{"id":"court_ctb_172_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":172,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"PETITION","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION In re: : HO WAN KWOK, : Debtor. :","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\nIn re: : HO WAN KWOK, : Debtor. :\n\n: CHAPTER 11\n\n: Case No. 22-50073(JAM)\n\n: April 6, 2022\n\n#### **OBJECTION OF CREDITORS RUI MA AND WEICAN MENG TO THE DEBTOR'S PROPOSED POSTPETITION FINANCING FACILITY**\n\nCreditors Rui Ma and Weican Meng (\"**Creditors**\"), by and through their undersigned counsel, hereby submit this objection to the motion of the Debtor for approval of a postpetition financing facility (the \"**Motion**\") [Docket No. 117], and respectfully state as follows:\n\n### **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\n1. If the Motion is an attempt by the Debtor to \"do everything by the book\" and to provide \"extraordinary transparency\" (as the Debtor's proposed counsel previously represented to the Court would be done),<sup>1</sup> it fails. The Motion should be denied because the proposed financing facility (the \"**DIP**\" or \"**DIP Facility**\") is illusory, is set up to benefit the Debtor (not his estate or creditors) and gives inequitable leverage over the course of this case to the Debtor and to Golden Spring (New York) Ltd. (\"**Golden Spring**\" or \"**Proposed Lender**\"), an insider of the Debtor.<sup>2</sup> The Debtor has failed to establish that the DIP Facility benefits the estate, and his conclusory and\n\n<sup>1</sup> The Debtor's proposed counsel made these statements at the hearings before the Court held on March 22, 2022.\n\n<sup>2</sup> The Bankruptcy Code defines the term \"insider\" to include among other things relatives, corporations of which the debtor is a director, officer or person in control, and affiliates. 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(A), (E). This definition \"is neither exclusive nor exhaustive\" and other persons may be insiders. *E.g., In re TS Emp., Inc.*, 603 B.R. 700, 708 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019) (citations omitted). Here, the Proposed Lender is an entity owned and controlled by the Debtor's son and with a long record of funding the Debtor's lavish expenses on non-commercial terms. *E.g.*, Motion ¶ 2. Accordingly, the Creditors submit that the Proposed Lender is an insider of the Debtor within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code.\n\nself-serving assertions are not entitled to business judgment deference. Accordingly, the Motion should be denied.\n\n## **ARGUMENT**\n\n2. The Motion describes a DIP Facility purporting to offer \"generous\" \\$8 million financing from his son (through his son's controlled-entity Golden Spring) that is unsecured and subordinated to general unsecured claims without any administrative or other priority repayment rights. [ECF 117 at p. 2 ¶¶1,3]. The DIP Facility contemplates the Debtor's proposed financial advisor, Verdolino & Lowey, P.C. (\"**V&L**\"), to take receipt of the loan proceeds and be the sole authorized signatory for disbursement of funds in accordance with the Budget. [*Id*. ¶ 2.]. The Motion also asserts that \"*[n]o* DIP Loan proceeds will be used to pay or reimburse the DIP Lender for any costs, expenses, or indemnification in connection with the DIP Facility.\" [ECF 117 at p. 6 ¶17 (emphasis added)].\n\n3. This is all illusory because the funding obligations under the DIP Facility are terminated, and the claims thereunder become superpriority administrative expenses, upon an Event of Default (as used in the Motion), which includes the following events:\n\n- (a) The Debtor fails to submit budgets as required or information requested by the Proposed Lender, or otherwise breaches the credit agreement;\n- (b) The Debtor files a motion to dismiss or convert this case to chapter 7;\n- (c) PAX obtains stay relief to proceed with its state court litigation;\n- (d) The New York court denies a motion to transfer venue of PAX litigation;\n- (e) This case is dismissed or converted to chapter 7;\n- (f) A chapter 11 trustee is appointed in this case; and\n- (g) The Debtor's exclusive right to propose a plan is terminated.\n\n*See* ECF 117 Exh. C (Credit Agreement) § 8.\n\n4. These Events of Default are either wholly within the control of the Debtor (*e.g*.,\n\nreporting requirements, the filing of motions to convert or dismiss the case) or that appear to have\n\na significant risk of occurring (*e.g*., appointment of a trustee, termination of exclusivity, relief from stay for PAX or denial of venue transfer). In other words, the proposed funding can be terminated at any time at the whim of the Debtor, or upon the occurrence of any one of several events, each of which has a significant probability of occurring (with the corollary that the probability of no such events occurring is low). Accordingly, the DIP Facility is illusory.\n\n5. Moreover, the DIP Facility provides that prior to entry of a final DIP order by the Court, the DIP loan proceeds \"can only be used to pay the administrative expenses of the Debtor's ordinary course professionals\". [ECF 117 Exh. C (Credit Agreement) § 2.04 (emphasis added)]. This provision can be interpreted to mean that the \\$4 million touted as being available to pay professionals of the Creditors' Committee or any examiner (if appointed) may not be available until much later in the case when (and if) the Court enters a final DIP Order. Further, no budget is provided in connection with the Motion, but rather the DIP Facility leaves it up to the Debtor and insider Lender to determine the budget themselves. [ECF 117 Exh. C (Credit Agreement) p. 2 (noting that the \"Initial Budget\" means \"a budget agreed to by the Debtor and the Lender…\")].\n\n6. Not only is the proposed funding illusory, but it also gives the Debtor and his insider Proposed Lender inequitable control over the progress of this case by controlling the availability of funding and by controlling the structure of any plan for at least two reasons:\n\n(a) *First*, the DIP Facility contemplates that, upon an Event of Default, the Proposed Lender obtains a superpriority administrative expense claim. While some language of the Motion suggests that any such superpriority claim is limited to recovery solely from and to the extent of any DIP Facility proceeds received but not yet expended by the Debtor (less the carve out), the Motion and proposed orders fail to effect this result, and instead operate to award superpriority status without limiting its satisfaction to any such unexpended proceeds. *E.g.,* Motion Exh. B (Proposed Final Order) ¶ 9. Accordingly, if (or more plausibly, *when*) one of the proposed Events of Default occurs, the Proposed Lender will have a superpriority administrative expense claim that is *not* subordinated to general unsecured claims.<sup>3</sup> In fact, in an Event of Default, the Lender's claim to the undisbursed Loan proceeds would also take priority over accrued but unpaid administrative claims (other than a \\$500,000 professional fee carve out).\n\n(b) *Second*, the DIP Facility matures on the confirmation of a plan of reorganization. Therefore, notwithstanding the purported subordination of the DIP Facility to general unsecured claims, a plan cannot be confirmed, and general unsecured claims will not be satisfied, without satisfying the DIP Facility. Moreover, the Motion in general, and the proposed orders in particular, do not actually provide that such obligations are not and will not be afforded administrative expense priority. As a practical matter, the DIP Facility is not subordinated to the claims of unsecured creditors if it matures at confirmation or if it does not expressly disclaim any administrative expense priority.\n\n7. Further, the Debtor is not entitled to any sort of business judgment deference in entering into the DIP Facility. The Debtor continues to live as a billionaire while maintaining under penalty of law that he has no assets or rights, not even a bank account or credit card, and lives off gifts from family. In fact, nothing about the Debtor's conduct or circumstances – either\n\n<sup>3</sup> In addition, the Debtor is seeking to incur significant professional expenses, and other administrative expenses, in reliance on DIP Facility funding. To the extent that such funding is subsequently unavailable for any reason, those claims will nonetheless have priority over the claims of general unsecured creditors. Accordingly, unless all such expenses and claims are expressly subordinated to general unsecured claims or are expressly limited to recovery from DIP Facility proceeds (if any), the notion that the DIP Facility is subordinated to or otherwise does not prejudice general unsecured claims is illusory.\n\nprior to or during this case – warrants any baseline deference to his business judgment.<sup>4</sup> Nor does the Debtor's conduct or circumstances allow for presumption of his good faith, a necessary precondition for business judgment deference.<sup>5</sup>\n\n8. The Debtor negotiated the DIP Facility with an insider, his son. [ECF 117 at p. 5 (\"the debtor asked his son to extend additional credit\"); p. 6 (\"The DIP Lender, an entity controlled by the Debtor's son, has agreed to extend the DIP Financing, on the terms requested by the Debtor.\")] In his February 9, 2022 contempt order in the PAX state court litigation, Judge Barry R. Ostrager already found that the Debtor had engaged in \"efforts to avoid and deceive his creditors by parking his substantial personal assets with a series of corporations, trusted confidants, and family members.\" [*See* February 9, 2022 J. Ostrager Decision p. 1]. Because the Proposed Lender is so closely related to the Debtor, and because the Debtor is not entitled to business judgment deference, the Court should evaluate the proposed financing on a standard no lower than entire\n\n<sup>4</sup> The Debtor has failed to establish the need for, or the reasonableness of, the proposed financing. Among other things, the DIP offers no budget and nothing beyond cursory platitudes to explain how or why the funds will be used. Further, the ability of the Debtor and this case to survive without interim relief on the DIP Facility, despite the Debtor's representations of the need for such relief to avoid \"immediate and irreparable harm,\" belies the Debtor's representations and his so-called business judgment.\n\n<sup>5</sup> The Creditors note the Debtor's attempts to establish his good faith by reference to various media pieces concerning his alleged efforts against the Chinese Communist Party and assorted conspiracy theories. None of this offers slightest shred of admissible evidence, and it is notable that the Debtor entirely ignores the myriad other media pieces concerning his wealth, his con artist schemes to take advantage of people (such as an ivermectin buttondown shirt to prevent COVID for \\$1,820), his pattern of accusing his deemed opponents – including Justice Ostrager (per PAX's counsel at the April 22nd hearing before this Court) – of being CCP agents, and the allegations that the Debtor is actually working for the CCP to identify and undermine dissidents abroad. E.g., Dan Friedman, *A Fugitive Chinese Tycoon Met Steve Bannon. Misinformation Mayhem Ensued*, Mother Jones (2022), <http> (accessed April 4, 2022). The Creditors also note the media reports that the Debtor – *during this case* – shut down a video streaming site that he launched in 2020 amid investor claims of fraud and SEC charges. Dan Friedman, *The Misinformation Empire Steve Bannon Built With a Fugitive Chinese Tycoon Is in Trouble*, Mother Jones (March 3, 2022), [http](http)[chinese-tycoon-is-in-trouble/](http) (accessed April 4, 2022).\n\nfairness, and the Debtor should be required to establish that any financing is necessary to meet a compelling interest of the estate and narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.<sup>6</sup>\n\n9. The Motion fails to establish any benefits to the estate from the DIP Facility. There is no budget. Despite some cursory statements concerning the Debtor's unliquidated litigation assets (for which no relevant detail is provided despite such claims apparently being pending since 2015 and 2017) the Debtor has provided no information whatsoever that can justify additional estate expenditures to pursue these so-called assets. Indeed, as the Debtor's schedules identify (again, with no relevant information whatsoever) multiple litigation funding agreements with and security interests in favor of the Proposed Lender on such claims,<sup>7</sup> there is no evidence that any such benefit would inure to the benefit of the estate. Moreover, the DIP Facility does require the estate to reimburse the insider Lender for Out of-Pocket Expenses (including reasonable fees, disbursement, and other charges of counsel) in connection with monitoring the Debtor's compliance with the terms of the DIP Loan Agreement. [ECF 117 at p. 10; Exhibit C (Credit Agreement) p. 7 §7.01)]. The DIP Facility also contains a provision requiring the Debtor to indemnify the Lender in connection with the DIP Facility under certain circumstances. [*Id.*]\n\n10. Obviously, the Creditors do not object to the Debtor's incurrence of unsecured indebtedness with payment subordination to prepetition general unsecured claims to fund administrative expense claims in this case. But the DIP Facility is not such a financing facility. It offers funding availability at the whim of the Debtor and the insider Proposed Lender, exposes the estate to potentially significant administrative claims incurred in reliance on the availability of\n\n<sup>6</sup> The Creditors note that the Proposed Lender seeks interest, default interest, fees, expenses, and indemnification, and requires reporting and other obligations in connection with making the DIP Facility. As the Proposed Lender appears to have a long history of funding the Debtor with no such requirements outside of this case, the Creditors submit that all such conditions are not warranted.\n\n<sup>7</sup> Moreover, to the extent that the Proposed Lender has claims with respect to the Debtor's litigation, no doubt the Proposed Lender is amply incentivized out of its own self-interest to continue to fund such litigation.\n\nthe DIP Facility, and overall is merely an attempt to control the course of this case and create superpriority administrative expense claims for the sole benefit of the Debtor and his insiders. The Debtor is welcome to continue living off the purported gifts from his wife and children as long as it is without prejudice to general unsecured creditors.\n\n# **CONCLUSION**\n\n**WHEREFORE**, for the foregoing reasons, the Creditors request that the Court deny the DIP Motion in its entirety and grant such other and further relief as is just and proper.\n\nDated: April 6, 2022 */s/ Kristin B. Mayhew*  Kristin Mayhew **MCELROY, DEUTSCH, MULVANEY & CARPENTER, LLP** 30 Jelliff Lane Southport, CT 06890 (203) 319-4000 kmayhew@mdmc-law.com\n\n- and -\n\nCarollynn H.G. Callari (*pro hac vice*) David S. Forsh (*pro hac vice*) **CALLARI PARTNERS LLC** One Rockefeller Plaza, 10th Floor New York, NY 10020 (212) 202-3050 ccallari@callaripartners.com dforsh@callaripartners.com\n\n*Attorneys for Rui Ma and Weican Meng*\n\n#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI, Kristin B. Mayhew, hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the foregoing Objection of Creditors Rui Ma and Weican Meng to the Debtor's Proposed Postpetition Financing Facility was filed with the Court on April 6, 2022. Notice of this filing will be sent by e-mail to all parties by operation of the court's electronic filing system. Parties may access this filing through the court's CM/ECF System.\n\n> /s/ Kristin B. Mayhew Kristin B. Mayhew","body_zh":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION（美国康涅狄格区联邦破产法院布里奇波特分院）\n\n关于：HO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），债务人。\n\n第 11 章\n\n案号：22-50073(JAM)\n\n2022年4月6日\n\n债权人 RUI MA（马蕊）与 WEICAN MENG（孟维参）对债务人拟议的申请后融资安排提出的异议\n\n债权人 Rui Ma（马蕊）与 Weican Meng（孟维参）（以下简称“债权人”），通过其下述署名律师，特此对债务人请求批准申请后融资安排的动议（以下简称“动议”）[案卷号 117] 提出本异议，并恭敬陈述如下：\n\n前言陈述\n\n1. 如果该动议是债务人试图“完全照章办事”并提供“非同寻常的透明度”（正如债务人拟聘请的法律顾问此前向法院陈述的那样）1 的一次尝试，那么它失败了。该动议应当被驳回，因为拟议的融资安排（“DIP”或“DIP 融资安排”）是虚妄不实的，其设立旨在使债务人受益（而非其破产财产或债权人受益），并且赋予了债务人以及债务人的内部人2 Golden Spring (New York) Ltd.（“Golden Spring”或“拟议出借人”）在审理本案进程中不公平的筹码。债务人未能证明 DIP 融资安排有利于破产财产，其断言性且\n\n1 债务人拟聘请的法律顾问在2022年3月22日向法院举行的听证会上作出了上述陈述。\n\n2 《破产法》对“内部人”一词的定义包括亲属、债务人担任董事、高级职员或控制人的公司以及关联方等。11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(A), (E)。这一定义“既非排他性的也非穷尽性的”，其他人亦可成为内部人。例如 In re TS Emp., Inc., 603 B.R. 700, 708 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019)（引文略）。在本案中，拟议出借人是由债务人的儿子所有并控制的实体，并且长期以来以非商业性条款为债务人的奢侈开销提供资金。例如 Motion ¶ 2。据此，债权人认为，拟议出借人属于《破产法》含义范围内的债务人内部人。\n\n自私自利的说法无权享有商业判断规则的尊重。据此，该动议应当予以驳回。\n\n抗辩理由\n\n2. 动议中描述的 DIP 融资安排声称提供来自其儿子（通过其儿子控制的实体 Golden Spring）的“慷慨”的 800 万美元融资，该笔融资为无担保且受偿顺位劣后于普通无担保债权，不享有任何行政管理费用或其他优先偿还权利。[ECF 117 第 2 页 ¶¶1,3]。DIP 融资安排拟由债务人拟聘请的财务顾问 Verdolino & Lowey, P.C.（“V&L”）接收贷款款项，并作为根据预算拨付款项的唯一授权签字人。[出处同上 ¶ 2.]。动议还主张，“任何 DIP 贷款款项均不得用于支付或补偿 DIP 出借人与 DIP 融资安排相关的任何成本、费用或补偿。” [ECF 117 第 6 页 ¶17（后加强调）]。\n\n3. 这全都是虚妄不实的，因为在发生违约事件（按动议中的用法）时，DIP 融资安排项下的出资义务即告终止，其项下的债权将变更为超级优先行政管理费用，该等违约事件包括以下各项：\n\n- (a) 债务人未能按要求提交预算或未提供拟议出借人要求的信息，或以其他方式违反信贷协议；\n- (b) 债务人提交驳回本案或将本案转换为第 7 章程序的动议；\n- (c) PAX 获得中止令救济以继续其州法院诉讼；\n- (d) 纽约州法院驳回移送 PAX 诉讼管辖地的动议；\n- (e) 本案被驳回或被转换为第 7 章程序；\n- (f) 本案中被指定了第 11 章破产受托人；以及\n- (g) 债务人提出重整计划的专属权利被终止。\n\n参见 ECF 117 附件 C（信贷协议）§ 8。\n\n4. 这些违约事件要么完全处于债务人的控制之下（例如，报告要求、提交转换或驳回案件的动议），要么看似具有极高的发生风险（例如，指定受托人、终止专有权、PAX 获得中止令救济或移送管辖地被拒）。换言之，拟议的资金提供可以随时根据债务人的心血来潮而终止，或者在若干个事件中的任何一个发生时终止，而每一个事件都有很大概率发生（其必然结果是，不发生任何此类事件的概率极低）。因此，DIP 融资安排是虚妄不实的。\n\n5. 此外，DIP 融资安排规定，在法院作出最终 DIP 裁定之前，DIP 贷款款项“只能用于支付债务人日常业务专业人员的行政管理费用”。[ECF 117 附件 C（信贷协议）§ 2.04（后加强调）]。这一条款可以被解读为意味着，吹嘘为可用于支付无担保债权人委员会专业人员或任何审查官（若被指定）费用的 400 万美元，可能要等到案件后期法院作出（如果作出的话）最终 DIP 裁定时才可用。此外，动议并未提供相关预算，而是由 DIP 融资安排留给债务人和内部人出借人自行决定预算。[ECF 117 附件 C（信贷协议）第 2 页（指出“初始预算”系指“经债务人与出借人同意的预算……”）]。\n\n6. 拟议的资助不仅虚妄不实，而且通过控制资金可用性以及控制任何重整计划的结构，赋予了债务人及其内部人拟议出借人对本案进程不公平的控制权，这至少基于以下两个原因：\n\n(a) 第一，DIP 融资安排规定，在发生违约事件时，拟议出借人将获得超级优先行政管理费用债权。尽管动议中的某些措辞表明，任何此类超级优先债权仅限于从债务人已收到但尚未支出的任何 DIP 融资款项（减去预留费用）中并以此为限获得清偿，但动议和拟议裁定并未实现这一结果，反而直接赋予超级优先地位，而未将其受偿限制在任何此类未支出的款项中。例如，Motion 附件 B（拟议最终裁定）¶ 9。因此，如果（或者更可能的是，当）拟议的违约事件之一发生时，拟议出借人将拥有一项不受普通无担保债权劣后限制的超级优先行政管理费用债权。3 事实上，在发生违约事件时，出借人对未拨付贷款款项的主张权利还将优先于已发生但未支付的行政管理债权（500,000 美元的专业人员费用预留除外）。\n\n(b) 第二，DIP 融资安排在重整计划获得确认时到期。因此，尽管声称 DIP 融资安排劣后于普通无担保债权，但若不偿付 DIP 融资安排，重整计划就无法获得确认，普通无担保债权也无法得到清偿。此外，动议通篇特别是拟议裁定中，并未实际规定此类债务现在及将来均不被赋予行政管理费用优先权。在实际操作中，如果 DIP 融资安排在计划确认时到期，或者其未明确放弃任何行政管理费用优先权，则其并未劣后于无担保债权人的债权。\n\n7. 此外，债务人在达成 DIP 融资安排时不应享有任何形式的商业判断规则的尊重。债务人继续过着亿万富翁般的生活，同时在伪证受罚的法律责任下坚称自己没有任何资产或权利，甚至连银行账户或信用卡都没有，靠家人的馈赠生活。事实上，债务人的行为或处境——无论\n\n3 此外，债务人正试图依托 DIP 融资安排的资金来承担巨额的专业人员费用以及其他行政管理费用。如果由于任何原因导致该等资助在后续无法获得，这些债权仍将优先于普通无担保债权人的债权。因此，除非所有此类费用和债权均明确劣后于普通无担保债权，或明确限于从 DIP 融资款项（如有）中受偿，否则认为 DIP 融资安排劣后于普通无担保债权或以其他方式不对普通无担保债权造成损害的概念纯属虚妄。\n\n是在本案之前还是在本案期间——均不构成对其商业判断予以任何基准尊重的理由。4 债务人的行为或处境也不允许推定其具有善意，而善意是对商业判断予以尊重的必要前提条件。5\n\n8. 债务人与一名内部人（其儿子）协商了 DIP 融资安排。[ECF 117 第 5 页（“债务人要求其儿子提供额外信贷”）；第 6 页（“DIP 出借人系由债务人之子控制的实体，已同意按照债务人要求的条款提供 DIP 融资。”）]。在 PAX 州法院诉讼中于 2022年2月9日 作出的藐视法庭裁定中，Barry R. Ostrager（巴里·R·奥斯特拉格）法官已经认定，债务人从事了“通过将其实质性个人资产停放在一系列公司、亲信和家庭成员名下来规避和欺骗其债权人的行为”。[见 2022年2月9日 Ostrager 法官裁决书第 1 页]。由于拟议出借人与债务人的关系如此密切，且由于债务人无权享有商业判断规则的尊重，法院对拟议融资的评估标准不得低于完全\n\n4 债务人未能证明拟议融资的必要性或合理性。除其他事项外，DIP 未提供任何预算，也未提供任何除敷衍空话之外的内容来解释资金将如何或为何被使用。此外，尽管债务人声称需要获得该等救济以避免“眼前且无法弥补的损害”，但债务人及本案在没有 DIP 融资安排的临时救济的情况下仍能维持下去，这戳穿了债务人的陈述及其所谓的商业判断。\n\n5 债权人注意到，债务人试图通过援引有关其所谓针对中国共产党的行动及各种阴谋论的多篇媒体报道来确立其善意。这些都未提供丝毫可采纳的证据，而且值得注意的是，债务人完全忽视了关于其财富的无数其他媒体报道，关于他利用他人谋利的骗局（例如以 1,820 美元出售用于预防 COVID 的伊维菌素牛津纺衬衫），关于他指责被其视为对手的人——包括 Ostrager 司法官（根据 PAX 律师在向本法院举行的 4月22日 听证会上的陈述）——为中共特工的惯常套路，以及关于债务人实际上正在为中共效力以识别和破坏海外异见人士的指控。例如 Dan Friedman（丹·弗里德曼），《A Fugitive Chinese Tycoon Met Steve Bannon. Misinformation Mayhem Ensued》（一名流亡中国大亨结识了史蒂夫·班农，虚假信息混乱随之而来），Mother Jones（《琼斯母亲》）（2022年），（2022年4月4日访问）。债权人还注意到媒体报道称，在本案审理期间，债务人因投资者的欺诈指控和 SEC（美国证券交易委员会）的指控，关闭了其于 2020年 推出的视频流媒体网站。Dan Friedman（丹·弗里德曼），《The Misinformation Empire Steve Bannon Built With a Fugitive Chinese Tycoon Is in Trouble》（史蒂夫·班农与一名流亡中国大亨建立的虚假信息帝国陷入困境），Mother Jones（《琼斯母亲》）（2022年3月3日），[http][chinese-tycoon-is-in-trouble/]（2022年4月4日访问）。\n\n公平标准，并且应要求债务人证明任何融资对于满足破产财产的迫切利益是必要的，且其设计严格限于实现该等利益。6\n\n9. 该动议未能证明DIP融资机制（DIP Facility）能为破产财产带来任何利益。其中没有任何预算。尽管有一些关于债务人未清算诉讼资产的草率陈述（尽管此类索赔显然自2015年和2017年以来一直在审理中，但未提供任何相关细节），债务人完全没有提供任何可以证明动用破产财产额外开支以追索这些所谓资产具有合理性的信息。事实上，由于债务人的财产明细表指明了（同样完全没有提供任何相关信息）多份针对此类索赔、且以拟议放款人为受益人的诉讼资助协议和担保权益7，因此没有证据表明任何此类利益会归属于破产财产。此外，DIP融资机制确实要求破产财产向内部人放款人偿还因监督债务人遵守DIP贷款协议条款而产生的实付费用（包括合理的律师费、垫付款项和其他收费）。[ECF 117，第10页；附件C（信贷协议）第7页第7.01条）]。DIP融资机制还包含一项条款，要求债务人在某些情况下就DIP融资机制向放款人提供赔偿。[同上]\n\n10. 显然，债权人并不反对债务人产生在偿付顺序上劣后于申请前一般无担保债权的无担保债务，以资助本案中的行政管理费用债权。但DIP融资机制并非此类融资机制。它完全凭债务人和内部人拟议放款人的一时兴起提供资金可用性，使破产财产面临因信赖DIP融资机制的可用性而产生的潜在重大行政管理债权，且总体而言，这仅仅是企图控制本案进程并纯粹为债务人及其内部人的利益制造超级优先行政管理费用债权。债务人尽可继续依靠其妻子和子女声称的赠与生活，只要这不会对一般无担保债权人造成损害。\n\n6 债权人指出，拟议放款人寻求利息、违约利息、费用、支出和赔偿，并要求履行与提供DIP融资机制相关的报告和其他义务。鉴于拟议放款人在本案之外似乎长期向债务人提供资助且无此类要求，债权人认为所有此类条件均无合理依据。\n\n7 此外，在拟议放款人对债务人的诉讼拥有债权的范围内，拟议放款人出于自身利益无疑有充分的动力继续资助此类诉讼。\n\n结论\n\n为此，基于上述理由，债权人请求法院全面驳回DIP动议，并给予公正和适当的其他及进一步救济。\n\n日期：2022年4月6日\n/s/ Kristin B. Mayhew\nKristin Mayhew\nMCELROY, DEUTSCH, MULVANEY & CARPENTER, LLP\n30 Jelliff Lane\nSouthport, CT 06890\n(203) 319-4000\nkmayhew@mdmc-law.com\n\n- 以及 -\n\nCarollynn H.G. Callari（特别许可出庭 / pro hac vice）\nDavid S. Forsh（特别许可出庭 / pro hac vice）\nCALLARI PARTNERS LLC\nOne Rockefeller Plaza, 10th Floor\nNew York, NY 10020\n(212) 202-3050\nccallari@callaripartners.com\ndforsh@callaripartners.com\n\nRui Ma（马锐）和 Weican Meng（孟维参）的代理律师\n\n送达证书\n\n本人，Kristin B. Mayhew，特此证明上述《债权人 Rui Ma（马锐）和 Weican Meng（孟维参）对债务人拟议的申请后融资机制的异议》的真实准确副本已于 2022年4月6日 提交法院。该提交的通知将通过法院电子提交系统的运行，以电子邮件形式发送给所有当事人。当事人可通过法院的 CM/ECF 系统查阅该文件。\n\n/s/ Kristin B. Mayhew\nKristin B. Mayhew","key_entities":["Je","Guo","CCP","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","GETTR","Chinese Communist Party"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":117,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":2436,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 13:14:50"}