{"id":"court_ctb_1939_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":1939,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION In re:","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"## UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION\n\nIn re:\n\nChapter 11\n\nHO WAN KWOK, *et al.*, [1](#page-0-0)\n\nDebtors.\n\n(Jointly Administered)\n\nCase No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n# **OBJECTION OF HK INTERNATIONAL FUNDS INVESTMENTS (USA) LIMITED, LLC AND MEI GUO TO TRUSTEE'S MOTION, PURSUANT TO BANKRUPTCY CODE SECTIONS 105 AND 363, BANKRUPTCY RULES 2002, 6004(c), AND 9014, AND LOCAL RULES 6004-1 AND 6004-2, SEEKING ENTRY OF AN ORDER (I) AUTHORIZING AND APPROVING SALE OF THE LADY MAY FREE AND CLEAR OF LIENS, CLAIMS, INTERESTS, AND ENCUMBRANCES, (II) AUTHORIZING AND APPROVING PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT, AND (III) GRANTING RELATED RELIEF**\n\nHK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC and Mei Guo (collectively, the\n\n\"HK Parties\"), by and through their undersigned counsel, hereby object to the Motion of Luc A. Despins, Chapter 11 Trustee (the \"Trustee\"), Pursuant to Bankruptcy Code Sections 105 and 363, Bankruptcy Rules 2002, 6004(c), and 9014, and Local Rules 6604-1 and 6004-2, Seeking Entry of an Order: (i) Authorizing and Approving Sale of the *Lady May* Free and Clear of Liens, Claims, Interests, and Encumbrances; (ii) Authorizing and Approving Purchase and Sale Agreement, and (iii) Granting Related Relief (the \"Sale Motion\"), and in support thereof, states as follows:\n\n<span id=\"page-0-0\"></span><sup>1</sup> The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and the Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\n#### **INTRODUCTION**\n\n1. The Trustee's Sale Motion presents the following question to the Court: under what circumstances may a trustee unilaterally impose a marketing and bidding process without affording advance notice to all parties-in-interest and an opportunity to object, without full compliance with Local Bankruptcy Rule 6004-2(d) and (e), and without this Court's imprimatur, only to seek afterthe-fact approval of its self-invented sale procedure?\n\n2. The Trustee has offered no legitimate justification to disregard the universally accepted practice of seeking *pre*-approval for his sale process. There is no Luc A. Despins, Trustee or Paul Hastings LLP exception. Sale procedures are intended to protect the integrity of the sale process and the interests of creditors. They should have been approved in advance before being implemented by the Trustee. They should have conformed with LBR 6004-2(d) and (e). The Sale Motion should be denied because the Trustee did not follow the rules.\n\n3. The Sale Motion also should be denied because the Trustee has failed to allow any discovery of his communications with his Broker (defined below), prospective purchasers, the few bidders who submitted formal offers, and the Buyer (as defined below). There has been no ability to test whether the Trustee obtained the maximum value for one of the most significant assets of the of the bankruptcy estate, nor to determine whether the final discounted, below list price offer, obtained after a remarkably short period, is fair and reasonable.\n\n4. Without parties in interest having had any prior opportunity to discover necessary and critical facts about the sale process, and in light of the known defects in that process highlighted below, the Court should not be persuaded by the Trustee's untested submissions at the sale hearing regarding value and reasonableness, and should deny the Sale Motion.\n\n#### **BACKGROUND**\n\n5. The Trustee filed the Sale Motion on June 2, 2023 (Docket No. 1858). By the Sale Motion, as amended, the Trustee seeks this Court's approval for the sale of the *Lady May* to Herb Chambers Yachting, LLC (the \"Buyer\"), for \\$23,150,000.\n\n6. The list price initially agreed upon between the Trustee and his retained broker for the yacht, Edmiston and Company Limited (the \"Broker\"), was \\$26,500,000. Declaration of Dirk Johnson in Support of the Sale Motion (the \"Broker's Declaration\") at 2, ¶ 4 (Docket No. 1858). No rationale for that list price has been provided by the Trustee or the Broker. Moreover, contrary to Rule 6004-2(b)(4) of this Court's Local Rules, the Trustee has failed to obtain any appraisal or other formal valuation of the *Lady May*.\n\n7. In addition to the above shortcomings, the Trustee did not obtain advance Court approval of the bidding procedures relating to his solicitation of offers to purchase the *Lady May.* Sale Motion at 4, ¶ 6. No minimum bid amount, bid deadline, form of purchase agreement, or other common bid procedures were disclosed by the Trustee in advance to the Court or parties in interest for review. Instead, the Trustee -- no doubt desperate to generate sale proceeds quickly to fund his enormous legal fees -- orchestrated a sale process hidden from view.\n\n8. In support of his unusual actions, the Trustee relies almost exclusively on grandiose descriptions of his Broker's \"extensive marketing campaign\" conducted \"[c]onsistent with best industry practices,\" including contact with \"approximately 10,000 clients and other potentially interested parties….\" Sale Motion at 2-3, ¶¶ 2-3; at 9, ¶¶ 23-24. For all such effort, from these thousands of contacted parties, only five bidders emerged. And of the five bidders, only one, the bidder deemed unilaterally by the Trustee to have submitted the highest and best offer, has been identified.\n\n9. During the closed-door bidding process, the Trustee submits that he countered the five bids he received, each of which was materially below the list price, with a proposed sale price of \\$23 million. No basis for a counteroffer in that amount has been offered by the Trustee or the Broker.\n\n10. The Trustee then unilaterally imposed a final bid deadline within about a month after the commencement of marketing and with only six days' notice to bidders. Sale Motion at ¶28 (email notice to bidders of the May 30, 2023 deadline sent on May 24).\n\n11. At a hearing conducted in this case on April 27, 2023, the Trustee conceded that he was likely to receive \"very low bids from some … bottom fishers.\" Transcript of April 27, 2023 hearing, p. 23 (Docket No. 1754). He then represented to the Court that he \"was not in a rush to sell\" the *Lady May* and that similar vessels \"don't get sold on two-weeks, three-weeks, or twomonths notice. It can be a long process.\" *Id*. at p. 24. The Sale Motion was filed a mere 36 days later, only five weeks after the Broker's retention was approved. (Docket No. 1717).\n\n12. As initially filed, the Sale Motion sought approval of a sale in the amount of \\$24 million. On June 19, 2023, however, the Trustee filed a Supplement to the Sale Motion (Docket No. 1913), stating that the Buyer had conducted a survey of the ship, as permitted in the sale contract, which uncovered certain alleged defects. As a result, the Trustee negotiated a reduction of the purchase price with the Buyer.\n\n13. The Trustee asserts in the Supplement (at 2, ¶ 3), that he will further explain and offer evidence of the circumstances that resulted in the price reduction, but to date he has not provided creditors, other parties-in-interest, or the Court with any relevant facts – not a copy of the Buyer's survey, not an explanation of the defects, and not a basis for the reasonableness of the\n\n\\$850,000 reduction in the purchase price, which already was \\$2,500,000 less than the list price. Instead, the Trustee has actively sought to avoid providing the HK Parties with that information. [2](#page-4-0)\n\n14. On June 14, 2023, nearly two weeks before the scheduled hearing on the Sale Motion, the HK Parties sent subpoenas to the Trustee and the Broker, seeking basic deposition and document discovery regarding the sale, including with respect to the sale timing, marketing, bidding conditions, and negotiation of price and other terms.\n\n15. The subpoenas seek customary information about a sale of a significant asset by a bankruptcy trustee, including copies of communications between and among the Trustee, the Broker, and potential buyers. The HK Parties sought to question the Trustee and the Broker regarding, among other things, the undisclosed other bidders and bids, the basis for the initial listing price and the Trustee's counteroffer, the timing of the sale, and other information relevant to the reasonableness of the sale process, the Buyer's good faith, and the other statutory requisites of 11 U.S.C. § 363.\n\n16. Rather than provide the HK Parties with the information requested by the subpoenas, on June 19, 2023, the Trustee filed an Emergency Motion for Entry of Order, Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rules 9014(c) and 9016, Quashing Subpoenas and Confirming that HK Parties Are\n\n<span id=\"page-4-0\"></span><sup>2</sup> The HK Parties are creditors and parties-in-interest who have standing to be heard on the Sale Motion. 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b). The HK Parties' claims arose post-bankruptcy, when HK USA was stripped of its title ownership of the *Lady May*, and Ms. Guo became potentially liable as the guarantor of the loan that funded the escrow to secure the return of the *Lady May* to Connecticut—funds over which the Trustee seeks to take control to pay administrative and other claims.\n\nThe Trustee has argued in the Motion to Quash (defined below) that HK USA \"has no ability to exercise legal rights in litigation ... without the Trustee's permission....\" Motion to Quash at 9, ¶ 25. But the Trustee misconstrues the effect of the Alter Ego SJ Order (as defined in the Motion to Quash). That decision, which is not a final order, nowhere finds that the individual debtor and HK USA are \"one and the same,\" or that the Trustee has any beneficial or other ownership of HK USA. Notwithstanding the Alter Ego SJ Order, HK USA has continued to appear on its own behalf in this bankruptcy case and in related adversary proceedings and appeals. The Trustee cannot deny HK USA its right to do so.\n\nNot Entitled to Discovery in Connection with Trustee's *Lady May* Sale Motion (the \"Motion to Quash\") (Docket No. 1912).[3](#page-5-0)\n\n17. The Court should deny the Sale Motion at this time. Among other things, the Trustee has failed to (a) obtain a formal valuation of the Lady May; (b) justify his self-invented and extraordinarily expedited bid process, including the bases for the list price, bidding schedule, accelerated bid requirements, and his counteroffer; and (c) disclose (i) his communications with the Broker and interested bidders, (ii) the identity of the unsuccessful bidders and the amount of their bids, and (iii) the alleged defects that resulted in a reduction to the purchase price and the basis for the amount thereof.\n\n## **LEGAL ARGUMENT**\n\n## **A. Applicable Legal Standards**\n\n18. Section 363(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code provides for the use, sale or lease of property of the bankruptcy estate outside of the ordinary course of business under appropriate circumstances. In order for a sale to be approved, the Trustee must demonstrate and the Court must find a \"sound business reason\" for the proposed transaction. *In re Lionel Corp.*, 722 F.2d 1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 1983) (reversing sale order where court did not articulate business justification for the sale); *In re Gulf Coast Oil Corp.*, 404 B.R. 407, 410 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) (rejecting sale motion where \"debtors have not demonstrated a substantial business reason\" for the sale).\n\n19. In addition to finding that a sound business justification exists, the Court \"must be satisfied that 'the proposed sale price is fair and reasonable.…'\" *In re Boston Generating, LLC*, 440 B.R. 302, 330 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (emphasis added) (citing *In re General Motors Corp.*,\n\n<span id=\"page-5-0\"></span><sup>3</sup> Copies of the HK Parties' subpoenas are attached to the Motion to Quash as Exhibits B and C, and attached to each subpoena is a Schedule of Documents to be produced by each of the parties with regard to the sale of the *Lady May.*\n\n407 B.R. 463, 493-94 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). The burden of proof is on the Trustee. *See In re Flour City Bagels, LLC*, Docket No. 16-20213-PRW, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 3231, at \\*81 (U.S. Bankr. W.D.N.Y. Sep. 2, 2016) (denying motion to sell free and clear where debtor had \"failed to carry its burden to introduce evidence to prove the value of Flour City's assets in proportion to the proposed sale price\"); *see also In re Taylor*, 198 B.R. 142, 157 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1996); *WBQ Ptnr. v. Va. Dept. of Medical Assistance Servs. (In re WBQ Ptnr.)*, 189 B.R. 97, 102 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995).\n\n20. When, pursuant to section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code, \"a [trustee] desires to sell an asset, its main responsibility, and the primary concern of the bankruptcy court, is the maximization of the value of the asset sold. In general, to receive approval of a proposed sale of assets, the debtor will need to demonstrate to the bankruptcy court that the proffered purchase price is the highest and best offer.\" *In re Integrated Resources*, 135 B.R. 746, 750 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992), *aff'd* 147 B.R. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).\n\n21. Simply put, the Trustee owes a fiduciary duty to creditors of the bankruptcy estate in selling the estate's property. *See In re Flour City Bagels, LLC*, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 3231, at \\*64; *In re Family Christian, LLC*, 533 B.R. 600, 621 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2015). In order to fulfill his fiduciary duty, the Trustee must demonstrate, and the Court must determine, that the sale is designed to obtain the maximum economic value. *In re Family Christian, LLC*, 533 B.R. at 621; *see also Douglas v. Stamco*, 363 F. App'x 100, 103 (2d Cir. 2010).\n\n22. A typical method of maximizing value is to hold a competitive and transparent sale for the subject property. The price achieved at auction through \"competition by an appropriate number of bidders\" is ordinarily assumed to approximate market value. *Simantob v. Claims Prosecutor, L.L.C. (In re Lahijani)*, 325 B.R. 282, 288-90 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005).\n\nBankruptcy courts will reject sale procedures that preclude or inhibit competitive bidding. *See Pacificorp Ky. Energy Corp. v. Big Rivers Elec. Corp. (In re Big Rivers Elec. Corp.)*, 233 B.R. 739, 751 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 14, 1998); *In re Bidermann Indus. U.S.A.*, 203 B.R. 547, 550 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997). Bankruptcy sales should be conducted to \"drum up the best price obtainable for the creditors\" rather than to \"cut off other possible sales.\" *In re Bidermann Indus. U.S.A.*, 203 B.R. at 552.\n\n23. Thus, courts often prefer public bankruptcy sales that provide for multiple parties to bid, ensuring that the maximum value is realized. *In re Planned Systems, Inc.*, 82 B.R. 919, 923 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) (denying motion to conduct private sale, because of insufficient evidence of property's value and noting that the court \"generally favors a public sale of property of the estate as opposed to a private sale\"); *see also Bank of Am. Nat. Trust and Sav. Ass'n v. 203 N. La Salle P'ship*, 526 U.S. 434, 457, 119 S. Ct. 1411, 143 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1999) (\"the best way to determine value is exposure to a market\" rather than a determination by a bankruptcy judge); *In re Excello Press, Inc.*, 890 F.2d 896, 905 (7th Cir. 1989) (price obtained from commercially reasonable auction is the market value). To be meaningful, the duration of the marketing and bid processes should be sufficient to provide prospective buyers with a full and fair opportunity to learn about the sale and meaningfully participate.\n\n# **B. The Trustee Failed to Maximize Value and Cannot Demonstrate that the Consideration to Be Paid by the Buyer Is Fair and Reasonable**\n\n## **(i) The Trustee Failed to Properly Market the** *Lady May*\n\n24. The Trustee purports to have extensively marketed the *Lady May,* but his effort lasted just slightly more than a month after the Broker was retained on April 27, 2023, through the unilaterally imposed bid deadline of May 30, 2023.\n\n25. The Trustee has refused to respond to discovery requests from the HK Parties that would allow them to investigate the Trustee's bidding process, instituted without prior disclosure or Court approval. The HK Parties were not permitted to explore whether the Trustee seriously considered any other available sale alternatives, including a longer marketing period to generate more than a handful of interested parties and more robust bidding. Unsurprisingly, and based on the Trustee's abbreviated timeframe related to the sale, the Trustee chose to file the Motion to Quash the subpoenas served on him and his Broker. It begs the question why the Trustee has conducted such an abbreviated sale process – roughly a month from the Broker's retention – to sell the largest asset in the estate.\n\n26. The Sale Motion does disclose that of the 10,000 or more potential purchasers contacted by the Broker, only five prospective buyers emerged, and those few made offers anywhere from \\$6,500,000 to \\$8,500,000 below list price. Sale Motion at 10, ¶26. Notwithstanding that only a handful of below list price offers were received, rather than continuing to market the yacht the Trustee countered the bottom-fishing bidders with a proposed sale price of \\$23 million, resulting in one bidder increasing its bid to only \\$20 million. *Id*. Apparently becoming desperate, the Trustee thereafter imposed an arbitrary deadline for prospective bidders to submit final and best bids, with a minimum bid of \\$20 million. Sale Motion at 10, ¶28.\n\n27. According to the Sale Motion, the Trustee then again received five formal bids, two of which did not meet the minimum bid price of \\$20 million. Sale Motion at 10, ¶29. After speaking privately with the three remaining bidders, one bidder eventually increased its proposed purchase price to \\$24 million. Sale Motion at 10, ¶30. It appears that the only actual proposal the Trustee seriously considered was from the Buyer.\n\n## **(ii) The Trustee Has Not and Cannot Demonstrate That the Consideration Paid Is Fair and Reasonable**\n\n28. The Trustee cannot meet his burden of demonstrating that the consideration to be paid by the Buyer to the estate is \"fair and reasonable.\" *See In re Boston Generating, LLC*, 440 B.R. 302, 330 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (emphasis added) *citing In re General Motors Corp.*, 407 B.R. at 493-94. Under appropriate circumstances, the fair and reasonable value of property to be sold may be ascertained through a competitive bidding process. *See Simantob v. Claims Prosecutor, L.L.C. (In re Lahijani)*, 325 B.R. 282, 288-90 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005). But the complete absence of any disclosures and communications from the Trustee and the Broker regarding the prospective bidders and unsuccessful bidders, including the amount of their bids and the extraordinarily limited duration of the marketing and bidding process, supports a conclusion that the sale process was not fairly designed to maximize value. The Trustee's disclosure of a single proposal from the Buyer cannot support a finding that the offer price is fair and reasonable. *See In re Nicole Energy Servs.*, 385 B.R. 201, 234 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2008).\n\n29. Nor does the Sale Motion supply any other basis to determine the reasonableness of the consideration to be paid by the Buyer in exchange for the *Lady May*. The Trustee has not obtained an appraisal or any type of valuation of the *Lady May*. The sole basis for the reasonableness of the proposed purchase price in the Sale Motion is a purportedly robust marketing process that was needlessly accelerated and that the Trustee has failed to expose to pre-hearing discovery.\n\n30. As an additional protection to ensure the realization of maximum value, Local Bankruptcy Rule 6004-1(a) provides for the appraisal of property to be sold outside of the ordinary course. If there was ever a case when an appraisal is absolutely warranted, it is when,\n\nas here, there has been no pre-approved sale process to encourage competitive bidding and the timeframe for the process to take place is substantially abbreviated.\n\n31. The efforts by the Trustee to ignore the protections afforded to the estate's creditors under Local Bankruptcy Rule 6004-1(a) is one more reason that a Court-sanctioned sale process needs to be conducted and the Sale Motion must be denied.\n\n## **C. The Trustee Conducted an Unauthorized Auction Sale in Contravention of Applicable Rules and the Protections Offered to Creditors and the Estate**\n\n32. The Trustee's after-the-fact characterization of the proposed transaction as a \"private\" sale is completely disingenuous. It cannot seriously be disputed that the Trustee unilaterally imposed a public sale/competitive bidding/auction process, which should be subject to applicable rules, including Local Bankruptcy Rule 6004-2(d) and (e). This Court need look no further than the representations and arguments made by the Trustee himself in the Sale Motion.\n\n33. The Trustee seeks approval precisely because the sale was public and the product of competitive bidding. The Trustee touts having \"secured a winning bid for the Sale of the Lady May.\" Sale Motion ¶ 1. That bid \"represents the highest and best bid obtained after an extensive marketing campaign conducted by the Trustee's yacht broker, … followed by a competitive bidding process among multiple bidders.\" *Id*.\n\n34. Initially, five prospective buyers submitted formal offers (the \"Initial Bids\"). *Id*. at ¶ 3. Then, the Trustee unilaterally established a bid deadline \"to submit best and final bids.\" *Id*. at ¶ 4. \"This bid deadline was designed to maintain maximum momentum with the Initial Bidders and other interested parties.\" *Id*. The Trustee unilaterally imposed bidding conditions. *Id*. at ¶¶ 4 and 27. The bidding terms and deadline were marketed to more than 1,857 other yacht brokers and on Yatco.com. *Id*. at ¶ 28. The Trustee then received five formal bids by the bid deadline he established. *Id*. ¶¶ 5 and 29. He attempted to negotiate with each of them, one increased their\n\noffer, and then the Trustee selected that offer as the highest and best bid now presented to this Court for approval. *Id*. ¶¶ 5 and 30.\n\n35. It also cannot be seriously disputed that the universally accepted practice is to seek and obtain prior approval, after due notice and a hearing, for marketing and bidding procedures to facilitate the sale of property of the estate. *See, e.g., In re Sakon*, 2023 Bankr. LEXIS 1584, No. 19-21691(JJT) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 16, 2023) (Tancredi, J.). In this district, the sale procedures should further conform with the specific requirements set forth in Local Bankruptcy Rule 6004- 2(d) and (e).\n\n36. The Trustee's attempt to justify not seeking pre-approval of his sale procedures is nonsensical and patently false. He argues that a competitive bidding process would have discouraged bidding, only to then argue that the competitive bidding process he unilaterally imposed maximized value. The Trustee contends that\n\n> conducting an auction would likely have discouraged potential buyers from bidding and/or making their best offer. Potential buyers would likely not have participated in a process that would have exposed them to the risk of overpaying (if selected as the winning bidder in an auction), and, to the extent they would have participated in such a process, they would likely have discounted their bids to reflect that risk.\n\nSale Motion at ¶ 38; *see also id*. at ¶¶ 6 and 39. Of course, the Trustee engaged in a public sale process through a broker, which culminated in a sealed bid auction through the bid deadline he imposed. The submission of sealed bids poses the greatest risk that bidders overpay because they do not know the amount of the bids they are competing against. And yet, five bidders submitted such bids. Directly undermining his feigned excuse for not seeking this Court's pre-approval, the Trustee argues repeatedly that the sale was the result of a competitive bidding process. *See id*. at ¶¶ 7 and 41.\n\n37. The Trustee's claim that pre-approval of his sale procedures would have delayed the sale process is equally unavailing. He has obtained from this Court numerous expedited hearings, and there is no reason to believe this Court would have denied him such a request with respect to his proposed sale procedures for the *Lady May*. Approval could have been obtained in a matter of days as has been done in so many other instances in this case. In fact, if this Court had denied him an expedited hearing, presumably the Court would have been justified in doing so. The Court would also have been justified if it had imposed—perhaps even at the request of other parties-in-interest, such as HK USA, who asserts a disputed ownership interest in the Lady May– a more comprehensive sale process than then one unilaterally imposed by the Trustee. For the same reason, the Trustee's concern over \"the delay associated with pursuing an auction process would also require the Trustee to continue incurring the substantial cost of maintaining the Lady May,\" *id*. at ¶ 40, is entirely pretextual. Again, pre-approval would have required only days unless this Court was fully justified in imposing a longer marketing and bid submission process.\n\n38. It is plain and simple. The Trustee did not want to comply with Local Bankruptcy Rule 6004-2(d) and (e). The Trustee did not want other parties to be heard, or this Court, perhaps persuaded by the arguments of others, to alter his unilaterally determined sale procedures. That is the abundantly obvious reason that he did not seek this Court's approval. This Court should not find that acceptable. To approve the Sale under these circumstances would establish an extremely unfortunate precedent in this district. The Sale Motion should be denied.\n\n### **CONCLUSION**\n\n39. The Trustee should not be rewarded for his failure to follow basic bankruptcy sale procedures, and for his utter lack of transparency in the sale process. The HK Parties should be given a reasonable opportunity to determine the reasonableness of the sale negotiations and final sale terms, and advocate for an alternative sale process than the one unilaterally imposed by the Trustee.\n\n40. In addition, given the indisputable deficiencies in the sale process, the untested assertion that the Buyer \"may attempt to walk and terminate [its] obligations to purchase the Lady May,\" Sale Motion at 28, ¶55, and the distinct possibility that the Trustee can do better if that happens, the Court should not waive the stay of Rule 6004(h) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure but allow the HK Parties the appropriate time to consider an appeal of any sale approval.\n\n41. Finally, if a sale of the *Lady May* ultimately is approved, the Court should order that the sale proceeds be escrowed pending a final determination of the competing interests in the *Lady May*, and continue to be subject to such competing interests including those held by HK USA.\n\nDated: June 23, 2023 */s/ Sam Della Fera, Jr.*\n\nRoseland, New Jersey Sam Della Fera, Jr. (admitted *pro hac vice*) [sdellafera@csglaw.com](mailto:sdellafera@csglaw.com)  Lee Vartan (admitted *pro hac vice*) [lvartan@csglaw.com](mailto:lvartan@csglaw.com) Melissa F. Wernick (admitted *pro hac vice*) [mwernick@csglaw.com](mailto:mwernick@csglaw.com) **CHIESA SHAHINIAN & GIANTOMASI PC** 105 Eisenhower Parkway Roseland, NJ 07068 Telephone: (973) 325-1500 Facsimile: (973) 325-1501 *Attorneys for Mei Guo and HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC*\n\n *and*\n\nAaron A. Romney (ct28144) [aromney@zeislaw.com](mailto:aromney@zeislaw.com)  James M. Moriarty (ct21876) [jmoriarty@zeislaw.com](mailto:jmoriarty@zeislaw.com)  **ZEISLER & ZEISLER PC** 10 Middle Street, 15th Floor Bridgeport, CT 06604 Telephone: (203) 368-4234 Facsimile: (203) 368-5485 *Local Counsel for Mei Guo and HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC*\n\n### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI hereby certify that on this 23rd day of June, 2023, a copy of foregoing was filed electronically. Notice of this filing will be sent by e-mail to all parties by operation of the Court's electronic filing system or by mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing as indicated on the Notice of Electronic Filing. Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF System.\n\nDated: June 23, 2023 */s/ Sam Della Fera, Jr.*  Roseland, New Jersey Sam Della Fera, Jr. (admitted *pro hac vice*) [sdellafera@csglaw.com](mailto:sdellafera@csglaw.com)  Lee Vartan (admitted *pro hac vice*) [lvartan@csglaw.com](mailto:lvartan@csglaw.com) Melissa F. Wernick (admitted *pro hac vice*) [mwernick@csglaw.com](mailto:mwernick@csglaw.com) **CHIESA SHAHINIAN & GIANTOMASI PC** 105 Eisenhower Parkway Roseland, NJ 07068 Telephone: (973) 325-1500 Facsimile: (973) 325-1501 *Attorneys for Mei Guo and HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC*\n\n *and*\n\nAaron A. Romney (ct28144) [aromney@zeislaw.com](mailto:aromney@zeislaw.com)  James M. Moriarty (ct21876) [jmoriarty@zeislaw.com](mailto:jmoriarty@zeislaw.com)  **ZEISLER & ZEISLER PC** 10 Middle Street, 15th Floor Bridgeport, CT 06604 Telephone: (203) 368-4234 Facsimile: (203) 368-5485 *Local Counsel for Mei Guo and HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC*","body_zh":"美国康涅狄格联邦破产法院布里奇波特分院\n\n关于：\n\n第11章\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等人，[1]\n\n债务人。\n\n（合并管理）\n\n案号：22-50073 (JAM)\nHK INTERNATIONAL FUNDS INVESTMENTS (USA) LIMITED, LLC（美国香港国际基金投资有限责任公司）及MEI GUO（郭美）就受托人根据《破产法典》第105条和第363条、《破产程序规则》第2002条、第6004(c)条和第9014条以及地方法规第6004-1条和第6004-2条提出的动议所提异议；该动议请求作出命令：(I) 授权并批准无任何留置权、债权、权益及负担地出售LADY MAY；(II) 授权并批准购买和出售协议；以及(III) 准予相关救济\n\nHK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC及Mei Guo（以下合称“HK各方”），通过其署名在下的律师，特此对Luc A. Despins（吕克·A·德斯平）第11章受托人（以下简称“受托人”）根据《破产法典》第105条和第363条、《破产程序规则》第2002条、第6004(c)条和第9014条以及地方法规第6604-1条和第6004-2条提出的动议提出异议；该动议请求作出命令：(i) 授权并批准无任何留置权、债权、权益及负担地出售Lady May；(ii) 授权并批准购买和出售协议；以及(iii) 准予相关救济（以下简称“出售动议”），并为支持该异议，陈述如下：\n\n1 本第11章案件中的债务人为Ho Wan Kwok（亦称Guo Wengui、Miles Guo及Miles Kwok，以及其他别名）（税务识别号码后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（税务识别号码后四位：8202）及Genever Holdings Corporation。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC及Genever Holdings Corporation的邮寄地址为：Paul Hastings LLP，200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166，转交Luc A. Despins，作为Ho Wan Kwok破产财产的受托人（仅为通知及通信之目的）。\n\n引言\n\n1. 受托人的出售动议向本院提出如下问题：在何种情形下，受托人可以在未向所有利益相关方事先发出通知并给予提出异议机会、未全面遵守地方法院破产规则6004-2(d)和(e)、且未获得本院认可的情况下，单方面施加一套营销和竞价程序，而后仅寻求对其自行创设的出售程序作出事后批准？\n\n2. 受托人未提出任何正当理由，以无视为其出售程序寻求事先批准这一普遍接受的做法。不存在Luc A. Despins受托人或Paul Hastings LLP的例外。出售程序旨在保护出售程序的完整性及债权人的利益。该程序本应在受托人实施前获得事先批准。其本应符合LBR 6004-2(d)和(e)。出售动议应予驳回，因为受托人未遵守规则。\n\n3. 出售动议亦应予驳回，因为受托人未允许对其与其经纪人（定义见下文）、潜在买方、提交正式报价的少数竞买人以及买方（定义见下文）之间的通信进行任何证据开示。各方无法检验受托人是否就破产财产中最重要的资产之一取得了最大价值，也无法确定在极短期间后取得的、低于挂牌价格的最终折价报价是否公平合理。\n\n4. 在利益相关方此前未有任何机会对出售程序所必需且关键的事实进行证据开示，并鉴于下文强调的该程序已知缺陷，本院不应在出售听证会上被受托人未经检验的有关价值及合理性的陈述所说服，并应驳回出售动议。\n\n背景\n\n5. 受托人于June 2, 2023提交出售动议（Docket No. 1858）。经修订的出售动议中，受托人请求本院批准以$23,150,000向Herb Chambers Yachting, LLC（以下简称“买方”）出售Lady May。\n\n6. 受托人与其为该游艇聘用的经纪人Edmiston and Company Limited（以下简称“经纪人”）最初商定的挂牌价格为$26,500,000。支持出售动议的Dirk Johnson声明（以下简称“经纪人声明”）第2页，第4段（Docket No. 1858）。受托人或经纪人均未就该挂牌价格提供任何理由。此外，违反本院地方法规第6004-2(b)(4)条，受托人未取得Lady May的任何评估或其他正式估值。\n\n7. 除上述不足外，受托人未就其征求购买Lady May报价所涉的竞价程序取得本院事先批准。出售动议第4页，第6段。受托人未事先向本院或利益相关方披露任何最低出价金额、投标截止日期、购买协议格式或其他常见投标程序以供审查。相反，受托人——毫无疑问急于迅速产生出售所得以支付其巨额律师费——策划了一个不公开的出售程序。\n\n8. 为支持其不寻常行为，受托人几乎完全依赖对其经纪人所开展“广泛营销活动”的夸张描述，该活动“[c]onsistent with best industry practices”进行，包括联系“approximately 10,000 clients and other potentially interested parties….”出售动议第2-3页，第2-3段；第9页，第23-24段。尽管作出所有这些努力，在数千名被联系方中，仅出现五名竞买人。在这五名竞买人中，仅有一名被受托人单方面认定为提交最高且最佳报价的竞买人被确认身份。\n\n9. 受托人称，在闭门竞价程序中，其针对收到的五份报价——每份均实质性低于挂牌价格——提出了$23 million的建议出售价格作为还价。受托人或经纪人均未提出以该金额作出还价的任何依据。\n\n10. 随后，受托人在营销开始后约一个月内单方面设定最终投标截止日期，并且仅向竞买人提前六天通知。出售动议第28段（向竞买人发出关于May 30, 2023截止日期的电子邮件通知于May 24发送）。\n\n11. 在本案于April 27, 2023举行的听证会上，受托人承认其很可能收到“very low bids from some … bottom fishers.”April 27, 2023听证会记录，第23页（Docket No. 1754）。随后，其向本院表示，其“was not in a rush to sell”Lady May，且类似船舶“don't get sold on two-weeks, three-weeks, or twomonths notice. It can be a long process.”同上，第24页。出售动议仅在36天后提交，即经纪人的聘用获批准后仅五周。（Docket No. 1717）。\n\n12. 最初提交的出售动议请求批准金额为$24 million的出售。然而，于June 19, 2023，受托人提交出售动议补充文件（Docket No. 1913），称买方已依出售合同所允许，对该船进行检验，发现某些被指称的缺陷。因此，受托人与买方协商降低购买价格。\n\n13. 受托人在补充文件（第2页，第3段）中主张，其将进一步说明并提供导致价格降低的情形的证据，但迄今其未向债权人、其他利益相关方或本院提供任何相关事实——既未提供买方检验报告副本，也未说明缺陷，亦未说明购买价格降低$850,000的合理性依据；而购买价格本已比挂牌价格低$2,500,000。相反，受托人积极试图避免向HK各方提供该等信息。[2]\n\n14. 于June 14, 2023，即出售动议预定听证会前近两周，HK各方向受托人及经纪人送达传票，请求就出售进行基本的证言及文件证据开示，包括有关出售时间、营销、竞价条件以及价格和其他条款谈判的证据开示。\n\n15. 传票请求有关破产受托人出售重大资产的惯常信息，包括受托人、经纪人及潜在买方之间及相互之间通信的副本。HK各方寻求就下列事项向受托人及经纪人进行询问，其中包括：未披露的其他竞买人及报价、最初挂牌价格和受托人还价的依据、出售时机，以及与出售程序的合理性、买方善意及11 U.S.C. § 363的其他法定要件有关的其他信息。\n\n16. 受托人没有向HK各方提供传票所请求的信息，而是在June 19, 2023提交紧急动议，请求根据《破产程序规则》第9014(c)条和第9016条作出命令，撤销传票并确认HK各方无权就受托人的Lady May出售动议进行证据开示（以下简称“撤销传票动议”）（Docket No. 1912）。[3]\n\n2 HK各方是债权人及利益相关方，有资格就出售动议陈述意见。11 U.S.C. § 1109(b)。HK各方的债权产生于破产之后，当时HK USA被剥夺对Lady May的所有权所有权，且Guo女士作为为担保将Lady May返还康涅狄格州的托管资金贷款之保证人，可能承担责任——受托人寻求控制该等资金以支付管理债权及其他债权。\n\n受托人在撤销传票动议（定义见下文）中主张，HK USA“has no ability to exercise legal rights in litigation ... without the Trustee's permission....”撤销传票动议第9页，第25段。但受托人误解了Alter Ego SJ Order（定义见撤销传票动议）的效力。该项决定并非最终命令，且其中任何地方均未认定个体债务人与HK USA“one and the same”，或认定受托人对HK USA拥有任何受益所有权或其他所有权。尽管有Alter Ego SJ Order，HK USA仍持续在本破产案件及相关对抗程序和上诉中代表其自身出庭。受托人不得剥夺HK USA如此行事的权利。\n\n17. 本院目前应驳回出售动议。其中，受托人未能：(a) 取得Lady May的正式估值；(b) 说明其自行创设且异常加速的竞价程序的正当性，包括挂牌价格、竞价时间表、加速投标要求及其还价的依据；以及(c) 披露：(i) 其与经纪人及有意竞买人的通信，(ii) 未成功竞买人的身份及其报价金额，以及(iii) 导致降低购买价格的所称缺陷及该降低金额的依据。\n\n法律论证\n\nA. 适用的法律标准\n\n18. 《破产法典》第363(b)(1)条规定，在适当情形下，可在正常营业过程之外使用、出售或租赁破产财产。为使出售获得批准，受托人必须证明且本院必须认定，拟议交易具有“合理的商业理由”。In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 1983)（在法院未说明出售的商业正当理由时撤销出售命令）；In re Gulf Coast Oil Corp., 404 B.R. 407, 410 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009)（在“debtors have not demonstrated a substantial business reason”支持出售时驳回出售动议）。\n\n19. 除认定存在合理的商业正当理由外，本院“必须确信‘the proposed sale price is fair and reasonable.…’”In re Boston Generating, LLC, 440 B.R. 302, 330 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010)（强调系后加）（引用In re General Motors Corp.,\n\n作为附件B和C附于撤销传票动议的，是香港当事人（HK Parties）的传票副本3份；每份传票均附有一份文件清单，列明各方就出售“Lady May”号游艇（Lady May）应提交的文件。\n\n407 B.R. 463, 493-94 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009)。举证责任由受托人承担。参见 In re Flour City Bagels, LLC, Docket No. 16-20213-PRW, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 3231, at *81 (U.S. Bankr. W.D.N.Y. Sep. 2, 2016)（驳回无负担出售动议，理由是债务人“未能履行其举证责任，提供证据证明 Flour City 资产相对于拟议售价的价值”）；另参见 In re Taylor, 198 B.R. 142, 157 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1996); WBQ Ptnr. v. Va. Dept. of Medical Assistance Servs. (In re WBQ Ptnr.), 189 B.R. 97, 102 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995)。\n\n20. 根据《破产法典》第363条，当“[受托人]意图出售一项资产时，其主要责任以及破产法院首要关注的是实现所售资产价值的最大化。一般而言，为获得对拟议资产出售的批准，债务人须向破产法院证明，所提出的购买价格为最高且最佳报价。”In re Integrated Resources, 135 B.R. 746, 750 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd 147 B.R. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)。\n\n21. 简而言之，受托人在出售破产财产的财产时，对破产财产的债权人负有信义义务。参见 In re Flour City Bagels, LLC, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 3231, at *64; In re Family Christian, LLC, 533 B.R. 600, 621 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2015)。为履行其信义义务，受托人必须证明，且法院必须认定，该出售旨在获得最大经济价值。In re Family Christian, LLC, 533 B.R. at 621; 另参见 Douglas v. Stamco, 363 F. App'x 100, 103 (2d Cir. 2010)。\n\n22. 实现价值最大化的典型方法是对涉案财产进行竞争性且透明的出售。通过“适当数量的竞买人之间的竞争”在拍卖中实现的价格，通常被认为接近市场价值。Simantob v. Claims Prosecutor, L.L.C. (In re Lahijani), 325 B.R. 282, 288-90 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005)。\n\n破产法院将拒绝妨碍或限制竞争性竞价的出售程序。参见 Pacificorp Ky. Energy Corp. v. Big Rivers Elec. Corp. (In re Big Rivers Elec. Corp.), 233 B.R. 739, 751 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 14, 1998); In re Bidermann Indus. U.S.A., 203 B.R. 547, 550 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997)。破产出售应当旨在“为债权人争取可获得的最佳价格”，而非“排除其他可能的出售”。In re Bidermann Indus. U.S.A., 203 B.R. at 552。\n\n23. 因此，法院通常倾向于允许多方竞价的公开破产出售，以确保实现最大价值。In re Planned Systems, Inc., 82 B.R. 919, 923 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988)（驳回进行非公开出售的动议，理由是关于财产价值的证据不足，并指出法院“通常倾向于公开出售破产财产，而非非公开出售”）；另参见 Bank of Am. Nat. Trust and Sav. Ass'n v. 203 N. La Salle P'ship, 526 U.S. 434, 457, 119 S. Ct. 1411, 143 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1999)（“确定价值的最佳方式是使其暴露于市场”，而非由破产法官作出判断）；In re Excello Press, Inc., 890 F.2d 896, 905 (7th Cir. 1989)（通过商业上合理的拍卖取得的价格即为市场价值）。为具有实质意义，营销及竞价程序的持续时间应足以使潜在买方获得充分且公平的机会了解该出售并有意义地参与其中。\n\nB. 受托人未能实现价值最大化，且无法证明买方应支付的对价公允合理\n\n(i) 受托人未能适当营销“Lady May”号游艇\n\n24. 受托人声称其已对“Lady May”号游艇进行了广泛营销，但其努力仅持续略多于一个月，即自于2023年4月27日聘用经纪人（Broker）起，至其单方面设定的2023年5月30日竞价截止日期止。\n\n25. 受托人拒绝回应香港当事人的证据开示请求；这些请求本可使其调查受托人在未事先披露或获得法院批准的情况下制定的竞价程序。香港当事人未被允许探究受托人是否认真考虑过其他可行的出售方案，包括更长的营销期限，以产生多于少数几个的潜在意向方以及更充分的竞价。毫不意外地，且鉴于受托人与出售相关的缩短期限，受托人选择就向其本人及其经纪人送达的传票提出撤销传票动议。这不禁令人质疑，为何受托人为出售破产财产中最大的资产，采取了如此缩短的出售程序——自聘用经纪人起约一个月。\n\n26. 出售动议确实披露，在经纪人联系的10,000名或更多潜在买方中，仅出现五名潜在买方，且该少数买方提出的报价均低于挂牌价，幅度介于$6,500,000至$8,500,000之间。Sale Motion at 10, ¶26。尽管仅收到少数低于挂牌价的报价，受托人并未继续营销该游艇，而是向这些抄底竞买人提出$23 million的拟议售价，致使其中一名竞买人仅将其报价提高至$20 million。Id. 显然已变得急切，受托人随后为潜在竞买人设定了任意的期限，要求其提交最终且最佳报价，最低报价为$20 million。Sale Motion at 10, ¶28。\n\n27. 根据出售动议，受托人随后再次收到五份正式报价，其中两份未达到$20 million的最低报价。Sale Motion at 10, ¶29。在与其余三名竞买人私下交谈后，一名竞买人最终将其拟议购买价格提高至$24 million。Sale Motion at 10, ¶30。受托人似乎唯一认真考虑过的实际提案来自买方（Buyer）。\n\n(ii) 受托人尚未且无法证明所支付的对价公允合理\n\n28. 受托人无法履行其证明买方应向破产财产支付的对价“公允合理”的举证责任。参见 In re Boston Generating, LLC, 440 B.R. 302, 330 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010)（原文强调）引用 In re General Motors Corp., 407 B.R. at 493-94。在适当情形下，拟出售财产的公允合理价值可通过竞争性竞价程序确定。参见 Simantob v. Claims Prosecutor, L.L.C. (In re Lahijani), 325 B.R. 282, 288-90 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005)。但是，受托人和经纪人完全未就潜在竞买人及未中标竞买人作出任何披露或沟通，包括其报价金额，以及营销和竞价程序持续时间的极度有限，支持得出如下结论：出售程序并非以公允方式设计以实现价值最大化。受托人披露买方的一项单独提案，不能支持认定该报价公允合理。参见 In re Nicole Energy Servs., 385 B.R. 201, 234 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2008)。\n\n29. 出售动议亦未提供任何其他依据，以确定买方为换取“Lady May”号游艇应支付对价的合理性。受托人尚未取得对“Lady May”号游艇的评估或任何类型的估值。出售动议中拟议购买价格合理性的唯一依据，是一项据称充分的营销程序；该程序被不必要地加速，且受托人未将其置于听证前证据开示之下。\n\n30. 作为确保实现最大价值的额外保护，《地方破产规则》6004-1(a)规定，对在正常经营范围之外出售的财产进行评估。如有任何案件绝对需要进行评估，即是在如下情形：\n\n如本案，未有经事先批准、旨在鼓励竞争性竞价的出售程序，且该程序实施的期限被大幅缩短。\n\n31. 受托人试图无视《地方破产规则》6004-1(a)赋予破产财产债权人的保护，这又是必须开展经法院认可的出售程序并驳回出售动议的一个理由。\n\nC. 受托人违反适用规则以及向债权人和破产财产提供的保护，进行了未经授权的拍卖出售\n\n32. 受托人在事后将拟议交易描述为“非公开”出售，完全不真诚。受托人单方面施加了公开出售／竞争性竞价／拍卖程序这一点，无可严肃争议；该程序应受包括《地方破产规则》6004-2(d)和(e)在内的适用规则约束。本法院无需超出受托人在出售动议中所作的陈述和论证即可作出判断。\n\n33. 受托人正是因该出售属公开出售且为竞争性竞价的产物而寻求批准。受托人宣称已“为出售‘Lady May’号游艇获得中标报价”。Sale Motion ¶ 1。该报价“代表在受托人的游艇经纪人开展广泛营销活动后，……经多名竞买人之间的竞争性竞价程序获得的最高且最佳报价”。Id.\n\n34. 起初，五名潜在买方提交了正式报价（“初始报价”）。Id. at ¶ 3。随后，受托人单方面设定竞价截止日期，要求“提交最佳和最终报价”。Id. at ¶ 4。“该竞价截止日期旨在维持初始竞买人及其他意向方的最大势头。”Id. 受托人单方面施加竞价条件。Id. at ¶¶ 4 and 27。竞价条款和截止日期被营销给超过1,857名其他游艇经纪人，并在Yatco.com上发布。Id. at ¶ 28。受托人随后在其设定的竞价截止日期前收到五份正式报价。Id. ¶¶ 5 and 29。他试图与其中每一方谈判，一方提高了其报价，随后受托人选择该报价作为现提交本法院批准的最高且最佳报价。Id. ¶¶ 5 and 30。\n\n35. 同样无可严肃争议的是，普遍接受的做法是在经适当通知和听证后，就营销和竞价程序寻求并获得事先批准，以促进出售破产财产。参见，例如，In re Sakon, 2023 Bankr. LEXIS 1584, No. 19-21691(JJT) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 16, 2023) (Tancredi, J.)。在本区，出售程序还应符合《地方破产规则》6004-2(d)和(e)规定的具体要求。\n\n36. 受托人试图为其未就出售程序寻求事先批准辩解，毫无逻辑且明显不实。他主张竞争性竞价程序将阻碍竞价，却又主张其单方面施加的竞争性竞价程序实现了价值最大化。受托人辩称：\n\n进行拍卖很可能会阻碍潜在买方竞价和／或提出其最佳报价。潜在买方很可能不会参与一个使其面临支付过高价格风险的程序（如在拍卖中被选为中标竞买人），并且，即使其参与此类程序，其也很可能会折减其报价以反映该风险。\n\n出售动议第 38 段；另见同上第 6 段和第 39 段。当然，受托人通过经纪人进行了公开出售程序，最终在其设定的投标截止日期前举行了密封投标拍卖。提交密封投标使投标人面临最大的溢价支付风险，因为他们不知道自己所竞争的投标金额。尽管如此，仍有五名投标人提交了此类投标。受托人一再主张该出售是竞争性投标程序的结果，这直接削弱了其未寻求本院预先批准的佯称借口。见同上第 7 段和第 41 段。\n\n37. 受托人声称对其出售程序进行预先批准会延误出售程序的说法，同样站不住脚。他已从本院获得多次加急听证，没有理由认为就其拟议的 Lady May 出售程序而言，本院会拒绝其提出此类请求。正如本案中的许多其他情形一样，批准可在数日内获得。事实上，若本院拒绝其加急听证请求，则推定本院有理由如此决定。若本院施加——甚至可能应其他利害关系方的请求，例如主张对 Lady May 享有争议性所有权利益的 HK USA——比受托人单方面施加的程序更为全面的出售程序，本院同样有理由如此决定。基于同样的理由，受托人对于“进行拍卖程序所伴随的延误也将要求受托人继续承担维持 Lady May 的巨额费用”的担忧，同上第 40 段，完全是托词。再次强调，除非本院完全有理由施加更长的营销和提交投标程序，否则预先批准仅需数日。\n\n38. 事情再清楚不过。受托人不愿遵守《地方法院破产规则》6004-2(d)和(e)。受托人不愿让其他各方陈述意见，也不愿让本院或许因其他人的论点而改变其单方面确定的出售程序。这正是其未寻求本院批准的极其明显的原因。本院不应认定此举可以接受。在此等情形下批准该出售，将在本地区树立一个极其不幸的先例。出售动议应予驳回。\n\n结论\n\n39. 不应因受托人未遵循基本的破产出售程序，以及其在出售程序中完全缺乏透明度而予以奖励。应给予 HK 各方合理机会，以确定出售谈判及最终出售条款是否合理，并主张采取不同于受托人单方面施加的出售程序的替代出售程序。\n\n40. 此外，鉴于出售程序中无可争议的缺陷、买方“可能试图退出并终止[其]购买 Lady May 的义务”这一未经检验的主张，出售动议第 28 页第 55 段，以及若发生该等情形受托人可能取得更好结果的明显可能性，法院不应豁免《联邦破产程序规则》6004(h)规定的中止期，而应给予 HK 各方适当时间考虑对任何出售批准提起上诉。\n\n41. 最后，如最终批准出售 Lady May，法院应命令将出售所得款项存入托管账户，直至对 Lady May 上相互竞争的权益作出最终裁定，并使该等款项继续受该等相互竞争的权益约束，包括 HK USA 所持有的权益。\n\n日期：June 23, 2023\n/s/ Sam Della Fera, Jr.\n\nRoseland, New Jersey\nSam Della Fera, Jr.（小萨姆·德拉·费拉）（经特别许可出庭）\n[sdellafera@csglaw.com]\nLee Vartan（李·瓦尔坦）（经特别许可出庭）\n[lvartan@csglaw.com]\nMelissa F. Wernick（梅利莎·F·韦尼克）（经特别许可出庭）\n[mwernick@csglaw.com]\nCHIESA SHAHINIAN & GIANTOMASI PC（CHIESA SHAHINIAN & GIANTOMASI 专业公司）\n105 Eisenhower Parkway\nRoseland, NJ 07068\n电话：(973) 325-1500\n传真：(973) 325-1501\nMei Guo（郭美）和 HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC（HK 国际基金投资（美国）有限责任公司）的代理律师\n\n以及\n\nAaron A. Romney（亚伦·A·罗姆尼）（ct28144）\n[aromney@zeislaw.com]\nJames M. Moriarty（詹姆斯·M·莫里亚蒂）（ct21876）\n[jmoriarty@zeislaw.com]\nZEISLER & ZEISLER PC（ZEISLER & ZEISLER 专业公司）\n10 Middle Street, 15th Floor\nBridgeport, CT 06604\n电话：(203) 368-4234\n传真：(203) 368-5485\nMei Guo 和 HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC 的本地律师\n\n送达证明\n\n本人特此证明，于 2023 年 6 月 23 日，前述文件副本已以电子方式提交。本次提交的通知将通过法院电子提交系统以电子邮件发送给所有当事方，或按《电子提交通知》中所示，通过邮件发送给无法接受电子提交的任何人士。当事方可通过法院的 CM/ECF 系统查阅本次提交文件。\n\n日期：June 23, 2023\n/s/ Sam Della Fera, Jr.\n\nRoseland, New Jersey\nSam Della Fera, Jr.（小萨姆·德拉·费拉）（经特别许可出庭）\n[sdellafera@csglaw.com]\nLee Vartan（李·瓦尔坦）（经特别许可出庭）\n[lvartan@csglaw.com]\nMelissa F. Wernick（梅利莎·F·韦尼克）（经特别许可出庭）\n[mwernick@csglaw.com]\nCHIESA SHAHINIAN & GIANTOMASI PC（CHIESA SHAHINIAN & GIANTOMASI 专业公司）\n105 Eisenhower Parkway\nRoseland, NJ 07068\n电话：(973) 325-1500\n传真：(973) 325-1501\nMei Guo 和 HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC 的代理律师\n\n以及\n\nAaron A. Romney（亚伦·A·罗姆尼）（ct28144）\n[aromney@zeislaw.com]\nJames M. Moriarty（詹姆斯·M·莫里亚蒂）（ct21876）\n[jmoriarty@zeislaw.com]\nZEISLER & ZEISLER PC（ZEISLER & ZEISLER 专业公司）\n10 Middle Street, 15th Floor\nBridgeport, CT 06604\n电话：(203) 368-4234\n传真：(203) 368-5485\nMei Guo 和 HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC 的本地律师","key_entities":["Je","Guo","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Despins","CIPA","Paul Hastings","Miles Guo"],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":4730,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 18:34:14"}