{"id":"court_ctb_1813_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":1813,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION x : : : : : : :","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"### **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\nx : : : : : : :\n\nIn re:\n\nHO WAN KWOK, *et al*.,\n\nChapter 11\n\nCase No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\nDebtors.\n\n## **GREENWICH LAND, LLC'S AND HING CHI NGOK'S OBJECTION TO THE CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE'S FIFTH SUPPLEMENTAL OMNIBUS MOTION OF CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR RULE 2004 DISCOVERY**\n\nParties-in-Interest and Defendants in Adversary Proceeding No. 23-05005 (the \"Adversary Proceeding\") Greenwich Land, LLC (\"Greenwich Land\") and Hing Chi Ngok (\"Ms. Ngok\" and together with Greenwich Land, \"Defendants\") respectfully submit this objection to Chapter 11 Trustee Luc A. Despins' (the \"Trustee\") Fifth Supplemental Omnibus Motion for Entry of an Order Under Bankruptcy Rule 2004 Authorizing Discovery (the \"Rule 2004 Motion\") (ECF 1789).\n\n#### **INTRODUCTION**\n\n1. The Trustee filed the Adversary Proceeding against Defendants alleging Ms. Ngok is not the real owner of Greenwich Land, but rather that her husband the Debtor Ho Wan Kwok (\"Debtor\") is the true equitable owner. The Trustee obtained an *ex parte* attachment and *ex parte* temporary restraining order against Defendants in the Adversary Proceeding based on his sworn certification that he possessed sufficient evidence for the extraordinary relief.\n\n2. Having commenced the Adversary Proceeding, the Trustee must now abide by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Nevertheless, the Trustee is bucking decades of caselaw and seeking to conduct shadow discovery away from Defendants but for use in the Adversary Proceeding under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2004.\n\n#### **RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND**\n\n3. The Trustee commenced this Adversary Proceeding on March 27, 2023 (ECF 1). The same day, the Trustee made his *ex parte* PJR Application pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §52- 278e(a) (\"PJR Application\") (ECF 11), and *ex parte* PI Motion (including for a TRO) (ECF 12). The PJR Application and PI Motion both seek similar relief to attach the Taconic Property and to enjoin Defendants from taking any action to encumber or transfer the Taconic Property. (ECF 4, ¶2 (PJR Application); ECF 12, ¶¶1-2 (Motion)).\n\n4. On March 28, 2023, the Court entered the Trustee's proposed order and granted the PJR Application (the \"PJR Order\" (ECF 15)). The same day, the Court granted the Trustee's Motion for an *ex parte* temporary restraining order (\"TRO\") and set a hearing on the Trustee's PI Motion (ECF 14), which hearing is now scheduled to commence on May 30, 2023.\n\n5. On May 15, 2023, the Trustee filed his Rule 2004 Motion. Among the relief sought by the Trustee, is discovery from Bento Technologies, Inc. (\"Bento\"). The Rule 2004 Motion makes clear that the Trustee is seeking the discovery from Bento for use in the Adversary Proceeding. Specifically, the Rule 2004 Motion alleges that \"Bento has, among other things, been the recipient of significant funds from Greenwich Land LLC ….\" ECF 1789, pp. 4-5. The Trustee says nothing further than that Bento has information relevant to Greenwich Land, and his sprinkling of speculation that it may have other relevant information cannot be a basis for ignoring the pending action doctrine prohibiting the misuse of Rule 2004 discovery.\n\n6. While it is obvious from the Rule 2004 Motion that the discovery the Trustee seeks from Bento is meant for use in the Adversary Proceeding, given the very limited and conclusory statements made by the Trustee regarding the other proposed examinees, it may be that the discovery from those examinees is also meant for use in the Adversary Proceeding. The Trustee should also be required to take the discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with participation by Defendants. In the meantime, the Court should require the Trustee to plead in detail the relevance of the information he seeks from the other examinees and to state whether any of the discovery relates to the Adversary Proceeding. If so, it cannot proceed under Rule 2004.\n\n### **ARGUMENT**\n\n7. \"Relevance alone is not sufficient to justify a Rule 2004 request. A party seeking to conduct a Rule 2004 examination must also show good cause, such as the proposed examination is necessary to establish the claim of the party seeking the examination, or denial of such request would cause the examiner undue hardship or injustice.\" *In re Sunedison, Inc*., 572 B.R. 482, 489 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017). Moreover, it is blackletter law \"that once an adversary proceeding or contested matter is commenced, discovery should be pursued under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and not by Rule 2004.\" *In re Enron Corp*., 281 B.R. 836, 840 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002); *see also In re Cambridge Analytica LLC*, 600 B.R. 750, 752 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019) (\"There is a well-recognized rule that once an adversary proceeding or contested matter is commenced, discovery should be pursued under the applicable Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and not Rule 2004\"). \"The pending proceeding rule is based on the different safeguards that attend Rule 2004 and civil litigation discovery, and reflects a concern that a party to litigation could circumvent his adversary's rights by using Rule 2004 rather than civil discovery to obtain documents or information relevant to the lawsuit.\" *In re Sunedison, Inc*., 572 B.R. at 489.\n\n8. Furthermore, no evidence obtained pursuant to Rule 2004 subpoenas served after the Trustee files an adversary proceeding should be admissible in the adversary proceeding. *See In re Anderson*, 17-adv-03008 (AMN) 2022 WL 1165002, \\*4-5 (Bankr. D. Conn. April 19, 2022) (holding that Rule 2004 examination transcripts of unavailable witnesses were inadmissible hearsay in an adversary proceeding commenced after the Rule 2004 examinations); *see also Geico Indemnity Co. v. Dionisio*, 12-cv-01137, 2016 WL 74390, \\*6 (D. Conn. Jan. 6, 2016) (testimony from separate lawsuit inadmissible where party in the present action did not have the opportunity to cross-examine the witness during the prior testimony).\n\n9. The Trustee's Rule 2004 Motion blatantly seeks to take discovery against Defendants under Rule 2004 for use in the Adversary Proceeding he already filed against Defendants. In the Adversary Proceeding, the Trustee seeks to dispossess Ms. Ngok of her only residence. The Trustee already obtained an attachment and injunction over the residence on an *ex parte* basis, relying on his sworn certification that he had sufficient evidence to warrant the drastic relief. The filing of the Adversary Proceeding itself eliminated the Trustee's ability to take Rule 2004 discovery concerning the subject matter of the Adversary Proceeding. Given how advanced the Trustee represents he is in his investigation concerning the subject matter of the Adversary Proceeding, it is even more egregious that he seeks to take more secret discovery without Defendants' involvement and without being subject to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.\n\n10. Defendants are entitled to participate in any discovery concerning the Adversary Proceeding, and that discovery must be governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, to the extent the Trustee proceeds with discovery under Rule 2004 without Defendants' involvement, none of it should be admissible in the Adversary Proceeding. *In re Anderson*, 2022 WL 1165002, \\*5 (transcripts of 2004 examination were inadmissible hearsay where the examinations were not taken within the adversary proceeding and the parties to the adversary proceeding did not have a full and fair opportunity to participate and cross examine).\n\n11. Cases previously relied upon by the Trustee to avoid the pending action doctrine are inapplicable to the current Rule 2004 Motion and Defendants. ECF 1184, p. 2. The Court in\n\n4\n\n*In re Sunedison, Inc*., 572 B.R. at 490, denied discovery by the debtors. In doing so, it did not apply the pending action doctrine, because the Debtors were not parties to the pending state court litigation. In *In re Washington Mutual, Inc*., 408 B.R. 45, 53 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009), the court permitted discovery under Rule 2004 only after it made a finding that the discovery sought was unrelated to the adversary proceeding. *Id*., at 52-53 (\"In this Court's view, the proper approach is that of Bennett Funding. Where a party requests a Rule 2004 examination and an adversary proceeding or other litigation in another forum is pending between the parties, the relevant inquiry is whether the Rule 2004 examination will lead to discovery of evidence related to the pending proceeding or whether the requested examination seeks to discover evidence unrelated to the pending proceeding\"). In *In re Ecam Publications, Inc*., 131 B.R. 556, 560-61 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991), the court explicitly recognized the pending action doctrine in permitting a trustee to take a 2004 examination where no adversary proceeding was actually pending: \"Moreover, the trustee has not commenced an adversary proceeding against the witnesses based on the transferred claims, in which event a Rule 2004 examination would not be appropriate because discovery in an adversary proceeding, as in Galluci, must be obtained in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.\" *Id*. at 560. These cases provide no support for the Trustee's attempt to take Rule 2004 discovery for use in the Adversary Proceeding.\n\n#### **CONCLUSION**\n\n12. The Court should deny the Trustee's Rule 2004 Motion. Defendants are entitled to participate in discovery for the Adversary Proceeding, which lawsuit carries enormous consequences for Ms. Ngok. The Court should not permit him to carry on a fishing expedition outside of the Adversary Proceeding and without the guardrails provided under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants' declaration of their meet and confer efforts is **Exhibit 1**.\n\n5\n\nDated: May 22, 2023 Stamford, Connecticut\n\n# **MEISTER SEELIG & FEIN PLLC**\n\n By: */s/ Christopher J. Major* Christopher J. Major, Esq. Austin D. Kim, Esq. 125 Park Avenue, 7th Floor New York, NY 10017 Tel: (212) 655-3500 Email: cjm@msf-law.com adk@msf-law.com\n\n *Attorneys for Defendants*\n\n# **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\n I hereby certify that on the 22nd day of May, 2023, I caused the foregoing to be filed and served on all appearing parties in this Adversary Proceeding via the Court's Electronic Case Filing System.\n\n By: */s/ Christopher J. Major* Christopher J. Major, Esq.","body_zh":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION（美国康涅狄格区破产法院布里奇波特分院）\n\nx : : : : : : :\n\n案件涉及：\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，\n\n第11章\n\n案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n\n债务人。\nGREENWICH LAND, LLC 与 HING CHI NGOK 对第11章破产受托人依据第2004条规则请求证据开示之第五次补充综合动议的异议\n\n利害关系方及第 23-05005 号对抗性诉讼（下称“对抗性诉讼”）被告 Greenwich Land, LLC（下称“Greenwich Land”）与 Hing Chi Ngok（岳庆芝，下称“岳女士”，与 Greenwich Land 合称“被告”）谨就第11章破产受托人 Luc A. Despins（下称“受托人”）依据《联邦破产诉讼程序规则》第2004条规则申请作出准予证据开示裁定的第五次补充综合动议（下称“第2004条规则动议”）（ECF 1789）提出本异议。\n\n引言\n\n1. 受托人针对被告提起该对抗性诉讼，声称岳女士并非 Greenwich Land 的真实所有人，其丈夫即债务人 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵，下称“债务人”）才是真实的衡平法所有人。受托人依据其已掌握足够证据以获得此项非常规救济的宣誓证明，在对抗性诉讼中取得了针对被告的单方扣押令及单方临时限制令。\n\n2. 既已启动对抗性诉讼，受托人此时必须遵守《联邦民事诉讼程序规则》。然而，受托人违背数十年的判例法，企图依据《联邦破产诉讼程序规则》第2004条规则，避开被告开展暗中证据开示，并将其用于对抗性诉讼中。\n\n相关事实背景\n\n3. 受托人于2023年3月27日启动了本对抗性诉讼（ECF 1）。同日，受托人依据《康涅狄格州普通法典》§ 52-278e(a) 提出了单方判决前救济申请（下称“PJR 申请”）（ECF 11），以及单方初步禁令动议（包括申请临时限制令）（下称“PI 动议”）（ECF 12）。PJR 申请与 PI 动议均请求类似的救济，即扣押 Taconic 房产，并禁止被告采取任何对 Taconic 房产设定权利负担或予以转让的行为。（ECF 4，¶2（PJR 申请）；ECF 12，¶¶1-2（动议））。\n\n4. 2023年3月28日，法院签署了受托人拟定的裁定并准予了 PJR 申请（下称“PJR 裁定”（ECF 15））。同日，法院准予了受托人关于单方临时限制令（下称“TRO”）的动议，并就受托人的 PI 动议排定听证（ECF 14），该听证现定于2023年5月30日开始。\n\n5. 2023年5月15日，受托人提交了其第2004条规则动议。受托人所请求的救济包括从 Bento Technologies, Inc.（下称“Bento”）处获取证据开示。第2004条规则动议明确表明，受托人寻求自 Bento 处获取证据开示是为了用于对抗性诉讼。具体而言，第2004条规则动议声称“Bento（除其他事项外）一直是来自 Greenwich Land LLC 大额资金的接收方……”。ECF 1789，第4-5页。受托人除了声称 Bento 拥有与 Greenwich Land 相关的资料外，未作进一步说明，其零星推测 Bento 可能拥有其他相关资料的说辞，不能作为无视禁止滥用第2004条规则证据开示的未决诉讼原则的依据。\n\n6. 鉴于从第2004条规则动议中显而易见地看出受托人向 Bento 寻求证据开示旨在用于对抗性诉讼，而受托人对于其他拟受检人员的陈述极为有限且流于断言，向该等受检人员寻求证据开示很可能同样是为了用于对抗性诉讼。受托人亦应被要求在被告参与的前提下，依据《联邦民事诉讼程序规则》开展证据开示。与此同时，法院应要求受托人详细说明其向其他受检人员所寻求资料的相关性，并说明该等证据开示是否有任何部分与对抗性诉讼相关。若相关，则不得依据第2004条规则进行。\n\n抗辩理由\n\n7. “仅凭相关性不足以证明第2004条规则之请求具备正当理由。寻求依第2004条规则进行询问的一方还必须证明有正当理由，例如拟进行的询问对于确立请求询问方的权利主张必不可少，或者拒绝该请求将给询问方造成不当困境或不公。”In re Sunedison, Inc., 572 B.R. 482, 489 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017)（纽约南区破产法院2017年）。此外，公认的法律原则是“一旦启动对抗性诉讼或争议事项，证据开示应当依据《联邦民事诉讼程序规则》进行，而非依据第2004条规则。”In re Enron Corp., 281 B.R. 836, 840 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002)（纽约南区破产法院2002年）；另见 In re Cambridge Analytica LLC, 600 B.R. 750, 752 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019)（纽约南区破产法院2019年）（“存在一项公认的规则，即一旦启动对抗性诉讼或争议事项，证据开示应当依据适用的《联邦民事诉讼程序规则》进行，而非第2004条规则”）。“未决诉讼规则建立在伴随第2004条规则与民事诉讼证据开示的不同保障措施之上，并反映了这样一种关切：诉讼当事人可能通过使用第2004条规则而非民事证据开示来获取与诉讼相关的文书或资料，从而规避其对手方的权利。”In re Sunedison, Inc., 572 B.R. at 489。\n\n8. 此外，受托人提起对抗性诉讼后依据送达的第2004条规则传票所获得的任何证据，均不得在对抗性诉讼中采信。参见 In re Anderson, 17-adv-03008 (AMN) 2022 WL 1165002, *4-5 (Bankr. D. Conn. April 19, 2022)（康涅狄格区破产法院2022年4月19日）（认定无法出庭证人的第2004条规则询问笔录在第2004条规则询问之后启动的对抗性诉讼中属于不可采信的传闻证据）；另见 Geico Indemnity Co. v. Dionisio, 12-cv-01137, 2016 WL 74390, *6 (D. Conn. Jan. 6, 2016)（康涅狄格区联邦地区法院2016年1月6日）（在本案当事人无机会在先前证言中对证人进行交叉询问的情况下，来自另一独立诉讼的证言不可采信）。\n\n9. 受托人的第2004条规则动议公然企图依据第2004条规则对被告进行证据开示，以用于其已经对被告提起的对抗性诉讼。在该对抗性诉讼中，受托人企图剥夺岳女士唯一的住所。受托人已经依据其宣誓证明拥有足够证据证明该严厉救济具备正当性，从而在单方基础上获得了针对该住所的扣押令和禁令。提起对抗性诉讼本身就已经消除了受托人就对抗性诉讼之标的事项开展第2004条规则证据开示的能力。鉴于受托人声称其就对抗性诉讼标的事项的调查已取得何等深入的进展，其企图在没有被告参与且不受《联邦民事诉讼程序规则》约束的情况下开展更多秘密证据开示，显得尤为恶劣。\n\n10. 被告有权参与涉及对抗性诉讼的任何证据开示，且该等证据开示必须受《联邦民事诉讼程序规则》管辖。此外，在受托人未让被告参与而依据第2004条规则进行证据开示的范围内，其任何证据均不得在对抗性诉讼中采信。In re Anderson, 2022 WL 1165002, *5（当询问并非在对抗性诉讼内部进行且对抗性诉讼当事人未享有充分且公正的参与及交叉询问机会时，第2004条规则询问笔录属于不可采信的传闻证据）。\n\n11. 受托人先前为规避未决诉讼原则所依赖的案例不适用于当前的第2004条规则动议及被告。ECF 1184，第2页。法院在 In re Sunedison, Inc., 572 B.R. at 490 一案中拒绝了债务人的证据开示请求。法院在作出该裁定时并未适用未决诉讼原则，因为债务人并非未决州法院诉讼的当事人。在 In re Washington Mutual, Inc., 408 B.R. 45, 53 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009)（特拉华区破产法院2009年）一案中，法院仅在认定所寻求的证据开示与对抗性诉讼无关后，方准予依据第2004条规则进行证据开示。同上，第52-53页（“在本院看来，正确的做法是 Bennett Funding 案的做法。当一方当事人请求依第2004条规则进行询问，且当事人之间存在未决的对抗性诉讼或其他法院的诉讼时，相关的审查在于第2004条规则询问是否会获取与未决诉讼相关的证据，抑或所请求的询问是否寻求发现与未决诉讼无关的证据”）。在 In re Ecam Publications, Inc., 131 B.R. 556, 560-61 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991)（纽约南区破产法院1991年）一案中，法院在准许受托人在实际上并无未决对抗性诉讼的情况下进行2004条询问时，明确承认了未决诉讼原则：“此外，受托人并未基于转让的主张对证人提起对抗性诉讼，若提起，则进行第2004条规则询问将是不恰当的，因为正如 Galluci 案所确立的，对抗性诉讼中的证据开示必须按照《联邦民事诉讼程序规则》获取。”同上，第560页。这些案例完全无法为受托人企图获取第2004条规则证据开示以用于对抗性诉讼提供支持。\n\n结论\n\n12. 法院应驳回受托人的第2004条规则动议。被告有权参与针对对抗性诉讼的证据开示，该诉讼给岳女士带来重大影响。法院不应允许其在对抗性诉讼之外且脱离《联邦民事诉讼程序规则》所设防护的情况下进行摸底调查。被告关于其磋商努力的声明见证据1。\n\n日期：2023年5月22日 康涅狄格州斯坦福\nMEISTER SEELIG & FEIN PLLC\n\n签署人：/s/ Christopher J. Major Christopher J. Major, 律师 Austin D. Kim, 律师 125 Park Avenue, 7th Floor New York, NY 10017 电话：(212) 655-3500 电子邮件：cjm@msf-law.com adk@msf-law.com\n\n被告代理律师\n\n送达证书\n\n本人特此证明，于2023年5月22日，本人已通过法院的电子案件立卷系统，致使前述文书被提交并送达至本对抗性诉讼中的所有出庭当事方。\n\n签署人：/s/ Christopher J. Major Christopher J. Major, 律师","key_entities":["Je","CIPA","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Despins"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":1,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":4,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":11,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":12,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":14,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":15,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1184,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1789,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":1637,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 12:56:45"}