{"id":"court_ctb_2035_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":2035,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT ) )","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\n ) )\n\n)\n\nIn re: ) Chapter 11 ) Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) HO WAN KWOK, *et al.*, ) (Jointly Administered)\n\nDebtors. ) Re: ECF Nos. 1453 and 1649\n\n# **APPEARANCES**\n\nLuc A. Despins (argued) Avram E. Luft G. Alexander Bongartz Douglass Barron Paul Hastings LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166\n\nDouglass S. Skalka Patrick R. Linsey Neubert, Pepe & Montieth 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, CT 06510\n\nand\n\nNicholas A. Bassett (argued) Paul Hastings LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C. 20036\n\n*Counsel for Movant and Cross-Respondent Mr. Luc A. Despins, Chapter 11 Trustee for the Estate of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok*\n\nStephen R. Cook Brown Rudnick LLP 2211 Michelson Drive, 7th Floor Irvine, California 92612\n\nand\n\nStephen A. Best (argued) Brown Rudnick LLP 601 13th Street, NW, Suite 600 Washington, DC 20005\n\nEric Henzy (argued) James M. Moriarty Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. 10 Middle Street Bridgeport, CT 06604\n\nand\n\nWilliam Baldiga (argued) Brown Rudnick LLP Seven Times Square New York, NY 10036\n\n*Counsel for Respondent and Cross-Movant Mr. Ho Wan Kwok, Debtor1*\n\n# **MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER HOLDING INDIVIDUAL DEBTOR IN CONTEMPT OF COURT AND DENYING MOTION FOR STAY OF ORDER COMPELLING PRODUCTION**\n\nJulie A. Manning, United States Bankruptcy Judge\n\n# **I. INTRODUCTION**\n\nBefore the Court are the Motion for Order to Show Cause Why Debtor Should Not Be Held in Contempt of Court (the \"Contempt Motion\"), (ECF No. 14532 ), filed by Mr. Luc A. Despins, in his capacity as Chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") for the bankruptcy estate (the \"Estate\") of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Individual Debtor\"), and the Motion for a Limited Stay of Order Granting in Part Motion to Compel Compliance (the \"Stay Motion,\" and together with the Contempt Motion, each a \"Cross-Motion\" and, collectively, the \"Cross-Motions\"), (ECF No. 1649), filed by the Individual Debtor. The Trustee seeks to hold the Individual Debtor in civil contempt of court for failure to comply with the Order Granting in Part Motion to Compel Compliance (the \"Order Compelling Production\"). (ECF No. 1353.) The Individual Debtor cross-moves to stay the Order Compelling Production in light of the criminal action *United States v. Kwok*, Case No. 23 Cr. 118 (AT) (S.D.N.Y.) (the \"Criminal Action\") pending in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (the \"Criminal Court\"). For\n\n<sup>1</sup> The attorneys at Brown Rudnick LLP have withdrawn their appearances since these matters were argued. (ECF No. 2034.)\n\n<sup>2</sup> Various pleadings and orders discussed in this memorandum of decision were omnibus in nature. For the sake of clarity and coherence, the titles of pleadings and orders have been set forth only insofar as they concern the parties before the Court on the instant matters.\n\nthe reasons stated below, the Court holds the Individual Debtor in civil contempt of court and denies the Stay Motion.\n\n## **II. BACKGROUND**\n\nThe Individual Debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition in this Court on February 15, 2022. (ECF No. 1.) The Individual Debtor's case is jointly administered with two affiliated corporate Chapter 11 cases. (ECF Nos. 970 and 1141.) For the reasons set forth therein, on June 15, 2022, the Court entered a memorandum of decision and order appointing a Chapter 11 trustee. (ECF No. 465.) *In re Kwok*, 640 B.R. 514 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022). On July 8, 2022, Mr. Despins was appointed as the Trustee. (ECF No. 523.)\n\nOn July 28, 2022, the Trustee filed the Motion for 2004 Examination of the [Individual] Debtor, (ECF No. 636), which motion the Court granted, (ECF No. 757), on August 16, 2022. On August 19, 2022, the Individual Debtor was served with the Rule 2004 subpoena. (*See, e.g.*, ECF No. 1650 ¶ 7.) On October 28, 2022, the Trustee filed a Motion for Order Compelling Individual Debtor to Comply with Rule 2004 Subpoena (the \"Motion to Compel\"). (ECF No. 1046.) On November 14, 2022, the Individual Debtor filed an objection to the Motion to Compel. (ECF No. 1090.) On November 30, 2022, a hearing was held on the Motion to Compel. The Court took the Motion to Compel under advisement. On January 20, 2023,3 the Court entered the Order Compelling Production. (ECF No. 1353.)\n\n<sup>3</sup> Between November 16, 2022, and January 13, 2023, the Court was engaged with matters in an adversary proceeding related to these Chapter 11 cases styled *Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund v. Kwok (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 22-05032 (JAM) (Bankr D. Conn. Jan. 13, 2023) (hereinafter the \"Social Media/Protest Adversary\"). Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(3), the Court was required to address the matters in that adversary proceeding \"at the earliest possible time, taking precedence over all other matters except hearings on older matters of the same character.\"\n\nOn February 7, 2023, the Individual Debtor filed a declaration in response to the Order Compelling Production (the \"Declaration\"). (ECF No. 1444 Ex. A.) In the Declaration, the Individual Debtor stated under penalty of perjury that he invoked his \"rights under the 5th Amendment to the United States Constitution, including under the act of production doctrine[,] with respect to the Subpoena dated August 17, 2022, in its entirety, including all requests for documents and information set forth therein.\" (*Id.* Ex. A.) On February 10, 2023, the Trustee filed the Contempt Motion, arguing that (i) the Individual Debtor needed to show cause why his invocation of the Fifth Amendment was proper and why he should not be held in contempt of court; (ii) even if the Individual Debtor's invocation was proper, he needed to assert it in response to each request for documents and information; and (iii) the Declaration did not comply with the Order Compelling Production because it did not detail the efforts undergone to search for documents and information responsive to the subpoenas. (ECF No. 1453.) On March 7, 2023, a hearing was held on the Contempt Motion. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court set a briefing schedule on the issues raised by the Contempt Motion.\n\nOn March 15, 2023, at the start of an evidentiary hearing in a related adversary proceeding, the Individual Debtor's counsel informed the Court that an indictment against the Individual Debtor had been unsealed in the Criminal Action and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (the \"FBI\") had arrested the Individual Debtor earlier that morning. On March 22, 2023, the Court granted the Individual Debtor's motion for an extension of time to respond to the Contempt Motion. (ECF No. 1585.)\n\nOn April 10, 2023, the Individual Debtor filed an objection to the Contempt Motion. (ECF No. 1650.) The Individual Debtor's objection argues that he has complied with the Order Compelling Production because he has properly invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-\n\nincrimination. (*Id.*) Contemporaneously, the Individual Debtor, through his counsel in the Criminal Action appearing in these Chapter 11 cases as his special (criminal) counsel, filed the Stay Motion. (ECF No. 1649.) The Stay Motion argues that to preserve the Individual Debtor's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, this Court must stay the Order Compelling Production pending resolution of the Criminal Action. (*Id.*) On April 14, 2023, the Trustee filed a reply to the objection to the Contempt Motion. (ECF No. 1670.) On April 19, 2023, the Trustee filed an objection to the Stay Motion. (ECF No. 1680.)\n\nOn April 20, 2023, a hearing was held on the Cross-Motions. At the conclusion of argument, the Trustee and the Individual Debtor seemingly reached a consensual resolution of the Cross-Motions. However, on April 24, 2023, the parties filed competing proposed orders. (ECF Nos. 1698, 1699.) On April 27, 2023, a Status Conference on the Cross-Motions was held to discuss the competing orders. The parties agreed to proceed consensually where they could agree, but expressed disagreement as to the terms of the previous agreement. On May 1, 2023, the Court entered a consent order requiring the Individual Debtor to make individual invocations of his Fifth Amendment right to each of two-hundred two (202) questions posed by the Trustee. (ECF No. 1740.) Also on that date, the Individual Debtor filed a supplemental pleading in support of his interpretation of the April 20th agreement. (ECF No. 1737.)\n\nOn May 2, 2023, a second hearing was held on the Cross-Motions resulting in an impasse as to the terms of the April 20th agreement. The Trustee argued that the parties had agreed the Individual Debtor would file a motion in the Criminal Action seeking permission to share the prosecution's production to him with the Trustee, provided the Trustee complied with protective orders and other confidentiality orders and use restrictions issued in the Criminal Action. The Individual Debtor argued that the parties had agreed that the Individual Debtor would seek,\n\npotentially by motion, to have the prosecution agree to produce documents simultaneously to the Individual Debtor and the Trustee, provided the Trustee complied with protective orders and other confidentiality orders and use restrictions issued in the Criminal Action. Citing the impasse, the Court concluded it had to rule on the Cross-Motions. However, the Individual Debtor's bankruptcy counsel asked the Court to wait before ruling on the Cross-Motions to allow the Individual Debtor time to appreciate the nature of the prosecution's production to him in the Criminal Action.\n\nGiven the serious nature of the issues involved, the Court waited. On June 13, 2023, a final hearing was held on the Cross-Motions. The Court inquired whether the parties had made any progress toward a consensual resolution of the Cross-Motions. The parties reported that the Individual Debtor had prepared a supplemental declaration (the \"Supplemental Declaration\"), wherein he invoked the Fifth Amendment on an individuated basis to each of the Trustee's questions. (*See Despins ex rel. Kwok v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073, Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 8, 2023), ECF No. 1 Ex. 1.) Beyond the Supplemental Declaration, however, the parties reported that the impasse remained and asked the Court to rule on the Cross-Motions. The Court took the Cross-Motions under advisement.\n\nThe Cross-Motions are ripe for decision.\n\n### **III. JURISDICTION**\n\nThe United States District Court for the District of Connecticut has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). This Court has authority to hear and determine this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) and the Order of Reference of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut dated September 21, 1984. The instant proceedings are statutorily core proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A). The Court concludes its exercise of\n\njurisdiction is not precluded by Constitutional concerns. *Cf. Stern v. Marshall*, 564 U.S. 462, 487–99 (2011). Moreover, the Trustee and the Individual Debtor have impliedly consented to this Court entering a final order on the Cross-Motions by filing dispositive motions without contesting this Court's authority to enter a final order. *See Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif*, 575 U.S. 665, 686 (2015) (holding that parties may consent to entry of a final order by bankruptcy courts notwithstanding the holding in *Stern*); *True Traditions, LC v. Wu*, 552 B.R. 826, 838 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (holding that implied consent is given by filing a dispositive motion).\n\nVenue in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.\n\n# **IV. DISCUSSION4**\n\nThe Cross-Motions present serious issues. The Trustee seeks to hold the Individual Debtor in contempt for failure to comply with the Order Compelling Production. The Individual Debtor argues that the invocation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is compliance and must be protected by a stay of the Order Compelling Production. For the reasons stated below, the Court concludes that the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination does not apply under the specific facts and circumstances before the Court. Therefore, the Court holds the Individual Debtor in contempt of court and denies the Stay Motion.\n\n### **A. Is the Individual Debtor in civil contempt of court?**\n\nThe Court first considers whether the Individual Debtor is in contempt of court for failure to comply with the Order Compelling Production. This Court has the power to hold parties in contempt of court under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9020. *Taggart v. Lorenzen ex*\n\n<sup>4</sup> The following constitutes the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Court pursuant to Rule 7052 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, which is made applicable to contested matters by Rule 9014(c).\n\n*rel. Brown*, 139 S. Ct. 1795, 1801 (2019); *PHH Mortg. Corp. v. Sensenich ex rel. Gravel (In re Gravel)*, 6 F.4th 503, 512 (2d Cir. 2021); *Mar. Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chauteaugay Corp.)*, 920 F.2d 183, 187 (2d. Cir. 1990). Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 37(b)(1) and 37(b)(2)(A)(vii), made applicable by D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 37 and D. Conn. Bankr. L.R. 1001-1(a)(1) and 2004-1(a), provide further authority to hold parties in contempt of an order compelling production of discovery materials.\n\nContempt may be sought to \"'coerce the defendant into compliance'\" with a court order or to \"'compensate the complainant for losses'\" resulting from noncompliance with a court order. *Taggart*, 139 S. Ct. at 1801 (citing *United States v. United Mine Workers*, 330 U.S. 258, 303–04 (1947)). A finding of civil contempt requires that \"(1) the order the contemnor failed to comply with is clear and unambiguous, (2) the proof of noncompliance is clear and convincing, and (3) the contemnor has not diligently attempted to comply in a reasonable manner.\" *King v. Allied Vision, Ltd.*, 65 F.3d 1051, 1058 (2d Cir. 1995). The contemnor must also (4) have notice of the relevant order. *Gravel*, 6 F.4th at 512.\n\n### **1. Is the Order Compelling Compliance clear and unambiguous?**\n\nAn order is clear and unambiguous where \"'there is [no] *fair ground of doubt* as to the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct.'\" *Taggart*, 139 S. Ct. at 1801 (citing *Cal. Artificial Stone Paving Co. v. Molitor*, 113 U.S. 609 (1885)). A court generally applies an objective standard – a \"party's subjective belief that she was complying with an order ordinarily will not insulate her from civil contempt if that belief was objectively unreasonable.\" *Taggart*, 139 S. Ct. at 1802 (citing *McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co.*, 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1949) (\"The absence of wilfulness [sic] does not relieve from civil contempt.\")). Nevertheless, a party's bad faith may justify \"placing 'the burden of any uncertainty in the decree . . . on [the] shoulders' of the party\n\nwho violated the court order,\" and \"a party's good faith, even where it does not bar civil\n\ncontempt, may help to determine an appropriate sanction.\" *Taggart*, 139 S. Ct. at 1802 (citing\n\n*McComb*, 336 U.S. at 192–93 and *Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A.*, 481 U.S.\n\n787, 801 (1987)).\n\nThe Order Compelling production states, in pertinent part, the following:\n\n**ORDERED:** The Objection is **OVERRULED** as it relates to discovery requests directed to the [Individual] Debtor except as to the requests that seek documents dated earlier than June 1, 2014, and to the requests that seek the [Individual] Debtor's passport(s), to which extent the Objection is **SUSTAINED**, without prejudice to the Trustee to seek documents dated earlier than June 1, 2014, and the [Individual] Debtor's passport(s) at a later date as the investigation proceeds upon cause shown. The [Individual] Debtor shall, by 5:00 p.m. on January 31, 2023, search for and produce to the Trustee:\n\n(i) documents responsive to the Trustee's requests dated June 1, 2014, or later, unless a particular request specifies a different time period that does not begin before June 1, 2014;\n\n(ii) documents responsive to the Trustee's requests as to both assets he acknowledges he owns and assets allegedly belonging to persons or entities other than the [Individual] Debtor, including without limitation his family members and associated entities; and\n\n(iii) documents responsive to the Trustee's requests that are within his custody, possession, or control, including without limitation documents in the files of his current or former counsel and other agents and advisors, unless such documents have already been produced by his current or former counsel and other agents and advisors but without consideration of any potential future production by his current or former counsel and other agents and advisors;\n\nand it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** The [Individual] Debtor shall, by 5:00 p.m. on February 7, 2023, file on the docket of this case a sworn declaration describing in detail the document collection, search, and review actions taken by him and his counsel in response to the subpoena, including without limitation a detailed description of the processes that he and his counsel performed to:\n\n(i) identify all of the [Individual] Debtor's electronic devices; all online document repositories to which he has access; all social media, email, and other accounts associated with electronic documents; all bank accounts and related\n\naccount statements; and all other potential sources of responsive hard copy and electronic documents that may exist; and\n\n(ii) search the foregoing sources for responsive documents, including without limitation for documents responsive to the requests related to expenses or money transfers, to assets or financial or business transactions or records related to the [Individual] Debtor's family or associated entities, and to business interests associated with the [Individual] Debtor . . .\n\n(ECF No. 1353.) The Individual Debtor did not raise any argument in pleadings or during oral argument that there is \"a fair ground of doubt\" as to the meaning of the Order Compelling Production.5 The Court concludes the Order Compelling Production is clear and unambiguous as it relates to the Individual Debtor.6\n\n### **2. Did the Individual Debtor comply with the Order Compelling Production?**\n\nRegarding the second element, the Trustee must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the Individual Debtor has not complied with the Order Compelling Production. *King*, 65 F.3d at 1058. The Trustee argues that because (i) the Individual Debtor has failed to produce documents or records and (ii) the Individual Debtor has failed to file a declaration identifying potential sources of documents or records as well as the efforts undertaken to search those sources, the Individual Debtor has not complied with the Order Compelling Production.\n\nIn response, the Individual Debtor makes two arguments. First, the Individual Debtor argues that it is impossible for him to comply because he is presently being detained pending trial without the possibility of pre-trial release. Second, the Individual Debtor argues that the\n\n<sup>5</sup> The Individual Debtor argues that there is a fair ground of doubt as to whether the Individual Debtor could invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in response to the Order Compelling Production. The Court considers this argument below in the discussion of whether the Individual Debtor has diligently attempted to comply with the Order Compelling Production.\n\n<sup>6</sup> The Court has previously held that the Order Compelling Production is clear and unambiguous as to other parties. (*See* ECF No. 1537.)\n\n\"act of production\" doctrine permits him to invoke his Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination in response to requests for the production of documents and records. On this basis, the Individual Debtor asserts that he has complied with the Order Compelling Production.\n\n### **i. Is it impossible for the Individual Debtor to comply?**\n\nWhile the Individual Debtor is correct that \"[a] long recognized defense to a civil contempt citation is the cited individual's inability to comply with the court's order,\" *United States v. Wendy*, 575 F.2d 1025, 1030 (2d Cir. 1978), and that the proper time to assess impossibility of compliance is at the time of issuing the ruling on contempt, *United States v. Rylander*, 460 U.S. 752, 757 (1983), the Court concludes compliance remains possible for the Individual Debtor. While it is true that the prosecution has seized documents and records of the Individual Debtor in connection with the Criminal Action, the Individual Debtor has not established that (a) all of his documents and records have been seized and (b) he has no additional copies of the seized records. Moreover, based on the statements of his counsel, the Court understands the prosecution's production to the Individual Debtor in the Criminal Action should begin soon – if it has not already. While it is (i) likely that the Trustee would have to become a signatory to and comply with confidentiality requirements and use restrictions in the Criminal Action and (ii) possible that production to the Trustee may be opposed by the prosecution or not allowed by the Criminal Court, it is not impossible for the Individual Debtor to petition the Criminal Court to allow production to the Trustee. Although, the Individual Debtor is presently detained pending trial, his attorneys are not. The Individual Debtor may produce documents through his attorneys and/or other agents. Therefore, it is not impossible for the Individual Debtor to comply with the Order Compelling Production.\n\n11\n\n### **ii. Has the Individual Debtor properly invoked the Fifth Amendment?**\n\n# **a. Does the act of production doctrine apply?**\n\nThe Individual Debtor's argument that he has complied with the Order Compelling Production relies on the \"act of production\" doctrine. In *Fisher v. United States*, which held that the act of production at issue in that case was not protected by the Fifth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court nevertheless held that\n\nThe act of producing evidence in response to a subpoena nevertheless has communicative aspects of its own, wholly aside from the contents of the papers produced. Compliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes the existence of the papers demanded and their possession or control by the taxpayer. It also would indicate the taxpayer's belief that the papers are those described in the subpoena.\n\n425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976); *see United States v. Hubbell*, 530 U.S. 27, 36–37 (2000). In *Fisher*, the Supreme Court held the test to determine if the act of production could be protected by the Fifth Amendment is whether the \"tacit averments\" involved in the act of production are both \"testimonial\" and \"incriminating\" under prevailing Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. 425 U.S. at 410–11. In particular, the Supreme Court expressed concern regarding tacit averments as to: (i) the existence of the documents or records; (ii) the producing party's possession or control over the documents or records; and (iii) the producing party's belief that the documents and records were those requested by the subpoena. *Id.* The act of production doctrine does not protect the testimonial and incriminating contents of documents – it only protects testimonial and incriminating *production*. *Id.*; *Hubbell*, 530 U.S. at 40–41.\n\nUnder binding precedent of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the act of production *may* entail testimonial tacit averments \"(1) 'if the existence and location of the subpoenaed papers are unknown to the government'; or (2) where production would 'implicitly authenticate' the documents.\" *United States v. Doe (In re Grand Jury Subpoena)*, 1\n\nF.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 1993) (hereinafter \"*Grand Jury 1993*\") (citing *United States v. Fox*, 721 F.2d 32, 36 (2d Cir.1983)). If the Trustee can show (1) the existence and location; and (2) the authenticity of the documents is a \"foregone\" conclusion or already established by other evidence, then the production is not protected by the Fifth Amendment. *Grand Jury 1993*, 1 F.3d at 93. Moreover, even if the tacit averments involved in production are testimonial under *Fox*, the Individual Debtor must also establish that revealing the existence, location, or authenticity of the documents or records is incriminating. *See Hoffman v. United States*, 341 U.S. 479, 486–87 (1951); *Fox*, 721 F.2d at 40; *In re Schick*, 215 B.R. 4, 9 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997); *cf. Martin-Trigona v. Belford (In re Martin-Trigona)*, 732 F.2d 170, 176 (2d Cir. 1984).\n\nThe Individual Debtor's burden to establish that the act of production is testimonial and incriminating is less than a normal burden of proof: \"To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.\" *Hoffman*, 341 U.S. at 486–87. In determining whether the Individual Debtor may invoke the Fifth Amendment, the Court must use its \"personal perception of the peculiarities of the case\" as much as factual support submitted by the Individual Debtor. *Id.* at 487. The act of production is incriminating if it could be \"a link in the chain of evidence\" used to prosecute the Individual Debtor. *Id.* at 486.\n\nThe Individual Debtor argues that producing documents and records under compulsion of the Order Compelling Production would be testimonial because the production could be construed as a tacit averment that he beneficially owns and/or controls various entities and assets and that he has authority over various persons. Such tacit averments, the Individual Debtor argues, would be incriminating because the present Criminal Action and an alleged investigation\n\ninto bankruptcy crimes involve allegations about the Individual Debtor's beneficial ownership and control of entities and/or assets and the Individual Debtor's authority and/or control over certain individuals.\n\nThe Trustee raises numerous objections to the Individual Debtor's argument. The Trustee's primary objection is that the \"required records\" doctrine applies and is an exception to the act of production doctrine. In support of this argument, the Trustee asserts that the Individual Debtor, as a debtor in bankruptcy, cannot properly invoke the Fifth Amendment to avoid production of documents and records relating to his financial affairs, assets, and liabilities as required by the Bankruptcy Code – whether or not the act of production is testimonial and incriminating. The Trustee's required records argument involving the Individual Debtor's duties in his bankruptcy case will be addressed below. The Court will first address the Trustee's various objections as to whether the Individual Debtor has met his burden of proof to show that compliance with the Order Compelling Production would be both testimonial and incriminating.\n\n### *The Supplemental Declaration*\n\nThe Individual Debtor and the Trustee have reached a resolution regarding one of the Trustee's objections. Before the Contempt Motion was filed and the hearings on it were held, the Individual Debtor's Declaration made a blanket assertion of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The Trustee argued that this was improper because (a) such a blanket assertion did not evidence that the Individual Debtor had properly considered each of the Trustee's requests before invoking the Fifth Amendment; and (b) these Chapter 11 cases are civil proceedings, meaning that the Individual Debtor's invocation of the Fifth Amendment may, under proper circumstances, be admitted as evidence. However, the Individual Debtor has since provided the Supplemental Declaration pursuant to a consent order, wherein he answers each\n\nquestion posed by the Trustee on an individual basis and asserts his Fifth Amendment right in response to each of the two-hundred two (202) questions. Although the Individual Debtor has now properly invoked his Fifth Amendment right to the Trustee's specific questions, issues related to the production of documents remain.\n\n### *Pre-indictment invocation of the Fifth Amendment*\n\nOne of the Trustee's remaining objections to the Individual Debtor's proof of compliance with the Order Compelling Production is unpersuasive. The Trustee argues that the Individual Debtor was in contempt before the unsealing of the indictment against him and cannot now invoke the Fifth Amendment in light of the Criminal Action to avoid being held in contempt. However, the Individual Debtor is correct that the Fifth Amendment may be invoked prior to the commencement of a criminal action. *See United States v. Miranti*, 253 F.2d 135, 139 (2d Cir. 1958) (allowing a witness to invoke the Fifth Amendment where there was only a slight *possibility* of prosecution). Just as the Individual Debtor could assert his Fifth Amendment right during the evidentiary hearing in December 2022 and during his March 2023 deposition, he could do so in February 2023 so long as he had \"reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer\" and his Fifth Amendment right was otherwise applicable. *Hoffman*, 341 U.S. at 486.\n\n### *Documents in possession of the prosecution*\n\nA second argument of the Trustee also fails. The Trustee argues that there is no harm to the Individual Debtor because the prosecution is already in possession of his documents and records. The Trustee is correct insofar as the existence and location of these documents is known and, hence, the first prong of the *Fox* test fails. *Grand Jury 1993*, 1 F.3d at 93. Nevertheless, whether the act of producing the Individual Debtor's documents and records\n\nalready in the possession of the prosecution would result in authenticating those documents and records remains an issue. *Id.* The Individual Debtor is concerned that his act of production would authenticate the documents. The Court has not seen these documents and records. Nor has the Trustee. The Court recognizes the Trustee is in a difficult position because he is not a party to the Criminal Action. Nevertheless, the Trustee has not shown that it would be a foregone conclusion that the documents and records are authentic. Therefore, under the second prong of the *Fox* test, the tacit averment as to the authenticity of the documents and records in the possession of the prosecution may be testimonial. *Id.*\n\nMoreover, because the documents and records seized by the prosecution may be used in the Criminal Action to prosecute the Individual Debtor, the Court finds the Individual Debtor's argument that his implicit authentication of those documents and records could be \"a link in the chain of evidence\" used to prosecute him is persuasive. *Hoffman*, 341 U.S. at 486. Therefore, unless the Trustee can show that it would be a foregone conclusion that the documents and records are authentic, the act of production doctrine applies to the documents held by the prosecution, unless an exception to the doctrine applies.\n\n## *Documents not in the possession of the prosecution*\n\nThe Individual Debtor argues that the entire universe of documents and records the Order Compelling Production compels him to produce have been seized by the prosecution. The Court does not agree and, therefore, continues its discussion. As the Trustee contends, the blanket assertion that the Individual Debtor has no documents or records in his possession, custody, or control because he is now incarcerated is not convincing. The FBI apparently seized many documents, records, and electronic devices at the Individual Debtor's residences despite previous representations that the Individual Debtor maintained almost no documents, records, and devices. Similarly, the Trustee is correct that there is no evidentiary basis to support the contention that there are no records within the Individual Debtor's possession, custody, or control that are not already among the documents and records seized by the prosecution. Given past descriptions of the efforts – or, as the case may be, the lack thereof – conducted by the Individual Debtor's counsel, the Individual Debtor has not established that a reasonably diligent search occurred. (*See* Order Compelling Production ¶ 9.) For both of these reasons, the Court concludes that the Individual Debtor has not established that all potentially responsive documents and records have been seized by the prosecution.\n\nAs to documents and records that were not seized by the prosecution, the Trustee has not shown that the location, existence, or authenticity of these documents is a foregone conclusion. Therefore, if the Individual Debtor establishes that they are incriminating, the act of production doctrine would apply. *Fox*, 721 F.2d at 36. The Trustee argues that the Individual Debtor has not met his burden to establish that the requested documents and records are incriminating. The Trustee is correct that even with the Supplemental Declaration, the Individual Debtor has not established that each requested production would be incriminating.\n\nNevertheless, the Court is mindful of the lessened burden the Individual Debtor must meet. The Court is also mindful that it must rely on its own perception of the facts and circumstances of these Chapter 11 cases and related adversary proceedings. *Hoffman*, 341 U.S. at 486–87. Moreover, as the Individual Debtor's counsel notes, \"[t]he privilege afforded not only extends to answers that would in themselves support a conviction under a federal criminal statute but likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a federal crime.\" *Id.* at 486. However, the Court's \"personal perception of the peculiarities of the case\" includes the observation that the Individual Debtor\n\nhas obstructed lawful inquiry into his assets, liabilities, and financial affairs in addition to his avowed desire to avoid self-incrimination. *Id.* at 487. (*See, e.g.*, Social Media/Protest Adversary, ECF No. 133.)\n\nThe indictment in the Criminal Action is not alone sufficient for the Individual Debtor to meet his burden with respect to the documents and records that the prosecution has *not* seized. The indictment alleges fraud going back to approximately 2018, whereas many of the assets of interest to the Trustee thus far – that certain yacht, the Lady May; the apartment at the Sherry-Netherland Hotel; the Ace Decade Holdings Limited cause of action – were allegedly acquired prior to 2018. While some of these assets, *e.g.*, the Lady May, are discussed in the indictment, the Court cannot, with its \"personal perception of the peculiarities of the case\" and the Individual Debtor's scant evidentiary showing, hold that the Individual Debtor has sufficiently supported his blanket assertion of the Fifth Amendment on the basis of the Criminal Action. *Id.* at 487. The Individual Debtor has not established that all of his assets, liabilities, and financial affairs relate to the alleged fraud or may somehow present a \"link in the chain of evidence\" regarding the alleged fraud. *Id.* at 486.\n\nIn support of his argument that he has complied with the Order Compelling Production, the Individual Debtor also presented a subpoena directed at the Trustee relating to an alleged investigation into potential bankruptcy crimes committed in these Chapter 11 cases. (ECF No. 1719, at \\*80:20–81:8.) As noted above, it does not matter if prosecution due to this investigation is likely when determining if production of the documents is incriminating. *Miranti*, 253 F.2d at 139.\n\nTitle 18 of the United States Code, sections 152, 156, 157, 1519, and 3284 set forth crimes related to the concealment of assets in a bankruptcy case. Sections 152, 156, 157, and\n\n1519 require knowing, intentional, or fraudulent acts. Section 3284 requires \"concealment.\" The tacit averments that the Individual Debtor has possession or control over documents or records responsive to the Rule 2004 subpoena and that such documents or records are authentic are not themselves incriminating because they do not establish that the Individual Debtor knowingly, intentionally, or fraudulently withheld assets – or documents and records pertaining to assets – from the Estate. Debtors routinely mistakenly overlook assets and liabilities and amend their statements and schedules and/or update their disclosures.\n\nNevertheless, the Court must consider whether such tacit averments are a \"link in the chain of evidence\" regarding a potential prosecution of the Individual Debtor for concealment of his assets from the Trustee, this Court, and his creditors. *Hoffman*, 341 U.S. at 486. The Trustee alleges that the Individual Debtor has a multitude of business interests and should have commensurate documents and records. While the Individual Debtor denies these allegations, it is the Court's \"personal perception of the peculiarities of the case,\" on the basis of prior findings of this and other courts, that the Individual Debtor has at least *some* business interests beyond those he presently admits. *See Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund, L.P. v. Kwok Ho Wan*, Index No. 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 9, 2022), NYCEF No. 1181; *E. Profit Corp. Ltd. v. Strategic Vision US LLC*, Case No. 18-cv-2185 (LJL), 2021 WL 2554631, at \\*1 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2021). (*See* ECF No. 1110; *HK Int'l Funds Invs. (USA) Ltd., LLC v. Despins ex rel. Kwok (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 22-05003 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. May 18, 2023), ECF Nos. 177, 221; Social Media/Protest Adversary, ECF No. 133 ¶ 7.) The Court perceives that the Individual Debtor's production may be similarly expansive to the production at issue in *Hubbell*. *See* 530 U.S. at 40–43. Even though *Hubbell* was a case involving immunity granted to a party where the scope of the production was known and the burden had shifted to the prosecution, it *may* be similarly necessary for the Individual Debtor \"to make extensive use of 'the contents of his own mind' in identifying the hundreds of documents responsive to the requests in the subpoena\" and essentially create a map of his assets, liabilities, and business interests. *See id.* at 43. Regarding the alleged investigation into bankruptcy crimes, such a map may aid in discovery of evidence of knowledge, intent, or fraud. Using its perception of the specific facts and circumstances of these Chapter 11 cases and related adversary proceedings, the Court finds that such admissions could be links in the chain of evidence because they could have a \"derivative use.\" *See id.* at 41–43.\n\n### *The Individual Debtor's production is testimonial and incriminating*\n\nFor the above reasons, the Court concludes that production in compliance with the Order Compelling Production would be testimonial and incriminating both with regards to the documents in the possession of the prosecution and the documents that have not been seized by the prosecution. *See Fisher*, 425 U.S. at 410–11. The Court notes, however, that the evidentiary record to date is not strong. If in the future the Trustee can (i) show that the location, existence, and authenticity of any document is a foregone conclusion; (ii) establish with regard to any document or category of documents that the Individual Debtor has not met his burden; or (iii) establish that he already has a map of the Individual Debtor's assets, liabilities, and business interests with respect to any documents or category of documents, this finding may be revisited upon a proper motion.\n\n### **b. Does the 'required records' exception apply?**\n\nAlthough the act of production doctrine applies, that does not end the Court's analysis or necessarily determine the result of the Contempt Motion. As noted above, the Trustee's primary argument is that the required records doctrine applies on the specific facts and circumstances\n\nbefore the Court and presents an exception to the act of production doctrine. The Trustee therefore argues that it does not matter whether the act of production doctrine would allow the Individual Debtor to properly invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in response to the Order Compelling Production because the required records exception applies in this case.\n\nIn support of his argument, the Trustee relies on *Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight*, 493 U.S. 549 (1990). In *Bouknight*, the Supreme Court restated and reaffirmed the existence of the required records doctrine post-*Fisher*. 493 U.S. at 555–59. Under the required records doctrine, \"the Fifth Amendment privilege may not be invoked to resist compliance with a regulatory regime constructed to effect the State's public purposes unrelated to the enforcement of its criminal laws.\" *Id.* at 556; *see Grosso v. United States*, 390 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1968) (articulating factors to consider regarding required records doctrine); *Shapiro v. United* States, 335 U.S. 1, 32 (1948) (originating the required records doctrine).\n\nThe Individual Debtor asserts *Bouknight* does not describe an exception to the act of production doctrine set forth in *Fisher* and that the required records doctrine does not provide for the compelled testimonial and incriminating production of documents and records. The Individual Debtor's assertion contradicts the clear text of *Bouknight* which states:\n\nThe possibility that a production order will compel testimonial assertions that may prove incriminating does not, in all contexts, justify invoking the privilege to resist production. Even assuming that this limited testimonial assertion is sufficiently incriminating and \"sufficiently testimonial for purposes of the privilege,\" Bouknight may not invoke the privilege to resist the production order because she has assumed custodial duties related to production and because production is required as part of a noncriminal regulatory regime.\n\n*Bouknight*, 493 U.S. at 555–56 (discussing *Fisher*) (internal citations omitted). In addition to the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit has also clearly rejected the Individual Debtor's assertion:\n\n\"[T]he required records doctrine is an exception to the Fifth Amendment privilege. As such, it necessarily overrides the privilege in instances in which the privilege would otherwise apply. *Fisher* was not concerned with required records and nothing in its analysis could be construed as weakening the required records exception.\"\n\n*United States v. Doe (In re Grand Jury Subpoena)*, 741 F.3d 339, 346 (2d Cir. 2013) (hereinafter \"*Grand Jury 2013*\") (quoting *Doe v. United States (In re Doe)*, 711 F.2d 1187, 1192–93 (2d Cir. 1983)). Indeed, the Second Circuit has emphatically stated \"[t]his Court has twice explicitly rejected the idea that the required records exception has been abrogated by the act of production doctrine.\" *Grand Jury 2013*, 741 F.3d at 346. This binding Supreme Court and Second Circuit precedent makes clear that the required records doctrine is an exception to the act of production doctrine.7 Therefore, if the required records exception applies in this case, the Individual Debtor has failed to comply with the Order Compelling Production regardless of the conclusion that such production would be testimonial and incriminating.\n\nIn determining whether the required records doctrine applies, the Second Circuit turns to the *Grosso* factors. *Grand Jury 2013*, 741 F.3d at 345. In *Grosso*, the Supreme Court applied the following factors: \"[F]irst, the purposes of the United States' inquiry must be essentially regulatory; second, information is to be obtained by requiring the preservation of records of a kind which the regulated party has customarily kept; and third, the records themselves must have assumed 'public aspects' which render them at least analogous to public documents.\" 390 U.S.\n\n<sup>7</sup> The Individual Debtor observes that one of the cases cited by the Trustee, *In re Ross*, 156 B.R. 272, 279 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1993), both found the production of the requested documents to be insufficiently testimonial and found that the required records doctrine applied. From this observation, the Individual Debtor concluded that the latter holding required the former. The Court concludes otherwise. The court in *Ross*, like many courts – particularly lower courts subject to review, advanced multiple bases for its conclusion that the debtor in that case could not properly invoke the Fifth Amendment. 156 B.R. at 281 (\"Fifth, *even if the act of production involved here was both testimonial and incriminating*, the nature of chapter 7 as a regulatory regime directed toward society as a whole, and not toward inherently suspect criminal classes, renders the act of production outside the protection of the Fifth Amendment.\") (emphasis added).\n\nat 67–68. Here, the Trustee is seeking documents and records that the Order Compelling Production holds relate to \"the acts, conduct, or property or to the liabilities and financial condition of the [Individual Debtor], or to any matter which may affect the administration of the [Estate].\" Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004(b). Hence, the Individual Debtor is obligated to produce the documents and records the Trustee seeks under sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4). Therefore, the issue is whether the documents and records the Individual Debtor is obligated to produce under sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4) are required records under the *Grosso* test.\n\n### *What is the purpose of Bankruptcy Code sections 521(a)(3) and 521(a)(4)?*\n\nIn determining whether the first factor supports application of the required records doctrine, a court must consider whether the relevant \"legislation is not 'directed at the public at large' and concerns 'an area permeated with criminal statutes.'\" *Grand Jury 2013*, 741 F.3d at 347 (citing *Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd.*, 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965)); *see Marchetti v. United States*, 390 U.S. 39, 57 (1968); *Haynes v. United States*, 390 U.S. 85, 99 (1968). A court must make this determination as to the specific statutory sections at issue, rather than in reference to the entire surrounding statutory context. *Grand Jury 2013*, 741 F.3d at 348 (citing *California v. Byers*, 402 U.S. 424, 430 (1971)).\n\nSection 521 of the Bankruptcy Code is titled \"Debtor's duties.\" Sections 521(a)(3) and 521(a)(4) provide, respectively, that, where a bankruptcy trustee is serving in the case, as here, a debtor must cooperate with the trustee in the performance of the trustee's duties and must surrender to the trustee all property of the estate and any recorded information, including books, documents, records, and papers, relating to property of the estate.\n\nSection 109 of the Bankruptcy Code allows individuals or entities to file for bankruptcy under Chapters 7, 11, 11 Subchapter V, 12, or 13. In proceedings under Chapters 7, 12, and 13\n\nas well as Chapter 11 Subchapter V, a bankruptcy trustee is automatically appointed upon the commencement of the case. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701, 702, 1183, 1202, 1302. Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases are the most common among the general public and always involve a bankruptcy trustee to whom the debtor owes obligations under sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4).\n\nWhile in a Chapter 11 case the appointment of a bankruptcy trustee is an extraordinary remedy, *see* 11 U.S.C. § 1112, the effect of this extraordinary relief is that a dispossessed Chapter 11 debtor has the same obligations under sections 521(a)(3) and 521(a)(4) as a Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 debtor. By operation of law, upon filing a Chapter 11 case a debtor is automatically deemed to be a debtor-in-possession and assumes the role of a bankruptcy trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a). However, a debtor in a Chapter 11 case may be 'dispossessed' of the estate through appointment of a bankruptcy trustee \"for cause,\" provided it is in the best interest of the creditors and the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1).\n\nChapter 11 is distinct because it is designed for debtors with complex business interests, assets, and liabilities, such as large corporations and high net worth individuals. *See* H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 220 (1977). As such, Chapter 11 is guided by three basic presumptions: (i) debtors with substantial business interests and operations have more value as a continuing economic entity than divided up and liquidated, (ii) debtors with complex financial affairs, assets, and liabilities are better equipped than an appointed trustee to manage their own affairs for the benefit of creditors, and (iii) allowing debtors with substantial business interests and operations to reorganize preserves the interests of debtors, owners, employees, etc. in addition to the interests of creditors. *See id.* Ultimately, however, Chapter 11 is properly used wherever its specific provisions maximize the distribution to creditors. *See Toibb v. Radloff*, 501 U.S. 157, 163–64 (1991). Many of the enumerated examples of \"cause\" to appoint a bankruptcy trustee –\n\nor dismiss the case or convert the case to a proceeding under Chapter 7 – involve the rebuttal of the presumptions listed above or the debtor-in-possession's failure to comply with its obligations to manage the estate for the benefit of creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4); *see* 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 1112.04[6][b]–[k] (16th ed. 2023).\n\nWhen one is appointed, the bankruptcy trustee is the representative of the debtor's estate. 11 U.S.C. § 323. The purpose of sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4) is to enable the bankruptcy trustee to administer the debtor's bankruptcy estate in accordance with the bankruptcy trustee's duties. *See* 11 U.S.C. §§ 704, 1106, 1116, 1183, 1202, 1302; 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 521.15[5], 521.16. The administration of the bankruptcy estate requires the debtor's disclosure, surrender, and cooperation with the trustee because a case in bankruptcy is an all-encompassing action intended to equitably and finally resolve, adjust, or reorganize myriad debtor-creditor relationships. *See, e.g.*, 11 U.S.C. §§ 704(a)(5) (\"The trustee shall . . . examine proofs of claims and object to the allowance of any claim that is improper . . ..\"), 704(a)(7) (\"The trustee shall . . . furnish such information concerning the estate and the estate's administration as is requested by a party in interest . . .\"), 704(a)(8) (\"The trustee shall . . . file with the court, with the United States trustee, and with any governmental unit charged with responsibility for collection or determination of any tax arising out of such operations, periodic reports and summaries of the operation of such business . . ..\"), 1106(a)(3) (\"A trustee shall . . . investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and financial condition of the debtor, the operation of the debtor's business and the desirability of the continuance of such business, and other matters relevant to the case or to the formulation of a plan . . ..\"); 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1116.01 (\"The trustee's investigation and reporting duties provide a mechanism for full disclosure of the debtor's state of\n\naffairs so as to enable parties in interest to protect their rights and obtain the successful reorganization of the debtor.\").\n\nA debtor's failure to fulfill its obligations to (i) cooperate with the trustee, (ii) disclose financial affairs, assets, and liabilities, and (iii) surrender property of the bankruptcy estate and records relating thereto severely impedes a trustee's ability to administer the estate. *See United States v. Stone*, 282 F. 547, 553 (2d Cir. 1960) (\"[T]he very purpose of the statement of affairs is to give dependable information without need of going further.\") (upholding conviction in criminal action prosecuting debtor for bankruptcy crimes related to failure to properly disclose loan information on statement of financial affairs in proceeding under former Bankruptcy Act). This failure causes expense and delay to the estate's creditors which are cognizable injuries. *See Andrews v. McCarron (In re Vincent Andrews Mgmt. Corp.)*, 414 B.R. 1, 7 (D. Conn. 2009).\n\nFurthermore, the broad and extraordinary nature of much of the relief provided by the Bankruptcy Code is premised upon proper disclosure and notice. *See, e.g.*, 11 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (defining adequate information for the disclosure statement that must be served before plan solicitation may commence); *Till v. SCS Credit Corp.*, 541 U.S. 465, 475 n. 12 (2004) (finding that the \"Bankruptcy Code's extensive disclosure requirements reduce the risk that the debtor has significant undisclosed obligations,\" undergirding a court's \"authority to modify the number, timing, or amount of the installment payments from those set forth in the debtor's original contract\"); *In re Motors Liquidation Co.*, 829 F.3d 135, 158–61 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that failure to properly serve undisclosed known creditors with a sale motion rendered a sale order unenforceable against the creditors). A trustee, as the bankruptcy estate's representative, is the party tasked with; in the first instance, seeking much of this relief for: (i) the benefit of the estate, *Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub*, 471 U.S. 343, 352\n\n(1985); and (ii) the debtor who may receive, upon exiting the gauntlet, a \"fresh start,\" *see Grogan v. Garner*, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991).\n\nThe Court concludes that sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4) are targeted at the general public. Bankruptcy trustees are automatically appointed in a wide range of cases. The duty to disclose and surrender property and records to the trustee is essential to the fundamental and required administrative duties of the trustee and the exercise of the trustee's powers under the bankruptcy code.\n\nThe remaining issue is whether sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4) are concerned with an area \"permeated with criminal statutes.\" *Albertson*, 382 U.S. at 79. Title 18, sections 151 *et sequitur*, 1519, and 3284 of the United States Code criminalize certain actions taken in relation to proceedings under the Bankruptcy Code. Among these \"bankruptcy crimes\" are several related to the concealment of assets of the bankruptcy estate to protect them from distribution to the estate's creditors. The issue before the Court is not, however, whether certain failures to fulfill a debtor's duty under sections 521(a)(3) and (4) leave a debtor vulnerable to criminal prosecution, but rather whether sections 521(a)(3) and (4) are \"directed at a 'selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities.'\" *Marchetti*, 390 U.S. at 57.\n\nIn *Grosso* and *Marchetti*, the problem was not the criminal laws enforcing the statutory requirement to file tax returns, which are akin to the bankruptcy crimes enumerated above. *Grosso*, 390 U.S. at 64–65; *see Marchetti*, 390 U.S. at 57. Rather, in both cases the Supreme Court determined that the requirement to file a federal wagering tax return squarely targeted conduct already criminalized by state law, namely gambling. *Grosso*, 390 U.S. at 64–65; *Marchetti*, 390 U.S. at 57. At issue in *Albertson* was the requirement that members of the Communist Party of America personally register with the Subversive Activities Control Board.\n\n382 U.S. at 77–78. Affiliation with the Communist Party was criminalized at the time. *Id.* In *Haynes*, the issue was a requirement that persons who obtained firearms *other than in the normal course* – which the Supreme Court observed would be mostly persons acquiring firearms illegally – register their firearms. 390 U.S. at 95–97.\n\nThe facts before the Supreme Court in *Grosso*, *Marchetti*, *Albertson*, and *Haynes* are each dissimilar to the instant facts. First, all of those cases involved the creation of a new record rather than the production of existing documents and records. *Haynes*, 390 U.S. at 95–97; *Grosso*, 390 U.S. at 64–65; *Marchetti*, 390 U.S. at 57; *Albertson*, 382 U.S. at 77–78. More importantly, the routine administration of a bankruptcy case does not as a matter of course implicate criminal activity. The administration of the estate is intended to be separate from issues of criminal liability. *Compare* 11 U.S.C. §§ 323 (the trustee is the party to sue and be sued on behalf of the estate with regards to civil litigation), 362(a)(1) (generally, civil actions against the debtor or the estate are stayed by the filing of a voluntary bankruptcy petition) *with*  11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1) (criminal actions against the debtor are not stayed by the commencement of a case under Title 11). Debtors are generally not exposed to criminal liability for the disclosures they are required to make in their bankruptcy cases. The intent of disclosure requirements in bankruptcy proceedings is to lay bare *civil liability* to allow for the equitable and final resolution of all claims against the debtor. *See Byers*, 402 U.S. at 430–31 (finding that, while the California Vehicle Code involved some criminal statutes, \"it was not intended to facilitate criminal convictions but to promote the satisfaction of civil liabilities arising from automobile accidents\" and holding that the required records exception applied).\n\nTherefore, the purpose of sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4) is \"essentially regulatory,\" which supports the applicability of the required records exception to the production of documents by\n\nthe Individual Debtor compelled by the Order Compelling Production. *Grosso*, 390 U.S. at 67– 68.\n\n### *Are the purported required records customarily kept?*\n\nAs to the second factor, whether the purportedly required records are customarily kept, the Trustee is seeking, *e.g.*, financial and banking records, money transfer records, records relating to the Individual Debtor's business interests, etc. As the Second Circuit observed with respect to foreign bank account information, common sense dictates that persons and entities retain basic financial transaction and account information in order to manage their affairs and access their accounts. *Grand Jury 2013*, 741 F.3d at 350 (citing *M.H. v. United States (In re Grand Jury Investigation)*, 648 F.3d 1067, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011)). The Court finds this is especially true regarding individuals and entities with complex financial affairs, assets, and liabilities. Pointedly, the Second Circuit went on to say that although \"some individuals engaged in wrongdoing are advised not to keep even this basic information[,] . . . [w]e decline to look at the custom of only the miscreants . . ..\" *Grand Jury 2013*, 741 F.3d at 350. Therefore, the Court concludes that the records required by sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4) are \"customarily kept.\" *Grosso*, 390 U.S. at 67–68.\n\n### *Did the purported required records assume 'public aspects?'*\n\nAs to the third factor, whether the purportedly required records have assumed 'public aspects,' the question is whether the overall regulatory context of section 521(a)(3) and (a)(4) – requires the particular records be kept. *Grand Jury 2013*, 741 F.3d at 351–52.\n\nThe Bankruptcy Code requires disclosure both at the outset of a case and as a case proceeds. Section 521(a)(1) requires any debtor – including the Individual Debtor – to file a list of creditors, statement of financial affairs, and schedules of, *inter alia*, the debtor's assets,\n\nliabilities, income, and expenses. *See* 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 521.06[3][a] (\"The schedule is a statement of *all* property, both *real* and personal, within the broad definition of property of the estate under section 541(a), which includes 'all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.'\"), 521.06[3][b] (\"The scheduling of interests in property, both real and personal, is a very important duty.\"), 521.09 (\"The purpose of the requirement of filing a statement of financial affairs is to furnish the trustee and creditors with detailed information about the debtor's financial condition, thereby saving the expense and long and protracted examination for the purpose of soliciting information.\"). Section 341 requires any debtor to submit to an examination conducted by a trustee, in which its creditors may participate. *See* 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 341.01.\n\nRegarding Chapter 11 in particular, section 1107 provides that while a Chapter 11 debtor is a debtor-in-possession, such a debtor, as a fiduciary of the bankruptcy estate, would have many of the same disclosure obligations of a trustee discussed above, including reporting requirements. *See* 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 1107.02[3]–[4]. A debtor's failure to properly disclose financial affairs, assets, and liabilities in a Disclosure Statement required to be filed in connection with a Chapter 11 Plan would prevent confirmation of that plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1125; *see* 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 1125.02 (\"Disclosure is the pivotal concept in reorganization practice under the Bankruptcy Code.\") (citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 226–31 (1977)), 1125.02[2]. Failures to make appropriate disclosures can and do constitute cause to convert a Chapter 11 reorganization case to a Chapter 7 liquidation case, dismiss the Chapter 11 bankruptcy case, or appoint a Chapter 11 trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(f); *see* 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1112.04[6][f].\n\nMuch like the mother in *Bouknight*, the Individual Debtor assumed these obligations upon voluntarily commencing his Chapter 11 case, submitting himself to the *in personam*  jurisdiction of this Court, and submitting all of his legal and equitable interests in property – \"wherever located and by whomever held\" – to the *in rem* jurisdiction of this Court. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1); *Bouknight*, 493 U.S. at 559 (\"Bouknight submitted to the routine operation of the regulatory system and agreed to hold Maurice in a manner consonant with the State's regulatory interests and subject to inspection by BCDSS.\"). Moreover, as in *Bouknight*, where the mother was required to produce her child to the Baltimore City Department of Social Services upon cause shown, the Bankruptcy Code requires the Individual Debtor to produce documents and records relating to property of the estate to the Trustee, because cause was shown to appoint a trustee. 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(a)(4), 1112; *Bouknight*, 493 U.S. at 555–56. Because the Individual Debtor voluntarily filed his Chapter 11 case and became a debtor-in-possession, he assumed a bankruptcy trustee's duties to manage the Estate for the benefit of its creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a). The Individual Debtor was a custodian of the Estate and its books and records while a debtor-in-possession. *See Bouknight*, 493 U.S. at 555–56. Although his status as a debtor-inpossession ended upon the appointment of the Trustee, his resultant obligation to provide information to the Trustee did not.\n\nThe Court concludes that the records required to be produced by the Individual Debtor pursuant to sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4) have assumed \"public aspects\" because the Individual Debtor's case is a voluntary Chapter 11 case and because the specific facts and circumstances of these Chapter 11 cases and related adversary proceedings support this conclusion. *See Bouknight*, 493 U.S. at 555–56; *Grosso*, 390 U.S. at 67–68.\n\n31\n\n### *The 'required records' exception applies*\n\nAll three factors of the *Grosso* test support the applicability of the required records exception to the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination under the specific facts and circumstances before the Court. 390 U.S. at 67–68; *see Bouknight*, 493 U.S. at 555–56; *Grand Jury 2013*, 741 F.3d at 345; *Ross*, 156 B.R. at 279–81; *In re Fairbanks*, 135 B.R. 717, 730–33 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991).\n\nApplication of the required records exception is also supported by Supreme Court precedent relating to the former Bankruptcy Act. *In re Harris*, 221 U.S. 274 (1911) (holding Fifth Amendment did not protect a debtor from producing its books and records to the receiver in bankruptcy). *Bouknight*, in upholding the required records exception post-*Fisher*, cited *Harris*  approvingly as an example of the required records doctrine, confirming the continuing vitality of *Harris* today despite the evolution of Fifth Amendment jurisprudence since *Harris* was decided. *Bouknight*, 439 U.S. at 556–57; *see Fisher*, 425 U.S. 411–13 (discussing *Harris* without calling into question its holding); *see also Cohen v. de la Cruz*, 523 U.S. 213, 221 (1998) (holding that precedent under the Bankruptcy Act is not displaced unless there is a clear indication that Congress intended to do so); *Ross*, 156 B.R. at 279; 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 344.03[4] (\"[I]t is doubtful that a debtor, as opposed to other witnesses, may successfully refuse to turn over the property, books and records that every debtor under the Code is required to surrender to the trustee on the basis that this 'act of production' might itself tend to incriminate.\"); *but see Butcher v. Bailey*, 753 F.2d 465, 468 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding, pre-*Bouknight* and in an *involuntary* Chapter 7 case rather than a voluntary Chapter 11 case, that *Harris* was no longer good law after *Fisher* and section 521 did not require the production of documents to which the act of production doctrine applied).\n\nThe Individual Debtor objects that, nevertheless, *Harris* and the required records exception do not reach Rule 2004 subpoenas under *McCarthy v. Arndstein*. 266 U.S. 34 (1924). However, the Supreme Court in *Arndstein* distinguished its prior opinion in *Harris* on the basis that *Harris* concerned the surrender of documents and records and *Arndstein* concerned the issue of compelled *testimony*. 266 U.S. at 41–42. The Trustee is not objecting to the Individual Debtor answering interrogatories or questions during deposition or in-court testimony by invoking the Fifth Amendment. Instead, the Trustee is objecting to the Individual Debtor invoking the Fifth Amendment in response to requests for the production of documents and records. Therefore, *Arndstein* is inapposite.\n\nThe Court concludes that, both under an analysis of the *Grosso* factors and by application of Supreme Court precedent under the Bankruptcy Act, the required records exception applies.\n\n### **iii. The Individual Debtor did not comply with the Order Compelling Production**\n\nFor all of the above reasons, the Court concludes that (i) it is not impossible for the Individual Debtor to comply with the Order Compelling Production and (ii) under the required records exception, the Individual Debtor may not properly invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in response to the Order Compelling Production. Therefore, the Trustee has established by clear and convincing evidence that the Individual Debtor has not complied with the Order Compelling Production.\n\n# **3. Did the Individual Debtor diligently attempt to comply with the Order Compelling Production?**\n\nThe Trustee must also establish that the Individual Debtor did not diligently attempt to comply in a reasonable manner with the Order Compelling Production. *King*, 65 F.3d at 1058. The Trustee argues that the Individual Debtor has made no attempt to comply with the Order Compelling Production. In response, the Individual Debtor argues that there is a fair ground of\n\ndoubt as to whether the Individual Debtor could properly assert his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and that the Declaration and Supplemental Declaration represent his good faith efforts to comply with the Order Compelling Production.\n\nThe Individual Debtor's operative mistake is a mistake of law – not fact. Namely, the Individual Debtor has mistakenly concluded that the required records exception to the act of production doctrine does not apply and that he may invoke the Fifth Amendment in response to the Order Compelling Production. For the reasons stated above, whether producing each document or record would factually be testimonial and incriminating does not affect the outcome.\n\nGenerally, absent a requirement of willfulness or intention, mistake of law is not a defense to civil liability. *Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA*, 559 U.S. 573, 583–85 (2010). As noted above, \"[t]he absence of wilfulness [sic] does not relieve from civil contempt.\" *McComb*, 336 U.S. at 191. Therefore, the Court concludes that the Individual Debtor's mistake of law is not a defense to civil contempt. *Cf. Yellin v. United States*, 374 U.S. 109, 123 (1963) (holding mistake of law was no defense to contempt of Congress); *United States v. Remini*, 967 U.S. 754, 758 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding mistake of law was no defense to criminal contempt of court). This conclusion accords with the Supreme Court's observation in *Taggert*  that \"a party's good faith, *even where it does not bar civil contempt*, may help to determine an appropriate sanction.\" 139 S. Ct. at 1802 (emphasis added). Therefore, the Trustee has established that the Individual Debtor did not diligently attempt to comply with the Order Compelling Production.\n\n34\n\n### **4. Did the Individual Debtor have notice of the Order Compelling Production?**\n\nThe final element of civil contempt is notice of the relevant order. *Gravel*, 6 F.4th at 512. The Declaration admits the Individual Debtor had notice of the Order Compelling Production. (ECF No. 1444 Ex. A.) This element of civil contempt has been established.\n\n### **5. The Individual Debtor is in civil contempt of court**\n\nAll four elements having been established, the Contempt Motion is granted. The Court holds the Individual Debtor in civil contempt of court for failure to comply with the Order Compelling Production. As set forth in the decretal paragraphs below, the Individual Debtor will be afforded the opportunity to purge himself of contempt. In light of the serious nature of the circumstances facing the Individual Debtor and the good faith shown in answering the Trustee's two-hundred two (202) questions in his Supplemental Declaration, the Court will provide the Individual Debtor with ample time to purge himself of contempt. *Taggert*, 139 S. Ct. at 1802. However, if the Individual Debtor does not purge himself of contempt, the Trustee may request appropriate sanctions.\n\nThe Individual Debtor's counsel are reminded that \"[c]ounsel have an obligation, as officers of the court, to assist in the discovery process by making diligent, good-faith responses to legitimate discovery requests.\" *McLeod, Alexander, Powel & Apffel, P.C. v. Quarles*, 894 F.2d 1482, 1486 (5th Cir. 1990). To that end, the Individual Debtor's counsel are further reminded that this Court has already found that \"counsel to the [Individual Debtor and others] has not established that they were sufficiently diligent under the circumstances.\" (Order Compelling Production ¶ 9.) The Individual Debtor was ordered to comply with the Order Compelling Production at or before 5:00 p.m. on January 31, 2023, but did not do so. \"[N]either\n\n[counsel] nor [a party has] a unilateral right to decide whether or when to comply with discovery demands.\" *535 Broadway Assocs. v. Com. Corp. of Am.*, 159 B.R. 403, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).\n\nThe Individual Debtor and his counsel are to take reasonable and diligent steps, whether or not this Court has articulated those steps directly, to bring the Individual Debtor into compliance with the Order Compelling Production. As the Individual Debtor's counsel has stated on the record, reasonable steps include filing a motion in the Criminal Court seeking to allow production to the Trustee of documents and records produced to the Individual Debtor by the prosecution which are responsive to the Rule 2004 subpoena, subject to the Trustee abiding by whatever conditions the Criminal Court may impose. In seeking to purge himself of contempt, the Individual Debtor would be acting under compulsion of the Order Compelling Production and, therefore, not waiving any Fifth Amendment right by moving in the Criminal Court to produce to the Trustee. *See Bouknight*, 493 U.S. at 561–62. In considering any sanctions motion, the Court will consider the diligence with which the Individual Debtor seeks relief in the Criminal Court.\n\n### **B. Should the Order Compelling Production be stayed?**\n\nHaving ruled on the Contempt Motion, the Court turns to the Stay Motion. The Individual Debtor argues that the Order Compelling Production must be stayed pending the end of the Criminal Action in order to preserve the Individual Debtor's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. In response, the Trustee argues that there is no basis to impose a stay of the Order Compelling Production and that such a stay would substantially injure the Trustee.\n\nThe Court first notes that while the Stay Motion was filed by the Individual Debtor and seems to only concern the Individual Debtor, the attached proposed order would stay the Order Compelling Production entirely, including the decretal paragraphs relevant to the Individual\n\nDebtor's daughter, Ms. Mei Guo, and the Individual Debtor's adjudged corporate *alter ego*, HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC. To the extent that the Stay Motion seeks relief as to these additional parties, the Court denies the Stay Motion.\n\nTurning to the merits, the Court must determine whether to stay the Order Compelling Production within its sound discretion. *Kashi v. Grastos*, 790 F.2d 1050, 1057 (2d Cir. 1986). There is no strict requirement that a court stay civil proceedings due to pending criminal proceedings. *United States v. Kordel*, 397 U.S. 1 (1970); *Kashi*, 790 F.2d at 1057. In considering whether to stay civil proceedings in light of criminal proceedings, courts consider, *inter alia*:\n\n1) the extent to which the issues in the criminal case overlap with those presented in the civil case; 2) the status of the case, including whether the defendants have been indicted; 3) the private interests of the plaintiffs in proceeding expeditiously weighed against the prejudice to plaintiffs caused by the delay; 4) the private interests of and burden on the defendants; 5) the interests of the courts; and 6) the public interest.\n\n*Trs. of Plumbers & Pipefitters Nat'l Pension Fund v. Transworld Mech., Inc.*, 886 F. Supp. 1134, 1139 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).\n\nThe Court first considers the private interests of the Estate in proceeding expeditiously weighed against the prejudice to the Estate caused by delay. There is substantial prejudice to the Estate and the Individual Debtor's creditors in staying the Order Compelling Production. As discussed above, a debtor's disclosure of his financial affairs, assets, and liabilities is fundamental in bankruptcy proceedings. The Estate continues to incur enormous expense and delay because the Individual Debtor has not cooperated with and has instead obstructed the Trustee's investigation. Pursuant to section 521, the Trustee should have had all documents and records relating to the Individual Debtor's financial affairs, assets, liabilities, businesses, etc. immediately following his appointment more than a year ago. Instead, the Trustee has had to\n\nidentify other appropriate subpoena targets, issue countless subpoenas, and engage in ceaseless motion practice. While the Trustee's efforts have substantially benefitted the Estate, the Estate has also borne a heavy cost on account of these efforts.\n\nMoreover, these heavy costs are incurred in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding. It is likely that there already is not enough money to satisfy the claims of creditors, and creditors are losing the time value of their ultimate recovery due to the ongoing, incomplete investigation into the Individual Debtor's affairs. 11 U.S.C. §§ 726(a)(5), 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii). Furthermore, Congress has determined that the ultimate goal of a Chapter 11 case – confirmation of a plan – must occur within a specified timeframe. *See* 11 U.S.C. §§ 1106(a)(5), 1121(a), 1121(d). Delay in confirmation of a plan, which must provide for the ultimate realization of creditor's claims, results in substantial injury to creditors and the Estate. *See Andrews*, 414 B.R. at 7. The Trustee should not be forced to operate without the Individual Debtor's required cooperation and disclosures. *See Stone*, 282 F.2d at 553.\n\nThe Court next considers the private interests and burden on the Individual Debtor. There is no cognizable interest in delaying or obstructing these lawful bankruptcy proceedings. There is also no cognizable burden on the Individual Debtor to comply with the Order Compelling Production. For the reasons stated above, he cannot properly invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Moreover, in upholding the required records exception post-*Fisher*, the Supreme Court in *Bouknight* noted that\n\nThe State's regulatory requirement in the usual case may neither compel incriminating testimony nor aid a criminal prosecution, but the Fifth Amendment protections are not thereby necessarily unavailable to the person who complies with the regulatory requirement after invoking the privilege and subsequently faces prosecution.\n\n493 U.S. at 561–62; *but see Johnson v. United States*, 228 U.S. 457 (1913) (holding, pre-*Fisher*, that books and records produced under *Harris* could be used in a criminal proceeding).\n\nNext the Court considers the status of the pending criminal inquiries and the interest of the Criminal Court. There are two pending criminal inquiries to consider: the Criminal Action and the alleged investigation into bankruptcy crimes. The Individual Debtor has been indicted in the Criminal Action. There has been no evidence submitted to the Court that he has been indicted regarding any investigation into bankruptcy crimes. These Chapter 11 cases and related adversary proceedings do overlap with the Criminal Action – (a) many of the Individual Debtor's creditors are also his alleged victims in the Criminal Action, (b) some of the Individual Debtor's purported assets were alleged to have been bought with proceeds of the fraud alleged in the Criminal Action, and (c) some of the Individual Debtor's purported affiliates and corporate *alter egos* are alleged to be involved in the fraud alleged in the Criminal Action – but at the same time, there are incongruities – (d) there are creditors in these Chapter 11 cases that are not alleged fraud victims, (e) there are purported assets of the Estate that were purchased prior to the alleged fraud, and (f) there are purported affiliates and *alter egos* of the Individual Debtor *not* alleged to be involved in the fraud. However, any issue implicated by any investigation into bankruptcy crimes are directly related to these Chapter 11 cases.\n\nThe Court concludes this Order does not substantially interfere with the Criminal Court's interest in the orderly administration of the Criminal Action. The Individual Debtor raises the specter that requiring the Individual Debtor to produce documents to the Trustee would damage the prosecution's case against him and cause litigation about evidence in the Criminal Court. This argument is unpersuasive. The Individual Debtor producing documents and records under compulsion in these proceedings does not change the reality that the prosecution apparently already possesses voluminous evidence. While, as the Individual Debtor argues, the prosecution *may* not be allowed to use the Individual Debtor's production to the Trustee as evidence of the\n\nIndividual Debtor's control over or the authenticity of documents and records already in the prosecution's possession, the Individual Debtor's argument describes the *status quo*. Moreover, the Criminal Court will review and determine any motion to produce to the Trustee documents and records from the prosecution's production to the Individual Debtor.\n\nRegarding any investigation into bankruptcy crimes, because (a) there is no evidence that the Individual Debtor has been indicted and (b) there is no evidence that there are proceedings in relation to it in any court, the Court concludes that the interests of any such investigation should be given less weight. As stated above, the Bankruptcy Code does not exist for the purpose of creating bankruptcy crimes. It exists for the purpose of equitably and finally resolving, adjusting, and reorganizing the assets, liabilities, and financial affairs of a debtor for the benefit of all creditors and, ultimately, the debtor itself. It is not proper to hobble the Trustee's investigation into the affairs, assets, and liabilities of the Individual Debtor for the benefit of some speculative prosecution of the Individual Debtor for bankruptcy crimes. Bankruptcy crimes are an enforcement mechanism to promote proper disclosure in bankruptcy proceedings. If the Individual Debtor complies with the Order Compelling Production, he would remedy the harm the bankruptcy crimes exist to prevent, while also allowing these Chapter 11 cases to be administered appropriately.\n\nFinally, the Court concludes that the public's interest in \"the expeditious administration of bankruptcy cases is impaired by obstructing a trustee's efforts to collect, liquidate and distribute assets to creditors of the estate.\" *In re MGL Corp.*, 262 B.R. 324, 330 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2001). The public has an interest in a well-functioning bankruptcy system. It benefits the economy, debtors, and creditors. Obstruction of that process and efforts at dilation of that process are not in the public interest. Moreover, as set forth above, the production of documents\n\nand records by the Individual Debtor in accordance with the Order Compelling Production does\n\nnot offend the Fifth Amendment.\n\nHaving considered the equities, the Court concludes within its sound discretion that a stay\n\nof the Order Compelling Production is not warranted. Accordingly, the Stay Motion is denied.\n\n# **C. Should monetary sanctions enter for discovery abuse?**\n\nFinally, Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C), made applicable by D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 37 and D.\n\nConn. Bankr. L.R. 1001-1(a)(1) and 2004-1(a), provides\n\n(C) *Payment of Expenses.* Instead of or in addition to the orders above, the court must order the disobedient party, the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.\n\nUnder the specific facts and circumstances, the Court concludes an award of expenses is not warranted at this time.\n\n# **V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER**\n\nFor the reasons stated above, the Court (A) holds the Individual Debtor in civil contempt of Court for failure to comply with the Order Compelling Production, and (B) denies the Stay Motion and declines in its sound discretion to stay the Order Compelling Production pending the resolution of the Criminal Action. Accordingly, it is hereby\n\n**ORDERED:** The Court holds Mr. Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Individual Debtor\") in civil\n\ncontempt of court for failure to comply with the Order Granting in Part Motion to Compel Compliance (the \"Order Compelling Production\"), ECF No. 1353; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** Should the Individual Debtor fail to purge himself of contempt by failing to bring himself into full compliance with the Order Compelling Production on or before September 29, 2023, Mr. Luc A. Despins, in his capacity as Chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\")\n\nfor the bankruptcy estate (the \"Estate\") of the Individual Debtor, may move for whatever sanctions are appropriate; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** The Motion for a Limited Stay of Order Granting in Part Motion to Compel Compliance (the \"Stay Motion\"), ECF No. 1649, is **DENIED**.\n\nDated at Bridgeport, Connecticut this 26th day of July, 2023.","body_zh":"美利坚合众国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院\n\n) )\n\n)\n\n关于：) 第11章 ) 案号 22-50073 (JAM) HO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，) （合并管理）\n\n债务人。) 关于 ECF Nos. 1453 and 1649\n出庭代理人\n\nLuc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯平斯）（出庭陈述）\nAvram E. Luft（埃夫拉姆·E·卢夫特）\nG. Alexander Bongartz（G. 亚历山大·邦加茨）\nDouglass Barron（道格拉斯·巴伦）\nPaul Hastings LLP（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所）\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, NY 10166\n\nDouglass S. Skalka（道格拉斯·S·斯卡尔卡）\nPatrick R. Linsey（帕特里克·R·林赛）\nNeubert, Pepe & Montieth（纽伯特、佩佩及蒙蒂思律师事务所）\n195 Church Street, 13th Floor\nNew Haven, CT 06510\n\n以及\n\nNicholas A. Bassett（尼古拉斯·A·巴塞特）（出庭陈述）\nPaul Hastings LLP（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所）\n2050 M Street NW\nWashington, D.C. 20036\n\n动议提出人兼交叉被申请人卢克·A·德斯平斯先生作为郭文贵先生破产财产的第11章受托人的代理律师\n\nStephen R. Cook（斯蒂芬·R·库克）\nBrown Rudnick LLP（布朗·拉德尼克律师事务所）\n2211 Michelson Drive, 7th Floor\nIrvine, California 92612\n\n以及\n\nStephen A. Best（斯蒂芬·A·贝斯特）（出庭陈述）\nBrown Rudnick LLP（布朗·拉德尼克律师事务所）\n601 13th Street, NW, Suite 600\nWashington, DC 20005\n\nEric Henzy（埃里克·亨齐）（出庭陈述）\nJames M. Moriarty（詹姆斯·M·莫里亚蒂）\nZeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（蔡斯勒与蔡斯勒专业公司）\n10 Middle Street\nBridgeport, CT 06604\n\n以及\n\nWilliam Baldiga（威廉·巴尔迪加）（出庭陈述）\nBrown Rudnick LLP（布朗·拉德尼克律师事务所）\nSeven Times Square\nNew York, NY 10036\n\n被申请人兼交叉动议提出人郭文贵先生、债务人1的代理律师\n关于认定个人债务人藐视法庭并驳回暂缓要求提交裁定之动议的裁决备忘录及命令\n\nJulie A. Manning（朱莉·A·曼宁），美国联邦破产法院法官\n一、引言\n\n本院审理的事项包括：卢克·A·德斯平斯先生以郭文贵先生（“个人债务人”）破产财产（“破产财产”）第11章受托人（“受托人”）身份提出的《要求说明债务人为何不应被认定藐视法庭的命令动议》（“藐视法庭动议”），（ECF No. 14532）；以及个人债务人提出的《部分准许要求遵守动议的裁定之有限暂缓动议》（“暂缓动议”，其与藐视法庭动议分别称为“交叉动议”，合称“交叉动议”），（ECF No. 1649）。受托人请求本院因个人债务人未遵守《部分准许要求遵守动议的裁定》（“命令提交裁定”）而认定其构成民事藐视法庭。（ECF No. 1353。）个人债务人交叉提出动议，请求鉴于在 Southern District of New York（纽约南区）United States District Court（美国联邦地区法院）（“刑事法院”）审理中的刑事案件 United States v. Kwok, Case No. 23 Cr. 118 (AT) (S.D.N.Y.)（“刑事案件”），暂缓执行命令提交裁定。基于下述理由，本院认定个人债务人构成民事藐视法庭，并驳回暂缓动议。\n\n二、背景\n\n个人债务人于 February 15, 2022 在本院自愿提交第11章破产申请。（ECF No. 1。）个人债务人的案件与两宗关联公司第11章案件合并管理。（ECF Nos. 970 and 1141。）基于其中载明的理由，本院于 June 15, 2022 作出裁决备忘录及命令，指定一名第11章受托人。（ECF No. 465。）In re Kwok, 640 B.R. 514 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022)。于 July 8, 2022，德斯平斯先生被指定为受托人。（ECF No. 523。）\n\n于 July 28, 2022，受托人提出《关于对[个人]债务人进行2004规则审查的动议》，（ECF No. 636），本院于 August 16, 2022 准许该动议，（ECF No. 757）。于 August 19, 2022，个人债务人被送达依据规则2004发出的传票。（See, e.g., ECF No. 1650 ¶ 7。）于 October 28, 2022，受托人提出《要求个人债务人遵守规则2004传票的命令动议》（“强制动议”）。（ECF No. 1046。）于 November 14, 2022，个人债务人对强制动议提出异议。（ECF No. 1090。）于 November 30, 2022，就强制动议举行听证会。本院将强制动议留待审议。于 January 20, 2023，3本院作出命令提交裁定。（ECF No. 1353。）\n\n3 在 November 16, 2022 至 January 13, 2023 期间，本院正在处理与这些第11章案件相关的一宗对抗性程序中的事项，该程序案名为 Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund v. Kwok (In re Kwok), Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 22-05032 (JAM) (Bankr D. Conn. Jan. 13, 2023)（以下称“社交媒体/抗议对抗性程序”）。根据 Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(3)，本院必须“在最早可能的时间”处理该对抗性程序中的事项，并且该等事项“优先于其他所有事项，但同一性质的较早事项的听证除外”。\n\n于 February 7, 2023，个人债务人就命令提交裁定提交一份声明（“声明”）。（ECF No. 1444 Ex. A。）个人债务人在声明中以伪证处罚为担保声明，就“日期为 August 17, 2022 的传票整体，包括其中载明的所有文件及信息请求”，援引其“依据美国宪法第5修正案享有的权利，包括提交行为原则下的权利[，]”。（Id. Ex. A。）于 February 10, 2023，受托人提出藐视法庭动议，主张：(i) 个人债务人须说明其援引第五修正案权利为何适当，以及为何不应认定其藐视法庭；(ii) 即使个人债务人援引该权利适当，其亦须就每一项文件及信息请求分别主张该权利；以及 (iii) 声明不符合命令提交裁定，因为该声明未详述为查找响应传票的文件及信息所作出的努力。（ECF No. 1453。）于 March 7, 2023，就藐视法庭动议举行听证会。听证会结束时，本院就藐视法庭动议提出的问题确定书面陈述时间表。\n\n于 March 15, 2023，在相关对抗性程序的一次证据听证会开始时，个人债务人的代理律师告知本院，刑事案件中针对个人债务人的起诉书已被解封，且 Federal Bureau of Investigation（联邦调查局）（“FBI”）于当日早晨稍早时候已逮捕个人债务人。于 March 22, 2023，本院准许个人债务人延长对藐视法庭动议作出回应期限的动议。（ECF No. 1585。）\n\n于 April 10, 2023，个人债务人对藐视法庭动议提出异议。（ECF No. 1650。）个人债务人的异议主张，其已适当援引其第五修正案反对自证其罪的权利，因而已遵守命令提交裁定。（Id.）与此同时，个人债务人通过其在这些第11章案件中作为特别（刑事）代理律师出庭的刑事案件代理律师，提出暂缓动议。（ECF No. 1649。）暂缓动议主张，为维护个人债务人依据第五修正案享有的反对自证其罪权利，本院必须在刑事案件解决之前暂缓执行命令提交裁定。（Id.）于 April 14, 2023，受托人就对藐视法庭动议的异议提交答复。（ECF No. 1670。）于 April 19, 2023，受托人对暂缓动议提出异议。（ECF No. 1680。）\n\n于 April 20, 2023，就交叉动议举行听证会。辩论结束时，受托人与个人债务人似乎就交叉动议达成协商一致的解决方案。然而，于 April 24, 2023，双方提交相互竞争的拟议命令。（ECF Nos. 1698, 1699。）于 April 27, 2023，就交叉动议举行状态会议，以讨论相互竞争的命令。双方同意在能够达成一致的范围内协商推进，但就先前协议的条款表示存在分歧。于 May 1, 2023，本院作出同意命令，要求个人债务人就受托人提出的二百零二（202）个问题中的每一个分别援引其第五修正案权利。（ECF No. 1740。）同日，个人债务人提交补充书状，以支持其对 April 20 协议的解释。（ECF No. 1737。）\n\n于 May 2, 2023，就交叉动议举行第二次听证会，双方就 April 20 协议的条款陷入僵局。受托人主张，双方已同意个人债务人将向刑事案件提出动议，请求准许其与受托人分享控方就该债务人所作的提交，前提是受托人遵守刑事案件中作出的保护令及其他保密命令和使用限制。个人债务人主张，双方已同意个人债务人将寻求，可能通过动议，促使控方同意同时向个人债务人和受托人提交文件，前提是受托人遵守刑事案件中作出的保护令及其他保密命令和使用限制。鉴于该僵局，本院认定必须就交叉动议作出裁决。然而，个人债务人的破产代理律师请求本院在就交叉动议作出裁决前等待，以允许个人债务人有时间了解刑事案件中控方就其所作提交的性质。\n\n鉴于所涉问题的严重性，本院予以等待。于 June 13, 2023，就交叉动议举行最终听证会。本院询问双方是否在就交叉动议达成协商一致的解决方案方面取得任何进展。双方报告称，个人债务人已准备一份补充声明（“补充声明”），其中其就受托人的每一个问题分别援引第五修正案。（See Despins ex rel. Kwok v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok), Case No. 22-50073, Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 8, 2023), ECF No. 1 Ex. 1。）然而，除补充声明外，双方报告称僵局仍然存在，并请求本院就交叉动议作出裁决。本院将交叉动议留待审议。\n\n交叉动议已具备裁决条件。\n\n三、管辖权\n\nUnited States District Court for the District of Connecticut（康涅狄格州联邦地区法院）根据 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) 对本事项具有管辖权。本院根据 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) 以及康涅狄格州联邦地区法院于 September 21, 1984 作出的移送命令，有权审理并裁决本事项。本程序依法属于核心程序。28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A)。本院认定，行使管辖权不受宪法方面顾虑的排除。Cf. Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 487–99 (2011)。此外，受托人与个人债务人通过提出终局性动议而未对本院作出终局命令的权限提出异议，已默示同意本院就交叉动议作出终局命令。See Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 575 U.S. 665, 686 (2015)（裁定尽管 Stern 一案作出判决，当事人仍可同意由破产法院作出终局命令）；True Traditions, LC v. Wu, 552 B.R. 826, 838 (N.D. Cal. 2015)（裁定提出终局性动议即构成默示同意）。\n\n根据 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409，本地区为适格审判地。\n\n四、讨论4\n\n交叉动议提出了严肃问题。受托人寻求因个人债务人未遵守强制提交命令而认定其藐视法庭。个人债务人主张，其援引第五修正案规定的不自证其罪权利即构成遵守，且该权利必须通过暂缓执行强制提交命令予以保护。基于下文所述理由，法院认定，在法院面前的具体事实和情形下，第五修正案规定的不自证其罪权利不适用。因此，法院认定个人债务人藐视法庭，并驳回暂缓执行动议。\n\nA. 个人债务人是否构成民事藐视法庭？\n\n法院首先审议，个人债务人是否因未遵守强制提交命令而构成藐视法庭。本法院依据 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) 和 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9020，有权认定当事人藐视法庭。Taggart v. Lorenzen ex rel. Brown, 139 S. Ct. 1795, 1801 (2019); PHH Mortg. Corp. v. Sensenich ex rel. Gravel (In re Gravel), 6 F.4th 503, 512 (2d Cir. 2021); Mar. Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chauteaugay Corp.), 920 F.2d 183, 187 (2d. Cir. 1990)。Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 37(b)(1) 和 37(b)(2)(A)(vii)，经 D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 37 以及 D. Conn. Bankr. L.R. 1001-1(a)(1) 和 2004-1(a) 适用，进一步授权法院认定当事人藐视强制提交证据开示材料的命令。\n\n4 根据 Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure Rule 7052，下文构成本法院的事实认定和法律结论；该规则通过 Rule 9014(c) 适用于争议事项。\n\n可寻求藐视法庭认定，以“强制被告遵守”法院命令，或“赔偿申诉人因未遵守”法院命令所造成的损失。Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1801 (citing United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 303–04 (1947))。认定民事藐视法庭须满足：(1) 被藐视法庭者未遵守的命令明确且无歧义，(2) 不遵守的证据清楚且有说服力，及 (3) 被藐视法庭者未以合理方式勤勉地尝试遵守。King v. Allied Vision, Ltd., 65 F.3d 1051, 1058 (2d Cir. 1995)。被藐视法庭者还必须 (4) 知悉相关命令。Gravel, 6 F.4th at 512。\n\n1. 强制遵守命令是否明确且无歧义？\n\n如“对于被告行为的不当性不存在任何合理疑义”，则该命令明确且无歧义。Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1801 (citing Cal. Artificial Stone Paving Co. v. Molitor, 113 U.S. 609 (1885))。法院通常适用客观标准——“一方当事人主观上相信其正在遵守命令，若该信念在客观上不合理，通常不能使其免于民事藐视法庭。”Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1802 (citing McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1949) (“不存在故意性 [sic] 并不能免除民事藐视法庭责任。”))。然而，一方当事人的恶意可能证明有理由“将判令中任何不确定性的负担……置于违反法院命令的一方‘肩上’”，而“一方当事人的善意，即使其并不阻却民事藐视法庭认定，也可能有助于确定适当的制裁”。Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1802 (citing McComb, 336 U.S. at 192–93 and Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 801 (1987))。\n\n强制提交命令的相关部分载明如下：\n\n兹命令：就针对该［个人］债务人的证据开示请求而言，异议予以驳回；但对于寻求日期早于 June 1, 2014 的文件的请求，以及寻求该［个人］债务人护照的请求，异议在该范围内予以支持，但不妨碍受托人在日后经证明有正当理由且随着调查进展，寻求日期早于 June 1, 2014 的文件及该［个人］债务人的护照。该［个人］债务人应于 January 31, 2023 下午 5:00 前，检索并向受托人提交：\n\n(i) 对受托人日期为 June 1, 2014 或之后的请求具有回应性的文件，除非某一特定请求规定了并非始于 June 1, 2014 之前的不同时间段；\n\n(ii) 对受托人的请求具有回应性的文件，涉及其承认由其拥有的资产以及据称属于该［个人］债务人以外人士或实体的资产，包括但不限于其家庭成员和关联实体；以及\n\n(iii) 对受托人的请求具有回应性的、处于其保管、占有或控制之下的文件，包括但不限于其现任或前任律师以及其他代理人和顾问的档案中的文件，除非该等文件已由其现任或前任律师以及其他代理人和顾问提交；但不考虑其现任或前任律师以及其他代理人和顾问未来可能作出的任何提交；\n\n并进一步\n\n兹命令：该［个人］债务人应于 February 7, 2023 下午 5:00 前，在本案案卷中提交经宣誓的声明，详细说明其及其律师为响应传票而采取的文件收集、检索和审查行动，包括但不限于详细说明其及其律师为进行下列事项所实施的程序：\n\n(i) 确定该［个人］债务人的所有电子设备；其可访问的所有在线文件存储库；与电子文件相关联的所有社交媒体、电子邮件及其他账户；所有银行账户及相关账户对账单；以及可能存在的所有其他潜在的具有回应性的纸质和电子文件来源；以及\n\n(ii) 在前述来源中检索具有回应性的文件，包括但不限于检索对与费用或资金转移有关的请求、与该［个人］债务人家庭或关联实体有关的资产或财务或商业交易或记录有关的请求，以及与该［个人］债务人有关联的商业利益有关的请求具有回应性的文件……\n\n(ECF No. 1353.) 个人债务人未在书面陈述或口头辩论中提出任何论点，主张对强制提交命令的含义存在“合理疑义”。5 法院认定，就个人债务人而言，强制提交命令明确且无歧义。6\n\n2. 个人债务人是否遵守了强制提交命令？\n\n关于第二项要件，受托人必须以清楚且有说服力的证据证明，个人债务人未遵守强制提交命令。King, 65 F.3d at 1058。受托人主张，由于 (i) 个人债务人未提交文件或记录，且 (ii) 个人债务人未提交声明，以识别文件或记录的潜在来源以及为检索该等来源所作的努力，个人债务人未遵守强制提交命令。\n\n作为回应，个人债务人提出两项论点。第一，个人债务人主张，由于其目前被羁押候审，且不可能获得审前释放，其不可能遵守。第二，个人债务人主张，“提交行为”原则允许其针对要求提交文件和记录的请求援引第五修正案规定的不自证其罪权利。基于此，个人债务人主张其已遵守强制提交命令。\n\n5 个人债务人主张，对于个人债务人能否针对强制提交命令援引第五修正案规定的不自证其罪权利，存在合理疑义。法院在下文关于个人债务人是否已勤勉尝试遵守强制提交命令的讨论中审议该论点。\n\n6 法院此前已认定，就其他当事人而言，强制提交命令明确且无歧义。(See ECF No. 1537.)\n\ni. 个人债务人是否不可能遵守？\n\n个人债务人虽然正确指出，“对民事藐视法庭指控的一项长期获得承认的抗辩是，被指控者无能力遵守法院命令”，United States v. Wendy, 575 F.2d 1025, 1030 (2d Cir. 1978)，且评估不可能遵守的适当时间是在作出藐视法庭裁决之时，United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 757 (1983)，但法院认定，个人债务人仍有可能遵守。虽然检方确实已就刑事诉讼扣押个人债务人的文件和记录，但个人债务人并未证明：(a) 其所有文件和记录均已被扣押；以及 (b) 其没有被扣押记录的额外副本。此外，根据其律师的陈述，法院了解，在刑事诉讼中，检方向个人债务人作出的提交应很快开始——如果尚未开始。虽然 (i) 受托人很可能必须成为刑事诉讼中保密要求及使用限制的签署方并遵守该等要求及限制，且 (ii) 检方可能反对向受托人提交，或刑事法院可能不允许该提交，但个人债务人并非不可能请求刑事法院允许向受托人提交。尽管个人债务人目前被羁押候审，其律师并未被羁押。个人债务人可以通过其律师和／或其他代理人提交文件。因此，个人债务人并非不可能遵守强制提交命令。\n\nii. 个人债务人是否适当地援引了第五修正案？\n\na. 提交行为原则是否适用？\n\n个人债务人主张其已遵守强制提交命令，依赖于“提交行为”原则。在 Fisher v. United States 一案中，United States Supreme Court（美国联邦最高法院）裁定该案所涉提交行为不受第五修正案保护，但仍裁定：\n\n然而，响应传票而提交证据的行为本身具有交流性特征，完全独立于所提交文件的内容。遵守传票默示承认被要求提供的文件存在，并由纳税人占有或控制。该行为也表明纳税人相信，该等文件即为传票所描述的文件。\n\n425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976); see United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 36–37 (2000)。在 Fisher 一案中，最高法院裁定，确定提交行为是否可受第五修正案保护的标准是，提交行为所涉及的“默示陈述”是否依照现行第五修正案判例法同时具有“证言性”和“自证其罪性”。425 U.S. at 410–11。具体而言，最高法院对下列默示陈述表示关切：(i) 文件或记录的存在；(ii) 提交方对文件或记录的占有或控制；以及 (iii) 提交方相信文件和记录即为传票所要求的文件和记录。Id. 提交行为原则并不保护文件中具有证言性和自证其罪性的内容——其仅保护具有证言性和自证其罪性的提交行为。Id.; Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 40–41.\n\n根据 United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit（美国联邦第二巡回上诉法院）具有约束力的判例，提交行为可能包含具有证言性质的默示断言：“(1) ‘如果政府不知道被传唤文件的存在及所在地’；或 (2) 提交将‘默示认证’该等文件的情形。”United States v. Doe (In re Grand Jury Subpoena), 1 F.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 1993)（下称“Grand Jury 1993”）（援引 United States v. Fox, 721 F.2d 32, 36 (2d Cir.1983)）。如果受托人能够证明文件的 (1) 存在及所在地；以及 (2) 真实性，属于“显而易见”的结论，或者已由其他证据确立，则该提交不受第五修正案保护。Grand Jury 1993, 1 F.3d at 93。此外，即使根据 Fox 案，提交所涉及的默示断言具有证言性质，个人债务人还必须证明披露文件或记录的存在、所在地或真实性具有自证其罪性质。参见 Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486–87 (1951)；Fox, 721 F.2d at 40；In re Schick, 215 B.R. 4, 9 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997)；比较 Martin-Trigona v. Belford (In re Martin-Trigona), 732 F.2d 170, 176 (2d Cir. 1984)。\n\n个人债务人为证明提交行为具有证言性质且具有自证其罪性质所负的举证责任，低于通常的举证责任：“为维持该特权，只需从问题的含义及其提出的情境中明显看出，对该问题作出答复，或者说明为何无法答复，可能具有危险性，因为可能导致有害披露。”Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486–87。在确定个人债务人是否可以援引第五修正案时，法院必须在同等程度上运用其“对案件特殊情形的个人判断”以及个人债务人提交的事实支持材料。Id. at 487。如果提交行为可能成为用于起诉个人债务人的“证据链中的一环”，则该提交行为具有自证其罪性质。Id. at 486。\n\n个人债务人主张，根据强制提交命令而被迫提交文件和记录将具有证言性质，因为该提交可能被理解为默示断言：其对各个实体和资产享有实益所有权和/或控制权，并且其对各类人员具有权力。个人债务人主张，该等默示断言将具有自证其罪性质，因为当前刑事诉讼以及据称对破产犯罪的调查，均涉及关于个人债务人对实体和/或资产的实益所有权及控制权，以及个人债务人对某些个人的权力和/或控制权的指控。\n\n受托人对个人债务人的主张提出众多异议。受托人的主要异议是，“必要记录”原则适用，并构成提交行为原则的一项例外。为支持该主张，受托人主张，个人债务人作为破产债务人，不得适当地援引第五修正案，以避免提交《破产法》所要求的、与其财务状况、资产和负债有关的文件和记录——无论提交行为是否具有证言性质及自证其罪性质。下文将讨论受托人关于个人债务人在其破产案件中所负义务的必要记录主张。法院将首先审理受托人关于个人债务人是否已履行其举证责任，以证明遵守强制提交命令将同时具有证言性质和自证其罪性质的各项异议。\n\n补充声明\n\n个人债务人与受托人已就受托人的一项异议达成解决。在提出藐视法庭动议并就该动议举行听证会之前，个人债务人的声明笼统主张其第五修正案不自证其罪权利。受托人主张，此举不当，因为：(a) 该等笼统主张并未表明个人债务人在援引第五修正案之前，已适当考虑受托人的每一项请求；以及 (b) 本第 11 章案件属于民事程序，这意味着在适当情况下，个人债务人援引第五修正案可以被采纳为证据。然而，个人债务人此后已依照一项同意命令提交补充声明，其中其逐一回答受托人提出的每个问题，并针对二百零二 (202) 个问题中的每一个主张其第五修正案权利。尽管个人债务人现已就受托人的具体问题适当地援引其第五修正案权利，但与文件提交有关的问题仍然存在。\n\n起诉书公布前对第五修正案的援引\n\n受托人对个人债务人证明其遵守强制提交命令所提出的剩余异议之一，缺乏说服力。受托人主张，个人债务人在针对其的起诉书解封之前即已构成藐视法庭，现不能鉴于该刑事诉讼援引第五修正案，以避免被认定构成藐视法庭。然而，个人债务人正确地指出，可以在刑事诉讼开始之前援引第五修正案。参见 United States v. Miranti, 253 F.2d 135, 139 (2d Cir. 1958)（允许证人在仅存在轻微被起诉可能性时援引第五修正案）。正如个人债务人可以在 2022 年 12 月的证据听证会期间及其 2023 年 3 月的证言记录期间主张其第五修正案权利一样，只要其有“合理理由担心直接答复会带来危险”，且其第五修正案权利在其他方面适用，其亦可在 2023 年 2 月如此主张。Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486。\n\n检方持有的文件\n\n受托人的第二项主张同样不能成立。受托人主张，个人债务人不会受到损害，因为检方已持有其文件和记录。就该等文件的存在及所在地已为人所知，因而 Fox 检验的第一项要件不成立而言，受托人是正确的。Grand Jury 1993, 1 F.3d at 93。然而，提交检方已持有的个人债务人文件和记录，是否会导致对该等文件和记录进行认证，仍然是一个问题。Id. 个人债务人担心其提交行为会认证该等文件。法院未见过这些文件和记录，受托人亦未见过。法院认识到，受托人处境困难，因为其并非该刑事诉讼的一方。然而，受托人并未证明该等文件和记录的真实性将属于显而易见的结论。因此，根据 Fox 检验的第二项要件，关于检方持有的文件和记录真实性的默示断言可能具有证言性质。Id.\n\n此外，由于检方扣押的文件和记录可能被用于在刑事诉讼中起诉个人债务人，法院认为，个人债务人关于其对该等文件和记录的默示认证可能成为用于起诉其的“证据链中的一环”的主张具有说服力。Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486。因此，除非受托人能够证明该等文件和记录的真实性属于显而易见的结论，否则提交行为原则适用于检方持有的文件，除非该原则的一项例外适用。\n\n检方未持有的文件\n\n个人债务人主张，强制提交命令强制其提交的全部文件和记录均已被检方扣押。法院不同意，因此继续进行讨论。如受托人所主张，个人债务人关于其现已被监禁，因而其占有、保管或控制下不存在任何文件或记录的笼统主张，缺乏说服力。尽管此前曾陈述个人债务人几乎未保存任何文件、记录和设备，FBI 显然仍在个人债务人的住所扣押了大量文件、记录和电子设备。同样，受托人正确地指出，没有任何证据基础支持如下主张：个人债务人占有、保管或控制下不存在未包含于检方扣押的文件和记录之中的记录。鉴于过去对个人债务人律师所作努力——或者视情形而定，未作努力——的描述，个人债务人未能证明已进行合理勤勉的搜索。（参见强制提交命令 ¶ 9。）基于这两项理由，法院得出结论：个人债务人未能证明所有可能响应的文件和记录均已被检方扣押。\n\n对于检方未扣押的文件和记录，受托人未能证明该等文件的所在地、存在或真实性属于显而易见的结论。因此，如果个人债务人证明其具有自证其罪性质，提交行为原则将适用。Fox, 721 F.2d at 36。受托人主张，个人债务人未履行其举证责任，证明所请求的文件和记录具有自证其罪性质。受托人正确地指出，即使有补充声明，个人债务人仍未证明每一项被请求的提交均具有自证其罪性质。\n\n然而，法院注意到个人债务人必须满足的较低举证责任。法院还注意到，其必须依赖自己对本第 11 章案件及相关对抗程序的事实和情形的判断。Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486–87。此外，正如个人债务人的律师所指出：“所赋予的特权不仅延伸至本身足以支持依据联邦刑事法规作出有罪判决的答复，也同样包括那些将提供起诉主张该特权者联邦犯罪所需证据链中一环的答复。”Id. at 486。然而，法院“对案件特殊情形的个人判断”包括如下观察：除其明确表示希望避免自证其罪外，个人债务人还阻碍了对其资产、负债和财务状况的合法调查。Id. at 487。（参见，例如，Social Media/Protest Adversary, ECF No. 133。）\n\n刑事诉讼中的起诉书本身不足以使个人债务人就检方未扣押的文件和记录履行其举证责任。起诉书指控的欺诈可追溯至大约 2018 年，而迄今为止受托人关注的许多资产——该游艇 Lady May；Sherry-Netherland Hotel 的公寓；Ace Decade Holdings Limited（艾斯十年控股有限公司）的诉因——据称均在 2018 年之前取得。虽然其中一些资产，例如 Lady May，在起诉书中有所论述，但基于法院“对案件特殊情形的个人判断”及个人债务人有限的证据证明，法院不能认定个人债务人已基于该刑事诉讼充分支持其对第五修正案的笼统主张。Id. at 487。个人债务人未能证明其全部资产、负债和财务状况均与被指控的欺诈有关，或可能以某种方式构成有关被指控欺诈的“证据链中的一环”。Id. at 486。\n\n为支持其已遵守强制提交裁定的主张，个人债务人还提交了一份面向受托人的传票，该传票涉及对在这些第11章案件中涉嫌实施的潜在破产犯罪所进行的调查。(ECF No. 1719, at *80:20–81:8.) 如上所述，在确定提交文件是否具有自证其罪性时，该调查导致被起诉是否可能并不重要。Miranti, 253 F.2d at 139.\n\n《美国法典》第18编第152、156、157、1519和3284条规定了与在破产案件中隐匿资产有关的犯罪。第152、156、157和1519条要求行为人明知、故意或欺诈地实施行为。第3284条要求存在“隐匿”。关于个人债务人持有或控制对规则2004传票作出回应的文件或记录，以及该等文件或记录真实的默示陈述，本身并不具有自证其罪性，因为该等陈述并未证明个人债务人明知、故意或欺诈地向破产财产隐匿资产——或与资产有关的文件和记录。债务人经常因错误而遗漏资产和负债，并修改其陈述和清单及/或更新其披露。\n\n尽管如此，本院必须考虑，此类默示陈述是否构成关于可能因个人债务人向受托人、本院及其债权人隐匿其资产而对其提起诉讼的“证据链中的一环”。Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486. 受托人主张，个人债务人拥有众多商业利益，并应当持有与之相称的文件和记录。尽管个人债务人否认这些主张，但基于本院及其他法院先前作出的认定，本院对本案特殊情况的“个人判断”是，个人债务人至少拥有一些其目前未承认的商业利益。参见 Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund, L.P.（太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金，L.P.）v. Kwok Ho Wan（郭文贵）, Index No. 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 9, 2022), NYCEF No. 1181; E. Profit Corp. Ltd.（E. Profit有限公司）v. Strategic Vision US LLC（战略视野美国有限责任公司）, Case No. 18-cv-2185 (LJL), 2021 WL 2554631, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2021). (See ECF No. 1110; HK Int'l Funds Invs. (USA) Ltd., LLC（香港国际基金投资〈美国〉有限公司）v. Despins（德斯平斯）ex rel. Kwok（代表郭文贵）(In re Kwok), Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 22-05003 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. May 18, 2023), ECF Nos. 177, 221; Social Media/Protest Adversary（社交媒体/抗议对抗程序）, ECF No. 133 ¶ 7.) 本院认为，个人债务人的提交范围可能与 Hubbell 案中所涉的提交同样广泛。参见 530 U.S. at 40–43. 尽管 Hubbell 是一宗涉及向一方授予豁免的案件，在该案中提交范围已知且举证责任已转移至控方，但个人债务人同样可能有必要“在识别传票请求所要求的数百份文件时，广泛利用‘其自身头脑中的内容’”，并实质上绘制其资产、负债和商业利益的图谱。参见 id. at 43. 就所称对破产犯罪的调查而言，该图谱可能有助于发现有关知情、意图或欺诈的证据。基于其对这些第11章案件及相关对抗程序具体事实和情形的判断，本院认定，该等承认可能构成证据链中的环节，因为其可能具有“衍生用途”。参见 id. at 41–43.\n\n个人债务人的提交行为具有证言性且具自证其罪性\n\n基于上述理由，本院认定，遵守强制提交裁定而进行的提交，就控方持有的文件及控方尚未扣押的文件而言，均将具有证言性且具自证其罪性。参见 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410–11. 然而，本院指出，迄今为止的证据记录并不充分。若未来受托人能够：(i) 证明任何文件的位置、存在和真实性已属既定结论；(ii) 就任何文件或文件类别证明个人债务人未能履行其举证责任；或 (iii) 证明其就任何文件或文件类别已掌握个人债务人的资产、负债和商业利益图谱，则可经适当动议重新审议该认定。\n\nb. “必须保存的记录”例外是否适用？\n\n尽管提交行为原则适用，但这并未终结本院的分析，也不必然决定藐视法庭动议的结果。如上所述，受托人的主要论点是，根据本院面前的具体事实和情形，必须保存的记录原则适用，并构成对提交行为原则的例外。因此，受托人主张，无论提交行为原则是否允许个人债务人为回应强制提交裁定而适当地援引其第五修正案反对自证其罪的权利，均无关紧要，因为本案适用必须保存的记录例外。\n\n为支持其主张，受托人援引 Baltimore City Department of Social Services（巴尔的摩市社会服务局）v. Bouknight（布奈特）, 493 U.S. 549 (1990). 在 Bouknight 案中，美国最高法院在 Fisher 案之后重申并确认了必须保存的记录原则的存在。493 U.S. at 555–59. 根据必须保存的记录原则，“不得援引第五修正案特权以抗拒遵守旨在实现与执行本州刑法无关之公共目的的监管制度。”Id. at 556; see Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1968)（阐明与必须保存的记录原则有关的考量因素）；Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 32 (1948)（创设必须保存的记录原则）。\n\n个人债务人主张，Bouknight 并未说明其构成 Fisher 所确立的提交行为原则的例外，而且必须保存的记录原则并未规定可以强制提交具有证言性且具自证其罪性的文件和记录。个人债务人的主张与 Bouknight 的明确文本相矛盾，该文本规定：\n\n提交命令可能强制作出日后可能证明具有自证其罪性的证言性陈述，这一可能性并不在所有情形下均足以证明可援引该特权以抗拒提交。即使假定这一有限的证言性陈述具有充分的自证其罪性，并且“就该特权而言具有充分的证言性”，Bouknight 也不得援引该特权以抗拒提交命令，因为她已承担与提交有关的保管职责，且提交是非刑事监管制度的一部分所要求的。\n\nBouknight, 493 U.S. at 555–56（讨论 Fisher）（省略内部引文）。除美国最高法院外，第二巡回上诉法院也明确驳回了个人债务人的主张：\n\n“[必须保存的记录原则]是第五修正案特权的一项例外。因此，在该特权本应适用的情形下，该原则必然优先于该特权。Fisher 并未涉及必须保存的记录，且其分析中没有任何内容可被解释为削弱必须保存的记录例外。”\n\nUnited States（美国）v. Doe（多伊）(In re Grand Jury Subpoena), 741 F.3d 339, 346 (2d Cir. 2013)（下称“Grand Jury 2013”）（引自 Doe v. United States (In re Doe), 711 F.2d 1187, 1192–93 (2d Cir. 1983)）。事实上，第二巡回上诉法院已明确表示：“本院已两次明确驳回如下观点，即必须保存的记录例外已被提交行为原则废止。”Grand Jury 2013, 741 F.3d at 346. 这一具有约束力的美国最高法院和第二巡回上诉法院判例明确表明，必须保存的记录原则是提交行为原则的一项例外。7 因此，如本案适用必须保存的记录例外，则无论该提交被认定为具有证言性且具自证其罪性，个人债务人均未遵守强制提交裁定。\n\n在确定必须保存的记录原则是否适用时，第二巡回上诉法院采用 Grosso 因素。Grand Jury 2013, 741 F.3d at 345. 在 Grosso 案中，美国最高法院采用下列因素：“[第]一，美国的调查目的必须本质上属于监管性质；第二，须通过要求保存受监管方惯常保存种类的记录来获取信息；第三，记录本身必须已具有‘公共性质’，以使其至少类似于公共文件。”390 U.S. at 67–68. 本案中，受托人寻求的文件和记录，系强制提交裁定认定其与“[个人债务人]的行为、举止或财产，或与其负债及财务状况，或与可能影响[破产财产]管理的任何事项”有关。Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004(b). 因此，个人债务人根据第521(a)(3)和(a)(4)条负有提交受托人所寻求的文件和记录的义务。因此，争议在于，个人债务人根据第521(a)(3)和(a)(4)条负有提交义务的文件和记录，是否属于 Grosso 检验下的必须保存记录。\n\n破产法第521(a)(3)和521(a)(4)条的目的是什么？\n\n在确定第一项因素是否支持适用必须保存的记录原则时，法院必须考虑相关“立法是否并非‘面向广大公众’，且涉及‘充斥刑事法规的领域’。”Grand Jury 2013, 741 F.3d at 347（引自 Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965)）；see Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 57 (1968); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 99 (1968). 法院必须就所涉具体法条作出该项判断，而非参照其周边的全部法定背景。Grand Jury 2013, 741 F.3d at 348（引自 California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 430 (1971)）。\n\n《破产法典》第521条标题为“债务人的义务”。第521(a)(3)和521(a)(4)条分别规定，在如本案一般由破产受托人处理案件的情形下，债务人必须配合受托人履行受托人的职责，并必须向受托人交付破产财产的全部财产，以及与破产财产有关的任何已记录信息，包括账簿、文件、记录和文书。\n\n《破产法典》第109条允许个人或实体根据第7章、第11章、第11章V分章、第12章或第13章申请破产。在第7章、第12章和第13章程序中\n\n以及第11章V分章，破产受托人在案件开始时即自动获任。11 U.S.C. §§ 701, 702, 1183, 1202, 1302。第7章和第13章案件是普通公众中最常见的案件，并且始终涉及一名破产受托人，债务人根据第521(a)(3)及(a)(4)条对其负有义务。\n\n尽管在第11章案件中任命破产受托人是一项非常救济，见 11 U.S.C. § 1112，但该非常救济的效果是，被剥夺管理权的第11章债务人与第7章或第13章债务人一样，负有第521(a)(3)及第521(a)(4)条规定的义务。依法，债务人在提交第11章案件时，自动被视为占有中债务人，并承担破产受托人的角色。11 U.S.C. § 1107(a)。然而，在第11章案件中，如符合债权人和破产财产的最佳利益，债务人可因“正当理由”通过任命破产受托人而被剥夺对破产财产的管理权。11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1)。\n\n第11章具有独特性，因为其旨在适用于具有复杂商业权益、资产和负债的债务人，例如大型公司和高净值个人。见 H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 220 (1977)。因此，第11章受三项基本推定指引：(i) 具有重大商业权益和经营活动的债务人，作为持续经营的经济实体，比被拆分并清算更具价值；(ii) 财务事务、资产和负债复杂的债务人，比获任受托人更有能力为债权人的利益管理其自身事务；以及 (iii) 允许具有重大商业权益和经营活动的债务人重组，除债权人利益外，亦保障债务人、所有人、雇员等的利益。见同上。不过，归根结底，只要第11章的具体规定能够最大化向债权人的分配，第11章即得到适当使用。见 Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 163–64 (1991)。任命破产受托人的许多列举的“正当理由”示例——或驳回案件，或将案件转换为第7章程序——均涉及对上述推定的推翻，或占有中债务人未能履行其为债权人利益管理破产财产的义务。11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4); see 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 1112.04[6][b]–[k] (16th ed. 2023)。\n\n破产受托人一经任命，即为债务人破产财产的代表。11 U.S.C. § 323。第521(a)(3)及(a)(4)条的目的，在于使破产受托人能够依照其职责管理债务人的破产财产。见 11 U.S.C. §§ 704, 1106, 1116, 1183, 1202, 1302; 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 521.15[5], 521.16。破产财产的管理要求债务人向受托人披露、交出并予以合作，因为破产案件是一项包罗万象的程序，旨在公平且最终地解决、调整或重组无数债务人与债权人之间的关系。见，例如，11 U.S.C. §§ 704(a)(5)（“受托人应……审查债权申报，并对任何不适当获准的债权提出异议……”）, 704(a)(7)（“受托人应……按照利害关系方的要求，提供有关破产财产及其管理的信息……”）, 704(a)(8)（“受托人应……向法院、美国受托人以及负责征收或确定因该等经营产生的任何税款的任何政府单位，提交该企业经营情况的定期报告和摘要……”）, 1106(a)(3)（“受托人应……调查债务人的行为、操守、资产、负债和财务状况，债务人企业的经营情况和继续该企业的可取性，以及与案件或制定计划相关的其他事项……”）; 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1116.01（“受托人的调查和报告职责提供了一种机制，以充分披露债务人的事务状况，从而使利害关系方能够保护其权利并实现债务人的成功重组。”）。\n\n债务人未能履行以下义务：(i) 与受托人合作；(ii) 披露财务事务、资产和负债；以及 (iii) 交出破产财产及与之相关的记录，会严重妨碍受托人管理破产财产的能力。见 United States v. Stone, 282 F. 547, 553 (2d Cir. 1960)（“[T]事务说明书的根本目的，就是提供可靠信息，而无须进一步查证。”）（维持在一宗刑事诉讼中对债务人的定罪；该诉讼起诉债务人犯有与其未在财务事务说明书中适当披露贷款信息有关的破产罪行，程序依原《破产法》进行）。该等未履行行为导致破产财产的债权人承担费用和延误，构成可认定的损害。见 Andrews v. McCarron (In re Vincent Andrews Mgmt. Corp.), 414 B.R. 1, 7 (D. Conn. 2009)。\n\n此外，《破产法典》所提供的许多广泛且非常的救济，其前提是进行适当披露和通知。见，例如，11 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)（界定在开始征集计划之前必须送达的信息披露声明所需的充分信息）；Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 475 n. 12 (2004)（认定“《破产法典》广泛的信息披露要求降低了债务人存在重大未披露义务的风险”，从而支撑法院“修改债务人原合同所规定的分期付款次数、时间或金额的权力”）；In re Motors Liquidation Co., 829 F.3d 135, 158–61 (2d Cir. 2016)（裁定未能向未披露的已知债权人适当送达出售动议，致使出售命令对该等债权人不可执行）。受托人作为破产财产的代表，首先负有寻求此类救济中大部分救济的职责，以便：(i) 为破产财产的利益，Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 352 (1985)；以及 (ii) 为债务人的利益，债务人在历经考验后可能获得“重新开始”，见 Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991)。\n\n本院认定，第521(a)(3)及(a)(4)条面向普通公众。破产受托人在广泛类型的案件中自动获任。向受托人披露并交出财产和记录的义务，对于受托人履行基本且必要的管理职责以及行使其在《破产法典》下的权力至关重要。\n\n剩余问题在于，第521(a)(3)及(a)(4)条是否涉及一个“充斥刑事法规”的领域。Albertson, 382 U.S. at 79。《美国法典》第18编第151条及以下条款、第1519条和第3284条，将就《破产法典》下程序采取的某些行为规定为犯罪。这些“破产罪行”包括数项与隐匿破产财产资产有关的罪行，目的是使该等资产免于分配给破产财产的债权人。然而，本院面临的问题并非债务人未能履行第521(a)(3)及(4)条规定的某些义务是否会使债务人面临刑事追诉，而是第521(a)(3)及(4)条是否“针对‘本身即涉嫌从事犯罪活动的特定群体’”。Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 57。\n\n在 Grosso 和 Marchetti 案中，问题不在于执行法定纳税申报义务的刑法，这些刑法类似于上文列举的破产罪行。Grosso, 390 U.S. at 64–65; see Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 57。相反，在两案中，美国最高法院认定，提交联邦博彩税申报表的要求直接针对已被州法规定为犯罪的行为，即赌博。Grosso, 390 U.S. at 64–65; Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 57。Albertson 案所涉问题，是要求美国共产党成员亲自向颠覆活动管制委员会登记。382 U.S. at 77–78。当时，与共产党有关联已被规定为犯罪。Id.。Haynes 案所涉问题，是要求并非在正常过程中取得枪支的人——美国最高法院指出，该等人员大多会是非法取得枪支者——登记其枪支。390 U.S. at 95–97。\n\n美国最高法院在 Grosso、Marchetti、Albertson 和 Haynes 案中审理的事实，均与本案事实不同。首先，所有这些案件均涉及创设新记录，而非提交现有文件和记录。Haynes, 390 U.S. at 95–97; Grosso, 390 U.S. at 64–65; Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 57; Albertson, 382 U.S. at 77–78。更重要的是，破产案件的日常管理通常并不涉及犯罪活动。破产财产的管理旨在与刑事责任问题相分离。比较 11 U.S.C. §§ 323（就民事诉讼而言，受托人是代表破产财产起诉和被诉的一方）, 362(a)(1)（一般而言，针对债务人或破产财产的民事诉讼因提交自愿破产申请而中止）与 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1)（针对债务人的刑事诉讼不因第11编案件的开始而中止）。债务人通常不会因其在破产案件中被要求作出的披露而承担刑事责任。破产程序中披露要求的目的，是揭示民事责任，以便公平且最终地解决针对债务人的所有债权。见 Byers, 402 U.S. at 430–31（认定尽管《加利福尼亚州车辆法典》包含一些刑事法规，但“其目的并非便利刑事定罪，而是促进对因汽车事故产生的民事责任的清偿”，并裁定所要求记录例外适用）。\n\n因此，第521(a)(3)及(a)(4)条的目的“本质上具有监管性”，这支持将所要求记录例外适用于个人债务人依《强制提交命令》被迫提交文件的情形。Grosso, 390 U.S. at 67–68。\n\n所称的必要记录是否属于通常保存的记录？\n\n关于第二项因素，即所称必要记录是否通常保存，受托人正在寻求的包括财务和银行记录、资金转账记录、与个人债务人商业权益有关的记录等。正如联邦第二巡回上诉法院就外国银行账户信息所指出的，常识表明，个人和实体会保留基本的金融交易和账户信息，以管理其事务并访问其账户。Grand Jury 2013, 741 F.3d at 350 (citing M.H. v. United States (In re Grand Jury Investigation), 648 F.3d 1067, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011))。本院认定，对于财务事务、资产和负债复杂的个人和实体而言，这一点尤其如此。值得注意的是，联邦第二巡回上诉法院进而指出，尽管“某些从事不法行为的个人被建议不要保留哪怕是这些基本信息[,]……[我院]拒绝仅考察不法行为者的惯例……”Grand Jury 2013, 741 F.3d at 350。因此，本院认定，第521(a)(3)及(a)(4)条要求的记录属于“通常保存”的记录。Grosso, 390 U.S. at 67–68。\n\n所称的必要记录是否具有“公共属性”？\n\n关于第三项因素，即所称必要记录是否已具有“公共属性”，问题在于，第521(a)(3)及(a)(4)条的整体监管背景是否要求保存有关的特定记录。Grand Jury 2013, 741 F.3d at 351–52。\n\n《破产法》要求在案件开始时以及案件进行过程中均进行披露。第 521(a)(1) 条要求任何债务人——包括个人债务人——提交债权人名单、财务状况说明以及包括债务人资产、负债、收入和支出在内的明细表。参见 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 521.06[3][a]（“明细表是对第 541(a) 条所规定的破产财产这一广义定义范围内所有不动产和动产的陈述，该定义包括‘在案件开始时债务人对财产享有的所有法定或衡平法上的权益。’”），521.06[3][b]（“对不动产和动产权益进行列明是一项非常重要的义务。”），521.09（“要求提交财务状况说明的目的，是向受托人和债权人提供有关债务人财务状况的详细信息，从而节省为获取信息而进行冗长、长期审查的费用。”）。第 341 条要求任何债务人接受由受托人进行的审查，其债权人可以参与其中。参见 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 341.01。\n\n特别就 Chapter 11 而言，第 1107 条规定，在 Chapter 11 债务人作为占有中的债务人期间，该债务人作为破产财产的受托人，将承担上述受托人的许多相同披露义务，包括报告要求。参见 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 1107.02[3]–[4]。债务人未能在与 Chapter 11 计划有关而须提交的披露声明中适当披露财务状况、资产和负债，将阻碍该计划获得确认。11 U.S.C. § 1125；参见 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 1125.02（“披露是《破产法》下重整实务的关键概念。”）（援引 H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 226–31 (1977)），1125.02[2]。未作出适当披露可以且确实构成将 Chapter 11 重整案件转换为 Chapter 7 清算案件、驳回 Chapter 11 破产案件或指定 Chapter 11 受托人的理由。11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(f)；参见 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1112.04[6][f]。\n\n与 Bouknight 案中的母亲极为相似，个人债务人在自愿启动其 Chapter 11 案件、使其本人受本院对人管辖，以及将其对财产享有的所有法定和衡平法上的权益——“无论位于何处及由何人持有”——置于本院对物管辖之下时，承担了这些义务。11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)；Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 559（“Bouknight 接受了监管体系的常规运作，并同意以符合州监管利益且接受 BCDSS 检查的方式照管 Maurice。”）。此外，如同 Bouknight 案中母亲在有正当理由时被要求将其子女交给 Baltimore City Department of Social Services（巴尔的摩市社会服务局），《破产法》要求个人债务人向受托人提交与破产财产有关的文件和记录，因为已有正当理由指定受托人。11 U.S.C. §§ 521(a)(4), 1112；Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 555–56。由于个人债务人自愿提出其 Chapter 11 案件并成为占有中的债务人，他承担了为债权人利益管理破产财产的破产受托人职责。11 U.S.C. § 1107(a)。个人债务人在担任占有中的债务人期间，是破产财产及其账簿和记录的保管人。参见 Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 555–56。尽管其作为占有中的债务人的身份在受托人被指定后终止，但由此产生的向受托人提供信息的义务并未终止。\n\n本院认定，根据第 521(a)(3) 条和 (a)(4) 条要求个人债务人提交的记录已具有“公共属性”，因为个人债务人的案件是自愿的 Chapter 11 案件，并且这些 Chapter 11 案件及相关对抗程序的具体事实和情形支持该结论。参见 Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 555–56；Grosso, 390 U.S. at 67–68。\n\n“必需记录”例外适用\n\nGrosso 检验的全部三个因素均支持，在本院审理的具体事实和情形下，将必需记录例外适用于第五修正案反对自证其罪的权利。390 U.S. at 67–68；参见 Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 555–56；Grand Jury 2013, 741 F.3d at 345；Ross, 156 B.R. at 279–81；In re Fairbanks, 135 B.R. 717, 730–33 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991)。\n\n适用必需记录例外亦得到与原《破产法》有关的最高法院判例的支持。In re Harris, 221 U.S. 274 (1911)（裁定第五修正案不保护债务人免于向破产财产接管人提交其账簿和记录）。Bouknight 案在 Fisher 案之后维持必需记录例外时，肯定地援引 Harris 案作为必需记录原则的示例，确认尽管自 Harris 案裁决以来第五修正案判例法已有演变，Harris 案至今仍具效力。Bouknight, 439 U.S. at 556–57；参见 Fisher, 425 U.S. 411–13（讨论 Harris 案而未质疑其裁定）；另参见 Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 221 (1998)（裁定除非有明确迹象表明国会意图如此，否则《破产法》下的先例不被取代）；Ross, 156 B.R. at 279；3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 344.03[4]（“[I]与其他证人不同，债务人能否以这种‘提交行为’本身可能有自证其罪倾向为由，成功拒绝交付《法典》要求每一债务人向受托人交出的财产、账簿和记录，尚属可疑。”）；但参见 Butcher v. Bailey, 753 F.2d 465, 468 (6th Cir. 1985)（在 Bouknight 案之前，并在非自愿 Chapter 7 案件而非自愿 Chapter 11 案件中，裁定 Harris 案在 Fisher 案后不再是有效法律，且第 521 条不要求提交适用提交行为原则的文件）。\n\n尽管如此，个人债务人反对称，根据 McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924)，Harris 案和必需记录例外并不适用于 Rule 2004 传票。然而，最高法院在 Arndstein 案中基于 Harris 案涉及交付文件和记录，而 Arndstein 案涉及强制证言问题，区分了其在 Harris 案中的先前意见。266 U.S. at 41–42。受托人并不反对个人债务人在回答书面质询、讯问笔录中的问题或法庭证言时援引第五修正案。相反，受托人反对个人债务人针对要求提交文件和记录的请求援引第五修正案。因此，Arndstein 案不适用。\n\n本院认定，无论依据对 Grosso 因素的分析，还是适用《破产法》下的最高法院先例，必需记录例外均适用。\n\niii. 个人债务人未遵守强制提交命令\n\n基于上述所有理由，本院认定：(i) 个人债务人遵守强制提交命令并非不可能；以及 (ii) 根据必需记录例外，个人债务人不得针对强制提交命令适当地援引其第五修正案反对自证其罪的权利。因此，受托人已以清楚且令人信服的证据证明，个人债务人未遵守强制提交命令。\n\n3. 个人债务人是否勤勉地尝试遵守强制提交命令？\n\n受托人还必须证明，个人债务人未以合理方式勤勉地尝试遵守强制提交命令。King, 65 F.3d at 1058。受托人主张，个人债务人未作出任何遵守强制提交命令的尝试。作为回应，个人债务人主张，对于其是否可适当地援引其第五修正案反对自证其罪的权利存在合理疑义，且该声明和补充声明体现了其善意遵守强制提交命令的努力。\n\n个人债务人具有决定性的错误是法律错误，而非事实错误。即，个人债务人错误地认定，必需记录例外不适用于提交行为原则，且其可以针对强制提交命令援引第五修正案。基于上述理由，提交每份文件或记录在事实层面是否属于证言性且具有自证其罪性，并不影响结果。\n\n一般而言，在不要求故意或意图的情况下，法律错误不是民事责任的抗辩事由。Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573, 583–85 (2010)。如上所述，“缺乏故意 [sic] 并不能免除民事藐视法庭责任。”McComb, 336 U.S. at 191。因此，本院认定，个人债务人的法律错误不是民事藐视法庭的抗辩事由。参照 Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109, 123 (1963)（裁定法律错误不是藐视国会的抗辩事由）；United States v. Remini, 967 U.S. 754, 758 (2d Cir. 1992)（裁定法律错误不是刑事藐视法庭的抗辩事由）。该结论符合最高法院在 Taggert 案中的评述，即“当事人的善意，即便不阻却民事藐视法庭，也可能有助于确定适当的制裁。”139 S. Ct. at 1802（着重号为原文所加）。因此，受托人已证明个人债务人未勤勉地尝试遵守强制提交命令。\n\n4. 个人债务人是否知悉强制提交命令？\n\n民事藐视法庭的最后一个要件是知悉相关命令。Gravel, 6 F.4th at 512。该声明承认个人债务人知悉强制提交命令。(ECF No. 1444 Ex. A.) 民事藐视法庭的该要件已获证明。\n\n5. 个人债务人构成民事藐视法庭\n\n既然全部四个要件均已获证明，藐视法庭动议予以批准。本院认定个人债务人因未遵守强制提交命令而构成民事藐视法庭。如以下裁定主文段落所述，将给予个人债务人消除其藐视法庭状态的机会。鉴于个人债务人所面临情形的严重性，以及其在补充声明中回答受托人的二百零二 (202) 个问题时所表现出的善意，本院将给予个人债务人充足时间以消除其藐视法庭状态。Taggert, 139 S. Ct. at 1802。然而，若个人债务人未消除其藐视法庭状态，受托人可请求适当制裁。\n\n兹提醒个人债务人的律师：“作为法庭官员，律师有义务通过对正当的证据开示请求作出勤勉、善意的答复，以协助证据开示程序。”McLeod, Alexander, Powel & Apffel, P.C. v. Quarles, 894 F.2d 1482, 1486 (5th Cir. 1990)。为此，进一步提醒个人债务人的律师，本院已认定，“[个人债务人及其他人的律师]未能证明其在该等情形下已具备充分勤勉。”(Order Compelling Production ¶ 9.) 个人债务人被命令于 2023 年 1 月 31 日下午 5:00 或之前遵守强制提交命令，但其未如此行事。“[律师]和[任何一方]均无单方面决定是否或何时遵守证据开示要求的权利。”*535 Broadway Assocs. v. Com. Corp. of Am.*, 159 B.R. 403, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).\n\n个人债务人及其律师应采取合理且勤勉的措施，使个人债务人遵守《强制提交命令》，无论本院是否已直接明确阐述该等措施。正如个人债务人的律师在庭审记录中所述，合理措施包括向刑事法院提出动议，请求允许将控方已向个人债务人提交的、对 Rule 2004 传票有回应性的文件和记录提交给受托人，但受托人须遵守刑事法院可能施加的任何条件。个人债务人为消除其藐视法庭状态而采取行动时，系受《强制提交命令》所强制，因此，其向刑事法院申请向受托人提交文件，并不构成放弃其第五修正案权利。见 Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 561–62。在审议任何制裁动议时，本院将考虑个人债务人在刑事法院寻求救济时所展现的勤勉程度。\n\nB. 是否应中止《强制提交命令》？\n\n本院已就藐视法庭动议作出裁决，现转而审议中止动议。个人债务人主张，为保全其不自证其罪的第五修正案权利，必须在刑事案件终结之前中止《强制提交命令》。对此，受托人主张，不存在中止《强制提交命令》的依据，且该等中止将对受托人造成重大损害。\n\n本院首先指出，尽管中止动议由个人债务人提出，且似乎仅涉及个人债务人，但所附的拟议命令将完全中止《强制提交命令》，包括与个人债务人的女儿 Mei Guo（郭美）及被裁定为个人债务人公司人格替身的 HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC（香港国际基金投资（美国）有限公司）有关的判决主文段落。在中止动议就该等额外当事人寻求救济的范围内，本院驳回中止动议。\n\n转入实体问题，本院必须在其合理裁量权范围内决定是否中止《强制提交命令》。Kashi v. Grastos, 790 F.2d 1050, 1057 (2d Cir. 1986)。并无严格要求规定法院必须因存在未决刑事程序而中止民事程序。United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1 (1970); Kashi, 790 F.2d at 1057。在考虑是否鉴于刑事程序而中止民事程序时，法院尤其考虑：\n\n1）刑事案件中的争议与民事案件中提出的争议重合的程度；2）案件的状态，包括被告是否已被起诉；3）原告迅速推进程序的私人利益，与因延误给原告造成的不利影响之间的权衡；4）被告的私人利益及其负担；5）法院的利益；以及6）公共利益。\n\nTrs. of Plumbers & Pipefitters Nat'l Pension Fund v. Transworld Mech., Inc., 886 F. Supp. 1134, 1139 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).\n\n本院首先考虑财产迅速推进程序的私人利益，并权衡延误给财产造成的不利影响。中止《强制提交命令》将对财产及个人债务人的债权人造成重大不利影响。如上所述，债务人披露其财务状况、资产及负债，是破产程序的根本要素。由于个人债务人未配合、反而阻挠受托人的调查，财产持续承担巨额费用并遭受延误。根据 section 521，受托人在一年多前获任后，应当立即取得与个人债务人的财务状况、资产、负债、业务等有关的全部文件和记录。相反，受托人不得不确定其他适当的传票对象、发出无数传票，并进行持续不断的动议程序。尽管受托人的努力已使财产获得重大利益，财产也因该等努力承担了沉重成本。\n\n此外，该等沉重成本是在破产程序背景下发生的。很可能本已没有足够资金清偿债权人的债权，而由于对个人债务人事务持续且尚未完成的调查，债权人正在丧失其最终受偿的时间价值。11 U.S.C. §§ 726(a)(5), 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii)。此外，国会已确定，Chapter 11 案件的最终目标——确认一项计划——必须在规定期限内实现。见 11 U.S.C. §§ 1106(a)(5), 1121(a), 1121(d)。延误确认一项必须规定债权人债权最终实现的计划，将对债权人及财产造成重大损害。见 Andrews, 414 B.R. at 7。不得强迫受托人在缺乏个人债务人应有配合及披露的情况下开展工作。见 Stone, 282 F.2d at 553。\n\n本院接着考虑个人债务人的私人利益及其负担。拖延或阻挠该等合法破产程序不存在可认知的利益。个人债务人遵守《强制提交命令》也不存在可认知的负担。基于上述理由，其不能适当地援引其不自证其罪的第五修正案权利。此外，在 Fisher 之后维持法定记录例外时，最高法院在 Bouknight 案中指出：\n\n在通常案件中，国家的监管要求既可能不强制提供自证其罪的证言，也不协助刑事起诉，但第五修正案的保护并非因此必然不适用于在援引该特权后遵守监管要求、继而面临起诉之人。\n\n493 U.S. at 561–62; but see Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457 (1913)（在 Fisher 之前裁定，根据 Harris 提交的账簿和记录可在刑事程序中使用）。\n\n接下来，本院考虑未决刑事调查的状态以及刑事法院的利益。有两项未决刑事调查需要考虑：刑事案件以及对破产犯罪的所谓调查。个人债务人已在刑事案件中被起诉。没有证据向本院表明，其已因任何有关破产犯罪的调查而被起诉。这些 Chapter 11 案件及相关对抗性程序确实与刑事案件重合——（a）个人债务人的许多债权人亦是刑事案件中所称的其受害人；（b）个人债务人的部分所谓资产被指称系以刑事案件所称欺诈所得购得；以及（c）个人债务人的部分所谓关联方及公司人格替身被指称参与了刑事案件所称的欺诈——但与此同时，亦存在不一致之处——（d）这些 Chapter 11 案件中存在并非所称欺诈受害人的债权人；（e）存在在所称欺诈之前购得的所谓财产资产；以及（f）存在未被指称参与该欺诈的个人债务人所谓关联方及人格替身。然而，任何有关破产犯罪调查所涉及的问题，均与这些 Chapter 11 案件直接相关。\n\n本院认定，本命令并未实质干扰刑事法院对刑事案件进行有序管理的利益。个人债务人提出一种担忧，即要求个人债务人向受托人提交文件将损害控方针对其的案件，并导致在刑事法院就证据产生诉讼。该论点没有说服力。个人债务人在本程序中受强制提交文件和记录，并未改变以下现实：控方显然已持有大量证据。尽管如个人债务人所主张，控方可能不得将个人债务人向受托人作出的提交用作证明个人债务人对已在控方持有的文件和记录的控制权或真实性的证据，但个人债务人的论点所描述的是现状。此外，刑事法院将审查并裁定任何请求将控方向个人债务人提交的文件和记录提交给受托人的动议。\n\n关于任何对破产犯罪的调查，由于（a）没有证据表明个人债务人已被起诉，且（b）没有证据表明任何法院存在与之相关的程序，本院认定，应给予任何此类调查的利益较低权重。如上所述，《破产法》并非为了制造破产犯罪而存在。其存在目的，是为了所有债权人的利益，并最终为了债务人自身的利益，公平且终局地解决、调整及重组债务人的资产、负债及财务状况。为某些推测性的对个人债务人破产犯罪的起诉而妨碍受托人对个人债务人事务、资产及负债的调查，并不适当。破产犯罪是促进在破产程序中适当披露的执法机制。如个人债务人遵守《强制提交命令》，其将补救破产犯罪旨在防止的损害，同时亦使这些 Chapter 11 案件能够得到适当管理。\n\n最后，本院认定，公众对“迅速管理破产案件的利益，会因阻挠受托人为财产债权人收集、变现及分配资产的努力而受损。”In re MGL Corp., 262 B.R. 324, 330 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2001)。公众对运行良好的破产制度享有利益。其有益于经济、债务人及债权人。阻挠该程序以及试图拖延该程序，不符合公共利益。此外，如上所述，个人债务人依照《强制提交命令》提交文件和记录，并不违反第五修正案。\n\n经权衡衡平因素，本院认定，在其合理裁量权范围内，中止《强制提交命令》并无正当理由。因此，中止动议被驳回。\n\nC. 是否应因证据开示滥用而施加金钱制裁？\n\n最后，Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C)，经 D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 37 以及 D. Conn. Bankr. L.R. 1001-1(a)(1) 和 2004-1(a) 适用，规定：\n\n(C) 费用支付。作为对上述命令的替代或补充，法院必须命令不遵从的一方、向该方提供建议的律师，或二者，共同支付因该不遵从而产生的合理费用，包括律师费，除非该不遵从具有实质正当理由，或其他情形使费用裁决不公正。\n\n根据具体事实和情形，本院认定目前不宜裁定费用。\n\nV. 结论及命令\n\n基于上述理由，本院（A）认定个人债务人因未遵守《强制提交命令》而构成民事藐视法庭，且（B）驳回中止动议，并在其合理裁量权范围内拒绝在刑事案件解决前中止《强制提交命令》。因此，特此\n\n命令：本院认定 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）先生（“个人债务人”）因未遵守《部分准许强制遵守动议的命令》（“强制提交命令”），ECF No. 1353，而构成民事藐视法庭；并进一步命令\n\n命令：如个人债务人未能于2023年9月29日或之前完全遵守《强制提交命令》，从而未能解除其藐视法庭状态，则Luc A. Despins先生（吕克·A·德斯平斯）以个人债务人第11章受托人（“受托人”）的身份，可代表个人债务人的破产财产（“财产”）申请任何适当的制裁；并进一步\n\n命令：《部分准许强制遵守动议之命令的有限暂缓动议》（“暂缓动议”），ECF No. 1649，予以驳回。\n\n签署于康涅狄格州布里奇波特，日期为2023年7月26日。","key_entities":["Je","Kwok","Despins","Guo","Ho Wan Kwok","Paul Hastings","HCHK","CIPA"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":1,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":133,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":465,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":523,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":636,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":757,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1046,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1090,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1110,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1353,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1444,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1453,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1537,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1585,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1649,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1650,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1670,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1680,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1719,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1737,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1740,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2034,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":13128,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 21:35:21"}