{"id":"court_ctb_1885_2","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":1885,"sub_number":2,"doc_type":"EXHIBIT","filed_date":"2023-06-06","title":"Exhibit B -","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"# **Exhibit B**\n\n-\n-\n-\n\n\n\n# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\n| In re: | )
)
Chapter 11
)
Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |\n|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|\n| HO WAN KWOK, et al., | )
(Jointly Administered) |\n| Debtors. | )
)
) |\n| HK INTERNATIONAL FUNDS INVESTMENTS )
(USA) LIMITED, LLC, | )
Adv. P. No. 22-05003 (JAM)
) |\n| Plaintiff | )
Re: ECF Nos. 36 and 185
) |\n| v. | )
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE
FOR THE ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK, | )
) |\n| Defendant. | )
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE
FOR THE ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK, | )
)
) |\n| Counter-Plaintiff | )
) |\n| v. | )
) |\n| HK INTERNATIONAL FUNDS INVESTMENTS )
(USA) LIMITED, LLC, and MEI GUO, | )
) |\n| Counter-Defendants. | )
)
) |\n\n# **APPEARANCES**\n\nLuc A. Despins Avram E. Luft G. Alexander Bongartz Paul Hastings LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166\n\nDouglass S. Skalka Patrick R. Linsey Neubert, Pepe & Montieth 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, CT 06510\n\nand\n\nNicholas A. Bassett (argued) Paul Hastings LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C. 20036\n\n*Counter-Plaintiff Luc A. Despins, Chapter 11 Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok, and Counsel*\n\nLee Vartan Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC One Boland Drive West Orange, NJ 07052\n\nAaron Romney John L. Cesaroni James M. Moriarty Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. 10 Middle Street Bridgeport, CT 06604\n\nand\n\nSam Della Fera, Jr. Melissa F. Wernick (argued) Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC 105 Eisenhower Parkway Roseland, NJ 07068\n\n*Counsel for Counter-Defendants HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC, and Mei Guo*\n\n# **MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON SECOND COUNTERCLAIM**\n\nJulie A. Manning, United States Bankruptcy Judge\n\n# **I. INTRODUCTION**\n\nBefore the Court is the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Second Counterclaim\n\n(ECF No. 185,1 the \"Motion for Summary Judgment\") of the Counter-Plaintiff Mr. Luc A.\n\nDespins, in his capacity as Chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") for the bankruptcy estate (the\n\n\"Estate\") of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Individual Debtor\"). The Trustee filed several\n\ncounterclaims against the Counter-Defendants HK International Funds Investments (USA) Ltd.,\n\n1 References to the docket in this adversary proceeding will be styled \"ECF.\" References to the docket in the main case, *In re Kwok*, Case No. 22-50073, will be styled \"Main Case ECF.\"\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 1885-2 Filed 06/06/23 Entered 06/06/23 16:18:00 Page 6 of Case 22-05003 Doc 221 Filed 05/18/23 Entered 05/18/23 17:35:12 Page 3 of 37 40\n\nLLC (\"HK USA\") and Ms. Mei Guo (together with HK USA, collectively, the \"HK Parties\"). (ECF No. 36, the \"Answer and Counterclaims\" and, in pertinent part, the \"Counterclaims.\") Ms. Guo is the Individual Debtor's daughter and the sole member of HK USA. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 541, 542, and 544, the Trustee's Second Counterclaim seeks: (i) a declaratory judgment that HK USA is the alter ego of the Individual Debtor; and (ii) an order requiring the HK Parties to deliver the property of HK USA to the Trustee. For the reasons stated below the Motion for Summary Judgment is **GRANTED**.\n\n# **II. BACKGROUND2**\n\nThe Individual Debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition in this Court on February 15, 2022. (Main Case ECF No. 1.) The Individual Debtor's case is jointly administered with two affiliated corporate Chapter 11 cases. (Main Case ECF Nos. 970 and 1141.) Among early developments in the Individual Debtor's Chapter 11 case, the Office of the United States Trustee (\"UST\") filed a motion to appoint either an examiner or a Chapter 11 trustee (Main Case ECF No. 102) and creditor Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. (\"PAX\") filed a motion to dismiss or appoint a Chapter 11 trustee (Main Case ECF No. 183). For the reasons set forth therein, on June 15, 2022, the Court entered a memorandum of decision and order appointing a Chapter 11 trustee. (Main Case ECF No. 465.) *In re Kwok*, 640 B.R. 514 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022). On July 8, 2022, Mr. Despins was appointed as the Trustee. (Main Case ECF No. 523.)\n\n2 Much of the procedural background contained herein appears either in the March 30th Supplemental Memorandum of Decision in Support of Oral Ruling Granting Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the First Counterclaim (ECF No. 177, the \"Collateral Estoppel SJ Decision\") or the April 14th Memorandum of Decision and Order Denying in Part the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 202, the \"Decision Denying Dismissal\"). At the risk of repetition, the procedural background contained in this decision includes some differences that are significant to this decision.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 1885-2 Filed 06/06/23 Entered 06/06/23 16:18:00 Page 7 of Case 22-05003 Doc 221 Filed 05/18/23 Entered 05/18/23 17:35:12 Page 4 of 37 40\n\nWhen the Individual Debtor filed his Chapter 11 petition, PAX and the Individual Debtor were engaged in post-judgment litigation in the New York state courts. *See, generally*, *Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund, L.P. v. Kwok Ho Wan*, Index No. 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 9, 2022) (the \"New York Action\"). On March 1, 2022, PAX filed a motion in the Individual Debtor's Chapter 11 case seeking to confirm the inapplicability of the automatic stay or, alternatively, relief from the automatic stay. (Main Case ECF No. 57, the \"Stay Relief Motion.\") In the Stay Relief Motion, PAX sought to pursue the enforcement of prior rulings in the New York Action, including the Decision & Order, *Kwok Ho Wan*, Index No. 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 9, 2022), NYCEF No. 1181 (the \"Final Contempt Decision\") and to compel the return of the pleasure yacht Lady May to New York's navigable waters. (Main Case ECF No. 57.)\n\nOn April 10, 2022, the Individual Debtor filed a Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization (ECF No. 197, the \"Plan\"). Among other things, the Plan provided that the Lady May would be transferred to a trust created for the benefit of the Individual Debtor's creditors. The very next day, April 11, 2022, HK USA filed an appearance in the Individual Debtor's Chapter 11 case and filed a statement with regard to the Stay Relief Motion. (Main Case ECF Nos. 201–03.) During a hearing held before the Court on April 27, 2022, the parties agreed to resolve the Stay Relief Motion. On April 29, 2022, the Court entered a stipulated order, which, *inter alia*, compelled HK USA to deliver the Lady May to the navigable waters of Connecticut on or before July 15, 2022. (Main Case ECF No. 299, the \"Stipulated Delivery Order.\")3\n\n3 The Lady May was timely delivered to the navigable waters of Connecticut. (*See* Main Case ECF No. 723.)\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 1885-2 Filed 06/06/23 Entered 06/06/23 16:18:00 Page 8 of Case 22-05003 Doc 221 Filed 05/18/23 Entered 05/18/23 17:35:12 Page 5 of 37 40\n\nPursuant to the terms of the Stipulated Delivery Order, HK USA placed \\$37 million into an escrow account to secure its delivery obligation. (Main Case ECF No. 299.) Through a subsequent consent order, a \\$4 million repair reserve was created from the escrowed funds. (Main Case ECF No. 930.) The repair reserve funds are to be used to complete planned repairs to the Lady May. Through additional consent orders, certain other costs related to the Lady May are to be paid from the repair reserve. (Main Case ECF Nos. 1255, 1377, 1608, 1673.) The repair reserve is held in escrow by the Trustee (all remaining funds in the repair reserve coupled with the \\$33 million remaining in the original escrowed funds are, collectively, the \"Escrowed Funds\").\n\nOn the day HK USA appeared in the Individual Debtor's case, it also filed a complaint against the Individual Debtor and PAX,4 initiating the instant adversary proceeding. (ECF No. 1, the \"Complaint.\") The Complaint seeks a declaratory judgment that the Lady May is property of HK USA – not the Individual Debtor – and, therefore, is not property of the Individual Debtor's Estate. On September 23, 2022, the Trustee, having stepped into the Individual Debtor's shoes as a defendant in this adversary proceeding, filed his Answer and Counterclaims. (ECF No. 36.) On October 4, 2022, a summons issued which included Ms. Guo as a counter-defendant. (ECF No. 43.) On December 22, 2022, the HK Parties filed the Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims, which implicated the Second Counterclaim. (ECF No. 87, the \"Motion to Dismiss.\") On April 14, 2023, the Court issued its Decision Denying Dismissal. (ECF No. 202.) In pertinent part, the Decision Denying Dismissal held that the Trustee sufficiently alleged that he has standing to\n\n4 On August 26, 2022, HK USA voluntarily dismissed the complaint against PAX. (ECF No. 30.)\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 1885-2 Filed 06/06/23 Entered 06/06/23 16:18:00 Page 9 of Case 22-05003 Doc 221 Filed 05/18/23 Entered 05/18/23 17:35:12 Page 6 of 37 40\n\nbring the Second Counterclaim and that he could recover the Escrowed Funds because he is not bound by the Stipulated Delivery Order.\n\nOn March 15, 2023, an evidentiary hearing was held on the Trustee's Application for Pre-judgment Remedy (ECF No. 37) and Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 50), which collectively sought to prevent the dissipation of assets pending an adjudication on the merits of the Counterclaims. Before the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the HK Parties consented to entry of a pre-judgment remedy (ECF No. 140, the \"PJR\") and a preliminary injunction (ECF No. 142, the \"PI,\" and together with the PJR, collectively the \"PI/PJR\"). Prior to the entry of the PI/PJR, the parties' arguments regarding the Counterclaims – including the Second Counterclaim – had been fully briefed between September 23, 2022, and March 8, 2023, in anticipation of the evidentiary hearing. (ECF Nos. 37, 38, 50, 77, 101.)\n\nOn March 27, 2023, for the reasons stated on the record and in the subsequent supplemental memorandum of decision, the Court granted the Trustee partial summary judgment on the First Counterclaim. (ECF Nos. 172, the \"Collateral Estoppel SJ Order\" and 177.) The First Counterclaim sought a declaratory judgment that the Lady May was property of the Individual Debtor's Estate because the Final Contempt Decision collaterally estopped the HK Parties from arguing otherwise. The First Counterclaim further sought an order requiring the HK Parties to deliver the Lady May to the Trustee. The Collateral Estoppel SJ Order granted the Trustee the relief he requested and explicitly preserved the litigation on the Second Counterclaim. (ECF No. 172 ¶ 7.)\n\nDuring a Status Conference held on March 30, 2023, the Trustee informed the Court that after the entry of the PI/PJR and Collateral Estoppel SJ Order, he learned for the first time that HK USA owned another yacht in addition to the Lady May—the Lady May II. The Trustee\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 1885-2 Filed 06/06/23 Entered 06/06/23 16:18:00 Page 10 of Case 22-05003 Doc 221 Filed 05/18/23 Entered 05/18/23 17:35:12 Page 7 of 37 40\n\nlearned of this fact during discussions with the management company for both the Lady May and the Lady May II. He expressed his concern about this development because (i) Ms. Guo and HK USA failed to disclose the Lady May II in previous sworn statements to the Court and pursuant to the disclosure requirements of the PI/PJR; (ii) Ms. Guo recently asserted her fifth amendment rights in relation to the disclosure requirements of the PI/PJR; and (iii) Ms. Guo testified during the New York Action that her brother, Mr. Qiang Guo, owned the Lady May II. Consistent with his concerns regarding non-disclosure of the Lady May II, the Trustee alerted the Court and the HK Parties that he intended to file the instant Motion for Summary Judgment.\n\nIn response, counsel for the HK Parties represented that they, collectively, had misunderstood what the Lady May II was, thinking it resided inside the Lady May and was part of the Lady May. They also represented that they had not intended to deceive the Trustee or the Court. Counsel for the HK Parties referred the Court to its prior disclosure of the Lady May II in an email to PAX and the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the \"Committee\") in connection with providing proof of insurance as required by the Stipulated Delivery Order. Counsel for the HK Parties additionally represented that the Lady May II is referenced on the docket of the Individual Debtor's case in an exhibit the HK Parties had previously filed which contained an insurance premium for the Lady May and Lady May II as a budget line item. (Main Case ECF No. 1216.) The HK Parties then proffered and consented to an amendment to the Collateral Estoppel SJ Order to extend the relief granted to the Lady May II. (ECF No. 183, the \"Collateral Estoppel SJ Order Amendment,\" and, together with the Collateral Estoppel SJ Order, collectively, the \"Amended Collateral Estoppel SJ Order.\") After the Status Conference, the HK Parties filed the email that was sent to PAX and the Committee on the docket of the\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 1885-2 Filed 06/06/23 Entered 06/06/23 16:18:00 Page 11 of Case 22-05003 Doc 221 Filed 05/18/23 Entered 05/18/23 17:35:12 Page 8 of 37 40\n\nIndividual Debtor's case which had attached to it an insurance policy for the Lady May and Lady May II. (Main Case ECF No. 1623.)\n\nOn April 3, 2023, the Trustee filed (i) the Motion for Summary Judgment; (ii) a Memorandum of Law in Support of the Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 186); (iii) a Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (ECF No. 187, the \"56(a)(1) Statement\"); (iv) a Declaration of Nicholas A. Bassett (ECF No. 188, the \"Bassett Declaration\") with attached exhibits in support of the 56(a)(1) Statement; and (v) a Motion to Expedite Hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 189, the \"Motion to Expedite\"). On April 4, 2023, the Motion to Expedite was granted over the objection of the HK Parties (ECF No. 190), setting the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment for April 20, 2023 (ECF No. 191).\n\nOn April 14, 2023, HK USA filed (a) a Memorandum of Law in response to the Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 203); and (b) a Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement of Facts in Opposition (ECF No. 204, the \"56(a)(2) Statement,\" and, together with the 56(a)(1) Statement, collectively, the \"Rule 56(a) Statements\"). Notably, Ms. Guo did not file a response to the Motion for Summary Judgment. On April 18, 2023, the Trustee filed a reply to the HK Memo. (ECF No. 209.) Attached to the reply is one exhibit, the full transcript of Ms. Guo's deposition, specific excerpts of which are attached to the Bassett Declaration.\n\nOn April 20, 2023, a hearing was held on the Motion for Summary Judgment. The motion is ripe for decision.\n\n# **III. JURISDICTION**\n\nThe United States District Court for the District of Connecticut has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). This Court has authority to hear and determine this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) and the Order of Reference of the United States District\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 1885-2 Filed 06/06/23 Entered 06/06/23 16:18:00 Page 12 of Case 22-05003 Doc 221 Filed 05/18/23 Entered 05/18/23 17:35:12 Page 9 of 37 40\n\nCourt for the District of Connecticut dated September 21, 1984. The instant proceedings are statutorily core proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (C), (E). The Second Counterclaim implicates no constitutional concerns precluding this Court's exercise of jurisdiction. *Cf. Stern v. Marshall*, 564 U.S. 462, 487–99 (2011).\n\nFurthermore, as set forth in the Decision Denying Dismissal and incorporated by reference herein, 5 the Court concludes that, pursuant to section 544(a), the Trustee has standing to bring the Second Counterclaim because, *e.g.*, a hypothetical judicial lien creditor could bring a reverse veil-piercing claim under Delaware law.6 *Manichaean Capital, LLC v. Exela Techs., Inc.*, 251 A.3d 694, 714 (Del. Ch. 2021) (holding Delaware law recognizes outsider reverse veilpiercing); *see St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. PepsiCo, Inc.*, 884 F.2d 688, 700 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding a bankruptcy trustee has standing to bring alter ego claims either on behalf of the debtor or creditors); *Koch Refining v. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc.*, 831 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding a bankruptcy trustee has standing to bring alter ego claims under section 544(a)); *Titan Real Estate Ventures, LLC v. MJCC Realty Ltd. P'ship (In re Flanagan)*, 415 B.R. 29 (D. Conn. 2009) (observing that plaintiff failed to bring alter ego claim under section 544(a) and could no longer timely do so but that section 544(a) could have provided standing for such a claim).\n\nVenue in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.\n\n# **IV. UNDISPUTED FACTS**\n\nThe Court incorporates herein by reference the Undisputed Facts in the Collateral\n\nEstoppel SJ Decision. In connection with the Trustee's alter ego claim and HK USA's equitable\n\n5 Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54, made applicable in this adversary proceeding by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7054, it is within the Court's discretion whether the Decision Denying Dismissal is the law of the case. *Cangemi v. United States*, 13 F.4th 115, 140 (2d Cir. 2021).\n\n6 *See* Discussion, *infra* (holding that Delaware law applies to the Second Counterclaim).\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 1885-2 Filed 06/06/23 Entered 06/06/23 16:18:00 Page 13 of 22-05003 221 Filed 05/18/23 Entered 05/18/23 17:35:12 Page 10 of 37 40\n\ndefense of promissory estoppel, the Court additionally enumerates the following undisputed facts based on the record of these Chapter 11 cases; the Bassett Declaration and attached exhibits; and the Rule 56(a) Statements:\n\n1.A creditor of the Individual Debtor has existed since at least 2015. (*In re Kwok*, Case No. 22-50073, Claim 12-2.)\n\n# *Creation of HK USA, its assets, and its business purpose*\n\n2. On or about September 11, 2018, a certificate of formation was filed with the State of Delaware, Secretary of State, Division of Corporations, on behalf of HK USA. (Bassett Decl. Ex. 1.)\n\n3. Subsequently, on or about April 1, 2019, HK USA and Ms. Guo – HK USA's sole member – executed a limited liability company agreement (the \"LLC Agreement\") identifying Ms. Guo as HK USA's sole member. (*Id.* Ex. 2.)\n\n4. The LLC Agreement lists Ms. Guo's address as 781 5th Avenue, the Sherry Netherland Apartment, New York, New York 10022, where the Individual Debtor has, at times, resided. (*Id.* Ex. 2, at \\*2.)\n\n5. The LLC Agreement also lists the principal office of HK USA as 162 East 64th Street, New York, New York 10065. (*Id.* Ex. 2, at \\*1.) HK USA's principal office address is the same address listed by the Individual Debtor on his original and amended petitions, (Main Case ECF Nos. 1 and 19), and the same address as used by Greenwich Land LLC, (Bassett Decl. Ex. 3), Golden Spring (New York) Ltd., (Main Case ECF No. 767), GTV Media Group Inc., (Bassett Decl. Ex. 4), and Saraca Media Group Inc., (*id.* Ex. 5). It was also, for a time, the address of one of the Individual Debtor's counsel, Lawall & Mitchell, LLC. (*Id.* Ex. 6.)\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 1885-2 Filed 06/06/23 Entered 06/06/23 16:18:00 Page 14 of 22-05003 221 Filed 05/18/23 Entered 05/18/23 17:35:12 Page 11 of 37 40\n\n6. On or about April 17, 2020, HK International Funds Investments Ltd. (\"HK International\"), the previous record owner of the Lady May, transferred record ownership of the Lady May to HK USA. Accordingly, HK USA was the record owner of the Lady May from April 17, 2020, forward. (Complaint ¶¶ 2 and 23.)\n\n7. During the entire time period relevant to the Second Counterclaim, HK USA: (i) has generated no revenue, (*id. ¶* 24; Bassett Decl. Exs. 8 and 9); (ii) had no directors, officers, or employees, (Bassett Decl. Ex. 9, at 1); (iii) has not filed tax returns, (*id.* Ex. 9, at 1); (iv) had no bank account and had not otherwise been capitalized, (Complaint ¶ 24; Bassett Decl. Ex. 9, at 1); and (v) maintained no documents other than those relating to the Lady May, (Decl. of Mei Guo ¶ 25, Main Case ECF No. 1544).\n\n8. The Lady May's operating expenses exceed \\$100,000.00 per month. (Motion to Modify Repair Reserve Consent Order ¶ 16 (the \"HK Motion to Modify\"), Main Case ECF No. 1216.)\n\n9. The HK Parties and their counsel have repeatedly stated, including under the penalty of perjury, that HK USA's only asset is the Lady May. For example, during an April 13, 2022, hearing before the Court, counsel to HK USA represented that \"my client's sole asset is the boat.\" (Bassett Decl. Ex. 10, at \\*51:17–18.) Attorney Vartan made the same representation in a letter to the Trustee's counsel dated March 27, 2023. (Bassett Decl. Ex. 11.) Ms. Guo has made the same representation under penalty of perjury, both in a declaration submitted to this Court on March 13, 2023, (Decl. of Mei Guo ¶ 24, Main Case ECF No. 1544), and in her January 20, 2023, deposition, (Bassett Decl. Ex. 12, at \\*140:2–7). In February 2022, at a hearing on PAX's Final Contempt Motion, as defined in the Collateral Estoppel SJ Decision, in the New York Action, Ms. Guo testified under oath, upon seeing a video depicting the Lady May II, that her\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 1885-2 Filed 06/06/23 Entered 06/06/23 16:18:00 Page 15 of 22-05003 221 Filed 05/18/23 Entered 05/18/23 17:35:12 Page 12 of 37 40\n\nbrother owned the Lady May II. (*Id.* Ex. 17, at \\*71:20–72:9.) During a discovery dispute in this case, instead of acknowledging that HK USA owned the Lady May II, Ms. Guo's counsel took the position that if a Lady May II hypothetically existed, HK USA would not produce documents concerning it. (*Id.* Ex. 18, at \\*66:14–67:11.)\n\n10. Pursuant to the Collateral Estoppel SJ Order, the Trustee became the sole owner of the Lady May for the benefit of the Individual Debtor's Estate. (Collateral Estoppel SJ Order.)\n\n11. On March 29, 2023, the management company for the Lady May: (i) produced to the Trustee the registry of the Lady May II, which registry states HK USA is the record owner of the Lady May II, (Bassett Decl. Ex. 13); and (ii) informed the Trustee that the Lady May II is currently located in a storage facility in Mamaroneck, New York.\n\n12. On March 31, 2023, with the consent of the HK Parties, the Court entered the Collateral Estoppel SJ Order Amendment confirming that the Lady May II is also property of the Individual Debtor's Estate. Therefore, the HK Parties admit that the Individual Debtor's Estate now owns and controls all of the assets that they contend HK USA has ever owned.\n\n13. Ms. Guo is the signatory to contracts involving the Lady May, namely, a contract with Phoenix Crew IC Limited and various nondisclosure agreements with crewmembers. (Bassett Decl. Ex. 19.)\n\n14. Ms. Guo signed a personal guarantee (the \"Personal Guarantee\") regarding the loan of the \\$37 million which became the Escrowed Funds. The Personal Guarantee is undated but states it is effective as of April 19, 2022. The Personal Guarantee is not witnessed, countersigned, or notarized. (ECF No. 84 Ex. C.)\n\n# *Circumstances surrounding the Stipulated Delivery Order*\n\n15. On March 1, 2022, PAX filed the Stay Relief Motion. (Main Case ECF No. 57.)\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 1885-2 Filed 06/06/23 Entered 06/06/23 16:18:00 Page 16 of 22-05003 221 Filed 05/18/23 Entered 05/18/23 17:35:12 Page 13 of 37 40\n\n16. The Individual Debtor filed an objection to the Stay Relief Motion arguing, *inter alia*, that he did not own or control the Lady May. (Main Case ECF No. 83.)\n\n17. On April 10, 2022, the Individual Debtor filed the Plan, which provided for the liquidation of the Lady May for the benefit of the Individual Debtor's creditors and releases of, *inter alia*, HK USA. (Main Case ECF No. 197 Arts. I § A ¶¶ 13–16, 28–32, 74, 88–91, III, IV § B, IX.)\n\n18. On April 11, 2022, HK USA filed a statement asserting that the entry of a proposed order compelling HK USA to transport and deliver the Lady May to Connecticut would moot the Stay Relief Motion. (Main Case ECF No. 203.) HK USA also stated that it would consent to the entry of such an order and to the jurisdiction of this Court. (*Id*.)\n\n19. On April 13, 2022, a hearing was held on several matters in the Individual Debtor's case, including the Stay Relief Motion. During the hearing, the Court asked HK USA's counsel a number of questions regarding HK USA's proposal concerning the Lady May, including \"Why don't you just do this? If you really want to do this, why don't you just post a bond? Why don't you just post a bond for \\$134 million?\" (Bassett Decl. Ex. 10, at \\*51:7–9.)\n\n20. Thereafter, following a 62-minute recess, the Individual Debtor's counsel reported to the Court that \"the owner of the boat intends and is committed then instead to post cash equal to the cost of the boat, about \\$37 million.\" (*Id.* Ex. 10, at \\*86:21–23.)\n\n21. The Individual Debtor, PAX, the Committee, and creditors Rui Ma and Zheng Wu later reached an agreement to resolve the Stay Relief Motion, as reflected in the Stipulated Delivery Order. (Main Case ECF No. 299.)\n\n22. Under the Stipulated Delivery Order, HK USA was required to return the Lady May to Connecticut, with the performance of this obligation secured by the deposit of \\$37 million into\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 1885-2 Filed 06/06/23 Entered 06/06/23 16:18:00 Page 17 of 22-05003 221 Filed 05/18/23 Entered 05/18/23 17:35:12 Page 14 of 37 40\n\nescrow by HK USA, to be released back to HK USA only through the certification process. (Stipulated Delivery Order ¶ 5(i).)\n\n23. The proposed stipulation regarding the Lady May was announced to the Court during a hearing held on April 27, 2022, (Main Case ECF No. 318, at 97:4–103:15), and memorialized in a proposed stipulated order submitted to the Court on April 29, 2022, (Main Case ECF No. 294).\n\n24. On April 29, 2022, the Court approved the proposed stipulated order and entered the Stipulated Delivery Order. (ECF No. 299.)\n\n25. The Stipulated Delivery Order was entered while both (a) UST's motion seeking appointment of an examiner or Chapter 11 trustee in the Individual Debtor's case, (Main Case ECF No. 102); and (b) PAX's motion to dismiss the Individual Debtor's Chapter 11 case (Main Case ECF No. 183), were pending.\n\n26. The terms of the Stipulated Delivery Order only expressly contemplate the possibility that the Individual Debtor's Chapter 11 case would be dismissed, not the possibility that a Chapter 11 trustee would be appointed. (Stipulated Delivery Order ¶ 9.)\n\n27. To date, the Escrowed Funds remain either (i) in escrow at U.S. Bank N.A. pursuant to an escrow agreement between HK USA, the Committee, and U.S. Bank, as originally contemplated by the Stipulated Delivery Order, (Bassett Decl. ¶ 2); or (ii) in the repair reserve held in escrow by the Trustee pursuant to a consent order, (ECF No. 930).\n\n# **V. DISCUSSION**\n\nIn addition to seeking relief pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 544, the Second Counterclaim also seeks relief pursuant to sections 541 and 542 of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 541 states in pertinent part that\n\n(a) The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following property, wherever located and by whomever held:\n\n(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section, all legal and equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.\n\nSection 542(a) states\n\n(a) Except as provided in subsection (c) or (d) of this section, an entity, other than a custodian, in possession custody or control, during the case, of property that the trustee may use, sell, or lease under section 363 of this title, or that the debtor may exempt under section 522 of this title, shall deliver to the trustee, and account for, such property or the value of such property, unless such property is of inconsequential value or benefit to the estate.\n\nThe Second Counterclaim alleges that HK USA is the alter ego of the Individual Debtor.\n\nThe Trustee argues that HK USA's property, including without limitation the Lady May and the Escrowed Funds, is property of the Individual Debtor's Estate pursuant to section 541, and the HK Parties must deliver HK USA's property to the Trustee pursuant to section 542. (ECF No. 36 ¶¶ 112–19.) The Trustee argues that he is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law that HK USA is the alter ego of the Individual Debtor and that he is entitled to the attendant relief. HK USA objects to the Motion for Summary Judgment. Ms. Guo has not objected.\n\n# **a. Summary Judgment Standard**\n\nUnder Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), made applicable in the instant adversary proceeding by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7056, a court \"shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\" While a movant \"bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact,\" a movant is not required to \"support\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 1885-2 Filed 06/06/23 Entered 06/06/23 16:18:00 Page 19 of 22-05003 221 Filed 05/18/23 Entered 05/18/23 17:35:12 Page 16 of 37 40\n\nits motion with affidavits or other similar materials *negating* the opponent's claim.\" *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett ex rel. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).\n\n\"Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.\" *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine \"if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.\" *Anderson*, 477 U.S. at 248. Where the movant meets its factual burden, an \"opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.\" *Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.*, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Finally, to succeed on the motion, the movant must be entitled, upon the undisputed material facts, to judgment as a matter of law – the judge, in ruling on the motion, is not acting as a finder of fact. *Anderson*, 477 U.S. at 250. Summary judgment should enter \"where the evidence is such that it 'would require a directed verdict for the moving party.'\" *Id.* at 251 (internal citations omitted).\n\n# **b. Alter Ego Standard**\n\nUnless there is an overriding federal policy interest, bankruptcy courts apply forum state choice-of-law rules to issues of state law. *Geron ex rel. Thelen LLP v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (In re Thelen LLP)*, 736 F.3d 213, 219 (2d Cir. 2013). Under Connecticut law, \"[t]he law of the governing jurisdiction of a foreign limited liability company governs: (1) The internal affairs of the company; (2) the liability of a member as member and a manager as manager for a debt, obligation or other liability of the company; and (3) the liability of a series of the company.\" Conn. Gen. Stat. § 34-275(a). Based on a predecessor statute, the Connecticut Supreme Court has ruled that the state of formation of a foreign limited liability company governs the issue of veil-piercing. *Weber v. U.S. Sterling Securities, Inc.*, 924 A.2d 816, 822–23 (Conn. 2007).\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 1885-2 Filed 06/06/23 Entered 06/06/23 16:18:00 Page 20 of 22-05003 221 Filed 05/18/23 Entered 05/18/23 17:35:12 Page 17 of 37 40\n\nMoreover, Federal courts apply the same rule. *Hyundai-Wia Machine Am. Corp. v. Rouette (In re Rouette)*, 564 B.R. 157, 174 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2017). It is undisputed that HK USA is a Delaware limited liability company. Therefore, Delaware law governs the issue of whether HK USA is the alter ego of the Individual Debtor.\n\n\"Delaware courts use the terms 'piercing the corporate veil' and 'alter ego' theory interchangeably.\" *Harrison v. Soroof Int'l, Inc.*, 320 F. Supp. 3d 602, 609 n. 4 (D. Del. 2018). Under Delaware law, alter ego or piercing the corporate veil has two elements: (i) the corporate entity who is to be made liable for the debts of its alter ego is under the dominion and control of said alter ego such that it is a mere instrumentality rather than a separate economic entity and (ii) an overall element of fraud or injustice is caused by the corporate structure. *See Pauley Petroleum Inc. v. Cont'l Oil Co.*, 239 A.2d 629, 633 (Del. 1968) (Piercing the corporate veil \"may be done only in the interest of justice, when such matters as fraud, contravention of law or contract, public wrong, or where equitable consideration among members of the corporation require it, are involved.\"); *Wallace ex rel. Cencom Cable Income Partners II, Inc. v. Wood*, 752 A.2d 1175, 1184 (Del. Ch. 1999) (\"[P]iercing the corporate veil under the alter ego theory 'requires that the corporate structure cause fraud or similar injustice.'\") (internal citations omitted); *Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'ns Co.*, 621 A.2d 784, 793 (Del. Ch. 1992) (\"[A] court can pierce the corporate veil of an entity where there is fraud or where a subsidiary is in fact a mere instrumentality or alter ego of its owner.\") (internal citations omitted); *see also Fletcher v. Atex, Inc.*, 68 F.3d 1451, 1457 (2d Cir. 1995) (\"To prevail on an alter ego claim under Delaware law, a plaintiff must show (1) that the parent and the subsidiary 'operated as a single economic entity' and (2) that an 'overall element of injustice or unfairness . . . [is] present.'\") (internal citations\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 1885-2 Filed 06/06/23 Entered 06/06/23 16:18:00 Page 21 of 22-05003 221 Filed 05/18/23 Entered 05/18/23 17:35:12 Page 18 of 37 40\n\nomitted); *Tronox Inc. v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp. (In re Tronox Inc.)*, 549 B.R. 21, 43–44 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016) (applying Delaware law).\n\nDelaware law allows outsider reverse veil-piercing – piercing the veil of a downstream entity for the benefit of the creditors of an upstream entity or individual, *e.g.*, piercing the veil between a subsidiary and its parent for the benefit of its parent's creditors – upon consideration of \"the traditional factors Delaware courts consider when reviewing a traditional veil-piercing claim\" as well as additional factors reflecting the concern that creditors and other stakeholders of the downstream entity might have their legitimate expectations thwarted. *Manichaean Capital,* 251 A.3d at 714–15. Although *Manichaean Capital* appears to be the first reported decision of a Delaware court recognizing reverse veil-piercing, the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut correctly anticipated that Delaware courts would allow reverse veil-piercing. *Universitas Educ., LLC v. Benistar*, No. 3:20-cv-00738 (JAM), 2021 WL 965794 (D. Conn. Mar. 15, 2021).\n\nThe traditional factors to support a finding of alter ego and/or piercing the corporate veil\n\nare:\n\n\"(1) whether the company was adequately capitalized for the undertaking; (2) whether the company was solvent; (3) whether corporate formalities were observed; (4) whether the dominant shareholder siphoned company funds; and (5) whether, in general, the company simply functioned as a facade for the dominant shareholder.\" While these factors are useful, any single one of them is not determinative. An ultimate decision regarding veilpiercing is largely based on some combination of these factors, in addition to \"an overall element of injustice or unfairness.\"\n\n*Id.* at 706–07 (internal citations omitted). The first five factors are relevant towards the element of dominion and control. The additional reverse-piercing factors are:\n\n\"(1) the degree to which allowing a reverse pierce would impair the legitimate expectations of any adversely affected shareholders who are not responsible for the conduct of the insider that gave rise to the reverse pierce claim, and the degree to which allowing a reverse pierce would establish a precedent troubling to shareholders generally; (2) the degree to which the corporate entity whose disregard is sought has exercised dominion and control over the insider who is subject to the claim by the party seeking a reverse pierce; (3) the degree to which the injury alleged by the person seeking a reverse pierce is related to the corporate entity's dominion and control of the insider, or to that person's reasonable reliance upon a lack of separate entity status between the insider and the corporate entity; (4) the degree to which the public convenience, as articulated by [the Delaware General Corporation Law and Delaware's common law], would be served by allowing a reverse pierce; (5) the extent and severity of the wrongful conduct, if any, engaged in by the corporate entity whose disregard is sought by the insider; (6) the possibility that the person seeking the reverse pierce is himself guilty of wrongful conduct sufficient to bar him from obtaining equitable relief\"; (7) the extent to which the reverse pierce will harm innocent third-party creditors of the entity the plaintiff seeks to reach; and (8) the extent to which other claims or remedies are practically available to the creditor at law or in equity to recover the debt.\n\n*Id.* at 715 (internal citations omitted).\n\n# **c. HK USA is the Individual Debtor's alter ego**\n\nThe Trustee argues he has established that the Individual Debtor has asserted dominion and control over HK USA pursuant to the factors Delaware courts consider because: (a) pursuant to the Amended Collateral Estoppel SJ Order, the Court has held that the Individual Debtor beneficially owned and controlled all of the assets HK USA has ever purportedly owned, namely, the Lady May and Lady May II; (b) it is undisputed and admitted by the HK Parties that during the entire time period relevant to the Second Counterclaim, HK USA has (i) generated no revenue; (ii) had no directors, officers, or employees; (iii) not filed tax returns; (iv) had no bank account and had not otherwise been capitalized; and (v) maintained no documents other than those relating to the Lady May; and (c) it is undisputed that HK USA had no business purpose other than owning the Lady May and Lady May II. Regarding the fraud or injustice factor, the Trustee argues that HK USA's corporate form serves to judgment-proof the Lady May.\n\nHK USA advances three counter arguments. First, it argues that HK USA also served a business purpose for Ms. Guo – not just her father—because (i) Ms. Guo signed contracts regarding the operations of the Lady May; and (ii) she personally guaranteed a loan to HK USA.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 1885-2 Filed 06/06/23 Entered 06/06/23 16:18:00 Page 23 of 22-05003 221 Filed 05/18/23 Entered 05/18/23 17:35:12 Page 20 of 37 40\n\nSecond, HK USA argues that Ms. Guo did not intend fraud in creating HK USA, but rather sought to create an American entity to own the Lady May. Third, it argues that, while the factors may support finding Ms. Guo is the alter ego of HK USA, the Trustee is seeking to skip the step of establishing the Individual Debtor's ownership interest in HK USA, which is the relief the Trustee seeks in the Third Counterclaim. HK USA argues that the Trustee must first prevail on the Third Counterclaim before relief may be granted on the Second Counterclaim.\n\n# *The Individual Debtor asserts 'dominion and control' over HK USA*\n\nThe traditional alter ego factors support a finding that the Individual Debtor has dominion and control over HK USA. *See Manichaean Capital,* 251 A.3d at 714 (listing traditional alter ego factors). First, it is undisputed that HK USA was undercapitalized and could not pay for the operation and maintenance of the Lady May. By HK USA's own admissions, the operation and maintenance of the Lady May costs more than \\$100,000 a month. (Undisputed Fact 8.) Yet HK USA, again by its own admissions, has no income, generates no income, and has no liquid assets. (Undisputed Fact 7.)\n\nSecond, it is undisputed that HK USA does not observe corporate formalities. HK USA admits that it has no directors, officers, or employees. (Undisputed Fact 7.) In addition, HK USA admits it did not maintain a corporate bank account despite having its own expenses. (*Id.*)\n\nThird, HK USA is a mere instrumentality of the Individual Debtor. HK USA's only business is the ownership, operation, and maintenance of the Lady May and Lady May II. (Undisputed Facts 7, 9, 12.) The Court adopts its conclusion in the Amended Collateral Estoppel SJ Order that the Individual Debtor beneficially owns and controls the Lady May and the Lady May II.7 Taken together, the Trustee has established that HK USA's only business purpose is\n\n7 *See* note 5, *supra.*\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 1885-2 Filed 06/06/23 Entered 06/06/23 16:18:00 Page 24 of 22-05003 221 Filed 05/18/23 Entered 05/18/23 17:35:12 Page 21 of 37 40\n\nnominal ownership, operation, and maintenance of assets the Individual Debtor beneficially owns and controls. This alone establishes that HK USA is a mere instrumentality of the Individual Debtor. *See Fletcher*, 68 F.3d at 1457; *Geyer*, 621 A.2d at 793.\n\nBeyond the application of collateral estoppel, the record of this case supports the conclusion that the Individual Debtor beneficially owns and controls the Lady May and Lady May II. Among other things, Ms. Guo affirmed the testimony of former captains and managers of the Lady May who stated that overwhelmingly the Individual Debtor – not Ms. Guo – had the benefit of use of the Lady May. (Reply Ex. 2, at \\*92:8–107:17.) Moreover, Undisputed Facts 17 through 22 detail how HK USA's efforts in the early days of this case all benefited the Individual Debtor – not Ms. Guo. Furthermore, Undisputed Fact 5 provides additional evidence that HK USA is a mere instrumentality of the Individual Debtor. For example, HK USA shares or shared office space with, *inter alia*: (i) the Individual Debtor's counsel in these cases and in other cases (Main Case ECF No 530; Bassett Decl. Ex. 6); (ii) a family office purportedly controlled by the Individual Debtor's son that has historically paid many of the Individual Debtor's expenses, including in relation to these cases, and has procured counsel for the Individual Debtor (Main Case ECF Nos. 117, 197, 318, at 146:25–149:5; *Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund, L.P. v. Kwok (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 22-05032 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn.) (Nov. 30, 2022) (hereinafter \"PI Adversary\"), ECF No. 94, at 2:24–5:10); (iii) a property holding company purportedly controlled by the Individual Debtor's wife, which owns the Greenwich mansion where the Debtor resides (Main Case ECF Nos. 81 and 1015); and (iv) entities involved in the Individual Debtor's media and cryptocurrency business (*see* Corrected Memorandum of Decision ¶¶ 3, 7, PI Adversary (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 13, 2023), ECF No. 133). Moreover, the\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 1885-2 Filed 06/06/23 Entered 06/06/23 16:18:00 Page 25 of 22-05003 221 Filed 05/18/23 Entered 05/18/23 17:35:12 Page 22 of 37 40\n\nIndividual Debtor himself listed HK USA's address as his address on his Chapter 11 petition. (Main Case ECF No. 1, Part 1 § 5)\n\nHK USA has not established the existence of any disputed or undisputed material fact supporting its contention that HK USA has an additional business purpose. HK USA identifies documents signed by Ms. Guo on its behalf. Each such document, however, relates to the operation of the Lady May – which the Court has concluded was under the Individual Debtor's control. (Undisputed Facts 13–14, 17–23.) Therefore, HK USA has identified no genuine issue of material fact about whether it is a mere instrumentality of the Individual Debtor.\n\nAs to the remaining two factors, there is no allegation that funds have been drained from HK USA. In fact, HK USA admits that it has never had a bank account. (Undisputed Fact 7.) Finally, it is unclear whether HK USA is either cash-flow or balance-sheet insolvent. As to cashflow insolvency, the parties disagree about whether a funding agreement with Lamp Capital LLC is enforceable. (Main Case ECF Nos. 1216, 1490; *see* Main Case ECF No. 1550, at 101:4– 108:13.) As to balance-sheet insolvency, the parties disagree about whether the Escrowed Funds are a liability or an asset. Moreover, the value of the Lady May and Lady May II is presently unknown. HK USA's positions on these issues would tend to establish insolvency.\n\nNevertheless, an alter ego determination does not rely on the presence of all enumerated factors. *Manichaean Capital*, 251 A.3d at 714. Here, three of the five are present. While assertions of dominion and control tend to be fact-heavy questions ill-suited for summary judgment, this is a case where two of the five domination factors are established on *admitted* facts. Moreover, HK USA fails to point to any material facts, disputed or otherwise, that establish HK USA had any business other than ownership and operation of the Lady May and Lady May II, which business has already been established in this Court to be the Individual\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 1885-2 Filed 06/06/23 Entered 06/06/23 16:18:00 Page 26 of 22-05003 221 Filed 05/18/23 Entered 05/18/23 17:35:12 Page 23 of 37 40\n\nDebtor's business. The Court concludes that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that as a matter of law the Individual Debtor dominates and controls HK USA.\n\n# *HK USA's corporate form causes 'fraud or similar injustice'*\n\nTuring to the second element of the alter ego claim, the Court must address whether HK USA's corporate form causes some fraud or similar injustice. To establish this element, the Trustee does not need to prove fraud. *Fletcher*, 68 F.3d at 1457.\n\nHere, there is closely held corporation – HK USA. HK USA only exists to hold assets – the Lady May and Lady May II. HK USA is held in the name of Ms. Guo, a relative of the person who beneficially owns and controls those assets – the Individual Debtor. In the fraudulent transfer context, each of these facts is considered a badge of fraud. *Salomon ex rel. Kaiser v. Kaiser (In re Kaiser)*, 722 F.2d 1574, 1582–83 (2d Cir. 1983). The Court concludes that in the alter ego context, they are indicia of injustice wrought by the corporate form. These badges of fraud highlight that HK USA's purpose is to prevent the Individual Debtor's creditors from executing a judgment entered against the Individual Debtor upon the Lady May and Lady May II and support the inference that it was the Individual Debtor's intent to do so. *See Manichaean Capital*, 251 A.3d at 708–09. As noted above, HK USA's *only* purpose is to be the registered owner of the Lady May and Lady May II. Therefore, no additional business purpose has been established to complicate this analysis.\n\nWhile the HK Parties argue that Ms. Guo did not intend this injustice when creating HK USA, it is irrelevant whether she did or did not. The fraud or similar injustice element is about the *result* of the corporate form – not the intent at its formation. *NetJets Aviation, Inc. v. LHC Commc'ns, LLC*, 537 F.3d 168, 177 (2d Cir. 2008) (\"Finally, we note that the plaintiff need not prove that the corporation was created with fraud or unfairness in mind. It is sufficient to prove\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 1885-2 Filed 06/06/23 Entered 06/06/23 16:18:00 Page 27 of 22-05003 221 Filed 05/18/23 Entered 05/18/23 17:35:12 Page 24 of 37 40\n\nthat it was so used.\") (applying Delaware law); *see Martin v. D.B. Martin Co.*, 88 A. 612, 615– 16 (Del. Ch. 1913) (discussing cases where original fraudulent intent was held unnecessary).\n\n# *Delaware law does not require a direct corporate relationship*\n\nHK USA argues that the preceding analysis skips a step and makes an impermissible inference of equitable ownership before the Third Counterclaim has been decided in the Trustee's favor. The Court disagrees. The Trustee has established, at the very least, an indirect relationship between HK USA and the Individual Debtor. HK USA is the record owner of property that the Individual Debtor beneficially owns and controls. The record owner of HK USA is undisputedly his daughter, Ms. Guo. For alter ego purposes, it is not necessary under Delaware law to break down the intermediate barriers presented by an indirect relationship: while a typical alter ego case holds a parent liable for the debts of its subsidiary, a parentsubsidiary or other direct relationship is not an element of alter ego. *See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Reliance Capital Grp., Inc. (In re Buckhead Am. Corp.)*, 178 B.R. 956, 974–75 (D. Del. 1994) (concluding that a direct parent-subsidiary relationship is not needed under Delaware law where the two alter ego elements are present); *Maxus Liquidating Tr. v. YPF S.A. (In re Maxus Energy Corp.)*, 641 B.R. 467, 556–58 (Bankr. D. Del. 2022) (same); *Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Highland Capital Mgmt. L.P. (In re Moll Indus. Inc.)*, 454 B.R. 574, 587 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011) (same). These cases hold that the elements of alter ego are 'dominion and control' and 'fraud or injustice,' even where there is not a direct relationship and intermediate corporate veils have not been pierced – or in the case of enterprise liability, *do not even exist*. *See Maxus Energy*, 641 B.R. at 557–558 (quoting *Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co.*, 210 F.3d 18, 29 (1st Cir. 2000) discussing alter ego in non-traditional contexts, such as with \"sibling\" corporations).\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 1885-2 Filed 06/06/23 Entered 06/06/23 16:18:00 Page 28 of 22-05003 221 Filed 05/18/23 Entered 05/18/23 17:35:12 Page 25 of 37 40\n\nThis principle extends to the allegations in the Second Counterclaim. The purpose of alter ego is to prevent the corporate form from protecting the party actually responsible for an abuse of that form. *See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc. (In re Sunbeam Corp.)*, 284 B.R. 355, 365 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) (applying Delaware law). This accords with New York law. *See Freeman v. Complex Computing Co., Inc.*, 119 F.3d 1044, 1051 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that under New York law, equitable ownership may be established \"for veil-piercing purposes\" by establishing \"considerable authority over [the corporation] . . . to the point of completely disregarding the corporate form and acting as though [its] assets were his alone to manage and distribute'\") (internal citations omitted). While at first blush *Freeman* may seem to support HK USA's position, it does not. As *Freeman* articulates it, the proof for \"equitable ownership for veil-piercing purposes\" under New York law is *dominion and control*. This accords with the cases, *supra*, stating that, under Delaware law, an established direct corporate relationship – or, alternatively, veil-piercing of each intermediary – is not necessary.\n\nIt is important to note the distinction between the Second and Third Counterclaims. Alter ego and/or piercing the corporate veil as sought by the Second Counterclaim renders one entity liable for the debts of another individual or entity. *Tronox*, 549 B.R. at 44 (\"Under Delaware law, veil piercing is a doctrine of equity. . . . Veil piercing is thus not a purely independent cause of action. Instead, piercing the corporate veil effectively amounts to the imposition of joint and several liability between a direct actor and its corporate affiliate for some underlying wrong committed by the direct actor.\") In conjunction with sections 541 and 542, alter ego thus accomplishes the transfer of assets into the bankruptcy estate.\n\nWhile beneficial ownership of *personalty or realt*y in conjunction with sections 541 and 542 also accomplishes transfer of an asset into the bankruptcy estate, beneficial ownership of a\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 1885-2 Filed 06/06/23 Entered 06/06/23 16:18:00 Page 29 of 22-05003 221 Filed 05/18/23 Entered 05/18/23 17:35:12 Page 26 of 37 40\n\n*limited liability company* as sought by the Third Counterclaim does not alone accomplish this – it accomplishes the transfer of the *membership interest* into the bankruptcy estate. *See, e.g.*, *Paloian ex rel. Dordevic v. Dordevic (In re Dordevic)*, 633 B.R. 553, 574 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2021) (\"For all of these reasons, the Court finds and holds that the Trustee has met his burden of establishing that Debtor is the true equitable owner of Jorgovanka's *50% membership interest* in PHMX LLC and is entitled to exercise the rights accorded to him by that status. Judgment is entered in favor of the Trustee and against Jorgovanka under Counts I and II of the complaint.\") (emphasis added), *aff'd by* 20 b 9807, 21 C5328, 2022 WL 19638995 (N.D. Ill. July 25, 2022), *aff'd by* No. 22-2500, 2023 WL 3113706 (5th Cir. April 27, 2023). If only beneficial ownership of HK USA is established as sought in the Third Counterclaim, the bankruptcy estate would not include the *assets* of the limited liability company – the corporate veil would have to be pierced. If the Trustee were to succeed on the Third Counterclaim without succeeding on the Second Counterclaim, he would *control* HK USA because he would be the owner of the membership interest in HK USA. However, he would not own HK USA's assets and would have to respect its corporate form, absent a subsequent judgment as to some or all of HK USA's assets.\n\n# *Additional reverse-piercing factors support piercing corporate veil*\n\nThe Court must also consider the additional factors in *Manichaean Capital* regarding reverse veil-piercing. 251 A.3d at 715. While the parties did not directly address these factors in their pleadings or during oral argument, the parties did raise issues that are relevant to reverse veil-piercing. Analyzing the additional factors in light of the issues raised by the parties, the Court concludes that the applicable additional reverse veil-piercing factors also support a finding of alter ego.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 1885-2 Filed 06/06/23 Entered 06/06/23 16:18:00 Page 30 of 22-05003 221 Filed 05/18/23 Entered 05/18/23 17:35:12 Page 27 of 37 40\n\nFirst, reverse veil-piercing will not harm the legitimate expectations of HK USA's owners. Ms. Guo is the sole member of HK USA. Ms. Guo has no expectation of use or control of the Lady May or Lady May II. The Court has concluded that the Individual Debtor beneficially owns and controls the Lady May and Lady May II. Ms. Guo testified that prior testimony of the Lady May's former captains and managers stating that she did not personally direct the Lady May and that she did not frequently use the Lady May – in comparison to her father, who did – was accurate. (Reply Ex. 2, at \\*92:8–107:17.) As to the Lady May II, Ms. Guo testified under penalty of perjury that neither she nor HK USA owned the Lady May II. (Undisputed Fact 9.) Ms. Guo can also have no legitimate expectation to use the Escrowed Funds because (i) the funds are in escrow pending further order of the Court; and (ii) the funds were received as a loan, which Ms. Guo allegedly personally guaranteed.\n\nRegarding the Personal Guarantee, Ms. Guo knew or should have known that she was guaranteeing a loan to an entity whose only purported asset at that time was (a) subject to an ownership dispute; (b) already found by one court to be beneficially owned and controlled by the Individual Debtor; (c) previously held away from the jurisdictional waters of New York despite court order and might well similarly avoid the jurisdictional waters of Connecticut despite the Stipulated Delivery Order; and (d) intended to be transferred to the Individual Debtor's Estate and sold for the benefit of the Individual Debtor's creditors, which is particularly concerning because HK USA admittedly has no source of revenue from which to pay any interest that accrued on the loan. If Ms. Guo is liable on the Personal Guarantee – which is not clear since the Personal Guarantee is undated, unwitnessed, and unnotarized – she may have a claim against the Individual Debtor's Estate.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 1885-2 Filed 06/06/23 Entered 06/06/23 16:18:00 Page 31 of 22-05003 221 Filed 05/18/23 Entered 05/18/23 17:35:12 Page 28 of 37 40\n\nSecond, reverse veil-piercing will also not harm the legitimate expectations of HK USA's creditors. The Court has already allowed payment of the operation, maintenance, and management expenses of the Lady May. Himalaya International Financial Group Ltd. (\"Himalaya Financial\"), much like Ms. Guo, knew or should have known the loan was risky for the reasons discussed in the preceding paragraph.\n\nThird, reverse veil-piercing will allow recovery to the Individual Debtor's creditors where otherwise it remains uncertain. At this point, claims in aggregate of several hundred million – or perhaps billions of dollars – have been alleged against the Individual Debtor's Estate through proofs of claim, which are prima facie evidence of their validity. The Individual Debtor has asserted less than \\$4,000 in assets and has not been cooperating in the Trustee's investigation of assets.\n\nFourth, reverse veil-piercing would be in the public interest because, as noted above, HK USA's corporate form works an injustice. HK USA has no business purpose other than holding assets – none of the policy considerations supporting limited liability are applicable. There is no going concern to protect. HK USA only serves to shield assets beneficially owned and controlled by the Individual Debtor from the Individual Debtor's creditors.\n\nFor these reasons, there is no genuine dispute of material fact and that the Trustee is entitled to judgment as a matter of law that HK USA is the alter ego of the Individual Debtor.\n\n# **d. The Trustee is not bound by the Stipulated Delivery Order**\n\nHK USA raises an equitable defense8 against the Second Counterclaim arguing that the Trustee is estopped from recovering the Escrowed Funds by the provisions of the Stipulated\n\n8 Under *Celotex*, where a non-moving party bears the burden of proof such as HK USA with respect to the present equitable defense, the movant must make an initial \"showing\" regarding the claim, element, or defense. 477 U.S. at 322–23. The burden is not shifted to the movant and\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 1885-2 Filed 06/06/23 Entered 06/06/23 16:18:00 Page 32 of 22-05003 221 Filed 05/18/23 Entered 05/18/23 17:35:12 Page 29 of 37 40\n\nDelivery Order. The Stipulated Delivery Order provides in pertinent part that the Individual Debtor (among others)\n\nshall not take any act to assert, create, perfect or enforce any right, title, lien or other interest in the [Escrowed Funds] while in the possession of the Escrow Agent or their proceeds while in the possession of HK USA or any other person, including, but not limited to, through the enforcement of any judgment or service of any prejudgment remedy or other legal process\n\n(ECF No. 299 ¶ 12.) HK USA argues that the Trustee is bound by the Stipulated Delivery Order and, in particular, paragraph 12, because he stepped into the shoes of the Individual Debtor upon his appointment.\n\nThe Trustee argues that he is not bound by the Stipulated Delivery Order. First, the Trustee argues that it is black letter contract law that a party cannot enter a contract with itself and, therefore, the Stipulated Delivery Order – as between the Individual Debtor and HK USA – is null and void *ab initio*. Furthermore, the Trustee argues that he is not estopped from arguing that he is not bound by the Stipulated Delivery for several reasons, namely: (i) neither of the HK Parties are creditors in these cases; (ii) there is no public policy interest in allowing a debtor to self-deal in bankruptcy to shield assets from bankruptcy proceedings and no prejudice against a debtor in preventing such self-dealing; (iii) there is a public policy interest in allowing a Chapter 11 trustee to investigate a debtor's alleged efforts to hide assets and recover where a claim is meritorious; and (iv) the Stipulated Delivery Order was silent on its effect on a Chapter 11 trustee despite the pendency of the UST's motion for the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee.\n\nrather remains with the non-movant, in this case HK USA. *Id.* HK USA rested on its arguments made regarding the Motion to Dismiss.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 1885-2 Filed 06/06/23 Entered 06/06/23 16:18:00 Page 33 of 22-05003 221 Filed 05/18/23 Entered 05/18/23 17:35:12 Page 30 of 37 40\n\n# *Stipulated Deliver Order is null and void as between the Individual Debtor and HK USA*\n\n The Court first considers the Trustee's argument sounding in contract. The Trustee is correct that contract law applies to the Stipulated Delivery Order. *Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. N.Y. Times Co.*, 196 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1999) (\"Although consent decrees are judicial orders, they are also agreements between parties that 'should be construed basically as contracts.'\") (internal citations omitted); *see Doe v. Pataki*, 481 F.3d 69, 73 n. 3 (2d Cir. 2007) (\"As the District Court correctly noted, the Stipulation was the equivalent of a consent decree . . ..\"); *see also Vincent's of Mott Street, Inc. v. Quadami, Inc.*, 423 F. App'x 46 (2d Cir. 2011) (treating a stipulation approved by bankruptcy court as a contract). This Court applies Connecticut choice of law rules to questions of state law. *Thelen LLP*, 736 F.3d at 219. Connecticut applies the Second Restatement for choice of law determinations in actions on contracts. *Macomber v. Travelers Prop. & Cas. Corp.*, 894 A.2d 240, 256-57 (Conn. 2006); *see* Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 6, 186–188 (2022). The Stipulated Delivery Order does not contain a choice of law provision. Therefore, the Court applies Connecticut law as the contract was formed in this Court, which is in Connecticut.\n\nUnder Connecticut law, contract formation requires, *inter alia*, a meeting of the minds such that a mutual understanding of the terms is achieved between the parties. *L & R Realty v. Conn. Nat'l Bank*, 732 A.2d 181, 188–89 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999), *cert. denied*, 734 A.2d 984 (Conn. 1999). \"If the minds of the parties have not truly met, no enforceable contract exists.\" *L & R Realty*, 732 A.2d at 188–89. Therefore, a party cannot prosecute an action on a contract where it contracted with itself – although some other beneficiary to the contract may. *Moore v. Denslow*, 14 Conn. 235, 237–38 (1841); *accord Animazing Ent., Inc. v. Louis Lofredo Assocs., Inc.*, 88 F. Supp. 2d 265, 270–71 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating that under New York law it is well-\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 1885-2 Filed 06/06/23 Entered 06/06/23 16:18:00 Page 34 of 22-05003 221 Filed 05/18/23 Entered 05/18/23 17:35:12 Page 31 of 37 40\n\nestablished that there must be (at least) two parties to a contract – otherwise it is void). Because the Court has concluded that HK USA is the alter ego of the Individual Debtor, the Court concludes that as between HK USA and the Individual Debtor – into whose shoes the Trustee steps, in this regard – the Stipulated Delivery Order was void *ab initio*. Therefore, HK USA may not enforce the Stipulated Delivery Order against the Trustee and the Trustee may recover the Escrowed Funds.\n\n# *The Trustee is not estopped from recovering the Escrowed Funds*\n\nAs to whether the Trustee is estopped from recovering the Escrowed Funds, in *Feldman*\n\n*v. Trans-East Air, Inc.*, a case under the former Bankruptcy Act, the Second Circuit held that a\n\ntrustee was bound by the former debtor-in-possession's rejection of airplane leases because\n\nIn this case appellees changed their position in reasonable reliance on the rejection of the contracts. They properly understood the order of September 8 to require them to take the planes and to attempt to mitigate damages by finding a new lessee. However, demand for the aircraft was very low. As the district court found, appellees expended considerable amounts of money, time, and effort to re-lease the planes, and these efforts plus appellees' expertise were largely responsible for the favorable leases eventually obtained.\n\nAppellees had a right to rely on the order of disaffirmance. The debtor requested it, the court approved it, and no other party opposed it. For sixteen months neither the debtor nor the trustee objected to appellees' actions.\n\n497 F.2d 352, 355 (2d Cir. 1974). The Second Circuit noted there was no allegation of \"fraud or\n\nbad faith by any party.\" *Feldman*, 497 F.2d at 356. Similarly, in *E. Air Lines, Inc. v. Ins. Co. (In*\n\n*re Ionoshpere Clubs)*, the Second Circuit held that a Chapter 11 trustee was bound by a debtor-\n\nin-possession's obligations under an insurance plan where\n\nPromising to perform its obligations under the Plan with only the payment schedule altered, and remaining silent as to the contentions advanced in this litigation that it had not adequately given its consent to the 1.6 multiplier provided by the Plan, that that multiplier was unenforceable, and hence that its maximum premium should be less than the amount called for by the Plan, [the debtor] persuaded [the insurer] to agree to a relaxed premium payment schedule and to continue to provide insurance coverage.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 1885-2 Filed 06/06/23 Entered 06/06/23 16:18:00 Page 35 of 22-05003 221 Filed 05/18/23 Entered 05/18/23 17:35:12 Page 32 of 37 40\n\n85 F.3d 992, 1001 (2d Cir. 1996). The Second Circuit also noted, *inter alia*, that the debtor made \"no effort whatever to alter the formula for computing the maximum premium; according to McGuinness, that question was not even discussed\" and that allowing the trustee to alter the insurance plan would cause the insurer \"substantial prejudice.\" *Ionosphere*, 85 F.3d at 1001.\n\nSecond Circuit jurisprudence is in accord with the law of its sister circuits. In *Armstrong v. Norwest Bank, Minneapolis, N.A.*, the Eighth Circuit expressed concern that \"Creditors must be able to deal freely with debtors-in-possession, within the confines of the bankruptcy laws, without fear of retribution or reversal at the hands of a later appointed trustee.\" 964 F.2d 797, 801 (8th Cir. 1992) (not allowing a Chapter 7 trustee to undo a stipulation between a former debtor-in-possession and a creditor regarding the use of cash collateral). In *In re Superior Toy & Mfg. Co., Inc.*, the Seventh Circuit did not allow a Chapter 7 trustee to reconsider a previous assumption of a contract in Chapter 11 and pursue preference litigation on the cure payments involved in the assumption of the contract where there was not \"[f]raud by a party, or the intentional concealing of information from the court so as to improperly obtain an assumption order\" because the estate benefitted from the assumption and reconsideration now would prejudice the creditor. 78 F.3d 1169, 1173–76 (7th Cir. 1996). In *Seidle v. GATX Leasing Corp.*, the Eleventh Circuit held that a Chapter 11 trustee could not seek to recover alleged preference payments to a creditor where the former debtor-in-possession had entered into a stipulation with the creditor pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1110 noting that it had previously determined \"'equity demands that GATX not suffer a penalty for having voluntarily entered into a post-petition section 1110 agreement with Airlift.'\" 778 F.2d 659, 663–66 (11th Cir. 1985) (internal citations omitted).\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 1885-2 Filed 06/06/23 Entered 06/06/23 16:18:00 Page 36 of 22-05003 221 Filed 05/18/23 Entered 05/18/23 17:35:12 Page 33 of 37 40\n\nUltimately, in determining the equities, the Court must weigh the public's interest in appointing and allowing a Chapter 11 trustee to perform statutory duties against the policy concerns that favor binding a trustee to the bargain of a former debtor-in-possession. *Begier v. Am. Express, Inc. (In re Am. Int'l Airways, Inc.)*, 74 B.R. 691, 694 (Bankr. E.D. Penn. 1987). As set forth below, the Court agrees with the Trustee that on the specific facts and circumstances of these Chapter 11 cases, the public's interest in the Trustee performing his duties outweighs those policy concerns.\n\nWhile the HK Parties are correct that generally a trustee will be bound by a bargain made by a former debtor-in-possession, the policy concerns militating this general result do not support binding the Trustee to the terms of the Stipulated Delivery Order. Unlike in *Armstrong*, *Superior Toy*, and *Seidle*, it is undisputed that neither HK USA nor Ms. Guo is a creditor of the Individual Debtor.9 Therefore, the policy concern that creditors must be comfortable in reaching agreements with debtors-in-possession is not implicated on the instant facts. *See, e.g.*, *Armstrong*, 964 F.2d at 801. Furthermore, because the Court has found HK USA is a mere instrumentality of the Individual Debtor with no separate economic existence, there can be no prejudice to HK USA in holding it liable for the debts of the Individual Debtor. *See, e.g.*, *Ionosphere*, 85 F.3d at 1001; *Superior Toy*, 78 F.3d at 1176; *Seidle*, 778 F.2d at 665; *Feldman*, 497 F.2d at 355. Further still, there is no public interest in allowing an Individual Debtor to selfdeal in bankruptcy to shield assets from bankruptcy proceedings, which would be accomplished by binding the Trustee to the Stipulated Delivery Order. *See In re Alma Energy, LLC,* No. CIV. 10-80-ART, 2010 WL 4736905 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 16, 2010); *Coan v. Licata (In re First Conn.*\n\n9 While HK USA points to the fact that certain creditors were parties to the Stipulated Delivery Order, the Trustee is not seeking relief against such creditors.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 1885-2 Filed 06/06/23 Entered 06/06/23 16:18:00 Page 37 of 22-05003 221 Filed 05/18/23 Entered 05/18/23 17:35:12 Page 34 of 37 40\n\n*Consulting Grp.)*, Case No. 02-50852 (JJT), Case No. 02-51167 (JJT), Adv. P. No. 09-05010 (JJT), 2023 WL 2746826 (Bankr. D. Conn. Mar. 31, 2023); *Coan v. Licata (In re First Conn. Consulting Grp.)*, Case No. 02-50852 (JJT), Case No. 02-51167 (JJT), Adv. P. No. 09-05010 (JJT), 2023 WL 2752489 (Bankr. D. Conn. Mar. 31, 2023). This is because such self-dealing and bankruptcy-proofing constitutes \"fraud or bad faith.\" *Feldman*, 497 F.2d at 356; *see Superior Toy*, 78 F.3d at 1175; *Am. Int'l Airways*, 74 B.R. at 694. Finally, unlike in *In re MatlinPatterson Global Opportunities Partners II L.P.*, the Stipulated Delivery Order here does not expressly bind the Trustee, despite (a) the pendency at that time of a motion to appoint a Chapter 11 trustee and (b) discussing dismissal in light of PAX's then-pending motion to dismiss. 644 B.R. 418, 427–28 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2022); *see In re Phila. Athletic Club, Inc.*, 17 B.R. 345, 347 (Bankr. E.D. Penn. 1982).\n\nAt the same time, the public's interest underlying the appointment of the Trustee, on these facts and circumstances, is of utmost concern. The Trustee was appointed in this case for cause. *See* 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1). Among other things, the Trustee was appointed to investigate allegations that the Individual Debtor is engaged in shell games to hinder, delay, and defraud his creditors. The Second Counterclaim represents the sort of claim the Trustee was appointed to pursue. Piercing the corporate veil \"may be done only in the interest of justice, when such matters as fraud, contravention of law or contract, public wrong, or where equitable consideration among members of the corporation require it, are involved.\" *Pauley Petroleum*, 239 A.2d at 633. The Court has determined that HK USA's corporate form does injustice in that it serves to shield assets beneficially owned and controlled by the Individual Debtor from his creditors. This injustice would be served by holding the Trustee to be bound by the Stipulated Delivery Order. The public interest supports the Trustee's recovery from the Escrowed Funds.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 1885-2 Filed 06/06/23 Entered 06/06/23 16:18:00 Page 38 of 22-05003 221 Filed 05/18/23 Entered 05/18/23 17:35:12 Page 35 of 37 40\n\nFurthermore, the discussion above regarding the additional reverse veil-piercing factors reinforces this analysis of the equities.\n\nThe equitable analysis accords with the determination above that the Trustee is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his argument sounding in contract that he may recover the Escrowed Funds. Accordingly, for both these reasons, the Court concludes that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the Trustee is entitled to judgment as a matter of law that he may recover the Escrowed Funds.\n\n# **VI. CONCLUSION AND ORDER**\n\nFor the reasons stated above, no genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether HK USA is the alter ego of the Individual Debtor and the Trustee is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this issue. Therefore, the Court concludes that HK USA's property is property of the Individual Debtor's Estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541, which property the HK Parties must deliver to the Trustee pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 542.\n\nThe Court additionally concludes that HK USA may not enforce the Stipulated Delivery Order against the Trustee because it was null and void *ab initio* as between HK USA and the Individual Debtor because a party may not contract with itself. Alternatively, upon a consideration of the equities, the Court concludes that the Trustee is not bound by the Individual Debtor's bargain made while a debtor-in-possession. Therefore, in accordance with the Court's conclusion that HK USA is the alter ego of the Individual Debtor, the Trustee may recover the Escrowed Funds pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 541 and 542.\n\nHK USA's cross-motion to dissolve the PI/PJR is denied without prejudice. At this time, the Court's ruling on the First Counterclaim is on appeal. It is likely that this ruling on the Second Counterclaim will also be appealed. In addition, the Third and Fifth Counterclaims\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 1885-2 Filed 06/06/23 Entered 06/06/23 16:18:00 Page 39 of 22-05003 221 Filed 05/18/23 Entered 05/18/23 17:35:12 Page 36 of 37 40\n\nsurvived the HK Parties' Motion to Dismiss. Finally, although the Trustee argues that the Fourth Counterclaim is not, at this time, properly before the Court, it has not been dismissed, and may be properly before this Court now or in the future.\n\nAccordingly, it is hereby\n\n**ORDERED:** The Motion for Summary Judgment is **GRANTED** as set forth herein. HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC (\"HK USA\") is and was at all relevant times the alter ego of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Individual Debtor\"); and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** All property of HK USA at all relevant times to the present, including the Lady May, the Lady May II, and the Escrowed Funds constituted and constitute, as applicable, property of the Individual Debtor's Chapter 11 estate (the \"Estate\"); and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** On or before June 2, 2023, Ms. Mei Guo, HK USA's sole member, and HK USA (together, the \"HK Parties\") shall deliver all property of HK USA to Mr. Luc A. Despins, not in his personal capacity but in his capacity as Chapter 11 trustee of the Estate (the \"Trustee\"); and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** The Trustee is authorized to take all actions necessary and appropriate to effectuate this Order; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** This Order is effective immediately and no stay pursuant to Rule 7062 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure shall be effective. The Court hereby grants a waiver of any limitations set forth in Rule 7062 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure on the Trustee's ability to enforce this judgment upon its entry; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** This Court shall retain jurisdiction with respect to all matters arising from or related to the implementation, interpretation, and enforcement of this Order; and it is further\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 1885-2 Filed 06/06/23 Entered 06/06/23 16:18:00 Page 40 of 22-05003 221 Filed 05/18/23 Entered 05/18/23 17:35:12 Page 37 of 37 40\n\n# **ORDERED:** HK USA's cross-motion to dissolve the PI/PJR is **DENIED** without\n\nprejudice.\n\nDated at Bridgeport, Connecticut this 18th day of May, 2023.","body_zh":"附件 B\n\nUNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT（美国康涅狄格州破产法院）\n\n关于： )\n)\n第11章\n)\n案号 22-50073 (JAM)\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等， )\n（合并管理）\n债务人。 )\n)\n)\nHK INTERNATIONAL FUNDS INVESTMENTS )\n(USA) LIMITED, LLC（HK国际基金投资［美国］有限公司）， )\n对立程序案号 22-05003 (JAM)\n)\n原告 )\n关于 ECF 编号 36 和 185\n)\n诉 )\n)\n)\nLUC A. DESPINS（卢克·A·德斯平斯），作为\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）财产的第11章受托人 )\n)\n被告。 )\n)\n)\nLUC A. DESPINS（卢克·A·德斯平斯），作为\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）财产的第11章受托人 )\n)\n)\n反诉原告 )\n)\n诉 )\n)\nHK INTERNATIONAL FUNDS INVESTMENTS )\n(USA) LIMITED, LLC（HK国际基金投资［美国］有限公司）及 MEI GUO（郭美）， )\n)\n反诉被告。 )\n)\n)\n出庭人员\n\nLuc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯平斯） Avram E. Luft（艾弗拉姆·E·卢夫特） G. Alexander Bongartz（G. 亚历山大·邦加茨） Paul Hastings LLP（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所） 200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166\n\nDouglass S. Skalka（道格拉斯·S·斯卡尔卡） Patrick R. Linsey（帕特里克·R·林赛） Neubert, Pepe & Montieth（纽伯特、佩佩及蒙蒂斯律师事务所） 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, CT 06510\n\n以及\n\nNicholas A. Bassett（尼古拉斯·A·巴塞特）（出庭辩论） Paul Hastings LLP（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所） 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C. 20036\n\n反诉原告 Luc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯平斯），作为 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）财产的第11章受托人，及其律师\n\nLee Vartan（李·瓦尔坦） Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC（基耶萨、沙希尼安及詹托马西律师事务所） One Boland Drive West Orange, NJ 07052\n\nAaron Romney（亚伦·罗姆尼） John L. Cesaroni（约翰·L·切萨罗尼） James M. Moriarty（詹姆斯·M·莫里亚蒂） Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（蔡斯勒及蔡斯勒律师事务所） 10 Middle Street Bridgeport, CT 06604\n\n以及\n\nSam Della Fera, Jr.（小萨姆·德拉费拉） Melissa F. Wernick（梅丽莎·F·韦尼克）（出庭辩论） Chiesa Shahinian & Giantomasi PC（基耶萨、沙希尼安及詹托马西律师事务所） 105 Eisenhower Parkway Roseland, NJ 07068\n\n反诉被告 HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC（HK国际基金投资［美国］有限公司）及 Mei Guo（郭美）的律师\n关于准许就第二项反诉作出部分简易判决之动议的决定备忘录及命令\n\nJulie A. Manning（朱莉·A·曼宁），美国破产法官\n一、引言\n\n本院目前审理的是反诉原告 Luc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯平斯）先生以 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）先生（下称“个别债务人”）破产财产（下称“财产”）第11章受托人（下称“受托人”）身份提出的、关于第二项反诉作出部分简易判决的动议（ECF No. 185，1下称“简易判决动议”）。受托人针对反诉被告 HK International Funds Investments (USA) Ltd., LLC（HK国际基金投资［美国］有限公司，下称“HK USA”）及 Mei Guo（郭美）女士（与 HK USA 合称“HK当事方”）提出数项反诉。\n\n1 本对立程序中对案卷的引用将标示为“ECF”。对主案 In re Kwok, Case No. 22-50073 中案卷的引用将标示为“Main Case ECF。”\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 1885-2 提交 06/06/23 录入 06/06/23 16:18:00 第 6 页，共 40 页\n案件 22-05003 文书 221 提交 05/18/23 录入 05/18/23 17:35:12 第 3 页，共 37 页\n\n（ECF No. 36，下称“答辩及反诉”，就相关部分而言，下称“反诉”）。郭女士是个别债务人的女儿，且为 HK USA 的唯一成员。根据 11 U.S.C. §§ 541, 542, and 544，受托人的第二项反诉请求：（i）作出宣告性判决，确认 HK USA 是个别债务人的另一个自我；及（ii）作出命令，要求 HK 当事方向受托人交付 HK USA 的财产。基于下述理由，简易判决动议予以准许。\n\n二、背景2\n\n个别债务人于 February 15, 2022 向本院提交自愿第11章破产申请。（Main Case ECF No. 1。）个别债务人的案件与两宗关联公司第11章案件合并管理。（Main Case ECF Nos. 970 and 1141。）在个别债务人第11章案件的早期进展中，Office of the United States Trustee（美国受托人办公室，下称“UST”）提出动议，请求任命审查员或第11章受托人（Main Case ECF No. 102）；债权人 Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.（太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金有限合伙企业，下称“PAX”）提出动议，请求驳回案件或任命第11章受托人（Main Case ECF No. 183）。基于其中阐明的理由，本院于 June 15, 2022 作出决定备忘录及命令，任命第11章受托人。（Main Case ECF No. 465。）In re Kwok, 640 B.R. 514 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022)。于 July 8, 2022，Despins 先生被任命为受托人。（Main Case ECF No. 523。）\n\n2 本文所载的大部分程序背景，见于 March 30th 支持口头裁定准许就第一项反诉作出部分简易判决之动议的补充决定备忘录（ECF No. 177，下称“争点排除简易判决决定”），或 April 14th 部分驳回驳回动议的决定备忘录及命令（ECF No. 202，下称“驳回驳回动议的决定”）。尽管可能有所重复，本决定所载的程序背景包含若干对本决定具有重要意义的差异。\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 1885-2 提交 06/06/23 录入 06/06/23 16:18:00 第 7 页，共 40 页\n案件 22-05003 文书 221 提交 05/18/23 录入 05/18/23 17:35:12 第 4 页，共 37 页\n\n个别债务人提交其第11章破产申请时，PAX 与个别债务人正在纽约州法院进行判决后诉讼。一般参见 Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund, L.P. v. Kwok Ho Wan, Index No. 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 9, 2022)（下称“纽约诉讼”）。于 March 1, 2022，PAX 在个别债务人的第11章案件中提出动议，请求确认自动停止不适用，或作为替代请求，请求解除自动停止。（Main Case ECF No. 57，下称“解除停止动议”。）在解除停止动议中，PAX 请求继续执行纽约诉讼中的先前裁定，包括 Decision & Order, Kwok Ho Wan, Index No. 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 9, 2022), NYCEF No. 1181（下称“最终藐视法庭裁定”），并请求强制将游艇 Lady May（梅号）送返纽约可通航水域。（Main Case ECF No. 57。）\n\n于 April 10, 2022，个别债务人提交第11章重整计划（ECF No. 197，下称“计划”）。该计划尤其规定，Lady May 将被转让给为个别债务人债权人利益而设立的信托。次日，即 April 11, 2022，HK USA 在个别债务人的第11章案件中提交出庭通知，并就解除停止动议提交声明。（Main Case ECF Nos. 201–03。）在本院于 April 27, 2022 举行的听证会上，当事方同意解决解除停止动议。于 April 29, 2022，本院作出一项约定命令，该命令尤其强制 HK USA 于 July 15, 2022 当日或之前将 Lady May 送至康涅狄格州可通航水域。（Main Case ECF No. 299，下称“约定交付命令”。）3\n\n3 Lady May 已及时送至康涅狄格州可通航水域。（见 Main Case ECF No. 723。）\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 1885-2 提交 06/06/23 录入 06/06/23 16:18:00 第 8 页，共 40 页\n案件 22-05003 文书 221 提交 05/18/23 录入 05/18/23 17:35:12 第 5 页，共 37 页\n\n根据约定交付命令的条款，HK USA 将 \\$37 million 存入一个托管账户，以担保其交付义务。（Main Case ECF No. 299。）经后续同意命令，从托管资金中设立 \\$4 million 的维修储备金。（Main Case ECF No. 930。）维修储备金将用于完成对 Lady May 计划进行的维修。经其他同意命令，Lady May 相关的某些其他费用将从维修储备金中支付。（Main Case ECF Nos. 1255, 1377, 1608, 1673。）维修储备金由受托人托管（维修储备金中所有剩余资金连同原始托管资金中剩余的 \\$33 million，合称“托管资金”）。\n\n在 HK USA 于个别债务人案件中出庭的当日，其亦对个别债务人及 PAX 提起诉状，4 从而启动本对立程序。（ECF No. 1，下称“诉状”。）该诉状请求作出宣告性判决，确认 Lady May 属于 HK USA 而非个别债务人，因此不属于个别债务人的财产。于 September 23, 2022，受托人作为本对立程序中被告的个别债务人的继受人，提交其答辩及反诉。（ECF No. 36。）于 October 4, 2022，发出传票，其中将郭女士列为反诉被告。（ECF No. 43。）于 December 22, 2022，HK 当事方提交驳回反诉动议，其中涉及第二项反诉。（ECF No. 87，下称“驳回动议”。）于 April 14, 2023，本院作出驳回驳回动议的决定。（ECF No. 202。）就相关部分而言，驳回驳回动议的决定认定，受托人已充分主张其具有提出第二项反诉的诉讼资格，且其可以追回托管资金，因为其不受约定交付命令的约束。\n\n4 于 August 26, 2022，HK USA 自愿撤回对 PAX 的诉状。（ECF No. 30。）\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 1885-2 提交 06/06/23 录入 06/06/23 16:18:00 第 9 页，共 40 页\n案件 22-05003 文书 221 提交 05/18/23 录入 05/18/23 17:35:12 第 6 页，共 37 页\n\n于 March 15, 2023，就受托人的判决前救济申请（ECF No. 37）及初步禁令动议（ECF No. 50）举行证据听证会；两者合计请求在就反诉实体问题作出裁判前防止资产被耗散。在证据听证会结束前，HK 当事方同意作出判决前救济（ECF No. 140，下称“PJR”）及初步禁令（ECF No. 142，下称“PI”，并与 PJR 合称“PI/PJR”）。在作出 PI/PJR 前，为准备证据听证会，当事方已于 September 23, 2022 至 March 8, 2023 期间就反诉——包括第二项反诉——充分提交书面意见。（ECF Nos. 37, 38, 50, 77, 101。）\n\n于 March 27, 2023，基于庭审记录中陈述的理由及后续补充决定备忘录中陈述的理由，本院就第一项反诉准许受托人的部分简易判决。（ECF Nos. 172，下称“争点排除简易判决命令”，及 177。）第一项反诉请求作出宣告性判决，确认 Lady May 属于个别债务人的财产，理由是最终藐视法庭裁定因争点排除而禁止 HK 当事方提出相反主张。第一项反诉还请求作出命令，要求 HK 当事方向受托人交付 Lady May。争点排除简易判决命令准许受托人所请求的救济，并明确保留对第二项反诉的诉讼。（ECF No. 172 ¶ 7。）\n\n在 March 30, 2023 举行的情况会议期间，受托人告知本院，在作出 PI/PJR 和争点排除简易判决命令后，他首次得知 HK USA 除拥有 Lady May 外，还拥有另一艘游艇——Lady May II（梅二号）。受托人\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 1885-2 提交 06/06/23 录入 06/06/23 16:18:00 第 10 页，共 40 页\n案件 22-05003 文书 221 提交 05/18/23 录入 05/18/23 17:35:12 第 7 页，共 37 页\n\n是在与 Lady May 和 Lady May II 两艘游艇的管理公司讨论期间得知该事实。他对这一进展表示担忧，因为：（i）郭女士和 HK USA 未在先前向本院作出的宣誓陈述中，亦未依照 PI/PJR 的披露要求，披露 Lady May II；（ii）郭女士最近就 PI/PJR 的披露要求主张其第五修正案权利；及（iii）郭女士在纽约诉讼中作证称，其兄 Qiang Guo（郭强）先生拥有 Lady May II。与其对未披露 Lady May II 的担忧一致，受托人告知本院及 HK 当事方，其拟提交本简易判决动议。\n\n作为回应，HK Parties（香港各方）的律师表示，他们集体误解了 Lady May II（Lady May II号游艇）为何物，以为其位于 Lady May（Lady May号游艇）内部并构成 Lady May 的一部分。他们还表示，无意欺骗 Trustee（受托人）或本院。HK Parties 的律师提请本院注意，其此前曾在一封发送给 PAX（PAX）及 Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors（无担保债权人官方委员会，以下简称“委员会”）的电子邮件中披露 Lady May II，该电子邮件与根据 Stipulated Delivery Order（约定交付命令）提供保险证明有关。HK Parties 的律师还表示，Lady May II 在个人债务人案件的案卷中有所提及，HK Parties 此前提交的一份附件中将 Lady May 和 Lady May II 的保险费列作预算项目。(Main Case ECF No. 1216.) 随后，HK Parties 提议并同意修订 Collateral Estoppel SJ Order（争议排除简易判决命令），以将其中授予的救济延伸至 Lady May II。(ECF No. 183，即“Collateral Estoppel SJ Order Amendment（争议排除简易判决命令修正案）”，并与 Collateral Estoppel SJ Order 统称为“Amended Collateral Estoppel SJ Order（经修正的争议排除简易判决命令）”。) 在 Status Conference（状态会议）后，HK Parties 将发送给 PAX 和委员会的电子邮件提交至个人债务人案件的案卷中，\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 1885-2 提交于 06/06/23 录入于 06/06/23 16:18:00 第 11 页；案件 22-05003 文件 221 提交于 05/18/23 录入于 05/18/23 17:35:12 第 8 页，共 37 页 40\n\n该电子邮件附有 Lady May 和 Lady May II 的保险单。(Main Case ECF No. 1623.)\n\n2023年4月3日，受托人提交了：(i) 简易判决动议；(ii) 支持简易判决动议的法律备忘录 (ECF No. 186)；(iii) Local Rule 56(a)(1)（地方法则 56(a)(1)）无争议重大事实陈述 (ECF No. 187，即“56(a)(1) Statement（56(a)(1)陈述）”)；(iv) Nicholas A. Bassett（尼古拉斯·A·巴塞特）的声明 (ECF No. 188，即“Bassett Declaration（巴塞特声明）”)，连同所附附件，以支持 56(a)(1) 陈述；以及 (v) 加快审理简易判决动议的动议 (ECF No. 189，即“Motion to Expedite（加快审理动议）”)。2023年4月4日，本院不顾 HK Parties 的反对，准许了加快审理动议 (ECF No. 190)，并将简易判决动议的听证会定于2023年4月20日举行 (ECF No. 191)。\n\n2023年4月14日，HK USA（HK USA）提交了：(a) 对简易判决动议作出回应的法律备忘录 (ECF No. 203)；以及 (b) Local Rule 56(a)(2)（地方法则 56(a)(2)）反对事实陈述 (ECF No. 204，即“56(a)(2) Statement（56(a)(2)陈述）”，并与 56(a)(1) 陈述统称为“Rule 56(a) Statements（规则56(a)陈述）”)。值得注意的是，Guo 女士并未对简易判决动议提交回应。2023年4月18日，受托人提交了对 HK Memo（HK 备忘录）的答复。(ECF No. 209.) 该答复附有一份附件，即 Guo 女士证言记录的完整文本，其中特定摘录附于巴塞特声明。\n\n2023年4月20日，本院就简易判决动议举行了听证会。该动议已具备作出裁决的条件。\n\nIII. 管辖权\n\nUnited States District Court for the District of Connecticut（美国康涅狄格州联邦地区法院）根据 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) 对本事项具有管辖权。本院根据 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) 以及 United States District Court for the District of Connecticut 于1984年9月21日作出的移送命令，有权审理并裁决本事项。本程序依法属于核心程序。28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (C), (E)。第二项反诉不涉及任何妨碍本院行使管辖权的宪法问题。参见 Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 487–99 (2011)。\n\n此外，如驳回动议裁定中所述并通过援引纳入本文，5 本院认定，根据 section 544(a)，受托人有资格提出第二项反诉，因为，例如，一名假设的司法留置权债权人可根据 Delaware（特拉华州）法律提出反向揭开公司面纱请求。6 Manichaean Capital, LLC v. Exela Techs., Inc., 251 A.3d 694, 714 (Del. Ch. 2021)（认定 Delaware 法律承认外部人反向揭开公司面纱）；参见 St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 884 F.2d 688, 700 (2d Cir. 1989)（认定破产受托人有资格代表债务人或债权人提出另我人格请求）；Koch Refining v. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc., 831 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir. 1987)（认定破产受托人有资格根据 section 544(a) 提出另我人格请求）；Titan Real Estate Ventures, LLC v. MJCC Realty Ltd. P'ship (In re Flanagan), 415 B.R. 29 (D. Conn. 2009)（指出原告未根据 section 544(a) 提出另我人格请求，且已无法及时提出，但 section 544(a) 本可为该请求提供资格）。\n\n根据 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409，本地区为适格审判地。\n\nIV. 无争议事实\n\n本院通过援引纳入 Collateral Estoppel SJ Decision（争议排除简易判决决定）中的无争议事实。就受托人的另我人格请求以及 HK USA 的允诺禁反言衡平抗辩而言，本院还根据这些 Chapter 11（第11章）案件的记录、巴塞特声明及所附附件，以及规则56(a)陈述，列举以下无争议事实：\n\n5 根据 Fed. R. Civ. P. 54，经 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7054 适用于本对抗程序，驳回动议裁定是否构成案件既判法，属于本院裁量范围。Cangemi v. United States, 13 F.4th 115, 140 (2d Cir. 2021)。\n\n6 参见下文讨论（认定 Delaware 法律适用于第二项反诉）。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 1885-2 提交于 06/06/23 录入于 06/06/23 16:18:00 第 13 页；案件 22-05003 文件 221 提交于 05/18/23 录入于 05/18/23 17:35:12 第 10 页，共 37 页 40\n\n允诺禁反言抗辩，本院还根据这些 Chapter 11 案件的记录、巴塞特声明及所附附件，以及规则56(a)陈述，列举以下无争议事实：\n\n1. 自至少2015年以来，一直存在个人债务人的债权人。(In re Kwok, Case No. 22-50073, Claim 12-2.)\n\nHK USA 的设立、其资产及其经营目的\n\n2. 大约于2018年9月11日，代表 HK USA 向 State of Delaware, Secretary of State, Division of Corporations（特拉华州州务卿公司司）提交了成立证书。(Bassett Decl. Ex. 1.)\n\n3. 随后，大约于2019年4月1日，HK USA 与 Guo 女士——HK USA 的唯一成员——签署了一份有限责任公司协议（以下简称“LLC Agreement（有限责任公司协议）”），确认 Guo 女士为 HK USA 的唯一成员。(Id. Ex. 2.)\n\n4. LLC Agreement 将 Guo 女士的地址列为 781 5th Avenue, the Sherry Netherland Apartment, New York, New York 10022，个人债务人曾于不同时期居住于该地址。(Id. Ex. 2, at *2.)\n\n5. LLC Agreement 还将 HK USA 的主要办公地址列为 162 East 64th Street, New York, New York 10065。(Id. Ex. 2, at *1.) HK USA 的主要办公地址与个人债务人在其原始及修正申请书中列明的地址相同，(Main Case ECF Nos. 1 and 19)，亦与 Greenwich Land LLC（Greenwich Land LLC），(Bassett Decl. Ex. 3)，Golden Spring (New York) Ltd.（Golden Spring（纽约）有限公司），(Main Case ECF No. 767)，GTV Media Group Inc.（GTV Media Group Inc.），(Bassett Decl. Ex. 4)，及 Saraca Media Group Inc.（Saraca Media Group Inc.），(id. Ex. 5)，所使用的地址相同。该地址还曾一度为个人债务人的一家律师事务所 Lawall & Mitchell, LLC（Lawall & Mitchell, LLC）的地址。(Id. Ex. 6.)\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 1885-2 提交于 06/06/23 录入于 06/06/23 16:18:00 第 14 页；案件 22-05003 文件 221 提交于 05/18/23 录入于 05/18/23 17:35:12 第 11 页，共 37 页 40\n\n6. 大约于2020年4月17日，Lady May 此前的登记所有人 HK International Funds Investments Ltd.（“HK International”）将 Lady May 的登记所有权转让给 HK USA。因此，自2020年4月17日起，HK USA 一直是 Lady May 的登记所有人。(Complaint ¶¶ 2 and 23.)\n\n7. 在与第二项反诉相关的整个期间内，HK USA：(i) 未产生任何收入，(id. ¶ 24; Bassett Decl. Exs. 8 and 9)；(ii) 没有董事、高级职员或雇员，(Bassett Decl. Ex. 9, at 1)；(iii) 未提交纳税申报表，(id. Ex. 9, at 1)；(iv) 没有银行账户，也未以其他方式获得资本注入，(Complaint ¶ 24; Bassett Decl. Ex. 9, at 1)；以及 (v) 除与 Lady May 有关的文件外，未保留任何文件，(Decl. of Mei Guo ¶ 25, Main Case ECF No. 1544)。\n\n8. Lady May 的运营费用每月超过 $100,000.00。(Motion to Modify Repair Reserve Consent Order ¶ 16（以下简称“HK Motion to Modify（HK 修改动议）”）, Main Case ECF No. 1216.)\n\n9. HK Parties 及其律师曾多次表示，包括在伪证罪处罚的约束下表示，HK USA 的唯一资产是 Lady May。例如，在2022年4月13日于本院举行的一次听证会上，HK USA 的律师表示：“我当事人的唯一资产是该船。”(Bassett Decl. Ex. 10, at *51:17–18.) Vartan 律师在2023年3月27日致受托人律师的一封信中作出了相同表示。(Bassett Decl. Ex. 11.) Guo 女士亦在伪证罪处罚的约束下作出了相同表示，既在其于2023年3月13日向本院提交的一份声明中，(Decl. of Mei Guo ¶ 24, Main Case ECF No. 1544)，也在其2023年1月20日的证言中，(Bassett Decl. Ex. 12, at *140:2–7)。2022年2月，在 New York Action（纽约诉讼）中就 Collateral Estoppel SJ Decision 所定义的 PAX 最终藐视法庭动议举行的听证会上，Guo 女士在看到一段描绘 Lady May II 的视频后，经宣誓作证称，她的兄弟拥有 Lady May II。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 1885-2 提交于 06/06/23 录入于 06/06/23 16:18:00 第 15 页；案件 22-05003 文件 221 提交于 05/18/23 录入于 05/18/23 17:35:12 第 12 页，共 37 页 40\n\n(Id. Ex. 17, at *71:20–72:9.) 在本案的一项证据开示争议中，Guo 女士的律师没有承认 HK USA 拥有 Lady May II，而是主张，若假设 Lady May II 存在，HK USA 不会提交与其有关的文件。(Id. Ex. 18, at *66:14–67:11.)\n\n10. 根据 Collateral Estoppel SJ Order，为了个人债务人破产财产的利益，受托人成为 Lady May 的唯一所有人。(Collateral Estoppel SJ Order.)\n\n11. 2023年3月29日，Lady May 的管理公司：(i) 向受托人提交了 Lady May II 的登记文件，该登记文件载明 HK USA 为 Lady May II 的登记所有人，(Bassett Decl. Ex. 13)；以及 (ii) 告知受托人，Lady May II 目前位于 New York（纽约）Mamaroneck（马马罗内克）的一处存储设施内。\n\n12. 2023年3月31日，经 HK Parties 同意，本院作出 Collateral Estoppel SJ Order Amendment，确认 Lady May II 亦为个人债务人破产财产。因此，HK Parties 承认，个人债务人破产财产现拥有并控制他们主张 HK USA 曾经拥有的全部资产。\n\n13. Guo 女士是涉及 Lady May 的合同的签署人，即与 Phoenix Crew IC Limited（Phoenix Crew IC Limited）签订的合同，以及与船员签订的多份保密协议。(Bassett Decl. Ex. 19.)\n\n14. Guo 女士就成为 Escrowed Funds（托管资金）的 $37 million 贷款签署了一份个人担保（以下简称“Personal Guarantee（个人担保）”）。Personal Guarantee 未注明日期，但载明其自2022年4月19日起生效。Personal Guarantee 未经见证、会签或公证。(ECF No. 84 Ex. C.)\n\nStipulated Delivery Order 的相关情形\n\n15. 2022年3月1日，PAX 提交了 Stay Relief Motion（解除自动停止动议）。(Main Case ECF No. 57.)\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 1885-2 提交于 06/06/23 录入于 06/06/23 16:18:00 第 16 页；案件 22-05003 文件 221 提交于 05/18/23 录入于 05/18/23 17:35:12 第 13 页，共 37 页 40\n\n16. 个人债务人对解除自动停止动议提出异议，主张，其中包括，他并不拥有或控制 Lady May。(Main Case ECF No. 83.)\n\n17. 2022年4月10日，个人债务人提交了 Plan（计划），其中规定，为个人债务人的债权人的利益而清算 Lady May，并解除包括 HK USA 在内的各方的责任。(Main Case ECF No. 197 Arts. I § A ¶¶ 13–16, 28–32, 74, 88–91, III, IV § B, IX.)\n\n18. 2022年4月11日，HK USA（美国HK公司）提交了一份声明，主张作出一项拟议命令，责令HK USA将“Lady May”号运输并交付至康涅狄格州，将使解除中止动议（Stay Relief Motion）失去实际意义。（主案 ECF No. 203。）HK USA还表示，其将同意作出该等命令，并同意接受本院管辖。（同上。）\n\n19. 2022年4月13日，就个人债务人案件中的若干事项举行了听证会，其中包括解除中止动议。在听证会上，本院就HK USA有关“Lady May”号的提议向HK USA的律师提出了若干问题，包括：“你们为什么不直接这么做？如果你们确实想这么做，为什么不直接提供担保？为什么不直接为$134 million提供担保？”（Bassett Decl. Ex. 10, at *51:7–9。）\n\n20. 此后，在休庭62分钟后，个人债务人的律师向本院报告称：“该船的所有人意图并承诺改为缴存与该船成本相等的现金，约为$37 million。”（同上，Ex. 10, at *86:21–23。）\n\n21. 个人债务人、PAX（PAX）、委员会以及债权人Rui Ma（马蕊）和Zheng Wu（吴征）后来达成协议，以解决解除中止动议，如约定交付命令（Stipulated Delivery Order）所载。（主案 ECF No. 299。）\n\n22. 根据约定交付命令，HK USA须将“Lady May”号返还至康涅狄格州；该义务的履行以HK USA将$37 million存入托管为担保，该款项仅可通过认证程序返还给HK USA。（约定交付命令 ¶ 5(i)。）\n\n23. 有关“Lady May”号的拟议约定于2022年4月27日举行的听证会上向本院宣布，（主案 ECF No. 318, at 97:4–103:15），并载入于2022年4月29日提交本院的一项拟议约定命令中，（主案 ECF No. 294）。\n\n24. 2022年4月29日，本院批准了该拟议约定命令，并作出约定交付命令。（ECF No. 299。）\n\n25. 作出约定交付命令时，下列动议均尚待裁决：(a) UST（UST）请求在个人债务人案件中指定审查员或第11章受托人的动议，（主案 ECF No. 102）；以及(b) PAX请求驳回个人债务人第11章案件的动议（主案 ECF No. 183）。\n\n26. 约定交付命令的条款仅明确设想了个人债务人的第11章案件可能被驳回，而未设想可能指定第11章受托人。（约定交付命令 ¶ 9。）\n\n27. 截至目前，托管资金（Escrowed Funds）仍然：(i) 按照HK USA、委员会和U.S. Bank N.A.（美国合众银行）之间的托管协议，依约定交付命令最初所设想的方式，由U.S. Bank N.A.托管，（Bassett Decl. ¶ 2）；或(ii) 根据一项同意命令，由受托人托管于维修准备金中，（ECF No. 930）。\n\nV. 讨论\n\n除根据11 U.S.C. § 544寻求救济外，第二项反诉还根据《破产法》第541条和第542条寻求救济。第541条相关部分规定：\n\n（a）根据本法典第301、302或303条启动案件，即设立一项财产集合。无论位于何处、由何人持有，该财产集合包括下列全部财产：（1）除本条第（b）款和第（c）款第（2）项另有规定外，债务人在案件启动时对财产享有的全部法定和衡平权益。\n\n第542(a)条规定：\n\n（a）除本条第（c）款或第（d）款另有规定外，除保管人以外的任何实体，如在案件审理期间占有、保管或控制受托人可根据本法典第363条使用、出售或出租的财产，或者债务人可根据本法典第522条豁免的财产，应向受托人交付该财产或该财产的价值，并就此作出说明，除非该财产对财产集合的价值或利益微不足道。\n\n第二项反诉主张，HK USA是个人债务人的另我。\n\n受托人主张，HK USA的财产，包括但不限于“Lady May”号和托管资金，根据第541条属于个人债务人财产集合的财产，且HK各方必须根据第542条将HK USA的财产交付给受托人。（ECF No. 36 ¶¶ 112–19。）受托人主张，其依法有权获得简易判决，认定HK USA是个人债务人的另我，并有权获得随之而来的救济。HK USA反对简易判决动议。Guo女士未提出异议。\n\na. 简易判决标准\n\n根据Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)，并经Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7056适用于本对抗程序，如动议方证明对于任何重大事实不存在真实争议，且动议方依法有权获得判决，法院“应作出简易判决”。尽管动议方“负有初始责任，向地区法院说明其动议的依据，并指明其认为证明不存在重大事实真实争议的‘诉状、证词、询问书答复以及存档的承认，再加上宣誓书（如有）’部分”，但动议方无须“以宣誓书或其他类似材料支持其动议，以否定对方的请求”。Celotex Corp. v. Catrett ex rel. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)。\n\n“只有在适用法律下可能影响诉讼结果的事实争议，才会适当地排除作出简易判决。”Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)。如“证据足以使合理的陪审团作出有利于非动议方的裁决”，则该争议属于真实争议。Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248。在动议方满足其事实举证责任时，“对方不能仅仅表明对重大事实存在某种形而上的怀疑”。Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)。最后，为使该动议获得支持，动议方必须基于无争议的重大事实依法有权获得判决——法官在裁定该动议时并非事实认定者。Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250。如证据“将要求为动议方作出定向裁决”，则应作出简易判决。Id. at 251 (internal citations omitted)。\n\nb. 另我标准\n\n除非存在优先的联邦政策利益，破产法院对州法问题适用法院所在地州的法律选择规则。Geron ex rel. Thelen LLP v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (In re Thelen LLP), 736 F.3d 213, 219 (2d Cir. 2013)。根据康涅狄格州法律，“外国有限责任公司的管辖法域的法律管辖：(1) 公司的内部事务；(2) 成员作为成员以及经理作为经理对公司的债务、义务或其他责任所承担的责任；以及(3) 公司系列的责任。”Conn. Gen. Stat. § 34-275(a)。康涅狄格州最高法院根据一项前身法规裁定，外国有限责任公司的设立州管辖揭开公司面纱问题。Weber v. U.S. Sterling Securities, Inc., 924 A.2d 816, 822–23 (Conn. 2007)。\n\n此外，联邦法院适用同一规则。Hyundai-Wia Machine Am. Corp. v. Rouette (In re Rouette), 564 B.R. 157, 174 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2017)。无争议的是，HK USA是一家特拉华州有限责任公司。因此，特拉华州法律管辖HK USA是否为个人债务人另我的问题。\n\n“特拉华州法院将‘揭开公司面纱’和‘另我’理论两个术语交替使用。”Harrison v. Soroof Int'l, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 3d 602, 609 n. 4 (D. Del. 2018)。根据特拉华州法律，另我或揭开公司面纱包含两个要件：(i) 将对其另我的债务承担责任的公司实体，处于所述另我的支配和控制之下，以致其仅为一项工具，而非独立经济实体；以及(ii) 公司结构导致整体上的欺诈或不公正。见Pauley Petroleum Inc. v. Cont'l Oil Co., 239 A.2d 629, 633 (Del. 1968)（仅在正义利益要求时，即涉及欺诈、违反法律或合同、公共损害，或公司成员之间的衡平考量要求时，“方可”揭开公司面纱）；Wallace ex rel. Cencom Cable Income Partners II, Inc. v. Wood, 752 A.2d 1175, 1184 (Del. Ch. 1999)（“根据另我理论‘揭开公司面纱，要求公司结构造成欺诈或类似不公正。’”）（省略内部引文）；Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'ns Co., 621 A.2d 784, 793 (Del. Ch. 1992)（“在存在欺诈，或子公司实际上仅为其所有人的工具或另我时，法院可以揭开实体的公司面纱。”）（省略内部引文）；另见Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451, 1457 (2d Cir. 1995)（“要依据特拉华州法律就另我主张获胜，原告必须证明：(1) 母公司和子公司‘作为单一经济实体运营’；以及(2) 存在‘整体上的不公正或不公平要素……’”）（省略内部引文）；Tronox Inc. v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp. (In re Tronox Inc.), 549 B.R. 21, 43–44 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016)（适用特拉华州法律）。\n\n特拉华州法律允许外部人反向揭开公司面纱——为上游实体或个人的债权人利益而揭开下游实体的面纱，例如，为母公司债权人的利益而揭开子公司与其母公司之间的面纱——前提是考量“特拉华州法院审查传统揭开公司面纱主张时所考量的传统因素”，以及反映以下顾虑的附加因素：下游实体的债权人和其他利益相关方的合理预期可能受到挫败。Manichaean Capital, 251 A.3d at 714–15。尽管Manichaean Capital似乎是特拉华州法院首个承认反向揭开公司面纱的已报道判决，康涅狄格联邦地区法院正确预见，特拉华州法院将允许反向揭开公司面纱。Universitas Educ., LLC v. Benistar, No. 3:20-cv-00738 (JAM), 2021 WL 965794 (D. Conn. Mar. 15, 2021)。\n\n支持认定另我和/或揭开公司面纱的传统因素为：\n\n“(1) 公司是否为该项事业获得充足资本；(2) 公司是否具有偿债能力；(3) 是否遵守公司形式要件；(4) 控股股东是否抽取公司资金；以及(5) 总体而言，公司是否仅作为控股股东的幌子运作。”尽管这些因素具有参考价值，但其中任何单一因素均非决定性。关于揭开公司面纱的最终决定，主要基于这些因素的某种组合，外加“整体上的不公正或不公平要素”。\n\nId. at 706–07 (internal citations omitted)。前五项因素与支配和控制要件有关。附加的反向揭开公司面纱因素为：\n\n“(1) 允许反向刺破公司面纱在何种程度上会损害任何因该反向刺破公司面纱请求所源于之内部人行为而受到不利影响、但不对该行为负责的股东的正当期待，以及允许反向刺破公司面纱在何种程度上会树立令一般股东不安的先例；(2) 请求反向刺破公司面纱的一方所主张的内部人受到拟被否认其法人独立地位的公司实体支配和控制的程度；(3) 请求反向刺破公司面纱之人所称损害在何种程度上与公司实体对内部人的支配和控制有关，或者与该人对内部人与公司实体之间不存在独立实体地位的合理信赖有关；(4) 如允许反向刺破公司面纱，将在何种程度上服务于[《特拉华州普通公司法》和特拉华州普通法]所阐明的公共便利；(5) 拟被内部人否认其法人独立地位的公司实体所从事的不当行为（如有）的范围和严重程度；(6) 请求反向刺破公司面纱之人本人可能犯有足以阻却其获得衡平救济的不当行为”；(7) 反向刺破公司面纱将在何种程度上损害原告拟追索之实体的无辜第三方债权人；以及 (8) 该债权人在普通法或衡平法上为追偿该债务而实际可利用的其他请求权或救济的程度。\n\n同上，第 715 页（略去内部引证）。\n\nc. HK USA（HK 美国公司）是个人债务人的另我\n\n受托人主张，其已根据特拉华州法院考量的因素证明个人债务人对 HK USA 行使了支配和控制，因为：(a) 根据 Amended Collateral Estoppel SJ Order（经修正的争点排除简易判决裁定），本院已认定个人债务人受益所有并控制 HK USA 曾声称拥有的全部资产，即 Lady May（“五月女士”号）和 Lady May II（“五月女士 II”号）；(b) HK 各方不争议且承认，在与第二项反诉有关的整个期间内，HK USA：(i) 未产生任何收入；(ii) 没有董事、高级管理人员或雇员；(iii) 未提交纳税申报表；(iv) 没有银行账户，亦未以其他方式获得资本注入；以及 (v) 除与 Lady May 有关的文件外，未保存任何文件；以及 (c) 不争议的是，HK USA 除持有 Lady May 和 Lady May II 外没有其他经营目的。就欺诈或不公正因素而言，受托人主张，HK USA 的公司形式旨在使 Lady May 免于判决执行。\n\nHK USA 提出三项反驳理由。第一，其主张 HK USA 亦服务于郭女士（Ms. Guo）——而非仅服务于其父亲——的经营目的，因为：(i) 郭女士签署了有关 Lady May 运营的合同；以及 (ii) 她亲自为向 HK USA 提供的一笔贷款作出担保。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 1885-2 提交于 06/06/23 登记于 06/06/23 16:18:00 第 23 页，共 22-05003 221 页 提交于 05/18/23 登记于 05/18/23 17:35:12 第 20 页，共 37 页 40\n\n第二，HK USA 主张，郭女士在设立 HK USA 时并无欺诈意图，而是寻求设立一个美国实体以持有 Lady May。第三，其主张，尽管这些因素可能支持认定郭女士是 HK USA 的另我，但受托人正寻求跳过确定个人债务人对 HK USA 的所有权权益这一步骤，而这正是受托人在第三项反诉中寻求的救济。HK USA 主张，在第二项反诉中授予救济之前，受托人必须先在第三项反诉中胜诉。\n\n个人债务人对 HK USA 行使“支配和控制”\n\n传统的另我因素支持认定个人债务人对 HK USA 具有支配和控制。见 Manichaean Capital, 251 A.3d at 714（列举传统另我因素）。第一，不争议的是，HK USA 资本不足，无法支付 Lady May 的运营和维护费用。根据 HK USA 自己的承认，Lady May 的运营和维护每月花费超过 $100,000。（无争议事实 8。）然而，根据 HK USA 自己的承认，其没有收入、不产生收入，且没有流动资产。（无争议事实 7。）\n\n第二，不争议的是，HK USA 未遵守公司形式要件。HK USA 承认其没有董事、高级管理人员或雇员。（无争议事实 7。）此外，HK USA 承认，尽管其自身存在开支，却未维持公司银行账户。（同上。）\n\n第三，HK USA 仅是个人债务人的工具。HK USA 唯一的业务是持有、运营和维护 Lady May 及 Lady May II。（无争议事实 7、9、12。）本院采纳其在 Amended Collateral Estoppel SJ Order 中作出的结论，即个人债务人受益所有并控制 Lady May 和 Lady May II。7 综合而言，受托人已证明，HK USA 唯一的经营目的为\n\n7 见上文注释 5。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 1885-2 提交于 06/06/23 登记于 06/06/23 16:18:00 第 24 页，共 22-05003 221 页 提交于 05/18/23 登记于 05/18/23 17:35:12 第 21 页，共 37 页 40\n\n名义上持有、运营和维护个人债务人受益所有并控制的资产。仅此一点即足以证明 HK USA 仅是个人债务人的工具。见 Fletcher, 68 F.3d at 1457；Geyer, 621 A.2d at 793。\n\n除适用争点排除外，本案记录亦支持以下结论：个人债务人受益所有并控制 Lady May 和 Lady May II。其中，郭女士确认了 Lady May 前船长和管理人员的证词，该等证词表明，压倒性地是个人债务人——而非郭女士——享有 Lady May 的使用利益。（答复附件 2，第 *92:8–107:17 页。）此外，无争议事实 17 至 22 详细说明了，在本案早期，HK USA 所作的一切努力均使个人债务人——而非郭女士——受益。再者，无争议事实 5 提供了额外证据，证明 HK USA 仅是个人债务人的工具。例如，HK USA 与包括下列主体在内者共用或曾共用办公场所：(i) 个人债务人在本案及其他案件中的律师（主案 ECF No 530；Bassett Decl. Ex. 6）；(ii) 据称由个人债务人之子控制的一家家族办公室，该办公室历来支付个人债务人的许多费用，包括与本案有关的费用，并已为个人债务人聘请律师（主案 ECF Nos. 117, 197, 318, at 146:25–149:5；Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund, L.P. v. Kwok (In re Kwok), Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 22-05032 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn.) (Nov. 30, 2022)（以下简称“PI Adversary”）, ECF No. 94, at 2:24–5:10）；(iii) 据称由个人债务人之妻控制的一家物业持有公司，该公司拥有债务人居住的格林尼治宅邸（主案 ECF Nos. 81 and 1015）；以及 (iv) 涉及个人债务人媒体及加密货币业务的实体（见 Corrected Memorandum of Decision ¶¶ 3, 7, PI Adversary (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 13, 2023), ECF No. 133）。此外，\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 1885-2 提交于 06/06/23 登记于 06/06/23 16:18:00 第 25 页，共 22-05003 221 页 提交于 05/18/23 登记于 05/18/23 17:35:12 第 22 页，共 37 页 40\n\n个人债务人本人在其 Chapter 11（第 11 章）申请书中将 HK USA 的地址列为其地址。（主案 ECF No. 1, Part 1 § 5）\n\nHK USA 未能证明存在任何有争议或无争议的重要事实，以支持其关于 HK USA 具有额外经营目的的主张。HK USA 指出由郭女士代表其签署的文件。然而，每一份该等文件均涉及 Lady May 的运营——本院已认定该运营处于个人债务人的控制之下。（无争议事实 13–14、17–23。）因此，HK USA 未能就其是否仅为个人债务人的工具提出任何真实的重要事实争议。\n\n至于其余两个因素，并无主张称资金已从 HK USA 被抽走。事实上，HK USA 承认其从未拥有银行账户。（无争议事实 7。）最后，尚不清楚 HK USA 是否在现金流或资产负债表意义上无力偿债。就现金流无力偿债而言，各方对于与 Lamp Capital LLC（蓝普资本有限责任公司）签订的一项资金协议是否可执行存在争议。（主案 ECF Nos. 1216, 1490；见主案 ECF No. 1550, at 101:4–108:13。）就资产负债表无力偿债而言，各方对于 Escrowed Funds（托管资金）属于负债还是资产存在争议。此外，Lady May 和 Lady May II 的价值目前未知。HK USA 在这些问题上的立场倾向于证明其无力偿债。\n\n尽管如此，另我认定并不依赖于所有列举因素均存在。Manichaean Capital, 251 A.3d at 714。在此，五项因素中有三项存在。尽管关于支配和控制的主张往往属于事实密集型问题，不适宜通过简易判决解决，但本案中五项支配因素中的两项已由承认的事实确立。此外，HK USA 未能指出任何有争议或其他重要事实，以证明 HK USA 除持有和运营 Lady May 及 Lady May II 外还有任何其他业务，而本院已认定该业务属于个人债务人的业务。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 1885-2 提交于 06/06/23 登记于 06/06/23 16:18:00 第 26 页，共 22-05003 221 页 提交于 05/18/23 登记于 05/18/23 17:35:12 第 23 页，共 37 页 40\n\n本院认定，不存在任何真实的重要事实争议，并且作为法律问题，个人债务人支配并控制 HK USA。\n\nHK USA 的公司形式造成“欺诈或类似不公正”\n\n转向另我请求权的第二项要件，本院必须处理 HK USA 的公司形式是否造成某种欺诈或类似不公正。为证明该要件，受托人无须证明欺诈。Fletcher, 68 F.3d at 1457。\n\n此处存在一家封闭式公司——HK USA。HK USA 的存在仅为持有资产——Lady May 和 Lady May II。HK USA 登记在郭女士名下，她是受益所有并控制这些资产之人——个人债务人——的亲属。在欺诈转让情境中，上述各项事实均被视为欺诈迹象。Salomon ex rel. Kaiser v. Kaiser (In re Kaiser), 722 F.2d 1574, 1582–83 (2d Cir. 1983)。本院认定，在另我情境中，它们是由公司形式造成不公正的迹象。这些欺诈迹象凸显，HK USA 的目的是阻止个人债务人的债权人就针对个人债务人作出的判决对 Lady May 和 Lady May II 执行，并支持以下推论：个人债务人意图如此。见 Manichaean Capital, 251 A.3d at 708–09。如上所述，HK USA 唯一的目的就是作为 Lady May 和 Lady May II 的登记所有人。因此，并未确定任何额外经营目的会使该分析复杂化。\n\n尽管 HK 各方主张郭女士在设立 HK USA 时无意造成该不公正，但她是否有此意图并不相关。欺诈或类似不公正要件关注的是公司形式的结果——而非其设立时的意图。NetJets Aviation, Inc. v. LHC Commc'ns, LLC, 537 F.3d 168, 177 (2d Cir. 2008)（“最后，我们指出，原告无须证明设立公司时怀有欺诈或不公平的意图。证明公司被如此使用即已足够。”）（适用特拉华州法律）；见 Martin v. D.B. Martin Co., 88 A. 612, 615–16 (Del. Ch. 1913)（讨论认定无须原始欺诈意图的案件）。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 1885-2 提交于 06/06/23 登记于 06/06/23 16:18:00 第 27 页，共 22-05003 221 页 提交于 05/18/23 登记于 05/18/23 17:35:12 第 24 页，共 37 页 40\n\n特拉华州法律不要求存在直接的公司关系\n\nHK USA（HK USA）主张，上述分析跳过了一个步骤，并且在第三项反诉尚未裁定支持受托人（Trustee）之前，即对衡平所有权作出了不允许的推断。法院不同意。受托人至少已经证明，HK USA 与个人债务人（Individual Debtor）之间存在间接关系。HK USA 是由个人债务人受益所有并控制的财产的登记所有人。HK USA 的登记所有人无争议地是其女儿 Guo 女士（郭女士）。就另一自我而言，根据 Delaware（特拉华州）法律，没有必要拆除间接关系所形成的中间屏障：尽管典型的另一自我案件会令母公司对其子公司的债务负责，但母子公司关系或其他直接关系并非另一自我的构成要件。参见 Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Reliance Capital Grp., Inc. (In re Buckhead Am. Corp.), 178 B.R. 956, 974–75 (D. Del. 1994)（认定在两个另一自我构成要件均具备时，根据 Delaware 法律无需存在直接的母子公司关系）；Maxus Liquidating Tr. v. YPF S.A. (In re Maxus Energy Corp.), 641 B.R. 467, 556–58 (Bankr. D. Del. 2022)（同上）；Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Highland Capital Mgmt. L.P. (In re Moll Indus. Inc.), 454 B.R. 574, 587 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011)（同上）。这些案件认为，即使不存在直接关系且尚未刺破中间公司的面纱——或者在企业责任情形下，该等中间公司面纱甚至根本不存在——另一自我的构成要件仍是“支配和控制”以及“欺诈或不公”。参见 Maxus Energy, 641 B.R. at 557–558（引用 Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 210 F.3d 18, 29 (1st Cir. 2000)，讨论非传统情形下的另一自我，例如“姊妹”公司之间的情形）。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 1885-2 提交于 06/06/23 录入于 06/06/23 16:18:00 第 28 页，共 22-05003 221 文件 05/18/23 录入于 05/18/23 17:35:12 第 25 页，共 37 页 40\n\n该原则延伸适用于第二项反诉中的主张。另一自我的目的在于防止公司形式保护实际应对滥用该形式负责的一方。参见 Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc. (In re Sunbeam Corp.), 284 B.R. 355, 365 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002)（适用 Delaware 法律）。这也符合 New York（纽约州）法律。参见 Freeman v. Complex Computing Co., Inc., 119 F.3d 1044, 1051 (2d Cir. 1997)（认为根据 New York 法律，通过证明对“[该公司]拥有相当大的权力……以至于完全无视公司形式，并仿佛其资产仅由其本人管理和处分”，即可为“刺破公司面纱之目的”确立衡平所有权）（省略内部引文）。乍看之下，Freeman 似乎支持 HK USA 的立场，但事实并非如此。正如 Freeman 所阐述，根据 New York 法律，“为刺破公司面纱之目的的衡平所有权”的证明标准是支配和控制。这与上述案件相一致，即根据 Delaware 法律，已确立的直接公司关系——或者作为替代，对每一中间实体刺破公司面纱——并非必要条件。\n\n必须注意第二项和第三项反诉之间的区别。第二项反诉所请求的另一自我和／或刺破公司面纱，会使一个实体对另一自然人或实体的债务承担责任。Tronox, 549 B.R. at 44（“根据 Delaware 法律，刺破公司面纱是一项衡平法原则……因此，刺破公司面纱并非纯粹独立的诉因。相反，刺破公司面纱实际上是就直接行为人所实施的某一基础性不法行为，在直接行为人与其公司关联方之间施加连带责任。”）结合第 541 条和第 542 条，另一自我因而实现将资产转入破产财产。\n\n虽然动产或不动产的受益所有权，结合第 541 条和第 542 条，也会实现将一项资产转入破产财产，但第三项反诉所请求的有限责任公司受益所有权本身并不能实现这一点——其实现的是将成员权益转入破产财产。参见，例如，Paloian ex rel. Dordevic v. Dordevic (In re Dordevic), 633 B.R. 553, 574 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2021)（“基于所有这些理由，法院认定并裁定，受托人已履行其举证责任，证明债务人是 Jorgovanka 在 PHMX LLC 中 50% 成员权益的真正衡平所有人，并有权行使该身份赋予其的权利。法院就诉状中的第一项和第二项罪名项作出判决，支持受托人并针对 Jorgovanka。”）（强调部分已加），aff'd by 20 b 9807, 21 C5328, 2022 WL 19638995 (N.D. Ill. July 25, 2022), aff'd by No. 22-2500, 2023 WL 3113706 (5th Cir. April 27, 2023)。如果仅如第三项反诉所请求的那样确立 HK USA 的受益所有权，破产财产将不包括该有限责任公司的资产——必须刺破公司面纱。如果受托人在未成功取得第二项反诉胜诉的情况下成功取得第三项反诉胜诉，他将控制 HK USA，因为他将是 HK USA 成员权益的所有人。然而，他不会拥有 HK USA 的资产，并且必须尊重其公司形式，除非其后就 HK USA 的部分或全部资产作出判决。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 1885-2 提交于 06/06/23 录入于 06/06/23 16:18:00 第 29 页，共 22-05003 221 文件 05/18/23 录入于 05/18/23 17:35:12 第 26 页，共 37 页 40\n\n支持刺破公司面纱的额外反向刺破因素\n\n法院还必须考虑 Manichaean Capital 中有关反向刺破公司面纱的额外因素。251 A.3d at 715。尽管当事人没有在其书状中或在口头辩论期间直接论及这些因素，但当事人确实提出了与反向刺破公司面纱相关的问题。鉴于当事人提出的问题分析这些额外因素后，法院认定，适用的额外反向刺破公司面纱因素同样支持作出另一自我的认定。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 1885-2 提交于 06/06/23 录入于 06/06/23 16:18:00 第 30 页，共 22-05003 221 文件 05/18/23 录入于 05/18/23 17:35:12 第 27 页，共 37 页 40\n\n第一，反向刺破公司面纱不会损害 HK USA 所有人的合理期待。Guo 女士是 HK USA 的唯一成员。Guo 女士并不合理期待使用或控制 Lady May（Lady May）或 Lady May II（Lady May II）。法院已认定，个人债务人受益所有并控制 Lady May 和 Lady May II。Guo 女士作证称，Lady May 前任船长和管理人员此前的证词——即她并未亲自指挥 Lady May，且与经常使用 Lady May 的其父亲相比，她并不经常使用 Lady May——是准确的。（Reply Ex. 2, at \\*92:8–107:17。）就 Lady May II 而言，Guo 女士在伪证罪处罚的约束下作证称，她和 HK USA 均不拥有 Lady May II。（Undisputed Fact 9。）Guo 女士也不可能对使用托管资金（Escrowed Funds）具有任何合理期待，因为：(i) 该等资金正等待法院进一步命令而处于托管之中；且 (ii) 该等资金系作为一笔贷款收取，而 Guo 女士据称为该贷款提供了个人保证。\n\n关于个人保证（Personal Guarantee），Guo 女士知道或应当知道，她所保证的是向一个实体发放的贷款，该实体当时唯一声称拥有的资产：(a) 存在所有权争议；(b) 已被一家法院认定由个人债务人受益所有并控制；(c) 尽管有法院命令，先前仍被置于 New York 管辖水域之外，并且尽管有约定交付命令（Stipulated Delivery Order），很可能同样会避开 Connecticut（康涅狄格州）的管辖水域；以及 (d) 拟转入个人债务人的破产财产并为个人债务人债权人的利益出售。此情形尤其令人关切，因为 HK USA 承认其没有收入来源可用于支付该贷款应计的任何利息。如果 Guo 女士应就个人保证承担责任——鉴于该个人保证未注明日期、未经见证且未经公证，这一点并不明确——她可能对个人债务人的破产财产享有债权。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 1885-2 提交于 06/06/23 录入于 06/06/23 16:18:00 第 31 页，共 22-05003 221 文件 05/18/23 录入于 05/18/23 17:35:12 第 28 页，共 37 页 40\n\n第二，反向刺破公司面纱也不会损害 HK USA 债权人的合理期待。法院已准许支付 Lady May 的运营、维护和管理费用。Himalaya International Financial Group Ltd.（Himalaya Financial）与 Guo 女士一样，基于前一段所讨论的理由，知道或应当知道该贷款存在风险。\n\n第三，反向刺破公司面纱将允许个人债务人的债权人获得偿付，而否则该偿付仍不确定。截至目前，个人债务人的破产财产已通过债权申报被主张数亿美元——或者可能数十亿美元——的合计债权，该等债权申报构成其有效性的初步证据。个人债务人声称其资产不足 $4,000，且一直未配合受托人对资产的调查。\n\n第四，反向刺破公司面纱将符合公共利益，因为如上所述，HK USA 的公司形式造成不公。HK USA 除持有资产外没有任何商业目的——支持有限责任的政策考量均不适用。没有需要保护的持续经营企业。HK USA 仅用于将由个人债务人受益所有并控制的资产屏蔽于个人债务人的债权人之外。\n\n基于这些理由，不存在任何重大事实的真实争议，并且受托人有权依法获得判决，确认 HK USA 是个人债务人的另一自我。\n\nd. 受托人不受约定交付命令约束\n\nHK USA 针对第二项反诉提出衡平抗辩8，主张约定交付命令的规定禁止受托人追回托管资金。\n\n8 根据 Celotex，在非动议方承担举证责任的情况下，例如 HK USA 就当前衡平抗辩所承担的举证责任，动议方必须就该请求、要件或抗辩作出初步“说明”。477 U.S. at 322–23。举证责任并未转移给动议方，且\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 1885-2 提交于 06/06/23 录入于 06/06/23 16:18:00 第 32 页，共 22-05003 221 文件 05/18/23 录入于 05/18/23 17:35:12 第 29 页，共 37 页 40\n\n约定交付命令的相关部分规定，个人债务人（以及其他人）\n\n在托管资金由托管代理人（Escrow Agent）占有期间，或其收益由 HK USA 或任何其他人占有期间，不得采取任何行为以主张、设立、完善或执行对[托管资金]的任何权利、所有权、留置权或其他权益，包括但不限于通过执行任何判决或送达任何判决前救济或其他法律程序\n\n(ECF No. 299 ¶ 12.) HK USA 主张，受托人受约定交付命令，尤其是第 12 段的约束，因为他在获任时承继了个人债务人的地位。\n\n受托人主张，其不受《约定交付命令》的约束。首先，受托人主张，依据合同法的明确基本原则，一方不得与其自身订立合同，因此，《约定交付命令》——就个人债务人与 HK USA 而言——自始即属无效。此外，受托人主张，其并未因禁止反言而不得主张其不受《约定交付命令》约束，理由包括：（i）HK 各方均非本案债权人；（ii）允许债务人在破产程序中进行自我交易以使资产免受破产程序追索，不存在公共政策利益；而阻止该等自我交易亦不会对债务人造成不利影响；（iii）允许第 11 章受托人调查债务人被指隐匿资产的行为，并在请求具有理由时予以追偿，符合公共政策利益；以及（iv）尽管美国受托人（UST）指定第 11 章受托人的动议尚在待决，《约定交付命令》并未说明其对第 11 章受托人的效力。\n\n而仍由非动议方承担，在本案中即 HK USA。Id. HK USA 仅依赖其就驳回动议所提出的论点。\n案件 22-50073 文件 1885-2 于 06/06/23 提交 于 06/06/23 16:18:00 录入 第 33 页，共 22-05003 221 于 05/18/23 提交 于 05/18/23 17:35:12 录入 第 30 页，共 37 页 40\n《约定交付命令》在个人债务人与 HK USA 之间无效\n\n法院首先审议受托人基于合同法提出的论点。受托人正确地认为，合同法适用于《约定交付命令》。Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. N.Y. Times Co., 196 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1999)（“尽管同意判决是司法命令，但其也是当事人之间的协议，‘基本上应当按照合同予以解释。’”）（内部引文略）；见 Doe v. Pataki, 481 F.3d 69, 73 n. 3 (2d Cir. 2007)（“正如地区法院正确指出的，约定等同于同意判决……。”）；另见 Vincent's of Mott Street, Inc. v. Quadami, Inc., 423 F. App'x 46 (2d Cir. 2011)（将经破产法院批准的约定视为合同）。本法院对州法问题适用康涅狄格州（Connecticut）法律选择规则。Thelen LLP, 736 F.3d at 219。康涅狄格州在合同诉讼中就法律选择的判断适用《冲突法重述（第二版）》。Macomber v. Travelers Prop. & Cas. Corp., 894 A.2d 240, 256-57 (Conn. 2006)；见 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 6, 186–188 (2022)。《约定交付命令》不含法律选择条款。因此，法院适用康涅狄格州法律，因为该合同在本法院订立，而本法院位于康涅狄格州。\n\n根据康涅狄格州法律，合同成立尤其要求当事人意思表示一致，从而就条款达成共同理解。L & R Realty v. Conn. Nat'l Bank, 732 A.2d 181, 188–89 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999), cert. denied, 734 A.2d 984 (Conn. 1999)。“如果当事人的意思并未真正一致，则不存在可执行的合同。”L & R Realty, 732 A.2d at 188–89。因此，一方与其自身订立合同时，该方不得就该合同提起诉讼——尽管该合同的其他受益人可能可以。Moore v. Denslow, 14 Conn. 235, 237–38 (1841)；accord Animazing Ent., Inc. v. Louis Lofredo Assocs., Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 265, 270–71 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)（指出，根据纽约州法律，已确立的是，一份合同必须有（至少）两方当事人——否则即为无效）。由于法院已认定 HK USA 是个人债务人的另一个自我，法院认定，在 HK USA 与个人债务人之间——就此而言，受托人承继个人债务人的地位——《约定交付命令》自始无效。因此，HK USA 不得对受托人执行《约定交付命令》，且受托人可追回托管资金。\n案件 22-50073 文件 1885-2 于 06/06/23 提交 于 06/06/23 16:18:00 录入 第 34 页，共 22-05003 221 于 05/18/23 提交 于 05/18/23 17:35:12 录入 第 31 页，共 37 页 40\n\n受托人并未因禁止反言而不得追回托管资金\n\n关于受托人是否因禁止反言而不得追回托管资金，在依据原《破产法》审理的 Feldman v. Trans-East Air, Inc. 一案中，第二巡回上诉法院（Second Circuit）认定，受托人受原债务人占有管理人对飞机租赁合同予以拒绝的约束，因为\n\n在本案中，被上诉人基于对合同被拒绝的合理信赖而改变了其立场。他们正确地理解，9 月 8 日的命令要求他们接收飞机，并通过寻找新的承租人设法减轻损失。然而，对该飞机的需求极低。如地区法院所认定，被上诉人为重新出租飞机投入了大量金钱、时间和精力，而这些努力加上被上诉人的专业知识，在很大程度上促成了最终获得的有利租赁安排。\n\n被上诉人有权信赖该否认命令。债务人提出请求，法院予以批准，且没有其他当事人提出反对。在十六个月内，债务人和受托人均未反对被上诉人的行为。\n\n497 F.2d 352, 355 (2d Cir. 1974)。第二巡回上诉法院指出，并无人指称任何一方存在“欺诈或恶意”。Feldman, 497 F.2d at 356。同样，在 E. Air Lines, Inc. v. Ins. Co. (In re Ionoshpere Clubs) 一案中，第二巡回上诉法院认定，第 11 章受托人受债务人占有管理人在保险计划项下义务的约束，因其\n\n仅承诺履行其在该计划项下的义务，但改变付款时间表，并且对于其在本诉讼中提出的下列主张保持沉默：其未就该计划规定的 1.6 倍数充分表示同意；该倍数不可执行；因此其最高保费应低于该计划要求的金额，[债务人]说服[保险人]同意放宽保费支付时间表，并继续提供保险保障。\n案件 22-50073 文件 1885-2 于 06/06/23 提交 于 06/06/23 16:18:00 录入 第 35 页，共 22-05003 221 于 05/18/23 提交 于 05/18/23 17:35:12 录入 第 32 页，共 37 页 40\n\n85 F.3d 992, 1001 (2d Cir. 1996)。第二巡回上诉法院还指出，尤其是，债务人“完全没有试图改变计算最高保费的公式；根据 McGuinness 的说法，该问题甚至未被讨论”，并且允许受托人变更保险计划将使保险人遭受“实质性不利影响”。Ionosphere, 85 F.3d at 1001。\n\n第二巡回上诉法院的判例法与其姊妹巡回上诉法院的法律一致。在 Armstrong v. Norwest Bank, Minneapolis, N.A. 一案中，第八巡回上诉法院（Eighth Circuit）表示担忧：“债权人必须能够在破产法的范围内自由地与债务人占有管理人交易，而无须担心遭到后来指定的受托人的报复或推翻。”964 F.2d 797, 801 (8th Cir. 1992)（不允许第 7 章受托人撤销原债务人占有管理人与债权人之间关于使用现金担保物的约定）。在 In re Superior Toy & Mfg. Co., Inc. 一案中，第七巡回上诉法院（Seventh Circuit）不允许第 7 章受托人重新审议此前在第 11 章程序中对合同的承继，并就该合同承继所涉补救付款提起偏颇清偿诉讼；因为不存在“当事人的欺诈，或故意向法院隐瞒信息以不当取得承继命令”的情形，且破产财产从该承继中受益，而现在重新审议将使债权人遭受不利影响。78 F.3d 1169, 1173–76 (7th Cir. 1996)。在 Seidle v. GATX Leasing Corp. 一案中，第十一巡回上诉法院（Eleventh Circuit）认定，第 11 章受托人不得寻求追回被指向债权人支付的偏颇清偿款项；此前债务人占有管理人已根据 11 U.S.C. § 1110 与该债权人订立约定，并指出其先前已认定，“‘衡平法要求 GATX 不应因其自愿与 Airlift 订立申请破产后第 1110 条协议而遭受惩罚。’”778 F.2d 659, 663–66 (11th Cir. 1985)（内部引文略）。\n案件 22-50073 文件 1885-2 于 06/06/23 提交 于 06/06/23 16:18:00 录入 第 36 页，共 22-05003 221 于 05/18/23 提交 于 05/18/23 17:35:12 录入 第 33 页，共 37 页 40\n\n最终，在确定衡平因素时，法院必须权衡公众对指定并允许第 11 章受托人履行法定职责的利益，与支持使受托人受原债务人占有管理人所订交易约束的政策考量。Begier v. Am. Express, Inc. (In re Am. Int'l Airways, Inc.), 74 B.R. 691, 694 (Bankr. E.D. Penn. 1987)。如下所述，法院同意受托人的意见，即在这些第 11 章案件的具体事实和情形下，公众对受托人履行职责的利益超过上述政策考量。\n\n尽管 HK 各方正确地指出，通常受托人将受原债务人占有管理人所订交易的约束，但支持该一般结论的政策考量并不支持使受托人受《约定交付命令》条款约束。与 Armstrong、Superior Toy 和 Seidle 不同，毫无争议的是，HK USA 和 Guo 女士均非个人债务人的债权人。9 因此，债权人必须能够安心与债务人占有管理人达成协议这一政策考量，在本案事实中并不适用。见，例如，Armstrong, 964 F.2d at 801。此外，由于法院已认定 HK USA 只是个人债务人的工具，且不存在独立的经济实体，因此令其就个人债务人的债务承担责任，不会使 HK USA 遭受不利影响。见，例如，Ionosphere, 85 F.3d at 1001；Superior Toy, 78 F.3d at 1176；Seidle, 778 F.2d at 665；Feldman, 497 F.2d at 355。进一步而言，允许个人债务人在破产程序中进行自我交易以使资产免受破产程序追索，并不存在公共利益；而使受托人受《约定交付命令》约束将实现该结果。见 In re Alma Energy, LLC, No. CIV. 10-80-ART, 2010 WL 4736905 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 16, 2010)；Coan v. Licata (In re First Conn.\n\n9 虽然 HK USA 指出某些债权人是《约定交付命令》的当事人，但受托人并未寻求针对该等债权人的救济。\n案件 22-50073 文件 1885-2 于 06/06/23 提交 于 06/06/23 16:18:00 录入 第 37 页，共 22-05003 221 于 05/18/23 提交 于 05/18/23 17:35:12 录入 第 34 页，共 37 页 40\n\nConsulting Grp.), Case No. 02-50852 (JJT), Case No. 02-51167 (JJT), Adv. P. No. 09-05010 (JJT), 2023 WL 2746826 (Bankr. D. Conn. Mar. 31, 2023)；Coan v. Licata (In re First Conn. Consulting Grp.), Case No. 02-50852 (JJT), Case No. 02-51167 (JJT), Adv. P. No. 09-05010 (JJT), 2023 WL 2752489 (Bankr. D. Conn. Mar. 31, 2023)。这是因为，该等自我交易和破产隔离构成“欺诈或恶意”。Feldman, 497 F.2d at 356；见 Superior Toy, 78 F.3d at 1175；Am. Int'l Airways, 74 B.R. at 694。最后，与 In re MatlinPatterson Global Opportunities Partners II L.P. 不同，尽管（a）当时指定第 11 章受托人的动议尚在待决，且（b）该命令在讨论因 PAX 当时尚在待决的驳回动议而予以驳回的问题，《约定交付命令》在此并未明确约束受托人。644 B.R. 418, 427–28 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2022)；见 In re Phila. Athletic Club, Inc., 17 B.R. 345, 347 (Bankr. E.D. Penn. 1982)。\n\n同时，基于这些事实和情形，促成任命受托人的公共利益至关重要。受托人系因正当理由在本案中获任命。见 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)。除其他事项外，任命受托人是为调查关于个人债务人从事虚假安排以阻碍、拖延及欺诈其债权人的指控。第二项反诉请求属于任命受托人追究的那类请求。揭开公司面纱“仅可在正义利益所要求时进行，即涉及欺诈、违反法律或合同、公共不法行为，或公司成员之间的衡平考量要求如此时。”Pauley Petroleum, 239 A.2d at 633。法院已认定，HK USA（香港国际基金投资（美国）有限责任公司）的公司形式造成不公，因为其用于保护由个人债务人实益拥有并控制的资产，使其免受其债权人的追索。若认定受托人受约定交付命令约束，即会延续这一不公。公共利益支持受托人从托管资金中追回款项。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 1885-2 提交 06/06/23 录入 06/06/23 16:18:00 第 38 页，共 22-05003 221 提交 05/18/23 录入 05/18/23 17:35:12 第 35 页，共 37 页 40\n\n此外，上文关于其他反向揭开公司面纱因素的论述进一步强化了对衡平因素的这一分析。\n\n该衡平分析与上述认定一致，即受托人有权就其基于合同的主张获得依法判决，并可追回托管资金。因此，基于这两项理由，法院认定不存在任何真实的重大事实争议，且受托人有权获得依法判决，认定其可追回托管资金。\n\nVI. 结论及命令\n\n基于上述理由，就 HK USA 是否为个人债务人的另我实体，不存在任何真实的重大事实争议，且受托人有权就该问题获得依法判决。因此，法院认定，根据 11 U.S.C. § 541，HK USA 的财产属于个人债务人破产财产的一部分，HK 各方必须根据 11 U.S.C. § 542 将该等财产交付给受托人。\n\n法院进一步认定，HK USA 不得对受托人执行约定交付命令，因为在 HK USA 与个人债务人之间，该命令自始即属无效，原因是一方不得与其自身订立合同。或者，经衡平考量，法院认定，受托人不受个人债务人在作为占有中的债务人期间所达成交易的约束。因此，根据法院关于 HK USA 为个人债务人另我实体的认定，受托人可依据 11 U.S.C. §§ 541 and 542 追回托管资金。\n\nHK USA 要求解除 PI/PJR 的交叉动议被驳回，但不妨碍其日后再次提出。目前，法院就第一项反诉请求作出的裁决正在上诉中。该项关于第二项反诉请求的裁决亦很可能被上诉。此外，第三项及第五项反诉请求\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 1885-2 提交 06/06/23 录入 06/06/23 16:18:00 第 39 页，共 22-05003 221 提交 05/18/23 录入 05/18/23 17:35:12 第 36 页，共 37 页 40\n\n在 HK 各方提出的驳回动议后仍然存续。最后，尽管受托人主张第四项反诉请求目前并未适当地提交至法院审理，但该项请求尚未被驳回，并且目前或将来可能适当地提交至本法院审理。\n\n因此，现命令如下：\n\n命令：如本命令所述，简易判决动议获准。HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC（HK USA）在所有相关期间均为且一直是 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）先生（“个人债务人”）的另我实体；并进一步\n\n命令：HK USA 在所有相关期间直至目前的全部财产，包括 Lady May（“梅夫人号”）、Lady May II（“梅夫人二号”）及托管资金，已构成并在适用情况下构成个人债务人 Chapter 11 破产财产（“破产财产”）的一部分；并进一步\n\n命令：于 2023年6月2日或之前，Mei Guo（郭梅）女士，即 HK USA 的唯一成员，及 HK USA（合称“HK 各方”）应将 HK USA 的全部财产交付给 Luc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯平斯）先生，但并非以其个人身份，而是以其作为破产财产 Chapter 11 受托人（“受托人”）的身份；并进一步\n\n命令：受托人获授权采取一切必要且适当的行动以执行本命令；并进一步\n\n命令：本命令立即生效，且根据 Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure（联邦破产程序规则）第 7062 条作出的任何中止均不生效。法院特此豁免 Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 第 7062 条中就受托人在本判决作出后执行本判决之能力所规定的任何限制；并进一步\n\n命令：本法院对因执行、解释及实施本命令而产生或与之相关的全部事项保留管辖权；并进一步\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 1885-2 提交 06/06/23 录入 06/06/23 16:18:00 第 40 页，共 22-05003 221 提交 05/18/23 录入 05/18/23 17:35:12 第 37 页，共 37 页 40\n\n命令：HK USA 要求解除 PI/PJR 的交叉动议被驳回，但不妨碍其日后再次提出。\n\n于 2023年5月18日签发于 Connecticut（康涅狄格州）Bridgeport（布里奇波特）。","key_entities":["Guo","Kwok","Je","Despins","Ho Wan Kwok","CIPA","Geyer","Himalaya","Paul Hastings","GTV","Saraca"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":1,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":30,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":36,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":37,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":43,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":50,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":57,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":83,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":84,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":87,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":94,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":102,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":133,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":140,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":142,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":172,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":177,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":183,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":185,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":186,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":187,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":188,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":189,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":190,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":191,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":197,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":202,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":203,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":204,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":209,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":221,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":294,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":299,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":318,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":465,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":523,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":530,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":723,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":767,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":930,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1216,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1544,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1550,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1623,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":12610,"status":"published","published_at":"2023-06-06 00:00:00","created_at":"2023-06-06","updated_at":"2026-08-23 21:37:04"}