{"id":"court_ctb_182_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":182,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION In re:","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"## **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\nIn re:\n\nHO WAN KWOK<sup>1</sup>\n\nChapter 11 Case No.\n\n22-50073 (JAM)\n\nDebtor.\n\nApril 6, 2022\n\n# **OBJECTION OF PACIFIC ALLIANCE ASIA OPPORTUNITY FUND L.P. TO THE UNITED STATES TRUSTEE'S MOTION FOR AN ORDER DIRECTING THE APPOINTMENT OF AN EXAMINER**\n\nPacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. (\"PAX\") respectfully submits this limited\n\nobjection (this \"Objection\") to the *United States Trustee's Motion for an Order Directing the*\n\n*Appointment of an Examiner or, in the Alternative, Motion for Order Directing the Appointment*\n\n*of a Chapter 11 Trustee* [ECF No. 102] (the \"Examiner/Trustee Motion\"). PAX is filing\n\nconcurrently a cross motion for dismissal of the above-captioned chapter 11 case, or, in the\n\nalternative, a partial joinder in the United States Trustee's motion for appointment of a chapter\n\n11 trustee (the \"Dismissal Motion\").<sup>2</sup>\n\nIn support of this Objection, PAX respectfully represents as follows:\n\n# **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\n1. Ho Wan Kwok (\"Kwok\" or the \"Debtor\") owes PAX in excess of \\$250 million,\n\nincluding a substantial fine resulting from Kwok's brazen and prolonged contempt of court.<sup>3</sup>\n\n<sup>1</sup> The last four digits of the Debtor's taxpayer identification number are 9595.\n\n<sup>2</sup> *Cross Motion to Dismiss Chapter 11 Case or, in the Alternative, Partial Joinder to United States Trustee's Motion for Order Directing the Appointment of a Chapter 11 Trustee* (filed concurrently herewith). Capitalized terms used but not defined herein shall have the meaning set forth in the Dismissal Motion.\n\n<sup>3</sup> *See* Official Form 106 Summary of Assets & Liabilities & Certain Statistical Information at 20, ECF No. 78.\n\nPAX is, by far, Kwok's largest creditor and has committed extensive resources to uncovering his misconduct. PAX's efforts have borne fruit—there are already judicial findings relating to Kwok's pattern of using shell companies and family members to hide his assets in the New York Action.<sup>4</sup> And a separate federal court has reached similar conclusions, including finding that Kwok made various transfers to family members for no consideration and had operated an affiliated entity as a \"shell for him and his family.\"<sup>5</sup>\n\n2. There is no reason or need to appoint an examiner to review these findings or conduct an investigation into any other of Kwok's schemes. The appointment of an examiner would be a lengthy bridge to nowhere. An examiner cannot prosecute causes of action against Kwok, his family or his shell companies. An examiner can only issue a report that may or may not constitute admissible evidence in future proceedings, and which Kwok can simply ignore if he doesn't like the findings. Thus, an examiner will not bring this case any closer to consensus or closure. If this case is not dismissed, it needs *action***,** not reports—action to marshal estate resources, pursue suits against Kwok and his family and shell companies, and provide creditors with the recoveries to which they are entitled. That can be best achieved through case dismissal or appointment of a trustee—relief PAX is seeking.\n\n3. An examiner would also unfairly burden PAX because PAX will need to participate in any proceedings conducted by the examiner, yet PAX will still need to litigate all of the same issues once the examiner's report is issued. Appointment of an examiner favors the\n\n<sup>4</sup> *See* Dismissal Motion at 7–15. Justice Ostrager stated on the record in the New York Action in connection with PAX's motion to freeze Kwok's assets that he *\"believes . . . that Mr. Kwok has attempted to mislead the Court,\" is \"playing a shell game with his assets,\" and that this is a* \"*case in which there's been a great deal of gamesmanship, a great deal of dissembling, and some flagrant disregard of court orders.\"* Friedman Decl, Ex. 43 at 21:11–16; 24:9–11.\n\n<sup>5</sup> *E. Profit Corp. Ltd. v. Strategic Vision US LLC*, No. 18-CV-2185 (LJL), 2021 WL 2554631, at \\*1–7 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2021).\n\nDebtor for precisely this reason—it provides an opportunity to delay further enforcement of judgments against him.\n\n4. In sum, appointment of an examiner would impose delay, promote redundant work, and provide little to no benefit for Kwok's creditors. Only Kwok would benefit from this and an examination that does not and cannot result in immediate action against him. Dismissal of this case, or appointment of a trustee, would be a superior result for creditors. PAX therefore objects to the appointment of an examiner.\n\n#### **ARGUMENT**\n\n5. The Examiner/Trustee Motion outlines serious concerns with the Debtor's credibility and the proper management of estate assets. PAX agrees with the United States Trustee's concerns, but believes those concerns warrant case dismissal or appointment of a chapter 11 trustee, not the appointment of an examiner. Below, PAX sets forth the reasons an examiner is not sufficient to address Kwok's misconduct and therefore should not be ordered in the first instance.<sup>6</sup>\n\n6. As a threshold issue, if a trustee is appointed, an examiner cannot be. Section 1104(c) of the Bankruptcy Code provides \"if the court does not order the appointment of a trustee under this section . . . the court shall order the appointment of an examiner.\" Thus, the Court has the power to choose whether a trustee better fits the needs of this case than an examiner does. In a separate pleading, PAX has demonstrated why a trustee is appropriate. While the Court could conclude that appointment of an examiner is merited given Kwok's misconduct, an examiner is a much worse choice than a trustee for the reasons set forth below.\n\n<sup>6</sup> The reasons for dismissing the case, and why dismissal is the superior remedy, are set forth at length in the Dismissal Motion. *See* Dismissal Motion at 16–33. The case for the appointment of a chapter 11 trustee can also be found in the Dismissal Motion as well as the Examiner/Trustee Motion. *See* Dismissal Motion at 33–38; *see also*  Examiner/Trustee Motion at 4, 22–26.\n\n7. First, if Kwok's chapter 11 case is not dismissed, an examiner cannot necessarily take the actions needed to benefit creditors, which include compelling the turnover of property from—or pursuing claims against—Kwok or the shell companies and family members Kwok uses to hide assets. A trustee can, and, as a consequence, appointment of a trustee is far preferable.\n\n8. Courts have generally prohibited examiners from acting as trustees under the Bankruptcy Code. *See In re Int'l. Distrib. Ctrs. Inc.*, 74 B.R. 221, 222–24 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (reversing bankruptcy court order expanding examiner's powers \"to encompass all powers\" of a trustee); *Weld ex rel. Patton's Busy Bee Disposal Serv. v. Robert A. Sweeney Agency (In re Patton's Busy Bee Disposal Serv.)*, 182 B.R. 681, 685 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1995) (\"The position of examiner is not a device to circumvent the appointment of a trustee.\"). *See also In re The Bible Speaks*, 74 B.R. 511, 514 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) (\"[T]his case cries out for the services of a trustee. An examiner would lack the powers to accomplish what must be done.\"). Though some courts have afforded examiners limited trustee-like powers, the only circuit-level opinion addressing the issue concluded that \"§1106(b)'s broad grant is most naturally interpreted to authorize only acts relating directly to investigation.\" *Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. ex rel. Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery,* 330 F.3d 548, 578 (3rd Cir. 2003); *Official Comm. of Asbestos Pers. Injury Claimants v. Sealed Air Corp. (In re W.R. Grace & Co.),* 285 B.R. 148, 156 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) (\"the court has misgivings whether the concept of an examiner acting as the prosecutor of a fraudulent conveyance proceeding is consistent with the more general concept of the examiner under the Code\").\n\n4\n\n9. As set forth in the Dismissal Motion, Kwok is entirely unfit to act as a fiduciary of his bankruptcy estate.<sup>7</sup> If the Dismissal Motion is not granted, only a chapter 11 trustee can satisfy this fiduciary role—not an examiner.\n\n10. Second, an examiner's report would not be binding on the parties, and may not be able to provide admissible evidence, or otherwise advance the chapter 11 case. After an examiner's report is complete, there is no indication that Kwok would abide by its conclusions, so an examiner's report would likely serve as nothing more than an expensive delay. In contrast, a chapter 11 trustee's work will lead to action to recover assets on behalf of the estate. Indeed, the evidentiary value of an examiner's report is highly suspect: it would be subject to challenge as inadmissible hearsay in any proceedings and would also likely fail to withstand a challenge to its introduction as an expert report unless it were subject to costly discovery. *See, e.g.*, *In re Rickel & Associates, Inc.*, 272 B.R. 74, 87–88 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting that findings in examiner's investigation report are inadmissible hearsay and non-binding); *see also In re Washington Mut., Inc.*, Case No. 08-12229 (MFW) (Bankr. D. Del. 2010), Dec. 2, 2010 Hr'g Tr. at 25–32 (bench ruling indicating that examiner's reports are inadmissible as expert reports unless parties are given full discovery regarding the basis for the conclusions). Similarly, PAX's consent will presumably be necessary to confirm any plan, and the conclusions of an examiner's report is almost certain to have no impact on PAX's vote given everything PAX already knows about Kwok and his shell companies and family members. Thus, the cost in time and expense of an examiner would not materially advance the case, and so would have precious little to show for it.\n\n<sup>7</sup> *See* Dismissal Motion at 30–32, 34–37.\n\n11. Third, an examiner would be wastefully duplicative of previous efforts. Kwok and his estate have *already* been subject to multiple levels of investigation prior to the commencement of the case, so appointment of an examiner to produce an investigatory report would be unnecessary.\n\n12. Examiners may be useful in cases where there has been no prepetition litigation with findings of fact. For example, cases involving recently discovered (or uninvestigated) fraud, misconduct, or other mismanagement, such as *Tribune*, <sup>8</sup> *Dynegy*, <sup>9</sup> *Enron*, <sup>10</sup> or *WordCom*, 11 are prime candidates for an examiner, as are cases where examiners take more limited, specialized roles, such as valuing an asset<sup>12</sup> or reviewing a particular transaction process.<sup>13</sup> In the traditional examiner cases such as the four identified above, an examiner was preferable to a trustee because of the operating businesses that would be disrupted with the appointment of a trustee. An examiner provided a needed investigation while maintaining the ongoing status quo of the debtor-in-possession, which can be key to maximizing value during the pendency of complex commercial chapter 11 cases. In Kwok's case, there is no ongoing business for a trustee to either maintain or disrupt, so choosing an examiner over a trustee provides no benefit to the Debtor's estate. Thus, again, a trustee is preferable to an examiner.\n\n13. Moreover, as set forth in the Dismissal Motion, an extensive record already exists in Kwok's cases, and multiple judges have, upon reviewing the evidence as independent arbiters,\n\n<sup>8</sup> *In re Tribune Media Co.*, Case No. 08-13141 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008).\n\n<sup>9</sup> *In re Dynegy Holdings, LLC*, Case No. 11-38111 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).\n\n<sup>10</sup> *In re Enron Corp.*, Case No. 01-16034 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001).\n\n<sup>11</sup> *In re Worldcom*, Case No. 02-13533 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002).\n\n<sup>12</sup> *In re Northwest Airlines Corp.*, Case No. 05-17930 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).\n\n<sup>13</sup> *See, e.g.*, Order Directing the Appointment of an Examiner and Specifying Scope of Examiner's Investigation and Duties Pursuant to Sections 1104(c) and 1106(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, *In re Lyondell Chemical Co.*, Case No. 09-10023-mg (REG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2009), ECF 3148; Order Appointing an Examiner Pursuant to 11 U.S.C § 1104(c), *In re Purdue Pharma L.P.*, Case No. 19-23649 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2021), ECF 3048.\n\nmade findings with respect to Kwok's conduct.<sup>14</sup> Thus, an examiner's investigation and report would be unnecessarily duplicative of these efforts.\n\n## **CONCLUSION**\n\n14. For the reasons stated above, PAX objects to the appointment of an examiner because it is it is not what this case needs. If this case is not dismissed, a trustee should be appointed, not an examiner.\n\nDated: April 6, 2022 New York, New York\n\n# **Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.**\n\n*By: /s/ Patrick M. Birney*  Patrick M. Birney (CT No. 19875) Annecca H. Smith (CT No. 31148) **ROBINSON & COLE LLP**  280 Trumbull Street Hartford, CT 06103 Telephone: (860) 275-8275 Facsimile: (860) 275-8299 E-mail: pbirney@rc.com asmith@rc.com\n\n-and-\n\nPeter Friedman Stuart M. Sarnoff **O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP**  Seven Times Square New York, NY 10036 Telephone: (212) 326-2000 Facsimile: (212) 326-2061 Email: pfriedman@omm.com ssarnoff@omm.com\n\n<sup>14</sup> Dismissal Motion at 7–16, 35.\n\n## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI hereby certify that on April 6, 2022, a copy of the foregoing was filed electronically through the Court's CM/ECF System and served in the manner described in the accompanying Motion.\n\n> */s/ Patrick M. Birney*\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_ Patrick M. Birney","body_zh":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION（美国康涅狄格区破产法院布里奇波特分院）\n\n关于：\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）1\n\n第 11 章 案件编号：\n\n22-50073 (JAM)\n\n债务人。\n\n2022年4月6日\nPACIFIC ALLIANCE ASIA OPPORTUNITY FUND L.P. 对美国联邦破产受托人关于指派审查员之命令动议的异议\n\nPacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.（太盟亚洲机会基金有限公司，简称“PAX”）谨对 United States Trustee（美国联邦破产受托人）关于指示指派审查员之命令的动议，或在备选情况下，关于指示指派第 11 章受托人之命令的动议 [ECF No. 102]（简称“审查员/受托人动议”）提交本有限异议（简称“本异议”）。PAX 正在同时提交一份交叉动议，请求驳回上述标题项下的第 11 章案件，或在备选情况下，部分附议美国联邦破产受托人关于指派第 11 章受托人的动议（简称“驳回动议”）。2\n\n为支持本异议，PAX 谨陈述如下：\n初步陈述\n\n1. Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵，简称“Kwok”或“债务人”）欠 PAX 超过 2.5 亿美元，包括因郭肆无忌惮且长期藐视法庭而产生的巨额罚款。3\n\n1 债务人纳税人识别号的后四位数字为 9595。\n\n2 《驳回第 11 章案件的交叉动议，或在备选情况下，对美国联邦破产受托人关于指示指派第 11 章受托人之命令动议的部分附议》（与本件同时提交）。本件中使用但未予定义的专有名词应具有驳回动议中所述的含义。\n\n3 参见《官方表格 106 资产与负债汇总及若干统计信息》第 20 页，ECF No. 78。\n\nPAX 迄今为止是郭最大的债权人，并已投入大量资源来揭露其不当行为。PAX 的努力已取得成效——在 New York Action（纽约诉讼案）中已有关于郭利用空壳公司和家庭成员隐匿其资产之行为模式的司法认定。4 且另一家联邦法院也得出了类似的结论，包括认定郭在无对价的情况下向家庭成员进行了多笔转让，并将一家关联实体作为“供其及其家庭使用的空壳”进行运营。5\n\n2. 没有理由也没有必要指派审查员来复核这些认定，或对郭的任何其他计划开展调查。指派审查员将是一条漫长且通向死胡同的桥梁。审查员不能对郭、其家庭或其空壳公司提起诉讼由。审查员只能出具一份在未来的程序中可能构成、也可能不构成可采信证据的报告，而且如果郭不喜欢这些调查结果，他完全可以对其置之不理。因此，审查员不会让本案更接近达成共识或结案。如果本案不予驳回，它需要的是行动，而不是报告——采取行动清理并归集破产财产资源，对郭及其家庭和空壳公司提起诉讼，并向债权人提供其有权获得的清偿。这最好通过驳回案件或指派受托人来实现——这也正是 PAX 所寻求的救济。\n\n3. 审查员还会给 PAX 带来不公平的负担，因为 PAX 将需要参与审查员进行的任何程序，但在审查员的报告出具后，PAX 仍将需要就所有相同的问题进行诉讼。指派审查员恰恰出于这一原因而偏向\n\n4 参见驳回动议第 7–15 页。Ostrager 法官在纽约诉讼案中就 PAX 冻结郭资产的动议在庭审记录中陈述称，他“认为……郭先生企图误导法院”，“正在拿其资产玩空壳骗局”，并且这是一个“存在大量投机取巧、大量虚伪掩饰以及对法院命令公然漠视的案件”。Friedman Decl, Ex. 43 at 21:11–16; 24:9–11。\n\n5 E. Profit Corp. Ltd. v. Strategic Vision US LLC, No. 18-CV-2185 (LJL), 2021 WL 2554631, at *1–7 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2021).\n\n债务人——它为进一步拖延针对其判决的执行提供了机会。\n\n4. 总之，指派审查员会造成拖延，促成重复劳动，并给郭的债权人带来极少甚至毫无益处。只有郭才会从中以及从一项不会且不能导致针对其采取立竿见影行动的审查中获益。驳回本案或指派受托人对债权人而言将是更好的结果。因此，PAX 反对指派审查员。\n论证\n\n5. 审查员/受托人动议概述了对债务人的诚信度以及对破产财产资产的正当管理的严重关切。PAX 同意美国联邦破产受托人的关切，但认为这些关切理应支持驳回案件或指派第 11 章受托人，而不是指派审查员。下文中，PAX 阐明了审查员不足以应对郭的不当行为、因此首先不应下达指派审查员命令的理由。6\n\n6. 作为首要问题，如果指派了受托人，就不能指派审查员。《破产法典》第 1104(c) 条规定：“如果法院未根据本条命令指派受托人……法院应命令指派审查员。”因此，法院有权选择受托人还是审查员更符合本案的需要。PAX 在另一份认辩文书中已证明了为何指派受托人是适当的。虽然法院可以得出结论认为鉴于郭的不当行为有理由指派审查员，但基于下述理由，审查员是远不如受托人的选择。\n\n6 驳回案件的理由以及为何驳回是更优的补救措施，已在驳回动议中详尽阐述。参见驳回动议第 16–33 页。关于指派第 11 章受托人的主张亦可见于驳回动议以及审查员/受托人动议。参见驳回动议第 33–38 页；另见审查员/受托人动议第 4、22–26 页。\n\n7. 首先，如果郭的第 11 章案件不被驳回，审查员不一定能够采取使债权人获益所需的行动，这些行动包括强制郭或郭用于隐匿资产的空壳公司及家庭成员交出财产，或者针对他们提起索赔。受托人可以做到这一点，因此，指派受托人要好得多。\n\n8. 法院通常禁止审查员根据《破产法典》充当受托人的角色。参见 In re Int'l. Distrib. Ctrs. Inc., 74 B.R. 221, 222–24 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)（撤销破产法院将审查员权力扩大至“涵盖受托人所有权力”的裁定）；Weld ex rel. Patton's Busy Bee Disposal Serv. v. Robert A. Sweeney Agency (In re Patton's Busy Bee Disposal Serv.), 182 B.R. 681, 685 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1995)（“审查员一职并不是规避指派受托人的手段。”）。另见 In re The Bible Speaks, 74 B.R. 511, 514 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987)（“本案迫切需要受托人的服务。审查员将缺乏完成必须完成的工作的权力。”）。虽然一些法院赋予了审查员有限的类似受托人的权力，但审理该问题的唯一一份巡回法院级别的意见认定：“第 1106(b) 条的宽泛授权最自然的解释是仅授权与调查直接相关的行为。”Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. ex rel. Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 578 (3rd Cir. 2003)；Official Comm. of Asbestos Pers. Injury Claimants v. Sealed Air Corp. (In re W.R. Grace & Co.), 285 B.R. 148, 156 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002)（“法院对审查员作为欺诈性转让诉讼的追诉人的概念是否符合破产法典下审查员更一般的概念存有疑虑”）。\n\n9. 正如驳回动议中所陈述的那样，郭完全不适合担任其破产财产的受信人。7 如果驳回动议未获批准，只有第 11 章受托人能够履行这一受托职责——审查员则不能。\n\n10. 其次，审查员的报告对各方当事人不具有约束力，且可能无法提供可采信证据，或在其他方面推进第 11 章案件。在审查员报告完成后，没有任何迹象表明郭会遵守其结论，因此审查员报告很可能只是一场代价高昂的拖延。相比之下，第 11 章受托人的工作将转化为代表破产财产追回资产的行动。事实上，审查员报告的证据价值高度存疑：在任何诉讼程序中它都可能因属于不可采信的传闻证据而受到质疑，并且除非经过代价高昂的证据开示，否则它作为专家报告的引入也很可能经受不住质疑。参见例如 In re Rickel & Associates, Inc., 272 B.R. 74, 87–88 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002)（指出审查员调查报告中的认定属于不可采信的传闻，且不具有约束力）；另见 In re Washington Mut., Inc., Case No. 08-12229 (MFW) (Bankr. D. Del. 2010), Dec. 2, 2010 Hr'g Tr. at 25–32（法庭口头裁定指出，除非当事人就结论的依据获得全面的证据开示，否则审查员报告作为专家报告不可采信）。同样，确认任何重整计划据推测都需要 PAX 的同意，而鉴于 PAX 对郭及其空壳公司和家庭成员已知的一切情况，审查员报告的结论几乎肯定不会对 PAX 的表决产生任何影响。因此，审查员在时间和费用上的耗费不会实质性地推进本案，所能展现的成效也将微乎其微。\n\n7 参见驳回动议第 30–32、34–37 页。\n\n11. 第三，指派审查员将是对以往工作的徒劳重复。在案件启动之前，郭及其财产就已经接受了多层面的调查，因此指派审查员出具调查报告是不必要的。\n\n12. 审查员在申请破产前未发生过包含事实认定的诉讼的案件中可能是有用的。例如，涉及近期发现的（或未经调查的）欺诈、不当行为或其他管理不善的案件，如 Tribune 案、8 Dynegy 案、9 Enron 案 10 或 WorldCom 案，11 是指派审查员的主要候选对象；审查员承担更有限、更具专门性角色的案件也是如此，例如对资产进行估值 12 或审查特定交易流程。13 在上述确定的四起传统审查员案件中，审查员比受托人更可取，是因为指派受托人会打乱正在运营的业务。审查员提供了所需的调查，同时维持了债务人自行管理（debtor-in-possession）的持续现状，这在复杂的商业第 11 章案件审理期间对于最大化价值至关重要。而在郭的案件中，不存在可供受托人维持或打乱的持续运营业务，因此选择审查员而非受托人不会给债务人的财产带来任何益处。因此，受托人再次优于审查员。\n\n13. 此外，正如驳回动议中所陈述的那样，郭的案件中已经存在详尽的记录，并且多位法官在作为独立裁判者审查证据后，\n\n8 In re Tribune Media Co., Case No. 08-13141 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008).\n\n9 In re Dynegy Holdings, LLC, Case No. 11-38111 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).\n\n10 In re Enron Corp., Case No. 01-16034 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001).\n\n11 In re Worldcom, Case No. 02-13533 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002).\n\n12 In re Northwest Airlines Corp., Case No. 05-17930 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).\n\n13 参见例如《关于指示指派审查员并依据破产法典第 1104(c) 条和第 1106(b) 条明确审查员调查范围和职责的命令》，In re Lyondell Chemical Co., Case No. 09-10023-mg (REG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2009), ECF 3148；《关于依据 11 U.S.C § 1104(c) 指派审查员的命令》，In re Purdue Pharma L.P., Case No. 19-23649 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2021), ECF 3048。\n\n就 Kwok（郭文贵）的行为作出了事实认定。14 因此，审查员的调查和报告将不必要地与这些工作重复。\n结论\n\n14. 基于上述理由，PAX（太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金）反对指定审查员，因为这并非本案所需。若本案未被驳回，应指定受托人而非审查员。\n\n日期：2022年4月6日 纽约州纽约市\nPacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.（太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金有限合伙）\n\n签署人：/s/ Patrick M. Birney\nPatrick M. Birney（康涅狄格州执业编号：19875）\nAnnecca H. Smith（康涅狄格州执业编号：31148）\nROBINSON & COLE LLP（罗宾逊与科尔有限责任合伙律师事务所）\n280 Trumbull Street\nHartford, CT 06103\n电话：(860) 275-8275\n传真：(860) 275-8299\n电子邮件：pbirney@rc.com, asmith@rc.com\n\n—以及—\n\nPeter Friedman\nStuart M. Sarnoff\nO'MELVENY & MYERS LLP（美迈斯律师事务所）\nSeven Times Square\nNew York, NY 10036\n电话：(212) 326-2000\n传真：(212) 326-2061\n电子邮件：pfriedman@omm.com, ssarnoff@omm.com\n\n14 驳回动议第 7–16、35 页。\n送达证明书\n\n本人特此证明，于 2022年4月6日，上述文件的副本已通过法院的 CM/ECF 系统以电子方式提交，并按随附动议中所述的方式进行了送达。\n\n/s/ Patrick M. Birney\nPatrick M. Birney","key_entities":["Kwok","Je","Ho Wan Kwok","CIPA"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":78,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":102,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3048,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":3148,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":2128,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 13:07:46"}