{"id":"court_ctb_2074_2","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":2074,"sub_number":2,"doc_type":"MOTION","filed_date":"2023-08-09","title":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION In re : Chapter 11","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"# Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 1 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 1 of 63\n\n## **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION**\n\nIn re : Chapter 11\n\nHO WAN KWOK, *et al.*<sup>1</sup>\n\n:\n\n: Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n Debtors. : \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_:\n\n:\n\n\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_ :\n\n## **DEBTOR'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE APPEAL OF ORDER HOLDING DEBTOR IN CONTEMPT OF COURT AND DENYING MOTION FOR STAY OF ORDER COMPELLING PRODUCTION**\n\nPursuant to 28 U.S.C. §158(a)(3) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8004, the debtor, Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\")<sup>2</sup> , by and through his undersigned counsel, respectfully moves for leave to appeal the Bankruptcy Court's July 26, 2023 Memorandum of Decision and Order Holding Individual Debtor in Contempt of Court and Denying Motion for Stay of Order Compelling Production (Doc. No. 2035, the \"Contempt Order\"), a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A. The Contempt Order holds the Individual Debtor in contempt for failing to produce documents in response to a Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004 subpoena issued to the Debtor by the chapter 11 trustee, Luc A. Despins (the \"Trustee\"), and rejects the Debtor's invocation of his of Fifth Amendment rights against selfincrimination in response to the subpoena by finding that the Required Records exception to the Act of Production Doctrine applies as a result of the Debtor's obligations to cooperate with the\n\n<sup>1</sup> The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, and the Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\n<sup>2</sup> The Debtor refers solely to the individual debtor Ho Wan Kwok.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 2 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 2 of 63\n\nTrustee pursuant to 11 USC §§ 521(a)(3) and 521(a)(4). In support of his Motion for Leave to Appeal the Debtor respectfully states as follows.<sup>3</sup>\n\n## **I. INTRODUCTION**\n\n1. The Debtor invoked his Fifth Amendment right protecting against selfincrimination, including under the Act of Production Doctrine, in response to numerous and exceedingly broad requests for the production of document included in a subpoena served upon him by the Trustee pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004. The Bankruptcy Court correctly held that the Act of Production Doctrine applies in this case because the Debtor's production of the documents demanded by the Trustee would be \"testimonial and incriminating both with regards to the documents in the possession of the prosecution and the documents that have not been seized by the prosecution.\" (Contempt Order, at 20). Notwithstanding its holding that the Act of Production Doctrine applies, the Bankruptcy Court held that the Required Records exception to the Act of Production Doctrine also applies, given the Debtor's obligation to cooperate with a trustee where, as here, one has been appointed. The Bankruptcy Court's ruling, if applied uniformly, would effectively eliminate any natural person debtor's ability to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights when a trustee has been appointed, and would mandate the production of materials in any case where a natural person is both a debtor and the subject of a criminal proceeding.\n\n<sup>3</sup> This appeal arises from the Debtor's invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights in response to document requests included in a subpoena, and the Bankruptcy Court holding the Debtor in contempt for failing to comply with the subpoena. Where, as here, a person to whom a subpoena is issued, including a party, fails to comply with the subpoena and is then held in contempt for that non-compliance the contempt order is a final order for purposes of appeal. *Del Carman Montan v. Am. Airlines, Inc. (In re Aircrash at Belle Harbor)*, 490 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2007) (\"To obtain appellate review, the subpoenaed person ordinarily 'must defy the district court's enforcement order, be held in contempt, and then appeal the contempt order, which is regarded as final under § 1291.'\") (citations omitted). Because of the importance of the matter at issue to the Debtor, the Debtor files this Motion for Leave to Appeal to preserve his rights to seek interlocutory review in the event that the district court determines that the Contempt Order is not a final order.\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 3 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 3 of 63\n\n2. Contrary to the Bankruptcy Court's ruling, the Required Records exception is a narrow limitation to the Act of Production Doctrine, applying to limited categories of documents which are required to be maintained by statute or regulation. The Bankruptcy Court's expansion of the Required Records exception effectively makes every record of a debtor's business dealings, assets and liabilities a required record under 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(a)(3) and 521(a)(4)—regardless of whether the record falls into a category of records that are required to be maintained by some other statute or regulation.\n\n3. There is no authority for such a substantial expansion of an exception to a Constitutional right, and the Debtor, who is awaiting an April 2024 trial on numerous criminal charges, is now faced with the choice of either (a) producing the sought-after documents over his valid invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights to purge his contempt, or (b) facing whatever sanctions the Bankruptcy Court decides are appropriate for the Debtor's continued assertion of those same rights. Under these circumstances, and because the Debtor meets the standard for an interlocutory appeal of the Bankruptcy Court's ruling, leave to appeal the question of whether sections 521(a)(3) and 521(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code render the Act of Production Doctrine a nullity in bankruptcy cases in which a trustee is appointed based on the Required Records exception should be granted.\n\n#### **II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND**\n\n4. On February 15, 2022, the Debtor filed his voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, thereby commencing the above-captioned bankruptcy case. The Trustee was appointed on July 7, 2022, (Doc. No. 514), and his appointment was approved by order dated July 8, 2022 (Doc. No. 523).\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 4 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 4 of 63\n\n5. On July 28, 2022, the Trustee filed his i) Motion for 2004 Examination of the Debtor (Doc. No. 636, the \"Debtor 2004 Motion\"), ii) Omnibus Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee For Entry of Order Under Bankruptcy Rule 2004 and Local Rule 2004-1 Authorizing Discovery with Respect to Various Legal and Financial Advisors to the Debtor (Doc. No. 637), and iii) Omnibus Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee For Entry of Order Under Bankruptcy Rule 2004 and Local Rule 2004-1 Authorizing Discovery with Respect to Various Entities and Individuals Affiliated with the Debtor (Doc. No. 638) (collectively the \"July Rule 2004 Exam Motions\"). In the Debtor 2004 Motion the Trustee alleged, among other things, that \"[r]eports suggest that the Debtor … has a financial interest in myriad for-profit and not-for-profit entities,\" that the \"Debtor has an extensive network of shell companies he uses to pursue business interests and store his wealth,\" and that the \"Debtor … reportedly owns or controls 'more than 60 commercial, nonprofit and online groups' collectively referred to as the whistleblower movement.\" (Debtor 2004 Motion, ¶¶ 12, 13, 28).\n\n6. In the Debtor 2004 Motion, the Trustee made specific reference to, among other entities and individuals, GTV, GClubs, GMusic, the Rule of Law Society, the Rule of Law Foundation, Saraca Media Group, Inc., and the Debtor's family members.\n\n7. On August 5, 2022, the Debtor filed the Debtor's Limited Objection to Rule 2004 Motions (Doc. No. 703) to preserve certain rights, including the right to assert objections to the requests for the production of documents that would be served with the subpoena attached to the July Rule 2004 Exam Motions after the subpoena was actually served. By orders dated August 16, 2022, the Bankruptcy Court granted the July Rule 2004 Exam Motions.\n\n8. The Debtor was served with a Rule 2004 subpoena (the \"Rule 2004 Subpoena\") on August 19, 2022. The Rule 2004 Subpoena contained thirty requests for the production of\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 5 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 5 of 63\n\ndocuments, of which twenty include demands for documents relating to \"Associated Individuals\" and/or \"Associated Entities.\"\n\n9. An Associated Individual is defined in the Rule 2004 Subpoena, in relevant part, as \"individually and collectively, all individuals that (1) hold, control, have custody over, or discretion over assets owned, controlled, or enjoyed by the Debtor or the Debtor's Family; or (2) have been employees, directors, or otherwise affiliated with one or more Associated Entities, together with the respective employees, agents, counsel, advisors, or anyone acting on behalf of any of the foregoing.\" The definition of Associated Individuals includes twenty-seven individuals, including Yanping Wang (\"Ms. Wang\") and Je Kin Ming (\"Mr. Je\") (who, as described below, would become the Debtor's co-defendants in the criminal prosecution, *see infra* ¶ 18).\n\n10. An Associated Entity is defined in the Rule 2004 Subpoena, in relevant part, as \"individually and collectively, all organizations or Entities of any type that (1) have been owned, controlled, or invested in by the Debtor or the Debtor's Family; or (2) have an interest, whether directly or indirectly, in any assets owned, controlled, or enjoyed by the Debtor or the Debtor's Family, together with the respective employees, agents, counsel, advisors, or anyone acting on behalf of any of the foregoing.\" The definition of Associated Entity includes seventy-seven entities, including: GTV Media Group, Inc., G|Club Operations, LLC, G|MUSIC, Himalaya Exchange, Saraca Media Group, Inc., Rule of Law Foundation III, Inc., Rule of Law Foundation IV, Inc., Rule of Law Fund, Rule of Law Society, and Rule of Law Society IV, Inc.\n\n11. The Debtor served timely objections to the Rule 2004 Subpoena document requests, asserting objections to certain of the enumerated Instructions and Definitions included with the requests for production, as well as objections to certain of the requests for production. The Debtor objected to the production of certain categories of documents, primarily documents related to the\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 6 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 6 of 63\n\nassets of his \"family,\" which the Trustee defined to include \"the Debtor, the Debtor's Son, the Debtor's Daughter, and the Debtor's Purported Wife, and any other familial relation to the Debtor.\" The Debtor agreed to produce, and through his professionals and former professionals did produce, certain documents requested by the Trustee in the requests for production.\n\n12. On October 28, 2022, the Trustee filed his Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee for Entry of Order Compelling Individual Debtor, [and Others] to Comply with Rule 2004 Subpoenas (Doc. No. 1046, the \"Motion to Compel\"). On November 14, 2022 the Debtor filed his Joint Objection of the [Individual] Debtor, Mei Guo, and HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC to Chapter 11 Trustee's Motion to Compel Compliance with Rule 2004 Subpoenas (Doc. No. 1090). The Bankruptcy Court held a hearing on the Motion to Compel on November 30, 2022, and on January 20, 2023 entered an order Granting in Part Motion to Compel Compliance with Rule 2004 Subpoenas (Doc. No. 1353, the \"January 20 Order\"). The January 20 Order granted the Trustee's Motion to Compel as to the Debtor in full save for: i) setting a production date of June 1 2014 forward rather 2012 forward as advocated for by the Trustee and ii) the production of the Debtor's passport. (*Id.*, at 4).\n\n13. The January 20 Order required the Debtor to produce documents to the Trustee on or before January 31, 2023, and to file a sworn declaration on or before February 7, 2023, describing the document collection, search and review actions taken by him and his counsel in response to the Rule 2004 Subpoena. (January 20 Order, at 4). On February 1, 2023, the Debtor's counsel sent an email to the Trustee's counsel advising them that:\n\n> With respect to the Court's order on the Trustee's Motion to Compel, dated January 20, 2023, Doc. No. 1353, Mr. Kwok is asserting his rights under the 5th Amendment, including any rights under the Act of Production Doctrine.\n\n14. Thereafter, On February 7, 2023, the Debtor filed a sworn declaration stating:\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 7 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 7 of 63\n\nI am the Debtor in the above-captioned Chapter 11 case and am in receipt of the Court's order on the Trustee' s Motion to Compel, dated January 20, 2023, Doc. No . 1353. I hereby invoke my rights under the 5th Amendment to the United States Constitution, including under the act of production doctrine, with respect to the Subpoena dated August 17, 2022, in its entirety, including all requests for documents and information set forth therein.\n\n(February 7, 2023, Declaration of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok Concerning Invocation of Fifth Amendment Privilege in Regard to Rule 2004 Discovery (Exhibit A to Doc. No. 1444)).\n\n15. On February 10, 2023, the Trustee filed his Motion of Chapter 11 Trustee For Order to Show Cause Why Debtor … Should not be Held in Contempt of Court for Failure to Comply with Order Compelling Compliance with Rule 2004 Subpoenas and Sanctioned for Such Conduct (Doc. No. 1453, the \"Order to Show Cause\").\n\n16. On February 13, 2023, the Bankruptcy Court issued an order, (Doc. No. 1455), stating, among other things unrelated to the Debtor, that the court would set a briefing schedule on the Debtor's assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege at the conclusion of a mediation that the Court had ordered and was then on-going. (*Id.*, at 2).\n\n17. On March 7, 2023, the Bankruptcy Court ordered the Debtor to respond to the Order to Show Cause by March 28, 2023. The Debtor's time to respond to the Order to Show Cause was subsequently extended to April 10, 2023, because on March 15, 2023, a twelve-count indictment was unsealed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York charging the Debtor, Mr. Je and *others known and unknown* with various federal crimes. (*United States v. Ho Wan Kwok et al.*, Southern District of New York Case Number S1 23 Cr. 118 (AT), Doc. No. 2). The Debtor was arrested by federal law enforcement authorities on March 15, 2023, and remains in federal custody. The government has stated that through the execution of search warrants it recovered cellphones, computers or laptops, and external media storage devices from premises that it asserts belong to or are controlled by the Debtor. (*Id*., Doc. No. 26).\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 8 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 8 of 63\n\n18. On March 29, 2023, the government filed a Superseding Indictment. The Superseding Indictment names Ms. Wang as a co-defendant. The government alleges that the Debtor, Mr. Je, Ms. Wang and *others known and unknown* \"conspired to defraud thousands of victims of more than approximately \\$1 billion.\" (*Id*., Doc. No. 19, ¶ 1). The government further alleges that the Debtor, Mr. Je, Ms. Wang and \"their co-conspirators operated through a series of complex fraudulent and fictious businesses and investment opportunities that connected dozens of interrelated entities, which allowed the defendants and their co-conspirators to solicit, launder, and misappropriate victim funds.\" (*Id)*. The government further alleges that the Debtor and Mr. Je \"transferred, and directed the transfer of, money into and through more than approximately 500 accounts held in the name of at least 80 different entities or individuals.\" (*Id.* ¶ 3). The government names some of such entities or individuals, including GTV, GClubs, GMusic, the Rule of Law Society, the Rule of Law Foundation, Saraca Media Group, Inc., and the Debtor's family members (Associated Entities and Associated Individuals listed in the Rule 2004 Subpoena), but the great majority of such \"dozens of interrelated entities\", \"80 different entities or individuals\" and \"approximately 500 accounts\" are not named or identified in the Superseding Indictment.\n\n19. Throughout the Superseding Indictment, the government alleges that the Debtor controlled various entities and individuals, some named and many not named. For example, the government alleges that the Debtor \"functionally owned and controlled\" GTV Media Group, Inc., \"although [the Debtor] held no formal position or title\" in that entity. (*Id*., ¶ 10). Furthermore, the government alleges that G|Clubs \"was functionally owned and controlled by [the Debtor] although [the Debtor] held no formal position or title\" at G|Clubs. (*Id.,* at ¶ 11). The government also alleges that \"[e]ntities functionally owned and controlled by [the Debtor], such as G|Clubs and G|Fashion, had purported business relationships with the Himalaya Exchange . . .\" and that the Debtor\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 9 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 9 of 63\n\n\"claimed to be the designer of its purported cryptocurrency, although [the Debtor] held no formal position or title at the Himalaya Exchange.\" (*Id.,* at ¶12). While in the Superseding Indictment the government refers to certain individuals and entities by name, the government refers repeatedly to \"others known and unknown\" that conspired with the Debtor in the alleged fraud, (*id*., ¶¶ 1, 13, 15-17, 22, 26-32), and unnamed co-conspirators. (*Id*., ¶¶ 1-3, 5, 13h and 14).\n\n20. On April 10, 2023, the Debtor filed his Objection to the Chapter 11 Trustee's Motion for Order to Show Cause Why Debtor Should not be Held in Contempt (Doc. No. 1650, the \"Debtor's Contempt Objection\"), along with a motion seeking a Limited Stay of Order Granting in Part Motion to Compel Compliance with Rule 2004 Subpoena (Doc. No.1649, the \"Motion for Stay\").\n\n21. In the Debtor's Contempt Objection, the Debtor argued that he could not be held in contempt because he had complied with the January 20 Order by properly invoking his Fifth Amendment rights, including under the Act of Production Doctrine.\n\n22. The Trustee filed his Response to Debtor's Objection to Trustee's Motion for Order to Show Cause Why Debtor Should Not Be Held In Contempt on April 17, 2023, (Doc. No. 1670), and filed an objection to the Debtor's Motion for Stay on April 19, 2023. In the Trustee's April 17 Response he argued, among other things, that the Required Records exception to the Act of Production Doctrine applied in bankruptcy cases, and as a result the Debtor could not invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege in response to the January 20 Order and was therefore in contempt.\n\n23. The Bankruptcy Court conducted several hearings on the Order to Show Cause and the Motion for Stay over a period of several months. During that time counsel for the Trustee and the Debtor's then Special Criminal Counsel resolved the Trustee's contention that the Debtor was required to specifically invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege on a question-by-question basis by\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 10 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 10 of 63\n\nthe Debtor invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege to 202 specific written questions posed to the Debtor by the Trustee, but issues remained for the Bankruptcy Court's decision.\n\n24. On July 26, 2023, the Bankruptcy Court issued the Contempt Order, holding that the Act of Production Doctrine applied, and then further holding that a sweeping exception to the Act of Production Doctrine applies in bankruptcy cases under the Required Records exception and as a result the Debtor is in contempt. The Contempt Order further held that the Debtor may purge himself of contempt by complying with the January 20 Order and engaging in the very act of production the Bankruptcy Court concluded would be \"testimonial and incriminating both with regards to the documents in the possession of the prosecution and the documents that have not been seized by the prosecution.\" (Contempt Order, at 20).\n\n## **III. THE DEBTOR RESPECTFULLY MOVES FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL THE BANKRUPTCY COURT'S CONTEMPT ORDER**\n\n## **a. QUESTIONS PRESENTED**\n\n## 25. The Debtor's appeal will raise the following question:<sup>4</sup>\n\nWhether the Bankruptcy Court erred in holding the Debtor in contempt because the Required Records exception to the Act of Production Doctrine applies here.\n\n## **b. RELIEF REQUESTED**\n\n26. The Debtor respectfully requests that the district court find that the Required Records exception does not vitiate the Act of Production Doctrine for debtor's in bankruptcy cases in which a trustee is appointed and therefore the Debtor properly invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege in response to the January 20 Order and is not in contempt of that order.\n\n4 The Debtor reserves the right to alter, amend, add to, or otherwise change this question when he submits a statement of the issues presented in accordance with the applicable rules.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 11 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 11 of 63\n\n#### **c. REASONS FOR GRANTING LEAVE TO APPEAL**\n\n27. A party may seek an interlocutory appeal of orders and decrees of the bankruptcy court \"with leave of the [district] court\" pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). \"The decision as to whether to grant leave to appeal an interlocutory order of a bankruptcy court is committed to the discretion of the district court.\" *Osuji v. U.S. Bank, N.A.*, 285 F. Supp. 3d 554, 557 (E.D.N.Y. 2018). In exercising that discretion, district courts apply the standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and look to whether \"the order (1) involves a controlling question of law (2) as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion, and (3) an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.\" *Id.*, at 558. *See also Traversa v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp.*, 386 B.R. 386, 388 (D. Conn. 2008) (\"In determining whether to grant leave to appeal an interlocutory order from the bankruptcy court, the Court will apply the standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).\"). In addition, \"appellants bear the burden of showing that exceptional circumstances exist that warrant an interlocutory appeal … .\" *Osuji*, at 557, (citation and quotation omitted).\n\n#### **i.** *The Order Involves A Controlling Question of Law*\n\n28. An order involves a controlling question of law where \"reversal of the bankruptcy court's order would (1) terminate the action or (2) materially affect the outcome of the litigation.\" *Osuji*, 285 F. Supp. 3d at 558. *See also*, *United States ex rel Minge v. Hawker Beechcraft Corp. (In re Hawker Beechcraft, Inc.*), 13 Misc. 373 (PKC), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177779, \\*13 (SDNY, Dec. 18, 2013) (\"A controlling question of law exists if: (1) reversal of the district court's opinion could result in dismissal of the action, (2) reversal of the district court's opinion, even though not resulting in dismissal, could significantly affect the conduct of the action, or (3) the certified issue has precedential value for a large number of cases.\") (citations omitted). \"In addition, the question of law must refer to a 'pure' question of law that the reviewing court could decide quickly and\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 12 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 12 of 63\n\ncleanly without having to study the record.\" *2178 Atl. Realty LLC v. 2178 Atl. Ave. Hous. Dev. Fund Corp.*, No. 20-CV-1278 (RRM), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62226, at \\*11 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2021) (citation omitted).\n\n29. The question of law at the core of the Contempt Order, and this appeal, is undeniably \"pure\" and this Court can decide it \"quickly and cleanly without having to study the record.\" *2178 Atl. Realty LLC*, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62226, at \\*11. Indeed, the core legal issue here is whether the duty to cooperate with a bankruptcy trustee under 11 USC § 521(a)(3) and surrender to the trustee all property of the estate under 11 USC § 521(a)(4) is sufficient to overcome an individual's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination under the Required Records exception, regardless of whether there is any statutory or regulatory obligation that compels the preservation of the sought-after records.\n\n30. \"[I]t is now settled that an individual may claim an act of production privilege [under the Fifth Amendment] to decline to produce documents, the contents of which are not privileged, where the act of production is, itself, (1) compelled, (2) testimonial, and (3) incriminating.\" *In re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated Jan. 29, 1999*, 191 F.3d 173, 178 (2d Cir. 1999). \"The required records exception . . . abrogates the protection of the [Fifth Amendment] privilege for a subset of those documents that must be maintained by law.\" *United States v. Doe (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated February 2, 2012)*, 741 F.3d 339, 344 (2d Cir. 2013). As the Second Circuit has held:\n\n> The rationale behind the [Required Records] exception is twofold. First, if a person conducts an activity in which record-keeping is required by statute or rule, he may be deemed to have waived his privilege with respect to the act of production -- at least in cases in which there is a nexus between the government's production request and the purpose of the record-keeping requirement. Second, because the records must be kept by law, the record-holder \"admits\" little in the way of control or authentication by producing them.\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 13 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 13 of 63\n\n*In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum*, 793 F.2d 69, 73 (2d Cir. 1986). Thus, for example, the Required Records exception has been held to apply to records that must be maintained under FINCEN regulations, *United States v. Doe (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated February 2, 2012)*, 741 F.3d at, 348, New York state tax laws related to the purchase of alcohol for commercial purposes, *United States v. Doe (In re Two Subpoenas to Testify Before Grand Jury)*, 252 F. Supp. 3d 170, 176-177 (E.D.N.Y. 2017), and an attorney's contingency retention agreements and case closing statements. *In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum*, 793 F.2d 69, at 73.\n\n31. The FINCEN regulation at issue in *United States v. Doe (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated February 2, 2012)* is emblematic of the type of regulation that requires the retention of records and could lead to a finding that the Required Records exception is applicable to the production of those documents, as made clear by the applicable provisions of the United States Code:\n\n> Records of accounts required by § 1010.350 to be reported to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue shall be retained by each person having a financial interest in or signature or other authority over any such account. Such records shall contain the name in which each such account is maintained, the number or other designation of such account, the name and address of the foreign bank or other person with whom such account is maintained, the type of such account, and the maximum value of each such account during the reporting period. Such records shall be retained for a period of 5 years and shall be kept at all times available for inspection as authorized by law. In the computation of the period of 5 years, there shall be disregarded any period beginning with a date on which the taxpayer is indicted or information instituted on account of the filing of a false or fraudulent Federal income tax return or failing to file a Federal income tax return, and ending with the date on which final disposition is made of the criminal proceeding.\n\n31 CR 1010.420. The Bankruptcy Court did not focus its Contempt Order on discrete categories of documents that *an individual* is required to retain by statute or regulation, and therefore fall within the Required Records exception to the Act of Production Doctrine, such as those records at\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 14 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 14 of 63\n\nissue in *United States v. Doe (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated February 2, 2012)* or other Second Circuit cases that have applied the Required Records exception to the Act of Production Doctrine. Instead, the Bankruptcy Court held that *every* record related to the Debtor's financial affairs, assets, and liabilities is a required record under sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code regardless of whether there is any other statutory or regulatory obligation to create or retain the record and despite the fact that neither of those sections of the Bankruptcy Code include any requirement to retain records.<sup>5</sup> In short, the Bankruptcy Court created an exception to the Act of Production Doctrine that swallows the rule and in the process committed reversible error.\n\n32. The question of law the Debtor seeks to appeal, *i.e.,* whether sections 521(a)(3) and 521(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code render the Act of Production Doctrine a nullity in bankruptcy cases in which a trustee is appointed, is straight forward and the district court will not need to review the record to adjudicate this purely legal question.\n\n33. Adjudication of this narrow legal question at this point will not terminate the Debtor's bankruptcy case, but it could resolve the Debtor's obligations vis-à-vis the January 20 Order and provide greater clarity to the Debtor of the scope of his Fifth Amendment rights going forward in the Bankruptcy case. Specifically, under the existing Contempt Order, the Debtor is mandated to make a submission in his criminal proceeding—resolution of this issue would resolve that obligation.\n\n34. Lastly, because the legal issue is one of first impression, it could have precedential value for a large number of cases (and given the ongoing bankruptcy proceeding and related\n\n<sup>5</sup> The Debtor does not suggest that a debtor in bankruptcy is free to destroy records, but there is a fundamental difference between the obligation to avoid spoliation of records as part of a judicial proceeding and an affirmative statutory or regulatory obligation to retain records.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 15 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 15 of 63\n\nadversary proceedings, clarity even in this case). Therefore, the Contempt Order involves a controlling question of law and the first factor has been met.\n\n## *ii. There is A Substantial Ground for Difference of Opinion*\n\n35. There is a substantial ground for difference of opinion \"where (1) there is conflicting authority on the issue, or (2) the issue is particularly difficult and of first impression for the Second Circuit.\" *Osuji*, 285 F. Supp. 3d 554, 558 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).\n\n36. Research revealed no cases in the Second Circuit applying the Required Records exception through sections 521(a)(3) and/or (a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code. Likewise, research revealed no Second Circuit cases applying the Required Records exception with the breadth applied by the Bankruptcy Court in this case. Thus, this appears to be a case of first impression in the Second Circuit.\n\n37. Thus, the second factor has been met. *See*, *Hawker Beechcraft Corp. (In re Hawker Beechcraft, Inc.*), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177779, \\*15 (granting leave to file interlocutory appeal where the issues presented were of first impression and \"difficult, calling for complex statutory interpretation and addressing the intersections between different provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Code and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and the Bankruptcy Code and the FCA, respectively\").\n\n## *iii. An Immediate Appeal Materially Advances the Efficiencies within the Bankruptcy Case*\n\n38. This prong, \"assessing whether an appeal would materially advance termination of the litigation, is satisfied where the appeal promises to advance the time for trial or to shorten the time required for trial.\" *Osuji*, 285 F. Supp. 3d at 558 (citation and quotation omitted).\n\n39. As noted above, the Contempt Order provides that the reasonable steps to be taken by the Debtor to purge himself of contempt include \"filing a motion in the Criminal Court seeking\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 16 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 16 of 63\n\nto allow production to the Trustee of documents and records produced to the [ ] Debtor by the prosecution which are responsive to the Rule 2004 subpoena, subject to the Trustee abiding by whatever conditions the Criminal Court may impose.\" (Contempt Order, at 36). If the district court finds that the Contempt Order should not have been issued, the Debtor would not be required to file anything in his pending criminal case in the Southern District of New York seeking an order permitting him to produce documents provided to him by the government to the Trustee. Moreover, the Trustee is certain to be brought into any such motion practice, whether formally or informally, and will be forced to expand estate resources in a proceeding that if the Bankruptcy Court erred should never even occur.\n\n40. Likewise, an immediate appeal will provide the Debtor and the Trustee with greater certainty vis-à-vis their rights and obligations under the Contempt Order, and allow the Trustee to more expeditiously pursue discovery through other avenues if the Contempt Order is reversed and the Required Records exception is found inapplicable thereby advancing the bankruptcy case and brining it closer to completion.\n\n41. Thus, the third factor has also been met.\n\n#### *iv. Exceptional Circumstances Exist That Warrant An Interlocutory Appeal*\n\n40. This is an extraordinary situation. The Debtor is an individual, who has been charged with numerous crimes and faces that prospect of potential incarceration. Like any individual confronted with those consequences, he is guaranteed a constitutional right against selfincrimination. Now, however, the Debtor is forced to choose between refusing to comply with the January 20 Order and facing whatever contempt sanctions the Bankruptcy Court decides are appropriate, or seeking to produce documents even though the Bankruptcy Court has concluded that \"production in compliance with the Order Compelling Production would be testimonial and incriminating both with regards to the documents in the possession of the prosecution and the\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 17 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 17 of 63\n\ndocuments that have not been seized by the prosecution,\" (Contempt Order at 20), and even though the Contempt Order could ultimately be reversed on appeal. Of course, overturning the Contempt Order at the end of the bankruptcy case would be meaningless if the production made in the meantime resulted in production of these records over the valid invocation of the Debtor's Fifth Amendment rights.\n\n40. The Bankruptcy Court suggests that the Debtor would not be sacrificing his Fifth Amendment privilege if he moves in the criminal proceeding for an order permitting him to produce to the Trustee documents produced to him by the government that are responsive the Rule 2004 Subpoena because he would be making that motion \"under compulsion of the Order Compelling Production.\" (Contempt Order at 36). The Bankruptcy Court, however, is compelling the Debtor to engage in an act that the Bankruptcy Court itself determined was testimonial and potentially self-incriminating in a court proceeding, which is the paradigmatic example of what the Fifth Amendment was intended to prevent. Moreover, the Bankruptcy Court's conclusion that the Debtor would not be foregoing his constitutional protection provides no guarantee that the Trustee or the government will not argue that the filing of such a motion constituted a waiver of the Debtor's Fifth Amendment Privilege. Moreover, although the Contempt Order focuses on the Debtor producing to the Trustee documents that the government produces to him in the criminal case, *(id.)*, the Contempt Order is not limited to that singular category of documents. (*Id.* (\"As the Individual Debtor's counsel has stated on the record, *reasonable steps include* filing a motion in the Criminal Court seeking to allow production to the Trustee of documents and records produced to the Individual Debtor by the prosecution which are responsive to the Rule 2004 subpoena, subject to the Trustee abiding by whatever conditions the Criminal Court may impose.\") (emphasis added). While it is unlikely that the Debtor would have any documents to produce in light of his\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 18 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 18 of 63\n\nongoing incarceration and the government's execution of search warrants, the Debtor's constitutional rights should not be made contingent on whether he has documents that could be produced.\n\n41. This case is fundamentally different form the cases cited *supra* where the government was moving to compel compliance with grand jury subpoenas. In those cases the government was obtaining the documents directly from the witness under a statutory or regulatory document retention requirement that triggered the Required Records exception. In this case the basis for the application of the Required Records exception is the Bankruptcy Code. Although the government cannot use the Bankruptcy Code to overcome the Debtor's Fifth Amendment rights, the Bankruptcy Court has effectively held that the Trustee can, without any additional protections. Given that the government has already served the Trustee with subpoenas, there is nothing that would stop the Government from doing so again to obtain records that would otherwise be protected by the Debtor's Fifth Amendment Privilege but have now been ordered to be produced to the Trustee by the Bankruptcy Court. As outlined above, the Debtor's constitutional rights are directly and immediately impacted by the Bankruptcy Court Order. Thus, exceptional circumstances exist warranting an immediate appeal.\n\n#### **IV. CONCLUSION**\n\n42. For all of the foregoing reasons, the district court should grant the Debtor leave to appeal the Contempt Order.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 19 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 19 of 63\n\nDated: Bridgeport, Connecticut, August 9, 2023\n\n## THE DEBTOR, HO WAN KWOK\n\nBy: */s/ Eric Henzy*  Eric Henzy (ct12849) James M. Moriarty (ct21876) Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. 10 Middle Street, 15th Floor Bridgeport, Connecticut 06604 Telephone: (203) 368-4234 Facsimile: (203) 368-5487 Email: ehenzy@zeislaw.com Jmoriarty@zeislaw.com His Attorneys\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 20 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 20 of 63\n\n#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI hereby certify that on this 9th day of August, 2023, a copy of the foregoing was filed electronically. Notice of this filing will be sent by e-mail to all parties by operation of the Court's electronic filing system or by mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing as indicated on the Notice of Electronic Filing. Parties may access this filing through the Court's CM/ECF System.\n\n By: */s/ Eric Henzy*  Eric Henzy (ct12849)\n\n# **EXHIBIT A**\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 22 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 1 of 42 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 22 of 63\n\n## **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\nHO WAN KWOK, *et al.*, ) (Jointly Administered)\n\n ) )\n\n)\n\nIn re: ) Chapter 11 ) Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\nDebtors. ) Re: ECF Nos. 1453 and 1649\n\n#### **APPEARANCES**\n\nLuc A. Despins (argued) Avram E. Luft G. Alexander Bongartz Douglass Barron Paul Hastings LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166\n\nDouglass S. Skalka Patrick R. Linsey Neubert, Pepe & Montieth 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, CT 06510\n\nand\n\nNicholas A. Bassett (argued) Paul Hastings LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C. 20036\n\n*Counsel for Movant and Cross-Respondent Mr. Luc A. Despins, Chapter 11 Trustee for the Estate of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok*\n\nStephen R. Cook Brown Rudnick LLP 2211 Michelson Drive, 7th Floor Irvine, California 92612\n\nand\n\nStephen A. Best (argued) Brown Rudnick LLP 601 13th Street, NW, Suite 600 Washington, DC 20005\n\nand\n\nEric Henzy (argued) James M. Moriarty Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. 10 Middle Street Bridgeport, CT 06604\n\nWilliam Baldiga (argued) Brown Rudnick LLP Seven Times Square New York, NY 10036\n\n*Counsel for Respondent and Cross-Movant Mr. Ho Wan Kwok, Debtor1*\n\n## **MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER HOLDING INDIVIDUAL DEBTOR IN CONTEMPT OF COURT AND DENYING MOTION FOR STAY OF ORDER COMPELLING PRODUCTION**\n\nJulie A. Manning, United States Bankruptcy Judge\n\n## **I. INTRODUCTION**\n\nBefore the Court are the Motion for Order to Show Cause Why Debtor Should Not Be Held in Contempt of Court (the \"Contempt Motion\"), (ECF No. 14532 ), filed by Mr. Luc A. Despins, in his capacity as Chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") for the bankruptcy estate (the \"Estate\") of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Individual Debtor\"), and the Motion for a Limited Stay of Order Granting in Part Motion to Compel Compliance (the \"Stay Motion,\" and together with the Contempt Motion, each a \"Cross-Motion\" and, collectively, the \"Cross-Motions\"), (ECF No. 1649), filed by the Individual Debtor. The Trustee seeks to hold the Individual Debtor in civil contempt of court for failure to comply with the Order Granting in Part Motion to Compel Compliance (the \"Order Compelling Production\"). (ECF No. 1353.) The Individual Debtor cross-moves to stay the Order Compelling Production in light of the criminal action *United States v. Kwok*, Case No. 23 Cr. 118 (AT) (S.D.N.Y.) (the \"Criminal Action\") pending in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (the \"Criminal Court\"). For\n\n<sup>1</sup> The attorneys at Brown Rudnick LLP have withdrawn their appearances since these matters were argued. (ECF No. 2034.)\n\n<sup>2</sup> Various pleadings and orders discussed in this memorandum of decision were omnibus in nature. For the sake of clarity and coherence, the titles of pleadings and orders have been set forth only insofar as they concern the parties before the Court on the instant matters.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 24 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 3 of 42 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 24 of 63\n\nthe reasons stated below, the Court holds the Individual Debtor in civil contempt of court and denies the Stay Motion.\n\n## **II. BACKGROUND**\n\nThe Individual Debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition in this Court on February 15, 2022. (ECF No. 1.) The Individual Debtor's case is jointly administered with two affiliated corporate Chapter 11 cases. (ECF Nos. 970 and 1141.) For the reasons set forth therein, on June 15, 2022, the Court entered a memorandum of decision and order appointing a Chapter 11 trustee. (ECF No. 465.) *In re Kwok*, 640 B.R. 514 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022). On July 8, 2022, Mr. Despins was appointed as the Trustee. (ECF No. 523.)\n\nOn July 28, 2022, the Trustee filed the Motion for 2004 Examination of the [Individual] Debtor, (ECF No. 636), which motion the Court granted, (ECF No. 757), on August 16, 2022. On August 19, 2022, the Individual Debtor was served with the Rule 2004 subpoena. (*See, e.g.*, ECF No. 1650 ¶ 7.) On October 28, 2022, the Trustee filed a Motion for Order Compelling Individual Debtor to Comply with Rule 2004 Subpoena (the \"Motion to Compel\"). (ECF No. 1046.) On November 14, 2022, the Individual Debtor filed an objection to the Motion to Compel. (ECF No. 1090.) On November 30, 2022, a hearing was held on the Motion to Compel. The Court took the Motion to Compel under advisement. On January 20, 2023,3 the Court entered the Order Compelling Production. (ECF No. 1353.)\n\n<sup>3</sup> Between November 16, 2022, and January 13, 2023, the Court was engaged with matters in an adversary proceeding related to these Chapter 11 cases styled *Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund v. Kwok (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 22-05032 (JAM) (Bankr D. Conn. Jan. 13, 2023) (hereinafter the \"Social Media/Protest Adversary\"). Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(3), the Court was required to address the matters in that adversary proceeding \"at the earliest possible time, taking precedence over all other matters except hearings on older matters of the same character.\"\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 25 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 4 of 42 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 25 of 63\n\nOn February 7, 2023, the Individual Debtor filed a declaration in response to the Order Compelling Production (the \"Declaration\"). (ECF No. 1444 Ex. A.) In the Declaration, the Individual Debtor stated under penalty of perjury that he invoked his \"rights under the 5th Amendment to the United States Constitution, including under the act of production doctrine[,] with respect to the Subpoena dated August 17, 2022, in its entirety, including all requests for documents and information set forth therein.\" (*Id.* Ex. A.) On February 10, 2023, the Trustee filed the Contempt Motion, arguing that (i) the Individual Debtor needed to show cause why his invocation of the Fifth Amendment was proper and why he should not be held in contempt of court; (ii) even if the Individual Debtor's invocation was proper, he needed to assert it in response to each request for documents and information; and (iii) the Declaration did not comply with the Order Compelling Production because it did not detail the efforts undergone to search for documents and information responsive to the subpoenas. (ECF No. 1453.) On March 7, 2023, a hearing was held on the Contempt Motion. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court set a briefing schedule on the issues raised by the Contempt Motion.\n\nOn March 15, 2023, at the start of an evidentiary hearing in a related adversary proceeding, the Individual Debtor's counsel informed the Court that an indictment against the Individual Debtor had been unsealed in the Criminal Action and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (the \"FBI\") had arrested the Individual Debtor earlier that morning. On March 22, 2023, the Court granted the Individual Debtor's motion for an extension of time to respond to the Contempt Motion. (ECF No. 1585.)\n\nOn April 10, 2023, the Individual Debtor filed an objection to the Contempt Motion. (ECF No. 1650.) The Individual Debtor's objection argues that he has complied with the Order Compelling Production because he has properly invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 26 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 5 of 42 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 26 of 63\n\nincrimination. (*Id.*) Contemporaneously, the Individual Debtor, through his counsel in the Criminal Action appearing in these Chapter 11 cases as his special (criminal) counsel, filed the Stay Motion. (ECF No. 1649.) The Stay Motion argues that to preserve the Individual Debtor's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, this Court must stay the Order Compelling Production pending resolution of the Criminal Action. (*Id.*) On April 14, 2023, the Trustee filed a reply to the objection to the Contempt Motion. (ECF No. 1670.) On April 19, 2023, the Trustee filed an objection to the Stay Motion. (ECF No. 1680.)\n\nOn April 20, 2023, a hearing was held on the Cross-Motions. At the conclusion of argument, the Trustee and the Individual Debtor seemingly reached a consensual resolution of the Cross-Motions. However, on April 24, 2023, the parties filed competing proposed orders. (ECF Nos. 1698, 1699.) On April 27, 2023, a Status Conference on the Cross-Motions was held to discuss the competing orders. The parties agreed to proceed consensually where they could agree, but expressed disagreement as to the terms of the previous agreement. On May 1, 2023, the Court entered a consent order requiring the Individual Debtor to make individual invocations of his Fifth Amendment right to each of two-hundred two (202) questions posed by the Trustee. (ECF No. 1740.) Also on that date, the Individual Debtor filed a supplemental pleading in support of his interpretation of the April 20th agreement. (ECF No. 1737.)\n\nOn May 2, 2023, a second hearing was held on the Cross-Motions resulting in an impasse as to the terms of the April 20th agreement. The Trustee argued that the parties had agreed the Individual Debtor would file a motion in the Criminal Action seeking permission to share the prosecution's production to him with the Trustee, provided the Trustee complied with protective orders and other confidentiality orders and use restrictions issued in the Criminal Action. The Individual Debtor argued that the parties had agreed that the Individual Debtor would seek,\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 27 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 6 of 42 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 27 of 63\n\npotentially by motion, to have the prosecution agree to produce documents simultaneously to the Individual Debtor and the Trustee, provided the Trustee complied with protective orders and other confidentiality orders and use restrictions issued in the Criminal Action. Citing the impasse, the Court concluded it had to rule on the Cross-Motions. However, the Individual Debtor's bankruptcy counsel asked the Court to wait before ruling on the Cross-Motions to allow the Individual Debtor time to appreciate the nature of the prosecution's production to him in the Criminal Action.\n\nGiven the serious nature of the issues involved, the Court waited. On June 13, 2023, a final hearing was held on the Cross-Motions. The Court inquired whether the parties had made any progress toward a consensual resolution of the Cross-Motions. The parties reported that the Individual Debtor had prepared a supplemental declaration (the \"Supplemental Declaration\"), wherein he invoked the Fifth Amendment on an individuated basis to each of the Trustee's questions. (*See Despins ex rel. Kwok v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073, Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 8, 2023), ECF No. 1 Ex. 1.) Beyond the Supplemental Declaration, however, the parties reported that the impasse remained and asked the Court to rule on the Cross-Motions. The Court took the Cross-Motions under advisement.\n\nThe Cross-Motions are ripe for decision.\n\n#### **III. JURISDICTION**\n\nThe United States District Court for the District of Connecticut has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). This Court has authority to hear and determine this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) and the Order of Reference of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut dated September 21, 1984. The instant proceedings are statutorily core proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A). The Court concludes its exercise of\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 28 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 7 of 42 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 28 of 63\n\njurisdiction is not precluded by Constitutional concerns. *Cf. Stern v. Marshall*, 564 U.S. 462, 487–99 (2011). Moreover, the Trustee and the Individual Debtor have impliedly consented to this Court entering a final order on the Cross-Motions by filing dispositive motions without contesting this Court's authority to enter a final order. *See Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif*, 575 U.S. 665, 686 (2015) (holding that parties may consent to entry of a final order by bankruptcy courts notwithstanding the holding in *Stern*); *True Traditions, LC v. Wu*, 552 B.R. 826, 838 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (holding that implied consent is given by filing a dispositive motion).\n\nVenue in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.\n\n## **IV. DISCUSSION4**\n\nThe Cross-Motions present serious issues. The Trustee seeks to hold the Individual Debtor in contempt for failure to comply with the Order Compelling Production. The Individual Debtor argues that the invocation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is compliance and must be protected by a stay of the Order Compelling Production. For the reasons stated below, the Court concludes that the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination does not apply under the specific facts and circumstances before the Court. Therefore, the Court holds the Individual Debtor in contempt of court and denies the Stay Motion.\n\n#### **A. Is the Individual Debtor in civil contempt of court?**\n\nThe Court first considers whether the Individual Debtor is in contempt of court for failure to comply with the Order Compelling Production. This Court has the power to hold parties in contempt of court under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9020. *Taggart v. Lorenzen ex*\n\n<sup>4</sup> The following constitutes the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Court pursuant to Rule 7052 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, which is made applicable to contested matters by Rule 9014(c).\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 29 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 8 of 42 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 29 of 63\n\n*rel. Brown*, 139 S. Ct. 1795, 1801 (2019); *PHH Mortg. Corp. v. Sensenich ex rel. Gravel (In re Gravel)*, 6 F.4th 503, 512 (2d Cir. 2021); *Mar. Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chauteaugay Corp.)*, 920 F.2d 183, 187 (2d. Cir. 1990). Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 37(b)(1) and 37(b)(2)(A)(vii), made applicable by D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 37 and D. Conn. Bankr. L.R. 1001-1(a)(1) and 2004-1(a), provide further authority to hold parties in contempt of an order compelling production of discovery materials.\n\nContempt may be sought to \"'coerce the defendant into compliance'\" with a court order or to \"'compensate the complainant for losses'\" resulting from noncompliance with a court order. *Taggart*, 139 S. Ct. at 1801 (citing *United States v. United Mine Workers*, 330 U.S. 258, 303–04 (1947)). A finding of civil contempt requires that \"(1) the order the contemnor failed to comply with is clear and unambiguous, (2) the proof of noncompliance is clear and convincing, and (3) the contemnor has not diligently attempted to comply in a reasonable manner.\" *King v. Allied Vision, Ltd.*, 65 F.3d 1051, 1058 (2d Cir. 1995). The contemnor must also (4) have notice of the relevant order. *Gravel*, 6 F.4th at 512.\n\n#### **1. Is the Order Compelling Compliance clear and unambiguous?**\n\nAn order is clear and unambiguous where \"'there is [no] *fair ground of doubt* as to the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct.'\" *Taggart*, 139 S. Ct. at 1801 (citing *Cal. Artificial Stone Paving Co. v. Molitor*, 113 U.S. 609 (1885)). A court generally applies an objective standard – a \"party's subjective belief that she was complying with an order ordinarily will not insulate her from civil contempt if that belief was objectively unreasonable.\" *Taggart*, 139 S. Ct. at 1802 (citing *McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co.*, 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1949) (\"The absence of wilfulness [sic] does not relieve from civil contempt.\")). Nevertheless, a party's bad faith may justify \"placing 'the burden of any uncertainty in the decree . . . on [the] shoulders' of the party\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2073 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:03:36 Page 30 of 63 Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 9 of 42 Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 30 of 63\n\nwho violated the court order,\" and \"a party's good faith, even where it does not bar civil\n\ncontempt, may help to determine an appropriate sanction.\" *Taggart*, 139 S. Ct. at 1802 (citing\n\n*McComb*, 336 U.S. at 192–93 and *Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A.*, 481 U.S.\n\n787, 801 (1987)).\n\nThe Order Compelling production states, in pertinent part, the following:\n\n**ORDERED:** The Objection is **OVERRULED** as it relates to discovery requests directed to the [Individual] Debtor except as to the requests that seek documents dated earlier than June 1, 2014, and to the requests that seek the [Individual] Debtor's passport(s), to which extent the Objection is **SUSTAINED**, without prejudice to the Trustee to seek documents dated earlier than June 1, 2014, and the [Individual] Debtor's passport(s) at a later date as the investigation proceeds upon cause shown. The [Individual] Debtor shall, by 5:00 p.m. on January 31, 2023, search for and produce to the Trustee:\n\n(i) documents responsive to the Trustee's requests dated June 1, 2014, or later, unless a particular request specifies a different time period that does not begin before June 1, 2014;\n\n(ii) documents responsive to the Trustee's requests as to both assets he acknowledges he owns and assets allegedly belonging to persons or entities other than the [Individual] Debtor, including without limitation his family members and associated entities; and\n\n(iii) documents responsive to the Trustee's requests that are within his custody, possession, or control, including without limitation documents in the files of his current or former counsel and other agents and advisors, unless such documents have already been produced by his current or former counsel and other agents and advisors but without consideration of any potential future production by his current or former counsel and other agents and advisors;\n\nand it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** The [Individual] Debtor shall, by 5:00 p.m. on February 7, 2023, file on the docket of this case a sworn declaration describing in detail the document collection, search, and review actions taken by him and his counsel in response to the subpoena, including without limitation a detailed description of the processes that he and his counsel performed to:\n\n(i) identify all of the [Individual] Debtor's electronic devices; all online document repositories to which he has access; all social media, email, and other accounts associated with electronic documents; all bank accounts and related\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 10 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 31 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 31 of 63\n\naccount statements; and all other potential sources of responsive hard copy and electronic documents that may exist; and\n\n(ii) search the foregoing sources for responsive documents, including without limitation for documents responsive to the requests related to expenses or money transfers, to assets or financial or business transactions or records related to the [Individual] Debtor's family or associated entities, and to business interests associated with the [Individual] Debtor . . .\n\n(ECF No. 1353.) The Individual Debtor did not raise any argument in pleadings or during oral argument that there is \"a fair ground of doubt\" as to the meaning of the Order Compelling Production.5 The Court concludes the Order Compelling Production is clear and unambiguous as it relates to the Individual Debtor.6\n\n#### **2. Did the Individual Debtor comply with the Order Compelling Production?**\n\nRegarding the second element, the Trustee must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the Individual Debtor has not complied with the Order Compelling Production. *King*, 65 F.3d at 1058. The Trustee argues that because (i) the Individual Debtor has failed to produce documents or records and (ii) the Individual Debtor has failed to file a declaration identifying potential sources of documents or records as well as the efforts undertaken to search those sources, the Individual Debtor has not complied with the Order Compelling Production.\n\nIn response, the Individual Debtor makes two arguments. First, the Individual Debtor argues that it is impossible for him to comply because he is presently being detained pending trial without the possibility of pre-trial release. Second, the Individual Debtor argues that the\n\n<sup>5</sup> The Individual Debtor argues that there is a fair ground of doubt as to whether the Individual Debtor could invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in response to the Order Compelling Production. The Court considers this argument below in the discussion of whether the Individual Debtor has diligently attempted to comply with the Order Compelling Production.\n\n<sup>6</sup> The Court has previously held that the Order Compelling Production is clear and unambiguous as to other parties. (*See* ECF No. 1537.)\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 11 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 32 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 32 of 63\n\n\"act of production\" doctrine permits him to invoke his Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination in response to requests for the production of documents and records. On this basis, the Individual Debtor asserts that he has complied with the Order Compelling Production.\n\n#### **i. Is it impossible for the Individual Debtor to comply?**\n\nWhile the Individual Debtor is correct that \"[a] long recognized defense to a civil contempt citation is the cited individual's inability to comply with the court's order,\" *United States v. Wendy*, 575 F.2d 1025, 1030 (2d Cir. 1978), and that the proper time to assess impossibility of compliance is at the time of issuing the ruling on contempt, *United States v. Rylander*, 460 U.S. 752, 757 (1983), the Court concludes compliance remains possible for the Individual Debtor. While it is true that the prosecution has seized documents and records of the Individual Debtor in connection with the Criminal Action, the Individual Debtor has not established that (a) all of his documents and records have been seized and (b) he has no additional copies of the seized records. Moreover, based on the statements of his counsel, the Court understands the prosecution's production to the Individual Debtor in the Criminal Action should begin soon – if it has not already. While it is (i) likely that the Trustee would have to become a signatory to and comply with confidentiality requirements and use restrictions in the Criminal Action and (ii) possible that production to the Trustee may be opposed by the prosecution or not allowed by the Criminal Court, it is not impossible for the Individual Debtor to petition the Criminal Court to allow production to the Trustee. Although, the Individual Debtor is presently detained pending trial, his attorneys are not. The Individual Debtor may produce documents through his attorneys and/or other agents. Therefore, it is not impossible for the Individual Debtor to comply with the Order Compelling Production.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 12 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 33 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 33 of 63\n\n#### **ii. Has the Individual Debtor properly invoked the Fifth Amendment?**\n\n## **a. Does the act of production doctrine apply?**\n\nThe Individual Debtor's argument that he has complied with the Order Compelling Production relies on the \"act of production\" doctrine. In *Fisher v. United States*, which held that the act of production at issue in that case was not protected by the Fifth Amendment, the United\n\nStates Supreme Court nevertheless held that\n\nThe act of producing evidence in response to a subpoena nevertheless has communicative aspects of its own, wholly aside from the contents of the papers produced. Compliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes the existence of the papers demanded and their possession or control by the taxpayer. It also would indicate the taxpayer's belief that the papers are those described in the subpoena.\n\n425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976); *see United States v. Hubbell*, 530 U.S. 27, 36–37 (2000). In *Fisher*,\n\nthe Supreme Court held the test to determine if the act of production could be protected by the Fifth Amendment is whether the \"tacit averments\" involved in the act of production are both \"testimonial\" and \"incriminating\" under prevailing Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. 425 U.S. at 410–11. In particular, the Supreme Court expressed concern regarding tacit averments as to: (i) the existence of the documents or records; (ii) the producing party's possession or control over the documents or records; and (iii) the producing party's belief that the documents and records were those requested by the subpoena. *Id.* The act of production doctrine does not protect the testimonial and incriminating contents of documents – it only protects testimonial and incriminating *production*. *Id.*; *Hubbell*, 530 U.S. at 40–41.\n\nUnder binding precedent of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the act of production *may* entail testimonial tacit averments \"(1) 'if the existence and location of the subpoenaed papers are unknown to the government'; or (2) where production would 'implicitly authenticate' the documents.\" *United States v. Doe (In re Grand Jury Subpoena)*, 1\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 13 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 34 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 34 of 63\n\nF.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 1993) (hereinafter \"*Grand Jury 1993*\") (citing *United States v. Fox*, 721 F.2d 32, 36 (2d Cir.1983)). If the Trustee can show (1) the existence and location; and (2) the authenticity of the documents is a \"foregone\" conclusion or already established by other evidence, then the production is not protected by the Fifth Amendment. *Grand Jury 1993*, 1 F.3d at 93. Moreover, even if the tacit averments involved in production are testimonial under *Fox*, the Individual Debtor must also establish that revealing the existence, location, or authenticity of the documents or records is incriminating. *See Hoffman v. United States*, 341 U.S. 479, 486–87 (1951); *Fox*, 721 F.2d at 40; *In re Schick*, 215 B.R. 4, 9 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997); *cf. Martin-Trigona v. Belford (In re Martin-Trigona)*, 732 F.2d 170, 176 (2d Cir. 1984).\n\nThe Individual Debtor's burden to establish that the act of production is testimonial and incriminating is less than a normal burden of proof: \"To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.\" *Hoffman*, 341 U.S. at 486–87. In determining whether the Individual Debtor may invoke the Fifth Amendment, the Court must use its \"personal perception of the peculiarities of the case\" as much as factual support submitted by the Individual Debtor. *Id.* at 487. The act of production is incriminating if it could be \"a link in the chain of evidence\" used to prosecute the Individual Debtor. *Id.* at 486.\n\nThe Individual Debtor argues that producing documents and records under compulsion of the Order Compelling Production would be testimonial because the production could be construed as a tacit averment that he beneficially owns and/or controls various entities and assets and that he has authority over various persons. Such tacit averments, the Individual Debtor argues, would be incriminating because the present Criminal Action and an alleged investigation\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 14 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 35 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 35 of 63\n\ninto bankruptcy crimes involve allegations about the Individual Debtor's beneficial ownership and control of entities and/or assets and the Individual Debtor's authority and/or control over certain individuals.\n\nThe Trustee raises numerous objections to the Individual Debtor's argument. The Trustee's primary objection is that the \"required records\" doctrine applies and is an exception to the act of production doctrine. In support of this argument, the Trustee asserts that the Individual Debtor, as a debtor in bankruptcy, cannot properly invoke the Fifth Amendment to avoid production of documents and records relating to his financial affairs, assets, and liabilities as required by the Bankruptcy Code – whether or not the act of production is testimonial and incriminating. The Trustee's required records argument involving the Individual Debtor's duties in his bankruptcy case will be addressed below. The Court will first address the Trustee's various objections as to whether the Individual Debtor has met his burden of proof to show that compliance with the Order Compelling Production would be both testimonial and incriminating.\n\n#### *The Supplemental Declaration*\n\nThe Individual Debtor and the Trustee have reached a resolution regarding one of the Trustee's objections. Before the Contempt Motion was filed and the hearings on it were held, the Individual Debtor's Declaration made a blanket assertion of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The Trustee argued that this was improper because (a) such a blanket assertion did not evidence that the Individual Debtor had properly considered each of the Trustee's requests before invoking the Fifth Amendment; and (b) these Chapter 11 cases are civil proceedings, meaning that the Individual Debtor's invocation of the Fifth Amendment may, under proper circumstances, be admitted as evidence. However, the Individual Debtor has since provided the Supplemental Declaration pursuant to a consent order, wherein he answers each\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 15 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 36 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 36 of 63\n\nquestion posed by the Trustee on an individual basis and asserts his Fifth Amendment right in response to each of the two-hundred two (202) questions. Although the Individual Debtor has now properly invoked his Fifth Amendment right to the Trustee's specific questions, issues related to the production of documents remain.\n\n#### *Pre-indictment invocation of the Fifth Amendment*\n\nOne of the Trustee's remaining objections to the Individual Debtor's proof of compliance with the Order Compelling Production is unpersuasive. The Trustee argues that the Individual Debtor was in contempt before the unsealing of the indictment against him and cannot now invoke the Fifth Amendment in light of the Criminal Action to avoid being held in contempt. However, the Individual Debtor is correct that the Fifth Amendment may be invoked prior to the commencement of a criminal action. *See United States v. Miranti*, 253 F.2d 135, 139 (2d Cir. 1958) (allowing a witness to invoke the Fifth Amendment where there was only a slight *possibility* of prosecution). Just as the Individual Debtor could assert his Fifth Amendment right during the evidentiary hearing in December 2022 and during his March 2023 deposition, he could do so in February 2023 so long as he had \"reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer\" and his Fifth Amendment right was otherwise applicable. *Hoffman*, 341 U.S. at 486.\n\n#### *Documents in possession of the prosecution*\n\nA second argument of the Trustee also fails. The Trustee argues that there is no harm to the Individual Debtor because the prosecution is already in possession of his documents and records. The Trustee is correct insofar as the existence and location of these documents is known and, hence, the first prong of the *Fox* test fails. *Grand Jury 1993*, 1 F.3d at 93. Nevertheless, whether the act of producing the Individual Debtor's documents and records\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 16 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 37 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 37 of 63\n\nalready in the possession of the prosecution would result in authenticating those documents and records remains an issue. *Id.* The Individual Debtor is concerned that his act of production would authenticate the documents. The Court has not seen these documents and records. Nor has the Trustee. The Court recognizes the Trustee is in a difficult position because he is not a party to the Criminal Action. Nevertheless, the Trustee has not shown that it would be a foregone conclusion that the documents and records are authentic. Therefore, under the second prong of the *Fox* test, the tacit averment as to the authenticity of the documents and records in the possession of the prosecution may be testimonial. *Id.*\n\nMoreover, because the documents and records seized by the prosecution may be used in the Criminal Action to prosecute the Individual Debtor, the Court finds the Individual Debtor's argument that his implicit authentication of those documents and records could be \"a link in the chain of evidence\" used to prosecute him is persuasive. *Hoffman*, 341 U.S. at 486. Therefore, unless the Trustee can show that it would be a foregone conclusion that the documents and records are authentic, the act of production doctrine applies to the documents held by the prosecution, unless an exception to the doctrine applies.\n\n#### *Documents not in the possession of the prosecution*\n\nThe Individual Debtor argues that the entire universe of documents and records the Order Compelling Production compels him to produce have been seized by the prosecution. The Court does not agree and, therefore, continues its discussion. As the Trustee contends, the blanket assertion that the Individual Debtor has no documents or records in his possession, custody, or control because he is now incarcerated is not convincing. The FBI apparently seized many documents, records, and electronic devices at the Individual Debtor's residences despite previous representations that the Individual Debtor maintained almost no documents, records, and devices.\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 17 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 38 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 38 of 63\n\nSimilarly, the Trustee is correct that there is no evidentiary basis to support the contention that there are no records within the Individual Debtor's possession, custody, or control that are not already among the documents and records seized by the prosecution. Given past descriptions of the efforts – or, as the case may be, the lack thereof – conducted by the Individual Debtor's counsel, the Individual Debtor has not established that a reasonably diligent search occurred. (*See* Order Compelling Production ¶ 9.) For both of these reasons, the Court concludes that the Individual Debtor has not established that all potentially responsive documents and records have been seized by the prosecution.\n\nAs to documents and records that were not seized by the prosecution, the Trustee has not shown that the location, existence, or authenticity of these documents is a foregone conclusion. Therefore, if the Individual Debtor establishes that they are incriminating, the act of production doctrine would apply. *Fox*, 721 F.2d at 36. The Trustee argues that the Individual Debtor has not met his burden to establish that the requested documents and records are incriminating. The Trustee is correct that even with the Supplemental Declaration, the Individual Debtor has not established that each requested production would be incriminating.\n\nNevertheless, the Court is mindful of the lessened burden the Individual Debtor must meet. The Court is also mindful that it must rely on its own perception of the facts and circumstances of these Chapter 11 cases and related adversary proceedings. *Hoffman*, 341 U.S. at 486–87. Moreover, as the Individual Debtor's counsel notes, \"[t]he privilege afforded not only extends to answers that would in themselves support a conviction under a federal criminal statute but likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a federal crime.\" *Id.* at 486. However, the Court's \"personal perception of the peculiarities of the case\" includes the observation that the Individual Debtor\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 18 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 39 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 39 of 63\n\nhas obstructed lawful inquiry into his assets, liabilities, and financial affairs in addition to his avowed desire to avoid self-incrimination. *Id.* at 487. (*See, e.g.*, Social Media/Protest Adversary, ECF No. 133.)\n\nThe indictment in the Criminal Action is not alone sufficient for the Individual Debtor to meet his burden with respect to the documents and records that the prosecution has *not* seized. The indictment alleges fraud going back to approximately 2018, whereas many of the assets of interest to the Trustee thus far – that certain yacht, the Lady May; the apartment at the Sherry-Netherland Hotel; the Ace Decade Holdings Limited cause of action – were allegedly acquired prior to 2018. While some of these assets, *e.g.*, the Lady May, are discussed in the indictment, the Court cannot, with its \"personal perception of the peculiarities of the case\" and the Individual Debtor's scant evidentiary showing, hold that the Individual Debtor has sufficiently supported his blanket assertion of the Fifth Amendment on the basis of the Criminal Action. *Id.* at 487. The Individual Debtor has not established that all of his assets, liabilities, and financial affairs relate to the alleged fraud or may somehow present a \"link in the chain of evidence\" regarding the alleged fraud. *Id.* at 486.\n\nIn support of his argument that he has complied with the Order Compelling Production, the Individual Debtor also presented a subpoena directed at the Trustee relating to an alleged investigation into potential bankruptcy crimes committed in these Chapter 11 cases. (ECF No. 1719, at \\*80:20–81:8.) As noted above, it does not matter if prosecution due to this investigation is likely when determining if production of the documents is incriminating. *Miranti*, 253 F.2d at 139.\n\nTitle 18 of the United States Code, sections 152, 156, 157, 1519, and 3284 set forth crimes related to the concealment of assets in a bankruptcy case. Sections 152, 156, 157, and\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 19 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 40 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 40 of 63\n\n1519 require knowing, intentional, or fraudulent acts. Section 3284 requires \"concealment.\" The tacit averments that the Individual Debtor has possession or control over documents or records responsive to the Rule 2004 subpoena and that such documents or records are authentic are not themselves incriminating because they do not establish that the Individual Debtor knowingly, intentionally, or fraudulently withheld assets – or documents and records pertaining to assets – from the Estate. Debtors routinely mistakenly overlook assets and liabilities and amend their statements and schedules and/or update their disclosures.\n\nNevertheless, the Court must consider whether such tacit averments are a \"link in the chain of evidence\" regarding a potential prosecution of the Individual Debtor for concealment of his assets from the Trustee, this Court, and his creditors. *Hoffman*, 341 U.S. at 486. The Trustee alleges that the Individual Debtor has a multitude of business interests and should have commensurate documents and records. While the Individual Debtor denies these allegations, it is the Court's \"personal perception of the peculiarities of the case,\" on the basis of prior findings of this and other courts, that the Individual Debtor has at least *some* business interests beyond those he presently admits. *See Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund, L.P. v. Kwok Ho Wan*, Index No. 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 9, 2022), NYCEF No. 1181; *E. Profit Corp. Ltd. v. Strategic Vision US LLC*, Case No. 18-cv-2185 (LJL), 2021 WL 2554631, at \\*1 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2021). (*See* ECF No. 1110; *HK Int'l Funds Invs. (USA) Ltd., LLC v. Despins ex rel. Kwok (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 22-05003 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. May 18, 2023), ECF Nos. 177, 221; Social Media/Protest Adversary, ECF No. 133 ¶ 7.) The Court perceives that the Individual Debtor's production may be similarly expansive to the production at issue in *Hubbell*. *See* 530 U.S. at 40–43. Even though *Hubbell* was a case involving immunity granted to a party where the scope of the production was known and the burden had shifted to the\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 20 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 41 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 41 of 63\n\nprosecution, it *may* be similarly necessary for the Individual Debtor \"to make extensive use of 'the contents of his own mind' in identifying the hundreds of documents responsive to the requests in the subpoena\" and essentially create a map of his assets, liabilities, and business interests. *See id.* at 43. Regarding the alleged investigation into bankruptcy crimes, such a map may aid in discovery of evidence of knowledge, intent, or fraud. Using its perception of the specific facts and circumstances of these Chapter 11 cases and related adversary proceedings, the Court finds that such admissions could be links in the chain of evidence because they could have a \"derivative use.\" *See id.* at 41–43.\n\n#### *The Individual Debtor's production is testimonial and incriminating*\n\nFor the above reasons, the Court concludes that production in compliance with the Order Compelling Production would be testimonial and incriminating both with regards to the documents in the possession of the prosecution and the documents that have not been seized by the prosecution. *See Fisher*, 425 U.S. at 410–11. The Court notes, however, that the evidentiary record to date is not strong. If in the future the Trustee can (i) show that the location, existence, and authenticity of any document is a foregone conclusion; (ii) establish with regard to any document or category of documents that the Individual Debtor has not met his burden; or (iii) establish that he already has a map of the Individual Debtor's assets, liabilities, and business interests with respect to any documents or category of documents, this finding may be revisited upon a proper motion.\n\n#### **b. Does the 'required records' exception apply?**\n\nAlthough the act of production doctrine applies, that does not end the Court's analysis or necessarily determine the result of the Contempt Motion. As noted above, the Trustee's primary argument is that the required records doctrine applies on the specific facts and circumstances\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 21 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 42 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 42 of 63\n\nbefore the Court and presents an exception to the act of production doctrine. The Trustee therefore argues that it does not matter whether the act of production doctrine would allow the Individual Debtor to properly invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in response to the Order Compelling Production because the required records exception applies in this case.\n\nIn support of his argument, the Trustee relies on *Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight*, 493 U.S. 549 (1990). In *Bouknight*, the Supreme Court restated and reaffirmed the existence of the required records doctrine post-*Fisher*. 493 U.S. at 555–59. Under the required records doctrine, \"the Fifth Amendment privilege may not be invoked to resist compliance with a regulatory regime constructed to effect the State's public purposes unrelated to the enforcement of its criminal laws.\" *Id.* at 556; *see Grosso v. United States*, 390 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1968) (articulating factors to consider regarding required records doctrine); *Shapiro v. United* States, 335 U.S. 1, 32 (1948) (originating the required records doctrine).\n\nThe Individual Debtor asserts *Bouknight* does not describe an exception to the act of production doctrine set forth in *Fisher* and that the required records doctrine does not provide for the compelled testimonial and incriminating production of documents and records. The Individual Debtor's assertion contradicts the clear text of *Bouknight* which states:\n\nThe possibility that a production order will compel testimonial assertions that may prove incriminating does not, in all contexts, justify invoking the privilege to resist production. Even assuming that this limited testimonial assertion is sufficiently incriminating and \"sufficiently testimonial for purposes of the privilege,\" Bouknight may not invoke the privilege to resist the production order because she has assumed custodial duties related to production and because production is required as part of a noncriminal regulatory regime.\n\n*Bouknight*, 493 U.S. at 555–56 (discussing *Fisher*) (internal citations omitted). In addition to the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit has also clearly rejected the Individual Debtor's assertion:\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 22 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 43 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 43 of 63\n\n\"[T]he required records doctrine is an exception to the Fifth Amendment privilege. As such, it necessarily overrides the privilege in instances in which the privilege would otherwise apply. *Fisher* was not concerned with required records and nothing in its analysis could be construed as weakening the required records exception.\"\n\n*United States v. Doe (In re Grand Jury Subpoena)*, 741 F.3d 339, 346 (2d Cir. 2013) (hereinafter\n\n\"*Grand Jury 2013*\") (quoting *Doe v. United States (In re Doe)*, 711 F.2d 1187, 1192–93 (2d Cir.\n\n1983)). Indeed, the Second Circuit has emphatically stated \"[t]his Court has twice explicitly rejected the idea that the required records exception has been abrogated by the act of production doctrine.\" *Grand Jury 2013*, 741 F.3d at 346. This binding Supreme Court and Second Circuit precedent makes clear that the required records doctrine is an exception to the act of production doctrine.7 Therefore, if the required records exception applies in this case, the Individual Debtor has failed to comply with the Order Compelling Production regardless of the conclusion that such production would be testimonial and incriminating.\n\nIn determining whether the required records doctrine applies, the Second Circuit turns to the *Grosso* factors. *Grand Jury 2013*, 741 F.3d at 345. In *Grosso*, the Supreme Court applied the following factors: \"[F]irst, the purposes of the United States' inquiry must be essentially regulatory; second, information is to be obtained by requiring the preservation of records of a kind which the regulated party has customarily kept; and third, the records themselves must have assumed 'public aspects' which render them at least analogous to public documents.\" 390 U.S.\n\n<sup>7</sup> The Individual Debtor observes that one of the cases cited by the Trustee, *In re Ross*, 156 B.R. 272, 279 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1993), both found the production of the requested documents to be insufficiently testimonial and found that the required records doctrine applied. From this observation, the Individual Debtor concluded that the latter holding required the former. The Court concludes otherwise. The court in *Ross*, like many courts – particularly lower courts subject to review, advanced multiple bases for its conclusion that the debtor in that case could not properly invoke the Fifth Amendment. 156 B.R. at 281 (\"Fifth, *even if the act of production involved here was both testimonial and incriminating*, the nature of chapter 7 as a regulatory regime directed toward society as a whole, and not toward inherently suspect criminal classes, renders the act of production outside the protection of the Fifth Amendment.\") (emphasis added).\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 23 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 44 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 44 of 63\n\nat 67–68. Here, the Trustee is seeking documents and records that the Order Compelling Production holds relate to \"the acts, conduct, or property or to the liabilities and financial condition of the [Individual Debtor], or to any matter which may affect the administration of the [Estate].\" Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004(b). Hence, the Individual Debtor is obligated to produce the documents and records the Trustee seeks under sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4). Therefore, the issue is whether the documents and records the Individual Debtor is obligated to produce under sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4) are required records under the *Grosso* test.\n\n#### *What is the purpose of Bankruptcy Code sections 521(a)(3) and 521(a)(4)?*\n\nIn determining whether the first factor supports application of the required records doctrine, a court must consider whether the relevant \"legislation is not 'directed at the public at large' and concerns 'an area permeated with criminal statutes.'\" *Grand Jury 2013*, 741 F.3d at 347 (citing *Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd.*, 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965)); *see Marchetti v. United States*, 390 U.S. 39, 57 (1968); *Haynes v. United States*, 390 U.S. 85, 99 (1968). A court must make this determination as to the specific statutory sections at issue, rather than in reference to the entire surrounding statutory context. *Grand Jury 2013*, 741 F.3d at 348 (citing *California v. Byers*, 402 U.S. 424, 430 (1971)).\n\nSection 521 of the Bankruptcy Code is titled \"Debtor's duties.\" Sections 521(a)(3) and 521(a)(4) provide, respectively, that, where a bankruptcy trustee is serving in the case, as here, a debtor must cooperate with the trustee in the performance of the trustee's duties and must surrender to the trustee all property of the estate and any recorded information, including books, documents, records, and papers, relating to property of the estate.\n\nSection 109 of the Bankruptcy Code allows individuals or entities to file for bankruptcy under Chapters 7, 11, 11 Subchapter V, 12, or 13. In proceedings under Chapters 7, 12, and 13\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 24 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 45 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 45 of 63\n\nas well as Chapter 11 Subchapter V, a bankruptcy trustee is automatically appointed upon the commencement of the case. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701, 702, 1183, 1202, 1302. Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases are the most common among the general public and always involve a bankruptcy trustee to whom the debtor owes obligations under sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4).\n\nWhile in a Chapter 11 case the appointment of a bankruptcy trustee is an extraordinary remedy, *see* 11 U.S.C. § 1112, the effect of this extraordinary relief is that a dispossessed Chapter 11 debtor has the same obligations under sections 521(a)(3) and 521(a)(4) as a Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 debtor. By operation of law, upon filing a Chapter 11 case a debtor is automatically deemed to be a debtor-in-possession and assumes the role of a bankruptcy trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a). However, a debtor in a Chapter 11 case may be 'dispossessed' of the estate through appointment of a bankruptcy trustee \"for cause,\" provided it is in the best interest of the creditors and the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1).\n\nChapter 11 is distinct because it is designed for debtors with complex business interests, assets, and liabilities, such as large corporations and high net worth individuals. *See* H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 220 (1977). As such, Chapter 11 is guided by three basic presumptions: (i) debtors with substantial business interests and operations have more value as a continuing economic entity than divided up and liquidated, (ii) debtors with complex financial affairs, assets, and liabilities are better equipped than an appointed trustee to manage their own affairs for the benefit of creditors, and (iii) allowing debtors with substantial business interests and operations to reorganize preserves the interests of debtors, owners, employees, etc. in addition to the interests of creditors. *See id.* Ultimately, however, Chapter 11 is properly used wherever its specific provisions maximize the distribution to creditors. *See Toibb v. Radloff*, 501 U.S. 157, 163–64 (1991). Many of the enumerated examples of \"cause\" to appoint a bankruptcy trustee –\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 25 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 46 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 46 of 63\n\nor dismiss the case or convert the case to a proceeding under Chapter 7 – involve the rebuttal of the presumptions listed above or the debtor-in-possession's failure to comply with its obligations to manage the estate for the benefit of creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4); *see* 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 1112.04[6][b]–[k] (16th ed. 2023).\n\nWhen one is appointed, the bankruptcy trustee is the representative of the debtor's estate. 11 U.S.C. § 323. The purpose of sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4) is to enable the bankruptcy trustee to administer the debtor's bankruptcy estate in accordance with the bankruptcy trustee's duties. *See* 11 U.S.C. §§ 704, 1106, 1116, 1183, 1202, 1302; 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 521.15[5], 521.16. The administration of the bankruptcy estate requires the debtor's disclosure, surrender, and cooperation with the trustee because a case in bankruptcy is an all-encompassing action intended to equitably and finally resolve, adjust, or reorganize myriad debtor-creditor relationships. *See, e.g.*, 11 U.S.C. §§ 704(a)(5) (\"The trustee shall . . . examine proofs of claims and object to the allowance of any claim that is improper . . ..\"), 704(a)(7) (\"The trustee shall . . . furnish such information concerning the estate and the estate's administration as is requested by a party in interest . . .\"), 704(a)(8) (\"The trustee shall . . . file with the court, with the United States trustee, and with any governmental unit charged with responsibility for collection or determination of any tax arising out of such operations, periodic reports and summaries of the operation of such business . . ..\"), 1106(a)(3) (\"A trustee shall . . . investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and financial condition of the debtor, the operation of the debtor's business and the desirability of the continuance of such business, and other matters relevant to the case or to the formulation of a plan . . ..\"); 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1116.01 (\"The trustee's investigation and reporting duties provide a mechanism for full disclosure of the debtor's state of\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 26 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 47 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 47 of 63\n\naffairs so as to enable parties in interest to protect their rights and obtain the successful reorganization of the debtor.\").\n\nA debtor's failure to fulfill its obligations to (i) cooperate with the trustee, (ii) disclose financial affairs, assets, and liabilities, and (iii) surrender property of the bankruptcy estate and records relating thereto severely impedes a trustee's ability to administer the estate. *See United States v. Stone*, 282 F. 547, 553 (2d Cir. 1960) (\"[T]he very purpose of the statement of affairs is to give dependable information without need of going further.\") (upholding conviction in criminal action prosecuting debtor for bankruptcy crimes related to failure to properly disclose loan information on statement of financial affairs in proceeding under former Bankruptcy Act). This failure causes expense and delay to the estate's creditors which are cognizable injuries. *See Andrews v. McCarron (In re Vincent Andrews Mgmt. Corp.)*, 414 B.R. 1, 7 (D. Conn. 2009).\n\nFurthermore, the broad and extraordinary nature of much of the relief provided by the Bankruptcy Code is premised upon proper disclosure and notice. *See, e.g.*, 11 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (defining adequate information for the disclosure statement that must be served before plan solicitation may commence); *Till v. SCS Credit Corp.*, 541 U.S. 465, 475 n. 12 (2004) (finding that the \"Bankruptcy Code's extensive disclosure requirements reduce the risk that the debtor has significant undisclosed obligations,\" undergirding a court's \"authority to modify the number, timing, or amount of the installment payments from those set forth in the debtor's original contract\"); *In re Motors Liquidation Co.*, 829 F.3d 135, 158–61 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that failure to properly serve undisclosed known creditors with a sale motion rendered a sale order unenforceable against the creditors). A trustee, as the bankruptcy estate's representative, is the party tasked with; in the first instance, seeking much of this relief for: (i) the benefit of the estate, *Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub*, 471 U.S. 343, 352\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 27 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 48 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 48 of 63\n\n(1985); and (ii) the debtor who may receive, upon exiting the gauntlet, a \"fresh start,\" *see Grogan v. Garner*, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991).\n\nThe Court concludes that sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4) are targeted at the general public. Bankruptcy trustees are automatically appointed in a wide range of cases. The duty to disclose and surrender property and records to the trustee is essential to the fundamental and required administrative duties of the trustee and the exercise of the trustee's powers under the bankruptcy code.\n\nThe remaining issue is whether sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4) are concerned with an area \"permeated with criminal statutes.\" *Albertson*, 382 U.S. at 79. Title 18, sections 151 *et sequitur*, 1519, and 3284 of the United States Code criminalize certain actions taken in relation to proceedings under the Bankruptcy Code. Among these \"bankruptcy crimes\" are several related to the concealment of assets of the bankruptcy estate to protect them from distribution to the estate's creditors. The issue before the Court is not, however, whether certain failures to fulfill a debtor's duty under sections 521(a)(3) and (4) leave a debtor vulnerable to criminal prosecution, but rather whether sections 521(a)(3) and (4) are \"directed at a 'selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities.'\" *Marchetti*, 390 U.S. at 57.\n\nIn *Grosso* and *Marchetti*, the problem was not the criminal laws enforcing the statutory requirement to file tax returns, which are akin to the bankruptcy crimes enumerated above. *Grosso*, 390 U.S. at 64–65; *see Marchetti*, 390 U.S. at 57. Rather, in both cases the Supreme Court determined that the requirement to file a federal wagering tax return squarely targeted conduct already criminalized by state law, namely gambling. *Grosso*, 390 U.S. at 64–65; *Marchetti*, 390 U.S. at 57. At issue in *Albertson* was the requirement that members of the Communist Party of America personally register with the Subversive Activities Control Board.\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 28 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 49 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 49 of 63\n\n382 U.S. at 77–78. Affiliation with the Communist Party was criminalized at the time. *Id.* In *Haynes*, the issue was a requirement that persons who obtained firearms *other than in the normal course* – which the Supreme Court observed would be mostly persons acquiring firearms illegally – register their firearms. 390 U.S. at 95–97.\n\nThe facts before the Supreme Court in *Grosso*, *Marchetti*, *Albertson*, and *Haynes* are each dissimilar to the instant facts. First, all of those cases involved the creation of a new record rather than the production of existing documents and records. *Haynes*, 390 U.S. at 95–97; *Grosso*, 390 U.S. at 64–65; *Marchetti*, 390 U.S. at 57; *Albertson*, 382 U.S. at 77–78. More importantly, the routine administration of a bankruptcy case does not as a matter of course implicate criminal activity. The administration of the estate is intended to be separate from issues of criminal liability. *Compare* 11 U.S.C. §§ 323 (the trustee is the party to sue and be sued on behalf of the estate with regards to civil litigation), 362(a)(1) (generally, civil actions against the debtor or the estate are stayed by the filing of a voluntary bankruptcy petition) *with*  11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1) (criminal actions against the debtor are not stayed by the commencement of a case under Title 11). Debtors are generally not exposed to criminal liability for the disclosures they are required to make in their bankruptcy cases. The intent of disclosure requirements in bankruptcy proceedings is to lay bare *civil liability* to allow for the equitable and final resolution of all claims against the debtor. *See Byers*, 402 U.S. at 430–31 (finding that, while the California Vehicle Code involved some criminal statutes, \"it was not intended to facilitate criminal convictions but to promote the satisfaction of civil liabilities arising from automobile accidents\" and holding that the required records exception applied).\n\nTherefore, the purpose of sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4) is \"essentially regulatory,\" which supports the applicability of the required records exception to the production of documents by\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 29 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 50 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 50 of 63\n\nthe Individual Debtor compelled by the Order Compelling Production. *Grosso*, 390 U.S. at 67– 68.\n\n#### *Are the purported required records customarily kept?*\n\nAs to the second factor, whether the purportedly required records are customarily kept, the Trustee is seeking, *e.g.*, financial and banking records, money transfer records, records relating to the Individual Debtor's business interests, etc. As the Second Circuit observed with respect to foreign bank account information, common sense dictates that persons and entities retain basic financial transaction and account information in order to manage their affairs and access their accounts. *Grand Jury 2013*, 741 F.3d at 350 (citing *M.H. v. United States (In re Grand Jury Investigation)*, 648 F.3d 1067, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011)). The Court finds this is especially true regarding individuals and entities with complex financial affairs, assets, and liabilities. Pointedly, the Second Circuit went on to say that although \"some individuals engaged in wrongdoing are advised not to keep even this basic information[,] . . . [w]e decline to look at the custom of only the miscreants . . ..\" *Grand Jury 2013*, 741 F.3d at 350. Therefore, the Court concludes that the records required by sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4) are \"customarily kept.\" *Grosso*, 390 U.S. at 67–68.\n\n#### *Did the purported required records assume 'public aspects?'*\n\nAs to the third factor, whether the purportedly required records have assumed 'public aspects,' the question is whether the overall regulatory context of section 521(a)(3) and (a)(4) – requires the particular records be kept. *Grand Jury 2013*, 741 F.3d at 351–52.\n\nThe Bankruptcy Code requires disclosure both at the outset of a case and as a case proceeds. Section 521(a)(1) requires any debtor – including the Individual Debtor – to file a list of creditors, statement of financial affairs, and schedules of, *inter alia*, the debtor's assets,\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 30 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 51 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 51 of 63\n\nliabilities, income, and expenses. *See* 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 521.06[3][a] (\"The schedule is a statement of *all* property, both *real* and personal, within the broad definition of property of the estate under section 541(a), which includes 'all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.'\"), 521.06[3][b] (\"The scheduling of interests in property, both real and personal, is a very important duty.\"), 521.09 (\"The purpose of the requirement of filing a statement of financial affairs is to furnish the trustee and creditors with detailed information about the debtor's financial condition, thereby saving the expense and long and protracted examination for the purpose of soliciting information.\"). Section 341 requires any debtor to submit to an examination conducted by a trustee, in which its creditors may participate. *See* 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 341.01.\n\nRegarding Chapter 11 in particular, section 1107 provides that while a Chapter 11 debtor is a debtor-in-possession, such a debtor, as a fiduciary of the bankruptcy estate, would have many of the same disclosure obligations of a trustee discussed above, including reporting requirements. *See* 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 1107.02[3]–[4]. A debtor's failure to properly disclose financial affairs, assets, and liabilities in a Disclosure Statement required to be filed in connection with a Chapter 11 Plan would prevent confirmation of that plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1125; *see* 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 1125.02 (\"Disclosure is the pivotal concept in reorganization practice under the Bankruptcy Code.\") (citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 226–31 (1977)), 1125.02[2]. Failures to make appropriate disclosures can and do constitute cause to convert a Chapter 11 reorganization case to a Chapter 7 liquidation case, dismiss the Chapter 11 bankruptcy case, or appoint a Chapter 11 trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(f); *see* 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1112.04[6][f].\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 31 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 52 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 52 of 63\n\nMuch like the mother in *Bouknight*, the Individual Debtor assumed these obligations upon voluntarily commencing his Chapter 11 case, submitting himself to the *in personam*  jurisdiction of this Court, and submitting all of his legal and equitable interests in property – \"wherever located and by whomever held\" – to the *in rem* jurisdiction of this Court. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1); *Bouknight*, 493 U.S. at 559 (\"Bouknight submitted to the routine operation of the regulatory system and agreed to hold Maurice in a manner consonant with the State's regulatory interests and subject to inspection by BCDSS.\"). Moreover, as in *Bouknight*, where the mother was required to produce her child to the Baltimore City Department of Social Services upon cause shown, the Bankruptcy Code requires the Individual Debtor to produce documents and records relating to property of the estate to the Trustee, because cause was shown to appoint a trustee. 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(a)(4), 1112; *Bouknight*, 493 U.S. at 555–56. Because the Individual Debtor voluntarily filed his Chapter 11 case and became a debtor-in-possession, he assumed a bankruptcy trustee's duties to manage the Estate for the benefit of its creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a). The Individual Debtor was a custodian of the Estate and its books and records while a debtor-in-possession. *See Bouknight*, 493 U.S. at 555–56. Although his status as a debtor-inpossession ended upon the appointment of the Trustee, his resultant obligation to provide information to the Trustee did not.\n\nThe Court concludes that the records required to be produced by the Individual Debtor pursuant to sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4) have assumed \"public aspects\" because the Individual Debtor's case is a voluntary Chapter 11 case and because the specific facts and circumstances of these Chapter 11 cases and related adversary proceedings support this conclusion. *See Bouknight*, 493 U.S. at 555–56; *Grosso*, 390 U.S. at 67–68.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 32 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 53 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 53 of 63\n\n#### *The 'required records' exception applies*\n\nAll three factors of the *Grosso* test support the applicability of the required records exception to the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination under the specific facts and circumstances before the Court. 390 U.S. at 67–68; *see Bouknight*, 493 U.S. at 555–56; *Grand Jury 2013*, 741 F.3d at 345; *Ross*, 156 B.R. at 279–81; *In re Fairbanks*, 135 B.R. 717, 730–33 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991).\n\nApplication of the required records exception is also supported by Supreme Court precedent relating to the former Bankruptcy Act. *In re Harris*, 221 U.S. 274 (1911) (holding Fifth Amendment did not protect a debtor from producing its books and records to the receiver in bankruptcy). *Bouknight*, in upholding the required records exception post-*Fisher*, cited *Harris*  approvingly as an example of the required records doctrine, confirming the continuing vitality of *Harris* today despite the evolution of Fifth Amendment jurisprudence since *Harris* was decided. *Bouknight*, 439 U.S. at 556–57; *see Fisher*, 425 U.S. 411–13 (discussing *Harris* without calling into question its holding); *see also Cohen v. de la Cruz*, 523 U.S. 213, 221 (1998) (holding that precedent under the Bankruptcy Act is not displaced unless there is a clear indication that Congress intended to do so); *Ross*, 156 B.R. at 279; 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 344.03[4] (\"[I]t is doubtful that a debtor, as opposed to other witnesses, may successfully refuse to turn over the property, books and records that every debtor under the Code is required to surrender to the trustee on the basis that this 'act of production' might itself tend to incriminate.\"); *but see Butcher v. Bailey*, 753 F.2d 465, 468 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding, pre-*Bouknight* and in an *involuntary* Chapter 7 case rather than a voluntary Chapter 11 case, that *Harris* was no longer good law after *Fisher* and section 521 did not require the production of documents to which the act of production doctrine applied).\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 33 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 54 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 54 of 63\n\nThe Individual Debtor objects that, nevertheless, *Harris* and the required records exception do not reach Rule 2004 subpoenas under *McCarthy v. Arndstein*. 266 U.S. 34 (1924). However, the Supreme Court in *Arndstein* distinguished its prior opinion in *Harris* on the basis that *Harris* concerned the surrender of documents and records and *Arndstein* concerned the issue of compelled *testimony*. 266 U.S. at 41–42. The Trustee is not objecting to the Individual Debtor answering interrogatories or questions during deposition or in-court testimony by invoking the Fifth Amendment. Instead, the Trustee is objecting to the Individual Debtor invoking the Fifth Amendment in response to requests for the production of documents and records. Therefore, *Arndstein* is inapposite.\n\nThe Court concludes that, both under an analysis of the *Grosso* factors and by application of Supreme Court precedent under the Bankruptcy Act, the required records exception applies.\n\n#### **iii. The Individual Debtor did not comply with the Order Compelling Production**\n\nFor all of the above reasons, the Court concludes that (i) it is not impossible for the Individual Debtor to comply with the Order Compelling Production and (ii) under the required records exception, the Individual Debtor may not properly invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in response to the Order Compelling Production. Therefore, the Trustee has established by clear and convincing evidence that the Individual Debtor has not complied with the Order Compelling Production.\n\n## **3. Did the Individual Debtor diligently attempt to comply with the Order Compelling Production?**\n\nThe Trustee must also establish that the Individual Debtor did not diligently attempt to comply in a reasonable manner with the Order Compelling Production. *King*, 65 F.3d at 1058. The Trustee argues that the Individual Debtor has made no attempt to comply with the Order Compelling Production. In response, the Individual Debtor argues that there is a fair ground of\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 34 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 55 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 55 of 63\n\ndoubt as to whether the Individual Debtor could properly assert his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and that the Declaration and Supplemental Declaration represent his good faith efforts to comply with the Order Compelling Production.\n\nThe Individual Debtor's operative mistake is a mistake of law – not fact. Namely, the Individual Debtor has mistakenly concluded that the required records exception to the act of production doctrine does not apply and that he may invoke the Fifth Amendment in response to the Order Compelling Production. For the reasons stated above, whether producing each document or record would factually be testimonial and incriminating does not affect the outcome.\n\nGenerally, absent a requirement of willfulness or intention, mistake of law is not a defense to civil liability. *Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA*, 559 U.S. 573, 583–85 (2010). As noted above, \"[t]he absence of wilfulness [sic] does not relieve from civil contempt.\" *McComb*, 336 U.S. at 191. Therefore, the Court concludes that the Individual Debtor's mistake of law is not a defense to civil contempt. *Cf. Yellin v. United States*, 374 U.S. 109, 123 (1963) (holding mistake of law was no defense to contempt of Congress); *United States v. Remini*, 967 U.S. 754, 758 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding mistake of law was no defense to criminal contempt of court). This conclusion accords with the Supreme Court's observation in *Taggert*  that \"a party's good faith, *even where it does not bar civil contempt*, may help to determine an appropriate sanction.\" 139 S. Ct. at 1802 (emphasis added). Therefore, the Trustee has established that the Individual Debtor did not diligently attempt to comply with the Order Compelling Production.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 35 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 56 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 56 of 63\n\n#### **4. Did the Individual Debtor have notice of the Order Compelling Production?**\n\nThe final element of civil contempt is notice of the relevant order. *Gravel*, 6 F.4th at 512. The Declaration admits the Individual Debtor had notice of the Order Compelling Production. (ECF No. 1444 Ex. A.) This element of civil contempt has been established.\n\n#### **5. The Individual Debtor is in civil contempt of court**\n\nAll four elements having been established, the Contempt Motion is granted. The Court holds the Individual Debtor in civil contempt of court for failure to comply with the Order Compelling Production. As set forth in the decretal paragraphs below, the Individual Debtor will be afforded the opportunity to purge himself of contempt. In light of the serious nature of the circumstances facing the Individual Debtor and the good faith shown in answering the Trustee's two-hundred two (202) questions in his Supplemental Declaration, the Court will provide the Individual Debtor with ample time to purge himself of contempt. *Taggert*, 139 S. Ct. at 1802. However, if the Individual Debtor does not purge himself of contempt, the Trustee may request appropriate sanctions.\n\nThe Individual Debtor's counsel are reminded that \"[c]ounsel have an obligation, as officers of the court, to assist in the discovery process by making diligent, good-faith responses to legitimate discovery requests.\" *McLeod, Alexander, Powel & Apffel, P.C. v. Quarles*, 894 F.2d 1482, 1486 (5th Cir. 1990). To that end, the Individual Debtor's counsel are further reminded that this Court has already found that \"counsel to the [Individual Debtor and others] has not established that they were sufficiently diligent under the circumstances.\" (Order Compelling Production ¶ 9.) The Individual Debtor was ordered to comply with the Order Compelling Production at or before 5:00 p.m. on January 31, 2023, but did not do so. \"[N]either\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 36 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 57 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 57 of 63\n\n[counsel] nor [a party has] a unilateral right to decide whether or when to comply with discovery demands.\" *535 Broadway Assocs. v. Com. Corp. of Am.*, 159 B.R. 403, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).\n\nThe Individual Debtor and his counsel are to take reasonable and diligent steps, whether or not this Court has articulated those steps directly, to bring the Individual Debtor into compliance with the Order Compelling Production. As the Individual Debtor's counsel has stated on the record, reasonable steps include filing a motion in the Criminal Court seeking to allow production to the Trustee of documents and records produced to the Individual Debtor by the prosecution which are responsive to the Rule 2004 subpoena, subject to the Trustee abiding by whatever conditions the Criminal Court may impose. In seeking to purge himself of contempt, the Individual Debtor would be acting under compulsion of the Order Compelling Production and, therefore, not waiving any Fifth Amendment right by moving in the Criminal Court to produce to the Trustee. *See Bouknight*, 493 U.S. at 561–62. In considering any sanctions motion, the Court will consider the diligence with which the Individual Debtor seeks relief in the Criminal Court.\n\n#### **B. Should the Order Compelling Production be stayed?**\n\nHaving ruled on the Contempt Motion, the Court turns to the Stay Motion. The Individual Debtor argues that the Order Compelling Production must be stayed pending the end of the Criminal Action in order to preserve the Individual Debtor's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. In response, the Trustee argues that there is no basis to impose a stay of the Order Compelling Production and that such a stay would substantially injure the Trustee.\n\nThe Court first notes that while the Stay Motion was filed by the Individual Debtor and seems to only concern the Individual Debtor, the attached proposed order would stay the Order Compelling Production entirely, including the decretal paragraphs relevant to the Individual\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 37 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 58 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 58 of 63\n\nDebtor's daughter, Ms. Mei Guo, and the Individual Debtor's adjudged corporate *alter ego*, HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC. To the extent that the Stay Motion seeks relief as to these additional parties, the Court denies the Stay Motion.\n\nTurning to the merits, the Court must determine whether to stay the Order Compelling Production within its sound discretion. *Kashi v. Grastos*, 790 F.2d 1050, 1057 (2d Cir. 1986). There is no strict requirement that a court stay civil proceedings due to pending criminal proceedings. *United States v. Kordel*, 397 U.S. 1 (1970); *Kashi*, 790 F.2d at 1057. In considering whether to stay civil proceedings in light of criminal proceedings, courts consider, *inter alia*:\n\n1) the extent to which the issues in the criminal case overlap with those presented in the civil case; 2) the status of the case, including whether the defendants have been indicted; 3) the private interests of the plaintiffs in proceeding expeditiously weighed against the prejudice to plaintiffs caused by the delay; 4) the private interests of and burden on the defendants; 5) the interests of the courts; and 6) the public interest.\n\n*Trs. of Plumbers & Pipefitters Nat'l Pension Fund v. Transworld Mech., Inc.*, 886 F. Supp. 1134, 1139 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).\n\nThe Court first considers the private interests of the Estate in proceeding expeditiously weighed against the prejudice to the Estate caused by delay. There is substantial prejudice to the Estate and the Individual Debtor's creditors in staying the Order Compelling Production. As discussed above, a debtor's disclosure of his financial affairs, assets, and liabilities is fundamental in bankruptcy proceedings. The Estate continues to incur enormous expense and delay because the Individual Debtor has not cooperated with and has instead obstructed the Trustee's investigation. Pursuant to section 521, the Trustee should have had all documents and records relating to the Individual Debtor's financial affairs, assets, liabilities, businesses, etc. immediately following his appointment more than a year ago. Instead, the Trustee has had to\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 38 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 59 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 59 of 63\n\nidentify other appropriate subpoena targets, issue countless subpoenas, and engage in ceaseless motion practice. While the Trustee's efforts have substantially benefitted the Estate, the Estate has also borne a heavy cost on account of these efforts.\n\nMoreover, these heavy costs are incurred in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding. It is likely that there already is not enough money to satisfy the claims of creditors, and creditors are losing the time value of their ultimate recovery due to the ongoing, incomplete investigation into the Individual Debtor's affairs. 11 U.S.C. §§ 726(a)(5), 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii). Furthermore, Congress has determined that the ultimate goal of a Chapter 11 case – confirmation of a plan – must occur within a specified timeframe. *See* 11 U.S.C. §§ 1106(a)(5), 1121(a), 1121(d). Delay in confirmation of a plan, which must provide for the ultimate realization of creditor's claims, results in substantial injury to creditors and the Estate. *See Andrews*, 414 B.R. at 7. The Trustee should not be forced to operate without the Individual Debtor's required cooperation and disclosures. *See Stone*, 282 F.2d at 553.\n\nThe Court next considers the private interests and burden on the Individual Debtor. There is no cognizable interest in delaying or obstructing these lawful bankruptcy proceedings. There is also no cognizable burden on the Individual Debtor to comply with the Order Compelling Production. For the reasons stated above, he cannot properly invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Moreover, in upholding the required records exception post-*Fisher*, the Supreme Court in *Bouknight* noted that\n\nThe State's regulatory requirement in the usual case may neither compel incriminating testimony nor aid a criminal prosecution, but the Fifth Amendment protections are not thereby necessarily unavailable to the person who complies with the regulatory requirement after invoking the privilege and subsequently faces prosecution.\n\n493 U.S. at 561–62; *but see Johnson v. United States*, 228 U.S. 457 (1913) (holding, pre-*Fisher*, that books and records produced under *Harris* could be used in a criminal proceeding).\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 39 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 60 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 60 of 63\n\nNext the Court considers the status of the pending criminal inquiries and the interest of the Criminal Court. There are two pending criminal inquiries to consider: the Criminal Action and the alleged investigation into bankruptcy crimes. The Individual Debtor has been indicted in the Criminal Action. There has been no evidence submitted to the Court that he has been indicted regarding any investigation into bankruptcy crimes. These Chapter 11 cases and related adversary proceedings do overlap with the Criminal Action – (a) many of the Individual Debtor's creditors are also his alleged victims in the Criminal Action, (b) some of the Individual Debtor's purported assets were alleged to have been bought with proceeds of the fraud alleged in the Criminal Action, and (c) some of the Individual Debtor's purported affiliates and corporate *alter egos* are alleged to be involved in the fraud alleged in the Criminal Action – but at the same time, there are incongruities – (d) there are creditors in these Chapter 11 cases that are not alleged fraud victims, (e) there are purported assets of the Estate that were purchased prior to the alleged fraud, and (f) there are purported affiliates and *alter egos* of the Individual Debtor *not* alleged to be involved in the fraud. However, any issue implicated by any investigation into bankruptcy crimes are directly related to these Chapter 11 cases.\n\nThe Court concludes this Order does not substantially interfere with the Criminal Court's interest in the orderly administration of the Criminal Action. The Individual Debtor raises the specter that requiring the Individual Debtor to produce documents to the Trustee would damage the prosecution's case against him and cause litigation about evidence in the Criminal Court. This argument is unpersuasive. The Individual Debtor producing documents and records under compulsion in these proceedings does not change the reality that the prosecution apparently already possesses voluminous evidence. While, as the Individual Debtor argues, the prosecution *may* not be allowed to use the Individual Debtor's production to the Trustee as evidence of the\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 40 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 61 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 61 of 63\n\nIndividual Debtor's control over or the authenticity of documents and records already in the prosecution's possession, the Individual Debtor's argument describes the *status quo*. Moreover, the Criminal Court will review and determine any motion to produce to the Trustee documents and records from the prosecution's production to the Individual Debtor.\n\nRegarding any investigation into bankruptcy crimes, because (a) there is no evidence that the Individual Debtor has been indicted and (b) there is no evidence that there are proceedings in relation to it in any court, the Court concludes that the interests of any such investigation should be given less weight. As stated above, the Bankruptcy Code does not exist for the purpose of creating bankruptcy crimes. It exists for the purpose of equitably and finally resolving, adjusting, and reorganizing the assets, liabilities, and financial affairs of a debtor for the benefit of all creditors and, ultimately, the debtor itself. It is not proper to hobble the Trustee's investigation into the affairs, assets, and liabilities of the Individual Debtor for the benefit of some speculative prosecution of the Individual Debtor for bankruptcy crimes. Bankruptcy crimes are an enforcement mechanism to promote proper disclosure in bankruptcy proceedings. If the Individual Debtor complies with the Order Compelling Production, he would remedy the harm the bankruptcy crimes exist to prevent, while also allowing these Chapter 11 cases to be administered appropriately.\n\nFinally, the Court concludes that the public's interest in \"the expeditious administration of bankruptcy cases is impaired by obstructing a trustee's efforts to collect, liquidate and distribute assets to creditors of the estate.\" *In re MGL Corp.*, 262 B.R. 324, 330 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2001). The public has an interest in a well-functioning bankruptcy system. It benefits the economy, debtors, and creditors. Obstruction of that process and efforts at dilation of that process are not in the public interest. Moreover, as set forth above, the production of documents\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 41 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 62 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 62 of 63\n\nand records by the Individual Debtor in accordance with the Order Compelling Production does not offend the Fifth Amendment.\n\nHaving considered the equities, the Court concludes within its sound discretion that a stay of the Order Compelling Production is not warranted. Accordingly, the Stay Motion is denied.\n\n#### **C. Should monetary sanctions enter for discovery abuse?**\n\nFinally, Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C), made applicable by D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 37 and D.\n\nConn. Bankr. L.R. 1001-1(a)(1) and 2004-1(a), provides\n\n(C) *Payment of Expenses.* Instead of or in addition to the orders above, the court must order the disobedient party, the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.\n\nUnder the specific facts and circumstances, the Court concludes an award of expenses is not\n\nwarranted at this time.\n\n## **V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER**\n\nFor the reasons stated above, the Court (A) holds the Individual Debtor in civil contempt\n\nof Court for failure to comply with the Order Compelling Production, and (B) denies the Stay\n\nMotion and declines in its sound discretion to stay the Order Compelling Production pending the\n\nresolution of the Criminal Action. Accordingly, it is hereby\n\n**ORDERED:** The Court holds Mr. Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Individual Debtor\") in civil\n\ncontempt of court for failure to comply with the Order Granting in Part Motion to Compel\n\nCompliance (the \"Order Compelling Production\"), ECF No. 1353; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** Should the Individual Debtor fail to purge himself of contempt by failing to bring himself into full compliance with the Order Compelling Production on or before September 29, 2023, Mr. Luc A. Despins, in his capacity as Chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\")\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 2035 Filed 07/26/23 Entered 07/26/23 11:27:18 Page 42 of 42 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 63 63Case 22-50073 Doc 2074-2 Filed 08/09/23 Entered 08/09/23 15:21:50 Page 63 of 63\n\nfor the bankruptcy estate (the \"Estate\") of the Individual Debtor, may move for whatever sanctions are appropriate; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** The Motion for a Limited Stay of Order Granting in Part Motion to Compel Compliance (the \"Stay Motion\"), ECF No. 1649, is **DENIED**.\n\nDated at Bridgeport, Connecticut this 26th day of July, 2023.\n\n![](_page_62_Picture_4.jpeg)","body_zh":"案件 22-50073 文件 2073 提交于 08/09/23 录入于 08/09/23 15:03:36 第 1 页，共 63 页　案件 22-50073 文件 2074-2 提交于 08/09/23 录入于 08/09/23 15:21:50 第 1 页，共 63 页\n美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院　布里奇波特分部\n\n关于：　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　第 11 章\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等人1\n\n：\n\n：案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n债务人。：\n\n：\n\n债务人请求准许就认定债务人藐视法庭并驳回暂缓强制提交命令之动议的裁定提起上诉的动议\n\n根据 28 U.S.C. §158(a)(3) 和 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8004，债务人 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（“债务人”）2，经由其下列签署的代理律师，谨请求准许就破产法院于 2023 年 7 月 26 日作出的《关于认定个人债务人藐视法庭并驳回暂缓强制提交命令之动议的决定备忘录及命令》（文件编号 2035，“藐视法庭命令”）提起上诉，其副本作为附件 A 附于本动议之后。藐视法庭命令认定个人债务人因未能提交文件而藐视法庭，该等文件系针对第 11 章受托人 Luc A. Despins（“受托人”）向债务人发出的 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004 传票所作出的回应；该命令并驳回债务人就传票援引其第五修正案禁止自证其罪权利的主张，理由是，由于债务人根据 11 USC §§ 521(a)(3) 和 521(a)(4) 负有与受托人合作的义务，故提交行为原则的法定保存记录例外适用。为支持其准许上诉动议，债务人谨陈述如下。3\n\n一、引言\n\n1. 债务人针对受托人依据 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004 向其送达的传票中所载大量且极为宽泛的文件提交请求，援引了其第五修正案禁止自证其罪的权利，包括根据提交行为原则所享有的权利。破产法院正确认定，本案中提交行为原则适用，因为债务人提交受托人要求的文件将“就检方持有的文件和检方尚未扣押的文件而言，均具有证言性质并构成自证其罪。”（藐视法庭命令，第 20 页）。尽管认定提交行为原则适用，破产法院仍认为，鉴于债务人在如本案般已指定受托人的情况下负有与受托人合作的义务，提交行为原则的法定保存记录例外也适用。破产法院的裁决如获统一适用，将实际上剥夺任何自然人债务人在已指定受托人时援引其第五修正案权利的能力，并将要求在任何自然人既为债务人又为刑事诉讼对象的案件中提交材料。\n\n1 本第 11 章案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（亦称 Guo Wengui、Miles Guo 和 Miles Kwok，以及其他别名）（税务识别号码后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（税务识别号码后四位：8202）以及 Genever Holdings Corporation。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC 和 Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为 Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166，转交 Luc A. Despins，作为 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）财产的受托人（仅为通知和通信之目的）。\n\n2 “债务人”仅指个人债务人 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 2073 提交于 08/09/23 录入于 08/09/23 15:03:36 第 2 页，共 63 页　案件 22-50073 文件 2074-2 提交于 08/09/23 录入于 08/09/23 15:21:50 第 2 页，共 63 页\n\n受托人根据 11 USC §§ 521(a)(3) 和 521(a)(4) 提出。为支持其准许上诉动议，债务人谨陈述如下。3\n\n一、引言\n\n1. 债务人针对受托人依据 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004 向其送达的传票中所载大量且极为宽泛的文件提交请求，援引了其第五修正案禁止自证其罪的权利，包括根据提交行为原则所享有的权利。破产法院正确认定，本案中提交行为原则适用，因为债务人提交受托人要求的文件将“就检方持有的文件和检方尚未扣押的文件而言，均具有证言性质并构成自证其罪。”（藐视法庭命令，第 20 页）。尽管认定提交行为原则适用，破产法院仍认为，鉴于债务人在如本案般已指定受托人的情况下负有与受托人合作的义务，提交行为原则的法定保存记录例外也适用。破产法院的裁决如获统一适用，将实际上剥夺任何自然人债务人在已指定受托人时援引其第五修正案权利的能力，并将要求在任何自然人既为债务人又为刑事诉讼对象的案件中提交材料。\n\n3 本上诉源于债务人针对传票所载文件请求援引其第五修正案权利，以及破产法院因债务人未遵从传票而认定其藐视法庭。在如本案般的情形中，传票受送达人（包括当事人）未遵从传票，继而因该不遵从行为被认定藐视法庭时，该藐视法庭命令就上诉而言属于终局命令。Del Carman Montan v. Am. Airlines, Inc. (In re Aircrash at Belle Harbor), 490 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2007)（“为获得上诉审查，被传唤人通常‘必须违抗地区法院的执行命令，被认定藐视法庭，然后对藐视法庭命令提起上诉；该命令根据 § 1291 被视为终局命令。’”）（引文略）。鉴于争议事项对债务人的重要性，债务人提出本准许上诉动议，以在地区法院认定藐视法庭命令并非终局命令时保留其寻求中间审查的权利。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 2073 提交于 08/09/23 录入于 08/09/23 15:03:36 第 3 页，共 63 页　案件 22-50073 文件 2074-2 提交于 08/09/23 录入于 08/09/23 15:21:50 第 3 页，共 63 页\n\n2. 与破产法院的裁决相反，法定保存记录例外是对提交行为原则的一项狭窄限制，适用于法律或法规要求保存的有限类别文件。破产法院对法定保存记录例外的扩张，实际上使债务人的每一项业务交易、资产和负债记录均成为 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(a)(3) 和 521(a)(4) 下的法定保存记录——无论该记录是否属于其他法律或法规要求保存的记录类别。\n\n3. 对宪法权利例外作出如此重大扩张并无法律依据；债务人正等待于 2024 年 4 月就多项刑事指控受审，目前面临选择：要么 (a) 在其有效援引第五修正案权利的情况下提交所请求的文件，以消除其藐视法庭状态；要么 (b) 因债务人继续主张相同权利而面临破产法院认为适当的任何制裁。在此情形下，且由于债务人符合对破产法院裁决提起中间上诉的标准，应准许其就以下问题提起上诉：在已指定受托人的破产案件中，《破产法》§§ 521(a)(3) 和 521(a)(4) 是否基于法定保存记录例外而使提交行为原则失去效力。\n\n二、事实与程序背景\n\n4. 2022 年 2 月 15 日，债务人根据《破产法》第 11 章自愿提交救济申请，由此启动上述标题所列破产案件。受托人于 2022 年 7 月 7 日被指定（文件编号 514），其指定经日期为 2022 年 7 月 8 日的命令批准（文件编号 523）。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 2073 提交于 08/09/23 录入于 08/09/23 15:03:36 第 4 页，共 63 页　案件 22-50073 文件 2074-2 提交于 08/09/23 录入于 08/09/23 15:21:50 第 4 页，共 63 页\n\n5. 2022 年 7 月 28 日，受托人提交了 i) 《债务人 Rule 2004 审查动议》（文件编号 636，“债务人 2004 动议”）；ii) 《第 11 章受托人请求根据破产规则 2004 和地方法规则 2004-1 作出命令，授权就债务人的各类法律及财务顾问进行取证的综合动议》（文件编号 637）；以及 iii) 《第 11 章受托人请求根据破产规则 2004 和地方法规则 2004-1 作出命令，授权就与债务人有关联的各类实体及个人进行取证的综合动议》（文件编号 638）（统称“7 月 Rule 2004 审查动议”）。受托人在债务人 2004 动议中主张，除其他事项外，“报告显示，债务人……在无数营利性和非营利性实体中拥有财务权益”；“债务人拥有一个庞大的空壳公司网络，其利用该网络追求商业利益并储存财富”；以及“据称债务人……拥有或控制‘60 多个商业、非营利和在线团体’，统称为爆料者运动。”（债务人 2004 动议，第 12、13、28 段）。\n\n6. 在债务人 2004 动议中，受托人特别提及的实体和个人包括 GTV、GClubs、GMusic、Rule of Law Society、Rule of Law Foundation、Saraca Media Group, Inc. 以及债务人的家庭成员。\n\n7. 2022 年 8 月 5 日，债务人提交《债务人对 Rule 2004 动议的有限异议》（文件编号 703），以保留某些权利，包括在附于 7 月 Rule 2004 审查动议的传票实际送达后，对该传票所附文件提交请求提出异议的权利。破产法院通过日期为 2022 年 8 月 16 日的命令，准许了 7 月 Rule 2004 审查动议。\n\n8. 债务人于 2022 年 8 月 19 日收到一份 Rule 2004 传票（“Rule 2004 传票”）的送达。Rule 2004 传票载有三十项文件提交请求，其中二十项包括要求提交与“关联个人”和/或“关联实体”有关的文件。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 2073 提交于 08/09/23 录入于 08/09/23 15:03:36 第 5 页，共 63 页　案件 22-50073 文件 2074-2 提交于 08/09/23 录入于 08/09/23 15:21:50 第 5 页，共 63 页\n\n9. Rule 2004 传票对关联个人的相关定义为：“单独及共同指所有以下个人：(1) 持有、控制、保管或有权处分债务人或债务人家庭拥有、控制或享有的资产；或 (2) 曾为一个或多个关联实体的雇员、董事或以其他方式与之有关联，连同前述各方各自的雇员、代理人、律师、顾问或任何代表前述任何一方行事之人。”关联个人的定义包括二十七名个人，其中包括 Yanping Wang（王艳萍，“王女士”）和 Je Kin Ming（“Je 先生”）（如下文所述，他们将成为债务人在刑事诉讼中的共同被告，见下文第 18 段）。\n\n10. Rule 2004 传票对关联实体的相关定义为：“单独及共同指所有以下任何类型的组织或实体：(1) 曾由债务人或债务人家庭拥有、控制或投资；或 (2) 对债务人或债务人家庭拥有、控制或享有的任何资产直接或间接享有权益，连同前述各方各自的雇员、代理人、律师、顾问或任何代表前述任何一方行事之人。”关联实体的定义包括七十七个实体，其中包括：GTV Media Group, Inc.、G|Club Operations, LLC、G|MUSIC、Himalaya Exchange、Saraca Media Group, Inc.、Rule of Law Foundation III, Inc.、Rule of Law Foundation IV, Inc.、Rule of Law Fund、Rule of Law Society 和 Rule of Law Society IV, Inc.\n\n11. 债务人及时就 Rule 2004 传票中的文件请求送达异议，针对随提交请求一并列明的某些指示和定义，以及针对某些提交请求提出异议。债务人反对提交某些类别的文件，主要是与其“家庭”资产有关的文件；受托人将该“家庭”定义为包括“债务人、债务人的儿子、债务人的女儿、债务人的所谓妻子，以及与债务人有任何其他家庭关系的人。”债务人同意提交，并确已通过其专业人员及前专业人员提交了受托人在文件提交请求中要求的某些文件。\n\n12. 2022年10月28日，受托人提交了其《第11章受托人关于请求作出命令，强制个人债务人及其他人士遵守Rule 2004传票的动议》（文件编号1046，下称“强制动议”）。2022年11月14日，债务人提交了其本人、Mei Guo（郭美）及HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC（香港国际基金投资〈美国〉有限责任公司）对第11章受托人请求强制遵守Rule 2004传票之动议的联合异议（文件编号1090）。破产法院于2022年11月30日就强制动议举行听证会，并于2023年1月20日作出《部分准许强制遵守Rule 2004传票动议的命令》（文件编号1353，下称“1月20日命令”）。1月20日命令就债务人而言全面准许受托人的强制动议，但以下事项除外：i）将文件提交起始日期定为2014年6月1日，而非受托人主张的2012年起；以及ii）提交债务人的护照。（同上，第4页。）\n\n13. 1月20日命令要求债务人不迟于2023年1月31日向受托人提交文件，并不迟于2023年2月7日提交经宣誓的声明，说明其本人及其律师为回应Rule 2004传票所采取的文件收集、检索和审查行动。（1月20日命令，第4页。）2023年2月1日，债务人的律师向受托人的律师发送电子邮件，告知其：\n\n就法院于2023年1月20日作出的关于受托人强制动议的命令，即文件编号1353，Kwok先生（郭文贵）正在主张其根据《美国宪法》第五修正案享有的权利，包括其根据提交行为原则享有的任何权利。\n\n14. 此后，于2023年2月7日，债务人提交了一份经宣誓的声明，载明：\n\n案件22-50073 文件2073 于08/09/23提交 于08/09/23 15:03:36登记 第7页，共63页 案件22-50073 文件2074-2 于08/09/23提交 于08/09/23 15:21:50登记 第7页，共63页\n\n本人系上述标题所示第11章案件中的债务人，并已收到法院于2023年1月20日作出的关于受托人强制动议的命令，文件编号1353。本人特此就2022年8月17日的传票整体，包括其中列载的全部文件及信息请求，援引本人根据《美国宪法》第五修正案享有的权利，包括提交行为原则项下的权利。\n\n（2023年2月7日，Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）关于就Rule 2004调查援引第五修正案特权的声明〔文件编号1444的附件A〕。）\n\n15. 2023年2月10日，受托人提交了其《第11章受托人关于请求作出说明理由命令，要求说明为何债务人……不应因未遵守强制遵守Rule 2004传票的命令而被认定藐视法庭并因此行为受到制裁的动议》（文件编号1453，下称“说明理由命令”）。\n\n16. 2023年2月13日，破产法院作出一项命令（文件编号1455），其中除其他与债务人无关的事项外，载明法院将在其已命令进行且当时仍在进行的调解结束后，就债务人主张其第五修正案特权设定书面陈述时间表。（同上，第2页。）\n\n17. 2023年3月7日，破产法院命令债务人于2023年3月28日前对说明理由命令作出回应。债务人回应说明理由命令的期限随后被延长至2023年4月10日，原因是2023年3月15日，美国纽约南区联邦地区法院（Southern District of New York）公开了一份包含十二项罪名项的起诉书，指控债务人、Je先生（Je）及其他已知和未知人士犯有多项联邦罪行。（United States v. Ho Wan Kwok et al.（美国诉Ho Wan Kwok等），纽约南区案件编号S1 23 Cr. 118 (AT)，文件编号2。）债务人于2023年3月15日被联邦执法机关逮捕，并仍被联邦羁押。政府表示，其通过执行搜查令，从其主张属于或由债务人控制的场所查获了手机、计算机或笔记本电脑以及外部媒体存储设备。（同上，文件编号26。）\n\n案件22-50073 文件2073 于08/09/23提交 于08/09/23 15:03:36登记 第8页，共63页 案件22-50073 文件2074-2 于08/09/23提交 于08/09/23 15:21:50登记 第8页，共63页\n\n18. 2023年3月29日，政府提交了一份替代起诉书。替代起诉书将Wang女士（王女士）列为共同被告。政府指称，债务人、Je先生、Wang女士以及其他已知和未知人士“共谋诈骗数千名受害人，涉案金额超过约$1 billion。”（同上，文件编号19，第1段。）政府进一步指称，债务人、Je先生、Wang女士及“其共谋者通过一系列复杂的欺诈性和虚构性企业及投资机会开展活动，这些企业及投资机会连接了数十个相互关联的实体，使被告及其共谋者得以招揽、洗钱及侵占受害人资金。”（同上。）政府进一步指称，债务人和Je先生“向以至少80个不同实体或个人名义持有的约500多个账户转入资金，并指示将资金转入并经由该等账户转移。”（同上，第3段。）政府列举了部分该等实体或个人，包括GTV、GClubs、GMusic、Rule of Law Society（法治协会）、Rule of Law Foundation（法治基金会）、Saraca Media Group, Inc.（Saraca媒体集团股份有限公司）及债务人的家庭成员（Rule 2004传票中列明的关联实体和关联个人），但该等“数十个相互关联的实体”“80个不同实体或个人”及“约500个账户”中的绝大多数，均未在替代起诉书中被点名或识别。\n\n19. 在替代起诉书全文中，政府指称债务人控制多个实体和个人，其中部分被点名，许多未被点名。例如，政府指称，债务人“实质上拥有并控制”GTV Media Group, Inc.（GTV媒体集团股份有限公司），尽管“[债务人]在该实体中未担任任何正式职务或拥有任何正式头衔”。（同上，第10段。）此外，政府指称，G|Clubs“实质上由[债务人]拥有并控制，尽管[债务人]在G|Clubs未担任任何正式职务或拥有任何正式头衔”。（同上，第11段。）政府还指称，“由[债务人]实质上拥有并控制的实体，例如G|Clubs和G|Fashion，与Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）存在声称的业务关系……”并且债务人\n\n案件22-50073 文件2073 于08/09/23提交 于08/09/23 15:03:36登记 第9页，共63页 案件22-50073 文件2074-2 于08/09/23提交 于08/09/23 15:21:50登记 第9页，共63页\n\n“声称其是该交易所声称的加密货币的设计者，尽管[债务人]在Himalaya Exchange未担任任何正式职务或拥有任何正式头衔。”（同上，第12段。）虽然政府在替代起诉书中以名称提及某些个人和实体，但政府反复提及与债务人共谋实施所称欺诈行为的“其他已知和未知人士”（同上，第1、13、15-17、22、26-32段）以及未具名的共谋者。（同上，第1-3、5、13h和14段。）\n\n20. 2023年4月10日，债务人提交了其对第11章受托人关于请求作出说明理由命令、要求说明为何债务人不应被认定藐视法庭之动议的异议（文件编号1650，下称“债务人对藐视法庭事项的异议”），并同时提交了一项请求有限中止《部分准许强制遵守Rule 2004传票动议的命令》的动议（文件编号1649，下称“中止动议”）。\n\n21. 在债务人对藐视法庭事项的异议中，债务人主张，其不应被认定藐视法庭，因为其已通过适当援引其第五修正案权利，包括提交行为原则项下的权利，遵守了1月20日命令。\n\n22. 受托人于2023年4月17日提交了其对债务人就受托人关于请求作出说明理由命令、要求说明为何债务人不应被认定藐视法庭之动议所提异议的回应（文件编号1670），并于2023年4月19日对债务人的中止动议提交异议。受托人在其4月17日回应中主张，除其他事项外，必要记录例外适用于破产案件中的提交行为原则，因此债务人不得就1月20日命令援引其第五修正案特权，因而构成藐视法庭。\n\n23. 破产法院在数月期间内就说明理由命令和中止动议举行了多次听证会。在此期间，受托人的律师与债务人当时的特别刑事辩护律师，通过由债务人就受托人向其提出的202个具体书面问题逐一援引其第五修正案特权，解决了受托人关于债务人必须逐个问题具体援引其第五修正案特权的主张；但仍有问题留待破产法院裁决。\n\n案件22-50073 文件2073 于08/09/23提交 于08/09/23 15:03:36登记 第10页，共63页 案件22-50073 文件2074-2 于08/09/23提交 于08/09/23 15:21:50登记 第10页，共63页\n\n24. 2023年7月26日，破产法院作出藐视法庭命令，认定提交行为原则适用，继而进一步认定，依据必要记录例外，破产案件中适用一项对提交行为原则的广泛例外，因此债务人构成藐视法庭。藐视法庭命令还认定，债务人可通过遵守1月20日命令并实施破产法院认定将“就控方持有的文件以及控方尚未扣押的文件而言，均具有证言性和自证其罪性”的提交行为，消除其藐视法庭状态。（藐视法庭命令，第20页。）\n\nIII. 债务人谨此请求准许对破产法院的藐视法庭命令提起上诉\n\na. 提出的问题\n\n25. 债务人的上诉将提出以下问题：4\n\n破产法院认定债务人构成藐视法庭是否存在错误，理由是必要记录例外在本案中适用于提交行为原则。\n\nb. 请求的救济\n\n26. 债务人谨此请求地区法院认定：在已指定受托人的破产案件中，必要记录例外并不排除债务人的提交行为原则，因此债务人已就1月20日命令适当援引其第五修正案特权，且并未藐视该命令。\n\n4 债务人保留在其依照适用规则提交所提问题陈述时变更、修改、补充或以其他方式改变该问题的权利。\n\n案件22-50073 文件2073 于08/09/23提交 于08/09/23 15:03:36登记 第11页，共63页 案件22-50073 文件2074-2 于08/09/23提交 于08/09/23 15:21:50登记 第11页，共63页\n\nc. 准许上诉许可的理由\n\n27. 根据28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)，当事人可“经[地区]法院许可”就破产法院的命令和判令寻求中间上诉。“是否准许对破产法院中间命令提出上诉的决定，属于地区法院的自由裁量权。”Osuji v. U.S. Bank, N.A.（Osuji诉U.S. Bank, N.A.案），285 F. Supp. 3d 554, 557 (E.D.N.Y. 2018)。地区法院在行使该自由裁量权时，适用28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)规定的标准，并考察“该命令（1）是否涉及一个控制性的法律问题，（2）对于该问题是否存在实质性的意见分歧依据，以及（3）对该命令立即上诉是否可能实质性推进诉讼的最终终结。”同上，第558页。另见Traversa v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp.（Traversa诉Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp.案），386 B.R. 386, 388 (D. Conn. 2008)（“在确定是否准许对破产法院的中间命令提起上诉时，法院将适用28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)规定的标准。”）。此外，“上诉人负有证明存在足以支持中间上诉的特殊情形的责任……”Osuji案，第557页（引文及引述省略）。\n\ni. 该命令涉及一个控制性的法律问题\n\n28. 当“撤销破产法院的命令将会（1）终结该诉讼，或（2）对诉讼结果产生实质性影响”时，该命令涉及一个控制性法律问题。Osuji（奥苏吉案）, 285 F. Supp. 3d at 558。另见，Minge（明格）代表 United States（美国）诉 Hawker Beechcraft Corp.（霍克·比奇飞机公司）（In re Hawker Beechcraft, Inc.（关于霍克·比奇飞机公司））, 13 Misc. 373 (PKC), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177779, *13 (SDNY（纽约南区联邦地区法院）, Dec. 18, 2013)（“在下列情形中存在控制性法律问题：(1) 撤销地区法院的意见可能导致该诉讼被驳回；(2) 撤销地区法院的意见即使不导致驳回，也可能显著影响该诉讼的进行；或(3) 经认证的问题对于大量案件具有先例价值。”）（引文略）。此外，该法律问题必须是复审法院无需审阅案卷即可迅速、清晰地裁决的“纯粹”法律问题。2178 Atl. Realty LLC（2178大西洋地产有限责任公司）v. 2178 Atl. Ave. Hous. Dev. Fund Corp.（2178大西洋大道住房开发基金公司）, No. 20-CV-1278 (RRM), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62226, at *11 (E.D.N.Y.（纽约东区联邦地区法院） Mar. 30, 2021)（引文略）。\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 2073 已提交 08/09/23 已录入 08/09/23 15:03:36 第 12 页，共 63 页 案件 22-50073 文书 2074-2 已提交 08/09/23 已录入 08/09/23 15:21:50 第 12 页，共 63 页\n\n29. 藐视法庭命令以及本次上诉的核心法律问题，无疑是“纯粹”的；本院无需审阅案卷即可“迅速、清晰地”裁决该问题。2178 Atl. Realty LLC, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62226, at *11。事实上，此处的核心法律问题是：根据 11 USC § 521(a)(3) 与破产受托人合作以及根据 11 USC § 521(a)(4) 向受托人交付全部破产财产的义务，是否足以依据法定记录例外克服个人依据第五修正案享有的不自证其罪权利，而不论是否存在要求保存所寻求记录的任何法定或监管义务。\n\n30. “现已确定，个人可以主张［第五修正案项下的］提交行为特权，以拒绝提交其内容本身不享有特权、但提交行为本身具有以下性质的文件：(1) 被强制，(2) 具有证言性质，且(3) 可能导致自证其罪。”In re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated Jan. 29, 1999（关于日期为 Jan. 29, 1999 的三份大陪审团提交证据传票）, 191 F.3d 173, 178 (2d Cir.（第二巡回上诉法院） 1999)。“法定记录例外……对于依法必须保存的部分文件，排除了［第五修正案］特权的保护。”United States（美国）v. Doe（多伊）（In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated February 2, 2012（关于日期为 February 2, 2012 的大陪审团传票））, 741 F.3d 339, 344 (2d Cir. 2013)。如第二巡回上诉法院所判定：\n\n法定记录例外背后的理由有二。第一，如果某人从事一项法律或规则要求保存记录的活动，则就提交行为而言，可视为其已放弃特权——至少在政府的提交请求与记录保存要求的目的之间存在关联的案件中如此。第二，由于该等记录依法必须保存，记录持有人通过提交记录，对控制权或真实性“承认”的内容甚少。\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 2073 已提交 08/09/23 已录入 08/09/23 15:03:36 第 13 页，共 63 页 案件 22-50073 文书 2074-2 已提交 08/09/23 已录入 08/09/23 15:21:50 第 13 页，共 63 页\n\nIn re Two Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum（关于两份大陪审团提交证据传票）, 793 F.2d 69, 73 (2d Cir. 1986)。因此，例如，法定记录例外已被判定适用于 FINCEN（金融犯罪执法网络）法规要求保存的记录，United States v. Doe（In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated February 2, 2012）, 741 F.3d at, 348；适用于与为商业目的购买酒类有关的纽约州税法所要求保存的记录，United States v. Doe（In re Two Subpoenas to Testify Before Grand Jury（关于两份要求在大陪审团前作证的传票））, 252 F. Supp. 3d 170, 176-177 (E.D.N.Y. 2017)；以及适用于律师的风险代理聘用协议和结案陈述。In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 793 F.2d 69, at 73。\n\n31. United States v. Doe（In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated February 2, 2012）中所涉的 FINCEN 法规，典型地体现了要求保存记录并可能导致认定法定记录例外适用于提交该等文件的法规类型，适用的《美国法典》规定已明确表明这一点：\n\n§ 1010.350 要求向国内税务局局长申报的账户记录，应由对任何该等账户拥有财务利益、签字权或其他权限的每个人保存。该等记录应载明各该等账户的开户名称、该账户的账号或其他标识、开设该账户的外国银行或其他人士的名称和地址、该账户的类型，以及各该等账户在申报期间的最高价值。该等记录应保存 5 年，并应始终依照法律授权可供查阅。在计算 5 年期间时，应不计入自纳税人因提交虚假或欺诈性联邦所得税申报表，或未提交联邦所得税申报表而被起诉或以检察官起诉书提起诉讼之日起，至对该刑事程序作出最终处理之日止的任何期间。\n\n31 C.F.R. § 1010.420。破产法院并未将其藐视法庭命令聚焦于法律或法规要求个人保存、因而属于提交行为原则之法定记录例外的具体文件类别，例如 United States v. Doe（In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated February 2, 2012）中所涉的记录，或其他将法定记录例外适用于提交行为原则的第二巡回上诉法院案件中所涉的记录。相反，破产法院认定，与债务人财务事务、资产和负债有关的每一份记录，均根据《破产法》第 521(a)(3) 条和第 521(a)(4) 条属于法定记录，无论是否存在创制或保存该记录的任何其他法定或监管义务，且尽管《破产法》的这两个条款均不包含任何保存记录的要求。5 简言之，破产法院创设了一项吞没规则本身的提交行为原则例外，并在此过程中作出了可撤销的错误。\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 2073 已提交 08/09/23 已录入 08/09/23 15:03:36 第 14 页，共 63 页 案件 22-50073 文书 2074-2 已提交 08/09/23 已录入 08/09/23 15:21:50 第 14 页，共 63 页\n\n32. 债务人寻求上诉的法律问题，即《破产法》第 521(a)(3) 条和第 521(a)(4) 条是否使在指定受托人的破产案件中提交行为原则失去效力，是直接明了的；地区法院无需审阅案卷即可裁决这一纯粹的法律问题。\n\n33. 此时裁决这一狭窄的法律问题不会终结债务人的破产案件，但可能解决债务人相对于 January 20 命令的义务，并使债务人对其在破产案件中今后所享有的第五修正案权利范围有更清晰的认识。具体而言，根据现有的藐视法庭命令，债务人被要求在其刑事程序中提交文件——解决该问题将解决该项义务。\n\n34. 最后，由于该法律问题属于首次审理的问题，其可能对大量案件具有先例价值（且鉴于正在进行的破产程序及相关对抗程序，即使在本案中也具有明确意义）。因此，藐视法庭命令涉及一个控制性法律问题，第一项因素已经满足。\n\nii. 存在实质性的意见分歧依据\n\n35. 当“(1) 就该问题存在相互冲突的权威意见，或(2) 该问题对第二巡回上诉法院而言特别困难且属首次审理”时，存在实质性的意见分歧依据。Osuji, 285 F. Supp. 3d 554, 558 (E.D.N.Y. 2018)。\n\n36. 研究未发现第二巡回上诉法院有任何通过《破产法》第 521(a)(3) 条和／或第 521(a)(4) 条适用法定记录例外的案件。同样，研究未发现第二巡回上诉法院有任何以本案破产法院所适用的广度适用法定记录例外的案件。因此，这似乎是第二巡回上诉法院的首次审理案件。\n\n37. 因此，第二项因素已经满足。见 Hawker Beechcraft Corp.（In re Hawker Beechcraft, Inc.）, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177779, *15（在所提出的问题属首次审理且“困难，需要复杂的法定解释，并分别涉及《破产法》不同条款之间、《破产法》与《联邦破产程序规则》之间，以及《破产法》与 FCA（《虚假申报法》）之间的交叉关系”时，准许提起中间上诉）。\n\niii. 立即上诉实质性促进破产案件程序的效率\n\n38. 该项标准“评估上诉是否会实质性促进诉讼的终结；在上诉有望提前审判时间或缩短审判所需时间时，即得到满足。”Osuji, 285 F. Supp. 3d at 558（引文及引号略）。\n\n39. 如上所述，藐视法庭命令规定，债务人为消除其藐视法庭状态而应采取的合理步骤包括：“向刑事法院提交动议，请求允许向受托人提交控方提供给［］债务人、且对 Rule 2004 传票具有回应性的文件和记录，但以受托人遵守刑事法院可能施加的任何条件为限。”（藐视法庭命令，第 36 页）。如果地区法院认定不应作出藐视法庭命令，则债务人将无需在其纽约南区联邦地区法院正在审理的刑事案件中提交任何文件，请求命令允许其向受托人提交政府提供给他的文件。此外，无论以正式或非正式方式，受托人必然会被卷入任何该等动议程序，并将被迫在一项若破产法院存在错误则本不应发生的程序中扩大动用破产财产资源。\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 2073 已提交 08/09/23 已录入 08/09/23 15:03:36 第 16 页，共 63 页 案件 22-50073 文书 2074-2 已提交 08/09/23 已录入 08/09/23 15:21:50 第 16 页，共 63 页\n\n40. 同样，立即上诉将使债务人和受托人对其在藐视法庭命令下的权利和义务具有更大的确定性；如果藐视法庭命令被撤销且法定记录例外被认定不适用，还将使受托人能够更迅速地通过其他途径寻求证据开示，从而推进破产案件并使其更接近完成。\n\n41. 因此，第三项因素也已经满足。\n\niv. 存在足以支持中间上诉的特殊情形\n\n40. 这是一个特殊情形。债务人为个人，已被指控犯有多项罪行，并面临可能被监禁的前景。与任何面临该等后果的个人一样，其享有不自证其罪的宪法权利。然而，债务人现被迫在以下两者之间作出选择：拒绝遵守1月20日命令，并面临破产法院认为适当的任何藐视法庭制裁；或者设法出示文件，尽管破产法院已认定，“遵守《强制出示命令》而进行的出示，就检方持有的文件以及检方尚未扣押的文件而言，均具有证言性质且具有自证其罪性”（《藐视法庭命令》第20页），并且尽管《藐视法庭命令》最终可能在上诉中被撤销。\n案件 22-50073 文书 2073 提交日期 08/09/23 录入日期 08/09/23 15:03:36 第 17 页，共 63 页 案件 22-50073 文书 2074-2 提交日期 08/09/23 录入日期 08/09/23 15:21:50 第 17 页，共 63 页\n\n当然，如果在破产案件结束时推翻《藐视法庭命令》，但在此期间作出的出示导致在债务人有效援引第五修正案权利的情况下仍出示了这些记录，则该项推翻将毫无意义。\n\n40. 破产法院认为，若债务人在刑事程序中申请命令，准许其向受托人出示政府向其提供、且符合《规则2004传票》要求的文件，则债务人并不会放弃其第五修正案特权，因为其提出该动议是“在《强制出示命令》的强制之下”。（《藐视法庭命令》第36页。）然而，破产法院正在强制债务人在司法程序中实施一项行为，而破产法院本身已认定该行为具有证言性质并可能导致自证其罪；这正是第五修正案旨在防止之情形的典型例子。此外，破产法院关于债务人不会放弃其宪法保护的结论，并不能保证受托人或政府不会主张，提交该动议构成对债务人第五修正案特权的放弃。此外，尽管《藐视法庭命令》侧重于债务人向受托人出示政府在刑事案件中向其提供的文件，（同上），但《藐视法庭命令》并不限于该单一类别的文件。（同上：“如个人债务人的律师已在记录中陈述，合理步骤包括向刑事法院提出动议，请求允许向受托人出示检方向个人债务人提供、且符合规则2004传票要求的文件和记录，但须以受托人遵守刑事法院可能施加的任何条件为前提。”）（着重号为原文所加。）尽管鉴于债务人持续被监禁以及政府执行搜查令，债务人不太可能有任何文件可供出示，但债务人的宪法权利不应取决于其是否拥有可被出示的文件。\n案件 22-50073 文书 2073 提交日期 08/09/23 录入日期 08/09/23 15:03:36 第 18 页，共 63 页 案件 22-50073 文书 2074-2 提交日期 08/09/23 录入日期 08/09/23 15:21:50 第 18 页，共 63 页\n\n41. 本案与上文援引的、政府申请强制遵守大陪审团传票的案件存在根本区别。在那些案件中，政府依据触发“必备记录”例外的法定或监管性文件保存要求，直接从证人处取得文件。在本案中，适用“必备记录”例外的依据是《破产法典》。尽管政府不能利用《破产法典》克服债务人的第五修正案权利，破产法院实际上却认定，受托人可以在没有任何额外保护措施的情况下这样做。鉴于政府已经向受托人送达传票，没有任何事物能够阻止政府再次如此做，以取得原本受债务人第五修正案特权保护、但现已由破产法院命令向受托人出示的记录。如上所述，债务人的宪法权利受到破产法院命令直接且即时的影响。因此，存在足以支持立即上诉的特殊情形。\n\nIV. 结论\n\n42. 基于上述全部理由，地区法院应准许债务人就《藐视法庭命令》提出上诉。\n案件 22-50073 文书 2073 提交日期 08/09/23 录入日期 08/09/23 15:03:36 第 19 页，共 63 页 案件 22-50073 文书 2074-2 提交日期 08/09/23 录入日期 08/09/23 15:21:50 第 19 页，共 63 页\n\n日期：2023年8月9日，康涅狄格州布里奇波特\n\n债务人，HO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）\n\n代理人：/s/ Eric Henzy\nEric Henzy（ct12849）\nJames M. Moriarty（ct21876）\nZeisler & Zeisler, P.C.\n10 Middle Street, 15th Floor\nBridgeport, Connecticut 06604\n电话：(203) 368-4234\n传真：(203) 368-5487\n电子邮件：ehenzy@zeislaw.com\nJmoriarty@zeislaw.com\n其代理律师\n案件 22-50073 文书 2073 提交日期 08/09/23 录入日期 08/09/23 15:03:36 第 20 页，共 63 页 案件 22-50073 文书 2074-2 提交日期 08/09/23 录入日期 08/09/23 15:21:50 第 20 页，共 63 页\n\n送达证明\n\n本人特此证明，于2023年8月9日，前述文件副本已以电子方式提交。本次提交的通知将通过法院电子提交系统，以电子邮件发送给所有当事人；或者，对于无法接受电子提交的任何人士，将按《电子提交通知》中所示以邮件发送。当事人可通过法院的CM/ECF系统查阅本次提交。\n\n代理人：/s/ Eric Henzy\nEric Henzy（ct12849）\n\n附件A\n案件 22-50073 文书 2073 提交日期 08/09/23 录入日期 08/09/23 15:03:36 第 22 页，共 63 页 案件 22-50073 文书 2035 提交日期 07/26/23 录入日期 07/26/23 11:27:18 第 1 页，共 42 页 案件 22-50073 文书 2074-2 提交日期 08/09/23 录入日期 08/09/23 15:21:50 第 22 页，共 63 页\n\n美国康涅狄格州联邦破产法院\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等人，） （合并管理）\n\n）\n\n）\n\n关于：） 第11章 ） 案号 22-50073（JAM）\n\n债务人。 ） 关于 ECF Nos. 1453 和 1649\n\n出庭人员\n\nLuc A. Despins（辩论律师）\nAvram E. Luft\nG. Alexander Bongartz\nDouglass Barron\nPaul Hastings LLP\n200 Park Avenue\nNew York, NY 10166\n\nDouglass S. Skalka\nPatrick R. Linsey\nNeubert, Pepe & Montieth\n195 Church Street, 13th Floor\nNew Haven, CT 06510\n\n以及\n\nNicholas A. Bassett（辩论律师）\nPaul Hastings LLP\n2050 M Street NW\nWashington, D.C. 20036\n\n动议申请人兼交叉被申请人 Luc A. Despins 先生的代理律师；Luc A. Despins系HO WAN KWOK先生遗产的第11章受托人\n\nStephen R. Cook\nBrown Rudnick LLP\n2211 Michelson Drive, 7th Floor\nIrvine, California 92612\n\n以及\n\nStephen A. Best（辩论律师）\nBrown Rudnick LLP\n601 13th Street, NW, Suite 600\nWashington, DC 20005\n\n以及\n\nEric Henzy（辩论律师）\nJames M. Moriarty\nZeisler & Zeisler, P.C.\n10 Middle Street\nBridgeport, CT 06604\n\nWilliam Baldiga（辩论律师）\nBrown Rudnick LLP\nSeven Times Square\nNew York, NY 10036\n\n被申请人兼交叉动议申请人 HO WAN KWOK先生（债务人）的代理律师1\n\n关于认定个人债务人藐视法庭并驳回暂缓执行强制出示命令之动议的裁决备忘录及命令\n\nJulie A. Manning，美国联邦破产法官\n\nI. 引言\n\n本院现审理的事项包括：Luc A. Despins先生以HO WAN KWOK先生（“个人债务人”）破产遗产（“遗产”）第11章受托人（“受托人”）身份提出的《说明债务人为何不应被认定藐视法庭命令之动议》（“藐视法庭动议”）（ECF No. 14532）；以及个人债务人提出的《部分暂缓执行准许部分强制遵守动议之命令的动议》（“暂缓动议”；其与藐视法庭动议分别称为“交叉动议”，合称“交叉动议”）（ECF No. 1649）。受托人请求因个人债务人未遵守《准许部分强制遵守动议之命令》（“强制出示命令”）而认定其构成民事藐视法庭。（ECF No. 1353。）个人债务人则交叉申请，在美利坚合众国诉Kwok案，案号23 Cr. 118（AT）（S.D.N.Y.）（“刑事诉讼”）于纽约南区联邦地区法院（“刑事法院”）待决期间，暂缓执行《强制出示命令》。基于下述理由，本院认定个人债务人构成民事藐视法庭，并驳回暂缓动议。\n\n1 Brown Rudnick LLP的律师自就这些事项进行辩论后，已撤回其出庭代理。（ECF No. 2034。）\n\n2 本裁决备忘录中讨论的各项诉状和命令具有综合性。为清晰和连贯起见，诉状和命令的标题仅在其涉及本院当前事项中的当事人的范围内列明。\n案件 22-50073 文书 2073 提交日期 08/09/23 录入日期 08/09/23 15:03:36 第 24 页，共 63 页 案件 22-50073 文书 2035 提交日期 07/26/23 录入日期 07/26/23 11:27:18 第 3 页，共 42 页 案件 22-50073 文书 2074-2 提交日期 08/09/23 录入日期 08/09/23 15:21:50 第 24 页，共 63 页\n\n基于下述理由，本院认定个人债务人构成民事藐视法庭，并驳回暂缓动议。\n\nII. 背景\n\n个人债务人于2022年2月15日在本院提交自愿第11章破产申请。（ECF No. 1。）个人债务人的案件与两宗关联公司第11章案件合并管理。（ECF Nos. 970 and 1141。）基于其中所述理由，本院于2022年6月15日作出裁决备忘录及命令，任命一名第11章受托人。（ECF No. 465。）In re Kwok, 640 B.R. 514（Bankr. D. Conn. 2022）。2022年7月8日，Despins先生被任命为受托人。（ECF No. 523。）\n\n2022年7月28日，受托人提交《对〔个人〕债务人进行规则2004审查之动议》（ECF No. 636），本院于2022年8月16日准许该动议。（ECF No. 757。）2022年8月19日，个人债务人获送达规则2004传票。（参见，例如，ECF No. 1650 ¶ 7。）2022年10月28日，受托人提交《强制个人债务人遵守规则2004传票命令之动议》（“强制动议”）。（ECF No. 1046。）2022年11月14日，个人债务人对强制动议提出异议。（ECF No. 1090。）2022年11月30日，就强制动议举行了听证。本院将强制动议留待裁定。2023年1月20日，3本院作出《强制出示命令》。（ECF No. 1353。）\n\n3 2022年11月16日至2023年1月13日期间，本院正处理与这些第11章案件相关、题为Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund v. Kwok（In re Kwok）的对抗程序事项，案号22-50073（JAM），对抗程序案号22-05032（JAM）（Bankr D. Conn. Jan. 13, 2023）（下称“社交媒体/抗议对抗程序”）。根据Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(3)，本院须“在尽可能最早的时间”处理该对抗程序中的事项，并使其优先于其他所有事项，但同类性质的较早事项听证除外。\n案件 22-50073 文书 2073 提交日期 08/09/23 录入日期 08/09/23 15:03:36 第 25 页，共 63 页 案件 22-50073 文书 2035 提交日期 07/26/23 录入日期 07/26/23 11:27:18 第 4 页，共 42 页 案件 22-50073 文书 2074-2 提交日期 08/09/23 录入日期 08/09/23 15:21:50 第 25 页，共 63 页\n\n2023年2月7日，个人债务人就强制提交命令提交了一份声明（以下简称“声明”）。（ECF No. 1444 Ex. A.）个人债务人在该声明中，在伪证处罚的约束下表示，他就“2022年8月17日的传票整体，包括其中载明的所有文件和信息请求，援引其根据美国宪法第五修正案享有的权利，包括文件提交行为原则下的权利[，]”。（同上，Ex. A.）2023年2月10日，受托人提交藐视法庭动议，主张：(i) 个人债务人须说明理由，证明其援引第五修正案为何适当，以及其为何不应被认定为藐视法庭；(ii) 即使个人债务人的援引适当，他也须针对每一项文件和信息请求分别主张该权利；以及 (iii) 该声明不符合强制提交命令，因为其未详细说明为查找响应传票的文件和信息所作的努力。（ECF No. 1453.）2023年3月7日，法院就藐视法庭动议举行了听证。听证结束时，法院就藐视法庭动议提出的问题确定了书面陈述时间表。\n\n2023年3月15日，在一项相关对抗程序的证据听证开始时，个人债务人的律师告知法院，针对个人债务人的起诉书已在刑事诉讼中解封，联邦调查局（Federal Bureau of Investigation，以下简称“FBI”）已于当日早晨较早时逮捕了个人债务人。2023年3月22日，法院准许个人债务人延长答复藐视法庭动议期限的动议。（ECF No. 1585.）\n\n2023年4月10日，个人债务人对藐视法庭动议提出异议。（ECF No. 1650.）个人债务人的异议主张，他已遵守强制提交命令，因为他已适当援引其第五修正案规定的不自证其罪权利。（同上。）与此同时，个人债务人通过其在刑事诉讼中的律师——该律师作为其特别（刑事）律师出现在这些 Chapter 11 案件中——提交了中止动议。（ECF No. 1649.）中止动议主张，为维护个人债务人第五修正案规定的不自证其罪权利，本法院必须在刑事诉讼得到解决前中止强制提交命令。（同上。）2023年4月14日，受托人就对藐视法庭动议的异议提交了答复。（ECF No. 1670.）2023年4月19日，受托人对中止动议提出异议。（ECF No. 1680.）\n\n2023年4月20日，法院就交叉动议举行了听证。辩论结束时，受托人与个人债务人似乎就交叉动议达成了双方同意的解决方案。然而，2023年4月24日，双方提交了相互竞争的拟议命令。（ECF Nos. 1698, 1699.）2023年4月27日，法院就交叉动议举行了状态会议，以讨论相互竞争的命令。双方同意在能够达成一致的范围内协商推进，但对先前协议的条款表示异议。2023年5月1日，法院作出一项同意命令，要求个人债务人就受托人提出的二百零二（202）个问题中的每一个，分别援引其第五修正案权利。（ECF No. 1740.）同日，个人债务人提交补充陈述，以支持其对4月20日协议的解释。（ECF No. 1737.）\n\n2023年5月2日，法院就交叉动议举行第二次听证，双方就4月20日协议的条款陷入僵局。受托人主张，双方已同意，个人债务人将于刑事诉讼中提交动议，请求准许其与受托人共享控方已向其提供的材料，前提是受托人遵守刑事诉讼中作出的保护令及其他保密命令和使用限制。个人债务人主张，双方已同意，个人债务人将寻求——可能通过动议——使控方同意同时向个人债务人和受托人提交文件，前提是受托人遵守刑事诉讼中作出的保护令及其他保密命令和使用限制。鉴于该僵局，法院认定其必须就交叉动议作出裁决。然而，个人债务人的破产律师请求法院在就交叉动议作出裁决前暂缓，以便给予个人债务人时间了解控方在刑事诉讼中向其提供材料的性质。\n\n鉴于所涉问题的严重性，法院予以等待。2023年6月13日，法院就交叉动议举行了最终听证。法院询问双方是否已在就交叉动议达成双方同意的解决方案方面取得任何进展。双方报告称，个人债务人已准备一份补充声明（以下简称“补充声明”），其中他针对受托人的每一个问题分别援引第五修正案。（参见 Despins ex rel. Kwok v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok), Case No. 22-50073, Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 8, 2023), ECF No. 1 Ex. 1.）然而，双方报告称，除补充声明外，僵局依然存在，并请求法院就交叉动议作出裁决。法院将交叉动议留待裁定。\n\n交叉动议现已具备裁决条件。\n\nIII. 管辖权\n\n康涅狄格州联邦地区法院（United States District Court for the District of Connecticut）根据 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) 对本事项具有管辖权。本法院根据 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) 及康涅狄格州联邦地区法院于1984年9月21日作出的移送命令，有权审理和裁定本事项。本程序属于法定核心程序。28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A)。法院认定，其行使管辖权不受宪法方面考量的阻却。参见 Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 487–99 (2011)。此外，受托人与个人债务人在未对本法院作出最终命令的权限提出异议的情况下提交终局性动议，已默示同意本法院就交叉动议作出最终命令。参见 Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 575 U.S. 665, 686 (2015)（裁定尽管 Stern 作出判决，当事人仍可同意由破产法院作出最终命令）；True Traditions, LC v. Wu, 552 B.R. 826, 838 (N.D. Cal. 2015)（裁定提交终局性动议即构成默示同意）。\n\n根据 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409，本地区的审理地适当。\n\nIV. 讨论4\n\n交叉动议提出严重问题。受托人请求因个人债务人未遵守强制提交命令而认定其藐视法庭。个人债务人主张，援引其第五修正案规定的不自证其罪权利即构成遵守，且该权利必须通过中止强制提交命令予以保护。基于下述理由，法院认定，在本法院面前的具体事实和情形下，第五修正案规定的不自证其罪权利不适用。因此，法院认定个人债务人藐视法庭，并驳回中止动议。\n\nA. 个人债务人是否构成民事藐视法庭？\n\n法院首先审议个人债务人是否因未遵守强制提交命令而构成藐视法庭。本法院根据 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) 和 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9020，有权认定当事人藐视法庭。Taggart v. Lorenzen ex rel. Brown, 139 S. Ct. 1795, 1801 (2019); PHH Mortg. Corp. v. Sensenich ex rel. Gravel (In re Gravel), 6 F.4th 503, 512 (2d Cir. 2021); Mar. Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chauteaugay Corp.), 920 F.2d 183, 187 (2d. Cir. 1990)。经由 D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 37 以及 D. Conn. Bankr. L.R. 1001-1(a)(1) 和 2004-1(a) 适用的《联邦民事诉讼规则》37(b)(1) 和 37(b)(2)(A)(vii)，进一步授权法院认定当事人藐视要求提交证据开示材料的命令。\n\n可请求藐视法庭以“‘强制被告遵守’”法院命令，或以“‘赔偿申诉人因未遵守法院命令而遭受的损失’”。Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1801（引用 United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 303–04 (1947)）。认定民事藐视法庭须满足：(1) 被藐视者未遵守的命令清楚且明确；(2) 不遵守的证据清楚且有说服力；以及 (3) 被藐视者未以合理方式勤勉地尝试遵守。King v. Allied Vision, Ltd., 65 F.3d 1051, 1058 (2d Cir. 1995)。被藐视者还须 (4) 知悉相关命令。Gravel, 6 F.4th at 512。\n\n1. 强制遵守命令是否清楚且明确？\n\n如“‘对于被告行为的不当性不存在任何合理疑问’”，则命令清楚且明确。Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1801（引用 Cal. Artificial Stone Paving Co. v. Molitor, 113 U.S. 609 (1885)）。法院通常适用客观标准——“若一方当事人主观上相信其正在遵守命令，但该信念在客观上不合理，则该信念通常不能使其免于民事藐视法庭。”Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1802（引用 McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1949)（“缺乏故意[sic]并不能免除民事藐视法庭责任。”））。尽管如此，一方当事人的恶意可能证明有理由“将‘法令中的任何不确定性负担……置于’违反法院命令的一方当事人‘肩上’”，并且“一方当事人的善意，即使不能阻却民事藐视法庭，也可能有助于确定适当的制裁措施。”Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1802（引用 McComb, 336 U.S. at 192–93 和 Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 801 (1987)）。\n\n强制提交命令在相关部分规定如下：\n\n裁定：就针对个人债务人的证据开示请求而言，异议被驳回；但对于寻求日期早于 June 1, 2014 的文件的请求，以及寻求个人债务人护照的请求，异议在该范围内获支持，但不妨碍受托人在调查推进过程中，经说明理由后，于日后寻求日期早于 June 1, 2014 的文件及个人债务人的护照。个人债务人应于 January 31, 2023 下午 5:00 前，检索并向受托人提交：\n\n(i) 对受托人日期为 June 1, 2014 或之后的请求作出回应的文件，除非某一特定请求规定了并非始于 June 1, 2014 之前的不同期间；\n\n(ii) 对受托人关于其承认由其所有的资产，以及据称属于个人债务人以外的个人或实体的资产的请求作出回应的文件，包括但不限于其家庭成员及关联实体的资产；以及\n\n(iii) 对受托人的请求作出回应且处于其保管、占有或控制之下的文件，包括但不限于其现任或前任律师及其他代理人和顾问的档案中的文件，除非该等文件已由其现任或前任律师及其他代理人和顾问提交，但不考虑其现任或前任律师及其他代理人和顾问未来可能作出的任何提交；\n\n并进一步\n\n裁定：个人债务人应于 February 7, 2023 下午 5:00 前，在本案案卷中提交一份经宣誓的声明，详细说明其本人及其律师为回应传票而采取的文件收集、检索及审阅行动，包括但不限于详细说明其本人及其律师为以下目的所实施的程序：\n\n(i) 确定个人债务人的所有电子设备；其可访问的所有在线文件存储库；与电子文件相关联的所有社交媒体、电子邮件及其他账户；所有银行账户及相关\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 2035 提交于 07/26/23 登记于 07/26/23 11:27:18 第 10 页，共 42 页 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 31 63案件 22-50073 文件 2074-2 提交于 08/09/23 登记于 08/09/23 15:21:50 第 31 页，共 63 页\n\n账户对账单；以及所有其他可能存在的、可提供相关纸质和电子文件的潜在来源；以及\n\n(ii) 在前述来源中检索相关文件，包括但不限于与费用或资金转移有关的请求、与个人债务人家庭或关联实体有关的资产或财务或商业交易或记录有关的请求，以及与个人债务人相关的商业权益有关的请求所涉及的文件……\n\n（ECF No. 1353。）个人债务人未在书面陈述或口头辩论期间提出任何论点，认为强制提交裁定（Order Compelling Production）的含义存在“合理的疑义”。5 法院认定，就个人债务人而言，强制提交裁定清晰且无歧义。6\n\n2. 个人债务人是否遵守了强制提交裁定？\n\n关于第二项要件，受托人必须以清楚且令人信服的证据证明个人债务人未遵守强制提交裁定。King（金案），65 F.3d at 1058。受托人主张，由于 (i) 个人债务人未能提交文件或记录，且 (ii) 个人债务人未能提交声明，列明文件或记录的潜在来源以及为检索该等来源所作的努力，个人债务人未遵守强制提交裁定。\n\n作为回应，个人债务人提出两项论点。第一，个人债务人主张，其目前正被审前羁押且无法获得审前释放，因此其不可能遵守该裁定。第二，个人债务人主张，\n\n5 个人债务人主张，对于个人债务人能否针对强制提交裁定援引其《第五修正案》反对自证其罪的权利，存在合理的疑义。法院将在下文讨论个人债务人是否已勤勉尝试遵守强制提交裁定时审议该论点。\n\n6 法院此前已裁定，就其他当事人而言，强制提交裁定清晰且无歧义。（见 ECF No. 1537。）\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 2035 提交于 07/26/23 登记于 07/26/23 11:27:18 第 11 页，共 42 页 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 32 63案件 22-50073 文件 2074-2 提交于 08/09/23 登记于 08/09/23 15:21:50 第 32 页，共 63 页\n\n“提交行为”原则允许其针对提交文件和记录的请求援引其《第五修正案》反对自证其罪的权利。基于此，个人债务人声称其已遵守强制提交裁定。\n\ni. 个人债务人遵守该裁定是否不可能？\n\n尽管个人债务人正确指出，“[被援引的个人无法遵守法院命令，是针对民事藐视法庭裁定的一项长期得到承认的抗辩，”United States（美国） v. Wendy（温迪），575 F.2d 1025, 1030 (2d Cir. 1978)，并且评估无法遵守的适当时点是在作出藐视法庭裁决之时，United States（美国） v. Rylander（赖兰德），460 U.S. 752, 757 (1983)，但法院认定个人债务人仍有可能遵守。尽管确实，控方已就刑事诉讼（Criminal Action）扣押了个人债务人的文件和记录，但个人债务人并未证明：(a) 其所有文件和记录均已被扣押；以及 (b) 其并无被扣押记录的其他副本。此外，根据其律师的陈述，法院了解到，如尚未开始，控方在刑事诉讼中向个人债务人作出的提交应很快开始。尽管 (i) 受托人很可能必须成为刑事诉讼中保密要求和使用限制的签署方并遵守该等要求和限制，以及 (ii) 控方向受托人的提交可能会遭到反对，或不获刑事法院（Criminal Court）允许，但个人债务人并非不可能向刑事法院申请允许向受托人提交。尽管个人债务人目前正被审前羁押，其律师并非如此。个人债务人可以通过其律师和／或其他代理人提交文件。因此，个人债务人遵守强制提交裁定并非不可能。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 2035 提交于 07/26/23 登记于 07/26/23 11:27:18 第 12 页，共 42 页 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 33 63案件 22-50073 文件 2074-2 提交于 08/09/23 登记于 08/09/23 15:21:50 第 33 页，共 63 页\n\nii. 个人债务人是否已适当地援引《第五修正案》？\n\na. 提交行为原则是否适用？\n\n个人债务人关于其已遵守强制提交裁定的论点，依赖于“提交行为”原则。在 Fisher（费舍尔） v. United States（美国）一案中，该案认定其中所涉提交行为不受《第五修正案》保护，但美国联邦最高法院（United States Supreme Court）仍裁定：\n\n然而，响应传票而提交证据的行为本身具有传达信息的方面，完全独立于所提交文件的内容。遵守传票默示承认所要求文件的存在，以及纳税人对该等文件的占有或控制。其还表明纳税人相信该等文件即为传票所述的文件。\n\n425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976)；见 United States（美国） v. Hubbell（哈贝尔），530 U.S. 27, 36–37 (2000)。在 Fisher（费舍尔）一案中，最高法院裁定，确定提交行为能否受《第五修正案》保护的检验标准是：提交行为所涉的“默示断言”是否依通行的《第五修正案》判例法，同时具有“证言性”和“自证其罪性”。425 U.S. at 410–11。具体而言，最高法院对以下方面的默示断言表示关切：(i) 文件或记录的存在；(ii) 提交方对文件或记录的占有或控制；以及 (iii) 提交方相信该等文件和记录即为传票所要求的文件。Id. 提交行为原则不保护文件中具有证言性和自证其罪性的内容——其仅保护具有证言性和自证其罪性的提交行为。Id.；Hubbell（哈贝尔），530 U.S. at 40–41。\n\n根据 United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit（美国联邦第二巡回上诉法院）具有约束力的判例，提交行为可能包含具有证言性的默示断言：“(1) ‘若政府不知被传唤文件的存在和所在位置’；或 (2) 若提交将‘默示认证’该等文件。”United States（美国） v. Doe（多伊） (In re Grand Jury Subpoena)，1\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 2035 提交于 07/26/23 登记于 07/26/23 11:27:18 第 13 页，共 42 页 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 34 63案件 22-50073 文件 2074-2 提交于 08/09/23 登记于 08/09/23 15:21:50 第 34 页，共 63 页\n\nF.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 1993)（下称“Grand Jury 1993（1993 年大陪审团案）”）（引自 United States（美国） v. Fox（福克斯），721 F.2d 32, 36 (2d Cir.1983)）。如果受托人能够证明：(1) 文件的存在和所在位置；以及 (2) 文件的真实性，属于“既定”结论或已由其他证据确立，则提交行为不受《第五修正案》保护。Grand Jury 1993（1993 年大陪审团案），1 F.3d at 93。此外，即使依据 Fox（福克斯）案，提交所涉默示断言具有证言性，个人债务人还必须证明，披露文件或记录的存在、所在位置或真实性具有自证其罪性。见 Hoffman（霍夫曼） v. United States（美国），341 U.S. 479, 486–87 (1951)；Fox（福克斯），721 F.2d at 40；In re Schick（希克案），215 B.R. 4, 9 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997)；参见 Martin-Trigona（马丁-特里戈纳） v. Belford（贝尔福德） (In re Martin-Trigona（马丁-特里戈纳案）)，732 F.2d 170, 176 (2d Cir. 1984)。\n\n个人债务人为证明提交行为具有证言性和自证其罪性所负担的责任，低于通常的举证责任：“为维持该项特权，只须从问题的含义及其提出的情境中显见，对问题作出回应性答复，或解释为何不能作答，可能具有危险性，因为可能导致有害的披露。”Hoffman（霍夫曼），341 U.S. at 486–87。在确定个人债务人是否可以援引《第五修正案》时，法院必须运用其“对案件特殊性的个人认知”，其程度不亚于个人债务人提交的事实支持。Id. at 487。如果提交行为可能成为用于起诉个人债务人的“证据链中的一环”，则该提交行为具有自证其罪性。Id. at 486。\n\n个人债务人主张，根据强制提交裁定被强制提交文件和记录将具有证言性，因为该提交行为可能被理解为默示断言：其对各类实体和资产享有受益所有权和／或控制权，并且其对各类人员拥有权限。个人债务人主张，该等默示断言将具有自证其罪性，因为当前刑事诉讼以及一项据称针对破产犯罪的调查，涉及关于个人债务人对实体和／或资产的受益所有权和控制权，以及个人债务人对某些个人的权限和／或控制权的指控。\n\n受托人对个体债务人的论点提出了多项异议。受托人的主要异议是，“必备记录”原则适用，并且是提交行为原则的一个例外。为支持该论点，受托人主张，个体债务人作为破产案件中的债务人，不能适当地援引第五修正案，以避免提交《破产法》所要求的与其财务事务、资产和负债有关的文件和记录——无论提交行为是否具有证言性质且可能导致自证其罪。下文将讨论受托人关于个体债务人在其破产案件中所负义务的必备记录论点。法院将首先讨论受托人就个体债务人是否已履行其举证责任、证明遵守《强制提交命令》将同时具有证言性质且可能导致自证其罪所提出的各项异议。\n\n补充声明\n\n个体债务人与受托人已就受托人的一项异议达成解决。在藐视法庭动议提出及就该动议举行听证之前，个体债务人的声明概括性地援引了其第五修正案禁止自证其罪的权利。受托人主张，此举不当，因为：(a) 该概括性援引并未表明个体债务人在援引第五修正案之前已适当考虑受托人的每项请求；以及 (b) 这些第11章案件属于民事程序，这意味着，在适当情形下，个体债务人对第五修正案的援引可以作为证据被采纳。然而，个体债务人此后已依照一项同意命令提交补充声明，其中他逐一回答了受托人提出的每一问题，并就二百零二（202）个问题中的每一个援引其第五修正案权利。\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 2035 提交日期 07/26/23 录入日期 07/26/23 11:27:18 第 15 页，共 42 页 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 36 63案件 22-50073 文书 2074-2 提交日期 08/09/23 录入日期 08/09/23 15:21:50 第 36 页，共 63 页\n\n尽管个体债务人现已就受托人的具体问题适当地援引其第五修正案权利，但与提交文件有关的问题仍然存在。\n\n起诉前援引第五修正案\n\n受托人对个体债务人证明其遵守《强制提交命令》所提出的一项剩余异议没有说服力。受托人主张，个体债务人在针对他的起诉书被解封之前即已构成藐视法庭，现不能鉴于刑事程序而援引第五修正案以避免被认定为藐视法庭。然而，个体债务人的主张正确，即可在刑事程序开始之前援引第五修正案。参见 United States v. Miranti, 253 F.2d 135, 139 (2d Cir. 1958)（允许证人在仅存在轻微被起诉可能性时援引第五修正案）。正如个体债务人可在2022年12月的证据听证期间及2023年3月的证言录取期间主张其第五修正案权利一样，只要其具有“合理理由担心直接回答会带来危险”，且其第五修正案权利在其他方面适用，他亦可在2023年2月如此主张。Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486.\n\n控方持有的文件\n\n受托人的第二项论点同样不能成立。受托人主张，个体债务人不会受到损害，因为控方已经持有其文件和记录。就这些文件的存在及所在地已为人所知而言，受托人的主张正确，因此 Fox 测试的第一项不成立。Grand Jury 1993, 1 F.3d at 93. 尽管如此，提交控方已持有的个体债务人文件和记录的行为是否会导致对该等文件和记录进行认证，仍是一个问题。Id. 个体债务人担心其提交行为将认证这些文件。法院未见过这些文件和记录。受托人亦未见过。法院承认，受托人处于困难境地，因为其并非刑事程序的一方。然而，受托人未能证明该等文件和记录具有真实性将是一个既定结论。因此，根据 Fox 测试的第二项，对控方持有的文件和记录真实性的默示确认可能具有证言性质。Id.\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 2035 提交日期 07/26/23 录入日期 07/26/23 11:27:18 第 16 页，共 42 页 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 37 63案件 22-50073 文书 2074-2 提交日期 08/09/23 录入日期 08/09/23 15:21:50 第 37 页，共 63 页\n\n此外，由于控方扣押的文件和记录可能在刑事程序中用于起诉个体债务人，法院认为个体债务人的如下论点具有说服力：其对该等文件和记录的默示认证可能成为用于起诉他的“证据链中的一环”。Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486. 因此，除非受托人能够证明该等文件和记录具有真实性将是一个既定结论，否则提交行为原则适用于控方持有的文件，除非该原则的某项例外适用。\n\n不在控方持有之下的文件\n\n个体债务人主张，《强制提交命令》要求其提交的全部文件和记录均已被控方扣押。法院不同意，因此继续讨论。如受托人所主张，因个体债务人现已被监禁而概括性声称其不持有、保管或控制任何文件或记录，缺乏说服力。尽管此前曾陈述个体债务人几乎不保有任何文件、记录和设备，FBI 显然在个体债务人的住所扣押了许多文件、记录和电子设备。\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 2035 提交日期 07/26/23 录入日期 07/26/23 11:27:18 第 17 页，共 42 页 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 38 63案件 22-50073 文书 2074-2 提交日期 08/09/23 录入日期 08/09/23 15:21:50 第 38 页，共 63 页\n\n同样，受托人的主张正确，即没有证据基础支持如下主张：个体债务人持有、保管或控制的记录中，不存在尚未包含于控方扣押的文件和记录之中的记录。鉴于过去对个体债务人律师所作努力——或者视情况而定，未作努力——的描述，个体债务人未能证明已进行了合理勤勉的搜索。（参见《强制提交命令》第 9 段。）基于这两个理由，法院认定，个体债务人未能证明所有可能回应请求的文件和记录均已被控方扣押。\n\n对于控方未扣押的文件和记录，受托人未能证明这些文件的所在地、存在或真实性是一个既定结论。因此，如个体债务人证明其可能导致自证其罪，提交行为原则将适用。Fox, 721 F.2d at 36. 受托人主张，个体债务人未履行其举证责任，证明所请求的文件和记录可能导致自证其罪。受托人的主张正确，即使有补充声明，个体债务人亦未证明每一项被请求的提交均可能导致自证其罪。\n\n尽管如此，法院注意到个体债务人须满足的举证责任有所减轻。法院还注意到，其必须依赖自身对这些第11章案件及相关对抗程序的事实和情形的认识。Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486–87. 此外，如个体债务人的律师指出，“所赋予的特权不仅延及其本身足以支持依据联邦刑事法规作出定罪的回答，也同样涵盖能够提供起诉主张该特权者犯有联邦罪行所需证据链中一环的回答。”Id. at 486. 然而，法院“对本案特殊性的个人认识”包括如下观察：除其明确表示希望避免自证其罪外，个体债务人还阻碍了对其资产、负债和财务事务的合法调查。Id. at 487.（参见，例如，Social Media/Protest Adversary, ECF No. 133。）\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 2035 提交日期 07/26/23 录入日期 07/26/23 11:27:18 第 18 页，共 42 页 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 39 63案件 22-50073 文书 2074-2 提交日期 08/09/23 录入日期 08/09/23 15:21:50 第 39 页，共 63 页\n\n刑事程序中的起诉书本身不足以使个体债务人就控方未扣押的文件和记录履行其举证责任。起诉书指控的欺诈可追溯至约2018年，而迄今受托人关注的许多资产——特定游艇 Lady May；Sherry-Netherland Hotel 的公寓；Ace Decade Holdings Limited 诉讼请求——据称均于2018年之前取得。尽管其中一些资产，例如 Lady May，在起诉书中有所讨论，法院不能凭借其“对本案特殊性的个人认识”以及个体债务人有限的证据陈述，认定个体债务人已基于刑事程序充分支持其对第五修正案的概括性援引。Id. at 487. 个体债务人未能证明其所有资产、负债和财务事务均与被指控的欺诈有关，或可能以某种方式构成关于被指控欺诈的“证据链中的一环”。Id. at 486.\n\n为支持其已遵守《强制提交命令》的论点，个体债务人还提交了一份向受托人发出的传票，该传票涉及对在这些第11章案件中涉嫌实施的潜在破产罪行所进行的调查。（ECF No. 1719, at \\*80:20–81:8.）如上所述，在确定提交文件是否可能导致自证其罪时，因该调查而被起诉是否可能并不重要。Miranti, 253 F.2d at 139.\n\n《美国法典》第18编第152、156、157、1519和3284条规定了与在破产案件中隐匿资产有关的罪行。第152、156、157和1519条要求存在明知、故意或欺诈行为。第3284条要求存在“隐匿”。\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 2035 提交日期 07/26/23 录入日期 07/26/23 11:27:18 第 19 页，共 42 页 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 40 63案件 22-50073 文书 2074-2 提交日期 08/09/23 录入日期 08/09/23 15:21:50 第 40 页，共 63 页\n\n默示确认个体债务人持有或控制回应 Rule 2004 传票的文件或记录，以及此类文件或记录真实，并不本身具有罪责性，因为这并不能证明个体债务人明知、故意或欺诈性地向破产财产隐瞒了资产——或与资产有关的文件和记录。债务人经常错误地忽略资产和负债，并修改其陈述和清单及/或更新其披露。\n\n尽管如此，法院必须考虑，此类默示陈述是否构成就个别债务人因向受托人、本院及其债权人隐瞒其资产而可能受到刑事追诉的“证据链中的一环”。Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486。受托人主张，个别债务人拥有众多商业利益，因此应当持有与之相称的文件和记录。尽管个别债务人否认这些主张，但基于本院及其他法院先前作出的认定，法院根据其“对本案特殊情况的个人认知”，认为个别债务人至少拥有其目前承认范围之外的某些商业利益。参见 Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund, L.P. v. Kwok Ho Wan, Index No. 652077/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 9, 2022), NYCEF No. 1181；E. Profit Corp. Ltd. v. Strategic Vision US LLC, Case No. 18-cv-2185 (LJL), 2021 WL 2554631, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2021)。（参见 ECF No. 1110；HK Int'l Funds Invs. (USA) Ltd., LLC v. Despins ex rel. Kwok (In re Kwok), Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 22-05003 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. May 18, 2023), ECF Nos. 177, 221；Social Media/Protest Adversary, ECF No. 133 ¶ 7。）法院认为，个别债务人的提交范围可能与 Hubbell 案中争议的提交范围同样广泛。参见 530 U.S. at 40–43。尽管 Hubbell 是一宗涉及已获豁免当事人的案件，其中提交范围已知且举证责任已转移至控方，但个别债务人可能同样有必要“广泛运用‘其自身头脑中的内容’，以识别传票请求所回应的数百份文件”，并实质上绘制其资产、负债及商业利益的图谱。参见 id. at 43。就所称破产犯罪调查而言，该图谱可能有助于发现有关知情、意图或欺诈的证据。法院基于其对这些 Chapter 11 案件及相关对抗程序具体事实和情形的认知，认定此类承认可能构成证据链中的环节，因为其可能具有“派生使用”。参见 id. at 41–43。\n\n个别债务人的提交具有证言性和自证其罪性\n\n基于上述理由，法院认定，遵从《强制提交命令》进行提交，就控方持有的文件及控方尚未扣押的文件而言，均具有证言性和自证其罪性。参见 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410–11。然而，法院注意到，迄今为止的证据记录并不充分。如日后受托人能够：(i) 证明任何文件的位置、存在及真实性均为既定结论；(ii) 就任何文件或文件类别证明个别债务人未能履行其举证责任；或 (iii) 证明其就任何文件或文件类别已掌握个别债务人资产、负债及商业利益的图谱，则可经适当动议重新审查该认定。\n\nb. “必备记录”例外是否适用？\n\n尽管文件提交行为原则适用，但这并不终结法院的分析，亦不必然决定《藐视法庭动议》的结果。如上所述，受托人的主要论点是，必备记录原则适用于本院面前的具体事实和情形，并构成文件提交行为原则的一项例外。因此，受托人主张，无论文件提交行为原则是否允许个别债务人针对《强制提交命令》适当地援引其第五修正案反对自证其罪的权利，均无关紧要，因为本案适用必备记录例外。\n\n为支持其论点，受托人援引 Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549 (1990)。在 Bouknight 案中，最高法院在 Fisher 案之后重述并重申了必备记录原则的存在。493 U.S. at 555–59。根据必备记录原则，“不得援引第五修正案特权，以抗拒遵守旨在实现州与其刑法执行无关的公共目的而构建的监管制度。”Id. at 556；参见 Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1968)（阐明就必备记录原则应考虑的因素）；Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 32 (1948)（创设必备记录原则）。\n\n个别债务人主张，Bouknight 案并未描述 Fisher 案所确立的文件提交行为原则的一项例外，并且必备记录原则并不允许强制提交具有证言性和自证其罪性的文件及记录。个别债务人的主张与 Bouknight 案的明确文本相矛盾，其载明：\n\n在并非所有情形下，提交命令可能强制作出可能证明具有自证其罪性的证言性陈述这一可能性，均足以证明援引该特权以抗拒提交是正当的。即使假定该有限的证言性陈述具有充分的自证其罪性并且“就该特权而言具有充分的证言性”，Bouknight 也不得援引该特权以抗拒提交命令，因为她已承担与提交有关的保管职责，并且提交系非刑事监管制度的一部分所要求。\n\nBouknight, 493 U.S. at 555–56（讨论 Fisher）（省略内部引证）。除最高法院外，第二巡回上诉法院亦明确驳回了个别债务人的主张：\n\n“[T]he required records doctrine is an exception to the Fifth Amendment privilege. As such, it necessarily overrides the privilege in instances in which the privilege would otherwise apply. Fisher was not concerned with required records and nothing in its analysis could be construed as weakening the required records exception.”\n\nUnited States v. Doe (In re Grand Jury Subpoena), 741 F.3d 339, 346 (2d Cir. 2013)（下称“Grand Jury 2013”）（引自 Doe v. United States (In re Doe), 711 F.2d 1187, 1192–93 (2d Cir. 1983)）。事实上，第二巡回上诉法院明确指出，“[t]his Court has twice explicitly rejected the idea that the required records exception has been abrogated by the act of production doctrine。”Grand Jury 2013, 741 F.3d at 346。该具有约束力的最高法院及第二巡回上诉法院判例明确表明，必备记录原则是文件提交行为原则的一项例外。7 因此，如本案适用必备记录例外，则无论此前认定该提交行为具有证言性和自证其罪性，个别债务人均未遵从《强制提交命令》。\n\n在确定必备记录原则是否适用时，第二巡回上诉法院依照 Grosso 因素。Grand Jury 2013, 741 F.3d at 345。在 Grosso 案中，最高法院适用下列因素：“[F]irst, the purposes of the United States' inquiry must be essentially regulatory; second, information is to be obtained by requiring the preservation of records of a kind which the regulated party has customarily kept; and third, the records themselves must have assumed 'public aspects' which render them at least analogous to public documents。”390 U.S. at 67–68。本案中，受托人寻求的文件和记录，是《强制提交命令》认定与“[个别债务人]的行为、行为方式或财产，或其负债及财务状况，或可能影响[破产财产]管理的任何事项”有关的文件和记录。Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004(b)。因此，个别债务人有义务根据 sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4) 提交受托人所寻求的文件和记录。因此，争点在于，个别债务人根据 sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4) 有义务提交的文件和记录，是否属于 Grosso 检验下的必备记录。\n\n《破产法典》sections 521(a)(3) and 521(a)(4) 的目的是什么？\n\n在确定第一项因素是否支持适用必备记录原则时，法院必须考虑相关“立法是否并非‘面向广大公众’，且涉及‘一个充斥刑事法规的领域’”。Grand Jury 2013, 741 F.3d at 347（引自 Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965)）；参见 Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 57 (1968)；Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 99 (1968)。法院必须就所涉具体法条作出此项判断，而非参照周边整体法定背景。Grand Jury 2013, 741 F.3d at 348（引自 California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 430 (1971)）。\n\n《破产法典》Section 521 的标题为“债务人的义务”。Sections 521(a)(3) and 521(a)(4) 分别规定，在破产受托人如本案中正在案件中任职时，债务人必须配合受托人履行受托人的职责，并必须向受托人交出所有破产财产以及与破产财产有关的任何已记录信息，包括账簿、文件、记录和文书。\n\n《破产法典》Section 109 允许个人或实体根据 Chapters 7、11、11 Subchapter V、12 或 13 提起破产申请。在 Chapters 7、12 和 13 的程序以及 Chapter 11 Subchapter V 的程序中，破产受托人于案件开始时自动获任命。11 U.S.C. §§ 701, 702, 1183, 1202, 1302。Chapter 7 和 Chapter 13 案件在一般公众中最为常见，且始终涉及破产受托人，债务人对该受托人负有 sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4) 规定的义务。\n\n尽管在第11章案件中指定破产受托人属于非常救济，见 11 U.S.C. § 1112，但该非常救济的效果是，被剥夺管理权的第11章债务人承担与第7章或第13章债务人相同的、依据第521(a)(3)条和第521(a)(4)条所负的义务。依法，债务人在提出第11章案件时，自动被视为占有财产债务人，并承担破产受托人的角色。11 U.S.C. § 1107(a)。然而，在第11章案件中，如符合债权人和破产财产的最佳利益，可因“正当理由”指定破产受托人，从而“剥夺”债务人对破产财产的管理权。11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1)。\n\n第11章具有特殊性，因为其旨在适用于具有复杂商业权益、资产和负债的债务人，例如大型公司和高净值个人。见 H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 220 (1977)。因此，第11章遵循三项基本推定：(i) 具有重大商业权益和经营活动的债务人，作为持续经营的经济实体，比被拆分并清算具有更高价值；(ii) 具有复杂财务事务、资产和负债的债务人，比指定的受托人更适于为债权人的利益管理其自身事务；以及 (iii) 允许具有重大商业权益和经营活动的债务人进行重整，除保护债权人的利益外，还保护债务人、所有人、雇员等人的利益。见同上。然而，归根结底，只要第11章的具体规定能够使对债权人的分配最大化，第11章即应得到适当适用。见 Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 163–64 (1991)。为指定破产受托人所列举的许多“正当理由”事例——\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 2035 提交 07/26/23 登记 07/26/23 11:27:18 第 25 页，共 42 页 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 47 63\n案件 22-50073 文书 2074-2 提交 08/09/23 登记 08/09/23 15:21:50 第 46 页，共 63 页\n\n——或者驳回案件，或者将案件转换为第7章程序——均涉及对上述推定的推翻，或者占有财产债务人未能履行其为债权人利益管理破产财产的义务。11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4); see 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 1112.04[6][b]–[k] (16th ed. 2023)。\n\n在受托人被指定后，破产受托人即为债务人破产财产的代表。11 U.S.C. § 323。第521(a)(3)条和第521(a)(4)条的目的是使破产受托人能够依照其职责管理债务人的破产财产。见 11 U.S.C. §§ 704, 1106, 1116, 1183, 1202, 1302; 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 521.15[5], 521.16。破产财产的管理要求债务人向受托人披露、移交并予以合作，因为破产案件是一项涵盖广泛的诉讼，旨在公平且最终地解决、调整或重整无数债务人与债权人之间的关系。见，例如，11 U.S.C. §§ 704(a)(5)（“受托人应……审查债权证明，并对任何不当获准的债权提出异议……”）, 704(a)(7)（“受托人应……依利害关系方的请求，提供有关破产财产及其管理的信息……”）, 704(a)(8)（“受托人应……向法院、美国受托人以及负责征收或确定因该等经营活动产生的任何税款的任何政府单位，提交该企业经营情况的定期报告和摘要……”）, 1106(a)(3)（“受托人应……调查债务人的行为、操守、资产、负债和财务状况，债务人企业的经营情况及继续该企业经营的可取性，以及与案件或计划制定有关的其他事项……”）; 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1116.01（“受托人的调查和报告职责提供了一种机制，使债务人的事务状况得到充分披露，从而使利害关系方能够保护其权利并实现债务人的成功重整。”）。\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 2035 提交 07/26/23 登记 07/26/23 11:27:18 第 26 页，共 42 页 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 47 63\n案件 22-50073 文书 2074-2 提交 08/09/23 登记 08/09/23 15:21:50 第 47 页，共 63 页\n\n债务人未能履行以下义务：(i) 与受托人合作；(ii) 披露财务事务、资产和负债；以及 (iii) 移交破产财产及相关记录，会严重妨碍受托人管理破产财产的能力。见 United States v. Stone, 282 F. 547, 553 (2d Cir. 1960)（“财务状况说明的根本目的，正是提供可靠信息，而无须进一步调查。”）（维持在一项刑事诉讼中对债务人的定罪，该诉讼就债务人未能在依原《破产法》进行的程序中，于财务状况说明内适当披露贷款信息而提起破产罪行追诉）。该未履行行为给破产财产的债权人造成费用和延误，构成可认定的损害。见 Andrews v. McCarron (In re Vincent Andrews Mgmt. Corp.), 414 B.R. 1, 7 (D. Conn. 2009)。\n\n此外，《破产法》所提供的许多救济具有广泛而非常的性质，其前提是适当披露和通知。见，例如，11 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)（界定在开始征集计划之前必须送达的披露声明所需的充分信息）；Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 475 n. 12 (2004)（认定“《破产法》广泛的披露要求降低了债务人存在重大未披露债务的风险”，该风险降低支撑了法院“修改债务人原始合同规定的分期付款数额、时间或金额的权限”）；In re Motors Liquidation Co., 829 F.3d 135, 158–61 (2d Cir. 2016)（裁定，未将出售动议适当送达未披露的已知债权人，使出售命令对该等债权人不可执行）。作为破产财产代表的受托人，首先负有为以下对象寻求许多该等救济的职责：(i) 为破产财产的利益，Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 352\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 2035 提交 07/26/23 登记 07/26/23 11:27:18 第 27 页，共 42 页 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 48 63\n案件 22-50073 文书 2074-2 提交 08/09/23 登记 08/09/23 15:21:50 第 48 页，共 63 页\n\n(1985)；以及 (ii) 为债务人的利益，债务人在经历艰难历程后可能获得“重新开始”，见 Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991)。\n\n法院认定，第521(a)(3)条和第521(a)(4)条面向一般公众。破产受托人在广泛类型的案件中自动被指定。向受托人披露并移交财产和记录的义务，对于受托人的基本且必要的管理职责以及受托人依《破产法》行使权力至关重要。\n\n剩余问题是，第521(a)(3)条和第521(a)(4)条是否涉及一个“充斥刑事法规”的领域。Albertson, 382 U.S. at 79。《美国法典》第18编第151条及以下条款、第1519条和第3284条，将与《破产法》程序有关的某些行为规定为犯罪。这些“破产犯罪”中有数项涉及隐匿破产财产的资产，以保护该等资产免于分配给破产财产的债权人。然而，本院面临的问题并非未能履行债务人依据第521(a)(3)条和第(4)条所负义务的某些行为，是否使债务人易受刑事追诉，而是第521(a)(3)条和第(4)条是否“针对‘一个本身被怀疑从事犯罪活动的选择性群体’”。Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 57。\n\n在 Grosso 和 Marchetti 案中，问题并非执行法定报税要求的刑法，该等刑法类似于上文所列的破产犯罪。Grosso, 390 U.S. at 64–65; see Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 57。相反，在这两起案件中，最高法院认定，提交联邦赌博税申报表的要求直接针对州法已规定为犯罪的行为，即赌博。Grosso, 390 U.S. at 64–65; Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 57。Albertson 案所涉问题，是要求美国共产党（Communist Party of America）成员亲自向颠覆活动管制委员会（Subversive Activities Control Board）登记。\n\n案件 22-50073 文书 2035 提交 07/26/23 登记 07/26/23 11:27:18 第 28 页，共 42 页 2073 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36 49 63\n案件 22-50073 文书 2074-2 提交 08/09/23 登记 08/09/23 15:21:50 第 49 页，共 63 页\n\n382 U.S. at 77–78。当时，与共产党有联系属于犯罪行为。同上。Haynes 案所涉问题，是要求非在正常过程中取得枪支的人——最高法院指出，其中大多数将是非法取得枪支的人——登记其枪支。390 U.S. at 95–97。\n\n最高法院在 Grosso、Marchetti、Albertson 和 Haynes 案中审理的事实，各自均与本案事实不同。首先，所有该等案件均涉及创建新记录，而非提交现有文件和记录。Haynes, 390 U.S. at 95–97; Grosso, 390 U.S. at 64–65; Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 57; Albertson, 382 U.S. at 77–78。更重要的是，破产案件的常规管理通常并不涉及犯罪活动。破产财产的管理意在与刑事责任问题相分离。比较 11 U.S.C. §§ 323（受托人是代表破产财产就民事诉讼提起诉讼和被诉的当事人）, 362(a)(1)（通常，对债务人或破产财产提起的民事诉讼，因提出自愿破产申请而中止）与 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1)（根据第11编案件的开始，并不中止针对债务人的刑事诉讼）。债务人通常不会因其在破产案件中被要求作出的披露而承担刑事责任。破产程序中披露要求的意图，是揭示民事责任，以便公平且最终地解决针对债务人的全部债权。见 Byers, 402 U.S. at 430–31（认定，尽管《加利福尼亚州车辆法典》涉及某些刑事法规，“其目的并非便利刑事定罪，而是促进因机动车事故产生的民事责任之清偿”，并裁定适用所需记录例外）。\n\n因此，第521(a)(3)条和第521(a)(4)条的目的“本质上属于监管性”，这支持将所需记录例外适用于根据强制提交命令（Order Compelling Production）被强制要求提交文件的个人债务人（Individual Debtor）。Grosso, 390 U.S. at 67–68。\n\n所称的所需记录是否属于通常保存的记录？\n\n关于第二项因素，即所称须予保存的记录是否属于通常保存的记录，受托人正在寻求的例如包括财务和银行记录、资金转账记录、与个人债务人商业权益有关的记录等。正如第二巡回法院就外国银行账户信息所指出，常识表明，个人和实体会保留基本的金融交易和账户信息，以管理其事务并访问其账户。Grand Jury 2013, 741 F.3d at 350 (citing M.H. v. United States (In re Grand Jury Investigation), 648 F.3d 1067, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011)). 本院认定，对于财务事务、资产和负债复杂的个人和实体而言，这一点尤其如此。特别是，第二巡回法院进一步指出，尽管“某些从事不当行为的个人被建议不要保留甚至此类基本信息[,] . . . [w]e decline to look at the custom of only the miscreants . . ..” Grand Jury 2013, 741 F.3d at 350. 因此，本院认定，sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4) 所要求的记录属于“通常保存的”记录。Grosso, 390 U.S. at 67–68.\n\n所称须予保存的记录是否具有“公共属性”？\n\n关于第三项因素，即所称须予保存的记录是否具有“公共属性”，问题在于，section 521(a)(3) and (a)(4) 的整体监管背景是否要求保存该等特定记录。Grand Jury 2013, 741 F.3d at 351–52.\n\n《破产法》要求在案件开始时及案件进行过程中进行披露。Section 521(a)(1) 要求任何债务人——包括个人债务人——提交债权人名单、财务状况说明书以及包括但不限于债务人资产、负债、收入和支出在内的明细表。See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 521.06[3][a]（“该明细表是对所有财产的陈述，包括不动产和动产，该等财产属于 section 541(a) 对破产财产所作广义定义的范围内，其中包括‘案件开始时债务人对财产享有的所有法定或衡平权益。’”）, 521.06[3][b]（“对不动产和动产权益进行列示是一项极为重要的义务。”）, 521.09（“要求提交财务状况说明书的目的，是向受托人和债权人提供有关债务人财务状况的详细信息，从而节省为获取信息而进行长期且冗长审查的费用。”）。Section 341 要求任何债务人接受由受托人进行的审查，其债权人可以参与该审查。See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 341.01.\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 2035 于 07/26/23 提交，于 07/26/23 11:27:18 录入，第 30 页，共 42 页；2073 于 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36；第 51 页，共 63 页；案件 22-50073 文件 2074-2 于 08/09/23 提交，于 08/09/23 15:21:50 录入，第 51 页，共 63 页\n\n尤其就 Chapter 11 而言，section 1107 规定，在 Chapter 11 债务人为占有中的债务人期间，该债务人作为破产财产的受托人，将承担上述受托人的诸多相同披露义务，包括报告义务。See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 1107.02[3]–[4]. 债务人未能在与 Chapter 11 Plan 有关而须提交的披露说明书中适当披露财务事务、资产和负债，将导致该计划无法获准确认。11 U.S.C. § 1125; see 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 1125.02（“披露是《破产法》下重整实践的核心概念。”）（citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 226–31 (1977)), 1125.02[2]. 未作适当披露可以且确实构成将 Chapter 11 重整案件转换为 Chapter 7 清算案件、驳回 Chapter 11 破产案件或指定 Chapter 11 受托人的理由。11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(f); see 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1112.04[6][f].\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 2035 于 07/26/23 提交，于 07/26/23 11:27:18 录入，第 31 页，共 42 页；2073 于 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36；第 52 页，共 63 页；案件 22-50073 文件 2074-2 于 08/09/23 提交，于 08/09/23 15:21:50 录入，第 52 页，共 63 页\n\n与 Bouknight 一案中的母亲非常相似，个人债务人通过自愿提起其 Chapter 11 案件、使其自身接受本院对人管辖权，以及将其所有法定和衡平财产权益——“无论位于何处及由何人持有”——提交本院对物管辖权，承担了这些义务。11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1); Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 559（“Bouknight 服从监管体系的常规运作，并同意以符合州监管利益且接受 BCDSS 检查的方式照管 Maurice。”）。此外，如同在 Bouknight 一案中，在有正当理由证明时，母亲须向 Baltimore City Department of Social Services（巴尔的摩市社会服务部）交出其子女；由于已证明指定受托人具有正当理由，《破产法》要求个人债务人向受托人提交与破产财产有关的文件和记录。11 U.S.C. §§ 521(a)(4), 1112; Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 555–56. 由于个人债务人自愿提起其 Chapter 11 案件并成为占有中的债务人，他承担了破产受托人为债权人利益管理破产财产的职责。11 U.S.C. § 1107(a). 个人债务人在作为占有中的债务人期间，是破产财产及其账簿和记录的保管人。See Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 555–56. 虽然其占有中的债务人身份在指定受托人时终止，但其由此产生的向受托人提供信息的义务并未终止。\n\n本院认定，个人债务人依据 sections 521(a)(3) and (a)(4) 被要求提交的记录已具有“公共属性”，因为个人债务人的案件是自愿的 Chapter 11 案件，并且这些 Chapter 11 案件及相关对抗程序的具体事实和情形支持这一结论。See Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 555–56; Grosso, 390 U.S. at 67–68.\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 2035 于 07/26/23 提交，于 07/26/23 11:27:18 录入，第 32 页，共 42 页；2073 于 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36；第 53 页，共 63 页；案件 22-50073 文件 2074-2 于 08/09/23 提交，于 08/09/23 15:21:50 录入，第 53 页，共 63 页\n\n“须予保存的记录”例外适用\n\nGrosso 检验的全部三项因素，均支持在本院审理的具体事实和情形下，将须予保存的记录例外适用于第五修正案不得自证其罪的权利。390 U.S. at 67–68; see Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 555–56; Grand Jury 2013, 741 F.3d at 345; Ross, 156 B.R. at 279–81; In re Fairbanks, 135 B.R. 717, 730–33 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991).\n\n适用须予保存的记录例外，也得到与原《破产法》相关的最高法院先例的支持。In re Harris, 221 U.S. 274 (1911)（认定第五修正案不保护债务人免于向破产接管人提交其账簿和记录）。Bouknight 在 Fisher 之后维持须予保存的记录例外时，援引 Harris 并表示赞同，将其作为须予保存的记录原则的一个例子，确认尽管自 Harris 作出判决以来第五修正案判例法已有发展，Harris 至今仍然有效。Bouknight, 439 U.S. at 556–57; see Fisher, 425 U.S. 411–13（讨论 Harris 而未对其裁判结论提出质疑）; see also Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 221 (1998)（认定除非有明确迹象表明国会有意如此，否则《破产法》下的先例不被排除适用）; Ross, 156 B.R. at 279; 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 344.03[4]（“[I]t is doubtful that a debtor, as opposed to other witnesses, may successfully refuse to turn over the property, books and records that every debtor under the Code is required to surrender to the trustee on the basis that this 'act of production' might itself tend to incriminate.”）; but see Butcher v. Bailey, 753 F.2d 465, 468 (6th Cir. 1985)（认定，在 Bouknight 之前且在非自愿 Chapter 7 案件而非自愿 Chapter 11 案件中，Harris 在 Fisher 之后已不再是有效法律，并且 section 521 不要求提交适用提交行为原则的文件）。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 2035 于 07/26/23 提交，于 07/26/23 11:27:18 录入，第 33 页，共 42 页；2073 于 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36；第 54 页，共 63 页；案件 22-50073 文件 2074-2 于 08/09/23 提交，于 08/09/23 15:21:50 录入，第 54 页，共 63 页\n\n个人债务人提出异议称，尽管如此，根据 McCarthy v. Arndstein，Harris 和须予保存的记录例外并不适用于 Rule 2004 subpoenas。266 U.S. 34 (1924). 然而，最高法院在 Arndstein 一案中基于如下理由，将该案与其先前在 Harris 一案中作出的意见区分开来：Harris 涉及提交文件和记录，而 Arndstein 涉及被强制作证的问题。266 U.S. at 41–42. 受托人并未反对个人债务人在答复书面质询、证言录取期间的问题或法庭证言时援引第五修正案。相反，受托人反对个人债务人针对提交文件和记录的请求援引第五修正案。因此，Arndstein 不适用。\n\n本院认定，无论是根据对 Grosso 因素的分析，还是根据适用《破产法》下的最高法院先例，须予保存的记录例外均适用。\niii. 个人债务人未遵守强制提交命令\n\n基于上述所有理由，本院认定：(i) 个人债务人遵守强制提交命令并非不可能；以及 (ii) 根据须予保存的记录例外，个人债务人不得针对强制提交命令适当援引其第五修正案不得自证其罪的权利。因此，受托人已通过清楚且令人信服的证据证明，个人债务人未遵守强制提交命令。\n3. 个人债务人是否以合理方式尽力遵守强制提交命令？\n\n受托人还必须证明，个人债务人未以合理方式尽力遵守强制提交命令。King, 65 F.3d at 1058. 受托人主张，个人债务人未曾作出任何遵守强制提交命令的尝试。对此，个人债务人主张，对于其能否适当主张第五修正案不得自证其罪的权利存在合理疑义，并且该声明及补充声明体现了其善意遵守强制提交命令的努力。\n\n案件 22-50073 文件 2035 于 07/26/23 提交，于 07/26/23 11:27:18 录入，第 34 页，共 42 页；2073 于 08/09/23 08/09/23 15:03:36；第 55 页，共 63 页；案件 22-50073 文件 2074-2 于 08/09/23 提交，于 08/09/23 15:21:50 录入，第 55 页，共 63 页\n\n个人债务人所犯的关键错误是法律错误，而非事实错误。具体而言，个人债务人错误地认定，须予保存的记录例外不适用于提交行为原则，并且其可以针对强制提交命令援引第五修正案。基于上述理由，提交每一份文件或记录在事实上是否构成证言性且具有自证其罪性质，并不影响结论。\n\n一般而言，在不要求故意或意图的情况下，法律错误不是民事责任的抗辩理由。Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573, 583–85 (2010)。如上所述，“缺乏故意[原文如此]并不免除民事藐视法庭责任。”McComb, 336 U.S. at 191。因此，本院认定，个人债务人的法律错误不是民事藐视法庭的抗辩理由。参见 Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109, 123 (1963)（认定法律错误不是藐视国会罪的抗辩理由）；United States v. Remini, 967 U.S. 754, 758 (2d Cir. 1992)（认定法律错误不是刑事藐视法庭罪的抗辩理由）。这一结论符合最高法院在 Taggert 中的意见，即“当事人的善意，即使并不排除民事藐视法庭，也可能有助于确定适当的制裁。”139 S. Ct. at 1802（强调系后加）。因此，受托人已证明，个人债务人未勤勉地尝试遵守强制提交命令。\n\n4. 个人债务人是否知悉强制提交命令？\n\n民事藐视法庭的最后一个要件是知悉相关命令。Gravel, 6 F.4th at 512。该声明承认个人债务人知悉强制提交命令。(ECF No. 1444 Ex. A.) 民事藐视法庭的这一要件已经成立。\n\n5. 个人债务人构成民事藐视法庭\n\n四项要件均已成立，准许藐视法庭动议。本院认定个人债务人因未遵守强制提交命令而构成民事藐视法庭。如以下判令段落所述，个人债务人将获给予消除其藐视法庭状态的机会。鉴于个人债务人面临情形的严重性质，以及其在补充声明中回答受托人二百零二（202）个问题时表现出的善意，本院将给予个人债务人充足时间以消除其藐视法庭状态。Taggert, 139 S. Ct. at 1802。然而，如个人债务人未能消除其藐视法庭状态，受托人可请求适当制裁。\n\n特此提醒个人债务人的代理律师：“作为法院官员，律师有义务通过对合法的证据开示请求作出勤勉、善意的回应，协助证据开示程序。”McLeod, Alexander, Powel & Apffel, P.C. v. Quarles, 894 F.2d 1482, 1486 (5th Cir. 1990)。为此，进一步提醒个人债务人的代理律师，本院已经认定，“[个人债务人及其他人]的代理律师未能证明其在当时情形下已足够勤勉。”(Order Compelling Production ¶ 9.) 个人债务人被命令于 2023 年 1 月 31 日下午 5:00 或之前遵守强制提交命令，但其未予遵守。“[律师]和[当事人]均无单方面决定是否或何时遵守证据开示要求的权利。”535 Broadway Assocs. v. Com. Corp. of Am., 159 B.R. 403, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)。\n\n个人债务人及其代理律师应采取合理且勤勉的措施，无论本院是否已直接阐明该等措施，以使个人债务人遵守强制提交命令。正如个人债务人的代理律师在记录中所述，合理措施包括向刑事法院提出动议，请求允许向受托人提交控方已向个人债务人提供、且对 Rule 2004 subpoena 有回应性的文件和记录，但以受托人遵守刑事法院可能施加的任何条件为前提。个人债务人为消除其藐视法庭状态而行事时，系受强制提交命令所强制，因此，其向刑事法院提出动议以向受托人提交材料，并不放弃其第五修正案权利。见 Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 561–62。在审议任何制裁动议时，本院将考虑个人债务人在刑事法院寻求救济时所表现的勤勉程度。\n\nB. 是否应中止执行强制提交命令？\n\n在就藐视法庭动议作出裁决后，本院转而审议中止执行动议。个人债务人主张，为维护个人债务人免于自证其罪的第五修正案权利，强制提交命令必须中止执行，直至刑事诉讼结束。作为回应，受托人主张，没有依据中止执行强制提交命令，且该等中止将对受托人造成重大损害。\n\n本院首先指出，尽管中止执行动议由个人债务人提出，且似乎仅涉及个人债务人，但所附拟议命令将完全中止执行强制提交命令，包括与个人债务人的女儿 Ms. Mei Guo（郭梅）以及被裁定为个人债务人的公司人格替身的 HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC（HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC）有关的判令段落。就中止执行动议寻求对这些额外当事人予以救济的范围而言，本院驳回中止执行动议。\n\n转入实体问题，本院必须在其合理裁量权范围内确定是否中止执行强制提交命令。Kashi v. Grastos, 790 F.2d 1050, 1057 (2d Cir. 1986)。法院并无严格要求必须因未决刑事诉讼而中止民事诉讼。United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1 (1970); Kashi, 790 F.2d at 1057。在考虑是否鉴于刑事诉讼而中止民事诉讼时，法院考虑的因素包括：\n\n1) 刑事案件中的争议与民事案件中提出的争议重叠的程度；2) 案件的状态，包括被告是否已被起诉；3) 原告迅速推进诉讼的私人利益，与因迟延对原告造成的损害之间的权衡；4) 被告的私人利益及其负担；5) 法院的利益；以及 6) 公共利益。\n\nTrs. of Plumbers & Pipefitters Nat'l Pension Fund v. Transworld Mech., Inc., 886 F. Supp. 1134, 1139 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)。\n\n本院首先考虑破产财产迅速推进程序的私人利益，与因迟延给破产财产造成的损害之间的权衡。中止执行强制提交命令将对破产财产及个人债务人的债权人造成重大损害。如上所述，债务人披露其财务状况、资产和负债，是破产程序的基础。由于个人债务人未与受托人的调查合作，反而加以阻挠，破产财产持续承受巨额费用和迟延。根据 section 521，受托人在一年多前获任命后即应获得与个人债务人的财务状况、资产、负债、业务等有关的全部文件和记录。相反，受托人不得不确定其他适当的传票对象，发出无数传票，并持续进行动议程序。尽管受托人的努力已使破产财产获得重大利益，但破产财产也因这些努力承担了沉重成本。\n\n此外，这些沉重成本是在破产程序的背景下产生的。很可能已经没有足够资金满足债权人的债权，并且由于对个人债务人事务持续进行但尚未完成的调查，债权人正在失去其最终受偿的时间价值。11 U.S.C. §§ 726(a)(5), 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii)。此外，国会已确定，Chapter 11 案件的最终目标——确认计划——必须在特定期限内实现。见 11 U.S.C. §§ 1106(a)(5), 1121(a), 1121(d)。确认计划的迟延，该计划必须规定债权人债权的最终实现，将对债权人和破产财产造成重大损害。见 Andrews, 414 B.R. at 7。不应强迫受托人在缺乏个人债务人应有的合作和披露的情况下开展工作。见 Stone, 282 F.2d at 553。\n\n本院接着考虑个人债务人的私人利益及负担。迟延或阻挠这些合法破产程序并无可认知的利益。个人债务人遵守强制提交命令也不存在可认知的负担。基于上述理由，其不能适当地援引免于自证其罪的第五修正案权利。此外，最高法院在 Bouknight 中于 Fisher 之后维持必须保存记录例外时指出：\n\n通常情况下，州的监管要求既不会强制要求作出自证其罪的证言，也不会协助刑事起诉，但第五修正案的保护并不会因此必然不适用于在援引该特权后遵守监管要求、随后面临起诉的人。\n\n493 U.S. at 561–62；但参见 Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457 (1913)（认定在 Fisher 之前，根据 Harris 提交的账簿和记录可在刑事程序中使用）。\n\n接下来，本院考虑未决刑事调查的状态以及刑事法院的利益。有两项未决刑事调查需要考虑：刑事诉讼和所称对破产犯罪的调查。个人债务人已在刑事诉讼中被起诉。未向本院提交任何证据表明其已就任何破产犯罪调查被起诉。这些 Chapter 11 案件及相关对抗程序与刑事诉讼确有重叠——(a) 个人债务人的许多债权人也是刑事诉讼中其被指称的受害人，(b) 个人债务人的某些声称资产被指称系使用刑事诉讼中所指称欺诈的所得购买，以及 (c) 个人债务人的某些声称关联方和公司人格替身被指称参与了刑事诉讼中所指称的欺诈——但与此同时，也存在不一致之处——(d) 这些 Chapter 11 案件中有些债权人并未被指称为欺诈受害人，(e) 破产财产的某些声称资产是在所指称欺诈之前购买，以及 (f) 个人债务人的某些声称关联方和人格替身未被指称参与欺诈。然而，任何破产犯罪调查所涉及的任何问题，均与这些 Chapter 11 案件直接相关。\n\n法院认定，本裁定不会实质性干扰刑事法院对刑事诉讼的有序管理利益。个人债务人提出一种担忧，即要求个人债务人向受托人提交文件将损害控方对其提起的案件，并导致在刑事法院就证据发生诉讼。该论点缺乏说服力。个人债务人在本程序中被强制提交文件和记录，并未改变如下现实：控方显然已掌握大量证据。正如个人债务人所主张的，控方可能不得将个人债务人向受托人提交的材料用作证明以下事项的证据：\n\n案号 22-50073，文件 2035，提交于 07/26/23，录入于 07/26/23 11:27:18，第 40 页，共 42 页；2073，08/09/23，08/09/23 15:03:36，61，63；案号 22-50073，文件 2074-2，提交于 08/09/23，录入于 08/09/23 15:21:50，第 61 页，共 63 页\n\n个人债务人对控方已持有的文件和记录的控制权，或该等文件和记录的真实性，但个人债务人的论点描述的是现状。此外，刑事法院将审查并裁定任何要求向受托人提交控方向个人债务人提供的文件和记录的动议。\n\n关于任何对破产罪行的调查，由于(a)没有证据表明个人债务人已被起诉，且(b)没有证据表明任何法院中存在与此相关的程序，法院认定，应较少考虑任何此类调查的利益。如上所述，《破产法典》并非为了创设破产罪行而存在。其目的在于为所有债权人以及最终债务人本身的利益，公平且最终地解决、调整和重组债务人的资产、负债及财务事务。为了某种推测性的对个人债务人涉嫌破产罪行的控诉，而妨碍受托人对个人债务人的事务、资产和负债进行调查，并不适当。破产罪行是促进在破产程序中适当披露的一种执行机制。若个人债务人遵守《部分准许强制遵从动议的命令》（“强制提交命令”），其将弥补破产罪行旨在防止的损害，同时亦使这些第11章案件得以适当管理。\n\n最后，法院认定，公众对“破产案件迅速管理的利益，因妨碍受托人向破产财团债权人收集、变现和分配资产的努力而受损。”In re MGL Corp.（MGL公司破产案）, 262 B.R. 324, 330 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2001)。公众对运行良好的破产制度具有利益。其有利于经济、债务人及债权人。妨碍该程序及拖延该程序的行为不符合公共利益。此外，如上所述，个人债务人依照强制提交命令提交文件\n\n案号 22-50073，文件 2035，提交于 07/26/23，录入于 07/26/23 11:27:18，第 41 页，共 42 页；2073，08/09/23，08/09/23 15:03:36，62，63；案号 22-50073，文件 2074-2，提交于 08/09/23，录入于 08/09/23 15:21:50，第 62 页，共 63 页\n\n和记录，并不违反第五修正案。\n\n在权衡衡平因素后，法院认定，依其合理裁量权，中止强制提交命令并无必要。因此，中止动议被驳回。\n\nC. 是否应就证据开示滥用作出金钱制裁？\n\n最后，根据 D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 37 以及 D. Conn. Bankr. L.R. 1001-1(a)(1) 和 2004-1(a) 适用的 Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C) 规定：\n\n(C) 费用支付。除上述命令之外或作为其补充，法院必须命令不遵从的一方、向该方提供意见的律师，或二者，支付因未遵从所致的合理费用，包括律师费，除非该未遵从行为具有实质正当理由，或其他情形使费用裁定不公正。\n\n根据具体事实和情形，法院认定目前不宜裁定费用。\n\nV. 结论和命令\n\n基于上述理由，法院(A)认定个人债务人因未遵守强制提交命令而构成民事藐视法庭，且(B)驳回中止动议，并依其合理裁量权拒绝在刑事诉讼解决之前中止强制提交命令。因此，现命令：\n\n命令：法院认定 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）先生（“个人债务人”）因未遵守 ECF No. 1353，即《部分准许强制遵从动议的命令》（“强制提交命令”），而构成民事藐视法庭；并进一步\n\n命令：如个人债务人未能在 2023年9月29日或之前通过使其自身完全遵守强制提交命令而消除其藐视法庭状态，Luc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯平斯）先生以个人债务人破产财团（“破产财团”）第11章受托人（“受托人”）的身份，\n\n案号 22-50073，文件 2035，提交于 07/26/23，录入于 07/26/23 11:27:18，第 42 页，共 42 页；2073，08/09/23，08/09/23 15:03:36，63，63；案号 22-50073，文件 2074-2，提交于 08/09/23，录入于 08/09/23 15:21:50，第 63 页，共 63 页\n\n可申请任何适当制裁；并进一步\n\n命令：ECF No. 1649，即《部分准许强制遵从动议的命令之有限中止动议》（“中止动议”），予以驳回。\n\n2023年7月26日，于康涅狄格州布里奇波特。","key_entities":["Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Despins","Je","Guo","GTV","Himalaya","Saraca","Himalaya Exchange","Paul Hastings","Miles Guo","Yanping Wang","HCHK","CIPA"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":1,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":133,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":465,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":523,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":636,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":757,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1046,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1090,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1110,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1353,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1444,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1453,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1537,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1585,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1649,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1650,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1670,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1680,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1719,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1737,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":1740,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2034,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2035,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2073,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":21118,"status":"published","published_at":"2023-08-09 00:00:00","created_at":"2023-08-09","updated_at":"2026-08-23 22:04:55"}