{"id":"court_ctb_195_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":195,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2022-03-15","title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION | | | -------------------","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"#### **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| | | --------------------------------------------------------------------X | | |\n|--------|--------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|---|-------------------------|\n| | | | : | |\n| In re: | | | : | Chapter 11 |\n| | | | : | |\n| | Ho Wan Kwok, | | : | Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |\n| | | | : | |\n| | | | : | Date: April 13, 2022 |\n| | | Debtor.1 | : | Time: 10:00 AM (ET) |\n| | | | : | |\n| | | --------------------------------------------------------------------X | | |\n\n#### **DEBTOR'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION OF THE DEBTOR FOR ENTRY OF AN ORDER AUTHORIZING THE EMPLOYMENT AND RETENTION OF BROWN RUDNICK LLP AS COUNSEL FOR THE DEBTOR**\n\nMr. Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\"), through his undersigned proposed counsel, hereby files this reply in support of the *Application of the Debtor for Entry of an Order Authorizing the Employment and Retention of Brown Rudnick LLP as Counsel for the Debtor*, dated March 15, 2022 [Dkt. No. 86] (the \"BR Application\"). In support hereof, the Debtor respectfully states as follows:\n\n#### **REPLY**\n\n- 1. The Debtor received four objections to the BR Application:\n- (i) An objection filed by the United States Trustee (\"U.S. Trustee\") [Dkt. No. 159] (the \"UST Obj.\");\n- (ii) A limited objection filed by the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the \"Committee\") [Dkt. No. 164] (the \"Committee Obj.\");\n\n1 Although the Debtor's legal name is Ho Wan Kwok, he is also known by the following names: Guo Wengui; Miles Guo; and Miles Kwok.\n\n- (iii) A joinder in the Committee's limited objection filed by Rui Ma, Weican Meng, and Zheng Wu (the \"Individual Objectors\") [Dkt. No. 178] (the \"Individual Objectors Obj.\"); and\n- (iv) A limited objection filed by Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund, L.P. (\"PAX,\" and, collectively, with the U.S. Trustee, the Committee, and the Individual Objectors, the \"Objectors\") [Dkt. No. 169] (the \"PAX Obj.\").\n\n2. The Objectors do not object to Brown Rudnick's retention on the basis of the firm's qualifications to serve as general bankruptcy counsel, nor do any of the Objectors allege that Brown Rudnick \"holds or represents an interest adverse to the estate\" or is not \"disinterested,\" the requirements for approval under 11 U.S.C. § 327(a).\n\n- 3. Rather, the Objectors raise arguments that can be generally categorized into four groups:\n\t- (a) **Disclosures/Connections**: The U.S. Trustee raises objections respecting Brown Rudnick's disclosures set forth in the BR Application and the *Affidavit of William R. Baldiga in Support of Application of the Debtor for Entry of an Order Authorizing the Employment and Retention of Brown Rudnick LLP as Counsel for the Debtor*, dated March 30, 2022 [Dkt. No. 142] (the \"Baldiga Initial Aff.,\" and the engagement agreement annexed thereto, the \"Engagement Agreement\"). UST Obj. ¶¶ 13-19, at 10-11. The Individual Objectors separately state that they are evaluating issues respecting Brown Rudnick's prior representation of entities affiliated with Mr. Zheng Wu, and state that they reserve rights in this regard. Individual Objectors Obj. ¶ 2.\n\t- (b) **Specific Terms of Engagement Agreement/Retention Order**: The U.S. Trustee raises objections regarding certain proposed terms of Brown Rudnick's retention, specifically, (i) Brown Rudnick's right to charge 9% interest on unpaid fees under the engagement agreement; (ii) Brown Rudnick's ability to seek expense reimbursements that purportedly may exceed amounts permitted under the local bankruptcy rules; (iii) the conflict waiver under Brown Rudnick's standard engagement agreement; and (iv) the jurisdictional clause under Brown Rudnick's standard engagement agreement. UST Obj. ¶¶ 9, 10, 12, at 2, 10-11.\n\t- (c) **Choice of Law**: The U.S. Trustee objects to the Engagement Agreement's choice of law provision agreed to between the Debtor and Brown Rudnick.\n- (d) **Retainer**: The Objectors object to the retainer being held by Brown Rudnick pursuant to the Engagement Agreement (the \"Retainer\"). The Committee alleges that the Retainer is excessive and that \\$675,000 of the Retainer should be transferred to the estate. Committee Obj. ¶¶ 1, 11-28. The Individual Objectors suggest that there should be an investigation into whether any portion of the Retainer should be transferred to the estate. Individual Objectors Obj. ¶ 1. The U.S. Trustee objects to the Retainer to the extent that it is not permitted to fall below \\$250,000. UST Obj. at 3, 11. PAX contends that the Retainer is estate property. PAX Obj. ¶¶ 1-3.[2](#page-2-0)\n- (e) **Miscellaneous Compensation Objections**: The Committee objects to Brown Rudnick's standard hourly rates disclosed in the BR Application, and the allowance of fees related to non-working travel. Committee Obj. ¶¶ 2, 29-33. The Individual Objectors separately indicate concerns over whether Brown Rudnick can \"costeffectively\" represent the Debtor. Individual Objectors Obj. ¶ 1.\n- 4. With respect to the first two categories of objections (disclosures/connections and\n\nspecific terms of engagement), the Debtor offers the following responses, which he believes adequately resolves those objections.\n\n(a) **Disclosures/Connections**: Attached hereto as **Exhibit B** is the *Supplemental Affidavit of William R. Baldiga in Support of Application of the Debtor for Entry of an Order Authorizing the Employment and Retention of Brown Rudnick LLP as Counsel for the Debtor* (\"Baldiga Supp. Aff.\"), which addresses the various disclosure questions raised by the U.S. Trustee and the Individual Objectors. As set forth in the attached and in the BR Application and Baldiga Initial Affidavit, Brown Rudnick satisfies both the \"adverse interest\" and the \"disinterestedness\" requirements under Bankruptcy Code Section 327(a) and can, therefore, serve as the Debtor's general bankruptcy counsel in this case. The Debtor specifically notes that, as set forth in the Baldiga Supplemental Affidavit, Brown Rudnick is free to be adverse to Verdolino & Lowey, P.C. and Mr. Craig Jalbert on any matters in this case to the extent that any adversity were to arise. Baldiga Supp. Aff. ¶¶ 5, 8.\n\n2 PAX also suggests that the payment of the Retainer to Brown Rudnick may have violated a prepetition injunction issued against the Debtor. PAX Obj. ¶¶ 2-3. PAX's suggestion is incorrect. The injunction cited by PAX, issued in October 2020, related specifically to any interest that the Debtor had in \"(1) the Residence at the SherryNetherland Hotel and (2) the yacht, 'the Lady May'\". See Dkt No. 57-2, Exh. 3. The transcript of the hearing on the injunction, attached hereto as **Exhibit A**, further clarifies the scope of the injunction and the fact that the payment of the Retainer did not fall within its ambit. See Exhibit A attached hereto, at 23:9-24.\n\n- (b) **Specific Terms of Engagement Agreement/Retention Order**: To resolve the second category of objections, Brown Rudnick will agree to include the following terms in the order approving Brown Rudnick's retention:\n\t- (i) Notwithstanding anything set forth in the Engagement Agreement to the contrary, Brown Rudnick agrees to waive its right to charge 9% interest on fees unpaid after 30 days.\n\t- (ii) Notwithstanding anything set forth in the Engagement Agreement to the contrary, Brown Rudnick will comply with Appendix D to the Local Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut and 11 U.S.C. § 330 with respect to any request for the reimbursement of expenses.\n\t- (iii) For the avoidance of doubt, during the course of Brown Rudnick's engagement as counsel to the Debtor, Brown Rudnick will not represent any entity on any matter in which such entity's interest is adverse to the estate.\n\t- (iv) Notwithstanding anything set forth in the Engagement Agreement to the contrary, Brown Rudnick agrees that its engagement by the Debtor is subject to the Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction, including as it relates to the allowance of any fees or other compensation due and owing in respect of the engagement.\n\n5. Further, to address the U.S. Trustee's objection to the requirement that the Retainer balance not be permitted to fall below \\$250,000, the retention order will be revised to include that, notwithstanding anything set forth in the Engagement Agreement to the contrary, Brown Rudnick agrees to waive the requirement that the Retainer be replenished.\n\n6. Attached hereto as **Exhibits C-1** and **C-2**, respectively, are: (i) a revised proposed order approving Brown Rudnick's retention; and (ii) a redline to the original as-filed version of the proposed order showing the foregoing revisions.\n\n7. The Debtor offers the following responses to the remaining objections raised by the Objectors.\n\n4\n\n#### **I. New York Law Governs The Engagement Agreement.**\n\n8. The U.S. Trustee requests that Connecticut law govern the Engagement Agreement. No other Objector has challenged the choice of law provision under the Engagement Agreement.\n\n9. The Engagement Agreement contains a clear and unambiguous choice of law provision, which states that the Engagement Agreement \"shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of New York\". Engagement Agreement at 3.\n\n10. Connecticut jurisprudence respects and gives full force and effect to this express choice of law provision. Fieger v. Pitney Bowes Credit Corp., 251 F.3d 386, 393 (2d Cir. 2001) (\"Connecticut law 'give[s] effect to an express choice of law by the parties to a contract provided that it was made in good faith.'\") (quoting Elgar v. Elgar, 238 Conn. 839, 848 (Conn. 1996); Valley Juice Ltd., Inc. v. Evian Waters of France, Inc., 87 F.3d 604, 608-09 (2d Cir. 1996) (\"Contract clauses which require the application of the laws of other states upon breach or dispute are recognized as proper in Connecticut.\") (quoting Syncsort v. Indata Servs., 541 A.2d 543, 545 (Conn. App. 1988); Elgar, 238 Conn. at 850 (\"parties to a contract generally are allowed to select the law that will govern their contract\") (quoting 1 Restatement (Second), Conflicts of Law § 187); Bank of Am., N.A. v. Klein, No. 3:10-CV-987 JBA WIG, 2012 WL 5286962, at \\*3 (D. Conn. Oct. 23, 2012) (same).\n\n11. There is no factual or legal reason that supports the objection and would require the prepetition agreement of the parties to be disrupted.\n\n#### **II. Under New York Law, The Retainer Is Not Property Of The Estate.**\n\n- 12. New York law recognizes three types of retainers:\n- (i) A \"classic retainer,\" in which \"money is paid by the client to the attorney to secure the lawyer's availability over a prescribed period of time\";\n- (ii) A \"security retainer,\" in which \"the attorney holds the money solely to secure the ability of the client to pay for the services the client expects the lawyer to render in the future\"; and\n- (iii) An \"advance payment retainer,\" in which \"[t]he client pays the attorney in advance for all or some of the legal services which the attorney is expected to provide on behalf of the client.\"\n\nRuberto v. DeFilippo, 29 Misc.3d 1236(A), 913 N.Y.S.2d 889, 891 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2010) (citing In re McDonald Bros. Const. Inc., 114 B.R. 989, 998 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990); In re Dewey & LeBoeuf LLP, 493 B.R. 421, 428-29 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013); In re King, 392 B.R. 62, 71 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008).\n\n13. With respect to an \"advance payment retainer,\" \"ownership of the funds is intended to pass to the attorney at the time of payment in exchange for the promise by the attorney to provide the legal services\". Ruberto, 913, N.Y.S.2d at 891; In re Caesars Ent. Operating Co., Inc., 561 B.R. 420, 436 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2015) (\"An advance payment retainer is a payment in exchange for the commitment to provide future legal services. Like a classic retainer, ownership of an advance payment retainer 'passes to the lawyer immediately upon payment'; unlike a classic retainer, the retainer is an 'advance payment' and so is applied to charges for legal services when rendered.\"). Thus, funds paid as advance payment retainers \"do not become property of the estate\". King, 392 B.R. at 7.\n\n14. To be sure, with respect to an advance payment retainer, \"the client retains an interest in that portion of the Retainer that is not yet earned by the lawyer,\" and \"at the conclusion of the representation the lawyer must promptly return any portion of the advance payment retainer that is not earned,\" but until then, \"the advance payment retainer is not client property\". Dewey & LeBoeuf, 493 B.R. at 430 (quoting New York State Bar Association Op. No. 816 (Oct. 26, 2007)).\n\n15. Importantly, under New York law, there is a strong presumption that a retainer is an advance payment retainer. Indeed, \"absent a 'security retainer' being specifically created in the retainer agreement, New York treats all such legal fee payments as an 'advance payment retainer.'\" Ruberto, 913 N.Y.S.2d at 891; Dewey & LeBoeuf, 493 B.R. at 429 (\"A retainer is only a security retainer where it is specifically created in the retainer agreement…. Absent an agreement creating a security retainer, 'advance payments may be treated as fees belonging to the attorney upon transfer.'\") (quoting King, 392 B.R. at 71).\n\n16. Consistent with the strong presumption in favor of finding a retainer to be an advance payment retainer, New York law recognizes that, absent an express agreement to treat a fee advancement as client funds (by, for example, depositing such funds in a client trust account), a fee advancement is treated as belonging to the attorney upon transfer. King, 392 B.R. at 71 (\"The New York State Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics, Opinion 570 (1985) states that attorneys may agree with their clients to treat fee advances as client funds by depositing those funds in a client's trust account. Absent such an agreement, an attorney may deposit advance fee payments in its general trust account. In New York, these advance payments may be treated as fees belonging to the attorney upon transfer.\") (citing In re D.L.I.C., Inc.,120 B.R. 348, 351 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990)).\n\n17. Here, the Retainer constitutes an advance payment retainer and, as such, is not property of the estate. First, the Retainer was paid in advance of legal services that Brown Rudnick was expected to provide to the Debtor. Engagement Agreement at 1-2; Kwok Decl. ¶ 51; Baldiga Initial Aff. ¶¶ 7-8.\n\n18. Second, the parties intended ownership of the Retainer to pass to Brown Rudnick at the time of payment in exchange for the services that Brown Rudnick promised to provide. The\n\n7\n\nDebtor directed payment of the Retainer directly to Brown Rudnick and requested that Brown Rudnick apply its future fees and expenses to the Retainer. Kwok Decl. ¶ 8; Baldiga Initial Aff. ¶¶ 7-8.\n\n19. Third, the Engagement Agreement does not expressly state that the Retainer will be a \"security retainer\"; thus, the strong presumption under New York law militates in favor of the Retainer being an advance payment retainer.\n\n20. Finally, the Engagement Agreement is clear that the Retainer would be maintained in Brown Rudnick's general retainer account, *not* in a client trust account. Engagement Agreement at 2 (\"The Retainer, as well as any future deposits, will be held in the Firm's retainer account.\"). Consistent with the express provisions of the Engagement Agreement, the Retainer was not deposited in or transferred to a client trust account. Baldiga Supp. Aff. ¶ 9(ii). Rather, the Retainer was initially deposited in Brown Rudnick's general deposit account (along with the firm's other deposits), and then a commensurate amount was transferred from the general deposit account to Brown Rudnick's general retainer account (where it remains to this day, along with the firm's other retainer amounts). Baldiga Supp. Aff. ¶ 9(iii).\n\n#### **III. Alternatively, Brown Rudnick Has A Valid, Enforceable, Perfected Security Interest In The Retainer.**\n\n21. To the extent that the Court were to determine that the Retainer is a \"security retainer,\" rather than an \"advance payment retainer,\" Brown Rudnick nevertheless holds a valid, enforceable, perfected security interest in the Retainer that is senior to any interest of the estate or any other party.\n\n22. There are three requirements under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code to create a valid and enforceable security interest:\n\n(i) \"value has been given\";\n\n- (ii) the client \"has rights in the collateral or the power to transfer rights in the collateral\" to the attorney; and\n- (iii) the agreement is evidenced either through a signed security agreement or by transferring possession or control of the collateral to the attorney. N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-203(b).\n\n23. Here, all three requirements are satisfied. First, Brown Rudnick promised to perform the services agreed to under the Engagement Agreement, satisfying the \"value has been given\" requirement. Engagement Agreement at 1-2; In re Tuscany Energy, LLC, 561 B.R. 910, 915 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2016) (\"The Firm holds a valid, enforceable security interest in the Pre– Petition Retainer. First, value was given by the Firm as the Firm promised to represent the Debtor in this bankruptcy case.\").\n\n24. Second, Lamp Capital LLC (\"Lamp\") loaned the Retainer amount to the Debtor, who directed Lamp to pay the Retainer to Brown Rudnick, satisfying the \"rights in the collateral\" requirement. Kwok Decl. ¶ 51; Baldiga Initial Aff. ¶ 7; Tuscany Energy, 561 B.R. at 915 (\"Second, at the time the Debtor paid the Pre-Petition Retainer to the Firm the Debtor owned the funds in its SunTrust Bank account, the source of the Pre-Petition Retainer.\").\n\n25. Third, both the \"security agreement\" and \"possession or control\" requirements are met (although only one needs to be satisfied to create a valid security interest). To the extent that the Court determines that the Engagement Agreement creates a \"security retainer\" rather than an \"advance payment retainer,\" then the Engagement Agreement satisfies the requirement that there be a signed security agreement. Tuscany Energy, 561 B.R. at 915 (\"Third, the Firm and the Debtor entered into an engagement agreement that specifically addresses the retainer and its use for payment of fees and expenses in this case.\"); In re Adv. Imaging Techs., Inc., 306 B.R. 677, 681 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2003) (\"Under the Employment Agreement, the Debtor agreed that Gray Cary would hold the retainer funds to secure payment for future services rendered to the Debtor.\").\n\n26. Further, Brown Rudnick has possession of and control over the Retainer. See N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(3)(B) and (D) (allowing either possession or control to meet the evidentiary requirement for enforceability); Tuscany Energy, 561 B.R. at 915 (\"Also, the Firm is, and has been since November 16, 2015, in possession of the Pre-Petition Retainer by virtue of holding the Pre-Petition Retainer in the Firm's trust account. All of the requirements for attachment of a security interest under [the U.C.C.] are met. The Firm's security interest in the Pre–Petition Retainer is perfected by possession\"); In re On-Line Servs. Ltd., 324 B.R. 342, 346-47 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2005) (\"A security retainer involves the attorney holding the client's money as a pledge—a possessory security interest—and the Uniform Commercial Code expressly allows for a possessory security interest in money.\"); In re North Bay Tractor, Inc., 191 B.R. 186, 187-88 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1996) (holding \"[t]he attorney's interest in such a retainer is in the nature of a security interest, assuring the attorney of a minimum fee in the case\" and stating that requiring the attorney to give up the retainer \"would undermine the purpose of retainers....\"); In re K & R Mining, Inc., 105 B.R. 394, 398 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1989) (finding that \"applicant possesses a security interest in the retainer to secure payment of its attorney's fees and expenses\").\n\n27. Brown Rudnick's possession and control over the Retainer perfected the firm's security interest in the Retainer. See N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-312(b)(1), (3) (security interest in money perfected only by taking possession; security interest in deposit account perfected only by control); In re Shafer Bros. Constr. Inc., 525 B.R. 607, 619 (Bankr. N.D.W. Va. 2015) (\"Because Mr. Johnson possessed the \\$20,000 security retainer in a deposit account that he controlled—his Interest On Lawyer Trust Account ('IOLTA')—he held a perfected security interest in \\$5,950 thereof to secure the [d]ebtor's payment for services rendered to that point in time.\").\n\n28. Brown Rudnick's perfected security interest in the Retainer is senior to any interest of the estate, any other creditor, or any later-acquired security interest. N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-332; In re EAS Graceland, LLC, Case No. 20-24484, 2021 WL 1941658, at \\*3 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 4, 2021) (\"The Court finds iBorrow has no interest in the Pre-Petition Retainer. 'A transferee of funds from a deposit account takes the funds free of a security interest in the deposit account unless the transferee acts in collusion with the debtor in violating the rights of the secured party.' See [Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-9-332.](http)) iBorrow has never suggested that the Firm was involved in collusion. Thus, upon payment of the Pre-Petition Retainer to the Firm, iBorrow lost entirely its security interest in such funds. Because iBorrow has no interest in the Pre-Petition Retainer, the Pre-Petition Retainer is not cash collateral. See [11 U.S.C. § 363\\(a\\)](http)#co_pp_8b3b0000958a4) (non-debtor party must have an interest in the cash, deposit account, or other cash equivalent). The Debtor need not obtain iBorrow's consent for use of the Pre-Petition Retainer. See 11 [U.S.C. § 363\\(c\\)\\(2\\)\\(A\\).](http)#co_pp_5205000097ee7) The Firm is free to apply the Pre-Petition Retainer in payment of fees and expenses approved by this Court.\").\n\n29. The Objectors' contention that the Retainer is excessive under 11 U.S.C. § 329 is not supported by the law or the facts. Almost none of the case law cited by the Committee is remotely applicable to the case at bar. See, e.g., In re Printing Dimensions, Inc., 153 B.R. 715, 719-20 (Bankr. D. Md. 1993) (applying Maryland law, not New York law, and nevertheless observing that \"[c]ounsel, however, will not be required to share a prepetition retainer pro rata with other administrative claimants, where either the retainer is treated as security or the retainer is held in trust.\"); In re Chez, 441 B.R. 724 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2010) (ordering fee disgorgement because compensation was not properly disclosed; declining request for further disgorgement of fees for services rendered); In re Glemaud, No. 11-31697, 2013 WL 4498677, at \\*4–5 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2013) (finding that services provided by lawyer in preparing five consecutive bankruptcy petitions over eighteen-month period did not benefit estates). And, the one case that is relevant, In re D.L.I.C., Inc., 120 B.R. 348 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990), actually supports the position that the Retainer is not property of the estate, but rather is an advance payment retainer.\n\n30. Moreover, the Retainer is reasonable in light of the particular facts and circumstances of this case. The Retainer was integral to Brown Rudnick's agreement to accept the Debtor's engagement and enter into the Engagement Agreement. Baldiga Supp. Aff. ¶ 9(i). Given, among other things, the exigencies of the Debtor's prepetition situation (including the Debtor's potential imminent incarceration), the highly contentious nature of the relationship between the Debtor and certain of his creditors (including PAX, which is represented by its own experienced counsel), the complex issues implicated by the Debtor's bankruptcy case, the Debtor's need for highly skilled and experienced counsel, and the significant fee risk given the Debtor's prepetition financial position, the Retainer was and is reasonable as a form of advance payment for the substantial services that Brown Rudnick agreed and is expected to provide under the Engagement Agreement. Id. Brown Rudnick would not have accepted this engagement without the Debtor's agreement to and payment of the Retainer. Id.\n\n31. In short, the Debtor required skilled and experienced bankruptcy counsel; such counsel is entitled to obtain financial assurance respecting the engagement (as it would other engagements); and under the circumstances of this case, the Retainer was reasonable. In re Robotics Resources R2, Inc., 117 B.R. 61, 63 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1990) (in denying request to have retainer returned, stating: \"A prerequisite to a successful chapter 11 case is that the debtor have skilled legal counsel. As the court in In re Martin*,* 817 F.2d 175, 181 (1st Cir.1987), stated, \"[i]t\n\n12\n\nwill sometimes be difficult to obtain competent counsel in anticipation of a bankruptcy proceeding unless the lawyer's financial well being can be assured to some extent.\").\n\n32. The Committee's citations to retainers paid in other Brown Rudnick debtor engagements are irrelevant, and the factual circumstances surrounding those cases are markedly different from here. Committee Obj. ¶¶ 18-19. For example, In re Herald Media Holdings, Inc., Case No. 17-12881 (Bankr. D. Del.), involved a debtor with (i) approximately \\$34 million in operating revenues the year prior to the bankruptcy filing; (ii) approximately \\$6 million in cash or cash-equivalent assets (accounts receivable) on hand as of the petition date; (iii) a \\$5 million stalking horse bid for its assets; and (iv) a \\$500,000 DIP loan, which was approved on an uncontested basis. Further, Brown Rudnick was paid approximately \\$269,100 prior to the filing. Baldiga Supp. Aff. ¶ 10. And, in In re Dean and DeLuca New York Inc., Case No. 20-10916 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), the Debtor (i) paid Brown Rudnick retainers totaling approximately \\$517,000 prior to the petition date (the debtor paid all bankruptcy advisors total retainers of approximately \\$750,000), with approximately \\$374,000 of the retainer balance remaining as of the filing; (ii) had certain cash-generating assets (e.g., franchise agreements that generated \\$1.5 million in the prior year); (iii) had other tangible assets (property and equipment with a book value of \\$20 million; registered trademarks with a book value of approximately \\$50 million); and (iv) obtained approximately \\$2.4 million in DIP financing. Baldiga Supp. Aff. ¶ 11. Suffice it to say, those engagements represented materially different factual circumstances than this case.\n\n#### **IV. Miscellaneous Compensation Objections.**\n\n33. The Committee takes issues with the hourly rates cited by the Debtor in the BR Application and the potential reimbursement for non-working travel. The Individual Objectors raise concerns regarding whether Brown Rudnick can \"cost-effectively\" represent the Debtor.\n\n13\n\nThese objection points are in the nature of fee objections, and are not relevant to the approval of Brown Rudnick's retention pursuant to Bankruptcy Code Section 327(a). To the extent that the Committee or the Individual Objectors wish to press an objection to the allowance of any Brown Rudnick fees, the appropriate context in which to lodge such an objection would be in respect of a request for approval of compensation pursuant to Bankruptcy Code Section 330. To be sure, Brown Rudnick stands by its hourly rate structure, particularly given, among other things, the exigencies of the Debtor's bankruptcy filing, the novel and complex issues implicated by the Debtor's bankruptcy filing, and the skill and experience of the Brown Rudnick attorneys advising the Debtor, and will be prepared to satisfy its burden in respect of the allowance of any requested compensation in due course.\n\n#### *[Remainder of page intentionally left blank.]*\n\n#### **CONCLUSION**\n\n**WHEREFORE**, the Debtor requests that the Court grant the relief requested in the\n\nBR Application, overrule the Objectors' objections, and grant to the Debtor such other or further\n\nrelief as is appropriate.\n\nDated: April 10, 2022\n\n#### **BROWN RUDNICK LLP**\n\nBy: */s/ William R. Baldiga*\n\nDylan P. Kletter, Esq. 185 Asylum Street Hartford, Connecticut 06103 Telephone: (860) 509-6500 Facsimile: (860) 509-6501 Email: dkletter@brownrudnick.com\n\n-and-\n\nWilliam R. Baldiga, Esq. Robert J. Stark, Esq. Jeffrey L. Jonas, Esq. Bennett S. Silverberg, Esq. Seven Times Square New York, New York 10036 Telephone: (212) 209-4800 Facsimile: (212) 209-4801 Email: wbaldiga@brownrudnick.com rstark@brownrudnick.com jjonas@brownrudnick.com bsilverberg@brownrudnick.com\n\n*Proposed Counsel for Ho Wan Kwok, Debtor*\n\n## Exhibit A\n\n#### **FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2020 06:21 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 637 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2020 Case 22-50073 Doc 195 Filed 04/10/22 Entered 04/10/22 18:05:39 Page 17 of 60\n\n1\n\n| 1 | SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK | |\n|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|\n| 2 | COUNTY OF NEW YORK:
TRIAL TERM PART 61 | |\n| 3 | - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
X | |\n| 4 | PACIFIC ALLIANCE ASIA OPPORTUNITY FUND L.P., | |\n| 5 | Plaintiff, | |\n| 6 | - against - | |\n| 7 | KWOK HO WAN, a/k/a KWOK HO a/k/a GWO WEN GUI
a/k/a GUO WENGUI a/k/a GUO WEN-GUI a/k/a | |\n| 8 | WAN GUE HAOYUN a/k/a MILES KWOK a/k/a HAOYUN GUO,
GENEVER HOLDINGS CORPORATION and GENEVER HOLDINGS LLC, | |\n| 9 | Defendants. | |\n| 10 | - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
X | |\n| 11 | Index No. 652077/2017 | |\n| 12 | October 15, 2020
Teams Proceeding | |\n| 13 | B E F O R E:
THE HONORABLE BARRY R. OSTRAGER, Justice | |\n| 14 | A P P E A R A N C E S: | |\n| 15 | O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP | |\n| 16 | Attorneys at Law
7 Times Square | |\n| 17 | New York, New York 10036
BY:
STUART SARNOFF, ESQ. | |\n| 18 | EDWARD MOSS, ESQ. | |\n| 19 | BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP
Attorneys at Law | |\n| 20 | 45 Rockefeller Plaza, 14th Floor | |\n| 21 | New York, New York 10111
BY:
JOHN SIEGAL, ESQ. | |\n| 22 | MELISSA CARVALHO, ESQ.
ERICA BARROW, ESQ. | |\n| 23 | | |\n| 24 | | |\n| 25 | (Appearances continued on next page.) | |\n| | tav | |\n\n#### **FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2020 06:21 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 637 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2020 Case 22-50073 Doc 195 Filed 04/10/22 Entered 04/10/22 18:05:39 Page 18 of 60\n\n| 1 | A P P E A R A N C E S:
(Continuing) |\n|----|------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | LAWALL & MITCHELL LLC
Attorneys at Law |\n| 3 | 162 East 64th Street |\n| 4 | New York, New York 10065
BY:
AARON A. MITCHELL, ESQ. |\n| 5 | |\n| 6 | |\n| 7 | |\n| 8 | Terry-Ann Volberg, CSR, CRR |\n| 9 | Official Court Reporter |\n| 10 | |\n| 11 | |\n| 12 | |\n| 13 | |\n| 14 | |\n| 15 | |\n| 16 | |\n| 17 | |\n| 18 | |\n| 19 | |\n| 20 | |\n| 21 | |\n| 22 | |\n| 23 | |\n| 24 | |\n| 25 | |\n| | |\n\n#### **FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2020 06:21 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 637 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2020 Case 22-50073 Doc 195 Filed 04/10/22 Entered 04/10/22 18:05:39 Page 19 of 60\n\n| | 3
Proceedings |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | THE COURT:
Good morning. |\n| 2 | There are a few housekeeping matters that I want |\n| 3 | to address before we discuss the application for a temporary |\n| 4 | restraining order. |\n| 5 | If you are not speaking, please mute your |\n| 6 | microphone so we don't get static.
Thank you. |\n| 7 | So, as I started to say, there are a few |\n| 8 | housekeeping matters I want to resolve before we address the |\n| 9 | application for a temporary restraining order.
We are |\n| 10 | technically scheduled to discuss plaintiff's application for |\n| 11 | attorney's fees, and there's in the motion part a motion by |\n| 12 | the defendant to add an affirmative defense of failure to |\n| 13 | mitigate damages.
With respect to the latter issue, |\n| 14 | Mr. Moss, I would like you to stipulate that at trial we |\n| 15 | will conform the pleadings to the proof adduced at the |\n| 16 | trial, and because I addressed the mitigation of damage |\n| 17 | issue in my September 15th decision and order, and because |\n| 18 | that issue has always been at least peripherally in the |\n| 19 | case, I would like you to stipulate that that will be one of |\n| 20 | the issues that will be addressed at the plenary trial, and |\n| 21 | avoid the necessity of motion practice, and so I would like |\n| 22 | to mark that motion as withdrawn without prejudice on |\n| 23 | consent.
Is that acceptable to you? |\n| 24 | MR. MOSS:
Your Honor, I just -- I just would like |\n\nto understand, my understanding was that the Court was going 25\n\n#### **FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2020 06:21 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 637 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2020 Case 22-50073 Doc 195 Filed 04/10/22 Entered 04/10/22 18:05:39 Page 20 of 60\n\n1\n\n2\n\n3\n\n4\n\n5\n\n6\n\n7\n\n8\n\n9\n\n21\n\n4\n\n#### Proceedings\n\nto make a determination on damages. You had ordered us to put our calculation in. I thought the mitigation issue had already been decided by the Court on summary judgment, and that there was not going to be a trial on damages, that this was going to be done so that you could get the calculation so that the Clerk of Court could issue the judgment. That's what was in the order, and so I did not understand that there was going to be a trial, and we do not believe that there are any issues of fact for a trial.\n\nTHE COURT: My understanding is that I granted you summary judgment on liability which is why you're privileged to make the 5229 application that you're making today, and we deferred the calculation of damages because there are issues of fact relating to the quantum of damages. I found that your proof was insufficient for me to grant summary judgment on the issue of damages. So that's something that's going to be addressed at the hearing which I believe we scheduled for January. 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18\n\nMR. MOSS: So my understanding, your Honor, was that the January trial was on the veil piercing issues -- 19 20\n\nTHE COURT: It is, it is.\n\nMR. MOSS: -- and that the only defense on damages that Mr. Kwok has proffered, your Honor, is mitigation. Mitigation was something that the Court has already rejected as a matter of Hong Kong law on summary judgment. 22 23 24 25\n\n#### **FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2020 06:21 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 637 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2020 Case 22-50073 Doc 195 Filed 04/10/22 Entered 04/10/22 18:05:39 Page 21 of 60\n\n1\n\n2\n\n3\n\n4\n\n5\n\n6\n\n7\n\n8\n\n5\n\n#### Proceedings\n\nTHE COURT: I specifically referenced it in the September 15th decision. Now I referenced it in a manner suggesting that I thought it was a dubious claim, and I still think it's a dubious claim because I don't think it was incumbent upon your client post facto to purchase an apartment from the Communist Chinese Party at what would appear to be an above-market price, and that's what I said in my September 15, 2020, decision.\n\nSo there's a motion by the defendant to amend his answer to assert a defense of failure to mitigate damages. Whenever we get around to assessing damages, I'm going to hear the defendant on the mitigation issue. Now if you want him to make a motion, and you want me to decide the motion, there is nothing I can do other than allow him to make the motion, have you respond to the motion, and then decide the motion. And since any hearing that we have is one at which I'm going to conform the pleadings to the proof that's adduced at trial, I thought as a housekeeping matter we'd have the defendant withdraw that motion without prejudice and for you to be content with that state of play. 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20\n\nMR. MOSS: Okay, that's fine. If your Honor is going to grant the motion anyway on the motion for leave to amend, we can stipulate to that. 21 22 23\n\nWe have a pending motion for damages, and they -- THE COURT: Yes. 24 25\n\n#### **FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2020 06:21 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 637 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2020 Case 22-50073 Doc 195 Filed 04/10/22 Entered 04/10/22 18:05:39 Page 22 of 60\n\n| | 6
Proceedings |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | MR. MOSS:
So how would your Honor like to resolve |\n| 2 | the damages issue? |\n| 3 | THE COURT:
We are going to have a hearing on the |\n| 4 | damages issue and that hearing is not today. |\n| 5 | MR. MOSS:
Yes. |\n| 6 | THE COURT:
So at that hearing whatever the |\n| 7 | defendant wants to proffer in connection with this |\n| 8 | mitigation of damage theory which I strongly indicated in my |\n| 9 | September 15, 2020, decision and order is quite dubious, |\n| 10 | they will be permitted to adduce whatever evidence they |\n| 11 | have, if any, on that theory in connection with the damages |\n| 12 | hearing. |\n| 13 | Let me ask counsel for the defendant if we can |\n| 14 | mark the motion to amend the answer as withdrawn without |\n| 15 | prejudice in light of what is now on the transcript of |\n| 16 | proceedings of today? |\n| 17 | MR. SIEGAL:
Yes, John Siegal, Baker Hostetler, |\n| 18 | for defendant Kwok. |\n| 19 | We certainly consent to that result, and will |\n| 20 | serve our Second Amended Answer following today and file it |\n| 21 | so it's of record and that's the basis on which we will |\n| 22 | proceed to the hearing. |\n| 23 | THE COURT:
Fair enough.
It's really not |\n| 24 | necessary for you to file a Second Amended Complaint, but I |\n| 25 | think it's very clear on the transcript of the proceedings |\n| | |\n\n#### **FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2020 06:21 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 637 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2020 Case 22-50073 Doc 195 Filed 04/10/22 Entered 04/10/22 18:05:39 Page 23 of 60\n\n7\n\n#### Proceedings\n\nof today that we are going to have a damages hearing, and at the damages hearing you will be able to adduce whatever testimony you wish or whatever documents you wish to introduce on the mitigation portion claim, and it's really just burdensome to the Court and burdensome to the plaintiff for you to file a Second Amended Complaint and for the plaintiff to have to respond to it. So the record speaks for itself. I would just like a little cooperation from you and Mr. Moss here. MR. SIEGAL: Yes, your Honor. We appreciate the Court allowing us the opportunity to adduce evidence on that issue, and we will be ready at the hearing, and we have had good cooperation with Mr. Moss since we have appeared in the case, and I'm sure we will continue to, and we look forward to that opportunity to try to convince your Honor, who we understand it's dubious, that on full examination there's a mitigation defense here that has a very substantial impact 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17\n\n18\n\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n22\n\n23\n\nTHE COURT: All right.\n\non the damages, so thank you.\n\nWe will not have any Second Amended Complaint, and we are not going to have any motions, correct?\n\nMR. SIEGAL: Yes, your Honor, understood.\n\nTHE COURT: All right.\n\nNow the second housekeeping matter that we have is attorney's fees. Since there are going to be further 24 25\n\n#### **FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2020 06:21 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 637 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2020 Case 22-50073 Doc 195 Filed 04/10/22 Entered 04/10/22 18:05:39 Page 24 of 60\n\n8\n\n| | Proceedings |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | proceedings, it doesn't make any sense to address attorney's |\n| 2 | fees today because there will be more attorney's fees in |\n| 3 | connection with the two hearings that we are going to have, |\n| 4 | one on damages and the other that's been previously |\n| 5 | scheduled for January 15th. |\n| 6 | So with your consent, Mr. Moss, I would like to |\n| 7 | adjourn your application for attorney's fees to a more |\n| 8 | appropriate time. |\n| 9 | MR. MOSS:
That's fine.
That's fine, your Honor. |\n| 10 | I guess, you know, the attorney's fees are |\n| 11 | contract damages just like the principal and interest, and I |\n| 12 | would propose that we submit our evidence at the hearing or |\n| 13 | concurrently with the hearing.
I guess we really wouldn't |\n| 14 | have any witnesses on the attorney's fees other than Mr. |\n| 15 | Lewis.
I think we should do it at the hearing, your Honor, |\n| 16 | that would make the most sense to me, at the damages |\n| 17 | hearing, because they are really part of the damages. |\n| 18 | THE COURT:
When all proceedings in this case are |\n| 19 | concluded you will be awarded whatever contractually |\n| 20 | entitled attorney's fees are due you.
It's just not a today |\n| 21 | issue, it's an issue that awaits future resolution.
All |\n| 22 | right. |\n| 23 | MR. MOSS:
Yes, your Honor. |\n| 24 | And do we have -- do you have a sense of when you |\n| 25 | would like to conduct the hearing on damages? |\n| | |\n\n#### **FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2020 06:21 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 637 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2020 Case 22-50073 Doc 195 Filed 04/10/22 Entered 04/10/22 18:05:39 Page 25 of 60\n\n9\n\n| 9
Proceedings |\n|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| THE COURT:
As soon as I can. |\n| Not for anything, you're all aware of the fact |\n| that Justice Scarpulla has been elevated to the Appellate |\n| Division, Justices Friedman and Sherwood are retiring in the |\n| near term, so there are only five Commercial Division judges |\n| who are currently in the wheel, and Justice Scarpulla's |\n| cases have been reallocated to the five justices who remain |\n| in the wheel.
So we are all a little busy now. |\n| MR. MOSS:
Yes, your Honor. |\n| THE COURT:
You have a January 15th date on your |\n| other issue.
We will try and find a convenient time to |\n| resolve damages and attorney's fees. |\n| So now let's get to the only thing that I want to |\n| deal with this morning which is your application under CPLR |\n| 5229 for a restraining order that extends to Mr. Kwok's |\n| assets, and which you believe should be extended to entities |\n| that he controls whether they be single purpose LLCs or |\n| family members like his son. |\n| So I will hear you, Mr. Moss. |\n| MR. MOSS:
Thank you. |\n| Your Honor, as far as the relief goes under 5229, |\n| I don't think Mr. Kwok disputes that we are entitled to some |\n| relief.
He does not contest that Pacific Alliance meets the |\n| standard.
He does not dispute our contention that he |\n| intends to dissipate his assets, a process that has already |\n| |\n\n#### **FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2020 06:21 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 637 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2020 Case 22-50073 Doc 195 Filed 04/10/22 Entered 04/10/22 18:05:39 Page 26 of 60\n\n10\n\n| | Proceedings |\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | begun with this sham bankruptcy proceeding. |\n| 2 | The Court has suggested that there's a showing |\n| 3 | necessary beyond the fact of just prevailing on the |\n| 4 | judgment.
We have submitted that all you need to do is |\n| 5 | prevail on summary judgment.
The Court suggested that there |\n| 6 | might be a an additional showing necessary so we did set |\n| 7 | that forth in our papers. |\n| 8 | There's a clear and significant risk here that if |\n| 9 | left unchecked Mr. Kwok will continue to do everything in |\n| 10 | his power to shield assets and render this judgment |\n| 11 | uncollectible whether it's committing perjury, whether it's |\n| 12 | disobeying Court orders or whether it's making this sham |\n| 13 | bankruptcy petition.
We have been saying this judge for |\n| 14 | years.
It's why we requested the attachment.
We also knew |\n| 15 | what was going to happen.
We would win because Mr. Kwok had |\n| 16 | no legitimate defense, and then Mr. Kwok would evade the |\n| 17 | judgment, and that he would do whatever he can do to ensure |\n| 18 | that my client is left holding the bag. |\n\nSo the two issues specifically before the judge on the 5229, there are two arguments that Mr. Kwok makes to sort of limit the relief that we are requesting. So I will deal with it, what I think is the easier one first.\n\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n22\n\nFirst, Mr. Kwok does not dispute that we are entitled to depose him and to discovery into him, but he argues that the discovery should only be into assets that we 23 24 25\n\n#### **FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2020 06:21 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 637 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2020 Case 22-50073 Doc 195 Filed 04/10/22 Entered 04/10/22 18:05:39 Page 27 of 60\n\n11\n\n#### Proceedings have not sought discovery for, that we have not gotten discovery for. The only asset related to discovery in this case was during the attachment phase, and Mr. Kwok and his prior counsel vehemently and consistently refused to provide any discovery into any assets other than the Sherry-Netherland residence. I think we are all in agreement, actually, that all of the other assets are fair game. As for the apartment, the residence, there's no reason to limit the discovery on that. This is the only asset we have identified that Mr. Kwok has in New York. It seems to be the largest asset that he has in this country, and it's perhaps the largest asset he has anywhere that has not been frozen by the Chinese government. Now, Mr. Kwok's prior counsel denigrated us, they said we were hysterical, we were afraid of the merits because we kept seeking to attach the apartment. We knew who we were dealing with and we knew we would end up here, that this asset was our best chance to collect. We are entitled to discovery into that asset. There's no appreciable burden associated with this discovery, and we have not taken any discovery on the apartment for two years. There are new arguments, there are new things to discover. For example, Mr. Kwok is now claiming in his 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25\n\n#### **FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2020 06:21 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 637 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2020 Case 22-50073 Doc 195 Filed 04/10/22 Entered 04/10/22 18:05:39 Page 28 of 60\n\nProceedings\n\n12\n\n| 1 | bankruptcy petition that there's another company, not just |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | the New York company owned by the BVI company, the two |\n| 3 | Genever entities, there's a new company, a new shell company |\n| 4 | called Bravo Luck, and that's really the beneficial owner of |\n| 5 | the apartment, and that has been paying the expenses, and |\n| 6 | that is owned wholly by his son.
So his argument in the |\n| 7 | bankruptcy is not that he has any legitimate creditors, it's |\n| 8 | that the apartment is held in trust for his son, and his son |\n| 9 | should take priority over Pacific Alliance. |\n| 10 | It's all a shell game.
We are entitled to explore |\n| 11 | that and whatever else had is happening in the last few |\n| 12 | years.
They put the apartment on the market, and then they |\n| 13 | took it off the day of the attachment proceeding so that |\n| 14 | they could argue to you in court, hey, it's not on the |\n| 15 | market any more, you shouldn't attach it.
We are entitled |\n| 16 | to that discovery, and that's what CPLR 5229 is intended to |\n| 17 | give us, giving the judgment creditor precisely the |\n| 18 | information of who owns the assets, where they are located. |\n| 19 | The second issue that they raise, your Honor, and |\n| 20 | that's the one that you started this conversation with, is |\n| 21 | what should be the scope here, should the restraining order |\n| 22 | relate only to Mr. Kwok's assets, to Mr. Kwok's assets that |\n| 23 | he indirectly and directly owns?
What they are trying to |\n\n24 25\n\ntav\n\nsay here is that it should only pertain to assets he \"owns\n\ndirectly.\" That is an exception that would swallow the rule\n\n#### **FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2020 06:21 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 637 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2020 Case 22-50073 Doc 195 Filed 04/10/22 Entered 04/10/22 18:05:39 Page 29 of 60\n\n1\n\n2\n\n3\n\n4\n\n5\n\n6\n\n7\n\n8\n\n9\n\n10\n\n11\n\n12\n\n13\n\n14\n\n15\n\n16\n\n17\n\n18\n\n19\n\n20\n\n13\n\n# Proceedings because Mr. Kwok does not hold any assets directly. That is his MO. He holds assets through multiple layers of family members, multiple layers of shell companies precisely for this reason so creditors like us can't reach them. Mr. Kwok admitted it in his deposition in another case. He said, he testified under oath, we quote this, \"In reality I don't have any assets under the law. I'm penniless.\" He makes those claims because of the way he structures his holdings like the apartment. I told you, for example, shell company, shell company that he now says his son owns, and this is a company, Bravo Luck, that he says his son owns even though he used to hold it, 50 percent of it, and apparently says now he sold it to his son for a dollar based on documents he didn't produce in this case, backdated, forged documents. This entire thing is a sham, that his 20-something year old son at the time was really the one to pay\n\n\\$70 million for the apartment, he's the rightful owner of the apartment? It's all a game to make sure we are unable to collect.\n\nThere's also a 30 million-dollar yacht. That one is held by a Hong Kong company. 21 22\n\nTHE COURT: I thought it was \\$27 million. MR. MOSS: I'm sorry, I was rounding up. I was rounding up. 23 24 25\n\n#### **FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2020 06:21 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 637 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2020 Case 22-50073 Doc 195 Filed 04/10/22 Entered 04/10/22 18:05:39 Page 30 of 60\n\n1\n\n2\n\n3\n\n4\n\n5\n\n6\n\n7\n\n8\n\n15\n\n16\n\n17\n\n18\n\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n22\n\n23\n\n24\n\n25\n\n14\n\n#### Proceedings\n\nThere's a 27 million-dollar yacht held by a Hong Kong company, and once we are allowed to take discovery we will find more assets held by more shell companies of which Mr. Kwok or one of his children is the sole owner.\n\nHere's the issues: If they ask you to only enjoin him from dissipating his assets that he holds directly, that would exclude everything, and it would exclude everything even though Mr. Kwok has said that these are his assets.\n\nHe submitted an affidavit to this Court saying he owned the apartment. He submitted, he filed a complaint last month in New York saying that the yacht was \"his yacht.\" These are his assets, and it's permitted by the statute, CPLR 5229, to have a restraining order that applies to assets held directly and indirectly. 9 10 11 12 13 14\n\nCPLR 5229 provides that a plaintiff can have prejudgment restraint in the same way it can have post-judgment restraint. Post-judgment restraint is governed by CPLR 5222, and that says that the restraints apply to property in which he or she, meaning the judgment debtor, \"has an interest.\" It doesn't say direct interest, it says an interest. Mr. Kwok has already testified, he's already submitted evidence in this case that he owns the apartment, and he has judicial admissions that he owns the yacht.\n\nSo their cases that they cite for the proposition\n\n#### **FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2020 06:21 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 637 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2020 Case 22-50073 Doc 195 Filed 04/10/22 Entered 04/10/22 18:05:39 Page 31 of 60\n\n15\n\n| | Proceedings |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | that CPLR 5229 and 5222 only apply to direct assets are |\n| 2 | completely inapposite because none of them involve a |\n| 3 | situation whereas here the defendant has actually claimed |\n| 4 | that he owns these assets. |\n| 5 | THE COURT:
Mr. Moss, I understand your argument. |\n| 6 | Let me hear from Mr. Siegal. |\n| 7 | MR. MOSS:
Thank you, your Honor. |\n| 8 | MS. CARVALHO:
Good morning.
Melissa Carvalho |\n| 9 | from Baker & Hostetler for Mr. Kwok. |\n| 10 | I just want to begin by saying we have repeatedly |\n| 11 | heard this morning Mr. Moss saying \"Mr. Kwok's bankruptcy.\" |\n| 12 | The bankruptcy petition that was filed was not Mr. Kwok's. |\n| 13 | We have been made aware of it as the Court has been made |\n| 14 | aware of it.
On its face it says that it's filed by an |\n| 15 | entity, one of the entities who has counsel here present |\n| 16 | today.
So if any questions or issues are arising relating |\n| 17 | to the bankruptcy, I cannot speak to it, but Mr. Mitchell |\n| 18 | certainly can. |\n| 19 | So on CPLR 5229 the relief being sought by |\n| 20 | plaintiff in the TRO and order to show cause is far broader |\n| 21 | than that provided under CPLR 5229.
Plaintiff seeks to |\n| 22 | enjoin and restrain defendant Kwok with respect to \"any |\n| 23 | property in which he has an interest,\" but CPLR 5229's |\n| 24 | application is limited to Mr. Kwok, the adverse party. |\n| 25 | CPLR 5229 specifically states that \"the trial |\n\n#### **FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2020 06:21 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 637 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2020 Case 22-50073 Doc 195 Filed 04/10/22 Entered 04/10/22 18:05:39 Page 32 of 60\n\n1\n\n2\n\n3\n\n4\n\n5\n\n6\n\n7\n\n8\n\n9\n\n10\n\n11\n\n12\n\n13\n\n# 16 Proceedings judge may order examination of the adverse party and order him restrained with the same effect as if a restraining notice had been served upon him after judgment.\" Courts have strictly construed the language of CPLR 5229. The adverse party is Mr. Kwok, and the Court's decision and order on summary judgment is limited to him individually. Plaintiffs have spent a lot of time in their reply seeking to continue to poison the well against Mr. Kwok, but that is simply because plaintiff cannot present authority to support its unilateral expansion of CPLR 5229. Plaintiff presented the Court with various categories of cases where CPLR 5229 relief has been granted, but that goes to the Court's discretion to grant this\n\nrelief. The statute says the Court \"may order relief under 5229,\" and we are not disputing that. Yes, a Court can award CPLR 5229 relief in many different fact patterns, but the relief is still limited to what is provided in CPLR 5229, and plaintiff has not shown any basis supporting its unilateral expansion of the statute besides it's just what they want. 14 15 16 17 18 19 20\n\nThe cases cited by plaintiff, in fact, do not expand the scope of CPLR 5229. The APF case, Gallegos case, Safeco case, Unex case and Leser case all limit the relief to the specific adverse party and not to any \"interest\" that party may have. In the Eastern District of New York in the 21 22 23 24 25\n\n#### **FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2020 06:21 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 637 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2020 Case 22-50073 Doc 195 Filed 04/10/22 Entered 04/10/22 18:05:39 Page 33 of 60\n\n17\n\n| | Proceedings |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | Leser v. U.S. Bank case the Court specifically stated, |\n| 2 | \"Plaintiff is correct, however, that the scope of the order |\n| 3 | should be limited to the restraint on the assets of |\n| 4 | plaintiff Leser.\"
USB had originally sought restraints |\n| 5 | against \"plaintiff Leser and any person, company or other |\n| 6 | entity controlled by him,\" but then USB conceded during |\n| 7 | argument that it was only seeking restraint as to plaintiff |\n| 8 | Leser, and the Court found that appropriate and proper. |\n| 9 | Nothing plaintiff says can change that.
The statute only |\n| 10 | provides the relief that it provides.
So let's look at the |\n| 11 | statute. |\n| 12 | The statute provides for examination and |\n| 13 | restraints.
Examination:
Here Mr. Kwok's assets have |\n| 14 | already been addressed in discovery.
Mr. Kwok has been |\n| 15 | deposed three times in this matter, on October 3rd, 2018, |\n| 16 | November 25, 2019, and December 11, 2019.
Mr. Kwok has |\n| 17 | produced over 14 pages of documents.
Plaintiff has had |\n| 18 | multiple opportunities to sufficiently examine Mr. Kwok, |\n| 19 | and, in fact, if you look at plaintiff's second set of |\n\ndocument requests attached to my affirmation you see that they were, in fact, targeting assets.\n\n20\n\n21\n\nNow plaintiff argues that passed discovery is insufficient, but the record shows that there was, in fact, disclosure. Objections were certainly made based on the scope. There were questions asked of Mr. Kwok such as, 22 23 24 25\n\n#### **FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2020 06:21 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 637 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2020 Case 22-50073 Doc 195 Filed 04/10/22 Entered 04/10/22 18:05:39 Page 34 of 60\n\n18\n\n| | Proceedings |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | \"Were any of your assets received by the Chinese |\n| 2 | government,\" but by not allowing fishing expeditions that |\n| 3 | does not mean that discovery was not sufficient. |\n| 4 | I also note there were disputes in the past, and |\n| 5 | those discovery disputes have been resolved, but creating |\n| 6 | confusion by making these broad-sweeping statements, and |\n| 7 | attaching e-mails without original letters that they are |\n| 8 | responding to does not change that. |\n| 9 | Now turning to the second part that the statute |\n| 10 | allows restraint, but restraint is limited to CPLR 5229 and |\n| 11 | is distinguishable from the restraint provided under CPLR |\n| 12 | 5222.
The relief sought here pursuant to 5229 is applicable |\n| 13 | before a judgment has been entered so unlike post-judgment |\n| 14 | devices which are available against third-parties, the |\n| 15 | restraining powers under CPLR 5229 can only be used against |\n| 16 | \"the adverse party.\"
However, at any posture restraint is |\n| 17 | always limited to property in which Mr. Kwok has a direct |\n| 18 | and actual interest.
Restraint will not apply to indirect |\n| 19 | interests including interest held in a corporation, proceeds |\n| 20 | of property, or even assets of an alter ego until alter ego |\n| 21 | status has been adjudicated and liability has been |\n| 22 | determined. |\n| | |\n\nPlaintiff also cannot use CPLR 5229 as an end run under the requirements for prejudgment attachment statutes. Here plaintiff's application relies ad nauseam and we have\n\n23\n\n24\n\n25\n\n#### **FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2020 06:21 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 637 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2020 Case 22-50073 Doc 195 Filed 04/10/22 Entered 04/10/22 18:05:39 Page 35 of 60\n\n19\n\n#### Proceedings heard his counsel repeat this morning and admit that the sole focus here is on the ownership of the residence at the Sherry. Plaintiff himself says Mr. Kwok is not the owner of the Sherry. The Court has acknowledged and stated Mr. Kwok is not the owner of the Sherry. And even though Mr. Kwok does not have a direct interest in the residence at the Sherry, he agreed on consent to a court order where he would provide plaintiff with immediate written notice of any contract to sell, assign, pledge or transfer any assets of the respective defendant entity to any third-party. So plaintiff has received broader relief on subsequent than it would have been entitled on this instant publication under CPLR 5229 so, therefore, there's no concern with respect to dissipation of the Sherry. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14\n\nNow plaintiff argues that Mr. Kwok is trying to weaken the relief that they are seeking, but in actuality we are adhering to the statute and the powers that the Court has given under the statute. Plaintiff is relying on statements allegedly made by Mr. Kwok regarding his ownership of assets. Mr. Kwok can say anything he wants to, ownership is a factual legal issue. If he does not own it, he does not own it, period. That is not enough to give you broader relief under CPLR 5229. 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23\n\nDiscovery has been conducted. The plaintiff's focus here is solely on the Sherry, as we have repeatedly\n\n24\n\n25\n\n#### **FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2020 06:21 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 637 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2020 Case 22-50073 Doc 195 Filed 04/10/22 Entered 04/10/22 18:05:39 Page 36 of 60\n\n20\n\n| | Proceedings | | | | | |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|\n| 1 | heard this morning.
Any further examination is a waste of | | | | | |\n| 2 | time and money.
The subject is already -- the Sherry is | | | | | |\n| 3 | already subject to an order and it's restrained. | | | | | |\n| 4 | None of plaintiff's arguments change the | | | | | |\n| 5 | application of CPLR 5229 here.
That's it. | | | | | |\n| 6 | Now importantly relief under 5229 rests within the | | | | | |\n| 7 | sound discretion of the Court, absolutely, but Mr. Kwok has | | | | | |\n| 8 | already been examined, and any further examination should be | | | | | |\n| 9 | limited to assets and topics not previously addressed in | | | | | |\n| 10 | discovery.
Redundant and duplicative discovery are not | | | | | |\n| 11 | authorized under CPLR 5229. | | | | | |\n| 12 | And the transfer of the Sherry, as we have already | | | | | |\n| 13 | mentioned several times, it's already been restricted, and | | | | | |\n| 14 | any further restraints should be denied.
We have a consent | | | | | |\n| 15 | order in place that Mr. Kwok has agreed to, and Mr. Kwok | | | | | |\n| 16 | does not have a direct interest in the residence at the | | | | | |\n| 17 | Sherry. | | | | | |\n| 18 | So Mr. Kwok requests that this Court vacate the | | | | | |\n| 19 | TRO, deny plaintiff's motion for CPLR 5229 relief as it far | | | | | |\n| 20 | exceeds the scope of CPLR 5229.
Mr. Kwok has already been | | | | | |\n| 21 | examined, and his assets have already been discovered and | | | | | |\n| 22 | restrained by this Court, but should this Court be inclined | | | | | |\n| 23 | to grant plaintiff's relief under CPLR 5229, Mr. Kwok would | | | | | |\n| 24 | request that this Court use its discretion to modify such | | | | | |\n| 25 | relief to Mr. Kwok's assets in his individual capacity as | | | | | |\n\n#### **FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2020 06:21 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017\n\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 637 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2020 Case 22-50073 Doc 195 Filed 04/10/22 Entered 04/10/22 18:05:39 Page 37 of 60\n\n21\n\n| | Proceedings |\n|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | the \"adverse party,\" and Mr. Kwok's assets not previously |\n| 2 | the subject of prior discovery and court orders relating to |\n| 3 | a transfer. |\n| 4 | Thank you, your Honor. |\n| 5 | THE COURT:
Okay.
Does anybody from Genever want |\n| 6 | to say anything? |\n| 7 | MR. MITCHELL:
No, your Honor.
I think that was |\n| 8 | well said.
I join Ms. Carvalho in her argument. |\n| 9 | THE COURT:
All right. |\n| 10 | Look, this is a 2017 case.
We've had multiple |\n| 11 | motions relating to Mr. Kwok's assets.
The Court believes, |\n| 12 | as reflected in the September 15, 2020, order that Mr. Kwok |\n| 13 | has attempted to mislead the Court.
The Court believes that |\n| 14 | Mr. Kwok is, as the plaintiff contends, playing a shell game |\n| 15 | with his assets, and has violated if not the letter of court |\n| 16 | orders, the spirit of court orders.
This is going to come |\n| 17 | to an end on or shortly after January 15, 2021, when we have |\n| 18 | the trial on the alter ego issue, but between now and the |\n| 19 | commencement of the January 15, 2021, trial Mr. Kwok and any |\n| 20 | entities that he directly or indirectly controls are |\n| 21 | restrained from alienating or transferring any property that |\n| 22 | Mr. Kwok has a direct or indirect interest including most |\n| 23 | specifically the apartment at the Sherry-Netherland Hotel |\n| 24 | which was the subject of 2018 discovery and a consent order |\n| 25 | to which counsel for Mr. Kwok referenced, and also the yacht |\n\n#### **FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2020 06:21 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 637 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2020 Case 22-50073 Doc 195 Filed 04/10/22 Entered 04/10/22 18:05:39 Page 38 of 60\n\n1\n\n2\n\n3\n\n4\n\n5\n\n6\n\n7\n\n8\n\n9\n\n10\n\n11\n\n12\n\n13\n\n14\n\n22\n\n25\n\n22\n\n# which Mr. Kwok has at various times claimed ownership of. So the net result is that I exercise my discretion under CPLR 5229 to restrain any further transfers of the Sherry-Netherland apartment which Mr. Kwok once owned, and the 27 million-dollar yacht which Mr. Kwok once claimed to have owned.\n\nProceedings\n\nSo we are not going to have any more shell games. Wherever these assets are held, they are going to remain held where they presently reside, and if it's determined that the entities that are presently listed as the owners of the assets are the alter ego of Mr. Kwok or are wholly dominated and controlled by Mr. Kwok, those assets will be made available to satisfy any judgment that the plaintiff recovers.\n\nIn the interim, between now and the January 15, 2021 trial on the alter ego issues, the plaintiff can conduct discovery of any of the entities that claim to own the Sherry-Netherland apartment or the yacht, and counsel for Genever and counsel for Mr. Kwok are directed to forthwith provide counsel for the plaintiff with information identifying the record owners of those two assets. 15 16 17 18 19 20 21\n\nThat's the order of the Court.\n\nMS. CARVALHO: Your Honor, could I ask for some clarification? 23 24\n\nWe understand the order of the Court today,\n\n#### **FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2020 06:21 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 637 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2020 Case 22-50073 Doc 195 Filed 04/10/22 Entered 04/10/22 18:05:39 Page 39 of 60\n\n1\n\n2\n\n3\n\n4\n\n5\n\n6\n\n7\n\n8\n\n25\n\n23\n\n# Proceedings however, I am confused where it comes to indirect ownership because, I'm just thinking off the top of my head here, there could be entities that will be restrained from conducting regular and ordinary business, and to what extent can someone decide that something would be an indirect interest and prevent ordinary transfers? I mean, I don't know how far this goes with other independent autonomous companies.\n\nTHE COURT: It goes this far: There is no ordinary course transfer of a 70 million-dollar apartment at the Sherry-Netherland. There is no ordinary course transfer of a 27 million-dollar yacht. If Mr. Kwok wants to get a haircut or if Mr. Kwok wants to buy a newspaper or if Mr. Kwok wants to take a vacation in the middle of the coronavirus pandemic, that would be ordinary course, but I think everybody on this Microsoft Teams platform understands that there's been a lot of moving around of these two assets that have an aggregate value of at least \\$75 million, and the plaintiff is entitled to ascertain the entity that presently has title to these assets, how those entities came to have title to those assets, and any intermediate transfers that were made between the time Mr. Kwok was the record owner of these assets and the time that the present record owner came into possession of these assets. 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24\n\nMS. CARVALHO: Understood.\n\n#### **FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2020 06:21 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 637 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2020 Case 22-50073 Doc 195 Filed 04/10/22 Entered 04/10/22 18:05:39 Page 40 of 60\n\n1\n\n2\n\n3\n\n4\n\n5\n\n15\n\n16\n\n17\n\n18\n\n24\n\n#### Proceedings\n\nSo the assets specifically are the Sherry and the yacht, but the position, just to make sure I understand it, is that with respect to other autonomous corporations, they can continue in the ordinary course, there's no ceasing or stopping of business for other legally autonomous entities.\n\nTHE COURT: It's not clear to me what other business and what other entities Mr. Kwok has formed. The intent here which is very clear and specific is that in this 2017 case in which there's been a great deal of gamesmanship, a great deal of dissembling, and some flagrant disregard of court orders, I want to know if any transaction is going to take place in which Mr. Kwok is the guiding hand that's something other than an ordinary course of business transaction. 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14\n\n> MS. CARVALHO: Okay. I think we understand. Thank you, your Honor.\n\nMR. MOSS: Your Honor, if I may, just two points. Number one, in terms of the assets, we know that\n\nthere are also shell companies in Connecticut that own Greenwich real estate that he just bought for like \\$7 million. I think the most efficient -- and we don't know what we don't know. I think the most efficient way to proceed would be for us to be able to serve some sort of interrogatory at the outset, what are the assets and what are the entities that hold them, and then we can proceed to 19 20 21 22 23 24 25\n\n#### **FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2020 06:21 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 637 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2020 Case 22-50073 Doc 195 Filed 04/10/22 Entered 04/10/22 18:05:39 Page 41 of 60\n\n25\n\n#### depose Mr. Kwok and those entities if they are entities or Mr. Kwok as the 30(b)(6) for those entities. I want to do this efficiently and with minimal burden, and rather than just asking him questions that he is going to say he does not know the answer to, I think the most efficient way would be to try to use written discovery to get a list of what the actual assets are. THE COURT: Look, I'm not going to tell you how to practice law. You have the transcript of today's proceedings. I think I've made it very clear what you can do. You can conduct discovery of any assets -- you can conduct discovery of any entity that you have a good faith basis for believing Mr. Kwok directly or indirectly controls. It can be written discovery, it can be oral discovery. I'm not going to play schoolyard monitor while you jockey back and forth with discovery disputes about the scope of what you can do. I think Mr. Kwok's counsel and I think Genever's counsel full understand what is reflected in the transcript of proceedings. We are dealing with a telescoped period of time here. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21\n\nProceedings\n\nThere's a restraining order that's been entered with respect to two specific assets, and only two specific assets, and there's an alter ego trial that's scheduled for January 15, 2021, and there's a damages hearing that's going 22 23 24 25\n\n#### **FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2020 06:21 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017\n\n### NYSCEF DOC. NO. 637 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2020 Case 22-50073 Doc 195 Filed 04/10/22 Entered 04/10/22 18:05:39 Page 42 of 60\n\n| | 26
Proceedings |\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | to take place sometime before or in conjunction with the |\n| 2 | alter ego trial. |\n| 3 | Again, this is a 2017 case, and it's occupied a |\n| 4 | considerable amount of the Court's time.
It's resulted in |\n| 5 | several written decisions.
While orders of the Court are |\n| 6 | either flaunted or exceedingly liberally interpreted, and |\n| 7 | while intentional or unintentional misstatements that have |\n| 8 | misled the Court have been made to the Court, we are going |\n| 9 | to have closure in this case in January of 2021. |\n| 10 | So the court reporter will give you her e-mail |\n| 11 | address.
You will order a copy of the transcript.
I can't |\n| 12 | be any clearer than I've been on this transcript. |\n| 13 | If any party or any counsel disregards the orders |\n| 14 | of the Court, there will be serious sanctions. |\n| 15 | Are we all clear? |\n| 16 | MR. MOSS:
Yes. |\n| 17 | Your Honor, may I just -- one question on the |\n| 18 | damages motion. |\n| 19 | We filed our motion, they opposed.
I understand |\n| 20 | the Court is going to have a hearing as soon as possible on |\n| 21 | this issue.
May we reply because there are some things we |\n| 22 | would like to put before the Court given that they have |\n| 23 | opposed and we have not yet replied? |\n| 24 | THE COURT:
If you wish.
I have explained to you |\n| 25 | that I am backed up with trials and motions.
I have carved |\n| | tav |\n\n#### **FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2020 06:21 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 637 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2020 Case 22-50073 Doc 195 Filed 04/10/22 Entered 04/10/22 18:05:39 Page 43 of 60\n\n27\n\n#### Proceedings out a January 15th date. That's chiseled in stone. We will have the alter ego trial on January 15, 2021, if we can get to the damages hearing before, then we will, but there's not a lot of time between now and January 15th, and you, Mr. Moss, are probably going to be quite busy. MR. MOSS: Yes, your Honor. MR. MITCHELL: Your Honor, one last question regarding the order here today just because, as you're aware, Genever New York has filed bankruptcy. I doubt that any assets within the bankruptcy estate would be sold or anything between now and January 15th, but I want to make sure that myself particularly or any party to the action wouldn't draw the ire of a potential sanction for whatever happens in the bankruptcy court. THE COURT: No, I cannot -- I have no jurisdiction over any entity that's in bankruptcy. That doesn't mean applications can't be made by Mr. Moss to the bankruptcy court. It doesn't mean that Mr. Moss can't refer in any proceedings before the bankruptcy court to the transcript of the proceedings here today, but I well understand the automatic stay of the bankruptcy court with respect to entities that have filed for bankruptcy. MR. MITCHELL: Thank you, your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Terry, can you give the parties your e-mail 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25\n\n**FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2020 06:21 PM** INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 637 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2020 Case 22-50073 Doc 195 Filed 04/10/22 Entered 04/10/22 18:05:39 Page 44 of 60\n\n28\n\n| | Proceedings |\n|----|-------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | address from which they can order a copy of the transcript |\n| 2 | which will be so ordered and e-filed? |\n| 3 | Thank you very much. |\n| 4 | Have a nice day everyone. |\n| 5 | MR. MOSS:
Thank you, your Honor. |\n| 6 | *** |\n| 7 | C E R T I F I C A T E |\n| 8 | I, Terry-Ann Volberg, C.S.R., an official court reporter of |\n| 9 | the State of New York, do hereby certify that the foregoing |\n| 10 | is a true and accurate transcript of my stenographic notes. |\n| 11 | |\n| 12 | _______________________
Terry-Ann Volberg, CSR, CRR |\n| 13 | Official Court Reporter |\n| 14 | |\n| 15 | |\n| 16 | |\n| 17 | |\n| 18 | |\n| 19 | |\n| 20 | |\n| 21 | |\n| 22 | |\n| 23 | |\n| 24 | |\n| 25 | |\n| | |\n\n## Exhibit B\n\n#### UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION\n\n| | | --------------------------------------------------------------------X | | |\n|--------|--------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|---|-------------------------|\n| | | | : | |\n| In re: | | | : | Chapter 11 |\n| | | | : | |\n| | Ho Wan Kwok, | | : | Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |\n| | | | : | |\n| | | | : | |\n| | | Debtor.1 | : | |\n| | | | : | |\n| | | --------------------------------------------------------------------X | | |\n\n#### SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM R. BALDIGA IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION OF THE DEBTOR FOR ENTRY OF AN ORDER AUTHORIZING THE EMPLOYMENT AND RETENTION OF BROWN RUDNICK LLP AS COUNSEL FOR THE DEBTOR\n\nI, William R. Baldiga, hereby declare, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, under penalty of perjury:\n\n1. I am an attorney admitted to practice law in the State of New York and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and before the United States District Courts for the Districts of New York and Massachusetts. I am a member of the firm of Brown Rudnick LLP (\"Brown Rudnick\"), which maintains its offices at, among other places, Seven Times Square, New York, New York 10036 and One Financial Center, Boston, Massachusetts 02111.\n\n2. I submit this declaration (this \"Supplemental Declaration\") to supplement the disclosures in my declaration dated March 30, 2022 (the \"Initial Declaration\") [Docket No. 142] (and the engagement agreement annexed thereto, the \"Engagement Agreement\") and in further support of the Application of the Debtor for Entry of an Order Authorizing the Employment and\n\n1 Although the Debtor's legal name is Ho Wan Kwok, he is also known by the following names: Guo Wengui; Miles Guo; and Miles Kwok.\n\nRetention of Brown Rudnick LLP as Counsel for the Debtor (the \"Application\") [Dkt. No. 86] filed by Mr. Ho Wan Kwok, the debtor and debtor-in-possession (the \"Debtor\") in the above-captioned Chapter 11 case (the \"Chapter 11 Case\"). Unless otherwise stated, I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein.\n\n3. Since the filing of the Application and my Initial Declaration, Brown Rudnick has completed its internal identifications of connections between Brown Rudnick and the parties-ininterest in the Debtor's Chapter 11 Case.\n\n4. Brown Rudnick submits this Supplemental Declaration to expand upon Brown Rudnick's previously disclosed connections to the Debtor and this Chapter 11 Case.\n\n5. As set forth herein, Brown Rudnick is free to be adverse to Verdolino & Lowey, P.C. and Craig R. Jalbert on any matters in this case to the extent that any adversity were to arise.\n\n6. The Initial Declaration identified Forbes Hare and the Internal Revenue Service as former clients of Brown Rudnick. Upon further review of Brown Rudnick's accounting records in connection with the preparation of this Supplemental Declaration, I have determined that these entities are not former clients of Brown Rudnick.\n\n7. In response to issues raised by the United States Trustee regarding the terms of Brown Rudnick's engagement agreement with the Debtor, Brown Rudnick confirms and/or will agree to following:\n\n- (i) Notwithstanding anything set forth in the Engagement Agreement to the contrary, Brown Rudnick agrees to waive its right to charge 9% interest on fees unpaid after 30 days.\n- (ii) Notwithstanding anything set forth in the Engagement Agreement to the contrary, Brown Rudnick will comply with Appendix D to the Local Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut and 11 U.S.C. § 330 with respect to any request for the reimbursement of expenses.\n- (iii) For the avoidance of doubt, during the course of Brown Rudnick's engagement as counsel to the Debtor, Brown Rudnick will not represent any entity on any matter in which such entity's interest is adverse to the estate.\n- (iv) Notwithstanding anything set forth in the Engagement Agreement to the contrary, Brown Rudnick agrees that its engagement by the Debtor is subject to the Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction, including as it relates to the allowance of any fees or other compensation due and owing in respect of the engagement.\n- (v) Notwithstanding anything set forth in the Engagement Agreement to the contrary, Brown Rudnick agrees to waive the requirement that the retainer be replenished.\n- 8. Brown Rudnick makes the following additional supplemental disclosures with\n\nrespect to parties-in-interest in this Chapter 11 Case:\n\n- (i) Verdolino & Lowey, P.C. (\"V&L\"): V&L is a professional services firm that provides accounting, financial advisory and fiduciary services. V&L and Brown Rudnick are frequently involved on matters on behalf of common clients. Brown Rudnick has not previously represented V&L as a client. Notwithstanding Brown Rudnick's connections with V&L and Mr. Jalbert (as described below), Brown Rudnick may represent the Debtor in matters adverse to V&L. All matters (described below), other than V&L's proposed retention as a financial advisor to the Debtor, are wholly unrelated to the Debtor and his Chapter 11 Case:\n\t- a. In re Purdue Pharma, L.P., Case No. 19-23649 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) (Drain, R.): Brown Rudnick is co-counsel to the ad hoc committee of governmental and other contingent litigation claimants (collectively, the \"Ad Hoc Committee\"); V&L represents the Ad Hoc Committee in connection with certain administrative matters (holding and disbursing funds) relating to the preeffective date work to get the government creditor opioid trusts functioning. These activities are presently stayed due to the reversal of the plan confirmation order by the District Court for the Southern District of New York.\n\t- b. In re Patricia Pierce Fitzgerald, Case No. 19-12051 (Bankr. D. Mass.) (Bostwick, J.): Brown Rudnick serves as counsel to the debtor and V&L serves as the accountant and financial advisor to the Chapter 7 trustee.\n\t- c. In re HMH Media, Inc., Case No. 17-12881 (Bankr. D. Del.) (Silverstein, L.): Brown Rudnick served as co-counsel to the reorganized debtors and Craig R. Jalbert of V&L served as the liquidating trustee. The bankruptcy case was closed in January 2021.\n\t- d. In re Bulbs and Lamps Corp., Case No. 17-13196 (Bankr. D. Mass.) (Panos, C.): Brown Rudnick represented a creditor of the estate and V&L served as the accounting and financial advisor to the Chapter 7 trustee.\n- e. In re Cosi, Inc., Case No. 16-13704 (Bankr. D. Mass.) (Hoffman, M.): Brown Rudnick served as counsel to the reorganized debtors and Craig R. Jalbert of V&L served as the post-confirmation liquidating trustee. The bankruptcy case was closed in March 2019.\n- f. In re FIAC, Inc., Case No. 16-12238 (Bankr. D. Del.) (Shannon, B.): Brown Rudnick served as counsel to the Official Committee of Equity Security Holders, and, following confirmation of the Chapter 11 plan and disbandment of the Equity Committee, served as counsel to the liquidating trustee. V&L served as the accountant to the liquidating trustee. The bankruptcy case was closed in November 2018.\n- g. In re Corinthian Colleges, Inc., Case No. 15-10952 (Bankr. D. Del.) (Carey, K.): Brown Rudnick served as counsel to the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors. Craig R. Jalbert of V&L was appointed as trustee of the Corinthian Distribution Trust under the confirmed Chapter 11 plan, which occurred after Brown Rudnick's involvement in the matter had terminated.\n- h. In re Reed and Barton Corporation, Case No. 15-10534 (Bankr. D. Mass.) (Hoffman, M.): Brown Rudnick served as counsel to the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors and V&L served as the debtor's accountant and financial advisor.\n- i. In re Lyondell Chemical Company, et al., Case No. 09-10023 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) (Gerber, R.): Brown Rudnick served as counsel and V&L presently serves as administrator of certain Trusts established pursuant to the confirmed Chapter 11 plan of Lyondell. Brown Rudnick's work on such matters concluded in 2020.\n- j. Pro Bono. Brown Rudnick is counsel and V&L is providing administrative (holding and disbursing funds) and consulting services in connection with a fair housing initiative in Boston, Massachusetts on a pro bono basis.\n- (ii) Craig R. Jalbert: In addition to Brown Rudnick's work with Mr. Jalbert's firm, V&L, Brown Rudnick currently represents Mr. Jalbert in his capacity as the courtappointed trustee of the Vernon Tort Claims Trust (the \"Vernon Trust\"), a trust established pursuant to the Chapter 11 plan of Exide Technologies, LLC, Case No. 13-11482 (Bankr. D. Del.) (Walrath, J.). Additionally, in the Chapter 11 cases of The Northwest Company, LLC, Case No. 20-10990 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) (Wiles, M.), Brown Rudnick represents an unsecured creditor that sought the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee. Mr. Jalbert was appointed as the independent manager of one of the debtor-entities as settlement of such motion, and was subsequently replaced by a Chapter 7 trustee upon conversion of the case. Brown Rudnick served as cocounsel to the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors appointed in the Chapter 11 cases of F-Squared Investment Management, LLC, Case No. 15-11469 (Bankr. D. Del.) (Silverstein, L.). Brown Rudnick currently serves as co-counsel to the trusts established under the F-Squared Chapter 11 plan, and Mr. Jalbert serves as\n\nthe trustee of the trusts. All previous connections between Brown Rudnick and Mr. Jalbert are wholly unrelated to the Debtor and his Chapter 11 Case.\n\n- (iii) BakerHostetler LLP: BakerHostetler LLP currently represents or previously represented clients in matters in which Brown Rudnick currently represents or previously represented a party. These matters are wholly unrelated to the Debtor and his Chapter 11 Case.\n- (iv) HarcusParker Limited: HarcusParker Limited is a former client of Brown Rudnick on matters wholly unrelated to the Debtor and his Chapter 11 Case.\n- (v) Internal Revenue Service: Brown Rudnick currently represents and previously represented clients adverse to the Internal Revenue Service. In addition, the Internal Revenue Service is frequently a creditor in cases in which Brown Rudnick represents an ad hoc or official committee of unsecured creditors or equity holders. These matters are wholly unrelated to the Debtor and his Chapter 11 Case.\n- (vi) UBS AG: Brown Rudnick currently represents and previously represented clients adverse to UBS AG and its affiliates. Certain Brown Rudnick attorneys previously represented UBS AG and its affiliates before joining Brown Rudnick. None of these matters relate to the Debtor or his Chapter 11 Case.\n- (vii) United States Bankruptcy Court Judge Julie A. Manning: Two Brown Rudnick partners have a previous professional and/or social connection to Judge Manning. These two attorneys are not involved in Brown Rudnick's representation of the Debtor.\n- (viii) Zheng Wu (a/ka/ Bruno Wu): Certain entities owned or controlled by Mr. Zheng Wu are former clients of Brown Rudnick on matters wholly unrelated to the Debtor and his Chapter 11 Case. Brown Rudnick was not retained by, nor did the firm represent, Mr. Wu in his individual capacity. Brown Rudnick's engagement concluded approximately five (5) years ago (June 2017). The scope and substance of the engagement were entirely unrelated to this Chapter 11 Case. Pursuant to the engagement agreement, the clients consented to a waiver of existing and future conflicts on matters that were unrelated to the scope of the engagement.\n- 9. Brown Rudnick makes the following additional disclosures regarding the retainer\n\n(the \"Retainer\") under the Engagement Agreement with the Debtor:\n\n(i) The Retainer was integral to Brown Rudnick's agreement to accept the Debtor's engagement and enter into the Engagement Agreement. Given, among other things, the exigencies of the Debtor's prepetition situation (including the Debtor's potential imminent incarceration), the highly contentious nature of the relationship between the Debtor and certain of his creditors (including Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund, L.P., which is represented by its own experienced counsel), the complex issues implicated by the Debtor's bankruptcy case, the Debtor's need to retain highly skilled and experienced counsel, and the significant fee risk given the Debtor's prepetition financial position, I believe that the Retainer was and is reasonable as a form of advance payment for the substantial services that Brown Rudnick agreed and is expected to provide under the Engagement Agreement. Brown Rudnick would not have accepted this engagement without the Debtor's agreement to and payment of the Retainer.\n\n- (ii) Consistent with the express provisions of the Engagement Agreement, the Retainer was not deposited in or transferred to a client trust account at Brown Rudnick.\n- (iii) Rather, the Retainer was initially deposited in Brown Rudnick's general deposit account (along with the firm's other deposits), and then a commensurate amount was transferred from the general deposit account to Brown Rudnick's general retainer account (where it remains to this day, along with the firm's other retainer amounts).\n- 10. Brown Rudnick served as debtor's bankruptcy counsel to Herald Media Holdings,\n\nInc. I led this engagement on behalf of the firm. That case involved a debtor with (i) approximately \\$34 million in operating revenues the year prior to the bankruptcy filing; (ii) over \\$6 million in assets on hand (mostly cash and accounts receivable) as of the petition date; (iii) a \\$5 million stalking horse bid for its assets; and (iv) a \\$500,000 DIP loan, which was approved on an uncontested basis. Further, Brown Rudnick was paid approximately \\$269,100 prior to the filing.\n\n11. Brown Rudnick also served as debtor's bankruptcy counsel to Dean and DeLuca New York Inc. I led this engagement on behalf of the firm. In that case, the debtor (i) paid Brown Rudnick retainers totaling approximately \\$517,000 prior to the petition date (the debtor paid all bankruptcy advisors total retainers of approximately \\$750,000), with approximately \\$374,000 of the retainer balance remaining as of the filing; (ii) had certain cash-generating assets (e.g., franchise agreements that generated \\$1.5 million in the prior year); (iii) had other tangible assets (property and equipment with a book value of \\$20 million; registered trademarks with a book value of approximately \\$50 million); and (iv) obtained approximately \\$2.4 million in DIP financing.\n\nPursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.\n\nDated: April 10, 2022 New York, New York\n\n /s/ William R. Baldiga William R. Baldiga\n\n### Exhibit C-1\n\n#### UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION\n\n--------------------------------------------------------------------X In re: Ho Wan Kwok, Debtor. : : : : : : : : Chapter 11 Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) --------------------------------------------------------------------X\n\n#### ORDER AUTHORIZING RETENTION AND EMPLOYMENT OF BROWN RUDNICK LLP AS COUNSEL TO DEBTOR AND DEBTOR IN POSSESSION\n\n Upon the application of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Application\"),1 as debtor and debtor in possession in the above-captioned Chapter 11 case, pursuant to title 11 of the United States Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330, as amended (the \"Bankruptcy Code\"), for authorization to employ Brown Rudnick LLP (\"Brown Rudnick\") as his bankruptcy counsel effective as of the Petition Date, as more fully set forth in the Application; and upon the affidavit and supplemental affidavit of William R. Baldiga, Esquire, a partner of Brown Rudnick (together, the \"Baldiga Affidavits\"); and the Court being satisfied, based on the representations made in the Application and the Baldiga Affidavits, that Brown Rudnick does not represent or hold any interest adverse to Mr. Kwok or his Chapter 11 estate as to the matters upon which it is to be engaged and is a \"disinterested person\" under 11 U.S.C. § 101(14), as modified by 11 U.S.C. § 1107(b), and that the employment of Brown Rudnick is necessary to Mr. Kwok and his Chapter 11 estate; and the Court having jurisdiction to consider the Application and the relief requested therein in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334; and the Court having considered the objections to the Application and the resolution of such\n\n1 Capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed in the Application.\n\nobjections proposed by the Debtor; and the Court having overruled any further objections not otherwise resolved or withdrawn; and the Court having conducted a hearing on the Application; and the Court having found that adequate notice of the Application was provided to all parties in interest; and after due deliberation and sufficient cause appearing therefore:\n\n#### IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:\n\n1. The Application is granted and approved.\n\n2. Pursuant to sections 327(a) and 328(a) of title 11 of the United States Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101, et seq. (the \"Bankruptcy Code\"), Rule 2014 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the \"Bankruptcy Rules\") and Rule 2014-1 of the Local Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure for the District of Connecticut (the \"Local Rules\"), the Debtor, is authorized to employ and retain Brown Rudnick as his counsel to perform the services as set forth in the Application and the Baldiga Affidavits, effective as of the Petition Date.\n\n3. Brown Rudnick shall be compensated in accordance with the procedures set forth in sections 330 and 331 of the Bankruptcy Code and such Bankruptcy Rules, Local Rules and guidelines established by the Office of the United States Trustee as may then be applicable, from time to time, and such other procedures as may be fixed by order of this Court.\n\n4. Ten business days' notice must be provided by Brown Rudnick to the Debtor, the United States Trustee and the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors prior to any increases in the rates set forth in the Application, and such notice must be filed with the Court.\n\n5. Mr. Kwok is authorized and empowered to take all actions necessary to implement the relief granted in this Order.\n\n6. Notwithstanding anything set forth in the Engagement Agreement to the contrary, Brown Rudnick agrees to waive its right to charge 9% interest on fees unpaid after 30 days.\n\n2\n\n7. Notwithstanding anything set forth in the Engagement Agreement to the contrary, Brown Rudnick will comply with Appendix D to the Local Rules and 11 U.S.C. § 330 with respect to any request for the reimbursement of expenses.\n\n8. For the avoidance of doubt, during the course of Brown Rudnick's engagement as counsel to the Debtor, Brown Rudnick will not represent any entity on any matter in which such entity's interest is adverse to the estate.\n\n9. Notwithstanding anything set forth in the Engagement Agreement to the contrary, Brown Rudnick agrees that its engagement by the Debtor is subject to the Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction, including as it relates to the allowance of any fees or other compensation due and owing in respect of the engagement.\n\n10. Notwithstanding anything set forth in the Engagement Agreement to the contrary, Brown Rudnick agrees to waive the requirement that the retainer under the Engagement Agreement be replenished.\n\n11. The terms and conditions of this Order shall be immediately effective and enforceable upon its entry.\n\n12. This Court shall retain jurisdiction to hear and determine all matters arising from or related to the implementation and enforcement of this Order.\n\n3\n\n### Exhibit C-2\n\n#### UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION\n\n| | --------------------------------------------------------------------X | | |\n|--------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|--|\n| In re: | | :
:
Chapter 11 | |\n| | Ho Wan Kwok, | :
:
Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)
: | |\n| | Debtor. | :
:
: | |\n| | --------------------------------------------------------------------X | | |\n\n#### ORDER AUTHORIZING RETENTION AND EMPLOYMENT OF BROWN RUDNICK LLP AS COUNSEL TO DEBTOR AND DEBTOR IN POSSESSION\n\nUpon the application of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Application\"),1 as debtor and debtor in possession in the above-captioned Chapter 11 case, pursuant to title 11 of the United States Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330, as amended (the \"Bankruptcy Code\"), for authorization to employ Brown Rudnick LLP (\"Brown Rudnick LLP\") as his bankruptcy counsel effective as of the Petition Date, as more fully set forth in the Application; and upon the annexedaffidavit and supplemental affidavit of William R. Baldiga, Esquire, a partner of Brown Rudnick (together, the \"Baldiga AffidavitAffidavits\"); and the Court being satisfied, based on the representations made in the Application and the Baldiga AffidavitAffidavits, that Brown Rudnick does not represent or hold any interest adverse to Mr. Kwok or his Chapter 11 estate as to the matters upon which it is to be engaged and is a \"disinterested person\" under 11 U.S.C. § 101(14), as modified by 11 U.S.C. § 1107(b), and that the employment of Brown Rudnick is necessary to Mr. Kwok and his Chapter 11 estate; and the Court having jurisdiction to consider the Application and the relief requested therein in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334; and the Court having\n\n1 Capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed in the Application.\n\nconsidered the objections to the Application and the resolution of such objections proposed by the Debtor; and the Court having overruled any further objections not otherwise resolved or withdrawn; and the Court having conducted a hearing on the Application; and the Court having found that adequate notice of the Application was provided to all parties in interest; and after due deliberation and sufficient cause appearing therefore:\n\n#### IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:\n\n1. That theThe Application is granted and approved.\n\n2. Pursuant to sections 327(a) and 328(a) of title 11 of the United States Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101, et seq. (the \"Bankruptcy Code\"), Rule 2014 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the \"Bankruptcy Rules\") and Rule 2014-1 of the Local Bankruptcy Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure for the District of Connecticut (the \"Local Rules\"), the Debtor, is authorized to employ and retain Brown Rudnick as his counsel to perform the services as set forth in the Application and the Baldiga AffidavitAffidavits, effective as of the Petition Date.\n\n3. Brown Rudnick shall be compensated in accordance with the procedures set forth in sections 330 and 331 of the Bankruptcy Code and such Bankruptcy Rules, Local Rules and guidelines established by the Office of the United States Trustee as may then be applicable, from time to time, and such other procedures as may be fixed by order of this Court.\n\n4. Ten business days' notice must be provided by Brown Rudnick to the Debtor, the United States Trustee and any official committeethe Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors prior to any increases in the rates set forth in the Application, and such notice must be filed with the Court.\n\n5. Mr. Kwok is authorized and empowered to take all actions necessary to implement the relief granted in this Order.\n\n2\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 195 Filed 04/10/22 Entered 04/10/22 18:05:39 Page 60 of 60\n\n6. Notwithstanding anything set forth in the Engagement Agreement to the contrary, Brown Rudnick agrees to waive its right to charge 9% interest on fees unpaid after 30 days.\n\n7. Notwithstanding anything set forth in the Engagement Agreement to the contrary, Brown Rudnick will comply with Appendix D to the Local Rules and 11 U.S.C. § 330 with respect to any request for the reimbursement of expenses.\n\n8. For the avoidance of doubt, during the course of Brown Rudnick's engagement as counsel to the Debtor, Brown Rudnick will not represent any entity on any matter in which such entity's interest is adverse to the estate.\n\n9. Notwithstanding anything set forth in the Engagement Agreement to the contrary, Brown Rudnick agrees that its engagement by the Debtor is subject to the Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction, including as it relates to the allowance of any fees or other compensation due and owing in respect of the engagement.\n\n10. Notwithstanding anything set forth in the Engagement Agreement to the contrary, Brown Rudnick agrees to waive the requirement that the retainer under the Engagement Agreement be replenished.\n\n11. 6. The terms and conditions of this Order shall be immediately effective and enforceable upon its entry.\n\n12. 7. This Court shall retain jurisdiction to hear and determine all matters arising from or related to the implementation and enforcement of this Order.\n\n3","body_zh":"美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院布里奇波特分院\n\n关于： ： 第11章\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）， ： 案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n\n： 日期：April 13, 2022\n债务人。1 ： 时间：10:00 AM (ET)\n\n债务人就准许聘用及留任 BROWN RUDNICK LLP（布朗·拉德尼克律师事务所）担任债务人法律顾问之命令申请所提交的支持性答复\n\nHo Wan Kwok（以下简称“债务人”）通过其下列签署的拟聘法律顾问，现就债务人于 March 15, 2022 提出的《债务人关于签发准许聘用及留任 Brown Rudnick LLP 担任债务人法律顾问之命令的申请》[Dkt. No. 86]（以下简称“BR 申请”）提交本答复，以示支持。为支持本答复，债务人谨陈述如下：\n\n答复\n\n1. 债务人收到对 BR 申请提出的四项异议：\n\n(i) 由 United States Trustee（美国受托人，以下简称“U.S. Trustee”）提交的异议 [Dkt. No. 159]（以下简称“UST 异议”）；\n\n(ii) 由 Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors（无担保债权人官方委员会，以下简称“委员会”）提交的有限异议 [Dkt. No. 164]（以下简称“委员会异议”）；\n\n1 尽管债务人的法定姓名为 Ho Wan Kwok，但其亦使用以下姓名：Guo Wengui；Miles Guo；以及 Miles Kwok。\n\n(iii) 由 Rui Ma（马蕊）、Weican Meng（孟伟灿）和 Zheng Wu（吴征）（以下简称“个人异议人”）提交的加入委员会有限异议的文件 [Dkt. No. 178]（以下简称“个人异议人异议”）；以及\n\n(iv) 由 Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund, L.P.（太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金有限合伙企业，以下简称“PAX”，并与 U.S. Trustee、委员会及个人异议人合称“异议人”）提交的有限异议 [Dkt. No. 169]（以下简称“PAX 异议”）。\n\n2. 异议人并未基于 Brown Rudnick 作为一般破产法律顾问的资格而反对其留任，亦无任何异议人主张 Brown Rudnick“持有或代表与破产财产利益相冲突的权益”，或并非“无利害关系人”；后两项为根据 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) 获得批准的要求。\n\n3. 相反，异议人提出的论点大致可归入以下五类：\n\n(a) 披露/关联关系：U.S. Trustee 就 BR 申请中所载的 Brown Rudnick 披露事项，以及 William R. Baldiga（威廉·R.·巴尔迪加）于 March 30, 2022 提交的《William R. Baldiga 支持债务人关于签发准许聘用及留任 Brown Rudnick LLP 担任债务人法律顾问之命令申请的宣誓书》[Dkt. No. 142]（以下简称“Baldiga 初始宣誓书”，及其所附聘用协议，以下简称“聘用协议”）提出异议。UST Obj. ¶¶ 13-19, at 10-11。个人异议人另行表示，其正在评估有关 Brown Rudnick 先前代理与 Zheng Wu 关联实体的问题，并表示其保留就此主张权利。Individual Objectors Obj. ¶ 2。\n\n(b) 聘用协议/留任命令的具体条款：U.S. Trustee 对 Brown Rudnick 留任的若干拟议条款提出异议，具体包括：(i) Brown Rudnick 根据聘用协议就未付费用收取 9% 利息的权利；(ii) Brown Rudnick 寻求报销据称可能超过当地破产规则允许金额的费用的能力；(iii) Brown Rudnick 标准聘用协议中的利益冲突豁免；以及 (iv) Brown Rudnick 标准聘用协议中的管辖权条款。UST Obj. ¶¶ 9, 10, 12, at 2, 10-11。\n\n(c) 法律选择：U.S. Trustee 反对债务人与 Brown Rudnick 约定的聘用协议法律选择条款。\n\n(d) 预付聘用费：异议人反对 Brown Rudnick 根据聘用协议持有的预付聘用费（以下简称“预付聘用费”）。委员会主张该预付聘用费过高，并且其中 $675,000 应转移至破产财产。Committee Obj. ¶¶ 1, 11-28。个人异议人认为，应调查预付聘用费的任何部分是否应转移至破产财产。Individual Objectors Obj. ¶ 1。U.S. Trustee 反对该预付聘用费不得低于 $250,000 的规定。UST Obj. at 3, 11。PAX 主张该预付聘用费属于破产财产。PAX Obj. ¶¶ 1-3.[2]\n\n(e) 其他报酬异议：委员会反对 BR 申请中披露的 Brown Rudnick 标准小时费率，以及与非工作旅行有关费用的准许。Committee Obj. ¶¶ 2, 29-33。个人异议人另行表示，其担忧 Brown Rudnick 是否能够以“具成本效益”的方式代理债务人。Individual Objectors Obj. ¶ 1。\n\n4. 关于前两类异议（披露/关联关系及聘用的具体条款），债务人提出以下答复，并认为该等答复充分解决了这些异议。\n\n(a) 披露/关联关系：随附本文件作为附件 B 的是《William R. Baldiga 支持债务人关于签发准许聘用及留任 Brown Rudnick LLP 担任债务人法律顾问之命令申请的补充宣誓书》（以下简称“Baldiga 补充宣誓书”），该宣誓书回应了 U.S. Trustee 及个人异议人提出的各项披露问题。如所附文件、BR 申请及 Baldiga 初始宣誓书所述，Brown Rudnick 同时满足《破产法典》第 327(a) 条规定的“相冲突利益”及“无利害关系”要求，因而可在本案中担任债务人的一般破产法律顾问。债务人特别指出，如 Baldiga 补充宣誓书所述，倘若本案中产生任何利益冲突，Brown Rudnick 可在任何事项上与 Verdolino & Lowey, P.C.（韦尔多利诺与洛伊律师事务所）及 Craig Jalbert（克雷格·贾尔伯特）持相对立立场。Baldiga Supp. Aff. ¶¶ 5, 8。\n\n2 PAX 还认为，向 Brown Rudnick 支付预付聘用费可能违反了针对债务人签发的破产申请前禁令。PAX Obj. ¶¶ 2-3。PAX 的该项认为并不正确。PAX 所援引、于 October 2020 签发的禁令，具体涉及债务人在“(1) SherryNetherland Hotel（谢里-内瑟兰酒店）的住宅，及 (2) 游艇‘the Lady May’”中拥有的任何权益。See Dkt No. 57-2, Exh. 3。随附本文件作为附件 A 的禁令听证会记录进一步澄清了该禁令的范围，以及支付预付聘用费并不属于该禁令适用范围这一事实。See Exhibit A attached hereto, at 23:9-24。\n\n(b) 聘用协议/留任命令的具体条款：为解决第二类异议，Brown Rudnick 将同意在批准其留任的命令中纳入以下条款：\n\n(i) 尽管聘用协议中有任何相反规定，Brown Rudnick 同意放弃就逾期 30 日未付费用收取 9% 利息的权利。\n\n(ii) 尽管聘用协议中有任何相反规定，Brown Rudnick 就任何费用报销请求将遵守 United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut（美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院）的《当地破产程序规则》附录 D 及 11 U.S.C. § 330。\n\n(iii) 为免生疑，在 Brown Rudnick 受聘担任债务人法律顾问期间，Brown Rudnick 不会在任何该实体利益与破产财产相冲突的事项中代理该实体。\n\n(iv) 尽管聘用协议中有任何相反规定，Brown Rudnick 同意其受债务人聘用须受破产法院管辖，包括与就该聘用应付及欠付的任何费用或其他报酬之准许有关的事项。\n\n5. 此外，为回应 U.S. Trustee 对预付聘用费余额不得低于 $250,000 这一要求的异议，留任命令将予修订，纳入如下内容：尽管聘用协议中有任何相反规定，Brown Rudnick 同意放弃补足预付聘用费的要求。\n\n6. 随附本文件作为附件 C-1 和 C-2 的分别为：(i) 经修订的批准 Brown Rudnick 留任的拟议命令；及 (ii) 标示上述修订内容的拟议命令原始提交版本的红线稿。\n\n7. 债务人就异议人提出的其余异议作出以下答复。\n\nI. 聘用协议受纽约州法律管辖。\n\n8. U.S. Trustee 请求聘用协议受康涅狄格州法律管辖。没有其他异议人对聘用协议项下的法律选择条款提出质疑。\n\n9. 聘用协议载有明确且无歧义的法律选择条款，规定聘用协议“应受纽约州法律管辖并依其解释”。Engagement Agreement at 3。\n\n10. 康涅狄格州判例法尊重并充分赋予该明示法律选择条款效力。Fieger v. Pitney Bowes Credit Corp., 251 F.3d 386, 393 (2d Cir. 2001)（“康涅狄格州法律‘使合同当事人作出的明示法律选择生效，前提是其系善意作出。’”）（引自 Elgar v. Elgar, 238 Conn. 839, 848 (Conn. 1996)；Valley Juice Ltd., Inc. v. Evian Waters of France, Inc., 87 F.3d 604, 608-09 (2d Cir. 1996)（“要求在违约或争议时适用其他州法律的合同条款，在康涅狄格州被认可为适当。”）（引自 Syncsort v. Indata Servs., 541 A.2d 543, 545 (Conn. App. 1988)；Elgar, 238 Conn. at 850（“合同当事人通常被允许选择管辖其合同的法律”）（引自 1 Restatement (Second), Conflicts of Law § 187）；Bank of Am., N.A. v. Klein, No. 3:10-CV-987 JBA WIG, 2012 WL 5286962, at *3 (D. Conn. Oct. 23, 2012)（同上）。\n\n11. 不存在支持该异议并要求破坏当事人破产申请前协议的事实或法律理由。\n\nII. 根据纽约州法律，预付聘用费不属于破产财产。\n\n12. 纽约州法律承认三类预付聘用费：\n\n(i) “传统预付聘用费”，即“客户向律师支付款项，以确保律师在规定期间内可提供服务”；\n\n(ii) “担保预付聘用费”，即“律师仅为担保客户有能力支付客户预期律师将在未来提供的服务而持有该款项”；以及\n\n(iii) “预付报酬型预付聘用费”，即“客户预先向律师支付律师预期代表客户提供的全部或部分法律服务费用。”\n\nRuberto v. DeFilippo, 29 Misc.3d 1236(A), 913 N.Y.S.2d 889, 891 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2010)（引自 In re McDonald Bros. Const. Inc., 114 B.R. 989, 998 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990)；In re Dewey & LeBoeuf LLP, 493 B.R. 421, 428-29 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013)；In re King, 392 B.R. 62, 71 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008)。\n\n13. 就“预付报酬型预付聘用费”而言，“该等资金的所有权旨在于付款时转移给律师，以交换律师提供法律服务的承诺”。Ruberto, 913, N.Y.S.2d at 891；In re Caesars Ent. Operating Co., Inc., 561 B.R. 420, 436 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2015)（“预付报酬型预付聘用费是为换取提供未来法律服务的承诺而支付的款项。与传统预付聘用费一样，预付报酬型预付聘用费的所有权‘在付款时立即转移给律师’；与传统预付聘用费不同，该预付聘用费属于‘预付款’，因此在提供法律服务时适用于该等法律服务的收费。”）。因此，作为预付报酬型预付聘用费支付的资金“不成为破产财产”。King, 392 B.R. at 7。\n\n14. 诚然，就预付聘金而言，“客户对尚未由律师赚取的那部分聘金仍保有权益”，并且“在代理关系终止时，律师必须及时返还预付聘金中任何尚未赚取的部分”，但在此之前，“预付聘金并非客户财产”。Dewey & LeBoeuf, 493 B.R. at 430（引自 New York State Bar Association Op. No. 816 (Oct. 26, 2007)）。\n\n15. 重要的是，根据纽约州法律，聘金被推定为预付聘金的推定力很强。事实上，“除非在聘金协议中明确设立‘担保聘金’，纽约州将所有此类法律服务费付款均视为‘预付聘金’。”Ruberto, 913 N.Y.S.2d at 891；Dewey & LeBoeuf, 493 B.R. at 429（“仅当在聘金协议中明确设立时，聘金才属于担保聘金……如无设立担保聘金的协议，‘预付款可在转移时被视为属于律师的费用。’”）（引自 King, 392 B.R. at 71）。\n\n16. 与认定聘金为预付聘金的强烈推定一致，纽约州法律承认，除非存在将费用预付款视为客户资金的明示协议（例如，将该等资金存入客户信托账户），否则费用预付款在转移时被视为属于律师。King, 392 B.R. at 71（“New York State Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics, Opinion 570 (1985) 指出，律师可与其客户约定，通过将费用预付款存入客户信托账户而将该等资金视为客户资金。如无此类协议，律师可将预付费用存入其一般信托账户。在纽约州，该等预付款可在转移时被视为属于律师的费用。”）（引自 In re D.L.I.C., Inc.,120 B.R. 348, 351 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990)）。\n\n17. 本案中，该聘金构成预付聘金，因此并非破产财产。第一，该聘金是在 Brown Rudnick（布朗·拉德尼克律师事务所）预期向债务人提供法律服务之前预先支付的。Engagement Agreement（委聘协议） at 1-2；Kwok（郭文贵）Decl. ¶ 51；Baldiga Initial Aff. ¶¶ 7-8。\n\n18. 第二，当事人意图是，该聘金的所有权在付款时转移给 Brown Rudnick，以换取 Brown Rudnick 承诺提供的服务。债务人指示将该聘金直接支付给 Brown Rudnick，并要求 Brown Rudnick 将其未来的费用和支出从该聘金中扣付。Kwok Decl. ¶ 8；Baldiga Initial Aff. ¶¶ 7-8。\n\n19. 第三，委聘协议未明确规定该聘金将为“担保聘金”；因此，纽约州法律下的强烈推定支持认定该聘金为预付聘金。\n\n20. 最后，委聘协议明确规定，该聘金将保存在 Brown Rudnick 的一般聘金账户中，而非客户信托账户中。Engagement Agreement at 2（“该聘金以及任何未来存款，将保存在本所的聘金账户中。”）。与委聘协议的明示条款一致，该聘金未存入或转入客户信托账户。Baldiga Supp. Aff. ¶ 9(ii)。相反，该聘金最初存入 Brown Rudnick 的一般存款账户（连同该所的其他存款），随后从一般存款账户向 Brown Rudnick 的一般聘金账户转入等额款项（该款项至今仍与该所的其他聘金款项一并保存在该账户中）。Baldiga Supp. Aff. ¶ 9(iii)。\n\nIII. 或者，Brown Rudnick 对该聘金享有有效、可执行且已完善的担保权益。\n\n21. 若法院认定该聘金属于“担保聘金”而非“预付聘金”，Brown Rudnick 对该聘金仍享有有效、可执行且已完善的担保权益，该担保权益优先于破产财产或任何其他当事人的任何权益。\n\n22. 根据《统一商法典》第9编，设立有效且可执行的担保权益须具备三项条件：\n\n(i) “已给予价值”；\n\n(ii) 客户“对担保物享有权利，或有权向”律师“转让担保物上的权利”；以及\n\n(iii) 该协议通过已签署的担保协议，或通过将担保物的占有或控制权转移给律师，予以证明。N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-203(b)。\n\n23. 本案中，三项条件均已满足。第一，Brown Rudnick 承诺履行委聘协议项下约定的服务，满足了“已给予价值”的条件。Engagement Agreement at 1-2；In re Tuscany Energy, LLC, 561 B.R. 910, 915 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2016)（“本所对申请前聘金享有有效、可执行的担保权益。第一，本所已给予价值，因为本所承诺在本破产案件中代理债务人。”）。\n\n24. 第二，Lamp Capital LLC（蓝普资本有限责任公司）（“Lamp”）将聘金金额出借给债务人，债务人指示 Lamp 将聘金支付给 Brown Rudnick，满足了“担保物上的权利”条件。Kwok Decl. ¶ 51；Baldiga Initial Aff. ¶ 7；Tuscany Energy, 561 B.R. at 915（“第二，在债务人向本所支付申请前聘金时，债务人拥有其 SunTrust Bank 账户中的资金，该账户为申请前聘金的来源。”）。\n\n25. 第三，“担保协议”和“占有或控制”两项条件均已满足（尽管设立有效担保权益仅需满足其中一项）。若法院认定委聘协议设立的是“担保聘金”而非“预付聘金”，则委聘协议满足须有已签署担保协议的条件。Tuscany Energy, 561 B.R. at 915（“第三，本所与债务人订立了一项委聘协议，其中具体涉及该聘金及其用于支付本案费用和支出的用途。”）；In re Adv. Imaging Techs., Inc., 306 B.R. 677, 681 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2003)（“根据雇佣协议，债务人同意 Gray Cary 将持有该聘金资金，以担保支付向债务人提供的未来服务。”）。\n\n26. 此外，Brown Rudnick 占有并控制该聘金。见 N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(3)(B) and (D)（允许通过占有或控制中的任一方式满足可执行性的证据要求）；Tuscany Energy, 561 B.R. at 915（“此外，本所因将申请前聘金保存在本所信托账户中，自 2015年11月16日以来一直占有申请前聘金。根据[《统一商法典》]设立担保权益的所有条件均已满足。本所对申请前聘金的担保权益因占有而完善”）；In re On-Line Servs. Ltd., 324 B.R. 342, 346-47 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2005)（“担保聘金涉及律师将客户资金作为质押物持有——一种占有型担保权益——而《统一商法典》明确允许对金钱享有占有型担保权益。”）；In re North Bay Tractor, Inc., 191 B.R. 186, 187-88 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1996)（认定“[该]律师对此类聘金的权益本质上属于担保权益，确保律师在该案件中获得最低费用”，并指出要求律师放弃该聘金“将破坏聘金的目的……”）；In re K & R Mining, Inc., 105 B.R. 394, 398 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1989)（认定“申请人对该聘金享有担保权益，以担保支付其律师费和支出”）。\n\n27. Brown Rudnick 对该聘金的占有和控制完善了该所对该聘金的担保权益。见 N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-312(b)(1), (3)（金钱上的担保权益仅能通过取得占有而完善；存款账户上的担保权益仅能通过控制而完善）；In re Shafer Bros. Constr. Inc., 525 B.R. 607, 619 (Bankr. N.D.W. Va. 2015)（“由于 Johnson 先生在其控制的存款账户——其律师信托账户（‘IOLTA’）——中占有 \\$20,000 担保聘金，因此其对其中 \\$5,950 享有已完善的担保权益，以担保[d]ebtor 支付截至该时点已提供服务的费用。”）。\n\n28. Brown Rudnick 对该聘金已完善的担保权益优先于破产财产、任何其他债权人或任何后取得的担保权益。N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-332；In re EAS Graceland, LLC, Case No. 20-24484, 2021 WL 1941658, at \\*3 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Mar. 4, 2021)（“法院认定 iBorrow 对申请前聘金不享有任何权益。‘存款账户资金的受让人取得资金时，不受该存款账户担保权益的约束，除非该受让人与债务人串通，侵害担保权人的权利。’见 [Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-9-332.]）iBorrow 从未主张本所参与串通。因此，在向本所支付申请前聘金时，iBorrow 完全丧失了其对该等资金的担保权益。由于 iBorrow 对申请前聘金不享有权益，申请前聘金并非现金担保物。见 [11 U.S.C. § 363\\(a\\)]#co_pp_8b3b0000958a4)（非债务人一方必须对现金、存款账户或其他现金等价物享有权益）。债务人无需取得 iBorrow 对使用申请前聘金的同意。见 11 [U.S.C. § 363\\(c\\)\\(2\\)\\(A\\).]#co_pp_5205000097ee7) 本所可自由将申请前聘金用于支付经本法院批准的费用和支出。”）。\n\n29. 异议人主张该聘金根据 11 U.S.C. § 329 属于过高，既无法律依据，也无事实依据。委员会援引的判例中，几乎没有任何一项与本案存在丝毫关联。见，例如，In re Printing Dimensions, Inc., 153 B.R. 715, 719-20 (Bankr. D. Md. 1993)（适用马里兰州法律而非纽约州法律，但仍指出，“然而，如聘金被视为担保物或聘金以信托方式持有，律师无需与其他行政债权人按比例分摊申请前聘金。”）；In re Chez, 441 B.R. 724 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2010)（因报酬未被适当披露而命令返还费用；驳回进一步返还已提供服务费用的请求）；In re Glemaud, No. 11-31697, 2013 WL 4498677, at \\*4–5 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2013)（认定律师在十八个月期间连续准备五份破产申请所提供的服务未使破产财产受益）。并且，唯一相关的案件 In re D.L.I.C., Inc., 120 B.R. 348 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990)，实际上支持这样一种立场：该聘金并非破产财产，而是预付聘金。\n\n30. 此外，鉴于本案的特定事实和情形，该预付聘用费是合理的。该预付聘用费是 Brown Rudnick（布朗·拉德尼克律师事务所）同意接受债务人的聘请并订立《聘用协议》的必要组成部分。Baldiga 补充宣誓书 ¶ 9(i)。鉴于包括但不限于债务人破产申请前状况的紧迫性（包括债务人可能即将被监禁）、债务人与其若干债权人之间关系的高度争议性（包括由其自身经验丰富的律师代理的 PAX）、债务人破产案件所涉问题的复杂性、债务人对高技能且经验丰富的律师的需求，以及鉴于债务人破产申请前财务状况所产生的重大律师费风险，作为对 Brown Rudnick 根据《聘用协议》同意并预期提供的大量服务的预先付款形式，该预付聘用费过去及现在均属合理。见同上。若非债务人同意并支付该预付聘用费，Brown Rudnick 不会接受该项聘请。见同上。\n\n31. 简言之，债务人需要具备技能和经验的破产律师；该等律师有权就该项聘请取得财务保障（如同就其他聘请一样）；且在本案情形下，该预付聘用费属合理。In re Robotics Resources R2, Inc., 117 B.R. 61, 63 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1990)（在驳回要求返还预付聘用费的请求时称：“成功进行 chapter 11 案件的前提条件，是债务人拥有具备技能的法律顾问。正如 In re Martin, 817 F.2d 175, 181 (1st Cir.1987) 一案法院所述，‘除非能够在某种程度上保障律师的财务福祉，否则有时将难以在预期进行破产程序时获得称职的律师。’”）。\n\n32. 委员会援引 Brown Rudnick 在其他债务人聘请事项中收取的预付聘用费并不相关，且该等案件的事实情形与本案显著不同。委员会异议 ¶¶ 18-19。例如，In re Herald Media Holdings, Inc., Case No. 17-12881 (Bankr. D. Del.)，涉及的债务人：(i) 在提交破产申请前一年拥有约 $34 million 的营业收入；(ii) 截至申请日持有约 $6 million 的现金或现金等价资产（应收账款）；(iii) 就其资产有一项 $5 million 的领跑竞标；及 (iv) 获得了一笔 $500,000 的 DIP 贷款，该贷款在无人异议的基础上获批准。此外，Brown Rudnick 在提交申请前已获支付约 $269,100。Baldiga 补充宣誓书 ¶ 10。又，在 In re Dean and DeLuca New York Inc., Case No. 20-10916 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) 中，债务人：(i) 在申请日前向 Brown Rudnick 支付了合计约 $517,000 的预付聘用费（债务人向所有破产顾问支付的预付聘用费总额约为 $750,000），且截至提交申请时，尚余约 $374,000 的预付聘用费余额；(ii) 拥有若干可产生现金的资产（例如，前一年产生 $1.5 million 收入的特许经营协议）；(iii) 拥有其他有形资产（账面价值为 $20 million 的财产和设备；账面价值约为 $50 million 的注册商标）；及 (iv) 获得约 $2.4 million 的 DIP 融资。Baldiga 补充宣誓书 ¶ 11。毋庸置疑，该等聘请事项所代表的事实情形与本案存在实质性差异。\n\nIV. 其他报酬异议。\n\n33. 委员会对债务人在 BR 申请中列示的小时费率以及对非工作旅行时间可能进行的报销提出异议。个人异议人对 Brown Rudnick 是否能够以“成本效益合理”的方式代理债务人表示关切。这些异议属于律师费异议的性质，与根据《破产法典》第 327(a) 条批准聘用 Brown Rudnick 无关。若委员会或个人异议人希望坚持反对准许任何 Brown Rudnick 律师费，则提出该等异议的适当场合应为根据《破产法典》第 330 条请求批准报酬时。诚然，Brown Rudnick 坚持其小时费率结构，尤其是鉴于包括但不限于债务人提交破产申请的紧迫性、债务人破产申请所涉问题的新颖性和复杂性，以及为债务人提供意见的 Brown Rudnick 律师的技能和经验，并将在适当时候准备就准许任何所请求的报酬履行其举证责任。\n\n［本页剩余部分有意留白。］\n\n结论\n\n因此，债务人请求法院准予 BR 申请中所请求的救济，驳回异议人的异议，并向债务人准予其他适当或进一步的救济。\n\n日期：April 10, 2022\nBROWN RUDNICK LLP（布朗·拉德尼克有限责任合伙律师事务所）\n\n签署人：/s/ William R. Baldiga（威廉·R·巴尔迪加）\n\nDylan P. Kletter, Esq.（迪伦·P·克莱特律师） 185 Asylum Street Hartford, Connecticut 06103 电话：(860) 509-6500 传真：(860) 509-6501 电子邮件：dkletter@brownrudnick.com\n\n以及\n\nWilliam R. Baldiga, Esq.（威廉·R·巴尔迪加律师） Robert J. Stark, Esq.（罗伯特·J·斯塔克律师） Jeffrey L. Jonas, Esq.（杰弗里·L·乔纳斯律师） Bennett S. Silverberg, Esq.（贝内特·S·西尔弗伯格律师） Seven Times Square New York, New York 10036 电话：(212) 209-4800 传真：(212) 209-4801 电子邮件：wbaldiga@brownrudnick.com rstark@brownrudnick.com jjonas@brownrudnick.com bsilverberg@brownrudnick.com\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）债务人的拟任律师\n\n附件 A\n\nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2020 06:21 PM INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 637 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2020 Case 22-50073 Doc 195 Filed 04/10/22 Entered 04/10/22 18:05:39 Page 17 of 60\n\n1 纽约州最高法院\n\n2 纽约县：\n审判期第 61 庭\n\n3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nX\n\n4 PACIFIC ALLIANCE ASIA OPPORTUNITY FUND L.P.（太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金有限合伙企业），\n\n5 原告，\n\n6 - 诉 -\n\n7 KWOK HO WAN（郭文贵），又名 KWOK HO，又名 GWO WEN GUI，又名 GUO WENGUI，又名 GUO WEN-GUI，又名\n\n8 WAN GUE HAOYUN，又名 MILES KWOK，又名 HAOYUN GUO，\nGENEVER HOLDINGS CORPORATION（日内瓦控股公司）及 GENEVER HOLDINGS LLC（日内瓦控股有限责任公司），\n\n9 被告。\n\n10 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nX\n\n11 Index No. 652077/2017\n\n12 October 15, 2020\nTeams 庭审程序\n\n13 出庭法官：\n尊敬的 BARRY R. OSTRAGER（巴里·R·奥斯特拉格）法官\n\n14 出庭人员：\n\n15 O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP（奥美律师事务所）\n\n16 律师\n7 Times Square\n\n17 New York, New York 10036\n代理律师：\nSTUART SARNOFF, ESQ.（斯图尔特·萨诺夫律师）\n\n18 EDWARD MOSS, ESQ.（爱德华·莫斯律师）\n\n19 BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP（贝克·霍斯泰特勒律师事务所）\n律师\n\n20 45 Rockefeller Plaza, 14th Floor\n\n21 New York, New York 10111\n代理律师：\nJOHN SIEGAL, ESQ.（约翰·西格尔律师）\n\n22 MELISSA CARVALHO, ESQ.（梅利莎·卡瓦略律师）\nERICA BARROW, ESQ.（埃丽卡·巴罗律师）\n\n25 （出庭人员续见下一页。）\ntav\n\nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2020 06:21 PM INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 637 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2020 Case 22-50073 Doc 195 Filed 04/10/22 Entered 04/10/22 18:05:39 Page 18 of 60\n\n1 出庭人员：\n（续）\n\n2 LAWALL & MITCHELL LLC（劳尔与米切尔有限责任公司）\n律师\n\n3 162 East 64th Street\n\n4 New York, New York 10065\n代理律师：\nAARON A. MITCHELL, ESQ.（亚伦·A·米切尔律师）\n\n8 Terry-Ann Volberg, CSR, CRR（特里-安·沃尔伯格，CSR，CRR）\n\n9 官方法庭记录员\n\nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2020 06:21 PM INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 637 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2020 Case 22-50073 Doc 195 Filed 04/10/22 Entered 04/10/22 18:05:39 Page 19 of 60\n\n庭审程序\n\n1 法庭：\n早上好。\n\n2 在讨论临时限制令申请之前，我有几项事务性事项\n\n3 需要处理。\n\n4 \n\n5 如您未发言，请将您的\n\n6 麦克风静音，以免出现杂音。谢谢。\n\n7 如我刚才开始所说，在处理\n\n8 临时限制令申请之前，我有几项事务性事项要解决。我们\n\n9 在技术上安排讨论原告关于\n\n10 律师费的申请，并且在动议部分有一项由\n\n11 被告提出的动议，要求增加未能\n\n12 减轻损害的积极抗辩。关于后一个问题，\n\n13 Moss 先生，我希望您同意，在审判时我们将使诉状与\n\n14 审判中提出的证据相一致，\n\n15 并且，由于我已在 September 15th 的裁定和命令中处理了\n\n16 减轻损害问题，\n\n17 且该问题一直至少在外围上属于本案的一部分，\n\n18 我希望您同意，该问题将是\n\n19 在完整审判中处理的问题之一，\n\n20 从而避免进行动议程序。因此，我希望\n\n21 在双方同意的情况下，将该动议标记为不妨碍权利的撤回。\n\n22 \n\n23 这对您可以接受吗？\n\n24 MOSS 律师：\n法官阁下，我只是——我只是想\n\n25 了解一下，我的理解是法庭将要\n\nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2020 06:21 PM INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 637 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2020 Case 22-50073 Doc 195 Filed 04/10/22 Entered 04/10/22 18:05:39 Page 20 of 60\n\n庭审程序\n\n就损害赔偿作出裁定。您曾命令我们提交计算结果。我认为法庭已经在简易判决中裁定了减轻损害问题，并且不会就损害赔偿进行审判；这样做是为了让您取得计算结果，以便法院书记员能够作出判决书。这是命令中所载内容，因此我不理解将会进行审判，而且我们认为不存在任何需要审判的事实争议。\n\n法庭：我的理解是，我已就责任问题作出有利于你方的简易判决，这也是你方有资格今天提出你方所提出的 5229 申请的原因；而我们推迟了损害赔偿的计算，是因为存在与损害赔偿数额有关的事实争议。我认为你方的证据不足以让我就损害赔偿问题作出简易判决。因此，该问题将在我相信我们已安排于 January 进行的听证会上处理。10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18\n\nMOSS 律师：因此，法官阁下，我的理解是，January 的审判是关于揭开公司面纱问题的—— 19 20\n\n法庭：是的，是的。\n\nMOSS 律师：——而 Kwok 先生提出的关于损害赔偿的唯一抗辩，法官阁下，就是减轻损害。法庭已经根据香港法律在简易判决中驳回了减轻损害这一主张。22 23 24 25\n\nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2020 06:21 PM INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 637 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2020 Case 22-50073 Doc 195 Filed 04/10/22 Entered 04/10/22 18:05:39 Page 21 of 60\n\n庭审程序\n\n法庭：我在 September 15th 的裁定中明确提及了该问题。现在，我提及它的方式表明我认为这是一项站不住脚的主张，而我现在仍认为这是一项站不住脚的主张，因为我认为并不能要求你方当事人在事后以看似高于市场价的价格从中国共产党购买一套公寓；这正是我在 September 15, 2020 的裁定中所说的。\n\n因此，被告提出了一项动议，要求修改其答辩状以主张未能减轻损害的抗辩。无论我们何时着手评估损害赔偿，我都会就减轻损害问题听取被告的意见。现在，如果你方希望他提出动议，并希望我对该动议作出裁定，那么除允许他提出该动议、由你方答复该动议、然后对该动议作出裁定外，我别无选择。并且，由于我们举行的任何听证会都将是我使诉状与审判中提出的证据相一致的听证会，我认为，作为一项事务性事项，我们应让被告不妨碍权利地撤回该动议，而你方应接受这一程序状态。\n\nMOSS 律师：好的，没问题。如果法官阁下无论如何都会准许修改答辩状的许可动议，我们可以对此作出约定。\n\n我们有一项待决的损害赔偿动议，而他们——法庭：是的。24 25\n\n提交：纽约县书记官 10/23/2020 06:21 PM 案号 652077/2017 NYSCEF 文件编号 637 NYSCEF 收件日期：10/23/2020 案件 22-50073 文件 195 提交日期 04/10/22 录入日期 04/10/22 18:05:39 第 22 页，共 60 页\n\n庭审记录\n\n莫斯先生：\n那么，法官阁下希望如何解决损害赔偿问题？\n\n法庭：\n我们将就损害赔偿问题举行听证会，而该听证会不在今天举行。\n\n莫斯先生：\n是的。\n\n法庭：\n因此，在该听证会上，就这一损害减损理论而言，被告希望提出的任何主张——我在 2020 年 9 月 15 日的裁决和命令中已强烈表明该理论相当可疑——他们将获准在损害赔偿听证会中就该理论提出其拥有的任何证据，如有的话。\n\n让我询问被告代理律师：鉴于今天庭审记录中现已载明的内容，我们是否可以将修正答辩状的动议标记为不妨碍日后再提地撤回？\n\n西格尔先生：\n是的，我是 John Siegal（约翰·西格尔），Baker Hostetler（贝克霍斯特勒律师事务所）律师，代理被告 Kwok（郭文贵）。\n\n我们当然同意该结果，并将在今日之后送达并提交我们的第二次修正答辩状，以便载入案卷；这将是我们进行听证会的依据。\n\n法庭：\n可以。你们实际上没有必要提交第二次修正起诉书，但我认为，今天的庭审记录已十分明确：我们将举行损害赔偿听证会，而在损害赔偿听证会上，你们将能够就减损部分的主张提出你们希望提出的任何证言或希望提交的任何文件。你们提交第二次修正起诉书并要求原告作出回应，只会给法庭和原告增加负担。因此，记录本身已说明一切。我只希望你和莫斯先生在这方面稍作配合。\n\n西格尔先生：\n是的，法官阁下。我们感谢法庭允许我们有机会就该问题提出证据；我们将在听证会上做好准备。自我们在本案中出庭以来，我们一直与莫斯先生保持良好合作，我相信我们会继续如此。我们期待获得该机会，努力说服法官阁下——我们理解您认为此事可疑——在全面审查后，这里存在一项减损抗辩，对损害赔偿具有非常重大的影响，所以谢谢您。\n\n法庭：\n好的。我们不会有任何第二次修正起诉书，也不会有任何动议，对吗？\n\n西格尔先生：\n是的，法官阁下，明白。\n\n法庭：\n好的。\n\n现在，我们要处理的第二项程序性事项是律师费。鉴于还将有进一步程序，今天处理律师费没有意义，因为就我们将举行的两场听证会——一场关于损害赔偿，另一场是此前安排在 1 月 15 日举行的听证会——还会产生更多律师费。\n\n提交：纽约县书记官 10/23/2020 06:21 PM 案号 652077/2017 NYSCEF 文件编号 637 NYSCEF 收件日期：10/23/2020 案件 22-50073 文件 195 提交日期 04/10/22 录入日期 04/10/22 18:05:39 第 24 页，共 60 页\n\n庭审记录\n\n因此，经你同意，莫斯先生，我希望将你的律师费申请延期至更适当的时间处理。\n\n莫斯先生：\n可以。可以，法官阁下。\n\n我想，律师费与本金和利息一样，都是合同损害赔偿；我建议我们在听证会上或与听证会同时提交我们的证据。我想，除 Lewis（刘易斯）先生外，我们实际上不会就律师费问题传唤任何证人。我认为我们应当在听证会上办理，法官阁下；在损害赔偿听证会上办理对我而言最合理，因为它们确实是损害赔偿的一部分。\n\n法庭：\n本案所有程序结束后，你将获判你依合同有权获得的任何律师费。现在并非处理该问题的时候；该问题有待日后解决。好的。\n\n莫斯先生：\n是的，法官阁下。\n\n那么，对于何时举行损害赔偿听证会，您是否已有想法？\n\n提交：纽约县书记官 10/23/2020 06:21 PM 案号 652077/2017 NYSCEF 文件编号 637 NYSCEF 收件日期：10/23/2020 案件 22-50073 文件 195 提交日期 04/10/22 录入日期 04/10/22 18:05:39 第 25 页，共 60 页\n\n庭审记录\n\n法庭：\n我会尽快安排。\n\n并非别的原因，你们都知道，Scarpulla 法官（斯卡普拉法官）已升任上诉分庭，Friedman 法官（弗里德曼法官）和 Sherwood 法官（舍伍德法官）即将退休，因此目前轮值的商事分庭法官只有五位，而斯卡普拉法官的案件已重新分配给仍在轮值的五位法官。\n\n所以我们现在都有些忙。\n\n莫斯先生：\n是的，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：\n你们就另一事项定于 1 月 15 日举行听证会。我们将尽力寻找一个方便的时间来处理损害赔偿和律师费问题。\n\n现在，让我们处理今天上午我唯一希望处理的事项，即你们根据 CPLR 5229 提出的申请：一项延及郭先生资产的禁止令，以及你们认为应当延及其控制的实体——无论是单一目的有限责任公司，还是其儿子等家庭成员——的禁止令。\n\n那么，莫斯先生，我听你陈述。\n\n莫斯先生：\n谢谢。\n\n法官阁下，就 5229 项下的救济而言，我认为郭先生并不争议我们有权获得某种救济。\n\n他并不争议 Pacific Alliance（太平洋联盟）符合该标准。\n\n他并不争议我们的主张，即他意图转移其资产，而这一过程已经随着这项虚假破产程序开始。\n\n法庭曾表示，除仅仅在判决中胜诉这一事实外，还必须作出其他证明。我们提交的意见是，你们只需在简易判决中胜诉即可。法庭表示可能还需要作出额外证明，因此我们已在提交的文件中列明该证明。\n\n此处存在明确且重大的风险：如不加限制，郭先生将继续竭尽所能隐匿资产并使该判决无法执行，无论是作伪证、违抗法庭命令，还是提出这项虚假破产申请。\n\n我们多年来一直在向法官阁下说明这一点。这就是我们请求扣押的原因。我们也知道将会发生什么。我们会胜诉，因为郭先生没有任何正当抗辩；然后郭先生会规避判决，并且会尽其所能确保我的当事人一无所获。\n\n因此，就 5229 而言，目前具体摆在法官面前的是两个问题。郭先生提出两项论点，试图限制我们所请求的救济。因此，我将先处理我认为较为容易的一项。\n\n第一，郭先生并不争议我们有权对其进行证言记录和调查取证，但他主张，调查取证应仅限于我们尚未寻求或尚未获得调查取证的资产。本案中唯一与资产有关的调查取证是在扣押阶段进行的，而郭先生及其先前的律师坚决且一贯拒绝就 Sherry-Netherland（谢里-尼德兰）住宅以外的任何资产提供调查取证。\n\n提交：纽约县书记官 10/23/2020 06:21 PM 案号 652077/2017 NYSCEF 文件编号 637 NYSCEF 收件日期：10/23/2020 案件 22-50073 文件 195 提交日期 04/10/22 录入日期 04/10/22 18:05:39 第 27 页，共 60 页\n\n庭审记录\n\n事实上，我认为我们都同意，所有其他资产均可进行调查。至于该公寓、该住宅，没有理由限制对其进行调查取证。这是我们已确认郭先生在纽约拥有的唯一资产。它似乎是他在美国拥有的最大资产，也许是他在任何地方拥有的、尚未被中国政府冻结的最大资产。\n\n现在，郭先生先前的律师贬低我们，说我们歇斯底里，说我们因为不断寻求扣押该公寓而害怕案件实体问题。我们知道我们面对的是谁，也知道我们最终会走到这一步；该资产是我们获得执行的最佳机会。我们有权就该资产进行调查取证。\n\n此项调查取证不会造成任何显著负担，而且两年来我们没有就该公寓进行任何调查取证。现在有新的论点，也有新的事项需要调查。例如，郭先生现在在其破产申请中主张，除了由英属维尔京群岛公司拥有的纽约公司、两个 Genever（杰尼弗）实体外，还有一家新公司、一家名为 Bravo Luck（布拉沃·勒克）的新空壳公司；该公司才是该公寓的实益所有人，且一直在支付相关费用，并且由其儿子全资拥有。\n\n提交：纽约县书记官 10/23/2020 06:21 PM 案号 652077/2017 NYSCEF 文件编号 637 NYSCEF 收件日期：10/23/2020 案件 22-50073 文件 195 提交日期 04/10/22 录入日期 04/10/22 18:05:39 第 28 页，共 60 页\n\n庭审记录\n\n因此，他在破产程序中的论点并非其拥有任何正当债权人，而是该公寓是为其儿子以信托方式持有，其儿子应当优先于太平洋联盟受偿。\n\n这完全是一场空壳把戏。我们有权调查此事，以及过去数年中发生的任何其他事情。他们将该公寓挂牌出售，随后又在扣押程序当天将其撤下，以便在法庭上向您主张：嘿，它已不再挂牌出售，你不应扣押它。我们有权获得该调查取证，而这正是 CPLR 5229 旨在赋予我们的：向判决债权人提供关于资产由谁拥有、资产位于何处的确切信息。\n\n法官阁下，他们提出的第二个问题，也是您开始这次讨论时提出的问题，是这里的范围应当为何；禁止令是否应仅涉及郭先生的资产，即郭先生直接或间接拥有的资产？\n\n他们在此试图主张的是，它应当仅适用于他“直接拥有”的资产。这一例外将吞没规则，因为郭先生并不直接持有任何资产。这就是他的惯用手法。他通过多层家庭成员、多层空壳公司持有资产，正是为了这个目的，即使像我们这样的债权人无法触及这些资产。\n\n提交：纽约县书记官 10/23/2020 06:21 PM 案号 652077/2017 NYSCEF 文件编号 637 NYSCEF 收件日期：10/23/2020 案件 22-50073 文件 195 提交日期 04/10/22 录入日期 04/10/22 18:05:39 第 29 页，共 60 页\n\n庭审记录\n\n郭先生在另一案件中的证言记录中承认了这一点。他说，他在宣誓后作证称，我们引用如下：“实际上，依法我没有任何资产。我身无分文。”\n\n他之所以作出这些主张，是因为他以该公寓那样的方式安排其持有结构。我刚才向您说明，例如，空壳公司、他现在称由其儿子拥有的空壳公司；这是一家名为 Bravo Luck 的公司，他称其儿子拥有该公司，尽管他过去持有其 50%，而且显然现在称他依据未在本案中出示的、倒签日期的伪造文件，以一美元将其出售给其儿子。\n\n整件事情都是虚假的；他当时二十多岁的儿子实际上才是付款的人。\n\n为该公寓支付$70 million，他就是该公寓的合法所有人吗？这完全是一场游戏，目的是确保我们无法收取。\n\n还有一艘价值30 million-dollar的游艇。该游艇由一家香港公司持有。\n\n法庭：我以为是$27 million。\n\nMoss先生（莫斯先生）：抱歉，我是取整了。我是取整了。\n\n提交：NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2020 06:21 PM INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 637 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2020 Case 22-50073 Doc 195 Filed 04/10/22 Entered 04/10/22 18:05:39 Page 30 of 60\n\n庭审记录\n\n有一艘价值27 million-dollar的游艇由一家香港公司持有；一旦我们获准进行证据开示，我们将发现更多由更多空壳公司持有的资产，而Kwok先生（郭文贵）或其子女之一是该等公司的唯一所有人。\n\n问题在于：如果他们要求您仅禁止其处分其直接持有的资产，那将排除一切，并且即使Kwok先生已经表示这些是其资产，也仍将排除一切。\n\n他向本庭提交了一份宣誓书，称其拥有该公寓。他上个月在纽约提交了一份起诉状，称该游艇是“他的游艇”。这些是他的资产，而且法规CPLR 5229允许作出一项限制令，适用于直接和间接持有的资产。\n\nCPLR 5229规定，原告可以以与其获得判决后限制相同的方式获得判决前限制。判决后限制受CPLR 5222管辖，该条规定限制适用于其“拥有权益”的财产，其中“其”是指判决债务人。该条并未说直接权益，而是说一项权益。Kwok先生已经作证，他已在本案中提交证据证明其拥有该公寓，并且他已作出其拥有该游艇的司法承认。\n\n因此，他们援引的、主张CPLR 5229和5222仅适用于直接资产的案件\n\n提交：NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2020 06:21 PM INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 637 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2020 Case 22-50073 Doc 195 Filed 04/10/22 Entered 04/10/22 18:05:39 Page 31 of 60\n\n庭审记录\n\n与本案完全不相干，因为其中没有任何案件涉及像本案这样被告实际上主张其拥有这些资产的情形。\n\n法庭：Moss先生，我理解你的论点。让我听听Siegal先生（西格尔先生）的意见。\n\nMoss先生：谢谢，法官阁下。\n\nCarvalho女士（卡瓦略女士）：早上好。我是Baker & Hostetler（贝克·霍斯特勒律师事务所）的Melissa Carvalho（梅利莎·卡瓦略），代表Kwok先生。\n\n我想先说，今天上午我们反复听到Moss先生说“Kwok先生的破产”。已提交的破产申请并非Kwok先生提交的。我们已获悉此事，法庭也已获悉此事。从表面上看，该申请称其由一个实体提交，该实体之一的律师今日在场。因此，如有任何与破产有关的问题或争议，我无法对此发言，但Mitchell先生（米切尔先生）当然可以。\n\n因此，关于CPLR 5229，原告在临时限制令和说明理由令中所寻求的救济，远比CPLR 5229规定的救济宽泛。原告寻求禁止并限制被告Kwok就“其拥有权益的任何财产”采取行动，但CPLR 5229的适用范围仅限于不利当事人Kwok先生。CPLR 5229明确规定：“审判法官可以命令审查不利当事人，并命令限制其行为，其效力如同在判决后向其送达限制通知。”法院对CPLR 5229的措辞作出了严格解释。不利当事人是Kwok先生，法庭就简易判决作出的裁定和命令仅限于其个人。原告在其答复中花费大量时间，试图继续先入为主地贬损Kwok先生，但这只是因为原告无法提出权威依据来支持其单方面扩大CPLR 5229适用范围。原告向法庭提出了各类已获准给予CPLR 5229救济的案件，但那涉及法庭是否酌情给予该项救济。法规称法庭“可以根据5229作出救济命令”，对此我们并无争议。是的，法院可以在许多不同事实模式下给予CPLR 5229救济，但该救济仍限于CPLR 5229所规定的范围，而原告除称这正是其所想要的以外，并未表明任何支持其单方面扩大该法规的依据。\n\n提交：NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2020 06:21 PM INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 637 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2020 Case 22-50073 Doc 195 Filed 04/10/22 Entered 04/10/22 18:05:39 Page 32 of 60\n\n庭审记录\n\n原告援引的案件事实上并未扩大CPLR 5229的范围。APF案、Gallegos案、Safeco案、Unex案及Leser案，均将救济限于特定的不利当事人，而非该当事人可能拥有的任何“权益”。在Eastern District of New York（纽约东区）的Leser v. U.S. Bank案中，法院明确指出：“然而，原告的主张是正确的，即该命令的范围应限于对原告Leser资产的限制。”USB最初寻求对“原告Leser及其控制的任何个人、公司或其他实体”实施限制，但USB随后在辩论期间承认，其仅寻求对原告Leser实施限制，法院认定该做法适当且恰当。原告所说的任何内容均无法改变这一点。法规仅提供其所规定的救济。因此，让我们看一下该法规。\n\n该法规规定了审查和限制。审查：在本案中，Kwok先生的资产已在证据开示中得到处理。Kwok先生已就本案三次接受证言录取，分别是在2018年10月3日、2019年11月25日和2019年12月11日。Kwok先生已提交超过14页文件。原告已有多次机会充分审查Kwok先生，事实上，如果您查看附于我宣誓陈述的原告第二套文件请求，就会看到其实际上针对的是资产。现在，原告主张先前的证据开示不足，但案卷显示，事实上已进行披露。基于范围当然提出过异议。曾向Kwok先生提出诸如“你的任何资产是否由中国政府取得？”等问题，但不允许进行钓鱼式取证，并不意味着证据开示不足。\n\n提交：NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2020 06:21 PM INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 637 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2020 Case 22-50073 Doc 195 Filed 04/10/22 Entered 04/10/22 18:05:39 Page 34 of 60\n\n庭审记录\n\n我还指出，过去曾存在争议，而那些证据开示争议已经解决；但是，通过作出这些范围宽泛的陈述，并附上未附其所回复原始信函的电子邮件来制造混乱，并不能改变这一点。\n\n现在转向法规允许限制这一第二部分，但限制仅限于CPLR 5229，并可与CPLR 5222规定的限制相区别。根据5229在此寻求的救济适用于判决作出之前，因此不同于可针对第三方采取的判决后措施，CPLR 5229下的限制权力只能针对“不利当事人”行使。然而，在任何阶段，限制始终仅限于Kwok先生拥有直接且实际权益的财产。在另我人格地位已经裁定且责任已经确定之前，限制不适用于间接权益，包括在公司中持有的权益、财产收益，或另我人格的资产。\n\n原告也不能将CPLR 5229用作规避判决前扣押法规要求的手段。在此，原告的申请不厌其烦地援引，而且我们今天上午已听到其律师反复陈述并承认，此处唯一关注点是Sherry的住宅所有权。原告本人称Kwok先生并非Sherry的所有人。法庭已确认并表示Kwok先生并非Sherry的所有人。即使Kwok先生对Sherry的住宅并无直接权益，他仍同意一项经双方同意作出的法院命令，据此，他将就各被告实体向任何第三方出售、让与、质押或转让任何资产的任何合同，立即向原告提供书面通知。因此，原告通过该同意令获得的救济，比其依据CPLR 5229在本即时申请中本可获得的救济更为宽泛，因此，对于Sherry资产被处分并无担忧。\n\n提交：NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2020 06:21 PM INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 637 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2020 Case 22-50073 Doc 195 Filed 04/10/22 Entered 04/10/22 18:05:39 Page 35 of 60\n\n庭审记录\n\n现在，原告主张Kwok先生试图削弱其所寻求的救济，但实际上我们是在遵守该法规及法庭根据该法规授予的权力。原告依赖于据称由Kwok先生作出的、关于其对资产所有权的陈述。Kwok先生可以说任何他想说的话，所有权是一个事实和法律问题。如果他不拥有该资产，他就不拥有，至此而已。这不足以使你们获得CPLR 5229下更宽泛的救济。\n\n证据开示已经进行。正如我们今天上午反复听到的，原告在此仅关注Sherry。任何进一步审查都是浪费时间和金钱。该标的已经——Sherry已经受一项命令约束，并已受到限制。原告的任何论点均无法改变CPLR 5229在此的适用。这就是全部。\n\n提交：NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2020 06:21 PM INDEX NO. 652077/2017 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 637 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2020 Case 22-50073 Doc 195 Filed 04/10/22 Entered 04/10/22 18:05:39 Page 36 of 60\n\n庭审记录\n\n现在，重要的是，5229项下的救济完全属于法庭的合理酌处权范围，但Kwok先生已接受审查，任何进一步审查均应限于此前在证据开示中未处理的资产和事项。CPLR 5229不授权重复和冗余的证据开示。\n\n而且，正如我们已经多次提到的，Sherry的转让已受到限制，任何进一步限制均应被驳回。我们已有一项Kwok先生同意的同意令，且Kwok先生对Sherry的住宅不具有直接权益。\n\n因此，Kwok先生请求本庭撤销临时限制令，驳回原告就CPLR 5229救济提出的动议，因为该动议远远超出CPLR 5229的范围。Kwok先生已经接受审查，其资产也已由本庭进行证据开示并予以限制；但如本庭倾向于准许原告依据CPLR 5229寻求的救济，Kwok先生请求本庭行使其酌处权，将该救济修改为限于Kwok先生以其个人身份拥有的资产，\n\n提交：NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2020 06:21 PM INDEX NO. 652077/2017\n\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 637 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2020 Case 22-50073 Doc 195 Filed 04/10/22 Entered 04/10/22 18:05:39 Page 37 of 60\n\n庭审记录\n\n“对方当事人”，以及郭文贵先生此前并非与一项转让有关的先前取证和法院命令之标的的资产。\n\n谢谢您，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：\n好的。Genever（杰尼弗）一方是否有人要发言？\n\nMITCHELL先生：\n没有，法官阁下。我认为刚才说得很好。我加入CARVALHO女士的论证。\n\n法庭：\n好的。\n\n请看，这是一起2017年的案件。我们已经就郭先生的资产提出过多项动议。正如2020年9月15日命令所反映的，法庭认为郭先生曾试图误导法庭。法庭认为，如原告所主张，郭先生正在就其资产玩弄障眼法，并且即使未违反法院命令的文字规定，也违反了法院命令的精神。此事将于2021年1月15日或其后不久终结，届时我们将就另我问题进行审理；但自现在起至2021年1月15日审理开始期间，禁止郭先生及其直接或间接控制的任何实体处分或转让郭先生拥有直接或间接权益的任何财产，尤其包括Sherry-Netherland Hotel（谢里-内瑟兰酒店）的公寓，该公寓是2018年取证及郭先生律师所提及的一项同意命令的标的，以及郭先生曾在不同时间主张拥有所有权的游艇。\n\n提交：纽约县书记官 10/23/2020 06:21 PM 案号 652077/2017 NYSCEF 文件编号 637 收到 NYSCEF：10/23/2020 案件 22-50073 文件 195 提交 04/10/22 录入 04/10/22 18:05:39 第 38 页，共 60 页\n\n郭先生曾一度拥有的Sherry-Netherland公寓，以及郭先生曾一度声称拥有的价值27 million-dollar的游艇。因此，最终结果是，我根据CPLR 5229行使酌处权，禁止对上述两项资产作出任何进一步转让。\n\n庭审记录\n\n因此，我们不会再容许任何障眼法。无论这些资产由何处持有，它们都将继续由目前持有它们之处持有；如果确定目前被列为这些资产所有人的实体是郭先生的另我，或者完全受郭先生支配和控制，则这些资产将可用于满足原告获得的任何判决。\n\n在此期间，即自现在起至2021年1月15日就另我问题进行审理期间，原告可以对任何声称拥有Sherry-Netherland公寓或该游艇的实体进行取证；责令Genever律师和郭先生律师立即向原告律师提供信息，以确认该两项资产的登记所有人。\n\n这是法庭的命令。\n\nCARVALHO女士：法官阁下，我能否请求澄清一下？\n\n我们理解法庭今日的命令，\n\n提交：纽约县书记官 10/23/2020 06:21 PM 案号 652077/2017 NYSCEF 文件编号 637 收到 NYSCEF：10/23/2020 案件 22-50073 文件 195 提交 04/10/22 录入 04/10/22 18:05:39 第 39 页，共 60 页\n\n庭审记录\n\n但是，对于间接所有权，我感到困惑，因为我只是即兴想到，可能存在被禁止进行日常正常业务的实体；某人可以在何种程度上认定某项事物构成间接权益，并阻止正常转让？我的意思是，我不知道这对其他独立自主公司会延伸到多远。\n\n法庭：范围到此为止：在Sherry-Netherland转让一套价值70 million-dollar的公寓，不属于日常正常业务转让。转让一艘价值27 million-dollar的游艇，也不属于日常正常业务转让。如果郭先生想理发，或者郭先生想买一份报纸，或者郭先生想在冠状病毒疫情期间休假，这将属于日常正常业务；但我认为，这个Microsoft Teams平台上的每个人都明白，这两项合计价值至少\\$75 million的资产已经被大量转移，而原告有权查明目前对这些资产拥有所有权的实体、这些实体如何获得这些资产的所有权，以及在郭先生作为这些资产的登记所有人之时与目前登记所有人取得这些资产占有之时之间作出的任何中间转让。\n\nCARVALHO女士：明白了。\n\n提交：纽约县书记官 10/23/2020 06:21 PM 案号 652077/2017 NYSCEF 文件编号 637 收到 NYSCEF：10/23/2020 案件 22-50073 文件 195 提交 04/10/22 录入 04/10/22 18:05:39 第 40 页，共 60 页\n\n庭审记录\n\n因此，具体资产是Sherry公寓和游艇；但为确保我理解无误，立场是，对于其他自主公司，它们可以照常继续经营，其他法律上独立的实体无需停止或中止营业。\n\n法庭：郭先生成立了哪些其他业务及哪些其他实体，对我而言并不明确。这里的意图十分明确且具体：在这起2017年案件中，已经发生了大量策略性周旋、大量掩饰，以及一些公然无视法院命令的行为；我希望知悉，若发生任何交易，而郭先生是主导之手，该交易是否并非日常正常业务交易。\n\nCARVALHO女士：好的。我认为我们明白了。谢谢您，法官阁下。\n\nMOSS先生：法官阁下，如果可以，我只有两点。第一，就资产而言，我们知道，\n\n还有一些在Connecticut（康涅狄格州）的空壳公司拥有他刚以约\\$7 million购得的Greenwich（格林尼治）房地产。我认为，最有效率的方式——而且我们并不知道我们所不知道的事情——我认为，最有效率的推进方式是，让我们一开始就能够送达某种书面询问：有哪些资产，以及持有这些资产的是哪些实体；然后我们可以继续\n\n提交：纽约县书记官 10/23/2020 06:21 PM 案号 652077/2017 NYSCEF 文件编号 637 收到 NYSCEF：10/23/2020 案件 22-50073 文件 195 提交 04/10/22 录入 04/10/22 18:05:39 第 41 页，共 60 页\n\n对郭先生和这些实体进行证言录取；如果它们是实体，则由郭先生作为这些实体的30(b)(6)代表接受证言录取。我希望高效且以最小负担进行此事；与其只是向他提出问题，而他会说自己不知道答案，我认为最有效率的方式是尝试通过书面取证取得实际资产清单。\n\n法庭：请看，我不会告诉你如何执业。你有今日庭审记录的笔录。我认为我已非常明确地说明你可以做什么。你可以就任何资产进行取证——你可以就任何有善意依据相信郭先生直接或间接控制的实体进行取证。可以是书面取证，也可以是口头取证。我不会在你们就可以采取何种取证范围来回争执取证争议时充当校园监督员。我认为郭先生的律师和Genever的律师完全理解庭审记录所反映的内容。我们现在处理的是一段压缩的时间期限。\n\n庭审记录\n\n已经就两项特定资产，而且仅就两项特定资产，作出了限制令；并且已安排于2021年1月15日进行另我审理，以及将\n\n提交：纽约县书记官 10/23/2020 06:21 PM 案号 652077/2017\nNYSCEF 文件编号 637 收到 NYSCEF：10/23/2020 案件 22-50073 文件 195 提交 04/10/22 录入 04/10/22 18:05:39 第 42 页，共 60 页\n\n庭审记录\n\n在另我审理之前或与其同时的某个时间举行损害赔偿听证。\n\n再次强调，这是一起2017年的案件，并且已占用法庭相当多的时间。它已产生数项书面裁决。尽管法院命令被蔑视或被极其宽松地解释，并且尽管有人向法庭作出了故意或非故意的虚假陈述，误导了法庭，我们将在2021年1月结束本案。\n\n因此，法庭记录员会向你们提供其电子邮件地址。你们将订购一份笔录副本。对于本笔录所载内容，我不可能比现在说得更清楚。\n\n如果任何当事人或任何律师无视法院命令，将会受到严厉制裁。\n\n我们都清楚了吗？\n\nMOSS先生：是。\n\n法官阁下，我能否就损害赔偿动议再问一个问题？\n\n我们已提交动议，他们提出异议。我理解法庭将尽快就此问题举行听证。鉴于他们已提出异议而我们尚未答复，我们可否提交答复，因为有些事项我们希望提交法庭审理？\n\n法庭：如果你希望如此。我已经向你解释过，我积压了审判和动议。我已划出1月15日这个日期。该日期不可更改。我们将于2021年1月15日进行另我审理；如果我们能在此前举行损害赔偿听证，就会举行，但从现在至1月15日的时间并不多，而且你，Moss先生，可能会相当忙碌。\n\nMOSS先生：是，法官阁下。\n\nMITCHELL先生：法官阁下，关于今日命令的最后一个问题，因为如您所知，Genever New York（杰尼弗纽约）已申请破产。我怀疑从现在到1月15日期间，破产财产中的任何资产会被出售或发生任何其他情况，但我想确保，尤其是我本人或本案任何当事人，不会因破产法院中发生的任何事情而招致潜在制裁。\n\n法庭：不，我不能——我对任何处于破产中的实体均无管辖权。这并不意味着Moss先生不能向破产法院提出申请。这也并不意味着Moss先生不能在破产法院的任何程序中援引今日这里的庭审笔录，但我完全理解破产法院对于已申请破产实体所适用的自动中止。\n\nMITCHELL先生：谢谢您，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：好的。Terry，你能否向各方提供你的电子邮件\n\n提交：纽约县书记官 10/23/2020 06:21 PM 案号 652077/2017 NYSCEF 文件编号 637 收到 NYSCEF：10/23/2020 案件 22-50073 文件 195 提交 04/10/22 录入 04/10/22 18:05:39 第 44 页，共 60 页\n\n庭审记录\n\n地址，以便他们订购一份将被如此订购并以电子方式提交的笔录副本？\n\n非常感谢。\n\n祝大家愉快。\n\nMOSS先生：谢谢您，法官阁下。\n\n***\n\n证 明\n\n本人Terry-Ann Volberg（特里-安·沃尔伯格），C.S.R.，纽约州官方法庭记录员，特此证明，上述内容是本人速记笔记真实、准确的笔录。\n\n_______________________\nTerry-Ann Volberg, CSR, CRR\n官方法庭记录员\n\n附件B\n\nUNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION（美国康涅狄格地区破产法院布里奇波特分庭）\n\n关于： ： 第11章\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）， ： 案号 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n债务人。 ：\n\nWILLIAM R. BALDIGA（威廉·R·巴尔迪加）为支持债务人申请作出授权聘用及留用BROWN RUDNICK LLP（布朗·拉德尼克律师事务所）担任债务人律师之命令而提交的补充宣誓书\n\n本人William R. Baldiga，现根据28 U.S.C. § 1746，在伪证处罚的约束下声明：\n\n1. 本人是一名获准在纽约州、马萨诸塞州联邦以及纽约州和马萨诸塞州各美国联邦地区法院执业的律师。本人系 Brown Rudnick LLP（布朗·鲁德尼克律师事务所）成员，该律师事务所在包括 Seven Times Square, New York, New York 10036 和 One Financial Center, Boston, Massachusetts 02111 在内的地点设有办公场所。\n\n2. 本人提交本声明（以下简称“补充声明”），以补充本人于 March 30, 2022 作出的声明（以下简称“初始声明”）[Docket No. 142]（以及随附于该声明的聘用协议，以下简称“聘用协议”）中的披露，并进一步支持上述标题所示 Chapter 11 案件（以下简称“Chapter 11 案件”）中的债务人兼占有中的债务人 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵，以下简称“债务人”）提出的《债务人申请作出命令准许聘用及留任 Brown Rudnick LLP 作为债务人律师之申请》（以下简称“申请”）[Dkt. No. 86]。除非另有说明，本人对本声明所载事实具有亲身了解。\n\n1 尽管债务人的法定姓名为 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵），其亦以以下姓名为人所知：Guo Wengui；Miles Guo；及 Miles Kwok。\n\n3. 自提交申请及本人初始声明以来，Brown Rudnick 已完成对 Brown Rudnick 与债务人 Chapter 11 案件中利害关系方之间关联关系的内部识别工作。\n\n4. Brown Rudnick 提交本补充声明，以进一步说明 Brown Rudnick 先前披露的与债务人及本 Chapter 11 案件有关的关联关系。\n\n5. 如本声明所述，如本案中出现任何利益对立情形，Brown Rudnick 可在任何事项上与 Verdolino & Lowey, P.C.（韦尔多利诺与洛伊专业公司）及 Craig R. Jalbert（克雷格·R·贾尔伯特）处于对立立场。\n\n6. 初始声明将 Forbes Hare（福布斯·黑尔）及 Internal Revenue Service（美国国内税收局）列为 Brown Rudnick 的前客户。在编制本补充声明过程中进一步审查 Brown Rudnick 的会计记录后，本人确定该等实体并非 Brown Rudnick 的前客户。\n\n7. 就 United States Trustee（美国受托人）针对 Brown Rudnick 与债务人之间聘用协议条款提出的问题，Brown Rudnick 确认及/或将同意如下：\n\n(i) 尽管聘用协议中有任何相反规定，Brown Rudnick 同意放弃对逾期 30 日未付费用收取 9% 利息的权利。\n\n(ii) 尽管聘用协议中有任何相反规定，Brown Rudnick 将就任何费用报销请求，遵守 United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut（康涅狄格联邦地区美国破产法院）《破产程序地方法则》附录 D 及 11 U.S.C. § 330。\n\n(iii) 为免生疑，在 Brown Rudnick 担任债务人律师期间，Brown Rudnick 不会在任何实体的利益与破产财产利益相对立的任何事项中代理该实体。\n\n(iv) 尽管聘用协议中有任何相反规定，Brown Rudnick 同意，其受债务人聘用受 Bankruptcy Court（破产法院）的管辖，包括与核准就该聘用应付及到期的任何费用或其他报酬有关的事项。\n\n(v) 尽管聘用协议中有任何相反规定，Brown Rudnick 同意放弃要求补足预付保留金的条件。\n\n8. Brown Rudnick 就本 Chapter 11 案件中的利害关系方作出以下额外补充披露：\n\n(i) Verdolino & Lowey, P.C.（“V&L”）：V&L 是一家提供会计、财务顾问及受托服务的专业服务公司。V&L 与 Brown Rudnick 经常代表共同客户参与事项。Brown Rudnick 此前未曾代理 V&L 作为客户。尽管 Brown Rudnick 与 V&L 及 Jalbert 先生存在关联关系（如下文所述），Brown Rudnick 可在与 V&L 利益对立的事项中代理债务人。除拟聘用 V&L 作为债务人的财务顾问外，所有事项（如下文所述）均与债务人及其 Chapter 11 案件完全无关：\n\na. 关于 Purdue Pharma, L.P.（普渡制药有限合伙企业）一案，Case No. 19-23649 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.)（Drain, R.）：Brown Rudnick 担任政府及其他或有诉讼请求权人临时委员会（统称“临时委员会”）的共同代理律师；V&L 就与使政府债权人阿片类药物信托开始运作的计划生效日前工作有关的某些行政事项（持有及支付资金）代理临时委员会。由于 United States District Court for the Southern District of New York（纽约南区美国联邦地区法院）撤销计划确认命令，该等活动目前处于中止状态。\n\nb. 关于 Patricia Pierce Fitzgerald（帕特里夏·皮尔斯·菲茨杰拉德）一案，Case No. 19-12051 (Bankr. D. Mass.)（Bostwick, J.）：Brown Rudnick 担任债务人的律师，V&L 担任 Chapter 7 受托人的会计师及财务顾问。\n\nc. 关于 HMH Media, Inc.（HMH 媒体公司）一案，Case No. 17-12881 (Bankr. D. Del.)（Silverstein, L.）：Brown Rudnick 曾担任重组后债务人的共同代理律师，V&L 的 Craig R. Jalbert 曾担任清算受托人。该破产案件已于 January 2021 结案。\n\nd. 关于 Bulbs and Lamps Corp.（灯泡与灯具公司）一案，Case No. 17-13196 (Bankr. D. Mass.)（Panos, C.）：Brown Rudnick 代理破产财产的一名债权人，V&L 担任 Chapter 7 受托人的会计及财务顾问。\n\ne. 关于 Cosi, Inc.（科西公司）一案，Case No. 16-13704 (Bankr. D. Mass.)（Hoffman, M.）：Brown Rudnick 曾担任重组后债务人的律师，V&L 的 Craig R. Jalbert 曾担任确认计划后的清算受托人。该破产案件已于 March 2019 结案。\n\nf. 关于 FIAC, Inc.（FIAC 公司）一案，Case No. 16-12238 (Bankr. D. Del.)（Shannon, B.）：Brown Rudnick 曾担任股权证券持有人官方委员会的律师，并在 Chapter 11 计划确认及股权委员会解散后担任清算受托人的律师。V&L 曾担任清算受托人的会计师。该破产案件已于 November 2018 结案。\n\ng. 关于 Corinthian Colleges, Inc.（科林斯学院公司）一案，Case No. 15-10952 (Bankr. D. Del.)（Carey, K.）：Brown Rudnick 曾担任无担保债权人官方委员会的律师。V&L 的 Craig R. Jalbert 在确认的 Chapter 11 计划下被任命为 Corinthian Distribution Trust（科林斯分配信托）的受托人，该任命发生于 Brown Rudnick 参与该事项已终止之后。\n\nh. 关于 Reed and Barton Corporation（里德与巴顿公司）一案，Case No. 15-10534 (Bankr. D. Mass.)（Hoffman, M.）：Brown Rudnick 曾担任无担保债权人官方委员会的律师，V&L 曾担任债务人的会计师及财务顾问。\n\ni. 关于 Lyondell Chemical Company, et al.（利安德尔化学公司等）一案，Case No. 09-10023 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.)（Gerber, R.）：Brown Rudnick 曾担任律师，V&L 目前担任根据 Lyondell 已确认的 Chapter 11 计划设立的若干信托的管理人。Brown Rudnick 在该等事项上的工作于 2020 年结束。\n\nj. 无偿公益服务。Brown Rudnick 担任律师，V&L 就 Massachusetts（马萨诸塞州）Boston（波士顿）的一项公平住房倡议无偿提供行政服务（持有及支付资金）及咨询服务。\n\n(ii) Craig R. Jalbert：除 Brown Rudnick 与 Jalbert 先生所属公司 V&L 的工作关系外，Brown Rudnick 目前还代理 Jalbert 先生，后者以法院指定的 Vernon Tort Claims Trust（“Vernon 信托”）受托人身份行事；该信托系根据 Exide Technologies, LLC（埃克赛德技术有限责任公司）Chapter 11 计划设立，Case No. 13-11482 (Bankr. D. Del.)（Walrath, J.）。此外，在 The Northwest Company, LLC（西北公司有限责任公司）的 Chapter 11 案件中，Case No. 20-10990 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.)（Wiles, M.），Brown Rudnick 代理一名曾寻求任命 Chapter 11 受托人的无担保债权人。Jalbert 先生作为该动议的和解结果被任命为其中一个债务人实体的独立管理人，并在该案件转换后由 Chapter 7 受托人继任。Brown Rudnick 曾担任在 F-Squared Investment Management, LLC（F-Squared 投资管理有限责任公司）Chapter 11 案件中任命的无担保债权人官方委员会的共同代理律师，Case No. 15-11469 (Bankr. D. Del.)（Silverstein, L.）。Brown Rudnick 目前担任根据 F-Squared Chapter 11 计划设立的信托的共同代理律师，Jalbert 先生担任该等信托的受托人。Brown Rudnick 与 Jalbert 先生之间此前的所有关联关系均与债务人及其 Chapter 11 案件完全无关。\n\n(iii) BakerHostetler LLP（贝克·霍斯泰勒律师事务所）：BakerHostetler LLP 目前或此前曾在 Brown Rudnick 目前或此前代理某一方的事项中代理客户。该等事项均与债务人及其 Chapter 11 案件完全无关。\n\n(iv) HarcusParker Limited（哈克斯·帕克有限公司）：HarcusParker Limited 曾是 Brown Rudnick 的客户，所涉事项与债务人及其 Chapter 11 案件完全无关。\n\n(v) Internal Revenue Service：Brown Rudnick 目前及此前曾代理与 Internal Revenue Service 利益对立的客户。此外，在 Brown Rudnick 代理无担保债权人或股权持有人临时委员会或官方委员会的案件中，Internal Revenue Service 经常为债权人。该等事项均与债务人及其 Chapter 11 案件完全无关。\n\n(vi) UBS AG（瑞银集团）：Brown Rudnick 目前及此前曾代理与 UBS AG 及其关联方利益对立的客户。若干 Brown Rudnick 律师在加入 Brown Rudnick 前曾代理 UBS AG 及其关联方。该等事项均与债务人或其 Chapter 11 案件无关。\n\n(vii) United States Bankruptcy Court Judge Julie A. Manning（美国破产法院法官朱莉·A·曼宁）：两名 Brown Rudnick 合伙人与 Manning 法官此前存在职业及/或社交关系。该两名律师未参与 Brown Rudnick 对债务人的代理。\n\n(viii) Zheng Wu（吴征，亦称 Bruno Wu）：Zheng Wu 先生拥有或控制的若干实体曾是 Brown Rudnick 的客户，所涉事项与债务人及其 Chapter 11 案件完全无关。Brown Rudnick 未受 Wu 先生聘用，亦未以其个人身份代理 Wu 先生。Brown Rudnick 的聘用约于五（5）年前，即 June 2017 结束。该聘用的范围及实质与本 Chapter 11 案件完全无关。根据聘用协议，客户同意放弃与聘用范围无关事项中现有及未来的利益冲突。\n\n9. Brown Rudnick 就其与债务人之间聘用协议项下的预付保留金（以下简称“保留金”）作出以下额外披露：\n\n(i) 保留金是 Brown Rudnick 同意接受债务人的聘用并订立聘用协议的必要组成部分。鉴于债务人申请破产前情形的紧迫性（包括债务人可能即将被监禁）、债务人与其若干债权人之间关系的高度对抗性（包括由其自身经验丰富的律师代理的 Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund, L.P.（太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金有限合伙企业））、债务人破产案件所涉问题的复杂性、债务人需要聘请具备高超技能及丰富经验的律师，以及鉴于债务人申请破产前财务状况而存在的重大费用风险等因素，本人认为，保留金作为对 Brown Rudnick 根据聘用协议同意并预期提供的大量服务的预先付款形式，过去和目前均属合理。若债务人未同意并支付保留金，Brown Rudnick 不会接受该项聘用。\n\n- (ii) 根据聘用协议的明确规定，预付金未存入或转入 Brown Rudnick（布朗·拉德尼克律师事务所）的客户信托账户。\n- (iii) 相反，预付金最初存入 Brown Rudnick 的一般存款账户（连同该律所的其他存款），随后从该一般存款账户转入等额款项至 Brown Rudnick 的一般预付金账户（该款项至今仍与该律所的其他预付金一同存放于该账户）。\n\n- 10. Brown Rudnick 曾担任 Herald Media Holdings, Inc.（赫拉德媒体控股公司）的债务人破产法律顾问。我代表本所负责该项聘用。该案涉及一名债务人，其：(i) 在提交破产申请前一年约有 $34 million 的营业收入；(ii) 截至申请日持有超过 $6 million 的资产（主要为现金和应收账款）；(iii) 就其资产获得一项 $5 million 的“马匹竞标”报价；以及 (iv) 获得一笔 $500,000 的 DIP 贷款，该贷款在无异议的情况下获批。此外，Brown Rudnick 在申请提交前已获支付约 $269,100。\n\n11. Brown Rudnick 还曾担任 Dean and DeLuca New York Inc.（迪恩与德卢卡纽约公司）的债务人破产法律顾问。我代表本所负责该项聘用。在该案中，债务人：(i) 在申请日前向 Brown Rudnick 支付了总额约为 $517,000 的预付金（债务人向所有破产顾问支付的预付金总额约为 $750,000），截至申请提交时预付金余额约为 $374,000；(ii) 拥有某些产生现金收入的资产（例如，上一年度产生 $1.5 million 收入的特许经营协议）；(iii) 拥有其他有形资产（账面价值为 $20 million 的财产和设备；账面价值约为 $50 million 的注册商标）；以及 (iv) 获得约 $2.4 million 的 DIP 融资。\n\n根据 28 U.S.C. § 1746，本人特此在伪证处罚下声明，据本人所知及所信，上述内容真实且正确。\n\n日期：April 10, 2022 New York, New York\n\n/s/ William R. Baldiga William R. Baldiga（威廉·R·巴尔迪加）\n证物 C-1\n美国康涅狄格联邦破产法院布里奇波特分院\n\n--------------------------------------------------------------------X\n关于：Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵），债务人。 : : : : : : : : Chapter 11 Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n--------------------------------------------------------------------X\n授权聘用 BROWN RUDNICK LLP 担任债务人及占有中债务人法律顾问的命令\n\n兹审理 Ho Wan Kwok 先生（“申请”）^1 以本案标题所示 Chapter 11 案件中的债务人及占有中债务人身份，根据经修订的 United States Code 第 11 编 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330（“破产法”），提出的申请，请求授权自申请日生效聘用 Brown Rudnick LLP（“Brown Rudnick”）担任其破产法律顾问，具体内容详见该申请；并审理 Brown Rudnick 合伙人 William R. Baldiga 律师的宣誓书及补充宣誓书（合称“Baldiga 宣誓书”）；法院根据申请及 Baldiga 宣誓书中作出的陈述，确信 Brown Rudnick 就其拟受聘处理的事项而言并不代表或持有任何与 Kwok 先生或其 Chapter 11 破产财产利益相冲突的利益，且其为经 11 U.S.C. § 1107(b) 修正的 11 U.S.C. § 101(14) 所规定的“无利害关系人”，并且聘用 Brown Rudnick 对 Kwok 先生及其 Chapter 11 破产财产属必要；法院根据 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 和 1334 对审理该申请及其中请求的救济具有管辖权；法院已审议对该申请提出的异议以及债务人提出的解决该等异议的方案；\n\n1. 本文中未另行定义的首字母大写术语，具有申请中所赋予的含义。\n\n法院已驳回任何未以其他方式解决或撤回的进一步异议；法院已就该申请举行听证；法院已认定已向所有利害关系方就该申请作出充分通知；经适当审议并认定存在充分理由，特此命令：\n\n兹命令：\n\n1. 准予并批准该申请。\n\n2. 根据 United States Code 第 11 编第 327(a) 和 328(a) 条、11 U.S.C. §§ 101, et seq.（“破产法”）、Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure（“破产程序联邦规则”）第 2014 条以及 Local Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure for the District of Connecticut（“地方法则”）第 2014-1 条，授权债务人自申请日起聘用并留任 Brown Rudnick 担任其法律顾问，以履行申请和 Baldiga 宣誓书所述服务。\n\n3. Brown Rudnick 应依照破产法第 330 和 331 条规定的程序，以及届时不时适用的破产程序联邦规则、地方法则和 United States Trustee Office（美国受托人办公室）制定的指引，并依照本法院命令可能规定的其他程序获得报酬。\n\n4. 在申请所载费率作出任何上调之前，Brown Rudnick 必须提前十个工作日向债务人、美国受托人及 Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors（无担保债权人正式委员会）发出通知，并须向法院提交该通知。\n\n5. 授权并赋予 Kwok 先生采取实施本命令所授予救济所必需的一切行动的权力。\n\n6. 尽管聘用协议中有任何相反规定，Brown Rudnick 同意放弃其就逾期 30 天未支付的费用收取 9% 利息的权利。\n\n7. 尽管聘用协议中有任何相反规定，Brown Rudnick 将就任何费用偿还请求遵守地方法则附录 D 和 11 U.S.C. § 330。\n\n8. 为免生疑，在 Brown Rudnick 受聘担任债务人法律顾问期间，Brown Rudnick 不会在任何该实体利益与破产财产相冲突的事项上代理任何实体。\n\n9. 尽管聘用协议中有任何相反规定，Brown Rudnick 同意其受债务人聘用受破产法院管辖，包括与核准就该项聘用应付及欠付的任何费用或其他报酬有关的事项。\n\n10. 尽管聘用协议中有任何相反规定，Brown Rudnick 同意放弃补足聘用协议项下预付金的要求。\n\n11. 本命令的条款和条件应于录入后立即生效并可执行。\n\n12. 本法院保留管辖权，以审理并裁定因实施和执行本命令而产生或与之相关的所有事项。\n\n证物 C-2\n美国康涅狄格联邦破产法院布里奇波特分院\n\n关于： :\n:\nChapter 11\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）， :\n:\nCase No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n债务人。 :\n\n授权聘用 BROWN RUDNICK LLP 担任债务人及占有中债务人法律顾问的命令\n\n兹审理 Ho Wan Kwok 先生（“申请”）^1 以本案标题所示 Chapter 11 案件中的债务人及占有中债务人身份，根据经修订的 United States Code 第 11 编 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330（“破产法”），提出的申请，请求授权自申请日生效聘用 Brown Rudnick LLP（“Brown Rudnick LLP”）担任其破产法律顾问，具体内容详见该申请；并审理所附 Brown Rudnick 合伙人 William R. Baldiga 律师的宣誓书及补充宣誓书（合称“Baldiga 宣誓书”）；法院根据申请及 Baldiga 宣誓书中作出的陈述，确信 Brown Rudnick 就其拟受聘处理的事项而言并不代表或持有任何与 Kwok 先生或其 Chapter 11 破产财产利益相冲突的利益，且其为经 11 U.S.C. § 1107(b) 修正的 11 U.S.C. § 101(14) 所规定的“无利害关系人”，并且聘用 Brown Rudnick 对 Kwok 先生及其 Chapter 11 破产财产属必要；法院根据 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 和 1334 对审理该申请及其中请求的救济具有管辖权；法院已审议对该申请提出的异议以及债务人提出的解决该等异议的方案；法院已驳回任何未以其他方式解决或撤回的进一步异议；法院已就该申请举行听证；法院已认定已向所有利害关系方就该申请作出充分通知；经适当审议并认定存在充分理由，特此命令：\n\n1. 本文中未另行定义的首字母大写术语，具有申请中所赋予的含义。\n\n兹命令：\n\n1. 准予并批准该申请。\n\n2. 根据 United States Code 第 11 编第 327(a) 和 328(a) 条、11 U.S.C. §§ 101, et seq.（“破产法”）、Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure（“破产程序联邦规则”）第 2014 条以及 Local Bankruptcy Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure for the District of Connecticut（“地方法则”）第 2014-1 条，授权债务人自申请日起聘用并留任 Brown Rudnick 担任其法律顾问，以履行申请和 Baldiga 宣誓书所述服务。\n\n3. Brown Rudnick 应依照破产法第 330 和 331 条规定的程序，以及届时不时适用的破产程序联邦规则、地方法则和美国受托人办公室制定的指引，并依照本法院命令可能规定的其他程序获得报酬。\n\n4. 在申请所载费率作出任何上调之前，Brown Rudnick 必须提前十个工作日向债务人、美国受托人及无担保债权人正式委员会发出通知，并须向法院提交该通知。\n\n5. 授权并赋予 Kwok 先生采取实施本命令所授予救济所必需的一切行动的权力。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 195 Filed 04/10/22 Entered 04/10/22 18:05:39 Page 60 of 60\n\n6. 尽管聘用协议中有任何相反规定，Brown Rudnick 同意放弃其就逾期 30 天未支付的费用收取 9% 利息的权利。\n\n7. 尽管聘用协议中有任何相反规定，Brown Rudnick 将就任何费用偿还请求遵守地方法则附录 D 和 11 U.S.C. § 330。\n\n8. 为免生疑，在 Brown Rudnick 受聘担任债务人法律顾问期间，Brown Rudnick 不会在任何该实体利益与破产财产相冲突的事项上代理任何实体。\n\n9. 尽管聘用协议中有任何相反规定，Brown Rudnick 同意其受债务人聘用受破产法院管辖，包括与核准就该项聘用应付及欠付的任何费用或其他报酬有关的事项。\n\n10. 尽管聘用协议中有任何相反规定，Brown Rudnick 同意放弃补足聘用协议项下预付金的要求。\n\n6. 本命令的条款和条件应于录入后立即生效并可执行。\n\n7. 本法院保留管辖权，以审理并裁定因实施和执行本命令而产生或与之相关的所有事项。","key_entities":["Kwok","Je","Ho Wan Kwok","Guo","Miles Guo","CIPA"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":57,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":86,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":142,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":159,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":164,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":169,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":178,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":17286,"status":"published","published_at":"2022-03-15 00:00:00","created_at":"2022-03-15","updated_at":"2026-08-23 21:49:10"}