{"id":"court_ctb_1730_1","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":1730,"sub_number":1,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2023-04-28","title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION In re:","summary_zh":"支持重新审议动议的法律备忘录 —— Ho Wan Kwok 破产案（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo），CTB 22-50073 ECF #1730-1（2023-04-28立案）。HK 各方提交支持重新审议的法律备忘录，主张法院在未给予其法定的 21 天异议期的情况下直接裁定其连带支付 83,370.26 美元律师费，构成了明显错误和不公。","summary_en":"Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Reconsideration — In re Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo / Guo Wengui), CTB 22-50073 ECF #1730-1 (filed Apr 28, 2023). The HK Parties submitted a legal memorandum supporting their reconsideration motion, arguing that the Court committed clear error and caused manifest injustice by awarding $83,370.26 in attorneys' fees to the Trustee's counsel without granting them the required 21-day period to object to the fee application.","body_en":"## **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\nIn re:\n\nHO WAN KWOK,\n\nChapter 11\n\nCase No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\nDebtor.\n\n### **MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION**\n\nPursuant to D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 7, made applicable to this proceeding by D. Conn. Bankr. L. R. 1001-1(b), HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC (\"HK USA\"), Mei Guo (\"Ms. Guo\"), Lee Vartan, Esq. (\"Attorney Vartan\"), and Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC (\"CSG Law\" and, collectively with HK USA, Ms. Guo, and Attorney Vartan, the \"HK Parties\"), by and through their undersigned counsel, respectfully submit their Memorandum of Law in Support of the HK Parties' Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's April 21, 2023 Order Awarding Fees of Chapter 11 Trustee and His Counsel Pursuant to Sanctions Order (the \"Fee Order\") [Doc. No. 1693], which awarded attorneys' fees in the amount of \\$83,370.26 to the Individual Debtor's Estate for payment to Paul Hastings LLP with said fees to be paid by the HK Parties on or before May 5, 2023. The Fee Order further ordered that the HK Parties are jointly and severally liable for the payment of said fees.\n\nThe HK Parties seek reconsideration to address the clear error and manifest injustice that results from the Fee Order, an order that entered without the HK Parties being afforded any opportunity to object to the Special Fee Application of Chapter 11 Trustee and his Counsel, Paul Hastings LLP (together, the \"Applicants\"), for Services Rendered in Securing Compliance with Court-Authorized Subpoenas (the \"Fee Application\") [Doc No. 1648].\n\n### **I. BACKGROUND**\n\nOn October 28, 2022, the Chapter 11 Trustee (the \"Trustee\") filed a motion pursuant to Rules 26 and 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and Rules 2004 and 9016 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, to compel (the \"Motion to Compel\") compliance with Rule 2004 Subpoenas (the \"Rule 2004 Subpoenas\") [Doc No. 1046]. The single Motion to Compel sought compliance with subpoenas served upon seven different parties: (i) Ho Won Kwok (the \"Individual Debtor\"); (ii) HK USA; (iii) Ms. Guo; (iv) Hing Chi Ngok; (v) Greenwich Land LLC; (vi) Lamp Capital LLC and (vii) Golden Spring (New York) Ltd. (the \"Motion to Compel Parties\"). Thereafter, following entry of an order granting the Motion to Compel in-part, on February 10, 2023, the Trustee filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause as to why the Individual Debtor, HK USA, and Ms. Guo should not be held in contempt of court for failing to adequately respond to the Order Granting Motion to Compel (the \"Order to Show Cause\") [Doc No. 1453].\n\nOn March 10, 2023, the Court entered an Order Holding the HK Parties in Contempt of Court and Sanctioning them (the \"Contempt Order\") [Doc. No. 1537]. In accordance with the Contempt Order, HK USA and Ms. Guo were held in civil contempt of Court for failure to comply with (i) the Court's January 20, 2023 Order Granting in Part Motion to Compel Compliance With Rule 2004 Subpoenas filed by the Trustee [ECF No. 1353]; and (ii) the Court's February 13, 2023 Order Granting in Part the Trustee's Motion for Order to Appear and Show Cause Why the Court Should Not Hold the HK Parties in Contempt of Court [ECF No. 1455].\n\nIn addition, the Contempt Order held that HK USA, Ms. Guo, Attorney Vartan and CSG Law were jointly and severally liable for and sanctioned, as compensatory damages, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs related to the Trustee's efforts to secure compliance with the Rule 2004\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 1730-1 Filed 04/28/23 Entered 04/28/23 17:09:55 Page 3 of 16\n\nSubpoenas and prosecution of the Moton to Compel. The Contempt Order also held that the Trustee's reasonable attorneys' fees and costs associated with securing compliance with the Rule 2004 Subpoenas, would \"be determined by the Court upon the fee application(s) of the Trustee, which applications(s) are to be submitted on or before March 24, 2023.\" *See* Contempt Order, at 26.\n\nOn March 17, 2023, the Trustee filed an Unopposed Motion Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b), for Entry of an Order Extending Time to File Fee Application Pursuant to the Contempt Order (the \"Motion to Extend Time\") [Doc No. 1558]. Prior to filing the Motion to Extend Time, the Trustee's counsel requested the consent of the HK Parties to file the motion, which consent was agreed to by the HK Parties.\n\nBy Order dated March 20, 2023, the Court granted the Trustee's Moton to Extend Time which extended the filing date for the fee application by ten days to April 3, 2023. During a status conference on March 30, 2023, counsel for the Trustee requested a second extension to file the Fee Application, to April 10, 2023, which was granted by the Court. Thereafter, on April 10, 2023, the Trustee filed the Fee Application [Doc No. 1648].\n\nRule 2002(a)(6) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedures governs fee applications and states in pertinent part:\n\n> Twenty-one-day Notices to Parties in Interest. Except as provided in subdivisions (h), (i), (l), (p), and (q) of this rule, the clerk, or some other person as the court may direct, shall give the debtor, the trustee, all creditors and indenture trustees at least 21 days' notice by mail of :…(6) a hearing on any entity's request for compensation or reimbursement of expenses if the request exceeds \\$1,000.\n\nMoreover, D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 7(a), made applicable to this proceeding by Local Bankr. R. 1001- 1(b), provides that memoranda in opposition to motions \"shall be filed within twenty-one (21) days of the filing of the motion.\" The Court did not set a deadline for the HK Parties to file an\n\n### Case 22-50073 Doc 1730-1 Filed 04/28/23 Entered 04/28/23 17:09:55 Page 4 of 16\n\nopposition to the Fee Application. Thus, under the above stated rules, the deadline for the HK Parties to object to the Fee Application could be no earlier than May 1, 2023 based on the April 10, 2023 filing date, and a hearing could not be held until at least twenty-one (21) days after notice of a hearing issued which has yet to happen.\n\n Notwithstanding the time limitations of Bankruptcy Rule 2002(a)(6), and D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 7(a), and the fact that no other deadline was fixed by this Court for the HK Parties to oppose the Fee Application, the Court entered the Fee Order on April 21, 2023, before the HK Parties' time to respond had elapsed. Indeed, had the HK Parties been given the appropriate opportunity to oppose the Fee Application, they would have objected to the relief requested based upon the arguments below which clearly demonstrate that the Trustee is not entitled to the recovery awarded by the Court.\n\n### **II. ARGUMENT**\n\nD. Conn. L. Civ. R. 7(c) provides for the limited use of motions for reconsideration where \"the movant can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked in the initial decision or order.\" D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 7(c).\n\n\"A motion for reconsideration is committed to the sound discretion of the court.\" *Talyosef v. Saul*, Docket No. 3:17-CV-01451(KAD), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101433, \\*8 (D. Conn., June 9, 2020) (citation omitted). \"The grounds justifying reconsideration\" include \"the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.\" *Nesbitt v. Bemer*, Docket No. 3:18-CV-00699 (VLB), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185458, at \\*7-8 (D. Conn. Oct. 30, 2018), *quoting Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd. v. Nat'l Mediation Bd.*, 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir. 1992). \"In the context of a motion for reconsideration, 'manifest injustice' is defined as an error committed by the trial court that is direct, obvious, and observable.\" *Talyosef*, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101433, at \\*8, *quoting Corpac v. Does*, 10 F. Supp. 3d 349, 354 (E.D.N.Y. 2015); *see also Waller v. City of Middletown*, 89 F. Supp. 3d 279, 282-83 (D. Conn. 2015) (granting motion for reconsideration in-part to correct a clear error and avoid manifest injustice).\n\nHere, reconsideration is justified to address the denial of due process to the HK Parties by the Court granting the Fee Application without affording the HK Parties an opportunity to respond and demonstrate, *inter alia,* why the Trustee's fees are unreasonable. Indeed, the HK Parties respectfully submit that because this Court failed to permit any opposition to the Fee Application it overlooked argument and authority, as set forth below, that would alter the conclusion reached by the Court, and therefore correct a clear error and prevent manifest injustice to the HK Parties. Thus, reconsideration is necessary and appropriate, and the HK Parties' motion should be granted.\n\n### **A. The Requested Fees are Patently Unreasonable**\n\nThis Court determined that the fees sought by the Trustee are reasonable without articulating the basis for that finding, including why the hourly rates charged by the Trustee's counsel are reasonable within the District of Connecticut. *See* Fee Order, at 1. Indeed, it appears that the Court accepted the Applicant's unsupported statement that \"[s]uch fees are reasonable based on the customary compensation charged by comparably skilled practitioners in comparable non-bankruptcy cases in a competitive national legal market.\" Fee Application, at 10. The Applicants do not define the \"national legal market\" within which their hourly billing rates are reasonable, nor do they submit any evidence of other law firms, let alone law firms from across the undefined \"national legal market,\" that bill at the same hourly rates as Paul Hastings. The absence of such evidence is understandable since there are very few law firms with billing rates at the same level as Paul Hastings, including billing junior associates at more than \\$1,000 per hour.\n\n*See* Fee Application, at 2, Compensation by Individual, junior associate Ezra Sutton billing at\n\n\\$1,015.00 per hour.\n\nThe Contempt Order sanctions require the HK Parties to pay \"*reasonable* attorney's fees\n\nand costs . . .\". Contempt Order, at 25-26, emphasis added. In the Second Circuit,\n\nA reasonable hourly rate is generally \"the rate a paying client would be willing to pay,\" bearing in mind \"that a reasonable, paying client wishes to spend the minimum necessary to litigate the case effectively.\" *Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 190*. \"In assessing a reasonable hourly rate, the court takes into consideration the market rate prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.\" *Bozdogan v. 23 Ludlam Fuel, Inc., 16-CV-1053 (JMW), 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 233168, 2022 WL 17987044, at \\*3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2022)*(internal citations omitted). The relevant community is the district in which the reviewing court sits. This is known as the \"forum rule.\" *See, Simmons v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 575 F.3d 170, 174-75 (2d Cir. 2009)*.\n\n*Jackson v. GSO Bus. Mgmt., LLC (In re Jackson)*, Chap. 11 Case No.: 15-21233 (AMN), Adv.\n\nProc. No. 17-2068, 2023 Bankr. LEXIS 464, at \\*10, 2023 WL 2202738 (Bankr. D. Conn., Feb.\n\n23, 2023).\n\nCourts are not bound by the \"forum rule\" and in rare cases may apply an hourly rate from\n\noutside of the forum in awarding attorneys' fees:\n\n[A] district court may use an out-of-district hourly rate - or some rate in between the out-of-district rate sought and the rates charged by local attorneys - in calculating the presumptively reasonable fee if it is clear that a reasonable, paying client would have paid those higher rates. We presume, however, that a reasonable, paying client would in most cases hire counsel from within his district, or at least counsel whose rates are consistent with those charged locally. This presumption may be rebutted - albeit only in the unusual case - if the party wishing the district court to use a higher rate demonstrates that his or her retention of an out-of district attorney was reasonable under the circumstances.\n\n*In re Jackson,* 2023 Bankr. LEXIS 464, at \\*11-12, quoting *Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens*\n\n*Neighborhood Ass'n. v. County of Albany and Albany County Bd. of Elections,* 522 F.3d 182, 191\n\n(2d Cir. 2007).\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 1730-1 Filed 04/28/23 Entered 04/28/23 17:09:55 Page 7 of 16\n\nThe Trustee makes no attempt whatsoever to rebut the \"forum rule\" because he cannot. Indeed, the Trustee has retained the Connecticut firm of Neubert, Pepe & Monteith, P.C. (\"Neubert, Pepe\"), to serve as both his local counsel and to handle matters that Paul Hastings cannot handle due to conflicts.[1](#page-6-0) Neubert, Pepe has handled motions to compel compliance with Rule 2004 subpoenas filed against some of the world's largest financial institutions when Paul Hastings has been conflicted. *See e.g.,* Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee for Entry of Order Compelling UBS AG to Comply with Rule 2004 Subpoena, [Doc. No. 1362], including the signature block of only Attorney Patrick Linsey of Neubert, Pepe because Paul Hastings could not be adverse to UBS AG; Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee for Entry of Order Compelling JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. to Comply with Rule 2004 Subpoena, [Doc. No. 1303], including the signature block of only Attorney Patrick Linsey of Neubert, Pepe because Paul Hastings could not be adverse to JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A.\n\nIf Neubert, Pepe has the competency to address motions to compel directed to UBS and JPMorgan Chase, they certainly have the competency to handle the routine Motion to Compel and Order to Show Cause that underlies the Fee Application. Thus, because the Trustee has failed to rebut the \"forum rule\" it is the hourly rate charged by lawyers of \"reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation within the District of Connecticut\", *In re Jackson*, at \\*10, that should be applied in determining what constitutes a reasonable fee \"to secure compliance with the Courtauthorized Subpoenas from the preparation and prosecution [of the] Motion to Compel through\n\n<span id=\"page-6-0\"></span><sup>1</sup> During an August 1, 2022 hearing, the Trustee represented, in response to concerns about Paul Hastings' billing rates, that the Trustee would rely on Attorneys Skalka and Linsey \"as much as we can.\" Transcript of Motion Hearing Before the Honorable Julie A. Manning United States Bankruptcy Judge, at 102:19-21. It does not appear that the Trustee is relying on Neubert, Pepe, of which he is not a member, and their substantially lowering billing rates \"as much as he can.\"\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 1730-1 Filed 04/28/23 Entered 04/28/23 17:09:55 Page 8 of 16\n\nand including the reasonable attorneys' fees and costs spent in relation to ongoing efforts to secure compliance . . . .\" Contempt Order, at 26.\n\nIn determining what constitutes a reasonable hourly rate within the forum, courts can consider evidence submitted by the parties, as well as rates within the community of which the court is aware. *In re. Jackson*, 2023 Bankr. LEXIS 464, at \\*15 (\"Beyond just this evidence [submitted by the parties], I am aware of, and can consider, the range of hourly rates awarded in similar cases in this District.\"). After noting the appropriateness of considering hourly rates awarded in similar cases, Judge Nevins went on to identify hourly rates of a number of Connecticut Bankruptcy Court practitioners, including some of the most senior members of Connecticut's Bankruptcy bar:\n\n*In re Simone, 18-21993 (JJT), 2022 Bankr. LEXIS 1558, 2022 WL 1923278, at \\*2 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 3, 2022)*(finding hourly rate of \\$565 reasonable for Attorney Irve Goldman, chair of the bankruptcy, creditors' rights, and financial restructuring practice at Pullman & Comley); *Jackson v. DeJesus (In re Jackson), 15-21233 (AMN), 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 367, 2020 WL 718609, at \\*4 (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 12, 2020)*(concluding \\$325 per hour reasonable for Attorney John Cesaroni, then an associate, now currently a partner at Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.). I am also aware of the hourly rates charged by attorneys in some of the more complex Chapter 11 cases pending recently in this District, including:\n\n• \\$695 per hour for Attorney Patrick Birney, partner at Robinson & Cole, LLP as debtor's counsel in *In re The Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation*, Case No. 21-20687 (JTT);\n\n• \\$450 per hour for Attorney Douglas Skalka, a principal of Neubert, Pepe & Monteith, P.C., as local counsel to the Chapter 11 Trustee in *In re Ho Wan Kwok*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM);\n\n• \\$400 per hour for Attorney Jeffrey Sklarz, partner at Green & Sklarz, LLC, as local counsel to debtors in *In re The Rosegarden Health and Rehabilitation Center, LLC*, jointly administered under Case No. 18-30623 (AMN);\n\n• \\$500 per hour for Attorney James Berman, partner at Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C., as counsel to debtors in *In re Servicom, LLC*, jointly administered under Case No. 18-31722 (AMN).\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 1730-1 Filed 04/28/23 Entered 04/28/23 17:09:55 Page 9 of 16\n\n*In re Jackson*, 2023 Bankr. LEXIS 464, at \\*15-16. Many of the attorneys identified by Judge Nevins have also appeared in this case: Attorney Goldman is lead counsel to the Creditor's Committee, Attorney Cesaroni has appeared for HK USA, Ms. Guo and the Individual Debtor, Attorney Birney and his law firm, Robinson & Cole, are Connecticut counsel to PAX, and Attorney Skalka is counsel to the Trustee.[2](#page-8-0)\n\nIn *In re Jackson* the fee applicants, who were New York practitioners, sought to be compensated at an hourly rate of \\$750 per hour. *Id.*, at 14. Judge Nevis found the proposed rate to be unreasonable, *id.*, and instead awarded fees based on an hourly rate of \\$500 which Judge Nevins concluded was reasonable \"[b]ased upon the prevailing rates ranging from \\$400 to \\$695 per hour in this District.\" *Id.*, at 16. *See also*, Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.5 (noting that one of the factors to be utilized in determining whether an attorneys' fee is reasonable is \"[t]he fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services\"); [3](#page-8-1) *Duracell Inc. v. Global Imps., Inc.,* 17-mc-185 P1 (KNF), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140093, at \\*22 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2018) (\"A reasonable hourly rate is the rate prevailing in the [relevant] community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.\" (quoting *Farbotko v. Clinto Cty. Of N.Y*., 433 F.3d 204, 208 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation omitted); *see*\n\n<span id=\"page-8-0\"></span><sup>2</sup> At the time of the filing of the Trustee's Application to Employ Neubert, Pepe & Monteith as Local Counsel and Special Conflicts Counsel in July 2022, Attorney Linsey's hourly billing rate was \\$350 and Attorney Skalka's hourly billing rate was \\$450 per hour. *See* Doc. No. 569, at 6, ¶18.\n\n<span id=\"page-8-1\"></span><sup>3</sup> Other factors identified in Rule 1.5 also weigh heavily against assessing fees at the rates charged by the Trustee's counsel. Neither the Motion to Compel nor the Order to Show Cause presented novel or difficult legal questions and did not require attorneys with any specialized training. *See* Rule 1.5 (a)(1). Moreover, the Motion to Compel was denied in part, *id.*, at (a)(4), and both the Motion to Compel and the Order to Show Cause were undertaken on a timeline chosen by the Trustee. *Id.*, at (a)(5). In short, the Trustee is seeking to recover almost \\$90,000 in fees for a run-of-the-mill Motion to Compel and subsequent Order to Show Cause.\n\n### Case 22-50073 Doc 1730-1 Filed 04/28/23 Entered 04/28/23 17:09:55 Page 10 of 16\n\n*also Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass'n v. County of Albany*, 493 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating \"a reasonable, paying client would in most cases hire counsel from within his district, or at least counsel whose rates are consistent with those charged locally.\"); *Peterson v. McAndrew*, 160 Conn. App. 180, 211-212 (Conn. App. 2015) (affirming trial court's grant of attorney's fees pursuant to prevailing rate for litigators in Stamford-Norwalk judicial district of \\$300-\\$425 per hour and rejecting argument that fees should be allowed based on attorneys' hourly rate of \\$520-\\$540 per hour).\n\nBased on the applicable \"forum rule\" and the prevailing rates within the District of Connecticut for attorneys of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation the rates charged by the Trustee's counsel, which with some timekeepers are as high as \\$1,625, are patently unreasonable within the District of Connecticut and should not be utilized in determining the amount of attorneys' fees to be awarded. At most, the Court should award a maximum hourly rate of \\$450 per hour for partners and counsel and a maximum of \\$350 per hour for associates, the same hourly rates charged by the Trustee's very capable local and conflicts counsel, Neubert, Pepe.[4](#page-9-0)\n\nMoreover, according to the Fee Application, the Applicants failed to utilize lower billing associates for this case, even though their billing rates are still far and away higher than similar and even more senior attorneys within the District of Connecticut. [5](#page-9-1) Specifically, the Applicant's\n\n<span id=\"page-9-0\"></span><sup>4</sup> The appropriate forum rates result in a blended rate of \\$400 per hour. The Trustee seeks recovery for 131.2 hours of attorney time. *See* Fee Application, at 2, Compensation by Individual. The total fees at a blended rate of \\$400 per hour for 131.2 hours is \\$52,480. Fifty percent of \\$52,480 is \\$26,240. That is the maximum the Applicants should be able to recover and the starting point from which the Court should make cuts for, *inter alia*, excessive and duplicative billing.\n\n<span id=\"page-9-1\"></span><sup>5</sup> Attorney Linsey is an associate with Neubert, Pepe, who, according to the State of Connecticut Judicial Branch, was first admitted to practice in November 2010, *see <http>* last visited April 27, 2023, and whose billing rate is, or at least was as of July 2022, \\$350 per hour. *See* Doc. No. 569, at 6,\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 1730-1 Filed 04/28/23 Entered 04/28/23 17:09:55 Page 11 of 16\n\npartners and of counsel attorneys, all of whom bill at rates of \\$1,625 or greater per hour (as of January 1, 2023), billed 69.10 hours to the Motion to Compel and Order to Show Cause, while associates billed 59.60.\n\nFor example, during October 2022, one \"Of Counsel\" member of Paul Hastings, billed 11.9 hours, which accounted for \\$17,969 in fees, leading up to the filing of the Motion to Compel on October 28, 2022. The work primarily consisted of reviewing and editing the motion. Thereafter, the same attorney billed 12.7 hours, which accounted for \\$19,177 in fees, in preparation for the oral argument for the motion to compel hearing and attending the hearings on November 29 and November 30, 2022, respectively. The Objectors submit that \\$37,146 in fees is unreasonable to assist with drafting the Motion to Compel and then arguing the motion.\n\nThe foregoing example illustrates one attorney's time out of the eight that billed time related to the Motion to Compel, and only comprises a small percentage of the total amount requested in the Fee Application. *See Hensley v. Eckerthardt*, 461 U.S. 424, 434, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1939-40 (1983) (stating that \"[c]ounsel for the prevailing party should make a good faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary….\"). And, while in analyzing fee applications \"a court need not, and indeed should not become [a] green eyeshade account[],\" *In re Jackson*, 2023 Bankr. LEXIS 464, at \\*13, (citations omitted), \"[a] court\n\n<sup>¶18.</sup> Paul Hastings junior associates who were first admitted to practice in 2021, eleven years after Attorney Linsey was admitted to practice, are billing in this matter for 2023 at the rate of \\$915 per hour, Attorney Kosciewicz, and \\$1,015 per hour, Attorney Sutton. *See* Fee Application, at 2. Paul Hastings senior associates assigned to this matter, none of whom are more senior than Attorney Linsey, bill at rates that are nearly four times higher than his. *See id.*, Attorney Barron, admitted to practice in 2012, billing at the hourly rate of \\$1,320, and Attorney Maza, also admitted to practice in 2012 and billing at the same hourly rate as Attorney Barron. Lastly, Paul Hastings midlevel associate, Attorney Farmer, who was first admitted to practice in 2018, less than five years ago, is billed at \\$1,120 per hour. *Id.* Attorney Farmer billed 22.7 hours for a total of \\$25,424 which Applicants seek to recover. *Id.* Those same hours at Attorney Linsey's billing rate would equate to \\$7,945 in fees.\n\nmay adjust the number of hours to account for items that are 'excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary . . . .\" *Id.* In this case, the Court should determine the amount of fees to be assessed by applying forum billing rates of \\$450 per hour for partners and counsel and \\$350 for associates to the hours worked. The Court should then apply an appropriate across the board cut to the total fees calculated based on the forum billing rates in order to account for excessive or otherwise unnecessary hours billed by Applicants. *Id.*, at \\*18 (calculating attorneys' fees based on a billing rate of \\$500 per hour and then applying a 15% across the board reduction to account for \"vague and excessive billing entries.\").\n\n## **B. The Applicants Arbitrarily Allocated Half of Their Fees Incurred for the Motion to Compel and Motion for Order to Show Cause to HK USA & Ms. Guo Despite the Numerous Other Parties Involved**\n\nThe Motion to Compel sought compliance with the Rule 2004 Subpoenas served upon seven different and differently situated parties, represented by different counsel and who in some instances were in various stages of responding to their respective subpoenas. Despite these substantial differences the Applicants prepared a single Motion to Compel. See Fee Application ¶ 2. The Applicants admit that because they filed a single motion, \"it is not possible, with absolute precision, to determine how much time was spent on each specific discovery target.\" Id. [6](#page-11-0)\n\nNotwithstanding this fact, the Applicants arbitrarily allocated one-half of all fees associated with the Motion to Compel and Order to Show Cause to HK USA and Ms. Guo, with respect to any time entries that did not specifically identify a particular discovery target. *See* Fee Application at ¶ 3. That calculation is without any basis. Instead, all time entries that do not specifically\n\n<span id=\"page-11-0\"></span><sup>6</sup> This issue is all the more pertinent given that Court's recent order [ECF No. 1709] granting the Trustee's motion to hold Golden Spring (New York) Ltd. and Lamp Capital LLC in contempt, and awarding attorneys fees and costs in connection with the same Motion to Compel.\n\naddress the target of the discovery should be denied and the Fee Application should be reduced by\n\nthe amount of fees associated with such time entries.\n\nCase law permits the Court to adopt across-the-board percentage cuts to the Fee\n\nApplication based on the arbitrary allocation of fees assessed to HK USA and Ms. Guo. In\n\n*Duracell Inc.* 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140093 at, \\*36-37, the district court stated in relevant part:\n\nCourts are not required to \"set forth item-by-item findings concerning what may be countless objections to individual billing items.\" *Lunday v. City of Albany*, 42 F.3d 131,134 (2d Cir. 1994). In calculating reasonable attorney's fees, \"the district court has the authority to make across-the-board percentage cuts in hours 'as a practical means of trimming fat from a fee application.'\" *In re \"Agent Orange\" Prod. Liability Litig*., 818 F.2d 226, 237-38 (2d Cir. 1987) (*quoting* Carey, 711 F.2d at 1146); *see, e.g., RCB Equities #3, LLC v. Alma Bldg., LLC*, No. 11-CV-1004, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32884, 2012 WL 832286 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 12 2012) (adopting the magistrate judge's recommendation to apply sixty percent reduction to the requested attorneys' fees in light of a slightly excessive number of hours and the straightforward nature of the action); *Gesualdi v. Stallone Testing Labs, Inc*., No. 10-CV-646, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77906, 2011 WL 2940606, at \\*1 (E.D.N.Y. July 19, 2011) (applying fifty percent reduction of the requested attorneys' fees in part because of \"poor drafting\" which casted \"doubt on the accuracy of a party's submissions to the court and forcing the court to expend resources unnecessarily as a result.); *Hernandez v. Punto Y Coma Corp*., No. 10-CV-3149, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128734, 2013 WL 4875074, at \\*12 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2013) (applying forty percent reduction because the application fee was excessive).\n\n\"While a multi-office firm is certainly free to allocate its work force as it sees fit, that does\n\nnot mean an adversary should be required to pay for those staffing decisions.\" *Daiwa Special Asset Corp. v. Desnick*, No. 00 Civ. 3856, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23073, 2022 WL 31767817, at \\*3-5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2002). There is much fat to trim here, particularly given the overstaffing that the Applicants employed, and the Court should therefore apply an appropriate across the board reduction to the fees ultimately awarded under the appropriate billing rates. *See id.* (applying a fifty percent reduction to the requested attorneys' fees for \"duplication of attorney efforts, the overstaffing of meetings and depositions, and the inefficient allocation of human resources.\").\n\n### **III. CONCLUSION**\n\n Based upon entry of the Contempt Order on March 10, 2023, and the eventual submission of a fee application by the Trustee, the Applicants were given thirty (30) days to file the Fee Application. The Court, however, failed to provide the HK Parties with the required time to object and respond to the Trustee's application. The HK Parties Motion for Reconsideration should be granted.\n\nDated: April 28, 2023 */s/ Lee Vartan*\n\nRoseland, New Jersey Lee Vartan (admitted pro hac vice) [lvartan@csglaw.com](mailto:lvartan@csglaw.com) Sam Della Fera, Jr. (admitted pro hac vice) [sdellafera@csglaw.com](mailto:sdellafera@csglaw.com)  Melissa F. Wernick (admitted pro hac vice) [mwernick@csglaw.com](mailto:mwernick@csglaw.com) **CHIESA SHAHINIAN & GIANTOMASI PC** 105 Eisenhower Parkway Roseland, NJ 07068 Telephone: (973) 325-1500 Facsimile: (973) 325-1501 *Attorneys for Mei Guo, HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC, Lee Vartan, Esq., and Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC*  Aaron A. Romney (ct28144)\n\n[aromney@zeislaw.com](mailto:aromney@zeislaw.com)  James M. Moriarty (ct21876) [jmoriarty@zeislaw.com](mailto:jmoriarty@zeislaw.com)  **ZEISLER & ZEISLER PC** 10 Middle Street, 15th Floor Bridgeport, CT 06604 Telephone: (203) 368-4234 Facsimile: (203) 368-5485 *Local Counsel for Mei Guo, HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC, Lee Vartan, Esq., and Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC*\n\n## **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\nIn re:\n\nHO WAN KWOK,\n\nDebtor.\n\nChapter 11\n\nCase No: 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n# **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI hereby certify that on this 28th day of April, 2023, a copy of foregoing was filed electronically. Notice of this filing will be sent by e-mail to all parties by operation of the Court's electronic filing system or by mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing as indicated on the Notice ofElectronic Filing. Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF System.\n\nDated: April 28, 2023 */s/ Lee Vartan*\n\n Roseland, New Jersey Lee Vartan (admitted pro hac vice) [lvartan@csglaw.com](mailto:lvartan@csglaw.com) Sam Della Fera, Jr. (admitted pro hac vice) [sdellafera@csglaw.com](mailto:sdellafera@csglaw.com)  Melissa F. Wernick (admitted pro hac vice) [mwernick@csglaw.com](mailto:mwernick@csglaw.com) **CHIESA SHAHINIAN & GIANTOMASI PC** 105 Eisenhower Parkway Roseland, NJ 07068 Telephone: (973) 325-1500 Facsimile: (973) 325-1501 *Attorneys for Mei Guo, HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC, Lee Vartan, Esq., and Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC*\n\n *and*\n\n16\n\nAaron A. Romney (ct28144) [aromney@zeislaw.com](mailto:aromney@zeislaw.com)  James M. Moriarty (ct21876) [jmoriarty@zeislaw.com](mailto:jmoriarty@zeislaw.com)  **ZEISLER & ZEISLER PC** 10 Middle Street, 15th Floor Bridgeport, CT 06604 Telephone: (203) 368-4234 Facsimile: (203) 368-5485 *Local Counsel for Mei Guo, HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC, Lee Vartan, Esq., and Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC*","body_zh":"美国康涅狄格联邦破产法院\n布里奇波特分院\n\n关于：\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），\n\n第11章\n\n案号 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n债务人。\n支持复议动议的法律备忘录\n\n根据 D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 7，并经 D. Conn. Bankr. L. R. 1001-1(b) 适用于本程序，HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC（HK国际基金投资（美国）有限责任公司，以下简称“HK USA”）、Mei Guo（郭梅，以下简称“Guo 女士”）、Lee Vartan, Esq.（李·瓦尔坦律师，以下简称“Vartan 律师”）及 Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC（Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC 律师事务所，以下简称“CSG Law”，并与 HK USA、Guo 女士及 Vartan 律师合称“HK 各方”），通过其下方签署的律师，谨提交本法律备忘录，以支持 HK 各方就本院 2023年4月21日根据制裁命令作出的裁定第11章受托人及其律师费用裁定（以下简称“费用裁定”）[Doc. No. 1693] 所提出的复议动议。该裁定向个人债务人财产判给 $83,370.26 的律师费，用于支付给 Paul Hastings LLP（普衡律师事务所），并要求 HK 各方于 2023年5月5日或之前支付该等费用。费用裁定进一步命令 HK 各方对支付该等费用承担连带责任。\n\nHK 各方寻求复议，以纠正因费用裁定所导致的明显错误和显失公正；该裁定是在 HK 各方未获任何机会对第11章受托人及其律师 Paul Hastings LLP（普衡律师事务所）（合称“申请人”）就为确保遵守经本院授权的传票所提供服务提出的特别费用申请（以下简称“费用申请”）[Doc No. 1648] 提出异议的情况下作出的。\n\nI. 背景\n\n2022年10月28日，第11章受托人（以下简称“受托人”）根据《联邦民事诉讼规则》第26条和第37条以及《联邦破产程序规则》第2004条和第9016条，提交了一项要求遵守 Rule 2004 传票（以下简称“Rule 2004 传票”）的强制执行动议（以下简称“强制执行动议”）[Doc No. 1046]。该单一强制执行动议请求七个不同当事人遵守向其送达的传票：(i) Ho Won Kwok（郭文贵，以下简称“个人债务人”）；(ii) HK USA；(iii) Guo 女士；(iv) Hing Chi Ngok（邢志岳）；(v) Greenwich Land LLC（格林尼治土地有限责任公司）；(vi) Lamp Capital LLC（兰普资本有限责任公司）；及 (vii) Golden Spring (New York) Ltd.（金泉〔纽约〕有限公司）（以下简称“强制执行动议当事人”）。此后，在作出部分准许强制执行动议的命令后，受托人于 2023年2月10日提交了一项要求说明理由的动议，要求说明为何不应因个人债务人、HK USA 及 Guo 女士未能充分回应准许强制执行动议的命令而认定其藐视法庭（以下简称“说明理由命令”）[Doc No. 1453]。\n\n2023年3月10日，本院作出认定 HK 各方藐视法庭并对其实施制裁的命令（以下简称“藐视法庭命令”）[Doc. No. 1537]。根据藐视法庭命令，HK USA 及 Guo 女士因未能遵守下列命令而被认定为民事藐视法庭：(i) 本院于 2023年1月20日作出的部分准许受托人提出的要求遵守 Rule 2004 传票的强制执行动议的命令 [ECF No. 1353]；及 (ii) 本院于 2023年2月13日作出的部分准许受托人提出的要求出庭并说明本院为何不应认定 HK 各方藐视法庭的动议的命令 [ECF No. 1455]。\n\n此外，藐视法庭命令认定 HK USA、Guo 女士、Vartan 律师及 CSG Law 对与受托人为确保遵守 Rule 2004\n案号 22-50073 文书 1730-1 于 04/28/23 提交 于 04/28/23 17:09:55 登记 第 3 页，共 16 页\n\n传票及推进强制执行动议所作努力相关的合理律师费和成本，作为补偿性损害赔偿，承担连带责任并受制裁。藐视法庭命令还认定，受托人为确保遵守 Rule 2004 传票所产生的合理律师费和成本，将“由本院根据受托人的费用申请确定，该等申请应于 2023年3月24日或之前提交。”见藐视法庭命令，第26页。\n\n2023年3月17日，受托人根据《破产程序规则》第9006(b)条提交了一项无异议动议，请求作出延长根据藐视法庭命令提交费用申请期限的命令（以下简称“延长期限动议”）[Doc No. 1558]。在提交延长期限动议之前，受托人的律师请求 HK 各方同意提交该动议，HK 各方已同意。\n\n根据日期为 2023年3月20日的命令，本院准许了受托人的延长期限动议，将提交费用申请的日期延长十日，至 2023年4月3日。在 2023年3月30日的一次状态会议期间，受托人的律师请求第二次延长期限，将提交费用申请的期限延至 2023年4月10日，本院予以准许。此后，于 2023年4月10日，受托人提交了费用申请 [Doc No. 1648]。\n\n《联邦破产程序规则》第2002(a)(6)条规制费用申请，并在相关部分规定：\n\n向利害关系方发出二十一日期限通知。除本规则第 (h)、(i)、(l)、(p) 及 (q) 款另有规定外，书记员或本院可能指示的其他人，应至少提前21日通过邮寄向债务人、受托人、全体债权人及契约受托人发出下列事项的通知：……(6) 如任何实体请求的报酬或费用偿还超过 $1,000，就该请求举行听证会。\n\n此外，经地方破产规则 1001-1(b) 适用于本程序的 D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 7(a) 规定，反对动议的法律备忘录“应于动议提交后二十一（21）日内提交。”本院并未为 HK 各方提交\n案号 22-50073 文书 1730-1 于 04/28/23 提交 于 04/28/23 17:09:55 登记 第 4 页，共 16 页\n\n针对费用申请的异议设定期限。因此，根据上述规则，基于 2023年4月10日的提交日期，HK 各方对费用申请提出异议的期限不得早于 2023年5月1日；且在尚未发出听证会通知的情况下，至少应在发出听证会通知后二十一（21）日方可举行听证会。\n\n尽管《破产程序规则》第2002(a)(6)条及 D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 7(a) 规定了上述期限，且本院未为 HK 各方反对费用申请另行规定任何期限，本院仍于 2023年4月21日作出费用裁定，当时 HK 各方的答复期限尚未届满。事实上，若 HK 各方获得适当机会反对费用申请，其本会基于以下论点对所请求的救济提出异议；该等论点清楚表明受托人无权获得本院裁定给予的赔偿。\n\nII. 论证\n\nD. Conn. L. Civ. R. 7(c) 规定，复议动议仅在“动议方能够指出本院在最初决定或命令中忽略的具有控制力的判决或资料”时方可有限使用。D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 7(c)。\n\n“复议动议属于本院的合理酌情决定权。”Talyosef v. Saul, Docket No. 3:17-CV-01451(KAD), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101433, *8 (D. Conn., June 9, 2020)（引文略）。“足以支持复议的理由”包括“纠正明显错误或防止显失公正的需要。”Nesbitt v. Bemer, Docket No. 3:18-CV-00699 (VLB), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185458, at *7-8 (D. Conn. Oct. 30, 2018)，引用 Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd. v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir. 1992)。“在复议动议的语境下，‘显失公正’被界定为审判法院作出的直接、明显且可观察到的错误。”Talyosef, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101433, at *8，引用 Corpac v. Does, 10 F. Supp. 3d 349, 354 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)；另见 Waller v. City of Middletown, 89 F. Supp. 3d 279, 282-83 (D. Conn. 2015)（部分准许复议动议，以纠正明显错误并避免显失公正）。\n\n在本案中，为处理本院在未给予 HK 各方答复及证明包括受托人费用为何不合理在内事项之机会的情况下准许费用申请，从而对 HK 各方造成的正当程序剥夺，复议具有正当性。事实上，HK 各方谨陈，由于本院未允许对费用申请提出任何异议，其忽略了如下所述将改变本院所作结论的论点和法律依据，因而应纠正明显错误并防止对 HK 各方造成显失公正。因此，复议具有必要性和适当性，且应准许 HK 各方的动议。\n\nA. 所请求的费用显然不合理\n\n本院认定受托人所请求的费用合理，但未阐明该认定的依据，包括为何受托人律师收取的小时费率在康涅狄格地区内合理。见费用裁定，第1页。事实上，本院似乎接受了申请人毫无依据的陈述，即“该等费用基于在竞争性的全国法律市场中、可比非破产案件中由具备可比技能的执业人员通常收取的报酬，属于合理费用。”费用申请，第10页。申请人既未界定其小时计费费率在其中属合理的“全国法律市场”，亦未提交任何其他律师事务所的证据，更遑论来自未经界定的“全国法律市场”的律师事务所，证明其按与 Paul Hastings 相同的小时费率计费。缺乏该等证据可以理解，因为极少有律师事务所的计费费率与 Paul Hastings 处于同一水平，包括为初级律师每小时计费超过 $1,000。\n\n见费用申请，第2页，“按个人列示的报酬”，初级律师 Ezra Sutton 每小时计费\n\n$1,015.00。\n\n藐视法庭命令中的制裁要求 HK 各方支付“合理的律师费\n\n和成本……”。藐视法庭命令，第25-26页，着重号为原文所加。在第二巡回区，\n\n合理的小时费率通常是“付费客户愿意支付的费率”，并须牢记“合理的付费客户希望以有效诉讼案件所必需的最低支出进行诉讼。”Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 190。“在评估合理小时费率时，法院会考虑该社区中具备合理可比技能、经验和声誉的律师提供类似服务所通行的市场费率。”Bozdogan v. 23 Ludlam Fuel, Inc., 16-CV-1053 (JMW), 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 233168, 2022 WL 17987044, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2022)（内部引文略）。相关社区为审查法院所在地的地区。这被称为“法院所在地规则”。见 Simmons v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 575 F.3d 170, 174-75 (2d Cir. 2009)。\n\nJackson v. GSO Bus. Mgmt., LLC (In re Jackson), Chap. 11 Case No.: 15-21233 (AMN), Adv.\n\nProc. No. 17-2068, 2023 Bankr. LEXIS 464, at *10, 2023 WL 2202738 (Bankr. D. Conn., Feb.\n\n23, 2023).\n\n法院并不受“法院所在地规则”的约束，并可在少见情形下于裁定律师费时适用\n\n法院所在地以外的小时费率：\n\n[A] 地区法院可在计算推定合理费用时使用地区外的小时费率，或使用所请求的地区外费率与当地律师收取的费率之间的某一费率，前提是显然合理的付费客户本会支付该等较高费率。然而，我们推定合理的付费客户在大多数案件中会聘请其所在地区内的律师，或至少聘请费率与当地收取的费率一致的律师。该推定可被推翻——尽管仅限于不寻常的案件——若希望地区法院使用较高费率的一方证明，在当时情况下其聘请地区外律师是合理的。\n\nIn re Jackson, 2023 Bankr. LEXIS 464, at *11-12，引用 Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens\n\nNeighborhood Ass'n. v. County of Albany and Albany County Bd. of Elections, 522 F.3d 182, 191\n\n（第二巡回区，2007年）。\n案号 22-50073 文件 1730-1 提交日期 04/28/23 录入日期 04/28/23 17:09:55 第 7 页，共 16 页\n\n受托人完全未试图反驳“属地规则”，因为他无法反驳。事实上，受托人聘请了康涅狄格州律师事务所 Neubert, Pepe & Monteith, P.C.（纽伯特、佩佩及蒙蒂思律师事务所，以下简称“Neubert, Pepe”）担任其本地律师，并处理 Paul Hastings（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所）因利益冲突而无法处理的事项。[1] 当 Paul Hastings 存在利益冲突时，Neubert, Pepe 曾处理要求全球一些最大的金融机构遵守 Rule 2004 传票的强制履行动议。参见，例如，Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee for Entry of Order Compelling UBS AG（瑞银集团）to Comply with Rule 2004 Subpoena, [Doc. No. 1362]，其中仅包含 Neubert, Pepe 的 Patrick Linsey 律师的签字栏，因为 Paul Hastings 不能与 UBS AG 对立；Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee for Entry of Order Compelling JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A.（摩根大通银行）to Comply with Rule 2004 Subpoena, [Doc. No. 1303]，其中仅包含 Neubert, Pepe 的 Patrick Linsey 律师的签字栏，因为 Paul Hastings 不能与 JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. 对立。\n\n如果 Neubert, Pepe 有能力处理针对 UBS 和 JPMorgan Chase 的强制履行动议，他们当然也有能力处理构成费用申请基础的常规强制履行动议和说明理由命令。因此，由于受托人未能反驳“属地规则”，在确定为“为确保遵守经法院授权的传票，自准备和提出强制履行动议直至\n\n1 在 2022年8月1日的听证会上，受托人就对 Paul Hastings 计费费率的担忧陈述称，受托人将“尽可能多地”依赖 Skalka 律师和 Linsey 律师。Transcript of Motion Hearing Before the Honorable Julie A. Manning United States Bankruptcy Judge, at 102:19-21。受托人似乎并未“尽可能多地”依赖 Neubert, Pepe——其并非该所成员——及其大幅较低的计费费率。\n案号 22-50073 文件 1730-1 提交日期 04/28/23 录入日期 04/28/23 17:09:55 第 8 页，共 16 页\n\n包括为持续努力确保遵守……所支出的合理律师费及费用”所构成的合理费用时，应适用“康涅狄格州联邦地区内具有合理可比技能、经验和声誉的律师”所收取的小时费率，In re Jackson, at *10。Contempt Order, at 26。\n\n在确定属地内何种小时费率合理时，法院可以考虑当事人提交的证据，以及法院所知悉的该社区内的费率。In re. Jackson, 2023 Bankr. LEXIS 464, at *15（“除该等证据[由当事人提交]之外，我还知悉并可以考虑本地区类似案件中裁定的小时费率范围。”）。在指出考虑类似案件中裁定的小时费率具有适当性后，Nevins 法官继而列举了若干康涅狄格州破产法院执业律师的小时费率，其中包括康涅狄格州破产律师界的一些最资深成员：\n\n*In re Simone, 18-21993 (JJT), 2022 Bankr. LEXIS 1558, 2022 WL 1923278, at *2 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 3, 2022)*（认定 Pullman & Comley（普尔曼与康利律师事务所）破产、债权人权利和金融重组业务主席 Irve Goldman 律师的 \\$565 小时费率合理）；*Jackson v. DeJesus (In re Jackson), 15-21233 (AMN), 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 367, 2020 WL 718609, at *4 (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 12, 2020)*（认定当时为助理律师、现为 Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（泽斯勒与泽斯勒律师事务所）合伙人的 John Cesaroni 律师每小时 \\$325 的费率合理）。我还知悉近期在本地区审理的一些较复杂 Chapter 11 案件中律师收取的小时费率，包括：\n\n• Robinson & Cole, LLP（罗宾逊与科尔律师事务所）合伙人 Patrick Birney 律师，在 In re The Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation, Case No. 21-20687 (JTT) 中担任债务人律师，\\$695 每小时；\n\n• Neubert, Pepe & Monteith, P.C. 的负责人 Douglas Skalka 律师，在 In re Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) 中担任 Chapter 11 受托人的本地律师，\\$450 每小时；\n\n• Green & Sklarz, LLC（格林与斯克拉茨律师事务所）合伙人 Jeffrey Sklarz 律师，在 In re The Rosegarden Health and Rehabilitation Center, LLC, jointly administered under Case No. 18-30623 (AMN) 中担任债务人的本地律师，\\$400 每小时；\n\n• Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. 合伙人 James Berman 律师，在 In re Servicom, LLC, jointly administered under Case No. 18-31722 (AMN) 中担任债务人律师，\\$500 每小时。\n案号 22-50073 文件 1730-1 提交日期 04/28/23 录入日期 04/28/23 17:09:55 第 9 页，共 16 页\n\nIn re Jackson, 2023 Bankr. LEXIS 464, at *15-16。Nevins 法官列明的许多律师也已在本案中出庭：Goldman 律师为债权人委员会的首席律师，Cesaroni 律师曾代表 HK USA（凯旋美国）、Guo 女士和个人债务人出庭，Birney 律师及其所在律师事务所 Robinson & Cole 为 PAX 的康涅狄格州律师，Skalka 律师则为受托人的律师。[2]\n\n在 In re Jackson 中，费用申请人均为纽约州执业律师，其请求按每小时 \\$750 的费率获得补偿。Id., at 14。Nevis 法官认定所提议的费率不合理，id.，转而依据每小时 \\$500 的费率裁定律师费；Nevins 法官认定该费率“[b]ased upon the prevailing rates ranging from \\$400 to \\$695 per hour in this District”合理。Id., at 16。另参见 Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.5（指出，用于确定律师费是否合理的因素之一是“[t]he fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services”）；[3] Duracell Inc. v. Global Imps., Inc., 17-mc-185 P1 (KNF), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140093, at *22 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2018)（“合理的小时费率是相关社区中，具有合理可比技能、经验和声誉的律师提供类似服务所通行的费率。”（引自 Farbotko v. Clinto Cty. Of N.Y., 433 F.3d 204, 208 (2d Cir. 2005)（内部引文略）；参见\n\n2 在受托人于 2022年7月提交 Application to Employ Neubert, Pepe & Monteith as Local Counsel and Special Conflicts Counsel 时，Linsey 律师的小时计费费率为 \\$350，Skalka 律师的小时计费费率为 \\$450 每小时。参见 Doc. No. 569, at 6, ¶18。\n\n3 Rule 1.5 所列的其他因素也强烈不支持按受托人律师收取的费率计取律师费。强制履行动议和说明理由命令均未提出新颖或困难的法律问题，也不需要具备任何专门培训的律师。参见 Rule 1.5 (a)(1)。此外，强制履行动议被部分驳回，id., at (a)(4)，且强制履行动议和说明理由命令均在受托人选择的时间表内进行。Id., at (a)(5)。简言之，受托人请求就一项普通的强制履行动议及后续说明理由命令追偿近 \\$90,000 的费用。\n案号 22-50073 文件 1730-1 提交日期 04/28/23 录入日期 04/28/23 17:09:55 第 10 页，共 16 页\n\n另参见 Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass'n v. County of Albany, 493 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2007)（称“在大多数情况下，一个理性的付费客户会聘请其所在地区内的律师，或者至少聘请费率与当地收费一致的律师。”）；Peterson v. McAndrew, 160 Conn. App. 180, 211-212 (Conn. App. 2015)（维持初审法院依据 Stamford-Norwalk 司法区诉讼律师每小时 \\$300-\\$425 的通行费率裁定律师费，并驳回应依据律师每小时 \\$520-\\$540 费率准许律师费的主张）。\n\n基于适用的“属地规则”以及康涅狄格州联邦地区内具有合理可比技能、经验和声誉的律师的通行费率，受托人律师收取的费率——其中一些计时人员的费率高达 \\$1,625——在康涅狄格州联邦地区显然不合理，不应被用于确定应裁定的律师费金额。法院至多应向合伙人和顾问律师裁定每小时最高 \\$450 的费率，并向助理律师裁定每小时最高 \\$350 的费率，即受托人极具能力的本地律师和利益冲突律师 Neubert, Pepe 所收取的相同小时费率。[4]\n\n此外，根据费用申请，申请人未在本案中使用计费费率较低的助理律师，尽管其计费费率仍远高于康涅狄格州联邦地区内具有类似资历甚至更资深的律师。[5] 具体而言，申请人的\n\n4 适当的属地费率得出的综合费率为 \\$400 每小时。受托人请求追偿 131.2 小时的律师工作时间。参见 Fee Application, at 2, Compensation by Individual。按 \\$400 每小时的综合费率计算，131.2 小时的总费用为 \\$52,480。\\$52,480 的百分之五十为 \\$26,240。这是申请人应能够追偿的最高金额，也是法院应据以因包括过度和重复计费在内的情形予以扣减的起点。\n\n5 Linsey 律师是 Neubert, Pepe 的一名助理律师；根据 State of Connecticut Judicial Branch，其首次获准执业的时间为 2010年11月，*see * last visited April 27, 2023，且其计费费率是——或者至少截至 2022年7月为——\\$350 每小时。参见 Doc. No. 569, at 6,\n案号 22-50073 文件 1730-1 提交日期 04/28/23 录入日期 04/28/23 17:09:55 第 11 页，共 16 页\n\n合伙人和顾问律师，截至 2023年1月1日其所有人的计费费率均为 \\$1,625 或更高，就强制履行动议和说明理由命令计费 69.10 小时，而助理律师计费 59.60 小时。\n\n例如，在 2022年10月，Paul Hastings 的一名“Of Counsel”成员在 2022年10月28日提交强制履行动议之前计费 11.9 小时，计为 \\$17,969 的费用。该工作主要包括审阅和编辑该动议。此后，该同一律师为准备强制履行动议听证会的口头辩论，以及分别于 2022年11月29日和11月30日出席听证会，计费 12.7 小时，计为 \\$19,177 的费用。异议人主张，为协助起草强制履行动议并随后就该动议进行辩论而收取 \\$37,146 的费用不合理。\n\n上述例子说明了八名就强制履行动议相关工作计费的律师中一名律师的时间，仅占费用申请所请求总金额的一小部分。参见 Hensley v. Eckerthardt, 461 U.S. 424, 434, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1939-40 (1983)（称“胜诉方律师应本着善意，从费用请求中排除过多、重复或其他不必要的小时数……。”）。而且，尽管在分析费用申请时，“法院不必、事实上也不应成为[a] green eyeshade account[]，”In re Jackson, 2023 Bankr. LEXIS 464, at *13,（引文略），“[a] court\n\n¶18. Paul Hastings（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所）于2021年首次获准执业的初级律师助理，比Linsey律师获准执业晚十一年，就本事项在2023年按每小时\\$915的费率计费的是Kosciewicz律师，按每小时\\$1,015的费率计费的是Sutton律师。见费用申请，第2页。被指派处理本事项的Paul Hastings高级律师助理中，无一人的资历高于Linsey律师，但其计费费率几乎是Linsey律师的四倍。见同上，Barron律师于2012年获准执业，按每小时\\$1,320的费率计费；Maza律师亦于2012年获准执业，且按与Barron律师相同的小时费率计费。最后，Paul Hastings的中级律师助理Farmer律师于2018年首次获准执业，即不足五年前，其计费费率为每小时\\$1,120。同上。Farmer律师计费22.7小时，共计\\$25,424，申请人请求予以追偿。同上。按Linsey律师的计费费率计算，相同小时数的律师费应为\\$7,945。\n\n可调整小时数，以计入“过高、重复或其他不必要的……项目。”同上。在本案中，法院应通过将本地计费费率，即合伙人和顾问律师每小时\\$450、律师助理每小时\\$350，适用于实际工作小时数，来确定应裁定的律师费金额。随后，法院应对根据本地计费费率计算的律师费总额作出适当的统一扣减，以计入申请人计费的过高或其他不必要的小时数。同上，第\\*18页（按每小时\\$500的计费费率计算律师费后，再统一减少15%，以计入“模糊且过高的计费条目。”）。\n\nB. 尽管涉及众多其他当事人，申请人仍任意将其因提出强制执行动议和说明理由令动议所产生费用的一半分摊给HK USA和Guo女士\n\n强制执行动议寻求促使七个不同且情况各异的当事人遵守向其送达的Rule 2004传票；该等当事人由不同律师代理，并且在某些情形下正处于对各自传票作出回应的不同阶段。尽管存在这些重大差异，申请人仍准备了一份单一的强制执行动议。见费用申请第2段。申请人承认，由于其提交的是单一动议，“不可能以绝对精确的方式确定为每一特定证据开示对象所花费的时间。”同上。[6]\n\n尽管如此，对于未具体指明某一特定证据开示对象的任何工时记录，申请人仍任意将与强制执行动议和说明理由令有关的全部费用之一半分摊给HK USA和Guo女士。见费用申请第3段。该计算毫无依据。相反，所有未具体\n\n6 鉴于法院近期作出的命令[ECF No. 1709]准许受托人提出的动议，认定Golden Spring (New York) Ltd.（金泉〈纽约〉有限公司）和Lamp Capital LLC（蓝普资本有限责任公司）藐视法庭，并裁定支付与同一强制执行动议有关的律师费和费用，此问题尤为重要。\n\n说明证据开示对象的工时记录均应予以驳回，且费用申请应按\n\n与该等工时记录相关的费用金额予以减少。\n\n判例法允许法院基于任意分摊给HK USA和Guo女士的费用，对\n\n费用申请作出统一百分比扣减。在Duracell Inc.，2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140093，第\\*36-37页中，地区法院在相关部分指出：\n\n法院无需“就可能数不胜数的针对个别计费项目的异议逐项作出认定。”Lunday v. City of Albany, 42 F.3d 131,134 (2d Cir. 1994)。在计算合理律师费时，“地区法院有权作出统一百分比的小时数扣减，‘作为从费用申请中剔除冗余部分的实用手段。’”In re \"Agent Orange\" Prod. Liability Litig., 818 F.2d 226, 237-38 (2d Cir. 1987)（引自Carey, 711 F.2d at 1146）；例如，RCB Equities #3, LLC v. Alma Bldg., LLC, No. 11-CV-1004, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32884, 2012 WL 832286 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 12 2012)（鉴于小时数略有过高及诉讼性质简单，采纳治安法官关于对所请求律师费减少百分之六十的建议）；Gesualdi v. Stallone Testing Labs, Inc., No. 10-CV-646, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77906, 2011 WL 2940606, at \\*1 (E.D.N.Y. July 19, 2011)（对所请求律师费减少百分之五十，部分原因是“拙劣的起草”，其对“一方提交法院材料的准确性产生疑问，并因此迫使法院不必要地耗费资源。”）；Hernandez v. Punto Y Coma Corp., No. 10-CV-3149, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128734, 2013 WL 4875074, at \\*12 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2013)（因费用申请过高而减少百分之四十）。\n\n“虽然一家设有多个办事处的律师事务所当然可以按其认为适当的方式配置其劳动力，但这\n\n并不意味着对方应被要求支付该等人员配置决定所产生的费用。”Daiwa Special Asset Corp. v. Desnick, No. 00 Civ. 3856, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23073, 2022 WL 31767817, at \\*3-5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2002)。此处有大量冗余费用可予剔除，尤其考虑到申请人采用了人员过度配置，故法院应按适当计费费率，对最终裁定的费用作出适当的统一扣减。见同上（因“律师工作重复、会议和证言录取中的人员过度配置，以及人力资源配置低效”，对所请求律师费减少百分之五十）。\n\nIII. 结论\n\n基于于March 10, 2023作出藐视法庭命令，以及受托人最终提交费用申请，申请人获给予三十（30）日提交费用申请。然而，法院未给予HK各方提出异议并答复受托人申请所需的时间。应准许HK各方的复议动议。\n\n日期：April 28, 2023 /s/ Lee Vartan\n\nRoseland, New Jersey　Lee Vartan（李·瓦尔坦）（获准pro hac vice出庭）[lvartan@csglaw.com]\nSam Della Fera, Jr.（小萨姆·德拉费拉）（获准pro hac vice出庭）[sdellafera@csglaw.com]\nMelissa F. Wernick（梅利莎·F·韦尼克）（获准pro hac vice出庭）[mwernick@csglaw.com]\nCHIESA SHAHINIAN & GIANTOMASI PC（奇萨·沙希尼安及贾恩托马西专业公司）\n105 Eisenhower Parkway\nRoseland, NJ 07068\n电话：(973) 325-1500\n传真：(973) 325-1501\nMei Guo（郭美）、HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC（HK国际基金投资〈美国〉有限责任公司）、Lee Vartan, Esq.（李·瓦尔坦律师）及Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC的代理律师\n\nAaron A. Romney（阿伦·A·罗姆尼）(ct28144)\n[aromney@zeislaw.com]\nJames M. Moriarty（詹姆斯·M·莫里亚蒂）(ct21876) [jmoriarty@zeislaw.com]\nZEISLER & ZEISLER PC（泽斯勒及泽斯勒专业公司）\n10 Middle Street, 15th Floor\nBridgeport, CT 06604\n电话：(203) 368-4234\n传真：(203) 368-5485\nMei Guo、HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC、Lee Vartan, Esq.及Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC的本地律师\n美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院\n布里奇波特分院\n\n关于：\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），\n\n债务人。\n\nChapter 11\n\nCase No: 22-50073 (JAM)\n送达证明\n\n本人特此证明，于2023年4月28日，前述文件副本已以电子方式提交。根据法院电子提交系统的运作，本次提交的通知将通过电子邮件发送给所有当事人；对于无法接受电子提交者，则按电子提交通知中所示通过邮件发送。当事人可通过法院的CM/ECF系统查阅本次提交。\n\n日期：April 28, 2023 /s/ Lee Vartan\n\nRoseland, New Jersey　Lee Vartan（李·瓦尔坦）（获准pro hac vice出庭）[lvartan@csglaw.com]\nSam Della Fera, Jr.（小萨姆·德拉费拉）（获准pro hac vice出庭）[sdellafera@csglaw.com]\nMelissa F. Wernick（梅利莎·F·韦尼克）（获准pro hac vice出庭）[mwernick@csglaw.com]\nCHIESA SHAHINIAN & GIANTOMASI PC（奇萨·沙希尼安及贾恩托马西专业公司）\n105 Eisenhower Parkway\nRoseland, NJ 07068\n电话：(973) 325-1500\n传真：(973) 325-1501\nMei Guo（郭美）、HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC（HK国际基金投资〈美国〉有限责任公司）、Lee Vartan, Esq.（李·瓦尔坦律师）及Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC的代理律师\n\n及\nAaron A. Romney（阿伦·A·罗姆尼）(ct28144) [aromney@zeislaw.com]\nJames M. Moriarty（詹姆斯·M·莫里亚蒂）(ct21876) [jmoriarty@zeislaw.com]\nZEISLER & ZEISLER PC（泽斯勒及泽斯勒专业公司）\n10 Middle Street, 15th Floor\nBridgeport, CT 06604\n电话：(203) 368-4234\n传真：(203) 368-5485\nMei Guo、HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC、Lee Vartan, Esq.及Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC的本地律师","key_entities":["Guo","Paul Hastings","Je","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","CIPA"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":1353,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1455,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1709,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":5170,"status":"published","published_at":"2023-04-28 00:00:00","created_at":"2023-04-28","updated_at":"2026-08-23 18:48:18"}