{"id":"court_ctb_2133_1","court":"CTB","case_no":"22-50073","doc_number":2133,"sub_number":1,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2023-08-25","title":"EXHIBIT A | Case 22-50073
Case 1:23-cv-00343-LJL
Doc 2133-1
Filed 08/25/23
Document 57 | Filed 07/17/23 |","summary_zh":"证据A（Gong 诉 Sarnoff 案驳回起诉的意见与裁定）—— Ho Wan Kwok 破产案（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo），CTB 22-50073 ECF #2133-1（2023-08-25立案）。该附件为纽约南区联邦法院法官 Lewis J. Liman 于2023年7月17日作出的意见与裁定（案号 23-cv-00343，ECF #57），裁定以缺乏标的管辖权及未充分陈述 FARA 主张为由，带偏见驳回原告 Junwu Gong 对美迈斯律师事务所及 Stuart Sarnoff 的修订起诉。","summary_en":"Exhibit A (Opinion and Order dismissing amended complaint in Gong v. Sarnoff et al.) — In re Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo / Guo Wengui), CTB 22-50073 ECF #2133-1 (filed 2023-08-25). Attached as an exhibit is District Judge Lewis J. Liman's July 17, 2023 SDNY Opinion and Order (23-cv-00343, Dkt. No. 57) granting with prejudice O'Melveny & Myers LLP and Stuart Sarnoff's motion to dismiss Junwu Gong's amended complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim under FARA.","body_en":"# **EXHIBIT A**\n\n|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|\n| 25
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK | | 07/17/2023 |\n| ---------------------------------------------------------------------
JUNWU GONG, | X
:
:
: | |\n| Plaintiff, | : | |\n| | : | 23-cv-00343 (LJL) |\n| -v | : | |\n| STUART M. SARNOFF, O'MELVENY & MYERS | :
: | OPINION AND ORDER |\n| LLP, CARL M. STANTON, CITY OF NEW YORK, | : | |\n| OFFICER JOHN DOE 1, OFFICER JOHN DOE 2, | : | |\n| OFFICER JOHN DOE 3, OFFICER LAUREN A. | : | |\n| DUFFY, | : | |\n| | : | |\n| Defendants. | : | |\n| | : | |\n| --------------------------------------------------------------------- | X | |\n\nLEWIS J. LIMAN, United States District Judge:\n\nDefendants O'Melveny & Myers LLP and Stuart Sarnoff (together, \"Defendants\") move, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), to dismiss the amended complaint filed by plaintiff Junwu Gong (\"Plaintiff\") for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Dkt. No. 47.\n\nFor the following reasons, the motion to dismiss is granted.\n\n# **BACKGROUND**\n\nThe Court accepts the well-pleaded allegations of the amended complaint as true for purposes of this motion. Dkt. No. 43 (\"Amended Complaint\" or \"Am. Compl.\").\n\nPlaintiff is a foreign born, ethnic Chinese U.S. Permanent Resident who has, on numerous occasions, joined with other ethnic Chinese individuals to lawfully and peacefully protest against the Chinese Communist Party (\"CCP\"). *Id*. ¶¶ 46–47. He alleges that he has been subjected to an ongoing campaign of harassment by agents of the CCP. *Id.* ¶ 70.\n\nDefendant O'Melveny & Myers LLP (\"O'Melveny\") is a Delaware registered limited liability partnership, which conducts business as a law firm and regularly transacts business in the State of New York. *Id*. ¶ 63. Defendant Sarnoff is a partner at O'Melveny, *id*. ¶ 53, and is a resident of the State of New York, *id*. ¶ 62. Defendant Carl M. Stanton is a resident of the City and State of New York. *Id.* ¶ 64. The Amended Complaint also names as Defendants the City of New York, New York City Police Officer Lauren A. Duffy, and three John Doe police officers. *Id.* ¶¶ 65–69.1\n\nAs of January 2023, O'Melveny, has, upon information and belief, at least three offices in the People's Republic of China (\"China\" or the \"PRC\") with approximately forty-five lawyers. *Id*. ¶ 53. Plaintiff alleges that O'Melveny's work in the PRC is \"extremely lucrative,\" *id*. ¶ 56, and that O'Melveny's offices in China would not be permitted to continue to exist unless Defendants O'Melveny and Sarnoff were willing to serve the CCP on demand, *id*. ¶ 54. O'Melveny and Sarnoff have also handled numerous matters in the United States defending the interests, allies, or agents of the CCP. *Id.* ¶ 55(c). Citing a blog post written by a former O'Melveny attorney, Plaintiff alleges that \"O'Melveny has, on several occasions yet discovered by Plaintiff, represented entities from China (in [United States c]ourts) that have tortured Chinese individuals or have 'aided and abetted and/or ratified these acts of torture.'\" *Id*. ¶ 34 (quoting Dkt. No. 43-6). Plaintiff further alleges that O'Melveny \"defended the torturers [in] *Jun Zhao v. BYD America Corporation et al*[.], 2:2020-cv-01254 in the [United States] District Court for the Central District of California,\" *id*. ¶ 35, and that O'Melveny \"represented BGI (formerly 'Beijing Genomics Institute'), a China based genomic research and sequencing\n\n1 Defendants the City of New York, Duffy, and the John Doe police officers have not been served. *See* Dkt. No. 18 (Affidavit of Service).\n\ncompany,\" *id*. ¶ 36. On July 20, 2020, two BGI entities, Xianjiang Silk Road BGI and Beijing Liuhe BGI, were added to the Entity List of the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security for \"conducting genetic analyses used to further the repression of Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in the Xianjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.\" *Id.* ¶ 38. Plaintiff also alleges that O'Melveny and Sarnoff \"have, with other counsel, been part of the CCP team charged with destroying the life of Ho Wan Kwok (aka Miles Guo) and [with] us[ing] whatever means necessary to have him returned to China for either additional jail and torture or execution.\" *Id.* ¶ 55(f).\n\nThe claims in the Amended Complaint arise from events that occurred during Plaintiff's participation in what he claims were peaceful protests at the offices of O'Melveny, *id.* ¶ 81, and at a location believed to be in proximity to the home of Sarnoff, *id.* ¶ 82. On November 22, 2022, Plaintiff participated in peaceful protests at the office of Defendant O'Melveny because of O'Melveny's relationship with the CCP. *Id*. ¶¶ 79, 81. Beginning on December 2, 2022, Plaintiff participated in regular peaceful protests at a location believed to be near Sarnoff's home in New York City. *Id*. ¶¶ 82, 85. Plaintiff again joined protests at a location believed to be near Sarnoff's home on the morning of December 20, 2022. *Id*. ¶ 85.\n\nPlaintiff alleges that before and on December 20, 2022, he and other protestors were harassed by Stanton. *Id*. ¶ 83; *see also id.* ¶¶ 84, 87–96. During these protests, Stanton stalked the protestors, including in a Mercedes Benz GL 550 with a New Jersey license plate, refusing to identify himself. Stanton took video and/or photographs of the protestors on a daily basis, tried to intimidate the protestors by lingering close to them, made verbal threats directed at various protestors including Plaintiff that he would arrest them or have them arrested, misrepresented himself as a police officer, and struck the Plaintiff from behind. *Id.* ¶ 84.\n\nThe Amended Complaint focuses on Plaintiff's interactions with Stanton while Plaintiff was protesting in the vicinity of Sarnoff's home on December 20, 2022. On that day, as he had done previously, Stanton took photographs and/or video of Plaintiff and other protestors. *Id.* ¶ 93. Plaintiff and the other protestors tried to engage Stanton to ask who he was and what he was doing and to ask him to stop stalking the protestors, but Stanton became \"aggressive and threatening\" and stated, \"I do what I do, you do what you do.\" *Id.* ¶ 94. He also indicated that he worked with or had a connection to the New York City Police Department (\"NYPD\") and suggested that he had some kind of \"license\" and was \"with\" the police. *Id.* ¶¶ 94–95.2 When Stanton did not \"stop,\" Plaintiff called 911 twice, at \"approximately\"10:50 a.m. and 10:56 a.m. *Id*. ¶¶ 99, 101. Before Plaintiff made the calls, Stanton jumped out of his car and said, \"I will have you arrested\"; while Plaintiff was making the calls, Stanton returned to his vehicle but stayed in very close proximity to Plaintiff. *Id.* ¶¶ 98, 100.\n\nAfter the police arrived, Stanton moved his car forward and \"made contact with Plaintiff's back—causing [ ] Plaintiff to fall to the ground.\" *Id.* ¶ 110. Plaintiff was \"pushed . . . down the roadway by Defendant Stanton's car, and Defendant Stanton did not stop until other protesters screamed at Defendant to stop.\" *Id*. ¶ 111. Plaintiff was \"shocked\" by the course of events, and he remains traumatized by it. *Id*. ¶ 112. At \"around 11:45 AM\" of the same day of the protest, Plaintiff went to a nearby restaurant with some protesters, where he \"started to feel dizzy, short of breath, and he went into shock.\" *Id*. ¶¶ 125–26. He alleges that \"[t]he shock was a direct result of the events at the protest.\" *Id*. ¶ 127. One of the protestors called 911 to request an ambulance. *Id*. ¶ 128.\n\n2 Plaintiff alleges, upon information and belief, that Stanton is not an officer with the NYPD. *Id.* ¶ 96.\n\nPlaintiff alleges that the NYPD failed to assist him during the course of these events. Three police cars appeared on the scene after Plaintiff called 911 during the protest. *Id.* ¶ 102. The officers in the first police car \"refused to assist Plaintiff . . . and continued on their way.\" *Id.* ¶ 105. After he was hit by Stanton's car, Plaintiff called out to officers in a second NYPD car for aid, but the officers failed to respond in any way and waited for a long time before exiting the vehicle. *Id.* ¶ 113. When the officers left the vehicle, they \"did not talk to Defendant Stanton but directly accused Plaintiff of blocking the traffic, even though Plaintiff was the one who called 911 and reported the wrongdoing of Defendant.\" *Id.* ¶ 114. Shortly thereafter, a third NYPD vehicle arrived on the scene. *Id.* ¶ 115. Plaintiff reported to the officers in that vehicle that he had called 911, that Stanton had just struck him with his car, and that Stanton had been harassing, filming, and following the protesters for thirty days and was endangering \"kids in our group.\" *Id.* ¶¶ 118–20. However, the officers only \"spoke briefly with Defendant Stanton, and then let him go,\" left the scene, and did not file a police report. *Id*. ¶¶ 121–25.\n\nAfter the protestors had called an ambulance to aid Plaintiff at the restaurant, the third NYPD vehicle arrived again. *Id.* ¶¶ 128–29. An officer \"asked Plaintiff to present ID information.\" *Id*. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Lauren A. Duffy, a police officer, told the medical personnel in the ambulance that \"Plaintiff's 'jumping on the car' was wrong even though she was not at the scene when the incident happened [and] . . . Plaintiff never jumped on Defendant Stanton's car.\" *Id*. ¶¶ 129, 133. Officer Duffy \"indicated that the ambulance would not leave for the hospital until a supervisor came.\" *Id*. ¶ 130. Another officer obstructed Plaintiff's efforts to get medical attention and prevented the ambulance from leaving for several minutes. *Id.* ¶¶ 131–32.\n\nPlaintiff was then brought to Mount Sinai Hospital where he received treatment and remained for the afternoon. *Id.* ¶¶ 134–35. He alleges that he remains under medical care for the trauma he suffered. *Id.* ¶ 136. He also alleges that he \"is now living in a state of constant fear and apprehension because he does not feel safe enough [to] exercise his rights under [the] United States Constitution without suffering further and more aggressive attacks.\" *Id*. ¶ 138. He further alleges that he is likely to continue to require a doctor's care for the trauma he suffered on December 20, 2022. *Id.* ¶ 139.\n\nPlaintiff claims that the police \"were part and parcel of the effort to thwart the free exercise of the Constitutional rights of [ ] Plaintiff\" and that the \"effort against [ ] Plaintiff was undertaken at the behest of Defendants O'Melveny, Sarnoff and Stanton.\" *Id*. ¶¶ 103–04. However, he makes only two factual allegations to tie O'Melveny and Sarnoff to Stanton or to the events on December 20, 2022. First, Plaintiff alleges that the December 20 protest took place at a location that was believed to be the residence of Sarnoff. *Id.* ¶ 86. Second, during earlier protests outside O'Melveny's offices at Times Square in New York, Stanton was observed \"on several instances\" taking pictures of the protestors from inside the property where the protestors and members of the general public were not permitted and was observed entering the security entrance with a swipe card. *Id.* ¶¶ 90–91. Plaintiff also alleges that Stanton, O'Melveny, and Sarnoff are all \"now believed\" to be \"unregistered agents\" of the CCP. *Id*. ¶¶ 77, 78.\n\nPlaintiff brings six claims against the defendants.3 As relevant here, Plaintiff claims that all of the defendants deprived him of his rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that \"all Defendants, public and private, are\"\n\n3 The Amended Complaint's final cause of action is labelled \"Count VII.\" Dkt. No. 43 at ECF pp. 27–28. However, there is no Count IV. *See id.* at ECF pp. 20–28.\n\nresponsible for these actions because they are \"willful participants in depriving [ ] Plaintiff of his rights, and as such the Defendants have a symbiotic relationship for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983\" (\"Count I\"). *Id*. ¶¶ 140–47. Plaintiff also claims that \"[t]he Defendants have engaged in a conspiracy to deprive [ ] Plaintiff, and indeed any of his fellow Chinese dissident protestors, of his Constitutional rights\" in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (\"Count II\"). *Id*. ¶¶ 148–59. Plaintiff further claims that Defendants \"(a) retaliated against Plaintiff for engaging in speech and/or conduct protected by the First Amendment, and (b) imposed restrictions on such protected speech and/or conduct that violated Plaintiff's First Amendment rights\" in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because \"Plaintiff had previously protested against the Defendants\" (\"Count III\"). *Id*. ¶¶ 160–80. Finally, Plaintiff claims that O'Melveny and Sarnoff \"'act[ed] as an agent, representative, employee, or servant, or . . . in any other capacity at the order, request, or under the direction or control' of a foreign principal,\" and therefore are \"required to register under [the Foreign Agents Registration Act]\" (\"Count VII\"). *See id*. ¶¶ 187–93 (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 611(c)(1)).\n\nAmong others forms of relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages \"of not less than \\$10,000,000\" and a declaratory judgment that O'Melveny and Sarnoff must register pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act (\"FARA\"). Am. Compl. at ECF pp. 28–29.\n\n#### **PROCEDRUAL HISTORY**\n\nPlaintiff initiated this action through filing a complaint on January 18, 2023.4 Dkt. No. 2. On March 23, 2023, Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), and submitted a supporting memorandum of law and declaration. Dkt. No. 19–21. On March 28, 2023, Defendants submitted a motion for sanctions,\n\n4 The complaint was initially filed on January 13, 2023 but was rejected for a filing error. *See* Dkt. No. 1.\n\nalong with a supporting memorandum of law and declaration. Dkt. Nos. 26–28. Defendants withdrew the motion on March 29, 2023, because they had not complied \"with the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c)(2),\" Dkt. No. 29, and resubmitted the Rule 11 motion for sanctions, memorandum of law, and declaration, along with a declaration attesting to their compliance with Rule 11(c)(2), on April 20, 2023. Dkt. No. 36–39. On April 21, 2023, Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to Defendants motion to dismiss. Dkt. No. 40.\n\nOn April 26, 2023, Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint. Dkt. No. 43. On May 8, 2023, Defendants again moved to dismiss the four claims that are brought against them: Defendants moved to dismiss Counts I and III for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Count III for a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim for relief and Count VII for a violation of FARA under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Dkt. Nos. 46–48. On May 23, 2023, Defendants filed a notice of nonopposition, stating that \"Plaintiff did not file opposition papers on or before May 22, 2023\" and requesting that the Court dismiss the Amended Complaint for that reason, but retain jurisdiction to hear the Rule 11 motion. Dkt. No. 53 at 1.\n\n#### **LEGAL STANDARD**\n\nA court properly dismisses a claim under Rule 12(b)(1) when it \"lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.\" *Cortlandt St. Recovery Corp. v. Hellas Telecomms., S.A.R.L.*, 790 F.3d 411, 416–17 (2d Cir. 2015). Standing is a proper ground upon which to challenge a court's subject matter jurisdiction: \"If plaintiffs lack Article III standing, a court has no subject matter jurisdiction to hear their claim.\" *Mahon v. Ticor Title Ins. Co*., 683 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting *Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. Merck-Medco Managed Care, L.L.C*., 433 F.3d 181, 198 (2d Cir. 2005). To survive a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to\n\ndismiss for lack of standing, a plaintiff \"must allege facts that affirmatively and plausibly suggest that it has standing to sue.\" *Amidax Trading Grp. v. S.W.I.F.T. SCRL*, 671 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 2011). Where the defendant challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint's allegations, the court must treat all factual allegations as true and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the complaining party. *Robinson v. Gov't of Malay.*, 269 F.3d 133, 140 (2d Cir. 2001).\n\n\"Determining the existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold inquiry.\" *Clarex Ltd. v. Natixis Sec. Am. LLC*, 2012 WL 4849146, at \\*3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2012). \"When a defendant moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and also moves to dismiss on other grounds, the Court must consider the Rule 12(b)(1) motion first.\" *Reliability Inc. v. Doki*, 2021 WL 3408589, at \\*6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2021) (quoting *Almazon v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, Nat'l Ass'n*, 2020 WL 1151313, at \\*6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2020)).\n\nTo survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must include \"sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'\" *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007)). A complaint must offer more than \"labels and conclusions,\" \"a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,\" or \"naked assertion[s]\" devoid of \"further factual enhancement\" in order to survive dismissal. *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555, 557. The ultimate question is whether \"[a] claim has facial plausibility, [*i.e.*,] the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.\" *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678. \"Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.\" *Id.* at 679. Put another way, the plausibility requirement \"calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that\n\ndiscovery will reveal evidence [supporting the claim].\" *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 556; *see also Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano*, 563 U.S. 27, 46 (2011).\n\nPlaintiff's failure to oppose Defendant's motion does not alone justify dismissal for failure to state a claim for relief. *See McCall v. Pataki*, 232 F.3d 321, 322–23 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that dismissal based on the plaintiff's failure to respond to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion alone \"was error\"); *see also Maggette v. Dalsheim*, 709 F.2d 800, 802 (2d Cir. 1983) (\"Nothing in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Civil Rules of the Southern District requires a court to grant a motion by default simply because the nonmoving party fails to respond.\"). \"In deciding an unopposed motion to dismiss, a court is to 'assume the truth of a pleading's factual allegations and test only its legal sufficiency . . . . Thus, although a party is of course to be given reasonable opportunity to respond to an opponent's motion, the sufficiency of a complaint is a matter of law that the court is capable of determining based on its own reading of the pleading and knowledge of the law.\" *Haas v. Com. Bank*, 497 F. Supp. 2d 563, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting *McCall*, 232 F.3d 321, 322 (2d Cir. 2000)); *see also Strachn v. City of New York*, 2020 WL 6291428, at \\*1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2020); *Blanc v. Cap. One Bank*, 2015 WL 3919409, at \\*3 (S.D.N.Y June 24, 2015); *Vargas v. Person*, 2014 WL 1054021, at \\*2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2014); *O'Garro v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.*, 2013 WL 5798537, at \\*2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2013).\n\n#### **DISCUSSION**\n\nThe Court first turns to Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims (Count I and Count III) and their motion to dismiss Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim (Count II) under Rule 12(b)(6). It then addresses Defendants' motions to dismiss Plaintiff's FARA claim (Count VII).\n\n## **I. Motion to Dismiss Counts I, II, and III Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)**\n\n#### **A. Counts I and III: 42 U.S.C. § 1983**\n\nPlaintiff brings claims against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights and for First Amendment retaliation. Plaintiff argues that \"by coopting the City of New York, the New York Police Department, and certain members of the New York Police Department . . . Defendants . . . Sarnoff and O'Melveny—have conspired to violate, and have violated, the Plaintiff's rights under the Constitution of the United States of America.\" Am. Compl. ¶ 76. Plaintiff alleges that Stanton \"indicated that he worked with or had some kind of connection to the NYPD,\" *id*. ¶ 94, and that \"upon information and belief, this effort [of the police to thwart the free exercise of his constitutional rights to protest] . . . was undertaken at the behest of Defendants O'Melveny, Sarnoff and Stanton.\" *Id*. ¶ 104. In support of his Section 1983 claims, Plaintiff alleges that there was \"[a]n explicit agreement among the Defendants to take steps against [ ] Plaintiff as one of the Chinese protestors against the CCP.\" *Id*. ¶ 144(a).\n\nIn their motion to dismiss, Defendants argue that Plaintiff makes only conclusory, unsupported allegations that O'Melveny and Sarnoff, as private actors, acted under color of law, as required by Section 1983. Dkt. No. 47 at 13. Defendants also argue that Plaintiff fails to state a Section 1983 conspiracy claim because Plaintiff makes only conclusory allegations that O'Melveny and Sarnoff collaborated or conspired with a state actor to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights, because Plaintiff fails to sufficiently plead a meeting of the minds and because Plaintiff does not sufficiently plead that Defendants took an overt act in furtherance of any alleged conspiracy. *Id*. at 15–17.\n\nSection 1983 \"is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United States Constitution and federal statutes that it describes.\" *Kohutka v. Town of Hempstead*, 994 F. Supp. 2d 305, 316–17 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting *Baker v. McCollan*, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). \"While [Section 1983] claims are not subject to a 'heightened' pleading standard beyond that defined in Rule 8(a)(2), such claims nevertheless must meet the plausibility requirements of *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly* . . . and *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*.\" *Guzman v. United States*, 2013 WL 5018553, at \\*4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2013) (quoting *Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit*, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993)). \"Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements . . . will no more suffice in a [§ 1983] claim than in any other\" claim. *Id.*\n\n\"To prevail on a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that the conduct at issue was [(1)] 'committed by a person acting under color of state law' and [(2)] 'deprived [the plaintiff] of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.'\" *Kanciper v. Lato*, 718 F. App'x 24, 27 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting *Cornejo v. Bell*, 592 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2010)). \"For the purposes of § 1983, the actions of a nominally private entity are attributable to the state when: (1) the entity acts pursuant to the 'coercive power' of the state or is 'controlled' by the state ('the compulsion test'); (2) when the state provides 'significant encouragement' to the entity, the entity is a 'willful participant in joint activity with the [s]tate,' or the entity's functions are 'entwined' with state policies ('the joint action test' or 'close nexus test'); or (3) when the entity 'has been delegated a public function by the [s]tate,' ('the public function test').\" *Sybalski v. Indep. Grp. Home Living Program, Inc.*, 546 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir.\n\n2008) (alterations in original) (quoting *Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Ath. Ass'n*, 531 U.S. 288, 296 (2001)).\n\nPlaintiff fails to allege facts to support any of these theories under which O'Melveny or Sarnoff could be held liable under Section 1983 for any of the injuries he alleges he suffered. Plaintiff alleges that \"[t]here is an inextricable nexus between the various Defendants, and as such all Defendants, public and private, are willful participants in depriving the Plaintiff of his rights, and as such the Defendants have a symbiotic relationship for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.\" Am. Compl. ¶ 142. Plaintiff further alleges that \"Defendant O'Melveny [has a] practice of 'monetizing government positions' by maintaining a revolving door between the firm and government positions as a way to facilitate clients['] objectives using inside connections.\" *Id*. ¶ 55(d). The only relevant allegation that Plaintiff makes about the relationship between Defendants O'Melveny and Sarnoff and the NYPD or New York City government is the conclusory allegation that \"Defendants O'Melveny and Sarnoff, using whatever resource to do so, have conscripted elements of the NYPD to oppose the protestors . . . [or] have called upon contacts in the City with connections to the . . . office of the NY City Mayor.\" *Id*. ¶¶ 74–75. Plaintiff makes no factual allegation that Defendants were involved in the events on December 20, 2022.\n\nFirst, Plaintiff's allegations against O'Melveny and Sarnoff fail the compulsion test. \"Courts in the Second Circuit have held that in order to satisfy this test, plaintiff must allege 'actual coercion' by a state actor that impacts upon the private actor's decision-making.\" *O'Brien v. Carrier Coach, Inc*., 2006 WL 692409, at \\*3 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2006) (collecting cases) (rejecting a Section 1983 claim even though the plaintiff alleged that the defendant's business \"depend[s] upon a certain amount of governmental aid,\" and is \"conducted according to\n\npolicies which 'are greatly influenced and/or shaped by state and/or federal statutes and regulations'\" (citations omitted)).\n\nPlaintiff suggests that Defendants \"have conscripted elements of the NYPD,\" Am. Compl. ¶ 74, and he also suggests that Stanton \"indicated that he worked with or had some kind of connection to the NYPD,\" *id*. ¶ 94. However, he fails to allege that O'Melveny and Sarnoff have a relationship with Stanton, much less that Defendants are subject to state coercion with regard to the \"specific activities that caused the injury giving rise to the action.\" *Sybalski*, 546 F.3d at 257–58. The only allegations related to Stanton's relationship with Sarnoff and O'Melveny are that Stanton had access on previous occasions to the office where O'Melveny is located, that he observed the protests against O'Melveny and Sarnoff, and that he was present when the protest occurred outside a building in New York City believed to be the location of Sarnoff's residence. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 91, 93–94. Plaintiff then draws from those allegations the inference that Defendants were somehow involved in Stanton's action in touching Plaintiff's back with his car. *Id*. ¶¶ 104, 142–44. And, he then draws from the fact that Stanton—falsely according to Plaintiff—stated he had a relationship with the NYPD that Stanton was exercising state power when Stanton hit him and that each of Stanton and Defendants also bear liability under Section 1983 for the conduct of the police in obstructing Plaintiff's medical care. *Id*. ¶ 142. Plaintiff's allegations fail every link in the causal chain. There is no well-pleaded allegation, only speculation, that Defendants had a relationship with Stanton or that Stanton had a relationship with the NYPD. And, more important, there is no well-pleaded allegation that Defendants had any role with respect either to Stanton's actions in \"touching\" Plaintiff with his car or the actions of the NYPD in responding to that incident. Stated otherwise, Plaintiff's allegations fail the compulsion test, because he does not allege what the NYPD (or even Stanton)\n\nrequired or encouraged Defendants to do in violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. *See Mejía v. Robinson*, 2018 WL 3821625, at \\*5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2018) (holding that even if there is an exchange between a state actor and a private defendant, mere \"permissive language of the [state actor]\" does not suffice to plead state action under the compulsion test); *see also Caballero v. Shayna*, 2019 WL 2491717, at \\*4 (E.D.N.Y. June 14, 2019) (dismissing a Section 1983 compulsion claim because there were no specific facts from which to infer that the defendant acted \"as a result of demands or orders from . . . officers\").\n\nTo the extent that Plaintiff alleges that O'Melveny's \"offices in China would not be permitted to continue to exist unless Defendants O'Melveny and Sarnoff are willing to serve\" foreign entities, Am. Compl. ¶ 54, Plaintiff does not allege that the offending conduct that caused his injury was directed by these foreign entities. And even if there were sufficient allegations, \"acts by a foreign government and its officials 'cannot constitute conduct under color of state law' under Section 1983.\" *Lewis v. Google LLC*, 461 F. Supp. 3d 938, 956 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (citation omitted).\n\nSecond, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants were delegated a public function. The only public functions that appear in Plaintiff's allegations were functions performed by the police. Plaintiff does allege that, upon information and belief, the actions taken by the police against Plaintiff were done \"at the behest of Defendants\" Am. Compl. ¶ 104. But that allegation is a mere conclusion. The Amended Complaint is bereft of any facts that the conduct of the NYPD was taken at the instigation or behest of O'Melveny and Sarnoff. And without such facts, Plaintiff cannot maintain its Section 1983 claim under the delegation theory. *See Adebiyi v. City of N.Y.*, 2014 WL 4922888, at \\*4 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 30, 2014) (\"A private party supplying\n\ninformation or seeking police assistance does not become a state actor . . . unless the police officers were improperly influenced or controlled by the private party.\").\n\nThird, Plaintiff's conclusory allegations that Defendants conducted joint action with government actors do not come close to being sufficient under Rule 8(a)(2). \"It is not enough . . . for a plaintiff to plead state involvement in '*some activity* of the institution alleged to have inflicted injury upon a plaintiff'; rather, the plaintiff must allege that the state was involved 'with the *activity that caused the injury*' giving rise to the action.\" *Sybalski*, 546 F.3d at 257–58 (emphasis in original) (quoting *Schlein v. Milford Hospital, Inc*., 561 F.2d 427, 428 (2d Cir. 1977))). \"The touchstone of joint action is often a 'plan, prearrangement, conspiracy, custom, or policy' shared by the private actor and the police.\" *Forbes v. City of New York*, 2008 WL 3539936, at \\*5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2008) (quoting *Ginsberg v. Healey Car & Truck Leasing, Inc.*, 189 F.3d 268, 272 (2d Cir.1999)). \"Under the 'joint action' doctrine, . . . 'a plaintiff must show that the private citizen and the state official shared a common unlawful goal.'\" *Caballero*, 2019 WL 2491717, at \\*3 (quoting *Hollman v. Cty. of Suffolk*, 2011 WL 280927, at \\*8 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2011)).\n\nPlaintiff alleges that the police \"were part and parcel of the effort to thwart the free exercise of the Constitutional rights of the Plaintiff\" \"undertaken at the behest of Defendants O'Melveny, Sarnoff and Stanton.\" Am. Compl. ¶¶ 103–04. Plaintiff argues that Stanton \"indicated that he worked with or had some kind of connection to the NYPD.\" *Id*. ¶ 94. And Plaintiff claims that \"Defendants O'Melveny and Sarnoff, using whatever resource to do so, have conscripted elements of the NYPD to oppose the protestors . . . [or] have called upon contacts in the City with connections to the . . . office of the NY City Mayor.\" *Id*. ¶¶ 74–75. However, these conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim under Section 1983. Plaintiff pleads\n\nno facts that would establish a common goal between O'Melveny and/or Sarnoff and the NYPD, through Stanton or otherwise, or a plan to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights. *See Hannan v. Rose*, 2020 WL 1903282, at \\*12 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2020) (\"[C]onclusory statement of a 'joint effort,' without any factual support, does not demonstrate state action.\").\n\nFinally, Plaintiff alleges that \"by coopting the City of New York, the New York Police, Department, and certain members of the New York Police Department, together with agents of the CCP—Defendants Stanton, Sarnoff and O'Melveny—have conspired to violate, and have violated, the Plaintiff's rights under the Constitution of the United States of America.\" Am. Compl. ¶ 76. Plaintiff's allegations could be understood as suggesting that Defendants and Stanton conspired to deprive him of his constitutional rights in violation of Section 1983. Defendants, however, argue that the Amended Complaint fails to plead a meeting of the minds or any overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy and thus this claim must fail. Dkt. No. 47 at 15–18. The Court agrees.\n\n\"[T]o state a claim against a private entity on a § 1983 conspiracy theory, the complaint must allege facts demonstrating that the private entity acted in concert with the state actor to commit an unconstitutional act.\" *Spear v. W. Hartford*, 954 F.2d 63, 68 (2d Cir. 1992). Although \"[a] § 1983 conspiracy claim is distinct from one of joint action,\" *Betts v. Shearman*, 751 F.3d 78, 84 n.1 (2d Cir. 2014), \"[t]he concepts of acting 'jointly' or in 'conspiracy with' state actors are intertwined,\" *Stewart v. Victoria's Secret Stores, LLC*, 851 F. Supp. 2d 442, 445 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). \"Even if considered as conceptually separate theories, both require the pleading of facts sufficient to show something more than conclusory allegations.\" *Id*. \"To prove a § 1983 conspiracy, a plaintiff must show: (1) an agreement between two or more state actors or between a state actor and a private entity; (2) to act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional\n\ninjury; and (3) an overt act done in furtherance of that goal causing damages.\" *Pangburn v. Culbertson*, 200 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 1999).\n\nIn *De'Bey v. City of N.Y*., for example, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants \"'conspired the unconstitutional break in' by threatening to involve the police, that [the plaintiff] was 'charged as part of a conspiracy to limit the defendant's personal and municipal liability . . . and that [the d]efendants conspired 'to retaliate against him for filing a Notice of Clam against the [City] for damages.'\" 2021 WL 8013765, at \\*14 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2021) (citations omitted). There, the court held that the plaintiff \"fail[ed] to allege any objective factual basis from which the Court can properly infer a meeting of the minds among the individuals who were involved in the alleged constitutional violations, and as a result, [plaintiff's] conspiracy claims [under § 1983] 'must be dismissed.'\" *Id*. (citation omitted).\n\nHere, similarly, Plaintiff alleges that there was \"[a]n explicit agreement among the Defendants to take steps against the Plaintiff,\" Am. Compl. ¶ 144(a), and that \"Defendants acted under color of state law—individually, in concert, and through a conspiracy—to deprive Plaintiff of [constitutional rights],\" *id*. ¶ 163. However, there are no facts pleaded from which the Court could infer any agreement among the Defendants; rather, *Plaintiff* called the police. *Id*. ¶¶ 99– 101. There are no factual allegations that Defendants did or agreed to anything with the police either before the protest or during the protest. Therefore, \"those allegations are too conclusory to establish a conspiracy.\" *Ahmad v. White Plains City Sch. Dist*., 2019 WL 3202747, at \\*15 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2019); *see also Guttilla v. City of N.Y*., 2015 WL 437405, at \\*6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2015) (same).\n\nIndeed, to hold that Plaintiff's conspiracy allegations state a claim upon which relief can be granted would be to disregard the very lesson of *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S.\n\n544. Plaintiff \"points to conduct that, without more, does not suggest conspiracy, and a conclusory allegation of agreement at some unidentified point does not supply facts adequate to show illegality.\" *Id*. at 557. Thus, Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against Defendants must be dismissed.\n\n## **B. Count II: 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)**\n\nPlaintiff alleges that all of the defendants conspired to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Plaintiff claims that \"the [d]efendants have engaged in a conspiracy to deprive [ ] Plaintiff, and indeed any of his fellow Chinese dissident protestors, of his Constitutional rights.\" Am. Compl. ¶ 149. To substantiate his claim, he alleges that there is an \"[a]greement on the part of Defendants O'Melveny and Sarnoff to . . . [silence the] Chinese dissident protest in the\" United States. *Id*. ¶ 151(a). Plaintiff also alleges that \"Defendants O'Melveny, Sarnoff and Stanton colluded with the other Defendants\" to do so. *Id*. ¶ 153. Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a Section 1985(3) claim because the \"conspiracy allegations are utterly conclusory\" and the Amended Complaint fails to allege facts showing that similarly situated individuals were treated differently and thus has failed to plead discrimination against Plaintiff. Dkt. No. 47 at 19. The Court agrees for substantially the reasons set forth above.\n\n\"While a plaintiff is not required to allege that the defendants acted under color of state law to make out a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3),\" *LeVine v. N.Y. State Police*, 2022 WL 4465588, at \\*4 (N.D.N.Y. Sep. 26, 2022), the plaintiff must adequately allege \"(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either injured in his person or property or deprived of any right of a citizen of the United States. Furthermore, the conspiracy must also be\n\nmotivated by 'some racial or . . . [other] discriminatory animus.'\" *Mian v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp*., 7 F.3d 1085, 1087–88 (2d Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (citations omitted); *see also Thomas v. DeCastro*, 2019 WL 1428365, at \\*7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2019) (\"Under [Section 1985], [a p]laintiff must make 'a showing of class-based invidiously discriminatory animus' on the part of the conspiring parties, as well as provide 'some factual basis supporting a meeting of the minds, such that [the] defendants entered into an agreement, express or tacit, to achieve the unlawful end.'\" (citations omitted)).\n\nPlaintiff's allegations fail. Plaintiff has not pleaded any facts to support a conspiracy claim. Plaintiff has only alleged in a conclusory manner the most fundamental aspect of a conspiracy: an agreement. *See* Am. Compl. ¶ 149. Plaintiff asserts that \"Defendants O'Melveny and Sarnoff, using whatever resource to do so, have conscripted elements of the NYPD to oppose the protestors\" and \"have called upon contacts in the City with connections to the . . . office of the NY City Mayor.\" *Id*. ¶¶ 74–75. But these allegations state conclusions—there are no facts alleged to support that an agreement was formed between Defendants and the government actors, including \"how or when\" the conspiracy was formed. *See Walsh v. City of N.Y*., 2021 WL 1226585, at \\*8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2021) (dismissing a conspiracy claim under section 1985 because the \"complaint does not describe how or when the Defendant Officers entered into the agreement\"); *see also Ragland v. Coulter*, 2021 WL 4430271, at \\*5 (E.D.N.Y. June 25, 2021) (holding that \"alleging in conclusory fashion that [the defendant's] unspecified actions in connection with undescribed events are fairly attributable to the state\" was insufficient). Nor does Plaintiff allege specific facts regarding \"the roles of each of the defendants who allegedly participated in [the] conspiracy.\" *Laverpool v. New York City Transit Auth*., 760 F. Supp. 1046, 1056 (E.D.N.Y. 1991). Plaintiff's \"conspiracy allegation is [thus]\n\nvague and implausible.\" *Williams v. Rosenblatt Sec. Inc*., 136 F. Supp. 3d 593, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); *see also Morales v. City of New York*, 752 F.3d 234, 237 (2d Cir. 2014) (\"[E]ven specific allegations of conspiracy, if conclusory, [are] not . . . sufficient to state a claim for conspiratorial violation of [a plaintiff's] rights.\").\n\nAccordingly, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege a claim against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).5\n\n#### **II. Motion to Dismiss Count VII Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)**\n\nPlaintiff alleges that it \"would appear that Defendant O'Melveny is beholden to the CCP, and as such performs whatever acts are requested by the CCP.\" Am. Compl. ¶ 60. Plaintiff thus requests that the Court award \"a declaratory judgment to compel registration [of O'Melveny and Sarnoff] as foreign agents\" under FARA. *Id.* at ECF p. 27. Plaintiff argues that the Court is not \"obliged to disregard Plaintiff's claims due to an absence of an explicit 'private right of action' provision in the FARA statute.\" *Id*. ¶ 192. Defendants argue that the FARA claim should be dismissed because Plaintiff does not have standing to pursue the claim, FARA does not provide a private right of action, and Plaintiff's allegations are deficient. Dkt. No. 47 at 20–24. Because the Court finds that Plaintiff does not have standing to bring the FARA claim, it does not address Defendants' arguments that are properly brought under Rule 12(b)(6).\n\n\"For a plaintiff to have Article III standing, he must establish three things: (1) that he has an injury in fact; (2) that there is a causal connection between his injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) that his injury will be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.\" *Harty v. W. Point Realty, Inc.*, 28 F.4th 435, 442 (2d Cir. 2022). \"An injury-in-fact is 'an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent,\n\n5 Because Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege a conspiracy, the Court does not address the other elements of a Section 1985(3) claim.\n\nnot conjectural or hypothetical.'\" *In re USAA Data Sec. Litig*., 621 F. Supp. 3d 454, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (quoting *Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016)). \"Regarding statutory harms, it is not enough to allege a defendant violated the statute; '[o]nly those plaintiffs who have been concretely harmed by a defendant's statutory violation' will have standing.\" *Id.* (quoting *TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez*, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2200 (2021)).\n\nHere, Plaintiff does not allege any harm associated with his allegation of Defendants' violation of the statute; rather, he alleges that \"[FARA] creates transparency.\" Am. Compl. ¶ 190. It is true that FARA was passed because \"government officials and the public generally should be able to identify those who act on behalf of a foreign principal.\" *United States v. McGoff*, 831 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Plaintiff, however, does not sufficiently allege informational standing, because informational standing requires that a plaintiff be \"deprived of information that, on its interpretation, a statute requires the government or a third party to disclose to it and . . . [that he] suffers, by being denied access to that information, the type of harm Congress sought to prevent by requiring disclosure.\" *NRDC v. DOI*, 410 F. Supp. 3d 582, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting *Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. V. Presidential Advisory Comm'n on Election Integrity*, 878 F.3d 371, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2017)). Plaintiff has failed to include any allegations in his Amended Complaint that suggest that he suffered because O'Melveny and Sarnoff did not register under FARA, if they were required to do so. Additionally, to the extent that Plaintiff claims he suffered harm in the form of unwanted physical contact and emotional trauma, Am. Compl. ¶ 112, he fails to allege how there were traceable to Defendants' failure to register under FARA or how a declaratory judgment compelling registration would redress his alleged injury.\n\nTherefore, the Amended Complaint does not adequately plead standing to bring a FARA claim and must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1). Because the Court concludes that Plaintiff does not have standing to bring a FARA claim, it does not address whether Plaintiff has adequately alleged a claim under FARA in the Amended Complaint. *See Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp.*, 666 F. Supp. 2d 381, 385–86 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (\"[A]bsent authority to adjudicate, the Court lacks a legal basis to grant any relief, or even consider the action further.\"); *see also United States ex rel. Kreindler & Kreindler v. United Technologies Corp.*, 985 F.2d 1148, 1155– 56 (2d Cir. 1993) (\"Where, as here, the defendant moves for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P., as well as on other grounds, 'the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) challenge first since if it must dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the accompanying defenses and objections become moot and do not need to be determined.'\" (quoting 5 C. Wright and A. Miller, *Federal Practice and Procedure*, § 1350 (1969)).\n\n## **CONCLUSION**\n\nThe motion to dismiss Counts I, II, III, and VII against Defendants O'Melveny and Sarnoff is GRANTED with prejudice.6 The Court will retain jurisdiction to address Defendants' motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 to the degree that the motion is properly before this Court.7\n\nThe Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to close Dkt. No. 46.\n\nSO ORDERED.\n\nNew York, New York LEWIS J. LIMAN\n\nDated: July 17, 2023 \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\n\nUnited States District Judge\n\n6 Plaintiff does not request leave to replead and does not \"identify [any] additional facts or legal theories that [he] might assert if given the opportunity to replead. For this reason and because the Court concludes that any amendment would be futile,\" Counts I, II, III, and VII of the Amended Complaint against Defendants O'Melveny and Sarnoff are dismissed with prejudice. *Wade Park Land Holdings, LLC v. Kalikow*, 589 F. Supp. 3d 335, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2022), *amended*, 2022 WL 2479110 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2022).\n\n7 Defendants have also suggested that the Court consider imposing sanctions *sua sponte*. Dkt. No. 56 at 3. The Court takes that request under advisement.","body_zh":"附件A\n\n美国联邦地区法院\nSouthern District of New York（纽约南区） 07/17/2023\n\nJUNWU GONG（龚俊武）， X\n\n原告， :\n: 23-cv-00343 (LJL)\n-v :\nSTUART M. SARNOFF，O'MELVENY & MYERS :\n: 意见书及命令\nLLP，CARL M. STANTON，CITY OF NEW YORK， :\nOFFICER JOHN DOE 1，OFFICER JOHN DOE 2， :\nOFFICER JOHN DOE 3，OFFICER LAUREN A. :\nDUFFY， :\n\n被告。 :\n\n--------------------------------------------------------------------- X\n\nLEWIS J. LIMAN（刘易斯·J·利曼），美国联邦地区法官：\n\n被告O'Melveny & Myers LLP和Stuart Sarnoff（合称“被告”）依据《联邦民事诉讼规则》第12(b)(1)条和第12(b)(6)条提出动议，请求驳回原告Junwu Gong（“原告”）提交的修正起诉状，理由是本院缺乏事项管辖权，且该起诉状未能提出可获救济的请求。Dkt. No. 47。\n\n基于以下理由，准许驳回动议。\n\n背景\n\n就本动议而言，本院将修正起诉状中妥为陈述的指称视为真实。Dkt. No. 43（“修正起诉状”或“Am. Compl.”）。\n\n原告为出生于外国的华裔美国永久居民，曾多次与其他华裔人士一道，合法且和平地抗议中国共产党（“CCP”）。同上，第¶¶ 46–47段。他主张，其一直遭受CCP代理人持续实施的骚扰行动。同上，第¶ 70段。\n\n被告O'Melveny & Myers LLP（“O'Melveny”）是一家在特拉华州登记的有限责任合伙企业，以律师事务所形式开展业务，并经常在纽约州从事商业活动。同上，第¶ 63段。被告Sarnoff为O'Melveny的合伙人，同上，第¶ 53段，且为纽约州居民，同上，第¶ 62段。被告Carl M. Stanton为纽约市及纽约州居民。同上，第¶ 64段。修正起诉状还将City of New York（纽约市）、纽约市警察Lauren A. Duffy以及三名身份不明的John Doe警察列为被告。同上，第¶¶ 65–69段。1\n\n截至2023年1月，据知情及信念，O'Melveny在中华人民共和国（“中国”或“PRC”）至少设有三间办事处，约有四十五名律师。同上，第¶ 53段。原告主张，O'Melveny在PRC的业务“利润极其丰厚”，同上，第¶ 56段，并且除非被告O'Melveny和Sarnoff愿意应要求为CCP效力，否则O'Melveny在中国的办事处将不被允许继续存在，同上，第¶ 54段。O'Melveny和Sarnoff还在美国处理过众多事务，为CCP的利益、盟友或代理人进行辩护。同上，第¶ 55(c)段。原告援引一名前O'Melveny律师撰写的博客文章，主张“O'Melveny曾在原告迄今发现的数起案件中，在[美国联邦]法院代表来自中国的实体，该等实体曾酷刑虐待中国个人，或曾‘协助和教唆及/或追认这些酷刑行为。’”同上，第¶ 34段（引自Dkt. No. 43-6）。原告进一步主张，O'Melveny“在美国加利福尼亚中区联邦地区法院的Jun Zhao v. BYD America Corporation et al[.], 2:2020-cv-01254案中为实施酷刑者进行辩护”，同上，第¶ 35段，并且O'Melveny“代表了BGI（原名‘Beijing Genomics Institute’），一家总部位于中国的基因组研究和测序\n\n1 被告City of New York、Duffy及John Doe警察尚未被送达。见Dkt. No. 18（送达宣誓书）。\n\n公司”，同上，第¶ 36段。2020年7月20日，两个BGI实体，即Xianjiang Silk Road BGI和Beijing Liuhe BGI，因“进行用于进一步压迫Xianjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region维吾尔族及其他穆斯林少数群体的基因分析”，被列入商务部工业与安全局的实体清单。同上，第¶ 38段。原告还主张，O'Melveny和Sarnoff“与其他律师一道，属于CCP团队的一部分，该团队负责摧毁Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵，亦称Miles Guo）的生活，并[使用]一切必要手段使其被送回中国，以遭受进一步监禁和酷刑或被处决。”同上，第¶ 55(f)段。\n\n修正起诉状中的请求源于原告参加抗议活动期间发生的事件；原告称，该等抗议是在O'Melveny的办事处，同上，第¶ 81段，以及在被认为靠近Sarnoff住所的地点，同上，第¶ 82段，进行的和平抗议。2022年11月22日，原告因O'Melveny与CCP的关系，在被告O'Melveny的办事处参加和平抗议。同上，第¶¶ 79、81段。自2022年12月2日起，原告在被认为靠近Sarnoff纽约市住所的地点定期参加和平抗议。同上，第¶¶ 82、85段。2022年12月20日上午，原告再次在被认为靠近Sarnoff住所的地点参加抗议。同上，第¶ 85段。\n\n原告主张，在2022年12月20日之前及当天，他和其他抗议者受到Stanton的骚扰。同上，第¶ 83段；亦见同上，第¶¶ 84、87–96段。在这些抗议期间，Stanton跟踪抗议者，包括驾驶一辆挂有新泽西州车牌的Mercedes Benz GL 550，并拒绝表明身份。Stanton每日对抗议者拍摄视频及/或照片，试图通过在抗议者附近逗留来恐吓抗议者，向包括原告在内的多名抗议者作出言语威胁，称其将逮捕他们或让他们被逮捕，虚假声称自己是警察，并从背后撞击原告。同上，第¶ 84段。\n\n修正起诉状重点叙述原告于2022年12月20日在Sarnoff住所附近抗议时与Stanton的互动。当天，如同他此前所做的，Stanton对原告和其他抗议者拍摄照片及/或视频。同上，第¶ 93段。原告和其他抗议者试图与Stanton交谈，询问其身份及所作所为，并要求其停止跟踪抗议者，但Stanton变得“具有攻击性和威胁性”，并称：“我做我做的事，你做你做的事。”同上，第¶ 94段。他还表示其与New York City Police Department（纽约市警察局；“NYPD”）合作或存在关联，并暗示其持有某种“许可”且“与”警方有关。同上，第¶¶ 94–95段。2 当Stanton未“停止”时，原告于“大约”上午10:50和10:56两次拨打911。同上，第¶¶ 99、101段。在原告拨打电话前，Stanton从车中跳出并说：“我会让你被逮捕”；原告拨打电话时，Stanton返回其车辆，但仍与原告保持极近距离。同上，第¶¶ 98、100段。\n\n警察到达后，Stanton将其车辆向前移动，并“撞到原告背部——导致[]原告跌倒在地。”同上，第¶ 110段。原告被“被告Stanton的车辆……沿道路推倒，且被告Stanton直到其他抗议者对被告大喊停车时才停车。”同上，第¶ 111段。原告对这一事件经过感到“震惊”，且至今仍因此受到创伤。同上，第¶ 112段。在同一抗议日“大约上午11:45”，原告与一些抗议者前往附近一家餐厅，在那里他“开始感到头晕、呼吸急促，并陷入休克。”同上，第¶¶ 125–26段。他主张，“[该]休克是抗议期间发生事件的直接结果。”同上，第¶ 127段。一名抗议者拨打911请求救护车。同上，第¶ 128段。\n\n2 原告据知情及信念主张，Stanton并非NYPD警员。同上，第¶ 96段。\n\n原告主张，NYPD在这些事件过程中未能协助他。原告在抗议期间拨打911后，三辆警车到达现场。同上，第¶ 102段。第一辆警车中的警员“拒绝协助原告……并继续离开。”同上，第¶ 105段。在被Stanton的车辆撞击后，原告向第二辆NYPD警车中的警员呼救，但警员未作出任何回应，并在离开车辆前等待了很长时间。同上，第¶ 113段。当警员离开车辆后，他们“没有与被告Stanton交谈，而是直接指控原告阻碍交通，尽管原告才是拨打911并报告被告不当行为的人。”同上，第¶ 114段。此后不久，第三辆NYPD车辆到达现场。同上，第¶ 115段。原告向该车辆中的警员报告，他曾拨打911，Stanton刚刚用车撞击他，以及Stanton已骚扰、拍摄和跟踪抗议者三十天，并危及“我们团体中的孩子。”同上，第¶¶ 118–20段。然而，警员仅“与被告Stanton简短交谈，随后让其离开”，离开现场，且未制作警方报告。同上，第¶¶ 121–25段。\n\n抗议者在餐厅为协助原告而呼叫救护车后，第三辆NYPD车辆再次到达。同上，第¶¶ 128–29段。一名警员“要求原告出示身份证明信息。”同上。原告主张，被告Lauren A. Duffy警员向救护车内的医疗人员表示，原告“‘跳到车上’是错误的，尽管事发时她不在现场[，且]……原告从未跳到被告Stanton的车上。”同上，第¶¶ 129、133段。Duffy警员“表示，在主管到达之前，救护车不会驶往医院。”同上，第¶ 130段。另一名警员阻碍原告获得医疗救治，并阻止救护车离开数分钟。同上，第¶¶ 131–32段。\n\n随后，原告被送往Mount Sinai Hospital（西奈山医院），在该处接受治疗并留院至当日下午。同上，第¶¶ 134–35段。他主张，其因所受创伤仍在接受医疗照护。同上，第¶ 136段。他还主张，其“现生活在持续的恐惧和忧虑状态中，因为他感到自己无法在不遭受进一步且更具攻击性侵害的情况下，安全地行使其[美国]宪法权利。”同上，第¶ 138段。他进一步主张，其可能将继续需要医生照护，以治疗其于2022年12月20日遭受的创伤。同上，第¶ 139段。\n\n原告主张，警方“是阻挠原告自由行使宪法权利行动的组成部分”，且“针对原告的行动是应被告O'Melveny、Sarnoff和Stanton的要求而进行的。”同上，第¶¶ 103–04段。然而，他仅提出两项事实主张，以将O'Melveny和Sarnoff与Stanton或2022年12月20日的事件联系起来。第一，原告主张，12月20日的抗议在被认为是Sarnoff住所的地点进行。同上，第¶ 86段。第二，在此前于纽约Times Square的O'Melveny办事处外进行的抗议期间，曾“数次”观察到Stanton在不允许抗议者和公众进入的物业内拍摄抗议者照片，并观察到其使用刷卡进入安保入口。同上，第¶¶ 90–91段。原告还主张，Stanton、O'Melveny和Sarnoff现均被认为是CCP的“未登记代理人”。同上，第¶¶ 77、78段。\n\n原告对被告提出六项请求。3 与本案相关的是，原告主张，所有被告均违反42 U.S.C. § 1983，剥夺其根据《美国宪法》第一、第四和第十四修正案享有的权利，并主张“所有被告，无论公职或私人，均”\n\n3 修正起诉状的最终诉因标注为“Count VII”。Dkt. No. 43 at ECF pp. 27–28。然而，其中不存在Count IV。见同上，ECF pp. 20–28。\n\n应就这些行为承担责任，因为他们是“故意参与剥夺[ ]原告权利的人，因此，为42 U.S.C. § 1983之目的，被告之间存在共生关系”（“罪名项 I”）。同上 ¶¶ 140–47。原告还主张，被告“已参与共谋，以剥夺[ ]原告，乃至其任何中国异议人士抗议同伴的宪法权利”，违反了42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)（“罪名项 II”）。同上 ¶¶ 148–59。原告进一步主张，被告“(a) 因原告从事受《第一修正案》保护的言论和/或行为而对原告实施报复，及 (b) 对该等受保护言论和/或行为施加限制，从而侵犯原告依据《第一修正案》享有的权利”，违反了42 U.S.C. § 1983，因为“原告此前曾抗议被告”（“罪名项 III”）。同上 ¶¶ 160–80。最后，原告主张，O'Melveny（欧迈律师事务所）和 Sarnoff（萨尔诺夫）“‘作为外国委托人的代理人、代表、雇员或雇工，或……以任何其他身份，依外国委托人的命令、请求，或在其指示或控制下’行事”，因此“必须依据[《外国代理人登记法》]进行登记”（“罪名项 VII”）。见同上 ¶¶ 187–93（引自22 U.S.C. § 611(c)(1)）。\n\n在其他救济形式中，原告请求“不低于 \\$10,000,000”的金钱赔偿，并请求作出确认判决，确认 O'Melveny 和 Sarnoff 必须依照《外国代理人登记法》（“FARA”）进行登记。修正起诉书，ECF 第28–29页。\n\n程序经过\n\n原告于 January 18, 2023 提交起诉状，由此提起本案。4 Dkt. No. 2。于 March 23, 2023，被告依据《联邦民事诉讼规则》12(b)(1)和12(b)(6)提出动议，请求驳回起诉状，并提交了支持该动议的法律备忘录和声明。Dkt. No. 19–21。于 March 28, 2023，被告提交制裁动议，\n\n4 起诉状最初于 January 13, 2023 提交，但因提交错误被驳回。见 Dkt. No. 1。\n\n并同时提交支持该动议的法律备忘录和声明。Dkt. Nos. 26–28。被告于 March 29, 2023 撤回该动议，原因是其未遵守“《联邦民事诉讼规则》11(c)(2)的要求”，Dkt. No. 29；并于 April 20, 2023 重新提交了规则11制裁动议、法律备忘录和声明，同时提交一份声明，证明其已遵守规则11(c)(2)。Dkt. No. 36–39。于 April 21, 2023，原告提交法律备忘录，反对被告的驳回动议。Dkt. No. 40。\n\n于 April 26, 2023，原告提交其修正起诉书。Dkt. No. 43。于 May 8, 2023，被告再次提出动议，请求驳回针对其提出的四项主张：被告依据《联邦民事诉讼规则》12(b)(6)，以未能陈述可获救济的请求为由，请求驳回有关违反42 U.S.C. § 1983的罪名项 I和III，以及有关违反42 U.S.C. § 1985的罪名项 III；并依据《联邦民事诉讼规则》12(b)(1)，以缺乏事项管辖权为由，以及依据《联邦民事诉讼规则》12(b)(6)，请求驳回有关违反 FARA 的罪名项 VII。Dkt. Nos. 46–48。于 May 23, 2023，被告提交无异议通知，称“原告未于 May 22, 2023 当日或之前提交反对文件”，并请求法院因此驳回修正起诉书，但保留管辖权以审理规则11动议。Dkt. No. 53 at 1。\n\n法律标准\n\n法院在其“缺乏法定或宪法上的审判权力”时，适当地依据规则12(b)(1)驳回一项请求。Cortlandt St. Recovery Corp. v. Hellas Telecomms., S.A.R.L., 790 F.3d 411, 416–17 (2d Cir. 2015)。诉讼资格是对法院事项管辖权提出质疑的适当依据：“如果原告缺乏《宪法》第三条规定的诉讼资格，法院就没有事项管辖权审理其请求。”Mahon v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 683 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 2012)（引自 Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. Merck-Medco Managed Care, L.L.C., 433 F.3d 181, 198 (2d Cir. 2005)。为在依据规则12(b)(1)提出、以缺乏诉讼资格为由的驳回动议中存续，原告“必须主张积极且合理表明其具有起诉资格的事实”。Amidax Trading Grp. v. S.W.I.F.T. SCRL, 671 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 2011)。在被告质疑起诉状所述事实在法律上是否充分时，法院必须将所有事实主张视为真实，并作出有利于提出诉求一方的合理推断。Robinson v. Gov't of Malay., 269 F.3d 133, 140 (2d Cir. 2001)。\n\n“确定是否存在事项管辖权是一项门槛性审查。”Clarex Ltd. v. Natixis Sec. Am. LLC, 2012 WL 4849146, at \\*3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2012)。“当被告依据规则12(b)(1)以缺乏事项管辖权为由提出驳回动议，同时又基于其他理由提出驳回动议时，法院必须首先审议规则12(b)(1)动议。”Reliability Inc. v. Doki, 2021 WL 3408589, at \\*6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2021)（引自 Almazon v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 2020 WL 1151313, at \\*6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2020)）。\n\n为在依据《联邦民事诉讼规则》12(b)(6)提出的驳回动议中存续，起诉状必须载有“足够的、被视为真实的事实内容，以‘陈述一项表面上可信的可获救济请求’”。Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)（引自 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007)）。为避免被驳回，起诉状所载内容必须超过“标签和结论”、“对诉因要件的公式化复述”或缺乏“进一步事实充实”的“赤裸主张”。Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557。最终问题在于，“[一项]请求是否具有表面可信性，[即]原告是否提出了事实内容，使法院能够作出被告应对所主张不当行为承担责任的合理推断。”Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678。“判断起诉状是否陈述了可信的可获救济请求，将……是一项特定于具体情境的任务，要求审查法院运用其司法经验和常识。”同上 at 679。换言之，可信性要求“提出足够事实，以产生合理预期，即\n\n证据开示将揭示[支持该请求的]证据。”Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556；另见 Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 46 (2011)。\n\n原告未反对被告动议这一事实，本身并不证明应以未能陈述可获救济的请求为由予以驳回。见 McCall v. Pataki, 232 F.3d 321, 322–23 (2d Cir. 2000)（认定仅基于原告未对规则12(b)(6)动议作出回应而予以驳回“属错误”）；另见 Maggette v. Dalsheim, 709 F.2d 800, 802 (2d Cir. 1983)（“《联邦民事诉讼规则》或纽约南区（Southern District of New York）民事规则均未要求法院仅因未提出动议的一方未作回应，即以缺席方式准许一项动议。”）。“在裁决一项无人反对的驳回动议时，法院应‘假定诉状所载事实主张为真实，并仅检验其法律充分性……因此，尽管一方当事人当然应被给予合理机会回应对方当事人的动议，起诉状的充分性属于法律问题，法院能够根据其对诉状的自行解读及其法律知识作出判断。’”Haas v. Com. Bank, 497 F. Supp. 2d 563, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)（引自 McCall, 232 F.3d 321, 322 (2d Cir. 2000)）；另见 Strachn v. City of New York, 2020 WL 6291428, at \\*1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2020)；Blanc v. Cap. One Bank, 2015 WL 3919409, at \\*3 (S.D.N.Y June 24, 2015)；Vargas v. Person, 2014 WL 1054021, at \\*2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2014)；O'Garro v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2013 WL 5798537, at \\*2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2013)。\n\n讨论\n\n法院首先审议被告依据规则12(b)(6)提出的动议，即请求驳回原告根据42 U.S.C. § 1983提出的主张（罪名项 I和罪名项 III），以及请求驳回原告根据42 U.S.C. § 1985提出的主张（罪名项 II）。随后，法院审议被告请求驳回原告 FARA 主张（罪名项 VII）的动议。\n\nI. 依据《联邦民事诉讼规则》12(b)(6)请求驳回罪名项 I、II和III的动议\n\nA. 罪名项 I和III：42 U.S.C. § 1983\n\n原告根据42 U.S.C. § 1983 对被告提出主张，称被告侵犯其依据《第一修正案》《第四修正案》和《第十四修正案》享有的权利，并实施《第一修正案》报复。原告主张，“通过拉拢纽约市（City of New York）、纽约市警察局（New York Police Department）及纽约市警察局的某些成员……被告……Sarnoff 和 O'Melveny 已共谋侵犯，并且已经侵犯原告依据美利坚合众国宪法享有的权利。”修正起诉书 ¶ 76。原告主张，Stanton（斯坦顿）“表示其与 NYPD 有合作关系或某种联系”，同上 ¶ 94，并且“根据获悉的信息和相信，该项[警方阻挠其自由行使抗议宪法权利的]工作……是应被告 O'Melveny、Sarnoff 和 Stanton 的要求而进行的。”同上 ¶ 104。为支持其第1983条主张，原告主张，被告之间存在“一项明确协议，即针对作为反对 CCP 的中国抗议者之一的[ ]原告采取措施”。同上 ¶ 144(a)。\n\n在其驳回动议中，被告主张，原告仅作出结论性且缺乏支持的主张，称作为私人行为者的 O'Melveny 和 Sarnoff 系在法律色彩下行事，而这是第1983条所要求的。Dkt. No. 47 at 13。被告还主张，原告未能陈述一项第1983条共谋请求，因为原告仅作出结论性主张，称 O'Melveny 和 Sarnoff 与州行为者合作或共谋剥夺原告的宪法权利；因为原告未能充分主张存在意思联络；并且因为原告未能充分主张被告为推进任何被指称的共谋而实施了公开行为。同上 at 15–17。\n\n第1983条“本身并非实体权利的来源，而是实现《美国宪法》和联邦法规中其所述部分另行赋予的联邦权利的一种方法。”Kohutka v. Town of Hempstead, 994 F. Supp. 2d 305, 316–17 (E.D.N.Y. 2014)（引自 Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)）。“尽管[第1983条]主张不适用超出规则8(a)(2)所界定标准之外的‘提高’起诉标准，但该等主张仍必须满足 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly……和 Ashcroft v. Iqbal 所规定的可信性要求。”Guzman v. United States, 2013 WL 5018553, at \\*4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2013)（引自 Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993)）。“仅有结论性陈述支持的、对诉因要件的空泛复述……在[§ 1983]主张中，不会比在任何其他”主张中更为充分。同上。\n\n“为根据§ 1983主张权利，原告必须证明，所涉行为[(1)]‘系由在州法律授权下行事之人实施’，且[(2)]‘剥夺了[原告]受美国宪法或法律保障的权利、特权或豁免权。’”Kanciper v. Lato, 718 F. App'x 24, 27 (2d Cir. 2017)（引自Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2010)）。“就§ 1983而言，名义上属于私营实体的行为在下列情形下可归属于州：(1)该实体依州的‘强制性权力’行事，或者受州‘控制’（‘强制检验’）；(2)州向该实体提供‘重大鼓励’时，该实体是‘与该州共同活动的自愿参与者’，或者该实体的职能与州政策‘交织’（‘共同行动检验’或‘密切关联检验’）；或者(3)该实体‘被该州委托履行公共职能’（‘公共职能检验’）。”Sybalski v. Indep. Grp. Home Living Program, Inc., 546 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 2008)（原文改动）（引自Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Ath. Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 296 (2001)）。\n\n原告未能陈述事实，以支持任何可据此使O'Melveny（奥美）或Sarnoff（萨诺夫）就其所称遭受的任何损害而依Section 1983承担责任的理论。原告主张，“各被告之间存在不可分割的关联，因此，所有被告，无论公营还是私营，均为剥夺原告权利的自愿参与者，因此，为42 U.S.C. § 1983之目的，各被告之间存在共生关系。”Am. Compl. ¶ 142。原告进一步主张，“被告O'Melveny[有一种]通过在律所与政府职位之间维持旋转门，以利用内部关系促进客户目标的方式，‘将政府职位货币化’的做法。”Id. ¶ 55(d)。原告就被告O'Melveny和Sarnoff与NYPD（纽约市警察局）或纽约市政府之间的关系所作的唯一相关主张，是如下结论性主张：“被告O'Melveny和Sarnoff，不论使用何种资源，已征召NYPD的某些人员反对抗议者……[或者]已求助于市政府中与……纽约市市长办公室有联系的人士。”Id. ¶¶ 74–75。原告未作出任何事实主张表明被告参与了2022年12月20日的事件。\n\n第一，原告针对O'Melveny和Sarnoff的主张未通过强制检验。“第二巡回区法院认定，为满足该检验，原告必须主张州行为人施加了影响私营行为人决策的‘实际强制’。”O'Brien v. Carrier Coach, Inc., 2006 WL 692409, at \\*3 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2006)（汇集案例）（驳回一项Section 1983主张，尽管原告主张被告的业务“依赖于一定程度的政府援助”，并且“按照‘受州和/或联邦法规极大影响和/或塑造’的政策经营”（引文略））。\n\n原告称，被告“已征召NYPD的某些人员”，Am. Compl. ¶ 74，且其还称Stanton（斯坦顿）“表示其与NYPD共事或与其存在某种联系”，id. ¶ 94。然而，其未主张O'Melveny和Sarnoff与Stanton存在关系，更遑论被告就“造成引发本案之损害的特定活动”受到州强制。Sybalski, 546 F.3d at 257–58。原告有关Stanton与Sarnoff和O'Melveny关系的唯一主张是，Stanton此前曾进入O'Melveny所在的办公室，其观察过针对O'Melveny和Sarnoff的抗议活动，并且当抗议发生在纽约市一栋被认为是Sarnoff住所所在地的建筑物外时，其在场。Am. Compl. ¶¶ 91, 93–94。原告继而由这些主张推断，被告以某种方式参与了Stanton用其汽车触碰原告背部的行为。Id. ¶¶ 104, 142–44。而后，其又由Stanton——据原告称为虚假地——声称其与NYPD存在关系这一事实，推断Stanton撞到原告时正在行使州权力，并推断Stanton和被告各自亦应就警方妨碍原告获得医疗救治的行为依Section 1983承担责任。Id. ¶ 142。原告的主张未能证明因果链中的每一环。除推测外，并无陈述充分的主张表明被告与Stanton存在关系，或Stanton与NYPD存在关系。更重要的是，并无陈述充分的主张表明，被告对于Stanton以其汽车“触碰”原告的行为，或NYPD对该事件作出回应的行为，具有任何作用。换言之，原告的主张未通过强制检验，因为其未主张NYPD（甚至Stanton）要求或鼓励被告实施何种侵犯原告宪法权利的行为。参见Mejía v. Robinson, 2018 WL 3821625, at \\*5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2018)（认定即使州行为人与私营被告之间存在交流，州行为人的单纯“许可性措辞”亦不足以在强制检验下主张州行为）；另参见Caballero v. Shayna, 2019 WL 2491717, at \\*4 (E.D.N.Y. June 14, 2019)（驳回一项Section 1983强制主张，因不存在可据以推断被告“因……警员的要求或命令而”行事的具体事实）。\n\n就原告主张O'Melveny“在中国的办公室，除非被告O'Melveny和Sarnoff愿意为”外国实体服务，否则将不获准继续存在，Am. Compl. ¶ 54而言，原告并未主张造成其损害的不当行为系由这些外国实体指示。即使存在充分主张，“外国政府及其官员的行为亦‘不能构成’Section 1983项下在州法律授权下实施的行为。”Lewis v. Google LLC, 461 F. Supp. 3d 938, 956 (N.D. Cal. 2020)（引文略）。\n\n第二，原告并未主张被告受委托履行公共职能。原告主张中出现的唯一公共职能，是由警方履行的职能。原告确实主张，据其所知和相信，警方针对原告采取的行动系“应被告的要求”作出，Am. Compl. ¶ 104。但该主张仅为结论。《修正起诉状》完全没有任何事实表明NYPD的行为系在O'Melveny和Sarnoff的煽动或要求下采取。缺乏该等事实，原告不能依据委托理论维持其Section 1983主张。参见Adebiyi v. City of N.Y., 2014 WL 4922888, at \\*4 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 30, 2014)（“提供信息或寻求警方协助的私人当事人并不会成为州行为人……除非警员受该私人当事人不当影响或控制。”）。\n\n第三，原告关于被告与政府行为人实施共同行动的结论性主张，远不足以满足Rule 8(a)(2)的要求。“原告仅主张州参与了‘被指称对原告造成损害之机构的某些活动’尚不足够；相反，原告必须主张，州参与了‘造成引发本案之损害的活动。’”Sybalski, 546 F.3d at 257–58（原文强调）（引自Schlein v. Milford Hospital, Inc., 561 F.2d 427, 428 (2d Cir. 1977)）。“共同行动的试金石通常是私营行为人与警方共同享有的‘计划、事先安排、共谋、惯例或政策’。”Forbes v. City of New York, 2008 WL 3539936, at \\*5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2008)（引自Ginsberg v. Healey Car & Truck Leasing, Inc., 189 F.3d 268, 272 (2d Cir.1999)）。“根据‘共同行动’原则，……‘原告必须表明私营公民与州官员拥有共同的非法目标。’”Caballero, 2019 WL 2491717, at \\*3（引自Hollman v. Cty. of Suffolk, 2011 WL 280927, at \\*8 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2011)）。\n\n原告主张，警方“是阻挠原告自由行使宪法权利之努力的组成部分”，该努力“系应被告O'Melveny、Sarnoff和Stanton的要求而实施”。Am. Compl. ¶¶ 103–04。原告称Stanton“表示其与NYPD共事或与其存在某种联系。”Id. ¶ 94。原告还主张，“被告O'Melveny和Sarnoff，不论使用何种资源，已征召NYPD的某些人员反对抗议者……[或者]已求助于市政府中与……纽约市市长办公室有联系的人士。”Id. ¶¶ 74–75。然而，这些结论性主张不足以构成Section 1983项下的主张。原告未陈述任何事实，以证明O'Melveny和/或Sarnoff与NYPD之间——无论通过Stanton或其他方式——存在共同目标，或存在剥夺原告宪法权利的计划。参见Hannan v. Rose, 2020 WL 1903282, at \\*12 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2020)（“没有任何事实支持的关于‘共同努力’的结论性陈述，并不能证明州行为。”）。\n\n最后，原告主张，“通过拉拢纽约市、纽约警察局及纽约警察局的某些成员，以及中国共产党（CCP）的代理人——被告Stanton、Sarnoff和O'Melveny——已共谋侵犯并且已经侵犯原告根据美利坚合众国宪法享有的权利。”Am. Compl. ¶ 76。原告的主张可被理解为暗示被告与Stanton共谋剥夺其宪法权利，违反Section 1983。然而，被告辩称，《修正起诉状》未能主张合意或为推进共谋而实施的任何外显行为，因此该主张必须失败。Dkt. No. 47 at 15–18。本院同意。\n\n“[要]依据§ 1983共谋理论对私营实体提出主张，起诉状必须陈述事实，表明该私营实体与州行为人协同行动以实施违宪行为。”Spear v. W. Hartford, 954 F.2d 63, 68 (2d Cir. 1992)。尽管“§ 1983共谋主张不同于共同行动主张”，Betts v. Shearman, 751 F.3d 78, 84 n.1 (2d Cir. 2014)，“与州行为人‘共同’行动或‘共谋’行动的概念相互交织”，Stewart v. Victoria's Secret Stores, LLC, 851 F. Supp. 2d 442, 445 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)。“即使将其视为概念上独立的理论，两者均要求陈述足以显示存在结论性主张之外内容的事实。”Id.。“为证明§ 1983共谋，原告必须证明：(1)两名或以上州行为人之间，或州行为人与私营实体之间，存在协议；(2)协同行动以造成违宪损害；以及(3)为推进该目标而实施并造成损害的外显行为。”Pangburn v. Culbertson, 200 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 1999)。\n\n例如，在 De'Bey v. City of N.Y.（De'Bey 诉纽约市）一案中，原告主张，被告“通过威胁让警方介入而‘共谋实施违宪闯入’，[原告]被‘指控为限制被告个人及市政责任的共谋的一部分……，并且[被]告共谋‘就其向[市]提出损害赔偿申诉通知而对其进行报复。’”2021 WL 8013765, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2021)（引文略）。该案中，法院认定，原告“未能主张任何客观事实依据，使本院能够适当推断参与所称违宪行为的个人之间存在意思联络，因此，[原告]根据§ 1983提出的共谋主张‘必须予以驳回。’”同上（引文略）。\n\n同样地，本案中，原告主张存在“[被告之间就针对原告采取行动达成的明确协议”，修正起诉状第144(a)段，并主张“被告以州法律名义——单独、共同行动并通过共谋——剥夺原告的[宪法权利]”，同上第163段。然而，起诉状中并未主张任何可据以使本院推断被告之间存在协议的事实；相反，是原告报了警。同上第99–101段。没有任何事实主张表明，被告在抗议活动之前或期间曾与警方实施或同意实施任何行为。因此，“这些主张过于结论性，无法确立共谋。”Ahmad v. White Plains City Sch. Dist.（Ahmad 诉怀特普莱恩斯市学区）, 2019 WL 3202747, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2019)；另见 Guttilla v. City of N.Y.（Guttilla 诉纽约市）, 2015 WL 437405, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2015)（同理）。\n\n确实，若认定原告关于共谋的主张构成可获救济的请求，即是无视 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly（贝尔大西洋公司诉特沃姆布利）, 550 U.S. 544 一案所传达的核心教训。原告“所指称的行为，如无更多事实，并不表明存在共谋；在某个未确定时点达成协议的结论性主张，并未提供足以表明违法性的事实。”同上，第557页。因此，原告针对被告提出的 Section 1983 请求必须予以驳回。\n\nB. 第二项罪名：42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)\n\n原告主张，全体被告共谋，根据 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) 剥夺原告的宪法权利。原告称，“[被]告已参与一项共谋，以剥夺[]原告，乃至其任何中国异议人士抗议同伴的宪法权利。”修正起诉状第149段。为证实其主张，他声称，被告 O'Melveny（欧麦伦威）和 Sarnoff（萨诺夫）“达成[协]议……[压制]美国境内的中国异议人士抗议活动。”同上第151(a)段。原告还主张，“被告 O'Melveny、Sarnoff 和 Stanton（斯坦顿）与其他被告串通”以实施该等行为。同上第153段。被告辩称，原告未能提出一项 Section 1985(3) 请求，因为“共谋主张完全是结论性的”，且修正起诉状未能主张表明处境相似的个人受到不同对待的事实，因而未能主张对原告的歧视。Dkt. No. 47 at 19。本院基本基于上述理由同意该主张。\n\n“虽然原告无需主张被告以州法律名义行事，即可根据 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) 提出请求，”LeVine v. N.Y. State Police（LeVine 诉纽约州警察局）, 2022 WL 4465588, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Sep. 26, 2022)，但原告必须充分主张：“(1) 存在共谋；(2) 目的在于直接或间接剥夺任何人或任何类别人员的平等法律保护，或法律规定的平等特权及豁免；(3) 为推进该共谋而实施的行为；(4) 致使某人遭受人身或财产损害，或被剥夺作为美国公民的任何权利。此外，该共谋还必须出于‘某种种族或……[其他]歧视性恶意。’”Mian v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp.（Mian 诉Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette证券公司）, 7 F.3d 1085, 1087–88 (2d Cir. 1993)（合议庭意见）（引文略）；另见 Thomas v. DeCastro（Thomas 诉DeCastro）, 2019 WL 1428365, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2019)（“根据[Section 1985]，[原]告必须证明共谋各方具有‘基于类别的恶意歧视性动机’，并提供‘某些支持存在意思联络的事实依据，即[被告]达成明示或默示协议以实现该非法目的。’”（引文略））。\n\n原告的主张不能成立。原告未主张任何事实以支持共谋请求。原告仅以结论性方式主张了共谋最基本的要素：协议。见修正起诉状第149段。原告声称，“被告 O'Melveny 和 Sarnoff 不惜动用任何资源，已征用纽约市警察局（NYPD）的人员来反对抗议者”，并且“已向市内与……纽约市市长办公室有联系的人士寻求协助。”同上第74–75段。但这些主张只是结论——并未主张任何事实支持被告与政府行为人之间形成协议，包括该共谋“如何或何时”形成。见 Walsh v. City of N.Y.（Walsh 诉纽约市）, 2021 WL 1226585, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2021)（因“起诉状未描述被告警官如何或何时达成该协议”而驳回根据 section 1985 提出的共谋请求）；另见 Ragland v. Coulter（Ragland 诉Coulter）, 2021 WL 4430271, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. June 25, 2021)（认定“以结论性方式主张[被告]与未描述事件有关的未指明行为可合理归因于州”并不充分）。原告也未就“据称参与[该]共谋的每一被告的角色”主张具体事实。Laverpool v. New York City Transit Auth.（Laverpool 诉纽约市运输局）, 760 F. Supp. 1046, 1056 (E.D.N.Y. 1991)。因此，原告的“共谋主张含糊且不可信。”Williams v. Rosenblatt Sec. Inc.（Williams 诉Rosenblatt证券公司）, 136 F. Supp. 3d 593, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)；另见 Morales v. City of New York（Morales 诉纽约市）, 752 F.3d 234, 237 (2d Cir. 2014)（“即便是具体的共谋主张，如属结论性的，也……不足以提出关于共谋侵犯[原告]权利的请求。”）。\n\n因此，原告未能充分主张依据 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) 针对被告提出的请求。5\n\nII. 根据 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) 驳回第七项罪名的动议\n\n原告主张，“看起来被告 O'Melveny 受制于中国共产党（CCP），并因此实施中国共产党要求其实施的任何行为。”修正起诉状第60段。因此，原告请求本院根据 FARA 作出“一项宣告性判决，强制[O'Melveny 和 Sarnoff]登记为外国代理人。”同上，ECF第27页。原告辩称，本院并“不负有因 FARA 法规中不存在明确的‘私人诉权’规定而不予考虑原告请求的义务。”同上第192段。被告辩称，应驳回 FARA 请求，因为原告无资格提起该请求，FARA 未提供私人诉权，且原告的主张存在缺陷。Dkt. No. 47 at 20–24。由于本院认定原告无资格提出 FARA 请求，故不处理被告根据 Rule 12(b)(6) 正确提出的论点。\n\n“原告要具有 Article III 诉讼资格，必须证明三点：(1) 其遭受了实际损害；(2) 其损害与被诉行为之间存在因果联系；以及(3) 有利的司法裁决将救济其损害。”Harty v. W. Point Realty, Inc.（Harty 诉W. Point房地产公司）, 28 F.4th 435, 442 (2d Cir. 2022)。“实际损害是指‘对受法律保护利益的侵害，该侵害是具体、个别化且实际发生或即将发生的，而非推测性或假设性的。’”In re USAA Data Sec. Litig.（USAA 数据安全诉讼）, 621 F. Supp. 3d 454, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2022)（引自 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins（Spokeo公司诉Robins）, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016)）。“就法定损害而言，仅主张被告违反法规并不足够；‘只有因被告违反法规而受到具体损害的原告’才具有诉讼资格。”同上（引自 TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez（TransUnion有限责任公司诉Ramirez）, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2200 (2021)）。\n\n5 由于原告未充分主张存在共谋，本院不处理 Section 1985(3) 请求的其他要素。\n\n本案中，原告未主张与其所称被告违反该法规有关的任何损害；相反，他主张“[FARA] 创造透明度。”修正起诉状第190段。的确，FARA 获得通过，是因为“政府官员及公众总体上应能够识别代表外国委托人行事的人员。”United States v. McGoff（美国诉McGoff）, 831 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1987)。然而，原告未能充分主张信息诉讼资格，因为信息诉讼资格要求原告“被剥夺了依其解释，法规要求政府或第三方向其披露的信息，并且……[其]因被拒绝获得该信息而遭受国会通过要求披露所意图防止的那类损害。”NRDC v. DOI（自然资源保护委员会诉内政部）, 410 F. Supp. 3d 582, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)（引自 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. V. Presidential Advisory Comm'n on Election Integrity（电子隐私信息中心诉总统选举诚信咨询委员会）, 878 F.3d 371, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2017)）。原告未在其修正起诉状中载明任何主张，表明如果 O'Melveny 和 Sarnoff 被要求根据 FARA 登记而未登记，他因此遭受了损害。此外，若原告主张其以不受欢迎的身体接触和情感创伤的形式遭受损害，修正起诉状第112段，他未主张该等损害如何可追溯至被告未根据 FARA 登记，或强制登记的宣告性判决将如何救济其所称损害。\n\n因此，修正起诉状未充分主张提起 FARA 请求的诉讼资格，必须根据 Rule 12(b)(1) 予以驳回。由于本院认定原告无资格提出 FARA 请求，故不处理原告是否已在修正起诉状中充分主张 FARA 请求。见 Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp.（Cornwell 诉瑞士信贷集团）, 666 F. Supp. 2d 381, 385–86 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)（“[在]无权作出裁判的情况下，本院缺乏授予任何救济或甚至进一步审理本案的法律依据。”）；另见 United States ex rel. Kreindler & Kreindler v. United Technologies Corp.（美国依Kreindler & Kreindler之关系诉联合技术公司）, 985 F.2d 1148, 1155–56 (2d Cir. 1993)（“如本案，被告根据 Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 12(b)(1) 以及其他理由提出驳回动议时，‘法院应首先审理 Rule 12(b)(1) 的质疑，因为如其必须因缺乏事项管辖权而驳回起诉状，随附的抗辩和异议即告无实际意义，无须作出裁决。’”（引自 5 C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1350 (1969)））。\n\n结论\n\n准许被告 O'Melveny 和 Sarnoff 提出的、有偏见地驳回第一、二、三及七项罪名的动议。6 本院将保留管辖权，以在该动议适当地提交本院审理的范围内处理被告根据 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 提出的动议。7\n\n谨此指示书记官关闭 Dkt. No. 46。\n\n特此命令。\n\n纽约州纽约市 LEWIS J. LIMAN（刘易斯·J.·利曼）\n\n日期：July 17, 2023 ＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿\n\n美国联邦地区法院法官\n\n6 原告未请求准许再次修订诉状，也未“指出[任何]额外事实或法律理论，而[其]如获准再次修订诉状，可能会提出该等事实或法律理论。基于此原因，并且由于本院认定任何修订均属徒劳无益”，针对被告 O'Melveny（奥美律师事务所）和 Sarnoff（萨诺夫）的修订后诉状中第 I、II、III 和 VII 罪名项被有偏见地驳回。Wade Park Land Holdings, LLC v. Kalikow, 589 F. Supp. 3d 335, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2022), amended, 2022 WL 2479110 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2022).\n\n7 被告还建议本院依职权考虑施加制裁。Dkt. No. 56 at 3。本院对该请求暂缓作出决定。","key_entities":["Je","CCP","CIPA","Guo","Kwok","Miles Guo","Ho Wan Kwok","Chinese Communist Party"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":1,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":2,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":18,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":19,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":29,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":36,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":40,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":43,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":46,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":47,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":53,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":56,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":57,"court":"CTB"}],"word_count":7610,"status":"published","published_at":"2023-08-25 00:00:00","created_at":"2023-08-25","updated_at":"2026-08-23 20:16:04"}