{"id":"court_ctb_1891_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":1891,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT HO WAN KWOK, *et al.*, ) (Jointly Administered)","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"## **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\nHO WAN KWOK, *et al.*, ) (Jointly Administered)\n\n)\n\n)\n\n)\n\nDebtors.<sup>1</sup>\n\nIn re: ) Chapter 11 ) Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n) Re: ECF No. 1789\n\n## **ORDER GRANTING CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE'S FIFTH SUPPLEMENTAL OMNIBUS MOTION FOR 2004 EXAMINATION**\n\nOn May 15, 2023, Mr. Luc A. Despins, in his capacity as the Chapter 11 Trustee (the \"Trustee\") of the estate of Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\"), filed the Fifth Supplemental Omnibus Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee for Entry of Order under Bankruptcy Rule 2004 and Local Rule 2004-1 Authorizing Discovery with Respect to Additional Entities and Individuals Affiliated with Debtor, and Entities Doing Business with Debtor and Affiliated Entities (the\"Motion\"), (ECF No. 1789.) On May 22, 2022, Ms. Hing Chi Ngok and Greenwich Land, LLC (the \"Greenwich Parties\") filed an objection to the Motion (the \"Greenwich Objection\"). (ECF No. 1813.) The Greenwich Parties object to the Motion insofar as it seeks the examination of Bento Technologies, Inc. (\"Bento\"). That same date, the Debtor also filed an objection to the Motion (the \"Debtor Objection,\" and, together with the Greenwich Objection, the \"Objections\"). (ECF No. 1814.) The Debtor objects to the Motion on two grounds. First, the Debtor objects insofar as the Motion seeks the examination of Nodal Partners, LLC (\"Nodal\"). Second, the Debtor\n\n<sup>1</sup> The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and the Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\nobjects that, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(4), made applicable by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9016, and D. Conn. L. Bankr. R. 2004-1(c), the Trustee must give notice to the Debtor of the date and time of each Rule 2004 deposition. On June 2, 2023, the Trustee filed replies to the Objections. (ECF Nos. 1860, 1862.)\n\nOn June 6, 2023, a hearing on the Motion was held. None of the proposed examinees objected to the Motion either through a filing a responsive pleading or appearing at the hearing.\n\n## *The Greenwich Objection*\n\nWith respect to the objection of the Greenwich Parties, they argue that the Trustee must take discovery of Bento in the adversary proceeding styled *Despins ex rel. Kwok v. Greenwich Land,* LLC, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05005 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 5, 2023), because of the pending proceeding doctrine. The Trustee argues that it is the law of the case that the pending proceeding doctrine is inapplicable to Bento and that the examination of Bento and the request for production of documents directed at Bento are, in any event, about parties beyond just the Greenwich Parties.\n\nAs previously stated in the Order Granting Chapter 11 Trustee's Second Supplemental Omnibus Motion for 2004 Examination, ECF No. 1184, the Court continues to be persuaded by the case-law holding that the pending proceeding precludes discovery through a Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004 examination only where the proposed examiner and examinee are parties to a pending proceeding and discovery in that proceeding must be conducted under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the analogous part VII rules of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. *Compare In re SunEdison*, 572 B.R. 482, 490 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017) (\"The Debtors are not parties to the State Court Action, and hence, the rule does not apply to them.\"); *In re Washington Mutual, Inc.*, 408 B.R. 45, 53 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009) (\"The possibility that JPM may intervene in\n\n2\n\nthe DC Action is not a sufficient reason to deny the Debtors' Motion at this time. The 'pending proceeding' rule is predicated on there actually being a pending action involving the two parties. JPM has not cited any authority for the proposition that a Rule 2004 examination of an entity is improper when a proceeding is pending in another venue against a third party and there is a 'substantial likelihood' that the examinee may intervene.\") (internal citations omitted); *In re Ecam Publications, Inc.*, 131 B.R. 556, 560–61 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1991) (allowing 2004 examination by trustee of parties, against whom the trustee had bought but not yet brought claims) *with In re Martelli*, Nos. 16-20983-PRW, 16-20316-PRW, 16-20968-PRW, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 2015, at \\*12-13 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. July 20, 2017) (applying pending proceeding rule to non-parties to that proceeding because the material was sought by a party to the proceeding and was related to the proceeding); *In re Enron Corp.*, 281 B.R. 836, 838 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) (applying pending proceeding rule to a non-party to that proceeding because \"no party disputes that the automatic discovery stay of the [Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(3)(B)] applies to McKinsey.\"); *cf. In re Cambridge Analytica, LLC*, 600 B.R. 750 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019) (unclear who was the target of the 2004 examination); *In re Bennett Funding Grp., Inc.*, 203 B.R. 24, 30 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1996) (applying pending proceeding rule where discovery was sought by a party to the proceeding against a third-party defendant to that proceeding); *Sweetland v. Szadkowski (In re Szadkowski)*, 198 B.R. 140 (Bankr. D. Md. 1996) (applying pending proceeding doctrine a party to the proceeding was seeking discovery against another party to that proceeding.) The Greenwich Parties have not identified or established any relevant pending proceedings, in which Bento and the Trustees are parties. Therefore, the Greenwich Objection is overruled.\n\n## *The Debtor Objection*\n\nWith respect to the Debtor's first objection, the Debtor objects that the proposed subpoena is overbroad under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004(b) to the extent it seeks information the Debtor posits is unrelated to (i) the acts, conduct, or property; (ii) the liabilities of the Debtor; (iii) any matter which may affect the administration of the Debtor's estate; or (iv) the Debtor's right to discharge. The Trustee argues that the Debtor has no standing to object to the scope of the subpoena targeting Nodal and that the subpoena is reasonable under the specific facts and circumstances of this case and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004.\n\n\"To have standing, '[a] plaintiff must [1] allege personal injury [2] fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and [3] likely to be redressed by the requested relief.'\" *Hirsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co.*, 72 F.3d 1085, 1091 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing *Allen v. Wright*, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984), *abrogated on other grounds by Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.*, 572 U.S. 118, 128 (2014)) (modifications in the original). \"The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing [standing].\" *Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). The relevant jurisdictional facts must be \"clearly alleged.\" *Warth v. Seldin*, 422 U.S. 490, 490 (1972), which is a lower pleading standard than required for pleading the merits of a cause of action. *Harry v. Total Gas & Power N. Am., Inc.*, 889 F.3d 104, 110 (2d Cir. 2018); *Toretto v. Donnelley Fin. Solutions, Inc.*, 523 F. Supp. 3d 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2021); *Dennis v. JPMorgan Chase & Co.*, 343 F. Supp. 3d 122, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). A court may resolve disputed jurisdictional facts by reference to evidence outside the pleadings. *Antares Aircraft, L.P. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria*, 948 F.2d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 1991), *reaff'd by* 999 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1993).\n\n4\n\nIn the Chapter 7 context, the Second Circuit has held that it is \"well-established that a Chapter 7 debtor . . . has standing to object . . . only if there could be a surplus after all creditors' claims are paid.\" *60 E. 80th St. Equities, Inc. v. Sapir (In re 60 E. 80th Street Equities, Inc.)*, 218 F.3d 109, 115 (2d Cir. 2000); *see Cole v. Rescia*, Case No. 3:21-cv-01130-MPS, 2022 WL 4536830, at \\*4–5 (D. Conn. Sept. 28, 2022). The Court concludes that this principle also applies in Chapter 11 cases in which a Trustee is appointed. In the Chapter 11 context, the Second Circuit has held that standing in bankruptcy case requires a party be \"directly and adversely affected pecuniarily.\" *Licensing by Paolo, Inc. v. Sinatra ex rel. Gucci (In re Gucci)*, 126 F.3d 380 (2d Cir. 1997); 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1109.01[3] (16th ed. 2022). Hence, \"[i]n a chapter 7 case, or a chapter 11 case in which the debtor is not in possession and there is no possibility of a surplus being returned to the debtor, the debtor usually has no pecuniary interest in the outcome of claims objections and thus no standing to object to claims.\" 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 502.02[2][c]. This is because the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee divests a Chapter 11 debtor of a bankruptcy trustee's powers and duties. *Kraus-Thomson Org., Ltd. v. McCorhill Publ'g, Inc. (In re McCorhill Publ'g, Inc.)*, 89 B.R. 393, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). Nevertheless, a debtor-out-of-possession \"has a pecuniary interest in the equity of the estate if all the creditors can be paid in full, or if each class of impaired claims accepts [a] plan in accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8)(A), so that the debtor may retain an equity interest.\" *McCorhill Publ'g*, 89 B.R. at 396.\n\nThe Motion seeks 2004 examinations in furtherance of the Trustee's pursuit of his duties. While the Debtor owes his estate, the Trustee, and this Court different duties and obligations, *see, e.g.*, 11 U.S.C. § 541, he is no longer a debtor-in-possession under 11 U.S.C. § 1107 with a trustee's rights and duties. The Debtor, moreover, lacks a pecuniary interest in the estate. In his\n\nSchedules, the Debtor asserts he has \\$3,850 in assets, no income, and no expectation of a change in his income. (ECF No. 78.) The Debtor lists in his Schedules that he has \\$373,803,498.09 in non-priority unsecured debt. (*Id.*) The Debtor has not, at this time, sufficiently established that there is a reasonable possibility of a surplus in this case. For both of these reasons, on the instant facts, the Debtor lacks standing to object to the Trustee's 2004 examination of third parties. The Court does not, therefore, consider the Debtor's objection regarding the scope of the proposed examination and request for production of documents pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004(b). Furthermore, under D. Conn. L. Bankr. R. 2004-1(c)(3), Nodal may still object to any subpoena served upon it pursuant to this Order despite failing to object to the Motion, including on the grounds that such subpoena is overly broad. The Debtor's concern that this issue will slip past Court review is misplaced. The Debtor's objection as to the scope of the proposed 2004 examination of Nodal is overruled.\n\nWith respect to the Debtor's second objection, the Debtor objects that the Debtor must be given notice of the time, date, and place of any and all 2004 examinations under applicable procedural rules. The Trustee argues that the Trustee's position is compliant with Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 and D. Conn. L. Bankr. R. 2004-1(c).\n\nThe Debtor reads into Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(4) that parties other than the subpoena target must be given advance notice of the date and time of the target's deposition. Rule 45(a)(4) does not say that. Rather, Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(4) says that if a subpoena seeks \"production of documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things or the inspection of premises before trial,\" then \"a notice and a copy of the subpoena must be served on each party.\" The Trustee has done so: the proposed subpoenas are attached to the Motion. Similarly, the Debtor reads into D. Conn. L. Bankr. R. 2004-1(c) language that is not present. D. Conn. L. Bankr. R.\n\n2004-1(b) provides that parties may pursue a 2004 examination without a motion and/or subpoena pursuant to mutual agreement. Where there is such an agreement, D. Conn. L. Bankr. R. 2004-1(b)(1) requires that the relevant parties must provide notice to certain parties as to, *inter alia*, the date, time, and place of the proposed examination. No analogous language exists in D. Conn. L. Bankr. R. 2004-1(c). Moreover, this absence is not mistaken. Where, as here, a party files a motion for 2004 examination – and properly serves the motion – the relevant parties receive notice of the proposed 2004 examination. Therefore, the Debtor's objection as to the notice procedures is overruled. As discussed at the hearing, however, the Court encourages the parties to reach an agreement relating to the interplay of 2004 examinations and the Consent Order Regarding Control of Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Protection Related to Rule 2004 Subpoenaed Documents and Information. (ECF No. 856.)\n\nAccordingly, it is hereby\n\n**ORDERED:** The Objections are **OVERULED**. The Motion is **GRANTED**; it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** Neubert, Pepe & Monteith, P.C., as counsel for the Trustee, is hereby authorized to sign subpoenas in a form substantially similar to the subpoenas attached to the Motion as Exhibits C-1 to C-8 and to serve the subpoenas, along with a copy of this Order, in accordance with Bankruptcy Rule 2004 requiring examination and the production of documents by the examinees listed on Exhibit B to the Motion; it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** Subject to any rights under the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and applicable Local Rules, and unless otherwise ordered by the Court, the examinees are hereby directed to produce all documents within 30 days of the service of the subpoena, or such other time as agreed upon by the Trustee. To the extent an examinee does not produce any documents requested in the Subpoena on the basis of some\n\n7\n\nprivilege, the examinee is hereby directed to produce to the Trustee a privilege log that comports with Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(e)(2), made applicable by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9016, and D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 26(e), within 30 days of service of the Subpoena, or such other time as agreed upon by the Trustee; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** The examinees are hereby directed to ensure that all documents and other information, including without limitation in any electronic format, requested in the Subpoenas or otherwise relevant to the Debtor, his business, assets, liabilities, financial condition, or these Chapter 11 cases, are properly maintained, are available for production, inspection and copying, and are not destroyed; it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** Neubert, Pepe & Monteith, P.C., as counsel for the Trustee, is hereby authorized, without further order of this Court, to take the testimony of one or more representatives of any examinee listed on Exhibit B to the Motion by examination under Bankruptcy Rule 2004 either at the offices of Neubert, Pepe & Montheith, 195 Church Street, 13th Floor, New Haven, CT 06510, at the offices of Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166, or at such other place that is mutually acceptable to the parties, on a date acceptable to the Trustee, which, at the election of the Trustee, shall be not less than 14 calendar days after the production of documents by the proposed examinee in compliance with the subpoena and this Order pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2004, and such examination shall continue from day to day until completed.\n\nDated at Bridgeport, Connecticut this 7th day of June, 2023.","body_zh":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT（美国康涅狄格区破产法院）\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等， (联合审理)\n债务人。1\n关于： 第11章 案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF No. 1789\n\n准许第11章受托人关于第2004条调查的第五次补充综合动议的裁定\n\n2023年5月15日，Luc A. Despins 先生以 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（以下简称“债务人”）破产财产的第11章受托人（以下简称“受托人”）身份，提交了《第11章受托人关于根据<破产程序规则>第2004条及<本地规则>第2004-1条作出裁定以授权对与债务人关联的其他实体和个人以及与债务人及关联实体有业务往来的实体开展证据开示的第五次补充综合动议》（以下简称“动议”），(ECF No. 1789。) 2022年5月22日，Hing Chi Ngok（岳庆芝）女士与 Greenwich Land, LLC（格林威治土地有限责任公司）（以下简称“格林威治当事方”）对该动议提出了异议（以下简称“格林威治异议”）。(ECF No. 1813。) 格林威治当事方对动议提出异议，理由是该动议寻求对 Bento Technologies, Inc.（便当科技有限公司）（以下简称“Bento”）进行调查。同日，债务人亦对该动议提出了异议（以下简称“债务人异议”，并与格林威治异议统称为“各项异议”）。(ECF No. 1814。) 债务人基于两项理由对动议提出异议。首先，债务人提出异议，理由是动议寻求对 Nodal Partners, LLC（节点合伙人有限责任公司）（以下简称“Nodal”）进行调查。其次，债务人\n\n1 这些第11章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵，亦称 Guo Wengui、Miles Guo、Miles Kwok 以及其他诸多化名）（纳税人识别号后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（纳税人识别号后四位：8202）和 Genever Holdings Corporation。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 和 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为：Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 转交作为 Ho Wan Kwok 财产受托人的 Luc A. Despins（仅用于接收通知和通信之目的）。\n\n提出异议称，根据由 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9016 适用的 Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(4) 以及 D. Conn. L. Bankr. R. 2004-1(c)，受托人必须将每次第2004条宣誓录供的日期和时间通知债务人。2023年6月2日，受托人就各项异议提交了回复。(ECF Nos. 1860, 1862。)\n\n2023年6月6日，就该动议举行了听证会。拟被调查人均未通过提交答辩状或出席听证会的方式对动议提出异议。\n\n格林威治异议\n\n关于格林威治当事方的异议，他们主张，由于未决诉讼原则，受托人必须在名为 Despins ex rel. Kwok v. Greenwich Land, LLC, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05005 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 5, 2023) 的对抗性诉讼中对 Bento 进行证据开示。受托人则主张，未决诉讼原则不适用于 Bento 属于既判法理，且无论如何，对 Bento 的调查以及向 Bento 发出的调取文件请求所涉及的当事方均超出了仅限格林威治当事方的范围。\n\n正如先前在《准许第11章受托人关于第2004条调查的第二次补充综合动议的裁定》（ECF No. 1184）中所述，本法院仍然信服相关判例法，即未决诉讼原则仅在拟调查人与拟被调查人均为未决诉讼的当事方，且该诉讼中的证据开示必须根据《联邦民事诉讼规则》或《联邦破产程序规则》类似的第七部分规则进行时，才排除通过 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004 调查开展的证据开示。比较 In re SunEdison, 572 B.R. 482, 490 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017)（“债务人并非州法院诉讼的当事方，因此该规则不适用于他们。”）；In re Washington Mutual, Inc., 408 B.R. 45, 53 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009)（“JPM 可能介入哥伦比亚特区诉讼的可能性不足以构成此时驳回债务人动议的充分理由。‘未决诉讼’规则的前提是两方之间实际上存在未决诉讼。JPM 未引用任何判例依据来支持以下主张：即当在另一管辖地针对第三方存在未决诉讼且被调查人存在可能介入的‘实质可能性’时，对某一实体进行第2004条调查是不当的。”）（内部引文省略）；In re Ecam Publications, Inc., 131 B.R. 556, 560–61 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1991)（准许受托人对已购买但尚未提起索赔的当事方进行第2004条调查）；对照 In re Martelli, Nos. 16-20983-PRW, 16-20316-PRW, 16-20968-PRW, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 2015, at *12-13 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. July 20, 2017)（对该诉讼的非当事方适用未决诉讼规则，因为相关材料是由该诉讼的一方当事人寻求且与该诉讼相关）；In re Enron Corp., 281 B.R. 836, 838 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002)（对该诉讼的非当事方适用未决诉讼规则，因为“各方均不争议[1995年《私人证券诉讼改革法案》15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(3)(B)]的自动中止证据开示适用于 McKinsey”）；参见 In re Cambridge Analytica, LLC, 600 B.R. 750 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019)（第2004条调查的目标不明确）；In re Bennett Funding Grp., Inc., 203 B.R. 24, 30 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1996)（在证据开示由诉讼一方当事人针对该诉讼的第三方被告提出时适用未决诉讼规则）；Sweetland v. Szadkowski (In re Szadkowski), 198 B.R. 140 (Bankr. D. Md. 1996)（在诉讼一方当事人针对该诉讼的另一方当事人寻求证据开示时适用未决诉讼原则。）格林威治当事方并未指明或证明存在任何 Bento 和受托人均为当事方的相关未决诉讼。因此，格林威治异议被驳回。\n\n债务人异议\n\n关于债务人的第一项异议，债务人提出异议称，拟发出的传票根据 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004(b) 过于宽泛，因为它寻求的信息据债务人假设与以下各项无关：(i) 行为、作为或财产；(ii) 债务人的债务；(iii) 可能影响债务人破产财产管理的任何事项；或 (iv) 债务人获得免责的权利。受托人主张，债务人无资格对针对 Nodal 的传票范围提出异议，且根据本案的具体事实与情况以及 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004，该传票是合理的。\n\n“要具备诉讼资格，‘原告必须 [1] 声称遭受了 [2] 可相当程度归咎于被告被指控的非法行为、且 [3] 很可能通过所请求的救济得以救济的人身损害。’”Hirsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 72 F.3d 1085, 1091 (2d Cir. 1995)（援引 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)，在其他理由上被 Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 128 (2014) 废止）（原文中的修改）。“援引联邦管辖权的一方承担证明[诉讼资格]的举证责任。”Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)。相关的管辖事实必须“清楚声称”。Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 490 (1972)，这一诉答标准低于就诉因实质理由进行诉答的标准。Harry v. Total Gas & Power N. Am., Inc., 889 F.3d 104, 110 (2d Cir. 2018); Toretto v. Donnelley Fin. Solutions, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 3d 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2021); Dennis v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 343 F. Supp. 3d 122, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)。法院可以通过参考诉答文书之外的证据来解决有争议的管辖事实。Antares Aircraft, L.P. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 948 F.2d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 1991), reaff'd by 999 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1993)。\n\n在第7章的背景下，第二巡回法院认定，“第7章债务人……仅在所有债权人的索赔清偿后可能存在剩余资产的情况下……才具有提出异议的资格，这一点已是确立的法理。”60 E. 80th St. Equities, Inc. v. Sapir (In re 60 E. 80th Street Equities, Inc.), 218 F.3d 109, 115 (2d Cir. 2000); 参见 Cole v. Rescia, Case No. 3:21-cv-01130-MPS, 2022 WL 4536830, at *4–5 (D. Conn. Sept. 28, 2022)。本法院认定，该原则同样适用于指定了受托人的第11章案件。在第11章的背景下，第二巡回法院认定，破产案件中的诉讼资格要求当事方受到“直接且不利的金钱影响”。Licensing by Paolo, Inc. v. Sinatra ex rel. Gucci (In re Gucci), 126 F.3d 380 (2d Cir. 1997); 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1109.01[3] (16th ed. 2022)。因此，“在第7章案件中，或在债务人并非占有债务人且不可能将剩余资产归还给债务人的第11章案件中，债务人通常在债权异议的结果中没有金钱利益，因此没有对债权提出异议的资格。”4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 502.02[2][c]。这是因为指定第11章受托人剥夺了第11章债务人作为破产受托人的权力和职责。Kraus-Thomson Org., Ltd. v. McCorhill Publ'g, Inc. (In re McCorhill Publ'g, Inc.), 89 B.R. 393, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)。尽管如此，非占有债务人“在所有债权人均能得到全额偿付的情况下，或者在每个受损索赔组别根据 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8)(A) 接受方案以使债务人得以保留衡平权益的情况下，对破产财产的净值享有金钱利益。”McCorhill Publ'g, 89 B.R. at 396。\n\n动议寻求进行第2004条调查以推进受托人履行其职责。虽然债务人对其财产、受托人和本法院负有不同的职责和义务（参见例如 11 U.S.C. § 541），但他不再是根据 11 U.S.C. § 1107 享有受托人权利和职责的占有债务人。此外，债务人对破产财产缺乏金钱利益。在其\n\n财产明细表中，债务人声称其拥有 $3,850 的资产，无收入，且预计其收入不会发生变化。(ECF No. 78。) 债务人在其财产明细表中列明其拥有 $373,803,498.09 的非优先无担保债务。(Id.) 债务人目前尚未充分证明本案中存在剩余资产的合理可能性。基于这两个原因，在现有事实下，债务人缺乏对受托人就第三方开展第2004条调查提出异议的诉讼资格。因此，本法院不考虑债务人关于根据 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004(b) 拟进行的调查及调取文件请求的范围的异议。此外，根据 D. Conn. L. Bankr. R. 2004-1(c)(3)，尽管 Nodal 未对动议提出异议，但其仍可对根据本裁定送达给它的任何传票提出异议，包括以该传票过于宽泛为由提出异议。债务人担心该问题会逃避法院审查的顾虑是不必要的。债务人关于拟对 Nodal 进行第2004条调查的范围的异议被驳回。\n\n关于债务人的第二项异议，债务人提出异议称，根据适用的程序规则，必须就任何及所有第2004条调查的时间、日期和地点向债务人发出通知。受托人主张，受托人的立场符合 Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 和 D. Conn. L. Bankr. R. 2004-1(c)。\n\n债务人将 Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(4) 解读为必须向传票目标以外的当事方提前通知该目标的宣誓录供日期和时间。第45(a)(4)条并非如此规定。相反，Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(4) 规定，如果传票寻求“在审判前调取文件、电子存储信息或有形物品，或勘验场所”，则“必须向每一方当事人送达通知和传票副本”。受托人已经做到了这一点：拟发出的传票已附在动议之后。同样，债务人将未包含的措辞强加于 D. Conn. L. Bankr. R. 2004-1(c) 的文义之中。D. Conn. L. Bankr. R.\n\n第 2004-1(b) 条规定，各方可根据共同协议，在无需提出动议和/或传票的情况下进行 2004 条质证。在达成此类协议的情况下，D. Conn. L. Bankr. R. 2004-1(b)(1)（康涅狄格区破产地方法规第 2004-1(b)(1) 条）要求相关方必须就（其中包括）拟议质证的日期、时间和地点向特定当事方提供通知。D. Conn. L. Bankr. R. 2004-1(c) 中不存在类似的表述。此外，不存在此类表述并非疏漏。在此类情形下（如同本案），当一方提交 2004 条质证动议并妥善送达该动议时，相关各方即已收到拟进行 2004 条质证的通知。因此，债务人关于通知程序的异议被驳回。然而，正如听证会上所讨论的，法院鼓励各方就 2004 条质证与《关于与根据第 2004 条传唤之文件及信息相关的律师-委托人特权及工作成果保护控制的同意令》（ECF No. 856）之间的相互影响达成协议。\n\n据此，特此\n\n裁定如下：异议被驳回。动议获得准许；进一步\n\n裁定如下：Neubert, Pepe & Monteith, P.C.（纽伯特、佩佩与蒙泰思律师事务所）作为 Trustee（受托人）的律师，特此获得授权签署格式与作为动议附件 C-1 至 C-8 所附传票基本一致的传票，并根据 Bankruptcy Rule 2004（《联邦破产诉讼程序规则》第 2004 条）送达上述传票及本裁定书副本，要求动议附件 B 所列受质证人接受质证并提供文件；进一步\n\n裁定如下：在不影响 Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure（《联邦破产诉讼程序规则》）、Federal Rules of Civil Procedure（《联邦民事诉讼程序规则》）及适用 Local Rules（地方法规）项下任何权利的前提下，除法院另有裁定外，特此责令受质证人在传票送达后 30 日内，或在受托人同意的其他时间内，提供所有文件。在受质证人基于某种特权未提供传票中要求的任何文件的范围内，特此责令受质证人在传票送达后 30 日内，或在受托人同意的其他时间内，向受托人提供符合 Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(e)(2)（通过 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9016 予以适用）及 D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 26(e)（康涅狄格区民事地方法规第 26(e) 条）规定的特权清单；以及进一步\n\n裁定如下：特此责令受质证人确保传票所要求的、或与债务人、其业务、资产、负债、财务状况或这些第 11 章案件相关的全部文件及其他信息（包括但不限于任何电子格式），均得到妥善保存，可供出示、查验和复制，且不被销毁；进一步\n\n裁定如下：Neubert, Pepe & Monteith, P.C. 作为受托人的律师，特此获得授权在无需本法院进一步下达命令的情况下，根据《联邦破产诉讼程序规则》第 2004 条通过质证获取动议附件 B 所列任何受质证人的一名或多名代表的证词，地点可为 Neubert, Pepe & Montheith 的办公室（地址：195 Church Street, 13th Floor, New Haven, CT 06510）、Paul Hastings LLP（普衡律师事务所）的办公室（地址：200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166），或双方均可接受的其他地点；时间为受托人可接受的日期，且根据受托人的选择，该日期不得早于拟受质证人依照传票及本裁定根据《联邦破产诉讼程序规则》第 2004 条提供文件之后的 14 个日历日，且该质证应逐日连续进行，直至完成。\n\n于 2023 年 6 月 7 日签署于康涅狄格州布里奇波特。","key_entities":["Je","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Despins","Guo","Paul Hastings","Miles Guo"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":78,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":856,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1184,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1789,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1813,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1814,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":2581,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 13:15:33"}