n\nMr. Guo's disclosures has earned him a large following online—and a multipronged effort to discredit him.\n\nChina's Foreign Ministry has dismissed Mr. Guo's allegations as falsehoods. Chinese courts have jailed and fined a number of Mr. Guo's former associates and subordinates for crimes including fraud and embezzlement. Chinese media have published articles portraying him as unscrupulous. Several Chinese companies and individuals have sued Mr. Guo for defamation in U.S. courts.\n\nIn August, Chinese officials told the Associated Press that Mr. Guo was being investigated in at least 19 major criminal cases that involve bribery, kidnapping, fraud, money laundering and rape.\n\nMr. Guo has denied the allegations.\n\nChina's robust response underscores the stakes for the ruling Communist Party elite as it prepares for its October congress. Party insiders say President Xi Jinping wants to avoid controversies that could undermine his efforts to promote allies to leadership posts and sideline rivals before his second five-year term.\n\nMr. Guo has in the past claimed that he no longer possessed Chinese identification papers and holds passports from various jurisdictions, including the U.S. and Britain. However, documents from lawsuits Mr. Guo filed in New York in 2015 and 2016 show the tycoon identifying himself as a Chinese national with Hong Kong identification papers.\n\nWrite to Chun Han Wong at [chunhan.wong@wsj.com](mailto:chunhan.wong@wsj.com) and Felicia Schwartz at [Felicia.Schwartz@wsj.com](mailto:Felicia.Schwartz@wsj.com)\n\nCopyright © 2019 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved\n\nThis copy is for your personal, non-commercial use only. To order presentation-ready copies for distribution to your colleagues, clients or customers visit http\n\n## Exhibit C\n\n\n\n[CYBER RISK](http) OCTOBER 8, 2017 / 4:16 AM / 2 YEARS AGO\n\n## China denies links to alleged cyber attacks in United States targeting exiled tycoon Guo\n\n[Philip Wen](http)\n\n\n\nBEIJING (Reuters) - China has denied responsibility for alleged cyber attacks in the United States appearing to target exiled tycoon Guo Wengui, who has levelled corruption allegations against senior Communist Party officials and applied for political asylum.\n\nFILE PHOTO: Billionaire businessman Guo Wengui speaks during an interview in New York City, U.S., April 30, 2017. Picture taken April 30, 2017. REUTERS/Brendan McDermid/File Photo\n\nThe law enforcement agency said China had also provided the U.S. government with evidence that Guo, who has applied for political asylum in the United States, fabricated documents used to support his claims. It said China would make an official request for U.S. authorities to investigate the matter.\n\n\"The falsified official documents and the false information he fabricated are sensational and outrageous,\" the ministry said in a rare English-language statement.\n\nGuo denied the documents were forged and said the Ministry of Public Security's statement should not be believed.\n\nThe Washington-based Hudson Institute think tank was scheduled to host Guo last Wednesday in a rare public appearance, but canceled the event the day before without explanation.\n\nThe event would have coincided with the visit of an official Chinese delegation to the U.S. capital for a high-level law enforcement and cyber security dialogue between the two countries.\n\nThe Hudson Institute said it had detected a Shanghai-based attack aimed at shutting down access to its website several days earlier.\n\n## POLITICAL ASYLUM\n\nThe suspected attack was raised by U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions during a meeting with China's Public Security Minister Guo Shengkun on Wednesday, a Department of Justice spokesman told Reuters on Sunday.\n\nChina had \"pledged to cooperate\", the spokesman said.\n\n\"Why did the U.S. raise it in their meeting?\" he told Reuters.\n\nGuo Wengui applied for U.S. political asylum in September, but said this week the law firm representing him, Clark Hill PLC, had backed out after being targeted by Chinese hackers.\n\nClark Hill lawyer Thomas Ragland, who lodged the asylum claim, confirmed he was no longer representing Guo Wengui, without elaborating.\n\nGuo Wengui held a news conference at the National Press Club on Thursday, after his Hudson event was called off, where he produced what he claimed were \"top secret\" official documents showing China had sent secret agents into the United States.\n\nChina's Ministry of Public Security said the documents shown by him were \"clumsily forged\" and \"full of obvious mistakes\".\n\nGuo Wengui has made wide-ranging corruption allegations against senior Communist Party leaders through a daily stream of Twitter and YouTube posts since the start of the year, which he says are aimed at disrupting a key five-yearly Communist Party congress that begins next week.\n\nThe Chinese government has been seeking to discredit Guo Wengui, who is the subject of an Interpol red notice issued at Beijing's request, as a criminal suspect who should not be trusted.\n\nReporting by Philip Wen in BEIJING; Additional reporting by Makini Brice and Sarah Lynch in WASHINGTON and Gui Qing Koh in NEW YORK; Editing by Michael Perry and Paul Tait Our Standards: [The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.](htt)\n\n# Exhibit D\n\n\n\n## Exhibit E\n\n\n\n[CYBER RISK](http) JUNE 26, 2019 / 6:04 AM / 5 MONTHS AGO\n\n## Exclusive: China hacked eight major computer services firms in years-long attack\n\n[Jack Stubbs](http), [Joseph Menn](http), [Christopher Bing](http)\n\n\n\nLONDON (Reuters) - Hackers working for China's Ministry of State Security broke into networks of eight of the world's biggest technology service providers in an effort to steal commercial secrets from their clients, according to sources familiar with the attacks.\n\nFILE PHOTO - A man holds a laptop computer as cyber code is projected on him in this illustration picture taken on May 13, 2017. REUTERS/Kacper Pempel/Illustration\n\nRead the full report here:\n\n## [here](http)\n\nA U.S. indictment in December outlined an elaborate operation to steal Western intellectual property in order to advance China's economic interests but stopped short of naming victim companies. A Reuters report at the time identified two: Hewlett Packard Enterprise and IBM.\n\nNow, Reuters has found that at least six other technology service providers were compromised: Fujitsu, Tata Consultancy Services, NTT Data, Dimension Data, Computer Sciences Corporation and DXC Technology, HPE's spun-off services arm.\n\nReuters has also identified more than a dozen victims who were clients of the service providers. That list includes Swedish telecoms giant Ericsson, U.S. Navy shipbuilder Huntington Ingalls Industries and travel reservation system Sabre.\n\nHPE said it worked \"diligently for our customers to mitigate this attack and protect their information.\" DXC said it had \"robust security measures in place\" to protect itself and clients, neither of which have \"experienced a material impact\" due to Cloud Hopper.\n\nNTT Data, Dimension Data, Tata Consultancy Services, Fujitsu and IBM declined to comment. IBM has previously said it has no evidence sensitive corporate data was compromised by the attacks.\n\nSabre said it had disclosed a cybersecurity incident in 2015 and an investigation concluded no traveler data was accessed. A Huntington Ingalls spokeswoman said the company is \"confident that there was no breach of any HII data\" via HPE or DXC.\n\nEricsson said it does not comment on specific cybersecurity incidents. \"While there have been attacks on our enterprise network, we have found no evidence in any of our extensive\n\nThe Chinese government has consistently denied all accusations of involvement in hacking. The Chinese Foreign Ministry said Beijing opposed cyber-enabled industrial espionage. \"The Chinese government has never in any form participated in or supported any person to carry out the theft of commercial secrets,\" it said in a statement to Reuters.\n\nThe Cloud Hopper attacks carry worrying lessons for government officials and technology companies struggling to manage security threats.\n\nChinese hackers, including a group known as APT10, were able to continue the attacks in the face of a counter-offensive by top security specialists and despite a 2015 U.S.-China pact to refrain from economic espionage.\n\nReuters was unable to detail the full extent of the damage done by the hacking and many victims are unable to tell exactly what was stolen. Yet senior Western intelligence officials say the toll was high.\n\n\"This was a sustained series of attacks with a devastating impact,\" said Robert Hannigan, former director of Britain's GCHQ signals intelligence agency and now European chairman at cybersecurity firm BlueVoyant.\n\nAdditional reporting by Gao Liangping, Cate Cadell and Ben Blanchard in Beijing. Editing by Ronnie Greene and Jonathan Weber\n\nOur Standards: [The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.](htt)\n\n# Exhibit F\n\n## [Chine](http)se spies stole NSA hacking tools, report finds **[LIVE TV](htt)** 332\n\nBy [Kevin Collier](http), CNN\n\nUpdated 6:28 PM ET, Sat June 15, 2019\n\n**New York (CNN) —** Chinese hackers acquired and used National Security Agency hacking tools in 2016 and used them to carry out cyberattacks, a [new report has found](http).\n\nIn the report, the cybersecurity company Symantec claims that a Chinese hacker group associated with Chinese government intelligence conducted a hacking campaign using a tool that at the time was only known to be the property of the NSA.\n\nThough Symantec doesn't name particular agencies in its report, the Chinese group in question [was an arm](http) of [China's Ministry of State Security in Guangzhou, which went dark after the US Department of Justice indicted](http) three of its members in November 2017.\n\n> While Chinese government hackers are prolific spies around the world, they apparently only used their NSA tool sparingly.\n\n\"When they were in action, they were pretty noisy, they hit a lot of targets,\" Eric Chien, a fellow at Symantec, told CNN.\n\n\"But the number of targets that we've been able to recover so far that used this exploit was very few. They saw it was high value and didn't want to use it everywhere,\" he said.\n\nThe New York Times [was first to report](http) the story.\n\nRelated Article: Pentagon says China's [military using espionage to steal secrets](http) The findings muddy the timeline of an already strange episode in the NSA's recent history. In 2016, a group calling itself Shadow Brokers appeared online in 2016 and began leaking the agency's tools.\n\nIn April 2017 — after the last known incident in which the Chinese hackers used the NSA tool, but before the US indictment prompted that operation to go dark — Shadow Brokers released their most damaging set of NSA tools. That included one Windows exploit that both North Korea and Russian intelligence services used to create the two most damaging ransomware strains in history, prompting international condemnation.\n\nBut those were dierent variants of the NSA tools than the ones Symantec found that China was using.\n\nIt's unclear how the tool got into Chinese hands. The NSA didn't respond to request for comment.\n\n\"We're in a very murky place,\" John Hulquist, director of intelligence at FireEye, a company that extensively tracks Chinese hacking, told CNN.\n\n> \"This report raises a lot of questions that are still unanswered.\"\n\nIn response to the claims, China's Ministry of Foreign Aairs echoed China's common refrain when it is accused of hacking US targets. Spokesperson Geng Shuang denied the\n\n|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|--|--|\n| | Last week, the Pentagon published a report which alleged
that China is using espionage to steal cutting edge
technology for military purposes. | | | |\n| Related Article: US intelligence warns
China is using student spies to steal
secrets | \"China uses a variety of methods to acquire foreign military
and dual-use technologies, including targeted foreign direct
investment, cyber theft, and exploitation of private Chinese
nationals' access to these technologies, as well as harnessing
its intelligence services, computer intrusions, and other illicit
approaches,\" the congressionally mandated Department of
Defense report said. | | | |\n| | CNN's Steven Jiang and Ryan Browne contributed to this
report. | | | |\n\nSearch CNN...\n\n| US |\n|---------------|\n| World |\n| Politics |\n| Business |\n| Opinion |\n| Health |\n| Entertainment |\n| Tech |\n| Style |\n| Travel |\n| Sports |\n| Videos |\n| Coupons |\n| More |\n\n# Exhibit G\n\n**[SUBSCRIBE TO OUR BEACON EXTRA NEWSLETTER](http)**\n\n## **Beijing Suspected in Hacking Yacht Owned by Chinese Billionaire**\n\nFBI investigating possible electronic sabotage against dissident's ship\n\n\n\nLady May\n\n#### [Bill Gertz](http) - SEPTEMBER 8, 2017 5:00 AM\n\nChina is suspected of hacking the electronics of a yacht owned by a Chinese billionaire targeted by Beijing.\n\nGuo Wengui, who uses the English name Miles Kwok, said several incidents involving his 152-foot motor yacht, Lady May, appear to be part of a Chinese government effort to threaten and intimidate him.\n\nGuo, a real estate developer now living in New York City, said he believes a sophisticated intelligence service, likely the Chinese, disrupted the electronics on his high-tech yacht during several incidents beginning with the suspected ship hacking July 18.\n\n\"I hope to let the American people and government know that through this incident there exists a great and real threat from China,\" Guo said.\n\n\"I want every American and law enforcement agency to understand the Chinese government, through using the internet, cell phones, and modern communications technologies, can obtain private correspondence and information from each and every American citizen if it wishes, and can do that very easily almost without any cost,\" he added.\n\nHe urged the U.S. government to investigate the hacking and report the results to the American people.\n\nThe FBI was called in on the yacht hacking and has launched an investigation into the suspicious cyber incident, as well as a similar electronic disruption on the ship, and the buzzing of the vessel by a drone aircraft. Asked about the investigation, an FBI spokeswoman in New York declined to comment.\n\nGuo has been a target of the Chinese government efforts to silence him since earlier this year when he began speaking out in online videos and interviews exposing corruption by senior Chinese leaders.\n\nAmong those named by Guo is Wang Qishan, a member of the Communist Party's seven-member Politburo Standing Committee, the collective dictatorship that rules China, and one of the nation's most powerful leaders. The allegations of corruption against Wang are explosive since he is the chief enforcer behind Chinese leader Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign that has ensnared thousands of ofcials.\n\nThe hacking of the ship's computerized steering controls was especially alarming. The incident was outlined in a report and PowerPoint presentation, including photos and videos, provided by Guo.\n\nDisclosure of the suspected yacht hacking comes as the Navy is investigating with external electronic hacking who is involved in two similar collisions between U.S. Navy destroyers and commercial ships that killed 17 American sailors. One of the\n\nThe Lady May's captain, Gavin George Hurn, said in a statement in the report that the ship had sailed to the George Washington Bridge and was awaiting a harbor pilot to come aboard to guide the ship further north.\n\nBut after deciding to return instead to Chelsea Piers dock in lower Manhattan, the vessel's bow and stern thrusters suddenly shut down. \"I was unable to take control of the thrusters in the bridge,\" Hurn said.\n\nA technician then discovered that the thrusters were functioning but control over them had been disconnected from the bridge.\n\n\"We still had full control of the engine and steering on-board at all times,\" Hurn noted.\n\nHowever, without the thrusters, the yacht was unable to turn around and was caught in a 2-knot current. The captain reversed the ship down river and was eventually able to direct the bow toward shore and a safer location.\n\nAt the time, a large liqueed natural gas ship was located around 300 feet from the Lady May, prompting fears of a collision.\n\nThe yacht was built in 2014 by the Dutch manufacturer Feadship Royal Dutch Shipyards and is equipped with advanced computerized controls and communications.\n\nRadio Holland, a company specializing in shipping electronics, later investigated the ship's electronics and discovered \"several errors that were not normal in the system,\" Hurn stated.\n\nA system anomaly involving the ship's autopilot when placed in a certain conguration prevented using steering thrusters. Changes were made in the control system to prevent further mishaps, Hurn stated.\n\nThe report stated that the ship's controls were hacked by an unknown third party that gained access to the ship's computer system, possibly using a mobile phone.\n\nInvestigation into the incident indicated the malfunctioning of the Lady May's computer system was caused by unknown actors taking external control over the yacht's system and network, the report said.\n\n332\n\n| MANUAL
RUT | O RADIUS VIL | | |\n|------------------------------------------------|--------------|----------------|--|\n| 60 | | | |\n| | | | |\n| 200
190 | 210 | 220 | |\n| | | | |\n| | | | |\n| HEADING 205.2 .
GYRO | | SETPOINT 205.4 | |\n| | | | |\n| | | | |\n| Radar Target
17 46 15 | ALARIV | DV688-007 | |\n| Workstation network/appmanager
17 48 20 | NORMAL | DV688-007 | |\n| 2
Rader Tracker | ALARM | DV688-007 | |\n| Meteo NMEA message
17.8 31 | VA HO | DV688-001 | |\n| Wind NMEA message
17:38:31 | VALIE | LIVE38-007 | |\n| Slave not stendby
17 39 30 | NORMAL | DV688-002 | |\n| Link Server <=> 112-Radar Server
17 39 30 | NORMAL | DV638-00% | |\n| 17 38 29
Heading control | NORMAI | DV688-001 | |\n| 17 39 27
Rudder ready | NORMAL | CV636-UV | |\n| BARDS
Pleading control configuration
177 | NORMAL | DV686-007 | |\n| 17 30 23 Propulsion Stod clucch | NORMAL | DV588-007 | |\n| 17 30 15 Propulsion Port clutch | NORMAL | DVES | |\n| 17 25 10
Propulsion Stbd thrust | VALID | DVE | |\n| 17-21-21
Herschild control must low | NORMAI | OVE | |\n| 17-21/37 Propulsion Stod shaft speed | VALID | DVG
8100 | |\n| 1777 134
Echo Depth NMEA message | VALID | DVD
0 | |\n| 17 20 53
Off-thesding kmit | NORMAL | STUL | |\n| 17:20 44 Heading control thrust low | 19000MAL | LINE LE LIV | |\n| 27 16 37
General Nawgebon | ADARM | OVERSON | |\n| 14 21-30 Ends Montoning | AUTARIM | OVERSE-DOM | |\n\nPhotos of the bridge displays during the incident showed propulsion failures on both sides of the ship and an alarm regarding a \"radar target\"—a possible collision.\n\nThe hacking also coincided with online threats against Guo both before and after the July 18 Hudson River incident, according to the report.\n\nSeveral tweets from a supporter of Guo in China claimed that the Chinese government was targeting Guo and his yacht.\n\nOn July 28 the supporter tweeted that China planned to assassinate Guo using an unmanned aerial vehicle, and warned that the yacht, where Guo had produced a video broadcast a day earlier, was not safe.\n\n\"Your yacht is tracked,\" the supporter wrote. \"There's no technical difculty to attack the yacht from the air using unmanned aerial vehicles. They [the Chinese] are bribing New York Air Route Trafc Control Center.\"\n\nThe same supporter a day later said \"detailed plans for eliminating Guo\" included the use of weapons-equipped drones and plans to place explosive devices near the Lady May as it was underway.\n\n\"The [Chinese] base is at a few mechanic and chemical engineering companies with Chinese background in New Jersey,\" the supporter said. \"Knowing the route of Guo's yacht in advance is the key to success.\"\n\nThe Lady May's chief engineer, Craig Rehaume, said in a statement that as soon as Guo arrived on the yacht that day, the ship's Wi-Fi network went ofine, apparently disrupted from an external source. The network service was eventually restored but operated intermittently.\n\nIn a bid to locate the source of the electronic disruption, the cell phones of all passengers on the yacht were moved to a small dingy away from the ship.\n\n\"The results show that my suspicion was right: My mobile phone was controlled by them,\" Guo stated, referring to the Chinese. \"This proved that my mobile phone was hacked and installed with some controlling apps.\"\n\nRehaume, the Lady May's engineer, supported Guo's claim. He stated that he initially suspected Guo's phone to be the source of the Wi-Fi disruptions.\n\nThe engineer said the disruption continued after Guo's phone was powered off. Only when the sim card was removed and the suspect phone wrapped in metal foil, did the network begin operating properly, Rehaume said.\n\nThen on July 29, according to Hurn, the yacht captain, the Lady May was intercepted by a quadcopter drone as the vessel sailed near the Bear Mountain Bridge along the Hudson. The drone aircraft followed the vessel upriver for about 20 minutes. The drone was \"doing small loops around the vessel and coming very close to the vessel looking into the bridge and exterior window,\" Hurn said.\n\nThe captain noted that the drone operator demonstrated extreme condence in ying the aircraft and was able to keep it very stable and within three to six feet from the ship.\n\nAgain on July 31 as the Lady May sailed down the river past the Bear Mountain Bridge another drone similar to the rst one also followed the ship. Hurn said he believed the drone was controlled from land and ew off after around 20 minutes.\n\nIn early August, Guo said he received additional warnings from the Twitter supporter who stated that the electronic disruption plan \"was executed by the [Chinese] military.\"\n\nThe supporter, identied as @FlightEagle2017, stated on Aug. 5 that after tweeting the warning about the disruption operation he was targeted by Unit 61398, the Chinese military hacking unit based in Shanghai.\n\nThe Chinese told him \"we know who you are, you'd better mind your own business.\" 332\n\nGuo said both electronic incidents and drone buzzing convinced him that the activities were \"from my enemies who launched a series of national-level, organizational attacks against me.\"\n\n\"This time hackers hacked into the systems of the Lady May, to make it lose control, nearly causing fatalities,\" he said.\n\n\"Then they repeatedly cut off the yacht's networks and the unmanned aerial vehicle incident,\" Guo said. \"All of this shows that the traitors are not merely intimidating, but rather really posing a threat to my life.\"\n\nGuo said he believes the Chinese have set up sophisticated intelligence and covert action networks in the United States, posing threats to him, his family, Americans, and their property.\n\n\"This incident shows that the traitors have deployed spies and agents in the United States on a large scale, and hacker,\" he said. \"They work hand in hand with the intelligence organizations controlled by the traitors in China.\n\nGuo said he believes China is behind constant hacking attacks against his associates, including his security personnel, lawyers, and consultants.\n\n\"American bureaucracy and red tape have enabled Chinese hackers and property stealers not only to be able to steal American property, but to kill any American if they so wish,\" he said. \"It is high time that this clear and present danger be understood and seen clearly and be changed.\"\n\nIn addition to disclosing Chinese high-level corruption, Guo [has provided](http) details of Chinese intelligence activities in the United States, including the dispatch of tens of thousands of intelligence collectors.\n\nGuo has also revealed how China's intelligence services utilize Chinese businessmen, like Guo, for funding and supporting activities around the world.\n\nGuo was once close to Ma Jian, the former No. 2 ofcial at the Chinese intelligence service, Ministry of State Security, and ran secret intelligence operations against the United States for more than a decade. Ma was imprisoned last year on corruption charges that many analysts say were political retribution for gathering intelligence on leadership corruption.\n\n# Exhibit H\n\n\n\n## **China says Interpol seeks arrest of tycoon Guo Wengui**\n\n20 April 2017\n\n\n\n**China says Interpol has issued a notice for the arrest of a billionaire who has criticised the government in Beijing.**\n\nProperty tycoon Guo Wengui is currently thought to be in the US.\n\nAuthorities did not give a reason for the notice, but state media outlets have claimed that Mr Guo bribed a vice-minister, which he has denied.\n\nMr Guo has recently made allegations regarding top Chinese officials and their families' businesses in interviews with overseas media.\n\n## Politically motivated?\n\nOn Wednesday, a **[Chinese foreign ministry spokesman](htt)** said Interpol had issued a \"red notice\" for Mr Guo, which seeks the arrest of a wanted person globally.\n\nAsked about Mr Guo, Interpol said it did not \"comment on specific cases or individuals except in special circumstances and with approval of the member country concerned\".\n\nChinese news outlets said Mr Guo bribed the former vice-minister of state security, Ma Jian, with 60m yuan (£6.8m, \\$8.7m). Mr Ma has since been arrested and is being prosecuted for corruption. 332\n\nBut Mr Guo has denied such allegations and suggested that the notice for his arrest was politically motivated.\n\nThe tycoon, who says he is no longer a Chinese citizen, **[said in a tweet](http)** (in Chinese) on Wednesday that the move was initiated by \"corrupt officials who are terrified that their criminal behaviour would be unmasked by me\".\n\nMr Guo has recently given interviews to foreign Chinese-language media outlets, including Voice of America, making allegations regarding certain Chinese officials and their families who control business empires.\n\n**[VOA said](htt)** its journalists had been approached earlier by Chinese officials asking them to cancel their interview. The live broadcast on Wednesday was cut short, which VOA said was due to a \"miscommunication\".\n\n**[The South China Morning Post](htt)** noted that Mr Guo's interviews have coincided with what it called an \"international publicity war\" launched by China against him.\n\n## Related Topics\n\n**[Interpol](http) [China](http) [China corruption](http)**\n\n## **Share this story** [About sharing](htt)\n\n## **More on this story**\n\n## **[The mystery of a Chinese tycoon's disappearance](http)**\n\n1 February 2017\n\n### **[China laps up glossy TV corruption drama](http)**\n\n8 April 2017\n\n## **[China combats corruption within anti-corruption agency](http)**\n\n9 January 2017\n\n### **['One million' Chinese officials punished for corruption](http)**\n\n24 October 2016\n\n## [China](http)\n\n#### **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**\n\n| GUO WENGUI a/k/a MILES KWOK a/k/a | ) |\n|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------|\n| HO WAN KWOK, | ) |\n| 162 E 64th Street | ) |\n| New York, NY 10065 | ) |\n| Plaintiff, | )
) |\n| | ) |\n| v. | ) |\n| | )
Case No. 1:19-cv-3195-JEB |\n| CLARK HILL PLC | ) |\n| 500 Woodward Avenue | )
Hon. James Boasberg |\n| Suite 3500 | ) |\n| Detroit, MI 48226 | ) |\n| | ) |\n| and | ) |\n| | ) |\n| THOMAS K. RAGLAND, | ) |\n| c/o Clark Hill PLC | ) |\n| 1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW | ) |\n| Suite 1300 | ) |\n| Washington, DC 20004, | ) |\n| | ) |\n| | |\n\nDefendants.\n\n#### **ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)**\n\nUpon consideration of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed on November 25, 2019, and\n\ngood cause having been shown, it is hereby:\n\nORDERED, that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED; and it is further\n\nORDERED, that Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.\n\nDate: \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_ \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\n\n James Boasberg United States District Judge\n\n#### **EXHIBIT 4**\n\n#### **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**\n\n**GUO WENGUI,**\n\n **Plaintiff,**\n\n**v. Civil Action No. 19-3195 (JEB)**\n\n**CLARK HILL, PLC,** *et al***.,**\n\n**Defendants.**\n\n## **ORDER**\n\nFor the reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, the Court\n\nORDERS that:\n\n- 1. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART;\n- 2. Counts I–III are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the extent that they rely on Defendants' withdrawal;\n- 3. Count IV is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and\n- 4. Defendants shall file an Answer to the Complaint by March 5, 2020.\n\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\n\n/s/ James E. Boasberg JAMES E. BOASBERG United States District Judge\n\nDate: February 20, 2020\n\n#### **EXHIBIT 5**\n\n#### **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**\n\n**GUO WENGUI,**\n\n **Plaintiff,**\n\n**v. Civil Action No. 19-3195 (JEB)**\n\n**CLARK HILL, PLC,** *et al***.,**\n\n**Defendants.**\n\n#### **MEMORANDUM OPINION**\n\nThis case features an asylum-application process gone awry, accompanied by alleged professional misconduct, foreign-government cyber hacking, and social-media propaganda campaigns. After Plaintiff Guo Wengui, a Chinese businessman and prominent political dissident, retained the services of the law firm Clark Hill, PLC to assist him with an asylum petition, someone –– whom the parties presume to be associated with the Chinese government –– hacked into the firm's computer servers. The hacker thereby gained access to Plaintiff's confidential information and then published that information on the Internet. Compounding Wengui's problems, the firm withdrew its representation in response to the attack. Plaintiff asserts that in making his information vulnerable to a targeted hacking and subsequently withdrawing from the matter, Defendants Clark Hill and its attorney Thomas Ragland are liable for legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract. Defendants now move to dismiss all claims.\n\nTo succeed on his tort claims, Wengui must \"point to an act (or omission)\" that \"resulted in a loss\" to him. See Seed Co., Ltd. v. Westerman, 840 F. Supp. 2d 116, 127 (D.D.C. 2012).\n\nPlaintiff has successfully pleaded that the alleged mishandling of his information and subsequent cyber attack resulted in damages. The withdrawal, however, may have added insult, but it did not add injury. In addition, he cannot establish that the withdrawal breached Defendants' contractual obligations to him. The Court therefore will dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims to the extent they rely on the theory that Defendants' withdrawal constituted a legally remediable wrong, but it will permit those claims to go forward that allege misrepresentations surrounding and mishandling of his confidential information. Finally, it dismisses the demand for punitive damages, as Plaintiff has not satisfied the high bar necessary for seeking such relief.\n\n#### **I. Background**\n\n#### A. Factual Background\n\nAs it must at this juncture, the Court draws the facts from the Complaint. See Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Plaintiff is a \"highly successful businessman\" and \"well-known Chinese dissident.\" ECF No. 1 (Complaint), ¶ 10. While living in China, he exposed \"systemic corruption\" and \"widespread abuse of human rights\" being perpetrated by the Communist Party of China (CCP), China's ruling political party. Id., ¶ 15. These activities naturally caught the attention of the CCP, which allegedly threatened his livelihood and that of his family in order to put an end to his subversive activities. Id., ¶¶ 18–19. Fearing further persecution, Plaintiff fled his native country in 2015, and he now resides in New York. Id., ¶ 10. Wengui's escape from China has not prevented further harassment. The Chinese government has, for example, sent emissaries to demonstrate against him outside of his home as part of a larger \"malicious negative propaganda campaign\" organized against him. Id., ¶¶ 23– 24. In response to this cross-continental maltreatment, Plaintiff set about applying for political asylum in the United States.\n\nThe source of this dispute dates back to Plaintiff's negotiations with Defendant Thomas Ragland, an attorney and partner at Defendant Clark Hill, PLC –– a firm comprising about 650 lawyers ––– regarding potential assistance with his asylum petition. Id., ¶¶ 11–12. Hoping to secure Plaintiff as a client, Ragland assured him that both he and the firm more broadly \"were qualified, capable, and competent to represent plaintiff and to protect his interests fully and professionally.\" Id., ¶ 28. At a subsequent meeting in August 2016, Wengui conveyed to Ragland and other Clark Hill attorneys \"his standing and visibility as a prominent Chinese political dissident\" and \"the risks associated with and attendant to plaintiff's position as a prominent visible critic of the Chinese regime.\" Id., ¶ 31. Plaintiff also \"warned of the persistent and relentless cyber attacks that he and his associates had endured.\" Id.\n\nIn further meetings with the firm, Wengui continued to warn Defendants that they should \"expect to be subjected to sophisticated cyber attacks.\" Id., ¶ 32. In taking on Plaintiff's case, Defendants accordingly agreed to \"take special precautions to prevent improper disclosure of plaintiff's sensitive confidential information.\" Id., ¶ 33. These precautions would include distinct measures to impede or evade cyber attacks, by, for example, \"not placing any of plaintiff's information on the firm's computer server,\" as doing so would make the information more vulnerable to hackings. Id. Relying on the firm's commitments regarding the protection of his confidential information, Plaintiff hired Defendants, executing a letter of retention and paying the firm a retainer fee of \\$10,000. Id., ¶ 36.\n\nUnfortunately for all parties involved, Plaintiff's warnings of a cyber attack, apparently as unheeded as Cassandra's, proved prescient. On September 12, 2017, the firm's computer system was \"hacked\" –– again, both parties assume that the hacking was orchestrated by the Chinese government –– \"apparently without great difficulty.\" Id., ¶ 41. The hacker obtained a\n\nsubstantial amount of Plaintiff's and his spouse's personal information, such as their passport identification numbers, as well as Plaintiff's application for political asylum. Id., ¶ 43. This information, including the contents of Wengui's asylum petition, was then published and disseminated on social media. Id., ¶ 44.\n\nFollowing the attack, the parties' relationship quickly dissolved. On September 19, Clark Hill's General Counsel, Edward Hood, informed Plaintiff that the firm was terminating its involvement with his case. Id., ¶ 49. Hood explained that the attack might require Ragland, along with other members of the firm, to serve as witnesses at Plaintiff's asylum proceeding, as the hacking provided evidence of the political persecution from which Plaintiff sought asylum in the United States. Id. Hood posited that because the Rules of Professional Conduct bar attorneys from playing the dual role of witness and advocate, Defendants were required to withdraw from the matter. Id., ¶¶ 49–50. At the time of that withdrawal, Plaintiff had filed an asylum application and was awaiting a hearing. Id., ¶ 51.\n\n#### B. Procedural History\n\nOn September 19, 2019, Wengui filed this action against Defendants in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. Defendants then removed the case to this Court on diversityjurisdiction grounds. See ECF No. 1 (Notice of Removal) at 1–2. Plaintiff's Complaint asserts four counts: (1) breach of fiduciary duty; (2) breach of contract; (3) legal malpractice; and (4) punitive damages. See Compl., ¶¶ 66–93. Defendants now move to dismiss all counts, maintaining that they fail to state plausible claims for relief.\n\n#### **II. Legal Standard**\n\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of an action where a complaint fails to \"state a claim upon which relief can be granted.\" Although \"detailed factual\n\nallegations\" are not necessary to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), \"a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.\" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation omitted).\n\nIn evaluating Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, the Court must \"treat the complaint's factual allegations as true and must grant plaintiff 'the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.'\" Sparrow, 216 F.3d at 1113 (citation omitted) (quoting Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (citing Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993)). The Court need not accept as true, however, \"a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation\" nor an inference unsupported by the facts set forth in the Complaint. See Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Papasan v. Allain*,* 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Finally, even at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, a court can review \"documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the complaint\" or \"documents upon which the plaintiff's complaint necessarily relies.\" Ward v. D.C. Dep't of Youth Rehab. Servs., 768 F. Supp. 2d 117, 119 (D.D.C. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).\n\n#### **III. Analysis**\n\nIn seeking dismissal here, Defendants argue that neither the cyber attack nor the withdrawal constitutes a ground for a viable claim of legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, or breach of contract. In particular, they assert that their conduct surrounding these two events did not breach any duty owed to Plaintiff. They also argue that their actions, even if improper, did not cause him to suffer any actual damages. The Court will consider the two relevant events\n\nin turn, examining the separate counts in that context, albeit slightly out of sequence.\n\n#### A. The Cyber Attack\n\nAs recounted above, the Complaint alleges that: Plaintiff warned Defendants of the risk of an impending cyber attack; Defendants misrepresented the manner in which they would protect Plaintiff's confidential information from such an attack; and Defendants then failed to protect this information, allowing it to be retrieved and then publicly disseminated by a thirdparty hacker. Defendants dispute that they made such representations and argue that, in any event, the cyber attack did not actually harm Plaintiff. The Court, however, rejects Defendants' premature attempt to litigate disputed facts at the pleading stage and will deny their Motion to Dismiss as it pertains to the cyber attack.\n\n#### *Breach of Fiduciary Duty*\n\nCount I asserts that Defendants breached various fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiff, including the duty of good faith, the duty of loyalty, and the duty to protect Plaintiff's confidential records. See Compl., ¶ 68. To succeed on a claim of breach of fiduciary duty in the District of Columbia –– the relevant jurisdiction here ––– Plaintiff must establish \"(1) the existence of a fiduciary duty and (2) a violation of that duty that (3) proximately causes injury.\" Council on Am.-Islamic Relations Action Network, Inc. v. Gaubatz, 82 F. Supp. 3d 344, 353 (D.D.C. 2015) (citing Shapiro, Lifschitz & Schram, P.C. v. Hazard, 24 F. Supp. 2d 66, 75 (D.D.C. 1998)). It is axiomatic that the attorney-client relationship is fiduciary in nature. See Thomas v. Nat'l Legal Prof'l Assocs., 594 F. Supp. 2d 31, 34 (D.D.C. 2009) (\"[T]here is an ever present fiduciary responsibility that arches over every aspect of the lawyer-client relationship.\") (quoting Connelly v. Swick & Shapiro, P.C., 749 A.2d 1264, 1268 (D.C. 2000)). Defendants\n\nargue, however, that they did not breach any recognized fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiff and, in any event, did not cause any actual injury to him.\n\nFirst, as to breach of duty, Wengui does not allege, contrary to Defendants' assertion, simply that \"because there was a cyber incident, Defendants must have put up . . . 'unreasonable' security measures.\" ECF No. 12 (Def. MTD) at 12. It is true that some courts have gone so far as to hold that corporations maintain a duty to consumers to \"'protect against a criminal act of a third person,' which could include hacking into a private data system, 'if it is alleged that the entity had reason to anticipate the criminal act.'\" Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 3d 1, 21 (D.D.C. 2019) (quoting *In re* Arby's Restaurant Group Inc., Litig., 2018 WL 2128441, at \\*5 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 5, 2018)). As a result, those courts have held that if a corporation fails to prevent a forseeable cyber attack, it thereby breaches fiduciary duties owed its customers. Id. This Court, however, need not go so far as to find that any corporation's failure to protect against any forseeable cyber attack, standing on its own, constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty.\n\nA fiduciary relationship –– like that between a lawyer and client –– \"is founded upon trust or confidence reposed by one person in the integrity and fidelity of another.\" Democracy Partners v. Project Veritas Action Fund, 285 F. Supp. 3d 109, 121 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Bolton v. Crowley, Hoge, & Fein, P.C., 110 A.3d 575, 584 (D.C. 2015)). The duty of loyalty in this context \"has been described as one of 'uberrima fides,' which means, most abundant good faith, requiring absolute and perfect candor, openness and honesty, and the absence of any concealment or deception.\" Herbin v. Hoeffel, 806 A.2d 186, 197 (D.C. 2002) (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted); see also Seed Co., 840 F. Supp. 2d at 126–27 (attorney breaches fiduciary duties when providing clients with \"incorrect and misleading\" advice); Herbin, 806 A.2d at 197 (\"Disclosure of client confidences is contrary to the fundamental principle that the\n\nattorney owes a fiduciary duty to her client and must serve the client's interest with the utmost loyalty and devotion.\") (quotation marks omitted).\n\nPlaintiff has sufficiently pleaded that Defendants breached their duties of loyalty and good faith by misrepresenting the manner in which they would protect his confidential information in order to secure his business. Although they promised to take special precautions, they placed that information, including his asylum application, on their server and conveyed it via a firm email account –– in direct contravention of his instructions –– leaving Plaintiff vulnerable to the precise sort of machinations he had forewarned counsel about. See Compl., ¶¶ 2–3, 40–43. He further alleges that the firm breached the applicable duty of care in its treatment of his information by utilizing security measures that were \"inadequate, unreasonable, and fell woefully far short of [D]efendants' promises, assurances, obligations, and commitments to provide adequate security measures.\" Id., ¶ 42. Discovery may reveal that Defendants never made any such misrepresentations to Plaintiff and were not negligent in their handling of his confidential information, but the well-pleaded allegations in the Complaint preclude granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.\n\nDefendants argue in the alternative that even if they misled Plaintiff and were negligent in handling his confidential information, the cyber attack did not actually cause him any cognizable harm. Under D.C. law, not surprisingly, a breach of a fiduciary duty requires a showing of injury or damages. See Headfirst Baseball LLC v. Elwood, 239 F. Supp. 3d 7, 14 (D.D.C. 2017) (canvassing D.C. caselaw); see also Becker v. Colonial Parking, Inc., 409 F.2d 1130, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (\"A simple breach of duty having no causal connection with the injury, we have admonished, cannot produce legal responsibility.\") (quotation marks omitted). In arguing that Plaintiff has not made such a showing, Defendants rely on Randolph v. ING Life\n\nInsurance & Annuity Company, 973 A.2d 702 (D.C. 2009), where the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that an \"increased risk of future identity theft\" does not qualify as an \"actionable\" injury \"required to maintain a suit for common-law breach of fiduciary duty.\" Id. at 708.\n\nAlthough this case, like Randolph, concerns a data breach, the similarities end there. In Randolph, an unknown burglar stole a laptop computer owned by the employee of an insurance company, which contained the plaintiffs' insurance information, including their names, addresses, and social-security numbers. Id. at 704. The DCCA reasoned that the plaintiffs had failed to plead \"actual harm\" because they had not alleged that the burglar stole the laptop in order to access their information or that their information had even been accessed since the laptop was stolen. Id. at 706–08. Instead, they simply alleged \"the anticipation of future injury [identity theft] that has not materialized.\" Id. at 708; see also *In re* Sci. Applications Int'l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 14, 19 (D.D.C. 2014) (dismissing case where plaintiffs' information, along with other items, was allegedly stolen from parked car because \"mere loss of data –– without evidence that it has been either viewed or misused –– does not constitute an injury sufficient to confer standing\").\n\nPlaintiff, however, has gone well beyond pleading the anticipation of future injury and has instead alleged an actual injury resulting from Defendants' conduct. According to the Complaint, the Chinese government or someone associated with it hacked Defendants' server for the express purpose of stealing Plaintiff's information. The hacker then \"published\" the confidential material, including Plaintiff's application for political asylum and passport identification number, on social media. See Compl., ¶¶ 43–44. This chain of events occurred in the context of a broader propaganda campaign orchestrated by the CCP, one that included\n\nutilizing social-media platforms to spread information about Plaintiff and mobilizing demonstrators to protest his presence in the United States. Id., ¶¶ 22–24. Wengui therefore does not \"speculate\" as to potential uses of the stolen information; it has already been employed as part of the CCP's persecution and harassment of him. The Court therefore rejects Defendants' invitation to find that the cyber attack did not actually harm Plaintiff as a matter of law.\n\n#### *Legal Malpractice*\n\nCount III alleges legal malpractice, asserting that Defendants breached their \"common law\" and \"professional and ethical duties and obligations to plaintiff . . . by failing to use the required degree of professional care and skill in representing plaintiff,\" and in failing to maintain \"reasonable security measures to secure their computer system from unauthorized access, as required and promised to plaintiff.\" Id., ¶¶ 82–85.\n\nThe elements of a legal-malpractice claim are similar to, but slightly distinct from, those for breach of fiduciary duty. See Hickey v. Scott, 738 F. Supp. 2d 55, 67 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Shapiro, Lifschitz & Schram, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 74). As Justice O'Conner has commented, \"Lawyers are professionals*,* and as such they have greater obligations.\" Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 676 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring). To succeed on a legal-malpractice claim in the District of Columbia, \"the plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant was employed as the plaintiff's attorney, (2) the defendant breached a reasonable duty, and (3) that breach resulted in, and was the proximate cause of, the plaintiff's loss or damages.\" Beach TV Props., Inc. v. Solomon, 306 F. Supp. 3d 70, 93 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Martin v. Ross, 6 A.3d 860, 862 (D.C. 2010)).\n\nFor the reasons recounted above, this count may also proceed as to the cyber attack because the Complaint identifies a breach of the duty of reasonable care owed by attorneys to\n\ntheir clients and actual damages. To be sure, attorneys cannot be held \"liable for mistakes made in the honest exercise of professional judgment.\" Biomet Inc. v. Finnegan Henderson LLP, 967 A.2d 662, 665 (D.C. 2009). Honest mistakes, however, are a far cry from the conduct alleged here: misrepresentations made in order to secure a prospective client, the failure to follow promised procedures to adequately secure confidential information, and damages. See Swann v. Waldman, 465 A.2d 844, 846 (D.C. 1983) (finding plaintiff's allegations that attorney lied to him about attempting to obtain continuance and was negligent in failing to obtain expert witness sufficient to withstand motion for summary judgment on legal-malpractice claim).\n\n#### *Breach of Contract*\n\nPlaintiff also brings a claim for breach of contract in Count II, alleging that the firm violated its contractual obligation to provide \"competent representation\" by undertaking a matter beyond its \"professional or technical competence\" and \"neglecting to undertake reasonable security measures.\" Compl., ¶ 76. \"To prevail on a claim of breach of contract, a party must establish (1) a valid contract between the parties; (2) an obligation or duty arising out of the contract; (3) a breach of that duty; and (4) damages caused by breach.\" United States Conference of Mayors v. Great-W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 327 F. Supp. 3d 125, 129 (D.D.C. 2018), aff'd, 767 F. App'x 18 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting Tsintolas Realty Co. v. Mendez, 984 A.2d 181, 187 (D.C. 2009)). Defendants concede that the parties entered into a valid contract (in this case, an engagement letter) that set forth their \"respective obligations and expectations.\" See Def. MTD at 14. They dispute, however, that Plaintiff has alleged a breach of that contract.\n\nAccepting the facts in the Complaint as true, Wengui has met his pleading burden –– if just barely –– of establishing that Defendants did not meet their contractual obligations. In particular, he alleges that they violated their obligations to provide \"competent representation\"\n\nand keep Plaintiff \"reasonably informed about the status of the matter,\" Def. MSJ, Exh. A (Retainer Agreement) at 2, by misleading him as to the manner in which his information would be handled in the future, and then by failing to inform him when they eventually placed that information on their server. For the reasons stated in regard to the prior counts, this claim can proceed on the basis of failing to safeguard his information, which could amount to incompetent representation.\n\nGoing forward, however, Plaintiff may need to clarify this count because he appears to be exploring several different theories as to how Defendants breached the retainer agreement. First, he seems to be laying the groundwork for the introduction of extrinsic evidence. This evidence might demonstrate that Defendants orally amended the terms of the contract in making representations regarding higher-level protection of Plaintiff's personal information. See Segal Wholesale, Inc. v. United Drug Serv., 933 A.2d 780, 784 (D.C. 2007) (extrinsic evidence \"consistent with the terms of a partially integrated agreement is permissible\"); see also Stamenich v. Markovic, 462 A.2d 452, 455 (D.C. 1983) (extrinsic evidence permissible to demonstrate \"a contemporaneous agreement in addition to and not inconsistent with or a variation of the written agreement between the same parties, which was an essential inducement of the written contract\" or where \"fraud, mistake, or duress is alleged\").\n\nAlternatively, Plaintiff also appears to be seeking to demonstrate that Defendants violated a general obligation to provide competent representation in providing insufficient protection of client materials. See Compl., ¶ 76. Or, finally, he may be asserting that Defendants breached the \"implied duty of good faith and fair dealing\" that D.C. courts have found to be contained within all contracts, one that prohibits \"evad[ing] the spirit of the contract\" or \"willfully render[ing] imperfect performance.\" Murray v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 953 A.2d 308, 321 (D.C. 2008)\n\n(internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff will have to choose among these theories, and provide much more substantial support for them, should he decide to defend this count against further dispositive motions.\n\n#### *Duplicative Nature of Claims*\n\nFinally, the Court rejects Defendants' argument that the three claims chronicled above are necessarily \"duplicative\" of one other and thus that only one can proceed past the pleading stage. Under D.C. law, when a plaintiff's breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim rests on the same factual allegations and requests the same relief as his professional-malpractice claim, a court \"as a matter of judicial economy, should dismiss\" one of the claims as duplicative. See N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice, PLLC, 887 F. Supp. 2d 78, 84 (D.D.C. 2012) (collecting cases). The same holds true for tort claims that arise out of the same factual circumstances as a breach-of-contract claim. See Attias, 365 F. Supp. 3d at 18 (\"Under D.C. law, for a plaintiff to recover in tort for conduct that also constitutes a breach of contract, 'the tort must exist in its own right independent of the contract, and any duty upon which the tort is based must flow from considerations other than the contractual relationship.'\") (quoting Choharis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 961 A.2d 1080, 1089 (D.C. 2008)).\n\nDown the line, Plaintiff may indeed have to choose among his three common-law claims. At this early stage, however, it would be premature to dismiss any of the three as duplicative, given the fact-dependent nature of such an inquiry. While the counts all relate to the cyber attack generally, they may be predicated on distinct wrongs surrounding the attack. Defendants' conduct may have, for example, violated a Rule of Professional Responsibility –– potentially creating liability for legal malpractice –– which does not necessarily give rise to a breach of fiduciary duty. See, e.g., Hickey, 738 F. Supp. 2d at 67–68 (finding fee-related fiduciary-duty\n\nclaim distinct from legal-malpractice claim concerning breach of Rule of Professional Responsibility in dispute over fees).\n\nFinally, considerations of judicial economy do not weigh in favor of dismissal of any claims here. Allowing all three to proceed will not expand the scope of the case or potential avenues of discovery. At this juncture, therefore, the Court will decline Defendants' invitation to narrow Plaintiff's potential theories of relief. In sum, the Court will deny Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Counts I, II, and III to the extent that they rely on the theft of his personal information via cyber attack and Defendants' misrepresentations relating to protections from that attack.\n\n#### B. The Withdrawal\n\nBy contrast, Defendants' withdrawal from Plaintiff's asylum process –– or, as Plaintiff labels the incident, their \"firing\" of him –– does not provide grounds for a viable legal claim. As described above, Defendants terminated their representation of Wengui following the cyber attack. They explained in a letter to him that the attack had created \"several ethical complications\" related to their representation. See ECF No. 12-5 (Clark Hill Termination Letter) at 1. Defendants' \"primary concern\" was that \"the cyberattack would require Mr. Ragland –– and possibly other members of the Firm –– to be a witness in [Plaintiff's] asylum proceeding\" because they now had first-hand knowledge of China's prior persecution of Plaintiff, a factor relevant to that proceeding. Id.\n\nIn their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants argue that not only did their withdrawal not breach any duty owed to Wengui, but that it was in fact required by the Rules of Professional Conduct. See D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 1.16(a)(1) (D.C. Bar 2010) (attorney must withdraw from representing client if ongoing representation would violate Rule of Professional Conduct). Defendants again rely on Rule of Professional Conduct 3.7(a), which states that an attorney\n\n\"shall not\" act as an advocate for a client when she is \"likely to be a necessary witness\" in the proceeding. They also invoke Rule 1.7(b)(4), which requires withdrawal if the lawyer's ability to represent a client \"reasonably may be adversely affected by the lawyer's responsibilities to or interests in a third party or the lawyer's own financial, business, property, or personal interests.\" Defendants explain that following the cyber attack, they had their \"own interests in investigating and mitigating the incident –– which conflicted with their representation of Plaintiff.\" Def. MTD at 8.\n\nRegarding Rule 3.7(a), Plaintiff counters that Defendants' withdrawal was premature at best, given that Wengui \"did not have an asylum interview, let alone any hearing\" and \"had not asked that Mr. Ragland be a witness.\" ECF No. 14 (Pl. Opp.) at 8. Additionally, Plaintiff argues that Rule 1.7(b)(4) raises \"inherently factual issues\" as to whether the cyber attack created a conflict of interest, issues that cannot be resolved at this stage. Id. at 21.\n\nThe Court need not settle these disputes because Wengui's fiduciary and malpractice claims run aground on a different shoal. Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled that Defendants' conduct, even if improper, damaged or prejudiced him. Both of these claims require a showing of damage or loss. See, e.g., Seed Co., 840 F. Supp. 2d at 126 (plaintiff bringing malpractice claim \"must point to an act (or omission) by the . . . [D]efendants that resulted in a loss\" to him); Randolph, 973 A.2d at 708–09 (same regarding breach of fiduciary duty). As one court in this district described the applicable test when considering legal malpractice, the claim \"does not accrue until the plaintiff-client has sustained some injury from the malpractice[,]' and the 'mere breach of a professional duty, causing only nominal damages, speculative harm, or the threat of future harm — not yet realized — does not suffice to create a cause of action for negligence.'\"\n\nVenable LLP v. Overseas Lease Grp., Inc., 2015 WL 4555372, at \\*2 (D.D.C. July 28, 2015) (quoting Knight v. Furlow, 553 A.2d 1232, 1235 (D.C. 1989)).\n\nPlaintiff's claims predicated on the withdrawal do not plead damages that rise above the \"speculative\" or \"nominal\" level. Wengui does not dispute, for example, that at the time of Defendants' withdrawal, his asylum application had already been filed and he was awaiting an initial interview, which can take years to schedule. See Def. MTD at 20. He also does not claim to have experienced difficulties in finding a successor counsel with immigration-law expertise. As a result, Wengui has failed to factually substantiate his conclusory allegations that Defendants' withdrawal caused him \"undue delay and complications,\" reputational harm, and prejudiced the outcome of his case. See Compl., ¶ 60; see also Hinton v. Stein, 278 F. Supp. 2d 27, 33 (D.D.C. 2003) (rejecting legal-malpractice claim where \"[a]lthough there was a brief attorney-client relationship between the parties, defendant was justified in seeking to withdraw[,] . . . [h]er motion to withdraw was filed promptly[,] and there is no indication that plaintiff suffered any injury as a result of her withdrawal\"). Put differently, the Complaint does not allege that Plaintiff \"suffered any injury because of Defendant[s'] failure to represent him,\" and the Court will therefore dismiss his fiduciary-duty and malpractice claims to the extent that they rely on the withdrawal as the purported harm. Id.\n\nPlaintiff's breach-of-contract claim based on the withdrawal is somewhat different, but also merits dismissal. A party may prevail on such a claim even if he \"fails to prove actual damages,\" although he will be \"entitled to no more than nominal damages.\" Wright v. Howard Univ., 60 A.3d 749, 753 (D.C. 2013) (quoting Bedell v. Inver Housing Inc., 506 A.2d 202, 205 (D.C. 1986)). With regard to the withdrawal, however, Plaintiff has failed to even gesture at provisions of the contract that Defendants breached in terminating their representation or at\n\nextrinsic evidence that might support such a claim. See Retainer Agreement at 2, 4 (attorney may terminate agreement for reasons permitted under Rules of Professional Conduct or if any conflict of interest arises).\n\n#### C. Punitive Damages\n\nThe Court last tackles Count IV, which asserts a claim of punitive damages. Specifically, the Complaint alleges that Defendants violated Plaintiff's \"rights\" in an \"intentional deliberate, [and] outrageous\" manner. See Compl., ¶ 90. To begin, punitive damages are a form of relief, not a stand-alone cause of action. Although the count cannot survive independently, the Court considers whether such damages are available to Wengui at all. \"To recover punitive damages,\" a plaintiff must establish that \"the tortious act was committed with 'an evil motive, actual malice, deliberate violence or oppression' or in support of 'outrageous conduct in willful disregard of another's rights.'\" Embassy of Nigeria v. Ugwuonye, 297 F.R.D. 4, 14 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Robinson v. Sarisky, 535 A.2d 901, 906 (D.C. 1988)). The imposition of punitive damages thus requires conduct that is \"replete with malice.\" See Dalo v. Kivitz, 596 A.2d 35, 40 (D.C. 1991); see also Hendry v. Pelland, 73 F.3d 397, 400 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (\"District of Columbia law allows punitive damages only if the attorney acted with fraud, ill will, recklessness, wantonness, oppressiveness, or willful disregard of the clients' rights.\").\n\nThe Complaint does not plead such \"outrageous\" activity. Instead, if true, Wengui's allegations suggest that Defendants' failure to protect his information against hacking may mean that the firm acted \"imprudently or incompetently, but they fall far short of showing the blatant wrongdoing necessary for a jury to infer that [Defendants] acted either with deliberate malice or conscious disregard of [their client's] rights.\" Hendry, 73 F.3d at 400; see also Embassy of Nigeria, 297 F.R.D. at 14 (rejecting punitive-damages claim where attorney stole client's tax\n\nrefund and deposited it in firm's account). Plaintiff does not allege, for example, that Defendants intentionally left their server vulnerable to third-party hackings or stood to profit from such an event in any way. The Court therefore dismisses Count IV of the Complaint.\n\n#### **IV. Conclusion**\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Defendants'\n\nMotion to Dismiss. A separate Order consistent with this Opinion will be issued this day.\n\n/s/ *James E. Boasberg* JAMES E. BOASBERG United States District Judge\n\nDate: February 20, 2020\n\n#### **EXHIBIT 6**\n\n#### **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**\n\n| GUO WENGUI a/k/a MILES KWOK | ) |\n|-----------------------------------------|-------------|\n| Plaintiff, | )
)
) |\n| v. | )
) |\n| CLARK HILL PLC and THOMAS K.
RAGLAND | )
) |\n| Defendants. | )
)
) |\n\nCase No. 1:19-cv-3195-JEB\n\nHon. James Boasberg\n\n#### **DEFENDANTS' ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT**\n\n)\n\nDefendants Clark Hill PLC and Thomas K. Ragland (collectively, \"Defendants\") hereby\n\nsubmit their Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Plaintiff Guo Wengui's Complaint.\n\nIn this case, plaintiff Guo Wengui, a/k/a Miles Kwok a/k/a Ho Wan Kwok, (\"plaintiff\") seeks compensatory monetary damages of \\$50 million or more, jointly and severally, and punitive damages, also jointly and severally, against the defendant law firm Clark Hill PLC (\"Clark Hill\" or the \"firm\") and one of the firm's members, defendant Thomas K. Ragland, Esq. (\"Mr. Ragland\"), for damages, injuries, and wrongs which plaintiff has sustained as the direct and proximate result and consequence of defendants' multiple serious breaches of their duties to plaintiff arising from the firm's s legal representation of plaintiff. In addition to compensatory damages, plaintiff seeks punitive damages. Punitive damages are warranted here because the wrongful conduct of Clark Hill and Mr. Ragland was reckless, oppressive, intentional, deliberate, and willfully disregarded plaintiff's rights. (Clark Hill and Mr. Ragland are referred to herein collectively as \"defendants\" or the \"firm.\")\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants admit that Defendant Thomas K. Ragland is a member of Defendant Clark Hill PLC. Defendants admit that, in this lawsuit, the plaintiff, Guo Wengui, a/k/a Miles Kwok, a/k/a Ho Wan Kwok (\"Plaintiff\"), has asserted claims against Defendants seeking compensatory damages. Answering further, Defendants note that the Court's February 20, 2020 order dismissed Plaintiff's request for punitive damages. Because the remaining allegations in Paragraph 1 constitute a legal conclusion, an answer by Defendants is neither required nor appropriate. To the extent an answer is required, Defendants deny the remaining allegations in Paragraph 1.1\n\nPlaintiff was a client of Mr. Ragland and the Clark Hill law firm. In the course of that representation, Mr. Ragland and the Clark Hill law firm breached a lawyer's/law firm's fundamental obligation to protect from improper unauthorized disclosure plaintiff's (a client's) confidential information. The firm, specifically including Mr. Ragland, was reckless in its handling of plaintiff's confidential information and, as a direct result of that recklessness, plaintiff's confidential information was disclosed and widely disseminated, all to the great harm, detriment, and oppression of plaintiff. Having failed to protect plaintiff's confidential information, the firm then proceeded to compound that breach by wrongfully, improperly, and without good cause terminating its representation of plaintiff. This action, too, was reckless and in willful disregard of plaintiff's rights and in willful disregard of the firm's duties and obligations to plaintiff as a client of the firm. The firm intentionally undertook a matter beyond its competence and capability and then intentionally, deliberately, and willfully, wrongly placed its interests above the firm's duties to its client. Plaintiff was damaged as a result of the firm's breaches of the duties\n\n1 Defendants reserve (and expressly do not waive for any purposes) the arguments asserted in their Motion to Dismiss and supporting memoranda of law.\n\nwhich the firm and its lawyer (Mr. Ragland) owed to plaintiff as a client. The firm's actions were oppressive and were taken in willful disregard of plaintiff's rights.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants admit that Dr. Lianchao Han of Initiatives For China retained\n\nClark Hill PLC to represent Plaintiff in connection with Plaintiff's asylum application. Defendants\n\ndeny the remaining allegations in Paragraph 2.\n\nPlaintiff reasonably relied on the firm's assurances — both implicit and explicit that the firm understood its ethical and legal obligations, including its fundamental obligation to protect plaintiff's confidential information, *and* that the firm actually had the capability to fulfill its obligations. In fact, however, Mr. Ragland failed to honor his assurances and, as a result, he recklessly exposed plaintiff's confidential information. Contrary to Mr. Ragland's representations, the firm did not have adequate and appropriate electronic security measures in place to protect plaintiff's information and Mr. Ragland failed to take appropriate actions to protect plaintiff's confidential information. The direct consequence of the firm's and Mr. Ragland's failures in this regard was that plaintiff's sensitive confidential information, which plaintiff disclosed to the firm in confidence and which the firm assured plaintiff would be protected, was disclosed broadly and disseminated over the internet on social media platforms. The firm's breaches of duty to plaintiff caused these unauthorized disclosures. These disclosures have harmed and damaged plaintiff and those harms and damages are continuous and ongoing. The firm's conduct here goes far beyond negligence and was conduct which was outrageous in its recklessness and in its willful disregard of plaintiff's rights.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 3.\n\nThe firm's representation of plaintiff involved preparing and filing plaintiff's application for asylum in the United States. Plaintiff sought asylum in the United States after fleeing from his native China to avoid further politically motivated harsh persecution, including fear of being tortured, incarcerated under extreme conditions, and potentially being murdered.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants admit that they represented Plaintiff in connection with\n\nPlaintiff's asylum application, Defendants prepared and filed Plaintiff's application for asylum in\n\nthe United States, Plaintiff is a Chinese national, and Plaintiff sought asylum based on purported\n\nthreats, harms, and mistreatment of Plaintiff and his family by the People's Republic of China.\n\nDefendants deny the remaining allegations in Paragraph 4.\n\nThe information which plaintiff disclosed to the firm and which, because of the firm's failures and breaches, was disclosed subsequently to the world, including to persons and interests in China committed to silencing, smearing, and potentially physically harming plaintiff, included information detailing plaintiff's political activities in China as well as other sensitive matters. This sensitive information, the public disclosure of which jeopardizes the life, safety, and\n\nwelfare of plaintiff and others, lost its confidential status when it was displayed and published on social media platforms, and this occurred because of defendants' failures to properly protect the information from improper disclosure. Agents and officials of the Chinese government are believed to be among the parties who gained access to plaintiff's confidential information, which, again, they were able to obtain because of defendants' manifest failures and breaches of duty, including defendants' improper and unlawful actions and inactions in not taking necessary actions to protect plaintiff's confidential information from disclosure.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants admit that in or about September 2017, Clark Hill PLC was the victim of a cyber-incident related to the firm's representation of Plaintiff. Defendants deny that any purported disclosure of Plaintiff's information was caused by Clark Hill PLC's failure to take actions to protect Plaintiff's information from disclosure. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the remaining allegations in Paragraph 5 and therefore deny the remaining allegations in Paragraph 5.\n\nAs plaintiff's counsel, Clark Hill owed plaintiff an undivided duty to act in his best interests. Here, the firm, in its representation of plaintiff and then in improperly terminating that representation, violated that obligation. The firm knew from the outset of considering whether to undertake the representation of plaintiff that agents and officials of the Chinese government have been and are hostile to plaintiff and pose a genuine threat to plaintiff's life, liberty, and security. These Chinese agents and officials and the persons and interests on whose behalf they have acted in the past and were (and are) expected to act in the future pose, as defendants knew before and when they agreed to represent plaintiff, a direct threat to plaintiff. Notwithstanding defendants' knowledge of the powerful interests hostile to plaintiff, knowledge which defendants had prior to agreeing to represent plaintiff, defendants failed to protect plaintiff's confidential information from disclosure from these persons and interests with a known agenda deeply hostile and antagonistic to plaintiff Defendants' conduct prejudiced plaintiff, caused him severe personal and financial damage, all of which could have, and should have, been avoided.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants admit that, as Plaintiff's attorneys, they owed him the standard duties imposed by the common law and the District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct. Answering further, the Court's February 20, 2020 order dismissed Plaintiff's claims arising from the Defendants' withdrawal from the representation of Plaintiff. Defendants deny the remaining allegation in Paragraph 6.\n\nDefendants then compounded their breaches to plaintiff when they wrongfully, unlawfully, improperly, without valid cause, and without any meaningful consultation with plaintiff unilaterally terminated their representation of him. When this matter got \"hot,\"\n\ndefendants did not stand with their client; rather, they \"ducked and ran.\" Defendants abandoned their client (plaintiff), and they put their perceived interests above their obligation to act in the interests of their client (plaintiff). Defendants violated their legal and ethical duty of undivided loyalty to their client. Defendants' conduct was oppressive, intentional, and willfully disregarded plaintiff's rights.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 7. Answering further, the\n\nCourt's February 20, 2020 order dismissed Plaintiff's claims arising from the Defendants'\n\nwithdrawal from the representation of Plaintiff.\n\nPlaintiff brings this action because defendants must be — and in this action will be — held accountable for their gross and intentional misconduct. Defendants are liable for both compensatory and punitive damages. Defendants' egregious failures to protect plaintiff's information from being exposed to potential \"hackers,\" including failing to have in place and/or to maintain necessary and effective electronic security measures sufficient to protect plaintiff's sensitive and confidential information, violated the rules of professional conduct; constituted a serious breach of the firm's fiduciary duty to plaintiff as a client of the firm; violated the firm's contractual obligations to plaintiff and violated the firm's obligation to provide plaintiff competent legal representation.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 8. Answering further, the\n\nCourt's February 20, 2020 order dismissed Plaintiff's request for punitive damages.\n\nThe wide-spread and deeply harmful publication and dissemination of plaintiff's sensitive personal information on social media was the direct, proximate, and inevitable (albeit entirely avoidable) result and consequence of the firm's breaches of its duties and obligations to plaintiff. The firm then intentionally, deliberately, and oppressively made matters worse when it terminated its representation of plaintiff, advancing a plainly pretextual, if not risible, \"justification\" for the firm's improper action. Defendants acted in willful disregard for the rights of plaintiff, and defendants' conduct was reckless and taken without regard to the safety or protection of the plaintiff, the firm's client, and in willful disregard of the firm's duties and obligations to plaintiff as a client. Because plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer serious harm and injury as a result of defendants' actions and inactions, plaintiff seeks monetary damages to compensate him for the grievous harms which defendants have caused him. In addition, plaintiff seeks punitive damages because of the recklessness, wantonness, and oppressiveness of defendants' conduct.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 9. Answering further, the\n\nCourt's February 20, 2020 order dismissed Plaintiff's request for punitive damages and Plaintiff's\n\nclaims based on Defendants' withdrawal.\n\n#### **PARTIES**\n\nPlaintiff, a native of China, currently resides in New York, NY. Plaintiff has a pending application for asylum in the United States. Plaintiff is a highly successful businessman and a political activist and well-known Chinese dissident. Plaintiff has fought vigorously for many years for the rule of law, human rights, and democracy in China. In early 2015, plaintiff was forced to escape from China as he justifiably feared being unlawfully arrested, detained, interrogated, tortured, and/or killed by the Chinese government and/or the Chinese Communist Party (the \"CCP\") because of his political activities and outspoken advocacy. (References herein to the \"CCP\" are inclusive of both the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party.)\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants admit that Plaintiff is a Chinese national, lived in New York,\n\nNY on or about September 2019, and filed an application for asylum in September 2017.\n\nDefendants admit that Plaintiff left mainland China on or about December 2013 and left the Hong\n\nKong Special Administrative Region, People's Republic of China, on or about January 2015.\n\nDefendants admit that Plaintiff sought asylum based, in part, on his purported political activities.\n\nDefendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to Plaintiff's state\n\nof mind and the remaining allegations in Paragraph 10, and therefore deny the remaining\n\nallegations in Paragraph 10.\n\nDefendant Clark Hill PLC (\"Clark Hill\") is a major law firm of approximately 650 attorneys and professionals, in 25 offices, and operates as a professional services limited liability company, organized and existing under the laws of the State of Michigan. Clark Hill does business on a regular, constant, and substantial basis in the District of Columbia, specifically including having an office at 1001 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Suite 1300, Washington, DC 20004, and Clark Hill's lawyers appear regularly before courts, agencies, and Congress in the District of Columbia.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants admit the allegations in Paragraph 11.\n\nDefendant Thomas K. Ragland, Esq. (\"Mr. Ragland\") is an attorney licensed to practice law in the District of Columbia and is a member (partner or principal) of the Clark Hill law firm in the firm's District of Columbia office. Mr. Ragland does business on a regular, constant, and substantial basis in the District of Columbia, including maintaining his office for the practice of law at the Clark Hill office at 1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Suite 1300, Washington, DC 20004, and appearing before agencies and tribunals in the District of Columbia. (As noted previously, Clark Hill PLC and Mr. Ragland are referred to collectively herein as \"defendants\" or the \"firm.\")\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants admit the allegations in Paragraph 12.\n\n#### **JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND CONVENIENCE**\n\nThis Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to D.C. Code § 11-921. This Court has personal jurisdiction over defendants as they both regularly and constantly conduct business in the District of Columbia. Defendants' actions and inactions giving rise to the matters alleged in this complaint took place in the District of Columbia, including meetings with plaintiff and/or his agents and authorized representative, Dr. Lianchao Han (\"Dr. Han\").\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants admit that the United States District Court for the District of\n\nColumbia has subject-matter jurisdiction over this matter, as this lawsuit was timely removed to\n\nfederal court on October 24, 2019, and has personal jurisdiction over Defendants. Answering\n\nfurther, Defendants admit that Mr. Ragland met with Dr. Han in the District of Columbia, at\n\nPlaintiff's request, on multiple occasions in or around September 2017 for the purpose of\n\ndiscussing Plaintiff's asylum application. Defendants further admit that they met with Plaintiff\n\ndirectly in or around September 2017 regarding Plaintiff's asylum application. Defendants deny\n\nthe remaining allegations in Paragraph 13.\n\nVenue is proper in this Court and this Court is a convenient forum for this action. This case relates directly to actions and inactions of defendants in connection with their law office and law practice in the District of Columbia; defendants are very much present and engaged in doing business on a daily basis in the District of Columbia; and a substantial part of the events, actions, and inactions giving rise to plaintiff's claims in this complaint occurred in the District of Columbia. By way of illustration, meetings between the firm and plaintiff's authorized representative, Dr. Han, during which the firm and plaintiff formed an attorney-client relationship, regularly exchanged information relating to plaintiff's asylum application, Mr. Ragland's preparation of that application, the firm's withdrawal from the representation, and other actions and inactions arising out of that relationship occurred in the District of Columbia at the firm's office in the District. Mr. Ragland was the firm's principal lawyer representing plaintiff and most of the work which Mr. Ragland did on behalf of plaintiff was done in the District of Columbia.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants admit that venue is proper in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, as this lawsuit was timely removed on October 24, 2019, and Defendants admit that Mr. Ragland was the most senior attorney at Clark Hill PLC preparing and filing Plaintiff's asylum application. Answering further, Defendants admit that Mr. Ragland met with Dr. Han in the District of Columbia, at Plaintiff's request, on multiple occasions in or around September 2017 for the purpose of discussing Plaintiff's asylum application. Defendants deny the remaining allegations in Paragraph 14.\n\n## **STATEMENT OF FACTS**\n\nFor years, plaintiff has been a forceful, visible, and well-known advocate for the rule of law, human rights, and democracy in China. In connection with his political activities and advocacy, plaintiff has, for example, exposed systemic corruption in the CCP, as well as by senior officials of the Chinese government and family members of those officials. Plaintiff has also disclosed the widespread abuse of human rights in China, including the use of torture. Plaintiff has opposed Chinese governmental and party suppression of democratic movements in China. Plaintiff has also been involved in exposing the degree, extent, and effectiveness of China's covert cultural, political, economic, and intelligence operations in the United States and elsewhere in the West.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants admit that Plaintiff sought asylum based, in part, on Plaintiff's\n\npolitical activities, and Defendants state that the content of Plaintiff's asylum application speaks\n\nfor itself. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the\n\ntruth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 15 and therefore deny them.\n\nPlaintiff has been effective in influencing international opinion with respect to China and the CCP. From the perspective of the CCP, plaintiff's activities and advocacy have affected adversely China's and the CCP's stature in the world community and, in response, the Chinese government has attempted to silence plaintiff. The Chinese government/CCP has employed various tactics, including coercion and offering bribes to attempt to silence plaintiff. Upon information and belief, the Chinese government/CCP has used its overseas intelligence networks to seek to discredit, silence, and threaten plaintiff's personal safety or, at the very least, to cause plaintiff to have good reason to fear for his personal safety as well as fearing for the safety of family members and friends.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants admit that Plaintiff sought asylum based, in part, on Plaintiff's\n\npolitical activities, and Defendants state that the content of Plaintiff's asylum application speaks\n\nfor itself. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the\n\ntruth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 16 and therefore deny them.\n\nUpon information and belief, the CCP believes plaintiff presently holds not publicly known proof of various types of improper conduct on the part of the CCP and those associated with it and acting on its behalf, including information relating to corruption, murder, hiding of illegally-gained money, and China's spy network. For these and other reasons, the Chinese government and the CCP are highly motivated, to understate the matter, and engaged aggressively\n\nin seeking to silence plaintiff. The Chinese government and the CCP are equally motivated and engaged in seeking to learn what plaintiff knows about improper activities undertaken by or on behalf of the Chinese government and the CCP. And, perhaps most critically, the Chinese government and the CCP have the capabilities — the \"operational reach\" — to carry out aggressive hostile actions against plaintiff.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants admit that Plaintiff sought asylum based, in part, on Plaintiff's\n\npolitical activities, including Plaintiff's claims to have information regarding Chinese officials,\n\nand Defendants state that the content of Plaintiff's asylum application speaks for itself. Defendants\n\nare without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining\n\nallegations in Paragraph 17 and therefore deny them.\n\nIn or about January 2015, for example, the CCP, through Bruno Wu Zheng, called plaintiff to request that plaintiff cooperate with the CCP and stop disclosing information regarding corruption on the part of senior CCP officials. Plaintiff refused. After several failed bribery attempts and threats, Bruno Wu Zheng directed the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (\"CCDI\") and the Special Task Force to request (truly demand) that plaintiff cooperate with China and return any evidence he had of corruption among senior leaders. Plaintiff was asked to hand over his evidence to the CCP and to stop acting against the CCP. In return, Bruno Wu Zheng promised plaintiff, *inter alia,* that (1) none of plaintiff's assets or properties would be seized by the CCP; (2) all privileges would be returned to plaintiff and his family; (3) plaintiffs family members would not be arrested; and (4) plaintiff would not be physically threatened or killed. Plaintiff refused this proposal. Plaintiff anticipated that this refusal would trigger the risk of serious persecution of plaintiff and his family.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants admit that Plaintiff attested to politically-motivated threats\n\nagainst himself and his family in support of his claim for asylum, including an incident involving\n\nMr. Wu Zheng, and Defendants state that the content of Plaintiff's asylum application speaks for\n\nitself. Defendants are without knowledge or belief sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the\n\nremaining allegations in Paragraph 18 and therefore deny them.\n\nPlaintiff's political activities and his refusal to cease those activities, when coupled with the CCP's powerful interest in bringing those activities to a halt, including using brute force, made it dangerous for plaintiff to remain in China. Consequently, on or about January 2015, plaintiff fled from China. He rightly feared being arrested, detained, interrogated, tortured, and/or killed by the Chinese government and/or the CCP. At or around this same time, the CCP seized substantial sums of plaintiffs family's assets and questioned and arrested 18 of plaintiffs family members. The CCP also arrested or detained a number of plaintiff's colleagues and employees and prohibited others from leaving China.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants admit that Plaintiff, in support of his claim for asylum, attested that he left mainland China in 2013, and left Hong Kong in 2015, based, in part, on his political activities and on actions by the People's Republic of China toward Plaintiff. Defendants admit that Plaintiff further attested to asset seizures, detention, and investigation of Plaintiff's family members in support of his claim for asylum. Defendants further state that the content of Plaintiff's asylum application speaks for itself. Defendants are without knowledge or belief sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 19 and therefore deny them.\n\nIn May 2017, by which time plaintiff was residing in the United States, the CCP sent Liu Yanping and three other agents to New York City to speak with plaintiff in yet another effort to seek to silence him. Liu Yanping was then Secretary of the CCDI. Plaintiff refused this threat as he had refused previous threats. Instead of giving in to this latest threat, plaintiff disclosed a broad network of CCP spies operating in the United States. Upon information and belief, the United States government revoked the visas of these four officials, including Liu Yanping, because of their actions in the United States.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants admit that Plaintiff was in the United States on or about May\n\n2017. Defendants further admit that Plaintiff's claim for asylum rests in part on his attestation that\n\nPlaintiff assisted United States government officials, which Plaintiff himself has made public in\n\nthis allegation, and further states that the content of Plaintiff's asylum application speaks for itself.\n\nDefendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the\n\nremaining allegations in Paragraph 20 and therefore deny them.\n\nThe CCP also took another highly aggressive action to seek to silence plaintiff by issuing two International Criminal Police Organization (\"INTERPOL\") \"red [arrest] notices.\" Plaintiff disputes the legitimacy of these notices.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants admit that Plaintiff has been the subject of INTERPOL \"red notices.\" Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in Paragraph 21 and therefore deny them.\n\nIn or around October 2017, just prior to China's 19th National Congress, an event of great importance to the CCP, plaintiff's Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook accounts were abruptly and suspiciously suspended, all without explanation.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief\n\nas to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 22 and therefore deny them.\n\nUpon information and belief, beginning in 2017, the Chinese government and/or the CCP sent agents and officials to the United States to organize demonstrations aimed directly against plaintiff outside the building in New York City where plaintiff resides. Persons attending these CCP-staged demonstrations, literally on plaintiff's front steps, were provided with preprinted signs defaming plaintiff in vile language, calling him a rapist and a liar, and urging plaintiff to leave the United States.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief\n\nas to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 23 and therefore deny them.\n\nThe CCP separately orchestrated a malicious negative propaganda campaign against plaintiff. The CCP formed a team of people, the \"50-cent troll army,\" to manipulate public opinion on social media for the benefit of the CCP. The commentators created favorable comments or articles on popular Chinese social media networks intended to derail discussions that are unfavorable to the CCP and promote narratives that serve the government's interests, together with disparaging comments and misinformation about political opponents and critics of the Chinese government, such as plaintiff.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief\n\nas to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 24 and therefore deny them.\n\nMerely supporting plaintiff became a crime in China. One of plaintiff's supporters, Dong Qi, reportedly was arrested and sent to jail for wearing a T-shirt with plaintiff's slogan \"Everything is just beginning\" — on it. Upon information and belief, plaintiff's followers have been questioned, restrained, and intimidated.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief\n\nas to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 25 and therefore deny them.\n\nUpon information and belief, the CCP perceives plaintiff as a dangerous challenge to the stability, legitimacy, and credibility of the Chinese regime and the CCP.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief\n\nas to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 26 and therefore deny them.\n\nPlaintiff's political actions and advocacy are known to and widely supported by many people in China and, indeed, around the world. The domestic Chinese and international support which plaintiff has and the related strong support for his political and advocacy activities are additional sources of anger, aggravation, deep displeasure, and frustration to the CCP.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in Paragraph 27 and therefore deny them.\n\nParagraphs 15-27 *supra,* describing plaintiff's political activities and advocacy and resulting persecution and justifiable fear of further retaliation after fleeing from China, provide background and context for plaintiffs seeking legal representation to assist him and advocate on his behalf in applying for and obtaining political asylum in the United States. Plaintiff retained Mr. Ragland and the Clark Hill law firm to represent him in this regard. Mr. Ragland holds himself out as a leading immigration lawyer. Mr. Ragland and the firm represented to plaintiff that Mr. Ragland and the firm were qualified, capable, and competent to represent plaintiff and to protect his interests fully and professionally. Plaintiff relied upon these representations; however, they turned out to be false.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants reincorporate their answers to Paragraphs 15 through 27 above as though fully set forth herein. Defendants admit that beginning in or about August 2017, they represented Plaintiff in connection with Plaintiff's asylum application. Defendants further admit that Defendants' communication with Plaintiff about the representation occurred through communication between Defendants and Plaintiff's representative, Dr. Han, and that Defendants communicated with Dr. Han at Plaintiff's request. Defendants further admit that the representation concerned U.S. immigration matters and that Mr. Ragland practices law in immigration matters. Defendants deny the remaining allegations in Paragraph 28.\n\nClark Hill receives and expects to receive (as any large law firm would) a large amount of confidential client information, including financial records, trade secrets, sensitive personal communications and disclosures, and sensitive personally identifiable information (*e.g.,* addresses, contact information, social security numbers, and health information). Receiving such information is a daily occurrence at Clark Hill (again, as it is at any law firm of comparable size). Clients, specifically including the present plaintiff, disclose confidential information to Clark Hill reasonably and justifiably relying on the firm's professional ethical and legal obligations to protect and preserve the confidentiality of their information, while strictly limiting disclosure of such information to that information which the client authorizes the firm to disclose.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants admit that Clark Hill PLC receives confidential client information in the context of legal representations on a regular basis, and that the common law and the District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct governed Defendants' obligations with respect to their representation of Plaintiff. Because the remaining allegations in Paragraph 29 constitute a legal conclusion, an answer by Defendants is neither required nor appropriate. To the extent an answer is required, Defendants deny the remaining allegations in Paragraph 29.\n\nClark Hill has clear and undeniable ethical and legal obligations to preserve a client's (plaintiffs) confidential information. These obligations to preserve confidentiality include information provided to the firm electronically and/or stored electronically on the firm's computer network. At all relevant times, Clark Hill and Mr. Ragland communicated to plaintiff, both implicitly and explicitly, that the firm understood its obligations to preserve plaintiff's confidential information and, of equal importance, that the firm could and would do so (*i.e.,* that the firm had the requisite professional and technical knowledge, capability, and competence to protect plaintiff's information).\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants admit that the common law and the District of Columbia Rules\n\nof Professional Conduct governed Defendants' obligations with respect to their representation of\n\nPlaintiff. Answering further, Defendants deny that Plaintiff requested any specific, additional, or\n\nextraordinary measures with respect to safeguarding his confidential information differently than\n\nany other client of Defendants. Defendants deny the remaining allegations in Paragraph 30.\n\nOn or about August 2017, plaintiff met with defendants in connection with plaintiff's potentially retaining the firm to represent him in preparing and filing his planned asylum application. During that meeting, plaintiff explained his standing and visibility as a prominent Chinese political dissident who is perceived as hostile to the CCP and related interests in China. Plaintiff also explained the risks associated with and attendant to plaintiff's position as a prominent visible critic of the Chinese regime. Plaintiff warned of the persistent and relentless cyberattacks that he and his associates had endured. At that meeting and subsequently, plaintiff disclosed to the firm confidential information about plaintiff's political and advocacy activities and equally sensitive confidential information regarding plaintiff's knowledge of wrongful actions and activities of the CCP. The firm knew from the very outset that plaintiff's asylum application was not \"routine\" and that in connection with that application plaintiff would necessarily be disclosing highly sensitive confidential information to Mr. Ragland and to the Clark Hill law firm.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants admit that in or about August 2017, they began representing Plaintiff in connection with Plaintiff's asylum application. Answering further, Defendants admit that they met with Plaintiff and Plaintiff's representatives regarding Plaintiff's asylum application, and, in those meetings, Plaintiff discussed his purported political activities and the alleged harassment of Plaintiff by Chinese officials. Answering further, Defendants deny that Plaintiff requested any specific, additional, or extraordinary measures with respect to safeguarding\n\nconfidential information differently than any other client of Defendants. Answering further, Defendants state that Plaintiff himself demanded, contrary to Defendants' advice, that Defendants publicize the fact the Plaintiff had applied for asylum. Defendants deny the remaining allegations in Paragraph 31.\n\nIn meetings with the firm, plaintiff explained that any law firm preparing his asylum application had to expect to be subjected to sophisticated cyberattacks. Having been so informed, with \"eyes wide open,\" and with a full awareness and understanding of the cyber security and other potential risks involved, defendants agreed to move forward and agreed to undertake the representation of plaintiff.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants admit that they formed an attorney-client relationship with Plaintiff in connection with Plaintiff's asylum application. Answering further, Defendants deny that Plaintiff requested any specific, additional, or extraordinary measures with respect to safeguarding confidential information differently than any other client of Defendants. Answering further, Defendants state that Plaintiff himself, contrary to Defendants' advice, demanded that Defendants publicize the fact the Plaintiff had applied for asylum. Defendants deny the remaining allegations in Paragraph 32.\n\nIn agreeing to undertake the representation of plaintiff, Mr. Ragland and the firm agreed to take special precautions to prevent improper disclosure of plaintiff's sensitive confidential information. Such precautions would include not placing any of plaintiff s information on the firm's computer server as doing so would, as Mr. Ragland and the firm understood, make the information an easy target for a \"hacker\" interested in obtaining the information. The firm also committed and agreed to have in place at all times the requisite security measures to protect plaintiff's confidential information and to otherwise provide plaintiff ethical and competent legal representation. Had the firm not made these commitments and agreements, plaintiff would not have retained the firm.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 33. Answering further, Defendants deny that Plaintiff requested any specific, additional, or extraordinary measures with respect to safeguarding confidential information differently than any other client of Defendants. Answering further, Defendants state that Plaintiff himself, contrary to Defendants' advice, demanded that Defendants publicize the fact the Plaintiff had applied for asylum.\n\nOn or about August 28, 2017, plaintiff, through his authorized representative, Dr. Han, and defendants executed a letter of agreement (the \"retention agreement\") for legal services pertaining to plaintiff's asylum application. That agreement created and formalized contractual, common law, and professional ethical and legal duties and obligations of defendants (as legal counsel) to plaintiff (as client), including the duties and obligations of undivided loyalty and the duties and obligations to maintain adequate and necessary security measures sufficient to safeguard plaintiff's sensitive personal and confidential information and documents.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants admit that, on or about August 28, 2017, Defendants and Dr. Han entered into a written engagement letter with respect to Defendants' legal representation of Plaintiff in connection with Plaintiff's asylum application, and that the engagement letter set forth the parties' obligations with respect to the representation. Answering further, Defendants state that the common law and the District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct governed Defendants' obligations with respect to their representation of Plaintiff. Defendants deny the remaining allegations in Paragraph 34.\n\nWhatever the firm's security protection obligations are or should be with respect to maintaining reasonable security measures to safeguard an \"ordinary\" client's sensitive personal information and confidential documents, the firm here was on full notice (\"high alert\") that the representation of plaintiff was in no sense an \"ordinary\" representation with \"ordinary\" risks of unauthorized disclosure. That is, the firm knew from the very outset, and prior to the firm's agreeing to undertake the representation of the plaintiff, that special care and attention to security measures were necessary, required, expected, and agreed-to by the firm. In agreeing to represent plaintiff, the firm agreed to take the necessary steps and actions to protect plaintiff's confidential information recognizing that meant the firm would take \"more than ordinary\" protective efforts. Had the firm not so committed and agreed, plaintiff would not have retained the firm.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 35. Answering further, Defendants deny that Plaintiff requested any specific, additional, or extraordinary measures with respect to safeguarding confidential information differently than any other client of Defendants. Answering further, Defendants state that Plaintiff himself, contrary to Defendants' advice, demanded that Defendants publicize the fact the Plaintiff had applied for asylum.\n\nIn accordance with the retention agreement, plaintiff paid defendants a retainer fee of \\$10,000, and the firm subsequently billed plaintiff (or his authorized representative) for its fees and the firm's fees were paid.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants admit the allegations in Paragraph 36. Defendants further answer that Plaintiff delayed paying Clark Hill PLC's final bill, which was ultimately paid by Initiatives For China on December 28, 2017.\n\nThe firm's retention agreement and its related standard terms of engagement state, among other things, that plaintiff, as a client, has the right to \"expect competent representation by an attorney\" of the firm; that the firm \"will at all times act on your behalf to the best of our ability\"; and that the firm's lawyers \"are subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct governing attorneys in Washington, DC.\" *See also* CLARK HILL, *About Us,* http (last visited Aug. 29, 2019) (\"Ethical [b]ehavior is [n]on-[n]egotiable. We believe in doing the right thing every time. We uphold our professional responsibilities and are accountable for our actions.\").\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants admit that the engagement letter between Plaintiff and Defendants incorporated Clark Hill PLC's Standard Terms of Engagement for Legal Services. Because the engagement letter, incorporated documents, and Clark Hill PLC's website speak for themselves, further answer is neither required nor appropriate.\n\nPlaintiff delivered sensitive personal information and confidential documents to defendants so they, as counsel, could complete plaintiff's asylum application. That application was prepared in the District of Columbia by Mr. Ragland in consultation with Dr. Han, plaintiff s authorized representative in the District of Columbia. The application was filed with the United States Department of Homeland Security in Washington, D.C. on September 5, 2017. As necessary and as appropriate and subject to appropriate protections (*e.g.,* under seal or *in camera*)*,* plaintiff will identify the confidential information he disclosed to the firm.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants admit that Plaintiff provided Defendants with information relevant to complete Plaintiff's asylum application. Defendants deny that the application was filed with the United States Department of Homeland Security, and further state that the application was filed with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (\"USCIS\") Vermont Service Center in St. Albans, Vermont, in accordance with USCIS requirements. Defendants deny the remaining allegations in Paragraph 38.\n\nNotwithstanding (1) the firm's obligation to protect the confidentiality of plaintiff's information, (2) the firm's advance knowledge of the circumstances of plaintiffs case and the increased need for protection of plaintiff's information, and (3) defendants' agreement, by undertaking the representation of plaintiff and otherwise, that it would and could protect plaintiff's\n\nconfidential information, the firm failed to do so. Discovery is needed to determine the specific details of the firm's failures; however, it is beyond dispute that the firm failed as plaintiff's information was disclosed. Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Ragland used the firm's server to store and transmit plaintiff's sensitive information, and used his firm email account to transmit plaintiff s confidential information to third parties, including to third parties not approved by plaintiff. If, as plaintiff believes and here alleges, that Mr. Ragland used his firm email account to transmit plaintiff's confidential information to third parties, that reckless and wanton conduct \"opened the door wide\" to the firm's server to potential \"hackers\" and thoroughly compromised the confidentiality of plaintiffs information.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants admit that on or about September 12, 2017, Clark Hill PLC's computer system was the subject of a cyber-incident. Answering further, Defendants deny that Plaintiff requested any specific, additional, or extraordinary measures with respect to safeguarding confidential information differently than any other client of Defendants. Answering further, Defendants state that Plaintiff himself, contrary to Defendants' advice, demanded that Defendants publicize the fact the Plaintiff had applied for asylum. Defendants further answer that Plaintiff's own representative, Dr. Han, advised Defendants to communicate with Dr. Han via email by requesting information about Plaintiff's asylum application via email. Defendants deny the remaining allegations in Paragraph 39.\n\nThe combination of Mr. Ragland's reckless conduct and the firm's inadequate cybersecurity measures and infrastructure was fatal. As a result, plaintiff's sensitive confidential information was not protected, but was disclosed to the world at large, and thus made available to the CCP and others with hostile intent to plaintiff and with the capacity to carry out that hostile intent.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 40.\n\nThe firm has indicated that on or about September 12, 2017, the firm's computer system was \"hacked\" by a third party. This third party, apparently without great difficulty, circumvented the firm's demonstrably inadequate (essentially porous) security and monitoring programs. After doing so, the third party \"hacker\" was able to locate and exfiltrate (obtain) plaintiff's asylum application and affidavit and, perhaps, other information and materials relating to plaintiff. On September 12, 2017, Mr. Ragland wrote to Dr. Han, plaintiff's representative, that \"his computer is down — apparently it was attacked.\"\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants admit that on or about September 12, 2017, Clark Hill PLC's\n\ncomputer system was the subject of a cyber-incident. Defendants further admit that Mr. Ragland\n\ninformed Dr. Han of the cyber-incident, and that any correspondence between Mr. Ragland and\n\nDr. Han speaks for itself. Defendants deny the remaining allegations in Paragraph 41.\n\nThe firm's security measures, whatever they were, failed to \"safeguard\" plaintiff's sensitive personal information and confidential documents. The firm's security measures were inadequate, unreasonable, and fell woefully far short of defendants' promises, assurances, obligations, and commitments to provide adequate security measures, given the circumstances of this case, in violation of defendants' contractual, common law, and professional duties to plaintiff.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants admit that on or about September 12, 2017, Clark Hill PLC's\n\ncomputer system was the subject of a cyber-incident. Defendants deny the remaining allegations\n\nin Paragraph 42.\n\nBecause of defendants' failures, documents obtained by the third party included plaintiff's and plaintiff's spouse's sensitive personal information — *e.g.,* plaintiff's passport identification number; plaintiff's I-94 admission-number; plaintiff's spouse's passport identification number; and plaintiff's spouse's I-94 admission-number. Beginning on or about September 23, 2017, sensitive personal information and confidential documents obtained from defendants' computer system relating to plaintiff began to appear on Twitter. The published material included the following:\n\n- (a) A copy of plaintiff's application for political asylum;\n- (b) Plaintiffs passport identification number;\n- (c) Plaintiff's I-94 admission-number;\n- (d) Plaintiff's spouse's passport identification number; and\n- (e) Plaintiff's spouse's I-94 admission-number.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants admit that on or about September 12, 2017, Clark Hill PLC's computer system was the subject of a cyber-incident. Answering further, Defendants admit that Plaintiff's passport number, his spouse's passport number, Plaintiff's I-94 admission number, and his spouse's I-94 admission number were stated in Plaintiff's asylum application, but deny that the enumerated pieces of information are sensitive or confidential. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the remaining allegations in Paragraph 43 and therefore deny them.\n\nThe information published and disseminated on social media included sensitive personal information and confidential portions of plaintiff's asylum application and affidavit. Plaintiff provided this and other highly sensitive information, including the entire contents of plaintiff's asylum application, to defendants in connection with their representation of plaintiff. Plaintiff did not consent to nor did he authorize the disclosure of any of the information to any persons other than to those in the United States government with a direct \"need to know\" in connection with the review of plaintiff's asylum application. By law, asylum applications are strictly confidential. By virtue of the wrongful conduct of Mr. Ragland and the firm, plaintiff s asylum application became entirely public and was published on social media sites.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants admit that 8 C.F.R. § 208.6 prohibits disclosure of asylum\n\napplications by the government in some, but not all, circumstances. Defendants are without\n\nknowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the remaining allegations in Paragraph\n\n44 and therefore deny the remaining allegations in Paragraph 44.\n\nDefendants cannot properly, let alone reasonably, defend their undeniable failure to protect plaintiff's information on grounds of \"impossibility\" or some variation of that theme. If defendants lacked the will, the resources, or the technical capability or sophistication to protect plaintiff's information from being disclosed, defendants were duty-bound to disclose this limitation (whatever its cause and despite such disclosure being against the defendants' economic interest in gaining plaintiff as a client) to plaintiff prior to the firm's undertaking the representation of plaintiff, and thus afford plaintiff the opportunity not to retain the firm to represent him. The firm denied plaintiff this opportunity. The legal and ethical obligations of lawyers (here, Mr. Ragland) include the obligation to decline a representation when the matter is beyond the competence, capacity, or ability of the lawyer. Mr. Ragland and the Clark Hill law firm breached that duty and obligation because they undertook the representation of plaintiff when they lacked the competence and ability to do so professionally, properly, and without harming their client (plaintiff).\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants admit that the common law and the District of Columbia Rules\n\nof Professional Conduct governed Defendants' obligations with respect to their representation of\n\nPlaintiff. Defendants deny the remaining allegations in Paragraph 45.\n\nSince the \"hacking,\" defendants have largely \"stonewalled\" and refused to provide plaintiff any meaningful information about what occurred. For example, defendants have refused to advise plaintiff of the scale of the attack, including whether materials of clients other than plaintiff were obtained and, if so, whether the firm withdrew from those representations, and whether there is any discernible pattern in the materials seized; and defendants have likewise refused to advise plaintiff of how defendants first learned of the attack and what counter-measures, if any, defendants took.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants state they have provided Plaintiff with the relevant information concerning the cyber-incident, and other information regarding the cyber-incident is confidential and protected by the attorney-client privilege and work product protection. Defendants deny the remaining allegations in Paragraph 46.\n\nOn or about May 14, 2019, Daniel S. Steinberg, Esq., as counsel for plaintiff, wrote to the firm's General Counsel, Edward J. Hood, Esq., to inquire regarding the cyberattack. Mr. Steinberg requested answers to several specific relevant questions:\n\n- (a) Have you been able to identify the source of the attack and the mechanism by which access was gained to your firm's information systems?\n- (b) What records were obtained by the hacker, and were they obtained by unauthorized access to an email server or by direct access to a storage location?\n- (c) How did the attacker circumvent the firm's security measures, or did the attack entail malicious software that gained control of the firm's computer system until [plaintiffs] information was transferred?\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants admit that Daniel S. Steinberg communicated with Edward J.\n\nHood, the general counsel of Clark Hill PLC, by letter dated May 15, 2019. Answering further,\n\nDefendants state that the content of the letter speaks for itself. Defendants deny the remaining\n\nallegations in Paragraph 47.\n\nOn or about May 23, 2019, Mr. Hood, claiming, without explaining, that the investigation which was conducted of the \"hacking\" is privileged, provided only a limited response. Mr. Hood failed to answer the direct question of \"how did the attacker circumvent the firm's security measures.\" Presumably, the investigative report, which, to date, the firm has steadfastly hidden from plaintiff as the victim of the attack, includes at least a preliminary answer to this question.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants admit that Edward J. Hood, as general counsel of Clark Hill\n\nPLC, responded to prior communication from Daniel S. Steinberg by letter dated May 23, 2019.\n\nAnswering further, Defendants state that the content of the letter speaks for itself. Defendants\n\ndeny the remaining allegations in Paragraph 48.\n\nA week following the \"hacking\" of defendants' plainly inadequate system, on or about September 19, 2017, Mr. Hood, in his capacity as General Counsel of the Clark Hill law firm, wrote to plaintiff to inform him that defendants were terminating their representation of plaintiff:\n\nI regret to inform you that, after careful consideration, the Firm has concluded it must withdraw as your legal counsel.\n\n\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\\*\n\nThe cyberattack has presented several ethical complications with continuing to represent you. A primary concern is that the cyberattack will require Mr. Ragland — and possibly other members of the Firm — to be a witness in your asylum proceeding. Under our Rules of Professional Conduct, a lawyer may not serve as an advocate in a proceeding where the lawyer is likely to be a material witness. Here, the cyberattack has placed Mr. Ragland in an untenable position of being a witness in your asylum case while simultaneously serving as your attorney. At this point, Mr. Ragland must confine his role to that of witness, rather than legal advocate. (Emphasis added.)\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants admit that they withdrew from representing Plaintiff via a letter\n\nfrom Mr. Hood, in his capacity as general counsel of Clark Hill PLC, to Plaintiff, on or about\n\nSeptember 19, 2017. Answering further, Defendants state that the content of the letter speaks for\n\nitself. Defendants deny the remaining allegations in Paragraph 49.\n\nThe firm's stated \"reason\" for its extreme unilateral action that \"it must withdraw\" was that Mr. Ragland and perhaps others at the firm might be a witness in plaintiff's asylum proceeding. This \"reason\" is without credibility or merit.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants admit that a reason for withdrawing from the representation of Plaintiff was that Mr. Ragland and others at Clark Hill PLC may be a witness in Plaintiff's asylum proceeding. Defendants admit that they withdrew from representing Plaintiff via a letter from Mr. Hood, in his capacity as general counsel of Clark Hill PLC, to Plaintiff, on or about September 19, 2017. Answering further, Defendants state that the content of the letter speaks for itself. Answering further, the Court's February 20, 2020 order dismissed Plaintiff's claims based on Defendants' withdrawal from representing Plaintiff. Defendants deny the remaining allegations in Paragraph 50.\n\nFor example, no hearing was pending when the firm unilaterally withdrew from and abandoned plaintiff (and none is pending as of this filing); plaintiff had not asked that Mr. Ragland be a witness were there a hearing; as the client, it would be plaintiff's decision, not Mr. Ragland's or the firm's decision, as to whether the value or necessity of Mr. Ragland's testimony at any hearing outweighed the firm's continuing as counsel (particularly in light of Mr. Ragland's claimed preeminence in immigration and asylum matters); the substance of Mr. Ragland's testimony at any hearing, were he to testify, would relate to uncontested matters, *i.e.,* that the firm's server had been \"hacked\" and plaintiff's information had been obtained; the firm never asked plaintiff's opinion on the matter; and the firm never so much as hinted, let alone explained, why Mr. Ragland's testimony was, supposedly, so \"essential\" at a then-non-existent hearing as to warrant the firm's unilaterally, precipitously, and without regard to the best interests of plaintiff terminating its attorney-client relationship with plaintiff when it did.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants admit that no asylum hearing or interview was pending when the firm withdrew from its representation of Plaintiff. Defendants admit that Plaintiff had not, at that point, asked Mr. Ragland to be a witness in any proceeding. Answering further, the Court's February 20, 2020 order dismissed Plaintiff's claims based on Defendants' withdrawal. Because the remaining allegations in Paragraph 51 constitute legal conclusions, an answer by Defendants is neither required nor appropriate. To the extent an answer is required, Defendants deny the remaining allegations in Paragraph 51.\n\nThe firm simply wanted \"out\" despite its clear contrary ethical obligations, including the duty of undivided loyalty to its client (plaintiff). To accomplish its improper \"fire the client\" escape mission, the firm manufactured a plainly bogus \"reason\" to seek to justify its action. Here, the firm's client had done nothing wrong and certainly had done nothing to warrant such brutal, unjustifiable, and unethical treatment. Determining the firm's actual reason(s), as distinguished from its manufactured one, for its wrongful termination of its representation of plaintiff, including whether the firm yielded to pressure whether from the \"hacker\" or otherwise, will be an important area for discovery.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 52.\n\nClark Hill has advised that it conducted (or had conducted on its behalf) an investigation of the cyberattack at issue in this case. That investigation and any investigative report may address the topic of the firm's improper withdrawal from representing plaintiff. To date, the firm has failed to provide plaintiff any investigative report produced as a result of the internal investigation of this matter despite the fact that the plaintiff's information was obtained, and perhaps the only successful target of the attack, and the firm terminated its representation of plaintiff because of that attack. Plaintiff will seek this report in discovery. Accordingly, defendants are hereby on notice to preserve the report and all related drafts, investigative notes, transcripts, exhibits, and materials.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants admit that Clark Hill PLC hired outside legal counsel to conduct an inquiry into the cyber-incident, that a report about the inquiry was prepared, and that such report is confidential and protected by the attorney client-privilege and work product protection. Defendants deny the remaining allegations in Paragraph 53.\n\nIf defendants were unwilling or unable to protect plaintiff's sensitive confidential information, or lacked the competence or the capability to keep plaintiff's information off the firm's server, or to secure properly its computer system and network to protect plaintiff's information, defendants were duty-bound to disclose this critical limitation to the plaintiff at the outset and prior to committing to represent plaintiff to give the plaintiff an opportunity to make an informed judgment as to whether to retain the firm given its limitations. The firm made no such disclosure and thereby denied plaintiff the opportunity to make an informed decision on retaining the firm. Had the firm been forthright and candid about its limitations and lack of adequate security measures and protections, plaintiff would not have retained the firm as his counsel.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants admit that the common law and the District of Columbia Rules\n\nof Professional Conduct governed Defendants' obligations with respect to their representation of\n\nPlaintiff. Answering further, Defendants deny that Plaintiff requested any specific, additional, or\n\nextraordinary measures with respect to safeguarding confidential information differently than any\n\nother client of Defendants. Answering further, Defendants state that Plaintiff himself, contrary to\n\nDefendants' advice, demanded that Defendants publicize the fact the Plaintiff had applied for\n\nasylum. Defendants deny the remaining allegations in Paragraph 54.\n\nAs a direct and proximate cause of defendants' multiple breaches of their duties and legal obligations to plaintiff, plaintiff's sensitive personal information and confidential documents were disclosed to third-parties, to the world at large, and to persons and institutions in China, including the Chinese government and CCP, to the great and severe injury, harm, and detriment of plaintiff.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 55.\n\nAs a direct consequence of defendants' wrongful and unlawful conduct, plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer damages to his personal and professional reputation; he has lost substantial business opportunities; plaintiffs personal safety and security have been put at risk; his efforts to obtain political asylum have been delayed; his family has been arrested and threatened; plaintiff s employees in China have been harassed; plaintiff has incurred costs and expenses; and plaintiff has been denied the benefit of defendants' claimed immigration law expertise in connection with pursuing plaintiffs asylum application. Defendants' breaches of their legal duties and obligations caused these and potentially other harms and damages to plaintiff. These harms are continuous and ongoing, and there is a substantial risk, if not likelihood, of additional harm and damage in the future.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 56.\n\nAs a direct and proximate cause of defendants' multiple breaches of their duties and legal obligations, the details and contents of plaintiff's asylum application and other materials have been disclosed widely on social media platforms and placed in the hands of third-parties hostile to plaintiff. There are powerful people and interests in China and elsewhere hostile to plaintiff because of his political activities who now have — solely because of defendants' failures and breaches of duty — detailed information about plaintiff which they would not otherwise have. There is good cause to believe that these persons have used and will continue to use plaintiff's confidential information for purposes harmful to plaintiff.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 57.\n\nThe severe harm defendants have caused extends to limiting plaintiffs freedom and liberty to travel and jeopardizes his personal safety. Defendants' breaches of legal duties and obligations caused these harms and damages to plaintiff. These harms are continuous and ongoing, and there is a substantial risk, if not likelihood, of additional harm and damage in the future.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 58.\n\nThe defendants' failure to safeguard plaintiffs sensitive personal information and confidential documents was the direct and proximate cause of the dissemination of plaintiff's sensitive personal information and confidential documents on social media, the publication of which has caused great harm to plaintiff by tarnishing his reputation and undermining his credibility and the credibility of his work in advancing the causes of bringing the rule of law, democracy, and justice to China. Defendants' breaches of legal duties and obligations caused these harms and damages to plaintiff. These harms are continuous and ongoing, and there is a substantial risk, if not likelihood, of additional harm and damage in the future.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 59.\n\nDefendants' improper and unjustified termination of its attorney-client relationship and attendant obligations has harmed and damaged plaintiff. Defendants' improper action in abandoning their client (plaintiff) denied plaintiff the benefit of counsel at a time when he needed counsel (because his confidential information had just been splayed all over social media); sent the message to the public that plaintiff was somehow untrustworthy or acted improperly in connection with the representation; denied plaintiff defendants' claimed expertise in immigration law; and has caused and/or will cause undue delay and complications in action on plaintiff's asylum application. These harms are continuous and ongoing, and there is a substantial risk, if not likelihood, of additional harm and damage in the future.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 60.\n\nAt trial, the jury will determine plaintiff's compensatory damages proximately caused by defendants. Plaintiff alleges that those damages are no less than \\$50 million and seeks a judgment in at least that amount.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants admit that Plaintiff has demanded a jury in this action.\n\nDefendants deny the remaining allegations in Paragraph 61.\n\n#### **PUNITIVE DAMAGES**\n\nAt trial, the jury will also be asked to award significant punitive damages in an amount the jury determines to be appropriate. Punitive damages are warranted here because defendants' actions, inactions, and breaches of duties and obligations were reckless, wanton, intentional, and taken in willful disregard of plaintiff's rights and of defendants' obligations and duties to protect plaintiff's rights.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants admit that Plaintiff has demanded a jury in this action.\n\nAnswering further, the Court's February 20, 2020 order dismissed Plaintiff's request for punitive\n\ndamages. Defendants deny the remaining allegations in Paragraph 62.\n\nDefendants were reckless in their handling of plaintiff's confidential information. Defendants' recklessness included failing to protect that information, putting it on the firm's computer server, either directly or indirectly by transmitting the information to third parties via the firm's email account, or otherwise. These actions were intentional, deliberate, and willfully disregarded plaintiff's rights and defendants' obligations and duties to protect plaintiff's rights.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 63. Answering further, the\n\nCourt's February 20, 2020 order dismissed Plaintiff's request for punitive damages.\n\nDefendants knew and understood the importance of protecting plaintiff's sensitive and confidential information, and that the dissemination of such information would jeopardize the personal and professional interests of plaintiff, plaintiff's family, including putting plaintiff and his family at grave risk of harm. Defendants specifically knew and understood that the CCP would attempt to obtain plaintiff s sensitive and confidential information and use that information to harm plaintiff and his family. Nevertheless, defendants ignored these very real and present risks, and their conduct was accompanied by fraud, ill will, recklessness, wantonness, oppressiveness, willful disregard of the plaintiff's rights, his safety, his family's safety, and with other circumstances tending to aggravate plaintiff's injuries.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 64. Answering further, the\n\nCourt's February 20, 2020 order dismissed Plaintiff's request for punitive damages.\n\nDefendants' compounded their recklessness by abandoning plaintiff as their client, choosing self-interest over protecting their client. Defendants' unilateral withdrawal as plaintiff's counsel was intentional, deliberate, reckless, and unwarranted conduct, and conduct in willful disregard of plaintiff's rights and of defendants' obligations and duties to protect plaintiff's rights.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 65. Answering further, the\n\nCourt's February 20, 2020 order dismissed Plaintiff's request for punitive damages.\n\n## **CLAIMS FOR RELIEF**\n\n## **COUNT I — Breach of Fiduciary Duties**\n\nPlaintiff adopts and incorporates by reference ¶¶ 1-65 as if each were here fully set forth.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants incorporate their answers to Paragraphs 1 through 65 above as\n\nthough fully set forth herein.\n\nDefendants formed an attorney-client relationship with plaintiff. As a consequence, defendants owed plaintiff all the fiduciary duties and obligations which a lawyer owes to a client. Rather than honor those duties and obligations, defendants breached them.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants admit that they formed an attorney-client relationship with\n\nPlaintiff with respect to Plaintiff's asylum application, and that the common law and the District\n\nof Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct governed Defendants' obligations with respect to their\n\nrepresentation of Plaintiff. Defendants deny the remaining allegations in Paragraph 67.\n\nAt all relevant times, the fiduciary duties defendants owed to plaintiff included, but were not limited to, the duty not to undertake a matter beyond the professional and technical competence, capability, and capacity of defendants; the duty to maintain reasonable and adequate, in this case meaning heightened, security measures to safeguard plaintiff's sensitive personal information and confidential records; the duty not to expose plaintiff's confidential information to the risk of disclosure by allowing the information to appear on the firm's computer server; the duty to exercise at all times the utmost good faith and undivided loyalty toward plaintiff the duty to provide competent professional legal representation; and the duty not to withdraw from representing plaintiff, effectively abandoning him, absent valid and appropriate cause.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants admit that they formed an attorney-client relationship with\n\nPlaintiff with respect to Plaintiff's asylum application, and that the common law and the District\n\nof Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct governed Defendants' obligations with respect to their\n\nrepresentation of Plaintiff. Because the remaining allegations in Paragraph 68 constitute legal conclusions, an answer by Defendants is neither required nor appropriate. To the extent an answer\n\nis required, Defendants deny the remaining allegations in Paragraph 68.\n\nDefendants breached their fiduciary duties to plaintiff. These breaches include defendants' failing to maintain reasonable security measures to safeguard plaintiff's sensitive personal information and confidential records by failing to maintain reasonable security measures, including placing information on the firm's computer server and/or allowing access to the firm's server, thus allowing unauthorized third-parties to gain access to electronic files and communications containing plaintiffs sensitive personal information and confidential documents.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 69.\n\nDefendants further breached their fiduciary duties and obligations to plaintiff by improperly and without valid cause withdrawing from representing plaintiff, whether in response to a \"ransom\" demand or otherwise. Defendants acted to advance their interests and contrary to the interests of the firm's client (plaintiff) to whom the firm owed its primary duty of undivided loyalty.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 70.\n\nDefendants had no valid or legally or ethically sufficient cause for terminating their representation of plaintiff. Plaintiff had satisfied his obligations as a client; defendants breached their obligations as counsel. The firm's stated reason for terminating its attorney-client relationship with plaintiff (that Mr. Ragland might be a witness in some unknown as-of-yet not scheduled hearing) was a transparent sham proffered to justify the defendants' improper unilateral decision to terminate the attorney-client relationship.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 71.\n\nIf defendants released plaintiffs sensitive personal information and confidential documents to regain control of their computer system, or engaged in any similar conduct (a topic plaintiff will pursue in discovery), defendants breached their primary duty of undivided loyalty to plaintiff as the firm's client by placing the interests of the firm above the interests of plaintiff.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 72.\n\nPlaintiff has been harmed and damaged as a result of defendants' breaches of duty to plaintiff. The amount of plaintiff's damages will be determined at trial.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 73.\n\nIn addition to compensatory damages, defendants are liable for punitive damages because defendants' actions willfully disregarded the rights of plaintiff, were intentional, deliberate, and reckless. The amount of punitive damages will be determined at trial.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 74. Answering further, the Court's February 20, 2020 order dismissed Plaintiff's claim that Defendants improperly withdrew from their representation of Plaintiff and Plaintiff's request for punitive damages.\n\n### **COUNT II — Breach of Contract of Representation**\n\nPlaintiff adopts and incorporates by reference ¶¶ 1-74 as if each were here fully set forth.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants incorporate their answer to Paragraphs 1 through 74 above as\n\nthough fully set forth herein.\n\nPlaintiff entered into a written contract with plaintiff for the firm to represent the plaintiff. Defendants breached their contractual obligations to plaintiff by undertaking a matter beyond defendants' professional or technical competence, capability, and competence; by failing to provide plaintiff competent representation; by neglecting to undertake reasonable security measures to safeguard plaintiff's sensitive personal information and confidential documents; and by improperly and wrongfully terminating the firm's representation of plaintiff.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants admit that Defendants entered into a written engagement letter with Initiatives For China with respect to Defendants' legal representation of Plaintiff in connection with Plaintiff's asylum application, and that the engagement letter set forth the parties' obligations with respect to the representation. Answering further, Defendants state that the engagement letter set forth the entirety of the parties' obligations. Defendants deny the remaining allegations in Paragraph 76.\n\nDefendants further breached the retention agreement and the associated terms of engagement if they delivered a \"ransom\" to unknown third parties that included ceasing to represent plaintiff and/or providing plaintiff's sensitive personal information and confidential documents (plaintiff will pursue this topic in discovery). If defendants did so, they failed to provide competent representation and failed to act to the best of their ability and for the benefit of their client.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 77.\n\nThe firm wrongfully placed its interests above the interests of its client (plaintiff) in violation of the firm's contractual and ethical obligations. Defendants had no good or sufficient cause for terminating their representation of plaintiff. Plaintiff had satisfied his obligations as a client; defendants breached their obligations as counsel. The firm's stated reason for terminating its attorney-client relationship with plaintiff (that Mr. Ragland might be a witness in some unknown as-of-yet not scheduled hearing) was a sham proffered to justify the defendants' improper unilateral decision to terminate the attorney-client contractual relationship.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 78.\n\nPlaintiff has been harmed and damaged as a result of defendants' breaches of their contractual duties and obligations to plaintiff. The amount of plaintiff's damages will be determined at trial.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 79.\n\n## **COUNT III — Legal Malpractice**\n\nPlaintiff adopts and incorporates by reference ¶¶ 1-79 as if each were here fully set forth.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants incorporate their answers to Paragraphs 1 through 79 as though\n\nfully set forth herein.\n\nAt all relevant times, an attorney-client relationship existed between plaintiff and defendants. Defendants owed plaintiff contractual, common law, and professional duties to use the required degree of professional care and skill to represent plaintiff competently and professionally and consistent with the applicable standard of care. As detailed in this complaint, the firm did not represent plaintiff with the required degree of professional care and skill. Defendants breached their duties to plaintiff.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants admit that they formed an attorney-client relationship with\n\nPlaintiff with respect to Plaintiff's asylum application, and that the common law and the District\n\nof Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct governed Defendants' obligations with respect to their\n\nrepresentation of Plaintiff. Defendants deny the remaining allegations in Paragraph 81.\n\nThe standard of care governing a lawyer's representation of a client is defined by a combination of contractual, common law, and professional (ethical) duties and obligations. In this case, the firm breached the standard of care to represent plaintiff competently and professionally as the firm's representation of plaintiff and its termination of that representation fell far short of the required standard of care.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants admit that they formed an attorney-client relationship with\n\nPlaintiff with respect to Plaintiff's asylum application, and that the common law and the District\n\nof Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct governed Defendants' obligations with respect to their\n\nrepresentation of Plaintiff. The allegations concerning the law governing the standard of care constitute legal conclusions, and thus an answer by Defendants is neither required nor appropriate. To the extent an answer is required, Defendants deny the allegations concerning the standard of care. Answering further, Defendants deny the remaining allegations in Paragraph 82.\n\nDefendants breached their contractual, common law, and professional and ethical duties and obligations to plaintiff by undertaking a matter beyond defendants' professional or technical competence and capability; by failing to use the required degree of professional care and skill in representing plaintiff, resulting in the global exposure and dissemination of plaintiff's sensitive personal information and confidential documents; and by wrongfully and without valid cause terminating their representation of plaintiff.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 83.\n\nDefendants failed to take competent and reasonable measures to safeguard plaintiff's sensitive personal information and confidential documents by, *inter alia,* failing to maintain reasonable security measures to secure plaintiffs files and communications; failing to maintain reasonable security measures to secure email accounts and information systems, including the data contained within them, from unauthorized access by third parties; and failing to maintain reasonable security measures to prevent email accounts from being accessed by unauthorized third parties.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 84.\n\nHad Mr. Ragland done as he promised—not exposed plaintiff's sensitive confidential information—and had defendants maintained reasonable security measures to secure their computer system from unauthorized access, as required and promised to plaintiff, the cyber adversary would not have been able to gain access to plaintiff's sensitive personal information and confidential documents. If defendants lacked the will, the competence, or the capability to properly secure the firm's computer system and network and thereby protect plaintiff's information from unauthorized disclosure, defendants were duty-bound to disclose this limitation to the plaintiff at the outset, prior to undertaking the representation, to give the plaintiff an opportunity to make an informed judgment as to whether to retain the firm given its limitations. The firm made no such disclosure and thereby denied plaintiff the opportunity to make an informed decision on retaining the firm.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 85.\n\nDefendants further breached their contractual, common law, and professional duties to plaintiff if they delivered a \"ransom\" to unknown third parties that included ceasing to represent plaintiff and providing plaintiff's sensitive personal information and confidential documents.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 86.\n\nDefendants further breached their contractual, common law, and professional duties to plaintiff by improperly and wrongfully terminating their representation of plaintiff and by the manner in which defendants did so. Defendants had no good, sufficient, or valid cause for terminating their representation of plaintiff. Plaintiff had satisfied his obligations as a client; defendants breached their obligations as counsel. The firm's stated reason for terminating its attorney-client relationship with plaintiff (that Mr. Ragland might be a witness in some unknown as-of-yet not scheduled hearing) was a transparent sham proffered to justify the defendants' improper unilateral decision to terminate the attorney-client relationship.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 87.\n\nPlaintiff has been harmed and damaged as a result of defendants' breach of their duties and obligations of care and competence to plaintiff. The amount of plaintiff's damages will be determined at trial.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 88.\n\n#### **COUNT IV — Punitive Damages**\n\nPlaintiff adopts and incorporates by reference ¶¶ 1-88 as if each were here fully set forth.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants incorporate their answers to Paragraphs 1 through 88 above as\n\nthough fully set forth herein. Answering further, \"punitive damages\" is not an independent cause\n\nof action, and the Court's February 20, 2020 order dismissed Plaintiff's request for punitive\n\ndamages.\n\nBecause defendants' actions, inactions, failures, breaches of duties and obligations, and violations of plaintiffs rights were intentional, deliberate, outrageous, and in willful disregard of defendants' duties and obligations and in willful disregard of plaintiffs rights, defendants are liable to plaintiff for punitive damages, in addition to compensatory damages.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 90. Answering further,\n\n\"punitive damages\" is not an independent cause of action, and the Court's February 20, 2020 order\n\ndismissed Plaintiff's request for punitive damages.\n\nDefendants' conduct at issue in this case is so far beyond the pale as to warrant punitive damages. Defendant's intentional, deliberate, wrongful conduct involves the failure to protect plaintiff's confidential information from deeply harmful public disclosure despite defendants' specific knowledge of the acute need to do so followed by defendants' then immediately \"running away\" from its client (plaintiff) after the disclosure occurred, which occurred because of defendants' failures.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 91. Answering further, \"punitive damages\" is not an independent cause of action, and the Court's February 20, 2020 order dismissed Plaintiff's request for punitive damages.\n\nDefendants' intentional and deliberate failures made plaintiff's information accessible to \"hackers\" and then defendants' intentionally, deliberately, wrongfully, and without regard to their duties and obligation and in willful disregard for the rights of plaintiff abandoned plaintiff as their client.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 92. Answering further, \"punitive damages\" is not an independent cause of action, and the Court's February 20, 2020 order dismissed Plaintiff's request for punitive damages.\n\nThe jury will determine the appropriate amount of punitive damages.\n\n**ANSWER:** Defendants admit that Plaintiff has demanded a jury in this action. Answering further, \"punitive damages\" is not an independent cause of action, and the Court's February 20, 2020 order dismissed Plaintiff's request for punitive damages. Defendants deny the remaining allegations in Paragraph 93.\n\n### **DEFENDANTS' AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES**\n\nDefendants, in addition to their responses above to the Plaintiff's specific allegations forming the basis of the claims asserted against Defendants, and without assuming the burden of proof on any claims, defenses, or legal or factual issues that would otherwise rest with the Plaintiff, assert the following affirmative defenses to all claims asserted against Defendants:\n\n#### **FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Counts I-III: Failure to State a Claim)**\n\nAll three of Plaintiff's claims are barred, in whole or in part, because Plaintiff fails to state claims upon which relief can be granted, including for the reasons identified in Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and supporting memoranda of law.\n\n#### **SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Counts I-III: No Damages)**\n\nPlaintiff's claims are barred because he suffered no actionable damages.\n\n#### **THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Counts I-III: No Causation)**\n\nTo the extent that Plaintiff can show that he suffered recoverable damages, those damages\n\nwere not caused by the actions of Defendants.\n\n### **FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Counts I-III: No Breach of Duty)**\n\nDefendants did not breach any duty of care owed to Plaintiff.\n\n### **FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Counts I and II: Duplicative of Count III)**\n\nCounts I and II are barred as duplicative of Count III, because Plaintiff's claims for breach\n\nof fiduciary duty and breach of contract are based on the same operative facts and the same injury\n\nas Plaintiff's legal malpractice claim.\n\n#### **SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Counts I-III: Unclean Hands)**\n\nPlaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of unclean hands.\n\n### **SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Counts I-III: Contributory Negligence)**\n\nPlaintiff's claims are barred by his own negligence and the negligence of his actual or\n\napparent agent.\n\n#### **EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Counts I-III: Failure to Mitigate)**\n\nPlaintiff has failed to mitigate his alleged damages.\n\n#### **NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Counts I-III: Superseding Cause)**\n\nThe injuries alleged by Plaintiff were caused in whole or in part by the conduct of third parties for whom Defendants were not responsible or through forces over which Defendants had no control.\n\n### **TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Counts I-III: Sole Proximate Cause)**\n\nTo the extent that Plaintiff suffered any injuries, Defendants were not the sole proximate\n\ncause of those injuries.\n\n#### **ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Counts I-III: Ripeness)**\n\nPlaintiff's claims are not ripe and therefore should be dismissed or stayed.\n\n## **TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Counts I-III: No Agreement)**\n\nPlaintiff's claims fail because Defendants did not agree to provide specific or extraordinary\n\nsecurity measures with respect to Plaintiff's information.\n\n#### **THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Counts I-III: Assumption of Risk)**\n\nPlaintiff's claims are barred because he assumed the risk of any damages he sustained.\n\n### **FOURTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Count II: Waiver)**\n\nPlaintiff's breach of contract claims are barred by the doctrine of waiver.\n\n## **FIFTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Counts I-III: Economic Loss Doctrine)**\n\nPlaintiff's claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the economic loss doctrine.\n\n#### **SIXTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Count IV: No Punitive Damages)**\n\nPlaintiff is not entitled to punitive damages under any act or theory that forms the basis of his claims. The Court's February 20, 2020 order dismissed Plaintiff's request for punitive damages.\n\n#### **SEVENTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Counts I-IV: State Law)**\n\nDefendants are entitled to the benefit of all defenses and presumptions contained in, or arising from, any rule of law or statute of any other state whose substantive law might control this action.\n\n#### **EIGTHEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (Counts I-IV: Reservation of Additional Defenses)**\n\nDefendants reserve the right to assert any additional defenses that become apparent during the course of this case. Additional facts may become known during the course of discovery and investigation which will support affirmative defenses that currently are unknown to Defendants. To preserve such affirmative defenses, Defendants hereby incorporate by reference all of the affirmative defenses set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) and reserve the right to assert additional affirmative defenses as discovery proceeds.\n\n#### **DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL**\n\nDefendants demand a trial by jury on all issues.\n\n#### **CONCLUSION**\n\nWHEREFORE, Defendants respectfully request that this Court enter judgment in favor of Defendants and against the Plaintiff and grant Defendants such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\nCLARK HILL PLC and THOMAS K. RAGLAND\n\nDated: March 19, 2020 By: */s/ John R. Storino* One of their attorneys\n\nJohn R. Storino (*via pro hac vice*) Leigh J. Jahnig (*via pro hac vice*) JENNER & BLOCK LLP 353 N. Clark Street Chicago, IL 60654-3456 Tel.: 312 222-9350 JStorino@jenner.com\n\nKali N. Bracey (#458965) JENNER & BLOCK LLP 1099 New York Avenue NW Suite 900 Washington, DC 20001-4412 KBracey@jenner.com\n\n#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI, John R. Storino, an attorney, hereby certify that I served the foregoing Defendants' Answer and Affirmative Defenses to the Plaintiff's Complaint on all counsel of record by electronic service via CM/ECF on this, the 19th day of March, 2020.\n\n */s/ John R. Storino*\n\n#### **Exhibit 7**\n\nThis exhibit has been filed under seal.\n\n### **EXHIBIT 8**\n\n#### **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**\n\n| GUO WENGUI a/k/a MILES KWOK a/k/a
HO WAN KWOK, | )
) |\n|---------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|\n| Plaintiff, | )
)
Case No. 1:19-cv-3195
) |\n| v. | ) |\n| CLARK HILL PLC; THOMAS K. | )
Hon. James Boasberg
) |\n| RAGLAND, | )
) |\n| Defendants. | )
) |\n\n#### **DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COMPEL DEPOSITION TESTIMONY OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR A NEGATIVE INFERENCE**\n\nDefendants Clark Hill PLC and Thomas K. Ragland (\"Clark Hill\"), through their counsel, respectfully move this Court for the entry of an order (1) compelling Plaintiff Guo Wengui to answer numerous deposition questions he refused to answer on Fifth Amendment grounds or, in the alternative, (2) authorizing a jury instruction permitting a negative inference from Guo's refusal to answer. In support of this motion, Clark Hill submits the accompanying memorandum of law and exhibits, and states:\n\n1. On July 28, 2021, Clark Hill took Guo's deposition. During his deposition, Guo refused, on Fifth Amendment grounds, to answer approximately 28 questions on a variety of topics.\n\n2. The questions that Guo refused to answer are centrally relevant to Clark Hill's defense to Guo's sole claim for damages, for emotional distress.\n\n3. The Court should order Guo to answer the questions that he refused to answer because:\n\na. Guo waived any Fifth Amendment privilege by voluntarily raising, in his prior statements in his complaint and discovery answers, the subject matter of the questions.\n\nb. Guo has no basis to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege as he did because there is no reasonable apprehension that additional statements on the topics at issue will result in incremental risk of criminal prosecution in the United States.\n\n4. Alternatively, if the Court does not order Guo to answer further deposition questions, the Court should authorize the giving of a jury instruction permitting a negative inference to cure the prejudice that would result from Guo's refusal to answer the questions. The precise parameters of that instruction can be determined closer to trial.\n\nWHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth above and those set forth in the accompanying memorandum of law and exhibits, Clark Hill respectfully requests that the Court enter an order (1) compelling Plaintiff Guo Wengui to answer numerous deposition questions he refused to answer on Fifth Amendment grounds or, in the alternative, (2) authorizing a jury instruction permitting a negative inference from Guo's refusal to answer.\n\nDated: September 14, 2021 Respectfully submitted,\n\n*/s/ John R. Storino* John R. Storino (*via pro hac vice*) David Jimenez-Ekman (*via pro hac vice*) Lindsey A. Lusk (*via pro hac vice*) JENNER & BLOCK, LLP 353 N. Clark Street Chicago, IL 60654-3456 Tel: (312) 222-9350 [JStorino@jenner.com](mailto:JStorino@jenner.com)\n\nKali N. Bracey (#458965) JENNER & BLOCK, LLP 1099 New York Avenue NW Suite 900 Washington, DC 20001-4412 Tel: (202) 639-6000 [KBracey@jenner.com](mailto:KBracey@jenner.com)\n\n*Counsel for Defendants*\n\n#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI, John R. Storino, an attorney, hereby certify that I caused to be filed the foregoing joint status report using the Court's CM/ECF filing system, which served a copy on all counsel of record on this, the 14th day of September, 2021.\n\n*/s/ John R. Storino*\n\n#### **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**\n\n) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )\n\n| GUO WENGUI a/k/a MILES KWOK, | | | | |\n|------------------------------------------|--|--|--|--|\n| Plaintiff, | | | | |\n| v. | | | | |\n| CLARK HILL PLC and THOMAS K.
RAGLAND, | | | | |\n| Defendants. | | | | |\n\nCivil Action No. 1:10-CV-3195-JEB\n\nJudge Hon. James Boasberg\n\n#### **MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COMPEL DEPOSITION TESTIMONY OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR A NEGATIVE INFERENCE**\n\nThe Court should compel Plaintiff Guo Wengui to answer numerous deposition questions he refused to answer on Fifth Amendment grounds or, in the alternative, authorize a jury instruction permitting a negative inference from his failure to answer. At his July 28 deposition, Guo's personal counsel (not the counsel representing Guo in this matter) instructed him not to answer approximately 28 questions on a variety of topics in five broad categories, including (1) Guo's alleged consulting relationship with ACA Capital Group Limited (\"ACA\"), (2) Guo's past litigation with various third parties, (3) Guo's relationship with T&M Protection Resources (which Guo referred to in interrogatory responses), (4) Guo's asylum application that is at the heart of this case, and (5) Guo's wealth and assets. Guo's counsel declined to articulate the basis for asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege during the deposition or afterward during correspondence and a meet-and-confer. Defendants Clark Hill, PLC and Thomas K. Ragland (\"Clark Hill\") therefore file this motion to compel or for a negative inference.\n\nThe Court should order Guo to answer or, in the alternative, permit a negative inference for three reasons. *First*, Guo waived the privilege over some or all of these topics with his prior allegations and discovery answers. *Second*, even if he had not waived the privilege, Guo has articulated no basis for asserting it now, and some of the topics have no conceivable ability to incriminate him. *Third*, alternatively, if the Court determines that Guo is able to articulate a plausible basis for asserting the privilege, the Court should authorize the giving of a jury instruction permitting a negative inference from Guo's refusal to answer.\n\n#### **BACKGROUND**\n\nThe Court is familiar with allegations by Guo from prior motion practice in this case. Guo's alleged injury arises from the September 2017 theft by unknown cyber hackers of certain personal information of Guo's from Clark Hill's computer system, including Guo's asylum application, which Clark Hill filed on his behalf. Compl. ¶¶ 38, 41.\n\nGuo's claimed damages have evolved over time. Guo initially contended in his complaint and early discovery responses that the theft from Clark Hill caused him various economic and outof-pocket damages, but he now seeks exclusively non-economic damages for emotional distress. The relevant pleadings and discovery responses are as follows:\n\n- October 24, 2019 Complaint: Guo alleged \"damages to his personal and professional reputation,\" \"lost substantial business opportunities,\" and incurred \"costs and expenses\" among other alleged damages to his \"personal and professional reputation\" and risk to his \"personal safety and security.\" *Id.* ¶ 56.\n- November 16, 2020 Interrogatory Response: Guo claimed his damages included the loss of his \"consulting agreement with ACA Capital Group Limited ('ACA').\" Ex. C, at ¶ 19.\n\n July 26, 2021 RFA and Interrogatory Responses: Guo officially dropped all of his economic damages and stated the only damages he now seeks are for emotional distress and \"reputational\" harm insofar as they caused Guo distress. *See generally,* Ex. D.\n\nClark Hill took Guo's deposition on July 28, 2021. Guo's personal counsel instructed Guo not to answer 28 questions. Exhibit A compiles the questions in a chart; Exhibit B is a copy of the complete deposition for any context the Court may need with the relevant questions and instructions highlighted. The questions fell into 5 broad categories:\n\n- **Guo's alleged consulting relationship with ACA Capital Group Limited (\"ACA\"),** including Guo's familiarity with the agreement (which Guo produced), the date Guo signed the consulting agreement, and the services Guo rendered to ACA (*see* Ex. B. at pgs. 28, 31, and 161);\n- **Guo's past litigation** where Guo alleged emotional harm during the same time period at issue in this case and **litigation Guo has pursued through his entities** (*see id.* at pgs. 45–46 and 86–87);\n- **Guo's relationship with T&M Protection Resources (\"T&M\")** as it relates to Guo's claims that T&M, an entity associated with Guo, was also hacked by the Chinese government (*see id.* at pgs. 98–99, and 101)1 ;\n- **Guo's asylum application**, especially questions relating to the accuracy of its statements and his alleged identity as a \"political dissident\" (*see id.* at pgs. 127–128, 130-133, 161, 168–69, and 248–49); and\n\n1 On February 12, 2021, Guo filed a verified statement concerning instructions to \"other fiduciaries.\" Feb. 12, 2021, Pl.'s Statement Concerning Instructions to \"Other Fiduciaries\", Ex. E. In this verified statement, Guo described T&M Protection as an entity that \"provided personal protection services to Plaintiff\" and asserted he asked it \"to limit its use of email when communicating concerning confidential matters related to its work for him.\" *Id.* at pg. 2.\n\n **Guo's wealth and assets**, such as questions about Guo's net worth, his employees, and his residences (*see id.* at pgs. 184–86 and 245).\n\nGuo's counsel declined to articulate any reason why answers to these questions could possibly implicate Guo's Fifth Amendment rights, either during the deposition or after. Ex. B at pg. 28; s*ee* Ex. F.\n\n#### **ARGUMENT**\n\nClark Hill brings this motion because the questions Guo refused to answer are centrally relevant to Guo's remarkably dubious damages claim in this case. Guo has narrowed his damages claim to an injury for emotional distress. Guo contends that he suffered a laundry list of physical symptoms because there was data in the information stolen from Clark Hill that was not already available online. Clark Hill disputes (a) that anything the thieves posted was not already available online, and (b) that Guo actually suffered any of the symptoms he claims. Questions about Guo's wealth, personal staff, and numerous high-end residences are directly relevant to his claimed symptoms and ability to mitigate them.\n\nBut even if he did suffer emotional distress, there is a panoply of other causes for that distress. Guo claims that he was persecuted and tortured by the Chinese Communist Party (\"CCP\") when he lived in China, that his brother was killed by the CCP, and that his wife and children were also imprisoned and mistreated. Ex. B at pgs. 124–125, 162, 234–35. Long before the Clark Hill theft, Guo began a highly public campaign critical of the CCP and began to suffer threats from the party. *See* Ex. B at pgs. 80–81. In the past 4 years, Guo has filed at least 10 lawsuits against various entities and individuals alleging that he suffered severe emotional distress as the result of\n\nthings *those individuals did*, not the Clark Hill theft.2 Whenever Guo is upset with someone and is determined to punish them through litigation, Guo relies on allegations of emotional distress to sustain his cause of action.\n\nIn this context, Clark Hill has a right to vigorously probe Guo's fantastic damages claims, and Guo's prior actions have waived any privilege he might otherwise enjoy over these topics. But even if the Court finds Guo still has a privilege, Clark Hill is prejudiced by its inability to obtain discovery on these issues, and is entitled to a negative inference from Guo's assertion of the privilege.\n\n#### **I. The Court Should Order Guo To Answer The Questions He Refused To Answer.**\n\n#### *A. Plaintiff Waived Any Fifth Amendment Privilege By His Prior Statements.*\n\nGenerally, \"[o]nce [a] witness voluntarily raises an issue [, a witness] cannot refuse to fill in the details\" by asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege. *S.E.C. v. Parkersburg Wireless Ltd. Liability Co.*, 156 F.R.D. 529, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting *Rogers v. United States*, 340 U.S. 367, 373 (1951)). By raising the subject, the witness waives any Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination \"*unless* the related questions further incriminates the witness.\" *See id.* at 536 (emphasis added); *see Banco Intercontinental, S.A. v. Alvarez Renta*, No. 04-20727-CIV, 2007 WL 9761293, at \\*1 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 10, 2007), *aff'd*, No. 04-20727-CIV, 2008 WL 11502470 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 25, 2008) (compelling party-witness to testify when court already ruled that the\n\n2 Complaint, *Guo v. Li*, 18-cv-00259 (D. Md., Jan. 26, 2018), at ¶ 192; Complaint, *Guo v. Wu*, 18-cv-00845 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 30, 2018), at ¶ 83; Complaint, *Guo v. Xiong*, No. 151430/2018 (N.Y., Feb. 14, 2018), at ¶ 144; Complaint, *Guo v. Xia*, 18-cv-00174 (E.D. Va., Feb. 14, 2018), at ¶ 223; Complaint, *Guo v. Teng*, 18 cv-02110 (D.N.J., Feb. 14, 2018), at ¶ 136; Complaint, Guo v. Chen, 18-cv-03800 (D.N.J., March 20, 2018), at ¶16; Complaint, *Guo v. Jianbin Yuan*, 18-cv-02276 (C.D. Cal., March 20, 2018), at ¶ 142; Amended Complaint, *Guo v. Stone*, 18-cv-20983 (S.D. Fla., May 21, 2018), at ¶ 35; Complaint, *Guo v. Lin*, 2018CP3203623 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pleas, Oct. 23, 2018), at ¶ 133; Complaint, *Guo v. Cheng*, A-18-779172- C (D. Nev., April 18, 2019), at ¶ 16.\n\nwitness waived his Fifth Amendment privilege in his interrogatory responses). The Court must make a particularized inquiry for each question opposing counsel asked to determine whether the privilege is well-founded. *S.E.C. v. Parkersburg Wireless Ltd. Liability Co.,* 156 F.R.D. at 535 (internal citations omitted). It is the *witness' burden* to demonstrate how the *additional* information is incrementally incriminating once the witness has raised the topic. *Id.* at 537.\n\nGuo waived any privilege he may otherwise have had on each of the five areas he asserted the Fifth Amendment. *First*, Guo expressly detailed \"enter[ing] into a consulting agreement with [ACA] in October 2016\" and providing \"his knowledge and expertise\" with them until ACA terminated the consulting agreement in December 2017 within his discovery responses. *See* Ex. G at pgs. 13–16. *Second*, Guo waived his privilege as to questions concerning T&M Protection Resources when he filed a verified statement regarding the personal protection services T&M provided to him. *See* Ex. E at pg. 2. *Third*, Guo waived his Fifth Amendment privilege as to allegations about mental distress in other lawsuits by voluntarily raising his mental health during and after December 2017, the same time period relevant to the emotional damages that Guo has asserted in other lawsuits he has filed. *See* Ex. C at pgs. 11–12. *Fourth*, Guo waived the privilege as to his asylum application, its authenticity, and his identity as a political dissident throughout prior statements in his discovery responses. Plaintiff has repeatedly alleged damages related to the disclosure of his \"sensitive information\" contained within \"his confidential asylum application.\" *See id.*; Ex. G at pgs. 16–17; Ex. H at pgs. 4-5. Guo also repeatedly identified himself as a political dissident seeking political refuge. Compl. ¶ 10 (\"Plaintiff is a highly successful businessman and a political activist and well-known Chinese dissident.\"); *see also* Ex. I at pg. 13– 14 (\"Plaintiff believes that the CCP perceives him as a dangerous challenge to the stability, legitimacy, and credibility of the Chinese regime and the CCP.\").\n\n#### *B. Plaintiff Has No Basis To Assert His Fifth Amendment Privilege On The Topics For Which He Did.*\n\nA witness is not exonerated from answering merely because he declares that in so doing he would incriminate himself—\"his say-so does not of itself establish the hazard of incrimination.\" *S.E.C. v. Bankers Alliance Corp.*, No. C.A. 95-0428 (PLF), 1995 WL 590665 at \\*3 (D.D.C. May 5, 1995) (quoting *Hoffman v. United States*, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1950). A witness may not make blanket assertions of a Fifth Amendment privilege but rather must assert the privilege one question at a time. *District Title v. Warren*, 265 F. Supp.3d 17, 21 (D.D.C. 2017); *see also In re LeFande*, 919 F.3d 554, 559 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (upholding order holding witness in contempt for failing to attend his deposition and \"assert . . . the Fifth Amendment privilege . . . on a question-by-question basis\"). In evaluating a witness' assertions, the Court must determine whether there is a reasonable basis for believing that \"answer[ing] a particular question would subject the witness to a real danger of incrimination.\" *District Title*, 265 F. Supp.3d at 21 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The \"danger of self-incrimination must be real, not remote or speculative.\" *Id*. A Fifth Amendment right is unavailable for a witness in danger of possible *foreign* prosecution. *See HT S.R.L. v. Velasco*, No. 16-664 (RBW), 2015 WL 13759884 at \\*7, n. 10 (D.D.C. 2015) (\"[T]he right against self-incrimination is unavailable if only based on a fear of prosecution by a foreign nation.\") (citing *United States v. Balsys*, 524 U.S. 666, 669 (1998)).\n\nGiven the statements Guo has already made about each of the five broad topics over which he asserted privilege, he cannot show that *additional* statements would be incrementally incriminating. *First*, Guo cannot show that questions asking for more information about allegations or assertions already made in this case present incremental jeopardy. Therefore, the \"cat is out of the bag\" on questions about Guo's relationships with ACA and T&M Protection\n\nResources (*see* Ex. B at pgs. 28, 31, 98, 101, 161); emotional damages related to the *Xia* case (*see id.* at 86-87); and employment information and identity as a political dissident contained within Plaintiff's asylum application (*see id.* at 127–31, 161)—all of which Plaintiff voluntarily raised in his discovery responses. The Court should order Guo to answer questions on these topics. *See* Questions 1–19. *Second*, there is no plausible basis for Guo to fear prosecution based on questions about his wealth, personnel, and residences. *See* Questions 20–25. *Third*, Guo cannot establish that questions concerning his activities in China could possibly implicate him in prosecution within the United States. *See* Ex. B at pgs. 248–249; Questions 26–28.\n\n### **II. Alternatively, The Court Should Give A Jury Instruction Permitting A Negative Inference.**\n\nThe Court \"is free to draw\" adverse inferences from a witness' continued assertions of the Fifth Amendment privilege in the face of probative evidence. *See Bankers Alliance Corp.*, 1995 WL 590665, at \\*5 (drawing adverse inferences from witness' continued Fifth Amendment assertions regarding the location of investor funds). Unlike in criminal proceedings, the Fifth Amendment does not preclude \"adverse inferences against parties to civil action when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them.\" *Baxter v. Palmigiano*, 425 U.S. 308, 333 (1976); *see S.E.C. v. Int'l Loan Network, Inc.*, 770 F. Supp. 678, 696 (D.D.C. 1991) (drawing an adverse inference \"in light of the probative evidence\" the defendant gathered against the witnesses).\n\nA decision not to draw an adverse inference \"should not obliterate another party's right to a fair proceeding.\" *Serafino v. Hasbro, Inc.*, 82 F.3d 515, 518 (1st Cir. 1996). This is especially true when the party invoking the privilege has direct control of the evidence. *See S.E.C. v. Whittemore*, 659 F. 3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (denying a motion for reconsideration because district court was well within its right to draw an adverse inference from defendants refusal to provide\n\nevidence especially when \"the defendants control[led] the evidence\"). The Court weighs the value of presenting evidence with the danger of unfair prejudice to the party asserting the privilege. *See Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v.* Richards, No. CV027583CASRNBX, 2006 WL 8452984, at \\*13 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2006), *aff'd,* 541 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2008) (reasoning that defendant-witness invoked Fifth Amendment privileges to a \"central question in the case\" and the plaintiffs provided \"direct and circumstantial evidence\" to substantiate an adverse inference).\n\nHere, if the Court finds that Guo did not waive his privilege, and Guo is able to articulate *in camera* a sufficient basis for asserting it on any topic, the Court should give a jury instruction permitting negative inferences on that topic. *First*, questions about Guo's alleged relationship with ACA are central Clark Hill's defense of Guo's claims of reputational damages allegedly suffered from the theft from Clark Hill, and the Court should cure the prejudice from Guo's assertion of the privilege with a negative inference.\n\n*Second*, questions about Guo's relationship with T&M are crucial to testing Guo's contention that he gave instructions to numerous fiduciaries about protecting his data, a claim which goes to the heart of Guo's breach of contract claim here.\n\n*Third*, questions about Guo's past litigation and other litigation through his entities that allege emotional distress are key to the causation question that will be at the heart of Clark Hill's damages defense. *See* Ex. B. at pgs. 45–46 and 86–87. Guo alleged in other cases that other conduct that occurred at around the same time as the theft from Clark Hill caused him emotional distress, requiring Clark Hill to have an opportunity to question Guo or suffer extreme prejudice.\n\n*Fourth*, Guo's refusal to answer questions concerning his asylum application warrants an adverse inference, because at the core of Guo's claim is his asylum application prepared by Clark Hill. Guo's alleged mental anguish is based on his identity as a political dissident. *See also* Ex. G\n\nat pgs. 14–16. Guo has sole control on issues concerning the accuracy of his asylum application and whether he understood the information contained in it, but Guo refused to answer questions about it.\n\n*Fifth*, Guo's responses to questions concerning his wealth and assets are key to evaluating Guo's contentions that the theft from Clark Hill of his information harmed his reputation and business opportunities. *See also id.* Guo has made public statements regarding his wealth and assets, and without Guo's own testimony, Clark Hill is unable to properly defend against Guo's alleged reputational harm and the \"mental anguish\" that allegedly occurred as a result. Because Guo has inserted these issues into the litigation he instituted and then declined to be examined on them, Defendants are prejudiced in their defense of the case and are entitled to an adverse inference.\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\nDate: September 14, 2021\n\n*/s/ John R. Storino* John R. Storino (*via pro hac vice*) David Jimenez-Ekman (*via pro hac vice*) Lindsey A. Lusk (*via pro hac vice*) JENNER & BLOCK, LLP 353 N. Clark Street Chicago, IL 60654-3456 Tel: (312) 222-9350 [JStorino@jenner.com](mailto:JStorino@jenner.com)\n\nKali N. Bracey (#458965) JENNER & BLOCK, LLP 1099 New York Avenue NW Suite 900 Washington, DC 20001-4412 Tel: (202) 639-6000 [KBracey@jenner.com](mailto:KBracey@jenner.com)\n\n*Counsel for Defendants*\n\n# **EXHIBIT A**\n\n#### **Plaintiff's Invocation of the Fifth Amendment Privilege**\n\n| No. | Defendant's Question | Objections | Ex. B | Objection Sustained or |\n|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|------------------------|\n| | | | Pg. Ref. | Overruled |\n| 1 | \"You're familiar with the
entity ACA Capital Group
Limited. Right?\" | Full objection | pg. 28 | |\n| 2 | \"Mr. Guo in October of 2016,
you signed a consultancy
agreement with ACA Capital
Group Limited. Correct?\" | Full objection | pgs. 28
–29 | |\n| 3 | \"And in the time period
between October of 2016 and
December 2017, did you
perform any services of any
kind on behalf of ACA Capital
Group Limited?\" | Full objection | pg. 31 | |\n| 4 | \"What services did you
provide on behalf—or for
ACA Capital Group Limited?\" | Full objection | pgs. 31
–32 | |\n| 5 | \"What compensation, if any,
did you receive from ACA
Capital Group Limited during
that time period or after?\" | Full objection | pg. 32 | |\n| 6 | \"What other lawsuits have you
or an entity that you're
affiliated with been a plaintiff
in?\" | Partial objection;
only object to any
affiliation with any
entity | pgs. 45–
46 | |\n| 7 | \"Can you describe the harm to
you personally from Mr. Xia's
actions?\" | Partial objection;
objects to any
economic or
business-related
harm | pgs. 86–
87 | |\n| 8 | Referring to paragraph 105 of
Exhibit 3/4: | Full objection | pg. 98 | |\n| | \"That paragraph says: 'Guo's
security company T&M
Protection was hacked by
China as well, which was
unprecedented.'\" | | | |\n| 9 | \"Do you have a security
company named T&M?\" | Full objection | pgs. 98
–99 | |\n| 10 | \"How do you know that
security company T&M
Protection was hacked?\" | Full objection | pg. 99 | |\n\n| | Plaintiff's Invocation of the Fifth Amendment Privilege |\n|--|---------------------------------------------------------|\n| | |\n\n| No. | Defendant's Question | Objections | Ex. B | Objection Sustained or |\n|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|------------------------|\n| | | | Pg. Ref. | Overruled |\n| 11 | \"And can you describe the
nature of the information that
T&M Protection had related to
you?\" | Full objection | pg. 101 | |\n| 12 | Referring to Exhibit 6:
\"Do you recall doing
something to make sure you
agreed with everything that
was in the application before
you signed it?\" | Partial objection;
not with respect to
the signature but
\"with respect to
the page with
Bates Number
Clark_Hill_000080 | pgs.
127–30 | |\n| 13 | Referring to Exhibit 6:
\"Do you recall doing
something to make sure you
agreed with everything that
was in the application before
you signed it under penalty of
perjury?\" | Partial objection;
counsel advised
Mr. Guo to
exclude anything
within Bates
Number
Clark_Hill_000080 | pg. 131 | |\n| 14 | Referring to Exhibit 6:
\"And do you recall doing
something to make sure that
you understood all the English
words in Exhibit 6 before you
signed it under penalty of
perjury?\" | Partial objection to
material related to
Clark_Hill_000080 | pg. 132
–33 | |\n| 15 | \"Is that answer accurate? Is it
true that you were not
employed between January of
2016 and September of 2017?\" | Full objection | pg. 161 | |\n| 16 | \"And isn't it true that you were
actually employed or had a
consulting agreement at least
with ACA during that period?\" | Full objection | pg. 161 | |\n| 17 | Referring to Exhibit 6:
\"Same question for the next
three pages, -078, -079, and -
080. Are those your initials?\" | Partial objection to
material related to
Clark_Hill_000080 | pg. 168 | |\n| 18 | Referring to Exhibit 6:
\"And looking specifically at
page -080 in Exhibit 6, is that
your initials on the bottom of
the page?\" | Full objection | pg. 168 | |\n\n### **Plaintiff's Invocation of the Fifth Amendment Privilege**\n\n| No. | Defendant's Question | Objections | Ex. B | Objection Sustained or |\n|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|----------------|------------------------|\n| | | | Pg. Ref. | Overruled |\n| 19 | Referring to Exhibit 6:
\"And asking specifically about
the entries on that page on -
080 where you were listed as
unemployed for two time
periods, is that accurate?\" | Full objection | pgs.
168–69 | |\n| 20 | \"Mr. Guo, you're a wealthy
man. Is that accurate?\" | Full objection | pgs.
184–85 | |\n| 21 | \"Can you describe your
approximate net worth, Mr.
Guo?\" | Full objection | pg. 185 | |\n| 22 | \"And of that net worth, can
you describe how much of it is
accessible to you as opposed
to frozen in some way by
China?\" | Full objection | pg. 185 | |\n| 23 | \"You—do you have a staff
that works for you, Mr. Guo?\" | Full objection | pg. 186 | |\n| 24 | \"Please describe how many
people work for you and what
their functions are.\" | Full objection | pg. 186 | |\n| 25 | \"Mr. Guo, do you, in fact, own
residences in all the places
identified in this article?\" | Full objection | pg. 245 | |\n| 26 | Referring to Exhibit 15:
\"'In the preinterview, Mr. Guo
explained that he paid for
office rentals, private jets,
surveillance systems,
personnel, and many other
expenses. In exchange, Guo
officials would assist him in
dealing with his business
rivals.' Is that accurate Mr.
Guo?\" | Fulljection | pg. 248 | |\n\n| No. | Defendant's Question | Objections | Ex. B | Objection Sustained or |\n|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|-----------------|------------------------|\n| | | | Pg. Ref. | Overruled |\n| 27 | Referring to Exhibit 15:
\"He also said he was ordered
by high-ranking Guo An
officials to hire private
investigators to dig up
information on overseas
properties owned by relatives
of top Communist Party
leaders. Mr. Guo said that he
believed that the majority, if
not all, business tycoons in
China had similar agreement | Full objection | pgs. 248
–49 | |\n| | with Guo An.\" | | | |\n| 28 | Referring to Exhibit 15:
\"To be clear, I don't think I
asked a question. The question
would have been is that, what
the translator just read,
accurate?\" | Full objection | pg. 249 | |\n\n#### **Plaintiff's Invocation of the Fifth Amendment Privilege**\n\n# **EXHIBIT B (Filed Under Seal)**\n\n# **EXHIBIT C**\n\n## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA\n\n| GUO WENGUI a/k/a MILES KWOK a/k/a | |\n|---------------------------------------|-----------------------|\n| HO WAN KWOK, | |\n| | Case No. 1:19-cv-3195 |\n| v. | |\n| CLARK HILL PLC; THOMAS K.
RAGLAND, | Hon. James Boasberg |\n| Defendants. | |\n\n#### PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS TO DEFENDANT THOMAS K. RAGLAND'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES\n\nPlaintiff Guo Wengui (hereinafter \"plaintiff\"), through undersigned counsel, hereby supplements his answers to defendant Thomas K. Ragland's first set of interrogatories. Plaintiff hereby incorporates the general objections to Thomas K. Ragland's first set of interrogatories.\n\n### INTERROGATORIES\n\n1. Identify all persons who have knowledge of any facts relating to any allegation in\n\nthe Complaint and state what information/facts the identified individuals possess.\n\nANSWER: The following individuals have knowledge of the allegations in the complaint:\n\n- a. Plaintiff Guo Wengui 162 E. 64th Street New York, NY 10065 Plaintiff has knowledge of his reasons for retaining Clark Hill; his discussions with Mr. Ragland prior to engaging Clark Hill; the terms and conditions of the representations; plaintiff and his agent's requests that Clark Hill protect plaintiff's private and sensitive information; Clark Hill's failure to protect plaintiffs information; Clark Hill's termination of its representation of plaintiff; and the damages that arose out of Clark Hill's misconduct at issue in this litigation.\n- b. Defendant Clark Hill PLC\n\n500 Woodward Avenue Suite 3500 Detroit, MI 48226\n\nClark Hill PLC has knowledge of the defenses in its answer; the terms and conditions of Clark Hill's and Thomas K. Ragland's representation of plaintiff; the facts and circumstances surrounding the data breach that resulted in the widespread and public disclosure of plaintiffs sensitive and confidential personal information: and the facts and circumstances surrounding Clark Hill's and Thomas K. Ragland's decision to withdraw as counsel for plaintiff.\n\nc. Defendant Thomas K. Ragland\n\nClark Hill PLC 10001 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Suite 1300 Washington, DC 20004\n\nThomas K. Ragland has knowledge of the allegations in the complaint and defenses asserted in the answer; the terms and conditions of Clark Hill PLC's and Thomas K. Ragland's representation of plaintiff; the facts and circumstances surrounding the data breach that resulted in the wide-spread and public disclosure of plaintiffs sensitive and confidential personal information; requests to protect plaintiff's private and confidential information; and the facts and circumstances surrounding Clark Hill PLC's and his decision to withdraw as counsel for plaintiff.\n\nd. Edward J. Hood\n\nClark Hill PLC 500 Woodward Avenue Suite 3500 Detroit, MI 48226\n\nEdward J. Hood has knowledge of the allegations in the complaint and defenses asserted in the answer; the facts and circumstances surrounding the data breach that resulted in the wide-spread and public disclosure of plaintiffs sensitive and confidential personal information; correspondence with plaintiffs counsel about the nature of the data breach and how Clark Hill handle the breach; and the facts and circumstances surrounding Clark klill PLC's and Thomas K. Ragland's decision to withdraw as counsel for plaintiff.\n\ne. Dr. Lianchao Han\n\nCitizen Power Initiatives for China 415 2nd Street NE Suite 100 Washington, DC 20002\n\nDr. Lianchao Han has knowledge of the allegations in the complaint and defenses asserted in the answer; the terms and conditions of Clark Hill PLC's and Thomas K. Ragland's representation of plaintiff, including requests to protect plaintiffs information; the facts and circumstances surrounding the data breach that resulted\n\nin the wide-spread and public disclosure of plaintiffs sensitive and confidential personal information; damages to plaintiff's reputation.\n\nf. Jianli Yang\n\nCitizen Power Initiatives for China 415 2nd Street NE Suite 100 Washington, DC 20002 Dr. Jianli Yang has knowledge of the terms and conditions of Clark Hill PLC's and Thomas K. Ragland's representation of plaintiff.\n\n- g. Joshua Schiller, Esq. Boies Schiller Flexner LLP 55 Hudson Yards, 20th Floor New York, NY 10001 Mr. Schiller has limited knowledge of the facts and circumstances of plaintiffs engagement with Clark Hill. The extent of his knowledge is unknown.\n- h. Persons involved in the post-hacking investigation, at both Clark Hill and third parties whose identities are unknown at this time, who would have knowledge, potentially, of what happened, why (cause), and how it might have been prevented.\n\n#### SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER:\n\ni. William Je\n\nACA Capital Group Ltd. 1605-6, 16/F, Hua Qin International Building 340 Queen's Road Central Hong Kong Mr. Je has knowledge of Plaintiff's consulting agreement with ACA Capital Group and of ACA Capital Group's termination of that agreement.\n\nj. Qu Guo Jiao\n\nCurrent address unknown. Plaintiff believes she is living in China and is attempting to locate her.\n\nLast known address: ACA Capital Group Ltd.\n\n1605-6, 16/F, Hua Qin International Building\n\n340 Queen's Road Central\n\nHong Kong\n\nMs. Qu has knowledge of Plaintiffs consulting agreement with ACA Capital Group and of ACA Capital Group's termination of that agreement.\n\n2. Identify all persons who provided information used to prepare the responses to these interrogatories or the responses to Thomas K. Ragland's requests for production, and identify the respective interrogatory or request to which each person provided information.\n\nANSWER: Plaintiff objects on the ground that the interrogatory seeks to invade the attorneyclient privilege and work product privilege. Without waiving the objection, plaintiff and his inhouse counsel, Daniel Podhaskie, provided information used to prepare the answers herein.\n\n3. Identify all persons who communicated with, interacted with, or directed Clark Hill on Plaintiffs behalf in connection with Clark Hill's representation of Plaintiff with respect to Plaintiff's asylum application, including, but not limited to, the discussions leading up to the representation.\n\nANSWER: See answer to interrogatory number 1. Plaintiff, Dr. Han, and Dr. Jianli.\n\n4. Identify all communications between Plaintiff and his representatives, employees, or agents (including without limitation Lianchao Han, any other employee at Initiatives for China. Jianli Yang, Josh Schiller, or any other attorney or employee of Boies Schiller Flexner LLP) about Clark Hill's representation of Plaintiff in U.S. immigration matters, the fact of Plaintiffs asylum application, or the cyber incident on or about September 12, 2017.\n\nANSWER: Plaintiff objects to this request as it is overly broad and unduly burdensome to \"identify\" all communications. Without waiving these objections, plaintiff has produced all relevant non-privileged correspondence among plaintiff, his agent, and Clark Hill. In addition, plaintiff states that Dr. Han and Dr. Yang had conversations with Mr. Ragland prior to retaining the firm about whether Clark Hill had adequate cyber security. Dr. Han expressly told Mr. Ragland that \"he needs to be prepared\" for a cyberattack. In response, Mr. Ragland told Dr. Han, among other things, that the firm had -first class state o f the art\" cyber technology and used -three outside\"\n\ncyber security firms to protect client information. Mr. Ragland also advised he would let the Clark Hill \"IT people know\" about the potential for an attack. Dr. Han repeatedly continued to advise Mr. Ragland that, in Dr. Han's his opinion, the firm did not take the threat serious.\n\n5. Identify each document or communication that you contend is relevant to the determination of Clark Hill's obligations with respect to safeguarding the information pertaining to Plaintiffs representation.\n\nANSWER: Plaintiff objects to this request as it is overly broad and unduly burdensome to \"identify each document or communication.\" Plaintiff will produce trial exhibits in accordance with the Court's scheduling order and governing rules. Without waiving these objections, plaintiff has produced all relevant non-privileged correspondence among plaintiff, his agent, and Clark Hill.\n\n6. Identify and describe all contracts or agreements between Plaintiff, or Plaintiffs representatives, agents, employees, or other parties acting for Plaintiffs benefit, and Clark Hill or Thomas K. Ragland, including who made the agreement, when the agreement was made, and the substance of the agreement.\n\nANSWER: Plaintiff entered into a legal services contract with Clark Hill. Plaintiff has produced a copy of that agreement.\n\n7. Describe in detail the level of \"necessary steps and actions\" and \"special care and attention to security measures\" (see Complaint 11 35) that Plaintiff contends Clark Hill agreed to implement in order to safeguard the information pertaining to Plaintiffs representation.\n\nANSWER: Plaintiff objects to this interrogatory as it calls for a statement or description of the actions and steps required for Clark Hill to satisfy its \"duty of care\" which is a legal determination. Clark Hill was required to provide adequate security measures to protect plaintiffs information. Clark Hill knew that the representation of plaintiff was in no sense an \"ordinary\" representation\n\nwith \"ordinary\" risks of unauthorized disclosure. Please see answer to interrogatory number 4. Clark Hill, through Mr. Ragland, agreed to take the necessary steps and actions to protect plaintiff s confidential information recognizing that meant the firm would take \"more than ordinary\" protective efforts, including not putting plaintiffs information on the server or using firm email accounts. Plaintiff will supplement this answer in accordance with the scheduling order governing expert disclosures.\n\nS. Describe in detail the \"necessary and effective electronic security measures\" that Plaintiff contends are \"sufficient to protect plaintiffs sensitive and confidential information\" (see Complaint If 8).\n\nANSWER: Please see objections and answer to interrogatory number 7.\n\n9. Identify all communications between Plaintiff or Plaintiffs representatives, employees, or agents (including without limitation Lianchao Han, any other employee at Initiatives for China, Jianli Yang, Josh Schiller, or any other attorney or employee of Boies Schiller Flexner LLP) and Clark Hill, including, but not limited to, any communications relating to any warnings or risks of cyber-incidents or \"hacks,\" any special security measures requested by Plaintiff; Plaintiff s publicity of the existence of the asylum application, or any facts contained in the asylum application.\n\nANSWER: Plaintiff objects to this request as it is overly broad and unduly burdensome to \"identify all communications.\" Without waiving these objections, plaintiff has produced all relevant nonprivileged correspondence among plaintiff, his agent, and Clark Hill. Please see answer to interrogatory number 4.\n\n10. State the basis for the allegation in paragraph 35 of the Complaint that Clark Hill \"was on full notice\" prior to agreeing to represent Plaintiff \"that special care and attention to security measures were necessary, required, expected, and agreed-to by the firm.\"\n\nANSWER: See answer to interrogatory number 4. Plaintiff and Dr. Han informed Clark Hill that the CCP would try to hack the firm to obtain plaintiffs sensitive and confidential information. Mr. Ragland agreed not to use the firm's server to store or transmit plaintiffs sensitive information over the firm's email accounts, and even warned his IT group that such an attack was possible.\n\n11. State the basis for the allegation in paragraph 3 of the Complaint that Clark 1-till \"assured\" Plaintiff that his confidential information would be \"protected.\"\n\nANSWER: Mr. Ragland assured plaintiff and his agents that the firm had state-of-the-art cybersecurity, three different outside firms which protect client information, and would protect plaintiffs information by using a separate computer, not placing it on the firm server or using the firm's email accounts.\n\n12. Describe the circumstances around the decision to publicize, via social media and news media, the fact of Plaintiffs asylum application and the fact of Clark Hill's representation of Plaintiff, including who made the decision, when the decision was made, who was aware of the decision before the publicity took place, and the reasons for the decision.\n\nANSWER: Plaintiff objects to the characterization that there was a decision to \"publicize\" the asylum application. Plaintiff further objects on relevance grounds and because this interrogatory invades the attorney-client privilege. Without waiving these objections, plaintiff was informed that others (presumably the CCP) knew he was seeking asylum. Plaintiff spoke to Mr. Ragland about making an announcement. Mr. Ragland thereafter gave interviews to numerous outlets regarding plaintiffs asylum application.\n\n13. Identify any communication between Plaintiff or Plaintiffs representatives, employees, or agents (including without limitation Lianchao Han. any other employee of Initiatives for China, Jianli Yang, Josh Schiller, or any other attorney or employee of Boies Schiller Flexner LLP) and any third party regarding Clark Hill's representation of Plaintiff, including, but not limited to, the filing of Plaintiffs asylum application, Clark 1-fill's representation of Plaintiff, the facts contained in the asylum application or the cyber incident on or about September 12, 2017. ANSWER: Plaintiff objects to this interrogatory on the grounds it is overly burdensome in that it seeks to have plaintiff \"identify any communication.\" The interrogatory also is duplicative of several other interrogatories. Without waiving these objections, plaintiff has produced all relevant non-privileged communications.\n\n14. Identify any posting or communication by Plaintiff or Plaintiffs representatives, agents, or employees on any internet or social media platform or outlet, including without limitation YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, SnapChat, or TikTok regarding the filing of Plaintiffs asylum application, Clark Hilt's representation of Plaintiff, the facts contained in the asylum application or the cyber incident on or about September 12, 2017. ANSWER: Plaintiff objects on relevance grounds. Without waiving the objection, plaintiffs twitter account was disabled, and he no longer has access to it. Plaintiff's YouTube account does\n\nnot appear to reference his asylum application.\n\n15. Identify any social media accounts or profiles, including without limitation YouTube usernames, accounts, or \"channels,\" Facebook profiles, or Twitter \"handles,\" currently used or previously used by Plaintiff, through which Plaintiff posted or disseminated, or caused to be posted or disseminated, any statements, postings, or opinions regarding the Chinese government, the Chinese Communist Party, the filing of Plaintiff's asylum application, Clark\n\nHill's representation of Plaintiff, the facts contained in the asylum application or the cyber incident on or about September 12, 2017.\n\nANSWER: Please see objections and answer to the previous interrogatory. Plaintiff further objects on the ground that this interrogatory is unduly burdensome. Without waiving those objections, plaintiff has a YouTube account and a GTV platform containing a substantial number of videos discussing the CCP and the Chinese government. Again, plaintiff is not aware of any reference on either of those two social media platforms of any reference to his asylum application.\n\n16. Identify the persons to whom Plaintiff \"disclosed a broad network of CCP spies operating in the United States,\" and when such disclosure took place, as alleged in paragraph 20 of the Complaint.\n\nANSWER: Plaintiff objects on relevance grounds, as plaintiff's disclosures are not reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence about defendants' failure to protect his confidential information.\n\n17. Identify all information that was contained in Plaintiff's asylum application which Plaintiff contends was confidential before September 12, 2017 and state the basis for that contention.\n\nANSWER: The contents of plaintiff's asylum application were confidential, including names, identifying information, addresses, passport information, family information, information plaintiff had provided to the US government, and details of his commercial and other dealings. Clark Hill has these documents and plaintiff produced them as well.\n\n18. Describe in detail the basis for the allegations, in paragraphs 3, 5, 9. 44, 57, and 59 of the Complaint, that information about Plaintiff or Plaintiffs asylum application published and\n\ndisseminated on social media after September 12, 2017 was acquired in the cyber-incident on or about September 12, 2017.\n\nANSWER: Plaintiff objects because the interrogatory is vague and confusing. Without waiving the objection, plaintiffs asylum application was published on social media after Clark Hill failed to adequately protect it.\n\n19. Describe in detail the damages that Plaintiff has allegedly suffered as a result of Clark Rill's alleged breach of legal duties and obligations, including the allegations in paragraph 56 of the Complaint of \"damages to his personal and professional reputation,\" \"lost substantial business opportunities,\" and the \"costs and expenses\" he has incurred.\n\nANSWER: Plaintiff has suffered damages in a variety of contexts, including, but not limited to, the following: Plaintiff entered into a consulting agreement with ACA Capital Group Limited (\"ACA\") in August 2016 (the \"Consulting Agreement\"). ACA aims to serve as the bridge connecting world-class businesses and innovative ideas between Asia and the world, while optimizing financial returns for its investors. ACA hired plaintiff as a consultant because of his reputation in the Asian business community; his knowledge and expertise of doing business throughout the world, but in particular China and Hong Kong; and because plaintiff had the ability to make introductions to numerous business executives in China and Hong Kong. The Consulting Agreement provided that plaintiff would be paid approximately \\$2 million per year. The Consulting Agreement did not have a fixed term and was expected to be ongoing. In November 2017, ACA terminated the Consulting Agreement because it learned that Clark Hill was hacked and plaintiff's very private and sensitive information was spread throughout the interact on a world-wide basis. Plaintiff was informed by ACA that it terminated the Consulting Agreement\n\nbecause of the company's fears that continuing its relationship with plaintiff would result in a loss of clients and future business and could result in ACA suffering a hack similar to Clark IIill.\n\nPlaintiff had other contractual arrangements with ACA worth several million dollars which were negatively affected by defendants' conduct.\n\nPlaintiff also suffered reputational damage, including followers on social media, which caused financial and other injury, and diminished plaintiff's earning capacity.\n\nPlaintiff will supply additional information regarding these injuries.\n\nSUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER:\n\nDefendant's conduct has caused Plaintiff to suffer damages in a variety of contexts, summarized as follows:\n\nPlaintiff entered into a consulting agreement with ACA Capital Group Limited (\"ACA\"') in October 2016 (the \"Consulting Agreement\"). After Plaintiff stepped down as ACA's chairman, ACA hired Plaintiff as a consultant because of his reputation in the Asian business community, his knowledge of and expertise in doing business throughout the world, particularly in China and Hong Kong, and his ability to make introductions to business executives in China and Hong Kong. The Consulting Agreement provided for Plaintiff to be paid \\$2 million per year. The Consulting Agreement did not have a fixed term and was expected to be ongoing. In December 2017, ACA terminated the Consulting Agreement, citing the Clark Hill cyberattack.\n\nPlaintiff also has suffered mental anguish as a result of the Clark Hill cyberattack. His asylum application contained sensitive details about his family members, family businesses, and the specifics of the assistance that he had provided to the U.S. government in order to expose CCP corruption. Soon after obtaining the information contained in Plaintiff's asylum application, the\n\nCCP arrested and imprisoned Plaintiffs family members in China, causing Plaintiff and his family to live in extreme fear and constant anxiety.\n\nPlaintiffs reputation has been damaged in a number of ways. Defendant's withdrawal as his counsel portrayed Plaintiff as a liar and a fraud, and created the impression that he had been dishonest with Clark Hill, and had done something wrong to justify his counsel's withdrawal from representation. He lost friends and business opportunities, and his family suffered tremendously. Plaintiff has suffered a loss of credibility in the United States and abroad both as a businessman and as a whistleblower. Further, in the wake of the Clark Hill cyberattack, law firms have refused to provide services to Plaintiff, and other entities have refused to conduct business with Plaintiff, citing a fear of being hacked by the CCP.\n\nIn addition to seeking compensation for the loss of income from the Consulting Agreement, for mental anguish, and for reputational harm, Plaintiff seeks recovery of fees paid to Clark Hill.\n\nThe categories other than the losses resulting from the termination of the Consulting Agreement (the only business opportunity for which Plaintiff is making a claim) and fees paid to Clark Hill are left to the jury's discretion; therefore, Plaintiff has not included specific dollar amounts.\n\nThis answer also supplements Plaintiff's answers to Clark Hill's interrogatories 2 and 8.\n\n20. Identify all businesses associated with Plaintiff that Plaintiff alleges has experienced harm as a result of the cyber-incident that occurred on or about September 12, 2017, or as a result of Clark Hill's alleged misconduct, and describe in detail the nature of the harm, including the basis for the allegation in paragraph 56 of the Complaint that Plaintiff has \"lost substantial business opportunities,\" and incurred \"costs and expenses.\"\n\nANSWER: See answer to interrogatory number 19.\n\n21. Describe in detail what has occurred in any proceedings in connection with Plaintiffs asylum application since September 19, 2017, including without limitation the basis for the allegation in paragraph 56 of the Complaint that Plaintiff's efforts to obtain political asylum have been delayed or otherwise harmed as a result of Clark Hill's alleged breach of legal duties and obligations, including Clark Hill's withdrawal from representing Plaintiff.\n\nANSWER: The disclosure of plaintiff's confidential asylum application has created delay because of the negative publicity surrounding the incident, Clark Hill's withdrawal as counsel for plaintiff, and the publication of plaintiffs sensitive, confidential, and private matters, some of which involve sensitive national security issues.\n\n22. Describe in detail the alleged harm or persecution that Plaintiff has suffered as a result of actions by or on behalf of the Chinese government or the Chinese Communist Party before the cyber incident on or about September 12, 2017, including the basis for Plaintiffs \"good reason to fear for his personal safety\" as described in paragraph 16 of the Complaint, the basis for the allegation in paragraph 17 of the Complaint that \"the CCP believes plaintiff presently holds not publicly known proof of various types of improper conduct on the part of the CCP and those associates with it and acting on its behalf,\" the basis for the allegations in paragraph 23 of the Complaint that demonstrations outside the building where Plaintiff resides were \"staged\" by the CCP, and the basis for the allegations in paragraph 26 of the Complaint that \"the CCP perceives plaintiff as a dangerous challenge to the stability, legitimacy, and credibility of the Chinese regime and the CCP.\"\n\nANSWER: Plaintiff has been effective in influencing international opinion with respect to China and the CCP. From the perspective of the CCP, plaintiff's activities and advocacy have affected adversely China's and the CCP's stature in the world community and, in response, the Chinese\n\ngovernment has attempted to silence plaintiff. The Chinese government/CCP has employed various tactics, including coercion and offering bribes to attempt to silence plaintiff, including, using overseas intelligence networks to seek to discredit, silence, and threaten plaintiffs personal safety or, at the very least, to cause plaintiff to have good reason to fear for his personal safety as well as fearing for the safety of family members and friends.\n\nThe CCP believes plaintiff presently holds not publicly known proof of various types of improper conduct on the part of the CCP and those associated with it and acting on its behalf, including information relating to corruption, murder, hiding of illegally-gained money, and China's spy network. For these and other reasons, the Chinese government and the CCP are highly motivated, to understate the matter, and engaged aggressively in seeking to silence plaintiff. The Chinese government and the CCP are equally motivated and engaged in seeking to learn what plaintiff knows about improper activities undertaken by or on behalf of the Chinese government and the CCP. And, perhaps most critically, the Chinese government and the CCP have the capabilities the \"operational reach\" — to carry out aggressive hostile actions against plaintiff.\n\nThe Chinese government and/or the CCP sent agents and officials to the United States to organize demonstrations aimed directly against plaintiff outside the building in New York City where plaintiff resides. Persons attending these CCP-staged demonstrations, literally on plaintiff's front steps, were provided with preprinted signs defaming plaintiff in vile language, calling him a rapist and a liar, and urging plaintiff to leave the United States.\n\nPlaintiff believes that the CCP perceives him as a dangerous challenge to the stability, legitimacy, and credibility of the Chinese regime and the CCP.\n\n23. Describe in detail any harms that Plaintiff has suffered at the hands of or caused by the Chinese government that have occurred after the cyber-incident on or about September 12,\n\n2017, including the basis for allegations in paragraph 56 of the Complaint, that \"plaintiff's personal safety and security have been put at risk,\" \"his family has been arrested and threatened,\" and \"plaintiffs employees in China have been harassed,\" and the basis for the allegations in paragraph 58 of the Complaint that \"plaintiff's freedom and liberty to travel\" has been - limit[ed] and that \"his personal safety\" has been \"jeopardize[ed]\" as a result of Clark Hill's alleged breach of legal duties and obligations.\n\nANSWER: Objection. This interrogatory is duplicative. Without waiving this objection, see answer numbers 19, 22, and other information contained in prior interrogatories, of which this interrogatory is duplicative.\n\n24. Identify any person who, after September 12, 2017, has used Plaintiff's information that Plaintiff alleges was obtained in the cyber-incident, identify what specific information was used, and explain how the information was used.\n\nANSWER: See answer number 23.\n\n25. Describe in detail the process and methodology that Plaintiff utilized to search for, identify, and locate the documents that Ragland requested in his first request for production of documents, including the date that Plaintiff began preserving documents related and relevant to this litigation, the scope and method of preserving documents, all persons or custodians who were asked to search for and produce responsive documents, and the search terms used to search electronically stored information.\n\nANSWER: Plaintiff searched his own information, and collected information from his agents which was thereafter produced to defendants.\n\nSUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER: Plaintiff directed his employees to search two computer hard drives maintained at the offices of Golden Spring (New York) Ltd.: (1) a hard drive where\n\ndocuments related to Plaintiff's legal matters are maintained; and (2) a hard drive where data stored on cell phones previously used by Plaintiff is maintained. Plaintiff requested that employees gather from those hard drives any correspondence related to his asylum application and correspondence with Lianchao Han and Jianli Yang. Employees also searched the hard drives for other documents containing the following terms: asylum, torn, ragland, clark hill, spencer lee, schiller, and hack.\n\nPlaintiff also requested that an employee search for social media postings and other public statements made by Plaintiff on the subjects of his asylum application, Clark Hill, or the hacking of Clark Hill's computer systems.\n\nIn addition, Plaintiff asked Lianchao Han to provide copies of any documents in his possession concerning Plaintiff's asylum application or Clark Hill's representation of Plaintiff.\n\nRespectfully Submitted,\n\nIslAri S. Casper Ari S. Casper Ralph S. Tyler The Casper Firm, LLC 400 East Pratt St., Suite 903 Baltimore, MD 21202 Tel: 410-989-5097 acasper@casperfirm.com\n\nAttorneys for Plaintiff\n\n## VERIFICATION\n\nThe facts stated herein are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge, information, and\n\nbelief.\n\nGuo Wengui\n\n### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\nI HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 16th day of November. 2020, the foregoing was served\n\nto the following by email:\n\nJohn R. Storino David P. Saunders Leigh J. Jahnig JENNER & BLOCK, LLP 353 N. Clark Street Chicago, IL 60654-3456 JStorinogenner.com dsaundersgenner.corn ljahniggjenner.com\n\nKali N. Bracey (#458965) JENNER & BLOCK, LLP 1099 New York Avenue NW Suite 900 Washington, DC 20001-4412 KBracey@jenner.com\n\n> /s/Ari S. Casper Ari S. Casper\n\n# **EXHIBIT D**\n\n#### **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**\n\n| ) |\n|----------------------------|\n| ) |\n| ) |\n| )
Case No. 1:19-cv-3195 |\n| ) |\n| ) |\n| )
Hon. James Boasberg |\n| ) |\n| ) |\n| ) |\n| ) |\n| ) |\n| |\n\n#### **PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES TO CLARK HILL'S THIRD SET OF REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION TO PLAINTIFF**\n\nPlaintiff Guo Wengui (\"Plaintiff\"), through undersigned counsel, hereby responds with these supplemental responses to Clark Hill's third set of requests for admission. Plaintiff incorporates herein all general objections set forth in his responses to Clark Hill's first and second sets of requests for admission.\n\n#### **RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION**\n\n#### REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 1:\n\nAdmit that the only damages you are seeking in this action are (a) damages from your asserted mental anguish from the Cyber-incident, and (b) recovery of fees paid to Clark Hill.\n\nRESPONSE: Plaintiff admits that he is not seeking damages based upon any claimed economic harm. Plaintiff further admits that in seeking damages for mental anguish/emotional distress, he is seeking damages for his mental pain and suffering, fear, nervousness, indignity, insult, humiliation, and embarrassment. Plaintiff denies the request to the extent that the phrase \"asserted mental anguish\" is intended to somehow limit Plaintiff's proof at trial or right to\n\nrecover for all the types and categories of mental anguish/emotional distress recognized under District of Columbia law. For further details, s*ee* Plaintiff's Answers to Clark Hill's Fourth Set of Interrogatories (hereby incorporated by reference). Plaintiff admits that he is not seeking recovery of fees paid to Clark Hill.\n\n#### REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 2:\n\nAdmit that you are not seeking any category or element of damages in this action other than (a) damages from your asserted mental anguish from the Cyber-incident, and (b) recovery of fees paid to Clark Hill.\n\nRESPONSE: Plaintiff admits that he is not seeking damages based upon any claimed economic harm. Plaintiff further admits that in seeking damages for mental anguish/emotional distress, he is seeking damages for his mental pain and suffering, fear, nervousness, indignity, insult, humiliation, and embarrassment. Plaintiff denies the request to the extent that the phrase \"asserted mental anguish\" is intended to somehow limit Plaintiff's proof at trial or right to recover for all the types and categories of mental anguish/emotional distress recognized under District of Columbia law. For further details, s*ee* Plaintiff's Answers to Clark Hill's Fourth Set of Interrogatories (hereby incorporated by reference). Plaintiff admits that he is not seeking recovery of fees paid to Clark Hill.\n\n#### REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 3:\n\nAdmit that the only out-of-pocket damages you are seeking in this action are the fees you previously paid to Clark Hill.\n\nRESPONSE: Plaintiff admits that he is not seeking any \"out-of-pocket damages.\" REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 4:\n\nAdmit that the only sum certain damages that you are seeking in this action are fees you\n\npreviously paid to Clark Hill.\n\nRESPONSE: Plaintiff admits that he is not seeking \"sum certain\" damages. Plaintiff admits that he is not seeking damages based upon any claimed economic harm. Plaintiff further admits that in seeking damages for mental anguish/emotional distress, he is seeking damages for his mental pain and suffering, fear, nervousness, indignity, insult, humiliation, and embarrassment. Plaintiff denies the request to the extent that the phrase \"asserted mental anguish\" is intended to somehow limit Plaintiff's proof at trial or right to recover for all the types and categories of mental anguish/emotional distress recognized under District of Columbia law. For further details, s*ee* Plaintiff's Answers to Clark Hill's Fourth Set of Interrogatories (hereby incorporated by reference). Plaintiff admits that he is not seeking recovery of fees paid to Clark Hill.\n\n#### REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 5:\n\nAdmit that you are not seeking damages in this action for any lost business opportunity. RESPONSE: Admitted.\n\n#### REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 6:\n\nAdmit that you are not seeking damages in this action for any lost opportunity to do business with ACA.\n\nRESPONSE: Admitted.\n\n#### REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 7:\n\nAdmit that you are not seeking damages in this action for any lost business opportunity, including any opportunity to do business with ACA.\n\nRESPONSE: Admitted.\n\n#### REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 8:\n\nAdmit that you are not seeking damages in this action for harm to your reputation.\n\nRESPONSE: Denied. Plaintiff is seeking damages for harm to his reputation. In seeking recovery for mental anguish/emotional distress, Plaintiff is seeking, as he is entitled to do under District of Columbia law, recovery for, among other things, indignity, insult, humiliation, and embarrassment. As a result of the cyberattack, disclosure of Plaintiff's information, and defendants' withdrawal as his counsel, Plaintiff also has suffered stigmatic harm. *See* Plaintiff's Answers to Clark Hill's Fourth Set of Interrogatories (hereby incorporated by reference).\n\nRespectfully Submitted,\n\n/s/*Ari S. Casper*\n\nAri S. Casper Ralph S. Tyler The Casper Firm, LLC 400 East Pratt St., Suite 903 Baltimore, MD 21202 Tel: 410-989-5097 acasper@casperfirm.com\n\n*Attorneys for Plaintiff*\n\n#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 26th day of July 2021, the foregoing was served to the\n\nfollowing by email:\n\nDavid Jimenez-Ekman John R. Storino Leigh J. Jahnig JENNER & BLOCK, LLP 353 N. Clark Street Chicago, IL 60654-3456 DJimenez-Ekman@jenner.com JStorino@jenner.com ljahnig@jenner.com\n\n> */s/ Ari S. Casper* Ari S. Casper\n\n# **EXHIBIT E**\n\n#### IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA\n\nGUO WENGUI, Plaintiff, v, CLARK HILL PLC, et al., Defendants.\n\nCase No. I :19-cv-03195\n\n## PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT CONCERNING INSTRUCTIONS TO \"OTHER FIDUCIARIES\"\n\nIn a letter dated February 12,2021, David Saunders, counsel to Defendants Clark Hill PLC and Thomas Ragland, demanded that Plaintiff provide a verified statement describing any special instructions he gave to fiduciary entities concerning the handling of confidential information he might provide to them.\n\nPlaintiff objects to this request on the ground that it is not relevant to any matter at issue in this litigation. Plaintiff retained Clark Hill to represent him in connection with confidential asylum proceedings, in which he would be providing the law firm with highly sensitive information concerning, among other things, decades of persecution that he and members of his family experienced in China, as well as highly sensitive details of certain assistance that he provided to the U.S. government. The instructions that Plaintiff gave to other fiduciaries concerning the handling of other types of information are not probative of any matter at issue in this case. Further, while Plaintiff understands that Defendants deny that Plaintiff ever asked them to give heightened protection to his confidential information, Defendants have produced an email communication in which Mr. Ragland expressly acknowledged that Plaintiff had asked Defendants to do so. As such,\n\neven if special instructions given by Plaintiff to another law firm representing him in connection with a business matter were somehow probatiVe of whether he gave special instructions to the law firm representing him in connection with his highly sensitive asylum application, there is no genuine dispute of fact here on that issue. Plaintiff further objects that, contrary to the letter sent by DefendantS' counsel, the information sought is not responsive to any interrogatory propounded by Defendants. All of the interrogatories cited by Mr. Saunders in his February 12 letter are contention interrogatories, and Plaintiff does not make any contention based on the information that Defendants are now seeking. Finally, Plaintiff objects on the ground that Defendants have already served an excessive number of interrogatories and requests for admissions.\n\nWithout waiving these objections, and for avoidance of a dispute concerning whether the Court's January 13, 2020 Minute Order had the effect of propounding a new interrogatory on behalf of Defendants, Plaintiff provides the following statement:\n\nPlaintiff requested that the following law firms, when communicating regarding or transmitting his confidential information, avoid using email or cloud-based services where possible, and instead attempt to do so via in-person meeting, phone call, or the exchange of hard copy documents: Boies Schiller; Tucker Levin; Wasserman, Mancini & Chang; and Williams & Connolly.\n\nPlaintiff asked the security firm T&M Protection, which has provided personal protection services to Plaintiff; to limit its use of email when communicating concerning confidential matters related to its work for him.\n\nIn connection with his providing confidential information to the Board of the Sherry-Netherland in 2015, Plaintiff asked that the Chairman of the Board review the information\n\nindependently and in confidence, and then report on the specifics of the information in person to the other members of the Board.\n\n> sl.Ari S. Casper Ari S. Casper Ralph S. Tyler The Casper Firm, LLC 400 East Pratt St., Suite 903 Baltimore, MD 21202 Tel: 410,989-5097 acasper@casperfirm.com\n\nAttorneys for Plaintiff''\n\nFebruary 19, 2021\n\n#### VERIFICATION\n\nThe facts stated above are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge, information, and\n\nbelief.\n\nGuo engui\n\n# **EXHIBIT F**\n\n**353 N. CLARK STREET CHICAGO, IL 60654-3456**\n\nAugust 27, 2021\n\nJohn Storino Tel +1 312 840 8683 JStorino@jenner.com\n\n*VIA EMAIL*\n\nAri Casper The Casper Firm 400 E. Pratt Street, Suite 903 Baltimore, MD 21202\n\n*Re: Wengui v. Clark Hill et al., No. 19-3195 (D.D.C.)*\n\nDear Ari,\n\n I write in connection to Plaintiff Guo Wengui (\"Plaintiff\")'s July 28, 2021 deposition. We are available to meet and confer on the issues raised in this letter.\n\nFollowing counsel's objections and advice, Plaintiff refused to answer 26 questions on Fifth Amendment privilege grounds. Defendants consider Plaintiff's Fifth Amendment assertions improper. Mr. Guo refused to answer a broad range of questions concerning Mr. Guo's current and previous allegations in this lawsuit; Mr. Guo's employment or business dealings; information concerning Mr. Guo's past lawsuits; Mr. Guo's wealth and assets; and Mr. Guo's activities in China. As you know, despite our requests at the deposition, Plaintiff's counsel refused to articulate why the answer to questions by Defendants' counsel could possibly implicate Plaintiff's Fifth Amendment rights. Guo Dep., July 28, 2021 at pg. 28. We reserve any and all of our rights under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and all local rules, including but not limited to our positions that Plaintiff waived his Fifth Amendment assertions, and that Plaintiff does not have a reasonable fear of possible prosecution. In the event the Court finds Plaintiff's assertions proper, Defendants further reserves the right to ask the Court to allow the jury to draw negative inferences from the Plaintiff's assertion of his Fifth Amendment privileges.\n\nWhile the Fifth Amendment protects Plaintiff from serving as a witness against himself in his deposition testimony, Plaintiff must still possess a \"reasonable basis for believing a danger to [Plaintiff] must exist in answering a particular question.\" *District Title v. Warren*, 265 F. Supp.3d 17, 20 (D.D.C. 2017). A witness who invokes the Fifth Amendment must demonstrate a \"real danger and not a mere imaginary, remote or speculative possibility of prosecution.\" *S.E.C. v. Bankers Alliance Corp.*, No. C.A. 95-0428 (PLF), No. C.A. 95-0428 (PLF), 1995 WL 590665 at \\*3 (D.D.C. May 5, 1995) (holding defendant in contempt of court order for refusing to reveal details about investor funds because witness \"has not expressed a nonfrivolous fear of selfincrimination or prosecution.\"). In demonstrating a real danger, a witness bears the burden of proving the danger of prosecution by providing credible reasons why revealing such information \"presents more than a remote or speculative fear of incrimination.\" *Id.* (quoting *S.E.C. v. Parkersburg Wireless Ltd. Liability Co.*, 156 F.R.D. 529, 537 (D.D.C. 1994)).\n\nAri Casper August 27, 2021 Page 2\n\nPlaintiff failed to identify a reasonable fear of prosecution when he objected to the 26 questions asked by Defendants' counsel. Please provide a basis for Plaintiff's Fifth Amendment assertions for each of the 26 questions Plaintiff declined to answer. We appreciate receiving a prompt response regarding Plaintiff's deficient Fifth Amendment invocations by Monday, August 30, 2021. If we do not receive such a response, we will move to compel, and/or move for other relief, for Plaintiff to complete answers on the topics he refused to address in his deposition.\n\nWe reserve all of our rights, including but not limited to its rights under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and all local rules. As always, we are willing to confer about this, or any other discovery issues, at any mutually agreeable time.\n\nSincerely,\n\n/s John R. Storino\n\nJohn Storino\n\n# **EXHIBIT G**\n\n## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA\n\n| GUO WENGUI a/k/a MILES KWOK a/k/a
HO WAN KWOK, | |\n|---------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|\n| Plaintiff, | Case No. 1:19-cv-3195 |\n| v. | |\n| CLARK HILL PLC; THOMAS K.
RAGLAND, | Hon. James Boasberg |\n| Defendants. | |\n\n### PLAINTIFF'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS TO DEFENDANT THOMAS K. RAGLAND'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES\n\nPlaintiff Guo Wengui hereby supplements his answers to Defendant Thomas K. Ragland's\n\nfirst set of interrogatories. Plaintiff incorporates the general objections stated in his initial answers\n\nto Mr. Ragland's first set of interrogatories.\n\n### INTERROGATORIES\n\n1. Identify all persons who have knowledge of any facts relating to any allegation in\n\nthe Complaint and state what information/facts the identified individuals possess.\n\nANSWER: The following individuals have knowledge of the allegations in the complaint:\n\na. Plaintiff Guo Wengui 162 E. 64th Street New York, NY 10065\n\nPlaintiff has knowledge of his reasons for retaining Clark Hill; his discussions with Mr. Ragland prior to engaging Clark Hill; the terms and conditions of the representations; plaintiff and his agent's requests that Clark Hill protect plaintiff s private and sensitive information; Clark Hill's failure to protect plaintiff's information; Clark Hill's termination of its representation of plaintiff; and the damages that arose out of Clark Hill's misconduct at issue in this litigation.\n\nb. Defendant Clark Hill PLC 500 Woodward Avenue\n\nSuite 3500\n\nDetroit, MI 48226\n\nClark Hill PLC has knowledge of the defenses in its answer; the terms and conditions of Clark Hill's and Thomas K. Ragland's representation of plaintiff; the facts and circumstances surrounding the data breach that resulted in the widespread and public disclosure of plaintiff's sensitive and confidential personal information; and the facts and circumstances surrounding Clark Hill's and Thomas K. Ragland's decision to withdraw as counsel for plaintiff.\n\nc. Defendant Thomas K. Ragland Clark Hilt PLC 10001 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Suite 1 300 Washington, DC 20004\n\nThomas K. Ragland has knowledge of the allegations in the complaint and defenses asserted in the answer; the terms and conditions of Clark Hill PLC's and Thomas K. Ragland's representation of plaintiff; the facts and circumstances surrounding the data breach that resulted in the wide-spread and public disclosure of plaintiff's sensitive and confidential personal information; requests to protect plaintiff's private and confidential information; and the facts and circumstances surrounding Clark Hill PLC's and his decision to withdraw as counsel for plaintiff.\n\nd. Edward J. Hood\n\nClark Hill PLC 500 Woodward Avenue Suite 3500 Detroit, MI 48226\n\nEdward J. Hood has knowledge of the allegations in the complaint and defenses asserted in the answer; the facts and circumstances surrounding the data breach that resulted in the wide-spread and public disclosure of plaintiff's sensitive and confidential personal information; correspondence with plaintiffs counsel about the nature of the data breach and how Clark Hill handle the breach; and the facts and circumstances surrounding Clark Hill PLC's and Thomas K. Ragland's decision to withdraw as counsel for plaintiff.\n\ne. Dr. Lianchao Han\n\nCitizen Power Initiatives for China 415 2nd Street NE Suite 100 Washington, DC 20002\n\nDr. Lianchao Han has knowledge of the allegations in the complaint and defenses asserted in the answer; the terms and conditions of Clark Hill PLC's and Thomas K. Ragland's representation of plaintiff, including requests to protect plaintiff's information; the facts and circumstances surrounding the data breach that resulted in the wide-spread and public disclosure of plaintiffs sensitive and confidential personal information; damages to plaintiff's reputation.\n\nf. Jianli Yang Citizen Power Initiatives for China 415 2nd Street NE Suite 100 Washington, DC 20002 Dr. Jianli Yang has knowledge of the terms and conditions of Clark Hill PLC's and Thomas K. Ragland's representation of plaintiff.\n\ng. Joshua Schiller, Esq. Boies Schiller Flexner LLP 55 Hudson Yards, 20th Floor New York, NY 10001 Mr. Schiller has limited knowledge of the facts and circumstances of plaintiff's engagement with Clark Hill. The extent of his knowledge is unknown.\n\nh. Persons involved in the post-hacking investigation, at both Clark Hill and third parties whose identities are unknown at this time, who would have knowledge, potentially, of what happened, why (cause), and how it might have been prevented.\n\n### SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER:\n\ni. William Je\n\nACA Capital Group Ltd. 1605-6, 16/F, Hua Qin International Building 340 Queen's Road Central Hong Kong Mr. Je has knowledge of Plaintiff's consulting agreement with ACA Capital Group and of ACA Capital Group's termination of that agreement.\n\nj. Qu Guo Jiao\n\nCurrent address unknown. Plaintiff believes she is living in China and is attempting to locate her.\n\nLast known address:\n\nACA Capital Group Ltd.\n\n1605-6, 16/F, Hua Qin International Building\n\n340 Queen's Road Central\n\nHong Kong\n\nMs. Qu has knowledge of Plaintiff's consulting agreement with ACA Capital Group and of ACA Capital Group's termination of that agreement.\n\n2. Identify all persons who provided information used to prepare the responses to these interrogatories or the responses to Thomas K. Ragland's requests for production, and identify the respective interrogatory or request to which each person provided information.\n\nANSWER: Plaintiff objects on the ground that the interrogatory seeks to invade the attorneyclient privilege and work product privilege. Without waiving the objection, plaintiff and his inhouse counsel, Daniel Podhaskie, provided information used to prepare the answers herein.\n\n3. Identify all persons who communicated with, interacted with, or directed Clark Hill on Plaintiff's behalf in connection with Clark Hill's representation of Plaintiff with respect to Plaintiff's asylum application. including, but not limited to, the discussions leading up to the representation.\n\nANSWER: See answer to interrogatory number 1. Plaintiff, Dr. Han, and Dr. Jianli.\n\n4. Identify all communications between Plaintiff and his representatives, employees, or agents (including without limitation Lianchao Han, any other employee at Initiatives for China, Jianli Yang, Josh Schiller, or any other attorney or employee of Boies Schiller Flexner LLP) about Clark Hill's representation of Plaintiff in U.S. immigration matters, the fact of Plaintiffs asylum application, or the cyber incident on or about September 12, 2017.\n\nANSWER: Plaintiff objects to this request as it is overly broad and unduly burdensome to \"identify\" all communications. Without waiving these objections, plaintiff has produced all relevant non-privileged correspondence among plaintiff, his agent, and Clark Hill. In addition, plaintiff states that Dr. Han and Dr. Yang had conversations with Mr. Ragland prior to retaining the firm about whether Clark Hill had adequate cyber security. Dr. Han expressly told Mr. Ragland that \"he needs to be prepared\" for a cyberattack. In response, Mr. Ragland told Dr. Han, among other things, that the firm had \"first class state of the art\" cyber technology and used \"three outside\"\n\ncyber security firms to protect client information. Mr. Ragland also advised he would let the Clark Hill \"IT people know\" about the potential for an attack. Dr. Han repeatedly continued to advise Mr. Ragland that, in Dr. Han's his opinion, the firm did not take the threat serious.\n\nSUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER:\n\nPlaintiff provides this supplemental answer in compliance with the Court's Minute Order dated January 13, 2021, in which the Court directed Plaintiff, among other things, to \"supplement including with details on dates and times of what his agents told him that Defendants promised to do in safeguarding his materials,\" to \"explicitly state that he does not use email,\" and to make a certification concerning his \"communications with the two employees of Initiatives for China,\" whom Plaintiff understands to be Dr. Lianchao Han and Dr. Jianli Yang.\n\nWith respect to Defendants' promises to safeguard Plaintiff's materials, during meetings at Plaintiff's residence in New York, Mr. Ragland assured Plaintiff that he and Clark Hill would take certain affirmative steps to ensure the security of Plaintiff's asylum application and other confidential and sensitive information related to Plaintiff's asylum application, including, for example, that the firm would not store Plaintiffs materials on its server. The first of these meetings took place on or about August 23, 2017, and there were additional in-person meetings that took place in September 2017.\n\nBetween the August 23 meeting at Plaintiffs residence and the cyberattack during the second week of September, Plaintiff had several conversations with Dr. Han. During at least one of those conversations, Dr. Han told Plaintiff that Mr. Ragland had assured him (Dr. Han) that Clark Hill had \"first class state of the art\" cyber technology and used three outside cyber security firms to protect client information. Dr. Han also relayed to Plaintiff Mr. Ragland's assurance that he (Mr. Ragland) would let Clark Hill's information technology staff know about the potential for\n\na cyberattack, so that the firm could ensure that heightened protection would be given to Plaintiff s information. Plaintiff does not recall the exact dates of these conversations.\n\nPlaintiff does not use email and communicates principally by phone. With respect to \"communications with the two employees for Initiatives for China,\" Plaintiff certifies that his agents were not able to locate any documents containing communications between him and either Dr. Han or Dr. Yang on the subjects of (a) Plaintiff's representation by Clark Hill, (b) Plaintiff s decision to apply for asylum and the filing of his asylum application, or (c) information security at Clark Hill or the cyberattack at Clark Hill. Plaintiff does have in his possession a number of WhatsApp communications with Dr. Han and Dr. Yang. Plaintiff certifies, however, that none of those communications concern the subject matters of this case.\n\n5. Identify each document or communication that you contend is relevant to the determination of Clark Hill's obligations with respect to safeguarding the information pertaining to Plaintiffs representation.\n\nANSWER: Plaintiff objects to this request as it is overly broad and unduly burdensome to \"identify each document or communication.\" Plaintiff will produce trial exhibits in accordance with the Court's scheduling order and governing rules. Without waiving these objections, plaintiff has produced all relevant non-privileged correspondence among plaintiff, his agent, and Clark Hill.\n\n6. Identify and describe all contracts or agreements between Plaintiff, or Plaintiffs representatives, agents, employees, or other parties acting for Plaintiff's benefit, and Clark Hill or Thomas K. Ragland, including who made the agreement, when the agreement was made, and the substance of the agreement.\n\nANSWER: Plaintiff entered into a legal services contract with Clark Hill. Plaintiff has produced a copy of that agreement.\n\n7. Describe in detail the level of \"necessary steps and actions\" and \"special care and attention to security measures\" (see Complaint 11¶ 35) that Plaintiff contends Clark Hill agreed to implement in order to safeguard the information pertaining to Plaintiff's representation.\n\nANSWER: Plaintiff objects to this interrogatory as it calls for a statement or description of the actions and steps required for Clark Hill to satisfy its \"duty of care\" which is a legal determination. Clark Hill was required to provide adequate security measures to protect plaintiffs information. Clark Hill knew that the representation of plaintiff was in no sense an \"ordinary\" representation with \"ordinary\" risks of unauthorized disclosure. Please see answer to interrogatory number 4. Clark Hill, through Mr. Ragland, agreed to take the necessary steps and actions to protect plaintiff's confidential information recognizing that meant the firm would take \"more than ordinary\" protective efforts, including not putting plaintiff's information on the server or using firm email accounts. Plaintiff will supplement this answer in accordance with the scheduling order governing expert disclosures.\n\n8. Describe in detail the \"necessary and effective electronic security measures\" that Plaintiff contends are \"sufficient to protect plaintiff's sensitive and confidential information\" (see Complaint ¶ 8).\n\nANSWER: Please see objections and answer to interrogatory number 7.\n\n9. Identify all communications between Plaintiff or Plaintiff's representatives, employees, or agents (including without limitation Lianchao Han, any other employee at Initiatives for China, Jianli Yang, Josh Schiller, or any other attorney or employee of Boies Schiller Flexner LLP) and Clark Hill, including, but not limited to, any communications relating to any warnings or risks of cyber-incidents or \"hacks,\" any special security measures requested by Plaintiff,\n\nPlaintiff's publicity of the existence of the asylum application, or any facts contained in the asylum application.\n\nANSWER: Plaintiff objects to this request as it is overly broad and unduly burdensome to \"identify all communications.\" Without waiving these objections, plaintiff has produced all relevant nonprivileged correspondence among plaintiff, his agent, and Clark Hill. Please see answer to interrogatory number 4.\n\n10. State the basis for the allegation in paragraph 35 of the Complaint that Clark Hill \"was on full notice\" prior to agreeing to represent Plaintiff \"that special care and attention to security measures were necessary, required, expected, and agreed-to by the firm.-\n\nANSWER: See answer to interrogatory number 4. Plaintiff and Dr. Han informed Clark Hill that the CCP would try to hack the firm to obtain plaintiffs sensitive and confidential information. Mr. Ragland agreed not to use the firm's server to store or transmit plaintiffs sensitive information over the firm's email accounts, and even warned his IT group that such an attack was possible.\n\n11. State the basis for the allegation in paragraph 3 of the Complaint that Clark Hill \"assured\" Plaintiff that his confidential information would be \"protected.\"\n\nANSWER: Mr. Ragland assured plaintiff and his agents that the firm had state-of-the-art cybersecurity, three different outside firms which protect client information, and would protect plaintiffs information by using a separate computer, not placing it on the firm server or using the firm's email accounts.\n\n12. Describe the circumstances around the decision to publicize, via social media and news media, the fact of Plaintiff's asylum application and the fact of Clark Hill's representation of Plaintiff, including who made the decision, when the decision was made, who was aware of the decision before the publicity took place, and the reasons for the decision.\n\nANSWER: Plaintiff objects to the characterization that there was a decision to publicize- the asylum application. Plaintiff further objects on relevance grounds and because this interrogatory invades the attorney-client privilege. Without waiving these objections, plaintiff was informed that others (presumably the CCP) knew he was seeking asylum. Plaintiff spoke to Mr. Ragland about making an announcement. Mr. Ragland thereafter gave interviews to numerous outlets regarding plaintiffs asylum application.\n\n13. Identify any communication between Plaintiff or Plaintiffs representatives, employees, or agents (including without limitation Lianchao Han, any other employee of Initiatives for China, Jianli Yang, Josh Schiller, or any other attorney or employee of Boies Schiller Flexner LLP) and any third party regarding Clark Hill's representation of Plaintiff, including, but not limited to, the filing of Plaintiffs asylum application, Clark Hill's representation of Plaintiff, the facts contained in the asylum application or the cyber incident on or about September 12, 2017. ANSWER: Plaintiff objects to this interrogatory on the grounds it is overly burdensome in that it seeks to have plaintiff \"identify any communication.\" The interrogatory also is duplicative of several other interrogatories. Without waiving these objections, plaintiff has produced all relevant non-privileged communications.\n\n14. Identify any posting or communication by Plaintiff or Plaintiffs representatives, agents, or employees on any internet or social media platform or outlet, including without limitation YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, SnapChat, or TikTok regarding the filing of Plaintiffs asylum application, Clark Hill's representation of Plaintiff, the facts contained in the asylum application or the cyber incident on or about September 12. 2017.\n\nANSWER: Plaintiff objects on relevance grounds. Without waiving the objection, plaintiff's twitter account was disabled, and he no longer has access to it. Plaintiff's YouTube account does not appear to reference his asylum application.\n\n15. Identify any social media accounts or profiles, including without limitation YouTube usernames, accounts, or \"channels,\" Facebook profiles, or Twitter \"handles,\" currently used or previously used by Plaintiff, through which Plaintiff posted or disseminated, or caused to be posted or disseminated, any statements, postings, or opinions regarding the Chinese government, the Chinese Communist Party, the filing of Plaintiff's asylum application, Clark Hill's representation of Plaintiff, the facts contained in the asylum application or the cyber incident on or about September 12, 2017.\n\nANSWER: Please see objections and answer to the previous interrogatory. Plaintiff further objects on the ground that this interrogatory is unduly burdensome. Without waiving those objections, plaintiff has a YouTube account and a GTV platform containing a substantial number of videos discussing the CCP and the Chinese government. Again, plaintiff is not aware of any reference on either of those two social media platforms of any reference to his asylum application.\n\n16. Identify the persons to whom Plaintiff \"disclosed a broad network of CCP spies operating in the United States,\" and when such disclosure took place, as alleged in paragraph 20 of the Complaint.\n\nANSWER: Plaintiff objects on relevance grounds, as plaintiff's disclosures are not reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence about defendants' failure to protect his confidential information.\n\n17. Identify all information that was contained in Plaintiff's asylum application which Plaintiff contends was confidential before September 12, 2017 and state the basis for that contention.\n\nANSWER: The contents of plaintiffs asylum application were confidential, including names, identifying information, addresses, passport information, family information, information plaintiff had provided to the US government, and details of his commercial and other dealings. Clark Hill has these documents and plaintiff produced them as well.\n\n#### SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER:\n\nPlaintiff provides this supplemental answer in compliance with the Court's Minute Order dated January 13, 2021, in which the Court directed Plaintiff, among other things, to \"provide in page-level detail more specificity regarding what information in his asylum application harmed him by being released.\"\n\nAs an initial matter, however, Plaintiff states that his asylum application as a whole was confidential and that he was harmed by Defendants' failure to protect his asylum application as a whole, in at least two respects. First, as explained in Plaintiff's Answer to Interrogatory No. 19, Plaintiff lost his consulting contract with ACA, and other entities refused to provide professional services to or conduct business with him, in large part because of the fact that, as a result of Defendants' negligence and failure to follow his directions with regard to the safeguarding of his information, Plaintiff had been the victim of a successful cyberattack. Second, Plaintiffs reputation was harmed not only by the disclosure of specific confidential information contained in his asylum application, but also by the disclosure of an actual copy of his asylum application. In other words, apart from and in addition to the harm that Plaintiff experienced as a result of the disclosure of specific items of confidential information contained in Plaintiffs asylum application,\n\nPlaintiff's reputation was harmed by the basic fact that, as a result of Defendants' failure to protect his asylum application, agents of the Chinese government were able to disseminate on the internet a copy of the application, notwithstanding that the application is expressly made confidential by U.S. law.\n\nWith respect to specific information contained in his asylum application, Plaintiff was harmed by the disclosure of confidential information stated on pages 5 to 8 of his 1-589 Form, as well as on pages 2 to 6 of the 1-589 Addendum that Clark Hill prepared for him. Material at those pages describes, in a manner and at a level of detail not otherwise made public: (a) the persecution that Plaintiff, his family members, and his family's employees have experienced in China, including specific descriptions of interrogation and torture; (b) Plaintiffs travel and residence in other countries; (c) Plaintiff's confidential dealings with the governments of other countries; (d) Plaintiff's confidential relationships with officials in the Chinese government and the CCP; (e) specific measures taken by the Chinese government and the CCP to attempt to intimidate or coerce Plaintiff into remaining silent concerning their corruption and human rights abuses in China; and (f) the assistance that Plaintiff provided to the U.S. government.\n\nPlaintiff also treated as confidential additional information contained in the 1-589 Form and related materials that Defendants allowed to be disclosed, including (g) his home address, (h) his phone number, (i) his passport and I-94 numbers, (j) his dates of entry into the United States, (k) his prior residential addresses, (1) his employment history, (m) the names of his siblings and parents, (n) the immigration status of his spouse and children, and (o) the passport and 1-94 numbers of his spouse and children. This information appears, among other places, at pages 1 to 4 of Plaintiff's 1-589 Form, as well as at pages 1, 6 and 7 of the 1-589 Addendum that Clark Hill prepared for him.\n\n18. Describe in detail the basis for the allegations, in paragraphs 3, 5, 9, 44, 57, and 59 of the Complaint, that information about Plaintiff or Plaintiffs asylum application published and disseminated on social media after September 12, 2017 was acquired in the cyber-incident on or about September 12, 2017.\n\nANSWER: Plaintiff objects because the interrogatory is vague and confusing. Without waiving the objection, plaintiff's asylum application was published on social media after Clark Hill failed to adequately protect it.\n\n19. Describe in detail the damages that Plaintiff has allegedly suffered as a result of Clark Hill's alleged breach of legal duties and obligations, including the allegations in paragraph 56 of the Complaint of \"damages to his personal and professional reputation,\" \"lost substantial business opportunities,\" and the costs and expenses\" he has incurred.\n\nANSWER: Plaintiff has suffered damages in a variety of contexts, including, but not limited to, the following: Plaintiff entered into a consulting agreement with ACA Capital Group Limited (\"ACA\") in August 2016 (the \"Consulting Agreement\"). ACA aims to serve as the bridge connecting world-class businesses and innovative ideas between Asia and the world, while optimizing financial returns for its investors. ACA hired plaintiff as a consultant because of his reputation in the Asian business community; his knowledge and expertise of doing business throughout the world, but in particular China and Hong Kong; and because plaintiff had the ability to make introductions to numerous business executives in China and Hong Kong. The Consulting Agreement provided that plaintiff would be paid approximately \\$2 million per year. The Consulting Agreement did not have a fixed term and was expected to be ongoing. In November 2017, ACA terminated the Consulting Agreement because it learned that Clark Hill was hacked\n\nand plaintiff's very private and sensitive information was spread throughout the internet on a world-wide basis. Plaintiff was informed by ACA that it terminated the Consulting Agreement because of the company's fears that continuing its relationship with plaintiff would result in a loss of clients and future business and could result in ACA suffering a hack similar to Clark Hill.\n\nPlaintiff had other contractual arrangements with ACA worth several million dollars which were negatively affected by defendants' conduct.\n\nPlaintiff also suffered reputational damage, including followers on social media, which caused financial and other injury, and diminished plaintiff's earning capacity.\n\nPlaintiff will supply additional information regarding these injuries.\n\n#### SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER:\n\nDefendant's conduct has caused Plaintiff to suffer damages in a variety of contexts, summarized as follows:\n\nPlaintiff entered into a consulting agreement with ACA Capital Group Limited (\"ACA\") in October 2016 (the \"Consulting Agreement\"). After Plaintiff stepped down as ACA's chairman, ACA hired Plaintiff as a consultant because of his reputation in the Asian business community, his knowledge of and expertise in doing business throughout the world, particularly in China and Hong Kong, and his ability to make introductions to business executives in China and Hong Kong. The Consulting Agreement provided for Plaintiff to be paid \\$2 million per year. The Consulting Agreement did not have a fixed term and was expected to be ongoing. In December 2017, ACA terminated the Consulting Agreement, citing the Clark Hill cyberattack.\n\nPlaintiff also has suffered mental anguish as a result of the Clark Hill cyberattack. His asylum application contained sensitive details about his family members, family businesses, and the specifics of the assistance that he had provided to the U.S. government in order to expose CCP\n\ncorruption. Soon after obtaining the information contained in Plaintiff's asylum application, the CCP arrested and imprisoned Plaintiff's family members in China, causing Plaintiff and his family to live in extreme fear and constant anxiety.\n\nPlaintiff's reputation has been damaged in a number of ways. Defendant's withdrawal as his counsel portrayed Plaintiff as a liar and a fraud, and created the impression that he had been dishonest with Clark Hill, and had done something wrong to justify his counsel's withdrawal from representation. He lost friends and business opportunities, and his family suffered tremendously. Plaintiff has suffered a loss of credibility in the United States and abroad both as a businessman and as a whistleblower. Further, in the wake of the Clark Hill cyberattack, law firms have refused to provide services to Plaintiff, and other entities have refused to conduct business with Plaintiff, citing a fear of being hacked by the CCP.\n\nIn addition to seeking compensation for the loss of income from the Consulting Agreement, for mental anguish, and for reputational harm, Plaintiff seeks recovery of fees paid to Clark Hill.\n\nThe categories other than the losses resulting from the termination of the Consulting Agreement (the only business opportunity for which Plaintiff is making a claim) and fees paid to Clark Hill are left to the jury's discretion; therefore, Plaintiff has not included specific dollar amounts.\n\nThis answer also supplements Plaintiff's answers to Clark Hill's interrogatories 2 and 8. SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER:\n\nPlaintiff provides this supplemental answer in compliance with the Court's Minute Order dated January 13, 2021, in which the Court directed Plaintiff, among other things, to \"list friends he lost and firms who refuse to represent him because of the hack.\"\n\nAs a result of the September 2017 cyberattack enabled by Defendants' negligence and failure to follow Plaintiff's directions with regard to the safeguarding of his information, the following entities and people declined to do business with Plaintiff or discontinued their business relationship with Plaintiff: Shinsei Bank; China Construction Bank; HSBC Bank; China Agricultural Bank; and JP Morgan. In addition, immediately after and as a result of the September 2017 cyberattack, the Hudson Institute, a Washington think tank, abruptly cancelled an event at which Plaintiff would have been the featured speaker. The last-minute cancellation, coupled with news of the cyberattack itself, caused considerable harm to Plaintiffs reputation, at a critical point in Plaintiffs efforts to gather support in Washington for his pro-democracy and human rights advocacy.\n\n20. Identify all businesses associated with Plaintiff that Plaintiff alleges has experienced harm as a result of the cyber-incident that occurred on or about September 12, 2017, or as a result of Clark Hill's alleged misconduct, and describe in detail the nature of the harm, including the basis for the allegation in paragraph 56 of the Complaint that Plaintiff has \"lost substantial business opportunities,\" and incurred \"costs and expenses.\"\n\nANSWER: See answer to interrogatory number 19.\n\n21. Describe in detail what has occurred in any proceedings in connection with Plaintiffs asylum application since September 19, 2017, including without limitation the basis for the allegation in paragraph 56 of the Complaint that Plaintiff's efforts to obtain political asylum have been delayed or otherwise harmed as a result of Clark Hill's alleged breach of legal duties and obligations, including Clark Hill's withdrawal from representing Plaintiff.\n\nANSWER: The disclosure of plaintiffs confidential asylum application has created delay because of the negative publicity surrounding the incident, Clark Hill's withdrawal as counsel for plaintiff,\n\nand the publication of plaintiffs sensitive, confidential, and private matters, some of which involve sensitive national security issues.\n\n22. Describe in detail the alleged harm or persecution that Plaintiff has suffered as a result of actions by or on behalf of the Chinese government or the Chinese Communist Party before the cyber incident on or about September 12, 2017, including the basis for Plaintiffs \"good reason to fear for his personal safety\" as described in paragraph 16 of the Complaint, the basis for the allegation in paragraph 17 of the Complaint that \"the CCP believes plaintiff presently holds not publicly known proof of various types of improper conduct on the part of the CCP and those associates with it and acting on its behalf,\" the basis for the allegations in paragraph 23 of the Complaint that demonstrations outside the building where Plaintiff resides were \"staged\" by the CCP, and the basis for the allegations in paragraph 26 of the Complaint that \"the CCP perceives plaintiff as a dangerous challenge to the stability, legitimacy, and credibility of the Chinese regime and the CCP.\"\n\nANSWER: Plaintiff has been effective in influencing international opinion with respect to China and the CCP. From the perspective of the CCP, plaintiff's activities and advocacy have affected adversely China's and the CCP's stature in the world community and, in response, the Chinese government has attempted to silence plaintiff. The Chinese government/CCP has employed various tactics, including coercion and offering bribes to attempt to silence plaintiff, including, using overseas intelligence networks to seek to discredit, silence, and threaten plaintiffs personal safety or, at the very least, to cause plaintiff to have good reason to fear for his personal safety as well as fearing for the safety of family members and friends.\n\nThe CCP believes plaintiff presently holds not publicly known proof of various types of improper conduct on the part of the CCP and those associated with it and acting on its behalf,\n\nincluding information relating to corruption, murder, hiding of illegally-gained money, and China's spy network. For these and other reasons, the Chinese government and the CCP are highly motivated, to understate the matter, and engaged aggressively in seeking to silence plaintiff. The Chinese government and the CCP are equally motivated and engaged in seeking to learn what plaintiff knows about improper activities undertaken by or on behalf of the Chinese government and the CCP. And, perhaps most critically, the Chinese government and the CCP have the capabilities — the \"operational reach\" — to carry out aggressive hostile actions against plaintiff.\n\nThe Chinese government and/or the CCP sent agents and officials to the United States to organize demonstrations aimed directly against plaintiff outside the building in New York City where plaintiff resides. Persons attending these CCP-staged demonstrations, literally on plaintiff's front steps, were provided with preprinted signs defaming plaintiff in vile language, calling him a rapist and a liar, and urging plaintiff to leave the United States.\n\nPlaintiff believes that the CCP perceives him as a dangerous challenge to the stability, legitimacy, and credibility of the Chinese regime and the CCP.\n\n23. Describe in detail any harms that Plaintiff has suffered at the hands of or caused by the Chinese government that have occurred after the cyber-incident on or about September 12, 2017, including the basis for allegations in paragraph 56 of the Complaint, that \"plaintiff's personal safety and security have been put at risk,\" \"his family has been arrested and threatened,\" and \"plaintiff's employees in China have been harassed,\" and the basis for the allegations in paragraph 58 of the Complaint that \"plaintiff's freedom and liberty to travel\" has been \"limit[ed] and that \"his personal safety\" has been \"jeopardize[ed]\" as a result of Clark Hill's alleged breach of legal duties and obligations.\n\nANSWER: Objection. This interrogatory is duplicative. Without waiving this objection, see answer numbers 19, 22, and other information contained in prior interrogatories, of which this interrogatory is duplicative.\n\n24. Identify any person who, after September 12, 2017, has used Plaintiffs information that Plaintiff alleges was obtained in the cyber-incident, identify what specific information was used, and explain how the information was used.\n\nANSWER: See answer number 23.\n\n25. Describe in detail the process and methodology that Plaintiff utilized to search for, identify, and locate the documents that Ragland requested in his first request for production of documents, including the date that Plaintiff began preserving documents related and relevant to this litigation, the scope and method of preserving documents, all persons or custodians who were asked to search for and produce responsive documents, and the search terms used to search electronically stored information.\n\nANSWER: Plaintiff searched his own information, and collected information from his agents which was thereafter produced to defendants.\n\nSUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER: Plaintiff directed his employees to search two computer hard drives maintained at the offices of Golden Spring (New York) Ltd.: (1) a hard drive where documents related to Plaintiff's legal matters are maintained; and (2) a hard drive where data stored on cell phones previously used by Plaintiff is maintained. Plaintiff requested that employees gather from those hard drives any correspondence related to his asylum application and correspondence with Lianchao Han and Jianli Yang. Employees also searched the hard drives for other documents containing the following terms: asylum, tom, ragland, clark hill, spencer lee, schiller, and hack.\n\nPlaintiff also requested that an employee search for social media postings and other public statements made by Plaintiff on the subjects of his asylum application, Clark Hill, or the hacking of Clark Hill's computer systems.\n\nIn addition, Plaintiff asked Lianchao Han to provide copies of any documents in his possession concerning Plaintiff's asylum application or Clark Hill's representation of Plaintiff.\n\nRespectfully Submitted,\n\nIslAri S. Casper\n\nAfi S. Casper Ralph S. Tyler The Casper Firm, LLC 400 East Pratt St., Suite 903 Baltimore, MD 21202 Tel: 410-989-5097 acasper@casperfirm.com\n\nAttorneys for Plaintiff\n\n## VERIFICATION\n\nThe facts stated herein are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge, information, and\n\nbelief. I\n\nGuo Wengui\n\n### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\nI HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 5th day of February, 2021, the foregoing was served to\n\nthe following by email:\n\nJohn R. Storino David P. Saunders Leigh J. Jahnig JENNER & BLOCK, LLP 353 N. Clark Street Chicago, IL 60654-3456 JStorinogenner.com dsaundersg enner.com ljahniggenner.com\n\nKali N. Bracey (4458965) JENNER & BLOCK, LLP 1099 New York Avenue NW Suite 900 Washington, DC 20001-4412 KBracey@j enner.com\n\n> /s/Ari S. Casper Ari S. Casper\n\n# **EXHIBIT H (Filed Under Seal)**\n\n# **EXHIBIT I**\n\n#### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA\n\n| ) |\n|----------------------------|\n| ) |\n| ) |\n| )
Case No. 1:19-cv-3195 |\n| ) |\n| ) |\n| )
Hon. James Boasberg |\n| ) |\n| ) |\n| ) |\n| ) |\n| ) |\n| |\n\n#### **PLAINTIFF'S ANSWERS TO DEFENDANT THOMAS K. RAGLAND'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES**\n\nPlaintiff Guo Wengui (hereinafter \"plaintiff\"), through undersigned counsel, hereby answers defendant Thomas K. Ragland's first set of interrogatories.\n\n### **GENERAL OBJECTIONS**\n\n 1. Plaintiff objects to these interrogatories to the extent that they seek information not subject to discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or information protected by the Attorney-Client Privilege, the Work Product Doctrine, or any other rule of privilege or confidentiality. Without waiving this objection, to the extent possible, plaintiff has construed every interrogatory as seeking only information not subject to any applicable privilege or immunity.\n\n2. Plaintiff objects to these interrogatories to the extent they purport to impose a greater duty than set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff provides its answers solely within the dictate of those Rules.\n\n3. Plaintiff objects to these interrogatories to the extent that they seek information that is not in its custody or control, or that of its agents, employees and attorneys, or is in the custody or control of a person or entity that is not a party to this litigation, or is as equally accessible to defendants as to the plaintiff.\n\n4. Plaintiff objects to the interrogatories that seek identification or production of all information or documents \"relating to\" the subject matter of the inquiry on the grounds that such a request is vague and so broad that it can conceivably encompass anything. Plaintiff further objects to these types of inquiries to the extent they call for legal conclusions regarding the relevance of particular documents to issues in this litigation and then to select documents on that basis.\n\n5. Plaintiff objects to the interrogatories on the ground that many of them are not limited in time or scope, are unduly burdensome, and meant to harass plaintiff.\n\n6. Plaintiff objects to these interrogatories in that they seek confidential information and that is not reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence.\n\n7. Plaintiff reserves the right to object on additional grounds, including the competency, relevancy, materiality, and admissibility of these and any future responses.\n\n8. These objections are continuing and are incorporated into plaintiff's objections to each and all of the particular and specific interrogatories and, therefore, may not be individually repeated.\n\n#### **INTERROGATORIES**\n\n1. Identify all persons who have knowledge of any facts relating to any allegation in the Complaint and state what information/facts the identified individuals possess. ANSWER: The following individuals have knowledge of the allegations in the complaint:\n\na. Plaintiff Guo Wengui 162 E. 64th Street New York, NY 10065\n\nPlaintiff has knowledge of his reasons for retaining Clark Hill; his discussions with Mr. Ragland prior to engaging Clark Hill; the terms and conditions of the representations; plaintiff and his agent's requests that Clark Hill protect plaintiff's private and sensitive information; Clark Hill's failure to protect plaintiff's information; Clark Hill's termination of its representation of plaintiff; and the damages that arose out of Clark Hill's misconduct at issue in this litigation.\n\nb. Defendant Clark Hill PLC 500 Woodward Avenue Suite 3500 Detroit, MI 48226\n\nClark Hill PLC has knowledge of the defenses in its answer; the terms and conditions of Clark Hill's and Thomas K. Ragland's representation of plaintiff; the facts and circumstances surrounding the data breach that resulted in the widespread and public disclosure of plaintiff's sensitive and confidential personal information; and the facts and circumstances surrounding Clark Hill's and Thomas K. Ragland's decision to withdraw as counsel for plaintiff.\n\nc. Defendant Thomas K. Ragland Clark Hill PLC 10001 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Suite 1300 Washington, DC 20004\n\nThomas K. Ragland has knowledge of the allegations in the complaint and defenses asserted in the answer; the terms and conditions of Clark Hill PLC's and Thomas K. Ragland's representation of plaintiff; the facts and circumstances surrounding the data breach that resulted in the wide-spread and public disclosure of plaintiff's sensitive and confidential personal information; requests to protect plaintiff's private and confidential information; and the facts and circumstances surrounding Clark Hill PLC's and his decision to withdraw as counsel for plaintiff.\n\n- d. Edward J. Hood\n\t- Clark Hill PLC 500 Woodward Avenue Suite 3500 Detroit, MI 48226\n\nEdward J. Hood has knowledge of the allegations in the complaint and defenses asserted in the answer; the facts and circumstances surrounding the data breach that resulted in the wide-spread and public disclosure of plaintiff's sensitive and confidential personal information; correspondence with plaintiff's counsel about the nature of the data breach and how Clark Hill handle the breach; and the facts and circumstances surrounding Clark Hill PLC's and Thomas K. Ragland's decision to withdraw as counsel for plaintiff.\n\ne. Dr. Lianchao Han Citizen Power Initiatives for China 415 2nd Street NE Suite 100 Washington, DC 20002\n\nDr. Lianchao Han has knowledge of the allegations in the complaint and defenses asserted in the answer; the terms and conditions of Clark Hill PLC's and Thomas K. Ragland's representation of plaintiff, including requests to protect plaintiff's information; the facts and circumstances surrounding the data breach that resulted in the wide-spread and public disclosure of plaintiff's sensitive and confidential personal information; damages to plaintiff's reputation.\n\nf. Jianli Yang\n\nCitizen Power Initiatives for China 415 2nd Street NE Suite 100 Washington, DC 20002 Dr. Jianli Yang has knowledge of the terms and conditions of Clark Hill PLC's and Thomas K. Ragland's representation of plaintiff.\n\n- g. Joshua Schiller, Esq. Boies Schiller Flexner LLP 55 Hudson Yards, 20th Floor New York, NY 10001 Mr. Schiller has limited knowledge of the facts and circumstances of plaintiff's engagement with Clark Hill. The extent of his knowledge is unknown.\n- h. Persons involved in the post-hacking investigation, at both Clark Hill and third parties whose identities are unknown at this time, who would have knowledge, potentially, of what happened, why (cause), and how it might have been prevented.\n- 2. Identify all persons who provided information used to prepare the responses to\n\nthese interrogatories or the responses to Thomas K. Ragland's requests for production, and identify\n\nthe respective interrogatory or request to which each person provided information.\n\nANSWER: Plaintiff objects on the ground that the interrogatory seeks to invade the attorney-\n\nclient privilege and work product privilege. Without waiving the objection, plaintiff and his in-\n\nhouse counsel, Daniel Podhaskie, provided information used to prepare the answers herein.\n\n3. Identify all persons who communicated with, interacted with, or directed Clark Hill on Plaintiff's behalf in connection with Clark Hill's representation of Plaintiff with respect to Plaintiff's asylum application, including, but not limited to, the discussions leading up to the representation.\n\nANSWER: *See* answer to interrogatory number 1. Plaintiff, Dr. Han, and Dr. Jianli.\n\n4. Identify all communications between Plaintiff and his representatives, employees, or agents (including without limitation Lianchao Han, any other employee at Initiatives for China, Jianli Yang, Josh Schiller, or any other attorney or employee of Boies Schiller Flexner LLP) about Clark Hill's representation of Plaintiff in U.S. immigration matters, the fact of Plaintiff's asylum application, or the cyber incident on or about September 12, 2017.\n\nANSWER: Plaintiff objects to this request as it is overly broad and unduly burdensome to \"identify\" all communications. Without waiving these objections, plaintiff has produced all relevant non-privileged correspondence among plaintiff, his agent, and Clark Hill. In addition, plaintiff states that Dr. Han and Dr. Yang had conversations with Mr. Ragland prior to retaining the firm about whether Clark Hill had adequate cyber security. Dr. Han expressly told Mr. Ragland that \"he needs to be prepared\" for a cyberattack. In response, Mr. Ragland told Dr. Han, among other things, that the firm had \"first class state of the art\" cyber technology and used \"three outside\" cyber security firms to protect client information. Mr. Ragland also advised he would let the Clark Hill \"IT people know\" about the potential for an attack. Dr. Han repeatedly continued to advise Mr. Ragland that, in Dr. Han's his opinion, the firm did not take the threat serious.\n\n5. Identify each document or communication that you contend is relevant to the determination of Clark Hill's obligations with respect to safeguarding the information pertaining to Plaintiff's representation.\n\nANSWER: Plaintiff objects to this request as it is overly broad and unduly burdensome to \"identify each document or communication.\" Plaintiff will produce trial exhibits in accordance with the Court's scheduling order and governing rules. Without waiving these objections, plaintiff has produced all relevant non-privileged correspondence among plaintiff, his agent, and Clark Hill.\n\n6. Identify and describe all contracts or agreements between Plaintiff, or Plaintiff's representatives, agents, employees, or other parties acting for Plaintiff's benefit, and Clark Hill or Thomas K. Ragland, including who made the agreement, when the agreement was made, and the substance of the agreement.\n\nANSWER: Plaintiff entered into a legal services contract with Clark Hill. Plaintiff has produced a copy of that agreement.\n\n7. Describe in detail the level of \"necessary steps and actions\" and \"special care and attention to security measures\" (*see* Complaint ¶ 35) that Plaintiff contends Clark Hill agreed to implement in order to safeguard the information pertaining to Plaintiff's representation.\n\nANSWER: Plaintiff objects to this interrogatory as it calls for a statement or description of the actions and steps required for Clark Hill to satisfy its \"duty of care\" which is a legal determination. Clark Hill was required to provide adequate security measures to protect plaintiff's information. Clark Hill knew that the representation of plaintiff was in no sense an \"ordinary\" representation with \"ordinary\" risks of unauthorized disclosure. Please see answer to interrogatory number 4. Clark Hill, through Mr. Ragland, agreed to take the necessary steps and actions to protect plaintiff's confidential information recognizing that meant the firm would take \"more than ordinary\" protective efforts, including not putting plaintiff's information on the server or using firm email accounts. Plaintiff will supplement this answer in accordance with the scheduling order governing expert disclosures.\n\n8. Describe in detail the \"necessary and effective electronic security measures\" that Plaintiff contends are \"sufficient to protect plaintiff's sensitive and confidential information\" (*see* Complaint ¶ 8).\n\nANSWER: Please see objections and answer to interrogatory number 7.\n\n9. Identify all communications between Plaintiff or Plaintiff's representatives, employees, or agents (including without limitation Lianchao Han, any other employee at Initiatives for China, Jianli Yang, Josh Schiller, or any other attorney or employee of Boies Schiller Flexner LLP) and Clark Hill, including, but not limited to, any communications relating to any warnings or risks of cyber-incidents or \"hacks,\" any special security measures requested by Plaintiff, Plaintiff's publicity of the existence of the asylum application, or any facts contained in the asylum application.\n\nANSWER: Plaintiff objects to this request as it is overly broad and unduly burdensome to \"identify all communications.\" Without waiving these objections, plaintiff has produced all relevant nonprivileged correspondence among plaintiff, his agent, and Clark Hill. Please see answer to interrogatory number 4.\n\n10. State the basis for the allegation in paragraph 35 of the Complaint that Clark Hill \"was on full notice\" prior to agreeing to represent Plaintiff \"that special care and attention to security measures were necessary, required, expected, and agreed-to by the firm.\"\n\nANSWER: See answer to interrogatory number 4. Plaintiff and Dr. Han informed Clark Hill that the CCP would try to hack the firm to obtain plaintiff's sensitive and confidential information. Mr. Ragland agreed not to use the firm's server to store or transmit plaintiff's sensitive information over the firm's email accounts, and even warned his IT group that such an attack was possible.\n\n11. State the basis for the allegation in paragraph 3 of the Complaint that Clark Hill \"assured\" Plaintiff that his confidential information would be \"protected.\"\n\nANSWER: Mr. Ragland assured plaintiff and his agents that the firm had state-of-the-art cybersecurity, three different outside firms which protect client information, and would protect plaintiff's information by using a separate computer, not placing it on the firm server or using the firm's email accounts.\n\n12. Describe the circumstances around the decision to publicize, via social media and news media, the fact of Plaintiff's asylum application and the fact of Clark Hill's representation of Plaintiff, including who made the decision, when the decision was made, who was aware of the decision before the publicity took place, and the reasons for the decision.\n\nANSWER: Plaintiff objects to the characterization that there was a decision to \"publicize\" the asylum application. Plaintiff further objects on relevance grounds and because this interrogatory invades the attorney-client privilege. Without waiving these objections, plaintiff was informed that others (presumably the CCP) knew he was seeking asylum. Plaintiff spoke to Mr. Ragland about making an announcement. Mr. Ragland thereafter gave interviews to numerous outlets regarding plaintiff's asylum application.\n\n13. Identify any communication between Plaintiff or Plaintiff's representatives, employees, or agents (including without limitation Lianchao Han, any other employee of Initiatives for China, Jianli Yang, Josh Schiller, or any other attorney or employee of Boies Schiller Flexner LLP) and any third party regarding Clark Hill's representation of Plaintiff, including, but not limited to, the filing of Plaintiff's asylum application, Clark Hill's representation of Plaintiff, the facts contained in the asylum application or the cyber incident on or about September 12, 2017.\n\nANSWER: Plaintiff objects to this interrogatory on the grounds it is overly burdensome in that it seeks to have plaintiff \"identify any communication.\" The interrogatory also is duplicative of several other interrogatories. Without waiving these objections, plaintiff has produced all relevant non-privileged communications.\n\n14. Identify any posting or communication by Plaintiff or Plaintiff's representatives, agents, or employees on any internet or social media platform or outlet, including without limitation YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, SnapChat, or TikTok regarding the filing of Plaintiff's asylum application, Clark Hill's representation of Plaintiff, the facts contained in the asylum application or the cyber incident on or about September 12, 2017.\n\nANSWER: Plaintiff objects on relevance grounds. Without waiving the objection, plaintiff's twitter account was disabled, and he no longer has access to it. Plaintiff's YouTube account does not appear to reference his asylum application.\n\n15. Identify any social media accounts or profiles, including without limitation YouTube usernames, accounts, or \"channels,\" Facebook profiles, or Twitter \"handles,\" currently used or previously used by Plaintiff, through which Plaintiff posted or disseminated, or caused to be posted or disseminated, any statements, postings, or opinions regarding the Chinese government, the Chinese Communist Party, the filing of Plaintiff's asylum application, Clark Hill's representation of Plaintiff, the facts contained in the asylum application or the cyber incident on or about September 12, 2017.\n\nANSWER: Please see objections and answer to the previous interrogatory. Plaintiff further objects on the ground that this interrogatory is unduly burdensome. Without waiving those objections, plaintiff has a YouTube account and a GTV platform containing a substantial number of videos\n\ndiscussing the CCP and the Chinese government. Again, plaintiff is not aware of any reference on either of those two social media platforms of any reference to his asylum application.\n\n16. Identify the persons to whom Plaintiff \"disclosed a broad network of CCP spies operating in the United States,\" and when such disclosure took place, as alleged in paragraph 20 of the Complaint.\n\nANSWER: Plaintiff objects on relevance grounds, as plaintiff's disclosures are not reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence about defendants' failure to protect his confidential information.\n\n17. Identify all information that was contained in Plaintiff's asylum application which Plaintiff contends was confidential before September 12, 2017 and state the basis for that contention.\n\nANSWER: The contents of plaintiff's asylum application were confidential, including names, identifying information, addresses, passport information, family information, information plaintiff had provided to the US government, and details of his commercial and other dealings. Clark Hill has these documents and plaintiff produced them as well.\n\n18. Describe in detail the basis for the allegations, in paragraphs 3, 5, 9, 44, 57, and 59 of the Complaint, that information about Plaintiff or Plaintiff's asylum application published and disseminated on social media after September 12, 2017 was acquired in the cyber-incident on or about September 12, 2017.\n\nANSWER: Plaintiff objects because the interrogatory is vague and confusing. Without waiving the objection, plaintiff's asylum application was published on social media after Clark Hill failed to adequately protect it.\n\n19. Describe in detail the damages that Plaintiff has allegedly suffered as a result of Clark Hill's alleged breach of legal duties and obligations, including the allegations in paragraph 56 of the Complaint of \"damages to his personal and professional reputation,\" \"lost substantial business opportunities,\" and the \"costs and expenses\" he has incurred.\n\nANSWER: Plaintiff has suffered damages in a variety of contexts, including, but not limited to,the following: Plaintiff entered into a consulting agreement with ACA Capital Group Limited (\"ACA\") in August 2016 (the \"Consulting Agreement\"). ACA aims to serve as the bridge connecting world-class businesses and innovative ideas between Asia and the world, while optimizing financial returns for its investors. ACA hired plaintiff as a consultant because of his reputation in the Asian business community; his knowledge and expertise of doing business throughout the world, but in particular China and Hong Kong; and because plaintiff had the ability to make introductions to numerous business executives in China and Hong Kong. The Consulting Agreement provided that plaintiff would be paid approximately \\$2 million per year. The Consulting Agreement did not have a fixed term and was expected to be ongoing. In November 2017, ACA terminated the Consulting Agreement because it learned that Clark Hill was hacked and plaintiff's very private and sensitive information was spread throughout the internet on a world-wide basis. Plaintiff was informed by ACA that it terminated the Consulting Agreement because of the company's fears that continuing its relationship with plaintiff would result in a loss of clients and future business and could result in ACA suffering a hack similar to Clark Hill.\n\nPlaintiff had other contractual arrangements with ACA worth several million dollars which were negatively affected by defendants' conduct.\n\nPlaintiff also suffered reputational damage, including followers on social media, which caused financial and other injury, and diminished plaintiff's earning capacity.\n\nPlaintiff will supply additional information regarding these injuries.\n\n20. Identify all businesses associated with Plaintiff that Plaintiff alleges has experienced harm as a result of the cyber-incident that occurred on or about September 12, 2017, or as a result of Clark Hill's alleged misconduct, and describe in detail the nature of the harm, including the basis for the allegation in paragraph 56 of the Complaint that Plaintiff has \"lost substantial business opportunities,\" and incurred \"costs and expenses.\"\n\nANSWER: See answer to interrogatory number 19.\n\n21. Describe in detail what has occurred in any proceedings in connection with Plaintiff's asylum application since September 19, 2017, including without limitation the basis for the allegation in paragraph 56 of the Complaint that Plaintiff's efforts to obtain political asylum have been delayed or otherwise harmed as a result of Clark Hill's alleged breach of legal duties and obligations, including Clark Hill's withdrawal from representing Plaintiff.\n\nANSWER: The disclosure of plaintiff's confidential asylum application has created delay because of the negative publicity surrounding the incident, Clark Hill's withdrawal as counsel for plaintiff, and the publication of plaintiff's sensitive, confidential, and private matters, some of which involve sensitive national security issues.\n\n22. Describe in detail the alleged harm or persecution that Plaintiff has suffered as a result of actions by or on behalf of the Chinese government or the Chinese Communist Party before the cyber incident on or about September 12, 2017, including the basis for Plaintiff's \"good reason to fear for his personal safety\" as described in paragraph 16 of the Complaint, the basis for the allegation in paragraph 17 of the Complaint that \"the CCP believes plaintiff presently holds not publicly known proof of various types of improper conduct on the part of the CCP and those associates with it and acting on its behalf,\" the basis for the allegations in paragraph 23 of the\n\nComplaint that demonstrations outside the building where Plaintiff resides were \"staged\" by the CCP, and the basis for the allegations in paragraph 26 of the Complaint that \"the CCP perceives plaintiff as a dangerous challenge to the stability, legitimacy, and credibility of the Chinese regime and the CCP.\"\n\nANSWER: Plaintiff has been effective in influencing international opinion with respect to China and the CCP. From the perspective of the CCP, plaintiff's activities and advocacy have affected adversely China's and the CCP's stature in the world community and, in response, the Chinese government has attempted to silence plaintiff. The Chinese government/CCP has employed various tactics, including coercion and offering bribes to attempt to silence plaintiff, including, using overseas intelligence networks to seek to discredit, silence, and threaten plaintiff's personal safety or, at the very least, to cause plaintiff to have good reason to fear for his personal safety as well as fearing for the safety of family members and friends.\n\n The CCP believes plaintiff presently holds not publicly known proof of various types of improper conduct on the part of the CCP and those associated with it and acting on its behalf, including information relating to corruption, murder, hiding of illegally-gained money, and China's spy network. For these and other reasons, the Chinese government and the CCP are highly motivated, to understate the matter, and engaged aggressively in seeking to silence plaintiff. The Chinese government and the CCP are equally motivated and engaged in seeking to learn what plaintiff knows about improper activities undertaken by or on behalf of the Chinese government and the CCP. And, perhaps most critically, the Chinese government and the CCP have the capabilities – the \"operational reach\" – to carry out aggressive hostile actions against plaintiff.\n\nThe Chinese government and/or the CCP sent agents and officials to the United States to organize demonstrations aimed directly against plaintiff outside the building in New York City\n\nwhere plaintiff resides. Persons attending these CCP-staged demonstrations, literally on plaintiff's front steps, were provided with preprinted signs defaming plaintiff in vile language, calling him a rapist and a liar, and urging plaintiff to leave the United States.\n\nPlaintiff believes that the CCP perceives him as a dangerous challenge to the stability, legitimacy, and credibility of the Chinese regime and the CCP.\n\n23. Describe in detail any harms that Plaintiff has suffered at the hands of or caused by the Chinese government that have occurred after the cyber-incident on or about September 12, 2017, including the basis for allegations in paragraph 56 of the Complaint, that \"plaintiff's personal safety and security have been put at risk,\" \"his family has been arrested and threatened,\" and \"plaintiff's employees in China have been harassed,\" and the basis for the allegations in paragraph 58 of the Complaint that \"plaintiff's freedom and liberty to travel\" has been \"limit[ed] and that \"his personal safety\" has been \"jeopardize[ed]\" as a result of Clark Hill's alleged breach of legal duties and obligations.\n\nANSWER: Objection. This interrogatory is duplicative. Without waiving this objection, see answer numbers 19, 22, and other information contained in prior interrogatories, of which this interrogatory is duplicative.\n\n24. Identify any person who, after September 12, 2017, has used Plaintiff's information that Plaintiff alleges was obtained in the cyber-incident, identify what specific information was used, and explain how the information was used.\n\nANSWER: See answer number 23.\n\n25. Describe in detail the process and methodology that Plaintiff utilized to search for, identify, and locate the documents that Ragland requested in his first request for production of documents, including the date that Plaintiff began preserving documents related and relevant to\n\nthis litigation, the scope and method of preserving documents, all persons or custodians who were asked to search for and produce responsive documents, and the search terms used to search electronically stored information.\n\nANSWER: Plaintiff searched his own information, and collected information from his agents which was thereafter produced to defendants.\n\nRespectfully Submitted,\n\n/s/*Ari S. Casper*\n\nAri S. Casper Ralph S. Tyler The Casper Firm, LLC 400 East Pratt St., Suite 903 Baltimore, MD 21202 Tel: 410-989-5097 [acasper@casperfirm.com](mailto:acasper@casperfirm.com)\n\n*Attorneys for Plaintiff*\n\n#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 27th day of July 2020, the foregoing was served to the\n\nfollowing by email:\n\n John R. Storino (*via pro hac vice*) Leigh J. Jahnig (*via pro hac vice*) JENNER & BLOCK, LLP 353 N. Clark Street Chicago, IL 60654-3456 [JStorino@jenner.com](mailto:JStorino@jenner.com) [ljahnig@jenner.com](mailto:ljahnig@jenner.com)\n\n Kali N. Bracey (#458965) JENNER & BLOCK, LLP 1099 New York Avenue NW Suite 900 Washington, DC 20001-4412 [KBracey@jenner.com](mailto:KBracey@jenner.com)\n\n> */s/ Ari S. Casper* Ari S. Casper\n\n#### **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**\n\n) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )\n\n| GUO WENGUI a/k/a MILES KWOK, | | |\n|------------------------------------------|--|--|\n| Plaintiff, | | |\n| v. | | |\n| CLARK HILL PLC and THOMAS K.
RAGLAND, | | |\n| Defendants. | | |\n\nCivil Action No. 1:10-CV-3195-JEB\n\nHon. James Boasberg\n\n#### **PROPOSED ORDER**\n\n The Court having considered the Defendants' Motion to Compel Deposition Testimony or, in the Alternative, for a Negative Inference hereby ORDERS that:\n\n1. Plaintiff answer the questions Plaintiff refused to answer at his July 26, 2021\n\nDeposition on the basis of his Fifth Amendment rights.\n\n2. Or in the alternative, the Court will give the jury instruction permitting a negative\n\ninference to cure the prejudice that would result from Plaintiff's refusal to answer the questions.\n\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\n\nENTERED this \\_\\_\\_\\_ day of September, 2021.\n\nHonorable James Boasberg United States District Judge\n\n\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\n\n#### **EXHIBIT 9**\n\n#### **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**\n\n**GUO WENGUI,**\n\n **Plaintiff,**\n\n**v. Civil Action No. 19-3195 (JEB)**\n\n**CLARK HILL PLC,** *et al.***,**\n\n**Defendants.**\n\n#### **MEMORANDUM OPINION**\n\nUnknown hackers exposed Plaintiff Guo Wengui's personal information to the public after breaching the servers of Defendant Clark Hill PLC, the law firm that had been preparing his application for asylum in the United States. Guo is a prominent critic of the Chinese Communist Party, and both sides assume that the Chinese government was behind the attack. In this Motion, Defendants Clark Hill and firm attorney Thomas K. Ragland (jointly, Clark Hill) ask the Court to compel Guo to answer deposition questions for which he asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege. Because there is at least some possibility that Guo's responses could be incriminating, the Court will deny the Motion. While a negative inference may be available to Clark Hill at some point in this litigation, the Court will not decide that issue here.\n\n#### **I. Background**\n\nClark Hill conducted a 10-hour deposition of Plaintiff, which is documented in a 286 page transcript with 16 exhibits. See ECF No. 69 (Pl. Opp.) at 1, 3. During that deposition, Guo's counsel in his ongoing investigations (as opposed to counsel in this lawsuit) advised him to refuse to answer a number of questions by asserting his Fifth Amendment right against self-\n\nincrimination. See ECF No. 67-1 (Def. Mot.) at 1. Guo heeded that advice and withheld answers to \"approximately 28 questions on a variety of topics,\" which Defendants bundle into five categories:\n\n- Plaintiff's \"alleged consulting relationship with ACA Capital Group Limited\";\n- Plaintiff's past litigation where he \"alleged emotional harm during the same period at issue in this case and litigation Guo has pursued through his entities\";\n- Plaintiff's \"relationship with T&M Protection Resources\";\n- Plaintiff's \"asylum application\"; and\n- Plaintiff's \"wealth and assets.\"\n\nId. at 3–4. Plaintiff did not refuse to answer all questions in these categories, however. For some, he declined to answer only to the extent that they bore on his \"affiliation with any entity\" or were \"economic or business[ ]related.\" ECF No. 67-2, Exh. A (Tbl. of Pl. Invocations of Fifth Amend.), Nos. 6–7.\n\nIn moving to compel, Clark Hill asserts that Guo's testimony is not protected by the Fifth Amendment and that his answers to the questions are \"centrally relevant\" to the issue of damages in this case. See Def. Mot. at 4; see also ECF No. 71 (Def. Repl.) at 1. It asks the Court to compel Guo to answer or, in the alternative, to \"authorize the giving of a jury instruction permitting a negative inference from Guo's refusal to answer.\" Def. Mot. at 2. Guo's investigations counsel submitted an *ex parte*, *in camera* declaration outlining his reasons for advising Guo to invoke the privilege. The Court subsequently held an *ex parte* telephonic conference with both Plaintiff's counsel in this suit and his investigations counsel, where it asked for further explanation for why Defendants' questions would require answers that would violate Guo's Fifth Amendment rights.\n\n#### **II. Legal Standard**\n\nRule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure entitles parties to \"move for an order compelling an answer\" in the event that \"a deponent fails to answer a question asked under Rule 30 or 31.\" Rules 30(a)(2) and 31(a)(2) require a court to grant leave for oral and written depositions, respectively, \"to the extent consistent with Rule 26(b)(1).\" Rule 26(b)(1), in turn, sets the \"scope of discovery . . . as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.\" The question here is whether Defendants' deposition questions \"regard[] matter[s]\" subject to the privilege of the Fifth Amendment.\n\n#### **III. Analysis**\n\nClark Hill argues that the Fifth Amendment does not protect Guo's silence for two reasons. First, it maintains that he \"articulated no basis for asserting\" the Fifth Amendment privilege and that \"some of the topics have no conceivable ability to incriminate him.\" Def. Mot. at 2. Second, it contends that even if the privilege applied, \"Guo waived the privilege over some or all of the[] topics with his prior allegations and discovery answers.\" Id. The Court considers each of these two arguments before turning to Defendants' alternative request for a jury instruction permitting a negative inference from Guo's refusal to answer.\n\n#### A. Fifth Amendment Privilege\n\nThe Fifth Amendment protects a witness from being forced to give testimony in a civil case when he \"reasonably believes\" that such testimony could be used against him \"in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used.\" Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444–45 (1972); see also Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17, 21 (2001). To successfully invoke the privilege, Guo has the burden of proving that he faces a threat of self-incrimination\n\nthat is \"real\" and \"not remote or speculative.\" District Title v. Warren, 265 F. Supp. 3d 17, 21 (D.D.C. 2017) (citing Zicarelli v. N.J. State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472, 478 (1972)); SEC v. Parkersburg Wireless Ltd. Liability Co., 156 F.R.D. 529, 535 (D.D.C. 1994); see also Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) (more than witness's \"say-so\" is required to establish that privilege applies).\n\nNevertheless, because the Fifth Amendment privilege \"must be accorded liberal construction in favor of the right it was intended to secure,\" Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486, the Court may compel Guo to testify only if it \"clearly appears\" that he is at no risk of self-incrimination. Id.; cf. id. at 488 (must be \"perfectly clear . . . that the answer(s) cannot possibly have . . . [a] tendency to incriminate\"). With the above considerations in mind, the Court must use its \"personal perception[s] of the peculiarities of the case,\" id. at 487 (internal citation omitted), to individually evaluate the applicability of the privilege for each question that Guo refused to answer. See Reese, 561 F.2d at 900; see also District Title, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 22.\n\nAfter reviewing the *ex parte* declaration and hearing from Guo's investigations counsel, the Court believes that Plaintiff has successfully carried the burden of establishing that there is a possibility that his answers would be incriminating. Because the factual basis of that decision is under seal, however, the Court may not elaborate further on the particulars of Guo's decision.\n\nDefendants' conclusory arguments that \"there is no plausible basis for Guo to fear prosecution based on questions about his wealth, personnel, and residences\" and that \"questions concerning his activities in China\" cannot possibly \"implicate him in prosecution within the United States\" miss the mark. See Def. Mot. at 8. The Court is sympathetic to the fact that \"Clark Hill has no basis to understand why Guo thinks answering Clark Hill's questions would incriminate him\" because the details underlying his fear were submitted *in camera*. See ECF\n\nNo. 71 (Def. Repl.) at 2. That imbalance, however, stems from the nature of the Fifth Amendment privilege. See Anton v. Prospect Cafe Milano, Inc., 233 F.R.D. 216, 218 (D.D.C. 2006) (citing Reese, 561 F.2d at 900) (courts may not force witness to testify to reasonableness of his fear of persecution).\n\nClark Hill also fails in its attempt to frame the inquiry as a question of whether Plaintiff's answers \"would be incrementally incriminating\" given his previous statements on related topics. See Def. Mot. at 6. The \"further incriminat[ion]\" standard, which is less deferential to the party invoking the privilege, only applies after waiver of the privilege has been established. See Parkersburg Wireless, 156 F.R.D. at 535 & n.10 (explaining that Rogers v. U.S., 340 U.S. 367 (1951), intended wider scope of inquiry to be available after waiver than before) (internal citations omitted). It, accordingly, has no bearing on the question of whether the privilege attaches in the first place. Id. at 535 n.10 (\"In determining whether a new question 'further incriminates' [the] defendant, the Court should not apply the same rigid test used to determine whether the privilege could be initially invoked.\").\n\nHaving reviewed the individual questions at issue, the Court finds that each has a sufficient nexus to topics where Guo has a reasonable fear that he could be exposed to criminal liability. The Fifth Amendment privilege thus attaches, unless Defendants can prove waiver.\n\nB. Waiver\n\nA witness waives his Fifth Amendment privilege by \"voluntarily rais[ing]\" an incriminating issue. Id. at 535 (citing Rogers, 340 U.S. at 373). Federal courts \"have universally held that a 'testimonial waiver is not to be lightly inferred and the courts accordingly indulge every reasonable presumption against finding a testimonial waiver.'\" In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, 120 F. Supp. 2d 58, 66 (D.D.C. 2000) (quoting Klein v. Harris, 667 F.2d 274, 287 (2d\n\nCir. 1981)); see also Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137, 150 (1949). \"Traditionally, courts have only inferred a waiver of the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination from a witness's prior statements if [both]: '(1) the witness' prior statements have created a significant likelihood that the finder of fact will be left with and prone to rely on a distorted view of the truth, and (2) the witness had reason to know that his prior statements would be interpreted as a waiver of the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination.'\" In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 66 (quoting Klein, 667 F.2d at 287).\n\nAs discussed above, Clark Hill groups the unanswered questions into five categories: (1) Guo's relationship with ACA Capital; (2) his past litigation involving allegations of emotional harm; (3) his relationship with T&M Protection Resources; (4) his asylum application; and (5) his wealth and assets. See Def. Mot. at 3–5. Defendants posit that Guo voluntarily provided information in each of these categories. Id. at 5–6. They further assert that the unanswered questions \"are highly relevant to [their] defense.\" Def. Repl. at 2. Because the questions implicate Guo's Fifth Amendment privilege, however, the inquiry is not whether his answers would be \"relevant.\" Rather, for this Court to infer waiver, Guo's previous testimony must satisfy the two-part test outlined above. See In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 67. This is not the case here.\n\nFor questions in category (1), Defendants insist that they \"must be able to challenge the notion that Guo's reputation was harmed and his relationship with ACA goes directly to that.\" Def. Repl. at 3. For category (4), they argue that \"[t]o the extent Guo was untruthful on [his asylum] application or now gives statements inconsistent with it, that goes directly to his credibility and claims in the case.\" Id. Those are persuasive arguments that the unanswered questions would be relevant to Clark Hill's defense, but they do not establish that Guo's prior\n\nstatements will leave the factfinder with a distorted view of events. The Fifth Amendment often insulates details that would be helpful to a party's case, so Defendants must prove more. As for category (3), Guo's statements in different lawsuits cannot constitute waiver in this matter. See In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 66 (\"[M]ost courts that have considered this issue have held that the waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination in one proceeding does not affect the right of a witness or accused to invoke the privilege as to the same subject matter in another independent proceeding, but is limited to the proceeding in which it occurs.\"). And for categories (2) and (5), Defendants point to nothing in Plaintiff's prior testimony that could be construed as a waiver for such broad categories as his \"relationship with T&M Protection\" or his \"wealth and assets.\" See Def. Mot. 6–7.\n\nA trial court must \"'strive to accommodate a party's Fifth Amendment interests' while at the same time being careful to 'ensure that the opposing party is not unduly disadvantaged.'\" In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 66–67 (quoting Serafino v. Hasbro, Inc., 82 F.3d 515, 518 (1st Cir. 1996)). Here, the balance of those competing considerations weighs in favor of preserving Plaintiff's constitutional right. The Court thus finds that his previous testimony did not waive his Fifth Amendment privilege.\n\n#### C. Negative Inference\n\nAs a fallback, Defendants argue that the Court must at the least order that the jury should draw a negative inference from Guo's invocation of the privilege. See Def. Mot. at 8–10; Def. Repl. at 5. Courts may indeed draw an adverse inference against a civil litigant who successfully invokes his Fifth Amendment privilege. SEC v. Whittemore, 659 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2011), aff'g 691 F. Supp. 2d 198 (D.D.C. 2010). Such inference is appropriate when a party to a civil proceeding \"refuse[s] to testify in response to probative evidence offered against [him].\" SEC v.\n\nInt'l Loan Network, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 678, 695 (D.D.C. 1991), aff'd, 968 F.2d 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976)). Since Guo \"control[s] the evidence\" that Clark Hill seeks, an adverse inference may be particularly warranted. See Whittemore, 691 F. Supp. 2d at 206. A factfinder may also consider Guo's silence when later evaluating his credibility. Latif v. Obama, 666 F.3d 746, 759 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Such silence, however, \"should be 'given no more evidentiary value than [i]s warranted by the facts surrounding his case.'\" Int'l Loan Network, Inc., 770 F. Supp. at 695 (alteration in original) (quoting Baxter, 425 U.S. at 318); cf. Doe ex rel. Rudy-Glanzer v. Glanzer, 232 F.3d 1258, 1266 (9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting adverse inference from party's refusal to provide results of unreliable medical test that would not have been admissible as evidence). An adverse inference is thus likely warranted here.\n\nWhile this may be so, the Court finds it premature to decide on the precise wording of a jury instruction at this stage. The better course is to wait until hearing the parties' arguments and the evidence introduced. In addition, if Defendants believe that a negative inference would be relevant and appropriate at summary judgment, they may so indicate in that briefing.\n\n#### **IV. Conclusion**\n\nBecause Plaintiff has sufficiently shown that answering Defendants' questions could put him at risk of criminal liability, the Court will deny their Motion to compel his deposition testimony. A separate Order so stating will issue this day.\n\n> /s/ *James E. Boasberg* JAMES E. BOASBERG United States District Judge\n\nDate: October 25, 2021\n\n#### **EXHIBIT 10**\n\n#### **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**\n\n**GUO WENGUI,**\n\n **Plaintiff,**\n\n**v. Civil Action No. 19-3195 (JEB)**\n\n**CLARK HILL PLC,** *et al.***,**\n\n**Defendants.**\n\n#### **ORDER**\n\nFor the reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, the Court\n\nORDERS that Defendants' Motion to Compel is DENIED.\n\n/s/ *James E. Boasberg* JAMES E. BOASBERG United States District Judge\n\nDate: October 25, 2021\n\n#### **Exhibit 11**\n\nThis exhibit has been filed under seal.\n\n### **EXHIBIT 12**\n\n#### **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**\n\n**GUO WENGUI,**\n\n**Plaintiff,**\n\n**v. Civil Action No. 19-3195 (JEB)**\n\n**CLARK HILL PLC,** *et al.***,**\n\n**Defendants.**\n\n#### **MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER**\n\nPlaintiff Guo Wengui's suit alleges that Defendant Clark Hill PLC, a law firm, and its attorney Thomas Ragland are liable for legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract stemming from the firm's failure to safeguard Plaintiff's asylum materials from hacking and its subsequent withdrawal as his counsel. See ECF No. 1-1 (Complaint). On February 20, 2020, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, tossing Guo's counts \"to the extent they rely on the theory that Defendants' withdrawal constituted a legally remediable wrong, but . . . permit[ting] those claims to go forward that allege misrepresentations surrounding and mishandling of his confidential information.\" Guo Wengui v. Clark Hill, PLC, 440 F. Supp. 3d 30, 33 (D.D.C. 2020). The Court so held because \"Plaintiff ha[d] not sufficiently pled that Defendants' [withdrawal], even if improper, damaged or prejudiced him.\" Id. at 41. Armed with a recent psychiatrist's report purporting to show injury from the withdrawal, Guo now seeks twenty months later to reinstate his withdrawal-based claims. See ECF No. 72-1 (Motion to Revise Order). As discovery has since closed, Guo's delay and the resulting prejudice to Defendants dictate denial of the Motion.\n\n#### **I. Legal Standard**\n\nBecause Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of an interlocutory order dismissing the case in part, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) governs the Court's analysis. See Prince George's Hospital Center v. Advantage Healthplan Inc., 985 F. Supp. 2d 38, 42 (D.D.C. 2013)\n\n(\"Rule [54\\(b\\)](http)) is the appropriate procedural mechanism for reconsideration where, as here, the challenged order grants in part and denies in part a defendant's motion to dismiss, and therefore does not constitute a final judgment.\"). \"The standard of review for interlocutory decisions differs from the standards applied to final judgments under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b).\" Williams v. Savage, 569 F. Supp. 2d 99, 108 (D.D.C. 2008). Plaintiff has a lower bar to clear, as \"reconsideration of an interlocutory decision is available under the standard 'as justice requires.'\" Judicial Watch v. Dep't of Army, 466 F. Supp. 2d 112, 123 (D.D.C. 2006); accord Lemmons v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 241 F.R.D. 15, 21–23 (D.D.C. 2007).\n\nThe \"as justice requires\" standard may be met where, for example, the court \"has patently misunderstood\" the parties, strayed far afield of the issues presented, or failed to consider \"a controlling or significant change in the law or facts . . since the submission of the issue.\" See Cobell v. Norton, 224 F.R.D. 266, 272 (D.D.C. 2004) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). \"These considerations leave a great deal of room for the court's decision, and, accordingly, the 'as justice requires' standard amounts to determining 'whether [relief upon] reconsideration is necessary under the relevant circumstances.'\" Lewis v. Dist. of Columbia, 736 F. Supp. 2d 98, 102 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Cobell, 224 F.R.D. at 272). A court's discretion under Rule 54(b), however, is \"limited by the law of the case doctrine and subject to the caveat that where litigants have once battled for the court's decision, they should neither be required, nor without good reason permitted, to battle for it again.\" Singh v. George Washington Univ.,\n\n383 F. Supp. 2d 99, 101 (D.D.C. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting *In re* Ski Train Fire in Kaprun, Austria, on Nov. 11, 2004, 224 F.R.D. 543, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)).\n\n#### **II. Analysis**\n\nIn asking the Court to revisit its prior ruling, Plaintiff cites \"important new information which was not previously available.\" Mot. at 2. In particular, he notes that he \"recently (on October 4, 2021) obtained a report from a board certified psychiatrist which details plaintiff's significant withdrawal-caused harm.\" Id. (footnote omitted). Defendants, in response, raise a bevy of objections. The Motion is futile, they contend, as their \"withdrawal cannot give rise to a claim because, under the D.C. Rule[s] of Professional Conduct, Clark Hill had a legal right to withdraw.\" ECF No. 79-1 (Opp.) at 8–9. In addition, they suggest that a plaintiff cannot recover emotional-distress damages in such a circumstance absent a physical injury. Id. at 9–10. Even if Guo's proposed new claims are facially plausible, they continue, his delay is reason enough to deny the Motion, the granting of which would also prejudice Defendants. Id. at 10–14. Agreeing with the last points, the Court need not pursue the merits.\n\nAs to delay, the Court issued its decision in February 2020, almost 20 months before Guo filed the instant Motion. His only rejoinder to the delay accusation is to flag the psychiatrist's recent report. While the report may be new, he has been aware of his distress since the onset of the suit. After all, it is his own distress. See Klayman v. Judicial Watch, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 3d 208, 215 (D.D.C. 2018) (\"Plaintiff would have been intimately aware of the facts that caused his alleged distress at the time that the distress was caused.\"). All discovery except that for experts has closed, furthermore, meaning that Guo's request comes at the eleventh hour. Finally, if the route Guo had wanted to pursue was amending his Complaint, the deadline for that was July 1, 2020, over fifteen months before he filed his Motion. See Minute Order of April 21, 2020. The\n\ndelay alone strongly weighs against Plaintiff. See Trudel v. SunTrust Bank, 924 F.3d 1281, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (\"'[U]ndue delay' is a valid ground for denying leave to amend.\"); Elkins v. District of Columbia, 690 F.3d 554, 565 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (\"Undue delay is a valid reason to reject a party's attempt to add a new theory of liability to a complaint\").\n\nIn order to be dispositive, however, delay must frequently be coupled with prejudice, see Atchinson v. District of Columbia, 73 F.3d 418, 426 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting that courts \"should generally take into account . . . the possibility of any resulting prejudice\"), and it is here. Defendants explain that they have pursued discovery and shaped their case with the expectation that emotional-distress damages would only be recoverable for the hack, not the withdrawal. To permit Plaintiff to suddenly reverse field and open up an entirely new category of damages would be unfair to them and the tactics they have chosen. See 6 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller *et al.*, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1487 (3d ed. 2021) (\"[I]f the amendment substantially changes the theory on which the case has been proceeding and is proposed late enough so that the opponent would be required to engage in significant new preparation, the court may deem it prejudicial.\"). The Court believes this particularly true here where Plaintiff, after initially pursuing economic damages, has dropped that request, in part apparently because he was obliged to assert the Fifth Amendment in response to questions about his businesses. In addition, the Court has growing concerns about his ability to prove the cause of his distress damages given that he has filed no fewer than ten suits in the last few years seeking such damages from varied defendants in assorted incidents. See Opp. at 12 n.1.\n\nFor all of these reasons, no expansion of his Complaint will be permitted here, and he shall proceed on damages from the hack alone.\n\n#### **III. Conclusion**\n\nThe Court, accordingly, ORDERS that Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.\n\n*/s/ James E. Boasberg*\n\n JAMES E. BOASBERG United States District Judge\n\nDate: November 9, 2021\n\n#### **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| ----------------------------------------------------------- | x | |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|-------------------------|\n| In re: | :
: | Chapter 11 |\n| HO WAN KWOK et al., | :
:
: | Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |\n| Debtors.1 | :
: | Jointly Administered |\n| ----------------------------------------------------------- | x | |\n\n#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nThe undersigned hereby certifies that on April 28, 2023, the foregoing Motion, and all declarations, exhibits and attachments thereto, was electronically filed. Notice of this filing was sent by e-mail to all parties to the above-captioned chapter 11 case by operation of the Court's electronic filing (\"CM/ECF\") system or by mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing as indicated on the Notice of Electronic Filing. Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF system.\n\nDated: April 28, 2023\n\nNew Haven, Connecticut By: */s/ Douglas S. Skalka* Douglas S. Skalka (ct00616) Patrick R. Linsey (ct29437) NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 781-2847 dskalka@npmlaw.com plinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n*Counsel for the Chapter 11 Trustee*\n\n1 The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).","body_zh":"美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院 布里奇波特分院\n\n----------------------------------------------------------- x\n\n关于： :\n: 第11章\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），\n等， :\n:\n: 案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人。 :\n: （合并管理）\n----------------------------------------------------------- x\n第11章受托人根据《破产程序规则》第9019条提出的动议，请求作出裁定，批准与 CLARK HILL PLC（克拉克·希尔律师事务所）达成的和解协议\n\nLuc A. Despins（吕克·A·德斯平斯）以其作为在上述所列 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（以下简称“债务人”或“原告”）第11章案件（以下简称“第11章案件”）中获任命的第11章受托人（以下简称“受托人”）的身份，谨根据《联邦破产程序规则》（以下简称“破产规则”）第9019(a)条及美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院破产程序地方法规（以下简称“地方法规”）第9019-1(a)条，提交本动议（以下简称“本动议”），请求作出一项实质上按随附附件1所示格式的裁定（以下简称“拟议裁定”），批准受托人、Thomas K. Ragland（托马斯·K·拉格兰德）及 Clark Hill PLC（克拉克·希尔律师事务所）（统称“各方”）之间的和解协议（以下简称“和解协议”），该和解协议作为拟议裁定的附件A随附于后。为支持本动议，受托人谨陈述如下：\n\n1 本第11章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（又名 Guo Wengui、Miles Guo 和 Miles Kwok，以及众多其他别名）（税务识别号码后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（税务识别号码后四位：8202）及 Genever Holdings Corporation。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 及 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为：Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166，收件人：Luc A. Despins，作为 Ho Wan Kwok 遗产的受托人（仅用于通知及通信）。\n\n管辖权与审判地\n\n1. 本法院根据 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 和 1334，以及美国康涅狄格州联邦地区法院（United States District Court for the District of Connecticut）作出的授权移送常设命令，对审理本动议具有管辖权。本案属于 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) 所称的核心程序。\n\n2. 根据 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 和 1409，本地区为适格审判地。\n\n3. 本案所请求救济的依据为《破产规则》第9019(a)条及地方法规第9019-1(a)条。\n\n背景\n\n一、Clark Hill 诉讼\n\n4. 2019年9月19日，债务人在哥伦比亚特区高等法院（Superior Court of the District of Columbia）对其前任法律顾问 Clark Hill PLC（“Clark Hill”）及 Clark Hill 成员 Thomas K. Ragland（与 Clark Hill 合称“被告”）提起诉状（以下简称“诉状”），主张律师执业过失，并就涉及 Clark Hill 计算机服务器的网络事件所造成的损害请求赔偿；该网络事件据称导致债务人的庇护申请信息在互联网上被公开传播（以下简称“本诉讼”）。2\n\n5. 债务人主张，2017年8月，其聘请 Clark Hill 担任移民法律顾问，以协助其在美国申请并取得政治庇护时，曾就其作为“一名知名中国政治异见人士”的身份，警告 Clark Hill 注意中国共产党（以下简称“中共”）可能发动网络攻击的风险。3 债务人主张，被告称将采取特别预防措施以防止该等攻击，但据称未能如此，致使债务人的庇护申请\n\n2 债务人聘请 The Casper Firm, LLC（卡斯珀律师事务所）的 Ari Casper（阿里·卡斯珀）（“Casper 律师”）在本诉讼中代理其；被告则聘请 Jenner & Block LLP（詹纳与布洛克律师事务所）（“Jenner & Block”）担任辩护律师。\n\n3 移送通知，附件1，诉状第31段，Wengui v. Clark Hill PLC, No. 1:19-cv-03195-JEB (D. D.C. Oct. 24, 2019) [Docket No. 1]，作为附件2随附于后。\n\n中所含个人信息据称因对 Clark Hill 计算机系统实施的网络攻击（以下简称“网络攻击”）而被公开传播。\n\n6. 债务人主张，就网络攻击以及 Clark Hill 此后不再担任其法律顾问一事而言，债务人遭受了“损害、伤害及不法侵害……其直接和近因系被告因该律所对原告提供法律代理而对原告负有的义务发生多项严重违约所致”。4 具体而言，诉状对被告提出下列救济请求：(I) 违反信义义务；(II) 违反代理合同；(III) 法律执业过失；以及 (IV) 惩罚性赔偿；5 并请求与下列事项有关的补偿性及惩罚性赔偿：(i) 声誉损害，(ii) 对债务人人身安全的风险，(iii) 其庇护申请的延误，以及 (iv) 丧失商业机会。\n\n7. 2019年10月24日，本诉讼被移送至美国哥伦比亚特区联邦地区法院（United States District Court for the District of Columbia）（以下简称“地区法院”）。\n\n8. 2019年11月25日，被告提交驳回动议（以下简称“驳回动议”），请求有偏见地驳回诉状中的全部罪名项。6 2020年2月20日，地区法院作出裁定，部分准许并部分驳回该驳回动议（以下简称“MTD裁定”）。7 MTD裁定无偏见地完全驳回了关于惩罚性赔偿的第IV项罪名，并在债务人第I至III项罪名所涉主张依赖于以下理论的范围内予以驳回：即被告停止担任法律顾问构成可依法获得救济的\n\n4 同上，第1段。\n\n5 同上，第62至65段；第89至93段。\n\n6 参见驳回动议，Wengui v. Clark Hill PLC, No. 1:19-cv-03195-JEB (D. D.C. Nov. 25, 2019) [Docket No. 12]，作为附件3随附于后。\n\n7 参见 MTD裁定，Wengui v. Clark Hill PLC, No. 1:19-cv-03195-JEB (D. D.C. Feb. 20, 2020) [Docket No. 17]，作为附件4随附于后。\n\n不法行为。该驳回缩小了本诉讼的范围及可获救济，因为债务人关于被告“无正当、充分或有效理由”而“以不当及不法方式终止其对[债务人]的代理”，从而“违反其合同、普通法及专业义务”的主张，若非遭到驳回，本可构成债务人在诉状中请求损害赔偿的重要依据。8 地区法院准许债务人关于其机密信息被不当处理的主张及相关损害赔偿继续进行。9\n\n9. 2020年3月19日，被告提交对诉状的答辩（以下简称“答辩”），10 此后本诉讼开始证据开示程序。\n\n10. 2021年7月26日，债务人表示其不再在本诉讼中请求任何经济损害赔偿，并告知其唯一请求的赔偿为精神损害及仅限于导致债务人痛苦的“声誉”损害。11 经济损害赔偿此前曾构成债务人所请求赔偿的重要依据——债务人在诉状中主张其商业声誉受损，并损失了大量收入及商业机会。12 随着该等请求被驳回，诉状现仅请求因被告据称不当处理债务人机密信息而据称造成的精神损害赔偿。\n\n12 参见附件2第56段。\n\n8 附件2第87段。\n\n9 参见意见书第2页，Wengui v. Clark Hill PLC, No. 1:19-cv-03195-JEB (D. D.C. Feb. 20, 2020) [Docket No. 18]，作为附件5随附于后。\n\n10 答辩，Wengui v. Clark Hill PLC, No. 1:19-cv-03195-JEB (D. D.C. Mar. 19, 2020) [Docket No. 20]，作为附件6随附于后。\n\n11 参见简易判决动议，被告支持简易判决的地方法规7(h)无争议重大事实陈述第246段，Wengui v. Clark Hill PLC, No. 1:19-cv-03195-JEB (D. D.C. Feb. 15, 2022) [Docket No. 86]（密封提交），作为附件7随附于后。\n\n11. 2021年7月28日，Clark Hill 对债务人进行了证言录取。在证言录取期间，债务人以《第五修正案》为由，拒绝回答约28个涉及各种事项的问题，包括涉及债务人与 ACA Capital Group Limited（ACA 资本集团有限公司）据称关系的问题13，以及涉及债务人财富和资产的问题。14\n\n12. 2021年9月14日，Clark Hill 提交动议，请求强制债务人回答其在证言录取中援引《第五修正案》而拒绝回答的问题，或作为替代请求，准许根据债务人拒绝回答作出不利推定。15\n\n13. 作为回应，债务人的调查法律顾问提交了一份单方、不公开审查的声明，说明其建议债务人援引该特权的理由。16 随后，地区法院与债务人的调查法律顾问举行单方电话听证会，并要求进一步说明为何被告的问题——包括与债务人的财务联系、财富及资产有关的问题——会要求作出违反债务人《第五修正案》权利的回答。基于该声明及听证会，地区法院驳回17 被告的强制答复动议，认定债务人已成功证明其回答可能具有自证其罪性质，因此《第五修正案》特权适用。18 地区法院拒绝就被告提出的替代请求作出裁定，即作出陪审团指示，命令对债务人作出不利推定，因为地区法院认为，在听取各方论点及证据之前作出该裁定尚属过早；但地区法院仍指出，“[对债务人作出]不利推定在此很可能是有必要的”。19\n\n13 债务人此前曾主张，网络攻击使其失去了与 ACA Capital Group Limited 签订的一份价值数百万美元的合同。\n\n14 参见被告强制证言答复动议，或作为替代请求作出不利推定，第1段，Wengui v. Clark Hill PLC, No. 1:19-cv-03195-JEB (D. D.C. Sept. 14, 2021) [Docket No. 67]，作为附件8随附于后；支持被告强制证言答复动议或作为替代请求作出不利推定的备忘录，第1页 [Docket No. 67-1]，作为附件8随附于后；意见书第1至2页，Wengui v. Clark Hill PLC, No. 1:19-cv-03195-JEB (D. D.C. Oct. 25, 2021) [Docket No. 78]，作为附件9随附于后。\n\n15 参见附件8。\n\n16 参见附件9，第2页。\n\n17 裁定，Wengui v. Clark Hill PLC, No. 1:19-cv-03195-JEB (D. D.C. Oct. 25, 2021) [Docket No. 77]，作为附件10随附于后。\n\n18 参见附件9，第5页。\n\n14. 2021年10月14日，债务人提出动议，请求修改地区法院的裁定，并恢复债务人关于被告在网络攻击后停止代理的相关主张。地区法院于2021年11月9日驳回债务人的动议，理由是其延迟提出该动议（在地区法院就被告驳回动议作出裁定二十个月后），且由于证据开示已经结束，故将对被告造成不利影响。地区法院认为，对被告的不利影响“在本案中尤为明显，因为[债务人]在最初请求经济损害赔偿后，部分显然因其不得不就有关其业务的问题援引《第五修正案》，而放弃了该请求”。20\n\n15. 2022年2月15日，被告提出简易判决动议 [Docket No. 86]（以下简称“简易判决动议”）。21\n\n16. 简易判决动议主张，就与债务人主张有关的损害、因果关系及违反义务的要件而言，不存在任何重大事实的真实争议。Clark Hill 主张，债务人无法证明其数据被盗是其精神损害的法律原因，理由包括：(i) 其已将被盗信息的相关部分置于公共领域；(ii) 与其精神损害相关的大部分症状在网络攻击发生数年前即已出现；以及\n\n19 附件9，第8页\n\n20 裁定，Wengui v. Clark Hill PLC, No. 1:19-cv-03195-JEB (D. D.C. Nov. 9, 2021) [Docket No. 82]，作为附件12随附于后。\n\n21 附件7。\n\n（iii）债务人已提起另外十三起主张精神损害的诉讼，因此，Clark Hill（克拉克·希尔律师事务所）的行为不可能是任何此类所称损害的合理原因。Clark Hill进一步主张，债务人无法证明Clark Hill在其网络安全方面存在过失，或其违反了对债务人负有的注意义务。最后，Clark Hill主张，哥伦比亚特区法不允许就债务人在本案诉讼中所寻求的违约或专业人员过失造成的精神损害获得赔偿；若该立场正确，则本案中的全部损害赔偿均被排除。\n\n17. 被告方还提出庭审前排除证据动议，以排除债务人为履行其证明以下事项之举证责任而提出证言的三名专家证人：（i）Clark Hill负有其违反的注意义务；及（ii）所称违反在法律上导致债务人遭受精神损害[Docket No. 85]（以下简称“庭审前排除证据动议”）。22\n\n18. 庭审前排除证据动议请求排除债务人的网络安全专家Dr. Shane D. Shook（肖恩·D·舒克博士）的证言，理由是其据称未采用可靠的方法论形成其意见，且未确立注意标准；债务人的法医精神科医师Dr. Eric Goldsmith（埃里克·戈德史密斯博士）的证言（债务人提出其证言以证明其精神损害及其原因），理由是其据称除使用模糊或抽象术语外，未说明任何方法论，且未恰当适用其方法论；以及法学教授W. Bradley Wendel（W. 布拉德利·温德尔）的意见——债务人提出其意见以证明Clark Hill的行为未遵守某些职业行为规则——理由是其所提出的证言据称不可靠且对陪审团无助益，并且被告方主张其缺乏形成其意见所需的经验，且在得出结论时未运用任何方法论。\n\n22 Mot. in Lim., Wengui v. Clark Hill PLC, No. 1:19-cv-03195-JEB (D. D.C. Feb. 15, 2022) [Docket No. 85]（以密封方式提交），随附于本案，作为附件11。\n\n19. 鉴于债务人于February 15, 2022提交第11章申请而触发自动停止，债务人和受托人均未对简易判决动议或庭审前排除证据动议作出回应。\n\nII. 债务人寻求第11章救济\n\n20. 于February 15, 2022（以下简称“申请日”），债务人向法院自愿提交了根据《美国法典》第11编第11章寻求救济的申请书（以下简称“破产法典”）；该救济包括对针对债务人的所有司法程序的自动停止，参见 Bankruptcy Code 362(a)(1)，包括本案诉讼。\n\n21. 于June 15, 2022，法院作出决定备忘录及命令[Docket No. 465]（以下简称“受托人命令”），指示United States Trustee（美国受托人）在个人债务人的第11章案件中指定一名第11章受托人。根据受托人命令，美国受托人选定Luc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯平斯）为受托人。于July 8, 2022，法院作出命令，批准指定受托人为个人债务人第11章案件中的第11章受托人[Docket No. 523]。\n\n22. 债务人将包括本案诉讼在内的诉讼请求列为其破产财产，其价值不明。23 在其财务状况说明中，债务人将本案诉讼列为一项仍在进行的诉讼，其在该诉讼中为原告。（参见 Docket No. 77 at 22）。24\n\n23. 受托人获指定后，就本案诉讼而言，受托人代位行使债务人的权利。此外，于August 10, 2022，法院作出公司治理权利命令[Docket No. 717]，该命令明确确认受托人对债务人经济权利的所有权及权限，并指示债务人“向受托人交出全部破产财产……。”（公司治理权利命令第3段）（强调系原文所加）。\n\n23 参见 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）为支持第11章案件及某些动议所作声明第32(b)段（在“我的资产”部分列出Clark Hill请求权）[Docket No. 107]。\n\n24 将 Guo Wengui（a/k/a Miles Kwok）v. Clark Hill PLC and Thomas Ragland（托马斯·拉格兰）列为债务人作为当事人的一项诉讼。\n\n24. 于July 28, 2022，受托人就债务人的各类法律及财务顾问（包括Clark Hill）提出根据Rule 2004进行调查取证的动议[Docket No. 637]（以下简称“专业人士2004动议”）。于August 16, 2022，法院批准受托人的专业人士2004动议[Docket No. 756]。根据法院命令，于August 19, 2022，Clark Hill获送达Rule 2004传票及其所附文件请求（以下简称“传票”），25 该传票寻求受托人评估并控制作为破产财产的本案诉讼所必需的信息。（参见传票，文件制作请求）。26\n\n25. 根据传票，受托人收到并审阅了本案诉讼中的诉状、证言记录、专家报告及其他文件，包括简易判决动议和庭审前排除证据动议（合称“案件文件”）。受托人的律师还就当事人双方的立场、案件的是非曲直、驳回及／或撤回某些损害赔偿或请求权依据（包括不存在经济损害）的影响，以及本案诉讼可能的和解价值，与Jenner & Block（詹纳与布洛克律师事务所，Clark Hill的律师）及Attorney Casper（卡斯珀律师，债务人的律师）进行了多次且广泛的沟通。\n\n25 该传票作为附件B附于Docket No. 1105。\n\n26. 于November 2, 2022，债务人提出保护令动议（以下简称“庇护申请保护令”），禁止向受托人披露债务人的庇护申请（以下简称“庇护申请”）（参见 Docket No. 637）。于November 16, 2022，受托人就庇护申请保护令提交其答复。（参见 Docket No. 1105）。于December 9, 2022，法院作出部分批准庇护申请保护令的命令（以下简称“庇护申请命令”），命令Jenner & Block向受托人及其律师提交简易判决动议。（参见 Docket No. 1217）。于December 13, 2022，债务人提出动议（以下简称“上诉动议”），请求准许向United States District Court for the District of Connecticut（康涅狄格联邦地区法院）上诉庇护申请命令。于January 11, 2023，康涅狄格联邦地区法院驳回上诉动议。\n\n26. 于January 24, 2023，法院作出批准认定债务人藐视公司治理命令之动议的命令[Docket No. 1372]（以下简称“藐视法庭命令”）。法院在藐视法庭命令中认定，债务人因其未与受托人及法院命令合作而存在恶意行为。\n\n27. 于March 15, 2023，债务人因一份指控其犯有多项联邦罪行的起诉书，被联邦执法部门逮捕。\n\n和解\n\n28. 当事人双方均对本案诉讼的是非曲直进行了独立且审慎的审查。被告方自本案诉讼开始以来持续就这些问题进行诉讼，而受托人已审阅本案中的案件文件及诉状，并考虑了哪些请求权及损害赔偿仍可为债务人的破产财产带来利益，以及存在哪些证据支持该等请求权。\n\n29. 基于对各自立场相关是非曲直以及本案诉讼所伴随成本和风险的分析，当事人双方在长期内进行了广泛、善意且公平交易的谈判。在数月期间就请求权价值进行了多轮提议和反提议后，当事人双方已订立和解协议，该协议作为附件1附于拟议命令，以解决本案诉讼。和解协议的重要条款如下：27\n\na．Clark Hill将就起诉状中所寻求的救济，向债务人的破产财产支付总额$499,000（以下简称“和解付款”）；\n\nb．受托人同意有偏见地驳回本案诉讼；及\n\nc．以受托人收到和解付款及破产法院批准和解协议为条件，当事人双方同意按照和解协议第5节更详细规定的内容，相互放弃对对方的全部请求权。\n\n27 如本和解协议的摘要说明与随附的和解协议条款和条件之间存在任何不一致，应以和解协议条款为准。\n\n所请求的救济\n\n30. 受托人通过本动议，请求法院根据 Bankruptcy Rule 9019(a)作出命令，批准全部和解协议，并授权当事人双方依照和解协议的条款订立和实施该和解协议。\n\n所请求救济的依据\n\nI. 批准和解的标准\n\n31. 法院可根据 Bankruptcy Rule 9019授权受托人订立和解协议。妥协与和解是“重组程序中的正常组成部分。”Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 424 (1968)（引用 Case v. L.A. Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 130 (1939)）。为根据 Bankruptcy Rule 9019批准妥协与和解，破产法院应认定该妥协与和解公平且衡平、合理，并符合债务人破产财产的最佳利益。参见，例如，Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co. of Chi. (In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.), 156 B.R. 414, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1993.), aff'd, 17 F.3d 600 (2d Cir. 1994)（省略引文）；In re Enron Corp., No. 02 Civ. 8489(AKH), 2003 WL 230838, at *2 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2003)。\n\n32. 批准特定和解的决定属于破产法院的合理自由裁量范围。参见 Nellis v. Shugrue, 165 B.R. 115, 122-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)。\n\n33. 在行使其自由裁量权时，破产法院必须独立认定该和解公平且合理。同上，at 122。法院可考虑占有中的债务人或受托人及其律师认为该和解公平且合理的意见。同上；另参见 In re Purofied Down Prods. Corp., 150 B.R. 519, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 1724 Filed 04/28/23 Entered 04/28/23 16:10:54 Page 12 of 332\n\n破产法院应“鉴于支持和解的普遍公共政策”行使该自由裁量权。In re Hibbard Brown & Co., 217 B.R. 41, 46 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998)；Shugrue, 165 B.R. at 123（“[普遍规则是]和解受到青睐，且实际上受到上述批准程序的鼓励[。]”）。\n\n34. 重要的是，“和解无须是债务人本可获得的最佳和解。”In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp., 327 B.R. 143, 159 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005)（引用 In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 596 F.2d 1102, 1114 (3d Cir. 1979)）。相反，法院仅须“审视争议事项，并判断和解是否低于合理性范围的最低点。”同上（引用 In re W.T. Grant Co., 699 F.2d 599, 608 (2d Cir. 1983)）；另参见 Purofied Down Prods., 150 B.R. at 522（“法院无须进行‘小型审判’以确定基础[争议]的是非曲直[。]”）。\n\n35. 在决定特定和解是否落入“合理性”范围内时，法院考虑以下因素：\n\n（1）诉讼成功可能性与和解未来利益之间的平衡；（2）发生复杂且旷日持久的诉讼的可能性，“及其随之而来的费用、不便和延误”……；（3）“债权人的首要利益”，包括每一受影响类别的相对利益“以及债权人不反对或积极支持拟议和解的程度”；（4）其他利害关系方是否支持和解；（5）支持和解的“律师的能力和经验”，以及审查和解的“破产法院法官的经验和知识”；（6）“将由高级管理人员和董事获得的免责的性质和范围”；以及（7）“和解在多大程度上是独立交易谈判的产物”。\n\nMotorola, Inc.（摩托罗拉公司）诉 Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors（无担保债权人官方委员会）（In re Iridium Operating LLC（关于铱星运营有限责任公司案）），478 F.3d 452, 462 (2d Cir. 2007)（“Iridium”）。\nII. 批准和解的依据\n\n36. 受托人主张，根据具体情形并考虑适用的 Iridium 因素，和解协议公平且合理。\n\n37. 诉讼成功可能性与和解未来利益之间的平衡：和解协议在诉讼成功可能性与和解未来利益之间实现了公平平衡，尤其考虑到债务人起诉状的许多方面已经被驳回或限制。该等驳回和限制包括：(i) MTD 命令，驳回任何惩罚性损害赔偿以及与 Clark Hill PLC（克拉克·希尔律师事务所）退出担任债务人律师有关的任何损害赔偿；以及 (ii) 债务人不再寻求任何经济损害赔偿，两者均将债务人剩余的请求限制为精神痛苦损害赔偿。债务人获得此类损害赔偿的能力尚不确定，且被告已在其尚待裁决的简易判决动议中从法律和事实两方面予以强烈反对。对本案最为重要的是，债务人寻求推定的精神痛苦损害赔偿；被告主张，根据哥伦比亚特区法律，对于为履行法律职责而受聘的律师违反合同或过失违反义务，不能获得该等赔偿。参见 Hedgepeth v. Whitman Walker Clinic, 22 A.3d 789, 810-11 (D.C. 2011)（认定在律师与客户关系中，如“委托的目的在于取得财务、商业或法律目标”，精神损害赔偿请求并不适当）。此外，精神痛苦损害赔偿本质上依赖于债务人的可信度；债务人最近已被起诉，且在其最近一次证言录取中，对向其提出的每一个实质性问题均援引第五修正案。此外，Clark Hill 已提出可信证据，以支持其立场，即债务人本人此前已在其社交媒体帖子中向公众披露了其庇护申请中的大部分信息，这可能进一步削弱债务人声称因网络攻击而遭受的精神痛苦。\n\n38. 复杂且旷日持久的诉讼的可能性：如无法院授权订立并实施和解协议，受托人将被要求耗费大量财产资源，以回应简易判决动议和排除证据动议，其中每一项均需进行广泛的法律研究和事实调查。迄今为止，被告已积极抗辩针对其提出的请求。随后，即使成功，受托人仍需进行费用高昂且耗时的审判，而无论就责任还是任何损害赔偿的范围而言，其结果都远非确定。\n\n案号 22-50073 文书 1724 于 04/28/23 提交 于 04/28/23 16:10:54 登记 第 14 页，共 332 页\n\n39. 债权人及利害关系方的利益与支持：债权人已向受托人明确表示，他们急于及时获得回收款，并希望受托人迅速推进其调查。继续诉讼将耗费受托人大量时间，并给债务人财产造成高昂费用。和解协议为财产及其债权人提供回收，符合财产的最佳利益，因为其将对本案诉讼提供有意义的实现，同时消除与诉讼本案相关的费用、风险和时间。\n\n40. 律师的能力及破产法官的经验：本法院对债务人的破产案及其中提出的独特问题具有深入了解。就当事方而言，双方本身均为成熟当事方，并由成熟且经验丰富的律师代理。\n\n41. 独立交易谈判：和解协议是各方之间经广泛、独立交易且善意谈判的产物；该等谈判历经数月，围绕案件细节及其所代表的潜在价值进行了长期讨论。\n\n42. 和解协议处于合理性范围内，为债务人财产和债权人提供重大利益，并且对其公平且衡平。此外，和解协议解决了本案诉讼，从而消除了任何额外的诉讼风险和费用。因此，受托人认为和解协议符合《破产程序规则》9019，并应获批准。\n通知\n\n43. 本动议的通知已发送给：(i) 美国受托人；(ii) 各方；(iii) 债务人；(iv) 委员会；以及 (v) 通过使用法院电子提交（“CM/ECF”）系统进行电子提交，发送给所有使用 CM/ECF 系统出庭的当事方。受托人主张，在此情形下，无需其他或进一步通知。\n此前未提出请求\n\n44. 受托人此前未向本法院或任何其他法院提出本案所请求救济的请求。\n\n因此，受托人谨请求法院批准和解协议，并给予其他公正的进一步救济。\n\n日期：April\n28, 2023 LUC A. DESPINS（卢克·A·德斯潘斯），\n\nNew Haven, Connecticut CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE（第 11 章受托人）\n\n签署人：/s/ Douglas S. Skalka\n\nDouglas S. Skalka（道格拉斯·S·斯卡尔卡）(ct00616) Patrick R. Linsey（帕特里克·R·林赛）(ct29437) NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C.（纽伯特、佩佩与蒙蒂斯律师事务所）195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 781-2847 dskalka@npmlaw.com plinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n以及\n\nNicholas A. Bassett（尼古拉斯·A·巴塞特）（获准 pro hac vice）PAUL HASTINGS LLP（普衡律师事务所）2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C., 20036 (202) 551-1902 nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n以及\n\nAvram E. Luft（阿夫拉姆·E·卢夫特）（获准 pro hac vice）Douglass Barron（道格拉斯·巴伦）（获准 pro hac vice）PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6079 aviluft@paulhastings.com douglassbarron@paulhastings.com\n\n第 11 章受托人的律师\n附件 1\n拟议命令\nUNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION（美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院布里奇波特分院）\n\n----------------------------------------------------------- x\n\n关于： ：\n： 第 11 章\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），\n等， ：\n： 案号 22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人。 ：\n： （合并管理）\n\nx\n根据《破产程序规则》9019 批准与 CLARK HILL PLC 达成的和解协议的命令\n\n兹因 Luc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯潘斯）以其作为上述标题第 11 章案件（“第 11 章案件”）中 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（“债务人”）财产之第 11 章受托人（“受托人”）的身份，而非以个人身份，于 April 28, 2023 提出的动议（“动议”）2，请求作出命令，批准受托人与 Clark Hill PLC（“Clark Hill”）之间的和解协议，详见动议所述；且本法院根据 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334 对审理该动议及其中请求的救济具有管辖权；且受托人就本案诉讼承继了债务人的地位；且本法院已作出 Corporate Governance Rights Order（公司治理权命令），该命令明确确认受托人对债务人经济权利的所有权及管理权限；且受托人拥有提出和控制属于债务人财产的一切请求的唯一且排他性权利，包括本案诉讼中提出的所有请求；\n\n1 本第 11 章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（亦称 Guo Wengui、Miles Guo 和 Miles Kwok，以及众多其他别名）（税务识别号码后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（税务识别号码后四位：8202）以及 Genever Holdings Corporation。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 和 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为 Paul Hastings LLP（普衡律师事务所），200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166，c/o Luc A. Despins，作为 Ho Wan Kwok 财产的受托人（仅为通知及通信之目的）。\n\n2 本文所用但未在本文中另行定义的首字母大写术语，应具有动议中赋予该等术语的含义。\n\n案号 22-50073 文书 1724 于 04/28/23 提交 于 04/28/23 16:10:54 登记 第 19 页，共 332 页\n\n且本法院已认定并裁定：(i) 动议中请求的救济符合受托人、债务人财产、债权人及所有利害关系方的最佳利益；(ii) 和解协议所反映的和解在该等情形下公平、衡平且合理；以及 (iii) 动议中载明的法律及事实依据确立了给予本命令所授予救济的正当理由；并经适当审议，且有充分理由显示，现命令如下：\n\n1. 动议获准。\n\n2. 对动议提出的所有异议（如有），凡未被撤回、放弃或和解者，以及其中包含的所有权利保留，均予以驳回。\n\n3. 附于本命令并作为附件 A 的和解协议（“和解协议”），根据《破产程序规则》9019 获得批准。\n\n4. 受托人获授权，根据《破产程序规则》9019，在本命令作出后立即签署、交付、实施并全面履行任何及所有义务、文书、文件和书面材料，并采取为完成和解协议所反映的和解及履行其中预期的任何及所有义务而合理必要或适当的任何及所有行动。\n\n5. 根据《破产程序规则》6004(h)，本命令应于作出后立即生效并可执行，且受托人在收到和解付款后可不受限制地使用该款项。\n\n6. 本法院保留管辖权，以审理及裁定因本命令或和解协议产生或与之相关的一切事项。\n附件 A\n和解协议\n和解协议及相互免责\n\n本和解协议及相互免责（“协议”）于 April 28, 2023 签订并自该日起生效，由以下双方订立：(a) Luc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯潘斯），非以个人身份，而仅以其作为 Guo Wengui a/k/a Miles Kwok a/k/a Ho Wan Kwok（“Kwok”或“债务人”）财产之第 11 章受托人（“受托人”）的身份；以及 (b) 另一方 Clark Hill PLC 和 Thomas K. Ragland（托马斯·K·拉格兰）（统称“Clark Hill”）。受托人和 Clark Hill 在本文中有时各自单独称为“一方”，合称“各方”。本协议应于全体各方签署本协议之日生效（“生效日期”）。\n鉴于条款\n\nA. 鉴于，February 15, 2022（“申请日”），Kwok 根据《美国法典》第 11 篇（“破产法”）第 11 章，向 United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut（美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院）（“破产法院”）提交了自愿救济申请，该案件以 In re: Ho Wan Kwok, No. 22-50073 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn.) 管理；\n\nB. 鉴于，受托人是经正式任命的债务人财产第 11 章受托人；\n\nC. 鉴于，在申请日之前，Clark Hill 曾向 Kwok 提供法律服务；\n\nD. 鉴于，约于2019年9月19日，Kwok（郭文贵）在Washington D.C. court（华盛顿哥伦比亚特区法院）对Clark Hill（克拉克·希尔律师事务所）提起诉讼；并且，于2019年10月24日，该诉讼被移送至United States District Court for the District of Columbia（美国哥伦比亚特区联邦地区法院），案名为Wengui v. Clark Hill PLC et al（Case No. 1:2019-cv-03195）（以下简称“本案”）。本案主张的请求源于Clark Hill此前对Kwok的代理，包括：(1) 违反信托义务，(2) 违约，(3) 法律执业过失，以及(4) 惩罚性损害赔偿；\n\nE. 鉴于，约于2019年11月25日，Clark Hill依据Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)提出驳回动议，该动议的书面陈述程序于2020年1月14日全部完成；\n\nF. 鉴于，约于2020年2月20日，Clark Hill的驳回动议获部分准许（驳回Kwok关于惩罚性损害赔偿的请求，或因Clark Hill退出代理而导致任何损害的请求），并获部分驳回；\n\nG. 鉴于，本案的证据开示自2020年2月持续至2021年12月；\n\nH. 鉴于，2022年2月15日，Clark Hill以密封方式提交了：(1) Rule 56简易判决动议，以及(2) Rule 702排除原告所提出专家证言部分内容的证据排除动议；\n\nI. 鉴于，Clark Hill对针对其提出的请求存有争议并予以否认，并拟积极抗辩并在每一阶段提出抗辩理由；\n\nJ. 鉴于，本案中主张的请求现为债务人破产财产的财产；\n\nK. 鉴于，Clark Hill已向受托人提供本案的诉状及证据开示材料；\n\nL. 鉴于，各方认可继续诉讼所涉及的重大成本及风险；以及\n\nM. 鉴于，各方已进行广泛、独立且善意的谈判，并各自得出结论：其签署及履行本协议将避免长期且昂贵的诉讼，同时，若本协议所载和解得以完成，将给予各方实质性且有价值的利益：\n\n因此，鉴于已收到并确认其收取及充分性的良好且有价值的对价，各方协议如下：\n\n协议\n\n1. 前言。上述前言构成本协议不可分割的一部分，并纳入本协议，以证明各方签署本协议的意图，并说明其签署的相关情形。因此，本协议应据此解释。\n\n2. 定义。除上文及下文定义的术语外，本协议中使用的下列首字母大写术语具有以下含义：\n\n(a) “请求”是指任何及所有种类的请求、反请求、申诉、争议、要求、权利、诉讼、潜在诉讼、诉因、责任、职责、义务、损害赔偿、损失、价值减损、义务、判决、法令、律师费或费用请求、事项、问题、诉讼、程序及任何种类或性质的争议，包括但不限于与Clark Hill向Kwok提供的任何法律服务有关的所有请求、所有专业执业过失请求、所有违约请求、所有违反信托义务请求、所有赔偿或分担请求，以及因任何及所有侵权行为、欺诈、过失、错误和遗漏、恶意、诽谤、账款、费用、律师费、经济损失、人身伤害或财产损害、名誉、Kwok的庇护申请、隐私、安全漏洞、羞辱、精神痛苦、情绪困扰以及实际、补偿性、附带性、后果性或间接损害赔偿、利润损失、惩罚性或示范性损害赔偿而产生的所有其他义务或请求；无论已知或未知、已主张或未主张、或有或确定、已确定金额或未确定金额、已发生或未发生、怀疑或未怀疑、已披露或未披露、已提出或未提出、明显或不明显、可预见或不可预见、已到期或未到期、有担保或无担保；无论其现已存在、此前或先前存在，或将来可能存在；亦无论任何该等事项或请求是否已于生效日当日或之前提出，或本可提出，包括但不限于根据联邦、州或外国法律、普通法、破产法、制定法、衡平法、规则、条例或协议产生的任何请求；无论属于个人、集体、直接、派生、代表性、代表他人、法律、衡平、监管、政府性质，或任何其他类型或以任何其他身份提出。\n\n(b) “Estate Releasees”是指：(i) 债务人的破产财产；(ii) 受托人；以及(iii) 受托人的任何及所有律师、会计师、顾问、代表或代理人，均以其各自该等身份行事。\n\n(c) “Clark Hill Releasees”是指：(i) 以任何身份行事的Clark Hill；以及(ii) 就因本案产生或与本案有关的任何请求而言，Clark Hill任何及所有过去或现在的、直接或间接的母实体、子公司、部门、成员律所、关联方、前身及继承人，以及所有该等实体各自过去或现在的合伙人、成员、董事、负责人、高管、董事会成员、管理人员、股东、雇员、子公司、关联方、部门、前身、继承人、受让人、继承人、律师、股东、董事会、会计师、审计师、顾问、受托人、管理人、受信义务人、顾问、代表、保险人、共同保险人、再保险人及代理人，均以其各自该等身份行事。\n\n(d) “和解”是指本协议所设想的和解。\n\n(e) “和解动议”是指受托人依据Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure（联邦破产程序规则）Rule 9019提出的、请求作出和解命令的动议。\n\n(f) “和解命令”是指破产法院作出的、批准该和解及受托人订立本协议的命令。\n\n3. 对价。\n\n作为对本协议所载解除及其他条款的对价，Clark Hill应向债务人的破产财产支付总额为four-hundred-and-ninety-nine thousand (499,000) USD（“和解付款”）。和解付款应在破产法院作出和解命令之日起15日内，按照受托人将提供的指示，以电汇方式支付给受托人；但前提是，如已就和解命令提交上诉通知，则和解付款应不迟于和解命令不再受上诉或调卷复审程序约束且不存在任何该等未决程序之日起15日内，按照受托人将提供的指示，以电汇方式支付给受托人。\n\n4. 法院批准。\n\n本协议签署后，受托人应立即向破产法院提交和解动议，请求作出双方均可接受形式的和解命令；该命令应包括认定：被解除的请求归债务人的破产财产所有，且受托人拥有提出该等请求的唯一权力；并进一步规定，破产法院保留执行本协议和和解命令以及处理任何违反行为的管辖权。受托人将尽善意努力取得对和解命令的批准。如本协议未获破产法院批准，Clark Hill无须支付和解付款。\n\n5. 解除。\n\n(a) 债务人解除。在受托人收到和解付款且破产法院批准本协议的前提下，受托人、债务人的破产财产及Estate Releasees特此无条件、绝对且不可撤销地解除并免除Clark Hill Releasees就其现有或曾有的、因本协议签署日当日或之前以任何方式、原因或事由产生的针对Clark Hill Releasees的所有请求，包括但不限于有关、因本案中主张或本可主张的事实、情形、事件、交易或转让产生或与之有关的请求，或因本案标的事项产生的请求；受托人的意图是在本协议项下不保留任何事项，并确保Clark Hill Releasees免受每一项已解除请求的安宁及自由，无论该等请求具有何种性质及描述，并包括任何债权人可能以派生方式提出的任何请求；但前提是，本款任何内容均不得被视为或解释为对本协议条款和条件的解除、放弃或免除。受托人确认，其可能在生效日后发现不同于或补充其目前所知或相信为真实的事实。受托人同意，尽管日后发现该等不同或补充事实，本款所载解除在各方面均应保持有效。\n\n(b) Clark Hill解除。在受托人收到和解付款且破产法院批准本协议的前提下，Clark Hill Releasees特此无条件、绝对且不可撤销地解除并免除Estate Releasees就其现有或曾有的、因本协议签署日当日或之前以任何方式、原因或事由产生的针对任何Estate Releasees的所有请求；Clark Hill Releasees的意图是在本协议项下不保留任何事项，并确保Estate Releasees及其每一方免受每一项已解除请求的安宁及自由，无论该等请求具有何种性质及描述；但前提是，本款任何内容均不得被视为或解释为对本协议条款和条件的解除、放弃或免除。Clark Hill Releasees确认，其可能在生效日后发现不同于或补充其目前所知或相信为真实的事实。Clark Hill同意，尽管日后发现该等不同或补充事实，本款所载解除在各方面均应保持有效。\n\n(c) 受托人声明并保证，除本案中主张的请求外，其不知悉其可能对任何Clark Hill Releasees提出的任何其他请求。\n\n(d) Clark Hill声明并保证，除与本案有关的请求外，其不知悉其可能对受托人或债务人的破产财产提出的任何其他请求。\n\n6. 驳回受托人诉讼。\n\n在受托人收到和解付款后五(5)日内，受托人和Clark Hill应依据Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(ii)在本案中提交撤诉通知，以有偏见方式驳回本案，并应采取为促成本案以有偏见方式被驳回而合理必要的其他及进一步行动。\n\n7. 一般声明与保证。\n\n(a) 权限。每位下述签署人承诺并保证，其有权代表以该方式签署本协议的一方订立及签署本协议，以及本协议所载的所有解除、声明和保证；但就受托人而言，以破产法院批准本协议为条件。\n\n(b) 律师意见。各方确认并保证，其已就本协议条款咨询其律师，且本协议条款已被完整阅读、充分理解，并为就本协议所载任何及所有请求作出完全且最终的妥协、和解及放弃之目的而自愿接受。\n\n(c) 审慎调查。各方均已对本协议所载事项以及与本协议有关的所有其他事项进行了调查。各方声明并保证，其订立本协议时并未依赖本协议未另行明确规定的任何承诺、协议、陈述、声明或保证。\n\n(d) 不得转让。受托人声明并保证，截至生效日，其未曾转移或转让，且不会转移或转让，本协议中所免除的请求权的全部或任何部分。\n\n(e) 不承认责任。本协议所载任何内容均不得视为任何一方就此前存在争议的任何事项、请求或抗辩承认任何责任或承认任何请求缺乏依据。\n\n(f) 费用。各方应自行承担与本协议及与债务人破产案件和本诉讼有关或由其产生的所有其他事项相关的各自成本、费用及支出。各方均放弃其可能对另一方享有的、要求或追偿任何成本、费用或支出的任何权利，包括但不限于与请求权、本协议或本诉讼有关或相关的律师费。\n\n(g) 完整协议。本协议构成各方之间完整且全部的协议。任何未被明确纳入本协议，或未被纳入根据本协议要求或预期交付的任何其他协议、文书、证明或文件中的书面或口头陈述、保证、承诺或条件，均不对各方具有约束力。所有其他讨论、谈判及书面文件均已并应视为合并入本协议。\n\n(h) 准据法及同意管辖。本协议及本协议要求或预期的所有其他文件，应受纽约州法律管辖并依其解释，该等法律适用于完全在纽约州境内订立和履行的合同，但不考虑其法律选择规则。作为促使各方订立本协议的特别诱因，各方特此同意由破产法院专属管辖，以解决因本协议产生或与本协议有关的任何争议，并放弃其可能对在任何该等法院确定审判地提出的任何异议，以及放弃任何关于该等诉讼在不方便法院提起的主张。\n\n(i) 向各方发出的通知。\n\n根据本协议发出的所有通知，均应通过专人递送；由信誉良好的隔夜递送服务进行隔夜递送；或通过电子邮件发送并以美国邮政寄送副本，送达至下列地址（或如适用，送达至可获得的该方最新地址）：\n\n该等通知必须发送给下列人员：\n\n如送达受托人：Paul Hastings LLP（保罗·哈斯廷斯律师事务所）\n收件人：Avram E. Luft（阿夫拉姆·E·卢夫特）\n200 Park Ave\nNew York, NY 10166\n+ 212 318 6079\naviluft@paulhastings.com\n\n如送达 Clark Hill（克拉克·希尔）：Jenner & Block LLP（詹纳与布洛克律师事务所）\n收件人：John Storino（约翰·斯托里诺）\n353 N Clark Street\nChicago, IL 60654\n+ 1 312 840 8683\nJStorino@jenner.com\n\n8. 进一步必要行动。\n\n各方同意，无需进一步对价，签署或促使签署并向另一方或其律师交付为履行其各自在本协议项下义务所可能必要的任何其他文件，并采取任何其他行动。受托人根据其在破产案件中依据规则 2004 进行的调查，向 Clark Hill 送达了传票。受托人确认，Clark Hill 已出示对该传票有回应性的文件，且受托人同意不在破产案件中向 Clark Hill 寻求进一步取证。\n\n9. 适当解释。\n\n(a) 本协议所有部分的措辞，在所有情况下均应作为整体依其公平含义解释，而不得严格地有利于或不利于任何一方。\n\n(b) 在本协议中使用时，术语“或”应视为包括术语“和/或”；凡上下文表明或要求时，单数或复数应视为包括另一数。\n\n(c) 本协议中使用的章节标题仅为便于查阅之目的，不得以任何方式扩大、限制、修改或以其他方式用于解释本协议的任何条款。\n\n(d) 如本协议项下的截止日期适逢周末或法院假日，该截止日期应延长至下一个并非法院假日的工作日。\n\n10. 陈述与保证的存续。\n\n本协议所载的所有陈述和保证均应视为持续有效，并在本协议完成后继续有效。\n\n11. 放弃或修改。\n\n(a) 除非由作出放弃的一方以书面形式签署，否则任何放弃均不具有约束力。对本协议任何条款的任何放弃，不得视为或构成对任何其他条款（无论是否类似）的放弃，任何放弃亦不得构成持续性放弃。\n\n第 8 页\n\n(b) 除非经双方正式签署的书面文书，否则本协议或任何条款不得变更、放弃、解除或终止。对本协议的任何补充、修改或修订，除非以书面形式作出并经双方签署，否则不具有约束力。本协议不得通过口头或默示的承诺或陈述予以修改。\n\n12. 副本签署。\n\n本协议可签署一式多份，各份合在一起构成一份单一协议。通过包括电子邮件和传真在内的电子方式向另一方提供的各方正式授权签署人的签名副本，应视为原始签名。以传真或电子邮件发送的本协议副本上的签名，应被接受为对各方具有约束力。\n\n签署人：\n\n职务：\n\n附件 2\n哥伦比亚特区美国联邦地区法院\n\nGUO WENGUI（郭文贵），又名 MILES KWOK（郭文贵），又名\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），\n)\n)\n)\n\n原告，\n)\n)\n诉\n案号：_______________\n)\nCLARK HILL PLC（克拉克·希尔专业有限责任公司）及 THOMAS K.\nRAGLAND（托马斯·K·拉格兰），\n)\n自哥伦比亚特区高等法院移送\n)\n被告。\n)\n哥伦比亚特区高等法院\n)\n案号：2019 CA 001614M\n)\n移送通知\n\n根据 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(b) and 1446，被告 Clark Hill PLC（克拉克·希尔专业有限责任公司）和 Thomas K. Ragland（托马斯·K·拉格兰）（以下合称“被告”）特此将本案自 Superior Court of the District of Columbia（哥伦比亚特区高等法院）移送至 United States District Court for the District of Columbia（哥伦比亚特区美国联邦地区法院）。被告的移送通知基于以下理由：\n\n1. 2019 年 9 月 19 日，原告 Guo Wengui（郭文贵）（“原告”）在哥伦比亚特区高等法院以案号 2019 CA 006164M 对被告提起诉讼（“起诉状”）。起诉状的真实、正确副本以及送达给被告的全部传票、诉状和命令副本作为附件 1 随附。\n\n2. Clark Hill PLC 于 2019 年 9 月 26 日代表其自身及被告 Ragland 接受起诉状送达。本移送通知及时，因为其在传票和起诉状送达后 30 日内提交。参见 28 U.S.C. §1446(b)。\n\n3. 本法院根据 28 U.S.C.\n\n§1332(a)(2) 对本案具有初始管辖权，因为被告系不同州的公民，原告系外国的公民，且争议金额超过 \\$75,000，不包括利息或诉讼费用。\n\n4. 原告在其起诉状中主张，其系中华人民共和国的“原住民”，并正在美国寻求庇护。（起诉状 ¶ 10）。因此，就多元公民身份而言，原告系中华人民共和国公民。\n\n5. 被告 Clark Hill PLC 是根据密歇根州法律组建的专业有限责任公司，其主要营业地位于密歇根州底特律。（参见，例如，起诉状 ¶ 11；附件 2）。被告 Clark Hill PLC 约由 298 名成员组成，该等成员或者是在 Clark Hill PLC 各办事处工作的个人律师，或者是由个人律师设立、并通过其持有 Clark Hill PLC 成员资格的专业公司。（附件 2）。就多元公民身份而言，专业有限责任公司的公民身份由其成员的公民身份决定。参见，例如，Cunningham & Assocs., PLC v. ARAG, LLC, 842 F. Supp. 2d 25, 27 n.2 (D.D.C. 2012)。\n\n6. Clark Hill PLC 的任何个人成员均未在哥伦比亚特区设定住所或为哥伦比亚特区公民，且个人通过其持有成员资格的任何专业公司均非依据哥伦比亚特区法律设立。（附件 2）。因此，就多元公民身份而言，Clark Hill PLC 不是哥伦比亚特区公民。\n\n7. Clark Hill PLC 的所有个人成员均为美国公民，且均居住并设定住所于某一州。Clark Hill PLC 的任何成员均未居住或设定住所于美国境外。（附件 2）。因此，就多元公民身份而言，Clark Hill PLC 不是外国公民。\n\n8. 被告 Thomas Ragland 的住所设于弗吉尼亚邦。（附件 3）。因此，就多元公民身份而言，Thomas Ragland 是弗吉尼亚邦公民。\n\n9. 被告善意地相信争议金额超过 \\$75,000。原告的起诉状请求 \\$50 million 的补偿性损害赔偿，并请求惩罚性损害赔偿。（起诉状 ¶ 1）。因此，争议金额超过 \\$75,000，本案本可在本法院提起。\n\n10. 如 28 U.S.C. §1446(d) 所要求，本移送通知提交的书面通知将连同所有支持性文件一并提供给原告。此外，亦如 28 U.S.C. §1446(d) 所要求，本移送通知及所有支持性文件的副本正向哥伦比亚特区高等法院提交。\n\n11. 被告提交本移送通知，并不放弃其可能对本案提出的任何异议，并保留及时提出所有抗辩和异议的权利。\n\n12. 被告保留修改或补充本移送通知的权利。\n\n13. 被告要求由陪审团审判。\n\n因此，被告 Clark Hill PLC 和 Thomas K. Ragland 将本案自哥伦比亚特区高等法院移送至哥伦比亚特区美国联邦地区法院。\n\n日期：October 24, 2019\n谨此提交，\n\nCLARK HILL PLC 和 THOMAS K. RAGLAND\n\n签署人：/s/ Jessica Ring Amunson\n其代理律师之一\n\nJessica Ring Amunson（杰西卡·林·阿蒙森）(#497223)\nJENNER & BLOCK, LLP（詹纳与布洛克律师事务所）\n1099 New York Avenue NW\nSuite 900\nWashington, DC 20001-4412\n电话：(202) 639-6000\nJAmunson@jenner.com\n\n送达证明\n\n本人 Jessica Ring Amunson，律师，特此证明，本人于 2019 年 10 月 24 日通过电子邮件和隔夜递送方式，向下列人员送达了上述移送通知：\n\nAri S. Casper（阿里·S·卡斯珀）\nRalph S. Tyler（拉尔夫·S·泰勒）\nThe Casper Firm（卡斯珀律师事务所）\n400 E. Pratt Street, Suite 903\nBaltimore, MD 21202\n\n/s/ Jessica Ring Amunson\n\n附件 1\n\n哥伦比亚特区高等法院 09/20/2019 09:16AM 法院书记官\n哥伦比亚特区高等法院 09/18/2019 18:47PM 法院书记官\n在哥伦比亚特区高等法院\n\n（民事庭）\n\n)\n\n又名 HO WAN KWOK（郭文贵） GUO WENGUI（郭文贵）又名 MILES KWOK（郭文贵）\n)\n)\n162 E, 64th Street\n)\nNew York, NY 10065\n)\n)\n原告，\n)\n)\n)\n诉\n)\nCLARK HILL PLC（克拉克·希尔专业有限责任公司）\n500 Woodward Avenue\nSuite 3500\nDetroit, MI 48226，\n)\n以及\n)\nTHOMAS K. RAGLAND（托马斯·K·拉格兰）\nClark Hill PLC\n1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW\nSuite 1300\nWashington, DC 20004，\n)\n被告。\n)\n)\n送达：\n)\nJohn J. Hern, Jr.（小约翰·J·赫恩）\n500 Woodward Avenue\nSuite 3500\nDetroit, MI 48226\n)\nThomas K Ragland\n1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW\nSuite 1300\n)\nWashington, DC 20004\n)\n)\n案号：2019 CA 006164 M\n起诉状及陪审团审判请求\n引言\n\n1. 在本案中，原告郭文贵（Guo Wengui，又名 Miles Kwok，又名 Ho Wan Kwok）（以下简称“原告”）请求判令被告律师事务所 Clark Hill PLC（克拉克·希尔律师事务所，以下简称“Clark Hill”或“本所”）及该所成员之一、被告 Thomas K. Ragland, Esq.（托马斯·K·拉格兰德律师，以下简称“Ragland 先生”）对原告因被告在本所为原告提供法律代理过程中多次严重违反其对原告所负义务而直接且近因遭受的损害、伤害及不法行为，连带承担 $50 million 或以上的补偿性金钱赔偿，以及连带承担惩罚性赔偿。除补偿性赔偿外，原告还请求惩罚性赔偿。鉴于 Clark Hill 和 Ragland 先生的不法行为具有鲁莽性、压迫性、故意性、蓄意性，并且故意无视原告的权利，本案应判处惩罚性赔偿。（以下统称 Clark Hill 和 Ragland 先生为“被告”或“本所”。）\n\n2. 原告曾是 Ragland 先生及 Clark Hill 律师事务所的客户。在该代理过程中，Ragland 先生及 Clark Hill 律师事务所违反了律师／律师事务所保护客户机密信息不被不当、未经授权披露的基本义务。本所，尤其包括 Ragland 先生，在处理原告机密信息时存在鲁莽行为；作为该等鲁莽行为的直接结果，原告的机密信息被披露并被广泛传播，致使原告遭受重大损害、不利及压迫。本所未能保护原告的机密信息后，继而在无正当理由的情况下，不法且不当终止其对原告的代理，从而加重了该等违约行为。该行为同样具有鲁莽性，且故意无视原告的权利以及本所作为原告所聘律师事务所对原告负有的职责和义务。本所故意承办超出其专业能力和胜任能力范围的事项，随后又故意、蓄意且有意地不当地将其自身利益置于本所对客户所负义务之上。原告因本所及其律师（Ragland 先生）对其作为客户所负义务的违反而遭受损害。本所的行为具有压迫性，并且是在故意无视原告权利的情况下作出的。\n\n3. 原告合理依赖本所明示及默示的保证，即本所理解其伦理和法律义务，包括保护原告机密信息的基本义务，并且本所确实有能力履行其义务。然而，事实上，Ragland 先生未遵守其保证，因此鲁莽地使原告的机密信息暴露于风险之中。与 Ragland 先生的陈述相反，本所未采取充分且适当的电子安全措施保护原告的信息，且 Ragland 先生未采取适当行动保护原告的机密信息。本所及 Ragland 先生在此方面失职的直接后果是：原告以保密方式向本所披露、且本所向原告保证将予以保护的敏感机密信息，被广泛披露并在互联网社交媒体平台上传播。本所对原告所负义务的违反导致了这些未经授权的披露。这些披露已对原告造成伤害和损害，且该等伤害和损害仍在持续。本所在此的行为远不止于过失，而是就其鲁莽性及其故意无视原告权利而言构成令人愤慨的行为。\n\n4. 本所对原告的代理包括准备并提交原告在美国的庇护申请。原告因担心遭受进一步具有政治动机的严酷迫害，包括担心被施以酷刑、在极端条件下被监禁，以及可能遭到杀害，而逃离其祖国中国后，在美国申请庇护。\n\n5. 原告向本所披露、且因本所的失职及违约而随后向全世界披露的信息，包括详细说明原告在中国政治活动的信息以及其他敏感事项；该等信息也被披露给致力于压制、诋毁及可能对原告实施人身伤害的中国相关人员和利益方。该等敏感信息的公开披露危及原告及其他人的生命、安全和福祉；该信息在社交媒体平台上展示和发布时失去了机密地位，而这正是由于被告未能妥善保护该信息免遭不当披露所致。据信，中国政府的代理人和官员属于获得原告机密信息的当事方之列；再次强调，由于被告明显的失职及违反义务，包括被告未采取必要行动保护原告机密信息免遭披露的不当及违法作为和不作为，他们得以获得该等信息。\n\n6. 作为原告的律师，Clark Hill 对原告负有为其最佳利益行事的不可分割义务。在本所代理原告以及随后不当地终止该代理的过程中，本所违反了该义务。本所在从一开始考虑是否承办原告的代理时便知悉，中国政府的代理人和官员过去一直且目前仍对原告抱有敌意，并对原告的生命、自由和安全构成真实威胁。如被告在同意代理原告之前及同意代理原告时所知悉，该等中国代理人和官员，以及他们过去曾代表并且预期将在未来代表其行事的人员和利益方，对原告构成直接威胁。尽管被告知悉对原告抱有敌意的强大利益方，并且该等知悉发生在被告同意代理原告之前，但被告未能保护原告的机密信息免遭这些对原告持有已知深刻敌意和对抗性议程的人员和利益方披露。被告的行为损害了原告，使其遭受严重的人身和经济损失，而所有这些损失本可且应当避免。\n\n7. 随后，被告在无正当理由、无任何有意义地与原告协商的情况下，单方面不当地、违法地终止对原告的代理，从而加重了其对原告的违约行为。当此事变得“棘手”时，被告没有与其客户站在一起；相反，他们“逃之夭夭”。被告抛弃了其客户（原告），并将其自认为的利益置于其为客户（原告）利益行事的义务之上。被告违反了其对客户负有的不可分割忠诚的法律和伦理义务。被告的行为具有压迫性、故意性，并且故意无视原告的权利。\n\n8. 原告提起本诉，因为被告必须——并将在本案中——为其严重且故意的不当行为承担责任。被告应对补偿性赔偿和惩罚性赔偿承担责任。被告严重未能保护原告信息免遭潜在“黑客”暴露，包括未建立和／或维持保护原告敏感及机密信息所必需且有效的电子安全措施，违反了职业行为规则；构成对本所作为原告所聘律师事务所对原告负有的信义义务的严重违反；违反了本所对原告所负的合同义务；并违反了本所向原告提供胜任法律代理的义务。\n\n9. 原告敏感个人信息在社交媒体上广泛且造成深重伤害的发布和传播，是本所违反其对原告所负职责和义务的直接、近因且不可避免（尽管完全可以避免）的结果和后果。此后，本所在终止对原告的代理时故意、蓄意且压迫性地使情况进一步恶化，并为本所不当行为提出了显然是托词、即使不属荒谬的“理由”。被告故意无视原告的权利；被告的行为具有鲁莽性，未顾及原告即本所客户的安全或保护，并且故意无视本所对原告作为客户所负的职责和义务。由于原告因被告的作为和不作为而已经并持续遭受严重伤害和损失，原告请求金钱赔偿，以补偿被告对其造成的严重损害。此外，鉴于被告行为的鲁莽性、肆意性和压迫性，原告请求惩罚性赔偿。\n\n当事人\n\n10. 原告系中国籍人士，现居住于 New York, NY。原告在美国的庇护申请尚在审理中。原告是一名极为成功的商人、政治活动人士及知名中国异见人士。多年来，原告一直积极为中国的法治、人权和民主而奋斗。2015 年初，原告因其政治活动及直言不讳的倡导，正当地担心会遭中国政府和／或中国共产党（Chinese Communist Party，以下简称“CCP”）非法逮捕、拘留、讯问、施以酷刑和／或杀害，因而被迫逃离中国。（本文中对“CCP”的提及，包括中国政府和中国共产党两者。）\n\n11. 被告 Clark Hill PLC（“Clark Hill”）是一家大型律师事务所，约有 650 名律师和专业人士，设有 25 个办事处，并作为依 Michigan 州法律组建和存续的专业服务有限责任公司运营。Clark Hill 在 District of Columbia 定期、持续且实质性地开展业务，具体包括在 1001 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Suite 1300, Washington, DC 20004 设有办事处，且 Clark Hill 的律师经常在 District of Columbia 的法院、机构和国会出庭。\n\n12. 被告 Thomas K. Ragland, Esq.（“Ragland 先生”）是在 District of Columbia 获准执业的律师，并为 Clark Hill 律师事务所 District of Columbia 办事处的成员（合伙人或负责人）。Ragland 先生在 District of Columbia 定期、持续且实质性地开展业务，包括在 Clark Hill 位于 1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Suite 1300, Washington, DC 20004 的办事处设立其律师执业办公室，并在 District of Columbia 的机构和裁判机构出庭。（如前所述，本文以下统称 Clark Hill PLC 和 Ragland 先生为“被告”或“本所”。）\n\n管辖权、审判地及便利性\n\n13. 本院依据 D.C. Code § 11-921 对本案享有管辖权。本院对被告享有人身管辖权，因为二者均在 District of Columbia 定期且持续地开展业务。导致本起诉状所称事项的被告作为和不作为发生于 District of Columbia，包括与原告和／或其代理人及获授权代表 Dr. Lianchao Han（韩连潮博士，以下简称“Han 博士”）举行的会面。\n\n14. 本院是适格审判地，且本院是审理本案的便利法院。本案直接涉及被告就其在哥伦比亚特区的律师事务所及律师执业所实施或未实施的行为；被告在哥伦比亚特区持续存在并每日积极开展业务；且本起诉状中原告主张所由产生的事件、行为及不作为的实质部分发生于哥伦比亚特区。举例而言，律所与原告获授权代表韩博士（Dr. Han）之间的会面，以及在该等会面中律所与原告建立律师—当事人关系、定期交换与原告庇护申请有关的信息、拉格兰先生（Mr. Ragland）准备该申请、律所退出代理及因该关系而产生的其他行为和不作为，均发生在该律所位于哥伦比亚特区的办公室。拉格兰先生是该律所代理原告的主要律师，且拉格兰先生代表原告所完成的大部分工作均在哥伦比亚特区进行。\n\n事实陈述\n\n一、原告是一名政治活动人士，且是中国政府和中国共产党（CCP）的目标。\n\n15. 多年来，原告一直是中国法治、人权和民主事业强有力、引人注目且广为人知的倡导者。就其政治活动和倡导而言，例如，原告揭露了中国共产党（CCP）的系统性腐败，以及中国政府高级官员及该等官员家属的腐败。原告还披露了中国广泛存在的人权侵害，包括使用酷刑。原告反对中国政府和中国共产党对中国民主运动的压制。原告还参与揭露了中国在美国及西方其他地区秘密文化、政治、经济和情报活动的程度、范围及效力。\n\n16. 原告在影响有关中国和中国共产党的国际舆论方面卓有成效。从中国共产党的角度看，原告的活动和倡导不利地影响了中国及中国共产党在国际社会中的地位，因此，中国政府试图使原告噤声。中国政府/中国共产党曾采取多种手段，包括胁迫和提供贿赂，试图使原告噤声。根据所知及确信，中国政府/中国共产党利用其海外情报网络，试图诋毁原告、使原告噤声并威胁原告的人身安全，或者至少使原告有充分理由担心其人身安全，并担心其家人和朋友的安全。\n\n17. 根据所知及确信，中国共产党相信原告目前持有尚未公开的证据，证明中国共产党及与其有关联并代表其行事之人存在多种不当行为，包括有关腐败、谋杀、隐匿非法所得资金以及中国间谍网络的信息。基于上述及其他原因，中国政府和中国共产党具有极强动机——这还是轻描淡写的说法——并积极试图使原告噤声。中国政府和中国共产党同样具有动机并积极试图了解原告所知的、由中国政府和中国共产党或代表其实施的不当活动。或许最为关键的是，中国政府和中国共产党具备对原告实施侵略性敌对行动的能力——即“行动触及范围”。\n\n18. 例如，于2015年1月前后，中国共产党通过吴征（Bruno Wu Zheng）致电原告，要求原告与中国共产党合作，并停止披露有关中国共产党高级官员腐败的信息。原告予以拒绝。在数次行贿企图和威胁均告失败后，吴征指示中央纪律检查委员会（Central Commission for Discipline Inspection，“CCDI”）及特别工作组请求（实则要求）原告与中国合作，并交还其所持有的任何关于高级领导人腐败的证据。原告被要求将其证据交给中国共产党，并停止针对中国共产党的行动。作为回报，吴征向原告承诺，除其他事项外，(1) 中国共产党不会扣押原告的任何资产或财产；(2) 所有特权将归还原告及其家人；(3) 原告的家人不会被逮捕；以及 (4) 原告不会受到人身威胁或被杀害。\n\n原告拒绝了该提议。原告预见到，该拒绝将引发其本人及家人遭受严重迫害的风险。\n\n19. 原告的政治活动及其拒绝停止该等活动，加之中国共产党强烈希望制止该等活动——包括使用暴力——使原告留在中国变得危险。因此，于2015年1月前后，原告逃离中国。他有理由担心遭中国政府和/或中国共产党逮捕、拘留、讯问、酷刑和/或杀害。在大致同一时期，中国共产党扣押了原告家庭的大量资产，并讯问和逮捕了原告的18名家人。中国共产党还逮捕或拘留了若干原告的同事和雇员，并禁止其他人离开中国。\n\n20. 2017年5月，当时原告居住在美国，中国共产党派遣刘彦平（Liu Yanping）及另外三名特工前往纽约市与原告交谈，再次试图使其噤声。刘彦平当时是中央纪律检查委员会的书记。原告如同拒绝先前的威胁一样，拒绝了这一威胁。原告没有屈服于这一最新威胁，而是披露了一个在美国活动的庞大中国共产党间谍网络。根据所知及确信，美国政府因该四名官员，包括刘彦平，在美国的行为而撤销了其签证。\n\n21. 中国共产党还采取了另一项极具攻击性的行动，试图通过发布两份国际刑警组织（International Criminal Police Organization，“INTERPOL”）“红色[逮捕]通报”使原告噤声。原告对这些通报的合法性提出异议。\n\n22. 于2017年10月前后，即对中国共产党极为重要的中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会之前，原告的Twitter、YouTube和Facebook账户突然且可疑地被暂停，且均未作出解释。\n\n23. 根据所知及确信，自2017年开始，中国政府和/或中国共产党派遣特工和官员前往美国，在原告居住的纽约市建筑物外组织直接针对原告的示威活动。参加这些由中国共产党策划的示威活动的人士——字面意义上就在原告家门口——获得了预先印制的标语牌，以恶毒语言诽谤原告，称其为强奸犯和骗子，并敦促原告离开美国。\n\n24. 中国共产党还另行策划了针对原告的恶意负面宣传活动。中国共产党组建了一支人员队伍，即“50-cent troll army”，以操纵社交媒体上的公众舆论，使之有利于中国共产党。这些评论者在流行的中国社交媒体网络上发布正面评论或文章，意在扰乱不利于中国共产党的讨论，并推动服务于政府利益的叙事，同时发表贬损性评论及有关中国政府政治对手和批评者——如原告——的错误信息。\n\n25. 仅仅支持原告在中国就成为犯罪。原告的一名支持者董琦（Dong Qi）据报因穿着印有原告口号——“一切才刚刚开始”——的T恤而被逮捕并送入监狱。根据所知及确信，原告的追随者曾遭到讯问、限制和恐吓。\n\n26. 根据所知及确信，中国共产党认为原告对中国政权和中国共产党的稳定性、合法性及可信度构成危险挑战。\n\n27. 原告的政治行动和倡导为中国许多人以及事实上全世界许多人所知并得到广泛支持。原告所获得的中国国内及国际支持，以及对其政治和倡导活动的相关强力支持，进一步使中国共产党感到愤怒、恼怒、深度不满和挫败。\n\n二、原告聘请克拉克希尔律师事务所（Clark Hill）代理其准备并提交在美国的庇护申请。\n\n28. 上文第15至27段描述了原告的政治活动和倡导、由此产生的迫害，以及其逃离中国后对进一步报复的正当恐惧，为原告寻求法律代理人协助其并代表其申请和取得美国政治庇护提供了背景和语境。原告为此聘请拉格兰先生及克拉克希尔律师事务所代理其事务。拉格兰先生自称为领先的移民律师。拉格兰先生和该律所向原告表示，拉格兰先生和该律所有资格、有能力且称职，能够代理原告并以充分、专业的方式保护其利益。原告依赖了这些陈述；然而，这些陈述后来被证明是虚假的。\n\n29. 克拉克希尔律师事务所接收并预期将接收（如任何大型律师事务所一样）大量客户机密信息，包括财务记录、商业秘密、敏感的个人通信和披露信息，以及敏感的个人身份识别信息（例如，地址、联系信息、社会保障号码和健康信息）。接收该等信息是克拉克希尔律师事务所的日常事务（同样，如任何规模相当的律师事务所）。客户，尤其包括本案原告，在合理且正当地依赖该律所保护和维护其信息保密性的专业、伦理及法律义务时，向克拉克希尔律师事务所披露机密信息，同时严格将该等信息的披露限制于客户授权律所披露的信息。\n\n30. 克拉克希尔律师事务所有明确且不可否认的伦理及法律义务维护客户（原告）的机密信息。这些维护保密性的义务包括以电子方式向该律所提供和/或以电子方式存储于该律所计算机网络上的信息。在所有相关期间，克拉克希尔律师事务所和拉格兰先生均以默示及明示方式向原告表示，该律所理解其维护原告机密信息的义务；同样重要的是，该律所能够且将会履行该义务（即，该律所具备保护原告信息所必需的专业及技术知识、能力和胜任力）。\n\n31. 约于 2017 年 8 月，原告与被告会面，就原告可能聘请该律师事务所代理其准备并提交拟议的庇护申请事宜进行商谈。在该次会面中，原告说明了其作为一名知名中国政治异见人士的地位和知名度，其被认为对中国共产党及中国境内相关利益持敌对立场。原告还说明了与其作为中国政权一名知名且公开可见的批评者的身份相关并伴随而来的风险。原告警告称，其本人及其关联人士一直遭受持续且无休止的网络攻击。在该次会面中及其后，原告向该律师事务所披露了有关其政治及倡议活动的保密信息，以及同样敏感的、有关其所知中国共产党不当行为和活动的保密信息。该律师事务所从一开始即知悉，原告的庇护申请并非“常规”申请，并且原告必然会就该申请向 Ragland 先生（拉格兰先生）及 Clark Hill law firm（克拉克·希尔律师事务所）披露高度敏感的保密信息。\n\n32. 在与该律师事务所的会面中，原告说明，任何准备其庇护申请的律师事务所均应预期会遭受复杂的网络攻击。在获悉该等情况后，被告在“充分知情”的情况下，并在充分知悉和理解所涉网络安全及其他潜在风险的情况下，同意继续推进并同意代理原告。\n\n33. 在同意代理原告时，Ragland 先生和该律师事务所同意采取特别预防措施，以防止原告敏感保密信息被不当披露。该等预防措施包括不将原告的任何信息置于该律师事务所的计算机服务器上，因为如 Ragland 先生和该律师事务所所理解，此举会使该等信息轻易成为意图获取该等信息的“黑客”的目标。该律师事务所还承诺并同意始终实施必要的安全措施，以保护原告的保密信息，并以其他方式向原告提供符合职业道德且胜任的法律代理服务。若该律师事务所未作出该等承诺和约定，原告不会聘请该律师事务所。\n\n34. 约于 2017 年 8 月 28 日，原告通过其授权代表 Han 博士（韩博士）与被告签署了一份关于原告庇护申请法律服务的协议函（以下简称“委托协议”）。该协议确立并正式化了被告（作为法律顾问）对原告（作为客户）承担的合同、普通法、职业道德及法律上的职责和义务，包括完全忠诚的职责和义务，以及维持充分且必要的安全措施、足以保护原告敏感个人信息和保密文件的职责和义务。\n\n35. 无论该律师事务所在维持合理安全措施以保护“普通”客户的敏感个人信息和保密文件方面所承担或应承担何种安全保护义务，本案中，该律师事务所已被充分告知（“高度警觉”），其对原告的代理绝非具有“常规”未经授权披露风险的“普通”代理。换言之，该律师事务所从一开始、且在同意代理原告之前，即知悉需要、必须、预期并已同意由该律师事务所对安全措施给予特别注意和谨慎。在同意代理原告时，该律师事务所同意采取必要步骤和行动保护原告的保密信息，并承认这意味着该律师事务所将采取“超出常规”的保护措施。若该律师事务所未作出该等承诺和约定，原告不会聘请该律师事务所。\n\n36. 根据委托协议，原告向被告支付了 \\$10,000 的预付律师费，随后该律师事务所就其费用向原告（或其授权代表）开具账单，该律师事务所的费用已获支付。\n\n37. 该律师事务所的委托协议及其相关的标准委托条款尤其规定，原告作为客户，有权“期待获得该律师事务所律师的胜任代理”；该律师事务所“将始终尽最大能力代表您行事”；以及该律师事务所的律师“受适用于 Washington, DC 律师的《职业行为规则》约束”。1 另见 CLARK HILL, About Us, https://www.clarkhill.com/pages/about (last visited Aug. 29, 2019)（“道德行为不可谈判。我们相信每次都应做正确的事。我们恪守职业责任，并对我们的行为负责。”）。\n\n38. 原告向被告提供敏感个人信息和保密文件，以便其作为法律顾问完成原告的庇护申请。该申请由 Ragland 先生在 District of Columbia（哥伦比亚特区）与原告在 District of Columbia 的授权代表 Han 博士协商后准备。该申请于 September 5, 2017 在 Washington, D.C. 向 United States Department of Homeland Security（美国国土安全部）提交。在必要且适当时，并在受到适当保护的前提下（例如密封提交或由法官单方审阅），原告将指明其向该律师事务所披露的保密信息。\n\n1 原告当然不承认且明确否认，委托协议中对某些权利的列举具有排他性，亦不承认原告过去或现在不享有其他权利。\n\nIII. 被告未能充分保护原告的保密信息，导致该等信息被广泛且有害地披露和传播。\n\n39. 尽管（1）该律师事务所负有保护原告信息保密性的义务，（2）该律师事务所事先知悉原告案件的情况及对原告信息加强保护的必要性，以及（3）被告通过同意代理原告及以其他方式同意其将会并能够保护原告保密信息，该律师事务所仍未能做到。需要通过证据开示确定该律师事务所失职的具体细节；但是，该律师事务所未能履行其义务并无争议，因为原告的信息已被披露。原告主张，Ragland 先生使用该律师事务所的服务器储存和传输原告的敏感信息，并使用其律师事务所电子邮件账户向第三方传输原告的保密信息，其中包括未经原告批准的第三方。若如原告所相信并在此主张，Ragland 先生使用其律师事务所电子邮件账户向第三方传输原告的保密信息，则该等鲁莽且恣意的行为向潜在“黑客”“大开方便之门”，使其可进入该律师事务所的服务器，并彻底损害原告信息的保密性。\n\n40. Ragland 先生的鲁莽行为与该律师事务所不充分的网络安全措施及基础设施相结合，造成了致命后果。因此，原告的敏感保密信息未获保护，而是被公诸于世，从而可供中国共产党及其他对原告怀有敌意且有能力实施该等敌意的人获取。\n\n41. 该律师事务所表示，约于 September 12, 2017，该律师事务所的计算机系统遭第三方“黑客攻击”。该第三方显然未遇到重大困难，即绕过了该律师事务所明显不充分（实质上形同虚设）的安全和监控程序。此后，该第三方“黑客”得以找到并外传（获取）原告的庇护申请和宣誓书，以及可能与原告有关的其他信息和材料。于 September 12, 2017，Ragland 先生致函原告的代表 Han 博士称：“他的电脑瘫痪了——显然遭到了攻击。”\n\n42. 该律师事务所的安全措施，无论其为何，均未能“保护”原告的敏感个人信息和保密文件。鉴于本案情况，该律师事务所的安全措施不充分、不合理，且远未达到被告承诺、保证、义务和约定提供充分安全措施的要求，违反了被告对原告承担的合同、普通法及职业责任。\n\n43. 由于被告的失职，第三方获得的文件包括原告及原告配偶的敏感个人信息——例如，原告的护照识别号码；原告的 I-94 admission-number；原告配偶的护照识别号码；以及原告配偶的 I-94 admission-number。自约 September 23, 2017 起，从被告计算机系统获得的与原告有关的敏感个人信息和保密文件开始出现在 Twitter（推特）上。发布的材料包括以下内容：\n\na. 原告政治庇护申请的副本；\n\nb. 原告的护照识别号码；\n\nc. 原告的 I-94 admission-number；\n\nd. 原告配偶的护照识别号码；以及\n\ne. 原告配偶的 I-94 admission-number。\n\n44. 在社交媒体上发布和传播的信息包括原告庇护申请和宣誓书中的敏感个人信息及保密部分。原告就被告代理原告一事，向被告提供了该等及其他高度敏感的信息，包括原告庇护申请的全部内容。原告既未同意，亦未授权向任何人披露任何该等信息，但与审查原告庇护申请直接具有“知情必要”的 United States government（美国政府）人员除外。根据法律，庇护申请受到严格保密。由于 Ragland 先生和该律师事务所的不当行为，原告的庇护申请完全公开，并被发布于社交媒体网站。\n\n45. 被告不能适当地、更遑论合理地，以“不可能”或该主题的任何变体为由，为其无可否认的未能保护原告信息的行为辩护。若被告缺乏防止原告信息被披露的意愿、资源、技术能力或成熟程度，则被告有义务在该律师事务所开始代理原告之前，向原告披露该等限制（无论其原因为何，且尽管该等披露有悖于被告将原告争取为客户的经济利益），从而给予原告不聘请该律师事务所代理其的机会。该律师事务所剥夺了原告这一机会。律师（本案中为 Ragland 先生）的法律和职业道德义务包括：当事项超出律师的胜任能力、能力或本领时，拒绝代理的义务。Ragland 先生和 Clark Hill law firm 违反了该项职责和义务，因为其在缺乏以专业、适当且不损害其客户（原告）的方式进行代理的胜任能力和能力时，仍承接了对原告的代理。\n\n46. 自该次“黑客攻击”以来，被告在很大程度上一直“推诿搪塞”，并拒绝向原告提供有关所发生情况的任何有意义信息。例如，被告拒绝告知原告该次攻击的规模，包括除原告外其他客户的材料是否被获取，以及如被获取，该律师事务所是否退出了该等代理；是否可从被扣押材料中辨识出任何模式；被告同样拒绝告知原告，被告最初如何得知该次攻击，以及被告采取了何种反制措施（如有）。\n\n47. 约于 2019 年 5 月 14 日，原告代理律师 Daniel S. Steinberg, Esq. 致函该所总法律顾问 Edward J. Hood, Esq.，询问有关网络攻击事宜。Steinberg 先生要求回答以下若干具体相关问题：\n\na. 你们是否已经确定攻击来源，以及攻击者通过何种机制获得进入贵所信息系统的权限？\n\nb. 黑客获取了哪些记录，这些记录是通过未经授权访问电子邮件服务器取得，还是通过直接访问存储位置取得？\n\nc. 攻击者如何规避该所的安全措施，或者该攻击是否涉及恶意软件，该软件控制了该所的计算机系统，直至[原告]的信息被传输？\n\n48. 约于 2019 年 5 月 23 日，Hood 先生在未作解释的情况下声称，对该“黑客攻击”所进行的调查享有特权，仅作出了有限回应。Hood 先生未回答“攻击者如何规避该所安全措施”这一直接问题。推定该调查报告——迄今为止，该所始终将其向作为攻击受害人的原告隐瞒——至少包含对此问题的初步回答。\n\nIV. 该所不当退出担任原告代理律师。\n\n49. 在被告显然不足的系统遭受“黑客攻击”一周后，约于 2017 年 9 月 19 日，Clark Hill law firm（克拉克·希尔律师事务所）的总法律顾问 Hood 先生致函原告，通知其被告将终止对原告的代理：\n\n我遗憾地通知您，经审慎考虑，本所已认定必须退出担任您的法律代理律师。\n\n该网络攻击给继续代理您带来了若干伦理方面的复杂问题。首要关切是，该网络攻击将要求 Ragland 先生——以及可能该所的其他成员——在您的庇护程序中作为证人出庭。根据我们的职业行为规则，律师在其可能成为重要证人的程序中不得担任代理人。在此，该网络攻击使 Ragland 先生处于一种无法维持的境地：他既是您庇护案件中的证人，同时又担任您的律师。此时，Ragland 先生必须将其角色限于证人，而非法律代理人。（原文强调。）\n\n50. 该所为其“必须退出”这一极端单方行动所陈述的“理由”，是 Ragland 先生及该所其他人员可能会在原告的庇护程序中成为证人。该“理由”毫无可信性或依据。\n\n51. 例如，在该所单方退出代理并抛弃原告时，并无任何听证会待决（截至本文件提交之日亦无听证会待决）；原告并未要求在有听证会时由 Ragland 先生作为证人；作为客户，是否认为 Ragland 先生在任何听证会上的证言价值或必要性超过该所继续担任代理律师的价值，应由原告而非 Ragland 先生或该所决定（尤其鉴于 Ragland 先生自称在移民和庇护事项中具有卓越地位）；若 Ragland 先生在任何听证会上作证，其证言内容将涉及无争议事项，即该所服务器遭到“黑客攻击”以及原告的信息被获取；该所从未征询原告对此事的意见；并且，该所从未暗示，更遑论解释，为何 Ragland 先生的证言在当时并不存在的听证会上据称如此“必要”，以至于足以使该所在其实际作出该行为之时，单方、仓促且不顾原告最佳利益地终止其与原告之间的律师—客户关系。\n\n52. 尽管该所对其客户（原告）负有明确相反的伦理义务，包括完全忠于客户的义务，该所仍只是想“退出”。为完成其不当“解雇客户”的脱身计划，该所捏造了一个显然虚假的“理由”，试图为其行为辩解。在此，该所的客户并无任何不当行为，当然也未作出任何足以使其遭受如此严酷、无正当理由且不合伦理待遇的行为。查明该所错误终止其对原告代理的真实理由——区别于其捏造的理由——包括该所是否屈从于来自“黑客”或其他方面的压力，将是证据开示中的一个重要领域。\n\n53. Clark Hill 已告知，其对本案所涉网络攻击进行了调查（或委托他人代其进行了调查）。该调查及任何调查报告可能涉及该所不当退出代理原告这一问题。迄今为止，尽管原告的信息被获取，且原告或许是该攻击唯一成功的目标，并且该所正是因该攻击而终止代理原告，该所仍未向原告提供因对本事项内部调查而形成的任何调查报告。原告将在证据开示中寻求取得该报告。因此，现特此通知被告保全该报告以及所有相关草稿、调查笔记、笔录、证物和材料。\n\n54. 如果被告不愿意或无法保护原告的敏感保密信息，或者缺乏使原告信息不存储于该所服务器上的能力，或者缺乏妥善保护其计算机系统和网络以保障原告信息的胜任能力或能力，被告有义务在最初且在承诺代理原告之前，向原告披露这一关键限制，以使原告有机会就是否鉴于该所的限制而聘请该所作出知情判断。该所未作任何此类披露，从而剥夺了原告就聘请该所作出知情决定的机会。若该所已坦诚如实说明其限制以及缺乏充分的安全措施和保护，原告不会聘请该所担任其代理律师。\n\nV. 被告违反义务已对原告造成损害。\n\n55. 作为被告多次违反其对原告所负义务和法律义务的直接及近因，原告的敏感个人信息和保密文件被披露给第三方、向公众广泛披露，并披露给中国境内的个人和机构，包括中国政府和 CCP，致使原告遭受重大且严重的伤害、损害和不利后果。\n\n56. 作为被告错误及违法行为的直接后果，原告已经并持续遭受其个人和职业声誉受损；其失去了大量商业机会；原告的人身安全和保障受到威胁；其获得政治庇护的努力被延误；其家属被逮捕和威胁；原告在中国的员工受到骚扰；原告产生了成本和费用；并且原告在推进其庇护申请过程中，未能获得被告自称具备的移民法专业知识所带来的利益。被告违反其法律义务和责任，造成了上述及可能其他对原告的伤害和损害。这些伤害持续并仍在发生，未来存在额外伤害和损害的重大风险，甚至可能性。\n\n57. 作为被告多次违反其义务和法律义务的直接及近因，原告庇护申请及其他材料的细节和内容已在社交媒体平台上被广泛披露，并落入敌视原告的第三方之手。由于原告的政治活动，中国及其他地方存在敌视原告的有权势人士和利益集团；如今，仅因被告的失职和违反义务，他们掌握了本不会掌握的有关原告的详细信息。有充分理由相信，这些人已经并将继续利用原告的保密信息，以实现损害原告的目的。\n\n58. 被告造成的严重伤害还包括限制原告旅行的自由和人身自由，并危及其人身安全。被告违反法律义务和责任，造成了对原告的这些伤害和损害。这些伤害持续并仍在发生，未来存在额外伤害和损害的重大风险，甚至可能性。\n\n59. 被告未能保护原告的敏感个人信息和保密文件，是原告敏感个人信息和保密文件在社交媒体上传播的直接及近因；该等信息和文件的公开发表，因损害原告声誉并削弱其可信度以及其致力于推动在中国实现法治、民主和正义之工作的可信度，而对原告造成重大损害。被告违反法律义务和责任，造成了对原告的这些伤害和损害。这些伤害持续并仍在发生，未来存在额外伤害和损害的重大风险，甚至可能性。\n\n60. 被告不当且无正当理由地终止其律师—客户关系及随附义务，已伤害并损害原告。被告不当地抛弃其客户（原告）的行为，使原告在其需要律师之时未能获得律师协助（因为其保密信息刚刚被散布于整个社交媒体）；向公众传递了原告在代理关系中不知何故不可信或行为不当的信息；使原告未能获得被告自称具备的移民法专业知识；并已造成及/或将造成对原告庇护申请采取行动的不当延误和复杂情况。这些伤害持续并仍在发生，未来存在额外伤害和损害的重大风险，甚至可能性。\n\n61. 在审判中，陪审团将确定由被告直接造成原告所受的补偿性损害赔偿。原告主张该等损害赔偿不少于 \\$50 million，并请求作出至少该金额的判决书。\n\n惩罚性损害赔偿\n\n62. 在审判中，还将请求陪审团裁定数额由陪审团认定为适当的重大惩罚性损害赔偿。在此应判给惩罚性损害赔偿，因为被告的作为、不作为以及违反义务和责任的行为，具有鲁莽、恣意、故意性质，并且是在故意无视原告权利及被告保护原告权利之义务和责任的情况下作出的。\n\n63. 被告在处理原告保密信息时存在鲁莽行为。被告的鲁莽行为包括未能保护该等信息，将其置于该所的计算机服务器上，无论是直接置于其上，还是通过该所电子邮件账户将信息传送给第三方而间接置于其上，或以其他方式置于其上。这些行为是有意、蓄意作出的，并且故意无视原告的权利以及被告保护原告权利的义务和责任。\n\n64. 被告知道并理解保护原告敏感和保密信息的重要性，并且知道该等信息的传播将危及原告及原告家属的个人和职业利益，包括使原告及其家属面临严重伤害风险。被告特别知道并理解，CCP 将试图获取原告的敏感和保密信息，并利用该等信息伤害原告及其家属。然而，被告无视这些非常真实且现实存在的风险，其行为伴随着欺诈、恶意、鲁莽、恣意、压迫性、故意\n\n罔顾原告的权利、其安全、其家人的安全，以及其他趋于加重原告损害的情形。\n\n65. 被告通过遗弃作为其客户的原告，选择自身利益而非保护其客户，进一步加剧了其鲁莽行为。被告单方面退出担任原告的代理律师，属于故意、蓄意、鲁莽且无正当理由的行为，并且是故意漠视原告权利及被告保护原告权利之义务和职责的行为。\n\n救济请求\n\n第一项诉请——违反信义义务\n\n66. 原告援引并纳入第1至65段，如同每一段均在此完整陈述。\n\n67. 被告与原告建立了律师—当事人关系。因此，被告对原告负有律师对客户所负的全部信义义务和责任。被告没有履行该等义务和责任，反而违反了该等义务和责任。\n\n68. 在所有相关期间，被告对原告负有的信义义务包括但不限于：不得承接超出被告专业及技术胜任能力、能力和容量范围的事项；维持合理且充分的安全措施——本案中系指强化的安全措施——以保护原告的敏感个人信息和保密记录的义务；不得通过允许该等信息出现在该律师事务所的计算机服务器上而使原告保密信息面临被披露风险的义务；始终对原告秉持最高诚信和不分割忠诚的义务；提供胜任的专业法律代理的义务；以及除非具有有效且适当理由，不得退出代理原告、从而实际上遗弃原告的义务。\n\n69. 被告违反了其对原告负有的信义义务。该等违反包括：被告未能维持合理安全措施以保护原告的敏感个人信息和保密记录，包括将信息置于该律师事务所的计算机服务器上和／或允许访问该律师事务所的服务器，从而使未经授权的第三方得以访问包含原告敏感个人信息和保密文件的电子文件及通信记录。\n\n70. 被告还通过不当且无有效理由地退出代理原告，无论是为回应“赎金”要求还是出于其他原因，违反了其对原告负有的信义义务和责任。被告为推进自身利益而行事，违背了该律师事务所客户（原告）的利益；该律师事务所对该客户负有首要的不分割忠诚义务。\n\n71. 被告没有任何有效、合法或在伦理上充分的理由终止其对原告的代理。原告已履行其作为客户的义务；被告违反了其作为律师的义务。该律师事务所为终止其与原告之间律师—当事人关系而提出的理由，即Ragland先生（拉格兰德先生）可能在某次尚未知晓且迄未排期的听证会上成为证人，显然是为证明被告不当单方面决定终止律师—当事人关系具有正当性而提出的幌子。\n\n72. 若被告为了重新取得对其计算机系统的控制而向未知第三方交出原告的敏感个人信息和保密文件，或实施任何类似行为（原告将在证据开示中追究该问题），则被告将该律师事务所的利益置于原告利益之上，违反了其作为该律师事务所客户的原告所负有的首要不分割忠诚义务。\n\n73. 原告因被告违反其对原告负有的义务而受到损害。原告损害赔偿的数额将在审判中确定。\n\n74. 除补偿性损害赔偿外，被告还应承担惩罚性损害赔偿责任，因为被告的行为故意漠视原告权利，且具有故意、蓄意和鲁莽性质。惩罚性损害赔偿的数额将在审判中确定。\n\n第二项诉请——违反代理合同\n\n75. 原告援引并纳入第1至74段，如同每一段均在此完整陈述。\n\n76. 原告与原告订立书面合同，由该律师事务所代理原告。被告通过承接超出被告专业或技术胜任能力、能力和胜任程度范围的事项；未能向原告提供胜任代理；怠于采取合理安全措施以保护原告的敏感个人信息和保密文件；以及不当且错误地终止该律师事务所对原告的代理，违反了其对原告负有的合同义务。\n\n77. 若被告向未知第三方交付包含停止代理原告和／或提供原告敏感个人信息及保密文件内容的“赎金”，则被告还违反了委托协议及相关聘用条款（原告将在证据开示中追究该问题）。若被告确实如此行事，则其未能提供胜任代理，且未能尽其最大能力为其客户利益行事。\n\n78. 该律师事务所将其自身利益置于其客户（原告）的利益之上，违反了该律师事务所的合同和伦理义务。被告没有任何正当或充分理由终止其对原告的代理。原告已履行其作为客户的义务；被告违反了其作为律师的义务。该律师事务所为终止其与原告之间律师—当事人关系而提出的理由，即Ragland先生可能在某次尚未知晓且迄未排期的听证会上成为证人，是为证明被告不当单方面决定终止律师—当事人合同关系具有正当性而提出的幌子。\n\n79. 原告因被告违反其对原告负有的合同职责和义务而受到损害。原告损害赔偿的数额将在审判中确定。\n\n第三项诉请——律师职业过失\n\n80. 原告援引并纳入第1至79段，如同每一段均在此完整陈述。\n\n81. 在所有相关期间，原告与被告之间存在律师—当事人关系。被告对原告负有合同法、普通法及职业上的义务，应采用必要程度的专业注意和技能，以胜任并专业地代理原告，并符合适用的注意标准。如本起诉状所详述，该律师事务所未以必要程度的专业注意和技能代理原告。被告违反了其对原告负有的义务。\n\n82. 规范律师代理客户的注意标准，由合同法、普通法及职业性（伦理）职责和义务共同界定。在本案中，该律师事务所违反了胜任且专业地代理原告的注意标准，因为该律师事务所对原告的代理及其终止该代理的行为，远未达到所要求的注意标准。\n\n83. 被告通过承接超出被告专业或技术胜任能力和能力范围的事项；未能在代理原告时采用必要程度的专业注意和技能，致使原告的敏感个人信息和保密文件在全球范围内暴露和传播；以及错误且无有效理由地终止其对原告的代理，违反了其对原告负有的合同法、普通法、职业和伦理职责及义务。\n\n84. 被告未能采取胜任且合理的措施保护原告的敏感个人信息和保密文件，其中包括未能维持合理安全措施以保护原告的文件和通信；未能维持合理安全措施，以保护电子邮件账户和信息系统（包括其中所含数据）免遭第三方未经授权的访问；以及未能维持合理安全措施，以防止电子邮件账户被未经授权的第三方访问。\n\n85. 若Ragland先生履行其承诺——不暴露原告的敏感保密信息——且若被告按对原告作出的要求和承诺，维持合理安全措施以保护其计算机系统免遭未经授权的访问，则网络对手将无法访问原告的敏感个人信息和保密文件。若被告缺乏妥善保护该律师事务所计算机系统和网络、从而保护原告信息免遭未经授权披露的意愿、胜任能力或能力，则被告有义务在开始代理前、承接该代理事项之前，向原告披露该限制，以给予原告机会就鉴于该律师事务所的限制是否聘用该律师事务所作出知情判断。该律师事务所未作出任何此类披露，因而剥夺了原告就聘用该律师事务所作出知情决定的机会。\n\n86. 若被告向未知第三方交付包含停止代理原告及提供原告敏感个人信息和保密文件内容的“赎金”，则被告还违反了其对原告负有的合同法、普通法和职业职责。\n\n87. 被告还通过不当且错误地终止其对原告的代理，以及被告实施该行为的方式，违反了其对原告负有的合同法、普通法和职业职责。被告没有任何良好、充分或有效理由终止其对原告的代理。原告已履行其作为客户的义务；被告违反了其作为律师的义务。该律师事务所为终止其与原告之间律师—当事人关系而提出的理由，即Ragland先生可能在某次尚未知晓且迄未排期的听证会上成为证人，显然是为证明被告不当单方面决定终止律师—当事人关系具有正当性而提出的幌子。\n\n88. 原告因被告违反其对原告负有的注意和胜任职责及义务而受到损害。原告损害赔偿的数额将在审判中确定。\n\n第四项诉请——惩罚性损害赔偿\n\n89. 原告援引并纳入第1至88段，如同每一段均在此完整陈述。\n\n90. 因被告的作为、不作为、未能履行、违反职责和义务以及侵犯原告权利的行为，具有故意、蓄意、骇人听闻的性质，并且故意漠视被告的职责和义务及故意漠视原告的权利，故被告除补偿性损害赔偿外，还应向原告承担惩罚性损害赔偿责任。\n\n91. 被告在本案中所涉行为极其逾越界限，足以判处惩罚性损害赔偿。被告故意、蓄意和错误的行为，包括尽管被告明确知悉迫切需要保护原告保密信息免遭极具危害性的公开披露，却未能加以保护；该等披露因被告的失职而发生后，被告随即“逃离”其客户（原告）。\n\n92. 被告故意和蓄意的失职使“黑客”得以访问原告的信息，随后被告故意、蓄意、错误地，并且不顾其职责和义务、故意漠视原告权利，遗弃了作为其客户的原告。\n\n93. 陪审团将确定适当的惩罚性损害赔偿数额。\n\n救济请求祈祷条款\n\n在审判中或之后，原告将请求法院判令被告承担连带责任，支付超过 \\$50 million 的补偿性金钱判决，另加按法定利率计算的利息、本案的诉讼费用及支出，以及其他公正和适当的救济。\n\n此外，原告将请求法院判令被告承担连带责任，支付由陪审团确定数额的重大惩罚性损害赔偿金。\n\n谨此提交，\n\n/s/ Ari S. Casper（阿里·S·卡斯珀）\n\nAri S. Casper（阿里·S·卡斯珀）（#471013） Ralph S. Tyler（拉尔夫·S·泰勒）（#357087） The Casper Firm, LLC（卡斯珀律师事务所，有限责任公司） 400 E. Pratt Street, Suite 903 Baltimore, MD 21202 ( 410) 989-5097 - 电话 (410) 630-7776 - 传真 acaspen1vcas pcrfirrn. com rtvl e r(tL1.casperfi rm. com 原告代理律师\n要求陪审团审判\n\n原告要求就所有争议事项进行陪审团审判。\n\n/s/ Ari S. Casper（阿里·S·卡斯珀）\n\nAri S. Casper（阿里·S·卡斯珀）\n\n裁决（仅限执行案件）\n\n财产侵权\n01 汽车\n02 侵占\n07 入店行窃，D.C. Code § 27-102 (a) 03 损毁私人财产 ____ 05 侵入\n04 财产损害\n\n人身侵权\n01 滥用诉讼程序\n02 破坏夫妻感情\n03 袭击及殴打\n04 汽车—人身伤害\n05 欺骗（虚假陈述）\n06 虚假指控\n07 非法逮捕\n08 欺诈 10 侵犯隐私\n11 诽谤及中伤\n12 恶意干预\n13 恶意起诉\nx 14 法律执业过失\n15 医疗过失（包括非正常死亡）\n16 过失—（非汽车、非执业过失）\n17 人身伤害—（非汽车、非执业过失）\n18 非正常死亡（非执业过失）\n19 非法驱逐\n20 友好诉讼\n21 石棉\n22 有毒物质／大规模侵权\n23 烟草\n74 铅漆\n\nC. 其他\n01 账目清算\n02 判决前扣押\n05 返还不动产\n09 特别令状／令状\n（DC Code § 11-941）\n10 交通裁决\n11 动产返还令\n12 执行机械留置权\n16 确认之诉 17 功绩人员法（OEA）\n（D.C. Code Title 1, Chapter 6）\n18 产品责任\n24 申请确认、修改、\n撤销仲裁裁决（DC Code § 16-4401）\n29 功绩人员法（OHR）\n31 住房法典条例\n32 代政府起诉\n33 举报人\n\nTI.\n03 更改姓名\n06 外国判决／国内\n08 外国判决／国际\n13 更正出生证明\n14 更正结婚\n证明\n26 民事资产没收申请（车辆）\n27 民事资产没收申请（货币）\n28 民事资产没收申请（其他） 15 信息诽谤\n19 将行政命令作为\n判决登记 [ D.C. Code &\n2-1802.03 (h) or 32-151 9 (a)]\n20 总表计（D.C. Code §\n42-3301, et seq.） 21 申请传票\nRule 28-1 (b)\n22 解除机械留置权\n23 Rule 27(a)(1)\n（保全证言）\n24 结构化和解申请\n25 清算申请\n\nD. 不动产\n09 不动产—房地产\n08 确认产权\n25 留置权：税款／水费 同意批准\n12 特定履行\n30 留置权：税款／水费 同意驳回\n04 征收（征用权）\n10 抵押权止赎／司法拍卖\n_ 31 税收留置权竞标证书 同意批准\n11 民事资产没收申请（不动产）\n\nAri S. Casper（阿里·S·卡斯珀）\n原告代理律师姓名\n\n400 E. Pratt Street, Suite 903 િક\n地址\nBaltimore, MD 21202 书记官录入\n09/26/2019\n410=989=5097 日期\n电话\n如果都是 老公安 注 (2000) 270-320-3272 Italifor sameler an Child R. B. R. 2007 use was was with has date for as 1 222870.000 3\n\nAri S. Casper（阿里·S·卡斯珀）\n\n原告代理律师姓名\n400 E. Pratt Street, Suite 903 137\n地址\nBaltimore, MD 21202\n410=989=5097 09/26/2019\n日期\n电话\n证据附件 2\n\nGUO WENGUI（郭文贵）又名 MILES KWOK（郭文贵）又名\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），\n\n原告，\n诉 案号\nCLARK HILL PLC（克拉克·希尔律师事务所）及 THOMAS K.\nRAGLAND（托马斯·K·拉格兰德），\n被告\n证据附件 3\n\nGUO WENGUI（郭文贵）又名 MILES KWOK（郭文贵）又名\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），\n\n原告，\n诉 案号\nCLARK HILL PLC（克拉克·希尔律师事务所）及 THOMAS K.\nRAGLAND（托马斯·K·拉格兰德），\n\nJS-44（修订于 6/17 DC）\n\nI. (a) 原告 被告\nGUO WENGUI（郭文贵）又名 MILES KWOK（郭文贵）又名\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵） CLARK HILL PLC（克拉克·希尔律师事务所）及 THOMAS K. RAGLAND（托马斯·K·拉格兰德）\nNew York County, NY\n(b) 第一列明原告居住县 _____________________\n（美国为原告的案件除外） Wayne County, MI\n第一列明被告居住县 _____________________\n（仅限美国为原告的案件）\n注：在土地征收案件中，使用涉案地块所在地\n(c) 律师（律所名称、地址和电话号码） 律师（如已知）\nAri S. Casper（阿里·S·卡斯珀）, Ralph S. Tyler（拉尔夫·S·泰勒）, The Casper Firm（卡斯珀律师事务所）, 400 E.\nPratt Street, Suite 903, Baltimore, MD 21202 Jessica Ring Amunson（杰西卡·林·阿蒙森）（#497223）, Jenner & Block LLP（詹纳与布洛克律师事务所）, 1099\nNew York Avenue NW, Suite 900, Washington, DC\n20001-4412, (202) 639-6000\n\nII. 管辖权依据\n（仅在一个方框内标记 x） III. 主要当事人的公民身份（仅限公民身份多元案件：原告和被告各在一个方框内标记 x） 原告 被告\no\no\n1 美国政府\n原告 3 联邦问题\n（美国政府非当事人） 原告\n被告\no\no\n\n本州公民 于本州注册成立或\n主要营业地在本州 o\n4 o\n\no\no\n2 美国政府\n被告 4 公民身份多元\n（注明第 III 项中当事人的公民身份） 另一州公民 o\n2 o\n2 于另一州注册成立且\n主要营业地在另一州 o\n5 o\n\n 外国公民或国民 o\n3 o\n3 外国 o\n6 o\n\nIV. 案件分配及诉讼性质\n（在最能代表您的诉因的 A-N 类别中标记一个 X，并在相应的诉讼性质中标记一项）\no\no\nA. 反垄断 B. 人身伤害／\n执业过失 o\no\nC. 行政机关\n审查\nD. 临时限制\n命令／初步\n410 反垄断 310 飞机\n315 飞机产品责任\n320 袭击、诽谤及中伤\n330 联邦雇主责任\n340 海事\n345 海事产品责任\n350 机动车\n355 机动车产品责任\n360 其他人身伤害\n362 医疗过失\n365 产品责任\n367 医疗保健／药品\n人身伤害产品责任\n368 石棉产品责任 151 医疗保险法\n社会保障\n861 HIA (1395ff)\n862 黑肺病（923）\n863 DIWC/DIWW (405(g))\n864 SSID Title XVI\n865 RSI (405(g))\n其他法规\n891 农业法\n893 环境事项\n890 其他法定诉讼（如\n涉及行政机关） 禁令\n任何类别中的任何诉讼性质\n均可为此案件分配类别\n所选。\n（如属反垄断案件，则以 A 为准）\no\nE. 一般民事（其他） 或 o F. 无律师代理的一般民事\n不动产\n破产\n210 土地征收\n422 上诉 27 USC 158\n220 止赎\n423 撤回 28 USC 157\n230 租金、租赁及返还不动产\n囚犯申请\n240 土地侵权\n535 死刑\n245 侵权产品责任\n540 强制令及其他\n290 所有其他不动产\n550 公民权利\n555 监狱条件\n动产\n370 其他欺诈\n560 民事被拘留人—羁押\n371 贷款真相\n条件\n380 其他动产\n财产权\n损害\n820 著作权\n385 财产损害\n830 专利\n产品责任\n835 专利—简化新药\n申请\n840 商标 联邦税务诉讼\n870 税款（美国为原告或\n被告）\n871 IRS-第三方 26 USC\n\n没收／处罚\n625 与毒品有关的财产\n扣押 21 USC 881\n690 其他\n其他法规\n375 虚假申报法\n376 代政府起诉（31 USC\n3729(a)）\n400 州选区重划\n430 银行及银行业\n450 商业／ICC\n费率／等\n460 驱逐出境 462 入籍\n申请\n465 其他移民\n诉讼\n470 受敲诈勒索影响及\n腐败组织\n480 消费者信贷\n490 有线／卫星电视\n850 证券／商品／\n交易\n896 仲裁\n899 行政程序\n法／行政机关决定的审查或上诉\n950 州法规合宪性\n890 其他法定诉讼\n（如非行政机关\n审查或隐私法）\n\no\nG. 人身保护令／\n2255 332\no\nH. 就业\n歧视 o\nI. 信息自由法／隐私法 o\nJ. 学生贷款\n530 人身保护令—一般\n510 动议／撤销刑罚\n463 人身保护令—外国人\n被拘留人 442 公民权利—就业\n（标准：种族、性别／性别认同、\n国籍、\n歧视、残疾、年龄、\n宗教、报复） 895 信息自由法\n890 其他法定诉讼\n（如属隐私法） 152 追回违约\n学生贷款\n（不包括退伍军人）\n（如无律师代理，选择此栏） （如无律师代理，选择此栏）\no\nK. 劳工／ERISA\n（非就业）\n710 公平劳动标准法\n720 劳工／管理关系\n740 铁路劳工法\n751 家庭和医疗\n休假法\n790 其他劳工诉讼\n791 雇员退休收入保障法 o\nL. 其他公民权利\n（非就业）\n441 投票（如非投票权法）\n443 住房／住宿\n440 其他公民权利\n445 美国残疾人法—\n就业\n446 美国残疾人法—\n其他\n448 教育 o\nM. 合同\n110 保险\n120 海事\n130 米勒法\n140 可转让票据\n150 追回多付款项\n及执行\n判决\n153 追回退伍军人福利\n多付款项\n160 股东诉讼\n190 其他合同\n195 合同产品责任\n196 特许经营 o\nN. 三法官\n法院\n441 公民权利—投票\n（如属投票权法）\n\nV. 来源\no\no\no\no4 恢复\no5\no\no7 向\no8\n1 原始\n2 移送\n3 发回\n转移\n6 多地区\n多地区\n程序\n自州\n自上诉\n或重新开启\n自另一\n诉讼\n地区法官\n诉讼—\n法院\n法院\n地区（注明）\n自治安法官\n直接提交\n法官\n\nVI. 诉因（列明您据以提起诉讼的美国民事法规，并简要陈述诉因。）\n公民身份多元，28 U.S.C. § 1332，及民事诉讼移送，28 U.S.C. § 1441\n50,000,000\n\nVII. 请求的\n如属集体诉讼，请勾选\n请求 \\$\n仅在起诉书中提出请求时勾选“是”\n✘\n根据 F.R.C.P. 23 的\n是\n否\n起诉书\n陪审团请求：\n\nVIII. 关联案件\n如有 （见说明）\n是 ✘\n否 如有，请填写关联案件表\n10/24/2019\n日期：_________________________ /s/ Jessica Ring Amunson（杰西卡·林·阿蒙森）\n登记代理律师签名 _________________________________________________________\n\n填写民事封面表 JS-44 的说明 民事封面表的授权依据\n\nJS-44 民事封面表及其中所载信息，除法院地方法规另有规定外，既不替代也不补充法律所要求提交和送达的诉状或其他文件。本表于 1974 年 9 月经美国司法会议批准，供法院书记官用于建立民事案卷记录。因此，每提交一份民事起诉书，均须向法院书记官提交一份民事封面表。以下列出填写民事封面表的提示。这些提示与封面表上的罗马数字相对应。\n\n－ I. 第一列明原告／被告的居住县 (b) 居住县：如原告居住于 Washington, DC，使用 11001 表示原告；如原告居住于美国但不居住于 Washington, DC，使用 88888；如原告位于美国境外，使用 99999。\n\n－ III. 主要当事人的公民身份：仅当在第 II 节的管辖权依据中选择公民身份多元时，才填写本节。\n\n－ IV. 案件分配及诉讼性质：向您的案件分配法官取决于您所选择的、最能代表起诉书中主要诉因的类别。您只能选择一个类别。您还必须选择该案件类别下的一项相应诉讼性质。\n\n－ VI. 诉因：列明您据以提起诉讼的美国民事法规，并简要陈述主要诉因。\n\n－ VIII. 关联案件，如有：如您表明存在关联案件，则必须填写一份关联案件表，该表可从书记官办公室取得。\n\n鉴于准确和完整信息的必要性，您应在签署本表前确保所提供信息的准确性。\n\n证据附件 3\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA（哥伦比亚特区联邦地区法院）\n\nGUO WENGUI（郭文贵）又名 MILES KWOK（郭文贵）又名 )\nENGLISH>>>\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）， )\n162 E 64th Street )\nNew York, NY 10065 )\n原告， )\n)\n)\n诉 )\n)\n案号：1:19-cv-3195-JEB\nCLARK HILL PLC（克拉克·希尔律师事务所） )\n500 Woodward Avenue )\nJames Boasberg（詹姆斯·博斯伯格）法官\nSuite 3500 )\nDetroit, MI 48226 )\n)\n及 )\n)\nTHOMAS K. RAGLAND（托马斯·K·拉格兰）， )\n转交 Clark Hill PLC )\n1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW )\nSuite 1300 )\nWashington, DC 20004， )\n)\n被告。 )\n被告依据《联邦民事诉讼规则》第 12(b)(6) 条提出的驳回动议\n\n被告 Clark Hill PLC 和 Thomas Ragland 谨此依据《联邦民事诉讼规则》第 12(b)(6) 条，请求本院下令有偏见地驳回原告郭文贵的起诉状（Dkt. 1-1）。被告同时提交载有支持该动议之具体法律论点及依据的备忘录，以及拟议命令。\n\n日期：November 25, 2019 谨呈，\n\nCLARK HILL PLC 和 THOMAS K. RAGLAND\n\n代理人：/s/ John R. Storino\n其律师之一 John R. Storino（经 pro hac vice 特别许可）\nJENNER & BLOCK, LLP\n353 N. Clark Street\nChicago, IL 60654-3456\n电话：(312) 222-9350\nJStorino@jenner.com\n\nKali N. Bracey（#458965）\nJENNER & BLOCK, LLP\n1099 New York Avenue NW\nSuite 900\nWashington, DC 20001-4412\n电话：(202) 639-6000\nKBracey@jenner.com\n\n送达证明\n\n本人 John R. Storino，律师，特此证明，本人已于 2019 年 November 月 25 日通过电子送达方式，向下列人员送达上述被告依据《联邦民事诉讼规则》第 12(b)(6) 条提出的驳回动议，以及所附支持备忘录和拟议命令：\n\nAri S. Casper\nRalph S. Tyler\nThe Casper Firm\n400 E. Pratt Street, Suite 903\nBaltimore, MD 21202\n\n/s/ John R. Storino\n\n哥伦比亚特区美国联邦地区法院（UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA）\n\nGUO WENGUI（郭文贵），又名 MILES KWOK（郭文贵），又名 )\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）， )\n162 E 64th Street )\nNew York, NY 10065 )\n原告， )\n)\n诉 )\n)\n)\n案号：1:19-cv-3195-JEB\nCLARK HILL PLC（克拉克·希尔律师事务所） )\n500 Woodward Avenue )\nJames Boasberg（詹姆斯·博斯伯格）法官\nSuite 3500 )\nDetroit, MI 48226 )\n)\n及 )\n)\nTHOMAS K. RAGLAND（托马斯·K·拉格兰）， )\n转交 Clark Hill PLC )\n1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW )\nSuite 1300 )\nWashington, DC 20004， )\n)\n被告。\n\n支持被告驳回动议的法律论点及依据备忘录\n\n目录\n\n事实背景 2\n\n法律标准 5\n\n论证 6\n\nI. 原告的律师专业过失请求不能成立，因为其无法主张被告对原告违反了义务。 6\n\nA. 被告退出代理并未违反义务 6\n\n1. 依据《职业行为规则》3.7 条，退出代理是必要的。 7\n\n2. 依据《职业行为规则》1.7 条，退出代理是必要的。 8\n\nB. 仅仅发生网络事件这一事实，不足以主张被告违反了保护保密信息的义务。 10\n\nII. 本院应驳回原告关于违反信义义务的请求。 12\n\nIII. 本院应驳回原告关于违约的请求。 13\n\nIV. 原告的全部三项请求均应予驳回，因为原告未主张（且无法主张）被告的行为造成了实际损害。 15\n\nA. 原告就网络事件主张的全部损害，要么具有推测性，要么早于该事件发生。 15\n\nB. 原告亦未适当地主张被告退出代理造成损害，因为其自身起诉状已反驳其主张。 19\n\nV. 因原告未达到高标准，本院应有偏见地驳回原告关于惩罚性赔偿金的请求。 21\n\n结论 23\n\n判例及其他依据目录*\n\n页码\n\n判例\n\nAnderson-Bey v. D.C., 466 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 2006) 6\n\nAshcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) 5, 10, 11\n\nAttias v. CareFirst, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2019) 15\n\nBanneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 798 F.3d 1119 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 3\n\nBolton v. Crowley, Hoge & Fein, P.C., 110 A.3d 575 (D.C. 2015) 13\n\nBoynton v. Lopez, 473 A.2d 375 (D.C. 1984) 22\n\nCaston v. Butler, 718 F. Supp. 2d 87 (D.D.C. 2010) 22\n\n*Chase v. Gilbert, 499 A.2d 1203 (D.C. 1985) 6, 19, 21\n\nDalo v. Kivitz, 596 A.2d 35 (D.C. 1991) 22\n\nEmbassy of Fed. Republic of Nigeria v. Ugwuonye, 297 F.R.D. 4 (D.D.C. 2013) 22, 23\n\nFarah v. Esquire Magazine, 736 F.3d 528 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 各处\n\nHammerman v. Peacock, 607 F. Supp. 911 (D.D.C. 1985) 22\n\nIn re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., No. CV 03-1650 (TFH), 2004\nWL 7081446 各处\n\nMarte v. Ltd. Brands, No. CIV.A. 13-139 FSH, 2014 WL 1092503 (D.N.J. Mar.\n18, 2014) 22\n\nMorrison v. MacNamara, 407 A.2d 555 (D.C. 1979) 11\n\nMount v. Baron, 154 F. Supp. 2d 3 (D.D.C. 2001) 6, 15, 19, 21\n\nN. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge\n& Rice, PLLC, 887 F. Supp. 2d 78 (D.D.C. 2012) 13\n\nNurriddin v. Bolden, 818 F.3d 751 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 5\n\nO'Neil v. Bergan, 452 A.2d 337 (D.C. 1982) 13\n\n* 被告主要援引的依据以星号标明。\n\nOwens v. BNP Paribas, S.A., 897 F.3d 266 (D.C. Cir. 2018) 5\n\nPark v. Reizes, No. 06-CV-0843 GTS/GJD, 2009 WL 4893142, at *5 (N.D.N.Y.\nDec. 15, 2009) 7\n\n*Pietrangelo v. Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr, LLP, 68 A.3d 697 (D.C.\n2013) 5, 6, 19, 21\n\n*Randolph v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 973 A.2d 702 (D.C. 2009) 2, 12, 15, 16\n\nRodriguez v. Lab. Corp. of AmericaHoldings, 13 F. Supp. 3d 121 (D.D.C. 2014) 14\n\nRollins v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 703 F.3d 122 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 5\n\nSackin v. TransPerfect Glob., Inc., 278 F. Supp. 3d 739 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) 12\n\nScott v. Burgin, 97 A.3d 564 (D.C. 2014) 18\n\nTellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007) 2\n\nU.S. Telesis, Inc. v. Ende, 64 F. Supp. 3d 65, 68 (D.D.C. 2014), aff'd, No. 14-\n7146, 2015 WL 653325 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 5, 2015) 13, 19, 21\n\nWilliams v. Patterson, 681 A.2d 1147 (D.C. 1996) 19\n\n其他依据\n\n肯定性庇护面谈排期，美国公民及移民服务局，\nhttp（最后访问于\nNovember 10, 2019） 20\n\n庇护决定类型，美国公民及移民服务局，\nhttp>decisions（最后访问于 November 10, 2019） 7\n\nI-94 表格，入境／离境记录，填写 USCIS 表格的信息，\n美国公民及移民服务局，http>94information（最后访问于 Nov. 12, 2019） 17\n\n移民法庭积案查询工具，\nhttp（最后访问于\nNovember 10, 2019） 20\n\n*D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 1.16(a) 6, 8\n\n*D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 3.7(a) 7\n\n*D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 1.7(b)(4) 8\n\nD.C. R. Prof. Conduct 1.7, cmt. 11 9\n\n原告郭文贵针对其前庇护律师 Thomas Ragland 及 Ragland 先生所在律师事务所 Clark Hill PLC（合称“被告”）提出的律师专业过失、违反信义义务及违约之诉，应被有偏见地驳回，因为原告未能充分主张其请求的诸多要件，且更重要的是，依法无法做到这一点。实际上，原告在其长达三十页的起诉状中已使其诉讼无法成立，因为其自身主张表明其不具有任何可成立的请求。正如其起诉状所概述，原告在过去十年的大部分时间里一直公开批评中国政府。该等公开批评已导致中国政府据称实施持续多年的报复。原告最终在美国申请庇护——但仍继续其针对中国政府的公开运动，并公开披露其申请庇护一事。\n\n原告制造的该等公开宣传，很快引发中国政府针对 Clark Hill 的网络攻击，旨在获取与原告有关的信息。原告现试图根据这一事态发展构造三项诉因及一项惩罚性赔偿金请求——而该事态始于原告自身对提交其庇护申请的公开宣传。其三项诉因均基于如下主张：被告因（1）网络事件本身，以及（2）被告在该事件后退出代理，而对原告违反了各种义务。然而，任一行为均不支持一项请求。具体而言，原告未提出任何关于被告据称如何违反其保护原告信息义务的事实主张。此外，律师事务所退出庇护事项不仅不构成律师专业过失，退出也是适当的——事实上是必要的——因为在该律师事务所遭受攻击后，被告立即成为中国据称在庇护案件中迫害原告的证人。\n\n此外，根据具有约束力的法律，原告未主张这两项行为中的任一项如何给其造成任何实际损害，而实际损害是维持其请求所必需的要件。见 Randolph v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 973 A.2d 702, 708 (D.C. 2009)（因未主张“实际损害”而维持驳回基于数据事件引起的过失行为的请求）。原告未主张退出代理对其庇护程序造成任何损害——其亦无法如此主张，因为其申请仍在审理中。为不足地试图主张某些损害，原告依赖于被其起诉状削弱的模糊、概括性主张；例如，其抱怨失去未具体说明的“商业机会”，并遭受未具体说明的旅行限制。起诉状 ¶¶ 56, 58。然而，按原告自身的说法，其所称网络事件造成的损害列举了其在聘请被告之前很久便已遭受的同样骚扰和压迫（其在美国寻求庇护即证明了这一点）。由于被告的行为不可能造成这些损害，本院应有偏见地驳回原告的起诉状。\n\n事实背景\n\n原告是一名知名中国异议人士。起诉状 ¶ 10。他承认，其批评中国政府的方法包括“揭露”中国政府及中国官员掌握的各种秘密。同上 ¶ 15。由于这些公开活动，中国政府据称至少五年来一直以威胁、骚扰和虚假信息运动针对原告（及其家人和企业）。同上 ¶¶ 10, 16-27。原告聘请被告在其美国庇护申请中代理其，以使其能够逃离该等迫害。同上 ¶ 28。作为附件 A 随附的是一份真实、正确的委托函副本，该函记录了被告对原告的代理，而原告已将其纳入其起诉状（见起诉状 ¶¶ 37, 76）。见 Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007)（对于 Rule 12(b)(6) 动议，法院必须考虑\n\n“通过援引并入起诉状的文件，以及法院可以司法认知的事项”）；Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 798 F.3d 1119, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 2015)（“援引并入的典型情形发生于起诉状主张违约，且任一方当事人将合同本身的真实副本附于其诉状之时。”）。\n\n原告对中国政府的公开批评，只有在其拥有受众的情况下，才可能招致中国政府如此愤怒——而原告确有受众。原告通过社交媒体帖子、访谈和视频发表其批评意见。见 Chun Han Wong and Felicia Schwartz, China Wants Fugitive Guo Wengui Back—but He's Applied for U.S. Asylum, Wall St. J. (Sept. 7, 2017),（作为证据B附后）；另见 Farah v. Esquire Magazine, 736 F.3d 528, 534 (D.C. Cir. 2013)（“对于公开可得的历史文章，适宜进行司法认知[。]”）；In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., No. CV 03-1650 (TFH), 2004 WL 7081446, at \\*1 n.1, n.3 (D.D.C. May 18, 2004)（法院可以对公共记录事项及报纸文章进行司法认知）。原告的 YouTube 页面有近800个视频，且其几乎每天都会添加新视频。见 http（最后访问于 November 10, 2019）。起诉状承认所有这些公开宣传——原告指出，“CCP [Chinese Communist Party（中国共产党）] believes plaintiff presently holds not publicly known proof of various types of improper conduct on the part of the CCP[.]” Complaint ¶ 17。中国共产党之所以如此认为，是因为原告本人曾反复这样说过。\n\n在其一段视频中，原告于 September 7, 2017 宣布其已在美国申请庇护。证据B（指出原告在“live video broadcast”中宣布了庇护申请）；另见 http at 15:25（September 2, 2017 的视频宣布，五天后原告将就其“legal team”和“visa”作出“一项重要公告”）；http watch?v=xW5TzUkUjrw（September 7, 2017 的视频）。\n\n不到一周后，即于 September 12, 2017 前后，Clark Hill PLC（克拉克·希尔律师事务所）遭到由中国政府支持的行为者实施的网络攻击。见 Complaint ¶ 41。原告本人主张，中国曾指使该网络事件以获取原告的庇护信息。Philip Wen, China denies links to alleged cyber attacks in United States targeting exiled tycoon Guo, Reuters (Oct. 8, 2017)（作为证据C附后）；另见 Farah, 736 F.3d at 534（关于司法认知）；In re Lorazepam, 2004 WL 7081446, at \\*1 n.1, n.3（同上）。事件发生后，被告及时通过口头方式及致原告的信函通知原告——原告亦将该信函纳入其起诉状。见 Complaint ¶ 49。在该信中，被告确认，该网络事件“与[被告]对[原告]的代理有关。”撤回函的真实且正确副本作为证据D附后。\n\n被告告知原告，其将退出作为原告律师的代理，原因是该网络事件使被告可能成为中国试图针对原告、进而涉及其庇护程序的证人。Complaint ¶ 49；Exhibit D。被告向原告保证，其将协助原告把庇护申请过渡至后任律师（该事项已经完成）。Exhibit D。由于庇护申请刚刚提交，且政府需要数月（即使不是数年）才会就原告的申请与其联系，原告在其庇护程序中未遭受任何不利影响或延误。见 Complaint ¶ 38, 49。原告的庇护申请仍在审理中。Id. ¶ 51。尽管存在这些无争议的事实，原告现仍就法律执业过失、违约及违反信义义务向被告请求损害赔偿，包括惩罚性赔偿。\n\n法律标准\n\n为在因未能提出可获救济的请求而提出的驳回动议中存续，起诉状必须包含足够事实，“以陈述一项表面上可信的救济请求。”Rollins v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 703 F.3d 122, 129 (D.C. Cir. 2012)（引自 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)）。起诉状中的事实必须使法院能够“作出被告应对所称不当行为承担责任的合理推断。”Id. at 130（引自 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678）。法院“无需接受缺乏事实支持的推断，或以事实主张形式表述的法律结论。”Owens v. BNP Paribas, S.A., 897 F.3d 266, 272 (D.C. Cir. 2018)（引自 City of Harper Woods Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Olver, 589 F.3d 1292, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 2009)）。“对诉因要件的公式化罗列，如仅由结论性陈述支持，尚不足够。”Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678。原告如主张的事实使其在实体问题上获胜不可能实现，即为自行将其案件排除于法院受理之外。Nurriddin v. Bolden, 818 F.3d 751, 757 (D.C. Cir. 2016)。同样，未能充分主张请求的某一要件，即须驳回。见 id.（当原告的主张未能“引起推断”认为该请求的全部要件均已具备时，驳回诉因）。\n\n仅就本动议而言，被告接受起诉状中所有妥为陈述的主张均为真实。Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678*.* 然而，如日后确有必要，被告将证明起诉状中的许多重要陈述并不准确。\n\n哥伦比亚特区法律管辖原告的请求。见 Pietrangelo v. Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr, LLP, 68 A.3d 697, 714 (D.C. 2013)（对位于哥伦比亚特区的律师所涉不当行为主张适用哥伦比亚特区法律；委托函来自该律师事务所的哥伦比亚特区办公室，且该关系以哥伦比亚特区为中心）。起诉状承认，被告代理原告的实质性工作部分发生在哥伦比亚特区。Complaint ¶ 14。原告并未主张任何其他州与该争议有关联。参见 Anderson-Bey v. D.C., 466 F. Supp. 2d 51, 67 (D.D.C. 2006)（法律选择分析的目的在于评估另一司法辖区是否具有相互竞争的利益，以致应由其法律管辖）。\n\n论证\n\nI. 原告的法律执业过失请求不能成立，因为其无法主张被告违反了对原告的义务。\n\n为提出法律执业过失请求，原告必须主张：（1）存在律师—客户关系；（2）律师违反了对客户的义务；（3）该违反行为导致客户受损；以及（4）实际损害。见 Chase v. Gilbert, 499 A.2d 1203, 1211 (D.C. 1985)；Mount v. Baron, 154 F. Supp. 2d 3, 8 (D.D.C. 2001)。作为法律问题，原告无法主张被告违反了其对原告的任何义务。此外，如下文第IV节所示，原告无法主张被告的行为对原告造成任何维持法律执业过失请求所必需的实际损害。\n\nA. 被告退出代理并未违反义务。\n\n原告无法证明，被告在网络事件发生后退出代理构成违反任何义务。根据 District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct（哥伦比亚特区职业行为规则），被告的退出完全适当。参见 Pietrangelo, 68 A.3d at 710（当律师未违反职业行为规则时，原告不得以披露保密信息为由对律师提出违反信义义务的请求）。如果律师继续代理客户将违反职业行为规则，律师必须退出代理。D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 1.16(a)。网络事件一旦发生，被告继续代理将违反多项规则，因此其必须退出代理。\n\n1. 根据职业行为规则3.7，退出代理是必要的。\n\n网络事件使被告处于可能成为原告庇护程序证人的位置。当律师“可能成为必要证人”时，律师“不得”在该程序中担任客户的辩护人。D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 3.7(a)。该网络事件意味着，被告现已成为中国对原告实施迫害的直接证人。鉴于中国先前对原告的迫害构成原告庇护请求的基础，被告现成为中国针对原告的某一特定方面的唯一证人。由于网络事件周围的事实支持原告的庇护请求，被告成为必要证人，根据职业行为规则退出代理属适当之举。\n\n撤回函已向原告说明这一退出代理的必要性。Exhibit D。原告的回应是，该陈述理由是“骗局”。Complaint ¶ 71。但原告的回应试图迫使被告规避其伦理义务。例如，原告在被告退出代理两年后抱怨，其并未要求被告成为证人，且与网络事件有关的事项不存在争议，因而属于规则3.7(a)的有限例外之一。Id. ¶ 51。这完全是推测。原告可能被要求参加庇护听证会或提交新证据，且原告无法预测其未来希望或需要提交何种证据。见 Types of Asylum Decisions, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services（美国公民及移民服务局）, http（最后访问于 November 10, 2019）（指出某些庇护决定需要法院听证或新证据）；另见 Farah, 736 F.3d at 534（关于司法认知）；In re Lorazepam, 2004 WL 7081446, at \\*1 n.1, n.3（同上）。原告不能代表美国政府发言，且无依据确定地声称哪些事项将不存在争议，或政府将传唤哪些证人。参见 Park v. Reizes, No. 06-CV-0843 GTS/GJD, 2009 WL 4893142, at \\*5 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2009)（因对方当事人意图传唤律师作为证人，故须退出代理）。同样，评估继续代理是否会违反职业行为规则是律师的义务，见 D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 1.16(a)，因此，必须由律师评估其是否“可能”成为证人。\n\n尽管原告目前表示不希望传唤被告作为证人，但随着庇护程序推进，情况可能发生变化。若随着原告庇护程序的推进，原告日后决定被告的证言将有益，被告继续代理原告将剥夺原告作出该决定的能力。被告未退出代理，将因剥夺原告作出该决定并从该证言中受益的能力，而违反其对原告的义务。因此，退出代理不仅适当，而且是必需的。\n\n2. 根据职业行为规则1.7，退出代理是必要的。\n\n根据规则1.7(b)(4)，退出代理亦属必需；该规则要求，如果律师代理客户的能力“可能因律师对第三方承担的责任或其在自身财务、商业、财产或个人利益方面的责任或利益而受到不利影响”，则律师必须退出代理。D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 1.7(b)(4)。网络事件发生时，被告立即在调查及减轻该事件方面拥有自身利益——这与其对原告的代理相冲突。原告自己的主张证明了这一点：原告抱怨被告未向原告提供有关网络事件的敏感信息，例如其他客户档案是否已遭泄露，以及被告获悉该事件的方式。Complaint ¶ 46。\n\n此外，当客户就律师在持续事项中先前的行为提出疑问时，规则设想了同类“先前工作”冲突。规则的评注解释道，“如果律师自身在一项交易中的行为是否正当受到严重质疑，则可能\n\n将难以或不可能使律师向客户提供客观建议。”D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 1.7, cmt. 11。本案即属此种情形——在网络事件发生后，原告质疑被告的行为，将损害被告在此后就同一事项提供客观建议的能力。为避免该风险，退出代理是必要的。\n\n被告的退出代理不仅符合《职业行为规则》，而且获得双方委托函的明确允许和预期。该委托函载明代理范围，且原告已将其纳入其起诉状；该函明确允许被告在其“认为出现任何将损害[被告]代理[原告]能力的利益冲突”时退出代理。附件A，第3页；见附件A，第8页。换言之，如被告认为存在任何利益冲突，其有权自行决定退出代理。如上所示，被告退出代理并确保原告此后获得不受利益冲突影响的代理，仅是在履行其职业义务。原告现不得将该问题作为其诉因的一部分提出，因为其已通过合同同意：如被告“认为”存在任何影响原告代理的利益冲突，被告可以退出代理。被告已证明此类利益冲突确实存在；至少，被告认为此类利益冲突实际存在。简言之，代理人以有序方式退出代理，且客户有时间寻找替代律师，并不构成律师执业过失。参见起诉状¶ 51（原告的庇护申请自提交以来一直处于待决状态）。本案发生的正是这种情形。\n\n由于《职业行为规则》要求被告退出对原告的代理，且该退出符合委托函，原告未能适当主张被告因退出代理而违反义务。\nB. 仅发生网络事件这一事实不足以主张被告违反保护保密信息的义务。\n\n原告亦未充分主张被告违反了对原告负有的保密义务。原告的主张假定：一外国政府对其经常且不懈地针对的个人实施网络事件这一事实本身，足以主张被告的信息安全系统必定存在严重缺陷，以至于违反对原告负有的义务。该推理存在两个致命缺陷。\n\n首先，原告忽视了其在该事件中的自身作用。原告不仅是中国的持续且频繁的批评者——中国过去曾对原告采取报复行动——其还亲自在其发布至互联网的一段视频中宣布其已申请庇护。原告本人引起了对其庇护申请的关注，并寻求有关庇护程序的宣传。原告的行为使中国知悉其庇护申请。这一挑衅表明，该网络事件不同于典型黑客攻击多个目标、以获取数百万消费者的私人信息并实施身份盗窃的情形。相反，此次黑客攻击是由一个意图仅针对原告（一名极具公众知名度的个人）的外国政府实施的。见起诉状¶¶ 15-27。\n\n原告仅仅假定，既然发生了网络事件，被告必定采取了“漏洞百出”且“不合理”的安全措施。同上¶¶ 41-42。此类推测性且含糊的主张不足以维持诉因。见Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678。恰恰相反，这是由一个具有网络战先进能力和经验的侵略性外国政府实施或促成的事件。Jack Stubbs et al., China hacked eight major computer services firms in years-long attack, Reuters (June 26, 2019) (Exhibit E); Kevin Collier, Chinese spies stole NSA hacking tools, report finds, CNN (June 15, 2019) (Exhibit F)。事实上，在原告的游艇据称也于2017年9月遭中国黑客攻击后，原告\n\n公开表示，中国“如其愿意，能够获得每一位美国公民的私人通信和信息，而且几乎无需任何成本即可非常容易地做到这一点。”Bill Gertz, Beijing Suspected in Hacking Yacht Owned by Chinese Billionaire, Wash. Free Beacon (Sep. 8, 2017) (Exhibit G); 见附件C，第3页（指出原定为原告举办公开露面的一个组织宣布，其是一起以上海为基地的网络事件的受害者）。为支持被告违反义务的主张，原告必须主张的不仅仅是发生网络事件这一简单事实。\n\n其次，原告或许意识到其无法充分主张被告违反任何义务，遂进行了大量且不准确的推测，徒劳地试图维持其诉因。具体而言，原告主张，若被告为与黑客谈判而向第三方交付原告信息的“赎金”，则被告违反了其义务。起诉状¶¶ 77, 86（着重号为原文所加）。但原告并未主张被告实际将原告的信息作为赎金交付，因为该情形并未发生。同样，原告假设网络攻击者“显然没有遇到很大困难”便侵入了被告的信息系统。同上¶ 41（着重号为原文所加）。这些主张试图将推测伪装成合理性，依法不足。见Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678。\n\n实际上，原告主张被告违反义务，是因为其安全措施未能奏效，“无论这些措施为何”。起诉状¶ 42。这构成循环式的事后逻辑：被告受到攻击，因此无论被告采取何种安全措施，该等措施必定严重不足，以至于被告违反了其义务。仅发生网络事件这一事实并不意味着被告违反义务；即使被告采取了合理注意，当一个不懈的外国政府专注于某一个人的信息时，其始终构成网络风险。见Morrison v. MacNamara, 407 A.2d 555, 561 (D.C. 1979)（指出律师执业过失案件中的\n\n注意义务标准是“在类似情形下执业的律师应具备的合理注意和技能程度”）。\n\n当基于数据事件的起诉状主张了表明被告未采取合理注意的事实——而非结论性主张——时，法院允许该等起诉状得以维持。见Sackin v. TransPerfect Glob., Inc., 278 F. Supp. 3d 739, 748 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)（在起诉状主张被告“未采取合理措施防止原告[个人可识别信息]被不当传播——包括建立数字防火墙、进行数据安全培训以及采取保留和销毁政策”时，驳回驳回动议）。但本案中，原告并未试图说明被告如何未采取合理注意——其只是认定被告未采取合理注意。依照这一逻辑，即使最好的安全措施，如一个技术先进且意志坚定的外国政府能够突破这些措施，也会严重不足而构成不合理。这些主张不当地仅关注结果，而非被告是否违反了义务。\n\n基于同一原因，原告关于被告仅因接受代理即违反义务的理论亦不能成立——原告未说明被告如此行为如何违反义务。仅发生网络事件这一事实不足以支持该事项超出被告胜任能力的主张。见起诉状¶ 45。\n\n总之，原告未主张被告因其退出代理或因网络事件而违反对原告负有的职业义务。本院应有偏见地驳回原告的执业过失请求。\nII. 本院应驳回原告关于违反信义义务的请求。\n\n原告关于违反信义义务的请求必须基于与执业过失请求相同的理由予以驳回——原告未充分主张被告违反义务。见Randolph, 973 A.2d at 709（认定当违反信义义务请求源于与过失请求相同的事实和情形时，该请求应基于与已被驳回的过失请求“基本相同的理由”予以驳回）。“在专业执业过失案件中，如基础执业过失请求不能成立，则基于该基础执业过失请求的附加请求亦不能维持。”U.S. Telesis, Inc. v. Ende, 64 F. Supp. 3d 65, 68 (D.D.C. 2014), aff'd, No. 14-7146, 2015 WL 653325 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 5, 2015)（引自Mawalla v, Hoffman, 569 F. Supp. 2d 253, 257 (D.D.C. 2008)）；见Bolton v. Crowley, Hoge & Fein, P.C., 110 A.3d 575, 582 (D.C. 2015)（“[本院]对律师执业过失请求的处理同样完全适用于违反信义义务的请求。”（引自Mills v. Cooter, 647 A.2d 1118, 1120 n.6 (D.C. 1994)））。\n\n此外，违反信义义务的请求必须予以驳回，因为该请求与律师执业过失请求重复。“当违反信义义务请求的基础源于与过失请求相同的事实并寻求相同救济时，该请求即属重复，因此应予驳回。”Bolton, 110 A.3d at 582; N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice, PLLC, 887 F. Supp. 2d 78, 83-84 (D.D.C. 2012)（汇集案例）。本案中，律师执业过失请求与违反信义义务请求均基于相同事实——二者均基于被告据称未能防范网络事件及退出对原告的代理，并主张完全相同的损害赔偿。见起诉状¶¶ 68-74, 83-88。本院应有偏见地驳回原告关于违反信义义务的请求。\nIII. 本院应驳回原告关于违约的请求。\n\n原告的违约请求亦与律师执业过失请求重复。见N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., 887 F. Supp. 2d at 83-84（解释违约请求与违反信义义务请求一样，在“源于与执业过失请求相同的情形并寻求相同救济”时，必须作为重复请求予以驳回）；O'Neil\n\nv. Bergan, 452 A.2d 337, 343 (D.C. 1982)。仅基于此理由，本院即应驳回违约请求。\n\n即使本院审查违约请求的构成要件，也必须驳回该请求，因为原告未能充分主张该诉因。根据哥伦比亚特区法律，违约请求要求“(1) 当事人之间存在有效合同；(2) 合同产生的义务；(3) 违反该义务；以及(4) 因违约造成的损害。”Rodriguez v. Lab. Corp. of AmericaHoldings, 13 F. Supp. 3d 121, 134 (D.D.C. 2014)（引自Tsintolas Realty Co. v. Mendez, 984 A.2d 181, 187 (D.C. 2009)）。本案中，原告承认当事人订立了书面协议——委托函。见起诉状¶ 76（“[被告]与原告订立书面合同，由该律师事务所代理原告。”）；¶ 34（主张委托函“创设并正式确立合同性”义务）；附件A。根据其条款，委托函“载明”当事人各自的义务和预期，且仅可通过书面形式修改。附件A，第1、5页。因此，委托函即为合同。\n\n原告未主张被告如何违反了委托函；如无此项主张，该请求必须被驳回。或许是认识到这一缺陷，原告试图主张，被告另行达成协议，以保护原告的信息，且该保护超出合同明示要求。起诉书 ¶ 33。但是，原告未主张任何关于该附加“协议”形成的事实，因为该协议并不存在。他也不可能主张——委托函明确规定，双方之间的合同只能以书面形式修改。原告并未主张该所谓的另行协议系以书面形式作出。基于所有这些理由，法院还必须终局性驳回原告的违约请求。\n\nIV. 原告的全部三项请求均应被驳回，因为原告未主张（且无法主张）被告的行为造成了实际损害。\n\n首先，原告主张 $50 million 的损害赔偿，但未以任何方式说明其如何得出该数额。此外，原告未主张支持其任何侵权请求所必需的实际损害。他抱怨受到中国政府的迫害——但该迫害早在网络事件之前便已开始。原告未说明该迫害如何增加或恶化，亦未说明网络事件如何造成任何新的具体损害。他也不可能作出说明。这一缺陷致使其起诉书无法成立。\n\n为维持基于律师执业过失或违反信义义务的侵权请求，原告必须证明被告造成的实际损害。Randolph, 973 A.2d at 708-09（关于基于过失的请求）；Mount, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 8（律师执业过失要求“因[律师]过失而造成的实际损失或损害”（引自 Shapiro, Lifschitz & Schram v. R.E. Hazard, Jr., 24 F. Supp. 2d 66, 75 (D.D.C. 1998)））。同一标准亦适用于违约请求。见 Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 3d 1, 9-10, 12 (D.D.C. 2019)。\n\nA. 原告就网络事件主张的全部损害要么具有推测性，要么发生在该事件之前。\n\n原告主张网络事件造成两类推测性损害：其对数据事件可能导致未来损害的担忧，以及据称由中国政府造成的各种笼统且模糊的损害，该等损害已持续多年。见起诉书 ¶ 10。这两类损害均无法支持其请求。\n\n哥伦比亚特区上诉法院（District of Columbia Court of Appeals）已直接处理支持源于数据事件的侵权请求所必需的损害问题，依据该具有约束力的判例法，原告的主张并不充分。在 Randolph v. ING Life Insurance and Annuity Co.（ING 人寿保险及年金公司）一案中，窃贼从一名 ING 代理人（ING Agent）家中盗走一台笔记本电脑，其中载有——未作任何加密或密码保护——由 ING 监管的递延补偿计划参与者的个人信息。973 A.2d at 704-05。该等个人信息包括地址和社会保障号码。Id. at 704, 706。原告起诉 ING，主张多项侵权请求，包括过失、重大过失和违反信义义务，并主张其遭受了：(1) 身份被盗用的风险，(2) 信用监测及其他安全措施的费用，以及 (3) 某些原告（警察）因“可能对警察怀有恶意者”所带来的身体危险。Id. at 708-09。\n\n地区法院驳回了起诉书，上诉法院维持了对起诉书的全部驳回。法院认为，所主张的三类损害均构成未来损害的风险，因此不足以支持原告的请求。Id. 法院在作出该裁定时解释称：“推测性损害，或尚未实现的未来损害威胁，不足以构成过失诉因。”Id. at 708（引自 In re Estate of Curseen v. Buchanan Ingersoll, P.C., 890 A.2d 191, 194 (D.C. 2006)）。\n\n本案亦然。基于三项理由，原告的请求比 Randolph 一案中被驳回的请求更具推测性。第一，原告试图与网络事件建立关联的唯一损害，是未具体说明的商业机会损失、未具体说明的“成本和费用”，以及未具体说明的“对其个人及职业声誉的损害”。起诉书 ¶ 56。这些主张极为笼统，以至于原告甚至未指明其“业务”，亦未说明该业务（非本案当事人）如何受到损害。他抱怨其庇护申请已在互联网上出现，但无法说明这实际上如何损害了他。原告对中国的批评在该事件发生前多年便已广为人知且广泛传播。见 id. ¶ 10。原告未说明其庇护申请包含任何其本人尚未置于公共领域的、关于中国的信息或对中国的批评——实际上，庇护申请必然以陈述申请人原籍国过去对其实施的迫害为基础。\n\n原告仅称，该信息已“失去其保密地位”，并且存在未具体说明的“理由相信”他人可能已利用该信息对其造成损害。Id. ¶¶ 9, 57。这正是 Randolph 所驳回的推测性损害类型。在该案中，由社会保障号码和地址泄露所产生的对未来损害的担忧，并未充分主张实际损害。同样，原告仅抱怨信息遭到黑客攻击——其未主张任何事实说明该所谓披露已经或将会如何对其造成损害。实际上，原告不大可能证明其所称被盗的任何信息能够对其造成任何损害——例如，原告称该信息中包括的 I-94 号码，仅仅是向任何前往美国的访客签发的号码。见起诉书 ¶ 43；Form I-94, Arrival/Departure Record, Information for Completing USCIS Forms, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services（美国公民及移民服务局）, http (last visited Nov. 12, 2019)。原告亦未主张其护照号码被公布所造成的任何损害（该号码同样属于该信息的一部分，见起诉书 ¶ 43）——鉴于任何试图以原告姓名旅行的人将面临广为报道的 Interpol（国际刑警组织）逮捕通报，这种损害不太可能发生。这与 Randolph 一案中丢失的信息（社会保障号码）不同，后者可能便利身份盗用，但即便如此仍不足以构成一项请求。\n\n第二，原告列举了其遭受中国政府侵害的一系列情况——但根据其本人承认，这些侵害在其聘请被告之前多年便已持续。见起诉书 ¶¶ 23-24。例如，原告主张，早在 January 2015，他就“有充分理由担心被中国政府和/或中国共产党（CCP）逮捕、拘留、讯问、酷刑和/或杀害。”Id. ¶ 19。然而，在网络事件之后，他抱怨其人身安全面临风险——正如事件发生之前一样。Id. ¶ 56。在事件发生之前，原告主张中国政府经常逮捕和拘留其同事，并且其雇员被逮捕和拘留，他还担心其家人和朋友的安全。Id. ¶¶ 16, 19。在网络事件之后，他主张中国政府继续拘留其雇员并骚扰其家人——但未说明该等情况在事件之后如何增加或恶化，或者更重要的是，网络事件如何导致该等损害增加或恶化。见 id. ¶ 56。原告抱怨其因该事件而旅行自由受限，id. ¶ 58，但他承认，中国政府在网络事件之前便已发出限制其旅行能力的 Interpol “red notice”。Id. ¶ 21；China says Interpol seeks arrest of tycoon Guo Wengui, BBC News（英国广播公司新闻）(Apr. 20, 2017) (Exhibit H)（Interpol red notice was issued in April 2017）；另见 Farah, 736 F.3d at 534（关于司法认知）；In re Lorazepam, 2004 WL 7081446, at *1 n.1, n.3（同）。更具体而言，原告未说明网络事件如何在既有的限制之外进一步限制其旅行自由，亦未说明如何量化该事件发生后的任何此类限制。因此，原告未主张任何在网络事件之后开始（甚至恶化）的实际损害。由于未陈述支持被告行为所致损害的事实，原告的起诉书未能提出可成立的请求。\n\n第三，即使原告已经主张了该等损害为何，其也无法基于其企业所受损害或代表其雇员维持请求。基于第三方所受损害的律师执业过失请求，要求该第三方为法律服务的预期受益人。见 Scott v. Burgin, 97 A.3d 564, 566 (D.C. 2014)。本案并非如此——原告未陈述任何被告向其企业提供法律服务的事实。见 Exhibit A。\n\n总而言之，即使法院认定中国造成的这些持续性损害构成“实际损害”，原告亦未主张其中任何损害是由网络事件造成的。如上所述，根据原告本人的陈述，其承认自己多年来一直因其自身直言不讳且频繁的倡导活动而遭受中国政府的侵害。实际上，这正是原告最初提交其庇护申请的原因。原告全部非推测性损害自至少 2015 起一直持续这一事实表明，原告未主张且无法主张，被告办公室发生的网络事件本身造成了任何实际损害。参见 Williams v. Patterson, 681 A.2d 1147, 1150 (D.C. 1996)（“法律已确定：在事故并未造成疾病状况，而仅加重并提高事故发生时既存状况的严重程度的情况下，该方只能就作为过失行为自然且近因结果而产生的该等增加或加重的痛苦获得赔偿。”（引自 Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Morgan, 35 App. D.C. 195, 200 (1910)））。\n\nB. 原告亦未适当主张被告的退出造成损害，因为其主张被其自身的起诉书所驳斥。\n\n原告抱怨其因被告作为其庇护案件代理律师退出而遭受三类损害，但其中无一显示支持其请求所需的实际损害。律师执业过失请求要求“律师的过失造成法律上可认知的损害”，且“仅有推测是不够的”。Chase, 499 A.2d at 1212；见 Pietrangelo, 68 A.3d at 713（“Pietrangelo 未主张足够事实，表明 WilmerHale 违反其专业职责造成因果关系或由此产生的非推测性损害。”）；U.S. Telesis, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 68（“UST 未充分主张被告的行为导致其在基础案件中失去其损害赔偿请求。”）；Mount, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 9-10（驳回起诉书，因“无法根据起诉书得出结论认为，若纳入其他律师事务所（及请求），陪审团裁决将会有所不同”）。\n\n原告首先推测，被告退出代理其案件延误了其庇护程序。起诉书 ¶ 56。原告提出如此模糊且具推测性的损害，是因为其承认其庇护申请仍在审理中。但他未提出任何理由推断该\n\n代理庇护申请人的律师是否会影响美国政府安排庇护程序的速度。至被告撤回代理时，庇护申请已经提交，此后原告必须等待政府采取行动，安排首次庇护面谈。众所周知，首次庇护面谈可能需要数年才能安排。参见《肯定性庇护面谈安排》，U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service（美国公民及移民服务局），http（最后访问于 November 10, 2019）（指出，庇护面谈安排自 January 2018 起改为后进先出原则，这意味着像原告这样较早提交的申请，只有在较近期提交的申请得到处理后才会被处理）；另参见《移民法院积案工具》，http（最后访问于 November 10, 2019）（显示纽约市听证地点的平均等待时间为 761 天，且有逾 100,000 宗待审案件）；另参见 Farah, 736 F.3d at 534（关于司法认知）；In re Lorazepam, 2004 WL 7081446, at *1 n.1, n.3（同上）。因此，在提交申请后不久更换律师并未造成任何延误。\n\n第二，原告抱怨其未能获得被告在移民法方面专业知识的益处。Complaint ¶ 56。然而，原告并未主张其无法获得合格的继任律师。他也未主张被告是唯一能够成功处理其庇护申请的律师。原告承认其庇护申请仍在待决中——这意味着继任律师已有两年多时间为面谈及可能举行的听证作准备。这并非律师在审判前夕遗弃客户、从而造成不利影响的案件。\n\n第三，原告主张其遭受声誉损害，因为撤回代理不知何故表明原告“不可信”。Id. ¶ 60。这同样纯属推测，并非法律所要求的“实际损害”类型。原告并未主张谁（如有任何人）知悉被告在本案中撤回代理，或此举如何改变了他们对原告的看法。\n\n原告推测，其庇护程序的结果将比被告未撤回代理时更差。参见 id. ¶ 60。然而，对于法律程序结果的推测，恰恰是不能维持法律过失索赔的那类主张。参见 Pietrangelo, 68 A.3d at 710（驳回基于抽象主张的诉因，即若基础案件中的律师采取不同做法，法院本会作出有利于原告的裁决）；Chase, 499 A.2d at 1212（确认驳回法律过失反诉，因为反诉原告关于基础程序结果本会不同的主张具有推测性）。原告并未指出其庇护程序中的任何不利措施，更遑论由被告行为造成的不利措施。显然，若原告最终获准庇护，则作为法律问题，他不会因撤回代理而遭受任何损害。参见 U.S. Telesis, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 68; Mount, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 9-10。\n\n此外，原告同样未充分主张撤回代理给原告造成了法律上可认定的损害。为充分主张因果关系，原告必须主张被告的过失导致其失去一项有胜诉依据的请求。参见 U.S. Telesis, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 68。根据原告自己的承认，其庇护请求仍在待决中，因此其不能主张其获得庇护的能力受到任何负面影响。\n\n由于原告无法主张撤回代理对其造成任何损害，基于撤回代理的请求必须依法以禁止再诉的方式驳回。\n\nV. 因原告未达到严格标准，法院应以禁止再诉的方式驳回原告关于惩罚性赔偿的请求。\n\n原告主张被告“故意”行事、“鲁莽”行事并实施了“欺诈”，但并未主张任何事实——毫无任何事实——支持这些结论性主张。\n\nComplaint ¶¶ 62-64。这些空泛结论完全不足以满足 Rule 12(b)(6) 的起诉状陈述标准，法院应以禁止再诉的方式驳回惩罚性赔偿请求。参见 Caston v. Butler, 718 F. Supp. 2d 87, 89 (D.D.C. 2010)（“关于‘令人愤慨或鲁莽行为’的结论性主张，不能构成作出［惩罚性赔偿］裁决的基础”）。实质上，原告是在要求法院在未提供任何支持该等结论的依据的情况下，假定发生了“鲁莽”行为。这颠倒了起诉状陈述标准。\n\n此外，原告的主张并未构成惩罚性赔偿请求。要向律师追偿惩罚性赔偿，被告必须具有实际恶意，或故意漠视原告的权利。Embassy of Fed. Republic of Nigeria v. Ugwuonye, 297 F.R.D. 4, 13 (D.D.C. 2013); Dalo v. Kivitz, 596 A.2d 35, 40 (D.C. 1991)（“［惩罚性赔偿仅适当地保留给充满恶意的侵权行为。］”（引自 Zanville v. Garza, 561 A.2d 1000, 1002 (D.C. 1989)））。“［就惩罚性赔偿而言，行为不会仅因实施者负有职业义务而变得更为恶劣。］”Boynton v. Lopez, 473 A.2d 375, 378 (D.C. 1984)。当原告未主张使法院能够“推断出惩罚性赔偿所必要的冷酷程度”的事实时，法院可依据 Rule 12(b)(6) 驳回惩罚性赔偿请求。Marte v. Ltd. Brands, No. CIV.A. 13-139 FSH, 2014 WL 1092503, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 18, 2014); 参见 Hammerman v. Peacock, 607 F. Supp. 911, 919 (D.D.C. 1985)（驳回普通法侵权及合同请求中的惩罚性赔偿请求，并说明“只有在被告的行为特别令人愤慨、表明其鲁莽漠视他人权利的情况下，才可判给惩罚性赔偿；单纯疏忽，甚至重大过失，均不足够”）。\n\n本案远未达到这一严格标准；原告未主张任何事实表明被告带有恶意行事或故意漠视原告的权利，且如上所示，其无法作出该等主张。法院已驳回涉及远为恶劣行为的惩罚性赔偿请求。例如，在 Embassy of Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Ugwuonye 一案中，一名客户向其前律师请求惩罚性赔偿；该律师盗取了客户的退税款并将其存入其律师事务所账户，同时持续告知客户退税款即将到账，且从未返还该退税款。297 F.R.D. at 7。法院拒绝判给惩罚性赔偿，因为客户未能证明该律师具有所要求的恶意。Id. at 14。被告被主张的行为远未如此恶劣（事实上，该等行为均合乎职业伦理且符合客户最佳利益），因此原告未充分主张支持惩罚性赔偿请求的事实。\n\n结论\n\n原告未充分主张被告的作为或不作为对其造成任何实际损害——其所称遭受的唯一损害，均是在网络事件发生前已持续多年的损害。任何“新的”损害均完全具有推测性。原告也未主张被告违反了对其负有的任何义务——其只是因被告以合乎职业伦理的方式行事，以及因其自身公开宣传所引发、且未对其造成任何损害的数据事件而责难被告。其所主张的三项诉因彼此重复。最后，其未提出任何支持其惩罚性赔偿请求的事实。法院应以禁止再诉的方式驳回全部起诉状。\n\n日期：November 25, 2019 谨此提交，\n\nCLARK HILL PLC（克拉克·希尔律师事务所）及 THOMAS K. RAGLAND（托马斯·K·拉格兰）\n\n署名：/s/ John R. Storino（约翰·R·斯托里诺）\n其代理律师之一 John R. Storino（经临时出庭许可）\nJENNER & BLOCK, LLP（詹纳与布洛克律师事务所）\n353 N. Clark Street\nChicago, IL 60654-3456\n电话：(312) 222-9350\nJStorino@jenner.com\n\nKali N. Bracey（卡莉·N·布雷西）(#458965)\nJENNER & BLOCK, LLP（詹纳与布洛克律师事务所）\n1099 New York Avenue NW\nSuite 900\nWashington, DC 20001-4412\n电话：(202) 639-6000\nKBracey@jenner.com\n\n送达证明\n\n本人，John R. Storino（约翰·R·斯托里诺），一名律师，特此证明：本人于 2019 年 November 25 日以电子方式向下列人员送达了上述《支持被告驳回动议的法律备忘录》：\n\nAri S. Casper（阿里·S·卡斯珀）\nRalph S. Tyler（拉尔夫·S·泰勒）\nThe Casper Firm（卡斯珀律师事务所）\n400 E. Pratt Street, Suite 903\nBaltimore, MD 21202\n\n/s/ John R. Storino\n\n证物 A\n\nThomas Ragland（托马斯·拉格兰）（成员） $510\n\nPatrick Taurel（帕特里克·托雷尔）（助理律师） $310\nJennifer Cook（詹妮弗·库克）（高级律师） $285\n高级律师助理 $235\nLauren Barger（劳伦·巴杰）（律师助理） $170\n法律秘书 $100\n\n证物 B\n\n您已被选中\n\nWSJ（《华尔街日报》）希望听取您的意见。请参与这份简短问卷，以帮助塑造《华尔街日报》。［参加问卷调查］\n\n本副本仅供您个人、非商业用途使用。如需订购适于展示、可分发给同事、客户或顾客的副本，请访问 http\n\nhttp\n\n［世界］\n\n中国希望遣返逃犯 Guo Wengui（郭文贵）——但他已申请美国庇护\n\n这名富商从其纽约落脚处向中国精英人士提出贪腐指控，北京则寻求将其引渡并审判\n\nGuo Wengui（郭文贵）于四月在纽约。照片：BRENDAN MCDERMID/REUTERS\n\n更新于 Sept. 7, 2017 8:49 pm ET 作者：Chun Han Wong（春汉·黄）和 Felicia Schwartz（费莉西娅·施瓦茨）\n\n北京——一名指控中国政治及企业精英存在腐败问题的流亡中国商人表示，他正在美国寻求庇护，与此同时［北京试图诋毁他］并以刑事罪名审判他。\n\n“我的祖国想不惜一切手段伤害我，”郭先生在其纽约住所拍摄的视频中说道。一项待决的庇护申请将使他能够留在美国；随着程序推进，这种状态可能持续数年。他说，如获批准，中国当局“无论采用何种方法，都无法把我带回去”。\n\n近几个月来，郭先生以关于中国商界精英与共产党高级官员之间涉嫌腐败关系的［耸人听闻故事］吸引了许多中国人的关注。他通过社交媒体和视频采访发布的披露内容，可能会搅动高级领导人之间幕后的角力；这些领导人正寻求在该党十月举行、每十年两次的领导层换届中获得晋升。\n\nU.S. State Department（美国国务院）、U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services（美国公民及移民服务局）及 China's Foreign Ministry（中国外交部）未立即回应置评请求。通过 WhatsApp（沃茨阿普）信息服务联系到郭先生时，他提及其网上言论，且未回应进一步问询。\n\n尽管郭先生仅提供了少量证据来证实其指控，许多中国人仍在［关注此事。北京已作出回应，宣布其为刑事嫌疑人，并请求发布一份］于四月签发的 Interpol（国际刑警组织）逮捕通知。\n\n决定给予郭先生庇护，可能会给 Trump（特朗普）政府带来外交复杂问题；该政府正在寻求中国合作，对 Pyongyang（平壤）施压，因平壤正加大对导弹和核技术的试验。北京已表示希望将郭先生作为被通缉的流亡者遣返回中国，而其待决请求很可能会成为北京与 Washington（华盛顿）之间又一个刺激因素。\n\n美国和中国没有引渡协议。\n\n这名也使用 Miles Kwok（郭文贵）这一姓名的郭先生于周三提交了庇护申请，负责此事的、驻 Washington（华盛顿）的该商人移民律师 Thomas Ragland（托马斯·拉格兰）表示。\n\nRagland 表示，郭先生凭一项将在数周内到期的旅游签证居住在美国。“除庇护请求外，我们可能会申请延长该签证，或改为不同的签证身份，”他说，并补充称，相比于庇护申请所赋予的留在美国境内这一基本资格，签证将使郭先生在美国工作和出境旅行时享有更大自由。\n\n申请人可能要等待数月甚至数年才能接受面谈，并获准在办理过程中留在美国。大多数情况下，庇护决定由移民官员在面谈后约两周作出；但如果申请人仍在接受安全审查，或者案件被提交给更高级别官员，决定可能会被延迟。332\n\n根据 USCIS，庇护申请遭拒者不得对此提出上诉，但可以重新申请。\n\n郭先生（郭文贵）表示，他于 2014 年末在获悉其一名“恩主”即将被捕的消息后离开中国；该“恩主”当时是一名国家安全部副部长，后因涉嫌腐败被拘留。\n\n随后，他销声匿迹，直至今年年初再次出现，发布了一系列视频采访和 Twitter 帖文，声称掌握有关中共高级官员、其亲属及关联人士以及中国知名商人的不当行为的详细证据。\n\n郭先生的披露为他在网上赢得了大量追随者，也招致了多管齐下的诋毁行动。\n\n中国外交部已驳斥郭先生的指控为谎言。中国法院已因包括诈骗和侵占在内的罪行，对郭先生的多名前关联人士及下属判处监禁和罚款。中国媒体发表文章，将其描绘为不择手段之人。数家中国公司和个人已在美国法院起诉郭先生诽谤。\n\n8 月，中国官员向 Associated Press（美联社）表示，郭先生至少正因 19 起涉及贿赂、绑架、诈骗、洗钱和强奸的重大刑事案件而接受调查。\n\n郭先生否认了这些指控。\n\n中国的强烈反应凸显了执政的共产党精英在为其 10 月党代会做准备之际所面临的重大利害关系。党内人士称，Xi Jinping（习近平）主席希望避免可能破坏其在第二个五年任期前提拔盟友担任领导职务、排挤对手之努力的争议。\n\n郭先生过去曾声称，他已不再持有中国身份证件，并持有包括美国和英国在内多个司法管辖区的护照。然而，郭先生于 2015 年和 2016 年在纽约提起的诉讼文件显示，这位富商自称为持有香港身份证件的中国国民。\n\n致函 Chun Han Wong（黄淳汉），邮箱：[chunhan.wong@wsj.com]；以及 Felicia Schwartz（费利西亚·施瓦茨），邮箱：[Felicia.Schwartz@wsj.com]\n\n版权所有 © 2019 Dow Jones & Company, Inc.（道琼斯公司）。保留所有权利。\n\n本副本仅供您个人非商业用途。若要订购可供向同事、客户或顾客分发的演示版副本，请访问 http\n\n证据 C\n\n[网络风险] 2017 年 10 月 8 日 / 上午 4:16 / 2 年前\n中国否认与美国境内针对流亡富商郭文贵的涉嫌网络攻击有关联\n\n[Philip Wen（菲利普·温）]\n\n北京（Reuters（路透社））——中国否认对美国境内似乎针对流亡富商 Guo Wengui（郭文贵）的涉嫌网络攻击负有责任；郭文贵曾对共产党高级官员提出腐败指控，并已申请政治庇护。\n\n资料照片：亿万富商郭文贵于 2017 年 4 月 30 日在美国纽约市接受采访时发言。照片摄于 2017 年 4 月 30 日。REUTERS/Brendan McDermid（布伦丹·麦克德米德）/资料照片\n\n该执法机构称，中国还向美国政府提供了证据，证明已在美国申请政治庇护的郭文贵伪造了用于支持其主张的文件。该机构称，中国将正式请求美国当局调查此事。\n\n“其伪造的官方文件和捏造的虚假信息，耸人听闻且令人愤慨，”该部在一份罕见的英文声明中表示。\n\n郭文贵否认这些文件系伪造，并称不应相信公安部的声明。\n\n总部位于华盛顿的智库 Hudson Institute（哈德逊研究所）原定于上周三在一次罕见的公开露面活动中接待郭文贵，但在前一天未作解释地取消了该活动。\n\n该活动原本将与中国一个官方代表团访问美国首都同期举行；该代表团此行是为了参加两国之间的高级别执法与网络安全对话。\n\n哈德逊研究所表示，其数日前发现了一起以上海为基地、旨在切断其网站访问的攻击。\n政治庇护\n\n美国司法部长 Jeff Sessions（杰夫·塞申斯）周三在与中国公安部长 Guo Shengkun（郭声琨）会晤时提出了这起涉嫌攻击事件；司法部一名发言人周日向路透社表示。\n\n该发言人表示，中国已“承诺合作”。\n\n“美国为何在他们的会晤中提出此事？”他向路透社表示。\n\n郭文贵于 9 月申请美国政治庇护，但本周表示，代表他的律师事务所 Clark Hill PLC（克拉克·希尔律师事务所）在遭到中国黑客攻击后已退出代理。\n\n提交庇护申请的 Clark Hill 律师 Thomas Ragland（托马斯·拉格兰德）确认，他已不再代理郭文贵，但未作详述。\n\n郭文贵的哈德逊研究所活动被取消后，他于周四在 National Press Club（全国记者俱乐部）举行新闻发布会，出示了他声称为“绝密”的官方文件，显示中国已向美国派遣秘密特工。\n\n中国公安部称，他出示的文件“粗劣伪造”且“充满明显错误”。\n\n自年初以来，郭文贵通过每日发布 Twitter 和 YouTube 帖文，对共产党高级领导人提出范围广泛的腐败指控；他称此举旨在扰乱下周开始的一次重要的五年一度共产党代表大会。\n\n中国政府一直试图将郭文贵——一名因北京请求而被发布 Interpol（国际刑警组织）红色通报的对象——诋毁为不应受到信赖的刑事犯罪嫌疑人。\n\nPhilip Wen（菲利普·温）在北京报道；Makini Brice（马基尼·布赖斯）和 Sarah Lynch（萨拉·林奇）在华盛顿、Gui Qing Koh（许庆高）在纽约补充报道；Michael Perry（迈克尔·佩里）和 Paul Tait（保罗·泰特）编辑。我们的准则：[The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles（汤森路透信任原则）。]\n证据 D\n证据 E\n\n[网络风险] 2019 年 6 月 26 日 / 上午 6:04 / 5 个月前\n独家：中国在持续多年的攻击中入侵八家大型计算机服务公司\n\n[Jack Stubbs（杰克·斯塔布斯）]，[Joseph Menn（约瑟夫·门恩）]，[Christopher Bing（克里斯托弗·宾）]\n\n伦敦（Reuters（路透社））——据熟悉这些攻击的消息人士称，为中国国家安全部工作的黑客入侵了全球八家最大科技服务提供商的网络，企图窃取其客户的商业秘密。\n\n资料照片——在这张摄于 2017 年 5 月 13 日的示意照片中，一名男子手持笔记本电脑，网络代码被投射在其身上。REUTERS/Kacper Pempel（卡斯珀·彭佩尔）/示意图\n\n在此阅读全文：\n[此处]\n\n美国于 12 月公布的一份起诉书概述了一项为推进中国经济利益而窃取西方知识产权的复杂行动，但未点名受害公司。路透社当时的一篇报道确认了其中两家：Hewlett Packard Enterprise（惠普企业）和 IBM（国际商业机器公司）。\n\n如今，路透社发现，至少另有六家科技服务提供商遭到入侵：Fujitsu（富士通）、Tata Consultancy Services（塔塔咨询服务公司）、NTT Data（恩梯梯数据公司）、Dimension Data（德讯数据公司）、Computer Sciences Corporation（计算机科学公司）以及 DXC Technology（DXC 科技公司），即 HPE 分拆出来的服务业务部门。\n\n路透社还确认了十多名作为这些服务提供商客户的受害者。该名单包括瑞典电信巨头 Ericsson（爱立信）、美国海军舰艇建造商 Huntington Ingalls Industries（亨廷顿·英格尔斯工业公司）以及旅行预订系统 Sabre（赛博公司）。\n\nHPE 表示，其“为客户勤勉工作，以减轻此次攻击并保护其信息。”DXC 表示，其已“采取强有力的安全措施”保护自身和客户，双方均未因 Cloud Hopper（云跳板）遭受“重大影响”。\n\nNTT Data、Dimension Data、Tata Consultancy Services、Fujitsu 和 IBM 拒绝置评。IBM 此前表示，没有证据表明敏感企业数据因这些攻击而受到损害。\n\nSabre 表示，该公司曾于 2015 年披露一起网络安全事件，调查结论为没有旅客数据被访问。Huntington Ingalls 的一名女发言人表示，该公司“确信没有任何 HII 数据”经由 HPE 或 DXC 发生泄露。\n\nEricsson 表示，其不对具体网络安全事件发表评论。“尽管我们的企业网络曾遭受攻击，但我们在任何广泛的\n\n中国政府一贯否认参与黑客攻击的所有指控。中国外交部表示，北京反对以网络手段实施的产业间谍活动。“中国政府从未以任何形式参与或支持任何人实施窃取商业秘密的行为，”该部在向路透社提供的一份声明中表示。\n\nCloud Hopper 攻击给正在努力应对安全威胁的政府官员和科技公司带来了令人担忧的教训。\n\n包括被称为 APT10 的组织在内的中国黑客，面对顶尖安全专家的反击，并且尽管 2015 年美中达成不从事经济间谍活动的协议，仍得以持续实施攻击。\n\n路透社无法详述黑客攻击造成损害的全部范围，许多受害者也无法确切说明被盗取了什么。然而，西方高级情报官员表示，损失十分严重。\n\n“这是一连串持续不断、具有毁灭性影响的攻击，”英国 GCHQ（政府通信总部）信号情报机构前主管、现任网络安全公司 BlueVoyant（蓝色远望）欧洲主席 Robert Hannigan（罗伯特·汉尼根）表示。\n\nGao Liangping（高良平）、Cate Cadell（凯特·卡德尔）和 Ben Blanchard（本·布兰查德）在北京补充报道。Ronnie Greene（罗尼·格林）和 Jonathan Weber（乔纳森·韦伯）编辑\n\n我们的准则：[The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles（汤森路透信任原则）。]\n证据 F\n据报道，中国间谍窃取 NSA 黑客工具 [直播电视] 332\n\n作者：[Kevin Collier（凯文·科利尔）]，CNN（美国有线电视新闻网）\n\n更新于美国东部时间 2019 年 6 月 15 日星期六下午 6:28\n\n纽约（CNN）——一份新报告发现，中国黑客于 2016 年获取并使用 National Security Agency（国家安全局）的黑客工具，并利用这些工具实施网络攻击。\n\n在该报告中，网络安全公司 Symantec（赛门铁克）声称，与中国政府情报机构有关联的一个中国黑客组织使用一种当时仅知属于 NSA 的工具开展了黑客攻击行动。\n\n尽管 Symantec 未在报告中点名具体机构，但所涉中国组织是 China’s Ministry of State Security in Guangzhou（中国国家安全部广州机构）的一个部门；在 US Department of Justice（美国司法部）于 2017 年 11 月起诉其三名成员后，该机构停止活动。\n\n尽管中国政府黑客是世界各地多产的间谍，但他们显然只是谨慎地使用其 NSA 工具。\n\n“他们行动时动静很大，攻击了许多目标，”Symantec 研究员 Eric Chien（埃里克·钱）告诉 CNN。\n\n“但迄今为止我们能够恢复、且使用过这一漏洞利用程序的目标数量非常少。他们认为它价值很高，不想在任何地方都使用它，”他说。\n\nThe New York Times（纽约时报）最先报道了这一事件。\n\n相关文章：Pentagon（五角大楼）称，中国军方利用间谍活动窃取秘密。这些发现使 NSA 近代史上一个本已奇怪事件的时间线更加模糊。2016 年，一个自称 Shadow Brokers（影子经纪人）的组织于 2016 年出现在网上，并开始泄露该机构的工具。\n\n2017 年 4 月——在中国黑客最后一次已知使用 NSA 工具的事件之后、但在美国起诉使该行动停止活动之前——Shadow Brokers 发布了其破坏性最大的 NSA 工具组合。其中包括一种 Windows 漏洞利用程序，朝鲜和俄罗斯情报机构均曾使用该程序制造历史上破坏性最大的两种勒索软件，招致国际谴责。\n\n但这些是与 Symantec 发现中国正在使用的 NSA 工具不同的变体。\n\n尚不清楚该工具如何落入中国手中。NSA 未回应置评请求。\n\n“我们正处于一个非常扑朔迷离的境地，”广泛追踪中国黑客活动的公司 FireEye（火眼）情报主管 John Hulquist（约翰·赫尔奎斯特）告诉 CNN（美国有线电视新闻网）。\n\n“这份报告提出了许多仍未得到解答的问题。”\n\n针对这些说法，中国外交部重申了中国在被指控入侵美国目标时的一贯说辞。发言人 Geng Shuang（耿爽）否认了\n\n上周，Pentagon（五角大楼）发布了一份报告，声称中国正利用间谍活动窃取尖端技术用于军事目的。\n相关文章：美国情报部门警告\n中国正利用学生间谍窃取\n机密 “China uses a variety of methods to acquire foreign military\nand dual-use technologies, including targeted foreign direct\ninvestment, cyber theft, and exploitation of private Chinese\nnationals' access to these technologies, as well as harnessing\nits intelligence services, computer intrusions, and other illicit\napproaches,”由国会授权发布的 Department of Defense（美国国防部）报告称。\nCNN 的 Steven Jiang（史蒂文·蒋）和 Ryan Browne（瑞安·布朗）对此报道亦有贡献。\n\n搜索 CNN……\n\n美国\n\n世界\n政治\n商业\n观点\n健康\n娱乐\n科技\n时尚\n旅行\n体育\n视频\n优惠券\n更多\n证物 G\n\n[订阅我们的 BEACON EXTRA 新闻简报]\n北京涉嫌入侵一名中国亿万富翁拥有的游艇\n\nFBI 正调查针对异见人士船只的可能电子破坏活动\n\nLady May\n[Bill Gertz（比尔·格茨）] - SEPTEMBER 8, 2017 5:00 AM\n\n中国被怀疑入侵了一名遭北京针对的中国亿万富翁所拥有游艇的电子设备。\n\nGuo Wengui（郭文贵）使用英文名 Miles Kwok（郭文贵），他称，涉及其 152-foot 机动游艇 Lady May 的数起事件，似乎是中国政府为威胁和恐吓他所作努力的一部分。\n\n现居 New York City（纽约市）的房地产开发商郭文贵称，他相信一个复杂的情报机构——很可能是中国的——在自 July 18 疑似船只入侵事件开始的数起事件中，干扰了其高科技游艇上的电子设备。\n\n“我希望让美国人民和政府知道，通过这一事件，来自中国的威胁是真实且重大的，”郭文贵说。\n\n“我希望每一名美国人和执法机构都明白，中国政府通过使用互联网、手机和现代通信技术，如果其愿意，就能够获取每一位美国公民的私人通信和信息，而且几乎无需任何成本便可轻易做到这一点，”他补充说。\n\n他敦促美国政府调查该入侵事件，并向美国人民报告调查结果。\n\nFBI 被就该游艇入侵事件召集介入，并已对该可疑网络事件、船上的类似电子干扰，以及无人机对该船的低空骚扰展开调查。被问及该调查时，FBI 驻纽约的一名女发言人拒绝置评。\n\n自今年早些时候郭文贵开始在网络视频和访谈中揭露中国高级领导人的腐败问题以来，他一直是中国政府试图让其噤声行动的目标。\n\n郭文贵点名的人士包括 Wang Qishan（王岐山）。王岐山是中国共产党七人 Politburo Standing Committee（中央政治局常务委员会）的成员；该委员会是统治中国的集体独裁机构，王岐山也是中国最有权势的领导人之一。针对王岐山的腐败指控极具爆炸性，因为他是中国领导人 Xi Jinping（习近平）反腐运动背后的主要执行者，该运动已牵连数千名官员。\n\n对该船计算机化操舵控制系统的入侵尤其令人震惊。该事件在郭文贵提供的一份报告和 PowerPoint 演示文稿中得到概述，其中包括照片和视频。\n\n披露这起疑似游艇入侵事件之际，Navy（美国海军）正调查外部电子入侵是否涉及两起类似碰撞事故；这两起事故发生在美国海军驱逐舰与商船之间，造成 17 名美国水兵死亡。其中一项\n\nLady May 的船长 Gavin George Hurn（加文·乔治·赫恩）在报告中的一份声明称，该船已航行至 George Washington Bridge（乔治·华盛顿大桥），正等待港口引航员登船，以引导该船继续向北航行。\n\n但在决定改为返回 lower Manhattan（曼哈顿下城）的 Chelsea Piers（切尔西码头）泊位后，该船的船首和船尾侧推器突然关闭。“我无法在驾驶台控制侧推器，”赫恩称。\n\n随后，一名技术人员发现，侧推器本身在运行，但对它们的控制已与驾驶台断开。\n\n“我们始终完全控制着船上的发动机和操舵，”赫恩指出。\n\n然而，由于没有侧推器，该游艇无法调头，并被卷入一股 2-knot 的水流。船长令该船倒退顺流而下，最终得以将船首驶向岸边和一个更安全的位置。\n\n当时，一艘大型液化天然气船距 Lady May 约 300 feet，引发了对碰撞的担忧。\n\n该游艇由荷兰制造商 Feadship Royal Dutch Shipyards（斐帝星皇家荷兰船厂）于 2014 年建造，并配备先进的计算机化控制和通信系统。\n\n专门从事船舶电子设备业务的公司 Radio Holland（荷兰无线电公司）随后调查了该船的电子设备，并发现“系统中存在数个不正常的错误”，赫恩称。\n\n当该船自动驾驶仪处于某一配置时，系统异常导致无法使用操舵侧推器。赫恩称，控制系统已作出变更，以防止进一步事故。\n\n报告称，该船的控制系统遭到身份不明的第三方入侵，该第三方取得了船舶计算机系统的访问权限，可能是通过手机进行的。\n\n报告称，对该事件的调查表明，Lady May 计算机系统的故障是由身份不明的行为者从外部控制游艇系统和网络所致。\n\n手动\n舵角 0 半径 VIL\n\n190 210 220\n\n航向 205.2\n陀螺设定点 205.4\n\n雷达目标\n17 46 15 报警 DV688-007\n工作站网络/appmanager\n17 48 20 正常 DV688-007\n\n雷达跟踪器 报警 DV688-007\n气象 NMEA 信息\n17:38:31 有效 DV688-001\n风力 NMEA 信息\n17:38:31 有效 LIVE38-007\n从属设备未处于待机状态\n17 39 30 正常 DV688-002\n链接服务器 <=> 112-雷达服务器\n17 39 30 正常 DV638-00%\n17 38 29\n航向控制 正常 DV688-001\n17 39 27\n舵机就绪 正常 CV636-UV\nBARDS\n操舵控制配置\n177 正常 DV686-007\n17 30 23 右舷推进离合器 正常 DV588-007\n17 30 15 左舷推进离合器 正常 DVES\n17 25 10\n右舷推进推力 有效 DVE\n17-21-21\nHerschild 控制必须低 正常 OVE\n17-21/37 右舷推进轴转速 有效 DVG\n\n1777 134\n回声测深 NMEA 信息 有效 DVD\n\n17 20 53\n偏离航向限值 正常 STUL\n17:20 44 航向控制推力低 正常 LINE LE LIV\n27 16 37\n一般导航 报警 OVERSON\n14 21-30 发动机监测 报警 OVERSE-DOM\n\n事件期间驾驶台显示器的照片显示，船舶两侧均出现推进故障，并有关于“雷达目标”的警报——可能发生碰撞。\n\n报告称，该入侵也与 July 18 Hudson River（哈德逊河）事件前后针对郭文贵的网络威胁同时发生。\n\n郭文贵在中国的一名支持者发布的数条推文称，中国政府正针对郭文贵及其游艇。\n\n该支持者于 July 28 发推称，中国计划使用无人机刺杀郭文贵，并警告称，郭文贵前一天曾在游艇上制作视频直播，因此该游艇并不安全。\n\n“你的游艇正被追踪，”该支持者写道。“使用无人机从空中攻击游艇不存在技术困难。他们［中国人］正在贿赂 New York Air Route Traffic Control Center（纽约航路交通管制中心）。”\n\n同一名支持者次日称，“清除郭文贵的详细计划”包括使用配备武器的无人机，以及在 Lady May 航行期间于其附近放置爆炸装置的计划。\n\n“［中国人的］基地位于 New Jersey（新泽西州）数家具有中国背景的机械和化学工程公司，”该支持者称。“事先掌握郭文贵游艇的航线是成功的关键。”\n\nLady May 的轮机长 Craig Rehaume（克雷格·雷霍姆）在一份声明中称，郭文贵当天一到游艇上，船上的 Wi-Fi 网络就离线了，显然是受到外部来源的干扰。网络服务最终恢复，但运行时断时续。\n\n为寻找电子干扰的来源，游艇上所有乘客的手机都被移至远离船只的一艘小艇上。\n\n“结果表明，我的怀疑是正确的：我的手机被他们控制了，”郭文贵在提及中国人时称。“这证明我的手机遭到入侵，并被安装了一些控制应用程序。”\n\nLady May 的工程师雷霍姆支持郭文贵的说法。他称，他最初怀疑郭文贵的手机是 Wi-Fi 干扰的来源。\n\n该工程师称，在郭文贵的手机关机后，干扰仍在持续。雷霍姆称，只有在取出 SIM 卡并将该可疑手机包裹在金属箔中后，网络才开始正常运行。\n\n随后，游艇船长赫恩称，July 29，当 Lady May 沿哈德逊河在 Bear Mountain Bridge（熊山大桥）附近航行时，一架四旋翼无人机拦截了该船。该无人机沿河向上跟随该船约 20 分钟。赫恩称，该无人机“围绕船只作小幅盘旋，并非常靠近船只，窥视驾驶台和外部窗户”。\n\n船长指出，无人机操作者在操控该飞行器时表现出极强的信心，能够使其保持非常稳定，并维持在距船只 three to six feet 的范围内。\n\nJuly 31，Lady May 再次沿河下行经过熊山大桥时，另一架与第一架相似的无人机也跟随该船。赫恩称，他相信该无人机由陆地操控，并在约 20 分钟后飞离。\n\nAugust 初，郭文贵称，他收到该 Twitter 支持者发出的进一步警告；该支持者称，电子干扰计划“由［中国］军方执行”。\n\n该支持者的身份为 @FlightEagle2017，其于 Aug. 5 称，在他发布关于干扰行动的警告推文后，自己成为 Unit 61398（61398 部队）的目标；该部队是驻在 Shanghai（上海）的中国军方黑客单位。\n\n中国人告诉他：“我们知道你是谁，你最好少管闲事。”332\n\n郭文贵称，这两起电子事件和无人机低空骚扰使他确信，这些活动“来自我的敌人，他们对我发动了一系列国家级、有组织的攻击”。\n\n“这一次，黑客入侵 Lady May 的系统，使其失去控制，几乎导致人员死亡，”他说。\n\n“随后，他们反复切断游艇网络，并发生了无人机事件，”郭文贵称。“所有这些都表明，叛徒并非仅仅是在恐吓，而是真正对我的生命构成威胁。”\n\n郭文贵称，他相信中国已在美国建立起复杂的情报和秘密行动网络，对他、其家人、美国人及其财产构成威胁。\n\n“这一事件表明，叛徒已在美国大规模部署间谍、特工和黑客，”他说。“他们与由中国境内叛徒控制的情报组织相互配合。\n\n郭文贵称，他相信中国是针对其同事的持续黑客攻击的幕后主使，其中包括其安保人员、律师和顾问。\n\n“美国的官僚主义和繁文缛节使中国黑客和财产窃贼不仅能够窃取美国财产，而且能够在其愿意时杀害任何美国人，”他说。“现在正是应当理解、清楚看见并改变这一明显且现实的危险的时候。”\n\n除披露中国高层腐败问题外，郭文贵［已提供］有关中国在美国情报活动的细节，包括派遣数万名情报收集人员。\n\n郭文贵还揭示了中国情报机构如何利用像郭文贵这样的中国商人，为其在世界各地的活动提供资金和支持。\n\n郭文贵曾与中国情报机构国家安全部的前二号官员马建（马建）关系密切，并在十余年间针对美国开展秘密情报行动。马建于去年因腐败指控被监禁；许多分析人士称，这些指控是对其收集领导层腐败情报的政治报复。\n\n证据H\n\n中国称国际刑警组织寻求逮捕大亨郭文贵\n\n20 April 2017\n\n中国称，国际刑警组织已发布通知，要求逮捕一名曾批评北京政府的亿万富翁。\n\n据信，房地产大亨郭文贵目前身处美国。\n\n有关部门未说明该通知的理由，但国家媒体声称郭文贵曾向一名副部长行贿；郭文贵对此予以否认。\n\n郭文贵最近在接受海外媒体采访时，就中国高级官员及其家族的商业活动提出了指控。\n\n政治动机？\n\n周三，一名[中国外交部发言人]表示，国际刑警组织已对郭文贵发布“红色通报”，该通报旨在全球范围内寻求逮捕被通缉人员。\n\n国际刑警组织在被问及郭文贵时表示，除非存在特殊情况并经有关成员国批准，否则其不会“对具体案件或个人发表评论”。\n\n中国新闻媒体称，郭文贵以60m yuan（£6.8m，$8.7m）贿赂了前国家安全部副部长马建。马建此后已被逮捕，并因腐败罪受到起诉。332\n\n但郭文贵否认了此类指控，并表示对其发出的逮捕通报具有政治动机。\n\n这名大亨称自己已不再是中国公民；他周三在一则[推文]（中文）中称，该行动是由“害怕其犯罪行为会被我揭露的腐败官员”发起的。\n\n郭文贵最近接受了包括美国之音（Voice of America）在内的外国中文媒体采访，并就控制商业帝国的某些中国官员及其家族提出了指控。\n\n[美国之音称]，其记者此前曾受到中国官员接触，要求他们取消采访。周三的直播被提前中断；美国之音称，这是由于“一次沟通失误”。\n\n[南华早报]指出，郭文贵的采访恰逢中国针对其发起其所谓“国际宣传战”。\n\n相关主题\n\n[国际刑警组织] [中国] [中国腐败]\n\n分享此报道 [关于分享]\n\n本报道的更多内容\n\n[一名中国大亨失踪之谜]\n\n1 February 2017\n\n[中国热衷于华丽的电视反腐剧]\n\n8 April 2017\n\n[中国在反腐机构内部打击腐败]\n\n9 January 2017\n\n[“一百万”中国官员因腐败受到处罚]\n\n24 October 2016\n\n[中国]\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA（哥伦比亚特区美国联邦地区法院）\n\nGUO WENGUI（郭文贵）又名 MILES KWOK 又名\nHO WAN KWOK，\n162 E 64th Street\nNew York, NY 10065\n原告，\n\n诉\n\n案号 1:19-cv-3195-JEB\nCLARK HILL PLC（克拉克·希尔专业有限公司）\n500 Woodward Avenue\n尊敬的 James Boasberg（詹姆斯·博斯伯格）\nSuite 3500\nDetroit, MI 48226\n\n及\n\nTHOMAS K. RAGLAND（托马斯·K·拉格兰），\n转交 Clark Hill PLC\n1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW\nSuite 1300\nWashington, DC 20004，\n\n被告。\n\n根据 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) 准许被告方驳回动议的裁定\n\n经审议被告方于 November 25, 2019 提交的驳回动议，且\n\n已有充分理由，特此：\n\n裁定，被告方的驳回动议获准；并进一步\n\n裁定，原告的起诉状有偏见地驳回。\n\n日期：____________________ ________________________________\n\nJames Boasberg 美国联邦地区法官\n\n证据4\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA（哥伦比亚特区美国联邦地区法院）\n\nGUO WENGUI，\n\n原告，\n\n诉 民事案号 19-3195 (JEB)\n\nCLARK HILL, PLC，等，\n\n被告。\n\n裁定\n\n基于随附备忘录意见书所载理由，法院\n\n裁定：\n\n1. 被告方的驳回动议部分准许，部分驳回；\n\n2. 第一至第三项罪名项在其依据被告方退出代理的范围内，不妨碍再次起诉地驳回；\n\n3. 第四项罪名项不妨碍再次起诉地驳回；及\n\n4. 被告方应于 March 5, 2020 前提交对起诉状的答辩。\n\n特此裁定。\n\n/s/ James E. Boasberg JAMES E. BOASBERG 美国联邦地区法官\n\n日期：February 20, 2020\n\n证据5\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA（哥伦比亚特区美国联邦地区法院）\n\nGUO WENGUI，\n\n原告，\n\n诉 民事案号 19-3195 (JEB)\n\nCLARK HILL, PLC，等，\n\n被告。\n\n备忘录意见书\n\n本案涉及一项失当的庇护申请程序，并伴有被指控的职业不当行为、外国政府网络黑客攻击以及社交媒体宣传活动。原告郭文贵是一名中国商人和著名政治异见人士；其聘请 Clark Hill, PLC 律师事务所协助其提出庇护申请后，某人——双方当事人推定其与中国政府有关联——入侵了该律师事务所的计算机服务器。黑客由此获得了原告的保密信息，随后在互联网上公布该等信息。使郭文贵的问题进一步加剧的是，该律师事务所因应此次攻击而退出代理。原告主张，被告 Clark Hill 及其律师 Thomas Ragland 使其信息易受针对性黑客攻击，并随后退出该事项，因此应对律师职业过失、违反信义义务及违约承担责任。被告方现动议驳回全部请求。\n\n为使其侵权请求获得支持，郭文贵必须“指出一项作为（或不作为）”，该作为（或不作为）“导致”其遭受“损失”。参见 Seed Co., Ltd. v. Westerman, 840 F. Supp. 2d 116, 127 (D.D.C. 2012)。\n\n原告已成功主张，对其信息的被指不当处理以及随后的网络攻击造成了损害。然而，退出代理或许雪上加霜，但并未增加损害。此外，他无法证明该退出代理违反了被告方对其承担的合同义务。因此，法院将驳回原告所有请求中基于被告方退出代理构成可依法救济的不法行为这一理论的部分，但将准许那些主张围绕其保密信息作出失实陈述及不当处理的请求继续进行。最后，法院驳回惩罚性损害赔偿的请求，因为原告未达到寻求该项救济所必要的高门槛。\n\n一、背景\n\nA. 事实背景\n\n如本阶段所必须，法院从起诉状中提取事实。参见 Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000)。原告是一名“极为成功的商人”和“知名中国异见人士”。ECF No. 1（起诉状），第10段。在中国居住期间，他揭露了由中国共产党（CCP）——中国的执政党——实施的“系统性腐败”和“广泛的人权侵害”。同上，第15段。这些活动自然引起了中国共产党的注意；据称，该党威胁其及其家人的生计，以终止其颠覆活动。同上，第18–19段。原告担心遭受进一步迫害，于2015年逃离其祖国，现居纽约。同上，第10段。郭文贵逃离中国并未阻止进一步的骚扰。例如，中国政府曾派遣人员在其住所外示威，作为针对其组织的更大规模“恶意负面宣传活动”的一部分。同上，第23–24段。为应对这种跨洲的不当对待，原告开始申请在美国获得政治庇护。\n\n本争议的根源可追溯至原告与被告 Thomas Ragland 的谈判；Ragland 是被告 Clark Hill, PLC 的律师及合伙人，该律师事务所约有650名律师，双方就可能协助其庇护申请进行谈判。同上，第11–12段。为争取原告成为客户，Ragland 向其保证，他本人及该律师事务所整体均“具备资格、能力和胜任力，能够代表原告并以全面、专业的方式保护其利益”。同上，第28段。在随后于 August 2016 举行的一次会议上，郭文贵向 Ragland 及其他 Clark Hill 律师说明了“其作为著名中国政治异见人士的地位和知名度”，以及“作为中国政权著名且显眼的批评者，原告所处地位相关并伴随的风险”。同上，第31段。原告还“警告称，他及其同事一直遭受持续且不懈的网络攻击”。同上。\n\n在与该律师事务所的进一步会议中，郭文贵继续警告被告方，他们应“预期会遭受复杂的网络攻击”。同上，第32段。因此，在承办原告案件时，被告方同意“采取特别预防措施，防止原告敏感保密信息被不当披露”。同上，第33段。这些预防措施将包括不同的措施，以阻碍或规避网络攻击，例如“不将原告的任何信息放置于该律师事务所的计算机服务器上”，因为这样做会使该信息更容易遭受黑客攻击。同上。原告依赖该律师事务所关于保护其保密信息的承诺，聘请了被告方，签署了聘用函并向该律师事务所支付了 $10,000 的预付费用。同上，第36段。\n\n不幸的是，对所有涉案当事人而言，原告关于网络攻击的警告显然如同卡珊德拉的预言一样未被理会，却被证明具有预见性。September 12, 2017，该律师事务所的计算机系统遭到“黑客入侵”——再次强调，双方当事人均假定该黑客攻击由中国政府策划——“显然并未遇到很大困难”。同上，第41段。黑客获得了\n\n原告及其配偶的大量个人信息，例如其护照识别号码，以及原告的政治庇护申请。同上，第43段。该等信息，包括郭文贵庇护申请书的内容，随后被发布并在社交媒体上传播。同上，第44段。\n\n攻击发生后，双方关系迅速破裂。September 19，Clark Hill 的总法律顾问 Edward Hood 告知原告，该律师事务所将终止参与其案件。同上，第49段。Hood 解释称，该攻击可能要求 Ragland 及该律师事务所其他成员在原告的庇护程序中担任证人，因为该黑客攻击提供了原告在美国寻求庇护所依据的政治迫害证据。同上。Hood 认为，由于职业行为规则禁止律师兼任证人和辩护人这两种角色，被告方必须退出该事项。同上，第49–50段。在退出代理时，原告已提交庇护申请，正等待听证。同上，第51段。\n\nB. 程序经过\n\nSeptember 19, 2019，郭文贵在哥伦比亚特区高等法院对被告方提起本案。被告方随后以多元管辖权为由将本案移送至本法院。参见 ECF No. 1（移送通知）第1–2页。原告的起诉状提出四项罪名项：(1) 违反信义义务；(2) 违约；(3) 律师职业过失；及 (4) 惩罚性损害赔偿。参见起诉状，第66–93段。被告方现动议驳回全部罪名项，主张其未能陈述可获救济的合理请求。\n\n二、法律标准\n\n联邦民事诉讼规则 12(b)(6) 规定，如起诉状未能“陈述可获救济的请求”，可以驳回诉讼。尽管“详细的事实\n\n“指控”无需达到足以抗辩 Rule 12(b)(6) 动议的程度，Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)，“但起诉状必须包含充分的事实内容，并将其视为真实，以提出表面上可信的救济请求。”Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)（省略内部引文）。\n\n在评估被告的驳回动议时，法院必须“将起诉状中的事实指控视为真实，并且必须给予原告‘可从所陈述事实中得出的所有推论之利益。’”Sparrow, 216 F.3d at 1113（省略引文）（引自 Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979)（援引 Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993)）。然而，法院无需将“以事实指控形式表述的法律结论”或不受起诉状所列事实支持的推论视为真实。参见 Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006)（引自 Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)）。最后，即使在 Rule 12(b)(6) 阶段，法院也可以审查“作为证据附件附于起诉状或通过引用并入起诉状的文件”，或者“原告起诉状必然依赖的文件”。Ward v. D.C. Dep't of Youth Rehab. Servs., 768 F. Supp. 2d 117, 119 (D.D.C. 2011)（省略内部引号及引文）。\n\nIII. 分析\n\n在此请求驳回时，被告主张，网络攻击和退出代理均不构成可成立的律师执业过失、违反信义义务或违约请求之依据。具体而言，他们主张，其围绕这两起事件的行为并未违反对原告所负的任何义务。他们还主张，即使其行为不当，也未导致原告遭受任何实际损害。法院将依次审议这两起相关事件，并在该背景下审查各项独立的罪名项，尽管顺序略有调整。\n\nA. 网络攻击\n\n如上所述，起诉状指称：原告曾警告被告即将发生网络攻击的风险；被告歪曲了其将如何保护原告机密信息免受该等攻击的方式；随后，被告未能保护该等信息，使其被第三方黑客获取并公开传播。被告否认曾作出此类陈述，并主张，无论如何，该网络攻击实际上并未损害原告。然而，法院驳回被告在起诉阶段过早就争议事实进行诉讼的尝试，并将驳回其与网络攻击有关的驳回动议。\n\n违反信义义务\n\n第一项罪名指称，被告违反了对原告所负的多项信义义务，包括诚信义务、忠诚义务以及保护原告机密记录的义务。参见 Compl., ¶ 68。要在哥伦比亚特区——本案相关管辖区——就违反信义义务的请求获得胜诉，原告必须证明“（1）信义义务的存在，以及（2）对该义务的违反，（3）该违反近因导致损害。”Council on Am.-Islamic Relations Action Network, Inc. v. Gaubatz, 82 F. Supp. 3d 344, 353 (D.D.C. 2015)（援引 Shapiro, Lifschitz & Schram, P.C. v. Hazard, 24 F. Supp. 2d 66, 75 (D.D.C. 1998)）。律师与客户之间的关系具有信义性质，此乃不言自明。参见 Thomas v. Nat'l Legal Prof'l Assocs., 594 F. Supp. 2d 31, 34 (D.D.C. 2009)（“[T]律师—客户关系的每一方面始终都笼罩着一项信义责任。”）（引自 Connelly v. Swick & Shapiro, P.C., 749 A.2d 1264, 1268 (D.C. 2000)）。然而，被告主张，他们并未违反对原告所负的任何已被认可的信义义务，并且无论如何也未对原告造成任何实际损害。\n\n首先，就违反义务而言，与被告所称相反，Wengui（文贵）并非仅仅主张“既然发生了网络事件，被告就必定采取了……‘不合理的’安全措施。”ECF No. 12 (Def. MTD) at 12。诚然，一些法院甚至认为，公司对消费者负有“‘防范第三人犯罪行为’的义务，若指称该实体有理由预见该犯罪行为，该义务可包括防范对私人数据系统的黑客入侵。”Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 3d 1, 21 (D.D.C. 2019)（引自 In re Arby's Restaurant Group Inc., Litig., 2018 WL 2128441, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 5, 2018)）。因此，这些法院认为，如公司未能防止可预见的网络攻击，即构成违反其对客户所负的信义义务。Id. 然而，本院无需进一步认定，任何公司未能防范任何可预见的网络攻击这一事实本身，即构成违反信义义务。\n\n信义关系——如律师与客户之间的关系——“建立在一人对另一人的诚信和忠实所寄予的信任或信赖之上。”Democracy Partners v. Project Veritas Action Fund, 285 F. Supp. 3d 109, 121 (D.D.C. 2018)（引自 Bolton v. Crowley, Hoge, & Fein, P.C., 110 A.3d 575, 584 (D.C. 2015)）。在此背景下，忠诚义务“被描述为‘uberrima fides’，意为最充分的善意，要求绝对且完全的坦诚、开放和诚实，以及不存在任何隐瞒或欺骗。”Herbin v. Hoeffel, 806 A.2d 186, 197 (D.C. 2002)（原文强调）（省略引号）；另参见 Seed Co., 840 F. Supp. 2d at 126–27（律师在向客户提供“不正确和误导性”的建议时违反信义义务）；Herbin, 806 A.2d at 197（“披露客户机密有悖于律师对其客户负有信义义务，并必须以至高的忠诚和奉献服务客户利益这一基本原则。”）（省略引号）。\n\n原告已充分主张，被告为获取其委托业务而歪曲其将如何保护其机密信息的方式，从而违反了忠诚义务和诚信义务。尽管被告承诺采取特别预防措施，但其仍将该等信息，包括其庇护申请，存放于其服务器并通过律所电子邮件账户传送——这直接违背了原告的指示——使原告易受其此前已警告律师的那类阴谋诡计之害。参见 Compl., ¶¶ 2–3, 40–43。他进一步主张，该律所因采用“不足、不合理，并且远远未达到[D]efendants关于提供适当安全措施的承诺、保证、义务和保证”的安全措施，在处理其信息时违反了适用的注意义务。Id., ¶ 42。证据开示可能表明，被告从未向原告作出任何此类失实陈述，且在处理其机密信息时并无过失，但起诉状中妥为陈述的指控排除了准许被告驳回动议的可能。\n\n被告备选主张，即使他们误导了原告，并且在处理其机密信息时存在过失，该网络攻击也未实际对其造成任何可获法律认可的损害。根据哥伦比亚特区法律，毫不令人意外，违反信义义务须证明损害或赔偿。参见 Headfirst Baseball LLC v. Elwood, 239 F. Supp. 3d 7, 14 (D.D.C. 2017)（梳理哥伦比亚特区判例法）；另参见 Becker v. Colonial Parking, Inc., 409 F.2d 1130, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1969)（“我们已告诫，单纯违反义务而与损害不存在因果关联，不能产生法律责任。”）（省略引号）。为主张原告未作出此类证明，被告依赖 Randolph v. ING Life Insurance & Annuity Company, 973 A.2d 702 (D.C. 2009)，在该案中，哥伦比亚特区上诉法院认为，“未来身份盗窃风险增加”并不构成“维持普通法违反信义义务诉讼所需的”可诉损害。Id. at 708。\n\n尽管本案与 Randolph 一样涉及数据泄露，但相似之处仅止于此。在 Randolph 案中，一名身份不明的窃贼盗走了一家保险公司雇员拥有的一台笔记本电脑，其中载有原告的保险信息，包括其姓名、地址和社会保障号码。Id. at 704。哥伦比亚特区上诉法院认为，原告未能主张“实际损害”，因为他们并未指称窃贼盗窃笔记本电脑是为了获取其信息，也未指称自笔记本电脑被盗后其信息甚至曾被访问。Id. at 706–08。相反，他们仅主张“尚未实现的未来损害［身份盗窃］之预期。”Id. at 708；另参见 In re Sci. Applications Int'l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 14, 19 (D.D.C. 2014)（驳回一案，其中原告信息连同其他物品据称从停放的汽车中被盗，理由是“仅仅丢失数据——没有证据表明该数据曾被查看或滥用——并不构成足以赋予诉讼资格的损害”）。\n\n然而，原告的主张远不止于未来损害的预期，而是主张了因被告行为造成的实际损害。根据起诉状，中国政府或与其有关联的某人为窃取原告信息这一明确目的而入侵了被告的服务器。该黑客随后在社交媒体上“发布”了机密材料，包括原告的政治庇护申请和护照识别号码。参见 Compl., ¶¶ 43–44。这一连串事件发生于中国共产党（CCP）策划的更广泛宣传活动背景下，该活动包括利用社交媒体平台传播有关原告的信息，并动员示威者抗议其在美国的存在。Id., ¶¶ 22–24。因此，Wengui 并非就被盗信息的潜在用途作出“推测”；该信息已被用作中共对其迫害和骚扰的一部分。因此，法院拒绝被告关于认定网络攻击在法律上并未实际损害原告的请求。\n\n律师执业过失\n\n第三项罪名指称律师执业过失，主张被告“未能在代理原告时采用所要求程度的专业注意和技能”，并且未能维持“为保护其计算机系统免受未经授权访问而应向原告提供并承诺提供的合理安全措施”，从而违反其对原告所负的“普通法”及“专业和道德义务与责任”。Id., ¶¶ 82–85。\n\n律师执业过失请求的要件与违反信义义务的要件相似，但略有不同。参见 Hickey v. Scott, 738 F. Supp. 2d 55, 67 (D.D.C. 2010)（引自 Shapiro, Lifschitz & Schram, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 74）。正如 O'Conner 大法官所评论：“律师是专业人士，因此他们负有更高的义务。”Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 676 (1985)（O'Connor, J., concurring）。要在哥伦比亚特区就律师执业过失请求获得胜诉，“原告必须证明：（1）被告受雇担任原告的律师；（2）被告违反合理义务；以及（3）该违反导致原告损失或损害，并且是该等损失或损害的近因。”Beach TV Props., Inc. v. Solomon, 306 F. Supp. 3d 70, 93 (D.D.C. 2018)（引自 Martin v. Ross, 6 A.3d 860, 862 (D.C. 2010)）。\n\n基于上述理由，该罪名项就网络攻击而言亦可继续进行，因为起诉状指出律师对原告所负的合理注意义务遭到违反。\n\n其客户及实际损害。诚然，律师不得因“在诚实行使专业判断时所犯的错误”而被追究责任。Biomet Inc.（捷迈公司）v. Finnegan Henderson LLP（芬尼根·亨德森律师事务所）, 967 A.2d 662, 665 (D.C. 2009)。然而，诚实的错误与此处所主张的行为相去甚远：为争取潜在客户而作出的虚假陈述、未遵循所承诺的程序以充分保护机密信息，以及造成的损害。参见 Swann（斯旺）v. Waldman（沃尔德曼）, 465 A.2d 844, 846 (D.C. 1983)（认定原告关于律师就试图取得延期一事向其撒谎、且因未取得专家证人而构成过失的主张，足以经受针对法律执业过失请求的简易判决动议）。\n\n违约\n\n原告还在第二罪名项中提出违约请求，主张该律师事务所通过承办超出其“专业或技术能力”范围的事项，以及“疏于采取合理安全措施”，违反了其提供“胜任代理”的合同义务。Compl., ¶ 76。“为胜诉于违约请求，当事人必须证明：(1) 当事人之间存在有效合同；(2) 因该合同产生的义务或责任；(3) 对该义务的违反；以及 (4) 该违反所造成的损害。”United States Conference of Mayors（美国市长会议）v. Great-W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co.（大西部人寿及年金保险公司）, 327 F. Supp. 3d 125, 129 (D.D.C. 2018), aff'd, 767 F. App'x 18 (D.C. Cir. 2019)（引自 Tsintolas Realty Co.（辛托拉斯房地产公司）v. Mendez（门德斯）, 984 A.2d 181, 187 (D.C. 2009)）。被告承认，当事人订立了一份有效合同（在本案中为聘用函），其中载明了其“各自的义务和预期”。见 Def. MTD at 14。然而，他们对原告是否已主张该合同遭到违反提出异议。\n\n将起诉状中的事实视为真实，文贵（Wengui）已勉强满足其主张责任，即证明被告未履行其合同义务。具体而言，他主张，被告通过就其信息未来将如何处理而误导他，并在最终将该信息置于其服务器上时未通知他，违反了其提供“胜任代理”并使原告“合理知悉事项进展情况”的义务，Def. MSJ, Exh. A (Retainer Agreement) at 2。基于就先前罪名项所述的理由，该请求可基于未能保护其信息而继续进行，该行为可能构成不胜任代理。\n\n然而，今后原告可能需要澄清该罪名项，因为他似乎正在探究关于被告如何违反聘用协议的若干不同理论。首先，他似乎正在为引入外部证据奠定基础。该证据可能证明，被告在就对原告个人信息提供更高等级保护作出陈述时，口头修改了合同条款。见 Segal Wholesale, Inc.（西格尔批发公司）v. United Drug Serv.（联合药品服务公司）, 933 A.2d 780, 784 (D.C. 2007)（“与部分整合协议条款一致”的外部证据可以采纳）；另见 Stamenich（斯塔梅尼奇）v. Markovic（马尔科维奇）, 462 A.2d 452, 455 (D.C. 1983)（外部证据可以采纳，以证明“同一当事人之间除书面协议之外且不与之矛盾的同期协议，或书面协议的变更，该协议是订立书面合同的重要诱因”，或者在“主张存在欺诈、错误或胁迫”的情形下）。\n\n或者，原告似乎还寻求证明，被告在对客户材料提供不足保护时，违反了提供胜任代理的一般义务。见 Compl., ¶ 76。又或者，最后，他可能主张被告违反了哥伦比亚特区法院认定所有合同均包含的“默示诚信和公平交易义务”，该义务禁止“规避合同精神”或“故意造成不完全履行”。Murray（默里）v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg.（富国银行住房抵押贷款公司）, 953 A.2d 308, 321 (D.C. 2008)（省略内部引号）。如原告决定针对进一步的终局性动议为该罪名项辩护，他将必须在这些理论之间作出选择，并为其提供更为实质性的支持。\n\n请求的重复性\n\n最后，法院驳回被告的主张，即上述三项请求必然相互“重复”，因而仅有一项可以越过主张阶段。根据哥伦比亚特区法律，当原告的违反受托义务请求基于与其专业执业过失请求相同的事实主张，并请求相同救济时，法院“出于司法经济的考虑，应当驳回”其中一项重复请求。见 N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc.（北美天主教教育节目基金会）v. Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice, PLLC（沃姆布尔、卡莱尔、桑德里奇及赖斯律师事务所）, 887 F. Supp. 2d 78, 84 (D.D.C. 2012)（汇集案件）。对于基于与违约请求相同事实情形产生的侵权请求，亦是如此。见 Attias（阿提亚斯）, 365 F. Supp. 3d at 18（“根据哥伦比亚特区法律，原告如欲就同时构成违约的行为获得侵权赔偿，‘该侵权必须独立于合同本身而存在，且侵权所依据的任何义务必须源于合同关系之外的考量。’”）（引自 Choharis（乔哈里斯）v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.（州立农场火灾及意外保险公司）, 961 A.2d 1080, 1089 (D.C. 2008)）。\n\n在后续程序中，原告确实可能必须在其三项普通法请求之间作出选择。然而，在这一早期阶段，鉴于此类审查依赖于具体事实，现在以重复为由驳回三项中的任何一项均为时过早。尽管各罪名项均总体上涉及网络攻击，但它们可能基于围绕该攻击的不同不法行为。例如，被告的行为可能违反了《职业责任规则》——从而可能产生法律执业过失责任——但这并不必然导致违反受托义务。见，例如，Hickey（希基）, 738 F. Supp. 2d at 67–68（认定在有关费用的争议中，与费用相关的违反受托义务请求不同于涉及违反《职业责任规则》的法律执业过失请求）。\n\n最后，司法经济的考量并不支持在此驳回任何请求。允许三项请求均继续进行，不会扩大本案范围或潜在的证据开示途径。因此，法院在此阶段将拒绝被告要求缩小原告潜在救济理论的请求。总而言之，法院将驳回被告关于驳回第一、第二和第三罪名项的动议，但限于该等罪名项所依据的是通过网络攻击窃取其个人信息以及被告就防护该攻击所作的虚假陈述。\n\nB. 撤回代理\n\n相比之下，被告退出原告的庇护程序——或者，如原告对该事件的称呼，他们“解雇”了他——并不构成可成立法律请求的依据。如上所述，被告在网络攻击后终止了对文贵的代理。他们在致其的信中解释，该攻击造成了与其代理有关的“数项伦理复杂情况”。见 ECF No. 12-5 (Clark Hill Termination Letter) at 1。被告的“首要担忧”是，“网络攻击将要求 Ragland 先生（Mr. Ragland）（拉格兰德）——以及可能的该律师事务所其他成员——在[原告]的庇护程序中成为证人”，因为他们现已直接知悉中国此前对原告的迫害，而这是一项与该程序相关的因素。Id.\n\n在其驳回动议中，被告主张，其撤回代理不仅未违反对文贵所负的任何义务，事实上还为《职业行为规则》所要求。见 D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 1.16(a)(1) (D.C. Bar 2010)（若持续代理将违反《职业行为规则》，律师必须退出对客户的代理）。被告再次援引《职业行为规则》3.7(a)，该规则规定，若律师“很可能成为”该程序中的“必要证人”，则其“不应”担任客户的诉讼代理人。他们还援引规则 1.7(b)(4)，该规则规定，如果律师代理客户的能力“可被律师对第三方的责任或利益，或者律师自身的财务、商业、财产或个人利益合理地不利影响”，则必须撤回代理。被告解释称，网络攻击后，他们拥有“调查和减轻该事件的自身利益——这与其对原告的代理相冲突”。Def. MTD at 8。\n\n关于规则 3.7(a)，原告反驳称，鉴于文贵“并未进行庇护面谈，更不用说任何听证”，且“并未要求 Ragland 先生成为证人”，被告的撤回代理充其量只是为时过早。ECF No. 14 (Pl. Opp.) at 8。此外，原告主张，规则 1.7(b)(4)就网络攻击是否造成利益冲突提出了“本质上属于事实的问题”，这些问题无法在本阶段解决。Id. at 21。\n\n法院无需解决这些争议，因为文贵的受托义务和执业过失请求在另一处礁石上搁浅。原告未充分主张，被告的行为即使不当，也对其造成了损害或不利影响。这两项请求均要求证明损害或损失。见，例如，Seed Co.（西德公司）, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 126（提出执业过失请求的原告“必须指出……被告作出的、导致其遭受损失的行为（或不作为）”）；Randolph（伦道夫）, 973 A.2d at 708–09（关于违反受托义务亦同）。正如本地区一法院在审理法律执业过失时所阐述的适用标准，该请求“直到原告客户因执业过失遭受某种损害时才产生”，且“仅仅违反专业义务，而仅造成象征性损害、推测性损害或尚未实现的未来损害威胁，不足以产生过失诉因。”\n\nVenable LLP（维纳布尔律师事务所）v. Overseas Lease Grp., Inc.（海外租赁集团公司）, 2015 WL 4555372, at \\*2 (D.D.C. July 28, 2015)（引自 Knight（奈特）v. Furlow（弗洛）, 553 A.2d 1232, 1235 (D.C. 1989)）。\n\n原告基于撤回代理提出的请求，并未主张超出“推测性”或“象征性”程度的损害。例如，文贵不争议，在被告撤回代理时，其庇护申请已经提交，且他正在等待初次面谈，而安排该面谈可能需要数年。见 Def. MTD at 20。他也未主张其在寻找具备移民法专业知识的继任律师时遇到困难。因此，文贵未能以事实证实其结论性主张，即被告撤回代理给他造成了“不当延误和复杂情况”、声誉损害，并不利影响其案件结果。见 Compl., ¶ 60；另见 Hinton（欣顿）v. Stein（斯坦）, 278 F. Supp. 2d 27, 33 (D.D.C. 2003)（驳回法律执业过失请求，其中“[a]尽管当事人之间存在短暂的律师—客户关系，被告有正当理由寻求撤回代理……[其]撤回动议被及时提出……且没有迹象表明原告因其撤回代理而遭受任何损害”）。换言之，起诉状并未主张原告“因被告未代理其而遭受任何损害”，因此，法院将驳回其受托义务和执业过失请求，但限于该等请求以撤回代理作为所称损害的部分。Id.\n\n原告基于退出代理提出的违约主张略有不同，但同样应予驳回。即使当事人“未能证明实际损害”，其仍可就此类主张胜诉，尽管其“至多只能获得象征性赔偿”。Wright v. Howard Univ., 60 A.3d 749, 753 (D.C. 2013) (quoting Bedell v. Inver Housing Inc., 506 A.2d 202, 205 (D.C. 1986)). 然而，就退出代理而言，原告甚至未提及被告在终止其代理时违反的合同条款，亦未提及可能支持该项主张的外部证据。参见 Retainer Agreement at 2, 4（律师可因《职业行为规则》允许的理由，或在出现任何利益冲突时终止协议）。\n\nC. 惩罚性赔偿\n\n本院最后处理第四项罪名项，该项主张请求惩罚性赔偿。具体而言，起诉书称，被告以“故意、蓄意、[且]令人愤慨”的方式侵犯了原告的“权利”。参见 Compl., ¶ 90。首先，惩罚性赔偿是一种救济形式，而非独立诉因。尽管该罪名项不能独立成立，本院仍审议此类赔偿是否完全可向文贵提供。“为获得惩罚性赔偿”，原告必须证明“侵权行为是出于‘邪恶动机、实际恶意、蓄意暴力或压迫’而实施，或系支持‘故意漠视他人权利的令人愤慨行为’。”Embassy of Nigeria v. Ugwuonye, 297 F.R.D. 4, 14 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Robinson v. Sarisky, 535 A.2d 901, 906 (D.C. 1988)). 因此，判处惩罚性赔偿要求存在“充满恶意”的行为。参见 Dalo v. Kivitz, 596 A.2d 35, 40 (D.C. 1991); see also Hendry v. Pelland, 73 F.3d 397, 400 (D.C. Cir. 1996)（“哥伦比亚特区法律仅在律师具有欺诈、恶意、鲁莽、肆意、压迫性行为，或故意漠视客户权利时，才允许判处惩罚性赔偿。”）。\n\n起诉书并未提出此类“令人愤慨”的行为。相反，若文贵的指控属实，则被告未能保护其信息免受黑客攻击，或许意味着该律师事务所的行为“欠缺审慎或不称职，但远不足以显示明显的不当行为，从而使陪审团可推断[被告]要么具有蓄意恶意，要么有意识地漠视[其客户]的权利。”Hendry, 73 F.3d at 400; see also Embassy of Nigeria, 297 F.R.D. at 14（驳回律师盗取客户退税款并将其存入律师事务所账户情形下的惩罚性赔偿请求）。例如，原告并未主张被告故意使其服务器处于易受第三方黑客攻击的状态，或以任何方式能够从该等事件中获利。因此，本院驳回起诉书第四项罪名项。\n\nIV. 结论\n\n基于上述理由，本院将部分准许、部分驳回被告的驳回动议。本院将于今日发布与本意见一致的单独命令。\n\n/s/ James E. Boasberg\nJAMES E. BOASBERG\n美国地区法院法官\n\n日期：February 20, 2020\n\n证据附件 6\n\n哥伦比亚特区美国联邦地区法院（UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA）\n\nGUO WENGUI（郭文贵），又名 MILES KWOK（郭文贵） )\n\n原告， )\n)\n)\n诉 )\n)\nCLARK HILL PLC（克拉克·希尔律师事务所）及 THOMAS K.\nRAGLAND（托马斯·K·拉格兰德） )\n)\n被告。 )\n)\n)\n\n案号：1:19-cv-3195-JEB\n\nHon. James Boasberg\n\n被告就原告起诉书提出的答辩及积极抗辩\n\n)\n\n被告 Clark Hill PLC（克拉克·希尔律师事务所）及 Thomas K. Ragland（托马斯·K·拉格兰德）（以下统称“被告”）特此就原告 Guo Wengui（郭文贵）的起诉书提交其答辩及积极抗辩。\n\n在本案中，原告 Guo Wengui（郭文贵），又名 Miles Kwok（郭文贵），又名 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（“原告”），请求被告律师事务所 Clark Hill PLC（“Clark Hill”或“该律师事务所”）及该律师事务所的一名成员、被告 Thomas K. Ragland, Esq.（“Ragland 先生”）就原告因被告多次严重违反其因该律师事务所向原告提供法律代理而对原告负有的义务所直接和近因遭受的损害、伤害及侵害，连带承担 \\$50 million 或以上的补偿性金钱赔偿及惩罚性赔偿。除补偿性赔偿外，原告还请求惩罚性赔偿。此处应判处惩罚性赔偿，因为 Clark Hill 和 Ragland 先生的不当行为具有鲁莽性、压迫性、故意性及蓄意性，并故意漠视原告的权利。（Clark Hill 和 Ragland 先生在本文中统称为“被告”或“该律师事务所”。）\n\n答辩：被告承认，被告 Thomas K. Ragland 是被告 Clark Hill PLC 的成员。被告承认，在本诉讼中，原告 Guo Wengui，又名 Miles Kwok，又名 Ho Wan Kwok（“原告”）已对被告提出请求补偿性赔偿的主张。进一步答辩称，被告指出，本院于 February 20, 2020 作出的命令已驳回原告关于惩罚性赔偿的请求。由于第 1 段中的其余指控构成法律结论，被告既无须亦不宜作出答辩。在需要作出答辩的范围内，被告否认第 1 段中的其余指控。1\n\n原告曾是 Ragland 先生及 Clark Hill 律师事务所的客户。在该代理过程中，Ragland 先生及 Clark Hill 律师事务所违反了律师/律师事务所保护原告（客户）保密信息免遭不当、未经授权披露的基本义务。该律师事务所，尤其包括 Ragland 先生，在处理原告保密信息时存在鲁莽行为，并且作为该鲁莽行为的直接结果，原告的保密信息被披露并广泛传播，致使原告遭受重大损害、不利影响及压迫。该律师事务所未能保护原告的保密信息后，又进一步加重该违反行为，错误地、不当地且无正当理由地终止了其对原告的代理。该行为同样具有鲁莽性，故意漠视原告的权利，并故意漠视该律师事务所对作为其客户的原告所负有的职责和义务。该律师事务所故意承办了超出其胜任能力和能力范围的事项，随后又故意、蓄意且有意地错误地将其自身利益置于该律师事务所对其客户所负职责之上。原告因该律师事务所违反该律师事务所及其律师（Ragland 先生）对作为客户的原告所负有的义务而受到损害。该律师事务所的行为具有压迫性，且系故意漠视原告权利而作出。\n\n1 被告保留（且明确不为任何目的放弃）其在驳回动议及支持性法律备忘录中提出的论点。\n\n答辩：被告承认，Initiatives For China 的 Lianchao Han 博士聘请 Clark Hill PLC 就原告的庇护申请事宜代理原告。被告否认第 2 段中的其余指控。\n\n原告合理依赖该律师事务所作出的明示及默示保证，即该律师事务所理解其道德和法律义务，包括其保护原告保密信息的基本义务，并且该律师事务所实际上具备履行其义务的能力。然而，事实上，Ragland 先生未能遵守其保证，因此鲁莽地使原告的保密信息暴露于风险之中。与 Ragland 先生的陈述相反，该律师事务所未采取充分和适当的电子安全措施来保护原告的信息，且 Ragland 先生未采取适当行动保护原告的保密信息。该律师事务所及 Ragland 先生在此方面失职的直接后果是，原告秘密向该律师事务所披露且该律师事务所向原告保证会受到保护的敏感保密信息，被广泛披露并在互联网社交媒体平台上传播。该律师事务所对原告违反义务导致了这些未经授权的披露。这些披露已对原告造成伤害和损害，且该等伤害和损害持续存在。该律师事务所的行为远不止于过失，其鲁莽性及故意漠视原告权利的程度令人愤慨。\n\n答辩：被告否认第 3 段中的指控。\n\n该律师事务所对原告的代理包括准备并提交原告在美国的庇护申请。原告为避免在其祖国中国遭受进一步出于政治动机的严酷迫害，包括对遭受酷刑、在极端条件下被监禁以及可能被杀害的恐惧，而逃往美国寻求庇护。\n\n答辩：被告承认其就原告的庇护申请代理原告；被告准备并提交了原告在美国的庇护申请；原告为中国国民；且原告基于中华人民共和国对原告及其家人实施的据称威胁、伤害及虐待而寻求庇护。被告否认第 4 段中的其余指控。\n\n原告向该律师事务所披露的信息，以及因该律师事务所的失职和违约而随后被向全世界披露的信息，包括原告在中国的政治活动详情以及其他敏感事项，其中包括致力于使原告噤声、诋毁原告并可能对原告造成身体伤害的中国人士和利益相关方。该敏感信息的公开披露危及原告及他人的生命、安全和福祉；当该信息被展示和发布于社交媒体平台时，其保密地位即告丧失，而这发生是由于被告未能妥善保护该信息免遭不当披露。据信，中国政府的代理人和官员属于获得原告保密信息的当事方；再次说明，他们之所以能够获得该信息，是由于被告明显的失职和违反义务，包括被告未采取必要行动保护原告保密信息免遭披露这一不当和违法的作为及不作为。\n\n答辩：被告承认，在或约于 September 2017，Clark Hill PLC 曾遭受与该律师事务所代理原告有关的网络事件。被告否认原告信息的任何据称披露系由 Clark Hill PLC 未采取行动保护原告信息免遭披露所致。被告对第 5 段中的其余指控不具备足以形成信念的知识或信息，故否认第 5 段中的其余指控。\n\n作为原告的律师，Clark Hill（克拉克·希尔律师事务所）对原告负有以其最佳利益行事的不可分割义务。在本案中，该律师事务所在代理原告以及随后不当终止该代理时，违反了该义务。该律师事务所在最初考虑是否接受原告委托时即知悉，中国政府的特工和官员过去一直且目前仍对原告抱有敌意，并对原告的生命、自由和安全构成真实威胁。这些中国特工和官员，以及他们过去曾代表并预期将在未来代表其行事的人士和利益，正如被告在同意代理原告之前及代理原告时所知，对原告构成直接威胁。尽管被告知悉对原告抱有敌意的强大势力，且该等知悉发生于被告同意代理原告之前，但被告未能保护原告的保密信息免遭具有已知深刻敌意和对抗性议程的该等人士和利益披露。被告的行为损害了原告，致使其遭受严重的人身及经济损失，而所有这些损失本可并且应当避免。\n\n答辩：被告承认，作为原告的律师，其对原告负有普通法及哥伦比亚特区职业行为规则所规定的标准义务。进一步答辩，本院于 February 20, 2020 作出的命令驳回了原告因被告退出对原告的代理而产生的请求。被告否认第6段中的其余指控。\n\n被告随后进一步加重了其对原告的违约行为：其错误、违法、不当、无正当理由且未与原告进行任何有实质意义协商，便单方面终止了对原告的代理。当此事变得“棘手”时，被告没有站在其客户一边；相反，他们“逃之夭夭”。被告遗弃了其客户（原告），并将其自认为的利益置于以其客户（原告）利益行事的义务之上。被告违反了对其客户负有的不可分割忠诚的法律及伦理义务。被告的行为具有压迫性、故意性，并且蓄意漠视原告的权利。\n\n答辩：被告否认第7段中的指控。进一步答辩，本院于 February 20, 2020 作出的命令驳回了原告因被告退出对原告的代理而产生的请求。\n\n原告提起本案，是因为被告必须——且将在本案中——为其严重且故意的不当行为承担责任。被告应承担补偿性损害赔偿和惩罚性损害赔偿责任。被告严重未能保护原告信息免于暴露给潜在“黑客”，包括未建立及／或维持保护原告敏感及保密信息所必需且有效的电子安全措施，违反了职业行为规则；构成对该律师事务所作为原告律师事务所客户所负信义义务的严重违反；违反了该律师事务所对原告承担的合同义务，并违反了该律师事务所向原告提供胜任法律代理的义务。\n\n答辩：被告否认第8段中的指控。进一步答辩，本院于 February 20, 2020 作出的命令驳回了原告关于惩罚性损害赔偿的请求。\n\n原告敏感个人信息在社交媒体上被广泛且造成深重损害地发布和传播，是该律师事务所违反其对原告所负职责和义务的直接、近因及不可避免的（尽管完全可以避免）结果和后果。该律师事务所随后在终止对原告的代理时，故意、蓄意且压迫性地使事态进一步恶化，并为该律师事务所的不当行为提出了显然是借口性的、即便不属可笑的“正当理由”。被告蓄意漠视原告的权利，其行为具有鲁莽性，且未顾及原告——该律师事务所的客户——的安全或保护，并蓄意漠视该律师事务所对作为客户的原告所负的职责和义务。由于原告因被告的作为和不作为已遭受且持续遭受严重损害和伤害，原告请求金钱赔偿，以补偿被告给其造成的严重损害。此外，鉴于被告行为的鲁莽、恣意和压迫性，原告请求惩罚性损害赔偿。\n\n答辩：被告否认第9段中的指控。进一步答辩，本院于 February 20, 2020 作出的命令驳回了原告关于惩罚性损害赔偿的请求，以及原告基于被告退出代理所提出的请求。\n\n当事人\n\n原告系中国出生人士，现居住于 New York, NY。原告在美国的庇护申请尚待审理。原告是一名非常成功的商人、政治活动人士及知名中国异见人士。多年来，原告一直积极致力于争取中国的法治、人权和民主。2015 年初，原告因其政治活动及直言不讳的倡导，正当地担心遭中国政府及／或 Chinese Communist Party（中国共产党，下称“CCP”）非法逮捕、拘留、讯问、酷刑及／或杀害，因而被迫逃离中国。（本文中对“CCP”的提述包括中国政府和中国共产党两者。）\n\n答辩：被告承认原告是中国国民，于 September 2019 前后居住于 New York, NY，并于 September 2017 提交庇护申请。被告承认原告于 December 2013 前后离开中国大陆，并于 January 2015 前后离开中华人民共和国香港特别行政区。被告承认原告部分基于其所称政治活动申请庇护。被告没有足够的知识或信息以就原告的心理状态及第10段中的其余指控形成判断，因此否认第10段中的其余指控。\n\n被告 Clark Hill PLC（克拉克·希尔专业有限责任公司，下称“Clark Hill”）是一家大型律师事务所，拥有约650名律师和专业人员，设有25个办事处，并作为一家依 Michigan State（密歇根州）法律组建并存续的专业服务有限责任公司运营。Clark Hill 在 District of Columbia（哥伦比亚特区）定期、持续且实质性地开展业务，具体包括在 1001 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Suite 1300, Washington, DC 20004 设有办事处，且 Clark Hill 的律师经常在哥伦比亚特区的法院、机构及国会出庭。\n\n答辩：被告承认第11段中的指控。\n\n被告 Thomas K. Ragland, Esq.（托马斯·K·拉格兰律师，下称“Ragland先生”）是一名获准在哥伦比亚特区执业的律师，并且是 Clark Hill 律师事务所哥伦比亚特区办事处的成员（合伙人或负责人）。Ragland先生在哥伦比亚特区定期、持续且实质性地开展业务，包括在 Clark Hill 位于 1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Suite 1300, Washington, DC 20004 的办事处设立其律师执业办公室，并在哥伦比亚特区的机构和审裁机构出庭。（如前所述，Clark Hill PLC 和 Ragland先生在本文中合称为“被告”或“该律师事务所”。）\n\n答辩：被告承认第12段中的指控。\n\n管辖权、审判地及便利性\n\n本院根据 D.C. Code § 11-921 对本案具有管辖权。由于两被告均在哥伦比亚特区定期且持续地开展业务，本院对被告具有对人管辖权。引起本起诉书所述事项的被告作为和不作为发生于哥伦比亚特区，包括与原告及／或其代理人和获授权代表 Lianchao Han（韩连潮博士，下称“Han博士”）举行的会议。\n\n答辩：被告承认，United States District Court for the District of Columbia（哥伦比亚特区联邦地区法院）对本案具有事项管辖权，因本诉讼于 October 24, 2019 被及时移送至联邦法院，且该院对被告具有对人管辖权。进一步答辩，被告承认，Ragland先生应原告请求，于 September 2017 前后多次在哥伦比亚特区与 Han博士会面，以讨论原告的庇护申请。被告进一步承认，于 September 2017 前后就原告的庇护申请直接与原告会面。被告否认第13段中的其余指控。\n\n本院是本诉讼的适格审判地，也是便利的审判地。本案直接涉及被告与其在哥伦比亚特区的律师办公室及律师业务有关的作为和不作为；被告每天均实际在哥伦比亚特区从事业务活动；并且引起原告在本起诉书中所提请求的事件、作为和不作为有很大部分发生于哥伦比亚特区。举例而言，该律师事务所与原告获授权代表 Han博士之间的会议——双方在会议中建立律师—客户关系、定期交换与原告庇护申请有关的信息、讨论 Ragland先生对该申请的准备工作、该律师事务所退出代理以及由该关系产生的其他作为和不作为——均发生于该律师事务所在哥伦比亚特区的办事处。Ragland先生是该律师事务所代理原告的主要律师，且 Ragland先生代表原告完成的大部分工作均在哥伦比亚特区进行。\n\n答辩：被告承认，United States District Court for the District of Columbia 是适格审判地，因本诉讼于 October 24, 2019 被及时移送；被告还承认，Ragland先生是 Clark Hill PLC 中负责准备和提交原告庇护申请的资深程度最高的律师。进一步答辩，被告承认，Ragland先生应原告请求，于 September 2017 前后多次在哥伦比亚特区与 Han博士会面，以讨论原告的庇护申请。被告否认第14段中的其余指控。\n\n事实陈述\n\n多年来，原告一直是中国法治、人权和民主的坚定、活跃且知名倡导者。与其政治活动和倡导有关，原告例如揭露了 CCP 的系统性腐败，以及中国政府高级官员及该等官员家属的腐败。原告还披露了中国广泛存在的人权侵犯行为，包括使用酷刑。原告反对中国政府和政党对中国民主运动的压制。原告还参与揭露中国在美国及其他西方地区秘密文化、政治、经济及情报活动的程度、范围和效力。\n\n答辩：被告承认原告部分基于原告的政治活动申请庇护，并称原告庇护申请的内容不言自明。被告没有足够的知识或信息以就第15段其余指控的真实性形成判断，因此否认该等指控。\n\n原告在影响国际社会对中国及中国共产党（CCP）的看法方面卓有成效。从中国共产党的视角来看，原告的活动和倡导已对中国和中国共产党在国际社会中的地位造成不利影响，因此，中国政府试图使原告噤声。中国政府/中国共产党已采取各种手段，包括胁迫和提供贿赂，试图使原告噤声。据所知并相信，中国政府/中国共产党已利用其海外情报网络，试图诋毁原告、使原告噤声并威胁原告的人身安全，或者至少使原告有充分理由担心其人身安全以及家人和朋友的安全。\n\n答辩：被告承认，原告部分基于其政治活动寻求政治庇护，并称原告的庇护申请内容本身已足以说明。被告缺乏足以就第16段其余指控的真实性形成信念的知识或信息，因此予以否认。\n\n据所知并相信，中国共产党认为，原告目前持有尚未公开的证据，证明中国共产党及与其有关联并代表其行事之人存在多种不当行为，包括有关腐败、谋杀、隐匿非法所得资金以及中国间谍网络的信息。基于这些及其他原因，中国政府和中国共产党的动机极为强烈——如此表述尚属轻描淡写——并且正积极寻求使原告噤声。中国政府和中国共产党同样具有强烈动机，并积极寻求了解原告对于由中国政府和中国共产党实施或代表其实施的不当活动知悉何种信息。而且，或许最关键的是，中国政府和中国共产党具备——即“行动触及范围”——对原告实施积极敌对行动的能力。\n\n答辩：被告承认，原告部分基于其政治活动寻求政治庇护，包括原告声称掌握有关中国官员的信息，并称原告的庇护申请内容本身已足以说明。被告缺乏足以就第17段其余指控的真实性形成信念的知识或信息，因此予以否认。\n\n例如，于2015年1月前后，中国共产党通过吴征（Bruno Wu Zheng）致电原告，要求原告与中国共产党合作，并停止披露有关中国共产党高级官员腐败的信息。原告予以拒绝。在数次行贿企图和威胁均告失败后，吴征指示中央纪律检查委员会（Central Commission for Discipline Inspection，CCDI）和特别工作组要求（实则强令）原告与中国合作，并交回其掌握的任何有关高级领导人腐败的证据。原告被要求将其证据交给中国共产党，并停止采取反对中国共产党的行动。作为回报，吴征向原告承诺，其中包括：(1) 中国共产党不会没收原告的任何资产或财产；(2) 原告及其家人将恢复一切特权；(3) 原告的家属不会被逮捕；以及 (4) 原告不会受到人身威胁或被杀害。原告拒绝了该提议。原告预期，该拒绝将引发原告及其家人遭受严重迫害的风险。\n\n答辩：被告承认，原告为支持其政治庇护申请，曾陈述其本人及家人遭受出于政治动机的威胁，包括涉及吴征先生的一起事件，并称原告的庇护申请内容本身已足以说明。被告缺乏足以就第18段其余指控的真实性形成信念的知识或信息，因此予以否认。\n\n原告的政治活动及其拒绝停止该等活动，加之中国共产党对终止该等活动的强烈利益，包括使用暴力，使原告继续留在中国变得危险。因此，于2015年1月前后，原告逃离中国。他有理由担心遭中国政府和/或中国共产党逮捕、拘押、讯问、酷刑和/或杀害。在大约同一时期，中国共产党没收了原告家人大量资产，并讯问和逮捕了原告家属中的18人。中国共产党还逮捕或拘押了原告的一些同事和雇员，并禁止其他人离开中国。\n\n答辩：被告承认，原告为支持其政治庇护申请，曾陈述其于2013年离开中国大陆，并于2015年离开香港，部分基于其政治活动以及中华人民共和国（People's Republic of China）针对原告采取的行动。被告承认，原告还为支持其政治庇护申请，曾陈述其家属的资产被没收、遭拘押及被调查。被告进一步称，原告的庇护申请内容本身已足以说明。被告缺乏足以就第19段其余指控的真实性形成信念的知识或信息，因此予以否认。\n\n2017年5月，当时原告居住在美国，中国共产党派遣刘彦平（Liu Yanping）及另外三名特工前往纽约市，与原告交谈，再次试图使其噤声。刘彦平当时任中央纪律检查委员会书记。如同原告拒绝先前威胁一样，原告拒绝了这一威胁。原告没有屈服于这一最新威胁，反而披露了一个在美国活动的中国共产党间谍网络。据所知并相信，美国政府因这四名官员在美国的行为而撤销了其签证，其中包括刘彦平。\n\n答辩：被告承认，原告于2017年5月前后在美国。被告进一步承认，原告的政治庇护申请部分基于其陈述曾协助美国政府官员，原告本人已在本项指控中公开该事项，并进一步称原告的庇护申请内容本身已足以说明。被告缺乏足以就第20段其余指控的真实性形成信念的知识或信息，因此予以否认。\n\n中国共产党还采取另一项高度激进的行动，试图通过发布两份国际刑事警察组织（International Criminal Police Organization，INTERPOL）“红色[逮捕]通报”使原告噤声。原告对这些通报的合法性提出异议。\n\n答辩：被告承认，原告曾是INTERPOL“红色通报”的对象。被告缺乏足以就第21段其余指控的真实性形成信念的知识或信息，因此予以否认。\n\n于2017年10月前后，即中国共产党极为重视的中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会之前，原告的Twitter、YouTube和Facebook账户突然且可疑地被暂停，且均未给出解释。\n\n答辩：被告缺乏足以就第22段指控的真实性形成信念的知识或信息，因此予以否认。\n\n据所知并相信，自2017年起，中国政府和/或中国共产党派遣特工和官员前往美国，在原告位于纽约市的住所大楼外组织直接针对原告的示威。参加这些由中国共产党策划的示威活动者——字面意义上就在原告家门口台阶上——获得了预先印制的标语牌，以恶毒语言诽谤原告，称其为强奸犯和骗子，并敦促原告离开美国。\n\n答辩：被告缺乏足以就第23段指控的真实性形成信念的知识或信息，因此予以否认。\n\n中国共产党还另行策划了一场针对原告的恶意负面宣传运动。中国共产党组建了一支人员队伍，即“五毛水军”，以操纵社交媒体上的舆论，使其有利于中国共产党。这些评论者在流行的中国社交媒体网络上发表正面评论或文章，旨在扰乱对中国共产党不利的讨论，并推动服务于政府利益的叙事，同时发表针对原告等中国政府政治对手和批评者的贬损性评论及虚假信息。\n\n答辩：被告缺乏足以就第24段指控的真实性形成信念的知识或信息，因此予以否认。\n\n仅仅支持原告在中国就成为犯罪。据报道，原告的一名支持者董琦（Dong Qi）因身穿印有原告口号“Everything is just beginning”的T恤而被逮捕并送入监狱。据所知并相信，原告的追随者曾遭讯问、限制和恐吓。\n\n答辩：被告缺乏足以就第25段指控的真实性形成信念的知识或信息，因此予以否认。\n\n据所知并相信，中国共产党将原告视为对中国政权和中国共产党稳定性、合法性及可信度的危险挑战。\n\n答辩：被告缺乏足以就第26段指控的真实性形成信念的知识或信息，因此予以否认。\n\n原告的政治行动和倡导为中国许多人所知并受到广泛支持，事实上也受到世界各地许多人的广泛支持。原告在中国国内及国际上获得的支持，以及对其政治和倡导活动的相关强力支持，是中国共产党愤怒、恼怒、深度不满和沮丧的其他来源。\n\n答辩：被告缺乏足以就第27段指控的真实性形成信念的知识或信息，因此予以否认。\n\n上文第15至27段描述了原告的政治活动和倡导，以及其逃离中国后遭受的迫害和对进一步报复的正当恐惧，为原告寻求法律代理以协助其申请并获得美国政治庇护及代表其进行倡导提供了背景和语境。原告聘请拉格兰德先生（Mr. Ragland）和克拉克希尔律师事务所（Clark Hill law firm）在此方面代理其事务。拉格兰德先生自称为一名领先的移民律师。拉格兰德先生和该律所向原告陈述，拉格兰德先生和该律所有资格、有能力且胜任代理原告，并以完全且专业的方式保护原告的利益。原告依赖了这些陈述；然而，这些陈述后来被证明是虚假的。\n\n答辩：被告将其对上文第15至27段的答辩重新纳入本答辩，视同在此完整列明。被告承认，自2017年8月前后起，其就原告的政治庇护申请代理原告。被告进一步承认，被告与原告就该代理事项的沟通，是通过被告与原告代表韩博士（Dr. Han）之间的沟通进行的，且被告应原告要求与韩博士沟通。被告进一步承认，该代理涉及美国移民事务，且拉格兰德先生从事移民事务法律业务。被告否认第28段其余指控。\n\nClark Hill（克拉克希尔）接收并预计将接收（如同任何大型律师事务所一样）大量客户机密信息，包括财务记录、商业秘密、敏感个人通信及披露信息，以及敏感个人身份识别信息（例如，地址、联系方式、社会保障号码和健康信息）。在Clark Hill接收此类信息是日常发生之事（同样，任何规模相当的律师事务所也是如此）。客户，特别包括本案原告，向Clark Hill披露机密信息时，合理且有正当理由地依赖该所保护和维持其信息机密性的职业道德和法律义务，同时严格将该等信息的披露限于客户授权该所披露的信息。\n\n答辩：被告承认，Clark Hill PLC在提供法律代理服务过程中定期接收客户机密信息，并且普通法及哥伦比亚特区职业行为规则规范被告就代理原告所承担的义务。由于第29段其余指称构成法律结论，被告既无须也不宜作出答复。如被要求作出答复，被告否认第29段其余指称。\n\nClark Hill负有明确且不容否认的职业道德和法律义务，以维护客户（原告）的机密信息。该等保密义务包括以电子方式提供给该所和/或以电子方式储存在该所计算机网络上的信息。在所有相关期间，Clark Hill和Ragland先生均以默示和明示方式向原告表示，该所理解其维护原告机密信息的义务；同等重要的是，该所能够且将会履行该义务（即，该所具备保护原告信息所必需的专业和技术知识、能力及胜任能力）。\n\n答辩：被告承认，普通法及哥伦比亚特区职业行为规则规范被告就代理原告所承担的义务。进一步答辩称，被告否认原告曾要求采取任何不同于被告其他客户所适用的、具体的、额外的或特殊的措施来保护其机密信息。被告否认第30段其余指称。\n\n约于2017年8月，原告就可能聘请被告代理其准备和提交拟议庇护申请一事与被告会面。在该次会面中，原告说明其作为一名著名中国政治异议人士的地位和知名度，以及其被认为对CCP（中国共产党）及其在中国的相关利益抱有敌意。原告还说明了其作为中国政权一名著名且公开可见的批评者所伴随及相关的风险。原告警告称，他及其同事曾遭受持续不断、毫不松懈的网络攻击。在该次会面中及此后，原告向该所披露了有关其政治和倡导活动的机密信息，以及有关其所知CCP不当行为和活动的同等敏感机密信息。该所从一开始即知道，原告的庇护申请并非“常规”申请，并且原告必然会就该申请向Ragland先生和Clark Hill律师事务所披露高度敏感的机密信息。\n\n答辩：被告承认，其于2017年8月前后开始就原告的庇护申请代理原告。进一步答辩称，被告承认其曾与原告及原告代表就原告的庇护申请会面，且原告在该等会面中讨论了其所称的政治活动及中国官员据称对原告实施的骚扰。进一步答辩称，被告否认原告曾要求采取任何不同于被告其他客户所适用的、具体的、额外的或特殊的措施来保护机密信息。进一步答辩称，被告表示，原告本人不顾被告的建议，要求被告公开原告已申请庇护这一事实。被告否认第31段其余指称。\n\n在与该所的会面中，原告说明，任何准备其庇护申请的律师事务所都必须预期会遭受复杂的网络攻击。被告在获知该情况后，在“充分知情”的情况下，并全面认识和理解所涉网络安全及其他潜在风险后，同意继续推进并同意代理原告。\n\n答辩：被告承认，其就原告的庇护申请与原告建立了律师—客户关系。进一步答辩称，被告否认原告曾要求采取任何不同于被告其他客户所适用的、具体的、额外的或特殊的措施来保护机密信息。进一步答辩称，被告表示，原告本人不顾被告的建议，要求被告公开原告已申请庇护这一事实。被告否认第32段其余指称。\n\n在同意代理原告时，Ragland先生和该所同意采取特别预防措施，以防止原告敏感机密信息被不当披露。该等预防措施将包括不将原告的任何信息置于该所的计算机服务器上，因为如Ragland先生和该所所理解，此举将使该等信息成为有意获取该等信息的“黑客”的容易目标。该所还承诺并同意始终采取保护原告机密信息所必需的安全措施，并以其他方式向原告提供符合职业道德且胜任的法律代理服务。若该所未作出这些承诺和约定，原告不会聘请该所。\n\n答辩：被告否认第33段的指称。进一步答辩称，被告否认原告曾要求采取任何不同于被告其他客户所适用的、具体的、额外的或特殊的措施来保护机密信息。进一步答辩称，被告表示，原告本人不顾被告的建议，要求被告公开原告已申请庇护这一事实。\n\n约于2017年8月28日，原告通过其授权代表Han博士与被告签署了一份关于原告庇护申请法律服务的协议函（以下简称“聘用协议”）。该协议设定并正式确认了被告（作为法律顾问）对原告（作为客户）所承担的合同、普通法以及职业道德和法律上的责任与义务，包括完全忠诚的责任与义务，以及维持充分且必要的安全措施、足以保护原告敏感个人信息和文件的责任与义务。\n\n答辩：被告承认，约于2017年8月28日，被告与Han博士就被告代理原告处理其庇护申请事宜签订了书面委托函，且该委托函载明了双方就该代理服务所承担的义务。进一步答辩称，被告表示，普通法及哥伦比亚特区职业行为规则规范被告就代理原告所承担的义务。被告否认第34段其余指称。\n\n无论该所就维持合理安全措施以保护“普通”客户的敏感个人信息和机密文件所承担或应当承担的安全保护义务为何，本案中，该所已被充分告知（处于“高度警戒”状态）：对原告的代理绝非具有“普通”未经授权披露风险的“普通”代理服务。即，该所从一开始、并在同意代理原告之前，即知道有必要、被要求、被期待且已同意对安全措施予以特别谨慎和关注。该所在同意代理原告时，同意采取必要步骤和行动保护原告的机密信息，并认识到这意味着该所将采取“超出普通程度”的保护措施。若该所未作出此等承诺和约定，原告不会聘请该所。\n\n答辩：被告否认第35段的指称。进一步答辩称，被告否认原告曾要求采取任何不同于被告其他客户所适用的、具体的、额外的或特殊的措施来保护机密信息。进一步答辩称，被告表示，原告本人不顾被告的建议，要求被告公开原告已申请庇护这一事实。\n\n根据聘用协议，原告向被告支付了\\$10,000的预付费用，且该所随后就其费用向原告（或其授权代表）开具账单，该所费用已获支付。\n\n答辩：被告承认第36段的指称。被告进一步答辩称，原告延迟支付Clark Hill PLC的最终账单，该账单最终由Initiatives For China（中国倡议组织）于December 28, 2017支付。\n\n该所的聘用协议及其相关的标准委托条款尤其规定，原告作为客户有权“期待获得该所律师的胜任代理”；该所“将始终尽最大能力代表您行事”；以及该所律师“受规范华盛顿哥伦比亚特区律师的职业行为规则约束”。另见CLARK HILL（克拉克希尔），About Us，http（最后访问日期为Aug. 29, 2019）（“合乎道德的行为不可妥协。我们相信每一次都应做正确的事。我们恪守我们的职业责任，并对我们的行为负责。”）。\n\n答辩：被告承认，原告与被告之间的委托函纳入了Clark Hill PLC的法律服务标准委托条款。由于委托函、纳入的文件以及Clark Hill PLC的网站本身已足以说明，既无须也不宜作出进一步答辩。\n\n原告向被告提交敏感个人信息和机密文件，以便被告作为其法律顾问完成原告的庇护申请。该申请由Ragland先生在哥伦比亚特区与Han博士协商后准备，Han博士系原告在哥伦比亚特区的授权代表。该申请于September 5, 2017在华盛顿哥伦比亚特区向United States Department of Homeland Security（美国国土安全部）提交。在必要、适当且受适当保护的情况下（例如，以密封方式或法官庭审内审查方式），原告将指明其向该所披露的机密信息。\n\n答复：被告承认，原告向被告提供了与完成原告庇护申请相关的信息。被告否认该申请系向 United States Department of Homeland Security（美国国土安全部）提交，并进一步陈述，该申请是按照 United States Citizenship and Immigration Services（美国公民及移民服务局，以下简称“USCIS”）的要求，向位于 Vermont（佛蒙特州）St. Albans（圣奥尔本斯）的 USCIS Vermont Service Center（USCIS佛蒙特服务中心）提交的。被告否认第38段中的其余指控。\n\n尽管（1）该律师事务所有义务保护原告信息的保密性，（2）该律师事务所预先知悉原告案件的情况以及保护原告信息的必要性增加，及（3）被告通过承接对原告的代理及其他方式，同意其将会且能够保护原告的保密信息，该律师事务所未能做到。需要通过证据开示确定该律师事务所失职的具体细节；然而，该律师事务所未能履行职责并无争议，因为原告的信息已被披露。原告主张，Ragland（拉格兰德）先生使用该律师事务所的服务器存储和传输原告的敏感信息，并使用其律师事务所电子邮件账户向第三方传输原告的保密信息，包括向未经原告批准的第三方传输。若如原告所相信并在此主张，Ragland先生使用其律师事务所电子邮件账户向第三方传输原告的保密信息，则该鲁莽且肆意的行为便向潜在的“黑客”敞开了进入该律师事务所服务器的大门，并彻底损害了原告信息的保密性。\n\n答复：被告承认，在2017年9月12日当日或前后，Clark Hill PLC（克拉克·希尔律师事务所）的计算机系统发生了一起网络事件。被告进一步答复称，被告否认原告曾就保障保密信息提出任何不同于被告其他客户的具体、额外或特殊措施要求。被告进一步答复称，原告本人违反被告的建议，要求被告公开原告已申请庇护这一事实。被告进一步答复称，原告本人的代表Han（韩）博士曾建议被告通过电子邮件与Han博士沟通，并通过电子邮件请求有关原告庇护申请的信息。被告否认第39段中的其余指控。\n\nRagland先生的鲁莽行为与该律师事务所不足的网络安全措施及基础设施相结合，造成了致命后果。因此，原告的敏感保密信息未获保护，反而向全世界披露，从而可供中国共产党（CCP）及其他对原告怀有敌意且有能力实施该等敌意行为者获取。\n\n答复：被告否认第40段中的指控。\n\n该律师事务所表示，在2017年9月12日当日或前后，该律师事务所的计算机系统遭第三方“黑客攻击”。该第三方显然未遇到很大困难，便规避了该律师事务所明显不足（实质上漏洞百出）的安全及监控程序。此后，该第三方“黑客”能够找到并窃取（取得）原告的庇护申请和宣誓书，以及可能与原告有关的其他信息和材料。2017年9月12日，Ragland先生致函原告代表Han博士称：“他的电脑瘫痪了——显然遭到了攻击。”\n\n答复：被告承认，在2017年9月12日当日或前后，Clark Hill PLC的计算机系统发生了一起网络事件。被告进一步承认，Ragland先生已将该网络事件告知Han博士，且Ragland先生与Han博士之间的任何通信均不言自明。被告否认第41段中的其余指控。\n\n该律师事务所的安全措施，无论其为何，均未能“保护”原告的敏感个人信息和保密文件。鉴于本案情形，该律师事务所的安全措施不足、不合理，并且严重未能达到被告就提供充分安全措施所作的承诺、保证、义务及约定，违反了被告对原告承担的合同、普通法及职业义务。\n\n答复：被告承认，在2017年9月12日当日或前后，Clark Hill PLC的计算机系统发生了一起网络事件。被告否认第42段中的其余指控。\n\n由于被告的失职，第三方取得的文件包括原告及原告配偶的敏感个人信息，例如原告的护照识别号码；原告的I-94入境号码；原告配偶的护照识别号码；以及原告配偶的I-94入境号码。自2017年9月23日当日或前后起，从被告计算机系统取得的、与原告有关的敏感个人信息和保密文件开始出现在Twitter（推特）上。已发布的材料包括如下内容：\n\n（a）原告政治庇护申请的副本；\n\n（b）原告的护照识别号码；\n\n（c）原告的I-94入境号码；\n\n（d）原告配偶的护照识别号码；以及\n\n（e）原告配偶的I-94入境号码。\n\n答复：被告承认，在2017年9月12日当日或前后，Clark Hill PLC的计算机系统发生了一起网络事件。被告进一步答复称，被告承认，原告的护照号码、其配偶的护照号码、原告的I-94入境号码及其配偶的I-94入境号码载于原告的庇护申请中，但否认所列信息属于敏感或保密信息。被告不具备足以就第43段其余指控形成判断的信息或资料，因此予以否认。\n\n在社交媒体上发布和传播的信息包括原告庇护申请和宣誓书中的敏感个人信息及保密部分。原告因被告代理原告之事，向被告提供了该等及其他高度敏感信息，包括原告庇护申请的全部内容。原告既未同意也未授权向任何人披露任何该等信息，惟向与审查原告庇护申请有关而具有直接“知情必要”的美国政府人员披露者除外。根据法律，庇护申请受到严格保密。由于Ragland先生及该律师事务所的不当行为，原告的庇护申请完全公开，并在社交媒体网站上发布。\n\n答复：被告承认，8 C.F.R. § 208.6禁止政府在某些但非所有情形下披露庇护申请。被告不具备足以就第44段其余指控形成判断的信息或资料，因此否认第44段中的其余指控。\n\n被告不能以“不可能”或该主题的某种变体为由，适当地，更不用说合理地，为其不可否认的未能保护原告信息的失职进行辩护。若被告缺乏保护原告信息免遭披露的意愿、资源、技术能力或技术成熟度，则被告有义务在该律师事务所承接对原告的代理之前，向原告披露该限制（无论其原因为何，且即使该披露有违被告将原告争取为客户的经济利益），从而给予原告不聘请该律师事务所代理其事务的机会。该律师事务所剥夺了原告该机会。律师（此处为Ragland先生）的法律及伦理义务包括：当事项超出律师的胜任能力、能力或本领时，拒绝接受代理的义务。Ragland先生和Clark Hill律师事务所违反了该义务及责任，因为其在缺乏以专业、适当且不损害其客户（原告）的方式从事代理所需胜任能力和能力时，仍承接了对原告的代理。\n\n答复：被告承认，普通法和District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct（哥伦比亚特区职业行为规则）规管被告就代理原告所承担的义务。被告否认第45段中的其余指控。\n\n自该“黑客攻击”以来，被告在很大程度上一直“敷衍搪塞”，并拒绝向原告提供有关所发生事件的任何实质性信息。例如，被告拒绝告知原告攻击的规模，包括除原告外其他客户的材料是否也被取得；如是，该律师事务所是否退出了对该等客户的代理；以及被取得的材料是否存在任何可辨识的模式；被告同样拒绝告知原告，被告最初如何得知该攻击，以及被告采取了何种反制措施（如有）。\n\n答复：被告称，其已向原告提供了与该网络事件有关的相关信息，而有关该网络事件的其他信息属于保密信息，并受律师—客户保密特权和工作成果保护的保护。被告否认第46段中的其余指控。\n\n在2019年5月14日当日或前后，Daniel S. Steinberg（丹尼尔·S. 斯坦伯格）律师作为原告的代理律师，致函该律师事务所总法律顾问Edward J. Hood（爱德华·J. 胡德）律师，就该网络攻击进行询问。斯坦伯格先生请求回答以下若干具体相关问题：\n\n（a）贵方是否能够识别攻击来源，以及获得进入贵律师事务所信息系统权限所使用的机制？\n\n（b）黑客取得了哪些记录，以及该等记录是通过未经授权访问电子邮件服务器取得，还是通过直接访问存储位置取得？\n\n（c）攻击者如何规避该律师事务所的安全措施，或者该攻击是否涉及恶意软件，该恶意软件控制了该律师事务所的计算机系统，直至［原告的］信息被传输？\n\n答复：被告承认，Daniel S. Steinberg于2019年5月15日通过信函与Clark Hill PLC总法律顾问Edward J. Hood进行通信。被告进一步答复称，该信函内容不言自明。被告否认第47段中的其余指控。\n\n在2019年5月23日当日或前后，Hood先生未作解释即声称，就该“黑客攻击”所进行的调查享有特权，并仅作出有限答复。Hood先生未回答“攻击者如何规避该律师事务所安全措施”这一直接问题。推定而言，迄今该律师事务所始终向作为攻击受害人的原告隐瞒的调查报告，至少包含对该问题的初步答复。\n\n答复：被告承认，Edward J. Hood作为Clark Hill PLC总法律顾问，于2019年5月23日通过信函回复了Daniel S. Steinberg此前的通信。被告进一步答复称，该信函内容不言自明。被告否认第48段中的其余指控。\n\n在被告明显不足的系统遭“黑客攻击”一周后，即在2017年9月19日当日或前后，Hood先生以Clark Hill律师事务所总法律顾问身份致函原告，告知其被告将终止对原告的代理：\n\n“我遗憾地通知您，经审慎考虑，本律师事务所已认定其必须退出作为您的法律顾问。”\n\n网络攻击使继续代理您产生了若干伦理方面的复杂问题。首要关切是，网络攻击将要求Ragland先生（拉格兰德先生）——以及可能的律师事务所其他成员——在您的庇护程序中作为证人出庭。根据我们的《职业行为规则》，律师在其可能成为重要证人的程序中不得担任诉讼代理人。在本案中，网络攻击使Ragland先生陷入难以维持的境地：他一方面须在您的庇护案件中作为证人，另一方面又同时担任您的律师。至此，Ragland先生必须将其角色限于证人，而非法律代理人。（着重号为原文所加。）\n\n答复：被告承认，其于或约于September 19, 2017，通过Hood先生（胡德先生）以Clark Hill PLC（克拉克·希尔律师事务所）总法律顾问身份致原告的信函，退出了对原告的代理。被告进一步答复称，该信函的内容不言自明。被告否认第49段中的其余指控。\n\n该律师事务所为其极端的单方面行为，即“其必须退出代理”，所陈述的“理由”是，Ragland先生以及该律师事务所的其他人员或许会在原告的庇护程序中成为证人。该“理由”毫无可信性或依据。\n\n答复：被告承认，退出对原告的代理的一个理由是，Ragland先生及Clark Hill PLC的其他人员可能会在原告的庇护程序中成为证人。被告承认，其于或约于September 19, 2017，通过Hood先生以Clark Hill PLC总法律顾问身份致原告的信函，退出了对原告的代理。被告进一步答复称，该信函的内容不言自明。被告进一步答复称，法院于February 20, 2020作出的命令驳回了原告基于被告退出对原告代理而提出的诉求。被告否认第50段中的其余指控。\n\n例如，在该律师事务所单方面退出对原告的代理并抛弃原告时，并无听证会待举行（截至本文件提交之日亦无听证会待举行）；即使有听证会，原告亦未要求Ragland先生作为证人；作为委托人，应由原告而非Ragland先生或该律师事务所决定，在任何听证会中Ragland先生证言的价值或必要性是否超过该律师事务所继续担任代理律师的价值或必要性（特别是鉴于Ragland先生声称其在移民和庇护事务中居于首要地位）；若Ragland先生作证，其在任何听证会上的证言内容将涉及无争议事项，即该律师事务所的服务器曾被“黑客攻击”，且原告的信息已被获取；该律师事务所从未征询原告对此事的意见；并且，该律师事务所从未暗示，更遑论解释，为什么Ragland先生的证言在当时并不存在的听证会上据称如此“必要”，以至于足以使该律师事务所在其实际作出决定时单方面、仓促地且不顾原告最佳利益地终止其与原告之间的律师—委托人关系。\n\n答复：被告承认，在该律师事务所退出对原告的代理时，并无庇护听证会或面谈待举行。被告承认，原告当时未要求Ragland先生在任何程序中作为证人。被告进一步答复称，法院于February 20, 2020作出的命令驳回了原告基于被告退出代理而提出的诉求。由于第51段中的其余指控构成法律结论，被告既无须亦不宜作出答复。如被要求作出答复，被告否认第51段中的其余指控。\n\n尽管其显然负有相反的伦理义务，包括对其委托人（原告）负有完全忠诚的义务，该律师事务所仍只是想要“脱身”。为实现其不当的“解雇委托人”逃脱计划，该律师事务所捏造了一个明显虚假的“理由”，试图为其行为辩解。在本案中，该律师事务所的委托人没有做错任何事，当然也没有做任何足以使其受到如此残酷、毫无正当性且不合伦理对待的行为。查明该律师事务所不当终止对原告代理的实际理由，而非其捏造的理由，包括该律师事务所是否屈从于来自“黑客”或其他方面的压力，将是证据开示的重要领域。\n\n答复：被告否认第52段中的指控。\n\nClark Hill已告知，其已就本案所涉网络攻击进行调查（或委托他人代表其进行调查）。该调查及任何调查报告可能涉及该律师事务所不当退出对原告代理这一事项。迄今为止，尽管原告的信息已被获取，且原告或许是该次攻击唯一成功的目标，并且该律师事务所正是因该攻击而终止了对原告的代理，该律师事务所仍未向原告提供因对本事项进行内部调查而形成的任何调查报告。原告将在证据开示中寻求取得该报告。因此，特此通知被告保存该报告及所有相关草稿、调查笔记、笔录、证物和材料。\n\n答复：被告承认，Clark Hill PLC聘请外部法律顾问就该网络事件进行调查，已编制有关该调查的报告，且该报告属保密信息，受律师—委托人特权及工作成果保护。被告否认第53段中的其余指控。\n\n如果被告不愿意或无法保护原告的敏感保密信息，或者缺乏能力或资质使原告的信息不存储于该律师事务所的服务器上，或者无法妥善保护其计算机系统和网络以保护原告的信息，则被告有义务在开始时并在承诺代理原告之前向原告披露该关键限制，以使原告有机会在考虑该律师事务所限制条件的情况下，就是否聘请该律师事务所作出知情判断。该律师事务所未作任何此类披露，因而剥夺了原告就聘请该律师事务所作出知情决定的机会。若该律师事务所坦诚、如实地说明其限制以及缺乏充分的安全措施和保护，原告不会聘请该律师事务所担任其代理律师。\n\n答复：被告承认，普通法和District of Columbia（哥伦比亚特区）《职业行为规则》规制被告就其代理原告所负的义务。被告进一步答复称，原告并未要求采取任何特定、额外或非常措施，以不同于被告其他委托人的方式保护保密信息。被告进一步答复称，原告本人违背被告的建议，要求被告公开原告已申请庇护这一事实。被告否认第54段中的其余指控。\n\n作为被告多次违反其对原告所负职责和法律义务的直接及近因，原告的敏感个人信息和保密文件被披露给第三方、向全世界公开，并披露给中国境内的个人和机构，包括中国政府和CCP（中国共产党），从而使原告遭受重大且严重的损害、伤害和不利后果。\n\n答复：被告否认第55段中的指控。\n\n作为被告不当且违法行为的直接后果，原告已遭受并持续遭受其个人及职业声誉损害；其失去了大量商业机会；原告的人身安全和保障已受到威胁；其获得政治庇护的努力被延误；其家属被逮捕并受到威胁；原告在中国的雇员受到骚扰；原告已产生费用和开支；并且原告在推进其庇护申请过程中未能获得被告所声称的移民法专业知识之益处。被告违反其法律职责和义务，造成了原告这些以及可能的其他伤害和损失。这些伤害持续且仍在发生，未来存在追加伤害和损失的重大风险，甚至是可能性。\n\n答复：被告否认第56段中的指控。\n\n作为被告多次违反其职责和法律义务的直接及近因，原告庇护申请及其他材料的细节和内容已在社交媒体平台上被广泛披露，并落入对原告抱有敌意的第三方手中。中国及其他地方存在因原告政治活动而对原告抱有敌意的有权势人士和利益集团，他们现已——完全由于被告的失职和违反职责——掌握了原本不会掌握的有关原告的详细信息。有充分理由相信，这些人已将并将继续将原告的保密信息用于损害原告的目的。\n\n答复：被告否认第57段中的指控。\n\n被告造成的严重伤害还包括限制原告旅行的自由和人身自由，并危及其人身安全。被告违反法律职责和义务，造成了原告这些伤害和损失。这些伤害持续且仍在发生，未来存在追加伤害和损失的重大风险，甚至是可能性。\n\n答复：被告否认第58段中的指控。\n\n被告未能保护原告敏感个人信息和保密文件，是原告敏感个人信息和保密文件在社交媒体上传播的直接及近因；该等信息和文件的公开通过损害原告声誉，并削弱原告的可信度及其推进在中国实现法治、民主和正义事业之工作的可信度，对原告造成重大伤害。被告违反法律职责和义务，造成了原告这些伤害和损失。这些伤害持续且仍在发生，未来存在追加伤害和损失的重大风险，甚至是可能性。\n\n答复：被告否认第59段中的指控。\n\n被告不当且无正当理由地终止其律师—委托人关系及随附义务，已对原告造成伤害和损失。被告不当地抛弃其委托人（原告）的行为，使原告在其需要律师的时候无法获得律师协助（因为其保密信息刚刚被散布于整个社交媒体）；向公众传递了原告在该代理事项中以某种方式不可信或行为不当的信息；使原告无法获得被告所声称的移民法专业知识；并且已经造成和/或将造成原告庇护申请处理过程中的不当延误和复杂情况。这些伤害持续且仍在发生，未来存在追加伤害和损失的重大风险，甚至是可能性。\n\n答复：被告否认第60段中的指控。\n\n在审判中，陪审团将确定由被告直接造成的原告补偿性损害赔偿。原告主张该等损害赔偿不少于$50 million，并请求作出至少该金额的判决书。\n\n答复：被告承认，原告已在本案中请求由陪审团审判。\n\n被告否认第61段中的其余指控。\n\n惩罚性损害赔偿\n\n在审判中，陪审团还将被要求裁定其认为适当数额的重大惩罚性赔偿金。鉴于被告的作为、不作为以及对职责和义务的违反具有鲁莽、恣意、故意的性质，并且故意无视原告的权利及被告保护原告权利的义务和职责，故本案有理由判处惩罚性赔偿金。\n\n答复：被告承认原告已在本案中要求由陪审团审理。\n\n进一步答复，法院于 February 20, 2020 作出的命令驳回了原告要求惩罚性赔偿金的请求。被告否认第62段其余指控。\n\n被告在处理原告的保密信息时存在鲁莽行为。被告的鲁莽行为包括未能保护该等信息；将其置于律所的计算机服务器上；直接或间接通过律所电子邮件账户将该等信息传送给第三方；或以其他方式处理。该等行为系故意、审慎作出，并故意无视原告的权利以及被告保护原告权利的义务和职责。\n\n答复：被告否认第63段的指控。进一步答复，法院于 February 20, 2020 作出的命令驳回了原告要求惩罚性赔偿金的请求。\n\n被告知悉并理解保护原告敏感及保密信息的重要性，也知悉该等信息的传播将危及原告及其家属的人身和职业利益，包括使原告及其家属面临严重受害风险。被告尤其知悉并理解，CCP（中国共产党）将试图取得原告的敏感及保密信息，并利用该等信息损害原告及其家属。然而，被告无视这些真实且现实的风险，其行为伴有欺诈、恶意、鲁莽、恣意、压迫性、故意无视原告权利、原告安全及其家属安全的情形，以及其他倾向于加重原告损害的情形。\n\n答复：被告否认第64段的指控。进一步答复，法院于 February 20, 2020 作出的命令驳回了原告要求惩罚性赔偿金的请求。\n\n被告抛弃原告这一客户，选择自身利益而非保护其客户，从而加重了其鲁莽行为。被告单方面退出担任原告代理律师的行为系故意、审慎、鲁莽且无正当理由的行为，并故意无视原告的权利以及被告保护原告权利的义务和职责。\n\n答复：被告否认第65段的指控。进一步答复，法院于 February 20, 2020 作出的命令驳回了原告要求惩罚性赔偿金的请求。\n\n救济请求\n\n第一项——违反信义义务\n\n原告采纳并以援引方式并入第1至65段，如同其每一段均在此完整载明。\n\n答复：被告并入其对上述第1至65段的答复，如同其在此完整载明。\n\n被告与原告建立了律师—委托人关系。因此，被告对原告负有律师对客户所负的一切信义义务和责任。被告没有履行该等义务和责任，反而违反了它们。\n\n答复：被告承认，其就原告的庇护申请与原告建立了律师—委托人关系，且普通法及 District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct（哥伦比亚特区职业行为规则）规范被告就代理原告所负的义务。被告否认第67段其余指控。\n\n在所有相关期间，被告对原告所负的信义义务包括但不限于：不得承办超出被告专业及技术胜任能力、能力和资质范围的事项；有义务维持合理且充分的，在本案中意指强化的安全措施，以保护原告敏感个人信息和保密记录；不得允许该等信息出现在律所计算机服务器上，从而使原告保密信息面临被披露的风险；有义务始终对原告保持最大诚信和完全忠诚；有义务提供胜任的专业法律代理；以及除非具有有效且适当的理由，不得退出代理原告，从而实际上抛弃原告。\n\n答复：被告承认，其就原告的庇护申请与原告建立了律师—委托人关系，且普通法及 District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct（哥伦比亚特区职业行为规则）规范被告就代理原告所负的义务。由于第68段其余指控构成法律结论，被告既无须也不宜作出答复。在需要答复的范围内，被告否认第68段其余指控。\n\n被告违反了其对原告的信义义务。该等违反包括：被告未能维持合理安全措施以保护原告敏感个人信息和保密记录，具体表现为未能维持合理安全措施，包括将信息置于律所计算机服务器上及/或允许他人访问律所服务器，从而使未经授权的第三方得以访问包含原告敏感个人信息和保密文件的电子档案及通信。\n\n答复：被告否认第69段的指控。\n\n被告还通过不当地且无有效理由地退出代理原告，违反了其对原告的信义义务和责任，无论该等退出是否为回应所谓“赎金”要求或出于其他原因。被告的行为旨在推进其自身利益，且违反了律所客户即原告的利益；律所对原告负有首要的完全忠诚义务。\n\n答复：被告否认第70段的指控。\n\n被告终止其对原告的代理并无有效、合法或伦理上充分的理由。原告已履行其作为客户的义务；被告违反了其作为律师的义务。律所声称终止其与原告律师—委托人关系的理由，即 Ragland先生（拉格兰德先生）可能在某次尚不知晓、迄今未安排的听证中作为证人，显然是为证明被告不当单方面决定终止律师—委托人关系而提出的虚假借口。\n\n答复：被告否认第71段的指控。\n\n如果被告为重新控制其计算机系统而向第三方泄露原告的敏感个人信息和保密文件，或从事任何类似行为（原告将在证据开示中追究该事项），则被告将律所利益置于原告利益之上，从而违反了其对作为律所客户的原告所负的首要完全忠诚义务。\n\n答复：被告否认第72段的指控。\n\n原告因被告违反其对原告所负义务而受到损害。原告损害赔偿的数额将在审判中确定。\n\n答复：被告否认第73段的指控。\n\n除补偿性赔偿金外，被告还应承担惩罚性赔偿金责任，因为被告的行为故意无视原告的权利，具有故意、审慎及鲁莽性质。惩罚性赔偿金的数额将在审判中确定。\n\n答复：被告否认第74段的指控。进一步答复，法院于 February 20, 2020 作出的命令驳回了原告关于被告不当退出代理原告的主张，以及原告要求惩罚性赔偿金的请求。\n\n第二项——违反代理合同\n\n原告采纳并以援引方式并入第1至74段，如同其每一段均在此完整载明。\n\n答复：被告并入其对上述第1至74段的答复，如同其在此完整载明。\n\n原告与原告订立书面合同，由该律所代理原告。被告通过承办超出被告专业或技术胜任能力、能力和胜任能力范围的事项；未能向原告提供胜任代理；未能采取合理安全措施保护原告敏感个人信息和保密文件；以及不当地且错误地终止律所对原告的代理，从而违反了其对原告的合同义务。\n\n答复：被告承认，被告就被告与原告有关原告庇护申请的法律代理事宜，与 Initiatives For China（中国倡议组织）订立了书面委托函，且该委托函载明了双方就该代理事宜所负的义务。进一步答复，被告称该委托函载明了双方义务的全部内容。被告否认第76段其余指控。\n\n如果被告向不明第三方交付包括停止代理原告及/或提供原告敏感个人信息和保密文件在内的“赎金”（原告将在证据开示中追究该事项），则被告进一步违反了委托协议及相关委托条款。如果被告如此行事，则其未能提供胜任代理，也未能尽其最大能力并为其客户利益行事。\n\n答复：被告否认第77段的指控。\n\n律所违反其合同和伦理义务，错误地将自身利益置于其客户即原告的利益之上。被告终止其对原告的代理并无正当或充分理由。原告已履行其作为客户的义务；被告违反了其作为律师的义务。律所声称终止其与原告律师—委托人关系的理由，即 Ragland先生（拉格兰德先生）可能在某次尚不知晓、迄今未安排的听证中作为证人，是为证明被告不当单方面决定终止律师—委托人合同关系而提出的虚假借口。\n\n答复：被告否认第78段的指控。\n\n原告因被告违反其对原告所负合同职责和义务而受到损害。原告损害赔偿的数额将在审判中确定。\n\n答复：被告否认第79段的指控。\n\n第三项——法律执业过失\n\n原告采纳并以援引方式并入第1至79段，如同其每一段均在此完整载明。\n\n答复：被告并入其对第1至79段的答复，如同其在此完整载明。\n\n在所有相关期间，原告与被告之间均存在律师—委托人关系。被告对原告负有合同、普通法及职业义务，即以所要求程度的专业审慎和技能，以胜任、专业并符合适用注意义务标准的方式代理原告。如本起诉状所详述，律所未以所要求程度的专业审慎和技能代理原告。被告违反了其对原告的义务。\n\n答复：被告承认，其就原告的庇护申请与原告建立了律师—委托人关系，且普通法及 District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct（哥伦比亚特区职业行为规则）规范被告就代理原告所负的义务。被告否认第81段其余指控。\n\n规范律师代理客户事务的注意义务标准，由合同义务、普通法义务以及职业（伦理）义务和责任共同界定。本案中，该律师事务所未能以胜任且专业的方式代理原告，违反了注意义务标准；该事务所对原告的代理及其终止该代理关系的行为，远未达到所要求的注意义务标准。\n\n答辩：被告承认，就原告的庇护申请而言，被告与原告建立了律师—客户关系，并承认普通法及 District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct（哥伦比亚特区律师职业行为规则）规范被告就代理原告所承担的义务。关于规范注意义务标准的法律之主张构成法律结论，因此被告既无须亦不宜作出答辩。在需要作出答辩的范围内，被告否认有关注意义务标准的主张。进一步答辩称，被告否认第82段中的其余主张。\n\n被告因承办超出其专业或技术胜任能力和能力范围的事项；未能以所要求的专业注意和技能程度代理原告，导致原告的敏感个人信息和保密文件在全球范围内暴露和传播；以及不当且无正当理由地终止其对原告的代理，而违反了其对原告所承担的合同、普通法、职业及伦理义务和责任。\n\n答辩：被告否认第83段中的主张。\n\n被告未采取胜任且合理的措施保护原告的敏感个人信息和保密文件，包括但不限于未维持合理的安全措施以保护原告的文件和通信；未维持合理的安全措施以保护电子邮件账户和信息系统，包括其中所含数据，免遭第三方未经授权的访问；以及未维持合理的安全措施以防止电子邮件账户遭未经授权的第三方访问。\n\n答辩：被告否认第84段中的主张。\n\n若 Ragland 先生如其承诺所为——未暴露原告的敏感保密信息——且被告如向原告所要求及承诺的那样维持合理安全措施以保护其计算机系统免遭未经授权访问，则网络对手将无法获得原告的敏感个人信息和保密文件。若被告缺乏妥善保护该事务所计算机系统和网络、从而保护原告信息免遭未经授权披露的意愿、胜任能力或能力，则被告有义务在接受代理之前即一开始向原告披露该等限制，以使原告有机会就鉴于该事务所的限制是否聘请该事务所作出知情判断。该事务所未作出任何此类披露，因而剥夺了原告就聘请该事务所作出知情决定的机会。\n\n答辩：被告否认第85段中的主张。\n\n如被告向身份不明的第三方交付了包含停止代理原告及提供原告敏感个人信息和保密文件的“赎金”，则被告进一步违反了其对原告所承担的合同、普通法及职业义务。\n\n答辩：被告否认第86段中的主张。\n\n被告还通过不适当地、不当地终止其对原告的代理，以及通过被告实施该等终止的方式，进一步违反了其对原告所承担的合同、普通法及职业义务。被告没有任何充分、足够或有效的理由终止其对原告的代理。原告已履行其作为客户的义务；被告违反了其作为律师的义务。该事务所所称终止其与原告之间律师—客户关系的理由（即 Ragland 先生可能在某个尚不知晓、迄今尚未排期的听证中成为证人）是为证明被告不当地单方面决定终止律师—客户关系正当而提出的明显托词。\n\n答辩：被告否认第87段中的主张。\n\n原告因被告违反其对原告所承担的注意及胜任义务和责任而受到损害。原告损害赔偿的数额将在审判中确定。\n\n答辩：被告否认第88段中的主张。\n\n第四项罪名——惩罚性损害赔偿\n\n原告援引并并入第1至88段，如同在此完整列明。\n\n答辩：被告并入其对上述第1至88段的答辩，如同在此完整列明。进一步答辩称，“惩罚性损害赔偿”并非独立诉因，且法院于 February 20, 2020 作出的命令已驳回原告关于惩罚性损害赔偿的请求。\n\n由于被告的作为、不作为、未履行、违反义务和责任以及侵犯原告权利的行为均属故意、蓄意、令人愤慨，且系故意无视被告的义务和责任并故意无视原告的权利，因此除补偿性损害赔偿外，被告还应向原告承担惩罚性损害赔偿责任。\n\n答辩：被告否认第90段中的主张。进一步答辩称，“惩罚性损害赔偿”并非独立诉因，且法院于 February 20, 2020 作出的命令已驳回原告关于惩罚性损害赔偿的请求。\n\n被告在本案中所涉行为严重超出界限，足以支持惩罚性损害赔偿。被告故意、蓄意、不当的行为包括：尽管被告明确知悉迫切需要保护原告的保密信息免遭极具损害性的公开披露，却未能加以保护；随后，在因被告的失职而发生该披露后，被告立即“逃离”其客户（原告）。\n\n答辩：被告否认第91段中的主张。进一步答辩称，“惩罚性损害赔偿”并非独立诉因，且法院于 February 20, 2020 作出的命令已驳回原告关于惩罚性损害赔偿的请求。\n\n被告故意且蓄意的失职使原告的信息可被“黑客”获取，随后被告故意、蓄意、不当地，在不顾其义务和责任且故意无视原告权利的情况下，遗弃了作为其客户的原告。\n\n答辩：被告否认第92段中的主张。进一步答辩称，“惩罚性损害赔偿”并非独立诉因，且法院于 February 20, 2020 作出的命令已驳回原告关于惩罚性损害赔偿的请求。\n\n陪审团将确定适当的惩罚性损害赔偿数额。\n\n答辩：被告承认原告在本案中已要求由陪审团审判。进一步答辩称，“惩罚性损害赔偿”并非独立诉因，且法院于 February 20, 2020 作出的命令已驳回原告关于惩罚性损害赔偿的请求。被告否认第93段中的其余主张。\n\n被告的积极抗辩\n\n除对构成原告针对被告所提出主张基础的具体指控作出上述答辩外，且在不承担本应由原告承担的任何主张、抗辩、法律问题或事实问题举证责任的前提下，被告就原告针对被告提出的全部主张提出下列积极抗辩：\n\n第一项积极抗辩（第一至三项罪名：未提出可获救济的请求）\n\n原告的全部三项主张全部或部分被禁止，因为原告未提出可获准救济的请求，包括因被告《驳回动议》及其支持性法律备忘录中所列明的理由。\n\n第二项积极抗辩（第一至三项罪名：无损害）\n\n原告的主张被禁止，因为其未遭受可诉损害。\n\n第三项积极抗辩（第一至三项罪名：无因果关系）\n\n即使原告能够证明其遭受了可获赔偿的损害，该等损害也并非由被告的行为所致。\n\n第四项积极抗辩（第一至三项罪名：未违反义务）\n\n被告未违反对原告所负有的任何注意义务。\n\n第五项积极抗辩（第一及二项罪名：与第三项罪名重复）\n\n第一及二项罪名因与第三项罪名重复而被禁止，因为原告关于违反信义义务及违反合同的主张，与原告的律师职业过失主张基于相同的核心事实和相同的损害。\n\n第六项积极抗辩（第一至三项罪名：不洁之手）\n\n原告的主张受不洁之手原则禁止。\n\n第七项积极抗辩（第一至三项罪名：共同过失）\n\n原告的主张因其自身过失及其实际或表见代理人的过失而被禁止。\n\n第八项积极抗辩（第一至三项罪名：未减轻损失）\n\n原告未能减轻其所称损害。\n\n第九项积极抗辩（第一至三项罪名：介入原因）\n\n原告所称损害全部或部分由被告无需负责的第三方行为或被告无法控制的力量所致。\n\n第十项积极抗辩（第一至三项罪名：非唯一近因）\n\n即使原告遭受任何损害，被告亦非该等损害的唯一近因。\n\n第十一项积极抗辩（第一至三项罪名：请求尚未成熟）\n\n原告的主张尚未成熟，因此应予驳回或中止。\n\n第十二项积极抗辩（第一至三项罪名：无协议）\n\n原告的主张不能成立，因为被告并未同意就原告的信息提供具体或特别的安全措施。\n\n第十三项积极抗辩（第一至三项罪名：自甘风险）\n\n原告的主张被禁止，因为其自愿承担其所遭受任何损害的风险。\n\n第十四项积极抗辩（第二项罪名：弃权）\n\n原告关于违反合同的主张受弃权原则禁止。\n\n第十五项积极抗辩（第一至三项罪名：纯经济损失规则）\n\n原告的主张全部或部分受纯经济损失规则禁止。\n\n第十六项积极抗辩（第四项罪名：无惩罚性损害赔偿）\n\n原告无权依据构成其主张基础的任何行为或理论获得惩罚性损害赔偿。法院于 February 20, 2020 作出的命令已驳回原告关于惩罚性损害赔偿的请求。\n\n第十七项积极抗辩（第一至四项罪名：州法）\n\n被告有权享有任何其他州的任何法律规则或法规中所载或由其产生的全部抗辩和推定之利益，若该州的实体法可能控制本案。\n\n第十八项积极抗辩（第一至四项罪名：保留补充抗辩）\n\n被告保留提出在本案过程中显现的任何补充抗辩的权利。在证据开示和调查过程中，可能知悉支持目前被告尚不知晓之积极抗辩的其他事实。为保留该等积极抗辩，被告特此援引并并入 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c)（《联邦民事诉讼规则》第8(c)条）所规定的全部积极抗辩，并保留在证据开示推进过程中提出补充积极抗辩的权利。\n\n陪审团审判请求\n\n被告要求就所有争点进行陪审团审判。\n\n结论\n\n因此，被告恭请本法院作出有利于被告、不利于原告的判决书，并给予被告本法院认为公正适当的其他及进一步救济。\n\n谨此提交，\n\nCLARK HILL PLC（克拉克希尔专业有限公司）及 THOMAS K. RAGLAND（托马斯·K·拉格兰）\n\n日期：March 19, 2020 签署人：/s/ John R. Storino（约翰·R·斯托里诺） 其代理律师之一\n\nJohn R. Storino（约翰·R·斯托里诺）（经临时出庭许可） Leigh J. Jahnig（利·J·雅尼格）（经临时出庭许可） JENNER & BLOCK LLP（詹纳与布洛克律师事务所） 353 N. Clark Street Chicago, IL 60654-3456 电话：312 222-9350 JStorino@jenner.com\n\nKali N. Bracey（卡莉·N·布雷西）（#458965） JENNER & BLOCK LLP 1099 New York Avenue NW Suite 900 Washington, DC 20001-4412 KBracey@jenner.com\n\n送达证明\n\n本人John R. Storino，律师，特此证明：本人于2020年3月19日通过CM/ECF电子送达方式，向所有登记在案的代理律师送达了上述被告对原告诉状的答辩及积极抗辩。\n\n/s/ John R. Storino\n\n附件7\n\n本附件已密封提交。\n\n附件8\n\n美利坚合众国哥伦比亚特区联邦地区法院\n\nGUO WENGUI（郭文贵），又名MILES KWOK，又名\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）， )\n)\n\n原告， )\n)\n案号：1:19-cv-3195\n)\n诉 )\nCLARK HILL PLC（克拉克希尔律师事务所）；THOMAS K. )\nBoasberg法官阁下\n)\nRAGLAND（托马斯·K·拉格兰）， )\n)\n被告。 )\n)\n\n被告请求强制取得证言的动议，或备选地，请求作出不利推定\n\n被告Clark Hill PLC和Thomas K. Ragland（以下统称“Clark Hill”）通过其代理律师，谨请求本院作出命令：(1) 强制原告Guo Wengui就其以第五修正案为由拒绝回答的众多证言问题作出回答；或备选地，(2) 准许向陪审团作出指示，允许根据Guo拒绝回答作出不利推定。为支持本动议，Clark Hill提交随附的法律备忘录及附件，并陈述如下：\n\n1. 2021年7月28日，Clark Hill对Guo进行了宣誓作证询问。在该次询问中，Guo以第五修正案为由，拒绝回答约28个涉及多种主题的问题。\n\n2. Guo拒绝回答的问题，与Clark Hill针对Guo唯一的精神痛苦损害赔偿请求所作的抗辩具有核心关联。\n\n3. 本院应命令Guo回答其拒绝回答的问题，理由如下：\n\na. Guo在其先前的诉状陈述及证据开示答复中自愿提出了相关问题的主题，从而放弃了任何第五修正案特权。\n\nb. Guo无依据如其所为主张第五修正案特权，因为没有合理理由担忧，就争议主题作出的补充陈述将在美国导致刑事追诉风险的增量增加。\n\n4. 备选地，如本院不命令Guo进一步回答宣誓作证询问问题，本院应准许作出陪审团指示，允许作出不利推定，以弥补Guo拒绝回答问题所造成的不利影响。该指示的具体范围可在临近审判时确定。\n\n因此，基于上述理由及随附法律备忘录和附件中所载理由，Clark Hill谨请求本院作出命令：(1) 强制原告Guo Wengui就其以第五修正案为由拒绝回答的众多宣誓作证询问问题作出回答；或备选地，(2) 准许陪审团作出指示，允许根据Guo拒绝回答作出不利推定。\n\n日期：2021年9月14日 谨此提交，\n\n/s/ John R. Storino John R. Storino（经临时出庭许可） David Jimenez-Ekman（大卫·希门尼斯-埃克曼）（经临时出庭许可） Lindsey A. Lusk（林赛·A·拉斯克）（经临时出庭许可） JENNER & BLOCK, LLP 353 N. Clark Street Chicago, IL 60654-3456 电话：(312) 222-9350 [JStorino@jenner.com]\n\nKali N. Bracey（#458965） JENNER & BLOCK, LLP 1099 New York Avenue NW Suite 900 Washington, DC 20001-4412 电话：(202) 639-6000 [KBracey@jenner.com]\n\n被告代理律师\n\n送达证明\n\n本人John R. Storino，律师，特此证明：本人已使用本院CM/ECF提交系统提交上述联合状态报告，该系统于2021年9月14日向所有登记在案的代理律师送达了一份副本。\n\n/s/ John R. Storino\n\n美利坚合众国哥伦比亚特区联邦地区法院\n\n) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )\n\nGUO WENGUI（郭文贵），又名MILES KWOK，\n\n原告，\n诉\nCLARK HILL PLC和THOMAS K.\nRAGLAND，\n被告。\n\n民事诉讼案号：1:10-CV-3195-JEB\n\nJames Boasberg法官阁下\n\n支持被告请求强制取得证言的动议，或备选地，请求作出不利推定的备忘录\n\n本院应强制原告Guo Wengui回答其以第五修正案为由拒绝回答的众多宣誓作证询问问题；或备选地，准许向陪审团作出指示，允许根据其未作回答而作出不利推定。在其7月28日的宣誓作证询问中，Guo的个人律师（而非在本案中代理Guo的律师）指示其不要回答约28个涉及五大类多种主题的问题，包括：(1) Guo与ACA Capital Group Limited（“ACA”）据称存在的咨询关系，(2) Guo与各类第三方之间的过往诉讼，(3) Guo与T&M Protection Resources的关系（Guo在书面质询答复中提及该实体），(4) 构成本案核心的Guo庇护申请，以及(5) Guo的财富和资产。Guo的律师拒绝说明其在宣誓作证询问期间或其后往来函件及会谈协商期间主张第五修正案特权的依据。因此，被告Clark Hill, PLC和Thomas K. Ragland（以下统称“Clark Hill”）提出本强制动议或请求作出不利推定。\n\n本院应命令Guo作出回答，或备选地，准许作出不利推定，理由有三。第一，Guo通过其先前的指控及证据开示答复，放弃了对其中部分或全部主题的特权。第二，即使其未放弃该特权，Guo亦未说明其现时主张该特权的任何依据，且其中部分主题不可能导致其自证其罪。第三，备选地，如本院认定Guo能够说明主张该特权的可信依据，本院应准许作出陪审团指示，允许根据Guo拒绝回答作出不利推定。\n\n背景\n\n本院熟悉Guo在本案先前动议程序中提出的指控。Guo所称损害源于2017年9月身份不明的网络黑客从Clark Hill的计算机系统盗取Guo的某些个人信息，其中包括Clark Hill代表其提交的Guo庇护申请。诉状第38、41段。\n\nGuo主张的损害赔偿随时间发生了变化。Guo最初在其诉状及早期证据开示答复中主张，Clark Hill遭盗窃致其遭受各种经济损失及自付费用损失，但其现仅请求精神痛苦的非经济损害赔偿。相关诉状及证据开示答复如下：\n\n• 2019年10月24日诉状：Guo主张其“个人和职业声誉受损”、“失去了大量商业机会”并产生“成本和费用”，以及其他据称对其“个人和职业声誉”造成的损害及对其“人身安全和保障”的风险。见同上，第56段。\n\n• 2020年11月16日书面质询答复：Guo主张其损害包括失去其与ACA Capital Group Limited（“ACA”）的“咨询协议”。附件C，第19段。\n\n2021年7月26日承认请求及书面质询答复：Guo正式放弃其全部经济损害赔偿，并表示其现时仅请求精神痛苦及因造成Guo痛苦而产生的“声誉”损害赔偿。总体见附件D。\n\nClark Hill于2021年7月28日对Guo进行了宣誓作证询问。Guo的个人律师指示Guo不要回答28个问题。附件A以图表汇集了这些问题；附件B载有完整宣誓作证询问笔录，以供本院在需要相关问题和指示的任何背景时参考，其中已突出标示相关问题和指示。这些问题分属五大类：\n\n• Guo与ACA Capital Group Limited（“ACA”）据称存在的咨询关系，包括Guo对该协议（Guo已提交）的了解程度、Guo签署咨询协议的日期，以及Guo向ACA提供的服务（见附件B，第28、31和161页）；\n\n• Guo过去的诉讼，其中Guo就本案所涉同一期间主张精神损害，以及Guo通过其实体提起的诉讼（见同上，第45–46和86–87页）；\n\n• Guo与T&M Protection Resources（“T&M”）的关系，涉及Guo主张T&M这一与Guo有关联的实体亦遭中国政府黑客攻击（见同上，第98–99及101页）1；\n\n• Guo的庇护申请，尤其是涉及其陈述准确性以及其据称“政治异见人士”身份的问题（见同上，第127–128、130-133、161、168–69及248–49页）；以及\n\n1 2021年2月12日，Guo就对“其他受托人”的指示提交了一份经核实陈述。2021年2月12日，原告关于对“其他受托人”指示的陈述，附件E。在该经核实陈述中，Guo将T&M Protection描述为一实体，该实体“向原告提供人身保护服务”，并主张其要求该实体“在就其为其开展的工作所涉机密事项进行沟通时，限制使用电子邮件”。同上，第2页。\n\nGuo的财富和资产，例如关于Guo净资产、其雇员及其住所的问题（见同上，第184–86及245页）。\n\nGuo的律师拒绝说明，对这些问题的回答为何可能涉及Guo的第五修正案权利，无论是在宣誓作证询问期间还是之后。附件B，第28页；见附件F。\n\n论证\n\nClark Hill提出本动议，是因为Guo拒绝回答的问题与Guo在本案中极其可疑的损害赔偿请求具有核心关联。Guo已将其损害赔偿请求限缩为精神痛苦损害。Guo主张，由于从Clark Hill被盗的信息中包含尚未在网上公开的数据，其遭受了一系列身体症状。Clark Hill对以下两点提出争议：(a) 盗贼发布的任何内容均非尚未在网上公开，及(b) Guo实际上未遭受其所称的任何症状。有关Guo财富、个人工作人员及众多高端住所的问题，与其所称症状及减轻该等症状的能力直接相关。\n\n但是，即使其确实遭受精神痛苦，亦有大量其他原因可能造成该痛苦。Guo主张，其在中国居住期间曾遭中国共产党（“CCP”）迫害和酷刑，其兄弟被CCP杀害，其妻子和子女亦被监禁和虐待。附件B，第124–125、162及234–35页。早在Clark Hill遭盗窃之前，Guo便开始了一场高度公开的批评CCP的运动，并开始遭受该党的威胁。见附件B，第80–81页。在过去4年中，Guo已针对各类实体和个人提起至少10起诉讼，主张其因该等个人所为而非因Clark Hill遭盗窃，遭受严重精神痛苦。2 每当Guo对某人感到不满并决意通过诉讼惩罚其时，Guo便依赖精神痛苦的指控来维持其诉因。\n\n在此背景下，Clark Hill有权充分审查Guo不切实际的损害赔偿请求，而Guo先前的行为已放弃其原本可能就这些主题享有的任何特权。但即使本院认定Guo仍享有特权，Clark Hill因无法就这些问题取得证据开示而受到不利影响，并有权根据Guo主张该特权作出不利推定。\n\nI. 本院应命令Guo回答其拒绝回答的问题。\n\nA. 原告通过其先前陈述放弃了任何第五修正案特权。\n\n通常，“[一]旦证人自愿提出某一事项，[证人]即不得通过援引其第五修正案特权而拒绝补充细节。”S.E.C. v. Parkersburg Wireless Ltd. Liability Co., 156 F.R.D. 529, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 373 (1951)). 证人提出该事项，即放弃其第五修正案不自证其罪特权，“除非相关问题会进一步使证人涉罪。”See id. at 536 (emphasis added); see Banco Intercontinental, S.A. v. Alvarez Renta, No. 04-20727-CIV, 2007 WL 9761293, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 10, 2007), aff'd, No. 04-20727-CIV, 2008 WL 11502470 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 25, 2008)（在法院已经裁定证人在其询问书答复中放弃第五修正案特权时，强制作为当事人的证人作证）。\n\n2 起诉状，Guo（郭文贵）v. Li，18-cv-00259 (D. Md., Jan. 26, 2018)，第 ¶ 192 段；起诉状，Guo v. Wu，18-cv-00845 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 30, 2018)，第 ¶ 83 段；起诉状，Guo v. Xiong，No. 151430/2018 (N.Y., Feb. 14, 2018)，第 ¶ 144 段；起诉状，Guo v. Xia，18-cv-00174 (E.D. Va., Feb. 14, 2018)，第 ¶ 223 段；起诉状，Guo v. Teng，18 cv-02110 (D.N.J., Feb. 14, 2018)，第 ¶ 136 段；起诉状，Guo v. Chen，18-cv-03800 (D.N.J., March 20, 2018)，第 ¶16 段；起诉状，Guo v. Jianbin Yuan，18-cv-02276 (C.D. Cal., March 20, 2018)，第 ¶ 142 段；修正起诉状，Guo v. Stone，18-cv-20983 (S.D. Fla., May 21, 2018)，第 ¶ 35 段；起诉状，Guo v. Lin，2018CP3203623 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pleas, Oct. 23, 2018)，第 ¶ 133 段；起诉状，Guo v. Cheng，A-18-779172-C (D. Nev., April 18, 2019)，第 ¶ 16 段。\n\n法院必须就对方律师提出的每一个问题进行具体审查，以确定该特权是否具有充分依据。S.E.C. v. Parkersburg Wireless Ltd. Liability Co., 156 F.R.D. at 535 (internal citations omitted). 在证人提出该议题后，证明额外信息将如何进一步使其涉罪的举证责任由证人承担。Id. at 537.\n\n对于其援引第五修正案的五个领域中的每一个，郭文贵均已放弃其本可享有的任何特权。第一，郭文贵在其证据开示答复中明确详述，其于 October 2016“与[ACA]签订咨询协议”，并在 ACA 于 December 2017 终止该咨询协议之前，向 ACA 提供“其知识和专长”。See Ex. G at pgs. 13–16. 第二，郭文贵就有关 T&M Protection Resources（T&M保护资源）的提问放弃其特权，因其提交了一份经核实的声明，说明 T&M 向其提供的个人保护服务。See Ex. E at pg. 2. 第三，郭文贵自愿提出其在 December 2017 期间及之后的心理健康状况，从而就其他诉讼中关于精神痛苦的指控放弃其第五修正案特权；该期间与郭文贵在其提起的其他诉讼中主张的精神损害赔偿所涉期间相同。See Ex. C at pgs. 11–12. 第四，郭文贵在其证据开示答复中先前的陈述中，就其庇护申请、该申请的真实性及其政治异议人士身份放弃了该特权。原告一再主张，与披露其“机密庇护申请”中包含的“敏感信息”有关的损害赔偿。See id.; Ex. G at pgs. 16–17; Ex. H at pgs. 4-5. 郭文贵还一再将自己表明为寻求政治庇护的政治异议人士。Compl. ¶ 10（“原告是一名非常成功的商人、政治活动人士及知名中国异议人士。”）；see also Ex. I at pg. 13–14（“原告相信，中国共产党（CCP）认为他对中国政权及 CCP 的稳定性、合法性和可信度构成危险挑战。”）。\n\nB. 原告对于其援引第五修正案特权的事项并无依据。\n\n证人不能仅因其声明作答将使其自证其罪而免于作答——“其一面之词本身并不能证明存在自证其罪的危险。”S.E.C. v. Bankers Alliance Corp., No. C.A. 95-0428 (PLF), 1995 WL 590665 at *3 (D.D.C. May 5, 1995) (quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1950). 证人不得笼统援引第五修正案特权，而必须逐一就每个问题援引该特权。District Title v. Warren, 265 F. Supp.3d 17, 21 (D.D.C. 2017); see also In re LeFande, 919 F.3d 554, 559 (D.C. Cir. 2019)（维持一项因证人未出席其证言录取并“逐一就每个问题……援引第五修正案特权……”而认定该证人藐视法庭的命令）。在评估证人的援引时，法院必须确定是否存在合理依据相信，“回答某一特定问题会使证人面临真实的自证其罪危险。”District Title, 265 F. Supp.3d at 21 (internal quotations and citations omitted). “自证其罪的危险必须是真实的，而非遥远或推测性的。”Id. 对于可能面临外国追诉危险的证人，第五修正案权利并不适用。See HT S.R.L. v. Velasco, No. 16-664 (RBW), 2015 WL 13759884 at *7, n. 10 (D.D.C. 2015)（“[如]仅基于对受外国追诉的恐惧，则不自证其罪权利不适用。”）(citing United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 669 (1998)).\n\n鉴于郭文贵已经就其援引特权的五个宽泛议题中的每一个作出陈述，他无法证明额外陈述会进一步使其涉罪。第一，郭文贵无法证明，要求提供本案中已作出之指控或主张的更多信息的问题，会带来进一步的风险。因此，就有关郭文贵与 ACA 及 T&M Protection Resources 关系的问题（see Ex. B at pgs. 28, 31, 98, 101, 161）；与 Xia 案相关的精神损害赔偿（see id. at 86-87）；以及原告庇护申请中所载的就业信息及其政治异议人士身份（see id. at 127–31, 161）而言，“猫已从袋中出来”——所有这些事项均由原告在其证据开示答复中自愿提出。法院应命令郭文贵回答有关这些议题的问题。See Questions 1–19. 第二，郭文贵没有任何可信依据因有关其财富、人员和住所的问题而担心受到追诉。See Questions 20–25. 第三，郭文贵无法证明，有关其在中国活动的问题可能使其在美国受到追诉。See Ex. B at pgs. 248–249; Questions 26–28.\n\nII. 或者，法院应作出允许陪审团作出不利推定的指示。\n\n面对具有证明力的证据，法院“可自由作出”不利推定，即使证人持续援引第五修正案特权。See Bankers Alliance Corp., 1995 WL 590665, at *5（就投资者资金所在地点，因证人持续援引第五修正案而作出不利推定）。与刑事程序不同，第五修正案并不排除“在民事诉讼中，当事人拒绝就针对其提出的具有证明力的证据作证时，对其作出不利推定。”Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 333 (1976); see S.E.C. v. Int'l Loan Network, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 678, 696 (D.D.C. 1991)（根据被告针对证人收集的“具有证明力的证据”作出不利推定）。\n\n不作出不利推定的决定“不得抹杀另一方当事人获得公平程序的权利。”Serafino v. Hasbro, Inc., 82 F.3d 515, 518 (1st Cir. 1996). 当援引特权的一方直接控制证据时，尤其如此。See S.E.C. v. Whittemore, 659 F. 3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2011)（驳回复议动议，理由是地区法院完全有权因被告拒绝提供证据而作出不利推定，尤其是在“被告控制证据”的情况下）。法院衡量提出证据的价值与对援引特权的一方造成不公平偏见的危险。See Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Richards, No. CV027583CASRNBX, 2006 WL 8452984, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2006), aff'd, 541 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2008)（认定被告证人就“本案核心问题”援引第五修正案特权，且原告提供了“直接和间接证据”以支持不利推定）。\n\n本案中，如法院认定郭文贵未放弃其特权，且郭文贵能够在不公开审查中就其针对任何议题援引该特权提出充分依据，法院应作出陪审团指示，允许就该议题作出不利推定。第一，有关郭文贵被指控与 ACA 关系的问题，是 Clark Hill（克拉克·希尔）就郭文贵主张因 Clark Hill 遭窃而蒙受名誉损害进行抗辩的核心，法院应以不利推定补救郭文贵援引特权所造成的偏见。\n\n第二，有关郭文贵与 T&M 关系的问题，对于检验郭文贵的主张至关重要；郭文贵主张其曾向多名受托人作出有关保护其数据的指示，而该主张触及郭文贵在本案中违约索赔的核心。\n\n第三，有关郭文贵过往诉讼及其通过实体提起、主张精神痛苦的其他诉讼的问题，是因果关系问题的关键；该问题将是 Clark Hill 损害赔偿抗辩的核心。See Ex. B. at pgs. 45–46 and 86–87. 郭文贵在其他案件中主张，在 Clark Hill 遭窃大致同期发生的其他行为使其遭受精神痛苦，因此必须给予 Clark Hill 询问郭文贵的机会，否则其将遭受严重偏见。\n\n第四，郭文贵拒绝回答有关其庇护申请的问题，足以支持作出不利推定，因为郭文贵索赔的核心是由 Clark Hill 准备的其庇护申请。郭文贵所称的精神痛苦，基于其政治异议人士身份。See also Ex. G at pgs. 14–16. 郭文贵对有关其庇护申请准确性以及其是否理解其中所载信息的问题享有唯一控制权，但郭文贵拒绝回答有关该申请的问题。\n\n第五，郭文贵对有关其财富和资产问题的答复，对于评估郭文贵的主张至关重要；其主张 Clark Hill 对其信息的窃取损害了其名誉及商业机会。See also id. 郭文贵已就其财富和资产发表公开声明；如无郭文贵本人的证言，Clark Hill 无法适当抗辩郭文贵所称的名誉损害，以及据称因此发生的“精神痛苦”。由于郭文贵已将这些问题纳入其提起的诉讼中，随后又拒绝就这些问题接受询问，被告在本案抗辩中受到不利影响，并有权获得不利推定。\n\n谨此提交，\n\n日期：September 14, 2021\n\n/s/ John R. Storino John R. Storino（经 pro hac vice）David Jimenez-Ekman（经 pro hac vice）Lindsey A. Lusk（经 pro hac vice）JENNER & BLOCK, LLP 353 N. Clark Street Chicago, IL 60654-3456 电话：(312) 222-9350 [JStorino@jenner.com]\n\nKali N. Bracey (#458965) JENNER & BLOCK, LLP 1099 New York Avenue NW Suite 900 Washington, DC 20001-4412 电话：(202) 639-6000 [KBracey@jenner.com]\n\n被告代理律师\n附件 A\n原告对第五修正案特权的援引\n\n编号 被告的问题 异议 附件 B 异议获支持或\n\n页码参考 驳回\n1 “您熟悉ACA Capital Group Limited（ACA资本集团有限公司）这一实体。对吗？” 完全异议 第28页\n2 “Guo先生，2016年10月，您与ACA Capital Group Limited签署了一份咨询协议。对吗？” 完全异议 第28–29页\n3 “在2016年10月至2017年12月期间，您是否曾代表ACA Capital Group Limited提供任何种类的服务？” 完全异议 第31页\n4 “您代表ACA Capital Group Limited，或者为ACA Capital Group Limited提供了哪些服务？” 完全异议 第31–32页\n5 “在该期间或此后，您从ACA Capital Group Limited获得了何种报酬，如有？” 完全异议 第32页\n6 “您或与您有关联的实体曾作为原告参与过哪些其他诉讼？” 部分异议；仅对与任何实体有关联提出异议 第45页–\n7 “您能否描述Xia先生的行为对您个人造成的损害？” 部分异议；对任何经济或商业相关损害提出异议 第86页–\n8 提及附件3/4第105段： 完全异议 第98页\n“该段称：‘Guo的安保公司T&M Protection（T&M安保）也遭到中国黑客攻击，此前从未发生过此类事件。’”\n9 “您是否有一家名为T&M的安保公司？” 完全异议 第98–99页\n10 “您如何得知安保公司T&M Protection遭到黑客攻击？” 完全异议 第99页\n\n原告援引第五修正案特权\n\n编号 被告的问题 异议 附件B 异议获支持或\n\n页码参考 驳回\n11 “您能否描述T&M Protection持有的与您有关信息的性质？” 完全异议 第101页\n12 提及附件6：\n“您是否记得，在签署该申请之前，您曾采取某些措施以确保您同意申请中载明的全部内容？” 部分异议；并非就签名提出异议，而是“就Bates编号Clark_Hill_000080所在页面提出异议” 第127–30页\n13 提及附件6：\n“您是否记得，在以伪证罪处罚为前提签署该申请之前，您曾采取某些措施以确保您同意申请中载明的全部内容？” 部分异议；律师建议Guo先生排除Bates编号Clark_Hill_000080所含的任何内容 第131页\n14 提及附件6：\n“您是否记得，在以伪证罪处罚为前提签署附件6之前，您曾采取某些措施以确保您理解附件6中的所有英文词语？” 对与Clark_Hill_000080有关的材料提出部分异议 第132–33页\n15 “该答案准确吗？您在2016年1月至2017年9月期间未受雇，这是真的吗？” 完全异议 第161页\n16 “而且，您在该期间实际上是否至少受雇于ACA，或者与ACA签有咨询协议，这不是真的吗？” 完全异议 第161页\n17 提及附件6：\n“接下来三页，即-078、-079和-080，也是同一个问题。那些是您的姓名首字母吗？” 对与Clark_Hill_000080有关的材料提出部分异议 第168页\n18 提及附件6：\n“并且，具体看附件6中的-080页，页面底部的是您的姓名首字母吗？” 完全异议 第168页\n\n原告援引第五修正案特权\n\n编号 被告的问题 异议 附件B 异议获支持或\n\n页码参考 驳回\n19 提及附件6：\n“并且具体询问该页-080上所列的条目，其中您被列为在两个期间未受雇，该项内容准确吗？” 完全异议 第168–69页\n20 “Guo先生，您是一个富有的人。这准确吗？” 完全异议 第184–85页\n21 “您能否描述您的大致净资产，Guo先生？” 完全异议 第185页\n22 “在该净资产中，您能否说明其中有多少可由您支配，而非以某种方式被中国冻结？” 完全异议 第185页\n23 “您——Guo先生，您是否有为您工作的员工？” 完全异议 第186页\n24 “请描述有多少人为您工作，以及他们的职能是什么。” 完全异议 第186页\n25 “Guo先生，事实上，您是否在本文章所列的所有地点均拥有住宅？” 完全异议 第245页\n26 提及附件15：\n“‘在预访谈中，Guo先生解释说，他支付办公室租金、私人飞机、监控系统、人员以及许多其他费用。作为交换，Guo An（国安）官员会协助他应对其商业竞争对手。’这准确吗，Guo先生？” 完全异议 第248页\n\n编号 被告的问题 异议 附件B 异议获支持或\n\n页码参考 驳回\n27 提及附件15：\n“他还表示，国安高级官员命令他雇用私家侦探，搜集中国共产党高层领导人亲属在海外拥有的财产信息。Guo先生表示，他相信，即使并非全部，中国的大多数商业巨头都与国安有类似协议。” 完全异议 第248–49页\n28 提及附件15：\n“为明确起见，我认为我没有提出问题。本应提出的问题是，译员刚才所读的内容准确吗？” 完全异议 第249页\n\n原告援引第五修正案特权\n附件B（密封提交）\n附件C\n美国哥伦比亚特区联邦地区法院\n\nGUO WENGUI（郭文贵），又名MILES KWOK（郭文贵），又名\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），\n案号：1:19-cv-3195\n诉\nCLARK HILL PLC（克拉克·希尔律师事务所）；THOMAS K.\nRAGLAND（托马斯·K·拉格兰）， James Boasberg（詹姆斯·博斯伯格）法官\n被告。\n\n原告对被告THOMAS K. RAGLAND的第一套书面质询的补充答复\n\n原告Guo Wengui（以下称“原告”）通过下方签署的律师，现补充其对被告Thomas K. Ragland第一套书面质询的答复。原告现将对Thomas K. Ragland第一套书面质询提出的一般性异议纳入本文。\n书面质询\n\n1. 识别所有知悉与起诉书中任何指控有关的任何事实的人员，并说明所识别人员掌握何种信息／事实。\n\n答复：下列人员知悉起诉书中的指控：\n\n- a. 原告Guo Wengui\n162 E. 64th Street\nNew York, NY 10065\n原告知悉其聘请Clark Hill的原因；其在聘请Clark Hill之前与Ragland先生的讨论；代理的条款和条件；原告及其代理人要求Clark Hill保护原告私人和敏感信息的请求；Clark Hill未能保护原告信息的情形；Clark Hill终止其对原告的代理；以及因Clark Hill在本诉讼中所涉不当行为而产生的损害。\n\n- b. 被告Clark Hill PLC\n500 Woodward Avenue\nSuite 3500\nDetroit, MI 48226\n\nClark Hill PLC知悉其答辩中的抗辩；Clark Hill及Thomas K. Ragland对原告代理的条款和条件；导致原告敏感且保密的个人信息被广泛公开披露的数据泄露的事实和情形；以及Clark Hill及Thomas K. Ragland决定退出担任原告律师的事实和情形。\n\nc. 被告Thomas K. Ragland\n\nClark Hill PLC\n10001 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW\nSuite 1300\nWashington, DC 20004\n\nThomas K. Ragland知悉起诉书中的指控及答辩中提出的抗辩；Clark Hill PLC及Thomas K. Ragland对原告代理的条款和条件；导致原告敏感且保密的个人信息被广泛公开披露的数据泄露的事实和情形；保护原告私人和保密信息的请求；以及Clark Hill PLC及其本人决定退出担任原告律师的事实和情形。\n\nd. Edward J. Hood（爱德华·J·胡德）\n\nClark Hill PLC\n500 Woodward Avenue\nSuite 3500\nDetroit, MI 48226\n\nEdward J. Hood知悉起诉书中的指控及答辩中提出的抗辩；导致原告敏感且保密的个人信息被广泛公开披露的数据泄露的事实和情形；与原告律师就数据泄露的性质以及Clark Hill如何处理该泄露所进行的通信；以及Clark Hill PLC和Thomas K. Ragland决定退出担任原告律师的事实和情形。\n\ne. Dr. Lianchao Han（韩连潮博士）\n\nCitizen Power Initiatives for China（中国公民力量）\n415 2nd Street NE\nSuite 100\nWashington, DC 20002\n\nDr. Lianchao Han知悉起诉书中的指控及答辩中提出的抗辩；Clark Hill PLC及Thomas K. Ragland对原告代理的条款和条件，包括保护原告信息的请求；导致原告敏感且保密的个人信息被广泛公开披露的数据泄露的事实和情形；对原告声誉造成的损害。\n\nf. Jianli Yang（杨建利）\n\nCitizen Power Initiatives for China\n415 2nd Street NE\nSuite 100\nWashington, DC 20002\nDr. Jianli Yang知悉Clark Hill PLC及Thomas K. Ragland对原告代理的条款和条件。\n\n- g. Joshua Schiller, Esq.（约书亚·席勒律师）\nBoies Schiller Flexner LLP（博伊斯·席勒·弗莱克斯纳律师事务所）\n55 Hudson Yards, 20th Floor\nNew York, NY 10001\nSchiller先生对原告聘请Clark Hill的事实和情形知悉有限。其知悉程度不明。\n- h. 参与黑客攻击后调查的人员，包括Clark Hill内部人员及身份目前不明的第三方；他们可能知悉发生了什么、原因（起因）以及如何可以防止该事件。\n\n补充答复：\n\ni. William Je（威廉·杰）\n\nACA Capital Group Ltd.\n1605-6, 16/F, Hua Qin International Building\n340 Queen's Road Central\nHong Kong\nJe先生知悉原告与ACA Capital Group签订的咨询协议，以及ACA Capital Group对该协议的终止。\n\nj. Qu Guo Jiao（屈国娇）\n\n现住址不明。原告相信她居住在中国，并正尝试寻找她。\n\n最后已知住址：ACA Capital Group Ltd.\n\n1605-6, 16/F, Hua Qin International Building\n\n340 Queen's Road Central\n\nHong Kong\n\nQu女士知悉原告与ACA Capital Group签订的咨询协议，以及ACA Capital Group对该协议的终止。\n\n2. 识别所有提供了用于编制对这些书面质询的答复或对Thomas K. Ragland的文件提供请求的答复的信息的人员，并识别每名人员就其提供信息的相应书面质询或请求。\n\n答复：原告提出异议，理由是该书面质询意图侵犯律师—委托人特权和工作成果特权。在不放弃该异议的情况下，原告及其内部法律顾问Daniel Podhaskie（丹尼尔·波德哈斯基）提供了用于编制本文答复的信息。\n\n3. 识别就Clark Hill代表原告处理原告庇护申请事宜，包括但不限于导致该代理关系的讨论，而代表原告与Clark Hill沟通、互动或指示Clark Hill的所有人员。\n\n答复：见对第1号书面质询的答复。原告、Han博士和Jianli博士。\n\n4. 识别原告与其代表、雇员或代理人（包括但不限于Lianchao Han、Initiatives for China的任何其他雇员、Jianli Yang、Josh Schiller或Boies Schiller Flexner LLP的任何其他律师或雇员）之间，就Clark Hill在美国移民事务中对原告的代理、原告提出庇护申请这一事实，或2017年9月12日前后发生的网络事件所进行的所有通信。\n\n答复：原告反对该请求，认为要求“识别”所有通信范围过宽且造成不当负担。在不放弃上述异议的前提下，原告已提供原告、其代理人及 Clark Hill（克拉克·希尔）之间所有相关且不受特权保护的通信。此外，原告称，韩博士和杨博士在聘请该律所之前曾与 Ragland 先生讨论 Clark Hill 是否具有充分的网络安全保障。韩博士明确告诉 Ragland 先生，他“需要为”网络攻击做好准备。对此，Ragland 先生告诉韩博士，除其他事项外，该律所拥有“第一流、最先进”的网络技术，并使用“三家外部”网络安全公司保护客户信息。Ragland 先生还表示，他将就可能发生攻击一事通知 Clark Hill 的“IT 人员”。韩博士反复继续告知 Ragland 先生，依韩博士的意见，该律所并未严肃对待该威胁。\n\n5. 识别你方主张与确定 Clark Hill 就保护与原告代理事项有关的信息所负义务相关的每一份文件或通信。\n\n答复：原告反对该请求，认为要求“识别每一份文件或通信”范围过宽且造成不当负担。原告将依照法院的排期命令及适用规则提供审判证物。在不放弃上述异议的前提下，原告已提供原告、其代理人及 Clark Hill 之间所有相关且不受特权保护的通信。\n\n6. 识别并描述原告或原告的代表、代理人、雇员或其他为原告利益行事的当事人与 Clark Hill 或 Thomas K. Ragland（托马斯·K·拉格兰德）之间的所有合同或协议，包括由谁达成协议、何时达成协议以及协议的内容。\n\n答复：原告与 Clark Hill 签订了一份法律服务合同。原告已提供该协议的副本。\n\n7. 详细描述原告主张 Clark Hill 同意实施以保护与原告代理事项有关的信息的“必要步骤和行动”以及“对安全措施的特别谨慎和关注”（见起诉状第35段）的程度。\n\n答复：原告反对此项书面质询，因为其要求陈述或描述 Clark Hill 为履行其“注意义务”所需采取的行动和步骤，而这属于法律认定。Clark Hill 必须提供足够的安全措施以保护原告的信息。Clark Hill 知道，对原告的代理绝非具有“通常”未经授权披露风险的“通常”代理事项。请参见对第4项书面质询的答复。Clark Hill 通过 Ragland 先生同意采取必要步骤和行动，以保护原告的机密信息，并承认这意味着该律所将采取“超出通常”的保护措施，包括不将原告信息置于服务器上，也不使用律所电子邮件账户。原告将依照规范专家披露的排期命令补充本答复。\n\n8. 详细描述原告主张“足以保护原告敏感和机密信息”的“必要且有效的电子安全措施”（见起诉状第8段）。\n\n答复：请参见对第7项书面质询的异议及答复。\n\n9. 识别原告或原告的代表、雇员或代理人（包括但不限于 Lianchao Han（韩连潮）、Initiatives for China（中国倡议组织）的任何其他雇员、Jianli Yang（杨建利）、Josh Schiller（乔什·席勒），或 Boies Schiller Flexner LLP（博伊斯·席勒·弗莱克斯纳律师事务所）的任何其他律师或雇员）与 Clark Hill 之间的所有通信，包括但不限于与任何网络事件或“黑客攻击”的警告或风险、原告要求的任何特别安全措施、原告对庇护申请存在这一事实的公开宣传，或庇护申请中所载任何事实有关的通信。\n\n答复：原告反对该请求，认为要求“识别所有通信”范围过宽且造成不当负担。在不放弃上述异议的前提下，原告已提供原告、其代理人及 Clark Hill 之间所有相关且不受特权保护的通信。请参见对第4项书面质询的答复。\n\n10. 陈述起诉状第35段所称 Clark Hill 在同意代理原告之前“完全知悉”“特别谨慎和关注安全措施是该律所必要、必须、预期并同意采取的”这一指控的依据。\n\n答复：参见对第4项书面质询的答复。原告和韩博士告知 Clark Hill，中国共产党（CCP）会试图入侵该律所，以获取原告的敏感和机密信息。Ragland 先生同意不使用律所服务器存储原告的敏感信息，也不通过律所电子邮件账户传输该等信息，甚至警告其 IT 团队此类攻击可能发生。\n\n11. 陈述起诉状第3段所称 Clark Hill 向原告“保证”其机密信息将受到“保护”这一指控的依据。\n\n答复：Ragland 先生向原告及其代理人保证，该律所拥有最先进的网络安全技术、三家保护客户信息的不同外部公司，并将通过使用单独的计算机、不将原告信息置于律所服务器上以及不使用律所电子邮件账户来保护原告的信息。\n\n12. 描述通过社交媒体和新闻媒体公开原告庇护申请这一事实及 Clark Hill 代理原告这一事实的决定所涉情形，包括由谁作出决定、何时作出决定、公开发生前谁知悉该决定，以及作出该决定的原因。\n\n答复：原告反对将其描述为曾作出“公开宣传”庇护申请的决定。原告进一步基于相关性提出异议，并认为该书面质询侵犯律师—当事人特权。在不放弃上述异议的前提下，原告获悉其他人（推定为 CCP）知道其正在寻求庇护。原告曾与 Ragland 先生讨论发布公告。此后，Ragland 先生就原告的庇护申请接受了多家媒体的采访。\n\n13. 识别原告或原告的代表、雇员或代理人（包括但不限于 Lianchao Han、Initiatives for China 的任何其他雇员、Jianli Yang、Josh Schiller，或 Boies Schiller Flexner LLP 的任何其他律师或雇员）与任何第三方之间有关 Clark Hill 代理原告的任何通信，包括但不限于有关提交原告庇护申请、Clark Hill 代理原告、庇护申请中所载事实或约于 September 12, 2017 发生的网络事件的通信。\n\n答复：原告反对此项书面质询，理由是其要求原告“识别任何通信”，从而造成过度负担。该书面质询亦与数项其他书面质询重复。在不放弃上述异议的前提下，原告已提供所有相关且不受特权保护的通信。\n\n14. 识别原告或原告的代表、代理人或雇员在任何互联网或社交媒体平台或渠道上发布的任何帖子或通信，包括但不限于 YouTube（优兔）、Twitter（推特）、Facebook（脸书）、Instagram、WhatsApp、SnapChat 或 TikTok，涉及提交原告庇护申请、Clark Hill 代理原告、庇护申请中所载事实或约于 September 12, 2017 发生的网络事件。\n\n答复：原告基于相关性提出异议。在不放弃该异议的前提下，原告的 Twitter 账户已被停用，其不再能够访问该账户。原告的 YouTube 账户似乎未提及其庇护申请。\n\n15. 识别原告目前使用或曾经使用的任何社交媒体账户或个人资料，包括但不限于 YouTube 用户名、账户或“频道”、Facebook 个人资料或 Twitter“用户名”，原告通过该等账户或资料发布、传播，或促使发布、传播有关中国政府、中国共产党、提交原告庇护申请、Clark Hill 代理原告、庇护申请中所载事实或约于 September 12, 2017 发生的网络事件的任何陈述、帖子或意见。\n\n答复：请参见对前一项书面质询的异议及答复。原告进一步反对，理由是该书面质询造成不当负担。在不放弃该等异议的前提下，原告拥有一个 YouTube 账户和一个 GTV 平台，其中包含大量讨论 CCP 和中国政府的视频。再次说明，原告不知道这两个社交媒体平台中的任何一个提及其庇护申请。\n\n16. 识别原告“披露了在美国活动的广泛 CCP 间谍网络”的对象，以及如起诉状第20段所称，该披露发生的时间。\n\n答复：原告基于相关性提出异议，因为原告的披露并非为获得关于被告未能保护其机密信息的可采证据而合理计算得出的。\n\n17. 识别原告庇护申请中包含的、原告主张在 September 12, 2017 之前属于机密的所有信息，并陈述该主张的依据。\n\n答复：原告庇护申请的内容均属机密，包括姓名、身份识别信息、地址、护照信息、家庭信息、原告向美国政府提供的信息，以及原告商业及其他交易的细节。Clark Hill 持有这些文件，原告亦已提供这些文件。\n\n18. 详细描述起诉状第3、5、9、44、57及59段所称，September 12, 2017 之后在社交媒体上发布和传播的有关原告或原告庇护申请的信息，是在约于 September 12, 2017 发生的网络事件中获得这一指控的依据。\n\n答复：原告提出异议，因为该书面质询含糊且令人困惑。在不放弃该异议的前提下，Clark Hill 未能充分保护原告的庇护申请后，该申请即被发布于社交媒体上。\n\n19. 详细描述原告因 Clark Hill 被指违反法律职责和义务而据称遭受的损害，包括起诉状第56段所称的“对其个人和职业声誉的损害”、“失去大量商业机会”及其已发生的“成本和费用”。\n\n答复：原告在多种情境下遭受了损害，包括但不限于以下情形：原告于2016年8月与ACA Capital Group Limited（ACA资本集团有限公司，“ACA”）签订了一份咨询协议（以下简称“咨询协议”）。ACA旨在充当连接亚洲与世界之间世界级企业和创新理念的桥梁，同时为其投资者优化财务回报。ACA因原告在亚洲商界的声誉；其在全球开展业务、尤其是在中国和香港开展业务的知识和专长；以及原告能够向中国和香港众多企业高管进行引荐的能力，而聘请原告担任顾问。咨询协议规定，原告每年将获得约$2 million报酬。咨询协议没有固定期限，预期将持续有效。2017年11月，ACA因得知Clark Hill（克拉克·希尔律师事务所）遭到黑客攻击，且原告极其私密和敏感的信息在全球范围内通过互联网传播，而终止了咨询协议。ACA告知原告，其终止咨询协议是因为该公司担心，继续与原告保持关系将导致客户和未来业务流失，并可能导致ACA遭受类似Clark Hill的黑客攻击。\n\n原告与ACA之间还有价值数百万美元的其他合同安排，因被告的行为而受到不利影响。\n\n原告还遭受了声誉损害，包括社交媒体关注者方面的损失，该等损害造成了财务及其他损失，并降低了原告的获利能力。\n\n原告将提供有关这些损害的补充信息。\n\n补充答复：\n\n被告的行为已导致原告在多种情境下遭受损害，概述如下：\n\n原告于2016年10月与ACA Capital Group Limited（ACA资本集团有限公司，“ACA”）签订了一份咨询协议（以下简称“咨询协议”）。在原告卸任ACA主席后，ACA因原告在亚洲商界的声誉、其在全球开展业务特别是在中国和香港开展业务的知识和专长，以及其向中国和香港企业高管进行引荐的能力，而聘请原告担任顾问。咨询协议规定原告每年获得$2 million报酬。咨询协议没有固定期限，预期将持续有效。2017年12月，ACA以Clark Hill网络攻击为由终止了咨询协议。\n\n原告还因Clark Hill网络攻击而遭受精神痛苦。其庇护申请包含有关其家庭成员、家族企业，以及其为揭露CCP（中国共产党）腐败而向U.S. government（美国政府）提供协助的具体情况等敏感细节。在获得原告庇护申请中所载信息后不久，CCP便在中国逮捕并监禁了原告的家庭成员，致使原告及其家人生活在极度恐惧和持续焦虑之中。\n\n原告的声誉以多种方式受损。被告不再担任其律师，将原告描绘为说谎者和欺诈者，并造成其对Clark Hill不诚实、且其行为有误以致其律师有理由退出代理的印象。他失去了朋友和商业机会，其家人遭受了巨大痛苦。原告作为商人和吹哨人在美国及海外均遭受了信誉损失。此外，在Clark Hill网络攻击之后，律师事务所因担心遭到CCP黑客攻击而拒绝向原告提供服务，其他实体也因同样的担忧而拒绝与原告开展业务。\n\n除寻求咨询协议所致收入损失、精神痛苦及声誉损害的赔偿外，原告还寻求追回向Clark Hill支付的费用。\n\n除因咨询协议终止造成的损失（这是原告主张损失的唯一商业机会）以及向Clark Hill支付的费用外，其他类别的损失均留待陪审团酌定；因此，原告未列明具体金额。\n\n本答复亦补充原告对Clark Hill第2号和第8号书面质询的答复。\n\n20. 请列明所有与原告有关联、且原告主张因2017年9月12日当日或前后发生的网络事件，或因Clark Hill被指称的不当行为而遭受损害的企业，并详细说明损害的性质，包括起诉书第56段中原告“失去了重大商业机会”并产生“成本和费用”这一主张的依据。\n\n答复：见对第19号书面质询的答复。\n\n21. 请详细说明自2017年9月19日以来，与原告庇护申请有关的任何程序中所发生的情况，包括但不限于起诉书第56段中所述原告获得政治庇护的努力因Clark Hill被指称违反法律职责和义务（包括Clark Hill退出代理原告）而被延误或以其他方式受损这一主张的依据。\n\n答复：原告机密庇护申请的披露，因围绕该事件的负面宣传、Clark Hill退出担任原告律师，以及原告敏感、机密和私密事项的公布（其中部分涉及敏感的国家安全问题），造成了延误。\n\n22. 请详细说明原告在2017年9月12日当日或前后发生网络事件之前，因中国政府或中国共产党采取的行动，或代表其采取的行动，而遭受的被指称损害或迫害，包括起诉书第16段所述原告“有充分理由担心其人身安全”的依据、起诉书第17段中“CCP相信原告目前掌握有关CCP及与其有关联并代表其行事者各种不当行为的、尚未公开知晓的证据”这一主张的依据、起诉书第23段中原告居住建筑物外的示威活动由CCP“策划”的主张依据，以及起诉书第26段中“CCP认为原告对中国政权和CCP的稳定性、合法性和可信度构成危险挑战”这一主张的依据。\n\n答复：原告在影响国际社会对中国和CCP的看法方面卓有成效。从CCP的角度看，原告的活动和倡议已对中国及CCP在国际社会中的地位产生不利影响，因此，中国政府试图使原告噤声。中国政府/CCP采用了各种手段，包括胁迫和提供贿赂，试图使原告噤声，其中包括利用海外情报网络，试图诋毁原告、使其噤声并威胁其人身安全，或者至少使原告有充分理由担心其人身安全，并担心家庭成员和朋友的安全。\n\nCCP相信原告目前掌握有关CCP及与其有关联并代表其行事者各种不当行为的、尚未公开知晓的证据，包括与腐败、谋杀、隐匿非法所得资金以及中国间谍网络有关的信息。基于这些及其他原因，中国政府和CCP具有极强的动机——保守地说——并积极试图使原告噤声。中国政府和CCP同样具有动机并积极试图了解原告知悉哪些由中国政府和CCP或代表其实施的不当活动。而且，也许最关键的是，中国政府和CCP拥有采取针对原告的积极敌对行动的能力和“行动范围”。\n\n中国政府和/或CCP向美国派遣特工和官员，在原告居住的纽约市建筑物外组织直接针对原告的示威活动。参加这些由CCP策划的示威活动的人士，就在原告住宅门前，获得了预先印制的标语牌，以恶毒语言诽谤原告，称其为强奸犯和说谎者，并敦促原告离开美国。\n\n原告相信，CCP认为其对中国政权和CCP的稳定性、合法性和可信度构成危险挑战。\n\n23. 请详细说明原告在2017年9月12日当日或前后发生网络事件之后，遭受中国政府之手或由中国政府造成的任何损害，包括起诉书第56段中“原告的人身安全和保障已受到威胁”、“其家人已被逮捕和威胁”以及“原告在中国的雇员受到骚扰”这些主张的依据，以及起诉书第58段中“原告旅行的自由和人身自由”因Clark Hill被指称违反法律职责和义务而受到限制，且“其人身安全”受到危害这些主张的依据。\n\n答复：异议。该书面质询重复。对此异议不予放弃的前提下，见第19号、第22号答复及先前书面质询中所载的其他信息，本书面质询与其重复。\n\n24. 请列明2017年9月12日之后使用过原告信息的任何人，原告主张该等信息系在网络事件中获得；列明所使用的具体信息，并说明该信息如何被使用。\n\n答复：见第23号答复。\n\n25. 请详细说明原告为搜寻、识别和定位Ragland（拉格兰德）在其首份文件出示请求中要求的文件所采用的程序和方法，包括原告开始保存与本诉讼有关及相关文件的日期、保存文件的范围和方法、被要求搜寻并出示回应性文件的所有人员或保管人，以及用于搜寻电子存储信息的检索词。\n\n答复：原告搜寻了其自身的信息，并收集了其代理人的信息，随后已向被告出示。\n\n补充答复：原告指示其雇员搜寻保存在Golden Spring (New York) Ltd.（金泉〔纽约〕有限公司）办公室的两块计算机硬盘：（1）保存与原告法律事务有关文件的硬盘；以及（2）保存原告此前使用的手机中所存数据的硬盘。原告要求雇员从这些硬盘中收集与其庇护申请有关的任何通信，以及与Lianchao Han（韩连潮）和Jianli Yang（杨建利）的通信。雇员还在硬盘中搜寻包含以下词语的其他文件：asylum、torn、ragland、clark hill、spencer lee、schiller和hack。\n\n原告还要求一名雇员搜寻原告就其庇护申请、Clark Hill或Clark Hill计算机系统遭黑客攻击等主题所作的社交媒体帖子及其他公开声明。\n\n此外，原告要求Lianchao Han提供其持有的、有关原告庇护申请或Clark Hill代理原告的任何文件副本。\n\n谨呈，\n\n/s/ Ari S. Casper（阿里·S·卡斯珀） Ari S. Casper Ralph S. Tyler（拉尔夫·S·泰勒） The Casper Firm, LLC（卡斯珀律师事务所，有限责任公司） 400 East Pratt St., Suite 903 Baltimore, MD 21202 电话：410-989-5097 acasper@casperfirm.com\n\n原告代理律师\n核验\n\n本人所述事实，据本人所知、所掌握的信息及相信，均真实准确。\n\nGuo Wengui（郭文贵）\n送达证明\n\n本人特此证明，于2020年11月16日，已通过电子邮件向下列人员送达上述文件：\n\nJohn R. Storino（约翰·R·斯托里诺） David P. Saunders（大卫·P·桑德斯） Leigh J. Jahnig（利·J·贾尼格） JENNER & BLOCK, LLP（詹纳与布洛克律师事务所） 353 N. Clark Street Chicago, IL 60654-3456 JStorino@jenner.com dsaunders@jenner.com ljahnig@jenner.com\n\nKali N. Bracey（卡莉·N·布雷西） (#458965) JENNER & BLOCK, LLP（詹纳与布洛克律师事务所） 1099 New York Avenue NW Suite 900 Washington, DC 20001-4412 KBracey@jenner.com\n\n/s/ Ari S. Casper Ari S. Casper\n附件 D\n哥伦比亚特区美国联邦地区法院（UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA）\n\n)\n\n)\n)\n)\n案号：1:19-cv-3195\n)\n)\n)\nHon. James Boasberg（詹姆斯·博阿斯伯格法官）\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n\n原告就 Clark Hill（克拉克·希尔）向原告提出的第三组承认事实请求所作的补充答复\n\n原告 Guo Wengui（郭文贵）（“原告”）通过下列签署的代理律师，特此就 Clark Hill 的第三组承认事实请求作出以下补充答复。原告在此援引并纳入其对 Clark Hill 第一组和第二组承认事实请求答复中提出的全部一般性异议。\n对承认事实请求的答复\n承认事实请求第1项：\n\n承认您在本案中寻求的唯一损害赔偿为：(a) 因网络事件所声称遭受的精神痛苦损害赔偿；以及 (b) 追回已向 Clark Hill 支付的费用。\n\n答复：原告承认，其并未基于任何声称的经济损失寻求损害赔偿。原告进一步承认，其就精神痛苦/情绪困扰寻求损害赔偿时，所寻求的是其精神疼痛和痛苦、恐惧、紧张、屈辱、侮辱、羞辱及尴尬的损害赔偿。原告否认该请求，前提是“所声称的精神痛苦”一语意图以任何方式限制原告在审判中举证，或限制原告获得哥伦比亚特区法律承认的所有种类和类别的精神痛苦/情绪困扰赔偿的权利。详见原告对 Clark Hill 第四组书面质询的答复（在此通过援引纳入）。原告承认，其并未寻求追回已向 Clark Hill 支付的费用。\n承认事实请求第2项：\n\n承认除：(a) 因网络事件所声称遭受的精神痛苦损害赔偿；以及 (b) 追回已向 Clark Hill 支付的费用外，您并未在本案中寻求任何其他类别或要素的损害赔偿。\n\n答复：原告承认，其并未基于任何声称的经济损失寻求损害赔偿。原告进一步承认，其就精神痛苦/情绪困扰寻求损害赔偿时，所寻求的是其精神疼痛和痛苦、恐惧、紧张、屈辱、侮辱、羞辱及尴尬的损害赔偿。原告否认该请求，前提是“所声称的精神痛苦”一语意图以任何方式限制原告在审判中举证，或限制原告获得哥伦比亚特区法律承认的所有种类和类别的精神痛苦/情绪困扰赔偿的权利。详见原告对 Clark Hill 第四组书面质询的答复（在此通过援引纳入）。原告承认，其并未寻求追回已向 Clark Hill 支付的费用。\n承认事实请求第3项：\n\n承认您在本案中寻求的唯一实际支出损害赔偿，是您先前向 Clark Hill 支付的费用。\n\n答复：原告承认，其并未寻求任何“实际支出损害赔偿”。\n承认事实请求第4项：\n\n承认您在本案中寻求的唯一确定金额的损害赔偿，是您先前向 Clark Hill 支付的费用。\n\n答复：原告承认，其并未寻求“确定金额”的损害赔偿。原告承认，其并未基于任何声称的经济损失寻求损害赔偿。原告进一步承认，其就精神痛苦/情绪困扰寻求损害赔偿时，所寻求的是其精神疼痛和痛苦、恐惧、紧张、屈辱、侮辱、羞辱及尴尬的损害赔偿。原告否认该请求，前提是“所声称的精神痛苦”一语意图以任何方式限制原告在审判中举证，或限制原告获得哥伦比亚特区法律承认的所有种类和类别的精神痛苦/情绪困扰赔偿的权利。详见原告对 Clark Hill 第四组书面质询的答复（在此通过援引纳入）。原告承认，其并未寻求追回已向 Clark Hill 支付的费用。\n承认事实请求第5项：\n\n承认您并未在本案中就任何丧失的商业机会寻求损害赔偿。\n\n答复：承认。\n承认事实请求第6项：\n\n承认您并未在本案中就任何丧失与 ACA 开展业务的机会寻求损害赔偿。\n\n答复：承认。\n承认事实请求第7项：\n\n承认您并未在本案中就任何丧失的商业机会，包括任何与 ACA 开展业务的机会，寻求损害赔偿。\n\n答复：承认。\n承认事实请求第8项：\n\n承认您并未在本案中就对您声誉造成的损害寻求损害赔偿。\n\n答复：否认。原告正就其声誉所受损害寻求损害赔偿。原告就精神痛苦/情绪困扰寻求赔偿时，正如其依哥伦比亚特区法律有权如此主张，寻求的赔偿包括但不限于屈辱、侮辱、羞辱及尴尬。由于网络攻击、原告信息的披露以及被告不再担任其代理律师，原告还遭受了污名化损害。见原告对 Clark Hill 第四组书面质询的答复（在此通过援引纳入）。\n\n谨此提交，\n\n/s/ Ari S. Casper\n\nAri S. Casper Ralph S. Tyler The Casper Firm, LLC 400 East Pratt St., Suite 903 Baltimore, MD 21202 电话：410-989-5097 acasper@casperfirm.com\n\n原告代理律师\n送达证明\n\n本人特此证明，于2021年7月26日，已通过电子邮件向下列人员送达上述文件：\n\nDavid Jimenez-Ekman（大卫·希门尼斯-埃克曼） John R. Storino Leigh J. Jahnig JENNER & BLOCK, LLP 353 N. Clark Street Chicago, IL 60654-3456 DJimenez-Ekman@jenner.com JStorino@jenner.com ljahnig@jenner.com\n\n/s/ Ari S. Casper Ari S. Casper\n附件 E\n哥伦比亚特区美国联邦地区法院内\n\nGUO WENGUI（郭文贵），原告，诉 CLARK HILL PLC（克拉克·希尔专业有限责任公司）等，被告。\n\n案号：1:19-cv-03195\n原告关于给予“其他受托人”指示的声明\n\n在一封日期为2021年2月12日的信函中，被告 Clark Hill PLC 和 Thomas Ragland（托马斯·拉格兰）的代理律师 David Saunders 要求原告提供一份经核验的声明，说明其就其可能向受托实体提供的保密信息之处理向该等实体作出的任何特别指示。\n\n原告反对该项请求，理由是其与本诉讼争议的任何事项均无关。原告聘请 Clark Hill 在保密的庇护程序中代理其，在该程序中，他将向该律师事务所提供高度敏感的信息，包括但不限于他本人及其家庭成员在中国经历的数十年迫害，以及其向美国政府提供的某些协助的高度敏感细节。原告就其他类型信息之处理向其他受托人作出的指示，不能证明本案任何争议事项。进一步地，尽管原告理解被告否认原告曾要求其对其保密信息给予加强保护，但被告已出示一封电子邮件通信，其中 Ragland 先生明确确认原告曾要求被告如此行事。因此，即使原告向另一家在商业事务中代理其的律师事务所作出的特别指示，能够以某种方式证明其是否曾向在其高度敏感的庇护申请中代理其的律师事务所作出特别指示，就该问题而言，此处也不存在真实的事实争议。原告进一步反对，理由是与被告代理律师所发信函的说法相反，所寻求的信息并非对被告提出的任何书面质询的答复。Saunders 先生在其2月12日信函中援引的全部书面质询均为主张式书面质询，而原告并未基于被告现正寻求的信息提出任何主张。最后，原告反对，理由是被告已送达数量过多的书面质询和承认事实请求。\n\n在不放弃上述异议的前提下，并为避免就法院2020年1月13日的简要命令是否产生代表被告提出一项新书面质询的效力而发生争议，原告作出如下声明：\n\n原告要求下列律师事务所在就其保密信息进行沟通或传递该等信息时，尽可能避免使用电子邮件或基于云端的服务，而改为尝试通过面谈、电话或交换纸质文件进行：Boies Schiller（博伊斯·席勒律师事务所）；Tucker Levin（塔克·莱文律师事务所）；Wasserman, Mancini & Chang（沃瑟曼、曼奇尼与张律师事务所）；以及 Williams & Connolly（威廉斯与康诺利律师事务所）。\n\n原告要求为其提供人身保护服务的安保公司 T&M Protection（T&M保护公司），在就其为原告开展的工作涉及的保密事项进行沟通时，限制使用电子邮件。\n\n2015年，原告向 Sherry-Netherland（谢里-内瑟兰）董事会提供保密信息时，要求董事会主席独立且保密地审阅该等信息，然后亲自向董事会其他成员报告该等信息的具体内容。\n\n/s/ Ari S. Casper Ari S. Casper Ralph S. Tyler The Casper Firm, LLC 400 East Pratt St., Suite 903 Baltimore, MD 21202 电话：410-989-5097 acasper@casperfirm.com\n\n原告代理律师\n\n2021年2月19日\n核验\n\n以上所述事实，据本人所知、所掌握的信息及相信，均真实准确。\n\nGuo Wengui（郭文贵）\n附件 F\n\n353 N. CLARK STREET CHICAGO, IL 60654-3456\n\n2021年8月27日\n\nJohn Storino 电话：+1 312 840 8683 JStorino@jenner.com\n\n通过电子邮件\n\nAri Casper The Casper Firm 400 E. Pratt Street, Suite 903 Baltimore, MD 21202\n\n事由：Wengui v. Clark Hill et al., No. 19-3195 (D.D.C.)\n\nAri：\n\n兹函涉及原告 Guo Wengui（“原告”）于2021年7月28日进行的证言录取。我们可就本函提出的问题进行会谈与协商。\n\n在代理律师提出异议和建议后，原告以第五修正案特权为由拒绝回答26个问题。被告认为原告主张第五修正案的做法不当。Guo 先生拒绝回答涉及广泛事项的问题，包括 Guo 先生在本诉讼中现时及此前提出的指控；Guo 先生的就业或商业往来；有关 Guo 先生既往诉讼的信息；Guo 先生的财富和资产；以及 Guo 先生在中国的活动。您知悉，尽管我们在证言录取中提出请求，原告代理律师仍拒绝说明，被告代理律师所提问题的答案为何可能牵涉原告的第五修正案权利。Guo 证言录取，2021年7月28日，第28页。我们保留依据《联邦民事诉讼规则》及全部地方法规则享有的任何及全部权利，包括但不限于我们所持立场，即原告已放弃其第五修正案主张，且原告不存在对可能被起诉的合理恐惧。如法院认定原告的主张适当，被告进一步保留请求法院准许陪审团从原告主张其第五修正案特权中作出不利推论的权利。\n\n第五修正案保护原告在其证言中不被强迫作出不利于己的证言，但原告仍必须具有“有合理依据相信，在回答某一特定问题时，[原告]将面临危险。”District Title v. Warren, 265 F. Supp.3d 17, 20 (D.D.C. 2017)。援引第五修正案的证人必须证明存在“真实的危险，而非仅仅是想象中的、遥远的或推测性的被起诉可能性。”S.E.C. v. Bankers Alliance Corp., No. C.A. 95-0428 (PLF), No. C.A. 95-0428 (PLF), 1995 WL 590665 at \\*3 (D.D.C. May 5, 1995)（因被告拒绝披露有关投资者资金的细节，裁定其藐视法庭命令，理由是该证人“并未表示对自证其罪或被起诉存在非无谓的恐惧。”）。为证明存在真实危险，证人负有举证责任，应当提供可信理由，说明披露该等信息“所导致的不只是对自证其罪的遥远或推测性恐惧。”同上（引述 S.E.C. v. Parkersburg Wireless Ltd. Liability Co., 156 F.R.D. 529, 537 (D.D.C. 1994)）。\n\nAri Casper（阿里·卡斯珀） 2021年8月27日 第2页\n\n原告在对被告代理律师提出的26个问题提出异议时，未能指明对被起诉的合理恐惧。请就原告拒绝回答的26个问题中的每一个，提供原告援引第五修正案的依据。我们希望在2021年8月30日星期一之前，及时收到关于原告有缺陷的第五修正案援引的答复。如未收到该答复，我们将提出强制答复动议，及/或申请其他救济，以要求原告就其在证言中拒绝回答的事项作出完整答复。\n\n我们保留所有权利，包括但不限于我们根据《联邦民事诉讼规则》和所有地方法规享有的权利。一如既往，我们愿意在任何双方均可接受的时间，就此事项或任何其他证据开示问题进行协商。\n\n谨启，\n\n/s John R. Storino\n\nJohn Storino（约翰·R·斯托里诺）\n证据附件 G\n哥伦比亚特区美国联邦地区法院\n\nGUO WENGUI（郭文贵），又名 MILES KWOK（郭文贵），又名\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），\n\n原告， 案号 1:19-cv-3195\n诉\nCLARK HILL PLC；THOMAS K.\nRAGLAND， James Boasberg（詹姆斯·博斯伯格）法官\n被告。\n原告对被告 THOMAS K. RAGLAND（托马斯·K·拉格兰德）第一组书面质询的第二次补充答复\n\n原告 Guo Wengui（郭文贵）特此补充其对被告 Thomas K. Ragland（托马斯·K·拉格兰德）第一组书面质询的答复。原告援引其对拉格兰德先生第一组书面质询的初始答复中所述的一般异议。\n\n书面质询\n\n1. 识别所有知悉与起诉状中任何指控有关的任何事实的人员，并说明所识别人员掌握何种信息/事实。\n\n答复：下列人员知悉起诉状中的指控：\n\na. 原告 Guo Wengui（郭文贵） 162 E. 64th Street New York, NY 10065\n\n原告知悉其聘请 Clark Hill（克拉克·希尔）的理由；其在聘请 Clark Hill 前与拉格兰德先生进行的讨论；代理的条款和条件；原告及其代理人要求 Clark Hill 保护原告私人及敏感信息的请求；Clark Hill 未能保护原告信息；Clark Hill 终止对原告的代理；以及因 Clark Hill 在本诉讼中所涉不当行为而产生的损害。\n\nb. 被告 Clark Hill PLC（克拉克·希尔律师事务所） 500 Woodward Avenue\n\nSuite 3500\n\nDetroit, MI 48226\n\nClark Hill PLC 知悉其答辩状中的抗辩；Clark Hill 及 Thomas K. Ragland 对原告代理的条款和条件；导致原告敏感及保密个人信息被广泛公开披露的数据泄露事件的事实和情形；以及 Clark Hill 及 Thomas K. Ragland 决定不再担任原告代理律师的事实和情形。\n\nc. 被告 Thomas K. Ragland Clark Hilt PLC 10001 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Suite 1 300 Washington, DC 20004\n\nThomas K. Ragland 知悉起诉状中的指控及答辩状中提出的抗辩；Clark Hill PLC 及 Thomas K. Ragland 对原告代理的条款和条件；导致原告敏感及保密个人信息被广泛公开披露的数据泄露事件的事实和情形；保护原告私人及保密信息的请求；以及 Clark Hill PLC 和其本人决定不再担任原告代理律师的事实和情形。\n\nd. Edward J. Hood（爱德华·J·胡德）\n\nClark Hill PLC 500 Woodward Avenue Suite 3500 Detroit, MI 48226\n\nEdward J. Hood 知悉起诉状中的指控及答辩状中提出的抗辩；导致原告敏感及保密个人信息被广泛公开披露的数据泄露事件的事实和情形；与原告律师就数据泄露的性质以及 Clark Hill 如何处理该泄露所进行的通信；以及 Clark Hill PLC 和 Thomas K. Ragland 决定不再担任原告代理律师的事实和情形。\n\ne. Dr. Lianchao Han（韩连潮博士）\n\nCitizen Power Initiatives for China（中国公民力量） 415 2nd Street NE Suite 100 Washington, DC 20002\n\nDr. Lianchao Han 知悉起诉状中的指控及答辩状中提出的抗辩；Clark Hill PLC 及 Thomas K. Ragland 对原告代理的条款和条件，包括保护原告信息的请求；导致原告敏感及保密个人信息被广泛公开披露的数据泄露事件的事实和情形；以及对原告声誉造成的损害。\n\nf. Jianli Yang（杨建利） Citizen Power Initiatives for China 415 2nd Street NE Suite 100 Washington, DC 20002 Dr. Jianli Yang（杨建利博士）知悉 Clark Hill PLC 及 Thomas K. Ragland 对原告代理的条款和条件。\n\ng. Joshua Schiller, Esq.（约书亚·席勒律师） Boies Schiller Flexner LLP（博伊斯·席勒·弗莱克斯纳律师事务所） 55 Hudson Yards, 20th Floor New York, NY 10001 希勒先生对原告聘请 Clark Hill 的事实和情形仅有有限了解。其了解程度不明。\n\nh. 参与黑客攻击后调查的人员，包括 Clark Hill 内部人员及目前身份不明的第三方；其可能知悉发生了什么、为何发生（原因）以及本可如何防止。\n\n补充答复：\n\ni. William Je（杰威廉）\n\nACA Capital Group Ltd.（ACA 资本集团有限公司） 1605-6, 16/F, Hua Qin International Building 340 Queen's Road Central Hong Kong 杰先生知悉原告与 ACA Capital Group 订立的咨询协议，以及 ACA Capital Group 对该协议的终止。\n\nj. Qu Guo Jiao（曲国娇）\n\n现住址不明。原告相信其居住在中国，并正试图找到她。\n\n最后已知地址：\n\nACA Capital Group Ltd.\n\n1605-6, 16/F, Hua Qin International Building\n\n340 Queen's Road Central\n\nHong Kong\n\n曲女士知悉原告与 ACA Capital Group 订立的咨询协议，以及 ACA Capital Group 对该协议的终止。\n\n2. 识别所有提供了用于编制对这些书面质询的答复或对 Thomas K. Ragland 的文件提交请求的答复的信息的人员，并识别每个人向其提供信息的相应书面质询或请求。\n\n答复：原告提出异议，理由是该书面质询试图侵犯律师—当事人特权和工作成果特权。在不放弃该异议的前提下，原告及其内部法律顾问 Daniel Podhaskie（丹尼尔·波德哈斯基）提供了用于编制本答复的信息。\n\n3. 识别所有就 Clark Hill 代表原告处理原告庇护申请一事，曾代表原告与 Clark Hill 通信、互动或向 Clark Hill 作出指示的人员，包括但不限于促成该代理关系的讨论。\n\n答复：见对第1号书面质询的答复。原告、韩博士和杨建利博士。\n\n4. 识别原告与其代表、雇员或代理人（包括但不限于 Lianchao Han、Initiatives for China 的任何其他雇员、Jianli Yang、Josh Schiller，或 Boies Schiller Flexner LLP 的任何其他律师或雇员）之间，就 Clark Hill 代表原告处理美国移民事务、原告提出庇护申请的事实，或2017年9月12日前后发生的网络事件所进行的所有通信。\n\n答复：原告对该请求提出异议，理由是要求“识别”所有通信的范围过宽且造成不当负担。在不放弃该等异议的前提下，原告已提交原告、其代理人和 Clark Hill 之间所有相关且不享有特权的通信。此外，原告称，在聘请该律师事务所之前，韩博士和杨博士曾与拉格兰德先生讨论 Clark Hill 是否具有足够的网络安全保障。韩博士明确告知拉格兰德先生，“他需要做好准备”应对网络攻击。作为回应，拉格兰德先生向韩博士表示，除其他事项外，该律师事务所拥有“第一流的最先进”网络技术，并使用“三家外部”\n\n网络安全公司来保护客户信息。拉格兰德先生还表示，其将告知 Clark Hill 的“信息技术人员”可能发生攻击。韩博士一再继续告知拉格兰德先生，依韩博士之见，该律师事务所未严肃对待该威胁。\n\n补充答复：\n\n原告依照法院于2021年1月13日作出的庭审记录命令提供本补充答复。该命令除其他事项外，指示原告“补充说明其代理人告知其被告承诺采取何种措施保护其材料的日期和时间细节”，须“明确说明其不使用电子邮件”，并就其与“Initiatives for China 的两名雇员”的“通信”作出证明；原告理解该两名雇员为 Dr. Lianchao Han 和 Dr. Jianli Yang。\n\n关于被告保护原告材料的承诺，在原告位于纽约的住所举行的会议期间，拉格兰德先生向原告保证，其本人及 Clark Hill 将采取某些积极措施，以确保原告庇护申请以及与原告庇护申请相关的其他保密和敏感信息的安全；例如，该律师事务所不会将原告材料存储于其服务器上。上述会议中的第一次约于2017年8月23日举行，另有数次当面会议于2017年9月举行。\n\n在原告住所举行的8月23日会议与9月第二周发生的网络攻击之间，原告曾与韩博士进行数次谈话。在其中至少一次谈话中，韩博士告知原告，拉格兰德先生曾向其（韩博士）保证，Clark Hill 拥有“第一流的最先进”网络技术，并使用三家外部网络安全公司保护客户信息。韩博士还向原告转达拉格兰德先生的保证，即其（拉格兰德先生）将告知 Clark Hill 的信息技术人员可能发生网络攻击，以便该律师事务所确保对原告信息提供更高级别的保护。原告不记得这些谈话的确切日期。\n\n原告不使用电子邮件，且主要通过电话进行沟通。关于“与 Initiatives for China（中国倡议组织）的两名员工的通信”，原告证明，其代理人未能找到任何载有其与 Dr. Han（韩博士）或 Dr. Yang（杨博士）就下列事项进行通信的文件：(a) Clark Hill（克拉克·希尔）对原告的代理；(b) 原告决定申请庇护及提交其庇护申请；或 (c) Clark Hill 的信息安全或对 Clark Hill 的网络攻击。原告持有若干与韩博士和杨博士进行的 WhatsApp 通信记录。然而，原告证明，该等通信均不涉及本案的争议事项。\n\n5. 指明你主张与确定 Clark Hill 就保护与原告委托代理有关的信息所负义务相关的每一份文件或通信。\n\n答复：原告反对该请求，理由是其要求“指明每一份文件或通信”，范围过宽且造成不当负担。原告将依照法院的排期命令及适用规则提交审判证据。原告在不放弃该等异议的前提下，已提交原告、其代理人与 Clark Hill 之间所有相关的非特权通信。\n\n6. 详细说明原告，或原告的代表、代理人、雇员或其他为原告利益行事的人员，与 Clark Hill 或 Thomas K. Ragland（托马斯·K·拉格兰）之间的所有合同或协议，包括由谁达成协议、何时达成协议及协议的内容。\n\n答复：原告与 Clark Hill 签订了一份法律服务合同。原告已提交该协议的副本。\n\n7. 详细说明原告主张 Clark Hill 同意为保护与原告委托代理有关的信息而实施的“必要步骤和行动”及“对安全措施的特别谨慎和关注”（见起诉书 ¶ 35）的具体标准。\n\n答复：原告反对该书面质询，理由是其要求陈述或说明 Clark Hill 为履行其“注意义务”所需采取的行动和步骤，而这属于法律判断。Clark Hill 必须提供充分的安全措施，以保护原告的信息。Clark Hill 知道，对原告的代理绝非具有“通常”未经授权披露风险的“通常”代理。请参见对第4号书面质询的答复。Clark Hill 通过拉格兰先生同意采取必要的步骤和行动保护原告的保密信息，并认识到这意味着该律所将采取“超出通常水平”的保护措施，包括不将原告的信息置于服务器上，亦不使用律所电子邮件账户。原告将依照规范专家披露的排期命令补充本答复。\n\n8. 详细说明原告主张“足以保护原告敏感及保密信息”的“必要且有效的电子安全措施”（见起诉书 ¶ 8）。\n\n答复：请参见对第7号书面质询的异议及答复。\n\n9. 指明原告或原告的代表、雇员或代理人（包括但不限于 Lianchao Han（韩连潮）、Initiatives for China 的任何其他雇员、Jianli Yang（杨建利）、Josh Schiller（乔什·席勒）或 Boies Schiller Flexner LLP（博伊斯·席勒·弗莱克斯纳律师事务所）的任何其他律师或雇员）与 Clark Hill 之间的所有通信，包括但不限于与任何网络事件或“黑客攻击”的警告或风险、原告要求的任何特别安全措施、原告对庇护申请存在这一事实的公开宣传，或庇护申请中所载任何事实有关的通信。\n\n答复：原告反对该请求，理由是其要求“指明所有通信”，范围过宽且造成不当负担。原告在不放弃该等异议的前提下，已提交原告、其代理人与 Clark Hill 之间所有相关的非特权通信。请参见对第4号书面质询的答复。\n\n10. 陈述起诉书第35段中以下指称的依据：Clark Hill 在同意代理原告之前，“已完全知悉”“该律所必须、需要、预期并同意对安全措施给予特别谨慎和关注。”\n\n答复：参见对第4号书面质询的答复。原告和韩博士告知 Clark Hill，中国共产党（CCP）将试图入侵该律所，以获取原告的敏感及保密信息。拉格兰先生同意不使用律所的服务器存储原告的敏感信息，亦不通过律所电子邮件账户传输该等信息，且他甚至曾警告其信息技术团队，此类攻击存在可能。\n\n11. 陈述起诉书第3段中以下指称的依据：Clark Hill 向原告“保证”，其保密信息将受到“保护”。\n\n答复：拉格兰先生向原告及其代理人保证，该律所拥有最先进的网络安全措施，有三家不同的外部公司保护客户信息，并将通过使用单独的计算机、不将原告的信息置于律所服务器上且不使用律所电子邮件账户来保护原告的信息。\n\n12. 详细说明通过社交媒体和新闻媒体公开原告提出庇护申请这一事实以及 Clark Hill 代理原告这一事实的决定所涉情况，包括由谁作出决定、何时作出决定、公开宣传发生前谁知悉该决定，以及作出该决定的理由。\n\n答复：原告反对将此描述为作出了公开庇护申请的决定。原告进一步基于关联性理由提出异议，并因该书面质询侵犯律师—当事人特权而提出异议。原告在不放弃该等异议的前提下，被告知其他人（推定为 CCP）知道其正在寻求庇护。原告曾与拉格兰先生讨论发布公告事宜。此后，拉格兰先生就原告的庇护申请接受了多家媒体的采访。\n\n13. 指明原告或原告的代表、雇员或代理人（包括但不限于韩连潮、Initiatives for China 的任何其他雇员、杨建利、乔什·席勒或 Boies Schiller Flexner LLP 的任何其他律师或雇员）与任何第三方就 Clark Hill 代理原告所进行的任何通信，包括但不限于关于提交原告庇护申请、Clark Hill 代理原告、庇护申请中所载事实或约于 September 12, 2017 发生的网络事件的通信。答复：原告反对该书面质询，理由是其要求原告“指明任何通信”，造成过度负担。该书面质询亦与若干其他书面质询重复。原告在不放弃该等异议的前提下，已提交所有相关的非特权通信。\n\n14. 指明原告或原告的代表、代理人或雇员在任何互联网或社交媒体平台或渠道上作出的任何发布或通信，包括但不限于 YouTube、Twitter、Facebook、Instagram、WhatsApp、SnapChat 或 TikTok 上，就提交原告庇护申请、Clark Hill 代理原告、庇护申请中所载事实或约于 September 12, 2017 发生的网络事件所作的任何发布或通信。\n\n答复：原告基于关联性理由提出异议。原告在不放弃该异议的前提下，其 Twitter 账户已被停用，且其不再能够访问该账户。原告的 YouTube 账户似乎未提及其庇护申请。\n\n15. 指明原告目前使用或曾经使用的任何社交媒体账户或个人资料，包括但不限于 YouTube 用户名、账户或“频道”、Facebook 个人资料或 Twitter“账号”，原告通过该等账户或资料发布或传播，或促使发布或传播任何关于中国政府、中国共产党、提交原告庇护申请、Clark Hill 代理原告、庇护申请中所载事实或约于 September 12, 2017 发生的网络事件的陈述、发布内容或意见。\n\n答复：请参见对前一书面质询的异议及答复。原告进一步反对，理由是该书面质询造成不当负担。原告在不放弃该等异议的前提下，拥有一个 YouTube 账户和一个 GTV 平台，其中包含大量讨论 CCP 和中国政府的视频。再次说明，原告并不知悉这两个社交媒体平台中的任一个提及其庇护申请。\n\n16. 指明原告“披露了在美国活动的广泛 CCP 间谍网络”的对象，以及如起诉书第20段所指称，该披露于何时发生。\n\n答复：原告基于关联性理由提出异议，因为原告的披露无法合理地导致获得关于被告未能保护其保密信息的可采证据。\n\n17. 指明原告庇护申请中所含的、原告主张在 September 12, 2017 之前属于保密信息的全部内容，并陈述该主张的依据。\n\n答复：原告庇护申请的内容属于保密信息，包括姓名、身份识别信息、地址、护照信息、家庭信息、原告向美国政府提供的信息，以及其商业和其他交易的细节。Clark Hill 持有这些文件，原告亦已提交该等文件。\n\n补充答复：\n\n原告依照法院于 January 13, 2021 作出的简易命令提交本补充答复；该命令除其他事项外，指示原告“以逐页详细说明的方式，更具体地说明其庇护申请中哪些信息因被公开而对其造成损害。”\n\n然而，作为初步事项，原告陈述，其庇护申请整体上均属保密，且被告未能保护其庇护申请整体上至少在两个方面对其造成了损害。第一，如原告对第19号书面质询的答复所述，原告失去了其与 ACA 的咨询合同，且其他实体拒绝向其提供专业服务或与其开展业务，这在很大程度上是因为：由于被告的过失以及未遵循其有关保护其信息的指示，原告成为一次成功网络攻击的受害者。第二，原告的声誉不仅因披露其庇护申请中所载的具体保密信息而受到损害，也因披露其庇护申请的实际副本而受到损害。换言之，除原告因披露其庇护申请中所载具体保密信息而遭受的损害之外，\n\n原告的声誉还因以下基本事实而受到损害：由于被告未能保护其庇护申请，中国政府的代理人得以在互联网上传播该申请的副本，尽管美国法律明确规定该申请属保密信息。\n\n就其庇护申请中所载的具体信息而言，原告因其 I-589 表格第 5 至第 8 页以及 Clark Hill（克拉克·希尔）为其编制的 I-589 附件第 2 至第 6 页所述保密信息被披露而受到损害。该等页面中的材料以其他未公开的方式和详尽程度描述了：(a) 原告、其家庭成员及其家族企业雇员在中国遭受的迫害，包括对审讯和酷刑的具体描述；(b) 原告在其他国家的旅行和居住情况；(c) 原告与其他国家政府之间的保密往来；(d) 原告与中国政府官员及中国共产党（CCP）官员之间的保密关系；(e) 中国政府及中国共产党为试图恐吓或胁迫原告对其在中国的腐败和侵犯人权行为保持沉默而采取的具体措施；以及 (f) 原告向美国政府提供的协助。\n\n原告亦将被告允许披露的 I-589 表格及相关材料中所载的其他信息视为保密信息，包括：(g) 其住址；(h) 其电话号码；(i) 其护照号码和 I-94 号码；(j) 其进入美国的日期；(k) 其先前居住地址；(l) 其就业经历；(m) 其兄弟姐妹和父母的姓名；(n) 其配偶和子女的移民身份；以及 (o) 其配偶和子女的护照号码和 I-94 号码。该等信息尤其载于原告 I-589 表格第 1 至第 4 页，以及 Clark Hill 为其编制的 I-589 附件第 1、第 6 和第 7 页。\n\n18. 详细说明起诉状第 3、5、9、44、57 和 59 段中所称，在 2017 年 9 月 12 日之后于社交媒体发布和传播的有关原告或原告庇护申请的信息，是在约于 2017 年 9 月 12 日发生的网络事件中获取的，该等主张的依据。\n\n答复：原告提出异议，因为该书面质询含糊且令人困惑。在不放弃该异议的前提下，Clark Hill 未能充分保护原告的庇护申请，之后该申请被发布在社交媒体上。\n\n19. 详细说明原告因 Clark Hill 被指称违反法律职责和义务而据称遭受的损害，包括起诉状第 56 段中关于“对其个人和职业声誉的损害”、“丧失重大商业机会”以及其已产生的“费用和开支”的主张。\n\n答复：原告在多种情形下遭受损害，包括但不限于以下情形：原告于 2016 年 8 月与 ACA Capital Group Limited（ACA 资本集团有限公司，以下简称“ACA”）订立咨询协议（以下简称“咨询协议”）。ACA 旨在成为连接亚洲与世界一流企业和创新理念的桥梁，同时为其投资者优化财务回报。ACA 因原告在亚洲商界的声誉、其在世界各地尤其是在中国和香港开展业务的知识和专长，以及原告能够向中国和香港众多企业高管引荐他人，而聘请原告担任顾问。咨询协议规定，原告每年将获得约 $2 million 的报酬。咨询协议没有固定期限，预期将持续有效。2017 年 11 月，ACA 因得知 Clark Hill 遭到黑客攻击而终止咨询协议，\n\n且原告极为私密和敏感的信息在全球范围内传播于互联网。ACA 告知原告，其终止咨询协议是因为该公司担心继续与原告保持关系将导致客户和未来业务流失，并可能导致 ACA 遭受与 Clark Hill 类似的黑客攻击。\n\n原告与 ACA 之间还有价值数百万美元的其他合同安排，该等安排因被告的行为而受到不利影响。\n\n原告还遭受了声誉损害，包括失去社交媒体关注者，因而造成财务及其他损害，并降低了原告的获利能力。\n\n原告将提供有关这些损害的补充信息。\n补充答复：\n\n被告的行为已在多种情形下造成原告遭受损害，概述如下：\n\n原告于 2016 年 10 月与 ACA Capital Group Limited（ACA 资本集团有限公司，以下简称“ACA”）订立咨询协议（以下简称“咨询协议”）。原告辞去 ACA 主席职务后，ACA 因原告在亚洲商界的声誉、其在世界各地特别是在中国和香港开展业务的知识和专长，以及其能够向中国和香港企业高管引荐他人，而聘请原告担任顾问。咨询协议规定原告每年获得 $2 million 的报酬。咨询协议没有固定期限，预期将持续有效。2017 年 12 月，ACA 以 Clark Hill 网络攻击为由终止了咨询协议。\n\n原告还因 Clark Hill 网络攻击遭受精神痛苦。其庇护申请载有关于其家庭成员、家族企业以及其为揭露中国共产党腐败而向美国政府提供协助之具体内容的敏感细节。在获得原告庇护申请所载信息后不久，中国共产党便逮捕并监禁了原告在中国的家庭成员，致使原告及其家人生活在极度恐惧和持续焦虑之中。\n\n原告的声誉以多种方式受到损害。被告不再担任其代理律师，将原告描绘成说谎者和欺诈者，并造成一种印象，即原告对 Clark Hill 不诚实，且其做了某些错误之事，从而使其代理律师有理由退出代理。其失去了朋友和商业机会，其家人遭受了巨大痛苦。原告作为商人和举报人，在美国及国外均遭受信誉损失。此外，在 Clark Hill 网络攻击发生后，律师事务所因担心遭到中国共产党黑客攻击而拒绝向原告提供服务，其他实体也因同样担忧而拒绝与原告开展业务。\n\n除就咨询协议项下的收入损失、精神痛苦和声誉损害寻求赔偿外，原告还请求返还支付给 Clark Hill 的费用。\n\n除因咨询协议终止造成的损失（这是原告主张的唯一商业机会）以及支付给 Clark Hill 的费用外，其他类别由陪审团酌定；因此，原告未列明具体金额。\n\n本答复亦补充原告对 Clark Hill 第 2 和第 8 项书面质询的答复。第二次补充答复：\n\n原告依照法院于 2021 年 1 月 13 日作出的分钟命令提供本补充答复，该命令指示原告，除其他事项外，“列出其因黑客攻击而失去的朋友，以及拒绝代理他的律师事务所。”\n\n由于被告的过失以及未遵从原告关于保护其信息的指示所导致的 2017 年 9 月网络攻击，下列实体和个人拒绝与原告开展业务，或者终止了与原告的业务关系：Shinsei Bank（新生银行）；China Construction Bank（中国建设银行）；HSBC Bank（汇丰银行）；China Agricultural Bank（中国农业银行）；以及 JP Morgan（摩根大通）。此外，在 2017 年 9 月网络攻击发生后立即，且因该网络攻击所致，华盛顿智库 Hudson Institute（哈德逊研究所）突然取消了一场原告原定担任主讲人的活动。该临时取消，加之网络攻击本身的消息，在原告努力于华盛顿争取支持其民主和人权倡导活动的关键时刻，对原告声誉造成了重大损害。\n\n20. 指明原告声称因约于 2017 年 9 月 12 日发生的网络事件或因 Clark Hill 被指称的不当行为而遭受损害的、与原告有关的所有企业，并详细说明损害的性质，包括起诉状第 56 段关于原告“丧失重大商业机会”并产生“费用和开支”的主张依据。\n\n答复：见对第 19 项书面质询的答复。\n\n21. 详细说明自 2017 年 9 月 19 日以来，就原告庇护申请所进行的任何程序中发生的情况，包括但不限于起诉状第 56 段中所称，原告获得政治庇护的努力因 Clark Hill 被指称违反法律职责和义务而被延误或以其他方式受损的依据，包括 Clark Hill 退出对原告的代理。\n\n答复：原告保密庇护申请的披露，因该事件所引发的负面宣传、Clark Hill 退出担任原告代理律师，以及原告敏感、保密和私密事项的公布而造成延误，其中部分事项涉及敏感的国家安全问题。\n\n22. 详细说明原告在约于 2017 年 9 月 12 日发生网络事件之前，因中国政府或中国共产党所采取或代表其采取的行动而遭受的被指称损害或迫害，包括起诉状第 16 段所述原告“有充分理由担心其人身安全”的依据、起诉状第 17 段中“中国共产党相信原告目前持有关于中国共产党及与其有关联并代表其行事者各种不当行为的未公开证据”这一主张的依据、起诉状第 23 段中原告居住建筑物外的示威活动由中国共产党“策划”的主张依据，以及起诉状第 26 段中“中国共产党认为原告对中国政权和中国共产党的稳定性、合法性和信誉构成危险挑战”这一主张的依据。\n\n答复：原告在影响国际社会对中国和中国共产党的看法方面卓有成效。从中国共产党的角度看，原告的活动和倡导不利地影响了中国和中国共产党在国际社会中的地位，因此，中国政府试图使原告保持沉默。中国政府/中国共产党采用了各种手段，包括胁迫和提供贿赂，试图使原告保持沉默，包括利用海外情报网络，试图诋毁原告、使原告保持沉默，并威胁原告的人身安全，或者至少使原告有充分理由担心其人身安全，并担心其家庭成员和朋友的安全。\n\n中国共产党相信原告目前持有关于中国共产党及与其有关联并代表其行事者各种不当行为的未公开证据，\n\n包括与腐败、谋杀、隐匿非法所得资金以及中国间谍网络有关的信息。基于这些及其他原因，中国政府和中国共产党（CCP）有极强的动机——这还只是轻描淡写的说法——并且积极试图使原告噤声。中国政府和中国共产党同样有动机并积极试图了解原告知悉哪些由中国政府和中国共产党实施或代表其实施的不当活动。而且，或许最关键的是，中国政府和中国共产党具有对原告采取侵略性敌对行动的能力——即“行动覆盖范围”。\n\n中国政府和/或中国共产党派遣特工和官员前往美国，组织直接针对原告的示威活动，该等活动在原告位于纽约市的住所大楼外举行。参加这些由中国共产党策划的示威活动者——活动地点就在原告住宅门前的台阶上——获发预先印制的标语牌，以恶毒语言诽谤原告，称其为强奸犯和骗子，并敦促原告离开美国。\n\n原告相信，中国共产党认为其对中国政权和中国共产党的稳定性、合法性及可信度构成危险挑战。\n\n23. 详细说明原告在2017年9月12日前后发生网络事件之后，因中国政府之手或由中国政府所致而遭受的任何损害，包括支持起诉状第56段所述主张的依据，即“原告的人身安全和保障已受到威胁”、“其家人已被逮捕和威胁”及“原告在中国的雇员已受到骚扰”；以及支持起诉状第58段所述主张的依据，即由于Clark Hill（克拉克·希尔）被指违反法律责任和义务，“原告旅行的自由和人身自由”已被“限[制]”，且“其人身安全”已被“危及[害]”。\n\n答复：异议。本询问重复。在不放弃该异议的前提下，参见第19项、第22项答复及先前询问中载明的其他信息，本询问与该等先前询问重复。\n\n24. 指明在2017年9月12日后使用原告主张系在该网络事件中取得的原告信息的任何人士，指明所使用的具体信息，并说明该信息如何被使用。\n\n答复：参见第23项答复。\n\n25. 详细说明原告为查找、识别和定位Ragland（拉格兰）在其第一份文件出示请求中要求的文件所采用的程序和方法，包括原告开始保全与本诉讼有关且相关文件的日期、文件保全的范围和方法、被要求查找并出示回应性文件的所有人士或保管人，以及用于检索电子存储信息的检索词。\n\n答复：原告检索了其本人的信息，并从其代理人处收集了此后向被告出示的信息。\n\n补充答复：原告指示其雇员检索Golden Spring (New York) Ltd.（金泉〔纽约〕有限公司）办公室保存的两块计算机硬盘：(1) 保存与原告法律事务有关文件的硬盘；以及(2) 保存原告先前使用的手机所存数据的硬盘。原告要求雇员从该等硬盘中收集与其庇护申请有关的任何通信，以及与Lianchao Han（韩连潮）和Jianli Yang（杨建利）的通信。雇员还在硬盘中检索包含下列词语的其他文件：asylum、tom、ragland、clark hill、spencer lee、schiller和hack。\n\n原告还要求一名雇员检索原告就其庇护申请、Clark Hill或对Clark Hill计算机系统的黑客攻击所作的社交媒体帖子及其他公开声明。\n\n此外，原告要求Lianchao Han提供其持有的、有关原告庇护申请或Clark Hill代理原告事宜的任何文件副本。\n\n谨此提交，\n\nAri S. Casper（阿里·S·卡斯珀）\n\nAri S. Casper\nRalph S. Tyler（拉尔夫·S·泰勒）\nThe Casper Firm, LLC（卡斯珀律师事务所，有限责任公司）\n400 East Pratt St., Suite 903\nBaltimore, MD 21202\n电话：410-989-5097\nacasper@casperfirm.com\n\n原告代理律师\n核验\n\n据我所知、所获信息及\n\n所信，本文件所述事实真实准确。我\n\nGuo Wengui（郭文贵）\n送达证明\n\n本人特此证明，于2021年2月5日，前述文件已通过电子邮件送达\n\n下列人士：\n\nJohn R. Storino（约翰·R·斯托里诺）\nDavid P. Saunders（大卫·P·桑德斯）\nLeigh J. Jahnig（利·J·雅尼格）\nJENNER & BLOCK, LLP（詹纳和布洛克律师事务所，有限责任合伙）\n353 N. Clark Street\nChicago, IL 60654-3456\nJStorino@jenner.com\ndsaunders@jenner.com\nljahnig@jenner.com\n\nKali N. Bracey（卡莉·N·布雷西）(4458965)\nJENNER & BLOCK, LLP\n1099 New York Avenue NW\nSuite 900\nWashington, DC 20001-4412\nKBracey@jenner.com\n\n/s/Ari S. Casper\nAri S. Casper\n附件H（密封提交）\n附件I\n美利坚合众国哥伦比亚特区联邦地区法院（UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA）\n\n)\n\n)\n)\n)\n案号：1:19-cv-3195\n)\n)\n)\n尊敬的James Boasberg（詹姆斯·博斯伯格）法官\n)\n)\n)\n)\n)\n\n原告对被告Thomas K. Ragland第一组书面询问的答复\n\n原告Guo Wengui（以下简称“原告”）通过下列签名律师，特此答复被告Thomas K. Ragland的第一组书面询问。\n一般异议\n\n1. 原告反对该等书面询问，凡其要求提供根据《联邦民事诉讼规则》不属于证据开示范围的信息，或受律师—当事人特权、工作成果原则或任何其他特权或保密规则保护的信息。原告在不放弃该异议的前提下，已在可能范围内将每一项书面询问解释为仅要求提供不受任何适用特权或豁免保护的信息。\n\n2. 原告反对该等书面询问，凡其意图施加超出《联邦民事诉讼规则》规定的义务。原告仅在该等规则的规定范围内作出答复。\n\n3. 原告反对该等书面询问，凡其要求提供并非由原告或其代理人、雇员和律师保管或控制的信息，或者由非本诉讼当事人的个人或实体保管或控制的信息，或者被告与原告同样容易获得的信息。\n\n4. 原告反对要求识别或出示与询问事项“有关的”所有信息或文件的书面询问，理由是该等请求含糊且范围过于宽泛，以至于可以设想涵盖任何事项。原告还反对此类询问，凡其要求就特定文件与本诉讼争议事项的相关性作出法律结论，然后据此选择文件。\n\n5. 原告反对该等书面询问，理由是其中许多询问未在时间或范围上加以限制，造成不当负担，且意在骚扰原告。\n\n6. 原告反对该等书面询问，因为其要求提供保密信息，且并非经合理计算可能导致发现可采证据。\n\n7. 原告保留基于其他理由提出异议的权利，包括对本答复及任何未来答复的资格、相关性、重要性和可采性提出异议。\n\n8. 该等异议持续有效，并纳入原告对每一项具体书面询问的异议之中，因此无需逐项重复。\n书面询问\n\n1. 指明知悉与起诉状中任何主张有关的任何事实的所有人士，并说明所指明个人掌握何种信息/事实。答复：下列人士知悉起诉状中的主张：\n\na. 原告Guo Wengui\n162 E. 64th Street\nNew York, NY 10065\n\n原告知悉其聘请Clark Hill的理由；其在聘请Clark Hill前与Ragland先生的讨论；代理的条款和条件；原告及其代理人要求Clark Hill保护原告私人和敏感信息的请求；Clark Hill未能保护原告信息；Clark Hill终止代理原告；以及因Clark Hill在本诉讼中所涉不当行为而产生的损害。\n\nb. 被告Clark Hill PLC\n500 Woodward Avenue\nSuite 3500\nDetroit, MI 48226\n\nClark Hill PLC知悉其答辩状中的抗辩；Clark Hill及Thomas K. Ragland代理原告的条款和条件；导致原告敏感及保密个人信息被广泛公开披露的数据泄露周边的事实和情形；以及Clark Hill及Thomas K. Ragland决定退出担任原告代理律师周边的事实和情形。\n\nc. 被告Thomas K. Ragland\nClark Hill PLC\n10001 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW\nSuite 1300\nWashington, DC 20004\n\nThomas K. Ragland知悉起诉状中的主张及答辩状中提出的抗辩；Clark Hill PLC及Thomas K. Ragland代理原告的条款和条件；导致原告敏感及保密个人信息被广泛公开披露的数据泄露周边的事实和情形；保护原告私人及保密信息的请求；以及Clark Hill PLC及其本人决定退出担任原告代理律师周边的事实和情形。\n\nd. Edward J. Hood（爱德华·J·胡德）\nClark Hill PLC\n500 Woodward Avenue\nSuite 3500\nDetroit, MI 48226\n\nEdward J. Hood知悉起诉状中的主张及答辩状中提出的抗辩；导致原告敏感及保密个人信息被广泛公开披露的数据泄露周边的事实和情形；与原告律师就数据泄露的性质以及Clark Hill如何处理该泄露所进行的通信；以及Clark Hill PLC和Thomas K. Ragland决定退出担任原告代理律师周边的事实和情形。\n\ne. Dr. Lianchao Han\nCitizen Power Initiatives for China（中国公民力量倡议组织）\n415 2nd Street NE\nSuite 100\nWashington, DC 20002\n\nLianchao Han博士知悉起诉状中的主张及答辩状中提出的抗辩；Clark Hill PLC及Thomas K. Ragland代理原告的条款和条件，包括保护原告信息的请求；导致原告敏感及保密个人信息被广泛公开披露的数据泄露周边的事实和情形；对原告声誉造成的损害。\n\nf. Jianli Yang\n\nCitizen Power Initiatives for China\n415 2nd Street NE\nSuite 100\nWashington, DC 20002\nJianli Yang博士知悉Clark Hill PLC及Thomas K. Ragland代理原告的条款和条件。\n\ng. Joshua Schiller, Esq.（约书亚·席勒，律师）\nBoies Schiller Flexner LLP（博伊斯·席勒·弗莱克斯纳律师事务所，有限责任合伙）\n55 Hudson Yards, 20th Floor\nNew York, NY 10001\nSchiller先生对原告聘请Clark Hill的事实和情形知悉有限。其知悉程度不明。\n\nh. 参与黑客攻击后调查的人员，包括Clark Hill内部人员及身份目前不明的第三方人员；该等人员可能知悉发生了什么、为何发生（原因）以及本可如何防止。\n\n2. 指明所有为编制对\n\n该等书面询问或对Thomas K. Ragland文件出示请求的答复而提供信息的人员，并指明\n\n每名人员为其提供信息的相应书面询问或请求。\n\n答复：原告反对该书面询问，理由是该询问试图侵犯律师—\n\n客户—律师特权及工作成果特权。在不放弃该异议的情况下，原告及其内部法律顾问 Daniel Podhaskie（丹尼尔·波德哈斯基）提供了用于编写本答复的信息。\n\n3. 识别所有代表原告就 Clark Hill（克拉克·希尔）代理原告处理其庇护申请事宜而与 Clark Hill 进行沟通、互动或向其作出指示的人员，包括但不限于在该代理关系建立前进行的讨论。\n\n答复：见对第1号质询问题的答复。原告、Han 博士和 Jianli 博士。\n\n4. 识别原告与其代表、雇员或代理人（包括但不限于 Lianchao Han（韩连潮）、Initiatives for China（公民力量）的任何其他雇员、Jianli Yang（杨建利）、Josh Schiller（乔什·席勒），或 Boies Schiller Flexner LLP（博伊斯·席勒·弗莱克斯纳律师事务所）的任何其他律师或雇员）之间，就 Clark Hill 代理原告处理美国移民事务、原告提出庇护申请这一事实，或发生于2017年9月12日当日或前后的网络事件所进行的所有沟通。\n\n答复：原告反对该请求，理由是其要求“识别”所有沟通，范围过宽且造成不当负担。在不放弃该等异议的情况下，原告已提供原告、其代理人和 Clark Hill 之间所有相关且不受特权保护的通信。此外，原告称，在聘请该律师事务所之前，Han 博士和 Yang 博士曾与 Ragland 先生交谈，讨论 Clark Hill 是否具备足够的网络安全措施。Han 博士明确告知 Ragland 先生，“他需要为”网络攻击做好准备。作为回应，Ragland 先生告知 Han 博士，除其他事项外，该律师事务所拥有“第一流的最先进”网络技术，并使用“三家外部”网络安全公司保护客户信息。Ragland 先生还建议，他将让 Clark Hill 的“IT 人员知悉”可能发生攻击的情况。Han 博士一再继续告知 Ragland 先生，根据 Han 博士的意见，该律师事务所并未严肃对待该威胁。\n\n5. 识别你方主张与确定 Clark Hill 就保护与原告代理事项有关的信息所负义务相关的每一份文件或每一项沟通。\n\n答复：原告反对该请求，理由是其要求“识别每一份文件或每一项沟通”，范围过宽且造成不当负担。原告将依照法院的排期命令及适用规则提供审判证据材料。在不放弃该等异议的情况下，原告已提供原告、其代理人和 Clark Hill 之间所有相关且不受特权保护的通信。\n\n6. 识别并描述原告，或原告的代表、代理人、雇员或其他为原告利益行事的当事人与 Clark Hill 或 Thomas K. Ragland（托马斯·K·拉格兰）之间的所有合同或协议，包括由谁达成协议、何时达成协议以及协议的内容。\n\n答复：原告与 Clark Hill 签订了法律服务合同。原告已提供该协议的副本。\n\n7. 详细说明原告主张 Clark Hill 同意实施的“必要步骤和行动”及对安全措施的“特别谨慎和关注”的程度（见起诉书第35段），以保护与原告代理事项有关的信息。\n\n答复：原告反对该质询问题，理由是其要求陈述或描述 Clark Hill 为履行其“注意义务”所需采取的行动和步骤，而这属于法律认定。Clark Hill 被要求提供足够的安全措施以保护原告的信息。Clark Hill 知道，对原告的代理绝非具有“通常”未经授权披露风险的“通常”代理。请见对第4号质询问题的答复。Clark Hill 通过 Ragland 先生同意采取必要的步骤和行动保护原告的机密信息，并认识到这意味着该律师事务所将采取“超过通常程度”的保护措施，包括不将原告的信息置于服务器上，或不使用律师事务所的电子邮件账户。原告将依照规范专家披露的排期命令补充本答复。\n\n8. 详细说明原告主张“足以保护原告敏感及机密信息”的“必要且有效的电子安全措施”（见起诉书第8段）。\n\n答复：请见对第7号质询问题的异议及答复。\n\n9. 识别原告或原告的代表、雇员或代理人（包括但不限于 Lianchao Han、Initiatives for China 的任何其他雇员、Jianli Yang、Josh Schiller，或 Boies Schiller Flexner LLP 的任何其他律师或雇员）与 Clark Hill 之间的所有沟通，包括但不限于与网络事件或“黑客攻击”的任何警告或风险、原告要求的任何特别安全措施、原告公开庇护申请存在一事，或庇护申请中所载任何事实有关的沟通。\n\n答复：原告反对该请求，理由是其要求“识别所有沟通”，范围过宽且造成不当负担。在不放弃该等异议的情况下，原告已提供原告、其代理人和 Clark Hill 之间所有相关且不受特权保护的通信。请见对第4号质询问题的答复。\n\n10. 陈述起诉书第35段所称 Clark Hill 在同意代理原告之前“已被充分告知”，即“该律师事务所必须、应当、预期并同意对安全措施给予特别谨慎和关注”这一主张的依据。\n\n答复：见对第4号质询问题的答复。原告和 Han 博士告知 Clark Hill，中国共产党（CCP）将试图入侵该律师事务所，以获取原告的敏感和机密信息。Ragland 先生同意不使用该律师事务所的服务器存储或通过该律师事务所的电子邮件账户传输原告的敏感信息，且甚至警告其 IT 团队可能发生此类攻击。\n\n11. 陈述起诉书第3段所称 Clark Hill 向原告“保证”其机密信息将受到“保护”这一主张的依据。\n\n答复：Ragland 先生向原告及其代理人保证，该律师事务所具有最先进的网络安全技术，有三家不同的外部公司保护客户信息，并将通过使用单独的计算机、不将其置于律师事务所服务器上或不使用律师事务所电子邮件账户的方式保护原告的信息。\n\n12. 描述通过社交媒体和新闻媒体公开原告提出庇护申请这一事实及 Clark Hill 代理原告这一事实的决定所涉情形，包括谁作出该决定、何时作出该决定、在公开发生前谁知悉该决定，以及作出该决定的理由。\n\n答复：原告反对将其描述为作出了“公开”庇护申请的决定。原告进一步基于关联性理由提出异议，并因为该质询问题侵犯客户—律师特权而提出异议。在不放弃该等异议的情况下，原告获悉其他人（推定为 CCP）知道其正在寻求庇护。原告曾与 Ragland 先生讨论发布公告。此后，Ragland 先生就原告的庇护申请接受了众多媒体的采访。\n\n13. 识别原告或原告的代表、雇员或代理人（包括但不限于 Lianchao Han、Initiatives for China 的任何其他雇员、Jianli Yang、Josh Schiller，或 Boies Schiller Flexner LLP 的任何其他律师或雇员）与任何第三方之间，就 Clark Hill 代理原告事宜所进行的任何沟通，包括但不限于提交原告的庇护申请、Clark Hill 对原告的代理、庇护申请中所载事实，或发生于2017年9月12日当日或前后的网络事件。\n\n答复：原告反对该质询问题，理由是其要求原告“识别任何沟通”，造成过度负担。该质询问题亦与其他数项质询问题重复。在不放弃该等异议的情况下，原告已提供所有相关且不受特权保护的通信。\n\n14. 识别原告或原告的代表、代理人或雇员在任何互联网或社交媒体平台或渠道上作出的任何发布或沟通，包括但不限于 YouTube、Twitter、Facebook、Instagram、WhatsApp、SnapChat 或 TikTok，所涉内容为提交原告的庇护申请、Clark Hill 对原告的代理、庇护申请中所载事实，或发生于2017年9月12日当日或前后的网络事件。\n\n答复：原告基于关联性理由提出异议。在不放弃该异议的情况下，原告的 Twitter 账户已被禁用，且其不再能够访问该账户。原告的 YouTube 账户似乎未提及其庇护申请。\n\n15. 识别原告当前使用或曾经使用的任何社交媒体账户或个人资料，包括但不限于 YouTube 用户名、账户或“频道”、Facebook 个人资料或 Twitter“用户名”，原告通过该等账户或个人资料发布或传播，或使他人发布或传播任何有关中国政府、中国共产党、提交原告的庇护申请、Clark Hill 对原告的代理、庇护申请中所载事实，或发生于2017年9月12日当日或前后的网络事件的陈述、发布内容或意见。\n\n答复：请见对前一质询问题的异议及答复。原告进一步反对，理由是该质询问题造成不当负担。在不放弃该等异议的情况下，原告拥有一个 YouTube 账户和一个 GTV 平台，其中包含大量讨论 CCP 和中国政府的视频。再次说明，原告并不知悉该两个社交媒体平台中的任何一个提及其庇护申请。\n\n16. 识别起诉书第20段所称原告向其“披露在美国活动的广泛 CCP 间谍网络”的人员，以及该等披露发生的时间。\n\n答复：原告基于关联性理由提出异议，因为原告的披露并非合理地可能导致获得有关被告未能保护其机密信息的可采证据。\n\n17. 识别原告主张在2017年9月12日之前属于机密的、原告庇护申请中所载的所有信息，并陈述该主张的依据。\n\n答复：原告庇护申请的内容属于机密，包括姓名、身份识别信息、地址、护照信息、家庭信息、原告向美国政府提供的信息，以及其商业和其他交易的细节。Clark Hill 持有这些文件，原告亦已提供这些文件。\n\n18. 详细描述起诉书第3、5、9、44、57和59段中的主张所依据的事实，即2017年9月12日后在社交媒体上发布和传播的有关原告或原告庇护申请的信息，是在发生于2017年9月12日当日或前后的网络事件中获取的。\n\n答复：原告提出异议，因为该质询问题含糊且令人困惑。在不放弃该异议的情况下，原告的庇护申请是在 Clark Hill 未能充分保护该申请后被发布在社交媒体上的。\n\n19. 详细描述原告因 Clark Hill 被指称违反法律义务和责任而据称遭受的损害，包括起诉书第56段中关于“对其个人和职业声誉的损害”、“失去重大商业机会”及其已经发生的“成本和费用”的主张。\n\n答复：原告在多种情形下遭受了损害，包括但不限于以下情形：原告于2016年8月与 ACA Capital Group Limited（ACA资本集团有限公司，以下简称“ACA”）订立了一份咨询协议（以下简称“《咨询协议》”）。ACA旨在作为连接亚洲与世界之间世界级企业和创新理念的桥梁，同时为其投资者优化财务回报。ACA因原告在亚洲商界的声誉、其在全球尤其是在中国和香港开展业务的知识与专长，以及原告能够引荐中国和香港众多企业高管的能力而聘请原告担任顾问。《咨询协议》规定，原告每年将获得约 $2 million 的报酬。《咨询协议》没有固定期限，且预计将持续有效。2017年11月，ACA因得知 Clark Hill（克拉克·希尔律师事务所）遭到黑客攻击，且原告极为私密和敏感的信息在全球范围内被散布于互联网上，遂终止了《咨询协议》。ACA告知原告，其终止《咨询协议》是因为该公司担心继续与原告保持关系将导致客户和未来业务流失，并可能导致ACA遭受与Clark Hill类似的黑客攻击。\n\n原告与ACA之间还存在价值数百万美元的其他合同安排，且该等安排受到被告行为的不利影响。\n\n原告还遭受了声誉损害，包括社交媒体追随者方面的损害，该等损害造成了经济及其他损失，并降低了原告的盈利能力。\n\n原告将就该等损害提供补充信息。\n\n20. 识别所有与原告有关联的企业，原告主张该等企业因2017年9月12日前后发生的网络事件或因Clark Hill所称的不当行为而遭受损害，并详细说明损害的性质，包括起诉状第56段中原告“失去了重大商业机会”并产生“成本和费用”这一主张的依据。\n\n答复：见对第19号书面质询的答复。\n\n21. 详细说明自2017年9月19日以来与原告庇护申请有关的任何程序中发生的情况，包括但不限于起诉状第56段所称原告取得政治庇护的努力因Clark Hill所称违反法律职责和义务（包括Clark Hill退出代理原告）而被延误或以其他方式受到损害这一主张的依据。\n\n答复：原告保密庇护申请的披露因围绕该事件的负面宣传、Clark Hill退出担任原告律师，以及原告敏感、保密及私密事项的公布而造成延误，其中部分事项涉及敏感的国家安全问题。\n\n22. 详细说明原告在2017年9月12日前后发生网络事件之前，因中国政府或中国共产党采取的行动或代表其采取的行动而遭受的任何所称损害或迫害，包括起诉状第16段所述原告“有充分理由担心其人身安全”的依据、起诉状第17段所称“中共认为原告目前持有未公开的、证明中共及与其有关联并代表其行事者存在各种不当行为的证据”这一主张的依据、起诉状第23段所称原告居住建筑物外的示威活动由中共“策划”的主张依据，以及起诉状第26段所称“中共认为原告是对中国政权和中共的稳定性、合法性和信誉的危险挑战”这一主张的依据。\n\n答复：原告在影响有关中国和中共的国际舆论方面卓有成效。从中共的角度看，原告的活动和倡导不利地影响了中国和中共在国际社会中的地位，因此，中国政府试图使原告噤声。中国政府/中共采取了各种策略，包括胁迫和行贿，以试图使原告噤声，其中包括利用海外情报网络，试图诋毁原告、使原告噤声并威胁原告的人身安全，或者至少使原告有充分理由担心其人身安全，并担心其家人和朋友的安全。\n\n中共认为原告目前持有未公开的、证明中共及与其有关联并代表其行事者存在各种不当行为的证据，包括与腐败、谋杀、隐匿非法所得资金以及中国间谍网络有关的信息。基于上述及其他原因，中国政府和中共具有极强动机——轻描淡写地说——并积极寻求使原告噤声。中国政府和中共同样具有动机并积极试图了解原告知悉的、由中国政府和中共或代表其实施的不当活动。并且，或许最关键的是，中国政府和中共具备实施针对原告的激进敌对行动的能力——即“行动范围”。\n\n中国政府和/或中共向美国派遣特工和官员，组织直接针对原告的示威活动，地点位于原告在纽约市居住的建筑物外。参加这些由中共策划的示威活动的人士，就在原告住所门前台阶上，被提供了预先印制的标语，以恶毒语言诽谤原告，称原告为强奸犯和骗子，并敦促原告离开美国。\n\n原告认为，中共将其视为对中国政权和中共的稳定性、合法性和信誉的危险挑战。\n\n23. 详细说明原告在2017年9月12日前后发生网络事件之后，遭受中国政府之手或由其造成的任何损害，包括起诉状第56段所称“原告的人身安全和安保已受到威胁”、“其家人已被逮捕和威胁”以及“原告在中国的员工受到骚扰”这些主张的依据，以及起诉状第58段所称，由于Clark Hill所称违反法律职责和义务，“原告旅行的自由和自由权”已被“限制”，且“其人身安全”已受到“危及”这些主张的依据。\n\n答复：异议。该书面质询重复。在不放弃该异议的情况下，见第19号、第22号答复及先前书面质询中所载的其他信息，本书面质询与其重复。\n\n24. 识别任何于2017年9月12日之后使用原告主张在网络事件中获取的原告信息的人，识别所使用的具体信息，并说明该信息如何被使用。\n\n答复：见第23号答复。\n\n25. 详细说明原告为搜索、识别和定位 Ragland（拉格兰）在其第一次文件出示请求中所要求的文件而采用的流程和方法，包括原告开始保存与本诉讼有关且相关的文件的日期、保存文件的范围和方法、被要求搜索和出示相关文件的所有人员或保管人，以及用于搜索电子存储信息的检索词。\n\n答复：原告检索了其自身的信息，并从其代理人处收集了随后向被告出示的信息。\n\n谨此提交，\n\n/s/Ari S. Casper（阿里·S·卡斯珀）\n\nAri S. Casper（阿里·S·卡斯珀） Ralph S. Tyler（拉尔夫·S·泰勒） The Casper Firm, LLC（卡斯珀律师事务所，有限责任公司） 400 East Pratt St., Suite 903 Baltimore, MD 21202 Tel: 410-989-5097 [acasper@casperfirm.com]\n\n原告代理律师\n送达证明\n\n本人特此证明，于2020年7月27日，前述文件已通过电子邮件送达给以下人员：\n\nJohn R. Storino（约翰·R·斯托里诺）（经特别出庭许可） Leigh J. Jahnig（利·J·扬尼格）（经特别出庭许可） JENNER & BLOCK, LLP（詹纳及布洛克律师事务所） 353 N. Clark Street Chicago, IL 60654-3456 [JStorino@jenner.com] [ljahnig@jenner.com]\n\nKali N. Bracey（卡莉·N·布雷西）（#458965） JENNER & BLOCK, LLP（詹纳及布洛克律师事务所） 1099 New York Avenue NW Suite 900 Washington, DC 20001-4412 [KBracey@jenner.com]\n\n/s/ Ari S. Casper（阿里·S·卡斯珀） Ari S. Casper（阿里·S·卡斯珀）\n哥伦比亚特区联邦地区法院\n\n) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )\n\nGUO WENGUI（郭文贵），亦称 MILES KWOK，\n\n原告，\n诉\nCLARK HILL PLC（克拉克·希尔专业有限公司）及 THOMAS K.\nRAGLAND（托马斯·K·拉格兰），\n被告。\n\n民事案号 1:10-CV-3195-JEB\n\nJames Boasberg（詹姆斯·博斯伯格）法官\n拟议命令\n\n本院已审议被告要求强制证言的动议，或者备选地要求作出不利推定的动议，现命令如下：\n\n1. 原告应回答其在2021年7月26日证言录取中基于其第五修正案权利而拒绝回答的问题。\n\n2. 或者备选地，本院将向陪审团作出指示，允许作出不利推定，以补救因原告拒绝回答问题而产生的损害。\n\n特此命令。\n\n于2021年9月____日录入。\n\nJames Boasberg（詹姆斯·博斯伯格）阁下\n美国联邦地区法官\n\n____________________________________________________________\n附件9\n哥伦比亚特区联邦地区法院\n\nGUO WENGUI（郭文贵），\n\n原告，\n\n诉 民事案号 19-3195 (JEB)\n\nCLARK HILL PLC（克拉克·希尔专业有限公司）等，\n\n被告。\n意见备忘录\n\n身份不明的黑客在入侵被告Clark Hill PLC的服务器后，向公众披露了原告郭文贵的个人信息；该律师事务所当时正在准备其美国庇护申请。郭是中国共产党的著名批评者，双方均假定此次攻击由中国政府幕后实施。在本动议中，被告Clark Hill及该所律师Thomas K. Ragland（合称“Clark Hill”）请求本院强制郭回答其援引第五修正案特权而拒绝回答的证言录取问题。由于郭的答复至少存在可能使其自证其罪的情形，本院将驳回该动议。虽然Clark Hill在本诉讼的某个阶段可能可以获得不利推定，但本院不会在此裁决该问题。\n\n一、背景\n\nClark Hill对原告进行了10小时的证言录取，该证言记录于一份286页的笔录中，并附有16份证物。见 ECF No. 69（原告反对意见）第1、3页。在该证言录取期间，郭在其持续进行的调查中的律师（而非本诉讼中的律师）建议其援引第五修正案不自证其罪权利，拒绝回答若干问题。见 ECF No. 67-1（被告动议）第1页。郭遵从了该建议，未回答“涉及多种主题的约28个问题”，被告将这些问题归纳为五类：\n\n原告“与 ACA Capital Group Limited 的所称咨询关系”；\n原告过去的诉讼，其中原告“主张在本案所涉同一期间遭受情感损害，以及郭通过其实体提起的诉讼”；\n原告“与 T&M Protection Resources 的关系”；\n原告的“庇护申请”；以及\n原告的“财富和资产”。\n\n同上，第3–4页。然而，原告并未拒绝回答这些类别中的所有问题。对于其中一些问题，他仅在其涉及其“与任何实体的关联”或属于“经济或商业相关”范围内拒绝回答。ECF No. 67-2，证物 A（原告援引第五修正案情况表），第6–7号。\n\n在提出强制答复动议时，Clark Hill（克拉克·希尔）主张，Guo（郭文贵）的证言不受第五修正案保护，并且他对这些问题的回答与本案损害赔偿问题“具有核心关联性”。见被告动议第4页；另见ECF No. 71（被告回复文件）第1页。其请求本院强制郭文贵作答，或者作为替代方案，“授权作出允许陪审团根据郭文贵拒绝作答作出不利推定的指示。”被告动议第2页。郭文贵的调查事务律师提交了一份单方、不公开审查的声明，说明其建议郭文贵援引该项特权的理由。随后，本院与本案原告律师及其调查事务律师举行了一次单方电话会议，并要求进一步说明为何被告的问题会要求作出侵犯郭文贵第五修正案权利的回答。\n\nII. 法律标准\n\n《联邦民事诉讼规则》第37条规定，如“接受讯问者未能回答依据第30条或第31条提出的问题”，当事人有权“申请作出强制答复的命令”。第30(a)(2)条和第31(a)(2)条分别要求法院在“与第26(b)(1)条一致的范围内”准许进行口头和书面证言录取。第26(b)(1)条继而将“证据开示的范围……规定如下：当事人可以就与任何一方的请求或抗辩有关、且与案件需要相称的任何非特权事项取得证据开示。”本案的问题在于，被告在证言录取中提出的问题是否“涉及”受第五修正案特权保护的“事项”。\n\nIII. 分析\n\nClark Hill主张，第五修正案不保护郭文贵的沉默，理由有二。第一，其认为郭文贵“未阐明援引”第五修正案特权的任何依据，并且“某些主题不可能具有使其自证有罪的可能性”。被告动议第2页。第二，其主张，即使该特权适用，“郭文贵已通过其先前的指控和证据开示答复，就这些主题中的部分或全部放弃了该特权。”同上。本院在审议被告提出的、要求作出允许陪审团根据郭文贵拒绝作答作出不利推定的替代性请求之前，先审议这两项论点。\n\nA. 第五修正案特权\n\n第五修正案保护证人免于在民事案件中被迫作出证言，只要其“合理相信”该等证言可能在“刑事追诉中”被用于对其不利，或者可能导致发现其他可能被如此使用的证据。Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444–45 (1972); see also Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17, 21 (2001). 为成功援引该特权，郭文贵负有证明其面临自证有罪风险的责任，该风险必须是“真实的”，而非“遥远或推测性的”。District Title v. Warren, 265 F. Supp. 3d 17, 21 (D.D.C. 2017) (citing Zicarelli v. N.J. State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472, 478 (1972)); SEC v. Parkersburg Wireless Ltd. Liability Co., 156 F.R.D. 529, 535 (D.D.C. 1994); see also Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951)（仅凭证人的“单方说法”不足以确立该特权适用）。\n\n然而，由于第五修正案特权“必须为保障其旨在确保的权利而作宽泛解释”，Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486，只有在“明确表明”郭文贵不存在自证有罪风险时，本院方可强制其作证。同上；参见同上，第488页（必须“完全明确……该答复绝不可能具有……使人自证有罪的倾向”）。鉴于上述考量，本院必须运用其“对于案件特殊性的个人判断”，同上，第487页（省略内部引证），逐一评估郭文贵拒绝回答的每个问题是否适用该特权。See Reese, 561 F.2d at 900; see also District Title, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 22.\n\n在审阅该单方声明并听取郭文贵调查事务律师的陈述后，本院认为原告已成功履行其证明责任，证明确有可能其回答将构成自证有罪。然而，由于该决定的事实依据处于密封状态，本院不得进一步详述郭文贵决定的具体情况。\n\n被告笼统主张，“郭文贵没有任何合理依据因有关其财富、人员及住所的问题而害怕被追诉”，以及“有关其在中国活动的问题”绝不可能“使其在美国境内受到追诉”，均未切中要害。见被告动议第8页。本院理解，“Clark Hill没有依据理解郭文贵为何认为回答Clark Hill的问题会使其自证有罪”，因为其担忧所依据的细节系以不公开审查方式提交。见ECF No. 71（被告回复文件）第2页。然而，这种不平衡源于第五修正案特权的性质。See Anton v. Prospect Cafe Milano, Inc., 233 F.R.D. 216, 218 (D.D.C. 2006) (citing Reese, 561 F.2d at 900)（法院不得强迫证人就其害怕受迫害的合理性作证）。\n\nClark Hill试图将审查问题表述为：鉴于原告先前就相关主题所作陈述，其答复是否“会进一步使其自证有罪”，同样不能成立。见被告动议第6页。对援引特权一方较少宽容的“进一步自证有罪”标准，仅在已确定放弃特权后才适用。See Parkersburg Wireless, 156 F.R.D. at 535 & n.10（说明Rogers v. U.S., 340 U.S. 367 (1951)意图使放弃特权后可进行的审查范围较放弃前更广）（省略内部引证）。因此，该标准并不影响首先是否附着该特权的问题。同上，第535页脚注10（“在确定一个新问题是否‘进一步使’该被告‘自证有罪’时，法院不应采用用于确定该特权最初能否被援引的同一严格检验。”）。\n\n经审查争议中的各个问题，本院认定，每一问题均与郭文贵合理担心自己可能面临刑事责任的主题具有充分关联。因此，第五修正案特权适用，除非被告能够证明郭文贵已放弃该特权。\n\nB. 放弃\n\n证人通过“自愿提出”一个可能使其自证有罪的问题而放弃其第五修正案特权。Id. at 535 (citing Rogers, 340 U.S. at 373). 联邦法院“普遍认为，‘不应轻易推定证言性放弃，法院因此对认定证言性放弃采取一切合理推定上的反对立场。’”In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, 120 F. Supp. 2d 58, 66 (D.D.C. 2000) (quoting Klein v. Harris, 667 F.2d 274, 287 (2d Cir. 1981)); see also Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137, 150 (1949). “传统上，法院只有在同时满足以下条件时，才会从证人先前的陈述中推定其放弃第五修正案免于自证有罪特权：‘(1) 证人先前的陈述已造成事实裁判者将获得并倾向于依赖对真相的扭曲认识的重大可能性；以及(2) 证人有理由知道其先前陈述将被解释为放弃第五修正案免于自证有罪特权。’”In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 66 (quoting Klein, 667 F.2d at 287).\n\n如上所述，Clark Hill将未获回答的问题分为五类：(1) 郭文贵与ACA Capital（ACA资本）的关系；(2) 其过去涉及精神损害指控的诉讼；(3) 其与T&M Protection Resources（T&M保护资源公司）的关系；(4) 其庇护申请；以及(5) 其财富和资产。见被告动议第3–5页。被告认为，郭文贵在上述每一类别中均自愿提供了信息。同上，第5–6页。其进一步主张，未获回答的问题“与[其]抗辩具有高度相关性”。被告回复文件第2页。然而，由于这些问题涉及郭文贵的第五修正案特权，审查重点并非其回答是否“相关”。相反，本院若要推定存在放弃，郭文贵先前的证言必须满足上述两部分检验。See In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 67. 本案并非如此。\n\n对于类别(1)的问题，被告坚持认为，其“必须能够质疑郭文贵的声誉受到损害这一观点，而其与ACA的关系直接关涉该问题。”被告回复文件第3页。对于类别(4)，其主张，“在郭文贵于[其庇护]申请中不诚实，或现在作出与之不一致陈述的范围内，这直接关涉其在本案中的可信度和主张。”同上。这些论点有力地表明，未获回答的问题与Clark Hill的抗辩相关，但其并未证明郭文贵先前的陈述会使事实裁判者对事件形成扭曲的认识。第五修正案常常保护对一方案件有帮助的细节，因此被告必须证明更多。至于类别(3)，郭文贵在不同诉讼中的陈述不能构成本案中的放弃。See In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 66（“[M]大多数审理过该问题的法院认为，在一项程序中放弃免于自证有罪特权，并不影响证人或被告在另一独立程序中就同一事项援引该特权的权利，而仅限于发生放弃的程序。”）。对于类别(2)和(5)，被告并未指出原告先前证言中的任何内容，能够被解释为就其与T&M Protection的“关系”或其“财富和资产”此类宽泛类别作出的放弃。见被告动议第6–7页。\n\n一审法院必须“‘努力兼顾一方的第五修正案利益’”，同时谨慎“‘确保对方当事人不会受到不当不利影响。’”In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 66–67 (quoting Serafino v. Hasbro, Inc., 82 F.3d 515, 518 (1st Cir. 1996)). 本案中，这些相互竞争考量的权衡结果支持维护原告的宪法权利。因此，本院认定，其先前证言并未放弃其第五修正案特权。\n\nC. 不利推定\n\n作为后备主张，被告认为，本院至少必须命令陪审团应当从郭文贵援引该特权中作出不利推定。见被告动议第8–10页；被告回复文件第5页。法院确可对成功援引其第五修正案特权的民事诉讼当事人作出不利推定。SEC v. Whittemore, 659 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2011), aff'g 691 F. Supp. 2d 198 (D.D.C. 2010). 当民事程序的一方“拒绝就针对[其]提出的有证明力证据作证”时，作出此类推定是适当的。SEC v. Int'l Loan Network, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 678, 695 (D.D.C. 1991), aff'd, 968 F.2d 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976)). 由于郭文贵“控制着”Clark Hill所寻求的证据，作出不利推定可能尤其具有根据。See Whittemore, 691 F. Supp. 2d at 206. 事实裁判者也可在之后评估郭文贵的可信度时考虑其沉默。Latif v. Obama, 666 F.3d 746, 759 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 然而，此类沉默“应当‘仅被赋予其案件周围事实所证明的证据价值。’”Int'l Loan Network, Inc., 770 F. Supp. at 695 (alteration in original) (quoting Baxter, 425 U.S. at 318); cf. Doe ex rel. Rudy-Glanzer v. Glanzer, 232 F.3d 1258, 1266 (9th Cir. 2000)（拒绝基于一方拒绝提供不可靠医学检测结果作出不利推定，因为该结果本不可作为证据采纳）。因此，本案中作出不利推定很可能具有根据。\n\n尽管如此，法院认为现阶段就陪审团指示的确切措辞作出决定尚属过早。更妥当的做法是等待听取双方当事人的论点及所提出的证据。此外，如被告认为在简易判决阶段作出不利推定具有相关性且适当，其可在该阶段的书面陈述中予以说明。\n\nIV. 结论\n\n由于原告已充分表明，回答被告的问题可能使其面临刑事责任风险，法院将驳回其要求强制其提供证言的动议。法院将于今日另行发布相应命令。\n\n/s/ James E. Boasberg\nJAMES E. BOASBERG\n美国地区法院法官\n\n日期：October 25, 2021\n\n证物10\n\n哥伦比亚特区美国地区法院\n\nGUO WENGUI（郭文贵）\n\n原告，\n\n诉 民事诉讼案号 19-3195 (JEB)\n\nCLARK HILL PLC（克拉克·希尔律师事务所）等，\n\n被告。\n\n命令\n\n基于随附备忘录意见书中阐明的理由，法院\n\n命令：驳回被告提出的强制执行动议。\n\n/s/ James E. Boasberg\nJAMES E. BOASBERG\n美国地区法院法官\n\n日期：October 25, 2021\n\n证物11\n\n本证物已密封提交。\n\n证物12\n\n哥伦比亚特区美国地区法院\n\nGUO WENGUI\n\n原告，\n\n诉 民事诉讼案号 19-3195 (JEB)\n\nCLARK HILL PLC 等，\n\n被告。\n\n备忘录意见书及命令\n\n原告 Guo Wengui 的诉讼主张，被告 Clark Hill PLC（一家律师事务所）及其律师 Thomas Ragland（托马斯·拉格兰）应就该律所未能保护原告的庇护材料免受黑客攻击，以及其后不再担任原告代理律师所引起的法律执业过失、违反信义义务和违约承担责任。见 ECF No. 1-1（起诉状）。2020年2月20日，法院部分准许并部分驳回了被告的驳回动议，驳回了 Guo 的罪名项“在其依据被告退出代理构成可依法救济的不法行为这一理论的范围内”，但“允许那些主张其机密信息相关虚假陈述及处理不当的请求继续进行”。Guo Wengui v. Clark Hill, PLC, 440 F. Supp. 3d 30, 33 (D.D.C. 2020)。法院作出该裁定，是因为“原告未充分主张，被告的[退出代理]，即使不当，曾对其造成损害或不利影响。”Id. at 41。现 Guo 凭借一份近期精神科医师报告，该报告声称表明退出代理造成了损害，在二十个月后寻求恢复其基于退出代理的请求。见 ECF No. 72-1（修订命令动议）。由于证据开示此后已结束，Guo 的拖延及由此给被告造成的不利影响决定了应驳回该动议。\n\nI. 法律标准\n\n由于原告寻求重新考虑一项部分驳回案件的中间命令，《联邦民事诉讼规则》第54(b)条适用于法院的分析。见 Prince George's Hospital Center v. Advantage Healthplan Inc., 985 F. Supp. 2d 38, 42 (D.D.C. 2013)\n\n（“第[54(b)]条是在如本案中受到质疑的命令部分准许、部分驳回被告的驳回动议，因而不构成终局判决时，重新考虑所适用的适当程序机制。”）。“对中间裁决的审查标准不同于《联邦民事诉讼规则》第59(e)条和第60(b)条下适用于终局判决的标准。”Williams v. Savage, 569 F. Supp. 2d 99, 108 (D.D.C. 2008)。原告须满足的门槛较低，因为“对中间裁决的重新考虑可依照‘正义所要求’的标准获得。”Judicial Watch v. Dep't of Army, 466 F. Supp. 2d 112, 123 (D.D.C. 2006); accord Lemmons v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 241 F.R.D. 15, 21–23 (D.D.C. 2007)。\n\n例如，在法院“明显误解”当事人、严重偏离所提出的问题，或未考虑“自该问题提交以来法律或事实发生的控制性或重大变化”时，可以满足“正义所要求”标准。见 Cobell v. Norton, 224 F.R.D. 266, 272 (D.D.C. 2004)（省略内部引文及引号）。“这些考量为法院的决定留下了很大的空间，因此，‘正义所要求’标准等同于确定‘在相关情形下，是否有必要[通过]重新考虑给予救济。’”Lewis v. Dist. of Columbia, 736 F. Supp. 2d 98, 102 (D.D.C. 2010)（引自 Cobell, 224 F.R.D. at 272）。然而，法院在第54(b)条下的裁量权“受案件既判原则限制，并受以下保留条件约束：当诉讼当事人曾就法院的裁决进行争辩时，不应要求其再次为此争辩，也不应在无正当理由的情况下允许其再次为此争辩。”Singh v. George Washington Univ.,\n\n383 F. Supp. 2d 99, 101 (D.D.C. 2005)（省略内部引号）（引自 In re Ski Train Fire in Kaprun, Austria, on Nov. 11, 2004, 224 F.R.D. 543, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)）。\n\nII. 分析\n\n原告请求法院重新审视其先前裁定时，援引了“此前无法获得的重要新信息”。动议第2页。具体而言，他指出，其“最近（于 October 4, 2021）获得一份由经委员会认证的精神科医师出具的报告，详细说明原告因退出代理造成的重大损害”。同上（省略脚注）。被告对此提出诸多异议。其主张，该动议徒劳无益，因为其“退出代理不能产生请求权，因为根据哥伦比亚特区《职业行为规则》，Clark Hill 有合法权利退出代理”。ECF No. 79-1（反对意见）第8–9页。此外，其认为，在不存在身体伤害的情况下，原告在该情形下不得获得精神损害赔偿。Id. at 9–10。其继续主张，即使 Guo 拟提出的新请求表面上具有合理性，其拖延也足以成为驳回该动议的理由，而准许该动议还将使被告受到不利影响。Id. at 10–14。法院同意后述观点，无须审理实体问题。\n\n就拖延而言，法院于 February 2020 作出裁定，距 Guo 提交本动议近20个月。其对拖延指控的唯一回应是指出该精神科医师的近期报告。尽管该报告可能是新的，但自本案诉讼开始以来，他一直知悉其自身痛苦。毕竟，这是他自己的痛苦。见 Klayman v. Judicial Watch, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 3d 208, 215 (D.D.C. 2018)（“原告在其所称痛苦发生之时，本应对造成该痛苦的事实有切身了解。”）。此外，除专家相关证据开示外，所有证据开示均已结束，这意味着 Guo 的请求是在最后关头提出的。最后，若 Guo 希望采取的路径是修改其起诉状，则其截止日期为 July 1, 2020，即在其提交动议前逾十五个月。见 April 21, 2020 的简短命令。仅凭拖延一项，即强烈不利于原告。见 Trudel v. SunTrust Bank, 924 F.3d 1281, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 2019)（“‘不当拖延’是拒绝准许修改的有效理由。”）；Elkins v. District of Columbia, 690 F.3d 554, 565 (D.C. Cir. 2012)（“不当拖延是驳回一方当事人试图在起诉状中增加新责任理论的有效理由。”）。\n\n然而，要具有决定性，拖延通常必须与不利影响相结合，见 Atchinson v. District of Columbia, 73 F.3d 418, 426 (D.C. Cir. 1996)（指出法院“通常应考虑……任何由此产生的不利影响的可能性”），而本案确有此种不利影响。被告说明，其一直在预期精神损害赔偿仅可因黑客攻击而非退出代理获得的基础上进行证据开示并构建其案件。允许原告突然改变立场并开启一个全新的损害赔偿类别，对被告及其所选择的诉讼策略而言将是不公平的。见 6 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1487 (3d ed. 2021)（“[如]修改实质性地改变案件一直据以进行的理论，且提出得足够晚，以致对方将被要求进行大量新的准备，法院可认定其具有不利影响。”）。法院认为，在本案中尤为如此，因为原告在最初寻求经济损失赔偿后，已放弃该项请求，部分显然是因为其就其企业的问题作答时有义务援引《第五修正案》。此外，鉴于原告在过去数年中至少已提起十起诉讼，就不同事件向各类被告寻求此类赔偿，法院对其证明精神损害赔偿原因的能力日益担忧。见反对意见第12页注1。\n\n基于上述所有理由，不允许在此扩大其起诉状，其应仅就黑客攻击造成的损害继续进行诉讼。\n\nIII. 结论\n\n因此，法院命令：驳回原告的重新考虑动议。\n\n/s/ James E. Boasberg\n\nJAMES E. BOASBERG\n美国地区法院法官\n\n日期：November 9, 2021\n\n康涅狄格地区美国破产法院布里奇波特分院\n\n----------------------------------------------------------- x\n\n关于： :\n: 第11章\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等， :\n:\n: 案号 22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人。1 :\n: 合并管理\n----------------------------------------------------------- x\n\n送达证明\n\n下署人特此证明，于 April 28, 2023，前述动议及其所有声明、证物和附件已以电子方式提交。依照法院电子提交（“CM/ECF”）系统的运行，或通过邮寄方式向电子提交通知中注明无法接受电子提交的任何人士，已通过电子邮件向上述标题所示第11章案件的所有当事人发送本次提交的通知。当事人可通过法院的 CM/ECF 系统查阅本次提交。\n\n日期：April 28, 2023\n\n康涅狄格州纽黑文 签署人：/s/ Douglas S. Skalka\nDouglas S. Skalka（ct00616）\nPatrick R. Linsey（ct29437）\nNEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C.\n195 Church Street, 13th Floor\nNew Haven, Connecticut 06510\n(203) 781-2847\ndskalka@npmlaw.com\nplinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n第11章受托人代理律师\n\n1 本第11章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（亦称 Guo Wengui、Miles Guo 和 Miles Kwok，以及众多其他别名）（税务识别号码后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（税务识别号码后四位：8202）及 Genever Holdings Corporation。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 及 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为 Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166，转交 Luc A. Despins，作为 Ho Wan Kwok 遗产的受托人（仅为通知和通信之目的）。","key_entities":["Je","Guo","CCP","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","CIPA","Chinese Communist Party","Despins","Paul Hastings","forfeiture","Miles Guo","GTV","Pro Se","pro se","William Je","Murray","MSS"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":1,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":12,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":14,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":18,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":20,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":67,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":69,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":71,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":72,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":78,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":79,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":82,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":77856,"status":"published","published_at":"2023-04-28 00:00:00","created_at":"2023-04-28","updated_at":"2026-08-23 23:59:41"}