{"id":"court_ctb_2043_0","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":2043,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2023-08-04","title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION | -------------------------------------------","summary_zh":"第 11 章受托人陈述书 —— Ho Wan Kwok 破产案（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo），CTB 22-50073 ECF #2043（2023-08-04立案）。第 11 章受托人 Luc A. Despins 向破产法院告知，纽约南区联邦地区法院已于 2023 年 8 月 2 日作出裁定，驳回郭文贵关联人员对受托人及 Paul Hastings 律所提起的 FARA 外国代理人相关诉讼，并依据联邦民事诉讼规则第 11 条对原告及其律师实施制裁，判令其连带赔偿受托方合理的律师费与诉讼成本。","summary_en":"Statement of Chapter 11 Trustee — In re Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo / Guo Wengui), CTB 22-50073, ECF No. 2043 (filed Aug. 4, 2023). Chapter 11 Trustee Luc A. Despins informs the Bankruptcy Court that on August 2, 2023, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York entered an Opinion & Order dismissing a FARA-related lawsuit brought against Despins and Paul Hastings by individuals associated with Kwok, and awarding reasonable attorneys' fees and costs as Rule 11 sanctions jointly and severally against plaintiffs and their counsel.","body_en":"# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\n| ------------------------------------------------------<br>x |             |                         |  |  |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|-------------------------|--|--|\n| In re:                                                      | :<br>:      | Chapter 11              |  |  |\n| HO WAN KWOK, et al.,1                                       | :<br>:      | Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |  |  |\n| Debtors.                                                    | :<br>:<br>: | (Jointly Administered)  |  |  |\n| ------------------------------------------------------x     |             |                         |  |  |\n\n# **STATEMENT OF CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE REGARDING OPINION AND ORDER ENTERED BY UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DISMISSING CLAIMS ASSERTED AGAINST TRUSTEE AND HIS COUNSEL**\n\n1. Mr. Luc A. Despins, in his capacity as the trustee (the \"Trustee\") in the chapter 11 case of Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Individual Debtor\"), previously advised the Court that, on November 28, 2022, certain individuals associated with the Individual Debtor (together, the \"Plaintiffs\") commenced a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (the \"SDNY Court\") against Mr. Despins and Paul Hastings LLP, *i.e.*, the Trustee's counsel in these chapter 11 cases (together, the \"Defendants\"), alleging that the Defendants violated the Foreign Agents Registration Act by failing to register as agents of the People's Republic of China or the Chinese Communist Party. Mr. Despins and Paul Hastings moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint and sought sanctions against Plaintiffs and their counsel under Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.\n\n 1 The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and the Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\n2. On August 2, 2023, the SDNY Court entered its opinion and order (the \"Opinion\n\n& Order\") (a) dismissing the Plaintiff's complaint and (b) sanctioning the Plaintiffs and their counsel under Rule 11 by awarding Defendants reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. Attached hereto as **Exhibit A** is a copy of the Opinion & Order.\n\nDated: August 4, 2023 LUC A. DESPINS, New Haven, Connecticut CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE\n\nBy: */s/ G. Alexander Bongartz*\n\nG. Alexander Bongartz (admitted *pro hac vice*) Avram E. Luft (admitted *pro hac vice*) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 (212) 318-6079 aviluft@paulhastings.com alexbongartz@paulhastings.com\n\n *and*\n\nNicholas A. Bassett (admitted *pro hac vice*) PAUL HASTINGS LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C., 20036 (202) 551-1902 nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n *and*\n\nDouglas S. Skalka (ct00616) Patrick R. Linsey (ct29437) NEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C. 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, Connecticut 06510 (203) 781-2847 dskalka@npmlaw.com plinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n*Counsel for the Chapter 11 Trustee*\n\n# **Exhibit A**\n\n**Opinion & Order**\n\n|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|\n|                                                                                      |   | USDC SDNY                                                                   |  |\n|                                                                                      |   | DOCUMENT                                                                    |  |\n|                                                                                      |   | ELECTRONICALLY FILED                                                        |  |\n|                                                                                      |   |                                                                             |  |\n| UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                                                         |   | DOC #:                                                                      |  |\n| SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK                                                        |   | 08/02/2023<br>DATE FILED:                                                   |  |\n| --------------------------------------------------------------                       | X |                                                                             |  |\n| TAO AN, CHUNGANG GUAN, CUI                                                           | : |                                                                             |  |\n| QINGYUN, HUIMIN LIN, BEILE LI,                                                       | : |                                                                             |  |\n| YANMING WANG, TAO ZHENG, ZHENG HU,                                                   | : |                                                                             |  |\n|                                                                                      |   |                                                                             |  |\n| YUAN CAO, LINWAN FENG,                                                               | : |                                                                             |  |\n|                                                                                      | : | 22-CV-10062 (VEC)                                                           |  |\n| Plaintiffs,                                                                          | : |                                                                             |  |\n|                                                                                      | : | OPINION & ORDER                                                             |  |\n| -against                                                                             | : |                                                                             |  |\n|                                                                                      | : |                                                                             |  |\n| LUC A. DESPINS and PAUL HASTINGS LLP,                                                | : |                                                                             |  |\n|                                                                                      | : |                                                                             |  |\n|                                                                                      | : |                                                                             |  |\n|                                                                                      |   |                                                                             |  |\n| Defendants.                                                                          | : |                                                                             |  |\n| --------------------------------------------------------------                       | X |                                                                             |  |\n\nVALERIE CAPRONI, United States District Judge:\n\nPlaintiffs are various Chinese nationals residing in the United States who have sued Paul Hastings LLP (\"Paul Hastings\") and one of its partners, Luc A. Despins, for allegedly violating the Foreign Agents Registration Act (\"FARA\"), 22 U.S.C. §§ 611–621, by failing to register as an agent of the People's Republic of China (\"PRC\") or the Chinese Communist Party (\"CCP\"). *See* Am. Compl., Dkt. 10. Defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for failing adequately to allege subject matter jurisdiction and Rule 12(b)(6) for failing to state a claim. *See* Defs. MTD Mem., Dkt. 15 at 1–2. Defendants also moved to sanction Plaintiffs' counsel pursuant to Rule 11(b) for bringing frivolous claims and allegedly initiating the lawsuit for an improper purpose. Defs. Sanctions Mem., Dkt. 12 at 1, 4. Plaintiffs opposed both motions. *See* Pls. Sanctions Opp., Dkt. 23; Pls. MTD Opp., Dkt. 22. For the following reasons, Defendants' motion to dismiss and motion for sanctions are GRANTED, and the Court awards Defendants reasonable attorneys' fees and costs.\n\n## **BACKGROUND**\n\nPlaintiffs allege that they are the victims of a harassment campaign brought by the CCP and PRC. Am. Compl. ¶ 24. Plaintiffs further allege that because Paul Hastings provided legal services related to the global public offering of Jinshang Bank, a bank controlled and operated by the CCP, it is an agent of the CCP or PRC and required to register as a foreign agent under FARA. *Id*. ¶¶ 39–49, 51–53. Defendants also allege that Mr. Despins is an agent of the CCP or PRC and has violated FARA's registration requirement.<sup>1</sup> *See id*. ¶¶ 3, 51.\n\nAt the center of this lawsuit is self-proclaimed billionaire Mr. Ho Wan Kwok, who is not a party to this action. On February 15, 2022, Mr. Kwok filed for bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut. *See generally Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. v. Ho Wan Kwok* (*In re* Kwok), Ch. 11 Case Nos. 22-50073, 22-5032 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022). The Bankruptcy Court appointed Mr. Despins, represented by Paul Hastings, as the Chapter 11 trustee of Mr. Kwok's controlled entities. *See* Orders, Dkts. 523, 668, *In re* Kwok, Ch 11 Case Nos. 22-50073, 22-5032.\n\nSince at least November 2022, Mr. Kwok has weaponized his active social media presence to mobilize his supporters and launch a harassment campaign against Paul Hastings, Mr. Despins, and Mr. Despins's family. *See* Order, Dkt. 133 ¶¶ 34, 41–45, 49, *In re* Kwok, Ch 11 Case Nos. 22-50073, 22-5032 (hereinafter \"Bankr. Prelim. Inj. Mem.\"). Mr. Kwok has threatened Mr. Despins with \"rogue's ways,\" and promised that Defenands \"will suffer calamities.\" Bankr. Prelim. Inj. Mem. ¶ 45.\n\n<sup>1</sup> Defendants state that Mr. Despins was not involved in the Jinshang Bank transaction, and Plaintiffs do not allege any facts to suggest that Mr. Despins is in any other way connected to the People's Republic of China (\"PRC\") or Chinese Communist Party (\"CCP\"). Defs. MTD Mem., Dkt. 15 at 4.\n\nFollowing Mr. Kwok's call to action, his supporters have protested outside the homes of Mr. Despins, his daughter, and his ex-wife, as well as near Paul Hasting's New York office. *See id.* ¶¶ 42–43, 52–53, 57, 69–71. They have distributed fliers that depict Mr. Despins with blood dripping from his eyes and mouth and a sickle and hammer emblazoned on his forehead, with text that refers to Defendants as \"the CCP's running dog\" and an \"enabler\" of the CCP. First Andres Decl. Ex. 22, Dkt. 13. They have also distributed materials that refer to Mr. Despins as an extortionist, an anti-Semite, and a \"scumbag.\" *See* First Andres Decl. Exs. 15, 22–25.\n\nThe harassment campaign has also included numerous federal lawsuits alleging that those involved in Mr. Kwok's bankruptcy proceeding are agents of the PRC or CCP and have violated FARA's registration requirement. *See, e.g.*, Am. Compl., Dkt. 43 ¶ 60, *Gong v. Sarnoff et al*, No. 23-CV-343 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2023); Compl., Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 74, 118–25, *Wyatt v. U. of Md.*, No. 23-CV-742 (D. Md. Mar. 17, 2023). Contemporaneously with filing this lawsuit, Plaintiffs sued Weijian Shan, the executive director and chairman of Mr. Kwok's largest creditor, and his son, in *An v. Shan*, No. 22-CV-10060 (S.D.N.Y. 2023), for allegedly violating FARA's registration requirement. Mr. Kwok has lauded Plaintiff Li as a \"comrade[]\" and posted photographs of this complaint on social media. *See* First Andres Decl. Ex. 5.\n\nRichard Freeth, who represents the Plaintiffs in this case and in *Shan*, also represented the plaintiff in *Wyatt v. University of Maryland*, No. 23-CV-742 (D. Md. 2023). At issue in *Wyatt* was the decision of the University of Maryland, at which Mr. Shan's daughter is enrolled, to order Mr. Kwok's supporters to cease protesting on the college commons. Compl., Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 14, 16, *Wyatt*, No. 23-CV-742 (D. Md. Mar. 17, 2023). Mr. Freeth also represents the plaintiffs in *Gong v. Sarnoff*, No. 23-CV-00343 (S.D.N.Y. 2023), who accuse O'Melveny & Myers LLP and\n\nits partner Stuart Sarnoff of \"destroying the life of Ho Wan Kwok.\" <sup>2</sup> Op., Dkt. 57 at 3, *Gong*, No. 23-CV-343 (July 17, 2023) (internal quotation omitted).<sup>3</sup>\n\nOn January 11, 2023, the Bankruptcy Court enjoined Mr. Kwok and anyone \"in active concert\" with him, including Plaintiff Beile Li, from harassing or \"doxing\" Defendants. Order, Dkt. 134 ¶ 5, *In re* Kwok, Ch 11 Case Nos. 22-50073, 22-5032 (hereinafter \"Bankr. Prelim.\n\nInj.\"). In its decision, Bankruptcy Court found that Beile Li is an agent of Mr. Kwok. *Id.*\n\nOn December 15, 2022, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. *See* Am. Compl. On January 19, 2023, Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint and also moved for sanctions. *See* Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. 14; Mot. for Sanctions, Dkt. 11.\n\n# **DISCUSSION**\n\n# **I. The Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Plaintiffs' Claims A. Legal Standard**\n\nA party who asserts that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over a particular claim \"has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it exists.\" *Makarova v. United States*, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). Subject matter jurisdiction exists if the case arises under federal law, *see* 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or if there is complete diversity between the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds \\$75,000.00, *see id*. § 1332. A court has federal question jurisdiction if a claim \"aris[es] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.\" *Id*. § 1331. To invoke federal question jurisdiction, a complaint must \"establish[] either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily\n\n<sup>2</sup> Judge Liman recently dismissed the complaint in *Gong v. Sarnoff et al.*, No. 23-CV-343 (S.D.N.Y. 2023), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. *See* Op., Dkt. 57, *Gong*, No. 23-CV-343 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2023).\n\n<sup>3</sup> Although only Richard Freeth has filed a notice of appearance on behalf of Plaintiffs, Yongbing Zhang, who represents plaintiffs in several of the parallel cases filed against Mr. Kwok's perceived adversaries, appears to have been actively involved in this litigation. *See, e.g.*, *Wyatt v. Univ. of Md.*, No. 23-CV-742 (D. Md. 2023). For example, Mr. Freeth copied Mr. Zhang on his most recent letter to this Court. Letter, Dkt. 28.\n\ndepends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.\" *Perpetual Secs., Inc. v. Tang*, 290 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 2002) (cleaned up).\n\nPlaintiffs urge the Court to find that it has federal question jurisdiction by inferring a private right of action under FARA.<sup>4</sup> *See* Pls. MTD Opp., Dkt. 22 ¶¶ 48–54. FARA requires any \"agent of a foreign principal\" to register with the Attorney General unless the entity qualifies for an exemption, and the statute vests the Attorney General with the sole authority to prosecute FARA violations.<sup>5</sup> 22 U.S.C. § 612; *see also id*. § 618(f) (granting the Attorney General authority to seek injunctive relief prohibiting actions taken on behalf of a foreign principal or requiring registration).\n\nAs Plaintiffs concede, there is no private right of action under FARA. *See* Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5–6. FARA vests the Attorney General with the exclusive authority to prosecute violations of the registration requirement, and there is no indication that Congress intended to create a private right of action. *See* 22 U.S.C. § 618(f). FARA's purpose is \"to provide [a] centralized reporting system to track activities of agents acting on behalf of foreign countries . . . and no language in [the] statute or its legislative history suggests that Congress intended to establish [a] cause of action in any entity other than [the] Federal Government.\" *See, e.g.*, *Weican Meng v. Xinhuanet Co.*, 2017 WL 3175609, at \\*3 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2017) (quoting *Comm'n for a Free Namibia v. S.W. Africa People's Org.*, 554 F. Supp. 722, 722 (D.D.C. 1982)).\n\n<sup>4</sup>\n\nPlaintiffs do not argue or allege any facts to suggest the existence of diversity jurisdiction.\n\n<sup>5</sup> An agent of a foreign principal is \"any person who acts as an agent, representative, employee, or servant, or any person who acts in any other capacity at the order, request, or under the direction or control, of a foreign principal or . . . whose activities are directly or indirectly . . . controlled . . . in whole or in major part by a foreign principal.\" 22 U.S.C. § 611(c). Agents of a foreign principal are exempt from FARA's registration requirement if they are \"engaging . . . only (1) in private and nonpolitical activities in furtherance of the bona fide trade or commerce of such foreign principal; or (2) in other activities not serving predominantly a foreign interest.\" *Id*. § 613(d).\n\nWhen a statute does not explicitly provide a private right of action, courts are reluctant to infer one. *See, e.g.*, *Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain*, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004) (noting that courts are hesitant to infer a private right of action, which \"permit[s] enforcement without the check imposed by prosecutorial discretion\"); *Olmsted v. Pruco Life Ins. Co. of N.J.*, 283 F.3d 429, 432 (2d Cir. 2002) (\"Without congressional intent, a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter . . . .\" *Id*. (cleaned up)). Accordingly, district courts that have considered whether FARA provides an implied private right of action have uniformly held, as far as this Court can tell, that it does not. *See, e.g.*, *Henry v. Washington*, 2022 WL 9491957, at \\*2 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 16, 2022), *report and recommendation adopted*, 2022 WL 9372175 (Oct. 14, 2022); *Bey v. Epstein*, 2021 WL 8155603, at \\*4 (D. Conn. Aug. 6, 2021) (\"As a private individual, plaintiff lacks standing to sue under this statute because a private right of action cannot be inferred from FARA.\"); *Waterhouse v. Cufi Church Ass'n Inc.*, 2014 WL 1745098, at \\*3 (D. Haw. Apr. 29, 2014).\n\nPlaintiffs acknowledge that the text of FARA and caselaw counsel against finding a private right of action but nevertheless urge the Court to infer the existence of a private right of action due to an alleged lack of enforcement by the Attorney General. *See* Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5–6. The extent to which the Attorney General chooses to enforce FARA is irrelevant. The determinative issue is legislative intent, and Plaintiffs fail adequately to allege in their Amended Complaint or to present in their opposition to the motion to dismiss any facts about the statute or its legislative history that would suggest that Congress intended for there to be a private right of action under FARA.\n\nEven if the Court were to infer a private right of action, however, the Court would still lack subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiffs have not shown that they have standing. It is\n\nblack-letter law that to bring a claim, a plaintiff must show \"(1) an 'injury in fact,' (2) a 'causal connection' between that injury and the conduct at issue, and (3) a likelihood 'that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.'\" *Maddox v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Tr. Co., N.A.*, 19 F.4th 58, 62 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting *Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 560–561 (1992)). Plaintiffs have alleged no facts that would permit the Court plausibly to infer that they have suffered an injury in fact that is \"concrete and particularized,\" not \"conjectural or hypothetical,\" let alone an injury that might conceivably be traced to Defendants' failure to register as an agent of a foreign government. *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 560 (cleaned up).\n\nWithout subject matter jurisdiction, the Court must dismiss the case without prejudice. *See Bank v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.*, 708 F. App'x 43, 44–45 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order). The Court declines to grant Plaintiffs leave to amend. Plaintiffs have already amended their complaint once and failed to remedy the jurisdictional defect; granting Plaintiffs another bite at the apple would be futile.<sup>6</sup>\n\n# **II. Sanctions Are Appropriate Because Plaintiffs' Complaint Is Frivolous and Was Filed for an Improper Purpose**\n\n## **A. Legal Standard**\n\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) requires an attorney presenting a filing to the court to certify that \"to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,\" the filing is not presented for an improper purpose, and the legal contentions are nonfrivolous and supported by the facts and law. Rule 11 also \"explicitly and unambiguously imposes an affirmative duty on each attorney to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the viability of a pleading before it is signed.\" *Int'l Shipping Co., S.A. v.*\n\n<sup>6</sup> Because the Court dismisses the Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court does not reach the merits of Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).\n\n*Hydra Offshore, Inc.*, 875 F.2d 388, 390 (2d Cir. 1989). Rule 11(c)(2)'s \"safe harbor\" provision states that a motion for sanctions \"must not be filed . . . if the challenged paper . . . is withdrawn or appropriately corrected within 21 days after service.\" \"If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that Rule 11(b) has been violated, the court may impose an appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule . . . .\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1). In addition to the authority provided by Rule 11, district courts have \"inherent authority to sanction parties that appear before it acting in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.\" *Sassower v. Field*, 973 F.2d 75, 80–81 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing *Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.*, 501 U.S. 32, 44–45 (1991)).\n\nA district court also has \"broad discretion in tailoring appropriate and reasonable sanctions under rule 11.\" *O'Malley v. New York City Transit Auth.*, 896 F.2d 704, 709 (2d Cir. 1990).<sup>7</sup> In determining whether sanctions are appropriate, courts consider, *inter alia*, whether the improper conduct was \"willful[] or negligent,\" whether the conduct was \"part of a pattern or activity,\" or whether the party had \"engaged in similar conduct in other litigation.\"<sup>8</sup> *Colliton v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP*, 2008 WL 4386764, at \\*12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2008). \"The sanction may include . . . reasonable attorney's fees and other expenses directly resulting from the violation.\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4).\n\n<sup>7</sup> Even if a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it retains the authority to impose sanctions against Plaintiffs and their counsel. *See, e.g.*, *Willy v. Coastal Corp.*, 503 U.S. 131, 137–39 (1992); *Schlaifer Nance & Co., Inc. v. Est. of Warhol*, 194 F.3d 323, 333 (2d Cir. 1999).\n\n<sup>8</sup> The Court may also consider whether the misconduct infected the entire pleading or only one particular count or defense; what effect the misconduct had on the litigation process in time or expense; and whether the responsible person is trained in the law. *Colliton v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP*, 2008 WL 4386764, at \\*12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2008).\n\n## **B. Plaintiffs' Claims Are Frivolous**\n\nA legal argument is frivolous pursuant to Rule 11(b)(2) if it is \"clear\" that there is \"no chance of success and no reasonable argument to extend, modify or reverse the law as it stands\" according to an \"objective standard of reasonableness.\" *Morley v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.*, 66 F.3d 21, 25 (2d Cir. 1995) (internal quotation omitted). A reasonable inquiry would have revealed that Plaintiffs' FARA claim was patently untenable for numerous reasons, not least of which was failing adequately to allege standing.\n\nPlaintiffs allege no facts to show that they have been \"concretely harmed\" by the Defendants' alleged violation of FARA as required to establish standing. *TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez*, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2205 (2021); *see also Holcombe v. Ingredients Sols., Inc.*, 797 F. App'x 630, 632 (2d Cir. 2020) (injury-in-fact must be \"concrete and particularized\"). The Amended Complaint describes concrete harm experienced by only one Plaintiff, Cui Qingyun. According to the Amended Complaint, at some unspecified time<sup>9</sup> Mr. Qingyun and his wife's extended family lost their fortunes to the PRC and, in April 2022, the PRC \"forcibly locked down\" him and his immediate family and fed them only intermittently for two weeks. Am. Compl. ¶ 28. The Amended Complaint alleges no facts, however, that connect the purported mistreatment of Cui Qingyun and his family by the PRC to Mr. Despins or Paul Hastings acting as an unregistered agent of the PRC or the CCP.\n\nAs to the other nine Plaintiffs, there are no allegations of any injury suffered. Instead, Plaintiffs rely on conclusory allegations of generalized injuries, including that they were \"subjected to an ongoing campaign of harassment by agents of the CCP and PRC.\" *Id*. ¶ 22. Conclusory statements of injury are insufficient adequately to allege standing. *See Gambles v.*\n\n<sup>9</sup> Although the Amended Complaint does not allege a date when these confiscations occurred, it was apparently decades ago when the CCP took control of China. *See* Am. Compl. ¶ 28.\n\n*Sterling Infosystems, Inc.*, 234 F. Supp. 3d 510, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). \"Article III grants federal courts the power to redress harms that defendants caused plaintiffs, not a freewheeling power to hold defendants accountable for legal infractions.\" *TransUnion LLC*, 141 S. Ct. at 2206 (internal quotation omitted).\n\nEven if the Court found that Plaintiffs had plausibly alleged some concrete injury, Plaintiffs have alleged no facts from which the Court can reasonably infer that Paul Hastings' provision of legal services to Jinshang Bank is an activity \"directly or indirectly . . . controlled . . . in whole or in part by a foreign principal\" such that Paul Hastings qualifies as an \"agent of a foreign principal\" within the meaning of FARA. 22 U.S.C. § 611(c). As thin as the allegations are against Paul Hastings, they are even thinner against Mr. Despins. The Amended Complaint alleges *no* facts specific to Mr. Despins beyond the fact that he is a resident of Connecticut. Am. Compl. ¶ 20. And even if Plaintiffs had alleged facts from which it would be plausible to infer that either Defendant was an agent of the PRC or CCP that is required to register pursuant to FARA, they do not explain how whatever harm they experienced is \"fairly traceable\" to Defendants' failure to register. *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 560. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants \"intimidated [them] into refraining from exercising their rights,\" Am. Compl. ¶ 25, but fail plausibly to allege any specific facts in support of this conclusory allegation or explain how registering as foreign agents would have prevented Defendants from inflicting this harm.10\n\nBecause even a cursory inquiry would have shown that the facts as alleged in the Amended Complaint fell far short of the threshold required to establish standing, Plaintiffs'\n\n<sup>10</sup> Plaintiffs also seem to argue that, because Paul Hastings provided legal services to Jinshang Bank, Defendants are responsible for any harm caused by the CCP or PRC. *See* Am. Compl. ¶¶ 39–49, 51–53. This claim is so tenuous as to be absurd. Plaintiffs also do not allege that Mr. Despins is connected to the CCP or PRC at all.\n\ncounsel clearly failed to fulfill the \"affirmative duty on each attorney to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the viability of the pleading before it is signed.\" *Int'l Shipping Co., S.A.*, 875 F.2d at 390 (internal quotation omitted). This is particularly true because Defendants notified Plaintiffs that Defendants believed that the complaint \"plainly was filed for the improper purpose of furthering Ho Wan Kwok's ongoing campaign to harass and intimidate Defendants,\" and that Plaintiffs' complaint was frivolous because FARA does not provide for a private right of action. *See* First Andres Decl. Ex. 1 at 1–2.\n\nThe Court finds that sanctions are appropriate. Defendants complied with Rule 11's safe harbor provision: they gave Plaintiffs notice of their intent to file sanctions because the complaint Plaintiffs filed was frivolous and served the Rule 11 motion papers to the last known address of Plaintiff's office more than twenty-one days before moving for sanctions.11 *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). Plaintiffs persisted by filing an Amended Complaint that cured none of the deficiencies Defendants had identified. *See* First Andres Decl. ¶ 2.\n\n<sup>11</sup> In what itself may well be a sanctionable argument, Mr. Freeth argues that Defendants did not comply with Rule 11's safe harbor provision because Defendants' service of the motion for sanctions was defective. Pls. Sanctions Opp., Dkt. 23 ¶¶ 7–8. This argument reeks of gamesmanship. Defendants properly served Mr. Freeth. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c)(2) requires a motion for sanctions to be served in accordance with Rule 5, which permits service by several methods, including \"mailing it to the person's last known address,\" \"handing it to the person,\" or leaving it \"at the person's office.\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(B). As long as the sender mailed the documents to the recipient's last known address, however, service is considered complete, even if the recipient did not receive the mail. *See*, *e.g.*, *Greene v. WCI Holdings Corp.*, 136 F.3d 313, 315 (2d Cir. 1998).\n\nMr. Freeth's last known address is his office address, which he has listed on all of the papers that he has filed in this case, on ECF, and which is on record with the First Judicial Department in connection with his registration to practice law in New York. *See* Second Andres Decl. Ex. 5, Dkt. 26. ECF Rule 20.6 requires attorneys to keep their addressees current. *See* ECF Rules and Instructions (July 24, 2023), available at http gov/rules/ecf-related-instructions. On December 27, 2022, Defendants served Mr. Freeth via mail and in-person service at the last known address of his office. *See* Second Andres Decl. ¶¶ 12–13. Defendants also requested that Mr. Freeth provide a new address, but he did not do so. *See id*. ¶ 15. Because Defendants complied with Rule 11's safe harbor provision, Mr. Freeth cannot argue that Plaintiffs did not have a reasonable opportunity to respond.\n\n## **C. Plaintiffs Filed the Lawsuit To Harass Defendants**\n\nPursuant to Rule 11(b)(1), an attorney cannot present a filing \"for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation.\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1). A court may infer an improper purpose if, in light of Plaintiffs' conduct during and outside of litigation, a complaint is so baseless as to suggest that there is an ulterior motive behind the lawsuit. *See, e.g.*, *S. Pac. Shipping Co. v. Redi-Fresh Produce Inc.,* 2014 WL 6968039, at \\*10 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2014) (holding that \"the deficiency of [plaintiff's] claim, coupled with its behavior\" in litigation in that and other courts \"gives rise to an inference of improper purpose\"); *see also Schlaifer Nance & Co, Inc.. v. Estate of Warhol*, 194 F.3d 323, 338 (2d Cir. 1999) (a court can infer bad faith when an action is \"so completely without merit as to require the conclusion [it] must have been undertaken for some improper purpose,\" *id*. (cleaned up)).\n\nIn this case, the context of Plaintiffs' filing demonstrates Plaintiffs' complete disregard for \"legal merit.\" *Galonsky v. Williams*, 1997 WL 759445, at \\*4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 1997). Plaintiffs failed to withdraw their complaint after the Bankruptcy Court enjoined Plaintiff Li and those \"in active concert\" with him from making baseless claims that Paul Hasting was an agent of the CCP. *See* Bankr. Prelim. Inj. at 60. Plaintiffs continued to violate that injunction even after Defendants notified Plaintiffs' counsel of numerous deficiencies in the complaint, which Mr. Feeth failed to cure when he subsequently filed the Amended Complaint. *See id.*; First Andres Decl. Ex. 1 at 1–2.\n\nPlaintiffs' papers reveal that their true preoccupation is with Mr. Kwok and trying to \"defend\" him by harassing those perceived to be his adversaries. Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Kwok's bankruptcy proceeding is \"irrelevant\" but nevertheless devote roughly half of their opposition to Defendants' motion to dismiss discussing Mr. Kwok's supposed \"fight against the\n\nCCP.\" Pls. MTD Opp. ¶ 19; *see also See* Pls. Sanctions Opp. ¶ 16; Pls. MTD Opp. ¶¶ 13–47. Plaintiffs baselessly assert, with no factual allegations to support their conclusion, that Mr. Despins \"has behaved thoroughly adverse to Mr. Kwok throughout the proceedings, rather than serving as trustee in a neutral manner,\" Pls*.* MTD Opp. ¶ 41, as though that somehow explains why people other than Mr. Kwok might have a cause of action against Mr. Despins.\n\nThe existence of similar litigation in other courts further supports the Court's finding that Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in bad faith. Plaintiffs' counsel has a pattern of bringing meritless FARA claims against Mr. Kwok's adversaries — conduct that he has praised. 12 The copy-andpaste nature of these numerous lawsuits is evident from the fact that Plaintiffs' complaint contains an out-of-place paragraph that alleges \"Defendant Bo Shan is also working as a spy for the CCP.\" Am. Compl. ¶ 50.\n\nTogether, Plaintiffs' legal contentions within this lawsuit, Plaintiff's counsel's history of meritless FARA claims against others, and the harassment campaign against Defendants as documented by the Bankruptcy Court lead the Court to conclude that this lawsuit is just another part of a campaign of misbehavior designed to vex Defendants, most likely by frustrating Mr. Despins's ability to perform his duties as trustee. As such, the Court finds that sanctions are appropriate.\n\nRule 11(c) enables courts to impose a sanction that \"suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated.\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4). Attorneys' fees are an appropriate remedy to prevent harassment in the form of bad-faith litigation, especially when the sanctioned party has failed to comply with prior court orders. *See Pentagen Techs. Int'l Ltd. v. United States*, 172 F. Supp. 2d 464, 473–474 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)\n\n<sup>12</sup> *See supra*, pp. 3–4.\n\n(imposing sanctions and awarding attorneys' fees to punish plaintiffs for \"engag[ing] in a pattern of litigation designed to evade previous rulings\" that was \"frivolous and repetitive . . . [and] intentionally so\"), *aff'd*, 63 F. App'x 548 (2d Cir. 2003). \"It is well settled that Rule 11 empowers judges with discretion to award that portion of a defendant's attorney's fees thought reasonable to serve the sanctioning purpose of the Rule.\" *Int'l Shipping Co., S.A.*, 875 F.2d at 392. The Court finds that an award of the full amount of reasonable attorneys fees is an appropriate sanction and not more punitive than necessary in light of Plaintiffs' counsel's complete disregard for the merits of Plaintiffs' claims, his gamesmanship, and both Plaintiffs' and Plaintiffs' counsel's defiance of the Bankruptcy Court's injunction.\n\nRule 11 \"authorizes assessment of a fee against counsel, a party, or both.\" *Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York*, 821 F.2d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 1987). Here, certain aspects of Plaintiffs' lawsuit are \"issue[s] over which counsel exercise[d] principal responsibility,\" *United Republic Ins. Co., in Receivership v. Chase Manhattan Bank*, 315 F.3d 168, 171 (2d Cir. 2003), like ensuring that the complaints filed met a minimum merit threshold and pled adequate facts to establish subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs' behavior — including their decision to pursue this lawsuit after the Bankruptcy Court's injunction — demonstrates, however, that Plaintiffs also bear responsibility for the harassment and frivolity of this lawsuit. In light of this, the Court imposes the fee award jointly and severally upon Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' counsel.\n\n## **CONCLUSION**\n\n For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion to dismiss and motion for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs as sanctions are GRANTED. The Amended Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice. Defendants must submit an application for attorney's fees and costs not later\n\nthan **August 11, 2023**. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the open motions at docket entries 11 and 14.\n\n**SO ORDERED.**\n\n**Date: August 2, 2023 VALERIE CAPRONI**\n\n\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\n\n**New York, New York United States District Judge**","body_zh":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION（美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院布里奇波特分院）\n\nx\n\n关于：　：\n：　第11章\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等人，1　：\n：　案号 22-50073 (JAM)\n债务人。　：\n：\n：　（合并管理）\n\n第11章受托人关于 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（美国纽约南区联邦地区法院）作出的驳回针对受托人及其律师所提主张的意见和命令之声明\n\n1. Luc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯平斯）先生，以 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）第11章案件中受托人（“受托人”）的身份，先前已告知本院：2022年11月28日，与个人债务人有关联的若干个人（合称“原告”）在 United States District Court for the Southern District of New York（美国纽约南区联邦地区法院）（“SDNY法院”）对 Despins 先生及 Paul Hastings LLP（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所），即受托人在这些第11章案件中的律师（合称“被告”），提起诉讼，指称被告未登记为 People's Republic of China（中华人民共和国）或 Chinese Communist Party（中国共产党）的代理人，违反了《外国代理人登记法》。Despins 先生和 Paul Hastings 提出动议，请求驳回原告的起诉状，并根据《联邦民事诉讼规则》第11(b)条，寻求对原告及其律师实施制裁。\n\n1 本第11章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（亦称 Guo Wengui、Miles Guo 和 Miles Kwok，以及其他众多别名）（税务识别号码后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（税务识别号码后四位：8202）以及 Genever Holdings Corporation。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 和 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为：Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166，收件人：Luc A. Despins，作为 Ho Wan Kwok 遗产的受托人（仅为通知和通信之目的）。\n\n2. 2023年8月2日，SDNY法院作出其意见和命令（“意见和命令”），(a) 驳回原告的起诉状，以及 (b) 根据第11条对原告及其律师实施制裁，裁定被告获得合理的律师费和费用。随附本文件的附件A为该意见和命令的副本。\n\n日期：2023年8月4日　LUC A. DESPINS，康涅狄格州纽黑文　第11章受托人\n\n签署人：/s/ G. Alexander Bongartz\n\nG. Alexander Bongartz（获准临时出庭）\nAvram E. Luft（获准临时出庭）\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, New York 10166\n(212) 318-6079\naviluft@paulhastings.com\nalexbongartz@paulhastings.com\n\n以及\n\nNicholas A. Bassett（获准临时出庭）\nPAUL HASTINGS LLP\n2050 M Street NW\nWashington, D.C., 20036\n(202) 551-1902\nnicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n以及\n\nDouglas S. Skalka (ct00616)\nPatrick R. Linsey (ct29437)\nNEUBERT, PEPE & MONTEITH, P.C.\n195 Church Street, 13th Floor\nNew Haven, Connecticut 06510\n(203) 781-2847\ndskalka@npmlaw.com\nplinsey@npmlaw.com\n\n第11章受托人律师\n\n附件A\n\n意见和命令\n\nUSDC SDNY\n文件\n电子提交\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT　文件编号：\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（美国纽约南区联邦地区法院）　2023年8月2日\n提交日期：\n--------------------------------------------------------------　X\nTAO AN（安涛）、CHUNGANG GUAN（关春刚）、CUI　：\nQINGYUN（崔庆云）、HUIMIN LIN（林惠敏）、BEILE LI（李贝乐），　：\nYANMING WANG（王彦明）、TAO ZHENG（郑涛）、ZHENG HU（胡铮），　：\n\nYUAN CAO（曹源）、LINWAN FENG（冯琳婉），　：\n：　22-CV-10062 (VEC)\n原告，　：\n：　意见和命令\n-诉　：\n\nLUC A. DESPINS（卢克·A·德斯平斯）及 PAUL HASTINGS LLP（保罗·黑斯廷斯律师事务所），　：\n\n被告。　：\n--------------------------------------------------------------　X\n\nVALERIE CAPRONI（瓦莱丽·卡普罗尼），美国地区法官：\n\n原告为居住在美国的若干中国国民，其起诉 Paul Hastings LLP（“Paul Hastings”）及其一名合伙人 Luc A. Despins，称其未登记为 People's Republic of China（“PRC”）或 Chinese Communist Party（“CCP”）的代理人，因而涉嫌违反《外国代理人登记法》（“FARA”），22 U.S.C. §§ 611–621。见修正起诉状，Dkt. 10。被告根据《联邦民事诉讼规则》第12(b)(1)条提出动议，请求以未充分主张事项管辖权为由驳回修正起诉状，并根据第12(b)(6)条以未提出可获救济的请求为由驳回修正起诉状。见被告驳回动议备忘录，Dkt. 15，第1–2页。被告还根据第11(b)条提出动议，请求因原告律师提出无理主张并被指为不当目的而提起本诉讼，对原告律师实施制裁。被告制裁备忘录，Dkt. 12，第1、4页。原告反对两项动议。见原告制裁反对意见，Dkt. 23；原告驳回动议反对意见，Dkt. 22。基于以下理由，被告的驳回动议和制裁动议均获准，本院裁定被告获得合理的律师费和费用。\n\n背景\n\n原告主张，其系 CCP 和 PRC 发起的骚扰行动的受害者。修正起诉状第24段。原告进一步主张，由于 Paul Hastings 就 Jinshang Bank（一家由 CCP 控制和运营的银行）的全球公开发行提供法律服务，其系 CCP 或 PRC 的代理人，并须根据 FARA 登记为外国代理人。同上，第39–49、51–53段。被告还主张，Despins 先生系 CCP 或 PRC 的代理人，且违反了 FARA 的登记要求。1 见同上，第3、51段。\n\n本诉讼的核心人物是自称亿万富翁的 Ho Wan Kwok 先生，其并非本案当事人。2022年2月15日，Kwok 先生在 United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut（美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院）申请破产。一般见 Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. v. Ho Wan Kwok (In re Kwok), Ch. 11 Case Nos. 22-50073, 22-5032 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022)。破产法院任命由 Paul Hastings 代理的 Despins 先生为 Kwok 先生所控制实体的第11章受托人。见命令，Dkts. 523、668，In re Kwok, Ch 11 Case Nos. 22-50073, 22-5032。\n\n至少自2022年11月以来，Kwok 先生一直利用其活跃的社交媒体影响力动员其支持者，并对 Paul Hastings、Despins 先生及 Despins 先生的家人发动骚扰行动。见命令，Dkt. 133，第34、41–45、49段，In re Kwok, Ch 11 Case Nos. 22-50073, 22-5032（下称“破产案初步禁令备忘录”）。Kwok 先生曾以“流氓手段”威胁 Despins 先生，并承诺被告“将遭受灾难”。破产案初步禁令备忘录第45段。\n\n1 被告称，Despins 先生未参与 Jinshang Bank 交易，且原告并未主张任何事实表明 Despins 先生以其他任何方式与 People's Republic of China（“PRC”）或 Chinese Communist Party（“CCP”）有关联。被告驳回动议备忘录，Dkt. 15，第4页。\n\n在 Kwok 先生发出行动号召后，其支持者曾在 Despins 先生、其女儿及其前妻的住所外，以及 Paul Hastings 纽约办公室附近抗议。见同上，第42–43、52–53、57、69–71段。他们散发传单，传单描绘 Despins 先生眼睛和嘴巴滴血、额头上印有镰刀锤子图案，文字称被告为“CCP的走狗”及 CCP 的“帮凶”。First Andres Decl. Ex. 22, Dkt. 13。他们还散发材料，称 Despins 先生为敲诈者、反犹主义者和“人渣”。见 First Andres Decl. Exs. 15, 22–25。\n\n该骚扰行动还包括多起联邦诉讼，指称参与 Kwok 先生破产程序的人士系 PRC 或 CCP 的代理人，且违反 FARA 的登记要求。见，例如，修正起诉状，Dkt. 43，第60段，Gong v. Sarnoff et al, No. 23-CV-343 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2023)；起诉状，Dkt. 1，第74、118–25段，Wyatt v. U. of Md., No. 23-CV-742 (D. Md. Mar. 17, 2023)。在提起本诉讼的同时，原告在 An v. Shan, No. 22-CV-10060 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) 中起诉 Weijian Shan（单伟建），即 Kwok 先生最大债权人的执行董事和董事长，以及其儿子，称其违反 FARA 的登记要求。Kwok 先生曾称赞原告 Li 为“同志[]”，并在社交媒体上发布本起诉状的照片。见 First Andres Decl. Ex. 5。\n\nRichard Freeth（理查德·弗里思）在本案及 Shan 案中代理原告，也曾在 Wyatt v. University of Maryland, No. 23-CV-742 (D. Md. 2023) 中代理原告。Wyatt 案所涉问题是 University of Maryland（马里兰大学）作出的决定，该大学有 Shan 先生的女儿就读，其命令 Kwok 先生的支持者停止在大学公共场地抗议。起诉状，Dkt. 1，第14、16段，Wyatt, No. 23-CV-742 (D. Md. Mar. 17, 2023)。Freeth 先生还在 Gong v. Sarnoff, No. 23-CV-00343 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) 中代理原告，该案原告指控 O'Melveny & Myers LLP（奥梅尔文尼律师事务所）及其合伙人 Stuart Sarnoff（斯图尔特·萨诺夫）“毁掉了 Ho Wan Kwok 的生活”。2 意见，Dkt. 57，第3页，Gong, No. 23-CV-343 (July 17, 2023)（内部引文省略）。3\n\n2023年1月11日，破产法院禁止 Kwok 先生及任何与其“积极共同行动”的人，包括原告 Beile Li，骚扰或“人肉开盒”被告。命令，Dkt. 134，第5段，In re Kwok, Ch 11 Case Nos. 22-50073, 22-5032（下称“破产案初步禁令”）。破产法院在其裁定中认定，Beile Li 是 Kwok 先生的代理人。同上。\n\n2022年12月15日，原告提交修正起诉状。见修正起诉状。2023年1月19日，被告提出动议，请求驳回修正起诉状，并另行提出制裁动议。见驳回动议，Dkt. 14；制裁动议，Dkt. 11。\n\n讨论\n\nI. 本院对原告的主张不具有事项管辖权\n\nA. 法律标准\n\n主张本院对某一特定请求具有事项管辖权的一方“负有以证据优势证明该管辖权存在的责任”。Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000)。如案件源于联邦法律，见 28 U.S.C. § 1331，或当事人之间存在完全多元管辖且争议金额超过 \\$75,000.00，见同上 § 1332，则存在事项管辖权。如果一项请求“源于美国宪法、法律或条约”，法院便具有联邦问题管辖权。同上 § 1331。为援引联邦问题管辖权，起诉状必须“确立联邦法律创设了诉因，或者原告获得救济的权利必然\n\n2 Liman 法官最近因缺乏事项管辖权驳回了 Gong v. Sarnoff et al., No. 23-CV-343 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) 中的起诉状。见意见，Dkt. 57，Gong, No. 23-CV-343 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2023)。\n\n3 尽管仅 Richard Freeth 代表原告提交了出庭通知，但 Yongbing Zhang（张永兵）似乎积极参与了本案诉讼；其在针对 Kwok 先生所认定对手提起的若干平行案件中代理原告。见，例如，Wyatt v. Univ. of Md., No. 23-CV-742 (D. Md. 2023)。例如，Freeth 先生在其最近致本院的信函中抄送了 Zhang 先生。信函，Dkt. 28。\n\n取决于对一项实质性联邦法律问题的解决”。Perpetual Secs., Inc. v. Tang, 290 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 2002)（引文清理）。\n\n原告敦促本院通过从 FARA 推定私人诉权，认定本院具有联邦问题管辖权。4 见原告驳回动议反对意见，Dkt. 22，第48–54段。FARA 要求任何“外国委托人的代理人”向司法部长登记，除非该实体符合豁免条件；该法将起诉 FARA 违法行为的专属权限赋予司法部长。5 22 U.S.C. § 612；另见同上 § 618(f)（授予司法部长寻求禁令救济的权限，以禁止代表外国委托人实施的行为或要求登记）。\n\n如原告方所承认，FARA《外国代理人登记法》项下不存在私人诉权。见修正起诉状第5–6段。FARA 授予司法部长对违反登记要求的行为进行追诉的专属权限，并无迹象表明国会意图创设私人诉权。见 22 U.S.C. § 618(f)。FARA 的目的在于“提供[a]一套集中报告制度，以追踪代表外国行事的代理人的活动……，且该法规或其立法历史中没有任何文字表明国会意图在联邦政府以外的任何实体中设立[a]诉因。”见，例如，Weican Meng v. Xinhuanet Co., 2017 WL 3175609, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2017)（引自 Comm'n for a Free Namibia v. S.W. Africa People's Org., 554 F. Supp. 722, 722 (D.D.C. 1982)）。\n\n原告方既未主张亦未陈述任何事实，以表明多元管辖权的存在。\n\n5 外国委托人的代理人是指“任何作为外国委托人的代理人、代表、雇员或雇工行事的人，或任何按照外国委托人的命令、请求，或在其指示或控制下以其他任何身份行事的人，或……其活动直接或间接地……全部或主要部分受外国委托人控制的人。”22 U.S.C. § 611(c)。如外国委托人的代理人“仅从事……(1) 推进该外国委托人善意贸易或商业的私人和非政治活动；或 (2) 不主要服务于外国利益的其他活动”，则免于 FARA 的登记要求。Id. § 613(d)。\n\n当一项法规未明确规定私人诉权时，法院不愿推定存在该项权利。见，例如，Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004)（指出法院对于推定私人诉权持谨慎态度，因为该项权利“允许在不受检察裁量权所施加制约的情况下进行执行”）；Olmsted v. Pruco Life Ins. Co. of N.J., 283 F.3d 429, 432 (2d Cir. 2002)（“若无国会意图，则不存在诉因，法院亦不得创设诉因，无论从政策角度看此举多么可取……。”Id.（引文整理））。因此，据本院所知，审议过 FARA 是否规定默示私人诉权的地区法院一致认定其并未规定该项权利。见，例如，Henry v. Washington, 2022 WL 9491957, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 16, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 9372175 (Oct. 14, 2022); Bey v. Epstein, 2021 WL 8155603, at *4 (D. Conn. Aug. 6, 2021)（“作为私人个人，原告无权依据该法规提起诉讼，因为不能从 FARA 推定出私人诉权。”）；Waterhouse v. Cufi Church Ass'n Inc., 2014 WL 1745098, at *3 (D. Haw. Apr. 29, 2014)。\n\n原告方承认，FARA 的文本及判例法均不支持认定存在私人诉权，但其仍敦促本院因司法部长据称缺乏执法而推定存在私人诉权。见修正起诉状第5–6段。司法部长选择在何种程度上执行 FARA 并不相关。决定性问题在于立法意图，而原告方未能在其修正起诉状中充分陈述，亦未能在其对驳回动议的反对意见中提出任何有关该法规或其立法历史的事实，以表明国会意图在 FARA 项下设立私人诉权。\n\n然而，即使本院推定存在私人诉权，本院仍将因原告方未证明其具备诉讼资格而缺乏事项管辖权。确立无疑的法律规则是，原告为提出请求，必须证明“(1)‘实际损害’，(2) 该损害与所涉行为之间存在‘因果联系’，以及 (3)‘有利判决将救济该损害’的可能性。”Maddox v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Tr. Co., N.A., 19 F.4th 58, 62 (2d Cir. 2021)（引自 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–561 (1992)）。原告方未陈述任何事实，使本院能够合理推定其遭受了“具体且个别化”的、而非“推测性或假设性”的实际损害，更遑论可设想追溯至被告方未登记为外国政府代理人这一行为的损害。Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560（引文整理）。\n\n在缺乏事项管辖权的情况下，本院必须不妨碍再诉地驳回本案。见 Bank v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 708 F. App'x 43, 44–45 (2d Cir. 2018)（简易命令）。本院拒绝准许原告方修改。原告方已经一次修改其起诉状，仍未补救管辖权瑕疵；再给予原告方一次机会将是徒劳的。6\n\nII. 因原告方的起诉状毫无依据且为不当目的而提交，制裁措施适当\n\nA. 法律标准\n\n《联邦民事诉讼规则》第 11(b) 条要求，向法院提交文件的律师证明，其“基于在当时情形下合理调查后形成的、本人最佳知识、信息和信念”，该文件并非为不当目的而提出，且其中的法律主张并非毫无依据，并有事实和法律支持。第11条还“明确且毫不含糊地规定，每位律师均有积极义务在签署诉状前对其可成立性进行合理调查。”Int'l Shipping Co., S.A. v. Hydra Offshore, Inc., 875 F.2d 388, 390 (2d Cir. 1989)。《规则》第 11(c)(2) 条的“安全港”规定，若被质疑的文件“在送达后 21 日内被撤回或得到适当纠正”，则制裁动议“不得提交……”。“如在通知及合理答辩机会之后，法院认定违反了第11(b)条，法院可对违反该规则的任何律师、律师事务所或当事人施加适当制裁……”Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)。除第11条赋予的权限外，地区法院还“拥有固有权限，对在其面前以恶意、纠缠不休、恣意或出于压迫性理由行事的当事人实施制裁。”Sassower v. Field, 973 F.2d 75, 80–81 (2d Cir. 1992)（引自 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44–45 (1991)）。\n\n地区法院还“对于依第11条制定适当且合理的制裁措施享有广泛裁量权。”O'Malley v. New York City Transit Auth., 896 F.2d 704, 709 (2d Cir. 1990)。7 在确定制裁是否适当时，法院会考虑包括但不限于不当行为是否属“故意[]或过失”、该行为是否“构成一种模式或活动的一部分”，或者当事人是否“在其他诉讼中从事过类似行为”。8 Colliton v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, 2008 WL 4386764, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2008)。“制裁可包括……因该违反行为直接导致的合理律师费和其他费用。”Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4)。\n\n7 即使法院缺乏事项管辖权，其仍保有对原告方及其律师实施制裁的权限。见，例如，Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 137–39 (1992); Schlaifer Nance & Co., Inc. v. Est. of Warhol, 194 F.3d 323, 333 (2d Cir. 1999)。\n\n8 本院还可考虑该不当行为是否污染了整份诉状，还是仅污染了某一特定罪名项或抗辩；该不当行为在时间或费用方面对诉讼程序造成何种影响；以及责任人是否受过法律训练。Colliton v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, 2008 WL 4386764, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2008)。\n\nB. 原告方的主张毫无依据\n\n根据第 11(b)(2) 条，若依照“客观合理性标准”，某项法律论点“显然”毫无成功可能，且不存在任何合理论点可延伸、修改或推翻现行法律，则该论点毫无依据。Morley v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 66 F.3d 21, 25 (2d Cir. 1995)（省略内部引文）。合理调查本会揭示，原告方的 FARA 请求因多项理由而显然站不住脚，其中尤为重要的是未能充分陈述诉讼资格。\n\n原告方未陈述任何事实，以表明其因被告方被指控违反 FARA 的行为而受到为确立诉讼资格所必需的“具体损害”。TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2205 (2021); 另见 Holcombe v. Ingredients Sols., Inc., 797 F. App'x 630, 632 (2d Cir. 2020)（实际损害必须是“具体且个别化的”）。修正起诉状仅描述了一名原告 Cui Qingyun（崔庆云）所遭受的具体损害。根据修正起诉状，在某个未具体说明的时间9，Qingyun 先生及其妻子的大家庭被中华人民共和国（PRC）夺走全部财产，并且在 2022年4月，中华人民共和国“强制封控”了他和他的直系亲属，并在两周内仅断续向他们提供食物。修正起诉状第28段。然而，修正起诉状未陈述任何事实，将中华人民共和国对 Cui Qingyun 及其家人的所谓虐待与 Despins 先生或 Paul Hastings（普衡律师事务所）作为中华人民共和国或中国共产党（CCP）的未登记代理人行事相联系。\n\n对于其余九名原告，则没有任何关于其所受损害的陈述。相反，原告方依赖于关于一般性损害的结论性陈述，包括其“遭受了中国共产党和中华人民共和国代理人持续进行的骚扰活动”。Id. 第22段。关于损害的结论性陈述不足以充分陈述诉讼资格。见 Gambles v. Sterling Infosystems, Inc., 234 F. Supp. 3d 510, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)。“《宪法》第三条赋予联邦法院的权力，是救济被告对原告造成的损害，而非赋予其不受约束的权力，要求被告为法律违法行为承担责任。”TransUnion LLC, 141 S. Ct. at 2206（省略内部引文）。\n\n即使本院认定原告方已合理陈述了某些具体损害，原告方也未陈述任何事实，使本院能够合理推定 Paul Hastings 向 Jinshang Bank（晋商银行）提供法律服务，是一项“直接或间接地……全部或部分受外国委托人控制”的活动，从而使 Paul Hastings 符合 FARA 所称“外国委托人的代理人”资格。22 U.S.C. § 611(c)。针对 Paul Hastings 的陈述已十分单薄，针对 Despins 先生的陈述则更为单薄。除 Despins 先生为 Connecticut（康涅狄格州）居民这一事实外，修正起诉状没有陈述任何专门针对他的事实。修正起诉状第20段。而且，即使原告方已陈述事实，使人可以合理推定任一被告是须依 FARA 登记的中华人民共和国或中国共产党的代理人，原告方也未说明其所受任何损害如何能“公平地追溯至”被告方未登记的行为。Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560。原告方称被告方“恐吓[他们]，使其避免行使自身权利”，修正起诉状第25段，但未合理陈述任何具体事实支持该结论性主张，亦未说明登记为外国代理人将如何防止被告方造成该损害。10\n\n由于即使粗略调查也会表明，修正起诉状中所陈述的事实远未达到确立诉讼资格所需的门槛，原告方的\n\n10 原告方似乎还主张，由于 Paul Hastings（博钦律师事务所）向 Jinshang Bank（晋商银行）提供法律服务，被告方应对 CCP（中国共产党）或 PRC（中华人民共和国）造成的任何损害负责。见修正起诉书 ¶¶ 39–49, 51–53。该项主张牵强到荒谬的程度。原告方亦未主张 Despins 先生与 CCP 或 PRC 存在任何关联。\n\n律师显然未履行“每名律师在签署诉状前均有积极义务对该诉状是否可成立进行合理调查”。Int'l Shipping Co., S.A., 875 F.2d at 390（引文出处略）。尤其如此，因为被告方已通知原告方，被告方认为该起诉状“显然是为进一步推进 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）持续骚扰和恐吓被告方的活动这一不正当目的而提起”，并且由于 FARA 未规定私人诉权，原告方的起诉状毫无根据。见 First Andres Decl. Ex. 1 at 1–2。\n\n本院认定适宜施加制裁。被告方遵守了 Rule 11 的安全港条款：其通知原告方，因原告方提交的起诉状毫无根据，被告方拟申请制裁；并在申请制裁前二十一日以上，将 Rule 11 动议文件送达至原告方办公地点最后已知地址。11 见 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2)。原告方仍坚持提交一份修正起诉书，未弥补被告方指出的任何缺陷。见 First Andres Decl. ¶ 2。\n\n11 在本身很可能构成可受制裁论点的主张中，Freeth 先生主张，被告方未遵守 Rule 11 的安全港条款，因为被告方对制裁动议的送达存在瑕疵。Pls. Sanctions Opp., Dkt. 23 ¶¶ 7–8。该主张充满策略性操作。被告方已适当向 Freeth 先生送达。Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c)(2) 要求制裁动议依照 Rule 5 送达，该规则允许以数种方式送达，包括“邮寄至该人最后已知地址”、“交付给该人”，或留置于“该人的办公地点”。Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(B)。但是，只要寄件人已将文件邮寄至收件人最后已知地址，即使收件人未收到邮件，送达亦视为完成。见，例如，Greene v. WCI Holdings Corp., 136 F.3d 313, 315 (2d Cir. 1998)。\n\nFreeth 先生最后已知地址为其办公地址；他在本案中提交的所有文件、在 ECF 上均列明该地址，且该地址亦已就其在纽约执业的注册向 First Judicial Department 登记在案。见 Second Andres Decl. Ex. 5, Dkt. 26。ECF Rule 20.6 要求律师保持其地址为最新状态。见 ECF Rules and Instructions (July 24, 2023), available at http gov/rules/ecf-related-instructions。2022年12月27日，被告方通过邮寄及现场送达方式，向 Freeth 先生办公地点最后已知地址送达。见 Second Andres Decl. ¶¶ 12–13。被告方还要求 Freeth 先生提供新地址，但他未予提供。见 id. ¶ 15。由于被告方遵守了 Rule 11 的安全港条款，Freeth 先生不能主张原告方未获得合理答复机会。\n\nC. 原告方提起本诉以骚扰被告方\n\n根据 Rule 11(b)(1)，律师不得“为任何不正当目的，例如骚扰、造成不必要延误，或无端增加诉讼成本”提交文件。Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1)。如结合原告方在诉讼期间及诉讼外的行为，起诉状毫无依据到足以表明本诉背后存在隐藏动机，法院可以推定存在不正当目的。见，例如，S. Pac. Shipping Co. v. Redi-Fresh Produce Inc., 2014 WL 6968039, at \\*10 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2014)（裁定原告方主张的“缺陷，加之其”在该法院及其他法院诉讼中的行为，“导致推定存在不正当目的”）；另见 Schlaifer Nance & Co, Inc.. v. Estate of Warhol, 194 F.3d 323, 338 (2d Cir. 1999)（当一项诉讼“完全毫无依据，以至于必须得出结论，[其]必定是为了某种不正当目的而提起”时，法院可以推定恶意，id.（引文整理））。\n\n在本案中，原告方提交文件的背景表明，原告方完全无视“法律依据”。Galonsky v. Williams, 1997 WL 759445, at \\*4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 1997)。在破产法院禁止 Li 原告及与其“积极共同行动”的人员提出毫无依据的主张，即 Paul Hasting 是 CCP 的代理人后，原告方未撤回其起诉状。见 Bankr. Prelim. Inj. at 60。即使在被告方已将起诉状中的众多缺陷通知原告方律师后，原告方仍继续违反该禁令；Feeth 先生其后提交修正起诉书时未予补正。见 id.; First Andres Decl. Ex. 1 at 1–2。\n\n原告方的文件表明，其真正关注的是郭文贵先生，并试图通过骚扰那些被视为其对手的人来“保护”他。原告方主张郭文贵先生的破产程序“无关紧要”，却仍在其对被告方驳回动议的异议中，以约半数篇幅讨论郭文贵先生所谓的“反对 CCP 的斗争”。Pls. MTD Opp. ¶ 19；另见 See Pls. Sanctions Opp. ¶ 16; Pls. MTD Opp. ¶¶ 13–47。原告方毫无依据地断言，且未提出任何事实主张支持其结论，Despins 先生“在整个程序中始终完全与郭文贵先生利益相悖，而非以中立方式履行受托人职责”，Pls*.* MTD Opp. ¶ 41，仿佛这以某种方式解释了为何郭文贵先生以外的人可能对 Despins 先生享有诉因。\n\n其他法院存在类似诉讼，进一步支持本院的认定，即原告方系出于恶意提起本诉。原告方律师一贯针对郭文贵先生的对手提出毫无依据的 FARA 主张——其对此种行为表示赞扬。12 这些大量诉讼具有复制粘贴性质，这一点可从原告方起诉状中包含一段不合语境的文字看出，该段主张“被告 Bo Shan 也在为 CCP 从事间谍工作”。修正起诉书 ¶ 50。\n\n本诉中原告方的法律主张、原告方律师针对他人提出毫无依据 FARA 主张的历史，以及破产法院记录在案的针对被告方的骚扰活动，共同使本院得出结论：本诉只是旨在刁难被告方的不当行为活动的又一部分，很可能意在妨碍 Despins 先生履行其受托人职责。因此，本院认定适宜施加制裁。\n\nRule 11(c) 使法院能够施加“足以遏制重复该行为或其他处境相似者实施类似行为”的制裁。Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4)。为防止恶意诉讼形式的骚扰，律师费是适当的救济，特别是在受制裁方未遵守先前法院命令的情况下。见 Pentagen Techs. Int'l Ltd. v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 2d 464, 473–474 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)\n\n12 见上文，第 3–4 页。\n\n（施加制裁并裁定律师费，以惩罚原告方“从事旨在规避先前裁决的诉讼模式”，该模式“毫无依据且重复……［并且］系故意为之”），aff'd, 63 F. App'x 548 (2d Cir. 2003)。“业已确立，Rule 11 授权法官酌情裁定被告方律师费中为实现该规则制裁目的而被认为合理的部分。”Int'l Shipping Co., S.A., 875 F.2d at 392。本院认定，鉴于原告方律师完全无视原告方主张的是非曲直、其策略性操作，以及原告方和原告方律师均藐视破产法院禁令，裁定合理律师费的全额是一项适当制裁，且其惩罚性并未超过必要程度。\n\nRule 11“授权向律师、一方当事人或二者评定费用”。Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 1987)。在本案中，原告方诉讼的某些方面属于“律师承担主要责任的问题”，United Republic Ins. Co., in Receivership v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 315 F.3d 168, 171 (2d Cir. 2003)，例如确保所提交的起诉状达到最低法律依据门槛，并陈述充分事实以确立事项管辖权。然而，原告方的行为——包括其在破产法院禁令后决定继续推进本诉——表明，原告方亦应对本诉的骚扰性和毫无依据性负责。鉴此，本院对原告方及原告方律师连带裁定律师费。\n\n结论\n\n基于上述理由，被告方的驳回动议以及要求以合理律师费和费用作为制裁的动议均予准许。修正起诉书予以驳回，但不妨碍重新提起。被告方必须不迟于 2023年8月11日提交律师费和费用申请。谨请书记官终止案卷条目 11 和 14 所载的未决动议。\n\n特此裁定。\n\n日期：2023年8月2日　VALERIE CAPRONI（瓦莱丽·卡普罗尼）\n\n＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿\n\n纽约州纽约市　美国联邦地区法官","key_entities":["Kwok","Despins","CCP","Paul Hastings","Je","CIPA","Ho Wan Kwok","Guo","Chinese Communist Party","Miles Guo"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":1,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":10,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":11,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":12,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":13,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":14,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":15,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":22,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":23,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":26,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":28,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":29,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":43,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":57,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":133,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":134,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":5450,"status":"published","published_at":"2023-08-04 00:00:00","created_at":"2023-08-04","updated_at":"2026-08-23 19:11:52"}